EDMUND HUSSERL

FIRST PHILOSOPHY

LECTURES 1923/24

AND RELATED TEXTS FROM

THE MANUSCRIPTS (1920-1925)

TRANSLATED BY

SEBASTIAN LUFT AND THANE M. NABERHAUS

Springer

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EDMUND HUSSERL

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TRANSLATED BY

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Springer

Edmund Husserl (deceased)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction to the Translation xiii

Edmund Husserl

First Philosophy

Lectures 1923/24

and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920–1925)

Part One. Critical History of Ideas 3
Section One. From Plato's Idea of Philosophy to the Beginnings of its Modern Realization in Descartes 3
Chapter One. The Idea of Philosophy and its Historical Origin . . 3
Lecture 1. On the Historical Task of Giving Phenomenology the Developmental Form of First Philosophy 3
Lecture 2. Plato's Dialectic and the Idea of a Philosophical Science 11
Chapter Two. The Grounding of Logic and the Limits of Formal-Apophantic Analytics 18
Lecture 3. The Aristotelian-Stoic-Traditional Logic as a Logic of Consistency or Concordance 18
Lecture 4. Excursus: On the Universal Logic of Consequence as Analytic Mathematics, the Correlative Treatment of Formal Ontology, and the Problem of a Logic of Truth 26
Chapter Three. First Reflections On Cognizing Subjectivity, Motivated by Sophistic Skepticism 33
Lecture 5. The Discovery of the Cognition of Ideas and the Greek Origins of the Philosophical, Rational Sciences 33
Lecture 6. The Demand for a Theory of Knowledge Implied in the Platonic Idea of Dialectics 39
Lecture 7. Systematic Sketch of the Full Idea of Logic—of a Logic of Truth—As a Science of Cognizing and in General Accomplishing Subjectivity 46
Chapter Four. The Historical Beginnings of the Science of Subjectivity 54
Lecture 8. Aristotle's Grounding of Psychology and the Basic Problem of a Psychology As Such 54

Lecture 9. Skepticism. The Fundamental Significance of Its "Ineradicability" in the History of Philosophy. Descartes's Decisive Step 60
Lecture 10. The Cartesian Meditations 65
Lecture 11. First Real Overview of Transcendental Science. Transition from the Cartesian Meditations to Locke 73
Section Two. The Elements of Locke's Attempt at an Egology and its Enduring Problematic 80
Chapter One. The Fundamental Limitation of Locke's Sphere of Vision and its Reasons 80
Lecture 12. The Naive Dogmatism of Objectivism 80
Lecture 13. The Prejudices of Empiricism. Psychologism in Epistemology 90
Lecture 14. The Paradigmatic Character of Modern Natural Science as a Restraining Force on the Development of a Genuine Intuitionistic Science of Consciousness 96
Chapter Two. Critical Disclosure of the Genuine and Enduring Problematic Concealed in Locke's Investigations 105
Lecture 15. The Problem of Immanence and of Synthetic Unity in Consciousness 105
Lecture 16. The Irreality of the Immanent Contents of the Synthesis of Consciousness in its Ego-Object Polarization and the Problem of Intersubjectivity. Remarks on Berkeley's Critique of Locke 113
Lecture 17. On the Question of the Constitution of "Exteriority": the Cartesian Self-Evidence of the Self-Givenness of Things in Perception 119
Chapter Three. Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness 130
Lecture 18. Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness 130
Lecture 19. The Need to Broaden the Idea of Intuition 135
Section Three. The Development of Skeptical Forerunners of Phenomenology in Berkeley and Hume, and Dogmatic Rationalism 145
Chapter One. From Locke to the Radical Consequence of Berkeley's Purely Immanent Philosophy 145
Lecture 20. The Positive Historical Significance of the Renewal of Skepticism through Locke and His Successors . . 145
Lecture 21. Berkeley's Discovery, and his Naturalistic

Misinterpretation of the Problem of the Constitution of the Real World 152
Lecture 22. Berkeley's Monadological Approach; Comparison with Leibniz. Transition to Hume 156
Chapter Two: Hume's Positivism. the Consummation of Skepticism and, Simultaneously, the Decisive Preparatory Step toward a Transcendental Foundational Science 162
Lecture 23. Hume's Nominalistic Reduction of All Ideas to Impressions and the Countersense Inherent in This Principle 162
Lecture 24. The Necessary Eidetics of the Science of Consciousness and Hume's Inductive-Empirical Objectivism 172
Lecture 25. The Problem of Constitution in Hume—and its Termination in Unmitigated Skepticism 178
Chapter Three. The Rationalism and Metaphysics of the Modern Period 188
Lecture 26. The Main Features of the Positively Constructive Trajectory of Modern Rationalism and its Dogmatism 188
a) Overview of the preparation for a future genuine metaphysics, hampered by the lack of a transcendental foundational science 188
b) Critical Remarks on the Regressive Procedure Employed in the Rationalist Systems Since Occasionalism. The Task of Progressive Research 194
Lecture 27. On Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Meaning of Leibniz's Monadology and Kant's Critique of Reason . . . 197
Part Two. Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction 207
Section One. Preliminary Meditations on the Apodictic Beginning of Philosophy 207
Chapter One. Preliminary Meditations on the Apodictic Beginning of Philosophy 207
Lecture 28. The Idea of Philosophy in History, and the Motivational Setting of the Subject who is Beginning to Philosophize 207
Lecture 29. On the Institution of the Emerging Philosopher's Habitual Form of Life 214
Lecture 30. The Pure Cultural Attitude as Such and the Original Institution of a Philosophical Radicalism 221
Chapter Two. The Idea of Apodictic Evidence and the Problematic of the Beginning 231
Lecture 31. Natural and Transcendental, Apodictic and Adequate Evidence 231

Lecture 32. The Possible Starting Points: "I am"—and "I as Beginning Philosopher"; "I am"—"This Worlds Is" 240
Section Two. First Path to the Transcendental Reduction 248
Chapter One. World-Perception and World-Belief 248
Lecture 33. The Ineliminable Contingency of the Statement "The World Exists" 248
Lecture 34. Transcendental and Empirical Semblance. On the "Objection of Insanity" 255
Chapter Two. Supplementations and Clarifications in Connection with the "Objection of Insanity" 263
Lecture 35. On the Doctrine of "Empathy" 263
Lecture 36. Transcendental Solipsism. The Negative Result of the Critique of Mundane Experience 268
Chapter Three. Opening Up the Field of Transcendental Experience. Transcendental, Phenomenological and Apodictic Reduction 274
Lecture 37. The Apodictic Certainty of the Possible Non-Existence of the World and the Transcendental Life of Subjectivity in Contrast to It 274
Lecture 38. The Field of Transcendental Experience as Topic of a Transcendental Critique 279
Section Three. On the Phenomenology of the Phenomenological Reduction. Opening Up a Second Path to the Transcendental Reduction 286
Chapter One. The Transcendental Temporal Form of Subjectivity's Transcendental Stream of Life 286
Lecture 39. The Full Content of Universal Transcendental Self-Experience: Transcendental Present, Past, and Future . . 286
Lecture 40. Reflection as Splitting of the I and the Identity of the I in the Streaming Living Present 290
Chapter Two: On the Theory of the Theoretical Attitude of the Phenomenologist. What the *Epoché* Means and Accomplishes 296
Lecture 41. Reflection and Theoretical Interest, Splitting of the I of Position-Takings 296
Lecture 42. The Most General Notion of Interest, of "Attitude," of "Theme" 301
Lecture 43. The Possibility of a Pure Interest in the Subjective Being in the Phenomenological *Epoché* and Reflection 309
Chapter Three. The Conscious Activity of Natural Egoic Life and the Reduction to Pure Subjectivity 316
Lecture 44. Positional and Quasi-Positional Acts and Their

Reduction; *Epoché* and Quasi-*Epoché* 316
Lecture 45. The Natural Mundane Life of the I as Act-Subject and the Unnatural Life of Phenomenologically Pure Self-Reflection. On the Train of Thought 323
Lecture 46. The New Shaping and Deepening of the Phenomenological Method: The Cartesian Path and the Path of the Psychologist to the Transcendental Reduction 329
Section Four. Phenomenological Psychology, Transcendental Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 334
Chapter One. The Accomplishment and Problematic of a Phenomenological-Psychological Reduction 334
Lecture 47. Intentional Implications and Iterations 334
Lecture 48. The Problem of the Transition From the Psychological Reduction With Respect to Certain Acts to the Universal Phenomenological *Epoché* and Reduction 340
Chapter Two. The Opening of the Realm of Transcendental Experience Following the Second Path 347
Lecture 49. The Horizons of the Living-Streaming Present . . . 347
Lecture 50. The Endless Temporal Stream of Life and Possibility of a Universal Reflection and *Epoché* 353
Lecture 51. Transition to the Universal *Epoché* and Reduction. The Pure Universal Life and Its World of Experience 358
Chapter Three. The Philosophical Significance of the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction 365
Lecture 52. Philosophy as Systematic Self-Unfolding of Transcendental Subjectivity in the Form of a Systematic Transcendental Self-Theorizing on the Basis of Transcendental Self-Experience 365
Lecture 53. The Problem of Intersubjectivity 370
a) The Possibility of Transcendental Naiveté on the Part of a Pure Phenomenology and the Philosophical Task of an Apodictic Critique of Transcendental Experience 370
b) Transcendental Egology ("Solipsistic Phenomenology") and the Transition to the Intersubjective Reduction 374
Lecture 54. The Path of the Phenomenological Reduction to Transcendental Idealism and the Latter's Phenomenological Meaning as Transcendental Monadology 381

Supplemental Texts from the Manuscripts (1920–1925) 391
1. Kant's Copernican Turn and the Meaning of Such a Copernican Turn in General (1924) 391
2. Descartes and Skepticism (1920) 413
3. A Difficult Point in the Critique of Descartes (1923) 419
4. ⟨A Critique of the Regressive Method of⟩ Kant ⟨and Neo-Kantianism⟩. Ad Lecture 26 (ca. 1924) 431
5. Meditation On the Idea of an Individual Life and Communal Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility (1924) 442
6. Reflection as Activity. On the Phenomenology of Reflection Upon the Goal of a Universal Science (1924) 451
7. Path Into Transcendental Phenomenology As Absolute and Universal Ontology Via the Positive Sciences and Positive First Philosophy (1923) 459
8. Attempt At a Distinction of the Stages on the Way to a Science of Transcendental Subjectivity (December 1925) 468
9. The Cartesian Path and the Path of Universal Phenomenological Psychology Into Transcendental Phenomenology (1923) 480
10. Husserl's Critical Notes on the Train of Thought [of Part II of the Lecture] (1924/25) 506
11. The Principle of Sufficient Reason For Every Scientific Judgment (1924 and 1925) 519
12. The Initial Questions (1924) 528
13. What Is Given As Apodictically-Absolute as Presupposition of All Striving for Cognition (1923) 532
14. On the Possibility of the Non-Existence of the World (1924) . 539
15. To What Extent Can One Even Posit the Demand for Apodicticity for a Cognition of Entities? (1925) 542
16. Nature and Nature-Experiencing Ego (1924) 555
17. All Being Presupposes Subjectivity (1924) 557
18. Double "Latency" of the Ego (1924) 559
19. What Kind of Ego Is It That I Cannot Cancel Out? (1923 or 1924) 562
20. Critique of the Two Steps In Which I Had Gained the Idea of the Reduction In 1907 and 1910 (1924) 566
21. Critique of the Wrong Presentation of the Difference Between Psychological and Transcendental Reduction in the Lecture of the Winter Term 1923/24 (1925) 575
22. The Immanent Adequation and Apodicticity and Immanent Time As Apodictic Form of Objective Subjectivity

(Constituting Itself for the Living Ego) or Subjective Objectivity of Itself Constituting Itself in the Streaming-Presentifying I-Am. 583
23. Difficulties of a Deepest Grounding of Philosophy As Universal Science on the Way of the Phenomenological Reduction (ca. 1923) 591
24. The Alleged Difficulty That One, Remaining in the *Epoché*, "Never Returns to the World" (ca. 1924) 599
25. Ground-Laying of Transcendental Idealism. The Radical Overcoming of Solipsism (1923) 604
26. Phenomenological Reduction and Absolute Justification 622

German–English Glossary 635

Index of Names 639

INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION

by Sebastian Luft

The present volume features a translation of Edmund Husserl's lecture course from the Winter Semester of 1923/24 at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau with a selection of the author's research manuscripts from the same time period.[1] This text is one of the lecture courses of Husserl that stands out among his lectureship, both by his own judgment (and by some of his students who attended it[2]), as well as in light of the reception of Husserl's work after its publication in the two-volume edition prepared by Rudolf Boehm and published in 1956 (*Husserliana* VII) and 1958 (*Husserliana* VIII). It is not too far fetched to consider this one of Husserl's more important texts, perhaps even on par with the *Logical Investigations, Ideas, Book I*, and the *Crisis*. To underscore its importance, it was a text Husserl explicitly composed to serve as the basis for his repeatedly planned but never completed "Systematic Work" that would introduce and summarize his mature thought. Although the text was ultimately never published by Husserl, he himself repeatedly acknowledged its relevance by giving it to several of his students[3] and by assigning his assistant at the time, Ludwig Landgrebe, to prepare a typescript of the manuscript. Husserl continued to annotate further changes and improvements once the text was available in typescript. This practice of transcribing manuscripts, to which his assistants Edith Stein, Landgrebe, and Eugen

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[1] On the criteria for selecting these research texts, cf. below, pp. lxxix f.

[2] According to Schuhmann's chronicle, the following persons were in attendance at the time: Helmuth Bohner, Reinhold Saleski, Fritz Taeger, Ludwig Landgrebe, Marvin Farber, Günther Stern, and Ernst Zermelo (cf. Schuhmann 1977, p. 273). There is also some evidence that Rudolf Carnap attended this lecture course (cf. Mayer 2016).

[3] Boehm writes that among the people who were privy to this text, besides the students in attendance, belong "friends and students" at the time (Boehm 1954, p. xv), though he does not mention any names. From his own admission, Husserl's Baltic student Theodor Celms had access to this text when he composed his 1928 *Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls*, cf. Celms 1928/1993.

Fink were assigned, was ordered by Husserl only for texts deemed of great importance and ultimately for publication, although, as in the case of the present text, most of these typescripts—with the exception of *Cartesian Meditations*, which was only published in French translation—never saw the light of day during Husserl's lifetime.[4]

As the simplicity of the title "First Philosophy" indicates, Husserl understood first philosophy to denote nothing other than his phenomenology. He understood the latter to be first philosophy, which is called upon to serve as a first philosophy in the sense of Aristotle and Descartes (who are invoked at the very beginning), that is, in its function of grounding all other sciences and ultimately also establishing philosophy as metaphysics, addressing (and ultimately answering) the "highest and ultimate questions." Although Husserl's ambitions as of the *Logical Investigations*, where he sketches the Leibnizian idea of a *mathesis universalis* or a pure logic, were immense, they were arguably never as great as during the present period (the early 1920s), and here, in the present lecture course.[5] Whatever one makes of such grand systematic attempts, especially in light of Husserl's own commitment to the "small change" of microscopic analysis versus the "big bills" of system-building, one has to acknowledge that Husserl himself attempted to compose such a system or at least a systematic introduction and an overview over his philosophy and considered this task as being of utmost importance. The topics treated in this text were the opening moves of this systematic presentation as well as crucial elements of the systematic scope of his phenomenology.

For many reasons, however, Husserl was dissatisfied with the result. This is especially due to his own insuppressible tendency to digress, to delve deeper into the problems and revise his earlier presentation, leading him time and again to veer off topic, and ultimately to be his

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[4] Among these typescripts belong the lectures on the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness, *Ideas II* and *III*, the *Logische Studien* (after Husserl's death published by Landgrebe as *Experience and Judgment*), and the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, a text of Fink's but commissioned and heavily annotated by Husserl.

[5] The term "lecture course" is here used as a translation of the German *Vorlesung*, so as to not confuse this text with a single lecture (or talk), but ensure that we are dealing here, rather, with a one-semester lecture series (the German winter semesters, then and now, run from around mid-October until mid-February, with a rather short Christmas break).

own strongest critic. In many respects (to be discussed below), this text presents a "shipwreck" (Landgrebe),[6] but is, perhaps for this reason more than any other, one of the most interesting texts Husserl produced.[7] That Husserl ultimately withheld the text from publication due to the obvious problems in composition and trajectory is, thus, justified in hindsight *from his own standpoint*; that one of the first editors would overrule the master's verdict is telling, however. Indeed, Boehm himself judges the text (especially with respect to part II of the lecture course) and its composition to be "thoroughly problematic" (Boehm 1958, p. xi[8]). Such a verdict does not mean, however, that it may not be treated as what it is: one of the more problematic and certainly controversial texts Husserl has written. Even those who may not be especially fond of this systematic aspect of Husserl's work cannot afford to disregard this text (and its important appendices).

That the text has not been translated into English has been, up to now, a great lacuna in scholarship, especially given that the text, or parts of it, have been translated into French, Italian, and Spanish (and translations into other major languages are currently underway[9]). This translation intends to finally fill this gap. Given the importance of this text in Husserl's oeuvre, it is bound to lead to a reassessment of one of Husserl's most controversial claims, that his phenomenology, in the mature form of a transcendental idealism, should come forth as a first philosophy. Especially in light of the newer interest in a phenomenological metaphysics[10] and the recent publication of Husserl's

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[6] The reasons Landgrebe lists for this verdict (inspired by Heidegger) are thereby not endorsed; I will discuss critically Landgrebe's famous thesis ("departure from Cartesianism") in section IV, below.

[7] It should be mentioned that many of Husserl's philosophically important readers (beginning perhaps with one of his strongest critics, Heidegger) were never overly impressed by his systematic ambitions and were more smitten with his small-scale analyses and descriptions.

[8] In the same context Boehm asserts that, based on an oral communication from Roman Ingarden, Husserl showed this second part to nobody (Boehm 1958, p. xi, n. 1). Based on Celms' assertion (cf. above, n. 3), this is manifestly incorrect.

[9] The text has been translated (in part or in full) into French (Arion Kelkel), Italian (there are two translations, by Vincenzo Costa and Paolo Bucci, of part II only), and Spanish (Rosa Helena Santos de Ilhau). Translation projects into Japanese (Tetsuya Sakakibara) and Korean (Ki-Bok Kim) are underway.

[10] Cf. Tengelyi 2013.

own manuscripts dedicated to this topic,[11] this translation will surely contribute sufficient fodder for a renewed interest in these and other themes of the late Husserl.

This translator's introduction will first (I.) introduce the theme of the volume by situating it within the history of Husserl's oeuvre. It will provide some general (historical, biographical) background, discuss Husserl's plans for publishing the volume, and attempt to locate the volume's central position in Husserl's oeuvre. It will also give a brief presentation of the very idea of a first philosophy and of the different meanings "first philosophy" has in Husserl.

In the next section (II.), an overview over the lecture course and its core themes will be given. The lecture course is separated into two different sections, as indicated by the timing of the winter semester, one beginning in October 1923 before the Christmas break and the second after New Year's and until February 1924.

A special section (III.) of this introduction will be devoted to the supplemental texts, which are taken (for the most part, insofar as they are dateable) from the period of the lecture course. This section will also provide a justification of their selection, especially since they cover a range of topics not treated in the lecture course.

Section IV will discuss the volume's reception, especially in the decade after its publication. This reception came from the most prominent thinkers in Germany at the time (Hans Wagner, Dieter Henrich, Ludwig Landgrebe, and others) and foreshadowed its reception in later scholarship. Although some of the things claimed about this text are quite problematic in hindsight, they have become almost an integral part of the way Husserl's philosophy is viewed to this day. For this reason, they deserve to be discussed and, as appropriate, scrutinized critically.

The last section (V.) will first present a few editorial matters; also, a justification will be given for the selection of the supplemental texts.

This introduction ends with acknowledgments (VI.).

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[11] These topics are treated in many of the research manuscripts, including some of this volume, but the texts Husserl dedicated to this topic in the order of his literary estate have only recently been published (in *Husserliana* XLI, 2014).

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL'S LECTURE COURSE ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY

1. *The Historical Context*

Husserl delivered the lecture course entitled "First Philosophy" (without subtitle) in the Winter Semester of 1923/24 at the University of Freiburg. Zooming out briefly: having been at the University of Göttingen from 1901 (as of 1906 full professor), Husserl assumed the professorship (*Lehrstuhl*) in Freiburg in 1916, which had become vacant since his predecessor, the famous Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert, had moved to the University of Heidelberg. This move to one of the top universities in Germany (dominated by the Neo-Kantians), and succeeding Rickert, who was a big name of this movement, was a substantial upward career move for the phenomenologist Husserl. Recovering (as all of his contemporaries) from the Great War, and mourning the loss of his youngest son in the war, Husserl's work took on a new upward trajectory as of the 1920s, becoming famous and attracting students from all over the world. Husserl was, in the 1920s and until his retirement in 1928, at the height of his career.

The well-attended lecture was delivered "*vierstündig*," that is, four times a week in 45-minute lectures[12] during the five monthlong semester.[13] As was Husserl's normal practice, the manuscript for this lecture was typically penned immediately before each class period, and in

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[12] According to the registrar's archive (*Quästurakten*) of the University of Freiburg, the lecture was delivered Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday from 5–6pm, the full hour traditionally meaning "c.t." = *cum tempore*, thus beginning at 5:15, ending on the full hour. The lecture course was announced "*publ*[*ice*]," that is, open for anyone and thus not only for students ("*privatim*"). The only other public lecture course in that semester was that of the Neo-Kantian Richard Kroner, "History of Newer Philosophy," which makes it likely that Husserl's lecture had a very good turnout (compared to Husserl, Kroner was fairly unknown). In that semester, Husserl also taught a seminar on "Phenomenological Exercises for Advanced Students," Wednesdays from 11–1. Other courses in phenomenology in that term were taught by Oskar Becker. Other notable figures teaching that semester in Freiburg were the Neo-Kantian Jonas Cohn and the Kant scholar Julius Ebbinghaus.

[13] Husserl delivered 54 lectures, which would make it a typical 13–14 week semester, excluding the Christmas and other holidays.

his lecture courses throughout his career, Husserl faithfully read off the manuscript, according to his own pronouncements, almost never veering off the text to speak extemporaneously. One can assume the same practice in this lecture course. In the case of this lecture, Husserl gave the manuscript afterwards to his assistant Ludwig Landgrebe on a weekly basis. The latter typed the lecture, giving each a title (perhaps in consultation with Husserl) and also attempting to give the text of the lecture course as a whole a structure consisting of two main parts with several sub-sections.[14] Husserl, in turn, read and annotated Landgrebe's typescript and wrote a plethora of marginalia and additional research manuscripts, often much more extensive than the lectures themselves. A selection of these are reproduced in footnotes (in the case of marginalia) and, if longer, in the texts printed in the appendix.[15]

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[14] Landgrebe writes in a later text, reflecting back on his time with Husserl: "My first task [as assistant] was the transcription [*Nachschrift*] and the editing [*Ausarbeitung*] of his lecture course on 'First Philosophy' in the winter semester of 1923/24. After every lecture, Husserl handed me his stenographic manuscript pages, which he for the most part had penned immediately before." (quoted in Schuhmann 1977, p. 273). Boehm claims (Boehm 1954, pp. xiii f.) that Landgrebe gave each lecture a title, ordered the text as a whole into subsections, and later wrote a synopsis (*Inhaltsübersicht*). However, it also appears that Husserl himself at least conceived the titles of the two main parts (critical history of ideas; theory of the phenomenological reduction), as his manuscripts referring to these parts indicate (see below, the supplemental texts). It is not unimportant to point out that there is a slight discrepancy between the facts that Husserl's assistants often ordered the lecture courses systematically (a practice that is followed in the lecture course editions of the *Husserliana*) and that Husserl himself wrote each lecture as a discrete text each time. He might have had a systematic order or structure in mind (prior to the semester, but which he often overthrew), but for the sake of reconstructing the composition of the entire text, he composed each lecture anew, oftentimes beginning by summarizing the main points of the previous lectures, but then pursuing the theme he was interested thenceforth. This practice, it should be noted, makes it quite difficult for an editor to furnish a systematic treatise from the manuscript base. In other words, the systematic structure that many editions of Husserl's lectures display has (for the most part) been produced by the editor and makes an impression that is more systematic than the at times *ad hoc* choices of themes or digressions in fact manifest.

[15] Boehm's appendices also contain lectures Husserl gave and drafts of texts Husserl intended to publish, for instance the Kant lecture on Kant's 200th anniversary (1924). Some of the latter have already been translated (e.g., the Kant lecture). Boehm also distinguishes between "*Abhandlungen*" (treatises) and "*Beilagen*" (supplements, oftentimes, though not always, with references to the lecture course). This distinction, however, is in many respects artificial and has not been reproduced here. Hence all texts in the appendix to this volume are here simply named "supplemental texts." It cannot always

The lecture course comes at a time in Husserl's career when he was beginning to put the events of the past behind him. In the period right after serving as chair of his departmental unit ("*Geschäftsführender Direktor*") from 1920–1921, which he describes as a rather annoying distraction, Husserl's work experienced a remarkable surge. He began broaching new systematic topics, leading him to produce a significant amount of new texts (only the minority of them published[16]). By then, Husserl had ascended to the top of his field in Germany. To illustrate his realm of influence: Husserl accepted invitations to give prestigious talks in London (1922), Amsterdam (1924) and, later, Paris (1929) (and this a long time before jet-setting became the preferred lifestyle of academics), each occasion giving rise to a plethora of manuscripts. Husserl was on the verge of becoming nationally and internationally recognized as Germany's most famous and well-respected philosopher. He witnessed, with great satisfaction, a large following of students who flocked to him from Germany and many parts of the world.

Having his retirement in view, it is not surprising that this period was also marked by his attempt to summarize his mature thought and give it a lasting systematic shape. Yet what was missing, in his own estimation, was a systematic presentation of his mature thought, including the newest results from his extensive research. Since 1913, when he published the programmatic *Ideas I* and declared phenomenology to be a form of transcendental philosophy, Husserl's thought had undergone major changes and expansions, most notably the move from static to genetic phenomenology.[17] At the same time, Husserl received critical pushback from many of his earlier followers from Göttingen and Munich, who disapproved of the transcendental turn he introduced in *Ideas I*. He did not feel the need to retract anything written there; but he acknowledged that his earlier presentation suffered from imperfections that inadvertently led to misunderstandings. What was clearly

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be said with certainty if Husserl wrote them as comments to the lecture course (although many times he refers to certain passages) or as "regular" research manuscripts.

[16] Among these are the articles Husserl published in the Japanese journal *The Kaizo*, in 1922, now published in Hua. XXVII.

[17] See the historical reconstruction in Welton (2000, esp. pp. 221–256) for a detailed analysis of the various projects Husserl was working on at the time.

needed was a new systematic introduction and a systematic overview, a comprehensive map of the landscape of his phenomenology (to speak in a metaphor Husserl appreciated). This systematic *project*, besides the more properly phenomenological *themes* he was working on at the time, now took center stage.

The plans to write a new systematic presentation of his phenomenology, which could serve as an introduction to his work as a whole, reach back to 1922. The outward reason for this was at the time the invitation to give a series of lectures at the University College of London. The four lectures he composed for this occasion are the basis of the systematic presentation, which also informed the composition of the present text, and are also the basis of the lectures delivered in Paris in 1929, leading to the 1930 work, *Cartesian Meditations*.[18] The *First Philosophy* lecture course is set squarely in this important period of the phenomenologist's work, when he was intent on giving phenomenology a lasting shape to serve as a philosophical program for future phenomenologists.

After the Great War, Husserl, like many contemporaries, also attempted to stem the tide of the crisis of culture he witnessed around him in the forms of skepticism, despair, and the overall mistrust in reason. Husserl's ambition extended not only to construing phenomenology as the *philosophia perennis* that was conceived in ancient Greece, revived in the Renaissance and since then frustrated in newer attempts. He was also convinced that phenomenology was the solution to the many crises of culture and civilization;[19] indeed, when he called his last work the *Crisis of the European Sciences*, this was just one

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[18] See the introduction by the editor of Hua. XXXV, Goossens, on a detailed reconstruction of these historical events. The book *Cartesian Meditations*, which was published only in French translation during Husserl's lifetime, contains five meditations, the fifth (the famous meditation on intersubjectivity) was added later, i.e., it was based on an impromptu lecture in Strasbourg. It does not, in other words, belong to the original composition of the four lectures (as in London and Paris).

[19] As he writes in 1919: "The greatest hopes rest on the pure and rigorous formation of these new disciplines [of philosophy], as you shall see; hopes which humankind can hope to place on the further progress of scientific culture." (Hua-Mat IX, p. 6). It is thus humankind as a whole that can have hope, not just scientists, and not just for science for the sake of science, but "scientific culture," that is, culture (encompassing science) that will be elevated to a higher plane.

of the several crises facing humankind at this time (the others were presumably omitted due to the censorship he experienced). Although the Nazi takeover of 1933 might not have been on the horizon a decade earlier, the time only a few years after the Great War and in the middle of the financial depression was nonetheless ripe with economic and political crises. Husserl felt his vocation as a philosopher clearly challenged, and although the present text is more narrowly focused on the problem of conceiving a first philosophy, these efforts have to be seen in the broader context just sketched, since, as we shall see, culture as a whole depends on foundations laid by the true philosophy, phenomenology.

As mentioned, Husserl intended to use these lectures as the basis for his systematic presentation to be published in the form of a (perhaps multi-volume) book.[20] It is important to mention, in this context, that in so doing he was taking up once again a plan that he had begun a year earlier, in the lecture course of the winter of 1922/23, *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Introduction to Philosophy, *Husserliana* XXXV), which, in turn, goes back to the "London Lectures" of the spring of 1922.[21] This earlier lecture course also had the purpose of introducing phenomenology through a meditation on the very idea of philosophy. Only when this idea has been laid out could it be made plain that phenomenology, and only it, would fit the bill for this idea. The lecture course of 1922/23 is in many respects thematically quite different from that of 1923/24.[22] Yet both lecture courses must be seen in connection

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[20] See the plans for the systematic (multi-volume) work Husserl sketched together with his assistant Fink in Hua. XV, p. xxxvi. Yet one must distinguish the plan of writing a *system* of phenomenology, giving an overview over the many themes of phenomenology, from that of a *systematic introduction* to phenomenology, which would prove to be the proper, rigorous-scientific form of *philosophy*.

[21] The London Lectures are published, in the form in which they were delivered in London, in *Husserl Studies* (Husserl 1999) and also in the appendix to Hua. XXXV, however here only the texts that were *omitted* later in the lecture course were printed. That is, some parts of the London Lectures were integrated verbatim into the lecture course. Cf. also the editor's elucidations of these historical details (Goossens 1999 and 2002).

[22] One thing Husserl does in the earlier course is to carry out the "apodictic critique" of phenomenology, or what also calls a "critique of the critique" (cf. Goossens 2002). Husserl mentions this task in *First Philosophy* in passing only and does not return to it, although it is also mentioned as a task to be carried out in *Cartesian Meditations* (Hua.

mainly due to their introductory character, that is, as a meditation in which the very theme of a leading-into (*Einführung*) phenomenology was problematized. Indeed, Husserl even included some of the manuscripts from the lecture course of 1922/23 in the present text.[23] That is to say, to fully comprehend the systematic ambitions Husserl harbored at this time, especially with respect to the topic of introducing his phenomenology and conceiving a satisfactory method to do so, the lecture courses of 1922/23 and 1923/24, respectively, deserve to be treated in close conjunction. The desire to publish the project as executed in 1922/23 was also abandoned once the semester came to a close, but not the plan itself. Husserl's lecture of 1923/24 is a renewed attempt at a systematic presentation, improving, so he hoped, over the earlier text. Yet, one year later Husserl again did not arrive at a result that satisfied him, and thus the plan, as well as the typescripts produced at the time, were shelved indefinitely, as so much of the work carried out by his assistants.

The text of 1923/24 is in several respects unique in Husserl's oeuvre. For one, the first half of the lecture is dedicated to a historical meditation on the very idea of philosophy in the Western tradition since the Greeks. Although Husserl lectured on the history of philosophy before and afterwards,[24] he never did so with the systematic intention of introducing his *phenomenology* in that manner, namely as the climax of the attempt to establish a *philosophia perennis* against the seemingly never abating pressure from skepticism.[25] The text is remarkable, secondly, since the systematic trajectory of the lecture course breaks off radically after the Christmas break, when Husserl

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I, p. 177). Given its crucial role for the sake of the fully critiqued phenomenological method, it is curious that Husserl never returns to it.

[23] These overlaps are detailed in (Goossens 2002).

[24] For a list of Husserl's historical lectures and seminars, cf. Hua. VII, pp. xxvii f. Cf. also the more detailed account in the introduction to Hua-Mat 9.

[25] To be fair, the lecture also titled "*Einleitung in die Philosophie*" (Introduction to Philosophy), which Husserl delivered several times between 1916 and 1920 (published in Hua-Mat IX), does include an historical précis of ca. 200 pages ranging from Descartes to Kant (ibid., pp. 288–477) and some musings on the "beginning Greek philosophy or science" (ibid., pp. 7–27), yet the "critical history of ideas" in the first half of the 1923/24 lecture course is a completely new composition with a much clearer "teleological" structure, which culminates in phenomenology as the "destiny" of all of Western philosophy.

begins a systematic presentation of the method of the phenomenological reduction. He begins anew, presumably, because the previous historical meditations were able to give his listeners "a preliminary concept of a transcendental phenomenology and of a genuine philosophy flowing from it—a purposive idea of the most general kind, and hence […] the necessary purposive idea of all future developments" (below, p. 4).[26] Although Husserl makes it seem that the earlier part had the purpose of an historical introduction, such that now the real, systematic, part could begin, it is not at all clear why there had to be such a strong rupture before and after the break. Rather than coming to a satisfying ending in his historical narrative, the text makes it appear that it was composed to fit the semester timing. This new beginning in 1924 is all the more curious, since the historical meditations break off with Kant, to whom he devotes (together with Leibniz) a mere summary lecture before Christmas 1923. To end with Leibniz and a very brief note on Kant makes the impression of a rushed conclusion before the break, and it means that Husserl omitted any discussion of German Idealism and the developments in the 19th century. Husserl never justifies this abrupt ending. To underscore the transcendental character of phenomenology and its character as transcendental idealism, as he emphasizes in the second half of the semester, it would have been helpful for the reader to hear Husserl present his views on Kant and especially the latter's shortcomings, as well as those of the Neo-Kantians.[27]

Another reason this text is unique is this systematic presentation of the reduction ensuing now (as of 1924) is in itself complex and its development and result surprising. By his own account, Husserl discovers and opens up a new path into the reduction, that via psychology. In terms of Iso Kern's famous presentation of "Husserl's three

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[26] Another possibility, hinted at by Landgrebe (though without any proof, cf. Landgrebe 1962, pp. 259f.), is that Husserl simply gave up on the plan of producing a publishable text: "It is the path [explicitly in part II] of an experimenting adventurer in thought whose successes are constantly thrown into question in the reflections which accompany the lectures and whose goal is not fixed from the start so that it actually leads elsewhere than initially foreseen" (ibid., p. 259).

[27] These discussions are indeed executed in much greater detail in the supplementary texts, esp. Text 1 and Text 4.

ways into the reduction" (the Cartesian, the psychological, and the ontological one), Husserl here introduces this second path for the first time publicly.[28] At the same time he acknowledges to his listeners the limits and shortcomings of the earlier Cartesian path, which he utilized in *Ideas I*, and which led to the famous reproaches of Husserl being a Cartesian, an idealist, or a solipsist. Such a public self-critique is rather rare in Husserl's oeuvre. Although Husserl is quite content with the opening up of this new path, the presentation is far from complete and comprehensive, due to the semester rushing to a close, and the lecture ends once again with some rather hasty remarks on phenomenology as transcendental idealism and a "new" monadology. Thus, while he accomplished quite a bit systematically, the presentation of the material, as it stands at the end of the semester, is far from satisfactory. Indeed, it is presumably for this reason that Husserl shortly afterwards abandoned the plan to use this text as the basis for his systematic introduction. As important as this systematic result is, one has to conclude that the manner of arriving at it is long-winded, full of ruptures and digressions. Nonetheless, the central importance of this text in Husserl's oeuvre is undisputed.

Husserl continues to plan and plot out a comprehensive systematic work (or systematic introduction), though by his own lights he never succeeds.[29] *Formal and Transcendental Logic* of 1929 can serve as an introduction to his genetic logic, and *Cartesian Meditations* of 1930 was deemed acceptable "only" to his French readers. After 1933 Husserl had essentially abandoned all plans. His last work, the *Crisis of European Sciences*, is a last and frantic attempt at such a presentation, which he undertakes in a last effort to give at least an introduction to

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[28] Kern's "three ways" essay has become canonical in its systematic presentation (cf. Kern 1962). However, this presentation overlooks the fact that to Husserl the question of the paths into the reduction was problematic at all times in his life after 1905. Not only are there also other ways into phenomenology (via the critique of the sciences, via intersubjectivity, etc.), it is also the case that traces of the way via intentional psychology can be found prior to 1924. The case that some interpreters have made of the importance of this lecture course *for the problem of the ways of the reduction* is in some respects overblown.

[29] An overview over these systematic plans is given in Kern's (editor's) introduction to Hua. XV, p. xxxvi. Cf. also the editor's introduction to Hua. XXXIV, which adds some newly found material.

his phenomenology. This last work is remembered, rightly so, for the existential urgency with which Husserl introduces phenomenology as a solution to the crisis of his day. However, especially in its historical part, the *Crisis* in many ways falls short of the much more detailed presentation in *First Philosophy*.

Scholars later have tried to make sense of the systematic place of *First Philosophy* in the context of Husserl's work in general, since the phrase "first philosophy" is not used by Husserl prior to 1923[30] and also recedes into the background after 1924. It was no lesser than Husserl's own pupil Heidegger, who claimed (in the 1929 dispute in Davos with Cassirer), that "for a period, Husserl had fallen into the arms of the Neo-Kantians,"[31] which presumably meant the temptation to conceive of phenomenology as a "first philosophy" in the sense of an ultimate foundationalism.[32] This claim also implies that at a later time Husserl would have wrested himself from this embrace and that it was only a temporary phase. Later scholars have also argued along Heidegger's claim that this task, and hence this text, presents a curiosity within Husserl's writings (see section IV, below). While it will be shown below that this claim is in many respects unfounded, it is true that in this text Husserl is perhaps more radical in his systematic ambitions than elsewhere. Husserl is dead serious when he characterizes phenomenology as the "secret desire of all of philosophy." What he means by this claim can perhaps be best understood by studying the present text.

Let me, in the following, address some of the central points tied to his claim that phenomenology should come forth as "first philosophy."

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[30] Interestingly, Natorp uses the phrase *proté philosophía* in his 1901 review of Husserl's *Prolegomena* (quoted in Boehm 1954, p. xix), not to identify Husserl's draft of a pure logic, but rather to argue that Husserl's achievement may not yet have accomplished this (though it should). It is not far-fetched to see Natorp as a *very strong* influence in Husserl's later attempt at such a first philosophy, as Natorp influenced Husserl in other aspects of his thought, especially in the 1920s (cf. Luft 2010, for more on Natorp's influence on Husserl).

[31] Heidegger 1973, p. 247.

[32] It is a different issue whether this captures the intentions of either school of Neo-Kantianism well. If it is to mean that philosophy should provide a firm foundations for all scientific efforts and be a permanent bulwark against skepticism, neither of the major schools of Neo-Kantianism would lay claims to such ambitions.

Understanding these can help the reader understand the main intentions driving Husserl. But before that, I will start out with a simple definition of what phenomenology is; this will provide the basis for my discussion of Husserl's attempt to bring phenomenology forth as first philosophy.

2. *A Simple Definition of Phenomenology*

Phenomenology is the eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity. What does this mean? Let us start with subjectivity (or consciousness or mind, all of which are synonymous for our purpose). Phenomenology studies the mind and its experience. The latter has a special feature: it is always of something. This "being-of-something" phenomenologists capture with the term "intentionality." The term is technical and not meant in the colloquial sense, in which "intentional" means something like "deliberate" or "with (explicit) intention." Rather, it designates the necessary "aboutness" of every mental episode or experience, and that in the broadest sense, which goes beyond merely psychic experiences. "Intentionality" thus refers to thinking, remembering, anticipating, hoping, but also seeing, feeling (such as pain), touching, wishing, emoting, willing, and so on. In a very basic sense, then, phenomenology studies the structure of intentionality in all regions of experience.

Looked at closely, every experience has a "subjective" and "objective" component. In the case of perceiving, for example, the act of seeing is the subjective component and that which is seen in the act is the objective component. Rather than calling this correlational structure "subjective" and "objective," since we are dealing with the structure of intentionality, Husserl uses the technical terms "noetic" and "noematic" for the two poles of the structure of intentionality. Thus, in a yet more basic sense, phenomenology studies the way in which the subject is connected with the world it experiences. It is an investigation of the relation of mind and world.

As covering *all* forms of intentionality, not just the strictly speaking mental ones ("inside our head"), phenomenology is not just psychology or a special version thereof. That phenomenology would be "descriptive psychology," as Husserl himself called it at the outset, is a severe limitation of its scope. Phenomenology studies the way in which the

world is experienced in all forms, and the way the subject *has* this experience. It is thus an investigation from the standpoint of the experiencing agent in her having experience in the broadest sense.

As discussed so far, phenomenology is mainly a descriptive exercise or a descriptive science. As describing the structure of intentionality in its different forms, it also aims to arrive at general insights that go beyond one's merely personal whimsy. Of course the investigator has to start from her (first person) experience, but what she describes are structures that hold for consciousness (or intentionality) as such, regardless of the fact that the person doing the describing is located in France or Finland or on the moon, regardless that she has two eyes, and that she studies the perception of a tree, a tiger in the forest, an object on the moon, or an imagined monster or a remembered loved one. The descriptor, hence, has to abstract from her own perspective and describe structures that hold as such. Every science has to move from individuals to generalities. Phenomenology is in this sense a science like every other science, aiming at general insights about, or essences concerning individuals.

Consider a basic example that Husserl was fond of: in the case of perceiving, the object that I see shows itself to me from a side facing me and a hidden (but co-meant) backside. The general structure *of perception* (mine, and everybody else's who has the ability to perceive) as a form of intentionality (regardless of who has it) is thus that its objects necessarily show themselves in profiles and that the perceiving agent cannot see all profiles at once. Phenomenology as a descriptive science abstracts from the fact (of, for example, the person's historical and geographical setting and her physical make-up) and aims at general structures. While there are levels of generality in empirical generalizations, phenomenology is philosophy and is thus aimed at insights that are a priori (independent of experience) and essential (necessarily true). In order to reach essential truths, the phenomenologist has to aim at insights that are true as such and not only valid for a certain group of exemplars (e.g., the human being). Though starting from her own experience, she aims at truths that are true independent of any existing experience, but true of *any possible* experience. It is, in this sense, an a priori science of consciousness in the same way that arithmetic is an a priori science of numbers. Thus far, I have clarified what "eidetic science of subjectivity" means.

Next, "subjectivity" has the addition "transcendental." As of Kant, the term has the meaning of "condition of the possibility." A transcendental investigation, hence, studies not a given something (in the case of Kant: cognition), but the conditions that must be assumed as necessarily in place to make this something possible. Again, to Kant, space and time as forms of intuition are the necessary condition of the possibility of us experiencing things in the world (as they give themselves to us conforming to our forms of sensibility).

In phenomenology, if subjectivity is called transcendental it means that subjectivity is understood as that which enables, broadly speaking, objectivity (or the world). In what sense is subjectivity the condition of the possibility for the world? Is this not a wild claim? It is, indeed, to us living normally and naturally. Normally we experience the world, that is, things in the world, and we do not attend to the subject we are who experiences the objects. We take this subjective aspect for granted. The same goes for the sciences, who study parts of the world, roughly distinguished as nature and spirit. The natural sciences study different species of animals, the physical and chemical world; the other sciences are what we also call "human" or "cultural" sciences, such as history, literary criticism, and theology. They all study things in the world and take the subjective aspect of experiencing them for granted. This general stance, in which we take the world for granted as existing independently from any experiencing agent, Husserl calls the "natural attitude." The natural attitude is the general, everyday way of living in the world, in which we pursue our projects. And it is also the stance every scientist takes. Phenomenology, as an "un-natural" science, stands opposed to the natural attitude, not negating it, but "bracketing" it in order to gain a different stance. Phenomenology takes place in a different attitude. In fact, its beginning occurs when we question the natural attitude and are, by virtue of that questioning, in a different attitude.

This attitude of phenomenology is different in that which focuses on that which the natural attitude precisely ignores or overlooks: the subjective part (of consciousness in its intentionality). It is always there, including in the natural attitude, but it is not attended to unless we explicitly reflect on it, when we, e.g., say, "it seems to *me* that X." But, of course, this is far from a well-formed science, and in any case, the subjective part is never seen *in* the natural attitude as a potential object of

a science, a science of the subjective. But when we attend to the sphere of intentionality, we have to concede that every experience in the natural attitude has a subjective (intentional) side to it. In order to make any scientific utterance about something, I must first have *experience* of it. This fact, which is trivial in the natural attitude, becomes precisely the problem and the scientific task for phenomenology; what would be a trivial aspect becomes an explicit object of a specific investigation. Because, when viewed reflectively (i.e., from the habitual standpoint of the phenomenologist), *every* worldly experience (of something in the world in the natural attitude) has this subjective side, this subjective aspect *enables* us to have any experience of objects. In this sense, then, one can say that subjectivity (in the way phenomenology frames it) is the *condition of the possibility* of everything objective. Consequently, phenomenology is the study of *transcendental subjectivity*, subjectivity in the way it experiences the world, or in whose experience the world manifests itself.

Phenomenology thus studies a dimension that is always there but always overlooked in the natural attitude. This is a dimension for which firstly an appreciation has to be engendered. To express its novelty, Husserl resorts to different metaphors. In one metaphor he uses repeatedly, he likens it to a new continent that has never been entered, let alone mapped. In another metaphor that is perhaps more apt (taken over from Gustav Theodor Fechner), phenomenology discovers a third dimension to the world of the natural attitude, which is merely two-dimensional. Phenomenology becomes true philosophy when it realizes it is *toto caelo* different from any other scientific discipline, and it is universal philosophy, since it encompasses *all* other sciences. It proceeds in this way, in general, in which one can distinguish the work of the sciences from that of philosophy. Phenomenology as the true philosophy, hence, does not just enable the natural attitude, but also all sciences of the natural attitude. As Husserl explains:

"To carry out plane-geometry, to investigate planes and their shapes, means: not to pay attention to the bodily dimension. But the latter is always there and everything spatial also has its third dimension. One may not ask too much of a metaphor, yet what it means for us for the sake of metaphorical talk is clear: Everything that the non-philosophical sciences investigate also has its 'philosophical' dimension, but to investigate it lies beyond the scope of these sciences.

Pure philosophy, hence, relates to all sciences, but what it searches for and captures theoretically, it cannot ever (for essential reasons) gain from these sciences. … The philosophical dimension provides not additional, generically related problems, but generically novel ones." (Hua-Mat IX, p. 2).

This enabling transcendental dimension comes first before the other dimension and the latter is dependent on it (the two-dimensional world is embedded in the three-dimensional one). It is the first for us (experience as access to the world), though it is not seen as such *in* the natural attitude. As standing on the ground of the natural attitude, all other disciplines of this dependent dimension are related to it in an essential way. In this way I have spelled out, in all brevity, not only the transcendental character of phenomenology, but its systematic position as *first philosophy*. Being in such a position, phenomenology, as being the "true" philosophy, also has, as it were, a special responsibility and calling.[33] We are now in a position to situate phenomenology's task as such a first philosophy, starting out with a short account of the term in the history of philosophy, and then in Husserl's oeuvre, where, as we shall see, it has several meanings that are related, to be sure, but that indicate different meanings and different tasks for the phenomenologist.

3. *The Very Idea of Phenomenology as First Philosophy*

Although it seems easy at first glance (in the sense just given) to give a definition of what Husserl means by "First Philosophy," it becomes a challenge to further explain this concept when he claims, *a fortiori*, that specifically *phenomenology* should come forth as a discipline that is more than just a descriptive, but also foundational discipline.[34] Rather,

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[33] Cf. also Schuhmann (2004) for an in-depth account of Husserl's idea of philosophy.

[34] On Husserl's alleged foundationalism and exactly which kind of foundationalist he is, cf. the helpful discussion by Berghofer (2018), who also gives a survey of this discussion both in contemporary philosophy of mind as well as in the scholarship on Husserl beginning with Føllesdal and up to more recent works by Drummond, Beyer, and Zahavi. It should be pointed out, however, that Berghofer, too, repeats the old error that Husserl does not distinguish between adequate and apodictic evidence until the *Cartesian Meditations* (cf. Berghofer 2018, p. 12). As is clear from the present discussion, this distinction was one of the main issues dealt with as of 1922 and it was a defining moment for the characterization of his phenomenology as First Philosophy.

it is perhaps helpful to assume that there is a cluster of motives that come together in this term. In order to gain some clarity here, I will begin by highlighting the main definitions in the two philosophers who were clearly most influential for Husserl in this regard: Aristotle and Descartes. Then I will present some of the notions involved in Husserl's usage of the term. Husserl was never able to bring these different notions together into one systematic or coherent account,[35] nor is the following account exhaustive. For a circumspect understanding, it is more fruitful, I believe, to single out and introduce some of these ideas and concepts separately.

i. *The idea of a first philosophy in the history of philosophy*

The term in the Greek original *proté philosophia* is coined, as is known, by Aristotle. Aristotle introduces it in his *Metaphysics* as the discipline that studies "being qua being," that is, being as such, prior to and vis-à-vis being according to one of the ten categories. Thus, the study of being as being is a proto-scientific discipline, meant to be foundational for all others to follow (in the sense of logically preceding them). But it also studies the highest being (God) as that which goes beyond (*meta*) the physical. Thus, "metaphysics" and "first philosophy" (or "study of wisdom" or "theology") are more or less synonymous to Aristotle.[36] As such, it is based on his famous claim that "all men suppose what is called wisdom (*sophia*) to deal with the first causes (*aitiai*) and the principles (*archai*) of things" (Met. 981b28).[37] First philosophy studies these first causes and principles, notably of being, of entities.

Descartes famously takes up the term in his *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* of 1641. Here the method of hyperbolic doubt is introduced to radically call into question everything that can be doubted in order to establish "first principles" and "firm foundations" for the

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[35] Schuhmann (2004, p. 62) also takes this position and argues for a "compiling method" for assembling what he calls (with Fink) an "'operative concept' of Husserlian phenomenology" (ibid.).

[36] This is notably *not* the case for Husserl, for whom metaphysics is "second philosophy." See subsection 3.vii below.

[37] Cf. also the overview by Cohen (2016).

sciences. The first principle upon which to base all other mediately certain axioms is the certainty of the "I think, I am," which remains even after the most radically possible doubt, doubting that God exists and that he is, instead, assumedly a genial but evil deceiver manipulating our every sensation and thought (cf. Descartes 1904, pp. 17–23). With this meditation, historically, the idea of a first philosophy is firstly linked to the thinking substance, the *ego cogito* or the subject. This is why Kant and Husserl could justifiably call Descartes' *Meditations* the (dimly anticipated) origin of *transcendental* philosophy.

Despite Husserl being closer to Descartes, nonetheless both elements, that of a foundational discipline dealing with first principles and the necessity of the turn to the *ego cogito* in order to accomplish the former, are present in Husserl in various ways, and he acknowledges his predecessors. At the very beginning of the lecture course, Husserl explicitly begins with an invocation of Aristotle's notion of "First Philosophy," which he also immediately connects with the term "metaphysics" (below, p. 3), though he makes it clear that he is not interested in the historically correct account but rather in the "formal preliminary indication of the theoretical intention" (ibid.) guiding its inceptor. Also, Descartes's *Meditations* are mentioned in the same passage as "represent[ing] a completely new beginning in the history of philosophy in their attempt to discover, with a radicalism unheard of up to then, the absolutely necessary beginning of philosophy" (below, p. 8).

Thus, it must be said that First Philosophy has first and foremost for Husserl the role of a foundational discipline. Moreover, since Kant's critique of reason, it takes the shape of a transcendental critique of knowledge or cognition (epistemology). His closest allies here, despite all differences, are thus clearly Descartes and—though he is not mentioned here—Kant, especially via the mediation through his Neo-Kantian contemporaries. Natorp has already been mentioned above. Boehm mentions another person who may have also been influential, the Neo-Kantian Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906), who, he claims, was "presumably the first to call 'epistemology' 'first philosophy'" (Boehm 1954, p. xviii). Von Hartmann writes in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* of 1878, "Epistemology is the true *philosophia prima*" (quoted in Boehm, ibid., n. 2). Husserl had this book in his possession; since, however, the copy in his personal library bears no annotations, it

cannot be established whether Husserl had knowledge of this passage. To claim that Husserl would have been directly influenced by von Hartmann in this respect cannot be established with certainty. Yet, Husserl would certainly agree with von Hartmann's statement.[38]

What should be clear, in any case, is that Husserl's perusal of the term First Philosophy in the context of his characterization of phenomenology is not meant as something radically novel; he is consciously making connections to traditional conceptions of philosophy, both to demonstrate his indebtedness to his forebears and to show that, despite all originality, his philosophy is the true fulfillment of these earlier visions.

ii. *Husserl's idea of first philosophy (sans phenomenology)*

Husserl's most basic idea of what a first *philosophy* as universal science should accomplish can be circumscribed without yet linking it up with phenomenology. There is a proto-phenomenological sense, as it were, for it is such a foundational structure that it is a universal, all-encompassing science and as such should be the guiding ideal for

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[38] Husserl knew of von Hartmann's notion of the unconscious. There are five books and offprints of von Hartmann's preserved in Husserl's library, of which he only annotated the book *Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus* (2nd edition of 1875). Von Hartmann is mentioned thrice in the entirety of Husserl's oeuvre, and in no case does he make reference to the concept of first philosophy: in Hua. VII, pp. 408f. (these are texts that appear to be experts from post-Kantian philosophers, such as von Hartmann, Jacobi, Hamann, Fichte, Hegel, Trendelenburg, Weisse, Fichte Jr., and Fries, which have not been included in this translation), B I 1/14 (unpublished), and in an annotation of Benno Erdmann's *Die Axiome der Geometrie: eine philosophische Untersuchung der Riemann-Helmholtz'schen Raumtheorie* (*The Axioms of Geometry: a Philosophical Investigation of Riemann-Helmholtz's Theory of Space*) of 1877, here pp. 130f. Erdmann here discusses von Hartmann's book of 1875.

Boehm further speculates (Hua. VII, pp. xvii f.) that von Hartmann, in reconceiving first philosophy as epistemology, attempted to further the impulses of the late Schelling. Boehm asserts that Husserl's distinction between first and second philosophy (to be discussed below) is reminiscent of the late Schelling's distinction between positive and negative philosophy. However, for reasons that cannot be discussed here, neither the assumption that Husserl knew of Schelling's distinction nor that Husserl's distinction is parallel to that of Schelling are very convincing. While Fichte and, to some extent, Hegel clearly influenced Husserl, any relation to Schelling's philosophy is spurious at best. (Cf. the collection, ed. by Luft & Fabbianelli 2014, on Husserl's relation to classical German philosophy.)

all scientists, that is, all those who have dedicated, or intend to dedicate, their lives to the search for Truth, which is the path towards bliss ("*Seligkeit*"). Universal science, as a general science, encompassing every individual science as specific formation thereof, is dedicated to the pursuit of truth for the sake of truth, of "theoria and nothing but theoria" (Hua. VI, p. 326).[39] This is the way Husserl makes his opening moves in the present lecture course.[40]

It is historically interesting that the two main inspirations Husserl credits here are *not* Aristotle and Descartes, but rather the latter and "the incomparable twin-star Socrates-Plato" (below, p. 8). What links Descartes and Socrates-Plato together, in Husserl's estimation, is that their philosophizing (as search for "pure truth") is inspired *first and foremost* by the specter of skepticism, that is, by the doubt in firm truths and fixed principles, principles which enable knowledge to come forth on the secure path of science. Yet principles are necessary not only in science and knowledge, but indeed in all practical life as well.[41] If one recalls Husserl's personal motivations for becoming a philosopher, which he recounts at times somewhat ceremoniously,[42] he too saw skepticism in theory *as well as in praxis—but more importantly in the latter*—as the greatest threat to the flourishing of humankind. Indeed, the paradoxes raised by skepticism are not first and foremost problems arising in the philosophical armchair, but make themselves

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[39] This notion of "truth for the sake of truth" and "theory for theory's sake" does not mean, however, that philosophy should not have practical application. To the contrary, all philosophy is ultimately aimed at practice in the sense of enabling the good life; cf. Schuhmann 2004, pp. 64 f., for an elucidation of the relation of theory and praxis.

[40] A part of these texts, it should be noted, Husserl took from an essay he published in the "Japanese-German Journal for Science and Technology" (vol. 1) in 1923, entitled "The Idea of a Philosophical Culture" (Hua. VII, pp. 203–207). A translation of this text will be published in the *Husserliana-Collected Works* volume containing the *Kaizo* articles. Husserl also begins the lecture course of 1922/23 with similar reflections on the nature of the ideal of science and the ideal scientist, cf. Hua. XXXV, pp. 43 ff.

[41] Husserl ignores that this presumably was an important motivation for Aristotle as well, e.g., to establish a well-grounded formal logic to counter Sophistic pseudo-argumentation.

[42] Cf. Husserl's impromptu speech at the celebration of his 70th birthday, cf. Schuhmann 1977, p. 344. There he says, according to a recollection from Roman Ingarden, "I *had* to philosophize, otherwise I could not live in *this* world."

felt most crucially in practical life. Indeed they are, in the latter shape, "fateful problems for mankind on its way to genuine humanity" (below, p. 9).[43] What is needed to combat skepticism, in most general terms, is "complete clarity" and "clarification" of all opinions, as to which are true (to the extent they can be justified), and which are mere opinions.

This clarity can only be achieved—and here we get a first indication of phenomenology's role in this endeavor—by a return to "'insight', or 'evidence'" (ibid.). The "principle of principles" ("*that each intuition affording [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge*"[44]) ought to be invoked and applied already in everyday life. Thus, completely clear evidences are the foundations for any scientific endeavor; they are the only thing upon which arguments or correct inferences can be founded. Trying to arrive at complete clarity and evidence is not already the working out of first philosophy, but it is this burning necessity that marks the Cartesian drive to "once in a lifetime" (*semel in vita*) start over and subject every commonly held opinion to radical scrutiny and to come up with first principles supporting other assertions. Everything must be subjected to the famous Socratic *lógon didónai*, to giving oneself a radical account, ideally spanning one's entire life. This is the first impulse to gaining any clarity and, *a fortiori*, lasting knowledge, enabling both the flourishing of theoretical and practical life.

iii. *First Philosophy as grounding a fully justified life of ultimate self-responsibility. Becoming an honest philosopher*

While continuous with the last point, the project of a first philosophy takes on a more concrete shape in Husserl's vision once this project, which begins with Socrates as a practical one, becomes applied to the *theoretical* project of science in the broadest sense in which it is synony-

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[43] It is here where Plato departs from Socrates, in Husserl's estimation, for the latter only engaged in thinking "only as a practical reformer" (below, p. 9). The relation to Husserl's ethical thought cannot be broached here, though clearly for Husserl, in most general terms, philosophy should be in the service of the good life. These motives come to the fore especially in his late ethical writings, cf. Hua. XXXVIII and LX, cf. also here the editors' (Peucker and Sowa) introductions to these volumes.

[44] Hua. III/1, p. 51 (Dahlstrom trans.).

mous with philosophy. This happens with Plato. As long as the quest for clarity is still merely a practical matter (as in Socrates), it is not yet radically reflected. Such a life is, in Husserl's terminology, still *naïve*. It becomes philosophical the moment it reflects on its ultimate grounds and thereby loses all naiveté. It thus becomes fully justified in every respect. This *complete* justification in *every* respect is an ideal, to be sure; but only true philosophy, rising above the everyday, can posit this ideal as a limit idea to which the individual scientist is to approximate herself asymptotically. Only then can the scientist in her individuality claim to be a true scientist, as following the ideal set up by the true philosopher; just as, in the practical sphere, one can only claim for oneself to be a truly good person once every guiding principle for action has been justified.[45] To do this in general, every dogmatic assumption must be suspended. Thus, the phenomenological epoché, the withholding of assent to any truth claim, finds its equivalent in the "ethical epoché" that every person must undertake, insofar as she wants to realign her life to an absolutely justified principle.[46] The ethical aspect is foundational for the epistemological one. This does not mean, however, that every person should become a scientist or philosopher; rather, the scientist practices this "renewal" with more rigor than is possible in the practical sphere and with a clearly defined methodological form of reflection, which cannot be demanded by the prescientific person.

Thus, the ultimate motivation for any human being is, to Husserl, to become a good and honest person (to oneself, to others), and the same standard ought to be applied to the good scientist and philosopher with respect to her ethos, which can only be the never-ending search for insurmountable truth. Once this goal has been conceived in its purity, which is *eo ipso* a philosophical achievement (since it is not contingent or applied to anything in particular, it is the "goal qua goal"), it must then be applied to the particular sciences. Every single scientist should also adhere to this ideal of being able to jus-

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[45] As an aside, this is the "personalistic" aspect of Husserl's thought, which becomes salient especially in his ethics. The fully justified person is beholden to *herself* and her own evidences exclusively. The contrast would be to the ideal laid out in virtue ethics, where the norm comes from the virtuous *other* who is admired by the people.

[46] Cf. Hua. XXVII, pp. 3–94 (the "Kaizo Articles") for a presentation of this line of thought.

tify every actual and possible deed (in the field or the laboratory) and judgment (in fixating findings). As enacting this idea of a first science or first philosophy, they thereby are "second philosophies" in referring themselves back to the very idea of the master science, which posits the pursuit of truth as ideal. A first philosophy thus formulates in ideal terms the very principles under which every individual researcher must stand if the enterprise of science as the search for truth can ever come off the ground and withstand the never-ending attacks on the part of the arch enemy, "the hydra of skepticism" (below, p. 59).

iv. *Phenomenology as the true* philosophia perennis*, asymptotically approached*

While first philosophy formulates the very idea of the pursuit of knowledge that serves as the ideal for all scientific endeavors, there is a fundamental *discontinuity* between the sciences and philosophy according to Husserl. Philosophy is fundamentally different from the sciences in several ways. For one, where the sciences are continuous with common sense and the natural view of the world—in Husserl's terminology: modern natural science establishes itself as a "naturalistic" attitude on the basis of the natural attitude, thus constituting naturalism—philosophy can only come to be with a radical break with common sense and all "natural" assumptions. It breaks with the naiveté of the natural attitude. While the natural sciences are reflective at times—every person reflects on the meaning of her life from time to time; no scientist can further her work and break the mold of the current paradigm without being reflective—they are not radically reflective. This means that they have not reflected on the most basic assumption of all worldly pursuits, namely that they all presuppose the mind-independent existence of the world (the "general thesis of the natural attitude"). Philosophy breaks with this fundamental assumption and thus reveals the subject-relativity of all experience (intentionality). Before studying intentionality, such an investigation is only possible on the basis of the fundamental move from all "mundane" scientific affairs to philosophy; it is only possible through a break with the natural view of the world. It is here where Husserl's pronouncements about phenomenology being "abso-

lutely without presuppositions" come into play. A complete break with the natural attitude is identical with a suspension of all presuppositions.

Husserl believes that only this radical break with the natural attitude reveals the *very idea* of philosophy, as *philosophia perennis*, the secret desire of all Western philosophy. It is an a priori notion that has been conceived by Western philosophy but never completely understood, let alone fully executed. Husserl for the first time placed philosophy on a novel basis from which it will henceforth ensue. Especially in the *Crisis* work, Husserl is insistent that he has formulated this idea to which future philosophy must approach asymptotically. He is emphatic about his philosophy being the "true scientific discipline of beginnings," since it has for the first time truly made such a beginning with Husserl's ground-laying. This view also squares with Husserl's view of his own work in the entirety of the Phenomenological Movement. The way he sees it, he has spent his life laying foundations, which will remain firm for all time. What yet needs to be accomplished is a full mapping of the terrain of future philosophy qua phenomenology. This is the task of future generations who shall build upon the ground laid by its founder.

v. *Phenomenology as first philosophy: as* mathesis universalis*, as universal science, as absolutely justified, as "ultimately grounding science"*

As a grounding science, phenomenology not only lays the ground for its own work, but also has an invaluable importance for the sciences. Philosophy does not come at the end of the work of the sciences, but must come at the outset (logically, not temporally), preceding and grounding it. What the Neo-Kantians do, Husserl says in a manuscript of ca. 1908, in laying foundations after the work of the scientist, is "*last* philosophy" (Hua. VII, p. 385, it. added) vis-à-vis first. To Husserl, such a procedure, as advocated by the Kantians, is naïve; to watch scientists just go about their work, to then later spring into action, is, for the philosopher, irresponsible. For that reason, all sciences are in need of a theory of science systematically preceding them. That is, temporally speaking (as in Descartes), they begin going about their business; but they are in need of a grounding that comes logically prior. Though nec-

essarily proceeding naively, they are in need of a systematic grounding in order to overcome this naiveté.

This very task is formulated as early as the "Prolegomena" to the *Logical Investigations*, where Husserl, after his famous refutation of psychologism, ends with a sketch of a "pure logic" fulfilling the Leibnizian vision of a "*mathesis universalis*." The latter is, to Husserl, an a priori theory of science, more specifically "the theory of the form of possible systems of propositions that are in principle of non-empirical structure" (Peucker 2017, p. 58). This pure logic is to govern the "ideal conditions of science" (ibid.) and is thus the "theory of theories, the science of sciences" (Hua. XVIII, p. 244). *Mathesis universalis* is, in effect, a first philosophy, which lays out in principle the pure (or formal) logic that all sciences must utilize if they are to reach sound foundations. To repeat, Husserl is not doing something altogether new in the present lecture, but merely giving it this traditional name.

Moreover, due to the correlational a priori between thought and object, a formal *mathesis* implies a formal ontology culminating in the pure "thing as such" (*Gegenstand-überhaupt*).[47] Such was Husserl's vision of forging a complete a priori theory of science, divided into formal logic and formal (and *a fortiori*, material) ontology. This project, while never fully completed, is nonetheless reaffirmed as a task to be completed in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In the present text Husserl explicitly (below, pp. 30 f., cf. the entire lecture 4[48]) links up this sense of *mathesis universalis* with the task of a first philosophy. This first philosophy as a theory for all sciences is not yet phenomenology proper, but a propaedeutic for *all* possible sciences that stand under rational (a priori) laws, attempting to reach cognition. Next, then, first philosophy, naturally leads to a *theory (or critique) of* such cognition or an epistemology.

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[47] Cf. again Schuhmann 2004, pp. 65–68 for a succinct summary, also highlighting the parts Husserl did not complete of this universal project.

[48] But cf. his self-critical note regarding his initial conception of *mathesis universalis* below, pp. 627 ff.

vi. *First Philosophy as transcendental critique of cognition. Consciousness as the absolute*

It is only now possible to explain how *phenomenology* is to be specifically this first philosophy. The cue is given through the previous exposition of the *mathesis universalis*, whose execution contains a necessary correlation, namely between consciousness and world. Husserl famously calls this the "correlational a priori"—no consciousness without something conscious, no being without a relation to (actual or possible) consciousness. Phenomenology's basic claim is that every object is actually or possibly conscious in some form of consciousness, or is given (or gives itself) in consciousness. It is the task of phenomenology to investigate the different manners of intentionality or of givenness of objects to consciousness. Consciousness constitutes the objects of its experience, or perhaps better, objects constitute themselves in consciousness. In this sense, phenomenology is the study of objects-as-constituted,–as-given, as they appear to us as phenomena, in their different forms (perception, imagination, memory, and so on, with their respectively different objects or contents, visual object, image, melody, and so on), all of which are objects in the world. In short, phenomenology is the investigation into the constitution of the world.

The full realm of the correlational a priori and the opening up of the realm of consciousness can only occur through a radical break with the natural attitude. This break consists in the rupture of the "ordinary" assumption that the world exists mind-independently. Part of this natural assumption is that there is an ontological priority to the world prior to it being experienced and cognized. However, the transcendental turn reveals that all being is only being-for-consciousness. In different terminology, phenomenology as transcendental reveals consciousness as the absolute, to which everything is relative. It is the "condition of the possibility" of all being becoming experienced. Without it being experienced, actually or potentially, it does not *exist* for us.[49]

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[49] I only mention in passing that there is a disagreement in scholarship whether or not Husserl's prioritizing (after the reduction) consciousness over the world entails an ontological commitment, or whether it is metaphysically neutral precisely due to the reduction. For a discussion of this, cf. Zahavi 2002.

Once one has seen the absoluteness of consciousness, it is both the first for us (it is our primal and only access to the world, as world-for-me from the first person perspective) *and* the first in itself, since it constitutes the world. That is, there is a *unilateral dependence* of world on consciousness from the standpoint of philosophy. Consciousness is *both* the first for us *and* in itself, and the study of it is, accordingly, first philosophy. As first philosophy it is an eidetic study of the transcendental structures that enable us to have experience of worldly being (essential structures of conditions of the possibility of any encounter with the world). In this sense, it is more fundamental than traditional epistemology, which studies the conditions of the possibility of *cognition* (Kant) or those of the current status of cognition in the *sciences* (the Marburg School, who therefore called their project *Erkenntniskritik*, critique of—existing—cognition).[50]

Phenomenology is the study of *all* forms of experience, beginning with passive, pre-predicative, pre-scientific, ordinary experience, then addressing simple perception, its temporal stream, all the way up to active behavior, such as acting, willing, and judging. Phenomenology is thus the study of the absolute, of that which constitutes everything worldly relative to it, and it is for this reason transcendental idealism. Transcendental phenomenology as transcendental idealism is the "*synthesis of natural and transcendental attitudes*" (Hua. XXXIV, pp. 16f.): "Necessarily a synthesis of natural and transcendental viewing of the world needs to be enacted [through phenomenology], and its enactment is, precisely, 'transcendental idealism'" (ibid.). Phenomenology is thus not just a philosophically "purified" psychology, but is situated altogether on a different plane, as it investigates all forms of consciousness, of the absolute; it does not merely study a layer (the psyche) within the psychophysically conceived human being, or even more narrowly its cognitive faculty. It is a study of the essential structures of transcendental subjectivity in all of its (genetic, intersubjective, historical, embodied, etc.) dimensions.

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[50] Husserl was aware of the distinction between the Kantian and Neo-Kantian projects, especially in his subtle usage of the term "*erkenntniskritisch*," cf. below, p. 35.

vii. *First Philosophy as Eidetic Phenomenology and Metaphysics as Second Philosophy*

This notion of phenomenology as transcendental idealism leads to the last element of Husserl's understanding of first philosophy, which links up to his peculiar notion of metaphysics. Phenomenology is first philosophy, finally, because it studies, as *philosophia perennis*, the eidetic, essential structures of consciousness(-as-world-constituting). In order to do so, I must start out from my personal, private for-me-ness, but attempt to reach *essential* results. Hence, in order to arrive at the eidetic level, an additional method is needed, that of eidetic variation. Once this variation is enacted, the "bind to the factum" is dropped, that is, the first-person access of the phenomenologist as an individuated, gendered, historically situated person in a certain time and place.[51] Phenomenology thus is, in its fullest form, *the eidetic study of transcendental (world-constituting) subjectivity (as a field of experience including other minds, hence as intersubjectivity) in its static and genetic dimensions*. In this form, it is the true First Philosophy.

But what about a phenomenology of the factum, *prior to* the eidetic variation? Such a discipline is indeed possible, it is by definition *second philosophy* and is thus a study of the factum of the world in its contingency, in its actuality as opposed to eidetic phenomenology, which investigates *any possible* consciousness. Contrary to every traditional understanding, Husserl calls this second philosophy, a phenomenological study of the world in its facticity, *metaphysics*. He defines it, in a note appended to the lecture course, as a study of the "irrationality of the transcendental *fact*, which expresses itself in the constitution of the *factual* world and of *factual* spiritual life—that is, metaphysics in a new sense" (below, p. 194, it. added).[52] The world as we know it and as has

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[51] For a classic presentation of the method of eidetic variation, cf. Para. 87 of *Experience and Judgment*. It is also mentioned in passing in the manuscripts, cf., for instance, text no. 9 of the supplemental texts below.

[52] Cf. also below, p. 479 (the only other place in the present volume where he uses it in his sense). In the lecture course itself, when Husserl uses the term "metaphysics," he uses it in the ordinary sense or in that of the philosopher in question.

As an aside, it would be interesting to investigate whether Heidegger's project of a metaphysics, which he pursues in his "metaphysical decade," in the 1930s, could be construed as an execution of this project, which is never worked out in detail by Husserl.

evolved is contingent, that is, it was not necessary that consciousness would come on the scene (in the meandering course of evolution) and from there humans, who ultimately do phenomenology. Yet in spite of its contingency, it is worth studying it as well and worth attempting to detect principles and norms that govern this factum world.

Yet it is only through phenomenology that we can even begin to address and eventually answer the "ultimate and highest questions" of this factum in which we live. As he told his students once: "But indeed [it will be possible] in the near future, through the power of this new rigorous scientific method, which we will get to know as 'phenomenological', to truly get a grasp on those sought for, but also much-maligned, problems of metaphysics, about the ultimate meaning of the world and human life, the time-honored goals of highest human striving for cognition, thus also about God, Freedom, and Immortality, to carry out rigorous scientific investigations with, correspondingly, secured results" (Hua-Mat IX, p. 6).

To give an example, one of the principles of the irrational factum world Husserl detects is its teleology—*eide* do not have developmental forms. This world, in its historical course, has an inherent telos, which governs its factual evolution. The philosophical consideration of this world necessitates the positing of such a teleology, as a limit idea, for otherwise the factum of the world would be meaningless, and hence, absent the assumption of such a telos, living in it would be rendered meaningless and lead to despair. It is from here that Husserl discusses existential phenomena such as personal crises and the loss of hope. This is a phenomenologically justified "existentialism."

Husserl has not worked out such a phenomenological metaphysics in detail. He mentions it a few times in his published writings; in the *Nachlass* order of his manuscripts, Husserl designated a separate section to "Theology, teleology, metaphysics" (E III), which touch on "limit problems" lying on the fringes of phenomenological description and evidence. A selection of these (rather scant) texts have now been published in Hua. LX (here, pp. 3–263). This is not the place to discuss Husserl's project of a "phenomenological metaphysics" as second philosophy. Only its contrast to and dependency upon eidetic phenomenology as first philosophy should be explicated here.

viii. *"First Phenomenology" as Self-Critique of Phenomenological Experience (Apodictic Critique).*[53]

Finally, a last task for phenomenology deserves to be mentioned, which is that of a "first *phenomenology*" (which does not exist in name) that would have the same relation to "ordinary" phenomenology as that between first philosophy and second philosophies. What Husserl means by such a higher-order investigation also functions under the headings of "phenomenology of phenomenology" or a "critique of critique." Once phenomenology has been established and has embarked on its daily business, it too still operates with a "higher naiveté," since its own work and the experience it scrutinizes have not, in turn, been subjected to a critique. If the first naiveté of the natural attitude is dislodged through the reduction, the phenomenologist, if she has not investigated her own work, is left with a "naiveté of the higher level" or a "second general thesis" (of the transcendental attitude). Without doing so, phenomenology is "*carried out in a certain uncritical naiveté*" (Hua. XXXV, p. 344). As he says: "In the *transcendental sphere* I have bracketed the universal presupposition of the natural thesis of the world. I proceed in this manner without presuppositions, so long as I experience and think purely transcendentally (transcendental justification). But is transcendental experiencing without presuppositions? Does it not also require a critique? *Second, transcendental general thesis*: I am, I, the concrete ego, while the entire world, also I as human being, is bracketed. A new universe" (ibid., p. 406).[54]

Hence, following especially the critiques the early German idealists brought forth against Kant—as in Reinhold, e.g., who claimed that Kant had provided the results but not the premises of his critique—Husserl, too, sees the need to carry out a self-critique of phenomenology to overcome the naïve first method of description. Such a self-critique investigates, as he writes in *Cartesian Meditations*, "the range and limits, but also the modes of apodicticity" (Hua. I, pp. 177f.).

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[53] This project is, once more, to be distinguished by what Husserl and his last assistant Fink later discuss under the title of a "phenomenology of phenomenology." On this project and in its distinction from the apodictic critique of the early 1920s, cf. Goossens 2002 and Luft 2002.

[54] From a manuscript, presumably of 1915, entitled, "Levels of Justification."

This recalls the distinction between the two modes of evidence that Husserl discerns in the early 1920s, adequate and apodictic evidence. The importance of this distinction cannot be overstated. Phenomenology in general studies the various types of evidence; yet not every evidence is ultimately "trustworthy," so to speak. Only laying bare what can count as apodictic evidence (and distinguishing it from evidence that is *merely adequate*) can fulfill the demand for an ultimate justification of evidences that *cannot in principle* be falsified. The demand for an apodictic critique is thus not an invitation for high-flying speculation, but rather the reining in of the sphere of apodicticity *within* the field of evident experience.[55]

The story of this apodictic critique deserves to be recounted briefly. This critique is mentioned, as noted earlier, at the end of the *Cartesian Meditations* and stated there as a desideratum. However, as also noted earlier, Husserl did perform this critique in the 1922/23 lecture course *Introduction to Philosophy*. Though left unpublished, Husserl himself drew attention to it later; e.g., he mentions this text in a footnote in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (cf. Hua. XVII, p. 295). Yet, both the transcriptor of these manuscripts of 1922/23, Husserl's assistant Landgrebe, and Kern, an editor of three *Husserliana* volumes, downplay or even ignore it. For instance, Kern claims that Husserl has "postponed [this critique] *ad Calendas Graecas*" (Kern 1964, p. 202), thus stating a factual error. It is only with this self-critique that the project of a complete ground-laying of phenomenology comes to its completion.[56] Whether it really *was* completed in view of the rather puzzling fact that Husserl carried out this critique in 1922/23 and referred to it in 1929 but never published it, will have to be the topic of further research.

One last comment on Husserl's conception of phenomenology as first philosophy. Using these terms in contemporary philosophy has a rather adverse effect to many working in the areas of epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and even phenomenology itself. Grandiose notions of "first philosophy" grounding all other scientific endeavors

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[55] Thus, this "critique of critique" is to be distinguished from Fink's indeed speculative VI. *Cartesian Meditation*, which is, as Fink claims, a piece of "constructive" phenomenology.

[56] For a detailed explication of these historical circumstances, cf. Goossens 2002.

and system-building have come out of fashion in much of contemporary philosophy. For this reason, it might seem a challenge to make this aspect of Husserl, doubtlessly the most important to its author, palatable to contemporary philosophy. Might this translation ultimately do its author bad rather than good? Two comments may be permitted here.

First, the exposition on what first philosophy means to Husserl in all of its complexity should make it clear that it is anything but a naïve approach to these issues or a superficial, merely brushed up "neo-Cartesianism." In anything he wrote, Husserl was never trivial. His thought and its meditative style are both difficult and rewarding. Understanding and appreciating what one of the greatest mind of 20th century philosophy meant continues to be a challenge and will further require careful study and interpretation, and at any rate cannot be put off easily. Philosophy the way Husserl understood it knows no fashions.

Secondly, it is undoubtedly the case that the notion of phenomenology as first philosophy is something for which even contemporary phenomenologists, even those considering themselves "Husserlian," feel a sense of embarrassment. Here is not the place to launch a defense of Husserl's project. However, those who reject notions such as foundationalism, idealism, and first philosophy will find in Husserl one of their staunchest and most sophisticated defenders. Although those who engage with these ideas might end up rejecting them, they will find that Husserl's project cannot easily be dismissed and will continue to require strenuous attention and a sophisticated response.

With these different meanings of the term Husserl used to title this lecture course clarified, we now turn to a brief overview over the themes treated in the course.

II. OVERVIEW OVER THE LECTURE & SURVEY OF MAIN THEMES

The present section is not meant to recount the content of the lecture in greater detail, but merely to present its composition and arrangement and then some of the main themes.

As mentioned, the lecture course is separated into two quite different halves: the critical history of ideas, which was presented in the

winter semester, and the theory of the phenomenological reduction, which was presented in the spring semester. Despite Husserl's efforts, the systematic connection between the halves is spurious at best; and to repeat, it is not clear why the second half proceeds in a completely new vein before having brought the historical part to a satisfying end. But both treat very interesting topics. Husserl directly addresses himself to his audience in the lectures, which sometimes directly continue the previous lecture's train of thought nearly uninterruptedly, at other times start with completely new material, and at yet other times deliberately interrupt the train of thought to reflect back on what has been achieved before moving on. Once again, given the complexity of the matters, the presentation is masterful from a heuristic point of view: rarely overly convoluted and (arguably) not too difficult even for beginners, yet never trivial.

1. *Part I (Critical History of Ideas)*

i. *Critical history of ideas as critical history of problems and the dialectics of the history of western philosophy*

Husserl does not discuss his word choice for his historical meditations, titled "*kritische Ideengeschichte*." Yet from his systematic ambition it should be clear that an English rendering as something like "intellectual history" (in the way practiced by, e.g., intellectual historians such as Isaiah Berlin[57]) would be wholly inadequate. It is completely blind to "non-philosophical" factors, such as the thinkers' social reality, and is a completely philosophical affair. It is perhaps helpful to assume that this phrasing is Husserl's term for what the Neo-Kantians called *history of problems* (*Problemgeschichte*), as a historiography focused on the development of philosophical ideas and problems. Yet there are some differences, as we shall see. In general,

[57] Berlin writes: "Historians are concerned with the discovery, description and explanation of the social aspects and consequences of what men have done and suffered." (Berlin 2013, p. 7) And later about his method: it is "a kind of transcendental deduction (in the Kantian sense) of historical truth. It is a method of arriving not, as hitherto, at an unchanging reality via its changing appearances, but as a changing reality—men's history—through its systematically changing modes of expression." (ibid., p. 15).

the guiding idea is that the sequence of philosophers (with a focus on the Western canon) is not a disrupted and idiosyncratic sequence of isolated thinkers. Instead, the history of the West (here covering exclusively philosophy and the sciences[58]) is a *systematically ordered* succession of thinkers, led off by a primal institution of this tradition by the seminal thinkers in Ancient Greece, who conceive the paradigm of Western thought: the pursuit of Truth in a scientific fashion (method) and the concomitant institution of the form of life belonging to it, the persona of the Researcher, dedicating her life to this pursuit. Both are ideal types, that is, never fully realized in the history of the West, but timeless ideals to be emulated—and an ideal to fall short of.

A present-day reader will notice that Husserl focuses exclusively on, and clearly favors, the West. Hence the accusation that he is Eurocentric cannot be dismissed easily. He does, however, consider elsewhere[59] that there are other "main" traditions in the factum of the world, such as India or China. They, too, present basic "anthropological types," though on his view they are inferior to the West.[60] In general, and this goes for all such types, once such a tradition has been "primally instituted" ("*urgestiftet*"), the story continues as a run-off of sedimentations, perhaps leading to novel institutions ("*Neustiftungen*") *within* this tradition, either revitalizing the old (as in the European Renaissance), or also inaugurating completely new ones, or, as in the West, falling into a deep crisis over the very meaning of its guiding idea around the end of the nineteenth century.

There is, however, a crucial difference from the Neo-Kantian history of problems. The latter historiography sees each subsequent thinker respond to questions that are left open by the predecessors; put dif-

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[58] In this sense, Husserl would agree with the scope of Cassirer's history of problems focused on the problem of cognition "in philosophy and the sciences in modernity." Cf. Cassirer 1994.

[59] Cf. Husserl 2010.

[60] Husserl leaves open whether other anthropological types exist, such as native African or American ones. A charitable reading would concede that, though Husserl does not mention them, his mere ignorance of them kept him from touching on them. Such a reading would be corroborated by Husserl's favorable reception of research into so-called "primitives" by the French ethnologist Lucien Lévy-Brühl or of Cassirer's investigations into myth as a symbolic form.

ferently, the newer research solves old problems, only to raise new ones, which are then those with which the next generation is occupied (and so on), in the Neo-Kantian parlance of "*Gaben*" (givens) being "*Aufgaben*" (tasks) for further and never-ending research. As this type of historiography sees it, each thinker in her way transcends her contingencies and rises to the realm of pure ideas, where she partakes in an atemporal conversation, spanning across the millennia. In this way, the conversation continues, not in order to reach a highest goal, but in order to keep culture alive. History of problems, in other words, is not at all times teleological, at times it is regressive, disrupted, or changes course.

By contrast, the way Husserl sees the history of Western science and philosophy is a seemingly endless struggle between the builders and the destroyers; those, in other words, who build the edifice of science, and those (the Skeptics in different guises), who continually tear down what the former have achieved. The ones who tear down reappear in different shapes, yet all stemming from the same "hydra of skepticism."[61] It is not until phenomenology comes on the scene that the beast is finally put to death and the path towards science, approximating itself infinitely to this limit idea, is taken. As of then, the teleology of science can begin, approaching Truth asymptotically. It is not that phenomenology has discovered such a teleology; Husserl only claims to have finally gotten the idea of an infinite progress started on a secure footing.

It should also be noted that the history Husserl tells is not a seamless one from antiquity to modernity. The period of the Middle Ages is entirely leaped over; Husserl seems to endorse a narrative that celebrates the birth of science and philosophy in ancient Greece, holds that they were forgotten and obscured in the "dark" middle ages, and were re-awakened in the Renaissance when the perennial discoveries of the Ancients were reborn and instituted anew.

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[61] Such a view, it may be argued, of the skeptical challenge is rather naïve after Kant and especially Hegel. Kant sought to find a middle path between skepticism and dogmatism through his transcendental method. Hegel sought to integrate and disarm the Skeptic through his dialectical method. In the Neo-Kantian history of ideas we also find a Hegelian motive; rather than tearing down, the Skeptic is elegantly woven into the story told by showing how they brought forth valid points, to which the successors responded constructively. Husserl's skeptic is purely destructive.

Indeed, the rebirth of the ancient spirit struggles with the same enemy, skepticism. The skeptical deterrents of modernity are not wholly without merit, however, for along the way they do give important impulses, which were distractions from the grand path of science at the time, but, once purified to their real intentions, can be positively taken up into the edifice of science. This is the way Husserl reads, for instance, the British Empiricists, who conceive of the idea of a "science of the psyche," however inadequately, but whose truth will be redeemed with phenomenology. The term Husserl also uses for his enterprise, "transcendental empiricism," shows that he sees phenomenology as the grand synthesis of the main tendencies of modern philosophy.

ii. *Husserl's Interpretation of the Main Figures in Western Philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Kant & the Neo-Kantians)*

This text presents the most sustained treatment of some major figures in their historical sequence in Husserl's oeuvre. This belies the old saw that Husserl had no knowledge about the history of philosophy. His interest is self-serving, as Husserl does not intend to present these figures in their historical context and with a textual-philological fidelity.[62] So the reader should not look to this text to enlighten her about Socrates, Plato or others. Husserl, instead, sees their impulses charitably as leading to and culminating in phenomenology. Although Husserl has been mocked for his historical naiveté and although it cannot be denied that he read the classics in the Western canon rarely in the original, nor even in primal sources, what Husserl says about the philosopher in question is always interesting and insightful, especially in his criticism. Husserl's discussions of Locke, Berkeley, Hume are quite engaging and keen, especially as he then goes on to highlight their shortcomings and point to how phenomenology overcomes them. For instance, he demonstrates how empiricism harbors hidden prejudices, such as objectivism and psychologism, and how the natural-scientific

[62] It should be noted that philological or historical fidelity is rarely the interest of original philosophers dealing with thinkers of the past. Consider, e.g., Hegel or Heidegger.

paradigm guiding the early moderns kept them from developing a true science of consciousness. Lecture 18 gives a succinct critique of empiricism's theory of abstraction and how its correct intuitions can be rendered fruitful by an eidetic science of pure consciousness.

While Husserl treats Kant rather as an aside, his interlocutors are oftentimes, though not named, his contemporary Neo-Kantians. Several of the critiques he launches—such as that of Kant's regressive method—are really comments on Neo-Kantian interpretations of Kant. Perhaps Husserl wanted to limit his critique to Kant and keep up the good relations he had with the big names at the time, such as Natorp and Rickert.

2. *Part II (Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction)*

At the beginning of the spring semester, the lecture course briefly resumes the topics of the idea of philosophy in history and the image of the ideal philosopher and her radicalism, but then quickly (as of Lecture 31) turns to what the title of Part II announces: a theory of the phenomenological reduction. The rest of the lecture course is dedicated to this theme, broadly speaking. Here are some themes that are especially important and noteworthy:

i. *Opening up the full scope of transcendental subjectivity*

The phenomenological reduction is the entrance gate into transcendental phenomenology. Hence, a sustained reflection on how one can make one's way into phenomenology, apart from the historical path in the first part of the lecture course, is an organic part of a systematic introduction to transcendental phenomenology. One element of such a reflection on the method also addresses what exactly the "yield" is once one "reduces." It is clearly not a reduction to a *solus ipse* (Lecture 36), but rather an opening up of a sphere of egoic experience, insofar as it is world-constituting in the broadest sense. Hence "transcendental experience and its content: transcendental life" is the topic of phenomenology's investigations. Husserl is intent on laying out the "full content of the universal transcendental self-experience" (Lecture 39), which he also pursues in its temporal dimensions. Elements of his phenomenology of internal time-consciousness are presented here in

brief but succinct terms (Lectures 39–40). All of this is meant to show how phenomenology encompasses all spheres of experience, transcendentally purified. The question becomes, next, how is it possible to gain such an overview?[63]

ii. *The phenomenology of the phenomenological attitude and the splitting of the ego*

One of the most interesting aspects of this text is the discussion of the nature of the phenomenological attitude. A discussion of the nature of the ego who "phenomenologizes" is known mainly through Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* and Husserl's annotations to it (Hua.-Dok. II/1 & 2). But the text stemming from Fink is not to obfuscate that there is a discussion of this theme in Husserl's own texts as well. That is to say, this discussion of the attitude of the phenomenologist of 1924 is, albeit brief, the *only sustained treatment of this topic stemming from Husserl himself*. Although compact (Lectures 41–43), these analyses are highly suggestive, as they discuss how the act of phenomenologizing relates to other acts of "ordinary" life. Husserl begins with an analysis of this ordinary life. Life is a constant splitting of the ego, in which the ego pursues different interests and egoic streams. This description is a subjective account, one could say, of how the ego lives in the world (as lifeworld). According to his presentation, one is always caught in a certain stream of consciousness, pursuing a certain interest, while other interests do exist but are not currently operative. In his terminology, the ego is constantly living in a stream of consciousness, but without reflecting on it, straight-forwardly, or (as he calls it) patently, while other streams are currently latent (e.g., while I pursue my job, my interest in painting lies patent, dormant, in passivity, but can be awakened at any time). The life of the ego is thusly always split, living is being split apart in different interests, which cannot always be unified or harmonized; writes Husserl: "*egoic life in activity* is nothing but *a constantly-splitting-itself-in-active-comportment*" (below, p. 294).

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[63] Reminding the reader of the distinction between apodictic and adequate evidence, Husserl is here clearly no longer concerned with the foundational issue of apodictic evidence, but pursues evidence in all shapes and forms, so to speak.

From this, the specific act of *doing* phenomenology is motivated as an extension from that of reflection. An act of reflection reflects on another act, which is currently patent. But once the reflecting-I reflects on this reflecting, the former act is latent, while the current act, doing the reflecting, is patent, and so on.

It is this structure that Husserl now exploits to motivate the shift to the phenomenological attitude. As opposed to an endless iteration of these reflections, which would amount to an infinite regress, Husserl posits the idea of an I of reflection, which reflects on *all* egoic acts in the natural attitude in general. Voilà arises the phenomenologizing ego, the *attitude* of the phenomenologist who is no longer "interested" in specific pursuits but has established herself in a "pure interest in the subjective being" (below, p. 309); thus a particular interest that is targeted at this subjective being. Vis-à-vis Fink's (from Husserl's point of view) quasi-problem of how one can truly break with the natural attitude, Husserl motivates it as a natural extension of reflection, "always already" occurring in the natural attitude, to a universalization of this reflection into a separate *attitude* (not merely an act of reflection). Given the characterization of life in the natural attitude as interest-driven and Husserl's radical distinction of the latter from a "pure interest" (not pursuing any worldly interests) in the act of phenomenologizing, it is also hard to see as salient Merleau-Ponty's famous critique that "the reduction can never be complete." Had Husserl known of this critique, he would have found it quite easy to rebut: Of course, the ego who does phenomenology remains a citizen, father, mother, and so on, but is able to drop all particular interests *for a certain time period*, in order then to return to the world, but with a changed outlook, compared to a religious conversion (cf. Hua. VI, p. 140).

iii. *The novel presentation of the reduction and phenomenology as transcendental idealism (departure from Cartesianism?)*

The final section turns to a different theme within Husserl's methodology, one which vexed him for a long time, and continued to haunt him: if phenomenology deals with the egoic life in all its forms, how is this not just some form of psychology? How do descriptive psychology and transcendental phenomenology differ? This is a question Husserl

had to confront due to his unfortunate labeling of phenomenology as "descriptive psychology" in the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, and he will return to it as late as the *Crisis*. It is at this point in the lecture course that Husserl distinguishes between the Cartesian path into phenomenology—focusing on the indubitable ego cogito as a first entry point—and what he calls the path via "intentional psychology." This leads him to proclaim a novel, "second path" into the reduction, the so-called psychological path (as of lecture 46). The talk of "opening up a novel path" is, however, nothing entirely new given the previous train of thought of that semester. Rather, Husserl exploits what he has achieved earlier in his meticulous laying bare of the field of phenomenological research. Phenomenology is parallel to intentional psychology (if such a discipline ever existed[64]), with the difference that the field of phenomenology is *transcendental*, i.e., world-constituting subjectivity, not, as "the mental," a layer of being in the world (the mind of human beings). This presents a different way into the reduction than the way via the indubitability of the ego cogito, insofar as the latter goes to the transcendental ego in the most direct fashion, only to then face the problem that this ego is putatively a "tag-end of the world," as he says in *Cartesian Meditations*. This path is, while "still retaining its right,"[65] also most prone to misunderstandings. With the psychological path, he hopes to put to rest the critics who focus exclusively on the Cartesian path.

Interesting in this context is Husserl's discussion of the famous hypothesis of the annihilation of the world and the remaining "residuum," the ego cogito, from *Ideas I* (cf. Hua. III/1, p. 104). There Husserl claims, controversially, that even if I hypothesize that the whole world were "nullified," "*the being of consciousness would be modified, to be sure*, […] *but would not be affected in its own existence*. […] *Hence, no real being* […] *is necessary for the being of consciousness itself*" (ibid.). This passage has fanned the flames of those who claimed that the reduction means a retreat to a pure region of consciousness, regardless

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[64] Cf. the critical discussion in Crowell (2002).

[65] Cf. Hua. XXIX, p. 426 (from 1937), "If one introduces the epoché without the historical thematic, then the problem of the lifeworld or of universal history remains to be tackled [*kommt hinten nach*]. The introduction of the *Ideas* does retain its right, but I consider the historical path now more principal and more systematic."

whether or not its correlate, the experienced world, turned out to be either a chaotic "swarm" or a naught. Husserl returns to this controversial passage in *First Philosophy*. Taken seriously, this hypothesis would lead to the charge of a self-encapsulated ego, which existed (along with its stream of consciousness), even if nothing else did. It is not entirely clear how Husserl now interprets this quite problematic thought experiment. Rather than calling it wrong-headed or too extreme, he now seems to argue that it is one possibility one can ponder to discover transcendental subjectivity in its life and its content (where it is irrelevant whether its referent "out there" exists or not). Another possibility is simply to "leave aside" this path and ask:

"Let us, instead, start out with the natural naive I, which carries out any random acts and thereby is related in the natural manner to any random intentional objects. Then we can, at first without thinking of a transcendental subjectivity, without having any ideas about it whatsoever, carry out with respect to every individual act a similar Epoché in a manner just as easily comprehensible as the one which we, related to the world and its experience, carried out on the Cartesian path." (below, p. 330)

Rather than facing the hypothesis head-on, Husserl seems to sidestep it here in favor of another path, which is equally possible. But that path has already been undertaken since the Christmas break. The psychological path is thus nothing but the path taken so far in this lecture, leaving aside the issue of the apodicticity of the ego (and hence the question of whether the world it experiences has to exist or not) and focusing on the stream of consciousness and what is given in it. Such an investigation is only seemingly a psychology because it focuses on consciousness as *transcendental*, i.e., world-constituting, irrespective of any ontological commitments to either the being of the ego or of the world. This is what Landgrebe later called "departure from Cartesianism." I will discuss below Landgrebe's reading and its influence.

The rest of the lecture course gives a final presentation of phenomenology as the true philosophy and makes some bold statements on phenomenology's meaning as transcendental idealism and at the same time as fulfilling Leibniz' idea of a monadology.

3. *Summary: Core Topics of the Main Text of the Volume*

To summarize, these are the major themes of this text in the light of Husserl's earlier position and his entire oeuvre:

i. *The idea of a system of phenomenology and its systematic introduction*

Husserl's earlier publications, *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas I*, were meant as programmatic introductions to phenomenology. His later published writings were, even more so, *mainly* intended as introductions to phenomenology, hardly giving any idea of the scope of phenomenological *work*. What Husserl clearly wanted as of his mature period (the 1920s) was an overview over the *system of phenomenology*, giving an idea of the topics within this system. But this, in turn, could not be established without a comprehensive, *systematic introduction*. What makes the introduction systematic here is the insight that one cannot merely "jump into" phenomenology, that is, without a systematic exposition of what it is that phenomenology does, of why it is necessary and important, and of its method. In no other text (with the exception of the 1922/23 lecture) does Husserl attempt such a systematic introduction. In this effort, he aligns himself with the great systematic efforts in that tradition, such as Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*, Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, and Hegel's preface and introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Perhaps the latter's text, providing a ladder into the system of philosophy, which is itself written from the standpoint of science, comes closest to what Husserl wished to accomplish here, despite all differences. In Hegel's ingenious presentation, the historical sequence of stages of consciousness is but the antithesis of the systematic order of these stages; Husserl's presentation, as a dialectical battle between system builders and skeptics, may be read in a similar spirit.

ii. *The place of phenomenology in the history of Western philosophy*

Husserl attempts to account for phenomenology's place within the project of Western philosophy and science writ large. His insistence

on phenomenology's position of uniqueness, as he sees it, is nothing new, and neither is his almost existential antagonism against skepticism in its various forms,[66] but both motives are here put together in a grand historico-systematic synthetic narrative. Phenomenology, in his mind, is the secret desire of Western philosophy because it finally puts philosophy on the path of a rigorous science, a basis from which all other sciences can find their foundation and on which eventually all highest and ultimate questions of metaphysics can be answered. Phenomenology is the fulfillment and execution of the great systematic ideals and ambitions of Western philosophy.

iii. *The breadth of the phenomenological reduction and phenomenology as transcendental idealism*

Finally, Husserl in the second half opens up a new path to the transcendental reduction, thereby critiquing the limitations and shortcomings of the Cartesian path, which was the only one known publicly from *Ideas I* of 1913. Given the criticism that this 1913 presentation of phenomenology received, what he delivers in *First Philosophy* is a remarkable systematic accomplishment in its own right, opening up the systematic space for the last path, the ontological path through the lifeworld, which Husserl publicly presents in the *Crisis*. But the three "traditional" paths (Cartesian, psychological, ontological) are merely a selection of other paths one can go. *All roads, rigorously pursued, lead to the reduction*[67] and into the realm of world-constituting transcendental subjectivity. But this structure, when fully unfolded, has intersubjective and genetic dimensions. This is the larger systematic lesson to learn from this text: Husserl wants to hammer home the point that his phenomenology is not just another form of Cartesianism with its concomitant solipsism and problematic ego metaphysics. Indeed it includes an intersubjective reduction; this appears nearly as

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[66] His later venomous pronouncements against "contemporary existentialism" are to be seen in this light: to him, they are nothing but contemporary iterations of skepticism.

[67] As Husserl tries to show in another manuscript (probably meant to be an article critical of Heidegger), even Heidegger's signature question as to the being of the entities leads to the reduction, cf. Hua. XXXIV, pp. 264–278. On the evidence of this text being the basis of such an article, cf. Janes/Luft 2019.

an afterthought but Husserl is eager to mention it at the end, in the long lecture 53b. Once this obstacle has been cleared away, it becomes plain that phenomenology thereby becomes the true and only all-encompassing transcendental idealism, fulfilling Kant's vision, and at the same time a transcendental monadology, fulfilling Leibniz's vision.

A word, finally, about the presentation of the material in this lecture course. It has often been noted that some of Husserl's best writings are to be found in his lecture courses, where he ostensibly makes the attempt to present material, difficult as it may be, in a clear and comprehensible form to his students. This is especially the case with *First Philosophy*, not only because the text was to be used as a basis for Husserl's systematic work and was more carefully crafted than other lectures courses, but also because Husserl apparently made special effort to present the most important beginning steps in complete clarity. Thus, those verdicts, meant to mock Husserl on his obscurity and his monological, non-communicative delivery, are proven wrong in this text (as regards the main lecture). Not only is Husserl for the most part (arguably) crystal clear in laying out difficult material (also in the excursuses and digressions, although they veer off topic), he also has an open ear for his listeners and sympathizes with their difficulties in comprehension. To give an example, Husserl acknowledges at the beginning of lecture 45 that "I have been told that the last lectures have been perceived as fairly difficult" (below, p. 323),[68] and he devotes that lecture to a systematic summary of his path of thought up to that point, deviating from his original plan to push forward. Several other passages in the lecture course are of this sort. This clearly shows that he had his students' comprehension in mind, which at the moment trumped his own systematic intentions.[69] This lecture course considered as a whole, despite its failure to deliver a comprehensive presentation of Husserl's thought, is nonetheless a highlight of pedagogical acumen and sensitivity, given the complexity of the material. It is due to Husserl's pedagogical skills that this text may be suitable for

[68] Indeed, the discussion of positing and quasi-positing consciousness and, accordingly, epoché and quasi-epoché in lecture 44 is by far the most difficult passage of the lecture course and an excellent example of Husserl's talent for microscopic analysis.

[69] Cf. also the passage invoking pedagogical principles of Herbart, cf. below, p. 327.

a systematic introduction to his philosophy and even preferable to his own published "Introductions," which many first readers perceive as frustratingly dense and opaque. Husserl might not have been the sort of orator people remembered with awe, such as Fichte, but it would be a good thing to finally let go of the old verdict that Husserl was a boring and uninspiring pedagogue.

III. THEMES FROM THE SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS

As mentioned many times, the bulk of Husserl's work consists in his manuscripts, which were written almost daily in the form of monological meditations. It is in these writings that Husserl formulates, as he insists several times, his most important insights.[70] However, these texts were for the most part not written with an eye towards publication; rather, they present Husserl's internal train of thought and they contain diversions, seldom pursue only one idea, and contradict themselves or lead to conclusions where Husserl himself wonders whether his thoughts could have been correct. That they were written only for himself also means that their style is rather crude, with many elliptical sentences (which only make sense with editorial emendations), missing verbs, convoluted (sometimes faulty) grammar, and so on. Many of these private texts have, in turn, annotations, which have the character of self-critiques, sometimes even damning judgments. The attraction of these meandering texts, and their meta-comments, lies clearly in their open-endedness and in the privilege of being able to observe the phenomenologist's innermost thoughts. One should not always expect, then, clear-cut conclusions and finely constructed arguments. While these texts clearly contain Husserl's most important insights, they are not always on display explicitly. As Iso Kern once said, these texts do not so much convey what Husserl knew, but rather what he *did not*

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[70] Cf. letter to Roman Ingarden from October 11, 1933: "Strange times. Can I work, can I live, de-nationalized as non-Arian? It was hard enough, finally I have forced myself, and I am back to work now for the last three months, almost with my old energy, despite being 75. [I am working] on my *Nachlass*! Posterity will seek it." (Hua-Dok. III/3, p. 291). Cf. also Luft/Wehrle 2017, pp. 114f.

know.[71] It is for this reason that the manuscripts are some of the most difficult material of the phenomenologist's oeuvre to assess, but also some of the most exciting writings he left to posterity.

Nonetheless, the supplemental texts of this volume, appended to the main lecture by Husserl himself or selected by the editor, do revolve around some main themes, which shall briefly be mentioned here. The status of these texts—this much must be clear—is not that they are mere musings on the side, but present important digressions, deepenings and systematic additions to the publicly available material and are deemed by some as even more important than the published material (including lecture courses, which were, after all, public). At the same time, they rarely pursue one train of thought, but show Husserl's mind wandering freely in texts, which at times roll along aimlessly, at others peter out (somewhat disappointingly), at still others abound with flourish and energy, sometimes even rhetorical panache. The quantity of the material presented here amounts to about half of the main text, though perhaps it would have been desirable to include much more (on the criteria for selecting these texts, cf. section V below). But in order to keep this volume manageable, a certain focus had to be placed on texts in closer proximity to the main text. Here are some of the dominant (though by far not exhaustive) themes treated here:

1. *Discussions of figures in the history of modern philosophy: Descartes, Kant, others (e.g., the Neo-Kantians)*

As mentioned, in the first half of the lecture course, Husserl is quite selective about whom he treats (mainly Socrates-Plato-Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Berkeley). Descartes is touched upon very briefly, as are Leibniz and Kant. In the notes, however, Husserl devotes much more time to these seminal figures in modern philosophy. It is especially Descartes whose philosophy is discussed on many occasions in those contexts where Husserl seeks to determine his position vis-à-vis that of Descartes, most importantly regarding the topics of the (Cartesian) way into phenomenology and the different forms of evidence. As is usual in his treatment of others, Husserl never deals directly with

[71] Cf. Hua. XIII, pp. xviii–xx.

Descartes' writings, but rather in spirit. "Descartes" serves the function of a certain type ("*Gestalt*") of philosophy against which Husserl plays off. Nonetheless, judging from the index of names, Descartes gets mentioned with greatest frequency.

Yet there are also other philosophers Husserl mentions in the manuscripts, especially his contemporaries (who are entirely absent in the lecture course). While he makes scant references to the British Idealists (the "Cambridge Platonists," cf. below, p. 88), there are many overt and more often veiled references to his immediate predecessors and contemporaries in the German-speaking world (Fries, Brentano, Lotze). Interestingly, he also treats the American Pragmatist James,[72] but especially the Neo-Kantians, who were the dominant philosophers in the German-speaking lands during Husserl's time and whom he had to contend with *nolens volens*. He rarely deals openly with figures from the Southwest and Marburg Schools (an exception is Text No. 4), but the way he phrases and understands Kant's procedure and task is oftentimes informed by his knowledge of Kant's contemporary representatives. For instance, instead of the common term "*Erkenntnistheorie*" and its adjective "*erkenntnistheoretisch*" (epistemology, epistemological), he at times uses the term "*Erkenntniskritik*" and "*erkenntniskritisch*," which are technical terms of the Marburg Neo-Kantians. Where the translation does not convey the reference contained in the original, these usages have been marked in footnotes. When dealing with Kant and his newer iterations, Husserl makes it plain that his own attachment to Kant is quite different from the Neo-Kantians. Phenomenology, as Husserl seems to imply, is informed by Kant, but is not another version of (Neo-)Kantianism.[73] Regardless of what one makes of Husserl's treatment of these figures, these texts shore up the impression that Husserl was "stewing in his own juices" and took little notice of other philosophers and their writings.

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[72] Cf. below, p. 170 VII/165.

[73] On Husserl's relation to Kant and Kantianism, cf. also Luft 2018.

2. *Self-critical reflections*

Husserl's self-critique is vast, circumspect, and multi-layered. Arguably, there is hardly a thinker so self-critical and honest about his own shortcomings, as he sees them, although admittedly in private notes. His self-criticisms range from quibbles with the presentation of the material (including terminology) and its arrangement in the lecture course to substantial disagreements with the very claims he makes there. Husserl, the private philosopher, is (as it were) constantly looking over the shoulders of the public professor, who is the celebrated founding father of the Phenomenological Movement, speaking *ex cathedra*. It has already been remarked that there is an almost schizophrenic contrast between the self-confident leader of the world of phenomenology on the lectern and the shy, humble, and oftentimes self-deprecating thinker writing from his private quarters (and at times in his life suffering from depression that the twain shall never meet). Especially for those not amused by the Husserl of the grand announcements in his published writings, reading these manuscripts, as difficult as they may be at times, can be a healthy antidote. Such readers may come to appreciate a wholly different thinker here, one who is fully devoted to the "small change" of minute descriptions and fine distinctions.

As a maxim, when reading these self-critical passages it is good hermeneutic practice to not always assume the private Husserl is (more) correct than the public persona, and then to use these passages as cases in point. It is, in other words, tempting to use such passages to argue in Husserl's or even one's own favor ("but Husserl also says …,"), in order to confront critics. These meditations, rather, have the character of inner dialogues, dialogues which are rarely settled and decided. This wavering on many issues is precisely a reason for reading them, if one wants to keep alive Husserl's very own notion of phenomenology as a working philosophy (*Arbeitsphilosophie*), with many open questions and problems.

To name a few of these internal criticisms, beginning with organization: Husserl is very critical of the arrangement of topics and the order of introducing them in the lecture. Especially text no. 10, which is Husserl's gloss on his assistant Landgrebe's written summary, gives a keen insight on what Husserl did not like about this public presen-

tation and how it could have been improved. This gives a peek not only into Husserl's manner of composition, but also into Husserl's underlying agenda.

Regarding content, Husserl is only slowly beginning to realize the importance the distinction between the two modes of evidence—adequate and apodictic—has for the self-critique of phenomenology. Its importance has already been discussed before; but this distinction can also be read in conjunction with Husserl's turn to genetic phenomenology in the same period (a topic that makes almost no appearance in the present texts), where Husserl, too, comes to realize the limits of phenomenological evidence and the need to expand the scope of analysis. A good amount of texts touch on the issue of evidence.

3. *Further ways into the reduction*

Another issue that takes up a great deal of space is Husserl's constant struggle to find the right, most convincing way into phenomenology. In this context, texts in which he reflects on his own intellectual development and his assessment of his earlier shortcomings (e.g., Text 20) illuminate his own view of his *Denkweg*. Husserl was especially dissatisfied with a systematic and persuasive presentation of the signature method, the phenomenological reduction. Many tests in the supplementary section attest to his constant wrangling with the issues.

As mentioned, the three "canonical" ways as identified by Kern are certainly not the only ways possible. Other ways are those via the positive sciences or via the critique of mundane experience. Husserl never arrives at a systematic order or a definitive number of these ways and their exact relation to each other. Yet the possible ways and paths of getting into the sphere of phenomenology are widely discussed in these texts and many others in his unpublished material (a larger selection of which is also available now in Hua. XXXIV). Several issues are never conclusively settled by their author, such as the clear distinction between intentional psychology and transcendental phenomenology, yet it is a nod to Husserl's philosophical honesty and righteousness never to have given up easily on these sticky points.

4. *Metaphysical and metaphilosophical reflections*

Finally, the manuscripts also contain a good number of reflections that may be called metaphysical (by Husserl's understanding, insofar as they concern the "last and ultimate questions") and that may also be called metaphilosophical (a term not used by Husserl). What I mean by the latter term concerns the role of philosophy in the canon of culture and its history (in the West) and more specifically phenomenology within this canon, superseding traditional philosophy's scope but fulfilling its guiding intentions, its "original idea" (*Ursprungsidee*). Some of these reflections also touch upon the topic of history, which will become an important theme in Husserl's last phase (the *Crisis* period) but which does not come out of nowhere, as evidenced here. Some of these texts have been well treated in the literature, and a few have become famous, such as text no. 26, which ends with the invocation that "history is the grand fact of being" (below, p. 633). Given that other texts have appeared since in the *Husserliana* on these topics (esp. in Hua. LX), the passages in the present translation can be placed in greater context within the horizon of Husserl's overall oeuvre, permitting us now to spell out the full scope of Husserl's thought, despite the quite fragmentary state in which its author left it to posterity.

IV. THE TEXT IN LIGHT OF THE EARLY RECEPTION

To grasp the importance of the present text, it is crucial to understand that this lecture course and the supplemental texts (thus both Hua. VII & VIII volumes in conjunction) made, by standards of the academy (especially in the age before the Internet), quite a splash in scholarship almost the moment they appeared. Within the first decade, a number of substantial reviews and review articles appeared by some of the big names in Germany at the time. Perhaps not surprisingly, this sustained reception took place in German-language scholarship alone and has no precedence in other languages. Nonetheless, this early reception has importantly shaped later readings of Husserl, as it has formed the view not only of this text, but of Husserl's philosophy in general in a significant manner. The way this happened is to be discussed here in brief terms.

To recall, after the war, Husserl was an almost entirely forgotten thinker, and those who remembered him knew him chiefly for his published works (mainly the *Logical Investigations*, and in any case most of his phenomenology prior to the transcendental turn[74]). That Husserl had things to say about figures in the history of philosophy and likened his phenomenology, now turned transcendental, to Leibniz', Kant's or Hegel's systems—indeed that he himself construed his phenomenology as a system—was completely unknown at the time. Among the first German reviewers of this lecture and the supplemental texts, there was hence almost a sense of being overwhelmed by a hitherto dormant force. Some of the things these reviewers claimed are quite problematic, some of it downright incorrect and unfair. But these early reviews cannot be ignored, since, as noted, they significantly shaped the subsequent reception of Husserl; and in a sense one can even say that the picture they drew of him was so dismal that they were directly responsible for the near-total neglect he suffered until ca. the 1990s, when he staged a slow renaissance.[75] The reviews in question are in large part responsible for the view of Husserl as the Cartesian, the solipsist, the mentalist, the armchair theoretician—a perfect backdrop and target for newer and more interesting approaches, be they in existential, ontological, hermeneutic, or other guises.

In the following, I cannot review these texts in detail, but will only highlight their central claims. I will spend a bit more time on the text by Husserl's own former assistant Ludwig Landgrebe, as it is by far the most influential of these texts, having been translated into English and other languages as well.[76]

Hans Wagner: Wagner (1917–2000), also called a "neo-neo-Kantian," influenced by Kant, Hegel, neo-Kantianism, and phenomenology, and at the time preparing his *magnum opus* "*Philosophie und Reflexion*" (1959), made the opening move by publishing, in 1953/54,

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[74] It is to be kept in mind that the full text of the *Crisis* did not appear until it was published in the *Husserliana* in 1962! Up until then, only part I (merely 18 pages!) of the publication of 1936 (published in Belgrade) was available.

[75] The new rise of Husserl at this point took place mainly in English-language scholarship, and the latter differs from the earlier English-language scholarship on Husserl in that it takes his transcendental project seriously.

[76] Other translations exist into Italian, Spanish, and French.

a lengthy review article in two installments in the first issue of the *Philosophische Rundschau*. The *Rundschau*, founded by the Heidegger student Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Helmut Kuhn (who had just returned to Germany from the United States[77]), was to become one of the most eminent philosophical journals in West Germany after the war. Wagner's review of 1953/54, the first text in the new journal, obviously does not yet include a discussion of the text of this volume. Rather, Wagner's article is a resume of everything that was available from Husserl at the time in the *Husserliana*: volumes I through V (thus *Cartesian Meditations* for the first time in German, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, and the three books of *Ideas*), including *Experience and Judgment* (reprinted in 1948) and excluding the *Crisis*, which was available only as the original fragment from 1936 and did not appear in full in the *Husserliana* until 1962. It is an important document of a highly talented philosopher trying to come to grips with Husserl after the war, and as such set the stage for the reception of *First Philosophy*, especially since he ends by announcing that more important material is to be expected from the further volumes of the *Husserliana*.

Wagner starts out by stating that a serious *Auseinandersetzung* with the oeuvre of the mature phenomenologist has not yet occurred.[78] And indeed, philosophers after Husserl's death had not had an opportunity to encounter the *full* Husserl. Wagner is keenly aware of the fact that most presentations of Husserl have occurred either directly through the lens of Heidegger or at the least have been influenced by him: "Here the characteristic tendency is characteristic to relate Husserl to Dilthey and Heidegger and to justify the former by placing him into the latters' proximity" (Wagner 1953/54, p. 3). Wagner explicitly does not want to succumb to this tendency (ibid., p. 4). Indeed, Wagner sees Husserl's

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[77] During his time in the United States, Kuhn (1899–1991) was professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, from 1937 to 1941, and Emory University, Atlanta, from 1947–1949. He then returned to Germany to become professor first in Erlangen, then from 1953–1967 in Munich.

[78] Wagner mentions the second-tier discussion waged by students of Rickert, Rudolf Zocher and Friedrich Kreis in articles of the early 1930s (cf. Wagner 1953/54, p. 1, n.), and the reply by Fink in his famous 1933 article in *Kant Studien*, which was endorsed by Husserl.

main themes and achievements in four "system-concepts", (*Systembegriffe*), which he discusses in a passage that deserves to be quoted:

"*Reduction* as the method of ultimate foundation; *pure subjectivity* and the latter on the one hand as that of the pure ego, characterized by primordial temporality, and on the other hand that of the pure (transcendental) ego; *constitution of the world* as a universal theme; *the problem of reason* as the idea of universal critique of reason. Now these system-concepts are without a doubt time-honored central concepts of any idealism and Husserl's phenomenology also construes itself explicitly as an *idealism*, as the true idealism" (ibid., p. 4).

These notions are "diametrically opposed" (ibid.) to Heidegger. Leaping over Heidegger (and Nicolai Hartmann too), Wagner is intent on connecting Husserl's true intentions with those of traditional (German) idealism and the last idealisms in the Neo-Kantian tradition (the late Natorp, Richard Hönigswald, Wagner himself). In this vein, Wagner applauds Husserl's method of reduction (which he reads as a method of finding an ultimate, indubitable foundation), which he sees on a similar trajectory as transcendental reflection in German idealism: "At the beginning of philosophy for classical idealism stands the transcendental reflection as does the reduction for phenomenological idealism." (ibid., p. 17).[79] From the selection of the key "system-concepts" it becomes clear that he sees Husserl in the transcendental tradition bequeathed by Kant. Importantly (regarding the theme of first philosophy), Wagner sees Husserl's phenomenology in the tradition of ultimate foundationalism. Yet "in this regard, Husserl has remained, to a significant degree, behind that which contemporary neo-Kantianism, especially those of its representatives who have dealt with Hegel, has accomplished" (ibid., p. 122).

Wagner's exposition of the Husserl he was able to glean from the works mentioned is a philosophically rich, though critical, rendition, connecting Husserl to classical German philosophical idealism. Such a contextualizing sets the stage for the reception of *First Philosophy*.

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[79] Wagner follows these laudatory remarks with a scathing critique, ibid., pp. 17–22. His main point is that in the distinction between world-constituting subjectivity and constituted world Husserl held on to a problematic (Platonic) "two-sphere theorem" (ibid., p. 21).

Dieter Henrich (1958):[80] Henrich (born 1927), a rising star in the philosophical scene in Germany at the time, is the next philosopher to devote a substantial text to Husserl. This text was published in the *Rundschau* on the heels of the publication of the first part of *First Philosophy* (Hua. VII). Henrich, too, looks to phenomenology as a project in the tradition of German Idealism, that is, of wanting to furnish a "philosophical ultimate justification" (Henrich 1958, p. 1). This project is launched, he adds, in contradistinction from Heidegger, stepping out of the "shadow of the enormous success of *Being and Time*, which overshadowed the old phenomenological school up to its forced conclusion and thereby brought about its end"[81] (ibid., p. 3). On the relation to Heidegger, he writes specifically with respect to the recently published text: "Whoever studies Husserl's *Nachlass*, will have to come to the conclusion, over and over, that there is little reason to overlook the achievements of the founder of phenomenology in light of his pupil." (ibid., 6). Thus, to assess, thus, the question of phenomenology as a system and its relation to classical idealism, "volume VII of *Husserliana* is indispensible" (ibid., p. 4). Henrich's general verdict with respect to Husserl's discussion of the figures of the tradition is thoroughly positive: "Since the arguments of Husserl's critical history of ideas have become known to us, every trace of naiveté and ignorance regarding questions in the history of philosophy vanish from the historically grown image of Husserl. He places himself as an equal figure into the ranks of those, who have asked anew, and have endured in asking, the question as to the possibility of philosophical knowledge, fully aware of the extent and breadth of this problematic." (ibid., p. 17)

Henrich goes on to discuss Husserl's treatments of Descartes, Hume, and Kant. He also briefly discusses the relation of Hegel to Husserl, placing him from the beginning in the tradition in which he sees Husserl positioning himself in this lecture course, seeing eye to eye with the greats of the tradition. He understands Husserl to be tackling the issue of laying an ultimate ground in (mostly oblivious)

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[80] Another text that appeared in the same year is that of Gerhard Funke (1958).

[81] The original term, "*erzwungenes Ende*," presumably refers to the official end of its public flourishing once it had been denounced as "Jewish" and "degenerate" ("*entartet*") by the Nazis.

congruity with the German Idealists and their contemporary heirs, but also in all of this tradition's (ultimately problematic) originality. That the majority of Husserl's attention was focused on this issue has had a crucial (though perhaps detrimental) impact on the reception of his work throughout history.

Henrich's discussion focuses on Husserl's attempts to exploit the tradition in order to find an ultimate ground of knowledge. Here Henrich agrees with Husserl's assessment that Hume attempted to open the door to transcendental philosophy but failed at that and instead opened the door to a problematic psychologism. The same tendency—opening this door but failing—is discernable in Husserl's discussion of Kant, as Henrich sees it. Henrich makes it clear that Husserl is not interested in the historical Kant (or Descartes, etc.), but in "the type [of philosophy] inaugurated by Kant" (ibid., p. 16), in this case the "method of regressive transcendental reflection" (ibid., p. 17).

The most suggestive discussion is Henrich's confrontation of Husserl with Hegel and Hegel's contemporary followers, such as Wagner, Wolfgang Cramer, and Richard Hönigswald, a discussion that constitutes a delayed *Auseinandersetzung*. Henrich confronts Husserl with Hegel on *Hegel's* terms. Henrich asserts that both Hegel and Husserl took issue with Kant's method of deduction and the way the latter deals with the skeptical challenge. Both agree that Kant did not go far enough, yet both idealists attempt to find a dialectically opposed solution. Husserl attempts to ground all knowledge in an "absolute subjectivism" that he also calls (as Henrich quotes), "an absolute science of pure consciousness" (ibid., p. 17, below, p. 440), which aims to be absolutely transparent to itself. On the other hand, Hegel's attempt consists in a heightening of the ideas of contradiction and negation: "According to Hegel, only the classical form of skepticism can rise to the level of philosophical knowing, that skepticism hence, which demonstrates the impotence of thinking from the relationality and contradictoriness of thinking itself." (ibid., p. 18) Henrich thus contrasts Husserl's "science of absolute origins" and Hegel's idea of "absolute knowledge" (ibid.). While Husserl wants to avoid an infinite regress of grounding relations, Hegel embraces the "circular structure of absolute knowledge in the *Logic*. Philosophical ultimate foundation can only be realized through a nexus in which the concepts of pure thinking justify themselves from themselves, which nexus hence returns back into itself" (ibid., p. 20).

To conclude, one has to leave open whether or not Henrich's "speculative" reading is justified. Its merits lie in his attempt to "translate" Husserl into speculative language and confront him with classical and contemporary idealisms. Placing Husserl in this tradition was, with the rise of Heidegger's reputation, more or less a (surely well-intended) kiss of death in the philosophical scene at the time. It is in this milieu, now, that Landgrebe's famous text must be understood.

Ludwig Landgrebe (1962): To set the stage, one cannot overemphasize the dominance of Heidegger on the scene after the war. Heidegger had emerged as still present and, more importantly, nearly unfazed by Nazism. Many of his contemporary philosophical colleagues were more directly identified with Nazism and lost their positions (or worse, kept them, such as Oskar Becker). But Heidegger's actions during the time (with exception of his presidency at the University of Freiburg) were largely unknown, although he too had to undergo a denazification trial and ended up being forced into early retirement. Hence, there was some general knowledge in the 1960s about Heidegger's role during the dark period of German history, but not as much was known then as would become known in the late 1980s (initiated by the book by Víctor Farías) and then, through the infamous *Black Notebooks*, in 2013. To the contrary, Heidegger after the war began publishing again successfully and went on numerous lecture circuits throughout Germany, Austria, and France, cementing his role as "last man standing" on the philosophical scene. At the same time, a huge reception of his work began in France and, later, in the North America. He was perceived as the last valid heir of phenomenology, as the appointed philosopher who could address—especially in his critique of modernity and its technology—the present age with its pressing issues, such as the Cold War, the building nuclear armament race, and the apparent destruction of the planet through human pollution.

Landgrebe's text was the third lengthy article on Husserl to appear in the *Rundschau*.[82] The irony of Landgrebe's intervention is that he

[82] Gadamer later characterized this period, and the role of Landgrebe's article in it, as follows (and reading between the lines, Gadamer distances himself from its interpretive tendency): "This is not how I alone felt [i.e., "that in essential points I was guided both by Husserl and Heidegger," ibid.], … this is also how Landgrebe, Eugen Fink, Gurwitsch, Biemel felt, as well as all kinds of others who had survived the Nazi period

intends to render Husserl attractive (again) for contemporary readers, but thereby reads something into Husserl with a Heideggerian lens that arguably is not there. As mentioned, Landgrebe (1902–1991) was Husserl's assistant in the 1920s and responsible, among other things, for typing off the very text of this lecture course. An intimate knowledge of its content can, hence, be assumed. Widely perceived (with Fink) as the spokesperson of Husserlian phenomenology, Landgrebe had a significant impact on post-war philosophy in Germany (but also in France, the US and Spanish-speaking countries[83]). His reading of Husserl, which comes to the fore most prominently in the text in question, was formative for several generations of phenomenologists.

The article jumps right into the fray, stating with forceful language at the outset that in this text "metaphysics takes its departure behind Husserl's back" (Landgrebe 1962, p. 261), prior to the fact that in light of the work of Heidegger "the 'end of metaphysics' is spoken of as if with a certain obviousness" (ibid.). "[B]efore the eyes of the reader occurs the shipwreck of transcendental subjectivism, as both a non-historical *apriorism* and as the consummation of modern rationalism" (ibid.). "But this shipwreck—and this could be clear to neither Husserl himself nor to those who heard the lectures at the time [that would include Landgrebe]—is more than an author's accidental misfortune"

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and the war in emigration or half-emigration, if one may count Leuven as that. They all attempted to emphasize, as strongly as possible, the commonalities between Husserl and Heidegger, and to judge the opposition, which one would have liked to see so dearly for political reasons, as untenable. And how they did this! Not by showing that Heidegger is based entirely on Husserl, but rather the other way around, that Husserl's philosophical thoughts in his late years indeed came very close to Heidegger. There is an article by Ludwig Landgrebe, which I myself printed in the *Philosophische Rundschau*, which bears the title 'Departure from Cartesianism'. There, Landgrebe wanted to show that Husserl in truth in the end, in the consequence of his own thinking about time and time-consciousness, had abandoned his Cartesian starting point, which he had repeatedly emphasized through his return to the transcendental ego, and that he had pursued the same path of thought as Heidegger" (Gadamer 1995, p. 113).

[83] Along with other Husserl students such as the Dutchman H.J. Pos, Landgrebe was engaged after the war in founding the *Institut International de Philosophie*. The latter exists to this day and is responsible for organizing the biyearly world congress for philosophy, which attempts to bring philosophers from all countries of the world together (each country is allowed to nominate two delegates). By today's standards, Landgrebe, as the appointed heir of the phenomenological movement, must be viewed as a major player in the philosophical scene world-wide.

(Ibid., p. 260). This is so because Husserl pursues the subject matter "with restless abandon" (ibid.) and follows it through to its inadvertent end. The result is that, at the end of his life, "Husserl saw that he was compelled to abandon the subject matter [first philosophy] itself, and that means that the guiding thought of the basic discipline designated by the title *First Philosophy* is to be abandoned as incapable of realization." (ibid., p. 262) Landgrebe's thesis is that Husserl's late "discovery" of the lifeworld in the *Crisis* is a tacit concession to Heidegger and an acknowledgment that Heidegger was right to reject Cartesianism and to focus on the pre-scientific facticity of human Dasein and its *Umwelt*, which Husserl termed *Lebenswelt*.[84] The result is that Husserl came close to Heidegger and that their projects converged in crucial systematic points, which are the result of Husserl's "departure from Cartesianism" and its concomitant commitment to an absolute grounding of knowledge in a self-knowing ego. To Landgrebe, it is only unfortunate that Husserl himself did not see this convergence with Heidegger.

Landgrebe begins his presentation by a reconstruction of the train of thought of the lecture course, showing the advances Husserl makes on his earlier position(s), especially in *Ideas I*. He then raises a few critical questions regarding "transcendental subjectivity as a field of absolute experience," and gives an exposition of transcendental subjectivity as a field of experience and the horizon into which it lives, the lifeworld. Looking over the entire scope of Husserl's work, Landgrebe then lays out Husserl's later turn to history and the lifeworld as in effect the "break from the tradition": "Hence one can say that the historical-philosophical establishing of phenomenology in the *Crisis* fills the place left empty in the lectures [*First Philosophy*] by the failure to fulfill the requirement of an apodictic critique" (Ibid., p. 284). Landgrebe claims that this "failure" occurs when Husserl realizes that transcendental subjectivity entails "the *all-totality of an endless nexus of life*" (below, p. 354/Landgrebe 1962, 286). The text ends with a critique of Husserl's claim as to the absoluteness of transcendental subjec-

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[84] Heidegger writes in the margins of *Being and Time*, regarding paragraph 21, "The Hermeneutical Discussion of Descartes' Ontology of 'World'": "Critique of Husserl's construction [*Aufbau*] of 'ontologies'! As in general this entire critique of Descartes is placed here with this intention." (Heidegger 1993, p. 442).

tivity (part 5).[85] Landgrebe concludes by stating that "the absolute," as also other concepts such as "constitution" and "achievement," are "operative concepts," a term coined by Fink (ibid., p. 299).

What is one to make of Landgrebe's influential reading? It needs to be repeated that this reading has influenced the reception of Husserl for several generations and is still alive. Yet a few points should make clear why Landgrebe's reading is problematic on several levels:

– To begin with the historical details, which he invokes for his systematic point:
  (a) Landgrebe claims that Husserl announced several times but never carried out an apodictic critique (cf. p. 283). The result is that Husserl appears as neglectful, making grand gestures with no follow-through. But Husserl did carry out this self-critique in the 1922/23 lecture course (as discussed above) and, moreover, Landgrebe himself was its transcriptor! Can such an omission be traced to mere forgetfulness on the part of Landgrebe?[86]

  The question then becomes whether Landgrebe's claim that Husserl suffered "shipwreck" concerning his plan to furnish a complete Cartesianism is in point. This is a different question, but certainly Landgrebe's *argument* for it, that "he could not furnish it because he never did what he announced" is simply faulty.
  (b) In the same context, Landgrebe cites the famous statement from the appendices of the *Crisis* that the dream of philosophy as a science is over (p. 283), and he comments: "Here we see how the dismissal of the guiding idea of an apodictic

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[85] This critique of Husserl's notion of transcendental reflection and the self-transparency it supposedly achieves resonate with Gadamer's critique of Husserl in *Truth and Method*, which had just appeared two years earlier (though Gadamer is not mentioned here). Gadamer criticizes Husserl there for producing yet another "philosophy of reflection" (cf. Gadamer 1989, p. 281).

[86] There is another discrepancy in Landgrebe's account. In an (apparently oral) statement to Dieter Henrich (cf. Henrich 1958, p. 24, fn 17), Landgrebe says that the critique of transcendental experience is contained in the second half of *First Philosophy*, whereas he claims in the "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism" text that Husserl was merely promissory in this respect.

science goes hand in hand with the decisive turning toward establishing the way of phenomenological reflection historically […]." In this famous statement, however, Husserl is putting these words into the mouth of his critics, not stating his own opinion. First proposed by Landgrebe, this reading has been rightfully discredited many times over, but it lives on stubbornly.

- Landgrebe's characterization of first philosophy and Husserl's Cartesianism is arguably simplistic and superficial and also tinged by a Heideggerian twist. For instance, he says that the firstness of transcendental subjectivity consists in "a 'region' of absolute being, since everything which we can in general speak of as 'being' (*Seiendem*) is being (*Sein*) for consciousness and must permit the justification for its being posited as 'being' to be exhibited in consciousness." (Ibid., p. 263). Landgrebe is, in effect, imputing the ontological difference to Husserl's distinction between constituting and constituted "being."
- One may wonder if Husserl indeed ever was the Cartesian Landgrebe makes him out to be, and what "Cartesianism" means. While Cartesian elements cannot be denied, Husserl's own self-critiques of the Cartesian way into phenomenology already show in abundance that his Cartesianism is peculiar and that, moreover, he is very wary of it. Also, if "Cartesianism" means finding a *fundamentum inconcussum* for knowledge, it is not clear that Husserl ever meant that in the way of Descartes, i.e., that the ego should be some kind of axiomatic principle. To search for apodictic *elements in the sphere of transcendental experience* is something very different.
- The grandiose claim that Husserl "left behind Cartesianism" comes down to the fairly innocuous point that "Husserl, in all essentials, had already left the Cartesian way of establishing a foundation behind insofar as he conceived the Cartesian 'apodictic' evidence of the 'I am' together with all of the content included within it as an absolute experience, indeed, as an entire realm of experience" (ibid., p. 269). If *this* is a departure from Cartesianism, Husserl had already departed from it in 1913. One may then ask whether he ever was a Cartesian.
- Landgrebe's *systematic* claim is that Husserl departed from Cartesianism because he "discovered" history and the lifeworld seemingly haphazardly and, as one may assume, under the tacit influence of

Heidegger. But this is an historical mistake that has been refuted many times over through scholarship (cf. Welton 2000). And, most directly, it is belied by Husserl's own texts, which show that Husserl used the term "lifeworld" in the salient sense already as of 1919[87] and that Husserl's supposed radical and seemingly unmotivated "turn to history" begins already with his turn to genetic phenomenology as of the early 1920s. For Landgrebe, an intimate knower of the unpublished material, to claim that Husserl's own published *Crisis* text is the only evidence of his concern for "history" is malicious.

– It is far from clear that this departure from Cartesianism is "the end of metaphysics." What is "metaphysics" here and why would it have come to an end? If one asks thusly, one is referred to Heidegger's problematic claims about "Western metaphysics," but Landgrebe simply relies on them as a *fait accompli*. Finally, the claim that "the end of metaphysics" occurred "behind Husserl's back" is another example of the type of *Seinsgeschichte* Heidegger is in the business of, i.e., to shift the focus from thinking individuals and their arguments (something they presumably have control over) to the history of "Beyng" and its "doing" to which we merely "correspond." Especially with a thinker such as Husserl who was self-critical, self-scrutinizing and self-reflective to a fault, such a statement that there was something in this thinker's blind spot which (necessarily) evaded him inadvertently puts the person making this claim in the position of knowing Husserl better than he knew himself; a bold claim, to say the least.[88]

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[87] Cf. Hua-Mat. IV (lecture course "Natur und Geist" of 1919), where he speaks not only of "lifeworld" plainly, but of "*die anschauliche* [intuitive] *Lebenswelt*" (p. 187), the "*vortheoretische* [pre-theoretical] *Lebenswelt*" (p. 223) or "*die natürliche* [natural] *Lebenswelt*" (p. 227).

[88] I cannot discuss all scholarship on Husserl's *First Philosophy*. The above discussion was meant to highlight its early reception. For other texts, cf. Marvin Farber (1963) and Hans Friedrich Fulda (1967). For some newer work, cf. Jeffner Allen (1982), Robert Sokolowski (2010), Luft (2010), and Faustino Fabbianelli (2017).

V. EDITORIAL MATTERS

What follows are a few notes on the translation, its policies and the editorial decisions of this volume. Regarding the present translation, the translators have, of course, consulted other translations of Husserl (into English and into other languages) and Cairns' helpful *Guide for Translating Husserl*. They have, for the most part, attempted to follow the best practices in translating Husserl[89] and to refrain from neologisms where existing translations, problematic as they may be, already exist. Reflecting on possible translations for certain words has, however, led them away from stipulating one-to-one translations for a given German word. The reason for this is Husserl's own terminological inconsistency, which would render any fixed translation for certain terms problematic, in some cases even absurd. Rather, the translators opted for a certain flexibility in translating key words, options which are to be found in the glossary appended at the end. The attempt was to use a certain "target" or "focal translation" as the default translation for a certain word, but deviate from it where deemed appropriate. Where possible ambiguities could ensue due to a word being translated in different ways or certain puns Husserl uses on (rare) occasion, the translators have placed footnotes. The translators have attempted, however, to keep any explanatory footnotes to a minimum.

Furthermore, our attempt was to render this text so that it reads fluidly and elegantly in English, at least when it comes to those parts of the text that were heavily edited by Husserl. This goes especially for the main text of the lecture course, which Husserl worked on extensively, since he intended to publish it. However, when it comes to the texts stemming from Husserl's private research notes, it was not at all times possible to reproduce them in elegant translation, mainly since the original German is not at all elegant and easily readable either. The attempt to render a German text that is at times elliptical, with incomplete sentences and extremely difficult grammar, into a fluid English

[89] The translators have also refrained from "gendering" Husserl, thus bringing him up to contemporary gender-balanced standards. Where a modern term such as "humankind" instead of "mankind" might be acceptable, it would be historically questionable to translate "she" where its author nearly one century ago used the generic male form.

text seems like love's labor lost. The translators have done their best to make the translation as comprehensible as possible in English, but fidelity should not be sacrificed for an easy read, which these texts never were from the beginning in the original. Hence, the reader of the English text, at times perhaps frustrated by Husserl's difficult and oftentimes highly convoluted syntax, should find solace in the fact that the reader of the original German faces the same obstacles.

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The translators had to take into account the fact that many of the editorial footnotes the editor of the German edition made are now obsolete in the light of newer texts that have appeared in more than 60 years since *Husserliana* VII and VIII and taking into account newer discoveries in the *Nachlass* and other texts that have since become available in other literary estates.[90] Simply translating these (such as references to texts that were not published then but are available now, or manuscripts not localized in the papers at the time but found in the meantime) would have in fact created many misunderstandings and even errors. Instead, where appropriate, the translators have updated Boehm's notes where he, for instance, referred to a text that is now published (where Boehm cited the Archival signature) and with the citation to the *Husserliana*. All of these updates can only help the current reader gain a better overview of Husserl's corpus. In cases where the notes deviate from those of the original editor, the translators have also placed some explanatory footnotes where they seemed appropriate and added some references, again all of this with the intention of keeping any interruption due to the editor's and translators' interventions to a minimum. The translators created three footnote apparatuses. Additions by the editor appear in pointed brackets

[90] Indeed, at the time Boehm was working on these editions, archival research into Husserl and the entire Phenomenological Movement was still in its infancy. (Van Breda established the Archives in 1938, but real editorial work did not begin until after World War II). Many texts have since been discovered and other *Nachlässe* (literary estates) have been established and archived, e.g., in Munich, and elsewhere. Hence, a good amount of this material was not available to him at the time of his editorial work.

(⟨ ⟩), those of the translators in square brackets ([ ]). Boehm's edition does (like most editions) contain some typos and misreadings from the stenography. These have been corrected; where a translation deviates from Boehm's text, these changes have been flagged in the notes. There are three types of footnotes in the main text. Notes with asterisks (*) are Husserl's annotations or marginalia. Notes with lowercap letters (a, b) are references to the German original. Notes with Arabic numerals (1, 2) are from the editor or translators.

* * *

Next, looking at the original *Husserliana* edition, the reader will notice a discrepancy in the arrangement of the main text. Since the two parts of the lecture course (before and after the Christmas Break) are very different in nature, the first giving an historical survey, the second a systematic treatment of the reduction, Boehm decided to separate what was a unified lecture course and to publish them in two separate volumes (as the main texts of *Husserliana* VII and VIII, respectively). This was justified, to him, presumably due to this thematic difference, but also due to the large amount of supplemental texts he decided to include. These, too, he appended topically to the two volumes, respectively, grouping the more historically oriented texts in *Husserliana* VII and the more systematic ones in *Husserliana* VIII. This procedure might have been justified at the time, but it hardly meets modern standards of critical editorship, apart from the fact that the nature of the *Husserliana* itself was a project in the making, as subsequent editions began to tackle unpublished manuscript material and proceeded differently.[91] Hence, it was decided to join the lecture

[91] Hua. IV (*Ideas II*), V (*Ideas III*), and VI (the *Crisis* text) are the first editions to contain manuscript material in the appendix in addition to the main composed texts of Husserl. Boehm's edition contains ca. one half manuscript material besides the main text (the lecture course). The first volumes to contain exclusively manuscript material were Kern's editions of the manuscripts on intersubjectivity (Hua. XIII, XIV, and XV) and Marbach's on pictorial and image-consciousness (Hua. XXIII). It should also be kept in mind that in the early days of the *Husserliana*, the edition was considered a preliminary edition, with the "real" historical-critical edition yet to come. But as of the mid-seventies, the editorial standards held up to those desired for historical-critical editions. Some old editions have, moreover, been re-edited critically (Hua. III and VI by Schuhmann, Hua IV and V by Dirk Fonfara).

course together again in the form in which it was presented in the winter semester of 1923/24. This procedure is further justified by the fact that not all supplemental texts Boehm selected are included here (to be justified below). It is a common practice in the English *Husserliana Collected Works* to rectify questionable editorial decisions of earlier *Husserliana* volumes,[92] and hence the philological rigor that should have been applied to the original edition has been applied now. The reader, however, can trace the German edition through the original pagination given in the margins.

* * *

As mentioned, not all of the appendix texts that were originally published in the Boehm edition have been translated here. There are several reasons why the translators decided to exclude certain texts and select only ca. half of the material published by Boehm.

For one, translating all texts would have blown this volume out of proportion. The explicit intention was to not let the reader miss the forest for the trees by burdening her with a huge amount of heterogeneous material that may have the effect of distraction from the main themes. One has to keep in mind, as mentioned, the situation in which Boehm found himself only shortly after World War II. Little was known of the vast manuscript material, and it clearly was Boehm's intention to let the readers at the time learn about this material, in which (as Husserl explicitly insisted several times) his "real" philosophy was to be found.

Moreover, that Husserl wrote on topics other than logic, let alone on the history of philosophy, was, as stated repeatedly, almost completely unknown at the time. Hence, in order to shore up this wrong impression, especially in light of other philosophers threatening to eclipse Husserl at the time (recall Heidegger), Boehm published a great number of texts Husserl had written on the history of philosophy, especially in the appendices of Hua. VII. A good amount of this material, however, is quite repetitive, relatively weak in its content and,

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[92] Cf., e.g., *Husserliana*-Collected Works, Vol. IX, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses*, which also restores the original lecture course, which is to be found scattered in Vols. XI, XVII, and XXXI of the original *Husserliana*.

in certain cases, at best of the quality of excerpts Husserl had culled from compendia, not even original sources.[93] It is doubtful whether Husserl would have consented to a publication of this material. Of course, Husserl's own judgments have been overridden many times in the *Husserliana*, but in this case, a rather restrictive editorial policy seemed sound to balance Boehm's rather liberal approach (which, to repeat, was understandable at the time).

The translators took the approach that they were not original *editors* but instead "merely" translators, whose task it was to select the best Husserl had written in order to present the author in the best light possible. Indeed, an editor of a critical edition has little choice over which texts to include if the texts were deemed part of a particular body of work by the original authors. Translators, on the other hand, whose intention it is to render an author attractive and readable in the target language, have the privilege of not always having to adhere to these critical editorial principles, assuming that the interested reader will, if she so desires, look at the original German for all possible details. It is with this liberty in mind that the translators selected what they deemed the most interesting, original and philosophically profound texts; texts, moreover, whose content is most aligned with the topics treated in the main lecture. These policies were discussed with Rudolf Bernet and Ullrich Melle, former directors of the Archives, in the early stages of the translation.[94]

* * *

A note on the nature of the collaboration on this volume. The concept of the translation and its basic outline, including decisions on translation policies, translation conventions and the selection of the appendices, were worked out jointly by Sebastian Luft and Thane Naberhaus.

The present Introduction was written by Sebastian Luft.

Sebastian Luft produced a first draft of the main text, of which Thane Naberhaus thoroughly reworked two thirds. Sebastian Luft translated the appendices.

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[93] Cf. esp. the excerpts on Plotinus and Nicolas of Cusa, Hua. VII, pp. 328–330.

[94] This policy was also adopted, it should be noted, by David Carr in his translation of the *Crisis*.

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Thane Naberhaus is grateful to Mount St. Mary's University for granting him a leave of absence during the spring and fall 2010 semesters to work on this translation. Portions of the translation in draft form were used in his course "Contemporary Philosophy" at Mount St. Mary's.

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Edmund Husserl

First Philosophy

Lectures 1923/24
and Related Texts from the Manuscripts (1920–1925)

Check for updates

PART ONE

CRITICAL HISTORY OF IDEAS

⟨Section One
From Plato's Idea of Philosophy to the Beginnings of its Modern Realization in Descartes⟩

⟨Chapter One
The Idea of Philosophy and its Historical Origin⟩

Lecture 1: ⟨On the Historical Task of Giving Phenomenology the Developmental Form of First Philosophy⟩

The term "First Philosophy," as is well known, was originally introduced by *Aristotle* as the name of a philosophical discipline but has, in the time since Aristotle, been displaced by the term "Metaphysics," which itself came into use quite accidentally. In reviving the term in its Aristotelian sense, I derive from the fact that it has fallen out of common usage the highly welcome advantage that it arouses in us only its literal meaning, and not the various sediments of historical tradition, which, as the vague concepts of metaphysics, allow memories of the manifold metaphysical systems of earlier times to become confusedly intermingled with one another. This literal meaning once served, as is quite understandable in an original terminological coinage, as a formal preliminary indication of the theoretical intention that the new discipline, whose subject matter was only later to be defined more precisely, hoped to realize. This formal preliminary indication can serve us, too, quite admirably, however far the science to which our lectures are to be devoted may depart from the Aristotelian First Philosophy in its subject matter. | VII, 3/4 For this reason we take over the term "First Philosophy" and make it the point of departure for our initial considerations.

"First Philosophy"—what should we read off of the literal meaning of the term? Evidently it will have to be a philosophy which, among the philosophies that together make up the one philosophy,

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is precisely the first. Since the sciences are not arbitrarily ordered in a free combination but rather bear within themselves an order, and hence principles of ordering, First Philosophy will naturally be the name for that philosophy which is first "in itself," i.e., according to inner essential principles. By that one could mean that it is the first in value and dignity, bearing within itself the Holy of Holies of philosophy, as it were, whereas the others, the "second" philosophies, would represent merely the necessary preliminary steps, so to speak the antechambers of that highest holiness. But its meaning could also be a different one—one, in fact, that for essential reasons is the more obvious choice. It is, at any rate, the one that we shall prefer here. Sciences are the products of purposive work,[a] and in the rational progression of the purposive activities belonging to them, unity of purpose creates a unity of order. Each science presents us with an endless manifold of spiritual formations; we call them truths. The truths of a science are not, however, an incoherent heap, just as, correlatively, the activity of the scientist is not an isolated and aimless searching for and creating of truths. Each individual result stands under higher guiding purposive ideas,[b] and ultimately under the highest purposive idea, that of science itself. Just as the rule for formative work is thereby indicated in a preliminary way, so too do all of the individual truths take on a systematic form, that is, a teleological form which is imprinted upon them. Individual truths enter, in fixed orderings, into truth-unities of truths of lower and higher purposive form, binding themselves together, e.g., into conclusions, proofs, and theories. At the highest point, an ideal total unity of theory as such belongs to science as a whole, a universal theory which expands endlessly and develops itself to an ever higher degree with the endless progress of science. | VII, 4/5

The same will also have to hold for philosophy, as long as we conceive of it as a science. Accordingly, it will have to have a theoretical beginning for all of its truth-products and produced truths. The name "First Philosophy" would then point towards a scientific discipline of beginnings. We would expect that, for the beginning, or

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[a] *aus zwecktätiger Arbeit entsprungen Werkgebilde* [b] *Zweckideen*

for a closed domain of beginnings, philosophy's highest purposive idea would demand a proper, self-contained discipline, with its own problematic of beginnings developed in accordance with spiritual preparation, an exact framing of the problem, and then a scientific solution. By inner, inescapable necessity this discipline would have to precede all other philosophical disciplines, grounding them both methodologically and theoretically. The entrance gate, the beginning of First Philosophy itself, would accordingly be the beginning of all philosophy whatsoever. With regard to the philosophizing subject, we would then have to say that the beginner of philosophy in the true sense is the one who genuinely gives shape to First Philosophy from its very beginning, i.e., in absolutely abiding truth or in the most perfect insight. As long as this has not been achieved in original research, there is as yet no beginner of philosophy in this sense, and likewise no true realization of First Philosophy itself. Once it has been achieved, however, there can also be beginners of philosophy in the other, more common sense of the word, namely, apprentices who take truths pre-thought by others and reproduce[a] them in their own insightful thinking, thereby making themselves into[b] beginners of First Philosophy.

These reflections on the literal sense of the term "First Philosophy" also give us a first formal preliminary indication of the aim of my lectures. In them we shall make an earnest attempt to do justice to the idea of a First Philosophy. At the same time, in their didactic presentation the lectures will attempt to lead the hearer who actively participates and thinks along with them to necessary ways in which he himself can become a co-beginner of First Philosophy in the true sense, and hence a beginning philosopher as such. I should say at the outset that the desideratum of a First Philosophy has by no means already long since been satisfied in one of the historically handed-down philosophical systems, | i.e., satisfied in the VII, 5/6
form of a genuine science of compelling rationality. We are, therefore, not interested here in merely reviving a historically inherited tradition in order to facilitate the student's task of appropriating new material. At the same time, of course, this means that I am

[a] *nacherzeugen* [b] *in sich selbst […] nachgestalten*

unable to accept any historical philosophical view whatsoever as final and definitive, that is, as a philosophy which, as is demanded unconditionally, has the form of the most rigorous science. Without a rigorous scientific beginning there can be no rigorous scientific progress. It is only with a rigorous First Philosophy that there can appear a rigorous philosophy as such, a *philosophia perennis*—a philosophy which, to be sure, is continually in a process of becoming (so long as endlessness belongs to the essence of all science), but which nevertheless has the essential form of finality.

On the other hand I am convinced that in the breakthrough of the new transcendental phenomenology there has already occurred a first breakthrough to the true and genuine First Philosophy—though only in a first, still imperfect approximation, so to speak. In several of my Freiburg lectures[1] I have made attempts in different ways to elevate this approximation to the highest level possible and to bring its guiding ideas, methods, and basic concepts to the most perfect clarity. At the same time I have made attempts to give phenomenology the developmental form demanded by the idea of First Philosophy, i.e., the form of a philosophy of beginnings that gives shape to itself in the most radical philosophical self-consciousness and in absolute methodological necessity. In the introductory lecture course from the previous winter semester,[2] I believe I was able to reach this goal in its main outlines. In the present lecture course I hope to carry out further simplifications and improvements. I hope, in any case, to be able to show anew that the idea of First Philosophy expands in steps; that it realizes the necessary and genuine idea of a universal theory of science;[a] and that it encompasses the entire theory of rational life and is hence a universal theory of cognitive, valuing, and practical reason. And furthermore [I hope to show] that

[a] *Wissenschafts-Lehre*

[1] Husserl became professor in Freiburg in 1916.—Trans.

[2] *Einleitung in die Philosophie* [*Introduction to Philosophy*] (1922/23), *Husserliana* [Hua.] XXXV.—Trans.

this First Philosophy is called upon | to reform our entire scientific VII, 6/7
edifice and to deliver us from all scientific specialization.

I will begin with an introduction, which will furnish us with the indispensable inner presuppositions for our endeavor. Up to this point, we do not even know which of the many and unfortunately very unclear concepts of philosophy we are to choose to guide us. No matter which concept we chose, it would at first stand before us only as an emptily abstract, formal word-thought.[a] Thus it would not have the power to arouse our minds and energize our wills. We are dealing here, as I have said, with nothing less than a reform of philosophy as a whole and, included therein, with a universal reform of all sciences whatsoever. And wherever one is concerned with radical and universal reform, no matter in which domain of culture, the motivation is a deeply stirring spiritual need. The general spiritual situation[b] fills our soul with such deep dissatisfaction that to continue to live in its current forms and norms is no longer possible. Yet if we are to consider the possibilities for altering this situation, for creating satisfying goals and methods of spiritual life in the sphere in question, then what is obviously called for are penetrating reflections on the inner motivational sources of that situation and on the whole spiritual framework of a mankind toiling restlessly at spiritual activities which have become ossified in their typicality.[c] Such reflections, however, only gain their full illumination from history, and history, in turn, interpreted from the present, sheds light understandingly on the present. We want, therefore, to turn away from the bewildering multiplicities offered to us by the science and philosophy of today and return to the times of primitive beginnings. First, then, a historical backward glance will serve as a spiritual preparation. It will reawaken primal, powerful motivations which can set our interest and our will into motion.

If today I were asked to look back upon the entire history of European philosophy and say, on the basis of the convictions that I have come to hold over the course of decades, which philosophers shine brightest of all, I would name two, or better three. They are the names of the greatest beginners, the greatest path-openers of

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[a] *Wortgedanke.* [b] *geistige Lage* [c] *sich in einer festgewordenen Typik geistigen Wirkens abmühenden Menschheit*

philosophy. | First I would mention *Plato*, or rather the incompa- VII, 7/8
rable twin-star *Socrates-Plato*. The creation of the idea of true and genuine science, or of philosophy—which for a long time meant precisely the same thing—as well as the discovery of the problem of method, lead back to these thinkers, and as a perfect creation to Plato.

Second I would name *Descartes*. His *Meditationes de prima philosophia* represent a completely new beginning in the history of philosophy in their attempt to discover, with a radicalism unheard of up to then, the absolutely necessary beginning of philosophy, while deriving this beginning from absolute and entirely pure self-knowledge. From these noteworthy "Meditations on First Philosophy" stems the tendency, found throughout the whole modern period, of recasting all philosophy as transcendental philosophy. This tendency indicates a basic character not only of modern philosophy, however, but also, as can no longer be doubted, of all scientific philosophy as such, now and for all time.

Let us first consider the older, Socratic-Platonic beginning of a genuine and radical philosophy, beginning with some preliminary remarks.[1] The earliest philosophy of the Greeks, naively directed toward the external world, experienced a rupture in its development through *sophistic skepticism*. Through sophistic argumentation, the ideas of reason in all their basic forms appeared to lose their value. The true in itself—Being, Beauty, and Good in themselves—was portrayed as a deceptive fantasy, shown, by means of impressive argumentation, to be mere supposition. This caused philosophy to lose its sense of purpose. For a being, beauty, and goodness that were at bottom merely subjectively relative, there could be no principles and theories true in themselves, no science, or (what meant the same in those days) no philosophy. Yet not only philosophy was affected. The entirety of practical life was robbed of its fixed normative goals, | VII, 8/9
and the idea of a practically rational life lost its value. *Socrates* was

[1] Husserl took the text from here up to p. 10 (to "of this essence whatsoever.") *verbatim* from his essay "*Die Idee einer philosophischen Kultur*" ("*The Idea of a Philosophical Culture*"), which is reprinted in the appendix to Hua. VII, pp. 203 ff., but which will be included in the English translation of the *Kaizo* articles (forthcoming).—Trans.

the first to recognize in these problems, so easily brushed aside in Sophistic paradoxes, fateful problems for mankind on its way to genuine humanity. He reacted to skepticism, as is known, only as a practical reformer.

Plato then shifted the emphasis of this reaction to science and became a reformer of the theory of science. At the same time he led the way, holding on to the Socratic impulses, for an autonomous development of humanity—autonomous in the sense that it develops into a rational humanity, beginning with a science that is reformed, in a new spirit, on the basis of a radical insight into method.

Let us elaborate on the sense of Socrates' and Plato's lifework, taking them one by one and focusing on their decisive main doctrines. As regards the first, we follow the rich preliminary indications[a] which Plato has handed down to us.

Socrates' ethical reform of life is characterized by his construal of the truly satisfying life as a life based on pure reason. Such a life is one in which human beings, through unremitting self-reflection and a radical giving of account,[b] exercise critique—ultimate evaluating critique—on their life-goals, and then, of course, mediated through these, on their life-paths, on their means of achieving these goals. Such giving of account and critique are carried out as cognitive processes, and moreover, according to Socrates, as a methodical return to the original source of all legitimacy[c] and our knowledge of it. Expressed in our terms, this occurs by recourse to perfect clarity, "insight," "evidence." All waking human life is carried out as an external and internal striving and acting. All action, however, is moved by opinions and convictions: opinions regarding what really exists in the surrounding world, but also regarding values, regarding what is beautiful and ugly, good and bad, useful and useless, etc. In the vast majority of cases these opinions are entirely vague and far removed from any original clarity. The Socratic method of knowledge is a method of complete clarification. In it, what is merely supposed to be beautiful and good is juxtaposed normatively to the Beautiful and Good themselves, as these have emerged in perfect clarification; | and in this way true knowledge is attained. It VII, 9/10

[a] *Vorzeichnung* [b] *Rechenschaftsabgabe* [c] *Recht*

is this genuine knowing, producing itself through perfect evidence, which alone, Socrates teaches, makes a human being truly virtuous. Or, what amounts to the same thing, it is this knowing alone which is able to provide true happiness, the greatest possible pure satisfaction. Genuine knowledge is the necessary (and according to Socrates, also the sufficient) condition of a rational or ethical life. Irrationality, the blind dwelling in unclarity, the sluggish passivity which no longer strives in a clarifying manner after genuine knowledge of the Beautiful and Good itself: it is all of this which makes man unhappy, which makes him chase after foolish goals. By making reflectively evident what one is really aiming at and everything that one has presupposed in an unclear way regarding the beautiful and ugly, useful and harmful—by doing this the true and the false, the genuine and non-genuine become distinguished. They become distinguished precisely because in perfect clarity the essential content of the things themselves, and along with this the valuable and invaluable itself, come to an intuitive realization.

Every clarification of this kind soon takes on exemplary significance. That which, in a particular case drawn from the life of an individual, from history, or from myth, is intuitively grasped[a] as the True and Genuine itself and as a standard against which unclear mere opinions can be measured, offers itself forthwith as an example of the general. What is grasped[b] here is grasped in a naturally adapted essential intuition—in an intuition in which everything that is empirically accidental takes on an extra-essential and freely variable character—and as that which is essentially genuine as such. In this pure (or a priori) generality, it functions as a valid norm for any conceivable individual case of this essence whatsoever. Thus, speaking more concretely, supposing that one were to think, in place of an example derived from daily life, myth, or history, of "any human being whatsoever"—as in general valuing or striving in this or that kind of situation, as in general oriented toward this or that kind of goal, as in general acting in this or that kind of way—it will then become generally evident either that such goals and ways are gen-

[a] *zur Erschauung kommt* [b] *erschaut*

uine ones or, in the opposite case, that they are generally spurious[a] and irrational. The latter occurs, of course, | when the Beautiful and VII, 10/11
Good themselves as they become manifest in clarification evidently contradict that which is supposed in advance, thereby annulling the supposition by revealing it as unfounded.

Lecture 2: ⟨Plato's Dialectic and the Idea of a Philosophical Science⟩

Let us summarize. In reaction to sophism, which contradicts every rational sense of life, *Socrates*, the ethical practitioner, put at the center of ethical-practical interest the basic opposition of all waking personal life: the opposition between unclear opinion and evidence. He was the first to recognize the necessity of a universal method of reason, and he recognized the basic sense of this method as—expressed in modern terms—an intuitive and a priori critique of reason. Or more precisely, he recognized the basic sense of this method as consisting in clarifying self-reflection, consummating itself in apodictic evidence as the original source of all finality. He was the first to see that pure and general essences exist in themselves as the absolute self-givennesses of a pure essential intuition. In relation to this discovery, the radical giving of account demanded generally by *Socrates* for ethical life *eo ipso* takes on the meaningful form of a fundamental standardization[b] or justification of practical life[c] in accordance with ideas of reason grasped through pure essential intuition.

It may be that there is missing in all of this a genuinely scientific framing of the issues and a systematic execution in the form of a scientific theory of the method of genuine life-practice. Socrates' lack of theoretical and scientific intentions is after all well known. Yet it may be regarded as certain that in Socrates the germ of ideas basic to a critique of reason can be found, ideas whose theoretical and technological shaping and highly fruitful development are the immortal glory of *Plato*. Let us turn now to him.

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[a] *unecht* [b] *Normierung* [c] *tätigen Lebens*

Plato carried over the Socratic principle of a radical giving of account to science.[1] Indeed, theoretical knowing, | researching, and VII, 11/12
justifying[a] are in the first instance merely specific forms of striving and acting life. Thus here, too, there is a need for radical reflection on the principles governing the genuineness of this kind of life.

While *Socrates*' ethical reform of life had been directed against the Sophists' confusing and corrupting of general ethical attitudes[b] through their subjectivism, *Plato* opposed them for corrupting science ("philosophy"). In both cases, the reason the Sophists encountered so little opposition and had such a harmful influence was that a genuine life of scientific knowledge, and a genuine rational life in general, were lacking. Here, too, all rationality was mere naive pretension, unclear to itself concerning the ultimate possibility and legitimacy of rationality's final goals and paths.

Genuine rational life, and in particular genuine scientific research and achievement, must, by means of radically clarifying reflection, completely transcend the standpoint of naiveté. It must—ideally speaking—furnish a fully sufficient justification for each step it takes, while at the highest level this justification must come from principles obtained with insight.

Through the high seriousness with which *Plato*, in this Socratic spirit, seeks to overcome anti-scientific skepticism, he becomes the father of all genuine science. He does so, first, by refusing to take lightly the Sophistic arguments against the possibility of valid knowledge and of a science that would be binding on every rational person, instead subjecting these arguments to a deeply penetrating, fundamental critique. Together with this, he undertakes the positive search for the possibility of such a knowledge and science, doing so (while being guided by the deepest understanding of Socratic maieutics) in the spirit of an intuitive clarification of essences and an evident exposition of the general essential norms of such a science. And finally, he strives with all his powers to set genuine science itself into motion on the basis of such fundamental insights.

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[a] *Begründen* [b] *Gesinnungen*

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[1] The text from here to the end of the lecture is taken verbatim from Husserl's article "*Die Idee einer philosophischen Kultur*." Cf. above, footnote 1, p. 8.—Ed.

One can say that with *Plato* the pure ideas of genuine knowledge, genuine theory and science, and—embracing | all of these—genuine VII, 12/13
philosophy make their way for the first time into mankind's consciousness. Similarly, he is also the first to have recognized these ideas as the philosophically most important, because most fundamental, topics of research, and to have dealt with them accordingly. Plato is also the creator of the problem of philosophy and of the science of method—the method, that is, of systematically realizing the highest idea of the purpose of "philosophy"[a] that is implied in the very essence of knowledge. Genuine knowledge, genuine truth (which is valid in itself and guides ultimately[b]), being in the true and genuine sense (as the identical substrate of ultimately guiding truths[c])—these become for him essential correlates. The totality of all truths which are valid in themselves and possibly attainable in acts of genuine knowing necessarily forms a unity, a unity whose theoretical integration is to be achieved methodologically: the unity of the *one* universal science. This is philosophy according to Plato. Its correlate, therefore, is the totality of all true being.

With this, a new idea of philosophy comes to the fore, an idea which determines all further developments. Philosophy is henceforth no longer to be simply science, is no longer simply the naive product of an interest aimed purely at knowledge. It is likewise not merely to be universal science—that already existed previously—but is rather at the same time absolutely justified science. It is to be a science which at every step and in every respect strives for finality, doing so precisely on the basis of justifications that have really been effected and for which the knower (and every co-knower) must, in complete insight and at all times, take absolute responsibility.

With the Platonic dialectic, this beginning of a new *Epoché*, it already becomes clear that philosophy in this higher and genuine sense is only possible on the basis of fundamental preliminary investigations into the conditions of the possibility of philosophy as such. Herein lies, as though borne in a living seed, the idea, so important for the future, of a necessary grounding and systematic ordering of philosophy in two stages—a "first" and a "second" philosophy, so

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[a] *oberste Zweckidee der "Philosophie"* [b] *endgültig bestimmende* [c] *endgültig bestimmender Wahrheiten*

to speak. Leading the way there is, as First Philosophy, a universal method which justifies itself absolutely. Or, understood theoretically, it is a science of the totality of the pure (a priori) principles of all possible knowledge and of the totality of a priori truths | contained VII, 13/14 systematically within (i.e., purely deducible from) these principles. In this way, as one can see, the unity of all a priori sciences ever to be realized is circumscribed, a unity inseparably bound together through the essential interconnection of all fundamental truths.

In the second stage there is the totality of "genuine" factual sciences, i.e., of "explanatory" sciences employing a rational method. Referring in all their justifications[a] back to First Philosophy, to the a priori system of any possible rational method whatsoever, these sciences derive through their constant application a thoroughgoing rationality. It is the rationality of that specific "explanation" which is able to authenticate[b] each and every methodological step as ultimately justified in accordance with a priori principles (and thus at all times by way of insight into apodictic necessity). At the same time these sciences take on—always ideally speaking—the unity of a rational system in accordance with the known[c] systematic unity of the highest a priori principles themselves. They are the disciplines of a "Second Philosophy" whose correlate and region are the unity of factual reality.

Turning back to Plato himself, it is now clear that he by no means intended to be merely a reformer of science. In his ultimate intentions he always remained, even in his efforts with respect to the theory of science, a Socratic, and hence in the most universal sense a practitioner of ethics. Thus his theoretical research had a still deeper meaning. In short, what is at stake is the following basic conviction, which has not at all been appreciated in its full sense and in its entire and proper scope: ultimate grounding, securing, and justifying of any human rational activity are[1] carried out in the forms and through the medium of predicatively judging theoretical reason—and are ultimately carried out by means of philosophy. The ascent of humankind to the level of true and genuine humanity

[a] *rechtfertigenden Begründungen* [b] *auszuweisen* [c] *erkannten*

[1] Reading "are" for "is" as in the original (*ist*).—Trans.

presupposes the development of genuine science in its fundamentally rooted and integrated totality. Genuine science is the epistemic locus of all rationality. From it the appointed leaders of humanity—the *Archonts*[1]—derive the insights in accordance with which they rationally order communal life. | VII, 14/15

Through such intuitions the idea of a new kind of culture is indicated in a preliminary way,[a] namely, a culture in which science does not merely arise amidst other cultural formations, striving towards its *telos* of "genuine" science ever more consciously, but in which science is called upon to take over the function of the *hegemonikon*[2] of all communal life and therewith of all culture whatsoever, and to strive to do so more and more consciously—in much the same way as *nous*,[3] in the individual soul, takes over this function *vis-à-vis* other parts of the soul. The development of humanity as a process of cultivation is carried out not only as a development within the individual, but as a development in the cultivation of "the individual writ large."[b] The highest condition of the possibility of humanity's cultivation into a true and "genuine" culture is the creation of genuine science. Science is the necessary means for the elevation and for the best possible attainment of all other forms of genuine culture and at the same time is itself a form of such culture. All that is true and genuine must be able to be authenticated[c] as such and is only possible as a free product which arises out of the evidence of a genuine goal.[d] Ultimate authentication, ultimate knowledge of all that is genuine, takes on the form of knowledge through judgments and as such stands under scientific norms. It achieves its highest rational form through fundamental justification, i.e., as philosophy.

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[a] *zeichnet sich […] vor* [b] "*Menschen im großen*" [c] *sich […] ausweisen lassen* [d] *aus der Evidenz der Zielechtheit*

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[1] The term is derived from the Greek *archon* (plural *archontes*), which means "leader," "ruler," or "prince." Husserl here alludes to the Platonic doctrine of philosopher kings. Cf. K. Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie*, Munich/Freiburg: Alber: 1988, pp. 163–165 for an interpretation of Husserl's use of this term.—Trans.

[2] "That which is authoritative."—Trans.

[3] Although the context suggests that Husserl is paraphrasing Plato, the terminology itself stems from Stoicism.—Trans.

Thoughts such as these (which of course have been further developed here) were anticipated in their essentials by Plato, who prepared them but also grounded them in their primitive forms. Certainly, the tendency which more than anything else is characteristic of European culture was first awakened in the genius of Plato, viz., the tendency towards universal rationalization by means of a science that fashions itself rationally. And it takes on, simply as a consequence of its lasting influence, the ever more strongly identifiable form of a norm acknowledged in general cultural consciousness and ultimately (in the era of the Enlightenment) of a purposive idea that consciously guides cultural development.

Pioneering in this respect was above all the insight that the individual and his life must necessarily be viewed as a functioning member of a unified community and its communal life, and that the idea of reason is therefore not the idea of an individual alone, | but VII, 15/16
is rather a communal idea. It is also, therefore, an idea in accordance with which socially unified mankind and the historically developed forms of social life are to be judged normatively. Plato, as we know, calls the community, with regard to its normal developmental form, the "state," the "individual writ large." What guides him is evidently the apperception, arising naturally and determining generally and unavoidably the thoughts and deeds of practical-political life, that views communities, cities, and states, by analogy with individuals, as thinking and feeling entities, as entities that act and make practical decisions—as something like personalities. And indeed, as is true of all original apperceptions, this apperception, too, has an original legitimacy. In this way, Plato becomes the founder of the doctrine of social reason, of a truly rational human community as such or of a genuine social life as such—in short, of social ethics, as the full and true ethics. For Plato, wholly in the spirit of the above considerations, this founding took on a special cast through his fundamental idea of philosophy. That is to say: whereas *Socrates* had grounded rational life on the basis of knowledge justifying itself through insight, in *Plato* philosophy, absolutely justified science, steps in to take the place of this knowledge. In lieu of rational individual life there is now communal life; in lieu of the individual there is the individual writ large. Thus philosophy becomes the rational foundation, the

fundamental condition of the possibility of a genuine, truly rational community and its truly rational life.

Although in Plato these ideas are limited to the idea of the state[a] and are conditioned by his time, it is easy to extend his basic thoughts to an arbitrarily large human community.[b] With that the way is opened up to the idea of a new humanity and human culture, a humanity and culture derived from philosophical reason.

How this idea would, in pure rationality, have to be developed, how far its practical possibility extends, to what extent it is to be recognized as the highest practical norm and put into effect—these are open questions for now. In any case, Plato's basic idea of a rigorous philosophy as | a function of a communal life that it is called upon to VII, 16/17
reform exerts *de facto* an unceasing and increasing influence. Consciously or unconsciously, it influences the essential character and the fate of European cultural development. Science spreads itself over all domains of life and everywhere lays claim, to the extent that it has succeeded or believes it has succeeded, to the significance of an ultimately normative authority.

[a] *Staatsgemeinschaft* [b] *vergemeinschaftete Menschheit*

⟨Chapter Two VII, p. 17
The Grounding of Logic and the Limits of Formal-Apophantic Analytics⟩

Lecture 3: ⟨The Aristotelian-Stoic-Traditional Logic as a Logic of Consistency or Concordance⟩

In the last lecture we became acquainted with the Platonic idea of philosophy. What interests us now is above all the development of European science: how and to what extent Platonic impulses come to life in it.

The new philosophy originating from *Plato's* dialectic—logic, general metaphysics (*Aristotle's* First Philosophy), mathematics, the sciences of nature and spirit in their various disciplines (such as physics, biology, ethics, and politics)—all of these disciplines were only incomplete realizations of the Platonic idea of philosophy, i.e., philosophy as absolutely justifying science. One can say that the radicalism of the Platonic intention aiming at the complete and final rationality of all scientific knowledge became weakened precisely through the fact that [only] subordinate levels of rationality were reached. This occurred both in the systematic development of logic functioning as a general theory of method charged with providing, in a professional manner, a preliminary illumination of concrete scientific work, as well as in the detailed working out of the particular scientific disciplines themselves. These now developed concretely, preceded and followed by constant critical consideration of their methods.[a] In this respect—especially with regard to the mathematical spheres of cognition, which were privileged from the beginning—these methods soon took on a rationality that went far beyond what the appointed | leader, logic, could justify on the basis VII, 17/18 of scientifically fixed normative laws. It is conceivable, by the way, that from the very start the development of logic and the devel-

[a] *unter steter kritischer Vor- und Nacherwägung ihrer Methoden*

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S. Luft, T. M. Naberhaus (translators), *First Philosophy*, Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Works 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_2

opment of the sciences went hand in hand. Already in relation to the primitive theoretical achievements of the oldest forms of mathematics, in relation to their conclusions and proofs, the focus on critical justification, and thereby on matters of principle, i.e., on pure generalities, was such that a solid framework of ideal forms and formal laws had to impose itself. It had to become apparent that the elementary and complex judgmental formations arising in judging activities are bound in evident necessity to fixed forms—if, that is, they are to be capable of being true at all, [i.e.,] if they are to be capable of being seen with insight as adequate to their states of affairs. In a genuinely Platonic spirit, the pure forms of judgment achieved, albeit incompletely, ideal-conceptual form, and the purely rational laws grounded in them, in which the formal conditions of the possibility of judgmental truth (and equally of judgmental falsehood) express themselves, were discovered. Thus arose the fundamental elements of a pure and indeed formal logic or, as we can also say, of a purely rational doctrine of science,[a] whose norms, precisely owing to their formal generality, had to be of an absolutely universal validity. Science as such, every conceivable science, strives to attain truths; in making assertions it strives to produce assertory contents that are not simply the judgments of subjects making assertions but are rather judgments that have been established by them with evidence and that can again at any time be confirmed with evidence. Thus it is clear that formal-logical laws, precisely as laws that make up the pure forms of possible true judgments, must have a normative meaning and an absolutely necessary validity for all conceivable sciences.

The *Stoic* logic, which further developed the great project of *Aristotelian* analytics, has the great merit of having for the first time explicitly worked out the necessary idea of a truly rigorous formal logic in a reasonably pure way. It laid the ground for this development through its significant—though disregarded, indeed completely forgotten—doctrine of the *lektón*. In this doctrine the idea of a proposition, as the judgment judged in the act of judging (judgment in the noematic sense), is succinctly expressed for the first time, | and the syllogistic laws are related to its pure forms. VII, 18/19

[a] *Wissenschaftslehre*

In its essentials, this logic, and the whole of traditional logic, was not a genuine logic of truth, but rather merely a logic of non-contradiction, unanimity, and consequence. More precisely, the core of this logic was constituted by rational theories that perpetuated themselves down through the millennia, however much logic in other respects may have undergone modifications. These theories were limited to the formal conditions of possibility governing the consistent fixing of judgments that have already been carried out, a fixing which is accomplished solely according to the analytic sense of these judgments and prior to any questions regarding their factual truth or possibility. Since we are dealing here with a most significant distinction—a distinction that indeed *Kant's* doctrine of analytic thought was ⟨already⟩ aiming toward, but that neither he nor subsequent thinkers were able to bring to that most necessary scientific clarity—I would like here to embark on a systematic excursus that should satisfy all demands for fundamental transparency.

Let us consider someone making a series of judgments, adding one judgment to another in such a way that the previously made judgments continue to be retained in his mind.[a] Then there arises not a mere series of judgments, but rather a series that is meant and remains so enduringly[b] in the unity of a comprehensive validity,[c] of a total judgment: one judgmental unity reaches through all of the individual judgments. These latter are not judgments that merely arise one after another in a stream of consciousness. Rather, after being produced in a judging act[d] they are retained continuously in one's spiritual grasp and hence, taken together in sequence, in *one* grasp: they have a unity that links judgment-sense[e] with judgment-sense and constitutes itself in a meaningful way in subsequent judging. This unity is the unity of a composite, overarching judgment that is founded in the individual judgments, imparting to them all the unity of an internally coherent validity. In this manner, the manifold expressions of [e.g.] a treatise have an all-encompassing unity of judgment, as do, in their own way, every theory and every complete science.

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[a] *innerlich fortgelten* [b] *die immerfort gemeint bleiben* [c] *Einheit einer Zusammengeltung* [d] *nach der aktuellen urteilenden Erzeugung* [e] *Urteilssinn*

Within each such overarching unity of judgment, particular judgments can stand in special relations to other judgments in an evident way, or they can enter into such relations subsequently. They can form unities | of judgment of a special kind, namely, unities of con- VII, 19/20
sistency and inconsistency.[a] Thus, every inference is a judgmental unity of consequence. In drawing a conclusion the so-called concluded judgment does not merely arise *after* the premise-judgments. One does not merely make one judgment after another; rather, the conclusion-judgment is judged from *out of* the premise-judgments. What one "concludes"[b] is concluded from what is already—that is, judgmentally—included[c] in them. That which is already "prejudged"[d] in them is now really and explicitly judged. For example, suppose that we judge, at one and the same time, "every A is B" and "every B is C." Then we might, "thereupon" and apparently as co-included in the latter, judge, "every A is C." Thus the concluding statement is not a judgmental production in and of it itself, but rather a judgment produced out of the premises. As long as we stick to these premises as our "meanings,"[e] as long as we retain them for ourselves in their validity, then not only can we continue our judging with "every A is C," but we see that this judgment can at any time be reproduced out of these premises, and thus that it "resides in" these premises in a certain way as "prejudged."

At times we move judgingly from certain premises to a new judgment, thinking that the new judgment might lie in them. But if we look closely at the premise-judgments that we judged previously and at this new judgment, if we make our judgmental meanings[f] clear, we occasionally see that the concluding judgment does not actually lie in the premises. In other cases, however, as in every case where the inference proceeds with evidence, we can see that the conclusion is indeed the conclusion of these premises, that it is

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[a] *Einheiten der Konsequenz und Inkonsequenz*. A series of inferences has a certain kind of unity, either a unity of consistency or of inconsistency, by which he means that as a whole it is the one or the other. "*Einheit*" here indicates the holistic character of a deductive chain.—Trans. [b] "*erschlossen*" [c] *beschlossen* [d] "*präjudiziert*" [e] *Meinungen*. Here Husserl employs this term in the sense of what is meant in a judgment, not in the more colloquial sense in which it means "opinion." The quotation marks have been added to indicate that the German word is not *Bedeutung*, *Sinn*, or any of the other more usual German equivalents of "meaning."—Trans. [f] *Urteilsmeinungen*

indeed, through the judgmental positing of the premises, itself determined as co-positable. In this way we learn that "being included in" is a relative quality, one that is actually attributed to the concluding judgment, as an identical declarative statement, in relation to the premise-judgments as such. Conversely, these premise-judgments, as identical judgments of their sense, have their own, corresponding peculiarity, namely, of bearing this concluding judgment within themselves. Beginning with these premise-judgments, one can make an evident transition in which the concluding judgment in its consequential character emerges with evidence, a transition that is possible at any time and that is to be carried out in an actual act of judging.

The character contrary to inferential consequence, as it belongs purely to judgments as judgments, is inconsequence or | contra- VII, 20/21
diction. If we have judged, for example, "every A is B," it might happen that, while we still have this conviction, we judge (perhaps because a certain experience teaches us so), "this A here is not B." However, as soon as we look back on the previous judgment and its sense becomes clear to us, we see that the new judgment contradicts the earlier one, and conversely the earlier one the later. If, perhaps on the basis of experience, we must adhere to the new judgment, then in view of this situation it quickly follows that we abandon the previous judgment and transform it into the negative judgment "not every A is B."

Finally we should mention a further circumstance that belongs to relations of both inclusion and exclusion, or including and excluding. Statements, such as A and B, can stand to each other in a relation that is one of neither inclusion nor exclusion, as, for example, with the statements "U is X" and "Y is Z." They then have a relation of compatibility[a] which we call non-contradiction.

We immediately notice that such examples are not accidental empirical occurrences in our judging life but that we are dealing here with essential laws, with generally intuitable and purely ideal universal validities—pure laws pertaining to consequence, inconsequence, and non-contradiction and determined exclusively by the pure *forms* of judgment. For example, with regard to what was said

[a] *Verträglichkeit*

above about inconsequence, we immediately notice the law: if B contradicts A, then it is "excluded" by A, and if A is posited, then the positing of B is ruled out. Following up on these laws, we learn that judgmental consequence and contradiction, inclusion, exclusion, and compatibility are judgmental relations that are bound together through overarching ideal laws. Furthermore, when we look at the matter more closely we can distinguish mediate and immediate consequences and contradictions, and, taking all of this into consideration and systematically following the various judgmental forms and forms of possible combinations of premises, we come to a multiform lawfulness that unites itself into the unity of a completed, systematic theory. | VII, 21/22

It is now important to note the following. Pure judgmental consequence and contradiction as inconsequence, as well as compatibility, pertain to judgments purely as judgments, independent of any question as to whether they are, in addition, true or false, or even only possibly so. We must sharply distinguish between two things here:

1) Making judgments evident in the sense of establishing them by convincing ourselves of their truth or falsity through recourse to the "things themselves." Likewise, the evident clarifying of judgments by making explicit their possibility, their possible truth or falsity, perhaps their a priori possibility or their a priori impossibility (absurdity).

2) It is something entirely different merely to "analytically clarify" judgments by ascertaining what is consequently co-judged in them purely as statements or what is excluded by them through contradiction. I am speaking here of the *analytic judgmental sense* (the pure unity of meaning) of the declarative statement. By this I mean the judgmental "meaning"[a] that can be extracted from each act of judging or asserting and that in repetition can always be re-identified with evidence. The evident extraction of this judgmental "meaning" is completely neutral with respect to whether one does or does not have recourse to the judged sphere of facts by way of clarifying or confirming intuition.

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[a] *Urteilsmeinung*

We thus distinguish, as we can also say, the[1] "pure judgment" (the pure unity of meaning) from the factual possibility or even truth corresponding to it, these latter being expressions that designate other concepts associated with the equivocal expression "sense."[a]

The entire traditional syllogistic, that is, almost the whole of traditional formal logic in its essential core, actually only enunciates laws concerning the conditions for the preservation of non-contradiction, or in other words laws concerning the explication and preservation of correct consequences and the elimination of inconsistencies. Accordingly, the concept of truth, and the concepts of possibility, impossibility, [and] necessity, do not actually belong to the formal discipline of the essential conditions of thoroughgoing non-contradiction and of purely consequential thinking, which we are here delimiting in its purity. The rational lawfulness of consequence is seen with insight by looking solely at the judgments as the pure meanings of the assertions | themselves, and by bringing their pure VII, 22/23 forms to full clarity. How judgments can be brought to adequacy with the things, however—how one may make decisions about truth and falsity, factual possibility and impossibility—this is not considered here.

To be sure, truth and modes of truth, on the one hand, and mere judgmental inclusion, exclusion, and coexistence [on the other] are not without a close connection. This connection consists in the fact that, e.g., no judgment, not even a synthetically uniform judgmental system that simultaneously presents *one* [single] judgment—thus, for example, no theory—can be true if a contradiction can be demonstrated in it.

Every contradiction is false: in saying this what we mean by the term "contradiction" as such is a judgment combined out of other judgments among which one of them excludes at least one other, [i.e.,] contradicts it. We can, however, also formulate the law: if B contradicts A and A is true, then B is false; and if B is true, then A is false. Corresponding laws hold when we take possibility and necessity (or their opposites) instead of truth. There are, fur-

[a] *Sinn*

[1] Reading *das* for *daß*.—Trans.

thermore, similar laws for the relationship of consequence, of pure judgmental inclusion. Especially the fundamental law: if the concluding statement is true (possible), then the concluded statement is true (possible), and if a concluded statement is false (impossible), then the concluding statement—its the whole set of premises—is false [(impossible)]. All such laws of connection have to be established carefully and as distinct principles, separated from the pure propositions of consequence. In pure conceptualization[a] we must then also distinguish from one another the concepts of validity belonging to the various spheres. In the logic of consequence the law which says that if the concluding statement does not hold, then neither do the premises says no more than that the rejection of the inferred judgment conditions the rejection of the concluding one. This is connected with another law according to which every relation in an inference can be inverted: the negation of the conclusion has as a consequence the negation of the premises. In the logic of truth, however, we do not speak of a validity or invalidity that makes a judgment out of a possible judgment, or that prohibits it, as already having been judged, from being posited as a judgment. Rather, we are talking here of validity as truth and as that of its derivatives.

Now to be sure, with regard to such groups of formal-general | VII, 23/24 laws of connection, a formal logic of pure consequence and noncontradiction turns out to be a valuable subordinate level of a logic of truth, though it remains merely a subordinate level. Our genuine cognitive interest, however, strives to make possible true judgments and thoroughgoing truth. At its highest level it strives to make possible universal knowledge, to produce a system of universal and absolutely justified truth—a philosophy in the Platonic sense. Accordingly, what was necessary was a purely rational doctrine of method for attaining truth, one that went beyond the admittedly [already] highly rational logic of consequence operating with pure essential laws. One did not get very far in that respect, not even with regard to the most general problems (which indeed were hard enough to gain access to) concerning the making possible of truth as such—leaving aside for the moment the far more extensive problems concerning the making possible of true science, let alone philosophy.

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[a] *Begriffsbildung*

Lecture 4: ⟨Excursus: On the Universal Logic of Consequence as Analytic Mathematics, the Correlative Treatment of Formal Ontology, and the Problem of a Logic of Truth⟩

In the last lecture we gave a characterization of the rational theories of formal logic. These theories, conceived by *Aristotle* under the title of analytics and subsequently filled out and purified, made up the basic stock, as it were, of traditional logic. In its main core, this logic was a rational systematics of essential laws governing consequence, inconsequence, [and] non-contradiction. I attempted to make clear (something that, to be sure, had not been seen by the tradition itself) that thereby *a self-standing discipline* is defined, one that, if it is construed purely in accordance with its sense and in its own theoretical essence,[a] does not yet include the concept of truth and its various derivatives and modalities at all. Included among such derivatives of truth are concepts like possibility (as possible truth), necessity, probability, etc. with their negations.

Our delimitation of a logic of consequence, to return once again to that, was grounded in the fact that judgments as mere *judgmental senses*[b] (*statements*)—or, as we can also say in the sphere of articulated judgments, *identical* | *meanings of declarative statements*—can VII, 24/25 be grasped with evidence by "mere explication." This evidence lies, as we showed, prior to all questions of possible or actual truth. Or equivalently, it is independent of the question of whether the judgment, with regard to its state of affairs, is intuitive and whether, if it is, its "meaning" is more or less saturated with the fullness of an intuition.

The essence of this *evidence of mere explication* consists in the fact that for this evidence, it is *not* in any way necessary to examine the individual asserted meanings with regard to their truth or even their merely possible truth; one does not need to pass over to a clarifying or confirming explication of these meanings (that is, of *what* one means in the judgment). Doing so would accomplish a making-evident of a completely different type and tendency. We can make a terminological distinction by juxtaposing *analytic clarification*, which makes explicit the identical "analytic" sense of the

[a] *Bestand* [b] *Urteilssinne*

assertion—e.g., in the assertion "2 is smaller than 3"—to *factual clarification or establishing*[a] and the possibility or truth that arise in it. The latter designates a wholly different concept of sense. Especially in negative speech we must then say, e.g., [of the statement] "2 is larger than 3," that it "has no sense." That is, it of course has an *analytic sense*; it is a statement that is entirely clear with regard to what would be meant in the judging assertion; but the *factual sense*, possibility and truth, is lacking here, as becomes evident in recourse to the factual intuiting of "2," "3," and "larger." Concerning the kind of evidence that is oriented toward the analytic sense, that of analytic clarification, we could also say that *a purely symbolic, purely verbal judging* suffices, a judging that does not yield anything at all with regard to necessity, probability of validity, and their opposites.

And now we must say with regard to this distinction: the entire syllogistic, construed purely, is—if we want to employ the Aristotelian term—"analytics"; it concerns the merely identical, ideal asserted meanings or judgments as material for analytic | clarification: precisely for the reason that relations such as that of consequence and inconsequence, inclusion and exclusion, and similarly analytic compatibility in the sense of non-contradiction, exclusively concern these judgments as pure judgmental "meanings" and judgmental senses. VII, 25/26

Traditional logic did not, however, take itself to be merely a logic of analytic consequence and non-contradiction. Indeed, it constantly spoke of *truth* and its derivatives—and this not just as an accidental accompaniment to connections of consequence. Rather, it took itself to be the method of truth. And obviously it could not even try to take itself to be the former, because it had not theoretically appropriated for itself the twofold evidence belonging to judging which we have just spoken of, nor hence the various concepts of judgmental sense belonging thereto. Accordingly, it did not, in a necessary methodological distinction, attribute to [the concept of] consequence what belongs to it, nor did it, through a separation of truth from the modalities of truth, attribute to these [concepts] what

[a] *sachlichen Klärung oder Bewährung*

specifically belong to them, that is, what can be said of judgments on the basis of the evidence of factual adequacy in the form of a priori laws of formal generality.

Thus, a great imperfection in its methodic procedure attaches to historical logic—to a discipline that, as a universal and fundamental doctrine of method for all knowledge, should satisfy the highest demands of method in and through its own procedure. Because it remained mired in unclarities and half-truths, its methodological norms for any knowing whatsoever had themselves to remain insufficient, unclear, and piecemeal.

Indeed, logic did not get very far, apart from what I expounded earlier. It remained insufficient even in the—as we shall see—fundamentally one-sided dimension along which alone it developed theoretically. Here we must note a very serious lack ⟨stemming from⟩ an impermissible limitation. Traditional logic was not capable of doing justice theoretically to the correlation between the predicatively determining judgment and the judgment-substrate, nor, accordingly, to the correlation between predicative truth and truly existing objectivity. The sense of every predicative assertion refers (in itself) to | certain objectivities, which it names in the judgment VII, 26/27 and about which it asserts something, determining [it as] this or that. Formal theories, which concern the consequence and truth of predicative judgments as such, also demand, correlatively, formal theories for nominal objectivities as objectivities of possible judgments—objectivities that can be conceived in pure consequence or non-contradiction, i.e., that can be posited in judgment. Equally, they demand theories for objects that are not merely coherently conceivable, but that possibly exist in truth.

Let us develop this in somewhat more detail. One can ask what holds a priori and in formal generality for objects as such. "In formal generality"—i.e., for any conceivable objects whatsoever, and purely as conceivable. But that means nothing other than [conceivability] for object-senses[a] as they might emerge in possible judgmental senses (in statements in the logical sense) as substrates of the properties, relative qualities, etc. conceived as belonging to them (straightforwardly, hypothetically, or conditionally, in certainty,

[a] *Gegenstandssinne*

assumption, probability, etc.). Every judgment is a judgment about this and that, and the corresponding substrates—as moments of sense, as object-senses—themselves belong to the nexus of the unity of sense, a unity that we call a judgment. It is precisely these object-senses that analytic mathematics (in set theory, arithmetic, and the theory of manifolds) designates as its objects of thought. More specifically, the question here concerns not only possible synthetic connections of possible judgments that are bound together by means of identical substrates ([i.e., substrates that are] "meant" as being identical in sense). Rather, it concerns those synthetic connections in which the judgments are unanimously connected, or, correlatively, in which the identical objects are thought as determined by means of non-contradictory determinations. If one conceives, in formal generality, of object-senses as substrates of judgmental senses with either purely arbitrary form or with certain forms selected from the a priori possible and conceptually constructible forms, then we have to ask about the a priori systems of forms in which these substrates can be posited in unanimity, and about the unanimous determinate forms which these substrates take on in them. Every form of unanimous determination is at the same time a law for objects as such, namely, as objects that can, in a non-contradictory fashion, be determined | in such a form. It is the task of a theory of VII, 27/28
manifolds to establish systematically immediately evident, unanimous systems governing the ways of determining possible objects as such and to deduce, constructively and analytically, all determinate forms consequently implied in them. The doctrine of "something" or "somethings" as such, i.e., of objects in general as substrates of possible predicative senses—senses that ought to be capable of being judged unanimously in continuous predication—is *formal ontology*. It is merely the correlative way of considering the doctrine of unanimous judging as such and of the forms in which judgments unite themselves into consequently unanimous judgmental systems. An apophantic logic, conceived as *all*-encompassing, is by itself a formal ontology, and conversely, a formal ontology that has been *fully* elaborated is by itself a formal apophantics.

The categorial concepts, i.e., the a priori possible forms of determination through which objects of thought are determined in possible judgments that are to be judged unanimously, differ from

the concepts through which the judgments themselves are determined. Thus ontological categories stand over against apophantic categories. On the other hand, however, the "statement" or "judgment"—we can also call them "matter of thought" or "thought" state-of-affairs as such[a]—is itself an ontological category in so far as each [statement or judgment] makes possible judgmental formations in which [the clause or judgment] functions as determining substrate. Of course, it is part of the task of a formal ontology to investigate all of the possible types of productions through which thought-objects arise from thought-objects, as well as the determinations that arise for them. Formal ontology encompasses all possible judgmental formations in which, on the other side, all possible determinations of thought-objects must occur.

But enough; one can see that inseparable correlations bind together object and judgment (or "objects" and "states-of-affairs"—both taken, in our present attitude, as mere posited senses, as mere "things that are thought").[b] We see that there is here a single a priori science which, relating back to itself, deals with objects and states-of-affairs, now orienting itself specifically toward factual or judgmental formations,[c] now toward object- |substrates and their consequent VII, 28/29
determination. All of the concepts involved here, i.e., the analytic-logical categories, are concepts that are purely derived from the "senses." Just as, with regard to statements, we speak only of unanimity and not of truth, with regard to the objects we speak only of contradiction-free conceivability and not of their factual possibility or reality. Thus the entire formal ontology *or* formal apophantics, each really taken in an all-encompassing way, is analytics.

One can see how imperfectly traditional logic went about its methodological work, how remote it remained from the idea of a universal formal logic and of a formal ontology implied in it, an idea that was actually only able to begin to make itself felt, if incompletely, through the spirit of *Leibniz* under the title *mathesis universalis*. This becomes clear from the fact that among those special scientific disciplines that stand over against logic there also arose individual, and indeed *mathematical disciplines* which, like

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[a] *"Denksachverhalt" oder "gedachter" Sachverhalt als solcher*
[b] *Gedachtheiten*
[c] *Sachverhalt- oder Urteilsgestalten*

arithmetic, could be fully subsumed under the idea of *formal ontology* as important though small branches of the latter. Thus, what in the historical consciousness of scientific humanity was held apart under the titles of logic and arithmetic—held as far apart as logic and physics or logic and politics—actually belonged very intimately together. Both arithmetic and apophantic logic (e.g. syllogistics) can, as subdisciplines, be subsumed under the complete idea of logic, indeed of a logic that can already be construed purely analytically. On the other hand, what in historical consciousness was intimately one, such as arithmetic and geometry, had to be divided. Geometry requires spatial intuition; its concepts must be derived from a factual sphere, from that of spatiality. Arithmetic, however, involves concepts that express modalities of the something-in-general, such as set and number, and the evidence required in it is of the same kind as that which allows us to obtain the logical-apophantic concepts of judgmental consequence. Viewed closely, the whole of arithmetic and thus the whole of analytic mathematics, is in fact merely a differently oriented analytics, merely a differently oriented logic of consequence—differently oriented in that, instead of being related to predicative positings, to judgments, it is rather related to the positing of "thought- |objects." But I cannot pursue this discussion VII, 29/30 further here and must confine myself to these mere hints.

The flaws of traditional logic that I indicated are closely related to certain very radical methodological flaws, flaws that harmed the way one treated the *ideas of truth* and *true being* as well as the remaining ideas essentially connected to them, those of modal modifications. If *logic* in fact—and in the realization of the great intentions of Platonic dialectics—hoped to be a *universal and radical doctrine of method* for attaining truth, then this research could not merely focus thematically on the level of the correlation between truth and true being. Rather, yet another correlative pair, itself standing in correlation with the previous correlation, would have to become thematic. *Judgment is that which is judged in judging activity, and this activity is a subjective* [*modality of*] *life*. Judging originally as true is judging that confirms itself in insight, and truly existing objectivity is objectivity that gives itself to the experiencing subject in its experiencing or otherwise intuiting and grasping lived experience. Objectively true judging ⟨is⟩ a judging that everyone necessarily confirms, or can

necessarily confirm, etc., with insight. What is needed is an investigation of judgments and truth, an investigation of objectivity and reality, not only with regard to judgments as identical assertion-senses and with regard to objects as identical substrate-senses, but also with regard to the *subjective aspect of judging*, of seeing with insight, of intersubjective and final confirmation, of the positing and experiencing of objects, and especially with regard to the subjective modes in which all such things, such as the meant and true object itself, the judgment as statement and truth, give themselves as themselves in cognizing lived experience, *in consciousness*.

Since the pioneering and most admirable investigations of *Aristotle's organon*, logical research in the main went forward into the dimension indicated by the concepts *statement, true statement, object*, [and] truly existing object. And indeed, this was | a quite natural way VII, 30/31 to proceed, after the first steps of subjective reflection[a] had done their job. He who as a scientist has to do battle against a universal skepticism—and the fight against sophistic skepticism was indeed the historical motive that compelled Greek thought to develop a fundamental doctrine of method—he who thus begins to reflect radically and asks himself to what extent truth and true being are attainable in cognizing activity will first of all look to those contents proposed in scientific accomplishments, to *statements and theories*. Necessarily, however, he will find himself drawn into subjectively oriented reflections directed toward the side of cognition. He will then clarify for himself the differences between evidence and blind intending, between concordant and contradictory judging, and the like, and in this way a first manner of justifying knowledge will arise, clearing the way for a first grounding of science.

[a] *subjektiv-reflektiver Besinnung*

⟨Chapter Three
First Reflections On Cognizing Subjectivity, Motivated by Sophistic Skepticism⟩

VII, p. 31

Lecture 5: ⟨The Discovery of the Cognition of Ideas and the Greek Origins of the Philosophical, Rational Sciences⟩

At the close of the last lecture I began to speak of the fact that while the researches of Platonic dialectics—those radical methodological reflections—did indeed issue in a logic, in a scientific doctrine of method, this logic, due to its one-sidedness, by no means realized the intended idea of a fully sufficient doctrine of method and of a philosophy brought into effect by it, a philosophy in the Platonic sense. What I characterized as one-sidedness was the fact that this logic never attained a scientific theorization of that thematic level which is designated by the correlate-pair "truth" and "true being" and, more generally still, "judgment" (significance of a proposition) and "object of judgment." At the same time, however, I pointed to a second correlation, one that relates these ideal unities to cognizing subjectivity; that is to say, | I pointed out that VII, 31/32 the identical thing which we call an "assertion" and the "truth" in a manifold of modes of judgment is given in subjective modes of lived experience.[a] The same goes for the object of judgment in the different modes in which it is clearly or unclearly experienced or otherwise becomes conscious. Let us put ourselves back into the initial motivations, in this case in the historical motivations that guided the Socratic-Platonic reaction [against Skepticism] and in so doing initiated the development of the idea of a philosophy of a new kind and of a doctrine of method that would serve it. He who, as a scientist, stands before the fact of Skepticism, with its repudiation of the possibility of every objective cognition going under the title of "science" or philosophy, will at first focus on the

[a] *in subjektiven Weisen des Wie subjektiven Erlebens*

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contents of contemporary or traditional philosophy, that is, on their doctrines and theories. Necessarily, however, he will soon be drawn into subjective reflections concerning the cognitional side of these theorems, i.e., the how of their subjective origination. The first thing he will undoubtedly do is make this clear to himself: that judging as such, putting forth judging propositions, no matter how lively one's conviction may be, is not yet rational judging, is not yet knowledge in the genuine sense. He will contrast insightful judging, judging that intuits the things and states of affairs[a] themselves and in that intuition determines them, with vague, irrelevant[b] "meaning."[c] He will say to himself: A mere "meaning" of this kind must first authenticate its truth value, and it can only do that by being measured against the corresponding intuition, which places the things themselves before our very eyes—not, that is, through an arbitrary but through a particular intuition, in short, through self-evidence, etc. Likewise he will, and with the same aim, reflect upon the value of an intuition that actually gives things[d] or in some cases may merely purport to do so, e.g., in the case of external experience. He will perhaps make clear to himself that while external experience does indeed give itself subjectively as an intuiting and grasping of the experienced object itself, the only being that the experiencing agent can get in his grip is a fleeting and never a final one; that what he gets in his grip is at all times burdened with mere opinion[e] that never reaches actual fullness of being itself, not even in the most eagerly pursued progress of supplementary experiences. He may thus come to see that external experience is never a consciousness that manages to satisfy | its pretension of a self-having, a self-grasping of the VII, 32/33
object itself. Science, however, does not merely strive for truth in the ordinary, lax sense, but for *objective* truth. What is involved in this attainment of objectivity?

Such reflections were made necessary by the Sophistic movement, as a universal Skepticism that negated the possibility of knowledge of objective truth in general and of every true being whatever. The purpose of these reflections was justification or, alternatively, a general critical reflection:[f] on that which resides

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[a] *Sachen und Sachverhalte* [b] *sachfernem* [c] "*Meinen*" [d] *sachgebende Anschauung*
[e] *Meinung* [f] *reflektiv-kritische Besinnung*

in cognition itself in the manner of lived experience, in the quite different modes of representing and judging, of the intuitable and non-intuitable; on that which gives us grounds for speaking of different modes of perfect (or genuine) and imperfect cognition and, at the highest level, of scientifically objective knowing; and finally on that which alone could give a possible sense to all normative concepts.

If in this way reflections on cognition, focusing on the subjective modes of givenness of that which is meant in experience and judgment, stood at the peak of their development, that does not mean that one had arrived at a comprehensive and successful *theoretical treatment* of the sphere of subjective modes of cognition opened up here or hence of cognizing subjectivity in general and as such. Indeed, millennia had to pass before the method for the type of research which lies in this subjective direction, and which is necessary for the purpose of a critical self-justification of cognition, could be worked out, thereby allowing a breakthrough to the development of a radical and genuine doctrine of the method of cognition. It is not as if the first critical epistemological[a] reflections, *Plato*'s tireless and profound preliminary investigations and the epistemological reflections of his great successors—never again to be abandoned—bore no scientific fruit: quite the contrary. Only this much should be said, that what was lacking was their necessary implementation in the form of a truly rational doctrine of the essence of cognition, regarded from the subjective point of view. What occurred instead was a relatively quick development of the special sciences, whose relatively satisfactory perfection in no way helped to remedy this | deficiency. How significant that was we shall VII, 33/34
soon learn to understand.

First a few remarks that will take us more deeply into the matter. The first more serious reflections on the *subjective nature of genuine cognition* were accompanied, as their greatest and earliest successes, by the discovery of the cognition of Ideas[b] as cognition of apodictic truth. There is an originally intuitive production—and indeed a perfect one—of pure essential concepts and of the essential

[a] *erkenntniskritischen* [b] *Ideenerkenntnis*

laws grounded in them, laws of intuitive, apodictic generality and necessity. This discovery soon made its effect felt in the purification and fundamental completion of the already existing science of mathematics, in its transformation into pure mathematics, as pure science of Ideas.

It should be noted here that the history of the rigorous and especially of the exact (in the strictest understanding of the term) sciences is generally traced back to well before the epoch of Plato, and indeed with good reason. One can, however, only grant these pre-Platonic efforts the status of scientific proto-forms. Thus, mathematics above all obtains its specific, scientific impress only thanks to the preliminary subjective-methodological work accomplished in Platonic dialectics. Only in this way does it become a *pure* geometry and arithmetic concerned with *ideally possible* spatial and numerical formations, formations conceived in normative relation to limit ideas that can be intuitively extracted from them[a] and against which all such possibilities approximate themselves. And to these pure ideals of approximation ("pure" unities, "pure" straight line, etc.) are then related immediate essential concepts and essential laws, concepts and laws which, as "axioms," in turn support the whole edifice of pure deduction. The first classical systematician of pure mathematics, *Euclid*, was a Platonist, as is widely known. Drawing on great predecessors of his like *Eudoxos*, he provides, in the *Elements*, the first worked-out sketch of a purely rational science according to the ideal of the Platonic school. But we should be more precise and say: Geometry was the first successful science conceived outside of the general doctrine of method but yet according to the ideal of rationality founded[b] by it. It was the *first science* to | create VII, 34/35
its basic concepts in a pure intuition of ideas and to form ideal laws,[c] essential laws, laws that can be seen[d] in apodictic evidence, i.e., as unconditionally valid necessities. It was the first science to lay down systematically ordered immediate essential laws and, systematically building up from these laws, in forms of pure consequence, to reveal all of the essential laws mediately contained in them. It is, accordingly, the first science to explain rationally all of the particularities

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[a] *intuitiv herauszuschauende* [b] *begründeten* [c] *Ideengesetze* [d] *einleuchten*

and all of the actualities[a] to be set forth in its application, giving insight into them as a priori necessities.

On the other hand it should be emphasized that the ideal of rationality which emerged from these epistemological preliminary investigations makes its effect felt within the doctrine of method itself, and indeed does so simultaneously with the abovementioned transformation of mathematics into purely rational mathematics. What I have in mind here of course is the *analytics* founded by Plato's personal student *Aristotle*, a discipline which, despite all the imperfection of its further development as a formal logic of propositions, truths, and true being, nevertheless from the very start managed to work out the basic elements of a discipline that was rational in the same sense [as mathematics]. This discipline was a systematic exposure,[b] proceeding deductively, of the essential laws of consequence and truth, designed for the methodological purpose of creating rational norms to govern particular and actual acts of judging in accordance with their purported truths and possibilities, in accordance with their purported consistencies and inconsistencies, etc.

Thus, the *general doctrine of the method of knowledge* began as a preliminary investigation that set out to think through the contested possibility of genuine knowledge and to meditate on this possibility in general reflections; from these reflections it gained a *first ideal of rationality*. And, realizing this ideal in a certain direction within its own methodological sphere, this doctrine of method now, in the same direction—i.e., in the dimension indicated by the ideas of judgment, judged object, truth, and true being—began to shape itself into a *rational* doctrine of method. From its immanent, self-generated motivation a development was thereby inaugurated in which this doctrine of method began to shape itself into a purely *rational* scientific discipline, | a purely rational discipline in accor- VII, 35/36
dance with an idea it had itself conceived beforehand—quite in the same way as, outside the doctrine of method, *arithmetic* and *geometry* were conceived as rational and genuine sciences in accordance with the same idea, and similarly with other sciences after them. Here we should mention *rationally explanatory natural science*—

[a] *Faktizitäten* [b] *Herausstellung*

and in particular the beginnings of physics and astronomy—which already in antiquity was striving towards realization, if only in its first and admittedly primitive beginnings. To be sure, this natural science could not in itself become a purely rational science; yet it had (although this was not understood for a long time) the *novel shape of a rational explanation of facts*, in so far as it gave empirical cognition a share in fundamental necessity by employing pure mathematics as a methodological tool.

The rational sciences that came to be created in this manner, both within and outside the framework of the doctrine of method, were sciences of an entirely new historical type. They embody a preconceived methodological ideal (one that, to be sure, is completely determined only in its embodiment), an ideal that for the entire future and on up to our own day constitutes the concept of genuine science. But however great their achievement, and however much pure mathematics, before all others, represented for general consciousness the idea of genuine science in its *primal image*, so to speak, functioning for millennia as the most highly admired model whenever a new science was to be founded—[in spite of this] mathematics and all the other subsequent sciences were merely "*special sciences*" or, put better, they were only *dogmatic sciences*, in opposition to which we, with good reason, must place the philosophical sciences.

What is meant by this opposition of *dogmatic* and *philosophical* sciences? The path we pursued thus far gives us in advance the guidance we need to understand, at least as a presentiment, the necessary but as yet unfulfilled desideratum for all dogmatic rationality. *Philosophical sciences*: this can only mean to us, as long as we cling to the Platonic idea of philosophy as the highest purposive idea of knowledge, sciences *based on absolute justification*, sciences, that is, that can | defend their knowledge [claims] in every respect. Or, put VII, 36/37
differently, sciences in which the scientist is able to justify fully every kind of cognition in every conceivable respect, so that no question as to justification that one could pose concerning that cognition would remain unanswered, so that no conceivable cognitive peculiarity that is in any way relevant to such questions would remain unconsidered, whether it concerned the analytic sense of assertions, the corresponding intuitive factual contents, or the various subjective

modes in which cognizing runs its course and in which alone that which is judged or cognized can make its appearance.

How things stood with this rationality, which is ultimately justifying in every respect, when the new sciences began to emerge—this will be our next question.

Lecture 6: ⟨The Demand for a Theory of Knowledge Implied in the Platonic Idea of Dialectics⟩

We concluded our last lecture with the question as to the rationality of the sciences of this new type, those sciences that like to call themselves "rational." Did these sciences—even Euclidian geometry, that veritable rational wonder of the world—really correspond to the Platonic idea of a philosophical discipline as such, which creates true and genuine knowledge and therewith in each true proposition *ultimately* conveys to us what being is in truth—i.e., in such a manner that with it *all rational questioning comes to an end*?

Let us consider the matter. In their original founding and in being re-created through subsequent appropriation,[a] the propositions making up the scientific theories that had developed and matured under the titles of formal or pure logic, pure arithmetic, geometry, and explanatory natural science were not just put forth at random or accepted in blind "meaning." One did not simply judge per se; one judged *with insight*, whether in immediate insight or in the insight of mediate consequence, i.e., in the consciousness of inferential necessity. The various judgmental thoughts, the signification-contents of the various assertions, were made, with insight, to conform to the objectivities themselves, to the states of affairs of the regions to which the | corresponding scientific endeavors, in visibly perfect adequation, were directed. VII, 37/38

What was achieved here was achieved in the consciousness of successful accomplishment, and of this success the researching and founding scientist could convince himself in concomitant reflective scrutiny. What more could one demand here? And yet—should not indeed a "more" be conceivable, a higher accomplishment in

[a] *übernehmenden Nacherzeugung*

comparison with those scrutinizing reflections that the researcher continuously carries out in the course of his mental activity? Such reflections consist in a simple observation of the path and trajectory of mental activity, observation of the self-generated signification-contents, of the experiences which have come about and been carried through autonomously, or of some other clarifying and confirming intuition. Such observation is especially concerned with whether the signification-contents have to an extent saturated themselves with the corresponding intuitive contents and whether what is meant[a] purely as such—that which we called the "purely analytical sense"—therefore precisely conforms itself to what is intuitively given in the fullness of its sense, or whether in the end it does not fit there, so that what was supposed[b] would have to be abandoned or modified. At all times ⟨the scientist⟩ is directed toward the object that he has set out to determine theoretically. Yet in the course of his procedure he can ask himself whether, e.g., he has already observed it closely enough, whether he does not still need to view it from the other side, etc. And when, as a consequence of such new considerations, changes in the determination of the object turn out to be necessary, he will justify such changes to himself by saying, e.g., "the object is not actually the way I first thought; a new view that I have obtained of it in the meantime has taught me otherwise," etc. On the basis of such considerations it becomes clear that the scientist, when he occasionally turns his reflective gaze inward for the purpose of justifying his activity, makes plain to himself that in his determination of the object—the very object that he always has in view as one and the same—it is for him nevertheless the manifold subjective modes of appearance in which the object presents itself to him that are authoritative. He may choose to carry this out more or less carefully and penetratingly, according to his needs; it is in any case a mere observing and a practical activity delimited by this subjectively | directed looking, an activity of recognizing and VII, 38/39
holding in memory or of rejecting and reconsidering. At all times, such looking and acting are tied to the particular case, just as they make up merely a component part of a particular scientific activity.

[a] *das Gemeinte* [b] *die Meinung*

However, should one not demand more here? Could and indeed must one not pose *general* questions here? Are we not dealing here with generally circumscribable occurrences of cognizing life in possible cognizing subjects as such, with occurrences that are most worthy of their own theoretical interest? Indeed. When the scientist engages in his occasional justifying considerations *mere sidelights* are cast on the processes occurring within cognizing subjectivity. The aspects of the object that he gets into his view in a particular case are only a few of the countless modes in which the object is continuously given to him, so long as he views it as one and the same—as the identical object that he sees now from the front, now from the back; which at one moment he has before him in perception, at another in memory; the object upon which he, absorbed in his research, focuses exclusively but which then again, during a distraction, recedes into the background of his consciousness; which now stands before him clearly and distinctly, now in a blurred way, etc.

Would not a theoretical investigation of *all* that, a research that *focuses theoretically* on *cognizing activity as such*, in all its modes, and then subsequently on the particular kind of cognizing activity that we call scientific—would not such a research necessarily yield general insights, insights that would also be of great value to the individual working scientists within the various sciences? Indeed, would these insights not enable the scientist to carry out a *justification of a higher kind*, a fundamental normative regulation[a] of his individual activity? He himself, the scientist of each science, is thus most invested in this. Indeed, we are dealing here with the theoretical investigation of that enormously diverse *active life* running its course within the cognizing scientist during his mental activity. It is this life in which—though it remains concealed from him—his cognizing accomplishment itself consists, or, put differently, in which consists the *inwardness* of the configuration | of that which VII, 39/40
continuously lies before his glance as a cognitive formation, goal, and path. Thinking theoretically and accomplishing his theoretical work, he *lives* in these processes, which he himself *does not see*. What he has in view are the results that take shape in these processes, as

[a] *prinzipielle Normierung*

well as the ways of achieving them: the experienced item which, in changing experience, in changing subjective views or perspectives, gives itself as one and the same thing; the judgment that gives itself, in the changing activity of asserting judgment, as identical, as one and the same proposition, e.g., "$2 \times 2 = 4$," a proposition to which one can return again and again; and then, in authenticating cognition, the propositions in their conformity to that which is objectively intuited, the character of correctness that proves itself to be identical in every authentication, etc. Only when the scientist moves from this naively operating thinking to the new reflective attitude, an attitude which he indeed requires for the purpose of a subjective justification of his activity, does something of that subjective life which was previously concealed come into view. Only then does he get in his view these moments (and others that may be of interest to him) of the subjective modes of givenness of his empirical objectivities, of judgments, of the correctness of these judgments—though, as we have said previously, merely in specific cases, in concrete singularity, and never as a theoretical theme of their own.

It is, however, clear—and, through making present to ourselves more precisely what lies in cognition as a scientific accomplishment, it has come to urge itself upon us as a great desideratum—that a theoretical and comprehensive investigation of this cognitive life, of these extraordinarily diverse cognitive activities of representing, judging, giving reasons, examining, justifying, and whatever other activities to which our language may give vague, general names, is extremely necessary. For these are the life-activities in which for each knower, in distinct and continuously refreshed acts, the identical cognitive unities, the identical objects of experience and thought, the identical assertions, and finally too the identical truths and falsehoods take on a subjective, conscious shape. What he [the knower] has, he has only as something that is had in his having, as something experienced in his experiencing, as something thoughtfully assembled in his thought, as something that in some way "sets itself up"[a] | VII, 40/41 in his subjective life. And if we call it "one" and "identical"—this one and identical object of perception, to which new perceptions and memories can recur, this one and identical judgment, this identical

[a] *sich […] irgendwie "macht"*

truth, won in repeated insight—we call it "identical" only by virtue of the subjective act of identification in which various subjective acts, moments of life, are brought to a synthesis, that is, by virtue of a consciousness of unity in which this "identity" subjectively takes on some shape or other. For the knower something can only exist, can only be called "one" and "identical," because it emerges precisely in such subjective experience, which we call identifying. The same cognitive unities, and the same species and genera of cognitive unities as well (things as such, objects as such, empirical propositions as such, or, more generally still, propositions as such), thereby point from the very beginning to the fact that the manifold subjective modes in which they can take on a shape in cognitive, conscious life run their course in a fixed manner in which species and genus correspond to them.[1] We can anticipate that to the *generality of cognitive unities* there will correspond a *generality of ordered typicality of the subjective modes of cognition* in which alone such unities can be given.

We find it obvious that every object which we represent, which we think about, is representable and conceivable *for everyone*; likewise that any judgmental thought, any arbitrary assertion-signification, is *intelligible* to everyone and is so time and time again. But this implies that in every person equivalent subjective lived experiences of representing, understanding, and sense-constituting consciousness are possible, lived experiences in which the identical meaning would emerge. We find it obvious that a truth which we grasp with insight could be similarly grasped by anyone. The *general validity* of truth is a general and always possible reproducibility of the corresponding subjective lived experiences of insight; and the same holds for the entire spheres of the objective and the logical. This already points to the fact that the normally hidden play of subjective life, in which meant objects, judgment-contents, cognized truths, | inferred consequences, etc. become conscious, takes on certain *typical configurations* as it runs its course and, thus running its course, again and again accomplishes the same thing, so that in VII, 41/42

[1] Reading *in einer festen und ihnen entsprechenden art- und gattungsmäßigen Typik* instead of *in einer festen und sich entsprechenden Art und gattungsmäßigen Typik*—Trans.

fact an *ordered correlation* obtains between the typicality of the cognizing activity and the unitary shape of that which is cognized. Special characteristics of "actual being," of the "true," come to the fore in the ideally unitary senses of consciousness, in that which is identically meant, in so-called insight. Here cognizing life, under the titles "insight" and "self-evidence," will have to take on a special form, that of *rationality*—the kind of life that produces what is right, that produces knowledge in the pregnant sense. What its essential forms are and how they are to be grasped theoretically—these will be especially important questions.

What then is the science—where is it?—whose thematic "region" lies this direction? "Logic," of course, will be the answer of him who is accustomed to conceiving of logic as the universal doctrine of the method of knowledge, wishing it to be understood as the complete science prefigured in the Platonic dialectic.

Whatever the case may be, however, this science is not the formal logic that stems from Aristotelian analytics, at least not if we give it the thoroughly necessary purifying delimitation discussed above. If we do that, we obtain a firmly self-enclosed rational science which has as its region, as its thematic plane, the correlation of object as such and judgment as such, and possibly of existing object as such and true judgment as such, with all the formal modifications belonging to them. But to establish a priori laws for objects of thought and for possible objects in general is not to establish laws for the subjective modes in which objects become conscious, in which they give themselves in subjective cognition. And likewise, establishing a priori laws for judgments as such, for judgmental relations of consequence and of judgmental truth as such—this is not to make thematic and establish a priori laws for either the subjective modes in which judgments come to the fore in the execution of judging activities or the modes of self-evidence in which they can be subjectively characterized as truths or probabilities. Indeed, "judgment" in formal logic designates | the identical assertion-signification that VII, 42/43
stands forth in the manifold subjective acts of asserting and which at all times can be cognized in them, e.g., the identical proposition, "$2 \times 2 = 4$." Propositions as such, taken in a priori generality—in the manner in which they are thematic for formal logic—constitute a unique sphere of ideal objectivities, much as numbers do in arith-

metic. Like a proposition, a number is an identical ideal entity, in this case an identical entity in the subjectively quite varied modes of counting and thinking of numbers. Thus, just as in arithmetic it is the numbers alone that form the thematic sphere, and not the subjective activity that occurs in the act of counting and in other arithmetical consciousness, so, too, is it with regard to the propositions of formal apophantics.

In general we see that in this respect *pure formal logic* as a rational discipline stands on equal footing with all the other sciences in the new rational sense. Like them, it is *ontic, not epistemological*; it is not directed toward cognizing subjectivity and its subjective modes. This holds, therefore, not only for those rational disciplines which, in accordance with our preliminary indications, are seen upon close inspection to belong thematically, right from the beginning, to syllogistics (which develops first) or better, to apophantic logic—that is, not just for arithmetic and for all the other disciplines of formal-analytic mathematics. If formal logic, narrowly or broadly construed, has a special place *vis-à-vis* all the other sciences; if it belongs within the framework of a universal doctrine of method for all sciences; if it articulates ideal laws which can potentially be of use to all the sciences and to which they all know themselves to be bound—all of this is due to the fact that logic, and the *mathesis universalis* encompassing it, speaks precisely of objects as such and of judgments or truths as such, and of all the modes in which objects are conceivable and of all the forms of possible judgments pertaining to any object whatever. But of course, all sciences erect theories, i.e., judgmental formations;[a] in all of them objects are judged. Thus, a formal logic, and all logical-mathematical disciplines, must be valid for all sciences, for all conceivable scientific domains, for all conceivable scientific propositions and theories. Or, as we can also say, formal | logical laws, once discovered, must have the job of normatively regulating all the sciences with respect to their theoretical contents, thereby functioning as principles of justification for them. VII, 43/44

On the other hand, formal logic, including mathematical analysis, stands, as we said, on equal footing with all the other sciences in that no more than any of them does it find its sphere of research in

[a] *Urteilsgebilde*

cognizing subjectivity. However, through these considerations we have come to feel the need for a science of the subjective side of knowledge, a science that systematically investigates the subjective side of knowledge in general and of the cognition of all object-domains and all scientific regions. It is distinguished from all the other sciences through the unique peculiarity that it is related in exactly the same way to every conceivable science and has the same task with regard to all of them: to investigate the subjective side of their knowledge.

Lecture 7: ⟨Systematic Sketch of the Full Idea of Logic—of a Logic of Truth—As a Science of Cognizing and in General Accomplishing Subjectivity⟩

The science of cognizing subjectivity[a] that we are proposing finds itself in a certain parallel to formal logic; however, the manner in which it relates to and encompasses all of the sciences is entirely different. All sciences concern themselves with objects in a cognizing and, according to the content of their theories, meaningful manner. In all of them the objects are objects of real and possible judgments, substrates of real and possible truths. However, all of these theoretical contents have, as cognitive *unities*, an original and persisting relation to real and possible cognizing subjects, who in themselves, in the manner consciousness, shape the identical objects, the same judgments and truths, in manifold subjective modes of cognition, and who can do so at all times. Thus *a universal science* of this consciousness, and of that subjectivity as such which (and in so far as) in its cognitive life it gives shape to anything "objective," to objective sense and objective truth of any sort, thematically encompasses *the entire possible* ⟨44/45⟩ *subjective side* of knowledge in all the sciences, in a similar way to that in which logic, in its concepts and laws, thematically encompasses the entire possible *objective* side of all the sciences. Put differently, a logic as a rational science of objectivity in general—however far its idea would have to be expanded (and perhaps even beyond a *mathesis universalis*)—

[a] *Erkenntnis-Subjektivem*

would have as its necessary counterpart a *logic of knowledge*, a science, perhaps also a rational science, of cognitive subjectivity as such. Both sciences, perhaps ordered in corresponding groups of particular disciplines, would stand in a necessary correlation. The term "logic" would be fitting here in so far as *logos* denotes not only, with regard to what is objective, that which is cognized—the assertion-signification, the true concept, and the like—but reason as well, and hence the subjective side, that of cognition.

The following is also to be noted. If in this logic of knowledge precisely this, cognizing subjectivity, becomes thematic, it does so, of course, in yet another act of cognition. It then becomes an object for new assertions and truths, which for their part take shape in the changing subjective modes of the scientist's cognizing activity. Accordingly, it is clear that the proposed universal science of cognizing subjectivity also has this remarkable peculiarity, that it relates back to itself, i.e., back to its own cognizing subjectivity. In this it again stands in parallel with objective logic, which, as objective universal science, relates back to itself, though only in so far as it itself posits objectivities in its concepts and propositions. Every law, including every logical law, is a proposition. If it is a logical law, such as the principle of non-contradiction, that states a truth for all propositions as such, then it relates back to itself in so far as it is itself a proposition. The law of non-contradiction states, "if a proposition is true, then its contradiction is false," and it states this as being valid for all conceivable propositions. But this law, too, is a proposition and hence falls under the generally valid truth that it itself states. And so objective logic as a whole, too, is thematically related back to itself. A similar, merely correlative self- |relatedness VII, 45/46 would apparently have to hold for the logic of cognizing subjectivity. All of the cognitive activities through which these laws become knowable would also have to fall under the general laws governing the subjective cognitive activities that this logic sets forth.

We feel compelled to add yet another remark pertaining to the proposed science of knowledge. If we conceive of this science as a logic that focuses on the subjective life of cognition, then from the outset our thoughts turn toward general insights that could serve as principles of justification, in this case precisely with respect to the subjective side of things. And we also think, from the outset, of

scientific research and thought with the goal of a true theory ranging over a region of objects that is to be determined in its true being and being-such. Yet not only is it the case that genuine knowing cannot be normatively regulated and investigated for the purpose of normative regulation without a thorough investigation of *non-genuine* knowing (which, in accordance with the most general characteristics of its genus, may still be called a kind of "knowing"); we must also take note of the fact that what we call *theoretical* or scientific knowing is only a *privileged higher form* [of knowledge] that relates back to lower levels—for example, to the various forms of sensuous intuiting and sensuous imagination, with the sensuously intuitive modes of judgment belonging to them, which not only historically precede scientific judgments as typical forms of the cognitive life of prescientific humanity (and indeed are already to be found in animals) but which also play a role in scientific thought itself as an always and necessarily co-functioning basis and underlay.[a] Of course, the full scope of a science of cognitive subjectivity would have to extend as far as the factual contexture of its region in general can be explored; and this region would already have to be conceived in as broad a way as actual generic commonality could ever extend. No one would, e.g., think of establishing a science of triangles and a science of circles alongside one another. In the same manner, in our context, one will not demand merely a science of cognizing, scientific reason but instead an all-encompassing science of *knowing as such, construed in the broadest | sense*, in which VII, 46/47 the totality of even the most primitive formations of perception, memory, and playful fantasy are as much subjects of theoretical inquiry as any formation of a priori and empirical-scientific theorizing.

In the end, however, we are driven even further. Who could want to sever cognitive subjectivity from feeling, striving, desiring, willing, and acting subjectivity, from the subjectivity that values in every lower and higher sense and that works to achieve its ends? Theoretical reason is typically placed in parallel to valuing reason, e.g., aesthetically valuing reason, and again in parallel to practical reason, in which case what one has especially in mind is the proper

[a] *Unterlagen und Einschläge*

manner of giving life an ethical shape. However, subjectivity does not thereby resolve itself into unrelated parts that lie alongside one another externally in the same subjectivity. Elements of feeling and striving, and sometimes of goal-oriented willing, reside in knowledge, and elements of knowledge reside in all the other types of acts and forms of reason. Everywhere, and intimately interwoven with one another, there arise parallel problems, problems of the same type that we have encountered in relation to knowledge. The correlation between the subjective life of cognition and the cognized unities of which it becomes conscious has an obvious parallel in the correlation between feeling-valuing and actively creative life, on the one hand, and those unities of value and purpose that it becomes conscious of, on the other. If, for example, we distinguished, in the sphere of cognition, the diverse forms of subjective experience from the identical object of conscious experience; if we pointed out that, while this object visibly stands there before us as one and the same, it has a constantly changing subjective appearance and can obviously only become conscious to us by appearing to us in some way; if we thus distinguished between subjective and objective—then, of course, we must also by analogy make the same distinctions in relation to a work of art, a symphony, a sculpture. The beautiful figure is there for us as beautiful only to the extent that our feeling speaks and does so in certain subjective ways, and this in turn presupposes that we become conscious of the sounds of the symphony in certain subjective modes of appearance, in certain subjectively felt intensities, in a certain subjective tempo; or, for plastic art, that the marble figure is seen from certain sides, in certain perspectives, in certain | illuminations that have a subjective effect on us, and the VII, 47/48
like. Only then does feeling speak, and it does so precisely in the form of aesthetically feeling consciousness. In aesthetic enjoyment, in the consciousness in which the work of art is there for us in full actuality, a certain rhythm of representational modes and modes of feeling founded through them, a definitely ordered subjective lived experiencing, runs its course. But the beautiful thing itself which is thereby made conscious is not this multifarious life, this consciousness in which it is made conscious. What the observer has there consciously in front of him and savors aesthetically is this single, this beautiful figure and its aesthetic value-particularities,

whereas the subjective and multifarious cognitive and feeling life in which the aesthetic having-as-conscious of the object consists is naturally hidden to him.

You see that with respect to *aesthetic unity and aesthetic subjectivity* we do indeed encounter similar problems, and also problems of aesthetic *reason*, relating to the *truth or genuineness of the beautiful*; and this evidently occurs *everywhere that we speak of reason in any sense whatsoever*. The solutions to all of these problems are interwoven; cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical subjectivity does not carry out, under the titles "cognizing," "feeling," "valuing," and "acting," separate acts that are alien to each other in content, but rather acts that are intimately intertwined and continuously founded in each other, with accomplishments of unity that themselves exhibit the corresponding foundings. Thus there will be, as we can anticipate, only *one* complete science of subjectivity—of the subjectivity, that is, which in itself gives shape (and in so far as it does so) to all possible unities of consciousness as unities of "meaning" and perhaps also of rational authentication. If we speak of consciousness as a conscious having of something—of a thing, a number, a proposition, of something beautiful and good, of an artifact, of a practically-oriented action—the having of such unities is not everywhere the same and undifferentiated; rather, depending on which of these unities we choose, and indeed already with respect to one and the same unity, this having, as already the most cursory reflection reveals, is an extraordinarily diverse subjective life. It is a life that, in the way in which it runs its course in the subject, brings about the unity as the one that is meant at a given moment and that possibly is intuited for the subject | in the manner of truth and genuineness. VII, 48/49
Having-conscious exists only as conscious accomplishment.

Another item requires discussion. The science presently under consideration is to be the universal science of the subjective as such, as that in which everything objective comes, and in which alone it can come, to consciousness. Alternatively: we pose for this science the task of investigating everything pertaining to conscious subjects and to consciousness itself as consciousness *of* something. This science would have to consider every conceivable manner in which subjects can show themselves to be consciously active and in which they thereby determine themselves, e.g., as rationally or irrationally

cognizing, valuing, or willing. It would have to investigate and determine all distinguishable genera and species of consciousness, and do so, moreover, *with constant regard to the objects of consciousness*, to the unities that in a given case are meant in consciousness itself and of which it is conscious in this or that manner.

The same unities are perhaps topics of other sciences, the objective sciences, or also topics of practical life, i.e., as that with which one is presently concerned, which one is practically thinking over and perhaps deals with in action. But it is one thing to be an objective topic, whether theoretical or practical, and another to be, as an objectivity for the consciousness that is related to it in manifold ways, a (subjective) topic of the science of conscious subjectivity—and in particular to be considered in this science from the point of view of *how* the diverse subjective manners of appearance, apperceptive formations, and subjective characters, in which one and the same object of this or that kind is given in consciousness, look and determine themselves.

We have sciences that we call objective, and all objects find their place in the objective sciences: and yet all objects belong at the same time to our science of conscious subjectivity. As objects of the objective sciences they fall into distinct scientific regions. Every such science has its region, every other science another. Yet at the same time *all* objects of *all* sciences belong *together* to that universal science of cognitive subjectivity and conscious subjectivity in general. Objective sciences strive to determine the objects of their regions according to unanimous experience in | theoretical truth: VII, 49/50
natural science the truths of nature, linguistics those of language, etc. If the science of consciousness investigates these same objects and thus all types of objects together, then this has a different sense and entails an investigation of a wholly different kind. The question here is not *what* the objects that are grasped in unanimous experience and according to their true being *are*, individually and in relation to each other in theoretical truth, but rather *what this cognizing activity looks like*, how it is determined theoretically, and how any other possible forms of consciousness in which such objects, and objects in general, can become conscious as unities, as identical objects, are determined. That includes, for example, the question of what experiencing looks like and what experiential unanimity looks

like, in which one becomes conscious of something experienced as a reality and a continually existing reality; but it also includes what the course of experience looks like when what is experienced is subsequently discredited as an illusion, which manners of appearance of objects in space, which subjective differences of "here" and "there," of "right" and "left," which subjective differences of shape and color perspective and the like might come into consideration as subjective modes in which something objective presents itself and must present itself to the experiencing and then, beyond that, to the judging, thinking agent.

Thus, our science deals with *any kind of objectivity* as *objectivity for consciousness* and as something that gives itself in subjective modes. The conscious subject and consciousness itself are not viewed separately from conscious objects; to the contrary, consciousness carries that of which it is conscious within itself, and it is as doing so that it is the topic of investigation. And this holds not only for objects of cognition in some arbitrarily limited sense of consciousness; rather, it also holds for the valuing and practical conscious life of any type and peculiarity.

However, we must note immediately that all types of conscious unities are available at all times for possible cognition, and they can thus also become theoretical objects so that the sciences can relate to them all—which in fact they already do, as, for example, in sciences of aesthetic objects such as aesthetics, sciences of economic goods |, etc. Accordingly, a complete science of cognizing subjectivity, for this reason, too, will *eo ipso* have to reach across all types of the conscious life that forms unities of any type whatever. VII, 50/51

Now that we have we come this far, the time has come to ask the following question, which will take us back to our historical considerations: Did not Greek antiquity necessarily already feel a need for such a science of subjectivity—a science of the subjectivity that, under the title "consciousness," accomplishes conscious unities? After all, Greek philosophy in its universal quest for knowledge advanced in all directions in founding ever new sciences.

Could it overlook the fact that the interest which, in the natural, naive progress of life is exclusively given over to cognitive unities, to objects of value and purpose, could also undergo a turning back upon itself, a turning back in which the consciousness that was pre-

viously, in the naive execution of consciousness, hidden to itself can become visible to the I and can become an object of investigation for it?

Could it overlook the fact that in this way questions can be posed with respect to all types of objectivities, questions that none of the rational objective sciences of these objects can answer, and could it not see that any science, no matter how rational, that ignores a whole dimension of questions pertaining to its objects—that any such science could never possibly satisfy the idea of a philosophical science completely?

Check for updates

⟨Chapter Four VII, p. 51
The Historical Beginnings of the Science of Subjectivity⟩

Lecture 8: ⟨Aristotle's Grounding of Psychology and the Basic Problem of a Psychology As Such⟩

To [the foregoing] we make the following reply. Coming from *logic*, which was emerging as a doctrine of method for genuine cognition and genuine science, and, in parallel with this, from *ethics*, which had likewise begun to develop as a doctrine of method for practically rational, "ethical," behavior, one was driven from the start to direct a theoretical interest towards cognizing and acting subjectivity | in its rational and non-rational activity. In just this VII, 51/52 respect the kind of *Sophistic attacks* against the possibility of cognition had to have a motivating force. The path to be pursued was predelineated through the natural, naive view of the world. "Reason" and "unreason" of any sort are names for faculties of the human soul, faculties for certain spiritual accomplishments that manifest themselves in the sciences, in practical wisdom and virtue, in politics, in the constitutions of states, etc. One is thus led to the *human being* and his inner life as a *scientific theme*, and from there, with regard to the lower strata of such life, to animals and their inner lives. The theorization of *psychology* was carried through here *in conjunction with the logical and ethical problematic*.

Soon thereafter, however, one was led, even apart from the rational-theoretical requirements of these doctrines of method, to the *desideratum of a psychology*. After Plato and (in a fruitful continuation of his work) Aristotle had outlined and broken through to the general idea of a rational science, all spiritual energies came under the spell of a task that determined the entire subsequent development, viz., the task of realizing this idea in ever new rational sciences, whether through the logical transformation of the old philosophies or sciences into rational ones, or through the founding of entirely new sciences, in all accessible areas. Naturally, therefore, new sciences had to be created for living nature as much as for phys-

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ical nature, for animals and humans, and then for social life. Among these the primary interest was in a science of man, in anthropology, with psychical anthropology of course intertwined with physical, since from the natural-objective point of view mental and corporeal being are factually[a] intertwined in the unity of the animal.

Thus already in antiquity there arose, in the great spirit of an *Aristotle*, a *first outline of a universal science of subjectivity*, i.e., a psychology, which was to concern itself with all mental functions and hence also the functions of human reason. One of the objective sciences in the series of empirical sciences dealing with the cosmos, one science alongside | the others, thereby enters into a special relation to logic and ethics, and through these to all the other sciences and their regions. VII, 52/53

To be sure, the way that psychology comes on the scene makes it a *constant cross* for philosophers. From the beginning it was not able to master the problematic that we, by taking cognition and unities of cognition as our point of departure and in conjunction with the methodological disciplines of logic and then ethics, have become aware of in these lectures. What was *lacking*, however much one spoke of the faculties of cognizing and practical reason, was the *method* that would, in the right way, *bring out, systematically and descriptively*—thus getting a theoretical grasp on—*the spheres of acts* to which these faculties are related and hence in general *consciousness as consciousness of* something. This was, however, a fundamental failure, one that of necessity rendered impossible the development of psychology into the fixed form of a genuine science advancing by means of rational descriptions and explanations. For in every pulse of life, human and animal mental life is a consciousness *of* this or that. Taken as a whole, this life can be characterized as a continually unitary stream of consciousness forming itself ever anew: of presenting, judging, feeling, striving, acting consciousness, of a consciousness that has an exceedingly diverse manifold of formations in which, constantly changing in accordance with objects and subjective modes of appearance, on the one hand subjective lived experiences, such as sensory data, feelings, and volitions, themselves become conscious, and on the other hand, together with these,

[a] *real*

things in space, plants and animals, mythical forces, gods or demons, diverse forms of culture, societies, values, goods, purposes, etc. [also become conscious]. How could a *psychology* be put on the right path *without breaking through to a systematic elementary analysis of consciousness as consciousness of something*, to what is in a sense the "ABC" of mental life?

Yet we are here interested in this failure to explore consciousness by no means as merely a failure of psychology, understood as an objective science among others, | i.e., as a failure of method VII, 53/54 that prevented it from attaining the level of a genuinely rational explanatory science and thus from becoming a worthy counterpart to mathematical natural science. The exploration of consciousness is after all relevant for logic and ethics, and here what interests us is psychology's claim in this respect to be the foundation for these fundamental doctrines of method—its claim to be the original source of energy for all fundamental normative regulation in science and practical life and thereby to rise above all the objective sciences, which otherwise would be on the same level with it.

Though at first it might seem completely obvious that psychology would be the science of subjectivity that would serve as the theoretical source upon which a doctrine of method for cognition and action would draw, this could only be obvious if logic and ethics neither wanted nor were able to be anything more than empirical-technical systems of rules for human conduct in scientific and ethical activity. Yet was logic in fact only intended to be an empirical technology of cognition, an empirical art[a] like, e.g., architecture? That was certainly not the original intention. From the very beginning logic provided a priori laws for objects as such, for propositions and truths as such, and thenceforth also it set its sights, in respect of what is subjective and quite openly, on attaining a priori norms of cognizing, judging, and intuiting in general. The obvious question is: could such a priori laws—i.e., propositions to whose ideal sense belongs unconditional generality and necessary validity—be dependent on man's contingent facticity, on this factical animal species *homo* existing within the factual universe? Would not such a dependency precisely entail

[a] *Kunstlehre*

that all logical laws only had the validity of zoological[1] laws? And would it not follow from this that a change in the human species, a suitable change in the factical rule-governed processes of human cognitive activity, could and indeed would bring with it a change in the laws of logic? If we give up the absolute validity of these laws, however, we run into serious difficulties. How would it be if logical laws actually had only an empirical-anthropological validity, along with the fact of the human | species itself, with its peculiar biological features, including the psychological ones that are presupposed here? And what about the fact of the entire world, which is no less presupposed here? Knowledge of the world comes from science, and in the case of the human being from physical and psychical anthropology. Only when this science is really valid can we in fact and in truth say that man exists and is governed by these and those psychological laws. If, however, that which from beginning to end gives this and every science whatsoever fundamental legitimacy—i.e., logic, through its logical principles—were to depend on the fact of man, then logic would depend on that which could only be made valid as legitimately existing in the first place through logic itself. This is obviously circular. Indeed, the circle already becomes apparent when we consider the highest logical principle: if the law of non-contradiction had a merely empirically relative validity, one dependent on the fact of the human species, that would imply that there could conceivably be a change in this species that would render it no longer valid. But then one would also be able to say of this modified human being that he existed and did not exist, that he had certain properties and did not have them, that he was and was not a modified human being, etc. VII, 54/55

As we can see, taking for granted without further thought that each and every scientific discipline is related to the world, where this world is presupposed as an unquestioned fact of experience, leads to difficulties. This goes especially for the way in which it is taken for granted that logic relates to the fact of the world and in particular to the factual existence of the human being with his capacity for cognition. In its original design and determination as

[1] Husserl uses this term in the sense of the Greek *zoon*, i.e., living entity—Trans.

Platonic dialectics, logic was to be a radical science of the possibility of cognition in general. It was to deal in a quite fundamental way with the possibility of attaining truths[a] in cognizing activity; after all, it opposed itself to the Sophistic movement, which flatly and quite generally denied this possibility. If, therefore, logic was conceived in true radicality, it would have to question, from the outset and quite fundamentally, the possibility of every cognition and truth. This implies, however, that it could not make use of even the existence of man and the allegedly self-evident existence of a world as an undeniable fact of experience. For this, too, is only a fact on the basis | of cognition, and as such a fact of cognition it must be VII, 55/56 questioned as to its possibility.

However much *Plato* was at pains to found a logic in this radical spirit, he did not break through to the requisite beginnings and methods, and *Aristotle* already fell into the quite natural trap of taking for granted a pregiven world, thereby relinquishing every radical grounding of cognition. Thus it happened that the science of antiquity, in spite of all of its claims to be philosophy—i.e., actual, finally justifying and fully satisfying science—and in spite of all of its admirable achievements, only managed to bring into being that which we call dogmatic science and can only count as a preliminary to genuine philosophical science, not genuine science itself.

So long as cognizing subjectivity, which must be conceived along with all actual and possible cognitions and sciences as an essential correlate, has not been examined, so long as a general and pure science of every possible cognizing consciousness, a science in which all true being reveals itself as a subjective achievement, has not been founded, no science, no matter how rational it may otherwise be, is fully and in every sense rational. Opposed to all sciences stands, as we have seen, a science of cognizing subjectivity, and this science, understood in the widest sense, is one that deals with the conscious subject, with consciousness and with consciously intended objectivity as such. This science stands opposed to all others as a correlate in the sense that it makes intelligible in principle everything that these other sciences accomplish consciously—in each step and beginning already with the lowest experiences—according

[a] *Wahrheitsleistungen*

to their subjective achievements, thereby making them for the first time ultimately rational. As long as one identifies this science with psychology, as long as one fails to recognize the fundamentally unique standpoint of this science, as long as one falls short of the radical method that opens up its proper domain, all science and all cognized objectivity, i.e., the whole universe, is burdened with obscurities, enigmas, and contradictions which block our way to the pure and genuine sense of the world and of all being. For science can only be science in the ultimate sense—philosophy—when it theoretically determines the world, and hence all objects of cognition, in such a way that every true assertion which comes to | cognition in it is freed of every conceivable obscurity and contradiction that would cause the object of cognition to be confused in any way. VII, 56/57

But at first the whole of antiquity remains blind to the necessity and peculiarity of such a science, while at the same time its deficiency in one way or another continually makes itself felt. What makes itself felt, that is to say, is the inadequacy of science up to that point. The historical index for this state of affairs is so to speak the *ineradicability of skepticism*. As the unconquerable spirit of negation, skepticism accompanies the flourishing development of ancient science, tirelessly opposing to every new appearance of philosophy a new anti-philosophy. Generally speaking, skepticism stubbornly persists in its attempt to prove, with arguments of finest intricacy, the impossibility of all philosophy, i.e., the impossibility of an ultimately justifying science, and this in spite of all the refutations through which those in the philosophical schools believed themselves able to overcome it. The hydra of skepticism grows ever new heads, and even those that have been chopped off quickly grow back. In any event, this opulent continuing survival of skepticism, which in its argumentations does not spare any of the particular sciences, not even the most exact mathematics, testifies to the fact that post-Platonic science did not in truth achieve that which, according to its claim to be philosophy, it should have achieved, viz., cognition on the basis of absolute justification. For otherwise it would necessarily have rendered this business of skepticism impossible and neatly resolved its paradoxes. By going back to the ultimate sources of the seductive and subjectively convincing power of these paradoxes, it

would necessarily have done justice to that which was truly powerful in them, in the positivity of its own fundamental justifications. However many valuable insights philosophy was able gain from this constant battle against skepticism, it could not as it were strike at its heart so long as skepticism derived its power in secret from that dimension which philosophy had not yet grown eyes to see, namely, the sphere of pure consciousness. | VII, 57/58

Lecture 9: ⟨Skepticism. The Fundamental Significance of Its "Ineradicability" in the History of Philosophy. Descartes's Decisive Step⟩

Already the oldest skeptical arguments, those of the ancient Sophists, contained a kernel of truth that philosophy was never able to get into its possession. Already in these oldest sophistries, highly significant philosophical themes were knocking at the door, but no one answered. When this did happen, a new domain of cognition was opened up, and along with it that from whence all knowledge must finally demonstrate its dignity. For us now it is thus indispensable to acquaint ourselves with the profound truth[a] of the Sophistic arguments.

The essence of all skepticism is subjectivism. It is originally represented by the two great Sophists, *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*. The fundamental idea which they put forward, apparently for the first time, lies in the following thoughts:

1. Everything objective is originally present for the cognizing agent only through his experiencing of it. To say that he experiences it, however, is to say that it appears to him subjectively in some way, in these or those modes of appearance. Now the object appears this way, now that, and everyone views it in the way in which it appears to him in his experience at that moment. That about which everyone can make indubitable assertions is that which is actually given to him, the thus-appearing as appearing-thus. The entity in itself (or an entity itself), independent of every appearing, existing in itself, absolutely identical with itself, is not and cannot be experi-

[a] *Wahrheitssinn*

enced. This thought could be taken in either of two directions. [One could say that] an entity that exists in and of itself can in principle not be experienced, or, what is the same, cannot be conceived; a true being which is related to subjective appearances as that which is objective in them is an absurdity. Or one could say that such a thing might well exist, but that no subject that was reliant on experiences, i.e., on changing appearances, could ever know anything about it.

2. *Gorgias*, the more radical and hence philosophically speaking more interesting [of the two Sophists], asserts the first, more extreme thesis. But in the case of the main argument of his that has come down to us (the second of the triad of arguments that are associated with his name), he does this without relying on the important Protagorean insight discussed earlier, viz., that anything real | (or, as VII, 58/59 we can quite well say more generally, anything objective whatever) can be experienced by a cognizing subject only in changing subjective modes of appearance. Gorgias's idea was simply the following: Obviously everything that I know to exist is my cognition, the presentation (in the sense of what is presented) of my act of presenting. However, if an act of presenting presents something "external," something transcendent to the presentation, then it is just this act of presenting in itself that presents this being-"external." In this respect it does not matter whether that which is presented is taken to be something experienced or something imagined, such as, for instance, a battle of chariots in the open sea. If we pursue Gorgias' train of thought here (the lineage of which cannot be traced clearly) to its ultimate conclusion, then one would have to say, speaking in the first-person: If I measure "confirmatory"[a] experience against experience; if I distinguish insight gained through rational thought, precisely as "insight," as "self-evidence," as *episteme*, from blind opinion, from mere *doxa*, and prefer the former, then I of course remain within the confines of my subjectivity. And no matter how I choose to characterize [this experience], whether as a feeling of the necessity of thought, as the consciousness of an unconditional universal validity, or however else, this point remains the same. All distinctions, all preferred characteristics that I can ever establish,

[a] "*bewährende*"

arise within my presentational life, within my subjective consciousness. If this is the case, however, then everything that is characterized as "true," as "necessary," as "law," as "fact," or as whatever else it may be characterized as is thus characterized only in my "presenting." And if in general one can only posit [as existing] something that is presented in my act of presenting, whereas nothing else is even conceivable—then it makes no sense to accept the existence of a being in itself, something that supposedly exists whether it is presented or not.

In ingenious paradoxes such as these, in skeptical arguments about which one cannot say for sure to what extent they are really meant seriously, a completely new theme of the most universal significance enters, albeit in primitive and vague form, into the philosophical consciousness of mankind. For the first time, the naive pregivenness of the world becomes problematic, and from thence, too, the world itself with regard to the fundamental possibility of cognizing it and with regard to the fundamental sense of its being in itself. Otherwise put, | for the first time the actual universe, and VII, 59/60 subsequently the totality of possible objectivity in general, is viewed "transcendentally," as the object of possible cognition, of possible consciousness in general. It is viewed in relation to the subjectivity for which it makes a claim to exist, and viewed purely in this relation. That is to say, subjectivity, too, is viewed purely as exercising these transcendental functions, and its consciousness, the transcendental function itself, is viewed as that in or through which all conceivable objects receive, for a conscious subject, whatever content and sense they can have for this subject.

As our earlier discussions have shown, it is precisely this transcendental impulse, stemming from the Sophists and from the Skepticism that grows out of Sophism, that fails to make its effect felt in antiquity. Neither the flourishing new philosophy in its dogmatic objectivism, so successful in the particular sciences, nor the skeptical modern philosophy rise to the task of comprehending the objective seriousness of the problem which comes to light here and which requires to be treated in a radical fashion.

The situation remains essentially unaltered until the modern period. The historians may fight over the question of the extent to which the traditional division of European history into the ancient,

medieval, and modern periods is justified; as far as philosophy and the history of scientific culture are concerned, there can be no disagreement. Here there is no doubt that in its fundamental character modern philosophy displays an altogether new line of development compared to the post-Platonic philosophy. It is Descartes who, with his *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia*, founds the new epoch and steers the current of the history of philosophy in an entirely new direction.

The novelty of the Cartesian philosophy, and with it of the entire modern philosophy, consists in the way it takes up anew and in an entirely new spirit the battle against skepticism, which in the general developmental situation had not yet been overcome, grasping it, in a truly radical fashion, by its deepest roots and from there attempting to eradicate it once and for all. What guides this philosophy internally is the conviction that such an overcoming does not simply have the job of | ridding the world of merely troublesome VII, 60/61 negations, which a successfully creative objective science should after all not concern itself with anyway, but that instead, themes of a fateful significance for [the future possibility of] an objective science and a universal philosophy reside in these skeptical arguments. It is guided, more precisely, by the conviction that in these arguments, radical obscurities and methodological imperfections in the objective sciences make themselves felt, and that the purification and theoretical unfolding of the valuable kernel of these arguments must necessarily lead to the securing of previous science and, at the same time, to its fulfillment with a new spirit, by raising it to clarity and self-justification in a new manner. All of this, however, culminates in the conviction that it is only on this path that we will become capable of realizing the original and altogether necessary idea of a universal philosophy.

Viewing the development thus far, we can also say that the most profound meaning of modern philosophy is that it has inwardly taken on a task whose force, even in an unclear way, constantly keeps it in motion, viz., that of bringing the radical subjectivism of the skeptical tradition to fulfillment in a higher sense. In other words, the development of modern philosophy tends toward the overcoming of the paradoxical, playful, frivolous subjectivism which denies the possibility of objective knowledge and science, by inaugurating a new,

serious-minded subjectivism, a subjectivism that is absolutely justifiable in the most radical theoretical conscientiousness—in short, through transcendental subjectivism.[1]

The modern period begins with *Descartes* because he was the first to attempt to do justice at a theoretical level to what is indubitably true about the skeptical arguments. He was the first to take possession theoretically of the most general ground of being, a ground that even the most extreme skeptical negations presuppose and to which in their arguments they all refer back, viz., self-certain, cognizing subjectivity. In a certain sense, to be sure, *Augustine* had already claimed this ground as his own; he had already pointed out the indubitability of the *Ego Cogito*. But the new turn emerges in Descartes through the way he | takes an anti- VII, 61/62
skeptical point made in the context of a mere counterargument and makes it into a theoretical determination. Insofar as he views this transcendental subjectivity under the aspect of the question raised by the Skeptics as to the possibility of philosophy, this subjectivity becomes for him by necessity a fundamental theoretical theme.

Here it should be noted that the *Cogito* in its indubitability easily refutes the frivolous extreme of an absolute negativism which denies every truth whatsoever, i.e., not just objective truth but also every subjective truth with the title "*Ego Cogito*" itself. But it does not thereby refute the skepticism that traditionally turns against the possibility of philosophy and actually only ever wanted to turn against this possibility: against the possibility of knowledge of "truths in themselves" concerning objects existing "in themselves." This would apply above all to an "objective" world in itself, and then, closely related to this, to Platonic "ideas" existing in themselves, to logical and mathematical principles that are valid in themselves, to sciences of every sort that are valid in themselves, or, as we also say, objective sciences. This skepticism, and only it, had the great historical mission of forcing philosophy into the path of transcendental philosophy. The "I think"—in the sense of Descartes but not that of Augustine—is the "Archimedean point" on the basis of which a systematic and

[1] Cf. Appendix 2, pp. 391 ff.—Ed.

absolutely secure ascent of the true philosophy should occur. On the absolute ground of pure self-knowledge and by means of a thought process carried out in absolute self-justification in the context of this self-knowledge, genuine philosophy should arise as an immanently generated product—should arise, indeed, as an activity that justifies itself absolutely from an absolute beginning and at every step of the way. In this way the *Ego Cogito* should be the first and only foundation for a philosophy built purely upon it, for a *sapientia universalis*.

On the other hand, however, we should also emphasize the following. The Cartesian *meditationes* do not purport to be accidental subjective musings on Descartes's part, let alone a literary-artistic device for the transmission the author's thoughts. Rather, they clearly present themselves as meditations which are necessary in respect of the manner and order of their motivations, as meditations that the radically philosophizing | subject as such must necessarily VII, 62/63 pass through. It must do so as a subject that has chosen the idea of philosophy as the guiding purposive idea of its life and that therefore is to become a genuine philosopher precisely by realizing this idea in its cognitive life through its own activity. Herein lies the eternal significance of the Cartesian *meditationes*. They sketch, or attempt to sketch, the necessary style of a philosophical beginning. Only by meditating can the philosopher begin, but the path, the method of this meditation, has a necessary shape. On the other hand, and correlatively, the beginning of philosophy itself—the initial theory, the method, and the main lines of its problematic—must arise in an objectively theoretical respect. Both together must delineate themselves as they emerge, and they must do so in a manner that is scientific after their own fashion.

Lecture 10: ⟨The Cartesian Meditations⟩

A glance at the history [of philosophy] shows that this was a powerful impulse, one that soon made its effect felt in a great emergence and in the complete reshaping of [philosophy's] development. Since the *Meditationes* philosophy has been consumed by the unremitting attempt to elevate the novel problems emerging from below in an at

first unclear manner to that level of fundamental clarity and purity which first makes it possible to treat them in a truly fruitful way. To be sure, it does not accomplish this in an entirely satisfactory manner, despite ever new approaches and enormous efforts. The starting point of this entire development already harbors fateful obscurities. In the first two of the six meditations, which are the most important, there lies, admittedly, a great discovery, indeed precisely the discovery that first had be made in order for transcendental philosophy to begin, viz., the discovery of transcendentally pure, absolutely self-enclosed subjectivity, which is capable of becoming aware of itself, in absolute indubitability, at any time. But Descartes was not able to lay hold of the genuine sense of this discovery. Indeed, great and dark depths open up behind the seeming triviality of its notorious pronouncement "*Ego Cogito, Ego sum*." It was the same for Descartes as it was for Columbus, who discovered the new continent | but did not know anything about it and believed he VII, 63/64 had merely discovered a new sea route to old India. In Descartes's case this was because he failed to grasp the deepest meaning of the problem of grounding philosophy in a new and radical manner. Or, what essentially amounts to the same thing, he did not grasp the genuine sense of a transcendental grounding of knowledge and science rooted in the *Ego Cogito*. The reason for this failure, in turn, lies in the fact that he never apprenticed himself to [the school of] Skepticism in the right way.

To elucidate this point, let us now call to mind in broad strokes the Cartesian path of the *Meditationes*, a path that will occupy us in more detail again later when we stage our own rigorous grounding of genuine philosophy.[1]

All science to this point, says Descartes, is not yet truly rigorous, absolutely grounded science. To attain such a science, to gain, in the form of an absolutely reliable and systematic construction, a universal science, a philosophy, we must make a clean sweep; we must put in question all previous knowledge whatsoever. Our principle shall be not to allow anything to count that is not so firm as to absolutely withstand every conceivable doubt. [If we take this

[1] Cf. the second part of *First Philosophy*, starting with Lecture 28.—Trans.

as our principle,] then the entire universe in the usual sense of the term—the entire world given to us through our senses—vanishes immediately from the circle of what can be accepted as valid. For the senses, as everyone must grant, can deceive; at every moment there is the possibility that we err in following them. If, however, I can and perhaps even do call the entire world into doubt, there is one thing that is indubitable: just this, *that* I doubt, and further, that this world appears to my senses; that I presently have this or that perception; that I pass judgment on it in this or that manner, emotionally value, desire, will, etc. I am, *sum cogitans*: I am the subject of this streaming conscious life, with these perceptions, memories, judgments, feelings, etc., and in this streaming I am absolutely certain of this, in absolute indubitability. I exist, even if the universe, including my body, should not; I exist whether or not this dubitable world | VII, 64/65 exists. Thus arises my absolute being and being-for-myself, with my absolute life as an absolutely self-contained being, and it is precisely this that we for our part earlier designated as "transcendental subjectivity."

Obviously this I is nothing at all other than the purely grasped concrete I as I, the purely spiritual subject to which every co-positing of that which is not it in itself is foreign. If, however, this pure I in its consciousness now experiences an objective world with its senses and erects sciences in its cognizing acts, how is this not a mere inner having of subjective appearances and subjectively generated judgments in subjective experiences of self-evidence? If it is self-evidence, the insight of reason, which gives the preference to scientific judgments over the vague and blind judgments of everyday life, this self-evidence is itself a subjective conscious occurrence. What justifies my giving this subjective quality the value of a criterion for a truth which is valid in itself, for a truth which has a claim to validity that reaches beyond subjective experience? And especially now, where cognition is of an allegedly extra-subjective world, what justifies me in according the belief that the world exists and that this objective science is truly valid the extra-subjective value that it demands, given that I am only immediately and indubitably certain of myself and my subjective lived experiences?

Descartes loses himself here, in the attempt to prove the legitimacy of self-evidence and its trans-subjective reach, in vicious

circles that were noted early on and have often been criticized. He concludes—regardless of how, from the finite peculiarity of the human pure *Ego*, [he thinks he can reach] the necessary existence of God—that with the criterion of self-evidence, God cannot deceive us. The use of this criterion is then permitted and, guided by it, the objective validity of mathematics and mathematical natural science is inferred, and with it the true being of nature, precisely in the way this science cognizes it. From there he founds the two-substance doctrine, according to which the true objective world consists, in ultimate philosophical truth, of material bodies and the spiritual entities connected causally to them, each existing absolutely in itself and for itself in the way my own *Ego* does.[1] | VII, 65/66

This is the train of thought that determines the new development. Its first culminating point, the *Ego Cogito*, was to a certain degree, undoubtedly, a generally understandable discovery. [But] it was such a new and incomparably important insight that it could not fail to have an enormous and lasting impact. For the first time, subjectivity—immediately conscious of itself in its being in and for itself, and capable of being experienced for itself in absolute indubitability—was laid bare, and firmly framed, in its pure being for itself, in the stream of consciousness in which its life consists. And it was also made evident that whatever exists for an I and can be posited, can be thought in any way by it can only be so as something appearing in the conscious life of that I, as something it is subjectively conscious of in some way. Therewith, precisely that "merely subjective" domain was scientifically exposed to which skeptical relativism—albeit precisely skeptically—reduced all cognizable being by means of the thought: if everything that can be thought or known is an appearance, then only subjective data, which we call appearances, are cognizable, and there is no cognition of being in itself, of the true.

Now, I have already said that Descartes lacked an immersion in the genuine sense of the urgent task set for philosophy by this relativism: for philosophy, for science in general, which now could

[1] Cf. Appendix 6, pp. 419 ff.—Ed.

no longer pursue its work in utter naiveté, in a naive self-confidence of reason, with confidence in the evidence of its methodological procedure.

What exactly was called into question by skepticism? The general possibility of objective knowledge; the possibility of gaining knowledge that reaches beyond one's current consciousness and the opinions and appearances currently resident in it—knowledge as such, which claimed to cognize objects existing in themselves, truths holding in themselves. As soon as, through skepticism, the transition was accomplished from a naive being-given-over to the objects that present themselves to a reflective attitude in which cognizing consciousness comes into view and that which is cognized is necessarily regarded as a unity of manifold acts of cognition in relation to it, in that moment the possibility and the sense of something being and being valid in itself had to become an enigma. On the one hand, one was faced with the fact | that *for* the cognizing agent, all objects VII, 66/67 mean what they mean, count for what they count for, are what they are, through his cognizing, through the sense-giving and judicative accomplishment taking place consciously within him in diverse guises. On the other hand, the world as evident fact demanded its own right, and one saw oneself forced to address the following question: How is it with the meaning and legitimacy of "external" real being and, no less importantly, with the being-in-itself of ideal entities? What could a purely internal cognitive accomplishment mean for something that exists outside the mind, for something that exists in and for itself somewhere "out there," and for any other kind of being in and for itself, with any other kind of sense? Here one would ultimately have needed at some point to reflect on the fact that this talk of "external being" and "being in itself," too, draws its sense exclusively from cognition, and that every assertion, justification, cognition of an external being is a cognitive and judicative accomplishment which is carried out within cognition itself.

At the very least this became completely clear the moment Descartes laid bare pure subjectivity, the self-enclosed *Ego Cogito*. In that case, however, was it not necessary to say that all of the obscurities and difficulties that one fell into through the attention to cognizing consciousness and by relating all objectivities and truths,

as had become necessary, back to possible cognition, that all of the incomprehensibilities and enigmas in which one found oneself ever more deeply enmeshed, stemmed from the fact that one had not yet so much as begun to study consciousness as accomplishing consciousness?

All scientific investigations up to that point were objectively directed; everywhere they had in advance, they presupposed, objectivity in naive experiencing and knowing. But never was the fundamental question taken up explicitly as to how cognizing subjectivity in its pure conscious life brings about this achievement of meaning, this achievement of judgment and insight, "objectivity"—not how this subjectivity, advancing theoretically, determines an objectivity that it has beforehand in its experience and in its experiential belief, but rather how in itself it comes to this having in the first place. For subjectivity is only in possession of what it accomplishes in itself. Already the simplest "having an object over against oneself" in | VII, 67/68 perception is consciousness and accomplishes meaning-giving and positing of reality in superabundant structures; it is only that reflection and reflective study are needed to know anything of this, and certainly anything that is scientifically useful. Only the Cartesian exposure of pure subjectivity, and with it the nexus of consciousness which is to be considered purely in itself, in its immanent self-enclosure, made it possible to get hold, in an unconfused way, of the meaning of this task, in opposition to the task of all objective research. If the latter strives to determine theoretically objects that are pregiven to the knower, the transcendental research that has now become necessary strives for something that is so completely different that it cannot in principle permit the having something pregiven, the simple being-there of objects, to count as *valid*. Its task consists in investigating generally and in every manner and stratum how objectivity as such and objectivity of every category constitutes itself as such subjectively in cognition, for the knower and in his cognizing "having"—i.e., how cognition, already as the simplest perception, accomplishes the pregivenness of this or that object and how, building thereupon, it carries out higher cognitive accomplishments.

Thus transcendental science in fact has an entirely different theme than all the objective sciences, from which it is separated and

to which it is nevertheless related as correlate. As we can already see, for this novel science everything depends upon its being able [to grasp] its task purely and thereby being able to secure its research against any retrogression to the naive-objective research attitude. It is, however, precisely the Cartesian discovery (which admittedly, as we shall see, still must be essentially purified) and its method which first make this possible in an effective sense.

Let us advance yet a bit further in our reflections, whose style it is to bring to complete clarity the transcendental motivation that lay hidden in Skepticism. We do so with the intention of producing only those cognitions that already lay in Descartes's horizon once he had exposed transcendentally pure subjectivity in the first two Meditations, so that he only would have had to grasp hold of them, as it were. For if the insights that we gained earlier are correct, then, I say, further consequences soon ensue. Moreover, it has now become entirely clear that and why objective science, no matter | how exact it may be, is not yet philosophy in the sense of the Platonic idea, i.e., is not a science that can give us final answers and that is capable of justifying itself in an absolute sense. Objective science, even a purely rational science such as mathematics, is not capable of this, not in a single one of its propositions, no matter how self-evident. Only when the rationality of straightforward research is, though not contested, yet questioned as to its fundamental sense, as to the essence (potentiality) of its achievement, and that rationality is then attained which springs from the study of the transcendental achievements of cognition, only when every confusion and misinterpretation that stems from a failure to understand the essential relations between objective being, objective truth, and cognizing-achieving consciousness have been swept aside through the positive clarifications of transcendental science—only then can a philosophy arise. VII, 68/69

What is at issue here are by no means merely some insignificant clarifications that could be added on to the objective sciences as though they fundamentally did not much pertain to them. As long as the sense of objectivity existing for itself, as a sense that could only be derived from cognizing consciousness, is unclear and enigmatic, the sense of the universe pregiven in naive self-evidence, and thus ultimately the sense of all the realities and truths known in the

objective sciences, remains unclear. Where obscurity holds sway, countersense cannot be far off. In fact, the rationality of even the most perfect of the objective sciences, including mathematics, did not prevent the emergence of a plethora of absurd theories, theories that over the course of the ages inconsistently clung to their results and which have their source entirely in transcendental misunderstandings. Already the skeptical negations included as their correlate a nonsensical position pertaining to the universe of knowable reality, viz., solipsism: [the view that] the universe reduces to me myself; that I am alone; that everything else is a mere subjective fiction within me; that the best I can have is knowledge of myself. But even those who respect and approve of objective science fall prey to ever new absurd theories, be they materialisms, idealisms of one or another sort, psychomonisms, Platonizing realisms, or what have you. | VII, 69/70

The fact that we need and search for a metaphysics beyond physics, and similarly with every other science, has its source, in the main at any rate, in the fact that objective theories and sciences, which otherwise pursue their own methodological paths, are bound up with transcendental interpretations and misinterpretations, which often enough lead their own methods astray in the end. Should it be the case, however, that there is a necessary gradation in legitimate scientific knowledge according to which there is, above a substratum of sciences, a higher science with the title "metaphysics" that has the task of addressing certain supreme and ultimate questions, of whichever sort they may be, then we can be certain from the very start of at least this much, that such a metaphysics (however it may be conceived), if it really is destined to be a science of the ultimate things and an absolutely grounded science, requires the science of transcendental subjectivity, and that ⟨it⟩ cannot ground, or contribute any presuppositions to, the latter. And what goes for this goes for every science.

Lecture 11: ⟨First Real Overview of Transcendental Science. Transition from the Cartesian Meditations to Locke⟩

A science is not permitted to have any unsolved or even unasked questions upon the answering of which depend the sense and cognitive value of all its results, beginning with the first and most primitive, and along with these the sense of the entire being that it claims to know. These questions, however, are the transcendental questions, and already for this reason they are of such an eminent sort that they must precede all objective, all non-transcendental questions; and so, too, must the science of transcendental subjectivity precede all the other, the objective sciences—"preceding" here not of course in the sense of an historical genesis, but rather of one that is prescribed by the idea of philosophy, i.e., the necessary idea of the most genuine and most rigorous science. For what such a science strives for is no more and no less than actually to fulfill its sense as science; and that means that it will not allow itself to count as a science as long as it does not understand itself, its methods and results, as long, in other words, as it is still in a condition of continually speaking and proposing | theories about matters whose fundamental sense it fails VII, 70/71 to understand.

Our claim here, therefore, is in no way merely that it is the function of transcendental science to keep at a distance from all the sciences (and in a reflective turning-back of those sciences themselves) certain unpleasant misinterpretations that could adhere to their method or to the sense of the objective being cognized in them. Indeed, that would almost be like saying that by firmly affixing blinders that blocked from view everything transcendental or by scrupulously and cleverly focusing on those factual connections that are revealed in a straightforward regard and with self-evidence while rigorously avoiding all concepts and thoughts stemming from any consideration of cognizing, constituting consciousness one could already establish a fully rigorous, fully sufficient science. But the absence of misinterpretations does not yet entail the gaining of correct ones, and unasked questions, and these perhaps most pressingly of all, are also unanswered questions.

Perhaps wearing transcendental blinders is at times a useful, even a necessary aid for achieving, in objective regard, the great results

of scientific theory, i.e., of objective scientific theory. If, however, these mental blinders "grow on," as it were, and become permanently attached, if ignoring the transcendental becomes a habitual blindness, then the advantage of avoiding misinterpretations is purchased at a very high price. For now all interpretation is invalidated, including the interpretation that must be carried out if we are to know how it really and ultimately is with the world and what kind of practical-ethical responses the world ultimately demands from us.

In actual fact, it is in no way the case that in relating the world that simply exists for us in naive experiential positing back to cognizing subjectivity (especially when the latter is seen in Cartesian fashion as pure subjectivity) we will find nothing to say about true being and its absolute sense. *Leibniz*, in the ingenious *aperçu* of his doctrine of monads, held that in their ultimate, true being, all entities are reducible to monads, which are nothing other than Cartesian *Ego*s. In the end it could be that a view of the world grounded in transcendental philosophy would demand precisely such an interpretation, or a similar one, | as an absolute necessity. And thus we might be VII, 71/72 justified in bringing a transcendental consideration of knowledge into intimate connection with metaphysics—just as ultimate, absolutely grounded, i.e., transcendental science must *eo ipso* accomplish the task of leading us, with its clarification of the sense of being, to ultimate answers about being.

Now that we have traversed the horizon of the philosophical problematic that has opened up before us from out of the Cartesian *Ego Cogito*, and which at the same time has brought out the full implications of the motivation of skepticism, let us now again turn back to Descartes, that great beginner of modernity.

Here we must unfortunately note that he knew nothing of this great problematic, though it lay within his horizon, ready to be grasped. He had no inkling of the necessity and the idea of a transcendental science of consciousness, a transcendental Egology, as we might also call it: he, who has the eternal glory, through the discovery of the transcendental *Ego*, of having unearthed the theme and, in the diverse formations of the life of pure consciousness, the domain of work for such a science.

To be sure, the awareness driving him of the insufficiency of all previous science and of the necessity of an absolute science secured

against every possible skepticism issues in an extensive and highly impressive train of thought and system, but from the start it does not give rise to the meditations that were demanded here or to a system that could have anticipated the future philosophy at least in its *style*. He did not offer meditations that would have clarified the inmost sense of the problematic awakened by skepticism (as a transcendental problematic) and the inmost sense of the dogmatic naiveté of objective science and, finally, the inmost sense of a fully sufficient science—meditations that would have sketched the necessary path to this science as transcendental. Descartes is the genuine beginner of philosophy, of philosophy itself, true philosophy, but only in the beginning of the beginning. For it is only the beginning of his meditations, which culminates in the *Ego Cogito*, that despite its still naive and crude train of thought already predelineates the necessary style which is classic for the *meditationes de prima philosophia*. I said, "despite | a still naive and crude train of thought": for instead VII, 72/73 of an ultimately clear insight into what is at work here, what holds sway in these meditations is, instead, the mere instinct of a great genius.

Descartes remained standing before the entrance gate, which he had opened up, of transcendental philosophy, the only truly radical philosophy; he did not go down the path into the never before entered, but still very much to be entered, "realm of the mothers."[a] His philosophical radicalism failed him. His conviction that it was necessary to go back to the primal sources of all knowledge in transcendental subjectivity did not bear the proper fruit for him and in his successors, precisely because he was unable to satisfy the deeper sense of such radicalism. He misunderstands his own good beginning, because he does not push his clarifying reflection to its fulfilling end. For this reason he soon runs up against problems that he otherwise would have regarded as countersensical. Precisely this hangs together with all that great mischief that Descartes, along with new and beneficial impulses, has brought upon modern philosophy. His obscurities, his bogus problems, his erroneous two-substance doctrine erected on the basis of a no less erroneous grounding of

[a] "*Reich der Mütter*." The phrase alludes to Goethe's *Faust II*. Goethe's own reference is to the "mothers of knowledge" in Greek mythology.—Trans.

the mathematical sciences, determine as well as mislead the future. So little does Descartes become the founder of a genuinely transcendental philosophy built on the transcendental ground of the *Ego Cogito* that he remains altogether ensnared in the objectivistic prejudice. The entire apparatus of his philosophically meditating methodology ultimately serves the purpose of saving the objective world, the substrate of the objective sciences, and these sciences themselves, from the attacks of skepticism. In particular his aim was to accord to mathematics and the mathematical natural sciences, in the form and method in which they were developing, the right of absolute validity and the role of a prototype for all genuine sciences.

The pure *Ego* that he discovered is for him nothing but the pure soul—that tag-end of the objective world that *alone* is given to every knower in absolute indubitability and immediacy—from which the rest of the world is supposed to be secured by means of inference. Precisely because he never understood the actual transcendental problematic, which he does nevertheless stumble upon with the | problem of evidence, he never sees the countersense of this entire conception and the theory of evidence grounding it. He does not see the countersense of the concept of evidence as a criterion, as a mere index of truth, and the countersense of any proof that would attempt in turn to secure the legitimacy of this indication. And he does not see the countersense of all those inferences that would allegedly take us from the transcendental sphere, from the pure *Ego*, into the objective sphere. As a sinister inheritance this countersense runs through modernity in the form of all those theories propounding a transcendental "realism," and similarly the other countersensical motives are carried into the future. The *basic objectivistic attitude* of the Cartesian philosophy and the entire style of its manner of founding sciences gave all the new exact sciences, and all the other positive sciences striving after their ideal, a seeming right to take themselves as absolute sciences, and ultimately to oppose themselves, as originally autonomous sciences, to philosophy. This objectivistic tendency required the development of psychologistic and naturalistic theories of reason, under whose hidden countersense the centuries then had to labor. VII, 73/74

The situation had a certain resemblance to that of post-Platonic antiquity, in which we without doubt can already speak of psychol-

ogism and naturalism. Here, as later, these words designate utterly erroneous theories of reason that spring from a conflation of transcendental with psychological or biological-scientific questions. In antiquity, *Plato* is the beginner who, with one eye on skepticism, radically calls into question the possibility of knowledge and meditates on the positive solution to this question, attempting under the title "dialectics" its first outlines. But already by the time of *Aristotle*, as we showed, the vigor of this radicalism weakens under the impression of the objective sciences, which were just then beginning to show positive results and which, because they were so impressive, did not foster the inclination to reflect seriously upon the depths of the skeptical problematic. And accordingly one rarely notices the psychologism hidden in ancient logic and ethics.

In the modern period, I said, things are somewhat similar. The | VII, 74/75 *Cartesian* radicalism, not penetrating deeply enough, finds no serious following, since the sciences develop so splendidly and autonomously in their own methods. But so momentously has the problem of knowledge—again, as in antiquity—been set into motion that it could not disappear *vis-à-vis* the positive sciences, and again and again attracts interest, and necessarily so. As before, the theoretical treatments of this problem are worked out in psychologistic and naturalistic terms.

Of particular significance for the fate of the subsequent development is Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, the foundational work of modern sensualistic psychology based on inner experience and at the same time the foundational work of epistemological psychologism. A curious and noteworthy shift occurs here. There is no more serious talk of a radical philosophy, of a systematic grounding of a science built upon absolutely certain foundations, of a science that at the outset would be radically called into question. The world is firmly established, and so, in principle, is the possibility of an objective science. What is called for now, however, is to study the instrument of this science, the human understanding, in order to promote its advance. What, for Locke, must thereby be taken as the obvious and concrete theme of investigation is nothing other than the Cartesian *Ego*, only now, of course, taken in a naturally objective manner as the human soul purely in itself, as our human spirit as it discloses itself in self-evident inner experi-

ence. If Descartes failed to make the *Ego Cogito* the theme of an independent science—a failure that was fatal enough, given his radical grounding of knowledge—then Locke's original contribution is that he does just this, except that, operating entirely from within the naturalistic perspective, his *Ego* is the soul in the pregiven world.

What Locke strives for is not psychology in the full sense of the term—he explicitly excludes all psychophysical or, as he terms them, "physical" considerations of the mind—but a discipline that finds its place within a complete, encompassing psychology. For the soul belongs to the world as the soul of its body and is hence bound up in the nexus of psychophysical causality; and to investigate it both according to its interiority and according to the causal, external | connections that are governed by the universally binding VII, 75/76 laws of causality is the task of a full psychology. Yet Locke wants to give a mere story of the soul; he wants to study the soul in its own inner being and purely on the basis of inner experience in a merely "historical" manner. This comparison with the historical indicates what is at issue here is a descriptive consideration of pure mental interiority, and more precisely a systematic description of mental development, starting from the first awakening of mental life. And yet this still does not characterize what he is actually aiming at, for on the other hand, the title *Essay concerning Human Understanding* indicates that it is the development of the understanding, of the cognitive faculty, that is Locke's true interest. Precisely in this manner Locke wants—and this is the actual topic of the work—to understand the essence, possibility, reach, scope and limits on the validity of knowledge and all the types of knowledge that can be descriptively distinguished; and furthermore, he wants to submit to clarification the essence, basic types and legitimate spheres of possible and justified sciences and of the methods that are constitutive for them, and, with the aid of these methods, to obtain norms that will guide man as an intelligent creature in his scientific activity. He has something similar in mind with respect to human ethical behavior and its normative regulation.

Locke does not see that the epistemological problems of possible validity, conceived in their purity and fundamentally, are incompatible with the objectivism of his method, that these problems demand *eo ipso* that the universe of objectivity be radically called

into question—as Descartes had already done—and that one remain exclusively on the terrain of pure consciousness. And he certainly does not see what eluded Descartes and what caused him to fall short of a true transcendental science, viz., that the real task here is systematically to investigate consciousness as *consciousness of* something, particularly with respect to the exceptional conscious connections in which, for the knower, consciousness originally in its own nexus generates the self-having and self-confirmation of something objective | under the titles "self-evidence" and "self-evident VII, 76/77 justification." He does not see that true objectivity is something that can only acquire a sense and an original realizing confirmation in consciousness, or that "true being" points for the subject to an immanent teleology that can be understood intuitively according to its essential traits and laws, and that it is precisely this that needs to be accomplished here.

Check for updates

⟨Section Two
The Elements of Locke's Attempt at an Egology and its Enduring Problematic⟩

VII, 78

⟨Chapter One
The Fundamental Limitation of Locke's Sphere of Vision and its Reasons⟩

Lecture 12: ⟨The Naive Dogmatism of Objectivism⟩

We can also express what we said at the end of last lecture in the following manner. *Locke* did not see the radical problem of cognition raised by ancient skepticism, and so this problem, naturally enough, is not the topic of his *Essay*. And yet the *Essay* purports to be a theory of the understanding, an epistemology—indeed an epistemology that is supposed to bring to an end the perpetual disputes of metaphysics, and to complete and perfect all the sciences through a clarification of the true meaning of their achievements and of the ultimate source of their basic concepts and methods. The focus here is on what is fundamental, both on what the sciences in general and as such have in common and on what determines the differences between essentially distinct types of sciences, such as the difference between empirical and purely rational sciences.

If Descartes, in his quest for a true and genuine philosophy as a system of absolutely grounded, absolutely self-justifying sciences, hit upon the problems of cognition, and if he at least called for a theory of the understanding that should precede all genuine science, it was precisely Locke who intended to actually develop such a theory, and indeed exactly for these purposes. And yet Locke is not the rightful heir to the Cartesian spirit, and he | did not take up the most VII, 78/79
valuable impulse that lay in the *Meditations*. To be sure, we also found it necessary to reproach Descartes for the fact that, despite having hit upon the transcendental problem of cognition, he failed to see it—misunderstood it—which was why his project of a radi-

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cally grounded universal science or philosophy had to fail. Instead of [developing] a transcendental Egology and the genuine transcendental theory of cognition contained within it, he goes down the erroneous path of a theological epistemology and a dogmatic metaphysics. But Locke, too, abandons the greatness and significance of the Cartesian *beginning*, and therewith precisely the original source of that immediate motivation which at any time could have led to him to cross over to a better ascent, to a philosophy, and first of all to a transcendental theory of cognition.

Instead of beginning, as Descartes did, by putting all the sciences, and the empirical world itself, in question, Locke, utterly naively, presupposes the validity of the new objective sciences, not to mention that he takes for granted the existence of the experienced world. He does not see the countersense and circularity contained in his and every similar theory of cognition. It is now of crucial importance to convince ourselves fully of this. The main issue treated in the epistemological writings after Locke may be characterized in a preliminary fashion, using an indeterminately general expression, as "clarification of objective cognition as such." "Cognition" is here an at first quite general title designating all the diverse manners of the subjective consciousness of something objective, in which the *Ego* in question experiences precisely that which it in general expresses by saying, "I am conscious of something objective" and which it designates, according to the circumstances, with the particular expressions "I perceive things, human beings, and the like"; "I remember them or expect them"; "I think of them vaguely"; "I do all such things in certainty or uncertainty"; "I am conscious of them as mere possibilities" or "I surmise that they are here or there" or "I was certain and am now becoming doubtful or have concluded with the conviction of their non-being." Belonging here as well, of course, are all the | predicative (conceptual), and in particular the VII, 79/80 theoretico-scientific, acts of judgment.

Standing opposed to every such consciousness of something, which in the broadest sense is called a "supposing,"[a] with this or that sense and in these or those modes of certainty, is mere phantasizing or imagining, which is not an actual supposing but rather precisely

[a] *ein "Vermeinen"*.

a phantasizing-oneself-into a supposing.[a] This, too, belongs to the sphere designated by the title "cognition," and does so for reasons easily seen, which we do not need to discuss here. To achieve cognition in this sphere, that is, precisely to be conscious of anything objective at all in this or that special mode of consciousness, does not entail having this consciousness itself in one's current cognitive reach. It entails being occupied with the object in question as a theme, not having the consciousness of the object as a theme. Thus the task of clarifying cognition—or, more precisely, of clarifying cognitive experience—has its source and its sense in the becoming aware of this [consciousness].[b] In normal cognition, which directs itself toward objects straightforwardly, these objects may be known and cognized on different levels and may attain their clarity, their self-evidence; but the cognizing activity itself, as a subjective experience and in all the changing subjective modes in which the object becomes precisely an object for us, remains thereby uncognized, unclear.

But the particular aim of epistemology, building on the foundation of a general study of cognitive formations in this widest sense, is to clarify that particular cognitive activity which is found in cognitive achievements in the *pregnant* sense. Supposing in general, consciousness in general, of whatever kind or particular form, is subject to a possible teleological appraisal. It either contains from the start or can incorporate into itself an *Ego*'s directing itself toward a *telos*, toward the object itself in its true being and being-thus. We have to distinguish here between supposed cognition (as act of meaning[c] in general) and cognition in the pregnant sense, which is to say that kind of cognition (that privileged type of meaning-act) in which the cognizing agent has the consciousness of the goal having been attained. In connection with this, there belong to the class of mere beliefs,[d] in the form of a merely aiming (merely intending) consciousness, transitional forms of consciousness: verifications and their negative counterparts, | refutations. A unitary consciousness, a VII, 80/81

[a] *Meinen* [b] *das Dessen-innewerden zu sein*. This sentence is linguistically opaque in the original. What Husserl means to say, presumably, is that it is the task of transcendental epistemology to become of aware of the subjective side of being consciously aware of something.—Trans. [c] *Meinen* [d] *Meinungen*

cognitive path, converts a mere aiming into a fulfilling aiming or, in the contrary case, into a different terminal consciousness in which something self-grasped, an attained goal, emerges to contradict the previous aiming supposition, which in turn "annuls" itself. Such special processes of cognizing in the pregnant sense, these teleological processes of rational achievement, are also, in their natural occurrence, hidden, unknown[a] and not themselves cognized.[b] They are in need of a clarifying explication, of a reflection directed toward them thematically that brings them to a clear self-grasping; and they are in need of a systematically cognizing investigation focusing on them so that one can understand what this cognizing achieving of something objective actually is and how it is capable of receiving something objective within itself by directing itself toward it—or, alternatively, how something objective could be understood now as merely supposed, now as truly existing, as an attained goal that is always capable of being attained anew.

For instance, it is puzzling how, in our external experience, a stream of subjective lived experience that forms a constant stratum of our waking conscious life, this very achievement comes about, an achievement that enables one to say, "I continually experience a spatiotemporal nature," "I experience these and those things," etc. In each such experience there resides the belief, "There is a thing, something objective, with these and those qualities, changing this way and that, affecting that other thing there, etc." In the experience itself there lies the fact that the thing there, in all its subjective changes, is one and the same objective entity—that it, upon entering into our experience, has not suddenly come into being, that it exists and will continue to exist in and of itself even when I "look away," etc. Should one ask how what exists in and of itself can itself be given to me, grasped by me, in my subjective experiencing, how it can belong to me precisely as something experienced, then the question reveals the fact that it is unclear and enigmatic what experience in itself is and how it can hold something objective in itself, how it makes entities that exist in themselves conscious to itself and

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[a] *unbekannt* [b] *erkannt*. Husserl here is alluding to the Hegelian distinction between the terms *bekannt* and *erkannt*, just as his use of the *aufheben* ("annul") in the previous sentence has Hegelian resonances.—Trans.

authenticates them in consciousness. This means, however, that in the act of experience, what is experienced becomes known while the act of experience itself, the essence and the sense of the experiencing achievement, does not. Yet this is completely understandable, since subjective life, which we call lived experience, has been concealed in its peculiar essence and has never been investigated. The same goes for the | diverse subjective lived experiences in which theoretical VII, 81/82 thought is carried out. Forming concepts on the basis of experiences, judging predicatively, we form propositions as theoretical insights, combining them into ever higher forms. What we obtain in this way we call truths about the truly existing objects, and we are convinced that these truths, which have been formed in our subjective activity, are valid "in themselves," much as, through a continuous unanimity of experiential verification, we take experienced objects to exist in themselves. Again, what is needed is a clarifying investigation that is predicatively directed at our cognizing life and its achievements, in order to make intelligible to ourselves for the first time what is actually achieved in the immanence of this cognizing life as a supposed and attained theoretical truth, or, alternatively, as objective being, as the substrate of a theoretically true determination.

Having made clear to ourselves what the aim of all epistemological inquiry is, what the obscurities are that attach in fundamental generality to objective cognition, and what the nature of the epistemological task is of transforming these obscurities, in this very generality, into theoretically intelligible and clear insights—[having done all this] it must now likewise be fully clear and certain to us that in a theory of knowledge every appeal to what is pretheoretically given in objective experience and every premise drawn from the objective sciences is inadmissible. Any such appeal would plainly amount to a countersensical *metábasis*. The universal subject of epistemology, the theory of cognizing "reason," encompasses every objectivity as the cognized objectivity of a possible cognition, and yet no objectivity in particular. To wrest objectivity from experience, or even from theoretical thought, and to increase one's cognitive stock by means of what has been obtained—to do this is to advance, in a naive-natural manner, from processes of taking notice of something, from conceptual judgments and insights, to new judgments and insights, and ultimately to theories and sciences.

But it is just this which is an enigma, and it is so at every step. What has been done, the deed, is "there" in every such step; it alone is in view, is the "theme," while the conscious life and achievement in which the doing itself consists are precisely lived and not made thematic. To bring | this into view in an experiencing and theorizing VII, 82/83 manner and to begin work on it—to bring this life, which in active living is unseen and therefore obscure, to intelligibility, to theoretical articulation—this indeed is the new problematic *vis-à-vis* each and every problem that emerges in the natural orientation toward objectivity. It is therefore clear that to carry out objective, "positive" science is something thoroughly and radically different from the task of making understandable, within the confines of pure subjectivity, how every conscious having, taking notice, and gaining of objectivity, but also every conscious supposing and attaining of predicative truths and theories, is a purely subjective achievement. This radical and unbridgeable gulf would obviously exist even if skeptical motives had never arisen from out of the first, confused awareness and not-yet-understanding of subjectivity, of that in which what is objective takes shape for the cognizing agent—motives that tend to deny the existence of a transcendent world, or at least hold it to be unknowable, and that thereby cast doubt on the possibility of a science of objective being. If this is done, it becomes all the more plain that, wherever the world has been called into question as to its existence or cognizability while at the same time the consciousness of that world remains unaffected, no objective being and no premises of objective science can be presupposed, especially not in investigations that aim to counter skepticism through a clarification of the sense belonging to objectivity and to the cognition of objectivity that is carried out solely in consciousness.

If Locke wanted what he and all the epistemologists who followed him undoubtedly wanted, namely, to lay bare the general essence of cognitive achievement; if, in order to obtain fundamental norms for cognizing activity, he wanted what was incomplete to be completed so that genuine science, science based on fundamental self-responsibility, could become possible for the first time; then he needed to bring the sense of his enterprise to unshakable clarity and to hold it there—in unshakable clarity, that is, concerning what the question of the essence, achievement or validity of cognition

actually means in this context. He needed to see that the proper achievement of cognition, of genuine, so-called rational cognition, is nothing less than the successful constitution of objectivities of every shape and form—of true being, true propositions, true theories | and VII, 83/84 sciences—for the cognizing agent. It was necessary to see and hold radically in one's grasp the fact that that objectivity, as something that is *attainable* in subjectivity, can have its site nowhere else than in the domain of consciousness itself (that of actual and possible consciousness) and that it makes no sense to posit this objectivity as existing outside of all possible consciousness, as something toward which consciousness, through, say, depiction or indication, could direct itself. As if that toward which consciousness directs itself, even a depicting or an indicating consciousness, could authenticate itself anywhere else but in consciousness, and as if this self-directing actualized itself in any other way than in syntheses of fulfilling identification! One needs to see above all that everything that is simply and evidently pregiven as existing is only given this way as something experienced in experiencing acts and that it only receives its sense and validity through them.

Since the Cartesian *Cogito* had already been discovered, having as its momentous foundation a world and a science that had been called into question in a general manner, all of this, one might assume, could easily have been seen with the help of a little deepening of one's reflection. But the tendency to fall back into the naive-natural mode of thought is too strong; and if a Cartesian radicalism was inadequate here, how much more inadequate would the approach of Locke be, to whom something like radicalism was from the start so alien? Already the fact that he, uncomprehendingly, abandons the Cartesian *beginning*, this actual beginning of an overcoming of naive dogmatism, and mires himself utterly in naiveté made it extraordinarily difficult for future thinkers to work through to that basic insight upon which every beginning of an epistemology that is to be free of countersense, and hence also of philosophy, depends, namely, the insight into the pure sense of the question itself.

Steadfastly persisting in his dogmatic attitude, Locke certainly intends to solve the fundamental problems of the understanding, of reason; he then takes for granted that these are psychological problems. The grounding of genuine objective science and philosophy is

carried out on the foundation of a science that is itself objective: psychology. As a matter of course psychology presents itself, for someone who is naturally oriented, as the science within which the essence and the norms of genuine cognition and scientific method are to be investigated. | Under Locke's influence, problems that are VII, 84/85 fundamentally distinct thus come throughout the entire modern period to be lumped together, a circumstance that is reflected in the double sense of the terms "epistemology" and "theory of reason." Although these problems are fundamentally distinct, they have an inner essential connection; and it fell to the philosophical developments that followed to distinguish these two tasks and, on the other side, to put them into relation with one another understandingly—if, that is, in the jumble of competing philosophies the one true and genuine philosophy was ever to emerge. For the terms *epistemology* and *theory of the understanding*, *of reason* can signify, and signify rightly, a *psychology of human cognition* or of human reason as a faculty of the human psyche that is one component of the entire nexus of human psychic life, just as the psychology of cognition is one component of a complete psychology. On the other hand, these same words can also signify a *transcendental* theory of cognition and reason. For such a theory, no psychology can serve as a home, as a site of available premises; rather, every psychology, like every objective science and every ontic region belonging to it, would be problematic, indeed would be part of the problem.

However fateful this confusion might have been for the times to come and however long it barred the way to a genuine theory of reason, it was not able to deflect the developmental direction of modern philosophy completely. Indeed, in discussing the distinction between the two sides of this problematic a moment ago, I already touched on their inner connection. A confusion that runs through the millennia, in which the problems are always treated solely as glittering or squinting two-sidedly, must of course have its causes in internal relations and essential connections, and these had to have their effect once the interest in epistemology had attained such vitality; they had to open up possibilities for making transitions from psychology to the transcendental problematic. Amid all the false interpretations and ambiguities there lay *in posse*, in the naiveté of the objective psychological method, valuable impulses growing out

of these essential connections, and therewith valuable impetuses toward the future. | And so, to the end of describing the motivation VII, 85/86 that spurs [philosophy's] future development and drives it toward the grounding of a transcendental theory of the understanding and philosophy, we have every reason to speak still further about Locke.

Indeed, in a certain way this psychologism was an advance, namely, as a reaction against *Cartesian Platonism* and the Platonism of the *Cambridge School*, which professed the doctrine of *ideae innatae*. No doubt this doctrine, too, should be characterized as psychologism, more precisely as *theological* psychologism. What is in question here epistemologically is the entirely singular status of certain basic concepts and of the propositions associated with them as axiomatic principles for all the sciences, as those propositions which alone are in a position to serve as the fundamental norms by which all scientific theory or, alternatively, all theorizing activity, is quite fundamentally bound. Included among these, of course, are all the basic concepts of logic but also those of formal mathematics, and of ethics as well. For it is obvious that the relation in which the basic concepts and principles of ethics stand *vis-à-vis* the entire conduct of life is analogous to that in which logical concepts stand relative to the achievements of science: they present themselves as absolutely valid fundamental norms to which all rational praxis must adhere. Accordingly, with respect to these basic concepts and principles parallel questions arise for a theory of practical reason. Everyone subjectively appropriates these fundamental assets for himself and, in apodictic evidence, grasps their absolute authority.[a] According to theological psychologism, however, the ultimate source of the absolute, supersubjective authority that articulates itself in apodictic evidences is—God, who implanted them in every soul originally. Thus, [this view is] a theologico-psychological clarification of the supersubjective validity of the fundamental elements of every theory or, alternatively, of all rational praxis.

Locke's reaction to this doctrine, which in Descartes is connected with the aforementioned theological doctrine of self-evidence, occurs in the famous first book of his *Essay*, which exerted such a great influence in its time. What he now sets up in opposition to this

[a] *Recht*

theological psychologism is a new, naturalistic psychologism. His psychology and psychological grounding of epistemology exclude all theological premises; like the new natural science, it is a science based purely on | experience or, more precisely, a purely inductive VII, 86/87 science of facts.

Yet it is, as we already know, a psychology with particular limits, one whose exclusive purpose was supposed to be to solve the problems of cognizing and practical reason and which for that reason renounced all psychophysical questions—a psychology, that is, carried out purely on the basis of inner experience. Therein lay a momentous theme inasmuch as it plainly was palpable to Locke (and even more so to his readers, thanks to his concrete expositions) that when it came to the problems of cognition, only a descriptive method would do. It had become palpable that a solution to the problems of cognition, and ultimately to the problems of rational validity, could, according to their sense, be obtained only on the basis of a directly intuitive inspection of the cognitive phenomena themselves, and that these solutions would therefore have to be found in the sphere of the Cartesian *Ego Cogito*, on the indubitable terrain of the self-givenness of cognitive lived experiences for the cognizing agent. Indeed, wherever actual and possible validity of any type of objective cognition is called into question and subject to critique, it is cognizing life itself that is, according to its actual and possible existence, an unquestionable fact, as what is presupposed in every critical question and which in this sense is indubitable and at all times immediately accessible for reflective inspection. However much the *Ego Cogito* may have been objectivistically—that is, anthropologico-psychologically—misinterpreted by Locke, it was nevertheless a great advance when he made the attempt, passed over by Descartes, to work out a pure Egology, albeit in a psychological inversion and misinterpretation, that is, as a psychological Egology, as a kind of history of human interiority.

Lecture 13: ⟨The Prejudices of Empiricism. Psychologism in Epistemology⟩

And indeed, had Locke ever actually arrived at the descriptions that are called for methodologically (descriptions, that is, of the immanently intuitive constituents of consciousness carried out by an *Ego* reflecting on itself and describing itself in pure inwardness); had he arrived at a genuine elementary analysis of conscious life and a genuine exhibition of its manner of construction from the bottom up; then this achievement would have been | of definitive VII, 87/88 significance not only for a genuine psychology but also for a transcendental Egology. The essential content of these descriptions, once a clarification of the misinterpretations had been carried out and the ensuing adjustments had been made, would have been of benefit to the transcendental science.

What was *lacking* here, characterized more precisely, lies in several different directions. One of these concerns the basic inadequacy of the empirico-inductive approach. This new psychology, as it comes into being through Descartes himself and also through his contemporary *Hobbes*, constitutes itself as a *purely inductive* science, one formed after the model of the new natural science—as a "natural science" of the psyche, we could say. This it also remains, even if for certain philosophical purposes it was insisted that it be elaborated as a purely descriptive natural history of psychic life carried out within the bounds of inner experience—which is just what Locke did, and for the first time.

But now one has to consider that as a doctrine of principles—indeed as a doctrine of the most fundamental principles conceivable—the theory of reason, like the analytical logic with which it emerged historically (the two theories having been unclearly intertwined), *eo ipso* had to become, according to its own sense, an a priori theory in the original Platonic sense of a science of ideas drawing from eidetic intuition. Certainly there is, in addition to this, an empirical theory of the understanding and an empirical typology of the human understanding, whether concerned quite generally with the empirical species "human being" or, in particular types, with races, peoples, eras, social classes, individuals, stages of life, or the like. These types can be investigated descriptively and induc-

tively in empirical fashion, and indeed benefit can potentially be derived from such researches: for purposes of individual education, national education, and the like. But when one speaks in this way of understanding or the lack of it, of greater or lesser intellectual achievements, of typical errors, and so on, there stands behind—or above—everything, as that which determines sense and regulates norms, a pure logic; and, for the most profound and ultimate understanding of such achievements, which stem from an achieving that is carried out, unrecognized, in conscious life, there stands together with this pure logic a transcendental theory, one that, as clarifying the fundamental essence, is a priori.

If one discerns a difficulty in the fact that clarification of the essence of a priori cognition is itself part of the | universal task of VII, 88/89 such a theory—just as much as, on the other side, clarification of the essence of empirical cognition as such belongs to it—and if one at length finds a general difficulty in the way that any epistemology that is conceived of in the fullest universality is burdened by a reflexive relatedness to itself, then one can nevertheless see, right from the start, at least this much: that if such an epistemology is to be undertaken at all, it can only be done in the form of, and with intention of being, a science of ideas, a purely rational science of the essence of cognizing subjectivity and its possible achievements. All the same, it is conceivable that someone might take himself to be carrying out empirical cognition—for example, [in] cognitive psychology—and in truth be obtaining a priori necessary cognition. Thus there is, in our positivistic age, no shortage of mathematicians who, reflecting unclearly on activities of theirs that are clear, succumb to fashionable theories and hold their purely a priori cognitions, which de facto they have grasped with insight in pure generality and necessity, to be empirical.

It was in this sense that I said that Locke's immanent descriptions could very well have been fruitful epistemologically, even despite the misinterpretation of their fundamental sense. And this is what in fact would have happened, had Locke actually carried out the methodologically correct analyses of consciousness—had he, in purely maintained inner experience and inner imagination, subjected the concrete structures of the actual and possible immanent lived experiences offering themselves there to a systematic

elementary analysis, thereby producing—while making sure to form his concepts carefully and to observe terminological rigor—exact descriptions. But these descriptions were not to be carried out, either by Locke or by any other psychologists or psychological epistemologists.

This is certainly one of the most curious facts in the history of the sciences. That theoretical explanations concerning infinities of mathematical form (mathematical manifolds), explanations that can only be achieved by means of highly complex and multilayered, highly elaborate conceptual formations and deductive theories—that such explanations are very hard to bring off is not astonishing. But what could be methodologically simpler and easier than description! To be sure, in the task of mastering | vast regions VII, 89/90 of the world—which, as in the case of the natural-historical regions, overabounds in exceedingly complicated structures—the systematics of description, too, present difficulties for the scientific mind. But in addition to all that, what is in question here are objective descriptions, each of which, in the task of ascertaining the objectively ordered and interrelated particular features belonging to the various objective observations and inductions, entails at every stage enormous organized undertakings—research expeditions and the like. It is otherwise in the purely subjective sphere. Here, indeed, every description, the moment it begins, lays hold of its object in adequate experience. The experiential act of grasping surely cannot itself be a domain of special difficulties—as if there existed some fundamental danger of entirely missing the objects that are to be described. But precisely this, strangely enough, is the situation in Locke's psychology and epistemology. He claims to describe, in pure inner experience, what has been experienced, and yet he has never actually had such a pure experience, has never actually seen its genuine constituents, has never managed to carry out an actual analysis in this region and therefore has been unable to achieve a genuine, systematic description.

The reasons for the failure of the Lockean method are profound and are rooted in the essence of subjectivity, which both describes and is described. Thus the difficulties are by no means accidental. External experience, indeed objective experience in general, is the experience of the natural attitude; to it belongs ordinary human

self-experience as well. It is that self-experience that we undergo in our practically active life, continuously being referred back to ourselves in our interactions with our neighbors—in alternation with our experience of mere things—as a natural, free life-activity that plays itself out as if by itself. Now, if psychology as an empirical science seeks descriptions and explanations, it makes use of this natural self-experience in much the same way that the natural scientist makes use of the experience of spatial things in so-called "sensory," "external" experience.

We are not concerned at this juncture with what the quite general methodological reasons might be that psychology had, and that any genuine scientific psychology whatever had to have, for carrying out descriptions within the confines of purely immanent, purely inner self-experience—which is to say, essentially, within the confines of the evidence | of the indubitable self-givenness that was claimed by VII, 90/91
Descartes (though that evidence might perhaps need to be limited critically). For Locke and the psychologizing epistemology, such reasons lie, as explained above, in the problematic of cognition with regard to its essence and validity for the understanding. Leading the way here was the surely indubitable thought that the achievements of cognition could be clarified only if one viewed that cognition oneself, laying out its elements and fixing them analytically—that, therefore, scientific clarification could only come about on the basis of scientific descriptions. But then, of course, the object of these descriptions is cognition as it is in its pure unique essentiality and insofar as it is given, in this unique essentiality, only in the pure *Ego Cogito* (or, as Locke styles it, inner experience).

But there are factors here—indeed factors lying in the very nature of what is to be described—that stand in the way of our undergoing a truly pure inner experience that automatically observes and fixes. The difficulties connected with inner observation have been discussed at length through the ages, especially in recent times. They were prompted by the fact that the descriptions of different observers—quite unlike those in the domain of external experience (though these latter do not in any way claim indubitable evidence for themselves)—seemed to harmonize with one another so poorly. Every attempt at an irreproachable, truly convincing exhibition of one's descriptive findings as true in themselves, through which dis-

putes in specific cases might have been settled, came to naught. But all the discussion of this difficulty was of little help as long as, in fact, one simply had no inner experience whatever, and no pure description of the corresponding pure inwardness, in one's possession. In order for it even to come into being, in order for its purity to be maintained and for there to be, along with it, the scientific assurance that this purity is being maintained, this description requires—as we shall show in detail later—its own method, the method of the phenomenological reduction. For it is only when the natural objectivistic attitude, with everything that is given in it, is suspended (which is exactly what this method teaches us to do)—only when, accordingly, the otherwise unavoidable intermingling of [inner experience with] what is experienced objectively (or, what is the same, with that which transcends pure inwardness) has been rendered completely impossible—that this difficulty can be overcome. Only then, indeed, can one | see what exists under the title VII, 91/92 "inwardness," that is, what is purely contained in the evidence of the *Ego Cogito*. And only then does it emerge—only then can we and must we see, provided that prejudices do not blind us, as through a sort of hypnosis, to what is actually seen—that our entire inner life is consciousness through and through, that it is consciousness and at the same time something we are conscious of, and that it is therefore only to be described as such.

In fact, it becomes apparent straight off that genuine "inner experience" is not, as it is in Locke's notion of a *tabula rasa*, something like a field, like a plain or a space, over which a nimble mental gaze merely glided from side to side, simply grasping and fixing on the given items appearing there one after the other, governed by a quasi-spatial order of succession. Rather, in continuously fresh attempts at reflection and in reflections on distinct levels that start from what has already been given in reflection, the tremendous wealth of modes of consciousness comes to the fore. In numerous, quite distinct ways, consciousness can itself appear as the consciousness of consciousness[a]—as can, in turn, this latter, in a continuing implication. Indeed, various continua even appear, continua of the

[a] *kann Bewußtsein selbst wieder als Bewußtes von Bewußtsein erscheinen*

consciousness of the consciousness of consciousness, and so on. Here the perceiving in which these inner items are grasped itself belongs to the inwardly perceivable items; we can reflect on it, and indeed it is only for this reason that we know of it and, in describing it, class it as itself belonging to the realm of "inner experience." The same holds, of course, for acts of describing and theorizing: though not grasped, not observed in being actively carried out, they themselves become, in reflection, graspable and describable, this latter act of describing then itself [becoming graspable and describable] on a higher level, and so on. What is inwardly experienced or experienceable, as something we are conscious of, perpetually has an inseparable relation to the consciousness of it in virtue of which it, too, belongs, unobserved and ungrasped, to the pure immanent sphere. This consciousness, for its part, is not something added on to and separate from its experiential content. Rather, consciousness is the consciousness of its content, and the content content of its consciousness: the two [are] inseparably one. What profusions of descriptive peculiarities—of the most intricate structures, already in the simplest cases—belong to such a concretion as "consciousness of something" can scarcely even be suggested here.

Locke and his successors had no inkling of any of this. That | VII, 92/93 for centuries a psychology and an epistemology could incessantly speak of items given in inner experience, could speak of the different genera and species of these given items, including perceptions, presentations, acts of judging, acts of willing, feelings, and so on; that one believed oneself to have fixed all this scientifically in descriptive concepts while [in fact] one had never seen at all, nor had one learned to see, what stands there before us in its purity and what can really be fixed in pure inwardness—all of this is most peculiar, and yet at the same time understandable, once we become cognizant of the inner causes and historical inhibitions. It didn't help that one wanted to construe the method not merely as the method of inner perception but as that of experience in a broader sense—primarily, that is, of inner experience—thereby surrendering the absolute self-evidence of inner memory (for the basic situation is the same for memory as for perception). If it is true that a psychology is inconceivable unless it draws its entire system of constitutive primitive concepts (as those concepts out of which all psychological

concepts are constructed) from pure inner experience as its sole source, then modern psychology presents us with the odd spectacle of a discipline that believes itself to be well grounded as a science, to have obtained its conceptual material, and even to have drawn this material descriptively from inner experience, but that in truth has no knowledge of the realm of pure inner experience, which alone can yield genuine concepts. The same could be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of modern epistemology, and not merely of the psychologistic epistemology of the Lockean type.

Lecture 14: ⟨The Paradigmatic Character of Modern Natural Science as a Restraining Force on the Development of a Genuine Intuitionistic Science of Consciousness⟩

Yet there are also, as already indicated, historical motives, motives arising from the modern period's position in the history of ideas, that right from the start functioned as inhibiting prejudices, impeding the recognition of what is given in its unique peculiarity when our gaze is turned toward pure inwardness.

In this regard, the paradigmatic character of the new natural science was, and indeed still is, very damaging to psychology. | The VII, 93/94 degree to which it could bedazzle even brilliant thinkers can be seen in the case of *Hobbes*. Natural science is for him the prototype of the true and most ultimately philosophical science possible, indeed to such a degree that he not only ascribes to material nature absolute being but also, conversely, reduces all absolute being, including inwardly experienced psychic being, to nature. If Descartes posited the purely grasped *Ego* with its *cogitationes* as a mental substance in an absolute fashion, Hobbes regards subjective inner life as a mere subjective illusion whose true being lies in the material psychophysical correlates. He thereby becomes the father of modern materialism, and of the new materialistic psychology as well.

The paradigmatic character of natural science does not, to be sure, affect Locke in this manner. But it becomes fateful for him as well, if in a different way. First of all: he, too, absolutizes natural science, and absolutizes nature, in the way he understands the natural-scientific determinations of his day. That is to say: material

bodies are absolute realities in their temporality and spatiality, in their physical qualities, or, in other words, exclusively with regard to their geometrico-mechanical determinations. Locke distinguishes here between primary qualities and powers. Primary or original qualities—size, figure, position, movement or rest—are the qualities that inhere inseparably in a material body, whatever state it might be in. By means of these, the body exerts its power to affect other bodies and our senses. If we now consider our experiential intuitions of bodies—our "ideas"—in which the material things outside us appear to our senses, present themselves in us subjectively, we see that these ideas also contain primary qualities as analogues of the external ones. On the other hand, specific sensuous qualities such as colors, sounds, heat and cold, and so on, which have no similar equivalents in material realities—these are merely subjective and are objectively significant only insofar as they *indicate* geometrico-mechanical properties in virtue of the interconnections of psychophysical causality. The sounds that we sense point to certain regular forms of aerial vibration and are causally "explained" through them; the sensed colors are likewise explained through emanations from bodies or other physical processes; and similarly everywhere. Material bodies existing | in themselves, says Locke, VII, 94/95
are not only substrates of primary qualities, but also substrates of powers. These Locke regards as analogues of the psychic powers that are originally experienced in inner experience. Qualities and the powers belonging to them are not independent elements that make up material realities in the manner of mere complexes or conglomerates; rather, they subsist in one uniform substrate—a substance—which is something completely unknown, a *je ne sais quoi*.

Owing to the paradigmatic character of natural science, this interpretation of natural science and of nature as understood by it, as well as of the relation between the latter, the true nature, and nature in the sense of external experience, in turn affects the interpretation of psychology and the interpretation of the psyche and the data of inner experience. In Locke's case, as is well known, it also influences his metaphysical conception of psychology, according to which mental acts, like physical ones, are underlain by an unknown substrate—a spiritual substance—serving as a support, from which

it follows for him that one cannot know whether this support might not be the same as the one that, in the scientific treatment of external experience, is taken to underlie material substance.

The way the new natural science, and the metaphysics bound up with it, influence Locke and the theory of the understanding in the entire modern period does not require a detailed critical appraisal regarding the particular preconceptions taken over from that science. The critique is already accomplished by pointing generally to the erroneous circularity inherent in the fact that a theory of reason, according to its own peculiar sense, is a critique of reason as such, and not a critique in the ordinary sense of a testing of the legitimacy of particular cognitions on the basis of presuppositions that are granted as obvious. In other words, the aim of a theory of reason is to clarify how it is that in the medium (which we cannot get beyond) of subjective acts of meaning of whatever form—experiencing, theorizing, judging, valuing, opining in the practical sphere—something like objective legitimacy emerges in so-called activities of reason; to clarify how it gains its original sense in a particular mode of validity—that of insight—and how from here there arises | the force VII, 95/96 of an unalterable norm, be it of simple truth, of possibility, probability, or whatever. Indeed, the theory of reason arises out of the awareness that all consciousness, all acts of meaning, and hence acts of meaning concerning every type of objectivity, are carried out in the self-contained sphere of the "cogitating" *Ego*, and that all talk of truth and legitimacy draws its sense, in subjectivity itself, from certain particular acts of meaning, acts which ground all insight and which have, depending on the particular type of meaning-act and what is meant in it, their distinct forms of sense. Should there develop the need, in relation to the hiddenness of this cognizing life—which remains, as it were, anonymous during the activity of objective cognizing—to bring this anonymity into the light of day; should enigmas and doubts arise out of these obscurities; and should objective cognition and the objective achievement of reason become topics of investigation for a theory of reason; then such obscurity, and with it the problem of reason itself, affect every act of cognition, every act of objective meaning and grounding, in the same way. Each and every objective conviction is thus contained in the universality of the problem. What objective presuppositionlessness in a theory

of reason entails, therefore, is obvious; it amounts to nothing other than the demand that one remain constantly mindful of the sense of the questions posed by the theory of reason as fundamentally universal, and, accordingly, that in particular one not be permitted to presuppose anything that itself has been called into question in the generality of the problem.

In Locke's approach, as in that of all naturalistic (anthropologistic, psychologistic) theories of reason, there thus lies a kind of countersensical circularity. It presupposes nature, or natural science, as valid while at the same time inquiring into the possibility of its validity.

However, the influence of natural science and of the naturalistic manner of thought it holds sacred is displayed in yet another significant peculiarity of Locke's epistemology, one that influenced future developments in an especially fateful manner: namely, in what we call the naturalizing of consciousness. What we mean by this requires a more precise elucidation.

According to what has just been established, Locke's Cartesian attempt, employing an approach based purely on the | *Ego Cogito*, to make comprehensible the possibility of objective cognition and science and to ground these absolutely—the attempt, that is, to highlight the authority[a] of pure subjectivity, in which all cognition is carried out, and to allow transcendent, objective cognition to count as valid only once its possibility and authority have been authenticated within the bounds of the *Ego Cogito*—this attempt finds no following. On the other hand, the notion of a pure immanence in which all transcendence must show and authenticate itself nevertheless remains decisive for Locke, however naively inconsistent his dogmatic approach may have been. For the mind, the only things that are immediately given are its own ideas—this is an oft-repeated principle in Locke's *Essay*. What Descartes had delineated purely under the title *cogitatio* with its *cogitatum qua cogitatum* as an immediate, absolutely indubitably secured given, as a *clara et distincta perceptio* carried out reflectively by the *Ego* in pure consciousness—this is what Locke calls, precisely in this immediacy, "idea." VII, 96/97

[a] *Recht*

The "history" of consciousness that Locke wants to give and through which he intends to solve the problems of cognition concerns itself with the realm of these "ideas." Motives of doubtless importance—motives which, however, do not reach their full maturity—guide his results and his subsequent method and continue to have their effect in the future ("epistemology"). Why is it, Locke asks himself (he suggests, though somewhat vaguely, that this is the primary motive of his entire enterprise), that the disputes of the metaphysicians are so dissatisfying? Why do they not, through their efforts, arrive at secure and mutually convincing results? Because they operate with vague notions[a] concerning God and world, mind and body, substance and accident, space and time, number and quantity, power, cause, effect, and so on, without inquiring into their origin, into their clear, original sense; that is, without first satisfying themselves as to whether these ideas and the metaphysical schemes devised along with them might not be devoid of any possibility of themselves being realized in clear intuition—or, as Locke says, whether they might not go beyond the limits within which human cognition, according to its nature, is confined. And in contrast to this tendency, Locke intends to roll back all | metaphysics (something he VII, 97/98 surely did not succeed in doing) and sketch, before anything else, a "history of the first beginnings of human knowledge." He intends—which is for him the same thing—to go back to the ideas, as the immediate objects of inner perception and the most immediate objects of thought, to exhibit the simple ideas systematically, and to describe the mental operations that the mind performs on them. Then he intends to move on to higher cognitive forms and thus to show in general how the mind, in step-by-step fashion, originally shapes all the knowledge it is capable of shaping. This is Locke's "historical" investigation, which he also contrasts with psychophysical explanation and which he regards as the task of epistemology.

Here, however, we must add the following by way of elucidation and supplementation. "Ideas" in their original form, as they first make their appearance in inner experience, are easily distinguished; they are easily recognized with regard to their similarities and differences. No fountainheads of error flow here. Once they

[a] *Vorstellungen*

have made their original appearance, however, these ideas return in merely reproductive forms, more or less dull and unclear, and then easily flow into one another indiscriminately. Bound up with this, furthermore, are the dangers of linguistic thought, helpful as it otherwise may be. We human beings have the ability to use sharply distinguishable sensuous ideas—so-called words—as signs for any other idea whatever, and to think in linguistic form. If the meanings of words are oriented by clear intuitions, and if we are furthermore able at all times to go back from the dull reproductions, in which these meaning-bestowing intuitions remain with us in memory, to the originally clear ideas—that is, to make these meanings clear to ourselves—then our linguistic thinking will make sense and be truthful, and we will be able to defend its truthfulness at any time. If, however, we continue to operate in our thought with unclear words and verbal meanings, if we form out of them ever new verbal thoughts and opinions without satisfying ourselves, by going back to the original intuition, as to whether what we have formed has a possible clear sense, a true meaning, corresponding to it, then our thinking is worthless.

Here, according to Locke, arises the great task of clarifying | VII, 98/99 all our concepts, those we obtained ourselves and those obtained through tradition, that is, of clarifying all the more or less confused representations of meaning[a] with which we operate in our lives—first and foremost, however, the basic concepts, the basic representations of our entire natural and scientific worldview, which play a universal and dominant role in all the sciences. These include the very concepts mentioned above: body and spirit, thing and quality, space, time, and so on. All these concepts lack clarity and distinctness, and the errors arising from them must obviously have especially far-reaching consequences. The crucially important task, therefore, is to go, precisely with regard to these concepts, back to the original ideas in a clarifying manner in order to give them a new definition and a fixed form in accordance with these ideas and then, possibly, to analyze them into their ultimate, originally clear conceptual elements.

[a] *Bedeutungsvorstellungen*

At this point a thought occurs to Locke that is at bottom significant, despite the troubling obscurity of his expositions: if it were possible to exhibit systematically all the elementary ideas (here understood as *cogitata qua cogitata*) that arise, in original intuitiveness, in pure consciousness; if it were possible, furthermore, to highlight systematically the ways in which these simple ideas originally come together in intuition to form complex ideas; then the entire universe of possible human cognition would be outlined in advance. We would then have determined in advance the stock of ideas for every possible concept, for every possible meaning of words—the ABC of the elementary ideas and legitimate concepts, so to speak. And we would also have obtained, from the ideas themselves, the modes of connection of actually intuitive complex ideas—the ABC of the manners of formation, so to speak, by means of which all true thoughts would be circumscribed.

One cannot fail to notice that an important motive is struggling to take shape in this methodological outline, and that in this way an epistemology could be given an aim. We shall come to understand that what we have here is nothing less than a presentiment of the genuine intuitionism that belongs to the essence of a transcendental grounding of cognition. It is a presentiment of the methodological style of a genuine epistemology and, depending upon it, of a new grounding of all the sciences, through which | they become for the VII, 99/100
first time rigorous sciences in a most profound and ultimate sense. For with the strengthening of transcendental epistemology, a new scientific ideal manifestly shines forth: namely, that of a science that understands itself and is responsible for itself down to the ultimate original sources of all forms of cognition and therewith too of the originally genuine sense of whatever being is cognized in it.

But a fruitfully effective working out of this presentiment—which, of course, we have already gone far beyond in our clarifications—was not to be attained. Every avenue by which one attempted to provide the idea of a universal elucidation of cognition with the necessary clarity was blocked by the naive naturalizing of consciousness, into which Locke immediately lapses.

This naturalizing arises from the fact that the realm of pure inner experience, this so-called realm of "ideas," is conceived entirely on analogy with the spatial world, the realm of external experience.

Indicative of this is the famous simile of the *tabula rasa*, which Locke revives from the ancient tradition. The soul, once it awakens to consciousness, resembles a blank white paper onto which experience inscribes signs. What make their appearance in the soul, or rather in the inner sphere of experience, are ever new such signs, ever new ideas, appearing in succession.[1] In this simile a tendency toward

[1] We must not overlook the confusion that Locke has created with his opposition between *sensation* and *reflection* [Husserl uses the English terms here—Trans.], a confusion that, along with his other confusions, has passed over into the psychological and epistemological traditions. [The English terms *sensation* and *reflection*] are usually translated [into German] as "outer" and "inner" experience [*äußere und innere Erfahrung*], but what one fails to notice thereby—being caught up in the confusion oneself—is that [the English term] *sensation* functions in two ways. In the first place, it functions as the *cogitatio* in the Cartesian sense, together with its sensational *cogitatum*—the latter, as phenomenon (as an *idea* on the slate of consciousness) remaining unaffected by whether or not the experienced things in question exist or indeed whether the whole world, as Descartes has it, remains in "doubt" as a possible transcendental illusion. The existence of this sensational *Cogito* along with its *cogitatum* is the indubitable self-evidence (which Locke does not dispute) of the *Ego Cogito*, and precisely for this reason it belongs among the ideas on the slate of consciousness. If we form the correct concept of pure conscious experience—or, if one prefers, of "inner" experience—then this concept encompasses all "ideas," including the ideas of sensation in this sense. On the other hand, this sensation is by no means a [type of] external experience, whose objects ⟨are⟩ not ideas but rather spatial things experienced "through" the sensuous ideas. However it may be with this "through" and with the relation between the pure thing-phenomenon as idea and the thing externally experienced in the natural attitude, this much is certain: what we have here are two distinct items, and in [100/101] moving from one to the other, a change of attitude occurs. In one attitude we enact the perceptual belief and "have" this existing thing; in the other we inhibit this belief and have instead of the thing the "thing-phenomenon." Accordingly, we must not call both of these "external experience" (external perception and its derivates). Obviously the correct concept is that of thing-experience (enacted in belief), while the other concept results in a particular form of "inner" experience, namely, the experience of the thing-phenomena, and reflectively of perceptual meaning or believing about things. Once this confusion has been clarified, we can nevertheless characterize Locke's method as a reduction of all epistemic problems to the ground of inner experience, the pure experience of ideas or of consciousness—all that being understood in the proper sense. Of course, then, we are not permitted to continue to characterize, under the title "sensory ideas," both the externally experienced things (or even the unexperienceable substances it is allegedly necessary to hypothesize) and at the same time the thing-phenomena as "ideas." This radical confusion, which carries over to the qualities of things (as opposed to quality-phenomena with their adumbrating sensory data, etc.), pervades the literature in psychology and epistemology—despite the demonstrations I provided long ago—to this day.

reification becomes manifest, a tendency whose effects become ever more pronounced as Locke's philosophy develops. Signs on a writing tablet, strokes of chalk or ink: such occurrences partake of the nature of physical things, | and what they symbolize, too, is always VII, 100/101 something thinglike. Just as space is the ontic field of physical things, so is the field of consciousness, the empty writing tablet, a kind of space for thinglike entities within the psyche. In the same way that natural science, first descriptively and then explanatorily, treats of the things and events of external experience (those in external space), describes them and explains them causally, so does psychology face analogous tasks with respect to ideas and formations of ideas in the field of consciousness.

The new and greatly admired natural science had become the prototype of any genuine science whatever, and this had the effect that one now as a matter of course took the spatial-thingly type of reality as the prototype of all reality, including that of the psyche. This was already the source of *Cartesian* dualism, *Hobbesian* materialism, and *Spinozistic* parallelism, and in the case of *Locke* it led to an interpretation of conscious life as a kind of accidental being supported in or even brought about on the ground of a soul-substance—on analogy with the material substance that was thought to underlie the complexes of sensuous ideas or qualities. But there is also to be found here the source of that naturalizing of what is given in inner experience that occurs in Locke's conception of the sphere of "ideas" as a *tabula rasa*.

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⟨Chapter Two
Critical Disclosure of the Genuine and Enduring Problematic Concealed in Locke's Investigations⟩

Lecture 15: ⟨The Problem of Immanence and of Synthetic Unity in Consciousness⟩

If psychic reality were in fact of the same ontological type as nature, then psychology, carried out rigorously and precisely as a science, would indeed have to look just like a natural science. It would have to be a science of purely inductive interconnections, and a fundamentally different way of [treating] those interconnections that are merely entwined with the inductive ones—and hence an essentially different methodological approach to psychological research and theory—would be excluded on grounds of principle. Now, this purely naturalistic, purely inductive type of psychology, which received encouragement from the paradigmatic character of natural science, took on a particular cast once it seemed that Locke had identified the *tabula rasa* of internal experience as the necessarily first field of cognition for psychology and epistemology, as the assumed basic field upon which all description and inductive theorizing would have to build. To be sure, Locke, who was in no way a man of reckless consistency, never carried such a psychology and epistemology into execution. This *Hume* was the first to do, and we shall see what that meant philosophically and how it represented nothing less than the end of all philosophy, and of science itself: [how it was], in a word, a skepticism countersensical from the bottom up, one noteworthy only because of its completely new historical style. In Locke's *oeuvre* there lies merely the beginning of this end, as it were, appearing completely innocent at first but through its irregularities—which were perceivable to those who could reflect more deeply—developing into new forms.

Internal experience comprises for Locke the totality of what is immediately given to the *Ego*, the "mind," at a particular moment. These data are assumed as a matter of course to be real occurrences

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existing within the confines of subjectivity, just as the data of external experience are assumed to be real events in external nature. But this parallelization has its hazards, which already in Locke's | VII, 102/103
descriptions are becoming palpable. Various viewpoints come into consideration here. On the one hand, [there is] the *Ego*-side of the *tabula rasa*: if this is the field of internal experience, then it is a field of the experiencing *Ego*, and internal experience is the *Ego*'s consciousness *of* the occurrences in this field.

Furthermore: the *Ego* not only *has* what it is conscious of as that which is experienced internally, it is also *affected* by it—by the signs on the slate of consciousness—and in reaction it also performs activities: it explicates qualities, it clarifies to itself that it is bringing to light what was darkly remembered, that it is collecting, comparing, referring, etc. In his probity, Locke never entirely abandons what he has seen, and hence he even posits activities of the "mind," as well as this: that these activities do not simply occur but that the "mind" instead becomes immediately conscious of them, that is, that they themselves become inscribed in turn as ideas on the slate of consciousness. But how in all this do things stand with that *Ego* of which we have implicitly been speaking all this time and of which one must always speak when describing internal experience? Locke speaks of it, or of what he calls the mind, almost as if there were a person standing before the slate of consciousness and puttering around with these signs—which is plainly nonsense—and moreover, he interprets it as an unknowable substance. At times he calls it an idea, and at other times he denies it is an idea. The latter is his actual view, and if according to him the field of ideas (of genuine ideas) is the domain of possible knowledge, the *Ego* is reduced to the complex of conscious lived experiences, just as the physical thing is reduced to the complex of "qualities" or—thanks to that confusion of which we are already aware—to the complex of sensible ideas. But this is an uneasy stance; for the *Ego*, as the subject of activities and as the perceiver *vis-à-vis* all ideas, cannot be wished away, no more than the identical thing of changing sensory complexes can. In connection with this last point there is the additional palpable difficulty that complexes of ideas in general, including those of sensible ideas, lie within subjectivity.

As is well known, *Descartes* attached great importance not only to the self-evidence of the *cogitatio* but also to that of the *Ego* of this

cogitatio—and indeed placed the primary emphasis on the latter form of | self-evidence. But *how* and *as what* is this *Ego* given? Is VII, 103/104
it a metaphysical *substantia cogitans?* Is it, expressed in Locke's terms, a *je ne sais quoi*, something that we must add in our thought to the experiences of internal consciousness, to those of the *tabula rasa*, something that must be postulated to accompany them, just as, according to the Lockean parallelism, an unknowable material substrate [must be added] to the data of the external experience of physical things? But is it not immediately evident that I, reflecting on my act-experiences of attentive perceiving, judging, valuing, or willing, never discover them as *Ego*less facts but rather necessarily in the general form *Ego Cogito*? Inseparably and quite immediately, I find in or associated with them the I of consciousness, which is everywhere identical. Every such act-experience is, when I behold it as an act of the *Ego*, itself the subject matter of a reflective act, and now, reflecting anew, I recognize it as an act-experience of the *Ego*, of the identically same I that carries out this experience. Indeed; and now in the fullest generality: any given conscious experience, even one that is not an act of the *Ego*, is, in just this way, *my* experience. Perhaps, for example, I cognize the hearing of a melody toward which I was not, during the hearing, directed in an attentively perceiving act but which I subsequently become aware of, in a retrospective beholding, as a non-attentively-perceiving act of hearing. (Or, alternatively, [I become aware of] the melody as a non-attentively-perceived melody.) In a similar fashion, [I become aware of this hearing] in self-evident reflection as my experience and, in the synthetic enacting of such reflections, as [the experience of] the selfsame *Ego* of every lived experience that I call or ever will be able to call mine—of the lived experiences that I can only call mine on the basis of such reflections and syntheses, in a constant self-evident identification of one and the same *Ego*, of the *Ego* that I am. Why, I ask, is all this not declared, in descriptions of internal experience, to be a basic fact? Why does one not say: "in the sphere of internal consciousness I find a variety of changing lived experiences, but each is an experience of my *Ego*, and this *Ego* exists in absolute identity"?

To be sure, this *Ego* in its absolute identity poses difficulties. One was tempted to identify it with that person who is so well known, the *Ego* that I am familiar with through the experience of my life.

However, there can be no question of an absolute self-evidence concerning character traits that determine | my personal reality. VII, 104/105
Still, is Descartes not entirely correct in claiming the strongest of all self-evidence for the pure *Ego*, as the *Ego* of the pure *Cogito*? It is therefore by no means an empty, entirely metaphysical construction, although I can say almost nothing about it within the sphere of absolute self-evidence, save this one thing, that as the abiding and numerically identical subject pole, it belongs to every conceivable experience that I am entitled to call my own. But certainly not as a part; every part of an experience vanishes with the experience itself, and no new experience can have a *part* that is genuinely identical with that of a previous one.

If one is naturalistically preoccupied from the outset, that is, oriented toward the analogues of external being and directed, if not toward internal things—since from the start there can be no talk here of abiding things—then at least toward analogues of real events, then certainly one will not have much to say about this "pure *Ego*." After all, one cannot naturalize lived experiences and insert into them such a natural absurdity as a numerically identical *Ego*, an absolutely identical something that self-evidently belongs to everything and yet is itself nothing real, no real part, no real annex [of anything]. We understand here the reason that all psychology standing under the spell of the naturalistic prejudice—and this applies to virtually the entirety of modern psychology—becomes blind to the pure *Ego*, why indeed it must become blind, if the soul is conceived of purely naturally as a reality parallel to physical reality and if the sphere of internal consciousness is conceived of as a field of real lived experiences.

Locke himself is not exactly downright blind to the *Ego*, but he does not know what to do with it. When he struck out in a naturalistic direction of thought and yet held on to the *Ego*, a tension between irreconcilable motives was produced, one that had to be eliminated. To the extent that naturalism remained determinant, an exclusion of the *Ego*, or of the spiritual substance that was postulated to lie beneath it, was bound to ensue in the further development of naturalistic doctrines.

There were still other contexts in which the wrongheadedness of the naturalizing of consciousness became apparent and in which

one became entangled in countersensical notions and theories, theories whose countersense, to be sure, could not, in the climate of general confusion, be exposed but which became palpable as an inner tension. | VII, 105/106

Here what must first be explained is that the naturalizing of consciousness renders one blind not only to the *Ego*, but also to everything that belongs essentially to consciousness as consciousness. Just as consciousness is inconceivable without the *Ego*, so likewise is it inconceivable without something, without some form of "objectivity," that it holds consciously within itself. Hence no description of consciousness, let alone a higher theorization of it, is possible unless it codescribes and cotheorizes the *Ego* and what is consciously present within it as that which this consciousness is conscious of. Consciousness "refers itself"—this is a natural and common manner of speaking—to some objectivity or other, and here the word "consciousness" designates lived experiences, such as a perception of something, a memory of something, the experience of a sign as a sign of something, of a liking as a liking of something, etc. If it is a matter of *Ego*-acts such as "I attentively perceive and take notice of something present" or "in memory, and grasping what is remembered, I take notice of something past," or the like, then this means in a special sense, "I refer myself to the objectivity in question" or, alternatively, "I am directed toward it." The I of the third person, each individual I, refers or directs itself, while on the other hand the act-experience itself is said as before to be in its way related to the something in question. This relation, which Brentano designates as intentional (and in keeping with this designation I call lived experiences "intentional experiences"), has an essentially different sense than all other relations, whether it be those we ascribe to objects among themselves or those we take to obtain between the *Ego* or some particular consciousness and whatever objects. The object of the intentional relation, as that relation which is encapsulated purely in the act, in the intentional experience itself, is the simple intentional object, the "immanent" object, as Brentano, following the Scholastics, employs the term. It is that which is supposed in the act *as* supposed, without asking or deciding whether it exists in truth, whether it "actually" exists or not. Where we make a straightforward assertion about a relation, in

the normal and modified sense, this assertion, according to its sense, claims to put one entity into relation with another, and the relation itself is put forth as, is affirmed to be, a relation between actually existing objects (regardless of whether they be real or ideal). | It is VII, 106/107 otherwise, as we can see, with the relation of the act to its object that resides in the act itself; the object to which the act relates itself is and remains its object however things may be with regard to its true being. Nevertheless, if I relate myself in perception to some object in my surroundings, for instance to that tree there by the brook, and say accordingly, "I see this tree," then this of course implies, in the normal sense of such talk, that the tree in truth *exists*, while on the other hand it is at the same time meant as that which is perceived in this perceiving. We therefore have here a normal assertion of a relation in which an intentional relation is at the same time coincluded and coasserted. If we, however, call the existence of the tree into question or if we purposefully abstain from every position-taking as to its existence, this alters nothing in the fact that the perceptual experience is in itself perception of "this tree" and remains what it is—perception of the latter, related in itself to its immanent object—even if it should turn out afterward that this perception would have to be judged an illusion. For the sake of clarity we would therefore do well to distinguish between: the immanent object of the particular [act of] consciousness (the immanent intentional object), as that of which we are conscious as such in the immanence of this consciousness, and the object *simpliciter*, as that which is asserted in a normal assertion as the substrate-object (the "about which")—asserted, that is, with the sense that it exists in truth. If we are living ⟨in⟩ ontic belief, if this object counts for us as something that actually exists—as when in straightforward experience we have "the" tree, that one over there, as given—then in our normal attitude and parlance we simply assert, "this tree …," and every such assertion then obviously intends the tree as real.

What is required, therefore, is a change of attitude, the enactment of a modification of sense, in order to bring into view,[a] in the pure immanence of the lived experience itself, the "supposed object

[a] *erkenntlich zu machen*

as such"—"regardless of existence or non-existence"—that is, in abstention from every position-taking with respect to it.

Only through these quite necessary clarifications can we understand the correct sense of that which, as objectivity of consciousness (as immanent-intentional objectivity), is inseparable from every consciousness, | and in this way we understand too the sense of a VII, 107/108
purely immanent description. This sense is transgressed and nullified if that which is supposed in each particular case is not described precisely as what is supposed in the consciousness in question, in and of itself, as when, falling back into the natural attitude—in which we allow the entirety of our knowledge to affect the assertion—we include in the description of the intentional object such characteristics as stem precisely from other convictions, from our remaining knowledge, however legitimate it otherwise may be.

If every conscious experience "bears" its immanent object within itself, then it must also be noted that this bearing-within-itself cannot have the sense of a genuine immanence, as if the immanent intentional object inhered in its consciousness as a real piece, as a genuine moment, as a part. To view matters this way would obviously be countersensical. For example, as we already said, the past that we recollect is, in the remembering itself, a remembered past; the future that we await, in the awaiting itself, a foreseen future. Yet just as little as the actual past or future, the "supposed past or future as such," the "immanent-intentional past or future," is a genuine constituent of the present lived experience. Every immanent temporal component of the experiential process is a genuine part of the experience as a datum of the immanent temporal stream. But the diverse memories or expectations in which we recollect or anticipate one and the same thing are distinct experiences in immanent temporality and can have no part in common. This can be seen from other arbitrarily chosen experiences. For example, the conscious act that we call remembering is in itself consciousness of this or that past happening; likewise the consciousness that we call external perceiving is in itself consciousness of what is perceived as external. And so it is everywhere.

This essentially inseparable immanence is, therefore, no genuine immanence, no genuine enclosedness; to view it as such would

be a self-evident countersense. This does not exclude the possibility of consciousness also being questioned and described as to its genuine pieces, its parts. A predicative judgment, for example, obviously has, as internal temporal processes, its tiered steps and pieces, its subject-positing, the predicate-positing related to it, | VII, 108/109 and so on. Likewise, separate conscious experiences can also be combined into a whole—can be *genuinely* so combined. On the other hand, however, we must see precisely that the combining of a [state of] consciousness with another [state of] consciousness also has a bearing on the intentional objectivity, and as combination of consciousness it carries out an achievement that is necessarily without analogue in the natural sphere. This achievement consists in its establishing, as "synthesis," a uniform intentional objectivity that, for the combined consciousness as *one* consciousness, is its objectivity. But perhaps it would be still better to emphasize this last point, namely that [states of] consciousness do not merely become combined but become combined into *one* consciousness—in itself a remarkable peculiarity—which as such has *its* immanent objectivity. This objectivity of the synthesis has, then, a necessary founding in these syntheses of combined conscious experiences. To treat synthesis as a type of genuine combination (believing, for example, that one can do justice to it in the modern manner, with real forms of combination, "*Gestalt* qualities"): this is to be blind to the peculiar nature of consciousness and to lapse into countersense.

In connection with this one must see, furthermore, that the conscious identity of an object, that which precisely justifies talk of *an object*, points back to a synthesis in which diverse [states of] consciousness—for example, distinct and multifarious perceptions—are combined into a consciousness of one and the same object, where this "one and the same" is itself consciously copresent, is itself intentional. And in turn one has to see that, parallel with the type of continuously governing synthesis that makes conscious, as objects for the *Ego*, the unity and identity of this or that, and thus in general of *objects* as such, conversely, the *Ego* itself is the index of a *universal* synthesis, through which all of this infinitely diverse consciousness, the consciousness that is mine, has a universal unity—not the unity of an object, but that of the *Ego*. Alternatively,

it must be seen that through this type of synthesis, the "fixed and abiding *Ego*" of this conscious life is perpetually constituted and made conscious.

Lecture 16: ⟨The Irreality of the Immanent Contents of the Synthesis of Consciousness in its Ego-Object Polarization and the Problem of Intersubjectivity. Remarks on Berkeley's Critique of Locke⟩

This double polarization under the titles *Ego* and *object*, which all conscious life as such has with absolute necessity, is of such a kind that to imagine it had an analogue in natural reality would be countersensical. What is real has real constituents, real parts and moments, real forms of combination. But a synthesis of consciousness has, in the form of these poles, immanent contents that are *irreal*. If one has begun at all to see, begun to understand, that these irrealities must be codescribed as inseparably contained in consciousness—and indeed in all the changing modes in which they belong to the consciousness in question—then true infinities of descriptive work open up before one.

One then notices above all the diversity of possible directions of reflection, in conjunction with which it first becomes apparent that the conscious having of something, for example, the perceiving of something perceived, the expecting of something expected, the judging of something judged, and the like, is not something empty or descriptively impoverished in comparison to what one becomes conscious of in these acts, having at best qualitative differences—as if perceiving and remembering, for example, differed only by an ineffable "quality of consciousness."[a]

These are, rather, highly complicated modes of consciousness, undergoing modifications in quite distinct dimensions and carrying out ever new intentional achievements, achievements that already stand behind each one of these crudely designating names: "perceiving" (and still more specifically "perceiving of a thing"),

[a] "*Qualität der Bewusstheit*". The neologism "*Bewusstheit*" was coined by Natorp and is translated here as "having-conscious."—Trans.

"remembering," "expecting," "judging," and "grasping," as well as "valuing," "wishing," "willing," and so on. No consciousness, not even the seemingly simplest perceiving or a conscious having to which no attention is paid, is an empty having of something, as if the subject simply contained its intentional objects inside itself as in a pouch.

Yet it never even occurs to Locke and his followers to carefully inspect this having and to actually describe it as ⟨that⟩ which it essentially is. It is | understandable that the natural scientist, VII, 110/111 when he has experiences, looks exclusively at the things and processes that are experienced in them and takes these latter as he has them in the experience, and then from there only goes so far as to theorize about what he has, describing and explaining it. It is an essential part of the natural-scientific method to be directed exclusively toward objectivity. Belonging to this is the notion that one is to leave what is subjective out of the question, even deliberately put it out of play. But for the psychologist and epistemologist, everything subjective is part of the subject matter to be treated, and hence the subjective having of something objective is not to be ignored. It is in itself something to be described according to its own essence, though that which it has as such is inseparable from it.

If we take any intentional experience, such as a simple act of external experience, then reflective consideration shows that a great variety is to be seen in it—how much already in the mere seeing of a thing as such!—[namely,] the infinitely changing subjective views of the object, which are nonetheless nothing in nature, in space itself, but precisely subjective views of the thing. The thing that is supposed in perception can, as I already mentioned earlier, in no way be conscious to us perceptually without having some appearance or other; and therewith is already suggested a topic of rich descriptions. A great diversity of such topics of subjective description exists not only with regard to object-perception. The same proves to be true for every consciousness. Even that universal conscious having through which we are conscious of all individual experiencing in its own right, so-called "internal" consciousness, is a truly miraculous edifice of the most intricate intentional structures, deeply concealed though they may be.

In order to prevent confusion, I would like here to call attention to the fact that the concept of consciousness is an ambiguous one, and so as the subject matter of the analyses in question here it can mean different things, namely:

1. The universal consciousness of the *Ego*, that in which the *Ego* is conscious of everything that is present and graspable for it in any sense, that in which it embraces all of this in the universal unity of its field of vision: what is external and internal, what is of the *Ego* and not of it, individual intentional experiences of the most diverse levels and their genuine and ideal contents.
2. Consciousness in the proper Cartesian | sense, that is, that which is designated by the *Ego Cogito* of Cartesian self-evidence. Here transcendent being such as physical nature is not posited as a reality and assumed to exist but rather is left artificially out of account.
3. The intentional experiences that appear individually as perceptions, wishes, volitions, etc. in the Cartesian field.

The soul-blindness to the peculiar essence of consciousness in all these universal and individual formations is apparent to anyone who has become acquainted with genuine descriptions in the fact that Locke's descriptions, as well as those of his followers, never manage to attain a correct genuine analysis and description, that is, of the genuine parts and connections [of consciousness], because they repeatedly misinterpret items that are intentionally contained [in consciousness]—which of course are inseparably there, too, and in a certain sense are necessarily seen—as items that are genuinely contained [in it]. Through such misinterpretations there then arise utterly wrongheaded problems, which hopelessly plague the centuries. Basic errors of this sort are of a wholly different kind from those dogmatic presuppositions according to which, for example, an objective world and psychophysical causalities are presupposed in epistemological investigations that are supposed to make their possibility comprehensible in the first place—although, incidentally, the two forms of misinterpretation reciprocally require one another and are intimately bound up with one another in the theories. VII, 111/112

To clarify what has been said by way of an example, I refer here to Locke's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, which has become universally known and predominant. External experience, regarded as an immanent lived experience, that is, as a datum of internal experience, is the experience of things—of plants, celestial bodies, etc. But these things, one says to oneself, do not themselves exist in the external experience, in the subjective lived experience. Thus, it is assumed that what we have internally is an internal perceptual image to which the external thing merely corresponds, more or less perfectly. The age-old naive image theory is thus taken up into the doctrine of internal experience from out of this supposedly obvious view. According to Locke's interpretation of the new natural science and | that of the natural scientist himself, the internal perceptual image is a blending of actual image and causal indicator—the former with regard to the so-called primary or original qualities of the objects that appear to the senses in external perception: the seen extension is actually an internal image and is actually an image insofar as it is analogous to the extension of the external things themselves. According to natural scientific doctrine, the latter are indeed in themselves extended. The same goes for quantity, figure, position, movement, number, and the like. In contrast, the specific sense qualities, the so-called "secondary," "derived" ones, lack analogy to any qualities in the natural things themselves. These latter have no visual, acoustic, etc. qualities; in nature itself there exist certain movements, there exist in general things furnished exclusively with primary qualities, with mathematical-mechanical ones, and in turn these things, through such qualities and the causalities belonging to them, are the explanatory causes of the sensible tones, sensible colors, and so on that feature in our perceptual image. VII, 112/113

It is curious that the complete absurdity of this doctrine has so little harmed its almost universal acceptance. Berkeley was the first to detect it, but he was able to expose it only imperfectly. He irrefutably identified a partial absurdity of this doctrine, namely, by pointing out the inconceivability of an extension lacking some specific sensible qualification or other, and thus in general of primary qualities without secondary ones. Yet Berkeley, the student of Lockean immanent naturalism, could not proclaim himself to have reached ultimate clarification in these matters. Admittedly, he says

still further things that are beneficial; with his ingenious gaze he spots the countersense of Locke's doctrine of external existence and that of every causal inference to the transcendent-physical realm. According to Locke, the internal perceptual image of the external thing is an associative complex of sensory data from the various senses springing causally from the external things of nature. The mind cannot but underlay such an associative complex with a *je ne sais quoi* as "bearer," whereby a causal inference from effect to transcendent cause plays its part. Admirably, | Berkeley objects VII, 113/114 that such an inference is indemonstrable and unimaginable. For on the basis of what, according to Locke, are the only immediate givens—those of the *tabula rasa*, among which are included all sensory data—it is quite understandable how inferences can be made, in associative-inductive fashion, from the given psychic data to new data, from given sensory complexes to new complexes; or again, how one can infer from a sensorily experienced body to an alien psychic life that is not experienced, by analogy with the experienced unity of one's own body and one's own psyche. But it is meaningless to make an inference to a *je ne sais quoi*, something that is in principle incapable of being experienced and for which every analogue in one's own immanent sphere is lacking. However much Berkeley, in the main lines of such thoughts, was on the right path, he could not provide a real clarification [of these matters] or a theory of the intentional constitution of exteriority in interiority, because he himself was blind to *intentionality* just as much as Locke was and thus was unable to uncover an intentional problematic.

To begin with, it must surely be surprising that Locke, and the natural scientists who shared his interpretation, took so little issue with the doubling, indeed the thousandfold multiplying, of the world. On the one side we would have so-called nature itself, the supposed archetype, while on the other we would have in every subject a unique system of perceptual images, each of which, however, with some difference from nature, would itself likewise be a nature, a real world for itself. And furthermore we would have the oddity that subjects, as human subjects, were through their bodies supposed at the same time to be parts of the objective world, so that the subjective worlds would simultaneously be woven into the so-called objective world. One could object that these are not worlds but only images

of worlds, and that they are actually mere associative sensation-complexes in the individual subjects; and associative complexes are not things. Very well, I reply, but how then should the things be distinguished from these associative complexes? If one accepts Locke's teaching, then one would have to say: if we must postulate external complexes as the causes of the internal complexes of sensory data that alone are given, as analogues of these internal complexes, and if it is true that we cannot conceive of such a true external | complex without a substance that is its bearer, why, then, VII, 114/115 do we not also have to postulate for the internal complex—which surely is fundamentally of the same type—an internal substance? And thus, indeed, and ineluctably, the internal aggregate images would be nothing other than internal things in which the external ones were depicted.

And the same will undoubtedly have to hold for every other way in which we might conceive of transcendent nature, and hence even if we abandon Locke's *je ne sais quoi*. It will have to hold precisely so long as we persist in assuming exteriority and interiority to have an imagelike character, however imperfect.

Is not Berkeley in principle correct in saying: only sensations can be analogous to sensations; analogues of associative sensation-complexes are necessarily themselves associative sensation-complexes; and sensations are inconceivable without a sensing subjectivity? In this way we would only be increasing the number of subjects by one, as a correlate belonging to so-called objective nature, without in the least having made comprehensible the sense of the priority over the supposedly archetypal objectivity of just this complex, "objective nature." It should certainly also be noted that every subject experiences nature purely within itself, and that it therefore never goes beyond its so-called images. In connecting experiences with experiences, in experiencing the harmonizing of its images, in other words, in convincing itself of the legitimate existence of things, of nature in general, the subject plainly can never find occasion to make those inferences to the transcendent that arose from and were contrived on the basis of a misunderstanding. This is so for the individual *Ego* in its own direct experience. The only means of transcending one's own subjectivity and the nature one has experienced oneself is empathy in relation to another sub-

jectivity, the internally motivated positing of an analogous spiritual being and sensory "images" analogous to those one experiences oneself. But why, then, do we call these the same things as those that *we* see, why do we speak of *one* nature that we all see? This is how Locke should have reflected and inquired.

Nevertheless, having come this far we are now sufficiently prepared to consider the matters themselves, the intentional matters, and to understand the radical blindness of the *tabula rasa* psychologists. | VII, 115/116

Lecture 17: ⟨On the Question of the Constitution of "Exteriority": the Cartesian Self-Evidence of the Self-Givenness of Things in Perception⟩

Having acquired an eye for intentionality, for consciousness as consciousness of something, we for our part will now object: All these internal images and signs on the *tabula rasa*, images and signs for a transcendent nature, are the contrivances of a misguided reflection. They are only plausible in the very first stages of epistemological naiveté, which either has no acquaintance with pure subjectivity or does not know what to do with it as conscious subjectivity. That the image theory already appears in the oldest Greek philosophy only points to the fact that the first fledgling departure from the attitude of natural life in the world, with its natural abandonment to what is outwardly experienced, and the first transition to a philosophical reflection that puts the internal and the external in relation must soon lead to such constructions.

Let us, however, exploit the Cartesian method of exposing the pure *cogitatio*, which yields an individual subjective experience as an absolutely self-evident one and allows us to analyze it into its genuine pieces and intentional constituents within the bounds of absolute self-evidence. And let us employ this method for experiences of the type "external perception." Is it not then absolutely self-evident that when I see, for example, a table, a house, or a tree, what I see is not anything like subjective sensation-complexes or anything like internal images of … or signs of a table or a house or the like but rather precisely the table itself, the house itself?

Certainly, the perceived thing could, despite my perceiving it, be illusory; perhaps I am the victim of a deception. With good reason I distinguish between the merely supposed perceptual thing and the actual thing. But where else does this "good reason" lie other than within my experiencing life—the same inner life that, using this method, I can inquire into at any time and study with regard to the absolutely self-evident constituents belonging to it? In my own advance from perception to perception, insofar as it is carried out continuously as the unity of a concordant synthesis, I then say that what was once posited as | existing corporeally— VII, 116/117
this table, for instance—continuously gives itself as identically one and the same and that this positing intention perpetually confirms itself. But in other cases it may happen that, owing to a discordancy, this experiencing and identifying positing suddenly suffers an unexpected break and ⟨I⟩ see that, for instance, what was hitherto perceived as existing has now taken on the character of nullity, or that its character as existing, which was unaffected up to now, has, as it were, been crossed through as with an invalidating stroke. So long, however, as the latter has not occurred, so long as experience retains its concordance in its synthetic unity, for just this long is that which is perceived precisely "there" as what is normally perceived. One can already anticipate that by its "true being" I could understand nothing other than the idea, arising from the constancy of confirmation, of a confirmation that in the course of future experience is never to be broken through, so that no future experience could lead me to abandon the experience I once obtained of a thing but could rather only complete and at the same time confirm it. In any case it is self-evident that if the thing is real, this real thing itself is nothing other than the perceived one and that it is fundamentally erroneous to say that what is perceived as such is merely an image of or sign for a true thing, existing in itself, that cannot fall into the purview of my perception as that which it is in itself.

Let us also consider the following here. When can I say that I have in my intuition an analogue or a mere image of something and not the thing itself? Here one must say: An analogue is an analogue of something else, something that is like it, that is more or less similar to it. Thus, instead of one thing I have another that more

or less resembles it. But the trees and houses that I am now seeing are not analogues of other houses and trees simply because they resemble them. An analogue is something in which something else is mirrored as similar, something given that serves as a representative for something else that is similar to it, a symbol of similarity; and in so serving it has not an objective quality but a characteristic way of functioning in the subjective apprehension. Hence, it presupposes a special analogizing consciousness in which alone the analogue has its actual locus of sense.

And this is all the more the case for the actual image. An image is an image only | for someone who, in a peculiar act of consciousness, VII, 117/118 a depicting one, appreciates its meaning as image; in something intuitively given or in the concrete single features that offer themselves, something else, something not itself given, must, in the manner of consciousness, present itself, just as in the painted or sketched landscape that hovers intuitively before us a landscape that is not itself seen but is rather merely illustratively depicted presents itself. What is present in perception here is the thing hanging on the wall, the framed canvas, or the copperplate engraving lying on the table. The painted image is a figment that we become conscious of along with this perception, and it is itself only present for me thanks to a peculiar act of consciousness through which the figment coappears by means of such a founding through perception. If in this figment something different, something existing but not present, is to presentiate itself to me, then I must precisely enact the corresponding conscious act of depicting presentiation, in which the intuitive figment takes on the meaning and validity of a presentiating presentation.

Plainly we are dealing here with modes of consciousness that are fundamentally different from simple perception, modes that are not in play when we simply see a thing. And the same holds with respect to the having of a sign for something else *vis-à-vis* the having of the thing itself. To the sign as such belongs the specific consciousness of being-a-sign for another thing, a mode of consciousness with a quite peculiar intentional structure.

Should we now say: *Indeed, ordinary perception is, admittedly, not from the start an analogizing representing or a representing through an image or indication. It is perceiving and nothing more. But what*

is perceived in it is precisely not the external natural thing itself, and in order to get matters right, what we must do is precisely to bring these new modes of consciousness into play?

However, what is important above all else here is to describe faithfully what is immediately perceived purely according to the proper sense of perception. We need to establish that what is perceived is not a complex of sensory data belonging to the individual perception as its genuine constituents, that is, arising | and passing VII, 118/119 away with it, but is rather nothing other than, for instance, this table here, only perceived now from this, now from the other side, and becoming visibly ever richer, ever more multiform in the advance of a synthetically self-unifying perception. But it is always it itself, this table (the synthetic unity, the one and identical conscious object), that in this advance exhibits and authenticates its ontic content and confirms its actual existence—assuming, that is, that no discordancy enters in and forces us to, as it were, cross out its existence and say: it was a mere illusion. What every conceivable confirmation and authentication of actuality authenticates is thus, as mentioned, the synthetic unity which we become conscious of in perception in the conscious character of self-existence and which is nothing other than the *external thing itself*, the spatial thing itself; it is from the very start the transcendent itself. Where else is knowledge of the latter to come from? How could knowledge of it ever authenticate itself other than through perception and through the continuous confirmation of the perceptions themselves in a concordant nexus of perceptions? What can analogizing, depiction, and indication achieve? Nothing without perception. If I myself have already experienced things and their existence has been directly given to me and authenticated in experience, if I have in this manner gained cognizance of the external world in the most original way conceivable, then I can, through things that are given, analogize others, present them depictively, presentiate them by means of indication, as, for instance, when a signal flag indicates the arrival of a ship. But what sense could it have to want to obtain for the first time through this kind of analogy or symbol something that was never yet experienced itself and in its ontic modality? After all, the consciousness that grants sense to such analogies and symbols points back, according to the origin and manner of its fulfilling confirmation, to possible

perception and, if this perception is to be capable of indicating what is transcendent, to a perception of something transcendent.

Hence it is nonsense to foist upon something that one self-evidently has, as something perceived, consciously in perception the status of an analogue or sign for something else, and indeed something unknowable, unperceivable. That this idea could occur to one and that one could find in it an intelligible theory obviously derives from the fact that, naturalizing naively, one wants to see in the | realm of inner experience only something like data on a slate VII, 119/120 of consciousness, and then, without noting it, and here very naively, one places an entire human subject behind this slate, a subject that of course sees the rest of the world outside the slate and that now, glancing back and forth, relates the signs on the slate to the world outside it, compares them, discerns the mutual causalities, and then can create from the data of the *tabula* analogues or causal signs for its own cognitive use. Instead of carrying out analyses in the immanent psychological and epistemological attitude of inwardness, instead of immersing oneself in the purely grasped sphere of consciousness itself, in the pure *Ego Cogito* and its intentional contents, in the naturally naive external view one takes oneself and other humans to be pieces of the pregiven world and takes their internal life, since it is located together with their bodies in space, as if it itself were something like a spatial thing, like a mere complex of real data, data combined or amalgamated through real forms of unity—in the modern outlook and parlance, "gestalt qualities"—exclusively governed in their continual change through a natural, i.e., merely inductively knowable, causality. One has no eye for the fact that what gives itself in pure "inner experience," that is, in a purely seeing devotion of one's reflection to that which is given as a stream of *cogitationes*, exhibits a completely different mode of being *vis-à-vis* everything natural—that it is precisely *cogitatio* through and through, consciousness of immanent-intentional "objects" in the how of variously changing "modes of givenness," universally centered by means of what we above called *Ego*-centering.

To be sure, it is anything but an easy matter to understand how exteriority is constituted in the experiencing stream of consciousness itself and in its synthetic connections; how then the difference between supposed and true being is to be accounted for; how

the genuine difference between subjective modes of appearance and that which itself appears, and the latter in its truth [are to be accounted for]; and, further, how then on a higher level the possibility, essence, and achievement of scientific cognition are to be brought to a definitively clarifying understanding. But only an essential description of pure consciousness itself in all such achievements can bring about this understanding. To have had an | *inkling* of this, VII, 120/121 in the form of a demand for an investigation of the understanding on the basis of inner experience, constitutes Locke's not inconsequential merit. Yet what is in question here is not a naturalistically misinterpreted inner experience but an ascertainment, running its course within the bounds of immanent self-evidence, of what conscious life *as* conscious life, in all its types, is in itself and of what it achieves, singularly and in regard to its synthetic connections and its intentional motivations. No ascertainment is permitted here to fall outside the attitude of pure immanence; what is exhibited must be taken and accepted exactly as it resides in pure consciousness itself, and the supposed exactly as it is supposed there. Thus, what is perceived, for example, [must be taken] precisely in the manner, precisely in the sense, in which it gives itself as perceived or that perception itself assigns to it—in respect of time, for instance, the sense of temporally present existence. Likewise what is remembered [must be taken] exactly as it gives itself as the remembered, in this case, therefore, with the sense "past event," which first obtains its sense precisely from this sense-giving—and similarly everywhere. [The task is to study] how individual objects obtain their subjective temporal modes from certain modes of consciousness and how, from other modes of consciousness, subjective modes such as analogue, image, and sign obtain their sense, as was explained earlier on various occasions.[1]

Thus, objects as such, taken purely factually and objectively in every respect and in every conceivable subjective and objective sense, obtain from sense-giving consciousness the sense that constitutes them as objects and ⟨as⟩ objects determined in this way,

[1] Husserl is presumably talking about these discussions in other lectures prior to the winter semester of 1923/24.—Trans.

through which they signify for the conscious subject precisely what they signify and are what they are accordingly as they are possible or actual. For each basic type of objectivity, we must study, with regard to their structure, the correlative basic types of consciousness and conscious syntheses in which as an achievement of consciousness an objectivity of the sort in question is constituted as unity of validity. To this structure belong, of course, the modes of givenness on ever new levels already emphasized frequently above—concerning the temporality that belongs to the immanently intentional individual object, for example, the modes of the now, the just-past, the about-to-come; or, concerning spatial objects and their spatiality, the modes of orientation conforming to | here and there, left and VII, 121/122 right, and so on, the modes of givenness from diverse perspectives, those of spatial shape but also those of the colorations that "extend" across these; or the modes of givenness according to the changing sides of the thing; in short, the entirety of the "merely subjective" that natural-scientific consideration excludes. But each and every objectivity, including those that are ideal, is a unity of diverse modes of givenness. Parallel to the concrete conscious experiences whose immanent-intentional objects they are, the "objectivities in the how" come to a "synthetic unity." This, however, must in every respect be uncovered, exactly described, and thereby made intelligible in a seeing reflection.

A naturalistic psychology and epistemology is fundamentally blind to all such problems concerning the correlation between acts of cognizing and other forms of consciousness, on the one hand, and "their" objectivities, on the other, concerning the subjective constitution of the world in cognizing subjectivity—blind, in other words, to every problem concerning subjectivity as the source of all sense-giving and validity. And this means that they are blind to the genuine epistemological problems of cognition and, in its empirical inflection, even to the genuine psychological problems of cognition. While we did not, therefore, overlook the advance that was inaugurated in Locke's *Essay* when, in contrast to Descartes, he undertook to found a science of the data of the *Ego Cogito*, it is now clear that he was unable to break through to the genuine foundational science for all cognition and, on the other side, to a genuine objective psychology founded on the basis of inner experience.

The critique we have just completed, in following the main line of the problematic discussed, demonstrated to us the methodological countersense of the Lockean epistemology's immanent naturalism. In the process it has also become clear that even if one, remaining in the natural objective attitude, wants to develop an objective psychology, the blindness to the intentional—the basic character of conscious psychic life—necessarily makes a true psychology impossible. A naturalistic *tabula rasa*-psychology such as the one that Locke brought into existence and that has developed through the centuries had to fail, had to become caught up in inductive superficialities. | Everything that is primordially essential for spiritual VII, 122/123
life; all the highly remarkable peculiarities of consciousness as consciousness of something and as the consciousness of an *Ego*; all the marvels of the manifold syntheses that bestow on the stream of consciousness, in accordance with whether we are dealing with actualities or possibilities, passivities or free activities, the character of an intelligible unity and an intelligible genesis, that make consciousness the locus of a continuously rational law-governed system—all this had to remain out of play. At most it could make itself felt, unintentionally and unscientifically, in a naturalistic guise and misinterpretation.

It remained out of play despite the fact that it lay within the reach of intuition and within the capacity for intuitive explication of the various particular beliefs and suppositions implied in consciousness. For the natural-scientific method makes one blind to the intellectual experience continuously exercised in active life and in all the human sciences, and to the method practiced in the latter of uncovering intellectual motivations, hidden comeanings, theoretical and practical premises, and so on. Experience and the method of experience were only permitted to be of one type: it necessarily had to be of the same essential type as that which is practiced in natural science.

However, the question of the right psychological method is not our question. Our interest lies in the possibility of an absolute science derived from the ultimate self-understanding of cognition regarding its own achievement, that is, solely in the founding of a genuine theory of reason. If, in accordance with this interest, every attempt to make use of objective psychology and objective sci-

ence in general is ruled out, what nonetheless reveals itself here is a community of interest between objective psychology and the pure theory of reason and subjectivity as such which is so intimate that we are with good reason compelled to have a brief look at the psychology inaugurated by Locke.

If we reflect on the outcome of our critical presentation of the Lockean approach to the theory of reason, we see that on the one hand it falls into countersense through its objectivism and "psychologism," that is, through the fact that it everywhere presupposes the objective world and the objective sciences and that it founds its theory of reason on psychology, psychology as | an objective VII, 123/124
science intertwined with the other objective sciences. To emphasize one important point especially, it falls into countersense through the whole manner in which it understands and works out its highly important leitmotif: we have in mind of course the motif of searching for the origin of all concepts and cognitive formations in general in consciousness, of going back to the immediate intuition of the "ideas" themselves and of the acts that generate ever new ideas—in the now common parlance, to "inner" or "self-" experience. It interprets this experience utterly naively and, in a way contrary to the peculiar sense of the rational problematic, as self-experience in the natural-objective sense of a component of psychophysical experience (as the experience of a psyche objectively bound up with a body).

The most recent critique we carried out, however, pertained to yet another countersense, one that in its consequences is even more significant. For even worse than this inability to keep psychological and transcendental self-experience, and therewith also the psychological and the transcendental unity of the stream of consciousness, separate from one another is the inability to see consciousness as consciousness in its essential peculiarity and to subject it as such to a pure experiential analysis and, more broadly, to a purely intuitive analysis in general, an analysis of the possible conscious formations and their essentially lawful modifications, implications, and syntheses. The immense tasks opened up by the title "intentionality," "consciousness as consciousness of …" remain closed off, of course, as long as one is blind, as Locke and the entire psychology that followed him were, to the basic character of all conscious life, and is so

by means of that naive prejudice which we called the naturalizing of consciousness. We characterized this prejudice as the apprehension of the stream of consciousness as an existing-together of "ideas," of "data"—as being like physical data on a previously blank sheet of paper or in a "dark room," where the parts are then meant as genuine parts, the connections as genuine connections, the forms of unity as genuine forms of unity, and meant only as such. Again and again, to be sure, there is talk of intentional items, as is inevitable, but never on the basis of a systematic essential seeing and a fixating description in which these items | would become thematic as VII, 124/125 needing to be established systematically and pursued in all their intentional entanglements.

In this consists the "sensualism" bequeathed by Locke to the future—for what is exposed through our contrasting exposition is nothing other than the fundamental sense, or rather countersense, of all those epistemologically erroneous traditional doctrines of the external and internal senses, and therewith of all operating with the "data" of external and internal experience. This sensualism crippled both of the developments emanating from Locke's work, that of psychology as objective science and that of the theory of reason as philosophical foundational science. Without an overcoming of "psychologism" and of objectivism in general (⟨without⟩ positivism in the good sense of the term), no philosophy of reason, certainly, is possible—which is to say, no philosophy at all. But without the overcoming of sensualism, of the naturalizing of consciousness, not even psychology as a genuine objective science is possible. A psychology that is acquainted with the basic field of all psychological experiential facts, the field of consciousness, only in a naturalistic misinterpretation, that is, one that is not acquainted with consciousness according to its original essence—we shall have to decline to recognize such a psychology as an actual science.

If psychology is to begin at all as a science, it will have to do so in the shape of a systematic and purely immanent analysis of consciousness—of a psychological "phenomenology." Phenomenological elementary analyses and descriptions furnish for it the ABC's. The exploration of these ABC's and of the formations to be derived from them a priori, or, alternatively, of the structural and genetic essential laws belonging to them, constitutes

an entire science—as has become apparent only in the present age—and an a priori science at that. Necessarily, it precedes every empirical psychology (every science of the facts of psychological experience)—every psychology "that is to come forth as rigorous science." It is precisely nothing other than the science of the primordial essence of the psychic as such. A psychologism on the basis of such a phenomenological psychology (even one that overlooked its a priori character) is remediable. It probably would have impaired the development of a genuine theory of reason and philosophy |, VII, 125/126 indeed would in principle have made it impossible; yet it would have been a mistake that was relatively easy to ameliorate—if only the analyses of consciousness were drawn from actual intuition and were actual intentional analyses. Through a change from the natural to the transcendental attitude, through the "bracketing" of all preposited objectivity together with that which must be posited along with it, all of the immanent analyses would have been preserved in their essential core and would have remained epistemologically usable.

A sensualistic psychologism, on the other hand, is irremediable. Its positions concerning the psyche itself are from the beginning not actual discoveries, not discoveries drawn from the proper essence of conscious life itself. To uncover intentionality is to *understand* intellectually,[a] is to understand cognition and its formations, especially those of truth and legitimacy, that is, to understand intentional formations through a methodical uncovering of the intentional constitutive-formational connections. To do this in a scientifically descriptive fashion is to understand them scientifically. So long as, on the contrary, one has not even begun to see what sort of thing intentional implication is, and thus to put in place the elements of an understanding, there is nothing at all to understand and hence nothing understandable. But psychological genesis, too, is, according to its essence, an understandable genesis, and thus every naturalistic psychology necessarily affords only the semblance of an explanation of psychological genesis.

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[a] *geistig verstehen* (that is, to comprehend in a mental grasp as opposed to having a naturalistic explanation).—Trans.

Check for updates

⟨Chapter Three
Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness⟩

VII, 126

Lecture 18: ⟨Empiricism's Theory of Abstraction as an Index of How it Falls Short of the Idea of an Eidetic Science of Pure Consciousness⟩

A particular basis of our critique above concerned Locke's doctrine of material substances and their qualities, or in other words his attempt to show how true exterior existence presents itself internally in the domain of ideas, how the subject, which has in an immediate way only the *tabula rasa* of its ideas, there obtains for itself | an VII, 126/127
image of what is outside and the conviction that it truly exists.

In the same vein, our critique could then proceed to address the entire series of Locke's subsequent remarks pertaining to the constitutive categories of the cognition of nature, to space, time, power, cause, effect, and so on. [However,] to continue in this direction is of no appreciable interest to us.

Things are quite different when it comes to Locke's chapters on language and thought, on truth and knowledge, science, and the like—⟨to Locke's *theory of abstraction*⟩. If at the bottom of the first kind of investigation there lay the problematic of the constitution of nature, of the constitution in cognizing consciousness of a world existing in itself, what is now at issue is the problematic of the specific logos, of the formal framework of logical categories, that the experienced world, with its real categories, must take on in order to become the scientifically true reality, the reality that is determined in theoretical truth.

Here what is required is to expose a new group of fundamental errors, errors that, beginning with British Empiricism, calamitously influence the whole of modern philosophy. These errors represent,

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to be sure, an old inherited flaw,[a] an inheritance from ancient Skepticism and medieval nominalism that with Hobbes flows into modern so-called empiricism. Our new topic is the blindness to ideas and ideal laws in the properly understood Platonic sense.

What characterizes traditional empiricism definitionally, so to speak, is the fundamental prejudice that only what is individual can be originally intuited. The denial of the possibility of intuitive grasping goes hand in hand with the denial of the possible existence of generalities—guided, of course, by the intuitionistic notion that legitimate thinking must be able to authenticate itself intuitively: what one cannot present to oneself intuitively or, where it is a question of actual being, what cannot be perceived, that also cannot exist.

This seemingly obvious identification of intuition and individual intuition, of self-grasping intuition and perception, is passed on to the empiricism of the new Lockean type, that of immanent naturalism. The capacity to grasp conceptual essences, the correlates of general terms, and also, from another point of view, the very existence of such | essences—these go unacknowledged. The VII, 127/128
universe of intuitive cognition is the entirety of those ideas that can be exhibited on the slate of consciousness. Intuition and "perception" (or "experience") are one and the same. In other words, the data on this slate are, just as much as the data of nature, altogether temporally individuated facts, individual psychic particulars, given in an immanent experience that is of the same kind as external experience.

This view is apparently contradicted by Locke's detailed account of "general ideas," and equally by his account of intuitive and demonstrative cognition, with the recognition founded upon it of a pure logic, pure mathematics, and pure morals that are sharply distinguished from the empirical sciences. If one looks more closely, however, one sees that according to Locke an abstract idea is merely an *individual* singular moment that has been made to stand out from an arbitrary individual thing that is itself taken from a multiplicity of similar things, a moment that repeats itself in each of these latter in the same way; and, in addition, "abstract idea" denotes a certain representative function that in assertions and thought we assign

[a] *Erbübel.*—Trans.

to this moment for our own convenience. If, for instance, several things resemble each other in being red, we can separate off the moment of agreement, which recurs in all of them in like manner, as an idea for itself, which of course is something individual. But the mind utilizes this individual as a representative or model in order subsequently to conceive of every occurring concrete thing that also contains this moment *red* as a red thing, that is, as a thing that contains a moment *red* that is like the abstract model *red*. Just this is what makes possible the so exceedingly useful function of general designation—the formation and employment of general terms such as "red," "round," etc., and then, following upon this, general asserting.

Yet to whatever degree recourse is had here to functions of consciousness, to acts of comparison, abstraction, representation, and normative regulation, and in however detailed a manner Locke otherwise treats of psychic acts such as collecting, referring, combining, distinguishing, identifying, and so on, there is nevertheless no talk, here or in any similar cases, of an analysis and description of the consciousness of generality as consciousness of … or of an intentional clarification of its objectivating achievement. An understanding of the problematic of intentionality is utterly | lacking. He VII, 128/129
therefore also fails to see that in the functions of general thinking, as their characteristic objectivating accomplishment, *peculiar* objectivities emerge in a progressive implication and indeed, in the original forms of this thinking, originally emerge intuitively, that is, as immediately self-given. If Locke does not even arrive at the descriptive conclusion that diverse conscious experiences of sensory perceiving can, in their immanence, be conscious of the numerically identical thing; if it even escapes him that what is real, what is individually transcendent, is capable of appearing in perception, not erroneously but quite literally in its bodily identity as that which is perceived by the latter; how much more, then, does he fail to see that something quite analogous holds for the mental grasping of generality, that is, with reference to general essences (in Platonic terms, "ideas"), and that it holds no less for the insightful grasping of general states of affairs or relations of ideas.[a] Empiricism as a whole fails to see this,

[a] *Sachverhalten oder Ideenverhalten*

and whatever modifications Locke's theory of abstraction subsequently undergoes, indeed all the way up to the present day, that which resides in a conscious manner and as an undeniable sense in all general thinking and asserting, and which resides in insightful asserting as an indubitable self-givenness, remains unseen.

General essences, too, are objects, are meant in consciousness as objects; predications are formed about them, correctly and incorrectly, with or without insight, as with other objects and particularly with individual objects. Like other objects, like individual objects, they are unities in diverse acts of consciousness that intend them and nothing else, and like other objects we can possibly be conscious of them in the eminent manner in which they come to immediate self-grasping—that is, entirely analogously to things perceived in perception. If we can become conscious of a thing now in an unclear or emptily unintuitive manner, now in a self-grasping perception or in a memory that presentiates anew an earlier self-grasping, then this is no less the case for something general, for a conceptual essence on some particular level of generality such as color and tone as such, triangle and figure as such, and the like. Now it may be considered and discussed unclearly, now intuited and grasped clearly and in full intuition as it itself | and as an existing generality. And here, too, in VII, 129/130 the relevant synthesis of identification, it becomes self-evident that what we are conscious of in one way at one moment and differently at another and in any case in different and distinct lived experiences is numerically one and the same, possibly being the identical thing which at one moment is merely supposed and then is itself given. Here, too, the synthesis of fulfillment, which leads the supposed back to what is self-grasped, is a synthesis of verifying confirmation that lays bare the "right" of what was previously meant; and here, too, in the process of going back to self-giving intuitions, what is meant can shatter in conflict—for instance, a meant regular decahedron[1] can prove itself to be a nullity.

The lived experiences that synthetically coincide in something identical do not, merely because they intend what is general, because

[1] Boehm's faulty transcription here is "*Dreieck*" (= triangle) instead of the correct reading "*Dekaeder*" (= decahedron).—Trans.

as mental graspings of something general they contain the latter in themselves originally, have anything like a genuine piece in common, any more than [do], for instance, several experiences of a thing, as experiences of the identical thing—only with an obvious difference in the case of the consciousness of generalities: while the experiences themselves are, of course, individual, immanent data, the generality that they mean in themselves intentionally or have itself is not something individual but precisely something general. Thus, the notion that there is, in a true and real sense, general thinking, general presenting, general intuiting is not the invention of an extravagant Platonism but instead a doctrine that consciousness itself gives us, provided only that we interrogate it, and interrogate it according to what in absolute self-evidence resides within it itself as meaning and achievement.

No theory of reason, no philosophy, is possible as a science at all if it persists, in the spirit of the general tradition, to discourse at length about self-evidence and insight while at the same time being incapable of interrogating the consciousness of self-evidence in the manner of intentional description, not recognizing this consciousness as what it is according to its essence: the self-giving or self-grasping of objectivities that we become conscious of in the flesh, as it were, in the process of originally authentic thinking—in this case, that is, in thinking that actively forms these objectivities as the objectivities they are. Grasping of what is self-given, however, is the same as immediate intuition, and it would be a foolish objection to this extension of the notion of intuition, with the immediacy belonging to it, if (as has happened) | one were to say: *Thinking is* VII, 130/131
a mediate form of consciousness in contrast to immediate intuition. Intuition signifies passivity, the mere accepting of something given. But thinking is a multiform activity proceeding from such givenness. And are we supposed to stop designating as mediate activities such as concept formation and even inferring and proving? This objection, I repeat, is foolish. Just as, in its way, the "passivity" of external experience, too, has its multifarious implications that in the fluctuation of perceiving, for example, and also in temporal succession, bring a manifold of apperceptions into a synthesis while the experienced object is "immediately" intuited—that is, precisely, self-given—so it is, similarly, with thinking. To it belongs, as I have repeatedly

explained at length, a multiplicity of acts, connected to a synthetic act-unity in order to make us conscious of the unity of the object; and when the acts have the form of authenticity and originality, they then constitute generatively the unity of the object, which in this generation is self-given. This entire edifice of active synthesis is the unity of self-giving; it achieves the immediately intuitive consciousness of the objectivity that is in question here, for example, the objective unity of an inferred conclusion or of an entire proof, an entire theory. Even a god could have such a thing given to him immediately only by carrying out this nexus of actually generative acts; he, too, can have thoughts only when he thinks, and when he thinks as connected everything that is demanded by the thought's unity of connection. Each type of objectivity has its immediacy of givenness, its type of intuition, of self-giving self-evidence. Instead, despite the passing of centuries, one did not actually get beyond what the medieval imagery of the *lumen naturale* implies: that a mysterious, luminous quality, a "feeling" of necessity in thought, and so on, constitutes the privilege of self-evident thinking, in which case there then arises the absurd problem of the question as to why this mark of distinction should indicate *truth*. And thus we find ourselves, ever since Descartes's recourse to the divine *veracitas*, still in the same predicament. | VII, 132

Lecture 19: ⟨The Need to Broaden the Idea of Intuition⟩

Concerning in particular the intuitive grasping of generality, which we claim is an exact analogue of the perception of something individually present or of the memory of an individual past event, this much is certain, that while general intuition is taking place, concrete acts of individual intuition are present in the field of consciousness, indeed, that as necessarily functioning supports of general intuition they themselves belong to it. It is also certain that when this occurs, the manner in which acts of individual intuition are carried out and we are conscious of, for instance, individual red things during the intuition of red in general, is essentially different from what occurs when individual intuitions precisely do not have this function, when they do not serve as the basis for the formation

and intuitive grasping of something general. For if in other cases the individual thing is grasped, meant, posited as a this-here, in the present case it is the generality, red as such, and only it, that is meant, that is intuited and grasped as an existing generality.

For us, who have already achieved a vantage point on consciousness itself and its intentional contents and who make such statements from this vantage point, the further course of action is now clearly sketched out. The next task would be to characterize these various modes of consciousness in comparison with one another and to describe analytically the modifications that individually intuiting consciousness undergoes—in what manner, through what structures, it accomplishes this new achievement that we call the insightful intuiting of something general. We will then have to take into consideration the levels of perfectibility that are possible here and everywhere with regard to clarity or intuitiveness, their peculiarity. And finally, we will have to consider non-intuitive thinking, which is ever so important, together with its modes: the way in which, in a mere empty anticipation, it intentionally constitutes within itself a non-intuitive sense, a supposed generality. Of course, we will then also have to do justice to all those most general formations, belonging together essentially, in which generalities are meant in thought, are themselves intuited and given in insightful thinking, as well as the subtypes that arise only in particular spheres. If I judge "red is a species of color," "triangle is a species of the genus *rectilinear figure*," then the species and genera are "objects | VII, 132/133
'about' …" that is, about their substrate-objects. But if I judge: "the sum of the angles of a triangle as such"—that is, of every triangle—"is equal to two right angles" or "a red ribbon, or in the plural red ribbons, flap in the wind," then instead of the universal *a* and *as such* I have thought the particular, which is equally a form of generality. There lies in all of these—in *the red*, *some red or other*, *every red*—something shared, and yet the modes of consciousness, and then also the modes of originally self-evident self-giving, are different.

In a wholly different direction lie those investigations concerning generality of the eminent form *pure or ideal straight line* and thus in general the "ideal" purity of geometrical concepts and essences, as contrasted with the kind of conceptual generality that is displayed in, for instance, the descriptive general concepts of botany: those types,

expressed by words such as *grape-shaped*, *umbel-shaped*, *round*, *elliptical*, etc., in which any suggestion of geometrical ideality is altogether remote and excluded from what is meant—types which of course are also grasped intuitively. This holds not only for spatial forms but in all individual spheres and spheres that are classifiable as such. Ideal concepts and types, though they are not individual things, are seen in their own manner and are also graphically depicted in their own manner. For these forms of generality, too, and for all the special forms of generality, the analogous problems of the clarification of the consciousness that constitutes them must be posed and solved.

This is how the problematic, an endlessly advancing one, presents itself to those who have learned how to grasp and describe consciousness as consciousness.

How very different is the empiricist doctrine of abstraction beginning with Locke! It conjures away the consciousness of generality and generality itself by pointing to the individual intuitions that function necessarily in actually self-evident intuitive thinking and then saying: over and above this there is "nothing more" than mere representation. The seen or imagined triangle, for example, serves in geometrical intuitive thinking as a representative of any triangle. But what is this "mere representation"? Examining it closely, if we stick to the insightful thought itself that is at issue (in our example, *a triangle as such*), stick to it itself as it can be interrogated | in imme- VII, 133/134
diate reflection, then this representation is nothing at all other than precisely that general intuiting itself that has been rejected—though the ambiguous term "representation" may scarcely be appropriate. It is, however, the naturalistic attitude that makes one theoretically blind to this. Of course the empiricist, too, experiences it and in a certain sense sees it, but he does not accept it. Bedazzled by the paradigm of natural-scientific explanation, one wants to explain everything in the same manner. By regarding the domain of inner experience as a closed field of facts with explanatory natural laws that go along with them, one substitutes for the problems of epistemological origin, for those pertaining to the clarification of the consciousness that constitutes every type of objectivity, problems pertaining to natural and causal explanation. Instead of carrying out pure self-cognition transcendentally, as a retrospective observa-

tion, analysis and immediate description of the contents that make the intentionality of consciousness and its achievement comprehensible, one falls back into psychological-causal constructions on the basis of an inner experience that has been misinterpreted in natural terms. The same occurs here in the domain of that which is given as general and the consciousness of generality. And yet all such constructions acquire the appearance of an explanation—one that clings to them—on the basis of that theoretically disregarded consciousness whose sense-contents are scintillatingly commingled with those that are causally hypothesized.

The fundamental wrongheadedness not only of Locke's theory of abstraction but also of Berkeley's highly celebrated theory and all those that follow does not apply to thought with regard to a single, isolated point. Rather, the entire realm of the logos is affected in the same way. As a result, each and every achievement of thought, each and every theory and science, has become incomprehensible. Indeed, we must go further: for anyone who is able to see the consequences, the very possibility of science has been fundamentally nullified. Through its theory of thought, the *tabula rasa* psychologism-cum-empiricism is already an extreme form of skepticism, albeit one that remains hidden to itself, and it is vulnerable to the charge of being a countersense of the most radically conceivable kind, something characteristic of all genuine skepticism of whatever form. For if one makes manifest what is contained in this view's theories as a consequence, then it must become self-evident that, through the content of these | theories, it denies in principle the VII, 134/135
possibility of every achievement of thought whatsoever, thereby denying what it lays claim to in its own thinking activity, in the formation of its own theory as a possible and actually accomplished achievement. Even Hume (the skeptic by profession, so to speak), although he uncovered the skeptical consequences of empiricism in other connections, did not see its radically skeptical consequences with regard to general thought—assuming he did not remain intentionally silent about them in order not to rob his skeptical theories of all influence and give them the appearance of being groundless and ridiculous from the outset. At any rate, Locke and all the other naturalists of inner experience honestly believe that they have not surrendered the achievements of thought and scientific thought but

only explained them psychologically, made them comprehensible—and most especially the achievements of pure thought in the purely rational sciences.

Since centuries' worth of criticism has essentially failed here, it will be of great interest to exhibit the skeptical situation with reference to one fundamental point: axiomatic cognitions and truths. We wish to criticize, in other words, the doctrine that historically has become famous under the Humean title of the knowledge of "relations of ideas," which Hume himself used as a foundation for his skeptical arguments. In all essential respects, however, the doctrine stems from Locke.

Certain propositions of lower and higher generality are immediately and completely self-evident, propositions that one can regard as general propositions concerning relations—for example, "red is different from green," "$2 < 3$," and the like. According to the dogma of the empiricist doctrine, only individual items are intuitively given and actually exist; thus, in each particular case, when I grasp such general propositions with insight, I have as actually given only individual relations of individual data. There is no seeing of the "as such" and of relations as such. But what can now give us the right to assert such general propositions? Can the mythical function of representation, even when carried over to the generality of a relational state of affairs, help us here—if it is precisely to be combined with the claim that generality as such is never itself intuited? How do I know that I can in this way lay a claim, in the sense in question here, | to the individually seen relation *this red and this* VII, 135/136
green as a "representation" for any arbitrarily chosen similar case? It lies, after all, in the very sense of such propositions that wherever I present to myself a red and whenever I present to myself a green, inevitably the corresponding relation obtains. If one should hold the interpretation that it belongs to the nature of a red that is seen or intuited in phantasy and of a green about which the same is true to be given together in human consciousness, that they can only occur in this relational combination, then we do not want to ask where and on the basis of which inductions this psychological law has been identified and whence the empiricist knows something about it as a natural law. In any case, whoever simply judges and grasps with insight what the axiom says does not speak about the soul—his own

soul or the present soul of another or those of the entire past, etc.—nor about psychological laws, but rather about nothing more than what he sees and grasps with insight, wholly immediately, which is simply this: red is different from green, and the like. And is it not clear that any application of psychological laws here completely alters the sense of these axioms? And furthermore: if it were a natural law of the psyche that such relational connections always arise wherever we are conscious of the termini of the relation, then in a given single case only the *individual* relation should exist, whereas what is in question is not how a mere individual case is possible, but rather how knowledge of general law, and indeed of axiomatic law, is possible as genuine knowledge.

At bottom, therefore, we always find the same method, which places behind the slate of consciousness a subject that knows all this and achieves in thought precisely what would have to appear on the table itself, i.e., in inner consciousness itself, as a conscious achievement—which, however, one forcefully wishes to explain away.

Thus, as we can see, empiricism is a mere sham intuitionism or a mere sham empiricism. For it is only an illusion that it carries out its principle to make no assertion that is not drawn from intuition; it is mere illusion that it goes back to experience, to self-grasping intuiting, and measures every assertion against the things and states of affairs themselves. We become convinced of this not only on the basis of psychologistic interpretations of axiomatic thought, and then of rational thought in general, that if taken seriously would have to lead to this thought's | outright rejection; and we become VII, 136/137 convinced thereby not merely of the countersensical skepticism that lies, and lies here in its most extreme form, in the fact that now indeed the cognition and validity of logical axioms, such as that of non-contradiction, is also affected; no, we also become convinced that, at bottom, for empiricism not even the possibility of a judgment concerning something individual remains intact and comprehensible for us.

We must bear in mind only the following. An individual assertion such as "this tone is higher than that one" has a uniform assertional sense whose truth I immediately recognize precisely when I directly cognize that which is asserted itself, that is, the state of affairs itself.

Now, it should be emphasized, first, that the concepts *tone* and *being higher* appear here as constituents of the assertional sense and, in being measured against intuition, as constituents of the asserted state of affairs itself. It is in keeping with the verbal sense of the words *tone* and *higher* that they become fulfilled through intuition, and yet not through the mere sensory experience of two tones and a sensory combination of them; instead, the intuitive fulfillment concerns these sensory particulars precisely as particular instances of generalities. Skepticism about generality, however, also annuls the general in the particular case, and since individual assertions are inconceivable without co-meant conceptual generalities, this alone would be enough to for us to recognize that empiricism appears to render even singular assertions concerning individuals incomprehensible and impossible.

But the following is of still greater interest. How do things stand, then, with the entire sphere of grammatical forms for assertions, beginning already with individual assertions—with the subject form and the predicate form, with the *is* and the *not*, with the *and* and the *or*, the *if* and the *then*, and so on? We say in ordinary speech: "I see that this house has a red roof," "I hear that this tone is higher than that one," and we speak not merely of seeing or hearing the house, roof, tone itself. In nature there are things, but what is surely not in nature are these states of affairs with their subject and predicate forms or the relation *higher than* and, on the other side, as a distinct thing, the opposing relation *lower than*, which in each case again is a dependent | moment of the intuitive portion of the entire proposition, of the state of affairs. In point of fact, to experience is not merely to experience individual data; experiencing is the consciousness of the self-giving, the self-grasping, the self-having of anything at all that is meant, in any form of consciousness whatever—of that which is meant in innumerable assertional forms with their individual shapes and which can then, in this sense-formation, precisely be given, itself intuited, and grasped as truly existing. Without this broadening of the idea of intuition, which is exactly measured to fit conscious acts of meaning, including those that are totally unintuitive, in all its forms, there can be no talk of a description of the cognitive situation or of a settled understanding about cognition and true being.

VII, 137/138

What is clear is that it is only when we resolve to set aside all prejudices and to identify experience or intuition with self-evidence, with cognition in the pregnant sense, and only when we become aware that this broadened "experience" denotes nothing other than the self-grasping of what is meant in exactly the way in which it is meant, only then can we seriously think of understanding cognition, that is, of understanding how not only the world of simple, concept-free experience but also logical objectivity, and thus objectivity of every type and level, with all its real and ideal forms, can have a sense and an authenticatable being for us. Consciousness in itself, in its essential forms, creates sense, creates, in the various forms of self-evidence, possible and true sense as a form of the possible fulfillment of unfulfilled thought-intentions, of a fulfillment in the form of self-giving or by being "measured" to such a form.

What has also become clear on the basis of our critical analysis, however, is the method that is the only one that can possibly help us tackle the problems of the possibility and sense of cognition that, beginning with ancient Skepticism and continuing with modern Empiricism, have forced themselves upon us so strikingly—indeed, even before that, can help free these problems from confusions, ambiguities, and contradictory obscurities and transform them into the kind of genuine and pure problems that as such are opposed to every objectivistic problem. This method is none other than that of going back to the Cartesian ground, to pure cognitive subjectivity and its pure | consciousness, and then of interrogating subjectivity VII, 138/139 itself according to its own self-evident sense and according to the essential forms of its possible sense-fulfillment or self-evidence, in which objectivity of every type is constituted originally in the manner of consciousness, as that "self" which is grasped in self-grasping.

But not only that. Yet another great step will prove to be necessary. The questions concerning possible cognition, the clarification of the how of original constitution in consciousness, have not arisen historically as questions addressed to singular objects and the consciousness of them. What became mysterious through the skeptical denials was the possibility of an experience and a knowing *in general* of things existing in themselves *in general*—and in like manner, later, the consciousness of generality in general and the mode of being of the idea in general, of evidence in general, in relation to truth in

general, etc. This much is clear here: once one has in one's possession pure ideas such as mathematical ideas and the ideas of pure apophantic logic, pure generality on the side of objects has to bring with it an equally pure generality on the side of consciousness. In other words, one becomes aware that transcendental consciousness in its basic configurations and its transcendental achievements can and must be considered using the method of *essential intuition*—that is, as we can say, using the purely grasped *Platonic method*. Every pure idea pertaining to a genus or a mathematical form of objectivities in general points back to an eidetic problematic concerning the modes of consciousness that relate to objectivities having the relevant nature or form; and these modes of consciousness themselves are thereby conceived in eidetic generality, and in the actual investigation they must be exhibited as "ideas" using the eidetic method.

In this way, what emerges from the critique of empiricism is the idea of an entirely different science of subjectivity based on pure "inner experience," an eidetic science of the *Ego* as such, of possible pure consciousness as such, of possible objects of consciousness as such, in which all facticity is suspended and is only included within the range of pure possibilities as one such possibility. If we delve more deeply into these matters, it even turns out that every transcendental | question to be posed about individual objects and VII, 139/140
individually determined consciousness, for instance of these human beings and this world, can and may only be treated in the manner of geometrical questions in reference to a determinate thing in nature and to nature in general as a something determinate. This means: the necessary method is that in which the individual case is regarded as an individual instance of a priori generality, so that the problem is shifted from the realm of the factual to the realm of pure possibility and its a priori. Transcendental philosophy is *first and foremost*, and necessarily, a priori philosophy, and only *then* application to the factual.

However, we cannot yet discuss what exactly is meant by this. At any rate, we retain for now that which lights the way for us, though admittedly still from a great distance: the idea of a universal essential science of pure subjectivity and its pure conscious life, a science that, as eidetic ("a priori"), explores the universe of the ideal

possibilities of this life and the objectivities that are constituted in it according to ideal possibility—in short, an *eidetic science of the Ego Cogito*.

Check for updates

⟨Section Three
The Development of Skeptical Forerunners of Phenomenology in Berkeley and Hume, and Dogmatic Rationalism⟩

VII, 141

⟨Chapter One
From Locke to the Radical Consequence of Berkeley's Purely Immanent Philosophy⟩

Lecture 20: ⟨The Positive Historical Significance of the Renewal of Skepticism through Locke and His Successors⟩

Our critique of Locke's philosophy has come to a natural conclusion insofar as we have critically exhibited from it what could be exhibited without external compulsion and without anticipating any further developments. We have at each moment carried out the critique from a certain distance, so that it developed into a critique that is applicable to any philosophy of the new type inaugurated by Locke. Just this new type of philosophy—that of an epistemological *tabula rasa* psychologism—which was essentially determinative for the entire image of modern philosophy, is what captivated us for so long, and for good reason, and in its continued, merely internally consistent development into a so-called immanent philosophy or immanent "positivism" it must captivate us further still. This development is tied to Locke's two ingenious pupils, Berkeley and Hume. In inseparable historical unity with these two thinkers, fulfilling himself in them, so to speak, Locke is a primary wellspring of the spirit of our living philosophical present.

It is exactly this wellspring, however, which, in keeping with the entire course and sense of our critical examination of the history of ideas, interests us above all else. For what is at issue for us in this examination is nothing less than the task of laying bare the unity of the motivation | that, stretching through the millennia, lived as VII, 141/142 the developmental drive in all philosophy insofar as it wanted to

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become true philosophy and in all philosophical method insofar as it wanted to become true method. At times partly satisfied in some philosophical approaches and yet never ultimately satisfied, philosophy is driven on to ever new methodological reflections; it assumes ever new methodological shapes and yet in doing so never reaches an end. It never reaches *the* end, which would be this: the true beginning of a true coming into being drawing on the power of the one true method. The true method here can only be the one that can be comprehended and considered in absolutely indubitable self-evidence as the only one that fulfills the meaning of philosophy, the only one that is demanded by it.

What is required is to understand that philosophy, according to its guiding methodological idea as a science that justifies itself absolutely, could not find satisfaction in the methodological ideal of the objective-rational science that grew early to maturity, that it instead demanded an entirely new way of proceeding methodologically without which it, and thereby genuine science as such, could never come into being, indeed could not even begin to come into being. It must be shown that certain hindrances, grounded in the nature of the very cognitive situation in which all philosophizing is rooted, divert the direction of regard of the mind's eye away from pure consciousness, thereby diverting it from the appointed site where all the foundational work needs to be done. And furthermore, we must reveal the hindrances that inhibit the grasping of the self-evident intentional elements and hence the development of the genuine intentional method in accordance with which alone work can be carried out here. Of course, we need to make clear the stages of development in which the nascent philosophy gradually became aware of this pure sphere of consciousness, how it then recognized this sphere as the necessary site of its work even while it nevertheless remained blind to its peculiar essence and the sort of work proper to it. This was the case up until the definitive breakthrough of the true method and the first beginning of real philosophy in the last several decades—that is, as I am convinced, in the form of the new phenomenology.

In this way we begin to understand that Locke is of quite particular historical significance in our context. However | tedious and verbose he may be (and he has those qualities in abundance); how- VII, 142/143

ever much he may be lacking in a sense of metaphysical depth, in a capacity for intuition about worldviews, lacking in everything that can raise hearts or remind them of the tragic nature of the world's fate in the struggling life of humanity; however offensive may be his empiricism and that of his school, as indeed it has at all times been found to be; however all that may be, the Lockean philosophy, both in its original type and as it further developed toward an immanent philosophy, was an essential stage on the thorny path to the true method.

Locke's philosophy must arouse our interest already by virtue of the fact that, as we could show, it is a form of skepticism—one veiled to itself, to be sure—which in its further development unveils itself, albeit not in every direction, and which then, in the form of Hume's skepticism, places the great demand on the new philosophy that it be overcome in the manner necessary for every radical skepticism, namely, by showing that it is true on a higher level.

Hence, Locke's psychologism interests us already because it is a new form of skepticism—new *vis-à-vis* ancient Skepticism, which as we showed was so significant for the development of ancient philosophy. After all, it is only in reaction against skepticism's most original form, the philosophy of the Sophists, that the idea and the problem of philosophy as a science based on absolute justification arose.

Let us recall some things that we know. We convinced ourselves that despite their ardent efforts, which in a certain sense were quite successful relatively speaking, the ancients were not really able to do justice to this idea. They created objectively rational science, a science that seemed to be fully satisfactory but that internally, despite all its achievements, remained skeptically burdened. That is, it remained incapable of answering those baffling questions that could be posed about the cognition of their objects—transcendental questions. Thus in antiquity, Skepticism remained intact as a broad current and remained, in fact, indomitable.

As far as the modern period is concerned, it begins, as we saw, as a renaissance of Platonic intentions. Descartes, with elemental force, renews the idea of a universal, radically | self-justifying science and VII, 143/144
attempts to set it going with a novel method. The undertaking does not succeed, although he takes the first, absolutely necessary step

and actually discovers in the *Ego Cogito* the Archimedean point, or rather the Archimedean ground, the absolutely certain and necessary ground for the work of laying the first foundations. But *that* it is a ground for the work to be done and what the manner and method of this work would have to be, that he does not discover, and so he only provides a powerful impulse, one whose impact could first be felt only historically. He thereby commits the fundamental error of allowing objective science, as a scientific type created by the ancients or at best in its new form as rational natural science, to justify itself absolutely only through a supporting foundation, without altering this science itself methodologically. In just this manner—the fundamental considerations and the universal theologico-metaphysical perspectives that it opened up seemed, after all, dispensable for the positive scientific work—Descartes cleared the way for a new dogmatism, gave the positive sciences the freedom to stand on their own legs and to leave the rest to a complementary metaphysics, to a science that is exactly as objectively dogmatic as these individual sciences themselves.

After Descartes, however, the next great stride is made by Locke. He is the first one to seek a path from the Cartesian *Cogito* to a science of the *Cogito* and the first one who, as regards method, calls for a universal intuitionistic grounding of cognition and of science: namely, by tracing all cognition back to its original intuitive sources in consciousness, in inner experience, and clarifying it on the basis of these sources. Notwithstanding all his immaturity and lack of clarity, he nevertheless sees that if everything that presents itself for a subject as reality and truth presents itself in that subject's own conscious life and can present itself only there, and if all authentication of legitimacy and illegitimacy, of truth and falsity, of probability and improbability, is simply an achievement carried out in the immanence of consciousness, an achievement carried out by a subject and in a subject: that in that case, only a systematic study of the sphere of consciousness, of the Cartesian domain of immediate self-evidence, can bring | the problems of cognition to a definite for- VII, 144/145
mulation and to actual resolution. The naive transference, which is unavoidable at this developmental stage, of the apperceptive habits belonging to the objective consideration of nature and the world to the Cartesian domain of immediate self-evidence leads him to the

naturalistic psychologism of the *tabula rasa* interpretation, which as our critique showed was necessarily, already by virtue of its type, a form of skepticism and which thus annihilates itself in countersense.

And so in relation to this new form of skepticism and considering the fact that it could nevertheless mark an epoch and continuously define the modern period to the present day, a picture presents itself for the modern period ranging up to the present day that is similar to the one that presented itself in antiquity. Just as, there, the current of the Skeptical schools ran parallel to Platonism and the current of rationalistic philosophy stemming from it, so, too, does there run, in parallel to Cartesianism and the stream of rationalistic philosophy stemming from it, the counter-stream of the empiricist philosophies. One can then say: the inextirpableness of skepticism in both cases shows that rationalism was not yet *true* rationalism, that is, that it was not able to realize the idea of a truly rational science, one that could justify itself in the full, absolute sense, much less of a universal, unified system of such sciences.

But though there is truth in this parallelism, it is not yet the whole truth. Ancient Skepticism is, to be sure, steadfastly and consciously a negativism, an anti-philosophy that acknowledges no philosophy whatsoever (and that means no objective philosophy whatsoever) and declares none to be possible in principle. It has no sphere of positive cognition and work; it knows of no true method, unless we count its techniques for constructing skeptical paradoxes. The only exception is the empiricism of the later medical empiricists, which, however, had but little influence on the total picture of ancient philosophy.

Things are different with modern empiricism. If we leave aside the great isolated phenomenon of Hume, empiricism did not want to be a negativism; it did not even want to be a skepticism. Even Hume's later imitators or epigones |, the philosophers of the "as VII, 145/146
if,"[1] did not want to deprive objective science of its esteem but only to interpret it in the correct manner. Indeed, Hume himself deems science wholly non-rational, but he does not want to do away with it.

[1] An allusion to the neo-Kantian philosopher Hans Vaihinger, whose popular *Die Philosophie des Als-Ob* (*The Philosophy of "As-if"*), first published in 1911, was already in its eighth edition by 1922.—Trans.

No matter how much countersense—and, when all is said and done, how many skeptical consequences—reside in empirical philosophy of the Lockean *tabula rasa* type, it is at any rate an epistemology and a psychology that has a method and that actually does something with this method. It is not simply empty construction; it is no conceptual scholasticism. The empiricist is unquestionably directed toward concretely tangible problems, and he genuinely aims to solve them through work he has seized hold of himself. Moreover, he actually has something in his hands, and his work is not completely without fruit; something takes shape in his hands. And for this reason one can learn something from Locke and his followers; one always sees what they see, and *that* they see something, and that something takes shape in the work they carry out.

But, one may ask, how does this square with our critique? I would answer as follows. What is great—and not merely what was factually epoch-making but what is lastingly significant—is the first breakthrough of the method of intuitionism, precisely, that is, of the principle discussed above directing us to go back to the original sources of intuition, to self-evidence, and to do so in a systematic procedure, clarifying all cognition on the basis of these original sources. Here the guiding insight is that under the title *Ego Cogito* there is a self-enclosed domain of all original sources—the domain of what is absolutely self-given and immediately self-evident—which must become the primordial field for every investigation. In this formal [principle] consists the lasting legitimacy of empiricism. If, though, it is incapable of understanding consciousness purely as consciousness and, to use our words, of interrogating consciousness itself according to its essence and intentional achievements, if it misinterprets [consciousness] naturalistically and substitutes naturalistic constructions for what is actually seen, still, *de facto* it ranges, by and large, over ground that it has chosen for itself, and despite all misinterpretations and even malign constructions, it is connections which are seen that make up its foundation. Furthermore, they become visible to anyone who reads carefully. Except that, of course, they are not, they are never, grasped scientifically, described in their pure sense and sense-connections, | or in general VII, 146/147
treated in accordance with the method that is demanded by the essence of intentionality. Only in this way can we make sense of the

enormous power of modern empiricism and the unceasing attempts to improve it and by means of it to bring about a truly scientific psychology and epistemology.

And in this way the preeminent interest that Locke and his school have for us becomes comprehensible. It becomes comprehensible because we are on a path to showing, from ever new sides and with reference to historical-critical material, that the sense of philosophy itself and the method demanded by this sense drive us toward an intuitionism, but that the true method, the genuine intuitionism, is not that of Locke, nor that of the immanent philosophy that emerged from him, which necessarily winds up in skepticism and countersense. It is, instead, the intuitionism of transcendental phenomenology, that is to say, that science of the *Ego Cogito*—or, in terms we also used, that Egology—which takes the *Ego* and the *Cogito* and the *cogitatum* in just the manner in which they are actually given in intuition, the lively streaming life of consciousness and what we are conscious of in it in its concrete living fullness, and then develops the pure methods of intentional analysis for the uncovering of hidden intentionalities, methods that proceed with an absolute and unflinching lack of presuppositions and that coincide at every step with what is purely intuited, with what is given in absolute indubitability.

Radical critique of the empiricism of inner experience is, therefore, not just any philosophical critique. It is a critique that, by exhibiting what the empiricist actually has before his eyes in absolute givenness and what, on the contrary, he hypothesizes, frees us from the objectivistic prejudices that blind us to the specifically transcendental, to pure subjectivity and the life and achievement that is carried out under the title "pure consciousness," in which all possible objectivity takes on meaning and being for a possible *Ego*. In just this way, the critique opens up the path to achieving the overcoming of all skepticism, and hence that of empiricism, that we hinted at above in saying that overcoming radical skepticism means showing that it is true in a good sense. This "showing-true" itself and in the fullest sense refers, of course, to the actual work performed, whose methods and horizons the critique could | make visible only VII, 147/148
in general terms. But the critique already brings out the truth of empiricism insofar as it helps empirical intuitionism to attain its true

legitimacy as intuitionism and thus, as it were, defends empiricism against itself, allows its true *Ego* and its guiding idea to speak, as it were, or extracts from a counterfeit empiricism the true and genuine empiricism. (And it brings out empiricism's truth in a higher sense just as, for instance, a critical transition from the Sophists to Socrates or Descartes brings out the truth of the sophistic movement.)

Lecture 21: ⟨Berkeley's Discovery, and his Naturalistic Misinterpretation of the Problem of the Constitution of the Real World⟩

To bring our examination of the history of ideas to a close, I must now speak about the development of Lockean psychologism into a purely immanent philosophy.

The inconsistent manner in which Locke assumed the existence of a transcendent world, the new natural science, and the interpretation, handed down among the natural scientists, of the subjective and objective qualities of sensorily intuited things as pregiven data while on the other hand his intuitionism was intent on carrying out a methodological analysis of what is purely given in inner experience—all this had to generate resistance. It was this intuitionism, surely, that constituted what was new and significant, in itself and for the time, in Locke's work. It is only our own "ideas" that are immediately given, only the field of our immediately self-evident inner experience. This, therefore, must be the original field of scientific-psychological research, and hence also of the scientific clarification of all cognitive problems. That was plausible. No one could take offense at the naturalizing of consciousness; it corresponded to the natural way of thinking. What was also plausible, therefore, was Locke's further methodological procedure of considering the data of inner experience with regard to their elements and subjecting them to a genetic analysis as to their origins: the complex features that come forth in developed consciousness must be built up genetically from their elements and accordingly must become comprehensible descriptively and with regard to their development.

It was, then, actually a matter of course that the objectivity | VII, 148/149 transcending consciousness, external reality, came into view in this

intuitionistic-genetic method solely as an internal phenomenon on the *tabula rasa*, that is, not as reality itself, but as an experiential content, a sensory appearance. And again: if it is only this phenomenon that is originally given and self-evident, and if all cognition, even that which lies in experience, is first to be elucidated according to its possibility through such an internal analysis, then it was impermissible to presuppose any objectivity. This, therefore, lay within the horizon of every reader who placed himself on the ground of the intuitionistic method and who was fundamentally clear in his thinking.

Thus, Locke's work itself harbored the tendency toward a purely immanent philosophy. This tendency distinctly comes to the fore in many broad individual analyses, for instance, in his express doctrine that cognition, as the awareness of a truth, is to be defined as merely the perception of agreement or lack of agreement among our own ideas—which implies, of course, that the cognition of something that is transcendent in principle is inconceivable, a position that certainly was difficult to square with Locke's doctrine of *transcendence*. It was, therefore, a quite obvious step to take to purify Locke's intuitionism methodologically and, under a strict suspension of transcendent presuppositions, to think through the problematic of the cognition of what is transcendent under the assumption of an exclusive restriction to what is immanently given—all that, of course, in the naturalistic attitude, since the time had not yet come when it would be possible to see consciousness as consciousness and to practice the intentional method.

Here, then, is where Berkeley comes in, one of the most radical and indeed most brilliant philosophers of the modern period. Modern empiricist epistemology and modern psychology revere him as their greatest trailblazer; but the best part of his spirit, that which lies beyond his truly admirable development of Locke's naturalistic internal analyses—this, it seems to me, the modern period has not managed to grasp.

Above we have already spoken about the criticism, which for its time was so worthy of admiration, that Berkeley levels at the Lockean doctrine of material substances and their primary qualities, a criticism that touches on fundamental matters, | though it VII, 149/150
does not exhaust them. It aids Berkeley in his establishing of the

first immanent—albeit naturalistic—theory of the material world. Belonging together with this, and speaking in greater generality, it is the first attempt to make the constitution of the real world (the physical and the animal-human world) in cognizing subjectivity theoretically comprehensible. Indeed, the very problem was actually first seen by Berkeley, even if merely in a primitive early form. To be sure, the problem can already be found in germinal form in the Cartesian *Meditations* insofar as their first task was to demonstrate how the *Ego*, proceeding from the immediately self-evident domain of its *cogitationes*, arrives at the belief in transcendent objectivity, in an external world and God. But to whatever degree the beginning of an entirely new epistemology, and the seed of the problem of constitution as well, may be found here, what is nevertheless lacking is the insight that what is required here is to undertake systematic work on the immediate field of consciousness itself, to interrogate this field itself and on its basis to plumb the meaning of the external world inasmuch as it is only in the phenomena of this field that we become conscious of this external world.

It is Locke's intuitionism that leads the way here, precisely, that is, when it is grasped purely, and only then. The moment Berkeley establishes the attitude of pure inwardness, he espies the problem and attempts a solution. With ingenious audacity he restores the legitimacy of natural experience. Taken purely immanently, as a lived experience of the *Ego*, external experience presents itself as the experience of the external world itself. What is seen, what is heard, what is apprehended with the senses, presents itself as nature itself, as it itself, *originaliter*, and not as some depiction of it. Perception does not hypothesize, does not make inferences.

On the other hand, Berkeley remains caught up in the naturalism of the *tabula rasa* view. In the sensualistic manner he confuses the individually perceived thing in the self-evidence of its being perceived with the individual complex of sensory data, of visual, tactual, acoustic and other data, without realizing that the *identical* thing that is self-evidently given in the continuity of the perceiving, precisely as self-evidently identical, cannot possibly be the continuous flux of sensory data. As with all sensualists, indeed all psychologists of the naturalistic school, | the self-evident distinction, to be grasped VII, 150/151
within immanence, between the flux of the manners of appear-

ance, of the constantly shifting aspects already concerning each individual characteristic of a thing, and the appearing thing itself with its appearing characteristics taken purely as appearing—this distinction eludes him. If one lets these adumbrating appearances count as sensory data, then the Berkeleian thesis implies that the experienced world of the cognizer is nothing other than his individual sensory complexes, that he substitutes for the unity of the experienced thing the manifold of its adumbrating appearances, something precisely bound up with the fact that he is blind to thing-consciousness as consciousness of unity, to the conscious synthesis that holds sway in our continuing experience, and to the experienced thing itself as a synthetic unity in the continuity of diverse meanings.[1]

Thus for the sensualist, what gives experiential unity to the intrinsically separate data of the different sensory modalities—colors, tones, and so on—is mere association. Things *are* nothing but associative complexes that are referred to one another according to habit, that appear in sensory experience in an empirically governed manner, in coexistence and succession. Even for Berkeley, natural causality is reducible to merely habitual expectations. Association is the principle of all experiential inferences; accordingly, I can infer from immanent data to immanent data but never to something transcendent, to something unperceivable. Just as a transcendent nature, as a realm | of transcendent material entities in a transcendent space, VII, 151/152

[1] As ancient as these confusions may be, they are, on the other hand, still ineradicably employed in contemporary psychology and epistemology. For this reason a further word of explanation might perhaps be useful. Hobbes (like Locke after him) identifies the perceptual thing—the unified substratum of perceived qualities—with the complex of sensory data that becomes visible at any time in reflecting upon sensation, a complex that "has" its particular data as collective elements but by no means as qualities. It is important to keep keenly in view the fact that in the continuity of their being perceived, already each particular quality is given as a self-evident synthetic unity. For example, the perceived color of a thing which remains unchanged as I see it even while I, in the normal case, move my eyes, move closer to it, and so on, is seen precisely as this identical color, while the sensory data that display this color from one moment to the next (the adumbrations of the color perspective) continuously change. In the change of attitude, in the transition from attending [reading "*Achten*" for "*echten*"—Trans.] to the perceived thing and its perceived qualities, to its perspectival presentations, this relationship becomes self-evident—and indeed as a necessary one.

is a fiction and is reducible to the nature that is experienced, which itself is nothing but the immanent, associatively unified sensory complexes, just so, the lawfulness of nature is reducible to an inductive lawfulness of these complexes, and ultimately to an associative regularity in the coming and going of sensory data in consciousness. Here there is no actual affecting and being affected, no actual causality, but only a rule-governed preceding and a rule-governed following, to be anticipated inductively. True causality is only *Ego*-causality.

Lecture 22: ⟨Berkeley's Monadological Approach; Comparison with Leibniz. Transition to Hume⟩

Sensory data and sensory complexes are conceivable only as perceived, as things a subject is conscious of. It makes no sense to postulate for them their own material substances, substances whose inconceivability is already indicated by the Lockean *je ne sais quoi*. They require for their existence only a mind that is conscious of them. On the other hand, the mind itself is a substance; it is the only conceivable being that exists independently for itself, and its being consists in having consciousness, in perceiving, and, on the other hand, in being active, in exerting genuine causality. True reality is reduced to minds.

But since for me it is only my own field of ideas that is immediately given, where do I learn about the being of other *Ego*-subjects from? Is it not perverse to want to deny the possibility of going beyond one's field of ideas in favor of a transcendent nature while on the other hand admitting something transcendent, that is, in the form of other *Ego*s? But the inference to minds external to me has very different foundations than does the inference to what is materially transcendent, and it is liable to no serious objections. Unfortunately, Berkeley does not treat this problem of the world of other minds in the *Treatise*, which is virtually the only text that receives consideration, but he does do so in the *Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. I will now present his train of thought, which is quite worthy of our interest, in a free (and somewhat pointed) manner.

Just as things can point to each other by way of association and induction, they can also point to what is specifically *Ego*-like: to *Ego*-acts, opinions and judgments of the *Ego*, and so on. In this regard | habitual combinations and expectations can form as well. VII, 152/153
Now, certain sensible things in my field of consciousness can, owing to their similarity to the thing I call my body, indicate something mental: *Ego*-acts and subjective combinations of lived experiences that are not mine. My body, remaining permanently in my field of consciousness, is intimately associated with my mental life. It is understandable that we assume that a thing sufficiently resembling it in style and behavior indicates an analogous psychic life. The inference is entirely comprehensible and does not terminate in something unknowable but rather proceeds from analogue to analogue. However, along with the fact that other subjects are given to me by reference to their bodies, that they are co-given in the manner of empirical indication, this is indicated as well: that the other subjects have their own sensory perceptions, that they experience the same complexes of sensory things that I do, that they "have in common" with me "one and the same" world or nature, which, however, is only a *façon de parler*. In substantial actuality, only I and the others exist, and each of us has his perceptions, his sensory complexes; in each, these complexes are inductively ordered and recognizable as natural regularities—only that, miraculously, as we learn from the fact of subjects' mutual understanding, the one and wholly identical nature, with the same sensory complexes and regularities, is constituted in everyone. The creator of this miraculous intersubjective order or this nature shared by all is God, whose existence we are compelled to infer precisely on the basis of this fact [of a common order of nature], and this is how we obtain the immanent species of teleological proof [of God's existence].

As primitive as this whole theory is, as much as it lacks a careful scientific implementation that penetrates into the details, it is, nevertheless, a first theory of transcendence on the ground of immanence, the first attempt to determine scientifically the sense of the experienced world by proceeding according to the necessary theoretical demands issuing from the immanently elapsing experiences themselves, and by proceeding *purely* from these demands. Here we also see the essential difference between the Berkeleian theory

and the contemporary Leibnizian monadology. As closely related as they may be in their outcomes, they are just as different in their manner of composition and grounding.

Leibniz's theory of monads has the style of a metaphysical | VII, 153/154 interpretation of mathematical natural science and of the material nature that is determined in truth—in natural-scientific truth—in its exact theories. He aims to reconcile natural-scientific truth with religious and theological truth, to harmonize the sense of nature dictated by natural science, that mechanics of atoms, with the teleological sense demanded by religion of all worldly, and hence also all natural, beings and events. Leibniz provides, in his monadology, an ingenious *aperçu*. He discovers the possibility of such a reconciliation by means of a spiritual interpretation of nature that interpretively ascribes to the natural-scientific sense [of nature] an inner monadological sense and collects arguments in support of this view.

On the other hand, Berkeley—the Bishop of Cloyne—is, naturally enough, also interested in theology, and in fact exclusively in theology and not, in a double-sided manner like Leibniz, in both theological and natural-scientific matters; for he is by no means a natural investigator. But what is novel about him is that he does not give metaphysical or theological interpretations but rather presents a piece of presupposition-free, systematically scientific investigation for which the theological interests that were initially determinative for the enterprise are completely irrelevant. Locke's critique provides for him the purely immanent ground, and upon it he attempts a descriptive and genetic exhibition of the purely immanent peculiarities of external perception, peculiarities in which the sense of experienced and experienceable nature as such, which self-evidently can be exhibited at any time, is immanently contained. Thus, he neither interprets nor hypothesizes but instead demonstrates, and attempts further to show, that all natural science makes reference to this immanent sense of external experience, that the things it cognizes are none other than those that are actually and directly perceived, and that in this manner we can do justice to all the scientific procedures of the investigators of nature.

What first comes to the fore here, albeit in an all-too-primitive form that is burdened with naturalistic countersense, is, as we indi-

cated in advance above, the problem of a constitutive theory of exteriority as a phenomenon of the self-contained interiority of consciousness. Leibniz came close enough to this problem; it lay, as it were, in his field of vision. But he | doubtless did not see its central VII, 154/155 philosophical significance; the idea of a systematic and rigorously scientific investigation of the pure sphere of consciousness and of the sense-bestowal that is effected in its pure immanence does not become for him the driving force of his philosophizing. In Berkeley's purification of Locke's confused initial approach to an immanent intuitionism there lies, however, the first seeds of a new kind of science of consciousness, one that, as a science of pure consciousness, necessarily diverges from the whole of traditional psychology as objective worldly science, however true it may be that every psychology is concerned with conscious lived experiences. Berkeley himself, however, did not accomplish a systematic working-out of this pure science of consciousness, or even mark out the boundaries of its full idea as the fundamental science for all cognition and every science whatever, although his *Treatise*, his dialogues, and indeed even his ingenious early writing on the *Theory of Seeing* (this latter with a few necessary modifications) prepare the way for the idea of this science and may be classified as primitive approximations of it.

The completer of Berkeley's work, who at the same time far surpasses him in the sphere of immanent naturalism, is David Hume. His singular significance in the history of philosophy lies first of all in the fact that he sees in Berkeley's theories and critiques the breakthrough of a new kind of psychology and recognizes in this new psychology the foundational science for every possible science whatever; and, furthermore, in the fact that he seeks to bring this science to a systematic realization by making use of the work done by Berkeley and partially, in impure form, by Locke as well; and moreover that he does so in the style of an immanent naturalism of the strictest consistency. And precisely in this way, Hume founded a radical psychologism of an essentially new type, one that grounds all the sciences on psychology, but on a purely immanent and at the same time purely sensualistic one.

It is exactly on this crucial point that Hume has continually been misunderstood. One has, so to speak, understood nothing of his theories if one understands Hume's psychology as a psychology

in the ordinary sense of an objective science of the psychic life of the human being in the objective world. To be sure, Hume's own way of speaking is misleading, and he never | draws the necessary VII, 155/156 contrasts. But the sense of his psychology must be discerned from his almost entirely consistent methodological procedure, and moreover he must be interpreted in historical context. When one reads in the Preface to his *Treatise*, "the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences" or reads, "There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science"; when it is said, further, that in the elucidation of the principles of human nature is contained the complete system of sciences; and if one adds to this other passages that confirm that no conceivable science is to remain excluded here and that even the ultimate grounding of mathematics and natural science has to take place through the science of man—when, I say, one reads all this, then one is presented with a crass anthropologism that seems to leave no room for any other interpretation.[1]

And yet, if one studies this notable work more closely and pays particular attention partly to the method, in which nothing more is presumed or theoretically established than occurrences in the sphere of perceptions, and, on the other hand, to the results, through which not only transcendent physical nature but the entire objective world, with all the categorial forms belonging to it, is to be shown to be a fictitious formation in the perceptual sphere, then it becomes clear that all this is anything but a psychology in the usual sense—that is, anything but an experiential science carried out on the ground of the actual spatiotemporal world that is given as existing and accepted as existing. A science which proves that the entire world, including human beings, human minds, persons, personal associations, and so on, is nothing but a fiction cannot be a science of the human being, the human mind, etc. in the ordinary sense, cannot be a science that presupposes the reality experienced

[1] The passages quoted and referred to here are taken from the Introduction (not the Preface) to Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pp. xix–xx in the Selby-Bigge edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1896). Husserl had this book in his library (in the edition by Longmans, Green, London 1882) as well as several German translations.—Trans.

by human beings. Such an absurdity cannot be attributed to a Hume, nor can it be found in his works themselves.

In truth, Hume's psychology is *the first* | *systematic attempt at a* VII, 156/157
science of what is purely given in consciousness; I would say it is the attempt at a pure Egology, if Hume had not held the *Ego*, too, to be mere fiction. It is a *tabula rasa* psychology that, in radical self-restraint, wishes to make use of nothing but what is found in the immanence of the *tabula rasa*, nothing, that is, but the immediately self-evident constituents of consciousness, and which then searches in this domain (i.e., in the sensualistically interpreted domain of the *Ego Cogito*) for psychological laws in keeping with which psychological explanations are to be obtained. We can also say that it is the first systematic and universal outline of the concrete constitutive problematic, the first concrete and purely immanent epistemology. We might even go so far as to say that Hume's *Treatise* is the first outline of a pure phenomenology, albeit in the guise of a purely sensualist and empirical phenomenology.

⟨Chapter Two
Hume's Positivism: the Consummation of Skepticism and, Simultaneously, the Decisive Preparatory Step toward a Transcendental Foundational Science⟩

Lecture 23: ⟨Hume's Nominalistic Reduction of All Ideas to Impressions and the Countersense Inherent in This Principle⟩

It is with Hume that sensualism first comes to a fully conscious and universal unfolding. Berkeley had been a sensualist only in his interpretation of the intuitions of external nature. Things are complexes of sensory data that are given in the immanence of consciousness itself. Transcendent material things are fictions; there are no material substances. But sensory perceptions, according to Berkeley, presuppose the perceiving subject, the *Ego*; for Berkeley the *Ego* is not a mere designation for some collection of merely associatively related psychic experiences. Rather, sensory perceptions taken as a whole, but also all the other subjective occurrences, all the acts and states of the *Ego* taken together, have in the *Ego* as mental substance a principle of unity. But this is exactly what Hume | VII, 157/158
denies. What do I find in reflection, as displayable in consciousness, whenever I reflect upon myself? Perceptions of heat and cold, light and shadow, love and hate, and the like; but I can find nothing like an I, a particular "impression" corresponding to this word. I: this is nothing more than a bundle of diverse perceptions following one another with unfathomable swiftness. In consequence there lies here for Hume himself, subsequently, an immense problem: How is it possible that I take myself to be an identical *Ego* and that every one of us apprehends himself not merely as a mass of lived experiences but rather as one and the same person amid this continuous flux of perceptions? At any rate, just as corporeal substances, as unities underlying the sensory data, are eliminated, so, too, are the mental unities, those underlying the totality of psychic experiences. The psyche cannot even be compared now to a *tabula rasa* or to a stage on which all kinds of fleeting psychic formations make their

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appearance. For nothing real corresponds to this table, this stage; it is not a thing in or on which experiences are found. Rather, the only thing that provides unity is the lawfulness that governs psychic experiences, purely objectively,[a] according to coexistence and succession.

In this way, sensualism's interpretation of the world attained its full extension and completeness. All being, that of bodies as well as minds, is reduced to psychic data, to a mass of *Ego*less perceptions. The analogy with the nascent exact natural science's atomistic-mechanistic conception of nature immediately catches the eye. Physical ⟨nature⟩ is conceived of as a spatiotemporal coinciding of independently existing atoms, yoked together only by the unity of the laws of nature, which unambiguously govern all physical events, all movement of atoms. In a similar manner, the naturalism of consciousness resolves subjectivity into atoms of consciousness, into primitive material[b] elements under purely material laws of coexistence and succession. These atoms of consciousness are the perceptions (which are for Hume what "ideas" are for Locke); corresponding here to the external laws of nature are the internal laws of association and habit, as well as some | laws of a similar type that VII, 158/159 are closely related to them. However, these are not actually parallel laws that stand opposed to one another. Rather, psychic laws are the true ultimate laws of all being; being taken as a whole, with all the supposedly self-subsistent laws belonging to it, is reduced to perceptions and formations built from perceptions in accordance with inner-psychic laws.

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[a] *sachlich*. Expressions based on the noun *Sache*—a word for which there is no precise English equivalent—are used frequently in this lecture. A *Sache*, as Husserl uses the word here, is roughly what Hume called a "matter of fact," and indeed for the most part this is precisely the rendering we have used. Husserl tends to reserve the word *Ding* for material things in the sense of spatiotemporal objects that can enter into causal relations describable in purely physical terms, whereas *Sachen*, like Humean matters of fact, comprise both "outer" (physical) and "inner" (mental) items. However, the material or quasi-material aspects of *Sachen* are very much at the center of Husserl's concerns in this lecture, and accordingly we have frequently translated *sachlich* as "material." On the other hand, the term also carries connotations of objectivity and impartiality; hence the rendering in the present context.—Trans.

[b] *sachliche*

Yet Hume does not presuppose all this but rather proves it precisely through a systematically advancing and assumption-free psychology that proceeds from the items that are immediately given to the psyche and empirically ascertains the fundamental laws obtaining for them—the law of association, of recollection, and the like—as the primitive laws of all intrapsychic genesis. Everything that exists for the individual subject under the title "experienced world of bodies and minds," all the quite familiar objective forms such as space, time, causality, thing, power, capacity, person, community, state, law, morality, and so on, must be explained through this psychology, as must the method and achievement of all sciences that pretend to deliver cognition of the entire world or individual regions of the world. Of course, the result of this most profound of psychological explanations of the totality of being and the totality of science runs like this: The entire world, including all objectivities, is nothing but a system of illusory forms, of fictions, which necessarily arise in subjectivity in accordance with immanent psychological laws; and science is a self-delusion of subjectivity, or an art of expediently organizing fictions for the purposes of life.

But now it is necessary to look a little more closely at the supposed freedom from presuppositions and radical objectivity[a] of Hume's psychology and epistemology, and more generally at the entire shape of his methodology. We notice, first, that every fundamental consideration of the kind that Descartes deems necessary for a systematic grounding of philosophy is entirely absent. For Descartes, this was a matter of such great importance that he made repeated attempts, in ever new forms, at such a fundamental consideration, as is evident from his *Discours* and his *Meditationes* and his *Principia* on the one hand, and his posthumous writings on the other. Since philosophy is supposed to become an absolutely self-justifying universal science, the fundamental consideration is to be the foundational | meditation that deliberates about the proper way VII, 159/160
in which a universal and absolute justification of cognition, as a justification that systematically encompasses all scientific and in general all genuine cognition, must proceed, and that devises and justifies the necessary procedure as such. Such a radical reflection on the

[a] *Sachlichkeit*

method of ultimate grounding is, as I said, absent in Hume, and his radicalism is, therefore, not the genuine radicalism that signifies ultimate self-responsibility growing out of ultimate self-reflection and self-clarification. The self-evidence of what is immediately given, that is, of the individual lived experiences that one finds in oneself, is an inheritance that is taken over as a matter of course and not acquired in a careful critique, as is also the case for the empiricist principle that all cognition is to be grounded in experience. The sense of this principle is dictated by the Lockean intuitionism of clarification.

This principle is presented in Hume's work with an impressive but illusory clarity in the methodological form of a reduction of all ideas to impressions. Impressions are the original vivid and forceful perceptions, faint afterimages or copies of which—Hume's so-called ideas—return reproductively after they have passed away. Through their mingling with one another and becoming joined, in so-called thinking, to new ideas, ideas and thoughts then arise that appear to be copies when in fact, as such formations, they neither stem themselves from original impressions nor can be related to actual impressions in a way that could be subsequently established. This is the source of all the errors, all the wrongheadedness, of non-objective[a] thinking. To practice a critique of cognition means, accordingly, to investigate all our thoughts, our "ideas," with a view toward whether and to what extent they have original impressions corresponding to them, whether and to what extent such impressions can be identified for them. What is unmistakably determinative here, in the crudest form of sensualistic oversimplification, is the opposition, which guides Locke's intuitionism as well as all empiricism, between unclear, non-objective opinions, between empty though artificial thought-formations—as, for instance, in the case of speculations that become entangled in scholastic verbal subtleties—and, by contrast, clear intuitions, judgments saturated with the fullness of clear intuition, judgments that bring to expression precisely what they have in intuition | as self-given. Every genuine verifying of opin- VII, 160/161
ions must consist in measuring them against self-giving intuitions, in making them self-evident.

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[a] *sachfern*

What would be required here for an immanent psychology of cognition that seriously wanted to illuminate cognition theoretically is a careful description of everything that this fundamental approach (which indeed is nothing but the dissection of the cognitive achievement itself) presupposes and asserts with regard to its essential elements—for instance, a description of the synthesis of clarification and verification, of legitimation and its opposite, delegitimation. An exact description would be required of the synthetic conscious transition in which an unclear thought acquires for itself fulfilling clarity and the legitimacy and correctness that confirm it, in which this thought now comes to possess as "itself" precisely what was previously "merely meant" and to possess it in exactly the manner in which it was meant—and this with respect to all the arrangements and forms of this meaning. Or, in the opposite case, one would have to show what delegitimation looks like, how in such a case a meaning approaches an intuition that it points toward but that does not fit it and instead annuls it, and what all this implies. However, all this would of course have to be preceded by a careful and scientifically rigorous description of what at first is designated in merely vague generality by the phrases "mere meaning," "empty thought," "empty verbal concept," and the like—and, opposed to this, "intuition." The basic essential particularities of these forms of consciousness, which are everywhere at play here, would need to be exhibited and described with precision.

But none of this is to be found in Hume or in the subsequent psychology and epistemology of the sensualist style. Everything is crudely leveled down in the terminology of impressions and ideas and in the demand that we identify for every idea a corresponding impression. This sensualism does not even break through to the basic essential distinction between an idea as an immanent memory-image or phantasm and thought in the specific sense that characterizes judicative thinking and all its components. And the same goes for the so-called impressions, where what is individually intuited as it is given prior to every forming by thought is not distinguished from what is intuited with such a forming. The naturalistic prejudice | makes one blind to everything fundamentally essential VII, 161/162
and to what is decisive psychologically as well as epistemologically,

blind to what makes being as consciousness and as what we are conscious of in consciousness *toto coelo* different from what presents itself as a real thing[a] in the natural, objective view of the world.

The entire distinction between impressions and ideas and the demand to trace ideas back to impressions becomes entirely meaningless when one imputes to these forms of consciousness the status of psychic facts[b] with their merely material[c] characteristics. Hume and the positivism following him make material characteristics out of the qualities impression and idea. His thought is that everything that is to exist or count for me as existing must authenticate itself in my consciousness. My consciousness, the realm of what I find immediately before me, is a realm of immediately experienced being that must be regarded in "theory-free," "nonmetaphysical" objectivity[d] and that must, accordingly, count as simply a field of facts.[e] Thus, the difference between impression and idea must be viewed as a mere factual difference.[f] Lived experiences, auditory data, tactile data, and the like first present themselves in a freshness and vivacity of primordial power, with material[g] characteristics such as those of intensity and the like. And later, according to material laws[h]—those of reproduction and association—weaker reverberations, as copies derived from them, appear; these are the ideas.

Already the first steps taken in the *Treatise*, which are meant as fundamentally determinative, are methodologically countersensical. They create merely the semblance of methodologically scientific findings. Why is it, for instance, that a faint perception of red means so much more than, well, a faint perception of red? Whence comes the assertion that it is an "afterimage of an earlier perception," as if it were not something totally original to say that someone's current faint experience of red is something completely different than an "earlier" one, an earlier one that, furthermore, was not faint but vivid, a prior "impression"? And again, how is it that something currently faint comes to be spoken of as a model for something in the future? Moreover, how is it that a currently faint thing can count now as a memory of something strong, now as one of something

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[a] *reale Sache* [b] *psychische Sachen* [c] *sachlichen* [d] *Sachlichkeit* [e] *Sachenfeld* [f] *Sachenunterschied* [g] *sachlichen* [h] *sachlicher Gesetzmäßigkeit*

weak, and all that in various modifications? | But here, indeed, we VII, 162/163
are speaking of a counting-as-something, of an act of meaning[a] with this or that sense.

We also become aware of the need to do justice to the difference between memory, or, alternatively, expectation, and mere phantasy, be it of something past or present or future, and of the fact that in the repetition of "ideas" that are ideas of the same thing, quite diverse "entities" serve to present to us one and the same thing, and that this presenting of the selfsame thing is a conscious meaning of this selfsame thing, possibly of something ever more clearly highlighted, determined, authenticated, and so on. Everything that is given precisely as first and in the Cartesian sense as indubitable, everything, that is, that is given prior to all objective facts and hypotheses, prior to all hypothetical and explanatory theories—the *presenting-to-oneself-as-this-or-that* as such, the *taking-for-this-or-that* as such, or, in a word, consciousness—falls by the wayside, so to speak, and along with it precisely that which makes subjectivity subjectivity, subjective life subjective life.

Thus, an impression is a matter of fact[b] and as such it is distinguished by material[c] characteristics—and what disappears is nothing less than its being the experience of something experienced, of something self-given. This vanishes and yet it is presupposed, already indeed in the fact that one incessantly pretends that these data are given in immediate self-evidence. But mere matters of fact are what they are, with their material properties; as matters of fact they *exist*, but they *signify* nothing, they *mean* nothing, they bear within themselves nothing of *sense*, nothing of the differences between meaning and what is meant, nothing of empty presentation or self-grasping, of being something identically selfsame that is repeatedly meant and given, or meant and given concurrently. To hope to find any of this in matters of fact or as material properties is countersensical.

Certainly it is true that immanent lived experiences, too, insofar as they are regarded exclusively as events running their course in the universal form of immanent time, extending through an immanent stretch of time, have a kind of composition out of genuine parts and properties that admits of a kind of material description. These

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[a] *Meinen* [b] *Sache* [c] *sachliche*

descriptions, which follow this elapsing temporal course, its orderings and temporal characteristics, | no doubt include the observation VII, 163/164
that "ideas" tend to be more fleeting than impressions. Whether differences of vivacity and intensity should seriously be brought into consideration here, and whether a mode of intentional intuitiveness is not already confused here with a mode of individual quasi-existence in immanent temporality—all this would still have to be seriously pondered. But even if it were correct, how fundamentally mistaken must any description be that professes to teach us that what makes impressions impressions and ideas ideas is nothing but such material moments! How should a (relatively speaking) quite faint and fleeting perception of red be anything more and different than precisely a faint and fleeting perception of red, or a strong and enduring one anything more than a strong and enduring one? Why on earth, indeed, the language of "perceptions," a term that is so highly suggestive and that expresses so much more than what is material? And how is it, especially, that one perception is said to be an impression *of something* and is for us, more specifically, the consciousness of a red that is bodily present, while another perception is called an idea, and specifically a memory or expectation, and is for us, depending on the case, the consciousness of a past red or the anticipation of a future and (let us imagine) presently arriving one, or again, as pure phantasy, is the intuition of an imagined red, a presentiated red that is itself in no way present? What nonsense it is to say that an impression, which in perception presentiates something as bodily present, is merely something strong, something vivacious, or whatever else it may be described as being in a similarly material vein,[a] while the omnium gatherum "idea," encompassing such profoundly different things as memory, fiction, and in general presentiations of so many diverse types, is nothing other than something faint, etc.!

It does not help in the least, of course, to say of the items characterized by vivacity, fleetingness, or whatever else of this sort might be said about them that they are peculiar and perhaps unique. It is downright grotesque how not only the Humean approach to

[a] *in ähnlichem, sachbeschreibendem Stile*

psychological analysis but that of the entire modern period failed here, perpetually attempting material description in a domain where every step beyond the formality of temporal arrangements immediately leads into intentional analyses, in which there is so much of a spiritual nature to be seen and established that one is truly forced to say that psychology | misses the forest for the psychological VII, 164/165 trees. It helps very little if one tries, as did William James, having been made aware of the peculiarities of intentionality through Brentano's first hints, to explain this peculiarity through material "colorings," through *fringes*,[1] "overtones," and suchlike metaphorical expressions, which precisely point to merely material, even if perhaps unprecedentedly singular, characteristics. No images are needed at all; nothing else is called for other than to interrogate consciousness of every type, to interrogate it itself as consciousness and to listen to its replies. As soon as one does this, however, a new kind of psychology, and the only possible one, at once comes into being and does so completely spontaneously, a psychology in which the method is determined in an entirely obvious way by the one great theme: the theme, ramifying with unending diversity, of consciousness, intentionality—though this does not exclude temporal arrangements and the associated material properties, and especially inductive modes of consideration, from playing a certain necessary, if only secondary, role.

I would add as a supplementary point that "impression" for Hume is the epistemological title for intuitions that are qualified to carry out the conscious achievement of self-evident verification. This presupposes, self-evidently, that these intuitions consciously hold within themselves as self-given the various objects, conceptual essences, and individual or general judgment-contents on which the mere meanings that we are to take measure of can, so to speak, appease their hunger. In truth, therefore, "impression" is a title for the consciousness of self-evidence in general or, spoken in the widest sense, of self-intuition in general as a possible foundation for every manner in which self-evidence comes to be, for every kind of verification. A real matter of fact, which as such merely exists,

[1] Husserl uses the English term.—Trans.

verifies nothing and contains within itself nothing verificatory. It is not the matter of fact that can verify but only the self-intuition of it; the perception or memory of something real can verify, and it can do so because it is a self-grasping of the matter of fact, because it can join with every corresponding mere meaning of the same matter of fact to form a higher, synthetic lived experience in which we are conscious of the selfsame thing as both something supposed and something true, verificatory, itself.

An impression, so understood, as it must be understood, has, therefore, a double-sidedness, precisely, that is, as the self-giving | VII, 165/166 consciousness of that which gives itself to this consciousness. This double-sidedness is not a *façon de parler* but rather a twofold division of descriptive moments extremely rich in content; and something analogous holds, of course, for the opposing title "idea," as the title for all meanings that are verifiable and in need of verification: each one of them is, in a double-sided manner, consciousness of something that we are made conscious of in it, something that is meant in it but is not self-given. Accordingly, all descriptions, especially those of syntheses, must obviously have this double-sidedness.

Let us finally take note of the following. Even if one fails to notice the intentional relations that lie in the diverse individual lived experiences, fails to notice their objectivities, and views these lived experiences as mere temporal data in immanent time, as mere so-called sensations, even then a countersense is produced if one in the usual manner turns the immediate having of these given data into a nullity. This immediate having is again a conscious having; the lived experiences are not located in a nowhere land. Their being[a] is essentially consciousness,[b] and all lived experiences that are mine are so in the all-encompassing unity of my consciousness; and as such they are accessible to the *Ego* in special reflections.

In this way we could exhibit in a step-by-step manner the countersense that consists in taking as topics for description what are in fact conscious occurrences, continuously speaking about and making use of intentional achievements while at the same time all our supposedly purely objective description is bent on establishing nothing about any of these intentional occurrences, and indeed on

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[a] *Sein* [b] *Bewußtsein*

principle does not regard them as needing to be taken seriously, as real. Thus, already in the method there is contained a fundamental skepticism, and it is not surprising that all this then results in the cognitive achievement of intentional life, the objective world and science, being declared mere fictions.

Lecture 24: ⟨The Necessary Eidetics of the Science of Consciousness and Hume's Inductive-Empirical Objectivism⟩

There is yet another side of Hume's method that we must discuss. It concerns the inductive empiricism from which the basic concepts and explanatory principles of his psychology | and epistemology VII, 166/167 are drawn. In the Preface [to the *Treatise*] the empiricist principle is asserted, like some matter of course about which there can be no dispute, with the following words: "And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation."[1] The invocation of Bacon, Locke and other moderns suffices. But what is most notable here is the way that the lack of a radical meditation on the method demanded by the sense of the fundamental science envisioned by Hume, and to begin with on that very sense itself, takes its revenge.

Consider this question: what was the motivation behind such a fundamental science? Or this: what was it, actually, that gave priority to the cognition of this pure subjectivity, for the sake of which it was made to precede all other cognitions and sciences and to function for them as ultimately grounding? Furthermore: what sort of grounding would the grounding of this cognition itself, that is, the grounding of this new kind of psychology in the field of pure subjectivity, have to be in order for us to be able to give it priority over all the other sciences and their groundings and to ground all the others meaningfully in it?

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[1] Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, p. xi. Husserl again quotes from the German translation. — Trans.

For us the answer is clear. To go back to pure subjectivity, back to the *Ego Cogito*: this means to reflect upon that which is ultimately unquestionable, ultimately indubitable, as that which is presupposed in every calling something into question or becoming doubtful. The moment one has apprehended this pure subjectivity, however, one also becomes aware of the fact that, in its pure conscious experiences, this subjectivity is the primal source of all sense-bestowal, the primal site where every objectivity that is to mean anything for the cognizing *Ego* and is to count as existing for it receives its meaning, receives its validity. This means: an object, for me, is nothing other than and can be nothing other than something appearing in my diversely varying appearances, something I am conscious of in my diversely varying conscious experiences, those of intuiting, of symbolic representing, of thinking, and so on. Only in such subjective experiencing does objectivity of whatever sort arise, as the sense-content of an individual consciousness. And, depending on the particular case, this objectivity as such counts for me as existent or non-existent, as possible, as probable, and so on; it may perhaps then also authenticate itself—again, in these or those | conscious VII, 167/168 formations—as *actually* and *truly* existent, non-existent, possibly existent, and so forth. In conscious life itself there lies the subjective "being valid" (judicative meaning) and the specifically subjective phenomenon of something authenticating itself to me as legitimately valid, as objectively valid, as true actuality, or, alternatively, as deceit and mere appearance. If, then, the question concerns science—well, science is undoubtedly an accomplishment in cognizing subjectivity through and through, and thus again as science it receives its sense and the authentication of its truth from this subjectivity, from its individual acts of scientific cognizing.

But from here there springs—and already when one has become aware of this general situation only in a first, still vague anticipation, in the manner of a mere preview—the necessary guiding idea: if I want to comprehend the achievement of cognition in general and of scientific cognition in particular, then I need to study it in its pure peculiarity, that is, at the primal site of pure subjectivity. But to do this is something completely different from pursuing ordinary "objective," "positive" science. For the latter, a certain region of objects is straightforwardly given, and what it aims to do is to

highlight the being and the being-thus of this region. What is contained in this notion of the "straightforwardly given"? This is not a problem of objective science. That everything which is pregiven for its theoretical treatment, the objective region with all the objects that become its particular special themes; that all this is a sense which is immanently constituted in the conscious fashioning of pure subjectivity—of this objective science knows nothing. A science of pure, of transcendental, subjectivity, on the other hand, has precisely pure consciousness as such, or, alternatively, this pure constitutive fashioning, as its theme. Precisely in this manner, it has ⟨as its theme⟩ every presupposed as well as every authenticated and authenticatable objectivity, not as naively posited in absolute fashion but as contained in the concretion of real and possible consciousness that is thematic for it. And the how of this achievement, the way it comes to be, purely subjectively in these or those modes of consciousness—this is its problem.

From here we can fully understand the sense of the demand for an ultimate grounding of all cognition and science in this peculiar "psychology," that is, in the | transcendental science of "pure" sub- VII, 168/169
jectivity, and at the same time we can understand the sense of a radical intuitionism and its demand for an ultimate clarification of cognition, a clarification of the basic concepts and in general of the collective "foundations" of all the sciences. For all sciences—I refer here of course to the pretranscendental sciences, the "objective" or "positive" sciences that arose historically—contain a radical defect owing to the naiveté in which they simply accept what is pregiven (this or that region of reality, and an entire world encompassing them) and in which they fashion concepts, principles, and indeed ideal sciences, ideal realms of objects. These sciences can only become absolutely grounded when one descends from their beginnings and grounds to the primal grounds and primal beginnings, to the true αρχαί. These latter, however, lie collectively in pure consciousness, in which every possible being is subjectively constituted according to content or sense and according to its ontic value with respect to reality and truth in conscious formations belonging together essentially. As long as one has not comprehended the sense-giving and the verifying achievement carried out or to be carried out in pure consciousness itself, in which being itself and

truth itself originally emerge for any possible cognitive subject; as long as consciousness is only lived, self-evidence is only put into service objectively but is not itself grasped in reflective self-evidence and studied scientifically: as long as this is the case, all science and all the objectivity theorized in it retains an enormous dimension of unintelligibility, that is, of possible questionability and doubt. This is the lesson taught insistently enough by every open and hidden skepticism, which indeed obtain its arms, so to speak, only through predatory incursions into the transcendental sphere. This sort of thing, however, remains a constant possibility as long as this sphere has not revealed its peculiar essentiality in reflective self-evidence, and revealed it theoretically in adequate concepts and insights.

Having in this way, in a summarizing recapitulation, brought before our eyes the sense of a transcendental foundational science, we can also easily answer the further question concerning the method through which such a science would have to be grounded, the question of which method is predelineated through its sense as the only possible one. Right from the start | it is notable that the VII, 169/170 goal is to provide general clarifications concerning cognition and the objectivities of cognition, cognition of these and those general cognitive types, related to objectivities of these and those kinds and forms. By what method, we must therefore ask, are the general and lawful peculiarities of the transcendental sphere to be ascertained?

Here it is clear that this entire idea of an absolute grounding of cognition would be a vain delusion if there lacked possibilities for grounding general essential peculiarities and eidetic regularities as principles of every further clarification to be carried out, and for doing so in an indubitable manner. An indubitable exhibiting of pure consciousness as the putative primal ground of all clarification of cognition can subserve such a clarification only when an indubitable science, and in the first place a system of absolutely indubitable truths of consciousness, can be established upon it.

This, therefore, is what the immanent psychology would have to look like that according to Hume is supposed to function as the fundamental science for all the other sciences, be they ontic or normative sciences, real sciences or ideal ones.

And now let us glance once more at Hume's *Treatise* and at the manner in which he obtains fundamental concepts and principles.

His naturalism consists not only in the fact that he reifies[a] consciousness, treating it as if it were something natural, but also in the fact that, on the ground of inner consciousness, he allows a bad empiricism to prevail, one that believes that all that can be accomplished here is to bring inner facts of experience under empirical concepts in order then to be in a position to establish empirical laws inductively. Of course Hume knows very well that inductive laws cannot be grounded absolutely, that induction can have only provisional validity. Indeed, more than that: he knows that all inductive inferring rests on association (for a famous section of the work itself is devoted to proving just this), and furthermore, he knows that such inferring could only be accompanied by necessary validity if the principles of association were themselves necessary or, as we can also say, if they were capable of being grounded absolutely. But exactly these fundamental principles governing all empirical inferences, which are for him the ultimate foundational laws of his entire psychology, are treated by him merely | as inductively ascertained laws. VII, 170/171 Thus, on a foundation of immediate self-evidence, a self-evidence that is unfortunately, however, the absolute self-evidence of merely immanent experience, laws are put forth not in similarly absolute self-evidence but in absolute irrationality. The naive reliance on induction is a poor substitute for absolute insight. For this fundamental psychological science is now completely suspended in the air; if it is not grounded in absolute self-evidence but grounded in the same naiveté as objective science, then, indeed, the entire undertaking of an ultimate grounding of cognition is deprived of all sense, and is so precisely at the level of this ultimate foundation.

Again we have identified here a basic ground of Hume's skepticism. Implicitly the complete irrationality of all cognition is assumed already in the fact that pure consciousness is made to be a seat of mere irrationality, in the fact that one readily expects it to be susceptible of lawful regulation but of a kind that can never be grasped rationally with insight: a set of merely empirical laws for which there are no grounds of validity that are absolutely graspable with insight on this pure foundation.

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[a] *versachlicht*

Hume's psychology thus has a basic feature in common with ordinary objective psychology insofar as it is, like the latter, *inductive* psychology. But with a significant difference: for that which may be altogether legitimate for objective psychology (if, that is, an epistemological theory of origins and norms can justify the legitimacy of objective inductions from apodictic principles at all) and which is then legitimate for an objective psychology on the grounds that what is psychic in the context of nature must, like everything natural, be viewed according to inductive connections—all this is fundamentally illegitimate, indeed countersensical, for a subjective psychology, a purely immanent one, insofar as the latter is supposed to be the foundational science, the science of the legitimate grounds for all possible cognition and science.

The *proteron pseudos* lies in the prejudice of empiricism, which as bad intuitionism acknowledges as self-given only the experiences of individual or temporal particulars and is blind to the fact that what is general—conceptual generalities and general states of affairs—can be intuitively grasped immediately and with insight; indeed such generalities are, so to speak, continually grasped intuitively. In fact, we need only point out that consciousness | is, as goes without saying, a site of immediate essential insights of pure generality and necessity; we would even be so bold as to try to demonstrate this for the laws of association, which only require a proper purely immanent formulation. Today this sounds quite paradoxical, so accustomed have we become since Hume and Mill—and not, as one might think, merely on the side of empiricism—to view association as an empirical peculiarity of human mental life and to parallelize the associative laws of psychic interiority with the law of gravitation as a law governing the inertial masses of external nature. One all too easily believes oneself to be able to pass over the question of whether it is possible and not rather countersensical to ground the ultimate principles of the legitimacy of all induction themselves through inductions. But at the very least, in our opinion, nobody who holds these views should be permitted to refuse the question of where then the scientific inductions are located, whoever might have carried them out, to which the laws of association owe their scientific grounding. For the law of gravitation we have the history of physics, and we know what efforts and orchestrated activities the execution

VII, 171/172

of these inductions has cost natural scientists. Where is the parallel on the side of psychology? It is absent for the same simple reason that it is also absent for logical and arithmetical axioms, which Mill, for instance, likewise wanted to declare as inductive. It is absent because these are general essential insights, which are precisely not induced but rather derived from purely general intuition,[1] derived as originally self-given generalities. The extreme *nominalism* that lives on in Hume's empiricism is completely blind when it comes to general intuitive grasping, and as was discussed above in our critique of Locke, in this blindness it attempts to explain away all general thinking by substituting for it natural interconnections of singular particularities—interconnections about which it of course makes general statements, concerning whose legitimacy one must only forget to ask. And precisely this is what the *Treatise* asks of us, namely, that we not even think of inquiring into the rational legitimacy of the induction of these foundational laws.

Lecture 25: ⟨The Problem of Constitution in Hume—and its Termination in Unmitigated Skepticism⟩

Once one has analyzed Hume's methodological principles, one essentially no longer needs to enter into his theories at all, for their countersense is merely an unfolding of the countersense contained in the fundamental principles. What compels us nevertheless to take one final look at them is not their enormous historical influence but the circumstance that in the questions raised by these theories problems of the highest philosophical dignity emerge for the first time, problems that, despite their naturalistic-skeptical depreciation, must nevertheless be regarded as forerunners of the main constitutional problems of the new phenomenology. In a certain sense, to be sure, something similar can already be said of the Lockean problematic. But only in Berkeley's turn to a transcendental psychology do these questions acquire a transcendental face, and in Hume's systematic carrying out of such a psychology they attain a new distinctness

[1] Reading *Intuition* for *Induktion*.—Trans.

and a significant deepening with regard to problems of synthetic unity. Hume's sharp eye glimpses in Berkeley's ingenious expositions concerning nature and natural science a lack of theoretical completeness. Where Berkeley believes he has finished his work, there tremendous problems of a new kind open up for him.

Sensory data in consciousness associate themselves into complexes. These, Berkeley said, are the things; their unity is a belonging-together resting on habit. The complexes themselves, since they in fact appear in an empirically regular manner, in turn become associated with one another, and for this reason we come to expect similar effects under similar material[a] circumstances. Everything that we call natural causality reduces itself to this. It is nothing but a relation of items in sequence, subjectively regulated by habit. The lawfulness of nature about which natural science speaks can, accordingly, be traced back to this regularity.

Yet all of that is insufficient, even for someone who, like Hume, wears sensualist spectacles. First of all, things are supposed to be mere associative complexes. But however much phenomenal things in perception point back to the data of the different senses and, as Hume the sensualist recognizes, are at first really nothing but complexes of such data unified through association | and habit, VII, 173/174 there is one thing that Berkeley has not at all seriously pondered and attempted to clear up: how we come to see any such complex, amid the alteration of its elements, as the *same*, sometimes changing, sometimes unchanged, thing—and indeed, going beyond this, how we come to assign it an existence independent of any current perception or non-perception. Why do I identify this table here as one and the same, even when I occasionally leave the room, since after all the remembered sensory complex and the new one appearing now are not the same but individually distinct and separated from one another? Hence precisely this (as we would say, *synthetic*) unity, the experienced thing itself as a unity of actual and possible experiences (or, stated more tendentiously, actual and possible complexes), falls by the wayside for Berkeley. Precisely this unity of the identical thing—this is one of Hume's cardinal problems. The parallel problem that accompanies it is that of the unity of the *Ego*,

[a] *dinglichen*

the person. Indeed he had denied a distinct impression for the *Ego* and had broken up the entire subjective unity into a heap or bundle of perceptions. But everyone believes he experiences himself as a person, just as he believes he experiences unified things; and in both cases these experienced unities are thought to exist even when they are not experienced. We continuously attribute such a sense, that of existence-in-itself, to them.

Furthermore: in explaining natural science as a science, and moreover as cognition stemming from mere habit, Berkeley simply made things too easy for himself. Certainly, association creates complexes of coexistence and succession. But is this *all*—and how would natural science be possible if this were all? For then there would be only inferences from habitual circumstances to habitual consequences, inferences that we make in our everyday life, but do not regard as scientific. Can one then doubt that natural science is genuine science, science that is permeated by the light of rationality? Can one doubt that necessity dwells in its inferences, that the laws it ascertains are mathematically exact, with a validity that is rigorously general? How are they supposed to be merely general expressions of habitual expectations? Rationalism had defended the | rational character of VII, 174/175 the new natural science in the most vigorous way, setting it on a par with mathematics. In any case one would have to take into account what it thus claimed.

To be sure, Berkeley had denied that the causality which is the title for all empirical inferences is genuine causality, which itself is proper only to the mind in its mental effecting and producing. But even if he may have been right that the originally mental concept of effecting and force cannot be attributed to material things animistically, he still should not have overlooked the peculiar sense of rational necessity and lawfulness belonging to the natural-scientific concepts of cause, effect, force, and law of forces, on which alone natural scientists depend. Berkeley therefore disclosed nothing intelligible whatsoever about nature and natural science, because he paid no heed to the basic sense in which both are generally taken: nature [as] a nexus of necessity in space and time, bound up with the change and stability of identical things existing for themselves; and natural science precisely [as] science, the cognition of rational necessities on the basis of apodictic principles.

But how is such sense-giving to be understood from the standpoint of consciousness? How does it arise in the genesis of original consciousness? For us, who see beyond the historical limitations of that time and have a transcendental science of consciousness as consciousness in view, it is clear that the problem of an inductive immanent psychological explanation in the style of a natural-scientific explanation is a complete countersense. At the same time, however, hidden behind this wrong-headed problem, felt and in a certain way formed anticipatively, lies the genuine and great problem, the one which, already as a descriptive problem, must be posed for every basic type of object that is constitutive for the makeup of the world (and, ideally speaking, for that of a world in general), a problem that demands an immense wealth of essential discoveries. For it is necessary, for each of these basic types of objectivity, and at the lowest level for material objectivity and physical nature as such, to exhibit in a specific way the essential formations of consciousness—formations in which | this kind of objectivity as VII, 175/176 such, first and foremost in original experience, constitutes itself as a synthetic unity—and to submit them to an analysis of their intentional achievements. Then one needs to study those higher formations of scientific consciousness in which such objectivities, as substrates of truths valid in themselves, are determined in their *theoretically* true being. The latter task designates the *transcendental* problem of scientific method, for instance that of natural science. Once this problematic comes into view, [it becomes clear that] it is essentially the same for all the highest regions of objects, and for the distinguishable objective totalities within them, which make up, or are called to make up, the "regions" of the sciences, each self-contained in principle. This applies, therefore, to those regions that stand under the great titles "culture" and "human society." On the other hand, in the problem of inductive-psychological genesis lies hidden the problem of the *genesis of consciousness*, or the problem as it were of *history* (eidetic or empirical): of *intersubjectivity* understood purely transcendentally and the history of its achievements, that is, of the real and ideal "worlds" that constitute themselves in pure subjects, individually and communally.

We can observe an exceedingly curious drama in the history of philosophy, particularly here in the development of an empiricism

that is countersensical through and through, in the way that, behind all of these confused and countersensical problems, problems that are quite profound, significant and meaningful are struggling to see the light of day, and in how the suggestive impression continually given by those spurious problems and their corresponding theories—which lends them strength in their development and enduring historical influence—is actually rooted in feeling one's way through these genuine problems. Transcendental consciousness, consciousness purely *as* consciousness, perpetually asserts itself and is a secret *spiritus rector*; it is only that the empiricist philosophies, incapable of doing justice to it, achieve the opposite of what philosophy wanted to achieve according to its proper essence, namely, to be a science in the fullest and most rigorous sense—but this means, we claimed, a science that is ready and well equipped to pose and answer theoretical questions in every essentially conceivable | dimension of inquiry, or, put differently: absolute science and VII, 176/177 together with it absolutely self-justifying science.

I cannot here get into a detailed description of *fictionalism*, which Hume lapses into, without first registering a shock at the consequences he incurs. For in accordance with these consequences, even exact natural science—and along with it, if we are to be precise, pure geometry—is supposed to be nothing more than the semblance of a science, a fiction, just as nature itself and its pure space are, supposedly, merely psychological illusions produced by the imagination, which only the philosopher uncovers. The shock quickly wears off, and later Hume seems to enjoy himself all too much in the role of the superior skeptic.

What interests us here are only the most general features of this Humean skepticism. Its entire constitution, as a theory that seeks to show all reality and all science of reality to be a fiction, becomes possible only through a kind of intellectual dishonesty, concerning which it is difficult to say how far Hume went in admitting it to himself and whether he ever made himself fully aware of it. The foundation of his famous theory of the transcendental correlation between the validity-source of our cognition of natural causality (the validity of causal inferences) and the true meaning of natural causality itself is, on the one hand, the recognition of purely rational truths, such as those that are purely mathematical and purely logical

(and herein lies precisely the intellectual dishonesty), and, on the other, its contrast with mere factual truths. The rationality of the latter is his problem, and what his theory ultimately claims is that they are absolutely irrational wherever, in our causal inferring, they go beyond immediate experience in the form of impression and memory.

Let us attempt a deeper understanding of the structure of Hume's problematic and argumentation.

Viewed historically, Hume's teaching, especially as stated in his *Essay*, can be characterized as empiricism's crushing victory over rationalism, or rather over the mathematizing rationalism that had prevailed since Descartes, whose essence consisted in an indiscriminate mixing of pure logico-mathematical causality with that of mathematical natural science. One held the cognitive achievement of mathematical physics | to be the same as that of pure arithmetic or VII, 177/178 geometry; one viewed it as merely an extension of pure mathematics, that is, as a geometry of material nature. The extreme and formally consistent carrying out of mathematical rationalism occurred in Spinoza's metaphysical system, whose scandalous content had to arouse suspicion directed against a purely rational method.

It was Leibniz and his contemporary Locke who were the first to recognize the ineradicable difference between purely ideal truths (or as Leibniz called them: pure truths of reason), whose negation is a countersense, a contradiction, and factual truths, the negation of which produces something that is false but not inconceivable, not countersensical. Hume takes over this distinction in the form of his famous division between cognitions concerning relations of ideas and cognitions concerning matters of fact. It thereby becomes clear that mathematical natural science, as an empirical science, is to be distinguished from the mathematico-logical sciences, which concern themselves entirely with purely rational truths, mediate and immediate. The application of mathematics to nature produces a higher degree of rationality, to be sure; but it cannot change its essential character as empirical science. But the rationality of mathematical natural science, so distinguished and highly esteemed as it is, had not thereby been clarified, and the confusion of it with pure mathematical rationality continually found support in real causal necessity, which played its role in all natural causal inferences and

which was not distinguished from rational necessity of the type that governs mathematical and logical inferences.

Hume's impressive—if not essentially new—division of causal from purely rational necessity is the starting point for the problem of the rationality of this latter kind of necessity in general, or, alternatively, of the rationality of natural-scientific modes of inference. Here one acts as though the rationality of relations of ideas and the rational inferences belonging to them were no problem, that is, were completely understood, since to deny this would lead to absurdity. On the other hand, the putative rationality of causal inferences is now dissolved into a fiction through their reduction to a thoroughly irrational origin in the | association of ideas—dissolved into a psychologically explicable confusion of blindly compelled belief resting on habitual association with that kind of rationality which alone is genuine. VII, 178/179

The art of Hume's skepticism consists in treating human cognition as a stage upon which reason and imagination enter as actors and annihilate one another as irreconcilable enemies. Reason has its strictly delimited sphere of authority;[a] its borderland bears the inscription "countersense." Within this sphere of authority[b] there are only ideas and relations of ideas, but nothing of a real world. The latter belongs in the domain of a different power, "imagination," which, in accordance with immanent-psychological laws, particularly (though not exclusively) those of the association of ideas and habit, produces the nature that we experience as its fictitious creation by secretly permitting itself unlawful, indeed countersensical, border-transgressions. The process is always the same: imagination, following its blind laws, first generates a countersense and then, to make this first countersense more palatable, fabricates a new countersense to go with it. The general principle of the imagination lies in a peculiar kind of inertia belonging to the human soul owing to which it cannot stop itself, once it has gained habitual momentum through its previous experiences, and must overshoot experience. Wherever anything of the regularity of coexistence and succession has presented itself to the soul in actual experience, it must immediately pass over to an extension of this regularity beyond what was

[a] *Herrschaftssphäre* [b] *Rechtssphäre*

hitherto experienced, projecting it into the future and absolutizing it as something existing objectively. Thus it invents, on the basis of the rough coexistence of data, enduring objects as existing independent of consciousness, thus it invents causal connections with putative necessities, and so on. Rationality does not permit us here to let the appearing world (the imaginative world of things, which is constructed behind the actual sense data) count as existing in any sense whatsoever; nor does it permit us to view this world as the manifestation of something transcendent lying further behind it. Something that is not to be found in our consciousness and that exists for itself is, according to Hume, at best an empty possibility of thought. The only way to make an inference from something given to something not given is | by way of association and habit, which VII, 179/180 themselves, however, license nothing.

Admittedly, what Hume means to say here is this: A thought process that is guided by imagination and is thus in the style of induction is "natural" in any case, whereas every inference to something metaphysical, or rather something "meta-psychical," is not only irrational, but also unnatural. But this simply cannot be taken seriously, since what is natural and what is unnatural are supposed to be fully irrational in the same way, and the irrational metaphysical inference can conceivably be effected just as naturally, according to some psychological laws or other, as the irrational causal inference. Yet Hume speaks repeatedly as if he were an agnostic, as if there existed after all in reality an unknown and unknowable transcendent world, which is to be assumed the ontic principle for the processes of our consciousness as well. But this contradicts his theories so glaringly that it can only be seen as an accommodation to prevailing views safeguarded by the Church.

Hume's philosophy is therefore the unreserved bankruptcy of any philosophy that hopes, through natural science or metaphysics, to inform us scientifically about "the" world. Philosophy, as the ultimate science, shows that the factual sciences are all irrational, that is, are not sciences. This conclusion is of course a consummate countersense, since philosophy itself, as a universal psychology, is supposed to be a factual science. It is not permissible to say here that skepticism concerns only the science of transcendent (natural) reality. For one should keep in mind that this entire argument for

the irrationality of empirical inferences is carried out on immanent ground, which is to say in such a manner that in the first place what it deals with directly are only impressions and ideas, that is, immanent perceptions. On the one hand, therefore, the rationality of immanent psychology is continuously presupposed, since it is through it, after all, that Hume's theories are supposed to show themselves to be rational; on the other hand, the result of these theories is that no science of experience whatsoever (including this psychology) can be rational.

I had said at the outset that all these skeptical theories presuppose, so to speak, the rationality of reason itself—presuppose, in other words, that the necessity attaching to cognitions | concerning relations of ideas is a truly genuine and intelligible one, and that as such it is distinguishable by means of the self-evident criterion that the negation of such a necessity yields a countersense. But it is precisely here that I see the intellectual dishonesty I mentioned earlier (which regardless of anything else must repel us from Hume). Hume as a skeptic resembles only too well an accomplished artist who, in order to achieve an aesthetic effect, deliberately creates distortions. To prove this no lengthy discussions are required; for indeed we already know that he took over Berkeley's doctrine of abstraction, that he in fact exaggerated it. In purely rational judgments, indeed, we judge in pure concepts about essential generalities and not about the momentary individual ideas, the momentary phantasms hovering before us. We judge generally; this generality is even held to be a pure, an unconditioned one, and the countersense in the denial is an unconditioned and general countersense. This, too, is reduced to associations and other irrational psychological mechanisms belonging with them, in accordance with the nominalistic interpretation of general thinking. General ideas, general insights, are at bottom a Humean title for mere subjective fictions. Were Hume a consistent skeptic, he simply would not permit himself to say anything; he could not even assert the general statement that it is impossible to understand how anything at all could be said about that which goes beyond the individual perceptions. There can be no talk, therefore, of the special advantages of pure mathematics. The end result is the absolute bankruptcy of *all* cognition.

VII, 180/181

And yet empiricist sensualism is not worthless, and Hume's writings are deserving of careful study. In virtually all of Hume's discussions phenomenological issues can be seen lying together with everything else, and they thereby enter the reader's horizon. Behind all the naturalistically misinterpreted problems lie true problems; behind all the absurd negations lie aspects of a valuable position. It is only that Hume himself did not take advantage of them, did not grasp them theoretically and form them into fundamental theoretical positions.

Just this is the significance for us of Hume's skepticism, consistent sensualist subjectivism that it is: that although it contains not a single sentence that is scientifically | tenable, it is nevertheless an intuitionist and purely immanent philosophy, and as such is a forerunner of the only genuine intuitionist philosophy, phenomenology. VII, 181/182

⟨Chapter Three
The Rationalism and Metaphysics of the Modern Period⟩

Lecture 26: ⟨The Main Features of the Positively Constructive Trajectory of Modern Rationalism and its Dogmatism⟩

⟨a). *Overview of the preparation for a future genuine metaphysics, hampered by the lack of a transcendental foundational science*⟩

In view of our particular aim *vis-à-vis* empiricism, a far less detailed examination is necessary of the great developmental direction, so rich in great thinkers, of rationalism, which leads from Descartes by way of Spinoza and Leibniz to Kant, and beyond him to Hegel. If modern empiricism had the highly consequential function of promoting the method of going back to the phenomenological origins of all cognition, which first made it possible to found a philosophy at all, and of lending force to the demand for a radically intuitionist philosophy, then rationalism's function lies in a completely different direction. In constant battle against empiricism, rationalism never understands how to give the latter its full due; it fails to grasp the significant essential core lying behind the skeptical errors. For this reason it never makes the attempt to develop a better immanent philosophy that could take the place of the skeptically countersensical one. Actually, it would have been its calling to do just that. For if empiricism is, at bottom, the continuation of the ancient skeptical-negativistic philosophy, then rationalism is the continuation of the positively constructive line of development which aims at true and ultimately complete science, and hence at genuine philosophy. Rationalism, that is to say, is the continuation of Platonism and medieval realism, and thus the enemy of every nominalistic attempt to interpret away general ideas and every kind of | truly rational cognition—the defender VII, 182/183
of "eternal" truths and of every scientific method based on experience that gives the empirical a share in pure rationality, and this

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S. Luft, T. M. Naberhaus (translators), *First Philosophy*, Husserliana: Edmund Husserl – Collected Works 14, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_10

above all in the paradigmatic form of mathematical natural science.

The rationalist Descartes inaugurated the modern period precisely by opening up the avenue of approach to the sphere of immanence as the absolute foundation for all grounding of cognition. Who more than rationalism would have felt called to take up this new sphere as a field of work, the work of developing purely rational conceptual formations and insights, that is, of developing an eidetics of transcendental subjectivity! But we already know that Descartes did not comprehend the genuine philosophical sense of his discovery and that it served for him only as anchorage to be used in securing the positive ("dogmatic") sciences. In this way he guided rationalism's entire subsequent development onto the path of a dogmatic metaphysics and dogmatic individual sciences. An irrepressible yearning for knowledge, together with the reverse side of an unleashed drive toward the practical domination of nature and the world, satisfied itself in ever new theories, specialized itself with unending fruitfulness in ever new sciences; and above these methodologically self-standing individual sciences there arises a new metaphysics. Being connected with all of them, this metaphysics sees its function in standing for the universal idea of philosophy and in putting the so-called highest and ultimate questions to undivided reality, understood as the entire universe. These were questions that, as was already the case for Aristotle's general ontology, were precisely not special questions bound to particular regions, and they culminated in theological problems. But this metaphysics, the modern one as much as the ancient and medieval ones, was a dogmatic science every bit as much as the natural sciences and the other special sciences newly establishing themselves were. Their basic concepts and principles, their methods and theories, were not drawn from the ultimate sources in transcendental subjectivity and therefore did not receive from these sources their ultimate sense and their ultimate truth. This transcendental subjectivity of the transcendental universal community[a] of individual transcendental subjects

[a] *Allgemeinschaft*. The word is Husserl's neologism, and a pun on the German words *allgemein* (general, universal) and *Gemeinschaft* (community). —Trans.

bound together through the possibility of | reciprocal understanding VII, 183/184
remained unseen, remained in the state of naive anonymity; still less was it recognized as the most radical and most important of all scientific themes. One did not yet see that it is the essential correlate of the totality of objectivities, which, seen exclusively as "positive," were the focus of all natural experience and then exclusively the focus of the positive sciences. The term "essential correlate," however, implies that objectivity without transcendental subjectivity is simply inconceivable. For one did not yet realize that the entirety of natural experience, and thus in general the one-sided focus on positivities (the universe and the mathematical world of ideas), involves a kind of abstraction, that it seduces philosophical thought into absolutizing mere *abstracta*, and that without a suspension of such abstraction by methodologically deactivating its positivistic captivation, making visible the transcendental subjectivity that in the natural sphere is hidden to itself, and undertaking a systematic study of this subjectivity as constituting all types of positivity—that without these procedures, a truly *concrete* cognition is impossible.

To be sure, an epistemological impetus, arising from Descartes' *Meditations* and as a continued effect of the even older question as to the proper method for a genuine grounding of science, was perennially in force, and metaphysical efforts were almost everywhere entangled and interspersed with epistemological considerations, just as, conversely, epistemological investigations at times unconcernedly made metaphysical presuppositions or presuppositions drawn from individual sciences. One simply did not yet know what an epistemology, what a doctrine of the understanding or of reason would have to accomplish, and that nothing less was demanded here than a fundamental science preceding every objective cognition and science, putting them all in question in the same manner—a science, in other words, that is independent of all of them. One did not see that without such a science, whose sole field of work could only be subjectivity grasped in its purity, no philosophy, no science of nature and of spirit, no metaphysics as universal science of the highest grounds of being—no science which, as all-sided and ultimately grounded, could also give an *ultimate* answer about being in general and its | individual scientific particularities—was possible. Or rather VII, 184/185
(as we demonstrated above), in the generation following Descartes,

a certain budding consciousness of the necessity of a grounding science of pure subjectivity had indeed succeeded in making itself felt on the side of empiricism, but in the form of an immanent sensualist psychologism, which had to be repudiated by the rationalists, in scathing critique, as a new variety of the nominalism and skepticism against which they had always done battle.

But the rationalist critique did not fulfill its historical function. For as was already the case in antiquity in relation to skeptical subjectivism, in the modern period one was confronted with the task, in relation to the new, the immanent psychologism, of not becoming caught up in merely demonstrating what is incorrect and countersensical about the skeptical theories, but of doing justice to their genuine content through a positive critique of their operative inner motives. One was thereby confronted with the task of realizing the truth of subjectivism in a higher sense, that is, of transforming a bad subjectivism into one demanded by necessity. But even a Leibniz, who saw positive value everywhere and in all philosophies, was not able, in his thorough (and in detail very instructive) critique of Locke, to wrest from the latter's sensualistic-empiricist intuitionism the true idea of a transcendental intuitionism, or to envision the grounding of an essential science of transcendental subjectivity, decisive for a scientific philosophy, in place of an immanent empirical and indeed sensualist psychology.

Still, it would be wrong to underestimate the tremendous mental work, itself highly fruitful for a scientific psychology of the future, that was accomplished in modern rationalist philosophy, no less than in that of antiquity. This is equally the case if we understand philosophy in the broadest (and indispensable) sense of the term, that is, if we count along with it the sciences that develop themselves ever more completely under the idea of rational grounding, or if we understand philosophy in a narrower sense and assign to it only those disciplines that deal with all-encompassing ontological questions and fundamental | normative questions. Certainly for us, VII, 185/186
who already understand a transcendental philosophy in the phenomenological style to be the *unum necessarium* for the attainment of ultimately sufficient cognition and ultimately scientific science, none of our existing sciences, whether exact mathematics, natural science, or any human science, however worthy of recognition on

methodological grounds, is science in this ultimate sense. And at bottom this is accepted by all those who regard as necessary a "philosophy of mathematics" independent of or alongside mathematics, a "philosophy of physics" or a "philosophy of nature" alongside physics itself, and similarly everywhere philosophies adjoining all the other positive sciences in an analogous fashion, rather than seeing these philosophies as fields of worthless terminological disputes. At the same time, we may doubtless assume a priori, albeit with a certain naiveté of self-evidence, that such a higher transcendental grounding of cognition would cause no substantial alteration to the main or central trunk of the theoretical method of the time-honored objective sciences. The gain would consist in laying a foundation that is clear down to the origins, in enacting an essential reference back to absolute subjectivity by means of which these sciences would be enriched through abundant increases in knowledge in the transcendental dimension opposed to them and experience definitive sense-determinations for their respective spheres of objects.

The situation is not so good, certainly, when it comes to the traditional philosophical disciplines in the pregnant sense, and above all when it comes to metaphysics as universal ontology. For here one never arrived at a methodologically secured, generally acknowledged science, nor could one do so since it was precisely for this that a transcendental grounding science in our sense was required. And yet, valuable precursors of metaphysical insights and metaphysical theories, with rich (albeit not really scientifically grounded) systematic content, came to be developed in metaphysics and played their part in a genuinely ascending development with the enduring vocation of preparing the way for a future genuine metaphysics.

I would like to explicate in general terms how I think about this, without losing myself in unending and pointless individual criticisms of the various systems. Such criticisms of the rationalist theories cannot, indeed, be contemplated with an aim similar | to that gov- VII, 186/187
erning our criticisms of the empiricist theories. In the case of the latter, a new methodological type had appeared with Locke, and our critique of this method had the important goal of making visible, behind the immanent psychological method, the historical tendency toward an absolutely necessary and true philosophical method, the phenomenological one. But rationalism, as dogmatic, does not aim

at an immanent method at all, and in its method no tendency toward the true, if incomplete, method is working itself out. In this respect, skeptical negativism is, in fact, more positive than the rationalism that advances through positive, rational labor. But what is of interest here is to show how this dogmatism was motivated through the Cartesian awakening of transcendental subjectivity and simultaneously through the new empiricism, how it was forced, in the dogmatic attitude, to take account of the transcendental and ultimately to develop coherent theories for it, theories which, although they did not do justice to the sense demanded by an immanent phenomenology, could nevertheless yield results that were suited to it. In addition, it should be noted that the new disciplines rationalism developed using a priori methods, more particularly the ontologies, had to take on an important function the moment the task of a phenomenology as a purely immanent transcendental philosophy had been correctly understood and embraced.* | VII, 187/188

*Put in the language of my *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*: The basic concepts and principles of the ontologies are the necessary "guiding clues" for a universal phenomenology at the higher stage of a phenomenology of reason, or, alternatively, for a systematic outline of the constitutive problematic. These guiding clues are related, on the one hand, to the formal-ontological quasi-region "object in general" and, on the other, to the highest regions of objectivities. What is needed, therefore, is a systematic grounding of all formal and regional ontologies and a universal "doctrine of categories" that brings them into systematic harmony, i.e., an eidetic grounding of the system of regions that is predelineated a priori, framed by the formal region. Even if this entire effort is carried out within the phenomenological attitude itself, after the methodological exposition of the universal ground of phenomenological research (the phenomenological reduction), it is nevertheless clear that every ontology conceived with naive-positive evidence—or, what amounts to the same thing, every purely rational discipline—is to be taken up into phenomenology (though perhaps needing to be improved through a clarification of origins), and that it thus hands down to it work that has already been done. If, as in the *Ideas*, [187/188] one limits the concept of phenomenology to an eidetic-"descriptive" fundamental science, bound to the realm of immediate intuition—the possible expansion to the entire sphere of mediate cognition is straightforward and leads to a universal phenomenological science encompassing all the rational sciences—then the basic concepts and basic principles of every ontology would belong to this descriptive phenomenology itself and would function at the same time as "guiding clues" for their constitutive investigations. All of this then carries over to the positive factual sciences, in the phenomenological interpretation of which arise all the ultimately scientific factual sciences, those that are in themselves philosophical, which no longer tolerate alongside them any special philosophies adhering to them. Through the final

⟨b). *Critical Remarks on the Regressive Procedure Employed in the Rationalist Systems Since Occasionalism. The Task of Progressive Research*⟩

Already in the Cartesian School we notice a tendency toward the development of a metaphysics rooted in the desire to reconcile causal and teleological[1] ways of considering the world, along with the development of an a priori ontology with a putatively exact method modeled on mathematics. With regard to the latter, we have in mind, of course, Spinoza, with his *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*. Every consideration, guided by extra-theoretical motivations, of the needs of positive religion and theology remained foreign to him. Instead, with brusque insolence he attempted to develop, out of purely axiomatic fundamental determinations and strictly deductively, an atheological doctrine of being and of God, as well as an ethics.

The *occasionalists* were different. With its dual-substance doctrine, which demanded a science of the spirit after the same fashion and method as natural science and attributed to *both* sciences absolute importance, the Cartesian philosophy seemed, metaphysically, to press toward a causal view of the world, which could satisfy neither the demands of religion nor the ethical needs | bound up with VII, 188/189
them. Thus, already in occasionalism, and even before Spinozism had started to have an influence, attempts were made to formulate a metaphysics under the guidance of ethico-religious postulates. The impetus toward such attempts becomes even stronger after the emergence of Spinoza's *Ethics*, which appeared to be the pure

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interpretation of the objective being that is explored in them as fact, which accrues to them through the application of eidetic phenomenology, and through a universal regarding of all regions of objectivity in relation to the universal community of transcendental subjects, the universe, the universal theme of the positive sciences, takes on a "metaphysical" interpretation, which means nothing other than an interpretation behind which it makes no scientific sense to search for another. But behind this interpretation, a new problematic opens up on phenomenological ground, one that cannot be further interpreted: that of the irrationality of the transcendental fact, which expresses itself in the constitution of the factual world and of factual spiritual life—that is, metaphysics in a new sense.

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[1] Reading *teleologischer* instead of *theologischer*—Trans.

consequence of the new mathematical science and which was bound to provoke the greatest offense. God had become a sort of mathematical being from whom every genuinely spiritual predicate had been removed. The emanation of the physical and spiritual realities of the world as we ordinarily view it from out of this absolute substance had been transformed into a mathematical emanation of mathematically determined outcomes based on basic definitional determinations. In this system of rigid mathematical consequence, there was no room for freedom, purposiveness, or divine teleology.

Subsequent developments are essentially dominated by the philosophical need to reconcile causal and final, natural and spiritual, views of the world, to reconcile mathematical-mechanical necessity with human and divine freedom. It is just this drive toward reconciliation which lends these metaphysical attempts a not inconsiderable methodological character, one that at the same time is co-determined by the need to give consideration to the theme, operative since Descartes, of the self-contained *res cogitans*—of spirit that is immediately conscious only of itself.

When, in the nineteenth century, in the wake of an interpretation of the Kantian critique of reason, one speaks of "transcendental method," then one has in mind, in contradistinction to what we mean by the term, a distinctive regressive and constructing method that traces the "conditions of possibility" of objectively valid cognition in the sense of the question, "What must be presupposed with regard to cognizing subjectivity; how must its cognitive capacities, the tiered cognitive functions of intuiting and thinking, be taken; how must they operate, in forming cognition, such that cognition of a true objectivity in the form of truths and sciences valid in themselves is to be possible and intelligible?" The metaphysics of reconciliation is reconstructive in a similar sense, and it seems to me that the enormous role that reconstruction | has taken on in epistemology VII, 189/190 has its original historical source in this reconstructive metaphysics.[1]

Now, as far as the latter is concerned, philosophy, which was still firmly mired in dogmatism, was faced, on the one hand, with the world of the new objective sciences—the world of mathematics, of

[1] Cf. Appendix 4, pp. 431 ff.—Ed.

mathematical natural science, and of psychology and the human sciences naturalistically conceived—and these sciences and their world were to be taken as absolute. On the other hand, religion and theology had designated God, as world-creator, the ultimate principle from which the entire world, in respect of its sense and being, springs, containing within itself the free rational creatures in whom self-responsibility rooted in individual logical and ethical conscience is intertwined with responsibility before God, individual free decisions and deeds with the omni-decision of the finally omni-active God. Implicit in the religious demand—at least this was the way it was understood—was the notion that the content of all actual being and even of all the lawlike regularities governing this being, as well as the sense and absolute validity of all ultimately justifying rational norms, must have their teleological grounds in the divine spirit. Positive and theological truths wanted and had to come into a reconciling unity—as did, together with them, divine being and the being of finite creatures; God's reason and will and the reason and will of man. Metaphysics as the science of being in the absolute sense was thereby forced onto the path of construction: How must we conceive the natural world above all, that of the objective sciences, so that it can become a God-affected, a teleologically intelligible world? The methodological procedure is, therefore, similar to the one theology always had to comply with when it wanted to make its theological doctrines rationally intelligible in the manner of a so-called natural theology. But what is permissible for theology, philosophy is not yet entitled to. Philosophy is permitted no pre-existing dogma, no antecedent conviction of any sort. Its essence consists, indeed, in wanting to be absolutely grounded science, or, more simply, *pure* science and nothing but science. For reasons of principle, it can begin only with absolutely perspicuous primordial grounds and from there make its ascent on an absolutely | unprejudiced path of justification, one that legitimates itself at every step on the basis of self-evident principles. Its procedure can and may only be progressive. VII, 190/191

In a certain sense, of course, every scientific researcher proceeds constructively and regressively; he does so in his inventive trains of thought. All invention presupposes anticipation, for one cannot seek or seek to create anything without having beforehand a guiding

idea about what is to be sought or created. And beforehand the inventor will attempt to imagine in phantasy possible paths that might lead in stages, by way of already established truths, to the anticipated result. But with all this we have only gained a conjecture and a provisional probability. The work that really accomplishes something then follows; it proceeds progressively from that which is firmly grounded to that which is grounded in it. But only by going forward ascendingly, in the actual labor of grounding, is perspicuous and concretely full cognition actually gained in respect of its path *and* goal, the kind of cognition that as a rule turns out to be, in both respects, not only richer but oftentimes also different than the original conjecture.

Lecture 27: ⟨On Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Meaning of Leibniz's Monadology and Kant's Critique of Reason⟩

Following what has been said, we understand that a dogmatic rationalism can never lead to a definitively valid philosophy, though for completely different reasons than in the case of empiricism. Rationalism is nothing but the continuation and modification of ancient Platonism. In it a momentous fundamental idea—that true being is the correlate of perspicuous conceptual thought, of logical judging—steadily continues to make itself felt. But what defines modern rationalism is the fact that with Descartes, cognizing subjectivity—as experiencing and logically thinking but also intending and deciding in every other sense—had become visible in its pure immanence. It thenceforth demanded to be regarded as the absolute ground on or in which the world that appears for the cognizing *Ego*, the true world, is constituted. Now everything depended on how this demand was understood. | VII, 191/192

Descartes' attempt to make the *Ego Cogito* the absolute foundation for the construction of all the objective sciences and, at the same time, to give unity and definitive grounding to the special sciences and the metaphysics encompassing them—this attempt, as we showed earlier, failed because Descartes could not yet see the necessity of making the realm of the *Ego Cogito*, as a field of transcendental experience, (or, alternatively, of eidetic intuition) the

theme of a descriptive science and of showing, in purely immanent research, how here in pure consciousness and according to their own essential necessities, all possible objective configurations are contained as cognitive configurations.

The period that followed, up to Kant, cannot shut its eyes against immanent subjectivity and the self-evidence of its subjective experiential processes; but it has before itself the intuited world and the established objective sciences that determine truth for it, as well as its religious and moral convictions, and now it reflects upon them: How must the realities be reconceived, how must they be interpreted, in order for the demands of science, of religion, of morality, to be satisfied—and into the bargain, and not least, *those* demands made by the immanence of cognition. Metaphysics, as the general doctrine of being in its absolute reality, becomes, in the last analysis, dependent on how one interprets the cognition that is carried out in immanence.

Of course, as in the case of an objective science of nature and of spirit, one could also formulate a general doctrine of being *straightforwardly*, that is, in the manner of positive science. Once the distinction between pure and applied mathematics had become clear, one could then also devise for nature, in contradistinction to empirical (if mathematically structured) science, a *purely rational*, an a priori natural science, or in other words, an a priori *ontology* of nature, a science not only of factual nature but of an ideally possible nature in general—precisely in the sense in which geometry is not a science of factual space and its forms but of ideally possible spatial formations and an ideally possible | space. And in the same manner VII, 192/193
one could attempt to devise an ontology of the soul, and finally a *general ontology* of any possible reality whatsoever—but with the utter naiveté with which mathematicians produce their a priori truths, unencumbered by any epistemology. Other expressions for such intended ontological disciplines are a *metaphysical* or *rational doctrine of nature and of the soul*, and, more comprehensively, *rational cosmology and theology*. Already Spinoza's *Ethics* is a purely rational metaphysics that was to include all special ontologies.

But in regard to such attempts, when they attempted to pass themselves off as finally valid sciences, the naiveté with which the absolute validity and the metaphysical value of the results was

asserted had to become perceptible. Metaphysics was the title under which one had always laid claim to ultimately valid ontological cognition. But after the problem of the possibility of objective cognition in the immanence of the cognizing subject had emerged with Descartes' *Meditations*, the value of all objective science and hence also of all naive metaphysics had to appear problematic. "Clear and distinct" cognition, the rational theorizing of science, is carried out in the immanence of the cognizing *Ego*. What is thus cognized is supposed to exist in truth. What exists in truth is rationally cognizable, and what is rationally cognized is true; it exists "in itself" as that which the cognitive judgment conceptually determines it to be. But how is this basic rationalistic conviction, upon which indeed all science rests, to be maintained, how is it explainable, when after all the cognizing agent, with all of his cognitive formations, only forms what he forms within himself, within his pure subjectivity? All scientific articulations, whether empirical or a priori, whether, in the latter case, in virtue of their fundamental generality and apodictic self-evidence, they could be characterized as metaphysical, required an interpretation as to their "sense" and "scope"—that is, an epistemological interpretation. With regard to them, it was necessary to pose and solve the problems concerning the "cognitive value" of the cognitive achievements carried out in the immanence of the cognizing activity.

Only then, therefore, can there be ultimate philosophical truth, | VII, 193/194 or, if metaphysics remains the title for such truth and for what is ultimately fundamental, only then can there be a genuine metaphysics. In the broader sense it then encompasses every objective science that is freed from its naiveté through epistemological interpretation. These are methodological convictions that become accepted early on in rationalist philosophy as consequences of the Cartesian impulses. They already define Leibniz's entire philosophizing, are then operative with a new and tremendous power in Kant's critique of reason, and are revived again in the nineteenth century in the neo-Kantian schools, albeit mostly in attenuated form.

The question now, however, is which method is to be used in carrying out this epistemological interpretation, and the entire epistemological labor accomplished in it. It is understandable that at first one would begin by accepting science, just as in his life

the natural human being accepts the world of experience as the taken-for-granted existing reality. After all, he has experienced—or rather has naively *actuated*—its self-evidence as it confirms itself in the concordant progress of experience, and its power lies in the taken-for-granted, immediate being-there-for-me[a] of the experienced things. Likewise, someone who has worked though his share of science actively and with insight is sure of what has been demonstrated theoretically, and of its truth. There is, however, a dangerous and methodologically countersensical confusion that occurs when, as can easily result from this attitude, one mixes the objective scientific statements that one accepts as *valid* in with epistemological questions, as when one, say, weaves psychophysical knowledge into epistemological considerations as an intermediary link. The empiricist Locke committed this mistake in a crude and clumsy way, and philosophizing natural scientists and natural-scientifically oriented philosophers—it is a mass phenomenon—are still committing it right down to our own day.

But although this reproach cannot be directed at the great philosophers of the eighteenth century, at a Leibniz or a Kant, there was nonetheless greatly lacking in them an ultimate and pure consciousness of the method upon which a scientifically genuine epistemological grounding of every science depends. What is needed here before all else is a | general and, so to speak, pedantic methodological focusing of attention: all cognition, beginning with simple experiential knowledge and on up to science of every kind, must be treated as epistemologically questionable, and at the same time, in keeping with the sense of this questionability, each and every cognition (its supposed object as much as the truth that is supposed to determine it) is initially to be taken merely as a phenomenon, instead of our taking it as a valid cognition and using it as such. But every cognition is a phenomenon for me in transcendental subjectivity, and so the genuine and pure method requires, first, that nothing else be posited but this given which is truly first in itself of all givens: transcendental subjectivity as "absolutely" self-evident. On the other hand, no matter how self-evidently given, every objectivity, the world of the senses and the science determin-

VII, 194/195

[a] *Für-mich-dasein*

ing it, may be posited only as something experienced in experience, as the judgmental content of these or those scientifically formed judging experiences. Once this highlighting of the universal realm of subjectivity, with its phenomena, has consciously occurred, the next step is obvious enough—and empiricism can make one aware of it—namely, the step of saying to oneself: here is a possible distinct, closed field of research that can and must be explored systematically.

But historically, epistemology does not proceed in this manner. Though it might, *de facto*, claim its problematic cognitions—be they sensory experiences and empirical judgments, be they purely rational concepts and judgments, be they entire sciences such as mathematics and exact natural science—to be phenomena, and though the validity of these cognitions express the immanent peculiarity of a subjectively perspicuous grounding: still, this procedure is not carried out in a methodologically conscious manner, one that first assures itself of transcendental subjectivity as its primordial ground and makes the cognitive formations on this ground into the systematic theme of its research. It is not enough to have cognitive formations as phenomena and to question them as to the sense of their objective validity; one must make it clear to oneself that these phenomena must first be studied as phenomena, and that as phenomena of intentionality they require an intentional explication. | VII, 195/196

Initially, of course, tentative general reflections offer certain guiding clues for interpretation—as, for instance, when Leibniz reflects on sensibility and thought in the following manner: "In purely sensory experience I am sensorially affected, and what is sensory affects me as something alien to me; in thinking I am active purely from out of myself; pure concepts are free of accidental experience; they are drawn from my pure being." In every a priori insight a lawlike regularity belonging to the pure essence of subjectivity enunciates itself, one that, as a lawfulness of essence, must be common to all subjects. What, then, of sensory experience and the empirical laws conditioned by it? How do pure concepts, as forming the primordial forms of my purely intellective being, operate in empirical science? How must one, advancing in this manner, interpret sensibility, and, following that, the nature that is experienced in sensation and cognized in natural science, if empirical cognition is to become comprehensible as objective?

I do not wish to go any further, but it is apparent that neither thinking cognition of a purely rational kind nor the experience of concrete natural objects is being investigated directly and subjected to a systematic intentional-essential analysis, and that such modes of consideration can only count as tentative anticipations, not as theories. Without actual analysis, one carries out reconstructive thought-formations while the phenomena in question remain far removed from the matters themselves. One searches for conditions of the possibility of the occurring of this or that cognitive achievement or for the possibility of a rationally intelligible world of cognition, and all the while the structure of sensibility (say, as confused thought) and of thinking is not actually investigated but is rather postulated. An intuitive thinker such as Leibniz, of course, invents nothing unless his ingenious imagination is also able to anticipate a suitable intuition, and accordingly his entire monadology is one of the greatest anticipations in history. Whoever fully comprehends it cannot but attribute a great degree of truth to it. In his discussion of the basic properties of the monad, Leibniz, under the titles "perception," "striving transition from perception to perception," and especially "representation of something not genuinely present of which we are nonetheless perceptively | conscious," grasped and assimilated metaphysically the basic properties of intentionality. But on the whole, he remains trapped in the occasional *aperçu*, in anticipations and constructions. VII, 196/197

Kant, too, as much as he is intent on systematic investigations and though he indeed makes advances in a system that is profoundly thought through, fails to see the method required for a genuine transcendental science. His method is closely related to that of Leibniz, and although he believes himself to be very far from Leibniz, this is because the genuine sense of Leibniz's philosophy could only come to light in our own day, on the basis of a more comprehensive knowledge of the ideas scattered throughout his sketches, letters, and smaller treatises. Certainly, we can say that in point of fact Kant's entire investigations play out on the absolute ground of transcendental subjectivity. Furthermore, he saw, with a matchless intuitive power, essential structures in this subjectivity that are of incomparable significance and of whose existence no one before him had had an inkling. In Kant's critique of reason, a chain of great discoveries

lies stretched out before us—and yet not only are they difficult to gain access to, but they are also justified methodologically in such a form that we are forced to say: Kant's critique of reason remains just as far removed from a transcendental philosophy, as ultimately grounding and ultimately grounded science, as does that of Leibniz. The regressive methodological procedure plays for him the largest role. How is pure mathematics possible? How is pure natural science possible?, and so on. How must we conceive of sensibility in order for pure geometrical judgments to become possible? How must the manifold of sensible intuition come to synthetic unity in order for rigorous natural science, that is, the defining of experiential objects as truths valid in themselves, to become possible? Kant himself demands and carries out "deductions," the deductions of the forms of intuition and of the categories, which he calls "metaphysical" and "transcendental"; he likewise deduces the schematism, the necessary validity of the principles of the pure understanding, and so on. To be sure, he does not merely carry out deductions, and of course they are not deductions in the ordinary sense of the term. And yet, it is a *constructive* thought procedure, followed afterward by intuition, and not a procedure that, ascending from below, advancing intuitively from authentication to authentication, makes | intelligible VII, 197/198 the constitutive accomplishments of consciousness, let alone one in keeping with all the points of view that are available to reflection. That which is in a sense the deepest interior of constituting consciousness is scarcely touched at all in Kant; the sensible phenomena that he occupies himself with are already constituted unities of an immensely rich intentional structure that is never subjected to a systematic analysis. Similarly, though judgment plays a fundamentally determinative role, yet when it comes to a phenomenology of judicative experiences and of the manner in which, in their alterations, the proposition and its ontological modalities become unified, no attempts are made. For this reason, although a great deal is seen in the way of formations in pure subjectivity, and important stratifications of them are discovered, yet everything floats in an enigmatic milieu and is the accomplishment of transcendental faculties that remain mythical.

Things might perhaps have been different had Kant been awoken from his dogmatic slumbers not by the Hume of the *Essay*

but by that of the *Treatise*, and had he studied carefully this great foundational work of the English skeptic. Perhaps he would have discovered, behind the skeptical countersense, the necessary sense of an immanent intuitionism, and the idea of an ABC of transcendental consciousness and its elementary achievements—an idea that Locke already had.

In one main point, which is partly decisive for the possibility of a scientifically adequate theory of transcendental consciousness and reason, Kant lags behind Leibniz. The latter has the merit of being the first in the modern period to understand the deepest and most valuable sense of Platonic idealism and accordingly to identify ideas as unities that give themselves in a peculiar *intuition of ideas*. One can no doubt say that for Leibniz intuition as self-giving consciousness was the ultimate source of truth and of the sense of truth. And thus every general truth intuited in pure self-evidence has, for him, absolute significance. For this reason it also makes sense to him to claim an utterly absolute significance for the essential peculiarities of the *Ego* that are glimpsed in such self-evidence. In Kant, however, the concept of the a priori puts us in a persistent state of embarrassment. The | character of generality and necessity by means of VII, 198/199
which he characterizes it points toward absolute self-evidence, and thus it would be, as we must expect, an expression for an absolute self-giving, the repudiation of which would be a countersense. But we soon see that he does not mean it in this way, and that the a priori lawlike regularity through which transcendental subjectivity forms objectivity in itself (according to its rational form, which is precisely what makes objectivity possible) ends up only having the significance of a general anthropological fact. In this way, Kant's critique of reason falls short of the idea of an absolute foundational science, one that cannot possibly be a priori in his sense but that can only be a priori in the genuinely Platonic sense.

Thus for Leibniz the thought suggested itself, although he did not pursue it, of devising a systematic science of the pure and absolutely necessary essence of an *Ego* as such, as the subject of a conscious life and one that constitutes objectivity in itself; a science that, by means of intuitive seeing and then systematic derivations, brings to the fore absolute truths and absolutely general truths; an a priori science that is a priori in the good and the only valuable sense, inso-

far as it does not put anything forth that could be denied without countersense; it would be a science that was the ultimate source for all cognition and for every science whatsoever—a science of the deepest a priori, in which every other a priori constitutes itself at a higher level.

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PART TWO[1] VIII, 3

THEORY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

⟨Section One Preliminary Meditations on the Apodictic Beginning of Philosophy⟩

⟨Chapter One Introduction: The Motivation of the Beginning Philosopher in the Absolute Situation⟩

Lecture 28: ⟨The Idea of Philosophy in History, and the Motivational Setting of the Subject who is Beginning to Philosophize⟩

The lectures prior to the Christmas holidays[2] coalesced into a closed totality, into an introduction to transcendental phenomenology and the phenomenological philosophy by way of the history of ideas. They considered the history of philosophy from the point of view of that idea of philosophy which had grown out of the Socratic-Platonic reactions against Sophism and which, as an inwardly guiding purposive idea, determined the course of the entire subsequent development of science. In accordance with it, philosophy was to be cognition out of a self-reflection, a self-comprehension, a self-responsibility of the cognizer for his cognitive accomplishments, one that is consistently of the highest and ultimate kind—or, equivalently, it was to be an absolutely self-justifying science, and

[1] Concerning the following lectures, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 506 ff.—Ed.

[2] Part II of *First Philosophy* was delivered in the second half of the winter semester 1923/24.—Trans.

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furthermore a universal science. History | was not able to realize this VIII, 3/4
idea, and the index of this circumstance was the persistent current of skepticism that developed, at times openly, at times in a concealed manner. We followed the course of this development under an unwavering radical critique and made ourselves starkly aware of this fact: all justifications have their ultimate source and their unity in the unity of cognizing subjectivity, grasped in transcendental purity. What was needed, therefore, was a science of primordial sources, a *first philosophy*, a science of transcendental subjectivity. From it, all genuine sciences would have to derive the origin of all their basic concepts and principles and all the other principles of their method. Precisely because of this commonality in the domain of their ultimate origins, these sciences of necessity showed themselves to be branches of the one, the sole, philosophy. Having thus gained, in the most general terms, a preliminary concept of a transcendental phenomenology and of a genuine philosophy flowing from it—a purposive idea of the most general kind, and hence one that had to make itself felt in theories before all others—and having discovered the necessary purposive idea of all future developments, let us now set about actualizing this idea through our own efforts, that is, bringing the philosophy corresponding to it into concrete existence from out of its first beginnings.

The seeds of transcendental philosophy we find historically in Descartes. Recalling his meditations may aid us in some ways, and particularly in the attempt at a genuine first beginning.[1]

It is the merit of the philosophical genius that even in his false theories or in his primitive trains of thought, which seem almost to lose themselves in trivialities, there lies a higher truth, hidden and yet perceptible: a truth *in statu nascendi*, far removed from any proper formulation and grounding but yet, filled with presentiments, pointing toward the future, while at the same time being quite readily recognizable, for those later-born ones who possess it as a fully matured truth, as the true germ of the subsequent developments. So it was with Descartes' *Meditations*, and especially with the first two

[1] With regard to the following, cf. lectures 9, 10, and 11 from part one, as well as the corresponding appendices.—Ed.

in the familiar series. In large part this explains, these presentiment-filled | depths explain, the enormous impact that these meditations VIII, 4/5
have exerted time and again, although in what is most essential they found so little following. In itself it was an act of greatness that Descartes denied all the sciences—not even excluding the mathematical ones—a definitive grounding, that he demanded for them a new method of grounding proceeding from a single absolute source that was to bestow upon them absolute justification. Through it, they were to become mere branches of the one *universalis sapientia*, which as such encompasses all genuine cognition, according to Descartes, and gives it the necessary unity, in virtue, that is, of the unity of reason, from which after all they must all derive. And a further act of greatness was the discovery of the seemingly so trivial *Ego Cogito*, as well as the relation of the required absolute grounding of cognition back to it—the conviction, that is to say, that transcendental self-cognition is the primordial source of all other cognition. We will show that in these most general terms, Descartes discovered the basic form of the beginning of all truly scientific philosophy, however much he misunderstood the sense of this beginning and thereby fell short of the true beginning.

What is also worthy of our interest, however, is the style of the meditation, in which Descartes guides himself and the reader to the *Ego Cogito* as the Archimedean point of philosophy and its method. What Descartes presents as a historical report on personal reflections in which the true method came to him obviously has a significance that goes beyond him and that must be understood in this sense. Let us take up the matter here.

Anyone who at all desires to become a philosopher in the highest sense must, according to the *Platonic* and *Cartesian idea* of a universal science resting on absolute justification, do so originally through such self-reflections, must do so by following such paths of rational self-formation and self-cognition. On the other hand, these self-reflections, beginning in the proper manner and going on to shape themselves in the proper manner, belong to the systematic content of philosophy itself; the subjective sources from out of which philosophy acquires an objective shape cannot be separated from philosophy itself. | Natural cognition, even positive science, can begin VIII, 5/6
by taking a fresh hold of things, striking out on paths of thought and

devising methods in naively enacted self-evidence. Before forming anything in thought, it has objects pregiven to it, has the scientific domain in question, and before all else it has a world through natural experience. The philosopher, however, cannot begin by taking a fresh hold of things, since he is not permitted to allow anything to count as pregiven, since he has and is permitted to have only what he has given himself in absolute justification. At the outset he has no objects; for him natural experience, which bountifully provides him with existing objects, has no automatic legitimacy. At the outset he is not permitted to allow any naively enacted self-evidence, of whatever experiential mode, to pass through unexamined, though it itself give rise to no cause for suspicion; nothing may be taken for granted and accepted in advance. Nothing may count as valid that has not been absolutely justified.

In this way the philosopher, before he has anything at all, any theoretical substrates whatsoever, sees himself faced with the need to reflect on how he can come to such a beginning, how he can, through his own activity, give himself anything that he may be permitted to count as absolutely justified—and that may thereby count as an absolutely first beginning. Standing at the head of it all will have to be the question as to the sense of this absolute justification, as to the sense of the philosophical aim. It remains a permanent question, one that continually keeps itself in action, since this sense perpetually shapes and differentiates itself anew from out of the first seeds. The philosopher as philosopher, since he initially has nothing other than *himself*, must therefore begin by reflecting upon himself as the one who desires philosophy, desires universal absolute cognition, and by procuring clarity for himself in this regard; he must entirely cease being a naive cognitive subject engrossed in certain objects as theoretical themes, all the while remaining heedless of himself.

This reflection is one that originally occurs in the *will*. Indeed, in defining himself as philosophical, the subject makes a resolution of the will directed at his | entire future cognitive life. From that point VIII, 6/7
on, he no longer wants to know things in general and in just any manner at all, no longer wants to know things as he previously has known them (whether prescientifically or scientifically), but instead defines himself willingly as one who perpetually desires nothing but

absolutely justified cognition, and cognition that is systematic and universal—a philosophy. Out of this reflective will arise reflections on the sense of this ambition and the possibilities of its realization. The contents of these latter reflections (which are thus means of realizing the reflective philosophical will) constitute the necessary first beginning on the path to philosophy. They form the site of the method, and they carry out the general formation of the method from whose exercise philosophy itself is subsequently meant to grow in content—as a system of absolutely justified theories. Only thus does philosophy actually grow as the cognitive edifice that, step by step, perfectly fulfills the philosophical will—in a limitless systematic progression.

In this way, philosophy, for reasons of principle, cannot come into being in naive cognitive activity but only from out of the free self-reflections, or, alternatively, the free self-determinations, of the knower, only from out of radically reflective clarity about himself and about what the subject, as philosophical, is actually aiming at, as well as about the route and the method he must follow thereafter in realizing his aim. If, accordingly, the philosophizing *Ego* must become for itself the focus of its own will, if it is to arrive at a philosophy, then it falls to it also, but only later on, to become for itself its first cognitive theme: it must grasp itself, on the basis of a certain methodological apperception, as a transcendental or pure *Ego* and then find therein the basic field of its theoretical endeavors. "Later on," I said; for this no longer belongs to the very first beginning but rather belongs to the content resulting from the meditations, as the first summit to which they lead.

Let us, however, linger for a moment on the form of the meditating first beginning, with its resolution of the will reflectively directed at the philosophizing subject. If we consider the habitual *form of life of the beginning philosopher* that is instituted through this resolution, we see that it can be characterized | as a cognitive life in VIII, 7/8 complete and continuous self-responsibility.

Let us examine, with reference to its formal generality, the subjective motivational situation of the subject who is beginning to philosophize, a situation from out of which he commits himself to the philosophical life. Initially he is still a naive cognitive subject, although he is no longer entirely naive insofar as he has become

aware of his previous cognitive naiveté and is dissatisfied with it. He has behind him a stretch of life and thus a stretch of cognitive life, since after all cognition, even when only in its lower forms, is embedded in all waking life. In addition to this he has already been a scientifically cognizing subject and as such not only has carried out cognitive accomplishments but also has subjected them to an evaluative critique and has reformulated them, in purposeful activity, in accordance with values corresponding to his ends. As scientific subject he is familiar with the fact that certain judging beliefs[a] can be formulated, in a quite distinctive manner, as "genuine" cognitions insofar as they do not simply hold[b] what they hold but instead what they hold is realized in the cognizing formulating activity itself, as the intuited truth itself. In the cognition, the believing[c] intention has come to fulfillment; in the formulating that achieves its end, the cognizing subject is now aware that the goal has been reached; in cognizing he intuits the "truth," which is precisely the achieved end, the "*it itself*" of the judicative believing. This is a situation that is familiar (if not one that has been made logically precise or been firmly established) to the philosophizing beginner, or rather to the philosopher *in statu nascendi*. In contrast to it there are for him the remaining judicative beliefs, which lack "self-evidence," the form of genuine cognition, and merely believe their states of affairs without having intuited ("grounded," "made perspicuous") them themselves. Familiar to him as well is the fact that every mere judicative *belief* can be taken up and worked upon, that one can attempt to provide for it a justifying grounding, that is, can attempt to convert it into a genuine cognition corresponding to it, in which the self-given truth becomes the measure of its legitimacy, or, alternatively, becomes this legitimacy itself, against which it authenticates itself as correct. And again, he knows that this attempt often fails and is transformed into its opposite insofar as | a truth VIII, 8/9 comes to light but is one upon which the judicative belief shatters, is negated, reveals its illegitimacy. It appears obvious to him that every judgment is either correct or incorrect, that it is either true or false, that, in other words, one of the two eventualities must be borne out; and obvious, too, that in all this it is not a question of accidental

[a] *Meinungen* [b] *meinen* [c] *meinende*

occurrences of the present acts of judging and cognizing, but that truth is rather an abidingly achievable good, a good that, once it has been achieved by the knower in his self-activity, can then serve as an abiding acquisition and possession, as the one and identical truth which, as selfsame, can be attained again and again and can never change into its opposite, into falsehood. What is true, what in actual, genuine cognition is intuitable as true or as the correctness of a judgment—this is truth once and for all, and falsehood is once and for all falsehood.

But truth may indeed be called an attainable good. It has a worth, just as untruth is worthless; as a practical value it becomes the aim of cognizing striving and cognizing action. As with any other action, however, cognizing action can attain its goal more or less imperfectly; it can fall short of it openly or without being so noted. The cognition can remain at a certain distance from the matter in question; it can have an imperfect clarity, one that indeed views but only pre-views and is not yet fully self-grasping or does not yet achieve self-giving with respect to all the sense-moments of the belief. In this way, a new striving is motivated to examine this cognizing action reflectively and to justify it: to refashion it, by way of a reflective critique of the supposed, the still imperfect, attainment, into an actually perfect one.

All of this is well known *in concreto* to the philosophical beginner as scientist (though he may lack the logical insight into the laws governing these matters, which first emerges from general analysis and description). Indeed, it belongs to the basic character of all scientific striving and of all the scientific cognition that proceeds from it. This cognition inherently desires not to be naive but to be instead a cognition that survives every cognitional critique. What the scientist pronounces he pronounces at all times in the consciousness of being beholden to norms (this at least is what he claims to do | as a scientist); his pronouncement has already been through VIII, 9/10
the purgatory of critique and has received from it the form of scientifically genuine cognition—precisely, that is, as cognition that has been critically evaluated.

Lecture 29: ⟨On the Institution of the Emerging Philosopher's Habitual Form of Life⟩

Thus far, the beginning philosopher has adopted the motivations of the scientist as such; these merely live on in him, since he was, after all, already a scientist previously. Fundamentally, he does not want to change anything whatsoever about this. As a philosopher, he wants to be nothing at all but a scientist, though of course a genuine, a radically genuine scientist. And like any other scientist, he is motivated by the love of wisdom, after which he is named and which at first is nothing but a scientific love of truth in the manner of a habitual devotion to the value-realm of truth, which is contained in the essence of the sphere of judgment. Through this love of truth, he too, therefore, allows himself to be defined by an abiding life decision aimed at what is greatest and best in this realm of truth, within the limits of what is practically possible.

And yet there is an essential difference here wherever we look. Undoubtedly, science and philosophy were originally one and the same, or rather, the special sciences were only living branches growing from the trunk of the whole, the *one* philosophy, as an indivisible living unity. But since then the two have become divided, and divided by nothing less than the ethos animating their entire working activity. The division has occurred because that spirit of radicalism has been lost which, under the title "philosophy," wanted to go to the end in that which makes science science: that is, in the epistemological justification of cognition, and precisely thereby in the self-justification of the scientist in his entire cognitive accomplishing. The sciences that have made themselves independent, and all hitherto existing science as a whole, leave the true philosopher, the scientist *kat' exochen* dissatisfied. This is not only because the | VIII, 10/11 objective universe, which each and every science desires to embrace as its theoretical dominion, is, despite its infinitude, still limited, or because the optimum of truth, namely the system of truth that each seeks, is likewise limited and is not the full optimum of the universal unity of truth—but first and foremost because all the sciences remain caught up in a half-naiveté and thereby fail to fulfill their inborn sense as sciences, the sense of being at every moment beholden to norms. All have things that are pregiven, things that

are pregiven through cognition; for even that which is ultimately pregiven, *experience*, is itself already cognition, albeit cognition of the lowest level. They have things that are pregiven: this means that they accept something although they have never before critically examined this pregiving cognition. Likewise, they engage in methodological cognition, which, to be sure, they have perused with a certain critical eye, which they have stamped with a critical form; and yet again not in such a way that they would, in the most radical reflection, have made this cognizing theoretical accomplishing a theme of its own, considered through to the end. It is precisely from this that the philosophical yearning for a beginning that is without presupposition arises—for a new, truly radical cognitive life, a life rooted in absolute justification that creates science, a life in which the philosopher can stand before himself, with an absolutely clear conscience, as one who engages in cognizing activity, in which he can understand and be responsible for the sense and legitimacy of every cognitive act and of every choosing and deciding that holds sway in it.

But this absolute radicalism entails, for him who wants to become a philosopher in this most genuine sense, a corresponding absolute and radical life-decision in which his life becomes a *life rooted in an absolute calling*. It is a decision by which the subject commits himself, and indeed simply *as* himself—from the innermost center of his personality—to that in the universal value-realm of cognition that is best in itself, and to a life that is consistently devoted to the idea of what is best in this sense. Or, as we can also say, it is a decision in which the subject in a certain sense "absolutely identifies" himself with what is best in this sense. A correlative expression for this same central and universal self-determination is to say that the subject who defines himself | as a philosopher chooses the highest form of VIII, 11/12
cognition, or philosophy, as an absolute final aim of his striving life, as his true "vocation," in terms of which he has defined himself and to which he has committed himself once and for all—to which he, as a practical *Ego*, has given himself over absolutely. The philosopher, as the subject of such a firm resoluteness, is at all times conscious of this guiding final aim, of this, his life's vocation. This is meant of course in a sense that is readily understood: this final aim lives in him in a continuously abiding habitual validity, and he can become

aware of it at any time, can make self-evident to himself at any time that this *is* the abiding purpose of his life, valid once and for all on the basis of the originally instituted decision and continually operative as the governing ideal pole of all his cognitive actions.

Accordingly, for the philosopher, who is therefore a philosopher only from out of this ideal centering, every deviation from this final aim of his life is a deviation from himself, a becoming-unfaithful-to-himself. Likewise, every act of the will that, flowing from the philosophical life-will, aims at consistent absolute justification plainly has, simultaneously and correlatively, the character of a self-justification of the philosopher as such.

However, there is still one important thing concerning the sense or the style of this decision that we, with our emphasis on absoluteness, have characterized only inadequately and ambiguously. We wish to develop this point more clearly.

To accord philosophy, the *universalis sapientia*, the personal validity of a final purpose as a life purpose—we do not mean by this simply choosing a life purpose in general, one like any other. In a certain sense, wealth, honor, power and glory, for instance, can also take on the character of a personal final purpose and determine the forms of a so-called professional life.[a] This, however, would be a professional life in which nothing less than a higher calling[b] announced itself, one from which the vocation[c] itself derived a higher meaning, the character of a peculiar ordination, as it plainly does for the philosophical vocation, but also for that of the genuine artist, the genuine statesman, and so on. Of course, we find general traits, bound together in the unity of a general spiritual form, recurring in like manner whenever we speak | in the ordinary or higher sense of VIII, 12/13
a vocation. For instance, anyone who chooses the vocation of a merchant, with the intention of going as far as possible in it, of achieving the greatest possible wealth, power and prestige, also makes an inner decision—and does so no differently than the philosopher does—in the form of the "once and for all." He too has in view an endless chain of values and purposes that are not merely arranged in a series but that build upon one another, that integrate with and enhance one another—values and purposes the later sum totals

[a] *Berufsleben* [b] *Berufung* [c] *Beruf*

of which absorb the earlier ones, thereby in a certain sense preserving them while yet again invalidating them by exceeding them; furthermore, values which in this endless stepwise building-up of an escalating progression themselves constitute a value-whole, a *gradus ad Parnassum*, as it were, which as an endless series of steps is itself a value and a purpose, one that is also chosen under the title "vocation." In every vocation that is chosen freely and in a truly inward manner there lies, in these forms belonging together correlatively, an idea of final validity, of a final purpose, and this entails, for the personal subject as willing subject, an identification with this purpose or system of purposes; it entails being given over to it from out of one's own center, creatively and practically "out of love," and a desire to live in it fully, in a distinctive manner, forevermore.

And yet vocation in the ordinary sense and vocation from a calling are worlds apart. Truly—worlds apart. For the home ground of genuine vocation is the *topos ouranios* of the *absolute idea*, of absolute or pure value in contrast to merely supposed value, whether or not the latter might also happen to contain hidden within it something genuine (and yet precisely not the purity of perfection). On the other hand, the home ground of a calling is the *Ego itself*, which not only evaluates in general but which, amid all one-sided finitizations and obfuscations, intends the pure and genuine values themselves, anticipatively and prefiguratively, dedicates itself to them lovingly, becomes one with them in a creative realization. Purity itself, however, resembles a mathematical limit. It is the limit idea lying in infinity—at least if it is true that every purity already intuited in itself still lies at a distance from the *Ego*, that it carries with it, either in itself or in its contextual horizons, components that are unfulfilled, into which the lover of ideas can and must be drawn. In this way there exists in every realm of values | something pure, VIII, 13/14 something valuable in itself, the pure *kalon* as idea; in the case of the cognitive value realm this is pure truth, which, in the systematic, creative formation of truths, perpetually elevates itself in theories. With this stepwise elevating formation, the truths produced at the lowest levels are in a certain sense abidingly preserved values, and yet at the same time they are absorbed into the higher value levels and degraded to the status of mere primitive values that have been transcended. If we then observe the infinite progression of the

theory itself and the graduated sequential process of truth creation carried out in it, this progression presents itself in turn, in its infinity and unity, as a pure value and as a value that is superior to all these stages, as the totality of the individual value formations and value progressions, which does not itself change and progress: and hence as an absolute and at the same time enduring value. Plainly, what is highest and ultimate here would be the infinite totality of pure truths as such, and among them of grounded theories—a totality that would plainly encompass every conceivable theorizing progression as well, those flowing from any truths whatever as starting points.

Thus we have here, in the universe of theoretically interconnected truths, a distinct infinite realm of pure beauty, revealing itself in pure seeing but actually revealing itself not in a passive looking-on and taking-hold, but in a loving, creative activity in which what is pure and beautiful in itself, as the fulfillment of anticipating intentions, actualizes itself as what it is in itself and then is intuited as the final aim, awoken in creative self-activity, at which the *Ego* itself has arrived. But every final aim is only a relative *telos*; again and again it is driven on to disclose new horizons lying in new directions, to disclose their still-concealed anticipations. What is thereby actualized is the enduring guiding idea (or the enduring absolute value) of the infinite progression in the relative and finite form of the present movement of cognition, with its cognitive acts that fulfill its yearning, though only relatively.

Beauty is loved. But love is without end. It is love only in the infinity of loving, and it permanently bears within itself as correlate the infinity of the pure | value itself. It is, as the creative *Ego*'s love VIII, 14/15 into infinity, a yearning for the beautiful; when inhibited by a lack of freedom it is cursed, and it becomes blessed in freely flowing, self-active fulfillment, in the constant realization of beauty itself—anticipated, then prefigured, and finally self-formed, albeit always merely relatively, in a way that is merely finitely limited.[1]

[1] Husserl remarks on the margin of this and the following passage: "insufficient." Cf. Appendix 10, pp. 506ff.—Ed.

Now, however, we must take note of the following. It is one thing to be lovingly open to pure beauty and already to embrace a world of beauty prefiguratively—and another to be given over completely to such a world. Again, it is one thing to be given over to it from time to time, to realize it from time to time in pure joy, creatively configuring or reconfiguring it and in just this way elevating oneself in self-purification—and another to dedicate oneself completely and totally to the infinities of such a world of value as a world of possible creative formations; to pour oneself, as it were, into these infinities; to want and to need to appropriate for oneself, through one's ownmost act, the infinite expanses of beauty in an endless progression, and to do so in an infinite, unconditional, absolute love.

If the love of pure beauty in any particular sphere of beauty has once been awoken, then in general the love of beauty in other spheres can and will be activated as well, provided that the prerequisites of an understanding have at all been met. But the lover is not able to commit himself, in a truly practical sense, to every realm of value in the same way, nor can he commit himself to all concurrently. Each is a world, an infinite totality in itself. The commitment to one of them, as it passes over into loving acts of realization, inhibits the very same kind of realization for another—and hence also the possibility of an unconditional commitment to it. But is the choice here, the unconditional decision, a matter of accident? Bringing to mind the word "calling" gives us the answer. I may intuit various worlds of pure beauty in loving valuation; I may even accept them equally as beauties as far as their value in itself is concerned; and yet I will be able to say, and will have to say: For me, as the one who I am, these worlds of beauty | cannot be equally valid; VIII, 15/16
I can and must commit myself, as the one I am, to this one. Not, that is, simply because in general I have to commit to one. As a rational being, I must commit myself practically, and then I can commit only to one beautiful thing, inasmuch as in comparison to everything that is beautiful in the pure sense, all other, formerly so passionately desired values (as merely supposed) become absolute practical nullities; and this is not merely because I am simply not able to do everything all at once and in my acting must give the preference to some one or other of the value-worlds, but because this one is the one for which I have a special and unconditional

affinity; or, alternatively, because I see that it is not the case that all beautiful things, though they be of equal value when considered in themselves, for that reason already must be practically equal for me, and see that here, in the present case, they *cannot* be, insofar as a personal valuation, rooted in my innermost inwardness, is suited to the one value-sphere, marking it as an absolute value for me. Thus, this one world of beauty—so I must say to myself—is the one to which I belong from the innermost center of my personality, and which for its part belongs to me as my own, as that which calls me, in an entirely personal way, and as that for which I am called. I, as who I am, cannot separate myself from this realm of beauty (or, speaking practically, from this realm of the good in the pure sense); to realize it is my task; here I find the realm of my vocational obligations. And if I follow this calling, what am I doing but losing myself, myself as a finite, as a sensible, inauthentic, untrue *Ego*, in order to gain myself, my genuine and true, my infinite *Ego*, purified of all that is earthly? Living thus—having a presentiment of the eternal in the earthly, of the pure in the impure, of the infinite in the finite, and realizing it as pure beauty in an unwearying act of love—I gain not merely "happiness" but "bliss," that is to say, that pure satisfaction in which alone I am satisfied; and in just this way I realize myself as the only one whom I can call myself in spirit and in truth.

Under the form of generality we of course also had in mind as included the special case that is in question for us here. We spoke generally of him who committed himself on the basis of a calling and had in mind particularly him who committed himself to philosophy, the true | philosopher who is only true when he follows VIII, 16/17
a call, the call that sounds out to him from the idea of a *sapientia universalis* and demands of him absolute devotion. Only he is a philosopher who consecrates himself to philosophy, just as it is only he who consecrates himself entirely to art who is the artist. To be interested in philosophy, to ponder upon questions of truth from time to time and even to work on them continually: this is not yet to be a philosopher, just as to dabble in painting and modeling, even for one's entire life, is not yet to be an artist. What is lacking in such cases is the radicalism of the will to finality, of the will that has in view the infinity of the pure idea and the infinities of an entire

world of ideas, and that can only satisfy itself in living toward the eternal poles—in which living-toward, and by living fully in creative activity, it realizes itself as eternal *Ego*.

Lecture 30: ⟨The Pure Cultural Attitude as Such and the Original Institution of a Philosophical Radicalism⟩

In the last lecture, we considered the pure domains of value as domains of a creative realization (*poiesis*) and drew a parallel between the domain of cognition and other pure value-domains. In doing so we treated philosophy, the universal and absolute science, or the science that strives to realize the totality of cognitive values in their final and purest perfection, as being on equal footing with the other ideal forms of pure culture, for instance with those of the visual arts. Everywhere the realization of the particular pure and genuine values demanded of the creative subject that radicalism of attitude which can never be satisfied in the finite, the incomplete, the imperfect, but which rather strives toward the eternal poles of the idea. On the other hand, the situation in philosophy and science is a significantly different one than in art and other cultural areas. Both, science as well as art, are universal concepts, the one encompassing the totality of scientific formations, the other encompassing the totality of artistic formations. But philosophy, as universal science, desires to make possible, or even to achieve, a purposive realization for the totality | of actual and possible sci- VIII, 17/18
entific formations, and already every special science has as a focus of its will's attention the specialized totality of truths of its infinite, even if limited, domain. That is to say: the philosopher is guided not only by that infinity of the one idea that underlies the individual work as the idea of its pure completion, but also by the infinity of the totality of such completed formations. Not merely objectively but on the basis of one's own conscious intention—this is at least the opinion of every researcher—the various individually achieved cognitions and theories each realize a new piece of the universal realm of truth, toward the universal conquering of which the scientific will is directed. In other cultural domains, there is of course no talk of any such things, although we are here disregarding the ques-

tion of whether one could not also imagine possibilities in relation to them, too, of arousing in mankind practical intentions that are universally directed and thereby of grounding higher-level cultural formations that in themselves are oriented toward universality. At any rate, art, conceived as pure and genuine art, is for us not a title of a universal artistic will aimed at the totality and at the particular subtotality (to be demarcated in some way) of actual and possible artistic formations.

Something else belongs here, however, that further differentiates the distinctive sense of philosophy from that of all other forms of pure culture. Pure culture by no means excludes a certain naiveté, and indeed it arises everywhere and remains everywhere—outside philosophy—in this naiveté, however much, incidentally, reflective self-criticism and criticism of the relevant level of creatively formed work belongs, under the radicalism of the idea, to every pure culture, and precisely thereby also belongs to positive science, which in this respect is really to be regarded as being on the same footing with all other forms of culture. Philosophy, however, rises above this entire level; it parts ways fundamentally with all naiveté. In this there is already contained the fact that its radicalism is essentially different from that belonging to every other cultural attitude. Thus, this general radicalism, which strains after the intuited and beloved pure values in unconditional devotion, is not yet philosophical radicalism. Connected with this as well is the fact that the type of | grounding VIII, 18/19 of that life-decision which makes one a philosopher is essentially different from that which pertains to the artist or scientist.

It must be said, first of all, that the objection that the philosopher would like to bring against the dogmatism of positive science by no means must affect the ideality of the scientific attitude. Even if modern positive science stands all too firmly under the principle of Baconian utilitarianism—following the motto *scientia est potentia*—we may not rightfully refuse to credit scientists, generally and without further ado, with the attitude of pure love for their realm of scientific truth; and in the good and the best among them, the spirit of research arising from out of a genuine calling is by no means lacking. Here, however, this love, and the personal life decision following it, can arise without being noted, and precisely the same can happen in other spheres of pure culture, as for example in

art. A pure love of art can be awoken in someone early on, already in youth, and can become a practical devotion, perhaps becoming specialized in the practice of landscape painting; and in this way the person may blunder into this vocation without taking special note of it, without, so to speak, a solemn decision. The explicit choice of a vocation, which may occur later, then has the character of a mere confirmation, and at the same time of an explicit forming of a habitual will to life and action that had already arisen naturally. The same can happen in relation to science, and this is not an infrequent occurrence in cases where talent develops early.

Things are entirely different with the philosopher. He *necessarily* requires a *decision* of his own that creates him, for the first time and originally, as a philosopher—a primal instituting, so to speak, that is his original self-creation. No one can blunder into philosophy.

This is because a "certain naiveté" stemming from the love of knowledge and the creation of knowledge necessarily comes at the beginning and is accompanied by an incompleteness that is hidden to it, one at best dimly felt, but not understood. This incompleteness is first revealed by *skepticism*, and this entails that it comes to light as what it is only when the cognitive subject begins to direct his attention to | the relation of the objects of cognition and the VIII, 19/20
cognized truths to the one who cognizes, and then falls into the familiar so-called epistemological difficulties. In the end he must convince himself that each and every kind of cognition is affected by these difficulties, that no cognitive value is to be put forth in naive absoluteness and held to be absolute in a naive attitude, precisely because each one has its inseverable relation back to the subject of cognition and its cognizing formational activity. He must acknowledge that, if a pure cognitive value is to be acquired and endorsed here at all, it must be conceived and understood in this correlation with the cognizing activity. It becomes ever clearer to him that nothing can be achieved with occasional reflections and amalgams of naiveté and reflection, that from them, rather, only countersense results. It becomes clear that merely logical critique, such as is practiced by the scientist himself and such as is in turn made formal only by dogmatic logic, cannot help here, precisely because all logical forms, and logic itself, are accompanied by the very same dimensions of unintelligibility. Only in this way does the necessity for a

new, a universal and absolute radicalism arise, one that attacks all naiveté fundamentally and that wants, by overcoming it, to attain final truth—and only this is the true and actual truth—and furthermore wants to attain it in the spirit of universality. Thus arises the will to a beginning and to a systematic advance of a completely novel, all-encompassing, thoroughgoingly transcendental science, a science that no longer contains any skeptical abysses but in which, rather, everything is completely bright and clear and secure.

Before Plato there stood the skeptical Sophists, and in opposition to them he aspired, with a new radicalism, to a new science. Skepticism accompanies and admonishes the whole of the philosophy and science that follow, the ancient as well as the medieval, perpetually exhorting them to a radicalism of the ultimate, which alone can overcome skepticism and make absolute science possible. Skeptical *nominalism* extends into the modern period; *Platonism*, renewed and strengthened in the *Renaissance*, is opposed by it, as well as by the ancient skepticisms and empiricisms which are revived at the same time. | In Descartes there arises anew and with primal power VIII, 21/21 the will to an absolutely radical grounding of science, defining the modern age. There is now the idea of philosophy as a definitively valid science possessing nothing in advance that it has not given to itself absolutely. And yet *British empiricism* comes along, and lives on until the present day, as an open or veiled skepticism. Before us all there stands Hume, and the positivism emanating from him. Before us all there stands modern, self-subsistent science, with its scientific ideal that is originally—and essentially still today—derived from mathematics, although this same archetypal mathematics exhausts itself in vain efforts to bring the kind of clarity to the basic elements of its method, its elementary concepts, propositions, and inferential principles, that could allow it finally to make good on its reputation for exemplary precision. All of this stands before us, the ones who, in understanding the insufficiency, indeed the hopelessness, of all such efforts, desire a philosophy. Thus the idea of philosophy itself entails a kind of final validity and a kind of radicalism of final validity that cannot grow in a natural and unremarked manner out of any naturally naive love of knowledge or out of any love of science that is still naive, such as reigns in the positive sciences. What this idea presupposes in the cognitive subject, in order for it to emerge as a

guiding purposive idea, is nothing less than a kind of collapse of all naive cognitive and scientific values, namely, through the realization that all previous science, no matter how highly valued, suffers from incurable imperfections—incurable so long as this science remains in its type—and that therefore all such "positive" science must be put in question, must at the outset be put in a certain way into suspense; that, therefore, a completely new beginning and a completely novel science are necessary—if science, science in the full sense of the term, is to be possible at all. Yet *whether* it is possible—even this cannot really be assumed but rather must be put in question at the beginning.

The beginning philosopher stands, therefore, in this unique circumstance, | and not merely by virtue of an accidental historical VIII, 21/22
factuality. For even *idealiter* it is clear that the idea of an absolute and radically grounded science must draw its sense from such a circumstance, into which, therefore, the beginning philosopher would have to be placed. Otherwise, despite all his pure love of knowledge, he falls unavoidably into cognitive naiveté, and no matter how the subsequent developments might in fact go, with regard to their outcomes they would have to maintain their general form: they would have to place the knowers before the transcendental abysses of cognition and entangle them in the skeptical snares and enigmas with which the classical situation for the beginning of a genuine philosophy would be produced.

As regards this situation, therefore, what is required is an individual, momentous life-decision, the decision to take on a hazardous venture and to risk one's life for it—the venture of seeking truth and science with the radicalism of the ultimate, or, rather, of attempting such a science, from out of oneself and in association with like-minded others: a science that grows out of an ultimate good conscience, which alone is able, thenceforth, to satisfy the pure love of knowledge definitively. It must be a science that creates perfect clarity on every possible side, one which therefore does not content itself with the naive satisfaction that comes from the fulfillment of straightforward cognitive intentions but which rather in addition, and above all, establishes transcendental clarity, through which, so to speak, the transcendental ghosts and cobwebs—those of skepticism on the one hand and those of dogmatic metaphysics on the other—

are chased away. This occurs, however, precisely when all scientific accomplishments are regarded in the *full concrete nexus of accomplishing subjectivity* and are never studied unless accompanied by a concomitant study of this correlation.

If we conceive of the philosopher as beginning in his absolute situation and after having made the original decision to do justice to it as a philosopher, then the necessarily first task is to set in motion *meditations on a possible method*, in the progress of which the empty generality of the philosophical idea of a beginning must become an ever more concretely fulfilled idea, and the concrete sense of philosophy must reveal itself ever more completely. And the same will | have to hold for the method in respect of the elements and VIII, 22/23 connections that become determined with ever greater richness.

Having come this far, we could at once enter into the meditations themselves and begin with what for the beginner is the first philosophical act, one that follows as an absolute demand in pure consequence of his philosophical will: namely, with the *universal overthrow* of all previous convictions, however obtained—that is, with that overthrow which Descartes demanded, "once in life," of all those *qui serie student ad bonam mentem*,[1] which plainly refers to that absolutely good cognitive conscience, that absolute self-justification, of the philosopher.

But before we begin with this, I would like to conclude this introduction with a not unimportant consideration which is intended to show you in brief that philosophy—however much it may be related to the universal realm of mere cognitive values, alongside which, indeed, there exist other value categories and accordingly other forms of pure culture—carries within itself a *significance that spans all pure culture* and, precisely thereby and correlatively, a significance for rational humanity as a whole and every universal rational humanity, back to which culture is related. In speaking of this universal significance, however, we are thinking of it not in the sense of a mere historical fact, but in the sense of an essential necessity binding together science and culture.

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[1] An allusion to Descartes' *Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii* (Regula VIII, 2c). The original phrase reads "*qui serio student ad bonam mentem*" ("who earnestly strives after good sense").—Trans.

If we take cognition in its full extent by taking together what is rational and irrational, unintuitive and intuitive, and so on, then it encompasses the entire sphere of judgment, the predicative and prepredicative spheres, every kind of *Ego*-act of belief, that something exists and in such-and-such a way, and all the modalities of belief (surmising, taking-to-be-possible, and so on). Despite this diversity of special forms of cognizing, or judging in the widest sense, many other species of *Ego*-act remain left over, for instance, every kind of loving and hating, of liking or disliking, of wishing, desiring, willing. On the other hand, these *Ego*-functions do not all simply lie next to one another but rather interpenetrate. Indeed, if we are speaking of acts of cognition in the pregnant sense, for example of scientific cognition, it is clear that each such act is not simply an act of judgment, but that here, rather, a striving and willing | tendency runs through an at first opaque act of judgment, a VIII, 23/24 tendency that finally terminates in a corresponding perspicuous judgment, the cognizing judgment in the pregnant sense, and that, for the will, gives its content the character of attained truth. Everywhere, therefore, judging and willing, and even evaluating, permeate one another, since the one who is directed in a practical way toward the truth positively values truth, the correlate of insight, and thus takes it as an aim of his will. Let us consider yet another example, that of a pure evaluation of liking, such as the delight in a flower. It stands before our eyes in perception, and this means that it gives itself in the perceptual belief as immediately existing with these and those factual characteristics. But from out of the liking itself there comes something else which is ascribable to the perceived flower, over and above the content of the characteristics delivered through perception: from there it takes on a content, namely the character of "charming," "beautiful," "lovely," and the like. We easily pass from the attitude of liking, of the *Ego*'s pure turning-toward in the heart,[a] to the judging attitude, in which the "beautiful," the "charming," first is grasped in an experiencing belief and then, as in the use of these words, is predicated. All of these predicates, therefore, have their origin in the heart prepredicatively and prior to the grasping experience, just as other predicates, those of the

[a] *Gemüt*

good and bad, of the useful, the advantageous or the harmful, have their source in the will that is conjoined to the evaluating heart. It is the same if we look around us at the various realms of culture; culture encompasses formations of praxis, which are grasped as such through an understanding, following along behind, of the corresponding acts of the heart and will: of will-intentions, such as those running through aesthetic feeling-intentions, that motivate a striving and acting aiming at an objective realization of the aesthetic formations in question. And what is thus understood can become the object of an experiencing grasping and of predicative determination and even of a scientific problematic—in which case the aesthetic and practical attitude transforms itself into a cognizing one. Only when we deliberately exclude, voluntarily and abstractively, all predicates the source of whose sense lies in the heart and will, as the natural researcher does, do we obtain sciences of pure cognition. In | these sciences—that is, in the natural sciences—the VIII, 24/25 heart and the will do contribute an influence, but only in the form of the will to cognition or, alternatively, of valuing-truth-as-cognitive-aim, but not in the sense that the heart and the will would be the source of the objective predicates' sense, as in the case of predicates of beauty and so on. All cultural sciences in the specific sense of sciences of cultural formations have in their thematic domain not mere nature with predicates of mere nature, but rather precisely those predicates stemming from the heart, that is, the ones that point back to the subject creating formations in evaluating and willing.

Here the universality of the encompassing by the realm of cognition of all the realms of accomplishment stemming from feeling and willing subjectivity clearly comes to the fore, as, to be sure, does, correlatively, a similar encompassing through which the valuing heart and the will in its striving and acting reach across the entirety of subjectivity and all its intentional functions. What this means for science, however, is that in it, as the objectivation of cognizing reason, all valuing and practical reason are mirrored and co-objectivated as well; or that in the cognitive forms of theoretical truth, all other truth—for instance, every value-truth (what we call true and genuine values) and practical truth—articulates itself, determines itself, in predicative forms, and also takes on grounding

forms appropriate to cognition. It is the heart that values, purely in itself, and the acting will that, purely in itself or as such, forms the beautiful. The truth, the genuineness of value and then of the work, manifests itself originally in a naive fashion, again in the heart, in pure satisfaction, just as the practical realization of the beautiful manifests itself in the founded satisfaction of attainment. But *responsibility* is taken for the genuineness of value and the truth of attainment in *cognition*, which, in the attitude of judging and in its logical forms, makes predications about what is valuable and what is worthless, and which perspicuously relates the value-intuition that happens to be on hand back to value-norms that can generally be grasped perspicuously, thereby attaining a higher responsibility as the responsibility of cognition. The highest and ultimate responsibility, however, arises in cognition from the transcendental orientation toward the ultimately constitutive achievements of the heart and will. | VIII, 25/26

Through this consideration it also becomes clear that a universal philosophy, a philosophy concerned with science as such, if it truly aspires to full universality, that is, keeps a steady eye on the entire transcendental problematic as well as the possible worlds of cognition as a whole, is not some "mere" epistemology, some "mere" theory of science, one which, under the title "possible cognition and science," deals with something merely restricted or with something logically or noetically general. Instead, whatever may play out between subjectivity and objectivity in the way of essential generalities and concrete yet still essential particularities, whatever types and formations of rationality, whatever essential forms of social subjectivity and whatever correlative forms of the cultural formations and cultural systems made possible by and in them—they all fall within the bounds of a full philosophy. And if, in all this, pure questions regarding cognition stand ahead of everything else, this is only because the natural path, of radical and transcendental philosophy as of logic, starts out from something with the highest generality and from there passes over to the fulfilled particularities. The highest generality of science is of course a form that is not yet able to prejudge with respect to fundamental particularities of being—in the formal and most general sense of being in the sense of truth—and thus is not yet acquainted with thematic distinctions

such as that between mere fact (which leaves aside every type of normative predicate), value, and practical ought-to-be; or, within the factual, differences such as that between mere nature and spirit (personalities, personal products, that is, culture), and so on.

Check for updates

⟨Chapter Two VIII, 26
The Idea of Apodictic Evidence and the Problematic of the Beginning⟩

Lecture 31: ⟨Natural and Transcendental, Apodictic and Adequate Evidence⟩

We stand before the great question of the beginning. We are now nascent philosophers in the absolute situation. Behind us lies | VIII, 26/27 our previous scientific life with all its cognitive products, heretofore so satisfactory to us: with, that is, the truths, theories, and sciences that we had previously deemed absolute. They no longer suffice for us. We have awoken from the naiveté of the positive grounding of truth; we have felt the sting of skepticism painfully enough. Through it we have learned to direct our gaze at that cognizing subjectivity from whose conscious achievements, from whose pretheoretical passivity and theoretical activity, all merely supposed being as well as that which is grounded as true, all merely supposed theory but also that which shows itself to be objective truth, arise subjectively. We have already become aware that a perfect cognition of what the world is and what true theory determines for it cannot be attained without studying the transcendental subjectivity in which world and world-theory are constituted in a transcendental–subjective manner. Every positive science is, accordingly, burdened by an abstract one-sidedness inasmuch as in it, the transcendental life and achievement of the experiencing, thinking, investigating, and grounding consciousness remains anonymous, unseen, untheorized, and uncomprehended.

We have already noted that while a group of previously existing sciences—*psychology* and the biological, sociological, and cultural disciplines intertwined with it—have also made subjectivity and its cognitive activity their theme, these sciences, too, are "positive" or "dogmatic." In other words, they, too, in their entire methodological procedure, set about their task with that naiveté in which the act of cognition as the originating function (the granting of sense, the

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grounding of being) of cognized objects fails to receive its proper theoretical treatment. This holds for the animal and human, the individual and societal subjectivities in these sciences—the sciences of personal subjects and subject-formations as *worldly objectivities*—as well as for their subjective products in the world (embodied spirituality, culture), and indeed for these latter understood as pretheoretical and theoretical formations of the cognitive functions corresponding to them (as categories of mundanized spirituality). | VIII, 27/28

All the sciences, therefore, entered into the circle of our investigations, and it became apparent that a failure of a generally uniform type had emerged: not only that this failure was one pertaining to the de facto sciences—as if it were an imperfection afflicting them accidentally—but also that this imperfection was owing to something *essential* in them, to their fundamental methodological character, so that in advance it would have to be inherent in any science that was to be newly grounded by this same method. It was thus clear that no conceivable refinement of these sciences remaining within the confines of their methodological type could ever do anything to change this.

In saying this we have already carried out an all-encompassing and in a certain sense radical critique of science: a critique of the entire course of the history of philosophy (which encompasses as well the history of all the sciences and the historical origin of the idea of positive science itself) and of the sciences in their current form—with their hopeless philosophical addenda. But this critique of the philosophical and scientific naiveté that has been handed down, and at the same time of the attempts at overcoming it, perpetually stunted as they were by half-measures, ambiguity, and inconsistency, was for us only a necessary first part of our *meditations de prima philosophia*. Its achievement was nothing other, and could be nothing other, than to make *palpable* to the most painful degree the fundamental inadequacy of positive science and the fundamental impossibility of any philosophy grounded in the positivist spirit that would be a science directed at the absolute sense of the world and everything that can be cognized whatsoever. Furthermore, it granted us a *foretaste* of a new kind of science and philosophy by turning our gaze toward that which is radical in all cognitive achievements, toward the subjectivity that fashions sense and valid sense, as well as

toward the dark correlations between cognizing achievement, cognitive sense, and cognized being. Indeed, even more: being pointed back to "transcendental" subjectivity as the region of origin for all rationality and for every rational formation, that is, for all the sciences together, had to give a new sense and a new strength, as it had already done for Descartes, | to the ancient idea of philosophy VIII, 28/29 as universal and absolutely grounded science, as a science that is clarified on the basis of ultimate cognitive sources and that thereby justifies itself absolutely.

But it was precisely this that created the motivation, the absolute situation. For one could not let the matter rest with the despair of the possibility of a genuine science in the ultimate sense modeled on all those sciences already actively carrying out their work. This despair of the final validity of their positive achievements entailed no skeptical despair of the possibility of genuine science per se. On the contrary, the critique of all types of skepticism, whose motivational sources themselves lie, and necessarily so, in the inadequacy of all cognitive positivity, became for us a primary means of grasping in anticipation what was lacking there: the theoretical exposition and systematic investigation of the ground of unity for all cognition and especially for all science—that is, of transcendental subjectivity, in whose cognitively achieving life all cognitive unities have their source.

It is just this that, in the end, constitutes the net result of all the foregoing reflections: the idea of a universal science of that which grounds primordially, of that which in the strictest sense is the original source for the sense-giving and ontic validity of all possibly true being and of every possible science; and of a universal philosophy as a universal and absolute science, a science that generates through its own activity all possible sciences from out of this original and concretely unitary source, that allows them to rise up in an absolute comprehensibility of their absolutely defensible authority, and that embraces them all as special branches.

In this way we obtain the supreme guiding purposive idea of all our cognitive efforts. Here this idea, as it has grown up for us in evident motivation, by no means already has the value of an explicit guiding idea for this science of and from the original source. In other words, here at the beginning we do not yet have at our command

a clear and distinct primordial image of a philosophy, but only the formal–general methodological guiding thought that under this title a science is necessary, one which, as an "archeology" truly deserving of the name, is to investigate systematically that which comprises within itself this ultimately original source and every origin of being and truth, and which subsequently is to teach us how, from out of this | primordial source of all belief and validity, any cognition VIII, 29/30 whatsoever can be brought into supreme and final rational form, that of absolute founding and absolute justification, that of the last conceivable clarification of sense and execution of authority—into a form, that is, in which it can be originally secured with an absolutely clear conscience as *finished*, as not only valid but "*finally valid*"[a] so that it can thenceforth be set aside as settled once and for all. Such cognition is thereby incorporated into the circle of our stable cognitive possessions, which as such can at any time be reactivated in their most original form and can be absolutely affirmed in their necessarily invariable finality: affirmed, that is, not only on the basis of the naive clarity that is commonly called "evidence" (*natural evidence, evidence of positivity*), but on the basis of the higher-level *evidence of the transcendental clarity of origin*, in which the origin of our cognitive achievement, hidden in the evidence of positivity, with its motivational horizon determining and delimiting its primordial legitimacy, is exposed and hence understood from its origins.

As nascent philosophers we resolve upon this idea of philosophy practically, and draw from this resolution the practical consequences. That is to say, we attempt to unfold that which this philosophy holds within itself as intention and which it points toward as indeterminate demand, thereby initiating the intended science itself as well as the subsequent development of its realizing formational process. Only in this way can we have *it itself* and hence know *what* we actually had in mind, where we were trying to go, or what it really is itself: this universal science in "absolute justification" that we seek, which is supposed to be ultimately valid inasmuch as only it establishes a cognition of every true being whatever that is finally valid in the true sense.

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[a] "*endgültige*"

Once we begin to enrich the first predelineation of our philosophical guiding idea by unfolding its meaning, we notice, already in the distinction between natural and transcendental evidence briefly indicated above, that this science, as "universal science based on absolute justification," bears within itself several sense-components that, in this terminological | ambiguity, in our talk of the universal VIII, 30/31 and absolute justification of cognition, do not clearly come into relief.[1]

The term "*absolute*" refers, on the one hand, to the unitary source of all cognition whatsoever, to transcendental subjectivity, with which, admittedly, we have to this point become familiar only as a distant idea. On the other hand, the expression "*absolute*" *justification* is supposed to denote a giving of account that is altogether complete, one that tolerates not the slightest lack of "clarity and distinctness," of evidence, of intuitive understanding—nothing that could becloud one's certainty in the least, nothing that could thereafter call one's cognitive results into question or cast doubt upon them. My cognition is supposed to be "*finally valid*," saving me from ever again having to surrender what is certain for me by reason of my being able to see in retrospect that what I believed with certainty is not so or is not as I believed it to be but is rather something else, something that annuls my belief. But my cognition is also supposed to be *evident* in every respect, from every perspective: including from each of the possible perspectives that are not now or not normally my current ones. What is cognized is not supposed to have essential determinations belonging to it that lie outside the regard of my otherwise perfect evidence and that, owing to their being unknown, entail captious ambiguities, riddles, and doubts.

This *double-sidedness of absolute justification* is, however, more deeply rooted, since, as quickly becomes apparent, each and every instance of evidence that is not yet tied back to absolute subjectivity, even if it be as perfect as mathematical evidence, necessarily has its possibly questionable, puzzling, and doubtful aspects, which, though

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[1] Husserl notes in the margin of the preceding passage: "Work out anew and shorten significantly"; cf. Appendix 10, pp. 506 ff., cf. Appendix 12, pp. 528 ff., which can also be viewed as a variant from p. 231, l. 6 up to here. But also compare from here up to the end of the lecture Husserl's critical note, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 506 ff.—Ed.

they do not alter the singular content of the evidence from the original perspective and do not annul this evidence in its "positivity," do nevertheless signify an imperfection with regard to cognition that cannot be tolerated. With this we for the first time fully understand the | distinction we encountered earlier between deficiencies of VIII, 31/32 evidence that leave open the possibility of an annulment of cognition and those that do not do this but instead denote something missing from what is precisely a one-sided instance of evidence and from our equally one-sided cognition itself (while denoting at the same time unseen abysses for a possible and perhaps quite perilous declension from the natural directions of cognition). This distinction was also directly intended to account for the deficiencies in all those instances of evidence that founder when it comes to the transcendental, of all merely natural–naive evidence, which we above also called the evidence of positivity.

At any rate, we must constantly keep both of these in mind in our search for a true beginning; on the other hand, we must preface this search with the *most general principle of justification*, under which every cognition stands—that which is one-sided in its naive positivity as much as the reflective–transcendental kind—and which articulates the demand for genuine grounding, grounding on the basis of pure evidence. We as beginning philosophers, willingly directed toward the idea of universal cognition based on absolute justification, desire to follow, and to do so in the most rigorous generality of the will, the principle of pure "evidence." This we understand in the following way.

We wish to accept nothing as cognized in the finally valid sense, that is, to accept nothing as existing and existing in such-and-such a way and in any particular mode of being, that does not *itself stand before our eyes*, grasped by us in itself precisely in the manner in which it is meant and posited in our cognitive belief. It is in this sense that from the outset we therefore also want to allow the radicalism of the ultimate to hold sway—want, that is, in a manner of speaking to pass over in all cognition to the limit of evidence, or at all times to attempt to pass over to it. Our cognitive satisfaction is supposed to be, as far as possible, an "absolute" one. It would then be an absolute attainment of what we were aiming to achieve cognitively. This demands at the start that our cognition be a mode

of pure certainty in the having of the entity itself. As long as there is still uncertainty, we are not satisfied. But the certainty must be one that is absolutely evident in this limit: not merely, therefore, a fully certain belief | but an intuiting certainty, one that in the end is VIII, 32/33 absolutely self-giving. Self-giving is to be for us the measure, and its absolute optimum the ultimate measure, by which we verify all judgments, all our beliefs concerning what is. In principle this lies *in the sense* of all scientific activity; we are only making it conscious to ourselves and creating out of it the first principle of a consciously purposive method.

But we must now add something else. We may not permit ourselves to rely on the cognitive satisfaction that is *felt* in the enactment of evidence. The evidence we have must also *justify* itself to us as evidence; we must convince ourselves that what is cognized—and, as the case may be, to the extent and degree to which it is fulfilling—truly realizes our cognitive intention and is truly given, and moreover given to the extent that nothing more in it is meant merely anticipatively without there being corresponding components of self-givenness. It is plain that, as a matter of fundamental possibility, we can at any time convince ourselves in this way by carrying out a reflection that follows upon the cognitive operation, a reflection that measures the components of the sense-content meant with judicative certainty against the composition of what is self-given, putting them individually to the test with regard to how well they are fulfilled by components of the "self" that is given. An instance of evidence that has the indicated ideal perfection we also call *adequate evidence*. *That* it is such, therefore, is in any case something we come to know only in a second act of evidence, precisely in *reflective evidence*, which must itself be adequate. That it can be carried out as adequate, that adequate reflections are thus possible *in infinitum*, and that, as it seems, justifications would be necessary *in infinitum* ought not to cause us concern here, although we will, at the appropriate time, need to ponder the problem lying herein, as well as the problem that the possibility of adequate givenness entails. For it might turn out that such self-givenness is a mere "idea" in a sense analogous to that in which we call pure red an idea. The red we see is, we think, at every moment red only in a more or less incomplete purity, belonging to scales of increasing

purity in the perceptual running through of which we approach pure red, although in the end we remain (more or less) distant | from VIII, 33/34 it. A further increase beyond what was last seen on such a scale is always possible, always conceivable; on the other hand, in our progressive movement itself we have the evidence of just this approach to "the" inaccessible "pure red." In a terminological ambiguity that is grounded essentially, however, what we have thereby is evidence of the existence of this idea—as idea—although not evidence, not a self-having, of pure red as such. Now, perhaps there lies in each and every instance of evidence as self-giving, as the consciousness of grasping what is meant as "it itself," a certain relativity such that wherever we speak of adequate evidence and are certain of it as such, we really only have a similar and also perhaps continuous process of increasing relative evidences that can be carried further at will, and thus a consciousness of a continuous and free approximation to a goal pertaining to and thus contained in consciousness, a goal that becomes evident as such—that is, only as an idea—while it nevertheless remains, and evidently so, unattainable despite the evidence of the approximation. Here, too, further questions quickly arise concerning whether infinite regresses do not threaten, and so on. These, however, cannot be questions for us at the beginning.

As a beginner I *have* no cognition; I *seek* it. I am not searching for just any "cognitions," but "genuine" ones that I can justify as genuine. What else can this mean, our first reflection tells us, but evident and, in the optimum case, adequately evident cognitions, or cognitions that can be justified through adequate evidence—to the extent that this kind of thing is possible at all? I do not want just to go off and believe, so to speak, but rather to draw what I believe (in the broadest sense: judge) from self-having, self-grasping; or, where my belief was not obtained in this way, to search for a self-having corresponding to it, to "verify" it by transforming something merely meant into a self-grasping of that very thing.

Is it not entirely clear, albeit from within a certain naiveté (which is unavoidable at the beginning), that in fact striving and acting run their course as an aiming at and attaining of a goal, and that, as simple self-reflection shows, the awareness of this attaining occurs as a realization and self-having of the goal, one that becomes certain to the agent in the act itself? Is it not clear that in the activity of

cognition, the practical intention, | by means of a simple belief about VIII, 34/35
what is, strives for the self-having of the entity that is meant, and that indeed in each case there is or can be such a thing as evidence, and evidence of different levels, up to the limit of adequation— as a presupposition for the corresponding graduated scale of the satisfaction of our cognitive striving? Nothing is clearer, indeed, than that I, perceiving an object, grasp *it itself*, existing over there, and grasp it *as* itself, and again that I (to take a case of adequation), "seeing" that $2 < 3$, have and grasp the state of affairs that I mean as it itself and that I, grasping in this way, have with my cognitive striving actually reached the goal itself, behind which, in its adequation, there is nothing further to seek. Obviously what has been "seen" is nothing other than the "it itself" in relation to what was meant, which therewith becomes both what is meant and what is self-had, self-grasped, simultaneously.

One more thing is to be noted here as a characteristic of adequate evidence. It comes to the fore when we put such evidence to the test by means of a passage through negation or doubt. If I attempt to negate or posit as doubtful an instance of adequate evidence, then the impossibility of the non-being or doubtfulness of what is evident, of what is grasped in absolute self-giving, immediately becomes apparent, and does so in turn with adequate evidence. We can also designate this peculiarity of adequate evidence as its *apodicticity*. It is plain that, conversely, *every instance of apodictic evidence is adequate*. We can, accordingly, treat the two expressions as equivalents and can favor the one or the other in particular depending precisely on whether we want to lay emphasis on adequation or apodicticity.[1]

This reflection leads us, finally, to the fundamental sense of the Cartesian maxim of indubitability, which Descartes employs at the beginning of his meditations as the principle of complete justification. This occurs in the form of his well-known method of rejecting as unjustified, for the purposes of achieving an absolute grounding of cognition, anything that might engender even the slightest cause for doubt. | VIII, 35/36

[1] Cf. Appendix 13, pp. 532 ff. — Ed.

Lecture 32: ⟨The Possible Points of Departure: "I Am"—and "I as Beginning Philosopher"; "I Am"—"This World Is."⟩

In the last lecture we articulated the guiding principle of adequate and thus also apodictic evidence and made it our own. It denotes a formal and in fact insurmountable ideal pertaining to the justification of cognition. Complete justification for a judgment is, after all, not conceivable otherwise than by not only making the judgment evident to ourselves in general but also convincing ourselves that what is meant in our judgment is in our grasp exactly as we meant it, is itself seen and grasped in the flesh, as it were, and by furthermore convincing ourselves, as a test of adequation, that for us every hint of non-being or doubtfulness with respect to what is seen has been nullified in absolute evidence. From the application of this principle there might arise the possibility of restricting a pre-given instance of evidence to that part which can be absolutely justified and thus of producing from an instance of evidence that is not adequate one that is adequate but limited.

We wish, therefore, to attempt to carry this absolute ideal of adequation into effect, no matter how much doing so asks of us. We want to see how far we can go with it.

Perhaps, in the further course of our meditations, we will have to distinguish from one another *all kinds* of peculiar forms of justification, which themselves do not exactly have the character of adequate evidence; but perhaps we will then be able to show that in all of them adequate evidence must function as the ultimate source of justification, in order for justification to count as actual and serious. But for now we know nothing of this kind of thing, and in any case the absolute ideal of justification is predelineated for us as the guiding principle for our beginning.[1]

The next reflection required of us aims at the beginning itself. It concerns the question of which instances of adequate evidence we are to take possession of first—that is, of the fundamental domain of justified cognitions that are intended to support the entire super-

[1] Husserl wrote on the margin of this sentence: "Why?" See Appendix 10 (pp. 506ff.); also cf. Husserl's extensive critical note there.—Ed.

structure of philosophy. How | shall we proceed in order to attain VIII, 36/37
this domain? For us beginning philosophers, the validity of all the sciences has been suspended; they all had to be put into question collectively. Should we sift through them for instances of adequate evidence, or examine the instances of evidence in them to determine which of them can be converted into adequate ones? Should we undertake a critique of evidence for all the fundamental cognitions of the sciences, since these latter are, as sciences, edifices of mediate cognitions and since the justification of mediate cognitions leads back to that of immediate ones, to fundamental cognitions?

Nevertheless, as good as this thought may be, and however easily one can make it fully evident to oneself that a universal justification of cognition would have to follow the path of mediacy und that therefore not only is a critique of the de facto existing sciences necessary but any and every universal critique of cognition, however construed, would first require a universal critique of immediate cognitions—nevertheless, we must become dubious regarding the procedure in question here as soon as we recall our preliminary meditations and once again allow their motivations to work upon us. Is what we have in mind then a science in the methodological style of the traditional sciences, and are we only to do with perfect completeness what these sciences themselves already do, though in an imperfect but all the same improvable manner? If this were the case, then we would not need a radical reconstruction of the sciences, or alternatively of the philosophy that includes them in itself universally and that systematically unfolds them from out of itself. We would then require no actual overthrow of the sciences; a general questioning in the form of an evaluating critique would suffice—with the appropriate universal reviews and corresponding improvements. Those cognitions which are verified in perfect evidence would again be adopted and cherished, while the others would be replaced by either amended or new cognitions.

But this would be an enterprise with little promise. After all, every scientist himself practices this type of critique, practices it constantly in his work and according to the best of his abilities. It is in this critique that the positive sciences themselves | ascend VIII, 37/38

from lower to higher levels of perfection. Furthermore, the need for such a critique long ago led to universal scientific considerations which, freeing themselves from the methodological peculiarities of the work in the particular sciences, were directed toward what is methodologically general in the sciences as such. For a long time already we have had a logic—as a universal theory of science—and it is plainly intended to perform precisely this function of being a universal science of the critique of all sciences as such.

What we now have in view, however, can be neither this general logic nor a system of special sciences (perhaps to be established with its help) that, however perfect, are of the type that we already have. For attaching to this type there is, as we have seen in our historical-critical meditations,[1] a fundamental imperfection, namely that transcendental naiveté whose overcoming determines the radical sense of what we are striving for in a philosophy. That all cognition is an achievement of cognizing subjectivity is something perfectly obvious, and yet it marks the source of all transcendental confusions and of all countersensical metaphysics. The evidence of the positive sciences, however perfectly it may be formed, is surrounded by transcendental and metaphysical fogs, in which skepticism and mysticism can play their false games. Every positive cognition, to the extent that it is genuine, is an instance of evidence, and yet at the same time it is an enigma. It requires a transcendental illumination. Since this holds for all cognition as such, a universal task is opened up, namely that of investigating cognizing subjectivity as such as that which accomplishes cognition, and of doing so systematically with regard to all types and forms. And it was precisely this unavoidable task that accrued to us in our preliminary meditations.

How is this task now to be taken hold of and fulfilled? How is the method to be fashioned by means of which the pure and singular sense of this task can first become apprehensible—the method of investigating scientifically the transcendental achievements of cognition, of cognition of every type and form? How should subjectivity | be made fit for that type of self-cognition in which it can VIII, 38/39

[1] Cf. the first part of this lecture course, pp. 3–205.—Ed.

thoroughly comprehend all truth and science as formations taking shape within itself and from there theoretically establish their finally valid sense? How can this comprehending clarity be attained, and how in the process can transcendental self-cognition satisfy the principle that we had to place at the head of our considerations—the principle of adequate evidence? One would also like to ask: is the demand for a transcendental investigation of cognition not itself, in the end, a further consequence of the demand that all cognition be brought to ultimate fulfillment, that it be made adequate to the highest conceivable degree? The two perfections that we must demand for an absolute and then universal cognition are very closely linked. It may be that the extreme demand that we carry into effect the ideal of fulfillment for every cognitive intention, that is, the demand for ultimate cognitive satisfaction, would by itself necessarily compel the transition into the transcendental problematic, so that a science justifying itself absolutely would, in accordance with the ideal of ultimate evidence, *eo ipso* have to be transcendental philosophy.

From our preliminary meditations we have long since known that great difficulties exist here. Above all we know that, while what we are concerned with is self-cognition, it is something completely different from the natural–naive self-cognition of the human being, and also completely different from a psychology that draws upon such self-cognition under the title "inner psychological experience." But whatever our preliminary meditations may have made known to us—here, where we are supposed to proceed in the most rigorously systematic manner, we are not permitted to presuppose anything of that kind, unless as a motivation conducting our intuiting eye and our newly achieved results. If we want to arrive at a genuine beginning, the beginning of an absolutely grounded philosophy, we are permitted to have nothing other than what we have acquired for ourselves originally.

Hence our task now will be once again to bring out, in this original manner, the transcendental ground, the ground of every transcendental problematic—that is, to wring from ourselves the positing of the I-am, with its singular and unqualifiedly necessary sense as a transcendental self-positing. | And following this the VIII, 39/40
task will accrue to us of carrying out universally not the natural–

naive, objective–logical critique of cognition, but as against this the transcendental critique of cognition, which is founded altogether differently. Afterward, however, we must also show that every achievement of positive science as well as its universal critique are comprised in and achieved together with the transcendental framework and transcendental critique, but now accomplished in the spirit of final validity.

For the meditation that now follows, *which is to create the beginning itself*, we can proceed in various ways. On the one hand, we can set out directly for the goal, which after all is already known to us, having been seen in advance. We can, accordingly, begin straightaway with the cognition "I am," see whether its evidence is adequate, and, if it turns out that the naturally first evidence of the "I am" is not complete, attempt to convert it into a piece of adequate and hence apodictic evidence. In the methodological carrying out of this purifying suspension of everything that cannot in principle be given adequately, we would arrive at pure or transcendental subjectivity. This would therefore be the content of the subjectivity that is accessible to itself in pure adequation.

In the second place, we can, rejecting any guidance from our preliminary meditations, use only what the idea of a universal science constructed on the basis of absolute justification furnishes us with. "I" would then have to mean: I as beginning philosopher. At the beginning, of course, therewould have to stand an immediate cognition, and perhaps a field of immediately accessible (and hence themselves immediate) cognitions indicated along with it, and these immediacies would have to be apodictically certain. Now, I have deprived all the sciences of my acceptance, but the stream of my life and my immediate experiences nonetheless continues, and these experiences continuously assure me of myself and the world in which I live. Admittedly, these, too, are cognitions, and they would have to be included in the overthrow—given my pretensions to universal, absolute justification. But *these* can be resurrected immediately; here I have, after all, irrefutable, indubitable evidence. *I am—this world exists*—how could I doubt this? To be sure, | I will VIII, 40/41 have to test them more precisely with regard to their actual apodicticity, drawing on a real stock of adequation. This test then leads to transcendental subjectivity as the only supply of apodictic imme-

diacies, of absolutely indubitable experiential givens, and thereby to the same thing that resulted from the first path—just as, conversely, the critique demanded by the first path makes it unavoidable for us to submit the putative indubitability of the existence of the world to critique; so that the two paths, when actually followed out, must quickly converge.

If we therefore decide, for systematic reasons, to favor the *second path*, then it seems that the *leading question* concerning the instances of immediate evidence that are potentially to precede all the sciences, and then, consistently therewith, concerning the experiences that stand at the head of such instances of immediate evidence—it seems that this question leads to the *world of experience*, as something whose existence cannot be doubted. We ourselves experience ourselves as particular entities enclosed within this world and subordinated to it; thus there at first appears to be no cause to single ourselves out for special treatment and pronounce, as our own special statement, "I am." *The world is there in continuous experience*; our cognitive efforts, our sorrows and worries, our activities, are continually related to it, to the individual occurrences experienced in it—nothing is more indubitable than this world. In particular cases, to be sure, it can happen that experience deceives us, that what initially stands before our eyes as the experienced thing in the flesh does not exist at all or is different than it appeared to us to be; we then speak of illusion, of sensory deception, of semblance. However, though sensory experience cannot without further ado lay claim to indubitability in the individual case, the existence of the world does not for that reason become questionable to us in any way. Experience can, after all, be executed with care, with the aim of attaining evidence and then with the requisite perfection, rather than in a cursory manner or with a lack of caution and completeness, and precisely for this reason it provides the rightful foundational cognition for rational science. *It seems* that the general title "*the world exists*," with the universe of deliberate and precisely observed experience belonging to it, contains within itself *the universe of all ultimate*, that is, *immediate principles of cognition* |, or alternatively the universe of all experi- VIII, 41/42
ences necessary for a universal science. Together with my existence and the experiences that immediately include me, *I am co-included*

in this universe as a matter of course; with the negation or actual annihilation of the world, I myself would be negated and annihilated.[1]

Yet as plausible as this indeed very natural consideration may seem, and as much as the "I am" presents itself as an accidental and by no means privileged feature of the existing world of experience, one can nevertheless take the view, and perhaps on much better grounds, that *the statement "I am" must instead be the true principle of all principles* and the first statement of all true philosophy. One can in fact show that this entire account, which was concerned with the indubitability of the world's existence, or alternatively with the legitimacy of the experience of the world, does not stand the test of genuine apodicticity; and that therefore, for a philosophy that is to be grounded absolutely, the validity of the universe taken in its full plenitude must remain in suspension. That is, it must remain in question for the time being as lacking absolute grounding, in just the same way as the statements of all the worldly sciences and the sciences in general.

Indeed, we can easily convince ourselves that every perception of a spatial thing is inadequate. It gives us the thing merely one-sidedly, with only a few of its determinations, with only partial qualities belonging to a shape that becomes visible only partially. We do have the consciousness of the existence of the thing itself, but nothing changes with regard to the perception's incompleteness; nor does anything change when we pass from perception to perception in continuous observation, however attentively, and allow the entire perceptual nexus to count as one perception. Regardless of the fact that every perceptual phase of such a nexus has only ever actually seen *its* component and that in the new phases of what was actually seen beforehand something is inevitably lost (and is so ever anew),

[1] Cf. the famous passage of *Ideas* I, paragraph 49, on "Absolute Consciousness as the Residue of Completely Nullifying the World," Hua. III/1, pp. 103–106, to which this passage stands in implicit contradiction. There, Husserl writes: "[I]f we think of the possibility of the not-being (inherent essentially in every instance of a transcending thing), then it becomes clear that *the being of consciousness*, of every stream of experience in general, *would necessarily be modified, to be sure, by nullifying the world of things, but would not be affected in its own existence*." (Hua. III/1, p. 104. Trans. by D. Dahlstrom)—Trans.

still, the | observing perception never comes to an end. But this belongs to the innate sense of the experience itself—the perceiver is quite well aware of the horizons of diverse possible experiences reaching beyond what is actually perceived.[1] | VIII, 42/43 VIII, 43/44

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark to this passage, in Appendix 10, p. 508.—Ed.

⟨Section Two
Critique of Mundane Experience
First Path to the Transcendental Reduction⟩

⟨Chapter One
World-Perception and World-Belief⟩

Lecture 33: ⟨The Ineliminable Contingency of the Statement "The World Exists."⟩

In the last lecture, we subjected the [seeming] indubitability of the world's existence owing to our continuously progressing mundane experience to an apodictic critique; that is, we investigated whether this indubitability was truly apodictic—whether, in other words, external experience (be it ever so carefully observing and experimenting) could ever constitute an adequate perception. What then first came to light, with respect to every perception of an individual spatial thing, was an inadequacy that was simply inescapable. It is true that in every perception the perceiver is conscious of grasping the spatial thing in question in its bodily selfhood, but he is also conscious of the fact that in grasping it in this bodily way, he is not grasping it fully and wholly, according to its entire determinate content. This is, therefore, not simply some fact to be ascertained from the outside. Rather, each and every perception, inasmuch as it is in itself an experiencing meaning, has on the one hand a content of determinations of which we are conscious, in the perception, as genuinely and truly self-grasped—for instance, a piece of the actually seen shape of the thing with the qualifications belonging to it—but on the other hand also a content of empty co-meaning and pre-meaning, which we are conscious of only as a content that would first come to bodily self-givenness in the process of a further perceiving, perhaps a freely initiated one.

What we have just said plainly holds with strict | necessity and VIII, 44/45
generality; hence every spatio-thingly perception exists inescapa-

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bly—and, when we perceive, is inescapably valid for us—as a mixture of genuine self-giving and such co-meaning. It is this co-meaning that gives every observing and experimenting intention its practical sense, gives it the open horizons that are yet unseized, unnoticed or incompletely known, and at the same time indicates lines of perception that can be activated freely, in which what is merely co-meant, what we are conscious of in mere anticipation, becomes something grasped itself in the flesh, something genuinely perceived. Though the perception of a spatial thing expand, though it unfold itself into a self-grasping that exposes ever new parts and sides of the thing, this structure belonging to the general essence of perception nevertheless remains ineliminable. The perception is and remains an inadequate one; a consummation in the form of a perception that would be a genuine perception through and through, with no anticipation, without a horizon of co-meaning, is inconceivable.

Precisely to this, however, there unavoidably belong open possibilities of the being-otherwise and even the non-being of what has been perceived in a spatio-thingly way. Every spatio-thingly perception (what is ordinarily called "external" perception) can deceive, despite the fact that it is a perception, which according to its proper sense is a direct self-grasping. For it is no less, according to its proper sense, anticipatory—the anticipation concerns something *co-meant*—and is so to such a radical degree that even in the content of what is self-grasped in the given perceptual moment, when it is considered carefully, there lie moments of anticipation. At bottom, nothing in the perceived is purely and adequately perceived. At all times we are reliant on continuing perceptual confirmations. We really see, for instance, a uniformly red-colored surface patch, but it is possible that as we move in closer, in our continually advancing perceiving, irregularities in the coloration will come to the fore; but initially it is equally an open possibility that the uniformity will be confirmed. Then again, even if the self-confirming as such has remained true to itself, at every moment the situation is the same: possibilities of a further non-confirmation remain open. Hence it is no surprise that experience deceives, and yet | again, that experience VIII, 45/46
legitimates itself through experience, if always only presumptively.

The same plainly holds when we consider, instead of perceptions directed at individual things, the total perception into which all the

individual perceptions are fitted and in which they are embedded as mere moments. Thanks to this universal perception, proceeding continuously in its universality, we are conscious at all times of a unified world, enduring in the one endless time, abiding through the flux of the individual changes, extending itself through the one space. This world, therefore, though it is constantly experienced in perception, is nevertheless always experienced only in the manner of anticipating meaning—with its open possibilities of being-otherwise and indeed even of not being at all. Let us reflect on this a bit more closely.

Our continuous stream of external perceiving, with all its chance and ever newly threatening disappointments, proceeds de facto in the form of a consistent correction. That is to say: each and every anticipating apprehension that is not confirmed can always be replaced, and each always replaces itself through a modified apprehension that restores the disrupted concord and that, at least for the time being, is confirmed in subsequent experience in its continually advancing validity. A perception proves to be deceptive—what is contained in this is that in the progress of perceiving the perception is annulled though an emerging discrepancy. Hand in hand with this annulment, however, there comes an alteration of the meaning, an alteration of the perceptual sense, such as, for example, a reinterpreting alteration of appearances through which instead of a person in the fog a tree stump in the fog is seen, with which the concord is restored. That this perpetually continues and can continue in this manner—this is a very curious fact and is nothing less than an apodictic necessity. An endless stream of external perceiving permeates my waking life. Unceasingly it maintains a structure of becoming of this kind, a transformation of this kind into harmony that dissolves all disharmony, so that we can remain conscious of one and the same world as existing perceptually. At all times we say "the" world and we experience it, the unique and selfsame world, as | self-grasped in the flesh, despite the fact that this self-grasping VIII, 46/47
is mere anticipation through and through, which as such is entirely oriented toward new confirmatory experience, and despite the fact that this anticipation sometimes is progressively confirmed in particular respects in a concordant fashion and at other times dissolves, in a breach of the concord, into a questionable, wavering, or downright vacuous illusion. But correction unceasingly takes place, or

at least is possible. The doubt can be brought to a resolution; what is null and void for our consciousness can be replaced by something correct, and thus a new concord can be established, a unity of experience everywhere confirming itself in which there lives a unity of belief that is uninterrupted in its continually advancing validity. Correlatively, the world experienced after a given correction counts as the true world. This truth is and constantly remains on the march. It too is provisional; it too must perhaps again be overcome, but in every case it *can* be overcome (and this is how it has always been up to now) in the form of a new correction and of a newly experienced world that is in concordance with itself. Here the earlier truth, the world that was previously taken to be self-grasped, as really there, shows itself (as our term "correction" already indicates) as never having been completely abandoned. A world is there in a perpetually relative truth, but yet in relative truth it is knowable.

In the stream of external experience, and owing to this remarkable unfolding harmony of an incessant self-correction, there arises the idea of an actual and finally valid true world, of this unique and selfsame world, but as one that would be experienced in a finally valid concord to be generated *idealiter*, which therefore would require no further correction. Herbart's maxim "So much appearance, so much intimation of being"[1] is merely an expression of the de facto structure of our universal experience. Though the possibility be perpetually present that what counted for us as existing reality could turn out to be mere semblance, yet with this semblance the matter is not simply at an end, and our continuously advancing experience brings to the fore, in a continuously advancing correction, a relative truth, one that, moreover, cannot in principle claim final validity because in principle there belongs to it an open possibility of further correction. But as a relative truth it can be placed into a graded series of relative truths; it can count as an approximation and | an ever better approximation of a finally valid but VIII, 47/48
itself unattainable truth. Such a progression of approximations, we hold, would have to allow itself to be realized fruitfully at least in

[1] Johann Friedrich Herbart: "*So viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung aufs Seyn*." *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 8, Langensalza 1893 (reprint: Aalen: Scientia, 1964), p. 53. — Trans.

the form of deliberate observation, of an experimenting experience that systematically holds fast to its experiential acquisitions and compares them to one another. Ultimately valid truth, the world as ultimately valid—this would be an idea. But this is to say that it is, on the one hand, simply inconceivable as something capable of being adequately perceived; yet on the other hand, it is anything but[1] a fiction or an arbitrary ideal. Rather, it is an ideal that is motivated in the universal contours of unfolding experience and that—as long as these contours are given—must necessarily be posited and cannot be refused: a pole, to be singled out intuitively, that originally remains unfulfilled with that validity of belief, a pole to which all relativities of empirical truth are validly referred. This is, admittedly, merely a sketch, but it does illuminate the unique character of the continuous course of perception, in which the world is constantly given to us as truly existing but necessarily incompletely; its givenness stands under the idea of an ever possible completion, an ever possible correction.

But is this harmonious unity-structure of universal world-perception, we must now ask, an apodictic necessity? Is it not an open possibility, and a *constantly* open possibility, that this unity-structure (which is itself only an empirical presumption) could dissolve, that experience might no longer run its course in the manner of a continuing correction and a continuing continuity of universally compatible corrections? That it must run its course in this manner is anything but an apodictic certainty, even if we were already apodictically certain that it had run its course in this manner up to now. It is conceivable, we will have to say, that a continuity of compatible appearances dissolve, to speak with Kant, into a mere "swarm" of appearances.[2] Admittedly, the individual perceptions would then lose their anticipating belief; they would alter their entire systematic anticipation-structure. The expectant meanings and co-meanings belonging to them as normal external

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[1] An example of Husserl's occasional usage of *nichts weniger als* to mean the opposite of the English "nothing less than." (In modern German, confusingly, the phrase has come to be used in both senses, and Husserl uses it in both senses as well.) See the next paragraph for another instance.—Trans.

[2] Cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 111.—Trans.

perceptions, which in the normal course of perception take on the character of fore-expectations, would lose their foothold and their | VIII, 48/49 force, ⟨their⟩ certainty of belief. When fore-expectations again and again are disappointed, it is precisely then that nothing more will be expected—the anticipation ceases. This would mean, however, that external perceptions would come to an end; the course of perception would lose its character as a course of thing-perceptions. Things and the world would no longer be there for the experiencer in perception, neither as currently experienced nor as ready to be experienced, as always accessible through a freely activated perceiving. What would be left over, at best, would be the memory of a world that appeared in an earlier, at times quite concordant experience and in which we believed with certainty, a world whose continued validity, however, now would have forfeited every experiential motive. Should every current external perception be lacking, should in addition the current perceptual readiness for perception, the certainty that "I can," seeing, hearing and so on, seek out and find spatial things, be absent, then the earlier world-belief would be completely uprooted. Every idea of the world[a] would have the character of an arbitrary fiction, and each would be, as such a fiction, on a par with every other one.

But have we not thereby already shown that the presumptive character of external perception, from which the positing of the world's existence derives its original legitimacy for the one who cognizes, also leaves open for him the constant possibility that the world, however much it may currently be given as experienced, perhaps does not exist at all? If I, the one who experiences, can bring to evident clarity the possibility of the non-existence of what is experienced, regardless of and during the experience itself, then there can be no talk of an apodictic necessity of the being of what is experienced. We must not therefore believe, for instance, that we can distinguish between the being-thus and the being itself of the experienced world and salvage, at least for its *existence*, apodictic, absolute indubitability. An apodictic cognition quite excludes the possibility of the non-existence of what is cognized. Indeed, this is also understandable: where nothing, absolutely nothing, of the

[a] *Weltvorstellung*

being-thus, of the determinate content, of external experience can be given adequately, there also remains no further room even for its mere existence to be apodictic.[1] | VIII, 49/50

Let us keep in mind the following. It is generally admitted that every fact, and hence also the fact of the world, is, as fact, *contingent*. Contained therein lies this: if it exists at all, it could be otherwise, and perhaps even not exist. Whether and to what extent this actually holds for *every* fact is of no interest to us here. But it should be pointed out that when it comes to the existence of the world, an entirely different kind of contingency is in question. *While* I perceive the world and generally experience it, and perceive it to whatever degree of perfection; *while* I am, therefore, conscious of it, with undiminished certainty, as self-given, as a world whose existence I simply cannot doubt; it nevertheless has a permanent *contingency of cognition*, and more particularly one with the sense that this *self-givenness "in the flesh" fundamentally never excludes its non-existence*. Furthermore, a *double indubitability* comes into relief here. Wherever I perceive in unbroken harmony I believe, and I cannot arbitrarily transform the belief into disbelief. So long as nothing speaks against experienced existence, I do not doubt; nor can I doubt. In the essence of doubt lies the "something speaks against it." *Apodictic* indubitability, however, is something else and very much more than that. It means: wherever I see as I see, and holding fast to the fact that I see in such-and-such a manner, there I cannot even conceive of the possibility that what is seen does not exist or is different—and consequently also, therefore, of the possibility that it could turn out afterward that what has been seen does not exist. I can conceive of such a thing; I can only regard it with intuitive understanding as a possibility when I think, in addition, that I do not see and see in this apodictic manner. Things are different with regard to the seeing of external experience. For what has been perceived not to exist is evidently admissible. In this, therefore, consists the unannullable contingency of the statement: "The world exists."

[1] Cf. Appendix 14, pp. 539ff.—Ed.

Lecture 34: ⟨Transcendental and Empirical Semblance. On the "Objection of Insanity."⟩

We identified an unannullable contingency in the cognition of the world, a contingency that in its basic essence is connected to the structure of the perception of the world treated above, without which a world could not exist for us—and thus also would not be cognizable for us in any other manner. Let us look more closely at the nature of this contingency, or, alternatively, at the nature of the contingency responsible for it, that of the structure of world-experience.

At issue here is not merely the structure of the particular perceptions and of the all-unifying total perception in the individual moment of perceiving, but also at the same time the *universal* structure of the continuing course of perception. Every perception is, as thing-perception, anticipation through and through, and this holds, we saw, of the universal world-perception as well, and more particularly in such a way that at every moment, and in the manner peculiar to consciousness, it bears within itself the anticipation of a future concordant course, or one to be brought to concord through possible future corrections. The perceiver himself continually expects confirmation of his current, future-directed expectations, and in addition he is conscious of being able to freely direct the course of perception with regard to many other dimensions and, along other advancing lines of the anticipatory horizons that open up before him, to transform other co-meanings into genuinely self-giving intuitions. Furthermore, he is conscious of the possibility that his anticipations will not be confirmed, but also of the practical possibility of correction in each particular case, and consequently of the eventual re-establishment of the concord of an all-pervading self-confirmation within the total perception. It is a mere correlate of this that he sees into[a] an enduringly existing world, into an identical world, existing for him in the flesh in an unruptured total belief: not merely one existing in the now, but one at the same time developing from out of the past into an open, approaching future. And this world, precisely due to this structure, is continually burdened with a

[a] *sieht […] hinein*

double sense of being and truth. Just as all experience is burdened with the possibility of correction, and the newly occurring correction again with | the possibility of a further correction, and so on *in infinitum*, in the same way, correlatively, the actually perceived world at a particular time is a "mere world of semblance"; that is to say, it is, in the manner in which it is perceptually given at a particular time with these and those sensibly intuitive characteristics, merely an appearance of a world existing in itself. Here lies the simple and true sense, not at all metaphysical or mystical but rather directly to be read off from the sense-structure of mundane perception, of the abiding correlation of appearing world and world in itself, appearing things and things themselves and in themselves. This "in themselves," however, means: contained in the openly possible flux of corrections there lies an ideal of approximation, an ideal that one, as a subject who experiences in a freely acting manner, can approach in continuing and ever more perfect correction, even if one can never reach it, since every actually attained correction fundamentally leaves open the possibility of further corrections. VIII, 51/52

To be sure, this entire structure of world-perception has, speaking of it in a certain connection, its absolute necessity, one whose sense has already come to the fore in our earlier analyses. For so long as the perceptual life of the perceiver runs its course in this style, he lives consciously into a world[a] that is constantly there for him, that stands there in the flesh before his eyes as the unique and identical world, and that, as the one existing world, is also not affected by the possible and frequent deceptions and corrections. Evidently, however, the converse also obtains: if the perceiver is to persist in the belief in the one existing world, if in general a world is to be capable of remaining experienced and experienceable for him, then this style must remain for us to infinity. A world cannot exist without developing into a horizon of an infinite future[b] and without being experienceable in this infinity for experiencing subjects. The correlate of the true being of the world that I now perceive in the mode of sensory appearance is the structure of my course of perception, never interrupted and remaining harmonious for all time.

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[a] *lebt er bewußt in eine Welt hinein* [b] *in einen Horizont unendlicher Zukunft hinein zu werden*

Now, however much we may be able to see intuitively that this correlation is a necessary one, and consequently also to grasp the essential necessity of the structure of mundane perception described above with regard to the persisting | form in which it runs its course VIII, 52/53 (its necessity under the condition that a truly existing world is to be and to be experienceable for us), still, this is precisely a relative necessity. Speaking straightforwardly, however, this universal structure of mundane perception is contingent—a mere fact that could also be otherwise.

Of course, we now have given to us a world existing there in the flesh; we live and have lived up to now, as memory tells us, in a harmony of experience that has preserved, or repeatedly established, a concord in the confirmation of all our perceptions. This preceding and still ongoing style of mundane perception as a whole necessarily motivates in itself the anticipative belief that it will continue to remain this way. And for this reason we believe it will do so, and we must believe it; the belief belongs abidingly to the universal structure of the flowing world-perception. On the other hand, it is at the same time an empirical belief, a mere anticipation that perpetually leaves open the possibility of not being confirmed, the possibility that this structure of the running-off of a consistent correction could dissolve—as indeed we have just now shown. Thus, while still living in mundane experience and in the perceptual belief that confirms itself concordantly, and while casting our regard toward it in attempting to establish conclusions, we can nevertheless see intuitively the possibility that this world perceived in the flesh could be a mere *semblance*, and not, as it obviously is, always merely an appearance, lying hidden within it as an Idea, of a world that is true in itself. To be sure, a semblance of a peculiar sort, a *transcendental semblance*, is in question here, which it is well to distinguish from every *empirical semblance*, from semblance in the ordinary sense. While we stand on the ground of empirical world-certainty—that is, while we have the world given to us in normal experience—an empirical semblance confronts us here or there, a semblance the explanation of which we can inquire into, one concerning which we can at any time ask after its *underlying* and merely hidden truth. That this question has a sense, that it is a question that can be *decided*, is, then, certain for us from the start. It is quite otherwise for transcendental sem-

blance. That the world, the one just now given in the flesh, might in truth not exist after all, that this world given in the flesh might be a semblance, a transcendental semblance, is a permanently open possibility. But in this case it belongs to the | semblance that we VIII, 53/54 called transcendental that it would be completely senseless to seek after a correction through a corresponding truth, or, alternatively, to inquire after a true being that could be posited *instead of*, *in lieu of*, this non-existing world. This would not be much different than if we were to ask what true thing existed in place of the mermaid that we had just freely imagined, how we could re-correct this non-entity so that it would become a something, the true something that erroneously appears to us as a mermaid.

We must not, of course, allow a false sense to become attached to our results, as if we had said, for instance, that it follows from them that the world we experience "*perhaps*" does not exist—"perhaps" in the ordinary sense of "*very well possible*" if not altogether "probable." Or as if we needed to be *prepared* for the world to come to an end; as if an apocalypse were just as possible as that a clear sky "could" become covered in a cloak of clouds, and suchlike. Instead what we say is: the existence of the world is *completely beyond doubt*, and this indubitability lies enclosed within the perception of the world itself in which we live continuously. Whoever, confused by skeptical arguments, judges and believes that the world does not in truth exist, or even merely judges that one must constantly be on the watch for this possibility, that person follows the motivation of theoretical (and in particular, no doubt, terminological–conceptual) arguments and does not attend to the sense-content of world-experience and the infrangible world-belief that lies within it in spite of all such arguments. It is a belief that does not tolerate the slightest conjecture or the real possibility of its being otherwise. Nothing speaks in favor of the world's not existing, and everything speaks in favor of its existing; we actually experience, and experiencing is actually a stream of concordant confirmation, as it always has been. But what is crucial for us here is the fact that this complete empirical certainty, this empirical indubitability, nevertheless, as empirical, leaves open the possibility that this world does not exist—the fact that it can be seen intuitively that this possibility obtains, even if absolutely nothing speaks in favor of its being real-

ized. The following remarkable result will become important for us: the statement that this world is a pure nothingness, a mere transcendental semblance, | is *compatible* with the empirically indubitable VIII, 54/55 perceptual certainty of the existence of the world. Accordingly, the *hypothetical supposition of the non-existence of the world* that I experience with indubitable empirical certainty is not an arbitrary hypothetical statement, certainly not one like "1 is more than 2" or "A square is round." Any countersensical statement can be molded into a hypothetical supposition; but it is then precisely a countersensical supposition. Here in our case, however, we are dealing with an *evidently possible* supposition, that is, one that can be seen intuitively as being *free of countersense*, and the fact that it concerns the universe that I experience (and while it is being experienced in its indubitable givenness in the flesh) is, for us beginning philosophers, of great interest.

Yet we may not yet claim this as a firm result when we have not yet taken into account an obvious objection. Surely, one could say, it is a merely contingent fact that the perceptions of some subject or other run their course in the form of that universal harmony that originally makes possible, in the concordance of a restituting correction, the consciousness of a world existing in the flesh and becoming ever more readily cognizable as the one and only true world. And surely the possibility is open that a human being's harmonious perceptual stream could be transformed into a senseless jumble, into a swarm of appearances. But what does this mean other than that that a human being, and ultimately every human being, could become *insane?* The possibility of insanity surely has no bearing on the possibility of the non-existence of the world. On the contrary, it is precisely here that we see the necessity of holding fast to the world's unique, absolutely necessary being. After all, does not the possibility of insane persons already presuppose the existence of the world?

Now admittedly, this would not be an especially strong counterargument. But the criticism it levels will serve us well in our attempts at clarification.

To begin with, the objection can serve to motivate a necessary improvement on our initially quite natural yet impermissible way of expressing ourselves in the communicative plural. I, the one med-

itating, must after all say to myself: prior to all science, which I of course have rendered null and void, the world is given to me through original experience, through my external perception. | Self-grasping, VIII, 55/56
grasping-in-the-flesh of things, of the world in general: this is nothing other than the enacting of "external perception." If I now, as the one who experiences, carry through for myself this series of meditations that have occupied us collectively and in the natural we-attitude, if I carry them through with respect to my own world-perception, which belongs to my own inner life, then what results for me is that I can accept no apodicticity for the existence of the world that I myself experience. Likewise I recognize for myself the possibility that my course of perception could become disharmonious, and could do so in such a manner that the world previously experienced in me dissolved into nothingness.

But if I ask myself how things stand with other experiencing subjects, in whom experience could run its course in normal concordance without any regard to the senseless disharmony of my experience, then I will readily give myself the answer: human beings are originally given to me only on the basis of certain of my external perceptions, more particularly, only by virtue of the fact that of the things given to me in the thing-world that I experience concordantly, certain of them are distinguished as *lived-bodies*, and in particular are distinguished by the fact that in them a "mental life"—sensing, ideating, feeling, willing, and so on—is *embodied*. At first I discover *myself* as human being by experiencing this embodiment in the most original manner in that particular body which I call my own. If I then find other things of the same spatio-thingly type, behaving with the same typicality as that of my own lived-body, then I experience them in the manner of empathy as manifestations of other subjects, and in this way I experience other human beings, human beings of whom I myself am one.

Thus it is presupposed here in advance that in general my experience, as spatio-thingly experience, proceeds in the form of that concordant experiential life in which a spatial world is there for me. If, as I can see intuitively and with evidence (and can do so again and again), the possibility exists that my stream of experience could be transformed, as described above, in such a way that it would lose its continuously confirming experiential belief and experiential sense,

in such a way that, therefore, there could no longer be any talk of this world, of "existing things," of experienced or (in freely initiated acts of perception) experienceable things | in general, then there also VIII, 56/57 could no longer be any talk of my lived-body, and none, therefore, of animals and of human beings—and so none of human beings whose concordant unfolding experiences, experiences that constitute an actual world, I could invoke. I can only invoke other human beings who are, in the realm of my open but yet still valid experience, if not experienced then at least experienceable—discoverable in space, the form of the freely accessible experiential horizons, when I freely initiate and run through active lines of perception. But if I no longer have any horizons of belief, but at best only world-fictions with fictitious horizons, then "world" becomes a title for infinitely many phantasy-possibilities which are, taken together, *empty*. As a consequence, other human beings, too, are then for me likewise empty possibilities, each of which is the same as every other and like them counts as a "nothing." Let us not forget the nature of these empty possibilities. That human beings live on Sirius is for me, who has as given an existing spatial world in the unbroken unity of my experiences, likewise an "empty" possibility, insofar as nothing in my experience speaks in its favor; but it is by no means a completely empty one, insofar as I could set out on actual experiential paths and gain knowledge through which it could finally be determined whether such human beings exist or not. No experiential paths, no paths of "I can" observe, I can gain experiential knowledge and make a determination, lead into the realm of, as it were, absolute fictions, which are not inscribed into the universe and do not inhabit its horizons of "real" possibilities, and which therefore have no share in the force of the concord of experience (or, what is the same, of the actual universal perception).

It now becomes clear to me that if I, as meditating philosopher of the beginning, desire to carry out a universal critique of mundane experience, then I may not do so in the communicative attitude, in which I presuppose the actual or even only the really possible (i.e., possible in the ordinary empirical sense) existence of human beings. For I would then have already assumed something that is itself in question, something that, according to the universal sense of critique, is itself among the things to be submitted to criticism.

More precisely: just as it is my experience through which | other VIII, 57/58
human beings are there for me, so too are their experiences there for me only as something experienced in my experiences—but experienced as hidden, in the manner of mere co-meaning. My perceiving of other human beings is immediately only a perceiving of their corporeal lived-bodies. I can never appropriate as my own, as my perceiving, their co-meant mental lives, and in particular their co-posited perceiving of other human beings. Thus for me, the other psychic subjects and their perceptions are necessarily only mediately co-meant in my perceptions—expressions that I understand of the lived-bodies that I see.

The universal critique of *my* experience is, therefore, *the* universal critique of experience as such, which it falls to me and could only ever fall to me to carry out. Provided I have reason and occasion to submit to critique someone else's experience as experience, this critique can have a sense only as a critique bearing on the mediacies of my experience, precisely as a critique of experiences that are co-experiences, founded in this or that manner, of certain experiences of *mine*.

Having in this way learned, in the critique of experience, to avoid a specifically cognitive-critical circularity, one counter to the proper sense of such critique, I shall now attempt to better ⟨appropriate for myself⟩ what I have pondered, aimed at, and actually achieved in the foregoing.

⟨Chapter Two
Supplementations and Clarifications in
Connection with the "Objection of Insanity"⟩

Lecture 35: ⟨On the Doctrine of "Empathy."⟩

In the last lecture we considered an objection against our just completed clarification of the possibility that the experienced world might not exist even though it is—and while it is—experienced, and experienced in an empirically indubitable manner. This [possibility] became evident to us in referring back to the possibility that the style of harmonious concord that turns the infinite | web of our VIII, 58/59 empirical anticipations into a continuously flowing total perception of one identical world, into this world's indubitable self-attestation, could dissolve. The objection then contended that this possibility merely signifies the appearance of madness in the experiencing subjects concerned, precisely as a succession of lived experiences in a senseless jumble, which does not, however, rule out the possibility that other subjects are not insane. This objection would serve for us as a proof that the self-reflection that the beginning philosopher has to carry out must not be carried out in the natural communicative attitude but rather, as it were, in the solipsistic attitude. What this means and requires we were just beginning to explore. So let us now, each of us, pass over into the attitude of "I-parlance."

I, the one who meditates on the evidence of the existence of the world as a possible fundamental beginning of a philosophy, am conscious, in the natural–naive manner, that I carry out my reflections in a circle of others striving for the same things, and indeed do so together with them. ⟨All the same,⟩ I find ⟨that⟩ in this circle ⟨I have⟩ nothing to think or say in the communicative plural. But I must nevertheless also keep in mind that this entire We belongs to the experiential content of my mundane perception as a whole. The universe in the full sense, which includes within itself all human beings, is given to me originally—that is, prior to all science, which I

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have rendered null and void—as arising from my universal perception, from that unifying manifold of the particular perceptions that make up *my* perceiving life.

In truth, even when I spoke communicatively, I carried out my entire reflections on the basis of *my* external perceptions at the time, and with a preference for spatio-thingly, physical perceptions; in doing so I involved my fellows only in an extra-essential manner, when I thought to myself that they, each for himself, would perforce find things to be just as I have found them. Now, however, I must eradicate every vestige of naiveté and reflect on how my fellow men, how human beings in general, are given to me perceptually—since I also can have knowledge of them only insofar as I can gain actual or possible experiences in which they | would be given to me originally VIII, 59/60 as existing. By now considering more closely the experiences that bring human beings, and even animals, to self-givenness for me, and the manner in which they integrate themselves into the entirety of mundane experience, I gain not merely a confirmation and along with it a supplementation of that which I had previously expressed and seen intuitively in the parlance of the "we": a supplementation, I say, inasmuch as I formerly paid no heed to this important and singular stock of novel experiences included in the mundane total experience, to the experiences of animal and human creatures; and on the other hand a confirmation, inasmuch as our result, which had only been attained on the basis of thing-perceptions, is confirmed in this broadening. But not only that. Our entire result will in this way receive a purification: to wit, the necessary reduction to the universal stream of my own world-perception, in which is given everything that can be given originally to me in perception, and thus also everything of which I can afterward gain mediate knowledge.

The elaboration is easy. Animals and human beings are plainly there for me perceptually only by virtue of the fact that among the perceptions I have, there are some that bring things to givenness for me that are not mere things but rather lived-bodies; or, what amounts to the same, that I discover in my phenomenal spatio-thingly surroundings things distinguished as *lived-bodies*. What distinguishes them as lived-bodies is that in them a "mental life"—sensing, perceiving, thinking, feeling, willing, and the like—is "expressed" or, so to speak, embodied. They have this distinction

for me naturally provided I experience them as such, in a type of experience in which they are precisely not, as is the case in mere thing-perception, there for me as mere things but rather precisely as *lived-bodies*—seen and apprehended as such, and confirming themselves concordantly in the progress of experience. In this context, *one* lived-body is privileged for me in a peculiar manner and in consequence is an animal creature, and more specifically a human being, ahead of all the others. It is *my* lived-body, and accordingly I am, for myself, distinguished from all other objects of experience—"I" in the ordinary empirical sense of the word, i.e., I, this human being, to whom belongs this lived-body, | my body. *My* lived-body VIII, 60/61 is the only one in relation to which I experience, in an absolutely immediate manner, the embodiment of a mental life (of a sensing, an ideating, a feeling, and so forth) that is my own life, or that "expresses" itself in the form of a lived-body, in changing bodily–thingly occurrences—a lived-body that I experience in such a way that I perceive together not only this thing *lived-body* and its thingly behavior but at the same time my psychic life, and ultimately the two precisely together in one: the self-embodiment of the latter in the former, the self-expressing of the one in the other. Thus, to take an example, each of those bodily movements of mine that I perceive as such—the movements of my hands, of my walking legs, and so on—is at once a thingly, a, so to speak, mechanical movement (inasmuch as mechanics speaks solely of such things), and at the same time, seen from the inside, a subjective "I move," which animates, as it were, the thingly–mechanical being-moved. Step by step, the lived-body appearing to me—as well as the change in the modes of its appearance—gives itself as bearing within itself this or that psychical element, as something outward that still bears in itself *originaliter* the inwardness that "expresses" itself in it. The two give themselves as unseparated, as coinciding; in an experiencing regard, for instance, the hand [is given], and [with it], in its movement, the double-sided psychophysical movement, the movement specific to the lived-body.

This, therefore, stands there for me in the perception that is specific to the lived-body, originally experienced in this two-layeredness and in such a way that here both strata, outwardness as much as inwardness, as well as their self-uniting, are themselves experienced,

and experienced quite originally, i.e., perceived together as one; the same goes for everything that belongs perceptually to my lived-body in the way of animation. But this only holds for *my* lived-body. If I ask how *other* lived-bodies, and thus how animals and other human beings, are experienced and experienceable as such in the universal framework of my world-perception, the answer is: in this framework, that is, from the standpoint of the original cognition of experience, my body plays the role of the *primordial lived-body*, from which is derived the experience of all other lived-bodies, and thus I am constantly, for myself and my experiencing, the *primordial human being*, from whom the experience of all other human beings derives its sense and perceptual possibility. For it is only in virtue of the fact | that in my very perceptual field, my lived-body VIII, 61/62 is continuously there as lived-body, in its original psychophysical, i.e., double-layered, perceptual givenness, that other lived-bodies can now also be there for me as lived-bodies and can in a certain way also count as perceived. Only to the extent that things in my bodily surroundings resemble my lived-body, and that which gives its physical behavior the status of an animating expression, can they and must they be apprehended and experienced as lived-bodies. I say this, however, not on the basis of any objective–psychological theories, about which I am permitted to know nothing here, but based on the observation of my perception itself and its own peculiar structure as perception of my own and others' lived-bodies. The perception of another lived-body is perception precisely insofar as I apprehend the existence of this lived-body as immediately itself there. And in like manner the other *human being* as human being is there for me perceptually. Indeed, I express the perceptual immediacy with the sharpest emphasis precisely by saying: a human being stands here before me in the flesh. It is not an inference, not some mediate thought process that leads me to posit the existence of another lived-body and fellow human being; this indeed would mean precisely that he was only "there" in a broad sense, *discoverable* somewhere in my environment, *experienceable* for me. No, he is *actually* experienced, and he stands there in his spatial location quite immediately; it is in no way conceivable that I could experience him still more immediately. And hence I say rightly: I perceive him in the flesh.

And yet there lies contained within the sense of this perception a certain mediacy, one that distinguishes it essentially from the perception of my own lived-body. In the latter case, we saw, the thingly lived-body, but also the psychical element embodied there, and the way it is embodied, are perceived in an originary manner. The psychical element is my own, after all. In contrast, although the other physical lived-body is, to be sure, perceived in my spatial surroundings, and in just as completely an originary manner as mine is, the psychical element embodied in it is not. It is not actually and genuinely self-given but only co-meant appresentatively. In this respect there is a similarity with that anticipation through which something co-perceived, as itself concomitantly meant there, | is VIII, 62/63 contained in every external perception—such as the unseen back side of the seen thing. But the analogy is not complete; it is an indication but not an anticipation[a] that could be transformed into a self-grasping.[b] What this indicating intention demands and makes possible is not a redeeming perception, as is the case in all moments of preliminary indication occurring within spatio-thingly perception. Rather, we are compelled to say, *the perception of another lived-body* is, in keeping with its distinctive essence, *perception through originary interpretation*. This originariness is grounded in its being essentially and inseparably related back to my own primordial lived bodiliness, in which I have the *primordial experiencing of an incorporation of the subjective* in something appearing in thingly form. When I perceive that thing there, which in its entire behavior resembles my lived-body, I cannot help but apprehend it as something in which a subjective element is embodied, indicated in determinately particular ways in the manner of a hand-moving, head-shaking, tactile sensing, etc. of an I. By apprehending this thing from the start according to what immediately embodies itself in it, I apprehend it itself concomitantly as a lived-body, to which belongs a concretely full subjectivity persisting in a more or less indeterminate fashion, a subjectivity that must experience itself in the "I am" but that is not me myself. This spatio-thingly seeing and *originary interpreting viewing*, which binds itself together in the apprehending of another's lived-bodiliness, this understanding as expression, is,

[a] *Vorgriff* [b] *Selbstgriff*

as against the simple external and the already founded perception of my own lived-body, *a distinctive basic form of experience*, which is still, according to its nature, to be designated perception.* Like every form of experience, it has its own manners of confirmation; the self-confirmation of interpreting perception is carried out again through interpretation—but here is not the place to go into the more precise manners of such confirmation. The interpreting perception is characterized as a secondary form of perception insofar as it presupposes, in its own sense, perception of one's own lived-body | and VIII, 63/64 constantly takes its cue from this perception. This is precisely why in the perception of another I am in a peculiar manner involved. In understanding him by interpreting his lived-body, I at the same time overlap, as it were, with what is grasped comprehendingly; and that all the more clearly and in a consciousness that is all the more lively, the more perfect the clarity is in which I in my interpretation come close to the other, entering ever more deeply into his inwardness.

Lecture 36: ⟨Transcendental Solipsism. The Negative Result of the Critique of Mundane Experience⟩

If I now, after these additions and clarifications,[1] survey the totality of my mundane experience, I see that it is pervaded by a stratum of spatio-thingly experience that supports all other mundane experience. Every possible experience that I can have of human beings presupposes spatio-thingly experience. If I trace the stream of the latter experience purely, if I here enact the reflections carried through previously, purely considering the harmonies, disharmonies, and corrections in this stream, and if I then recognize the possibility of that transformation into a mere "swarm" of appearances in which every unity of belief dissolves, and that for me there could then no longer be any talk of an empirically indubitable "existing"

*Lately, and quite inadequately, this experience through interpretation has commonly come to be called "empathy."

[1] Regarding what follows, cf. Husserl's critical comment, Appendix 10, pp. 506ff.—Ed.

world with "existing" things—there then lies contained in all this as necessary consequence that for me there can also no longer be any talk of existing animals and human beings. Thus for me there exists in fact not only the self-evident possibility that the spatio-thingly world, pure physical nature, while I am perceiving it in empirical indubitability, might not exist, but also, and indeed as a consequence thereof, the possibility that *no human beings* exist, and thus none of that mental life that expresses itself for me in lived-bodies. Of course—I remind myself of what I already appropriated for myself previously—this possibility of the absolute non-existence of the world of my experience, with all of its human beings, is not to be confused with any real possibility, which has the world | that exists VIII, 64/65 for me, that is posited as existing, as its bedrock. For such a possibility, as for instance that a procession of masked people would move through the Kaiserstraße,[1] may be merely conceivable but otherwise empty, yet it is placed on the general ground of experience, and in the context of experience it is determinable as an objective untruth. But here we are dealing with the possibility that the entirety of our experience as such loses all harmony and that therefore no valid ground for any positing whatsoever, including that of real possibilities, could exist.

Consequently, in a critique of experience we are permitted to operate with the real actuality and possibility of other subjects only so long as this critique is an ordinary empirical critique, such as, for instance, a historical critique or a critique of witnesses' statements, or the like; likewise, too, concerning the possibility that human beings could become insane. It is a form of real possibilities that already presuppose the existence of the world. But if the latter is itself in question and is so universally, and if a universal critique is to be carried out of the world-experience that originally gives and authenticates the world's existence, then this critique cannot be carried out under the supposition of the existence of other human beings, or even only of their possible co-existence along with me, the one criticizing. In doing so one would be presupposing something that

[1] At the time, the name of the main street in Freiburg's pedestrian zone. During the Nazi reign, the street was named "Adolph-Hitler-Straße" and renamed "Kaiser-Joseph-Straße" after World War II.—Trans.

is itself in question, something included implicitly in the universal theme of the critique, that is, something that is itself to be criticized. If, therefore, I place myself on the ground of the self-evidently possible hypothesis that my mundane experience would pass over into a senseless swarm of appearances, then for me, as the subject of this swarm, there is no longer the possibility of other human beings, sane or insane, whom I could invoke or who could teach me anything. To think myself into the hypothetical scenario of my perceptual life as a swarm and within this hypothesis to expect myself in addition to hold other human beings to be really possible is an incompatibility; for the swarm's very form excludes every motivation for believing in such real possibilities. But if the other human beings who are conceived along with me are only co-conceived as empty fictions, then these human beings' concordant or non-concordant courses of perception are also mere fictions, thus signifying nothing.

From these considerations, therefore, I realize that a universal | critique of experiences as such, which falls to me as beginning VIII, 65/66
philosopher and only ever could fall to me, can be *solipsistic* only in the good sense that it is only possible as a critique of *my* experiences, that it only knows other subjects and their experiences as experienced in my experiences and, placing them critically in question, does not presuppose their existence. To the extent that I may later ever have reason and occasion to perform a philosophical critique on the experience of others, this can only have a sense after I have performed a critique entering primarily into the mediacies of my universal experience. If the experience of others exists for me only through an experiencing that indicates itself through interpretive mediacy, indicating itself in what is experienced by me directly, then the primordial ground of all critique must in any case be the investigation of these mediacies, experienced in my consciousness itself and to be pursued there.

In addition to all this, our extensive reflection on the objection from the possibility of insanity has also had the good effect of making us aware, once and for all, of the danger of the specifically epistemological circle that consists in using in one's argument, without noticing it, something in particular form that, in the generality of the critical theme, stands in question.

After concluding this meditation concerning mundane experience and the possibility of the non-existence of the world during this experience, I can now make use of its *result*, improved and purified in the end, for my philosophical intentions. The world is there for me indubitably, thanks to my concordant perception. It extends through an endless past, thanks to my endless series of memories that can be awoken, memories of the stream of my previous perceptions. And my experiential belief extends into the openly endless future, provided I foresee the continuation of my perceptual stream in the same style of concordance as before. To every phase of this indubitable experiential certainty there also belongs the indubitable certainty that belonging to what was genuinely perceived individually in detail or in the universality of the current total perception are manifold horizons of perceivable things; or, speaking correlatively, that to every actual perceiving | there belongs a multifarious possible VIII, 66/67 perception, a realm of things that are freely accessible for me though lines of perception that can be activated freely. Of this, too, I have, speaking generally, indubitable certainty, which reaches beyond all openly possible individual disappointments, including those concerning this subjective being-able-to-activate. It will always work out somehow that the experiences that come to an actual running-off fit together and permit the unity of a world, this world of mine, to maintain itself in steady belief.

But none of this changes the fact that, as my closer consideration showed, the belief in the world, with its entire objective content which makes up the sense that is formed in experience itself and is determined ever anew, is a presumptive one through and through. This belief constantly leaves open the possibility that the perceptual style of concord that is now actually running its course could give way to a senseless swarm, notwithstanding all the possibilities that are free of doubt. But it also leaves open the possibility, which should not be overlooked, that despite the concord in which it actually ran its course in the past and even now still runs its course, even the horizons of the perceivable things that never came to be perceived lack that capacity to be fulfilled that was constantly and indubitably presumed. And this means, correlatively, that the world does not have to exist, never had to exist, and, even if it did and does exist, need not continue to exist. This world, which I experience now

as present in indubitable and continuously self-confirming perceptional belief, which I experience, in indubitable empirical memorial belief growing out of concordant past experiences, as the bygone world—this world need be nothing more than a transcendental illusion. That it is so is an absolutely empty possibility, against which the entirety of experience, with the full power of its concordance, speaks, and *for* which nothing at all speaks. That this possibility, that any of the infinitely many lawless particular possibilities that it entails, be the truth, is something I cannot believe—I, the one who lives in thrall to the experience of the world and who cannot annihilate it at will. I can therefore surely say that this possibility is without doubt a nullity, considering it, that is to say, precisely with respect to its actuality. And yet it is a possibility; it could nevertheless be how things are. Or what here amounts to the same thing: | it could VIII, 67/68 be that in truth there is nothing real, that there is no world, that no world ever existed and none exists now, even as I nevertheless experience this one in certainty and quite indubitably.

Let us now relate this insight to our *question concerning the correct beginning of philosophy*, which was the impetus for its explication. The beginning philosopher, we said, after the universal "overthrow" of all the sciences, is afforded, as the beginning lying closest to hand, the cognition "I am" but also the cognition "The world exists," where at first the latter seems to be preferable since it includes the former within it. In this connection the first methodological meditation made the demand, obvious for the beginning, that what should count as an absolutely justified cognition is one that is adequate and therefore apodictic. In the case of such a cognition, every possible negation, every possible doubt, is excluded, and indeed in such a way that this exclusion is itself adequately apprehensible. A merely correlative expression is: the possibility of the non-existence of what is adequately given is, precisely through the manner of its givenness, excluded in absolute self-evidence.

The existence of the world is originally given in an experience which is thoroughly inadequate and which cannot, for reasons of principle, be transformed into an adequate one, neither according to its essence nor its existence; it therefore leaves the non-existence of the world constantly open. The statement "the world exists" and the universe of particular experiential statements that could ever

be put forth here is thus directed. *The existence of the world and all that is comprised in it must be included in the universal overthrow*.

In what manner experiences of the world, and following them sciences of the world, could ever be philosophically re-validated or resurrected, I do not now know, although I do know that such a thing would be forever excluded, or that a justification of empirically grounded cognitions would forever remain impossible, if it were demanded that they satisfy the cognitive norm of apodicticity according to their straightforward sense, with which they are empirical certainties. Such would be an evidently absurd demand. This may now make me somewhat concerned and raise the question of whether I | will have to change something in the future concerning VIII, 68/69 my radical demand for apodictic justification; or, if it should not turn out, albeit with a certain modification of sense, that experience was after all an apodictically justifiable source of cognition; and accordingly if it should turn out that completely justified empirical sciences could in fact derive their right, their true and genuine right, from apodictically evident principles, and could only derive them from these.[1] But as a beginner I cannot yet tackle such questions. *I am still looking for the Archimedean point*, upon which I can rely absolutely firmly, the ground of cognition upon which I can begin my first, so to speak absolute work. I hold fast to the radical demand for apodictic justification and follow the thoughts which were awoken by my negative result of the absolute critique of universal empirical cognition and by the course of this critique itself.

[1] Cf. Appendix 15, pp. 542 ff. — Ed.

⟨Chapter Three
Opening Up the Field of Transcendental Experience
Transcendental, Phenomenological
and Apodictic Reduction⟩

Lecture 37: ⟨The Apodictic Certainty of the Possible Non-Existence of the World and the Transcendental Life of Subjectivity in Contrast to It⟩

If I hypothesize in evidently possible manner that the universe, the entire endless space with all in it, does not exist despite the concordantly continuously streaming world experience, then I may be permitted to ask: What would remain then, unaffected and perhaps apodictically existing? But is not "the universe" identical to "*the totality of being*"? Hence, does not my question ask, absurdly: What if *nothing* at all existed? Yet, this critical insight that I acquired, concerns, upon closer reflection, not the totality of entities in the broadest sense, but more precisely the entities of *mundane* | *experience*, of *objective* being. ⟨Experience⟩ itself and me, the *experiencing agent, with my life*, to which belongs the concrete stream of mundane experience, is something that I have constantly *posited as existing and which I have presupposed*. What I considered were altogether the forms of my actual experiential life and the evidently conceivable forms of its modification, among which those, through which no mundane objectivities as experienced and experiencable and no *mundus* at all would exist. Of course I have hereby not presupposed my existence and that of the course of my experience in the form of a hypothesis; instead, while I questioned critically the experienced world, I looked on at my lived life, at my streaming perceiving, remembering, anticipating and the like, and I took it as I found it, as I perceived it, in its experienced selfhood. Did I thereby not commit an epistemo-critical circle? *In the entire meditation I enacted self-cognition*, self-cognition concerning my mundane experiencing, that is, as I find it as the content of my own life, as I describe it in its style, consider it according to its possibilities of modification. How VIII, 69/70

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was I permitted to enact self-cognition, since I do belong to the world, and since in the apodictic critique of world cognition that of self-cognition had to be achieved as well?

I stand here before a very peculiar situation. On the one hand it is undoubtedly the case that I have presupposed myself and my experiencing life in the critique of mundane experiential cognition. During this critical meditation it was for me the focal point of concern, it was perceptually there, accepted in its very existence without ever considering subjecting this existing-for-me itself to an apodictic critique, that is, to subject to a critique the being-aware-of-myself, the being-aware-of-my-mundane-experiencing, the constantly-observing-it, the regarding-it, the reflecting-about-it, this entire course of enacted self-cognition, through which it was precisely there for me and topic of my reflection. I confess that therein lay a certain naiveté; I enacted a universal apodictic critique of my mundane experience, and this self-cognition, namely the experience of my | mundane experience, VIII, 70/71 and moreover this self-reflecting, this considering of my mundane experience, in which consisted, after all, this entire critique, I did not subject, in turn, to a critique.

It may be that such a critique, a critique, above all, of being-aware-of-oneself, perceiving-oneself, which give the mundane critique its ground, in turn is necessary, and I can already glean that it would presumably be of great importance. But what is in *question* first and foremost is: Did I, by neglecting [this critique], *really commit an epistemo-critical circle*? Is it not, rather, *clear* that here *two meanings of I*, and consequently of "my psychic life," "self-experience" and "self-cognition," begin to come into relief?

I, according to my ordinary I-parlance, means I, the *human I*. Taken concretely and in full, I am an animated lived-body, psychophysical reality, belonging to the world, to the totality of realities. I am an *object* of my mundane experience among others. But do I not have to *distinguish* the I, which is here the *subject* of experience, the I-subject for the I-object? Let us reflect more closely: I, who lives through, in enactment, a continual world experiencing, find this manifold-unified world and am thus, as an all-finding subject, precisely the subject for all objects, for the universe. But integrated into all of this I find also myself, that is, me as an object, this human I with all of its "mental life," belonging psychophysically

to this physical lived-body, which I call my own, embodied in it objectively. And this entire psychophysical reality is what it is in the universe, enmeshed in the manifold concatenations of causality, through which all mundane realities are immediately or mediately ⟨connected⟩, dependent upon one another in space, bound to one another causally.

Of course this is not merely an accidental equivocation. In the transition from the observing gaze of the I-subject to the I-object and back I must understand in apodictic evidence that the I, the subject of experience, is identical to the I that has become objective in the human being. More precisely spoken, I must acknowledge the following as an absolute | evidence: If I transition from my objective VIII, 71/72 self-experience of myself, as this human I and mental life incorporated in my lived-body, to the reflection upon myself as the subject who enacts this objective self-experience and who, concurrently, reveals any other [elements of] subjective life through such reflection; and if I then return back from this reflective experience of the subject-I to the objective-mundane experience of the human I, then I must at once incorporate[a] into myself, the objectively experienced human being or my own lived-body, all that I have experienced in the subject-reflection, and I must take as identical the I itself, subject-I and human I. It is I, the subject-I, and I am identical with the I, which belongs psychophysically to this lived-body and hence to the world. And on the other hand, I the human being, or this psychophysically real "human being" with its human I is the one who enacts this reflection and reveals through it its hidden internality. Mundane experience, in which I am an object of experience as a human being, is, while I am in this attitude, not visible in the objective content of experience; it only becomes graspable through reflection. Nevertheless, it is at the same time—and evidently—my experience, of this human being, just as, once again, the reflection, if I grasp it once again in a reflection of even higher level, is my reflection, that of the human being.

But despite all of this, and no matter what difficulties I may find here upon closer inspection, I cannot avoid this distinction.

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[a] *einverleiben*—the English term "incorporate" plays on the same etymology of body (Latin *corpus*)—Trans.

Indeed: If I enact the critique of my universal world experience, by observing it simply and with respect to the possible forms of modification that I can freely create in phantasy variation, I do truly gain the apodictic insight that the world that I factually experience at each moment does not have to exist absolutely. If I, in observing my mundane perceiving, have taken the latter naively as truly running its course, it is nevertheless apodictically certain, and in any case certain in phrasing it hypothetically or generally, that if mundane perceiving runs its course in such a normal style, what is perceived in it as world does not have to exist. Assuming, hence, that this world did not exist, then my lived-body would accordingly not exist either, hence also I as a human being would not exist, then not nothing remained, since all of the perception of the world that is presupposed would exist |, and I myself, as the VIII, 72/73 subject of this perceiving and of the entire concrete psychic life in which mundane perceiving runs its course, would still exist and remain as who I am with all of this life. I would be the one unaffected in my being by all world negation, the one who would be the never-negatable one through, so to speak, an epistemo-critical destruction of my lived-body just as of the universe writ large. Of course I may not express myself in this way: I remain who I am, even if I were taken from this world when I were severed from my lived-body; for this would seem as if it were a possibility that an angel of death would lift me, as a pure soul, out of this existing and remaining world. It would be much more appropriate to say—although admitting such religious ideas would be impermissible for the beginning philosopher, since they are included in the general overthrow of cognition: If the created world, the objective one of my experience, were destroyed, then I, the pure I of its experience, would not itself be destroyed for the same reason, and this experience itself would not be destroyed. But we are free to go even farther. If it had so pleased God, if this were conceivable, that he had created only a world of transcendental semblance instead of the real world and had given it to me, the experiencing agent, as an indubitable reality—and yet [it were truly] a nothing, then I would remain exactly who I am, in my pure selfness. But I, according to the transcendental semblance this human being, would in truth be without a lived-body; and even if I lost this lived-body of transcen-

dental semblance, I would nevertheless at all times be a subject—of an experience which had now transformed itself into an absurd swarm.[1]

Accordingly, if we now return to our purely philosophical meditations, there is no doubt that we have to distinguish, that is, that I as a beginning philosopher have to distinguish: my human existence, given to me originarily in perception in my mundane self-experience, and my transcendental existence, given to me originarily in transcendental self-experience, in that self-perception of pure reflection. In mundane self-experience I am a mind with a mental I, as really belonging to the sensually experienced lived-body, as bound to it psychophysically. If no | lived-body exists, then it is a VIII, 73/74 transcendental semblance, hence also no psychophysical causality that could really intertwine the I and contents of egoic life with physical-bodily events and could hence attribute to them objective-real identity as mind, mental life. The I as mental or as mind (if one does not like to distinguish between I and mind) would have vanished together with the world, and of course just as my mental I likewise that of other human beings and they themselves. This holds indubitably as long as the concept of mind still retains its natural meaning, which refers to a correlate, to a lived-body animated by a mind, as a lived-body which not only exists physically, but which functions psychically, moves subjectively and animates subjectivity.

On the other hand I must remind myself: The cognitive contingency that the world has due to the essence of my mundane experience, and everything that follows from this contingency, does not concern my I in its purity and my egoic life in its purity. All positing-as-nil, the annihilation of this universe lets my empirical mind, the mind as such, vanish; but not the purely mental, that pure egoic [life] which no longer has its real co-existence as animating, which no longer has an existential meaning from my mundane perception, but which has existence for me from my pure self-experience, which is in no way affected in its validity whether or not mundane experience has validity or which validity it has whatsoever. Indeed, if I put out of play the entire mundane experience

[1] Cf. Appendix 17, pp. 537 f.—Ed.

concerning its objective validity—as I do when I hypothesize on the ground that the world did not exist—and apodictically imagine this possibility, then that self-experience is not yet dismissed in which this mundane experience itself exists for me and remains for me as my living experiencing.[a] And now, while the entire mundane experience in its full universality is out of play, I no longer have any possibility, in the transition from reflection to the straightforward perspective on the world, to lay my subjectivity into a lived-body and into the world. Indeed, it is no longer anything mundane. On the other hand, my I and its experiencing life is, as I said, nothing less than put out of play. To the contrary: It is in constant effective validity for me | so much that self-experience provides for me the VIII, 74/75 entire ground on which my observation roams, which would become absolutely meaningless and aimless if I gave up this ground. This will require further considerations.

Lecture 38: ⟨The Field of Transcendental Experience as Topic of a Transcendental Critique⟩

Now all depends upon me seizing, utilizing, and expanding my cognitive gain in the right manner.

Looking back at the path taken so far, it seemed the most obvious to me, who intended to begin with an apodictically grounded philosophy, to begin with an apodictic critique of the most original self-evidences[b] that are still in effect after the Cartesian overturn of the sciences; thus [to begin] with a critique of the existence of the world of experience or of the validity of mundane experience, or the existence of my own I, or the critique of the evidence of the "I am." I preferred the former critique, which had to encompass, in its universality, the latter.[1] For, as I, of course I understood myself as human being, how could I have thought of anything else at this beginning stage? The result of this critique was the bracketing of

[a] *erfahrendes Erleben* [b] *Selbstverständlichkeiten*

[1] The first critique pertains to the critique of the existence of the world, whereas the latter to the way via the critique of the I—Trans.

the cognition of the world as mundane experience and experiential cognition. Such a critique can in principle not be an apodictic one. When I later, however, was led back to the "I am" and was left with it after this critique, then I no longer meant the I of the natural manner of speaking, as if I, the human being, had somehow saved myself from the epistemo-critical apocalypse. Instead, what remained was the transcendental I; and precisely this [I], because I as the subject of the entire world cognition did not belong to the cognized world and became aware of it of myself in my purity once I bracketed the former. Hereby, precisely, a most significant progress had been made, a much-promising horizon had been opened.[1] Admittedly, being left with transcendental self-experience with its transcendental self did not yet entail retaining it as an apodictic residuum | VIII, 75/76 of the apodictic critique of the world. Of the latter, nothing at all remained, and nothing of the validity of the experience giving it. But the being of this experience and thereby of the I as the subject of experiencing of this experience now became visible in a turn of the theoretical interest; it became visible that a self-experience remained, namely it remained unaffected throughout the mundane critique and that, if I bracketed the entire world, I myself would always lay ready to hand for myself as the theme of experiences and all other cognitions. By opening up transcendental experience and the field of transcendental subjective being and life in this manner, it is now also opened up as a theme for a transcendental critique. The latter is something that I, to be sure, yet have to supply, if I remain consistent with my philosophical principle of beginning, that I may only count apodictic evidences as valid in the beginning. This is, thus, the great task that still lies ahead of me.

It is now very important for the way I understand my own method to make clear to myself the following in reflection. Obviously, the apodictic critique of mundane experience—apart from its original function of deciding whether the self-evidence of world-existence has the meaning of an apodictic self-evidence and could thereby supply an apodictic ground of cognition—has afterwards taken on yet another, second, and very far-reaching function; namely to make

[1] Cf. Appendix 17, pp. 557 f.—Ed.

transcendental subjectivity and its transcendental life, which was hitherto hidden to me, visible.[1] For it is only in this way that the transcendental I comes into my field of vision as subjectivity that is purely in and for itself, as an ontic sphere to be posited for itself: as positable for itself, even if the universe does not exist or if any position-taking with respect to its existence remains inhibited. It is only in this manner that I can appropriate the transcendental I for myself, as it were as an ontic sphere purely to be severed from the world, and yet not severed in any natural sense of the term, as if we were dealing with separately existing—or even only possibly ⟨separately⟩ existing—ontic spheres and in which manner ever separately existing ontic spheres. Transcendental being is completely | self-encapsulated, and yet, according to the peculiar VIII, 76/77
meaning of mundane experience, hence according to an accomplishment enacting itself in the transcendental I, experiencable as animating a lived-body. Herein lies: The transcendental I is purely in itself; it enacts in itself, however, a self-objectivation, it gives itself the meaning formation[a] "human mind" and "objective reality."

But how, now, does my transcendental I release itself from this self-concealment? How do I free myself from the self-created apperception, which, again and again reasserting itself habitually, lets me appear for myself always only as I the human being? In other words, how can I ever overcome the habitually effective motivational force, which at all times draws me into mundane experience, believing in it, and into the enactment of the apperception as human being, which at all times enworlds me? How can I ever rise above this losing-myself in the world and this dressing-myself in a worldly cloak, and become aware of myself in my transcendental purity and peculiarity: as the subject in whose apperceiving experiencing (insofar as it shapes and actively enacts mundane experiencing in itself) this "this world exists" and this "I am a human being in this world" constitutes itself as a subjective accomplishment? Or: How can I ever see the subject and its subjective life purely in itself, in

[a] *Sinnesgestalt*

[1] Husserl comments on this sentence: "This could have been intended from the beginning." Cf. Appendix 10, p. 508.—Ed.

and through which all objective experienced being is for it, and moreover conscious being of every type and form?

The answer is clear: [all of this is possible] through the means of our methodological bracketing of the existence of the universe. For now I see, after having overcome the belief in the world and having put it out of power in the most effective form of an evidently possible hypothetical negation of the entire world, that for me now also my self-positing as worldly reality, as human being, has become impossible. On the other hand, I also see that my self-experience is not only enactable, but that it remains in an uninterrupted enactment and in constant validity. I as human being would no longer exist, or I can always put out of power my existence as human being. But at all times I do exist and so does my streaming life; at all times that to which my gaze is directed first and foremost is, in this context, my mundanely existing life and my apprehending and experiencing myself | as "human being in the world." Putting the VIII, 77/78 world into brackets, hence, includes concurrently a bracketing of my self-enworlding apperception. This is, hence, a method of undressing my empirical-objective cloak that I have inwardly put on myself or rather that I always again put on myself in a habitual apperceiving—which remains disregarded during my naive life experience. This is, hence, a method to bring for myself this very fact to cognition, and in general to cognition that I live, in my ultimate and true reality, an absolutely encapsulated life of my own, which is a life in a constant objectivating accomplishment, a life which, forming mundane experiences, forms in itself an objective world as its phenomenon, thus as a phenomenon in this ultimate subjectivity. The [world] is what it is from my transcendental forming, as appearing to me, being valid for me, existing in my own authentications, and confirming itself as real.

I can already see that all objectivity appearing to me, indeed, whatever I ever have or could have objectively conscious beyond the real world—that I may only take such objectivities as something appearing in my appearance, as something confirming itself in my confirming, as phenomenon forming itself intentionally in an absolute conscious accomplishing belonging to my transcendental life.

Yet, this look ahead will give me enough food for thought at a later stage. For now I declare this in the self-explanation of my

method, by which the transcendental I *vis-à-vis* the empirical I, the transcendental life and transcendental self-apprehension *vis-à-vis* the empirical mental life and empirical self-perception becomes visible.

In this latter reflection it has also become clear that we owe this access to transcendental subjectivity not only in fact to the described method, but that this or a familiar method in general is indispensable to discover it. I emphasize: *discover*. Nobody needs to discover his empirical natural I, himself as a human being. Every mature and waking human being finds himself as | human being with a human I VIII, 78/79 and human mental life; he enacts natural self-experience in natural reflection, which he enacts every time he says: I perceive, remember, I like this or that, I desire, I will, and the like. On the other hand, transcendental subjectivity had to be discovered first of all, everyone has to discover it for himself at one point, and first and foremost his own. And he only discovers it through a method which frees him of the motivational force of natural life. Mere reflection, no matter how carefully observing, analyzing and directed at my pure psychic [life], my own pure mental awareness, remains without such a method natural psychological reflection and remains what it already was— no matter in which imperfect shape: mundane experience. This pure mental simply is and remains mental, an interiority of a continually valid exteriority. As long as the world exists for me, in naive validity and continued validity as existing reality, this purely mental is still an animation of my lived-body, experientially and self-evidently belonging to it as co-entity in the world, which is valid for me. And as long as it is ⟨the world which exists for me⟩, I am therefore in it, [as] this human being, this human mental life. Which occasion could I ever have in my natural course of life to transcend this natural attitude? Obviously it is necessary, if this is to occur, that I bracket this validity that I attribute to mundane experience by enacting it naively, by enacting it in the naively enacted experiential belief. But this has to occur in such an effective form that every attempt to fall back into the naive enactment of experience is undercut. Only when nothing is "there" for me any longer in the most rigorous sense, if there is no longer existing reality, only then can I grasp myself as transcendental subject, as that irreality which all reality presupposes.

It is clear that transcendental subjectivity had also to be discovered first of all historically. In its first form immature, and for that reason rendered both ineffective and confused, the discovery of the Cartesian *Ego Cogito* comes to the fore, incidentally here immediately bound up with the claim to apodictic indubitability. A true and pure | display of transcendental subjectivity only occurs in VIII, 79/80 the method of the *phenomenological reduction*, which is familiar to every phenomenologist. It is no other ⟨method⟩ than that which has been described in detail in the last lectures. To this extent, it also deserves to be called the *Cartesian* method of transcendental reduction, insofar as it is nothing but a clarificatory exposition of the depth dimensions hidden—and hidden to Descartes himself—in the first *Meditations* of Descartes that only appear to be trivial. It will become clear only later why our method is called that of the *phenomenological* reduction, likewise why transcendental subjectivity is also called phenomenological.

I said that for Descartes transcendental subjectivity, the *Ego Cogito*, immediately discloses itself as absolutely indubitable being. In contrast to the possibility of the non-existence of the experienced world, or, as Descartes prefers [to say], the possibility of doubting it, the *Ego Cogito* comes into relief for me as something absolutely indubitable. It was, conversely, with much deliberation that I *disconnected* the method of transcendental reduction in the current presentation from the question as to the apodictic validity of transcendental self-cognition. *I* now *distinguish* this *transcendental reduction* or phenomenological reduction from the *apodictic reduction*, which is connected to it. The latter designates a task that only becomes possible through the phenomenological reduction.[1] Before practicing apodictic critique, I must have a field for critique, in this case a realm of experience, and the latter, that of transcendental self-experience, I only have thanks to the method of the phenomenological reduction.

On the other hand it is barely avoidable and in any case useful to carry out a piece of this apodictic reduction—the beginning, which

[1] Husserl carried out this apodictic critique in the lecture course one year prior to this lecture, entitled *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Introduction to Philosophy, ed. in Hua. XXXV)—Trans.

immediately suggests itself—as well in due time, and this [should occur] in the context of the first closer observation of the newly emerging transcendental sphere. Also *questions as to a possible modification of the method of the phenomenological reduction* soon become pressing, as contributing to the meaning of transcendental subjectivity. | VIII, 80/81

Let us begin by scrutinizing more closely transcendental subjectivity,[1] which had become visible in our methodological procedure only with *limited* contents, merely in the manner of a first glimpse. The latter occurred in the manner that I, the I as experiencing the world as natural-naive I, went on to completely strike through, as it were, this world, and then my *world-experiencing* itself remained for me, and hence I myself as experiencing I; although, of course, my lived-body and my humanness had been stricken through as well. This [world-experiencing], hence, entailed: I exist, and exist [as] experiencing these world experiences.

This experiencing life exists and it is my life, even if nothing real existed or [actually] exists, whether or not the world and humans (and so on) may exist or not; a continually streaming being as egoic life which I do not doubt in the least and where I at first have no occasion to doubt it or address critical questions to it: indeed, I experience it continually, entirely immediately in perception; only that this perception is transcendental, it is enacted in the attitude of a universal bracketing of the world. To this attitude belongs also my empirical self-experiencing as I-human, only that this experiencing is not enacted naively regarding its objective validity, but by bracketing—as we also say phenomenologically: by bracketing its validity, it is taken as a merely subjective fact, as a pulse of my egoic life.

[1] On the following, cf. Husserl's critical remark, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 508f.—Ed.

⟨Section Three VIII, 82
On the Phenomenology of the Phenomenological Reduction. Opening Up a Second Path to the Transcendental Reduction⟩

⟨Chapter One
The Transcendental Temporal Form of Subjectivity's Transcendental Stream of Life⟩

Lecture 39: ⟨The Full Content of Universal Transcendental Self-Experience: Transcendental Present, Past, and Future⟩

The I as experiencing mundane objectivity is, however, by far not the entire transcendental I, not the full content of a transcendental self-experience to be universally unfolded. If we look more closely, the consistent self-abstention of any natural-naive world-belief in mundane [objects] concerning every *perception* of anything objective does not only lead to its pure transcendental grasping, to a grasping as the transcendentally pure "I perceive," but the following becomes conspicuous for the first time. Finding myself in the natural attitude as human I and being constantly related to my surrounding to which I belong, I find not only myself as perceiving, and hence I say in reflection not only: I remember, I anticipate, I think, I doubt, I compare and contrast, I wish, desire, will and act. Instead, to all of these acts that are experienced mundanely in natural reflection as empirical egoic acts, correspond *transcendental* egoic *acts*, and these are nothing other than those concrete acts which have become enacted by myself as the I who has become visible in its pure ownness and independence of all worldly | existence VIII, 82/83
through the transcendental reduction. These are those same objective acts, but freed of all objectivating apperception in the attitude of naiveté; rather, the objectification becomes understood through my abstention from all mundane co-believing as an accomplishment that enacts itself in the respective subject as a transcendental one

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and is itself taken up into the transcendental content. If I seize, for instance, reflectively an "I wish for the nice winter weather to remain," then the abstention from all worldly belief leads me to view now my transcendentally pure "I wish this or that," that which truly occurs as my comporting-myself-wishingly, which exists whether or not the world exists. It is not a second wishing, a transcendental one besides the objective one; rather, what is objective in it is an apperception that enacts itself in me with an experiential belief that I myself enact. And it is precisely this that I see when I put "out of play," when I inhibit the experiential belief, namely the mundane one; or I must inhibit [it] if I want to become aware, reflecting as phenomenological I, what actually and truly is at hand as the purely subjective wishing life and deed in natural objectivating and the natural "I wish" intertwined with it. I may not spare anything of the mundane, which counts as content of natural reflection, from the phenomenological reduction, both on the side of the I as on the side of what is conscious for me as what is wished. Hence, the positing of reality related to the nice weather naturally has to be inhibited as well. Since natural objective apperception always comes prior, I have to practice the reduction when I gauge every "I do or suffer this or that" that offers itself objectively, or as we can also say, [I have to practice,] as a methodological tool, the mental "bracketing" which puts out of play the objective belief. This [is the case] with every egoic act and every egoic experience to be grasped in natural reflection; and we seize through this method each [act and experience] as what it is in transcendental subjectivity, as a pulse in the latter's true and pure life.

If we use the convenient Cartesian expression *Ego Cogito* as the universal title for all | transcendental egoic contents to be gained, VIII, 83/84 then the word *Cogito* does not designate thinking in the narrower sense of the term, but it encompasses no less any loving and hating, wishing and willing and so on; but each time we do not explicitly speak of the empirical-natural I-think, we mean the respective transcendental egoic life, that, hence, *in which* all objectivity appears and in which it is posited, whose own transcendental existence, however, retains nothing of objective being.

But before we shine further light on the method it will be beneficial to ensure ourselves in also another respect of the universality

of the transcendental sphere of experience, namely to make it clear to us that our method not only leads to the transcendental life of the *present*—that is, to the respective *Ego Cogito* that I enact now, that runs its streaming course during my reflection now as my current "I perceive, I think, I wish, I do." Just as I know in the natural attitude as I-human of my past and future life, looking back and ahead, I know likewise, practicing transcendental reduction, also of my transcendental being or life in the *past* and the *future*; and this [I know] from transcendental experience. Experience is first and foremost perception; but *memory* and—in a certain sense—*anticipation* are experience, and it is to the latter that we owe originarily all knowledge of the past as past and future as future.

Let us illustrate this with an example. I remember yesterday's walk to the castle. If I practice the method of bracketing here, then not only my present perceptual lived-body and my entire mundane perceptual presence are put out of play and the city with the castle hill as present existence, but also yesterday's entire castle walk with all that is posited therein as objective is affected by the phenomenological reduction. The latter reaches into the past, affects my past empirical I, the past lived-body, the ontic contents of the past external perceptions, through which the city, the respective streets as ones through which I promenaded, the | castle hill, as the VIII, 84/85 one that I climbed yesterday, were given to me as facts of objective existence. Here I soon notice that a *memory* indeed gives me *the transcendental in a double manner*. On the one hand I remember, and if I put the universe out of play, or inhibit the entire experiential belief that it concerns, then this reflectively perceived "I remember" remains for me as my current experience. On the other hand, in this current experiencing my past castle walk presentifies itself for me. Surely, I may not make any judgmental use of the past occurrence, which was a psychophysically real occurrence in the world as an action on the part of my human person; insofar as my memory is a belief in this real past, it is put out of play, this belief, through my phenomenological bracketing. But upon closer inspection there lies in my "I remember" included an "I *have* perceived"; and in the past action: "I *have* willed and done." It may be that the castle hill, my lived-body, my walking legs and so on are, *as past being*, undone, a transcendental semblance, it may be with their being as it may,

this entire continuity of perceiving, through which the path and the goal were *valid* for me as reality in perception, and the striving, willing, doing, which *was* my active experiencing together with my perceiving, [all of this] is not annulled through the inhibition of my judgment with respect to mundane being. Hence, not only do I have given currently as present transcendental experience the "I remember," but contained in it the memory of my past transcendental life. The same goes obviously for every memory. Every one of it permits evidently *a double transcendental reduction*, one of which yields the memory as my transcendental current experience, while the second, reaching strangely into the reproductive content of memory, reveals a piece of my past transcendental life. If I, in so doing, walk along the chain of my recollections, I let myself be, as it were, continually guided by a newly emerging recollection all the way up to a current present and if I practice the transcendental reduction with respect to the line of recollections being awakened continually, | then I thereby view my *continual transcendental past* VIII, 85/86 up to the now; but only a certain part of it; for, if I ask, conversely, about the pasts prior to that, reproductively awakening ever new distant recollections, then I see, practicing the phenomenological reduction, that my transcendental life continually reaches back into an *endless* past.

Things are somewhat different with respect to the *future*, inasmuch as the "predicting" of *anticipation* is not only not an actual seeing, but also not an exact analogue of the seeing-again-before-oneself in the manner of a presentifying recollection. But regardless, we can also practice phenomenological reduction with respect to the pre-anticipated, and we find again through the transcendental reduction a *double* transcendental [moment], on the one hand the anticipation as a present transcendental experience and on the other hand, contained therein as anticipation, the anticipated content; and insofar as constantly *every* present is continually accompanied by a future horizon of anticipation, we again have, analogously to the endless horizon of transcendental past, an *open endless horizon of a transcendental future*. We see, together with the world, *objective time*, that time which is the form of mundane objectivities as existing, is put out of play. But on the other hand: I, the transcendental I, live a transcendental life, which presents itself

in a continual transcendental experience in its *own transcendental temporal form*, which has, in a manner yet more closely to be described, the form of a present life, which bears in itself the endless horizon of recollection and anticipation, a horizon, which, once revealed, displays a transcendental stream of life that is endless in both directions.

Lecture 40: ⟨Reflection as Splitting of the I and the Identity of the I in the Streaming Living Present⟩

Yet we still need to reflect to penetrate much deeper into that which I have in my transcendental life and which role mundane objectivity plays therein, which is excluded from judgment, an objectivity which, despite this exclusion, does not cease | to appear for me. VIII, 86/87 A house that I perceive does not cease to be, if I cross over into the transcendental attitude and grasp my I-perceive as the transcendental experience, something perceived in my perception, something believed in it, in the certainty of standing there before me, existing thus and so, with this red roof, and so on. But wait, did I not bracket the existence of the house, excluded it, thus "put out of play" this naive belief of naive perception? If I take belief away from perception, it is no longer perception. It is of no help to say: One cannot simply take away the perceptual belief from the perception as if it were a detachable part. But this is not what is going on here; but instead [we are dealing with] a "putting out of action, out of play." Indeed. But does it not mean that to do so is to harm perception? In any case, through the phenomenological "bracketing" my original experiencing is altered. But through this bracketing I receive, it was said, my "I perceive" as the experience just as it is or was actually and purely in itself. I receive it as an element of my transcendental subjectivity, which, in itself, is purportedly nothing else than the I and egoic life, as it is in and for itself, may a world exist or not, and which enacts in itself, in its life, an experiencing of the world—as a special life of unruptured belief—and only through this has the world conscious in itself as an existing reality.

If I follow what this method recommends, I cognize this transcendental subjectivity and what is said of it, indeed, I see it. But once I

reflect, as I now did, on the method, I become doubtful whether it is suited and could ever be suited to unveil transcendental subjectivity and its life.

But I must not tolerate any confusions here. I must give myself a clearer account about the manner in which I practice the transcendental-reductive method and in which I have to practice and understand it in order not to fall into perplexities.[1] I begin my reflection naturally as *natural self-reflection* ⟨or⟩ reflection.[a] The perception of a house shall serve once more as an example | where VIII, 87/88 I shall first carry out this reflection. The given point of departure is that I perceive in a naive devotion and in a certain self-forgetfulness. I am completely absorbed in the perception of the house. It is not the self-oblivion of a dull sleep. The I is awake, it is a current I, that is, it is an enacting subject of an act, whose only correct[2] expression has the form: I think, *Ego Cogito*, and its complete expression still requires the determination of the respective *cogitatum*, of what I think. The uniqueness of the structure of the *actus* with act subject and act object expresses itself in the grammatical subject-object predication. In the *actus*, the enacting I is directed at the object that is conscious in the *actus* itself, it is occupied with it. In our case it is an enacting of a perceiving. Being aware, observing, I am directed at the house. But *that* I am so directed—and herein consists the self-oblivion I am talking about—of this I know nothing, and this is to say, I am not directed at it. This only occurs in the form of a reflection, of a perception of a higher type. In it the perceived is no longer the house but instead the "I perceive the house," and thusly the content of the reflection is indeed and faithfully expressed in the simple perceptual judgment. What happens or what has happened in this reflection? In this self-perception apparently this [happened], that I, *as the I of reflection, rise above the actus of the "I perceive,"* above that *actus* in which I, absorbed in its enactment, did not become aware of it and of myself as the enacting subject. And I as this *newly emerging* I of reflection come on the stage once more in an *actus* of

[a] *Selbstbesinnung ⟨oder⟩ Reflexion*

[1] On the following up to p. 314, cf. two critical remarks of Husserl; cf. Appendix 10, p. 509.—Ed.

[2] Reading *korrekter* instead of *konkreter*—Trans.

"I perceive," in which I turn that self-oblivious I and the previously unperceived "I perceive the house" into the perceived content and direct myself at it by grasping it.

Of course, once I allow reflection to set in, the *naive perceiving* of the self-oblivous I is *already past*. The latter I grasp, reflecting now, only through snatching it, reaching back into the "still having conscious" of so-called "*retention*," the immediate *recollection* attaching itself immediately to the original experiencing. Only | by VIII, 88/89 reflectingly reaching back in this manner I can become aware of the naive perceiving and the self-oblivious I, an awareness, hence, which properly is a *post-awareness* and not actually a perceiving grasping; but it is a grasping. Once the perception, in our example the perception of a house, continues after having established myself already as a reflecting I, then I have, for this further continuing perception, not a temporal spread[a] of the I directed at the house [on the one hand] and, on the other, of the I of reflection directed at this I and its being-directed-perceptually-at-the-house; as was the case for the period of the post-awareness of the self-oblivious perceiving reaching back. Rather, in the living present I have *in coexistence the doubled I and the doubled I-actus*; hence the I which now observes the house continually, and the I which enacts the *actus*: "I am aware that I continually observe the house," and which articulates itself, perhaps, in the form "I observe the house." For, of course this simple statement is an utterance on the part of the reflecting I, and the I expressed therein is the one that is reflectively grasped.

Furthermore: the I carrying out the reflection is obviously in the mode "self-oblivious I," and its own *actus* making this aware is a self-oblivious *actus*. But if we inquire *whence we know of this self-oblivion of the higher order*, the answer is clear and the same as for the self-oblivion of the lower order: through a reflection, and this means now through a *reflection of the second order*, which a corresponding reflecting and in turn again self-oblivious I, which would say, expressing its perception: I am aware that I perceive this house. Again one would have to show that one can distinguish here between phases of retentional grasping-back and perhaps later phases, in which the I-subjects, which are related back upon another

[a] *Auseinander*

in this splitting of the I, belong to the same streaming present. I hardly need to mention that each new, higher ascending reflection brings a new I to presence as the I of enactment, in the manner that, for instance, the third I and its *actus* is related to the second and the second to the first. | VIII, 89/90

Let me add one more terminological remark: the talk of *self-oblivion* is not fitting since, according to the normal parlance of oblivion, a conscious awareness would have had to precede it, which would have to be followed by the forgetting of something that was already conscious. But apparently, in our case, the mode of self-oblivion, viewed in itself, is what is prior. On the other hand, the expression "the I unconscious of itself" is not fitting either due to the ambiguities of the term consciousness. We might better speak of a *latent I*, and in contrast to it of a *patent I*. Accordingly we would have to say: An I becomes patent, a waking I, an enacting I of an *actus*, and the *actus* itself becomes patent only through the appearance of an I reflecting on the former, which is itself latent. Furthermore: Such a type of becoming-patent is possible for every latent I, hence also for that of reflection. [This becoming-patent] consists in that the reflecting I is one that enacts an *actus*, which makes the previously latent I an object of the *actus*, an intentional object.

But why, then, do we speak of *the identical I*, which relates itself back to itself, which becomes aware of itself and of its *actus* in "self-perception": while it is evident that different acts are layered upon one another and that *every act* has *its* separate I, so to speak as its *separate act pole*? In addition we will notice immediately that these I's separating themselves do not always have to agree with one another in their position-takings. Moreover: How is it possible that we were able to use the *image of a splitting*, which suggests a separation of something unified—and perhaps by conserving a certain unification—just as splitting a tree trunk does not yet a have to denote a split into pieces lying completely separated next to each other?

The answer comes when we look at the actual and always possible life in I-reflection. Indeed, I can at all times practice a higher-order reflection: overlooking an I grasped through a retroactive snatching, I can bring into view an I caught in the middle of a live *actus*, and at the same time observed in reflection; then, further, I can bring

into view a reflecting I that has already become patent, and so on. But then I can and must also see *that the "many" act poles are in themselves | evidently the identical I*, or that one and the same I VIII, 90/91
has its *appearance* in all of these acts and has in each and every appearance a different *mode*; I see that it, splitting itself into a plurality of acts and act subjects, is nevertheless one and the same, the same I which splits *itself* here.[1] I see that *egoic life in activity* is nothing but a *constantly-splitting-itself-in-active-comportment* and that at all times anew an all-overlooking I can establish itself which identifies all ⟨of those acts and act subjects⟩ or rather, and said in a more originary manner: I see that I can establish myself as an I that gains an overview over myself in higher reflection; that I can become conscious of myself in an evident synthetic identification of identity of sameness of all of these act poles and of the difference of their modal manners of existence. And hence I say: I am at all times and everywhere the same, I am as reflecting I the same who grasps himself as an unreflected I in an aftergrasp, who as a self-perceiver observes myself as the one who ⟨for instance⟩ perceives a house.[2]

Once we have become clear of this peculiar state of affairs and have assured ourselves especially of the multiplication of the enacting I's, we can now assert the following important statement, again in conjunction with the example of the perception of the house. In the normal case of a reflection upon my naively enacted house perception I observe, in my reflective perception, not only the "I perceive this house," and I am not merely observer of my house-perceiving I and of this particular perceiving, but *I also share the perceptual belief* of this I; I as reflecting I co-enact the belief of the house-perceiving I. This is to say, just as for me, insofar as I see and observe this house, precisely this house, and what I now assert as really existing with respect to it, exists, *holds valid* for me as existing so in my perceptual belief, thus for me as reflecting I all of that also exists as actual in the same manner. Together with the self-perception and the perception of | the house-perception I also allow VIII, 91/92
the latter to hold valid; I am also the enacting subject for this validity.

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[1] Cf. Appendix 18, pp. 559 ff. — Ed.
[2] Cf. Appendix 19, pp. 562 ff. — Ed.

Hence the result, that every statement of the form "I see this object," concurrently means for me: "I believe that this object is real"; and the same holds for everyone in ordinary parlance. But this normality is opposed to an anomaly, and now you will immediately understand why I had to carry through this entire self-clarification. For, it is necessary to emphasize, by contrast, *that it does not always have to be this way*, as it normally is; namely, that I as a reflecting I by no means always have to be co-believing. And, what is of special importance for comprehending the method of the phenomenological reduction: I can, *as a matter of my freedom, renounce* this natural co-belief in reflection. I can do this in a manner that I comport myself purely as an *observer* absolutely *disinterested* in the existence and being-thus of the perceived house and in the existence of the world as such.

⟨Chapter Two
On the Theory of the Theoretical Attitude of the Phenomenologist: What the *Epoché* Means and Accomplishes⟩

Lecture 41: ⟨Reflection and Theoretical Interest, Splitting of the I of Position-Takings⟩

Before I can further elucidate this disinterestedness, I have to first elucidate the more general phenomenon, which perhaps accompanies a splitting of the I, that of the *ambiguity in belief* and more generally in *position-taking comportment*, according to which, unlike the usual case, the reflecting I does not participate in the position-taking of the lower I (indeed, even perhaps rejects it), at which it has directed itself in reflection.[1] An example for this is the *Skeptic*, who actively lives through his perceptual belief in a straightforward perspective on his | external world of perception in the harmony VIII, 92/93 of his perceiving and cannot but, as a concordantly perceiving I, have these things and this world given as reality. But in the case where he, as a philosophical Skeptic motivated through these or those arguments, came to a negation or doubt regarding the world and now reflects upon himself as the one who perceives the real world, the splitting of position-taking is also visible in the unity of the split act. As perceiver of the world he believes, as a reflecting Skeptic he does not trust this belief, he does not participate in it, he doubts or rejects it.*

*Different comportments are possible with respect to the concordantly experienced world:

1) I can consider it possible that it does not exist, while I experience it believingly in steady certainty.

2) I can, irritated by skeptical arguments, assume a skeptical or negativistic theory, I can believe in the further course of experience, but place a layer of theoretical doubt or negation on top of this experiential belief.

I can say as an agnostic: This experiential certainty concerns only something

[1] On this and the following, cf. Husserl's critical note, cf. Appendix 10, p. 509—Ed.

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Regarding our investigations on reflection, we have assumed up to now only an example from the sphere of perception, hence we have merely clarified reflections upon perceiving and what is perceived. But not all reflections—and hence not all types of multiplication of the I—are of the same structure, and accordingly it will be beneficial to take an example from the sphere of reflections upon memory. I mean *remembrance*. It is not by accident that our [German] language expresses remembrance reflexively: "I remember [myself]."[a] In each memory lies in a certain sense a doubling of the I, insofar as what I remember directly is not only in general conscious as something past, but as *something past as perceived by me*. I recall a fire: I saw it; a concert: I heard it. In the case of mediacy: I do not myself recall the fire, | but I recall that I heard and read VIII, 93/94 about it. Certainly this doubling of the I consists in the fact that my past I belongs to the content of the remembrance just as much as the experience of my present waking I, the I that witnessed it, that heard of it, and the like. The experience transforms itself into a type of explicit I-reflection, when I direct my seizing gaze, looking back, also at the past I and its past egoic *actus*. I as reflecting I now state: "I have witnessed the fire." Obviously there belongs to the past perception of the fire a past perceptual belief. In the case of normal remembrance, I, the present I, perhaps as the I of reflection reaching back into the past, participate in this reproductive perceptual belief, that is: I still believe now as I did then. Hence there lies co-included in the normal meaning of every statement of the form "I remember that it was so," as a matter of course, the "it was so."

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subjective, subjective images. "The" world "itself" I do not ever experience. Or: I can in no way know if a world in itself exists.

Or I can acknowledge the experienced world as the world itself, but I can doubt whether it is true, but [I can do this] in a way that I hold this style of concordant unified constitution for a preliminary one, which I can and must reasonably trust practically for the time being. I hence comport myself as if the one world were in truth (completed), that is, practically—as long as no stronger motives of probability speak against it; but I believe I have a reason to assume that such a complete truth either not exist or be doubtful.

Cf. also Hume's *tricktrack*. [Cf. Hume's *An Essay on Human Nature*, Book I, 4.7.—Trans.]

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[a] "*Ich erinnere mich*." The German verb is reflexive: *sich erinnern*—Trans.

Meanwhile, I can become doubtful in retrospect and I can even come to the conviction that it was not so. While remembrance is still remembrance of the same and still presentifies for me the past perceiving with the past perceptual belief, my current I has freed itself of this co-belief and takes a position of a different type. Here it is, once more, as in the case of the Skeptic, and completely analogous in the case of the actual enactment of a reflection; only that the Skeptic not only declares a detail of his experience a deception, but directs his skepticism against the universal perception of the world.

It is worth emphasizing that what we have discussed with respect to perceptions and remembrances can easily be translated to any acts in which we comport ourselves somehow "believingly," whether these are intuiting acts or not; we can indeed reflect upon every act, thus also upon empty anticipations or intuitively "illustrated" expectations or upon pictorial acts, acts of empirical indication, acts of predicative thought, and so forth. All of these acts can appear in the primal mode of certainty or can also be modalized, as doubting, assuming, meaning. In all cases it will in general go its course | as VIII, 94/95 we have described it exclusively with respect to perceptions and remembrances; for, in general, the position of the reflecting I, regardless whether or not it has separated itself in the position-taking of belief from the reflectively seized I, will be one that is *interested in the being of the object*—in the being of the fire, in the existence of the world, and so on. Even if its comportment may not be that of co-believing (if in general the position-taking of the I observed in reflection, thematically observed, is simply co-enacted), it is in any case a position-taking with respect to being: a judging in the broadest possible sense, and be it also a modification of the primal and normal form of all judging, that of judgmental certainty; be it also a mere assuming, a taking-to-be-possible, a being-inclined-to-believe or a holding-to-be-probable or a doubting or a negating rejection, as it were a striking through of being, of being-assumed, being-probable, and so on.

Now[1] there lies, as we can further clarify for ourselves, in each such *actus* on the part of the judging I, as the word 'act' also indicates,

[1] Cf. on the following up to p. 309 Husserl's critical note, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 509 f. — Ed.

a *deed*—albeit perhaps only a fleetingly passing one. In a judging deed I am *directed at the being and being-thus* as at a *telos* to which I strive. Through every assuming, holding-to-be-probable or doubting and so on goes the intention toward a being to be established in certainty, ultimately at the entity "itself," which I can indeed only "have" in a form of certainty called evidence. Also negative certainty leads the intention further, or rather it leads it to flip over into a counter-intention; if the intended does not exist, a striving intention directs itself at what is *in its stead*, hence at a positive certainty. Again, if I already have certainty and already am with the entity, as in perceptual certainty, the intending continues further in the direction of an ever richer and more complete knowing of the object, towards a fulfillment of the anticipating meaning components of perception through new perceptions, self-giving ones in this respect, hence through a continually | proceeding observing VIII, 95/96 of ever new aspects or ever new individual moments. Such a deed proceeding from act to act is freely connected synthetically to the unity of a striving tendency, running through all of these acts, toward the continually identical and conscious telos. The free effectuation of such a striving may get stuck often enough, yes even, perhaps, get stuck after a first attempt, as other interests distract me and I move on to other acts with other goals striven for: for the present only the following is important, that I am in every *actus one who strives for a telos*, that I live in a more or less far-reaching act-continuity, which is centered by a conscious teleological unity. Especially as a judging agent I am directed at ontic certainty and possession of being and at completeness of this having, and in this sense I am, as an act-subject, *interested in being*; and hence I am, in general, still in the attitude of reflection, as an I of reflection.

Conversely it can be the case that I as reflecting I, while I observe my respective egoic act, am *completely disinterested* in what is believed in this *actus* and what is conscious as ontic *telos*. For in the splitting of the I we have: firstly, the I that enacts the *actus* of perception, or which enacted that of memory, and which is, accordingly, the I interested in Being; and we have at the same time, secondly, the I of reflection standing above the former, which, for instance, observes the "I perceive the house" and which normally also participates in the interest of the lower I, perhaps is identical to it in the

manner of the interested position-taking, co-believing, co-assuming, co-doubting, and so on. And conversely, I repeat, we have—what interests us now—the possibility that this participation and this unity not obtain and that the reflecting I grasp the *actus* of the I standing beneath it and its interested directedness at its telos, and *observes it, but is nonetheless disinterested* in what this observing I is interested in. Thus in this case I am, as, for instance, the one reflecting on my "I perceive this house," no longer the I for whom the house is indeed an existing reality, I do not enact the certainty of the lower | I. Of course I also do not enact any modal modifications VIII, 96/97 of this belief, no assuming, no doubting, no negating. Indeed, I have now not the slightest reason to do so, as I see the house before me in bright sunlight and no skeptical motivations confuse me. If the example were constructed differently and if such motives did affect me, I would ⟨yet still⟩ be interested in the being of the house; or, what says the same, I would be in a judging, a theoretical attitude, directed at the cognition of the house. But this is not my current attitude. And it is in this that I, *the disinterested self-observer and self-cognizer*, deviate from the I that stands in my reflective view. As the latter, I am, instead of in the existence and being-thus of the house, interested exclusively in the perceptual experience, in that of the perceptual act as such, the current one or the past or present one, the way it is[1] or was or will be.

I, as reflecting I, am not disinterested in every respect. I do carry out an act, I enact a cognitive interest; but this enactment of reflecting cognizing and judging directs itself at me and my perceiving in my own pure being. It is precisely by refraining from the enactment of an interest which co-participates in the perceived being, that of the house, thus by enacting nothing of a co-belief in this respect, that nothing exists for me except for the purely subjective, and my theoretical interest enacts itself in the observation and determination of precisely this purely subjective [realm] and its purely immanent contents. That this *actus* of perception, which is now my pure theme,

[1] The original manuscript read "*es*," which would refer to nothing in particular, rendering the meaning roughly as "the way things are, were, or will be." The editor corrected "*es*" to "*er*," which would refer the "it" to the act, present, past or future—Trans.

is the enactment of a belief, according to which there exists a house in front of me, this belongs, of course, to its pure content; this lies, hence, in the realm of my reflecting interest, while I, by acknowledging this belief as a moment of the factual experience, believe nothing concerning the being of the house, and may not make the least judgment with respect to it.* | VIII, 97/98

Lecture 42: ⟨The Most General Notion of Interest, of "Attitude," of "Theme."⟩

This disinterestedness in question here, through which I become an "unparticipating observer" and then theoretical observer and perhaps even investigator of myself (as the one who I am in myself and purely as myself and in my pure acts), *cannot* merely mean *a mere privation*, a mere passivity, ceasing of doing what I normally do; for instance, something that I certainly would not do while asleep that I otherwise do when I am awake. And it is also clear that I, switching over from the naive-latent enactment of the "I perceive the house" to reflection, cannot simply relinquish the hold of my interest in being, which I enact naively. [This interest] belongs to me who now exists, and it remains with me, even if I now enter into new acts, as long as not a motive arises that compels me to relinquish it. Said differently: *Simply* reflecting, I cannot but sympathize with myself as, reflecting upon myself, taking over my interest. A *special motivation* must firstly *free* me from this sympathy and thereby enable me to become a pure observer of myself, or an observer of my pure self and of the respective act taken purely in and for itself.

*On the other hand, all factuality [*alles Sachhaltige*] also remains contained in my reflecting I, insofar as the latter, carrying out the higher-level acts of any reflection whatsoever, now indeed gets a grip on the subjective life and in particular all that subjective [content] belonging to the corresponding things that were given to it straightforwardly before—the position-takings, modes of givenness of any type related to it—but *for that reason* [*the reflecting I*] *does not relinquish this factuality*. It now takes on in addition to its original thematic meaning, which contains nothing subjective, the subjective modes that have become thematic now, modes in which it was given, perhaps with the understanding that it is only conceivable in any such subjective modes of givenness.

Only through the *free deed of abstention from judgment*, through a letting-lose-willingly of the original co-interest, can this attitude of unparticipating observing arise, through which for me, in the observation of my own perceiving, the perceived ceases simply to exist as something valid or experiencable in my field of being. But what could be the *motive* for this?

But before pursuing this question which beckons already at this junction, it is necessary to understand it in its full breadth. For, our notions of interested and disinterested self-reflection are still limited in a manner that is external to their real essence, because we only referred to acts of "*doxa*," those | of the intellective sphere. VIII, 98/99 But it is important to also consider the acts of the heart and the will, acts of loving and hating, hoping and fearing, of considerations and decisions of the will, and the like, and to clarify the reflections peculiar to them, which are indeed novel. We will soon see that here, too, position-takings of the reflecting and reflectively grasped I (the lower I) can or also cannot coincide. Here arises the possibility of conceiving a broadest notion of an I of reflection, which as it were sympathizes or does not sympathize with itself, which rather denies itself all "sympathy" with itself, and thereby [we can also conceive] the more particular, but significant idea of an unparticipating theoretical self-observer and self-cognizer in general.

Before we approach the closer investigation of the reflections of the heart and the will, it will be of benefit to start out with a general consideration, related to the entire activity of the I, and thereby to ground a fundamental notion, that of *interest* and of acts of interest; at the same time, ⟨also⟩ some other fundamental notions, whose clarification will at all times be significant for us.[1]

Above we dealt with intellective acts in and of themselves, presupposing as a matter of course that they can function for themselves, just as well as in other cases acts of the heart or also acts of the practical sphere in the usual sense. But are not constantly and in every pulse of egoic life acts of all spheres interwoven with one another, towards which the I in general is "awake," egoically active in specific manners? What sense can it have to say, if we want to

[1] On the following, cf. Husserl's critical remark; cf. Appendix 10, p. 510—Ed.

make ourselves understood, that we are at one time in a theoretical *attitude*, at another time in a feeling-valuing one, and then again in a practical attitude, directed objectively at realizations? How is it possible that in the manifold of acts of an egoic act-tendency a unity of an intellective act—be it a merely experiencing action, be it a theorizing action—comes to the fore and takes on such a unity that we speak of *one act*—albeit a synthetical one— |, ⟨for instance⟩ of an VIII, 99/100 experiencing or a proving or a purely intellective act? As a *total act* it embraces perhaps a multitude of intellective partial acts, but not valuing acts, although they may also move the experiencing or theorizing agent. We see, even what we normally call an act, becomes questionable and requires a making-comprehensible-to-oneself,[a] which makes understandable inwardly (phenomenologically) the naive self-evidence[b] of using this terminology. The same must be said, of course, for the talk of *theme*, which, while common in the theoretical sphere, can easily be expanded. What we are "directed at," "attuned to" in a special manner is our theme, and it belongs, perhaps, to an infinitely encompassing sphere, which is co-viewed, to which we are co-attuned habitually—as our thematic universe. The same is meant with the talk of *directions of interest* and the *self of interests*. It is absolutely necessary to become clear about the primal sources of such concepts, and we shall attempt this now.

Let us preface what is to come with the following: The acts that the reflecting I finds as its own or, more precisely, as those of its unreflected I living in primary naiveté are, as already a quick overview teaches, as a rule, indeed precisely speaking, always more or less multifariously interwoven, connected, founded. In the case of some of these acts the impression immediately imposes itself that they are only possible as being founded in other acts. For instance, whoever models in clay, must have the latter before himself perceptually; moreover, he has the form to be created in mind in the manner of a—albeit dark—purposive idea, as a mere *dunamis*, so to speak, and

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[a] *Selbstverständigung* [b] *Selbstverständlichkeit*. With these two terms, Husserl plays on the terms *verstehen*, to comprehend/understand, and *Selbstverständlichkeit*, which derives from the adjective *selbstverständlich* (*selbst* + *verständlich*, which is related to the verb *verstehen*), which means, literally, self-comprehensible, but which is translated here as "self-evident" or "as a matter of course"—Trans.

every intermediary shape as an approximated, more or less successful or unsuccessful realization. This obviously implies constant [acts of] valuing; all intermediary stages of the realizing activity are valued in their own way; what I strive for as a goal must hold valid for me. As a naive subject of such an active act I am thus at once subject of many an act-intention, which, however, concatenate themselves as partial acts to the unity of a total act. Among these partial acts those that stand in a *function of service* can be distinguished from those that practice the *domineering action*, | that is, those that bear VIII, 100/101 what the act subject and the unified act, so to speak, are out for. And yet in another manner acts can stand in a *side action* or also in a *main action*, and this concerns acts which are connected, but are not unified to the unity of a single total act.[1] Thus I may be, as a botanist, delighted by the beauty of a flower, but this delight is not the main action, when I am in the attitude of getting to know it in observation and determining it in classification. Once I am finished with [observing and determining], then, in turn, instead of the theoretical attitude, now the aesthetical joy, which went alongside, may become the main action; and hence I am now in the aesthetic attitude, in that of the heart, instead of in the theoretical attitude, that of the understanding. Another example of such a switch is that between the aesthetical contemplation of a work of art and the theoretical attitude of the art historian. Here we would not say that both acts function as parts of a total act.

Let us, in contrast, take a closer look at the relation between the domineering and serving function, which firstly defines the concept of a total act that is unified in all interwovenness of acts. When, for instance, the forming artist views the creation taking on shape before him, when he values it, when he, so to speak, approves with pleasure a surface design here, and a line there, an elevation or a mold, or rejects it with displeasure, when he during this realization constantly strives for an aesthetically satisfying [design] or one as satisfying as possible, then the actions of the heart, those of pleasure or displeasure, of wishing-such, and so on, are only in a *serving*

[1] From here to p. 309 cf. Husserl's critical remark, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 510f. — Ed.

function; but they are for that reason by no means only enacted on the side. For the artistically active I lives in them in the main enactment. However, the domineering function, the one that *reigns* over the process, continues throughout the serving function, namely the acting will, as the willing directed at the realizing action and through the latter towards a final telos. Serving has thereby, as we can see, a different meaning, depending on whether we consider the founding valuing and sensual perceiving or the serving intermittent phases of acting | with their unfinished intermittent forms, VIII, 101/102 although there are types of necessary foundings everywhere to be found here. Such different interwovennesses, such different forms of the action's being together and intermingled belong, in different levels of complication, to the act life of the naive I, devoted to the intentional objects, hence latent to itself.

Corresponding to the multifariousness of acts, one also needs to pay attention to the multifariousness of the characteristics of the intentional objects belonging to them. Accordingly, the cognizing I, oblivious to itself in [the process of] cognizing, depending whether it believes in certainty, or assumes or doubts or negates, has before itself (as it were), as what it intends thematically, what it alone has in view, different things; thus at one moment something existing *simpliciter*, next this something as something possibly existing, or doubtful, or as non-existing, and so on, whereby the "something" represents the state of affairs, respectively. In the acts of the heart, which mingle in different ways with such acts, the naively devoted I has before itself its intentional [something] with the characters of pleasant or unpleasant, of loved or hated, of appreciated or feared, of beautiful, of useful, and so on.

One can now call an act of interest in the pregnant sense one which has an object, which the I not only has in conscious view, of which it is aware somehow on the side, as it were, but at which it is directed in a pregnant sense, which it is after, which it wants to attain. But there are even more differences. The noise coming from the street which "bothers" me does not belong to my theme, to the theoretical thought, whose completion is my "aim." But it can, in itself, be a means for other mental aims. And after all, I live now, for instance as a mathematician, in a special problem, but it is precisely a special mathematical one, and the unity of the

mathematical realm designates a unity of thematic interwovenness. We must also distinguish a momentarily *active* theme, and within it differences between other themes as that after which the final aiming goes, *vis-à-vis* a theme, which is "means" (premise) for this—
and | the realm of *habitual* themes, which remain in my "spiritual VIII, 102/103
possession" as abiding interests and which, again actualized, have, as finished themes, the character of something already attained, but which are, nevertheless, of further interest, precisely in the manner of a possession that was once actively attained.

Thematic interwovenness lies, of course, not only in concatenations of end and means, but all that can be said to belong together factually is already an indication of the type of an inner transition from interest to new interests, which soon becomes an inner interwovenness and creates, in the progress from aiming to aiming, an ever new synthetic unity of an encompassing aim, whose fulfilling realizations are, in the logical sphere, the logical nexus that comes to the fore, and, in the practical sphere, the purposive nexus.

If, as in our earlier examples, the domineering interest is an interest in the existence and being-thus, a cognizing interest in the broadest sense (or, as one likes to say, a theoretical one, although already mere experience belongs here), then the theme is a cognitive theme, perhaps a theoretical one in the strict sense of the term. Here, a teleological unity goes through all acts, although they may have many kinds of special teloi. It is the relation of the aiming cognizing to one and the same object, to the unity of an objective nexus, which perhaps only comes to the fore in a synthetic unification of the respective partially thematic acts, and firstly as something in turn to be attained; and ultimately the thematic drives further towards an encompassment of the realm. Ultimately the directed interest hereby at all times aims at attaining the respective "entity" (as what is posited as existing) by authenticating it according to its qualities, peculiarities and relations, in one word, in its truth. Through this manifold of thusly interwoven acts, each of which "has" *its* interest (here understood ontically, as the cognitive *telos*), runs the unity of "one" interest, which unifies, overarchingly, all special interests. In the habituality of a scientist we have the unity of an abiding thematic habitus, which has, one the one hand, its realm of acquired habitual possessions, that of acquired knowledge, and, on the other

hand, his open-infinite horizon of a future thematic, as a habitually ever-recurring | and always again old and familiar "occupational VIII, 103/104
attitude" for continual work, and in relation to the universal domain of this science. This translates from the individual scientist in like manner to the community of experts constituted for every scientist, experts with whom one "collaborates," whom one consults, and so on.

The interest can also be, however, an *interest of the heart*, a valuing interest in the broadest sense of the term, the intention [can be] one with value as its theme, the theme can be a value-theme, a theme of the heart. The I now wishes to live out its life in valuing. For instance, it wants to proceed from an anticipatory valuing, an anticipatory pleasure in the only fleetingly seen work of art to a fulfilled value, or one that fulfills itself in ever more richness, and ultimately wants to attain the value itself in the complete fulfillment of the founded valuing; hence, it wants to fulfill within itself, in the mode of the full and pure artistic pleasure (the synthetic unification of the value intentions which continually fulfill themselves within one another), the aesthetic object as this concrete value in itself, as an *energeia* of an earlier mere *dunamis*, as ultimate and real self-giving and self-having of the value, which is precisely nothing other than the pure and sated artistic pleasure. This [entire process] is, thus, not carried out in judging, but in valuing, and insofar as perceptions play their essential role here, they function only as serving acts, as presuppositions, lower and basic positings for the valuing feelings and grasping feelings founded in them. The value itself in its value-truth is not perceived,[a] but as it were taken as value;[b] and what *perception*[c] achieves for the mere object, is achieved for the value by *value-taking*.[d] The latter is the mode of fulfillment for valuing feeling. The aesthetic contemplator lives in a valuing interest, and only through a transformation of the interest, through the change of attitude as change of interest, does he shift over, as we said earlier, into an experiencing and thematic observing that posits being, for

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[a] *wahrgenommen* [b] *wertgenommen*. Here, as elsewhere (cf. esp. Hua. XXIV & XXVIII), Husserl plays on the analogy between *wahrnehmen* (perceiving, literally "taking to be true") and the neologism *wertnehmen*, taking to be valuable—Trans.
[c] *Wahrnehmung* [d] *Wertnehmung*

instance as an art historian; but this can only occur once the aesthetic interest has enacted itself and the value—and in it the *telos* of the heart—lies ready to hand, so to speak, as already valued, as self-valued through value-taking, for a theoretical interest to be directed at it, and firstly | for a perception directed at the aesthetic object, VIII, 104/105 the perception of a value-object.

The following holds generally: Once I have enacted to a certain extent acts and complex actions of any type whatsoever in naive devotion—regardless whether they still continue or after a complete stop—I can become aware of my doing or my just-having-done, I can reflect: for instance, while I am engaged in a scientific theorizing or in an aesthetic contemplation or an external planning or an executing forming of a work. Once this happens, once I raise myself thusly as a reflecting I above myself as ⟨I⟩ that is active in the respective actions, the act of reflection does not itself have to be—as we presupposed this without further ado in our earlier exemplary analyses of the intellective act sphere—an intellective act, hence not only, for example, a reflective perceiving of the "lower" acts and their intentional contents or a reflective relating-back in the manners of retention or recollection, as a reflective directing-oneself at what the lower I has just done, and so on, upon which a reflective thinking and theorizing can then ground itself. Rather, there also exist specific *reflections of the heart*, which can then, certainly, just as other acts of the heart, experience a thematic transformation into doxic reflections, but of a changed sense. I, as reflecting I, can likewise have in myself my intentional object, in pleasure and displeasure, in love and hate, in striving, in practical considerations and decisions, in realizing deeds, in myself as the subject of such acts of the heart enacted in past naiveté. I love, and in reflection I take pleasure in the fact that I love, the way in which I love, or, in displeasure in myself, I chide myself for this. I had willed and acted, and reflecting retrospectively I regret that I have acted thusly. *Conscience* is a name for a class of such reflective auto-relatednesses as egoic position-takings of the heart related back to oneself, which then oftentimes translate into a judging about oneself, a judging concerning one's own value.

Here one can see at the same time that the reflecting I can also at times agree or disagree in these reflective acts of the heart con-

cerning their position- |takings with the I upon which one reflects. VIII, 105/106
The latter is the case when, for instance, I now condemn a hate that was earlier enacted, or if I dismiss an earlier aesthetic appreciation, a remorse, and the like, in the current, opposite attitude of the heart, and accordingly in every case of a critique of the heart. This, too, can occur, that the act, that is, the domineering act of the reflecting I, is a different one from that of the reflected I. Instead we can also say, expanding now on what has been said earlier, that the interest of one and the same I can be a different one.[1]

Lecture 43: ⟨The Possibility of a Pure Interest in the Subjective Being in the Phenomenological *Epoché* and Reflection⟩

After having developed the most general notion of interest in the last lecture, we can now notice, if generally the interest on the part of the reflecting I and that of the reflected one can at times coincide and at times differ, that the latter is possible such that the interests can also be different as to their basic type, for instance, one can be an interest of the heart, the other an interest of the understanding. Thus, what is of special interest for us, the reflecting I as a theoretically interested observer can direct itself at the reflected I, which in turn may be aesthetically or in external activity occupied and interested as it may be, or it can direct itself at these acts. These acts are for [the reflecting I] the theme as existing and existing-so, that is, the theoretical theme.

And at the same time it is possible that the reflecting I limit its theoretical interest purely to the reflected I and its acts and deny itself any co-activity in position-takings, which are enacted in these acts, dominating or serving ones. For instance, if I switch from a naive devotion to a work of art, in the attitude of the naive enactment of the aesthetical pleasure, over into that of theoretical reflection, that is, an immediately experiencing observation of my own | aesthetical VIII, 106/107
act of the heart, then it is the *normal case* that I also have the inten-

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment on this passage, Appendix 10, p. 511. Husserl redrafted part of the text above (p. 308, l. 7–25) in light of this critical comment. —Ed.

tional object or the theme of this act on the part of the reflected I, hence that I am co-interested both in the objective being and the value-being and in the work as work. I am, accordingly, co-enacter of the acts of the lower I, through which the work of art is there for me not only as an existing thing, but precisely as a work of art, as a thing in which a value-content—one that the artist has embodied actively—gives itself. If I, however, withdraw—from any motives whatsoever—from this co-enactment of the acts of the heart and the will, at which I am directed in reflection, if I become the *pure, disinterested onlooker and theoretical observer* of these acts, then all of them, the founded and the founding [acts], the dominating and serving ones, are put out of action for me, hence also every unified theme belonging to their synthesis. *As* the reflecting I, I am then not the I that carries out the perceptual belief in which the work of art as a thing takes on the subjective validity as existing; I am also not that I that takes on the emotional validity of the value-shape of the art work in its value-taking activity, in the multiple attainment of valuing intentions, an emotional validity in which it is given to the heart; and I am equally not the I that would perhaps, in a change of attitude, observe the artwork, acknowledge it in theoretical experience, describe it and assess it in categories of art history.

Instead, as a reflecting theoretical I, I *can*—you see how what we said earlier in the limited act-sphere with respect to the non-participating onlooker repeats itself—be interested *through abstention* from all of these co-enactments of the lower theoretical acts purely in them themselves as these experiences. *That* these acts attribute validity of something really existing not only in perception to the perceived,[a] but also value-taking to something taken-as-valuable,[b] as well as to what they feel as valuable [they attribute] the validity of something beautiful, to something appearing sensually the validity of a work, and so on, this is obviously something which characterizes them essentially as act experiences that cannot be taken away from them. But only *that* they attribute this or that validity |, that they mean the existing as the existing, the valuable as VIII, 107/108

[a] *Wahrgenommenen* [b] *Wertgenommenen*

something valuable, belongs to my interest, I as the reflecting I. *It is pure interest in subjective being*. Whether the perceived being or being-thus, what is believed by me perceptually has a legitimacy or not, and likewise, whether or not the value is genuine or fake, this is not a decision for me to make as disinterested I of reflection, since I exist without any "participation" in the directions of interest of the straightforward acts.[1]

Again one has to say, and now *in fullest generality*: It is precisely through [this described procedure] that I gain as a theoretical theme my *pure subjectivity*, in the sense that it is what it is, even if all act objects meant in this subjectivity, in the respective egoic acts, as posited in validity, were in truth *not*; or it is what it is independent of how things stand with respect to the truthful validity of the object-meaning, which these acts carry out in themselves, thus prior to all critical questioning as to their legitimacy.

In this manner I can practice, as we can say already here in a preliminary way, a *"phenomenological" Epoché* with respect to every act that I carried out straightforwardly—in a sense, as it will turn out, which is limited and *in no way transcendental*.

I can take up the attitude of the onlooker who is theoretically interested only in the phenomenologically pure act experience, and I become such an onlooker through an *Epoché*, which denies the interest of validity to all thematic objects of the respective acts. And precisely this is what we mean with phenomenological bracketing.

This concerns all possible acts, and accordingly also all possible objects. If I pursue, for instance, the method of non-participating reflection with respect to those acts in which I have ideal objects such as numbers, mathematical manifolds, geometrical ideals as ontic objects, but also other ideals (and in any sense); if I practice it, for instance, concerning the act of evidence that $2 < 3$, then in this act this ideal state of affairs is given in apodictic | certainty; I aim for VIII, 108/109
and reach it therein truly and absolutely indubitably; but if I establish myself here as reflecting I, and as a purely phenomenologically interested one, this means: I become active in a complete disinterestedness with respect to the intentional objectivity *as existing*. Even

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment on this passage, Appendix 10, p. 511—Ed.

an absolutely evidently given being, such as that one that $2 < 3$, must not count for me as phenomenological I. And this not-counting means that I suppress any position-taking concerning existence or non-existence of this arithmetical state of affairs. If I were a mathematician and if I were moved by the interest in mathematical being, then the evidence of this givenness would be in necessary action for me. But as mathematizing I, I am simply not a phenomenological I that I am when I, at first doing mathematics, regard my mathematizing while I am reflectively split-off [from doing mathematics] and am purely interested in what this mathematizing is in itself, how it looks from within—without any judging position-taking with respect to what counts objectively for it. Thus, there can be no talk here of a skeptical attitude, of a skeptical *Epoché*. I do not have to repeat that the *Epoché* that the skeptic practices as a doubter would be interest in mathematical existence, and not interest in the purely subjective experience, as it is in itself.*

Hence, to appeal, in the logical normative regulation of cognition, to evidence is a logical and not a phenomenological reflection; in this latter reflection, evidence is a form of experience, whose structure interests me as a subjective fact, in the former, however, I say to myself in reflection that I view the objectivity itself, that I cannot doubt what is thusly viewed |, that I must co-believe where I see in VIII, 109/110
evidence. Here I am in the will to cognition, in intentional direction towards the ontic telos, and I assure myself that I have truly reached the telos, the entity itself. But it is precisely all interest in the ontic

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*Ontological predicates, ⟨as well⟩—all regional essential determinants—⟨come to the fore⟩ in the phenomenological reduction ⟨only⟩ as phenomenological predicates, as essential determinants of the regional noema.

For instance, if I imagine a random stretch of concordant experience of a thing, then it must have, as experienced, all "transcendental-aesthetical" determinants, precisely the formality of the regional noema "appearance of a thing." This implies: If I imagine stretches of possible further concordant experiences, in which empty horizons reveal themselves and would determine themselves more closely, and, based upon this, comparisons and so on, predicative determinations, readings, and so on, then I would have to utter "geometrical," chronological, and so on, "truths."

But in this case one is not speaking of truly existing things, which could truly authenticate their existence *in infinitum*. Ontological truth indicates noematic rules for synthetic-concordant experience—no matter how far the latter may reach, for all extensions of its possible continuation.

validity, as in any validity of the respective intentional object, that I must put out of play, if I want to attain the act experience in its peculiarity. We can even say, *pure* act experience can be defined as what can be posited in experience, and what is at any time positable and cognizable, if I, in reflection, put out of validity all that holds valid straightforwardly; and again: pure phenomenological interest is that ontic interest which is in all cases always possible if I exclude all other interest, namely all interests that I had as an I that carried out acts straightforwardly. Precisely in this manner I have, as reflecting I, no real or ideal objectivities given, no ontic or value objectivities and practical objectivities that I had previously given straightforwardly; to these belong also all human persons (objective subjectivities) and also everything psychic, their "mental life." But I do have something: the subjective, pure act experience, in which all these objectivities exist that had been put out of play as posited, experienced, thought, valued, creatively realized and so on; and in a certain sense I still have here these objectivities themselves, precisely "as thusly posited" by these acts, but not as posited by the phenomenological I.

This important point is well worth pointing out. One must be careful not to misinterpret *the talk of phenomenological bracketing* of the respective objects, of putting-them-out-of-play (which is an appropriate correlative expression of the putting-out-of-play of the acts and interests). The being, the value, the purpose that I as phenomenological onlooker no longer "have" in the normal sense, I do have persistently in a different and modified sense. What has been bracketed from my validity and from my interest in validity as such has, for that reason, not vanished from my field of consciousness; only it is given for me, the phenomenologist (*vis-à-vis* me as onlooker, cognizer, valuer, creative worker in the natural attitude), in an essentially | modified manner, and this by virtue of the method VIII, 110/111
through which I became a phenomenologist. With respect to the *object*, we termed this method *the method of bracketing*. We attach, as it were, an excluding bracket to the object, an index that says: Here I want to inhibit every co-validity, every ontic or value interest, and so in, I want to let the object count only as the intentional object of its act, of that act which attributes validity to it; I only want to be interested in the act and what it itself posits as object, as object

thematically characterized in this way. If I carry this out, I gain that which is phenomenologically purely subjective and *therein* its object in the modified shape of validity of the merely intentional object of its act. I, thus, do not become blind to the object as through an auto-hypnosis (even if I exclude the entire world, being blind for it entirely), but I remain seeing with respect to everything. But in the splitting of the I, I am established as at the same time seeing *simpliciter* and as practicing pure self-cognition, and everything seen *simpliciter* is there in the modification of the bracket, and seen *as* bracketed.

Let us now move one step further. Have we already gained all types of acts, concerning which we can clarify for us the method and accomplishment of the phenomenological bracketing?[1]

There are, for example, acts in which a *picture* is seen *as an image* of something. As founding [layer], they of course play their role in every aesthetical contemplation or also in an active shaping of works of "creative" art, insofar as the latter is in any way presentative, presenting something else in a picture. But the aesthetical [aspect], the valuing founded in image-consciousness, in such cases, does not interest us now; but simply the presenting-itself-in-an-image of something different, both as actually valid and as mere imagination. In the photographical or any other portrait a person presents himself to me as reality, in another image like a battle of Cyclopes', as phantasy. But in any case, it presents itself, and to me, insofar and only insofar as I have something presenting itself and something presented in the act of image-seeing: appearing image and— |not besides it but in it—the subject [of the image] presenting VIII, 111/112 itself. The following says the same: This intertwinedness is there for me so only due to its peculiarity because it holds valid for me in the naive act of image-consciousness. But here we have several things at once under the title "image." The photographical "image," the thing made of paper lying here on the table, and in another sense the sensually hovering violet figurine as the actual image, which is anything but a really existing thing, and in which the subject "person" presents itself. Thus I view naively, depending on the attitude,

[1] On the following, cf. Husserl's critical note, Appendix 10, p. 512—Ed.

either this or that, in the respectively directed enactments of my acts. As phenomenologist I can put out of play these acts as well and this validity as image in this or that sense lying in their enactments, and likewise I can grasp, classify, describe everything that belongs inseparably to such acts, what is purely subjective [in them].

⟨Chapter Three
The Conscious Activity of Natural Egoic Life and the Reduction to Pure Subjectivity⟩

Lecture 44: ⟨Positional and Quasi-Positional Acts and Their Reduction; *Epoché* and Quasi-*Epoché*⟩

Before discussing special peculiarities belonging to the reduction of pictorial acts, let us draw in another group of acts and consider for once the acts of reproductive *phantasy*, with the phantasy images hovering in them in naive phantasizing, at times coming on involuntarily, at times formed in free arbitrariness. As much as we here speak of "images" of phantasy, legitimately one cannot truly talk here of a pictorial presentation, with a distinction between that which pictures and the pictured, or image and subject. Admittedly, in one case or another something non-present is conscious in a present experience. But in the one case we have as image a spatio-thingly semblance, in the other case as so-called image nothing less than a semblance. For a semblance exists as something | presently represented in the flesh, which is not believed VIII, 112/113 to be existing, but only appears as if it existed. It is a fiction, but not a fiction of reproductive phantasy. Phantasy is not itself a presentifying but a *re*-presentifying representation. In this it is similar to recollection. But to recollection belongs the ontic belief in the recollected, while the fictitious [object] is only conscious in the mode "as if" it were and were thusly. At the same time it is clear that what hovers before me in the character of the "as if," while I phantasize, is not conscious to me and counts as presentation of something else, herein again similar to recollection, where what is not present to me as past yields nothing less than an image in which something else is depicted. No objection to what has just been said is the possibility that the recollected itself, just as on the other hand the fictitious [object] itself, can be a picture of something, as when I imagine, for instance, a holy site with the image of a godhead.

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We may also point out that phantasy and reality are separate but can also mingle; or rather, both can arise separate or mingled: the act consciousness through which reality is valid for me can arise as perceived, remembered, judged, valued, practically shaped, and on the other hand the act-consciousness in which the imagined reality exists for me, imagined presence in the flesh, imagined past, imagined judgments, value positings, activities, in which they are conscious to me and then conscious in the modified manner of the "as if." Examples of such minglings are all cases in which something is imagined into my surroundings conscious to me as perceptually present or otherwise conscious in a belief; as if I imagine that mermaids would perform a dance here before us, or if I imagine all kinds of adventures that I encounter on a hike through a tropical rain forest. On the other hand, it is clear that, just as a pure consciousness of reality without phantasy, there can be a pure phantasy without a co-active consciousness of reality. In the latter case all consciousness of reality is, so to speak, out of action. In a self-oblivion, in which not even my lived-body and my closest perceptual environment receive the grace of being regarded, thus an actively grasping and reality-positing experience, I live entirely in the world of the "as if," and all my perceiving, representing, thinking, | feeling, acting is itself an VIII, 113/114
activity in the "as if": as is the case, for instance, when I live, lost in dreams, in my forest adventures, in all the amazing things that I see and hear, what I encounter in fright. In this case phantasies are pure phantasies, and I myself am only as I in the phantasy in my field of objects. In other cases, however, where I only re-imagine reality and imagine also myself as co-active in the imagined surroundings, I have a mix, and to the extent that I myself belong to this phantasy, I am myself a mix, namely a re-imaigned I, whose stock of reality remained untouched.

Let us now transition to the phenomenological reduction. Just as all other acts, the acts in which phantasy objects—things, humans, I myself as somehow active I and so on—appear in the "as if" are originarily and naively enacted, but perhaps also grasped by the reflecting I through the splitting of the I after this enactment or partially in the midst of it and become a reflective theme in different manners. Of course I can also establish myself here as phenomenological observer, as interested purely in the experience and

its intentional contents. Here we see—as in the case of memory and, as we may immediately add, in every presentifying act—peculiar intertwined nestings[a] that the phenomenological reduction needs to unfold. If I imagine, for instance, a landscape with centaurs, then the phenomenological reduction is to give me my pure act-experience in which the intentional objects are grasped and acknowledged purely as such and precisely in the way they are characterized there. This is to say: I as phenomenologist do not actually imagine, this is done by the phenomenologically observed reflected I; I do not enact that consciousness in which objects count to me in the "as if." Put differently, I am not the dreaming I, given over to the dreamt, but I am the observer of dreams and the dreamt, of phantasizing and the phantasized as such. Hence, just as I bracket, as the onlooker of an actual act, with respect to the truly valid ontic objects, value objects, creative shapes and so on, their existence, their being valuable, being an activity or a work, I now bracket in the "as if"-objects the "as | if" and what is posited now in modification under this "as if." This "as if" is now, as it were, a modified sign under which stand, once again, being and ontic modalities, likewise values, works, also egoic acts of every type. VIII, 114/115

The acts to be subjected to the phenomenological *Epoché* fall, as we can also say, in the sense of a *universal* classification encompassing all acts in general, into *two large classes*. They correspond to each other, element for element in their circumference, so exactly that we can attribute to every possible act of one class one from the other, almost like a repeat copy. And yet it is, of course, no mere repetition. One is the act *simpliciter*, an act in the unmodified sense, which gives its theme the validity as real, as real object, as real value and the like. On the opposite side there corresponds [to this] (spoken in ideal possibility) a parallel act, which gives to the same content the validity "as if," the validity of an object existing "in phantasy," a phantasized value, work and so on. Correlatively we separate objects as objects *simpliciter*, meant as realities, and *quasi*-objects, meant as mere fictions. If we speak of a world *simpliciter*, it is the real one that we mean; but we can also speak of phantasy worlds, and then we mean those which are given to us in phantasy

[a] *Ineinanderschachtelungen*

action in the modification of the "as if." Advanced phenomenology calls the one class of acts positional, the other *quasi*-positional acts. Phantasizing action is, as an achievement modifying the validity *simpliciter*, itself a mode of validity. The achievement of the at first naively phantasizing I must also be bracketed, in order to gain the phenomenologically pure stock of phantasy experience.

The manner in which this bracketing *has an effect on* these phantasized contents, the intentional ones of phantasy, is something we shall now investigate more closely. Let us take up the [above] example and attempt to appropriate its purely phenomenological content; we immediately notice certain implications essentially belonging to the intentionality of the "as if." I imagine, for instance, a landscape with groups of trees, humans, centaurs, mythical creatures engaged in a wild fight. I may | myself belong to this phantasy world, for VIII, 115/116 instance I participate in the fight. But it is also possible that I am not part of it, that I do not count. But upon closer inspection I am *myself then* in a certain sense, and necessarily so, co-phantasized. For, how could I imagine such an episode of the phantasy world with such determination, without imagining it in a *certain orientation*? Of the phantasy trees, some are in the foreground, others in the background, some to the right, the others left. One of the centaurs jumps at me, a dragon leaps at the centaur from above and so on. All these words: right, left, front, back, from above and so on, are obviously occasional expressions and have a necessary relation to the observing and perceiving I which bears in itself the zero point of oriented space and of its dimensions of orientation—of oriented space, in which the respective piece of the world can only appear in an oriented fashion.

What I have just said I find, of course, not as a phantasizing I, lost in dreams, as one which, unaware of myself, follow the fight of the centaurs and dragons. Instead, I find this I in the reflective and phenomenological attitude of the unparticipating and theoretical observer of myself *as* phantasizing and the phantasy contents *as* phantasy contents. And then I find that intentionality is not such a simple matter, as if I had nothing but the act of phantasizing and in it the scene with centaurs as its simple intentional object in the mode of the "as if." Rather I find in a peculiar mediacy this intentional object as conscious, namely at first as an intentional object of my

perceiving; not of my actual perceiving, but of my necessarily co-phantasized perceiving, as whose subject I necessarily belong to the phantasy world as well. In other words, the *actus* "I phantasize a scene of centaurs" is only possible in the form that I enact, in the mode of the "as if," the *actus* "I perceive the scene of centaurs." To be sure, phantasizing *simpliciter*, my gaze is directed only at the fight. In the strict sense of the term only this fight, and especially in the case of arbitrary imagining, is called fiction; but that it stands before me as my theme in the genuine sense, as that what I exclusively mean, this is only | possible since I am not only self-oblivious as the now- VIII, 116/117
phantasizing I, but that I am, as a necessarily co-phantasized subject of the perception of the fight, also self-oblivious in the "as if." To phantasize oneself into a naive perceiving is a phantasy mode of self-oblivion. Just as the object, which is perceived by the phantasy-I, stands exclusively in view of the phantasy-I, in the same manner what is perceived in phantasy is immediately in view of the phantasy-I; and this is the latter's phantasized object. The gaze of the I within phantasy is the gaze "as if," its perceiving and what is perceived in it has the modification of the "as if." But everything in this modified validity exists for the real I which now phantasizes. As long as it phantasizes naively, it only finds thematically, as its fiction, the object of the phantasized *actus*. But the phantasizing I can enact at any time a change of attitude, in which it, in the phantasy of the centaurs' fight and its oriented manners of givenness, goes back to its manners of appearance as such and now, through corresponding reflective repositionings of its gaze towards the perceptual object in the "as if" views the perceptual act in the "as if," which only now appears there, ready for a thematic observation. One can also describe the procedure as follows: Phantasizing naively, I had as a fiction the fighting scene, and in this case I was co-phantasized as subject of perception, but in the manner that I observed the mythical fight in self-oblivion, hence did not enact a reflection upon myself. I proceed now to imaginatively change my co-imagined I into one that reflects upon itself; but this I enact in actual phantasy, without modifying the phantasy reality in its meaning, thus without transforming the original reality into a different phantasy reality; but [I enact this] in a phantasy creation of reflections which I could have enacted as phantasy-I and through which my erstwhile latent act would have disclosed itself.

All that is presented here is obviously itself a piece of phenomenological observation of something that is truly experienced in a phantasy which is firstly enacted *simpliciter*, and which belongs to its pure content. Also what we mean when we say: in the case of the example, | the quasi-perceiving phantasy-I is necessarily present, VIII, 117/118 but not part of the phantasized reality, *vis-à-vis* those cases where it is—would have to be shown as belonging to the peculiar sense of the phantasized act achievement. Explicitly, so to speak, I am part of it, as belonging to the meaning of the image, if I include myself as co-active, co-fighter and so on.

Furthermore we have to notice the manner in which the phenomenological *Epoché* as inhibiting all interested actions on the part of the naively enacted I is not only carried out with respect to the now *actual* I and I-consciousness as phantasizing, but also *within* the phantasy world, the co-phantasized subjectivity belonging to it and its naiveté; or rather, only through the *Epoché under the sign of the "as if"* is the *Epoché* carried out with respect to the action on the part of the phantasizing I. Nothing can hover before me as phantasy, as *quasi*-reality without the I itself belonging to the unity of this *quasi*-reality as co-phantasized I, as the subject for whom this "reality" exists as what it is, from the "validities" that its acts "carried out" and now "carry out"; what has become obvious in this example holds obviously generally and necessarily. Phantasizing is to act as if one had a reality, as if one perceived, thought, valued this or that, acted in this or that manner, and so on. And this is also the case whether or not one talks about phantasizing realities or idealities, in case these latter are, as an aside, conceivable without co-imagined phantasies of realities. To act "as if," this means first and foremost: to imagine oneself otherwise in imagination, thus to have oneself as a fiction; only that it belongs essentially to the imagining naiveté that the fiction of the imagined I can be grasped as fiction in the strict sense prior to the co-imagined I, as whose intentional content it can only be imagined. Hence, to go back to what is phenomenologically pure means, from the outset, nothing other than firstly exposing the pure structures of intentional objectivity, which are really at stake here, thus to go back to the intentionally nested subjectivity and its acts and its objects, and to grasp these under the sign of the "as if." | To every phenomenologically pure VIII, 118/119

positional act and its pure phenomenological contents corresponds the parallel phenomenologically pure *quasi*-positional act only in the manner that its purity entails, and intentionally, an exact mirror image of *the same* phenomenologically pure *positional* act with all of its content, but precisely under the sign of the "as if." This reduction is achieved through the enactment of the described reflection "in" phantasy and through phenomenological *Epoché*, which is then achieved under the sign of the "as if" with respect to the acts lying in the phantasy world. And this achievement then implies a *quasi*-achievement which is itself then mirrored into the phantasy world, a *quasi-Epoché* in phantasy. This is to say: every genuine *Epoché* that I practice with respect to my phantasy as phantasizing action, as my phantasy now truly hovering before me, entails in itself intentionally a *quasi-Epoché*, as if I, the phantasizing I, reflected and enacted the phenomenological bracketing. I can also say: enacting my actual reduction, I place myself—forgetting for a moment my actual present—on the ground of the phantasy world, I take it as if it were real. Then I must take the corresponding egoic acts, as if they were actual positions, and thereby [I have to take them] as if they had actual intentional objects. I must then exclude what *would* belong to the being of the objects themselves, as if these were actual, I must exclude any interest that I might have in these positional objects on this ground, in ontic objects, value objects and so on, and I have to do this in order to gain what would belong to these acts, in the manner in which they existed, and what remains after an exclusion of all questions as to legitimacy and truth which I could raise on this ground. If I do this and thusly gain the phenomenologically pure acts and act objects and if I realize that I have and can have no different objects in the phantasy world than as objects of the acts of my co-phantasized I, then it is clear that I gain through this procedure, and through it alone, my full and purely intentional objectivity of my ⟨phantasy act⟩. | VIII, 119/120

Lecture 45: ⟨The Natural Mundane Life of the I as Act Subject and the Unnatural Life of Phenomenologically Pure Self-Reflection. On the Train of Thought⟩

I have been told that the last lectures have been perceived as fairly difficult. This is not without reason; in principle, there are general reasons at play here that I want to discuss now, interrupting somewhat the systematic train of thought.

A first entering—so to speak, into the intimacies of the phenomenologically pure subjectivity—cannot be but very difficult, and this is so precisely because we are dealing here with currently lived life, in its being-for-itself and being-in-itself: Life of the I, this is: to be consciously related to any given objectivities, and among these, to be related in a special manner of specific acts. As a waking I, it is directed at objects in these acts, and it is occupied with them in cognition, valuing, action. In natural life—I mean here prior to the motives taking effect, which force the transition into the phenomenological attitude—everybody knows of his egoic life, he knows of his egoic relatednesses and his manifold real and ideal objectivities. He knows of them from natural reflection. But *the latter* can never yield a knowledge of pure subjectivity, one cannot even glean it from here. For it is its nature always to have objectivities—through a previous and *retained* objective knowledge—and now to relate the reflectively grasped I as act subject to these objectivities, whereby, in addition, the I itself is apprehended and posited as objectively human. In this natural reflection one cannot see (as long as it is exclusively dominant) that every having of objects and every determination in experience and thought, in which they exist for the I, is itself already an achievement of the I and its conscious life, and that at all times the I in its own life and doing essential to it—in its sensually experiencing, thinking, valuing, actively creating and other acts—brings about in itself and for itself the appearance and validity of objects. Hence, consciousness itself, intentional life, as it lives in itself |, as these and those subjective apperceptions VIII, 120/121 with their corresponding characters of subjective validities arise in it from purely essential motivations belonging to it—[all of this] remains necessarily hidden; this entire life, through which for me my respective world—things, humans, values, works, human actions,

socialities, and so on—are there for me as with one stroke, but upon closer inspection, they only exist for me in communication with others, so that we are referred, here, to the community of the I's, and of all I's or their intersubjective and unified life, which functions as this intersubjectively constituting life.

This pure life can be opened to the observing gaze and to theoretically experiencing and determining work only through the method of phenomenological *Epoché*, which occasions a new universal manner of observation, a new type of reflection of the I upon itself and upon all its worlds as worlds of its enacted consciousness. Only through this reflection, the pure I and its pure life, the entire realm of pure subjectivity, becomes visible and describable. We are dealing here, indeed, with a very "unnatural" attitude and a very unnatural observation of self and world. Natural life enacts itself as originally—at first entirely necessary—given over and lost to the world. The unnatural life[1] is the life of pure and radical self-reflection, self-reflection upon the pure "I am," upon the pure egoic life and the manners in which what gives itself as objective in any sense whatsoever in this life, takes on precisely this sense and this manner of validity as objectivity: purely from inner and genuine achievement of this life itself.

Hence one understands the difficulty of a first entering into the realm of pure subjectivity and of the pure enactment of that pure "know thyself!" from which, as shall become ever more clear, philosophy as a whole wells up. Any instruction to ever so complicated activities on the ground of natural cognition and in the context of the natural attitude of life we can satisfy fairly easily, its difficulties otherwise notwithstanding; for in all individual steps only something typically known and familiar is brought upon us. From childhood on—and this is precisely | the accomplishment of child- VIII, 121/122
hood development—we have come to know, in all directions, the typicality of the natural world. But this means, we were at all times engaged in motivations through which all types of consciousness and all types of egoic acts could spring into action through which

[1] Reading "*das unnatürliche [Leben]*" instead of "*das Unnatürliche*" as in Boehm's transcription (the stenogram does not distinguish between lower and upper case).—Trans.

a typically known world, completely familiar in all general formal structures, could form itself for us: a world of objects, a world of values, a world in which we find ourselves as children of the world, as acting into this world and dependent on it, stirred in pleasure and pain. Little by little we have become accustomed to practice all main sorts of such objective activities, experiencing ones, cognizing, also scientifically cognizing, practically forming, and so on. All of this is, hence, familiar to us at least according to its type, and what one cannot accomplish yet one can attempt and learn in a comprehensible manner, following the respective instruction.

On the other hand, phenomenology's instructions have, in the entire life experience of the individual and in history, no precedent, they can make no recourse to any elementary and typical familiarities. With respect to the worlds of pure subjectivity, but this means with respect to our pure, original life, through which all natural being and validity has its self-evidence, we are at the outset in a similar situation as someone blind from birth whose cataract has been removed and who now literally has to begin to learn how to see. The successful surgery does not yet make one see, that is, apprehend the spatial world in its familiar spatial forms and visual characteristics. The visual apperceptions must firstly form themselves, build themselves up in the nexus of apperception's inner motivations. Accordingly, even if the idea of a methodological phenomenological attitude has already been grasped, the method must only now be enacted and practiced in multiple directions; and it must be practiced systematically with respect to subjectivity related in natural-objective manner to real and ideal worlds and with respect to the universal typicality of its objective givennesses and its objective-subjective human life. Thus, we must first come to learn to see and understand the universe of pure subjectivity systematically, so that it can, at least at the outset, stand before for us as a world of its own |, familiar VIII, 122/123
in its most general typicality, just as, for instance, the physical world to the beginners of physics [appears] as a realm of spatio-thingly experience familiar from childhood.

In this way, thus, lies, before all beginnings of a possible science of phenomenological subjectivity, a great task, which the naive-natural sciences could not have faced. While the latter already have a ready-made, well-known world of experience prior to science,

phenomenology must firstly work to establish for itself its phenomenological world of experience, the world of phenomenological subjectivity, freely to be overseen in the phenomenological attitude and well-known in its typicality. The phenomenologist must, first and foremost, learn to see phenomenologically, and must create for himself systematically, in his own activity, the typicality of intuitive formations belonging to a phenomenological subjectivity as such. One can also describe the methodological situation due to the necessary priority of being a natural world-child as follows: Whoever wants to become a phenomenologist, must free himself systematically from being a child of the world and must practice the phenomenological reduction with respect to all types of world-childly experiencing, representing, thinking and living in general and with respect to all correlative types of worldly-natural being; thus [he must practice] that systematic *Epoché* through which all that is worldly is elevated and transcendentally spiritualized into pure subjectivity. At the same time, the natural child, the world child, metamorphoses into the phenomenological child, the child in the realm of pure spirit.[1]

Yet, these general difficulties are even more heightened for the beginning philosopher by the fact that the pure I, although it has already been seen as the subject of that intentional life, in which all objectivities shape themselves in appearance and validity, bears hitherto unimagined and deeply hidden mediacies of *intentional implication*, whereby, without being unraveled, pure life remains completely incomprehensible. Unnoticed, one still stands, and even after a first grasping of the necessity and the meaning of a phenomenological *Epoché* and reduction, under the spell of natural habits of thought, and views for that reason | the newly opened VIII, 123/124 realm of phenomenological data as an analogue to objective data. Since phenomenological subjectivity gives itself firstly as an individual temporal entity as well, one construes it as an entity of the sort of objective-temporal being, and in the most obvious manner as an analogue to physical-spatial being. But in so doing, one falls into error. *The phenomenological analysis*, which we are interested

[1] Cf. Appendix 26, pp. 622 ff. — Ed.

in, is in no way *an analogue to an objective, thingly analysis*.* The phenomenological observer does not find pure life as something like an intertwinement of "elements" [formed to] a totality of forms, or *vice versa*, he does not find formations which allow themselves to be broken down into coexisting elements succeeding one another, united with others in these or those unitary forms to be identified abstractively. Instead, no matter which intentionalities we observe, we see in a deeper penetration into their structures that a concrete intention is only possible through an *intermingling* of intentional achievements, which are, incidentally, *independent* [of one another]. Hence, it is precisely through such an intentional analysis that we realize that *subjectivity is something absolutely unique*, which can have nothing resembling it in the world of objectivities alien to an I, and we come to the realization that in fact a phenomenological analysis has, methodologically as well as factually, a *completely different meaning* than natural-objective *analyses of nature*.

We have recently pondered a piece of such an analysis of intentional implication, which was completely unexpected in its type and form, in the *analysis of phantasy*, which merely seemed difficult at first glance. Instead of repeating it, I will have the opportunity to bring into your view what is essential, through the presentation of briefer parallel analyses, which, however, should be more easily comprehensible in light of our earlier exercises.

But before I begin, I recall the wise pedagogical doctrine of *Herbart* concerning the correct alternation and the correct pace of deepening and reflection, | without which the learner cannot acquire, VIII, 124/125 as a free spiritual possession, the unity of the spiritual shape to be assembled inwardly from the individual moments.[1] Where the deep-

*It is irrelevant whether one takes the analysis of nature of the Ancients, or the causal and functional analysis of the Moderns.

[1] A reference to the philosopher and pedagogue Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) according to whom there are two levels of education (*Stufen des Unterrichts*): *Vertiefung* and *Besinnung* (deepening and reflection), c.f. J.F. Herbart (1806/1887): *Allgemeine Pädagogik aus dem Zweck der Erziehung abgeleitet*. In: Kehrbach, Karl (Ed.): Joh. Fr. Herbart's sämtliche Werke in chronologischer Reihenfolge. Bd. 2. Langensalza, pp. 1–139, esp. pp. 38f. Several of Herbart's books on pedagogy were in Husserl's library and Husserl lectured on "The History of Pedagogy" several times between 1903–1916. Transcripts of students are extant. — Trans.

ening into individual, especially novel and difficult lines of thought exhausts all energies, reflection is doubly necessary in order not to lose track of the general plan of thought and the nexus in which these thoughts should be only functional elements. Hence, after having departed from the rigorous systematic path today anyway, I want now to add a *reflection concerning the train of thought* we are engaged in, looking backwards and ahead, which can also serve to strengthen the interest for our further proceeding.

We had first attempted to realize the deepest meaning of the Cartesian beginning of a universal and absolutely justified science, hence to construct the pure and truly grounded path to transcendental subjectivity, which is only indicated in the first of the Cartesian Meditations.[1] This path had, as a guiding principle of absolute justification offering itself to me, the following [peculiarity]: What I simply cannot negate, not cast into doubt, should hold valid for me. This [principle] we grasped immediately in the sharpest manner as the principle of apodictic indubitability. Retrospectively, it seems to me that this *sharpening of the indubitability, initially natural, to the apodictic indubitability could have* also *been introduced at a later point*. For, if one attempts, guided by the naturally vague principle, to appropriate for oneself the being of the world, given at any time, and indubitably given—which seems to lead to the path of the grounding of a science of the world from experience—then one becomes aware that there is a difference between *empirical indubitability*, or empirical impossibility of giving up the belief in the concordantly experienced world, and *a different indubitability*, which excludes, in a novel sense, any *possible* doubt: namely, *apodictic indubitability*. Every sensual | experiencing leaves it open that further experience VIII, 125/126
motivates a doubt in the being of what has been hitherto experienced and what is completely certain; a doubt is conceivable, albeit without empirical reasons. The non-existence of what is experienced as empirically indubitable is never excluded. *Possibly only now the principle of apodictic evidence offers itself as philosophical guiding principle*. But it becomes obvious also in a different regard, which does not have to be interested in the critique of cognition, that the

[1] Cf., from here to p. 332, Husserl's critical comment, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 512 f.—Ed.

whole world does not have to exist, although it is and while it is experienced in concordant experiential certainty; Descartes travels this path, although not in radical purity, but in the main lines. The possible *Epoché* concerning the entire world of experience makes visible pure subjectivity in a reflection directed at the cognizing subject; a subjectivity which remains even if the world would not exist. This subjectivity then became expanded from the presence into past and future, to the pure subject in its transcendental life, endless in both directions.

Lecture 46: ⟨The New Shaping and Deepening of the Phenomenological Method: The Cartesian Path and the Path of the Psychologist to the Transcendental Reduction⟩

But what presented itself in this manner as pure subjectivity was not shown to be apodictically indubitable. The exclusion of the world for the reason that it was not apodictically given, only pointed the way to the universe of a pure subjectivity given in a new type of experience, the transcendental intuition. However, the critique of its apodicticity had to be carried out, but we delayed it earlier. This was, thus, our first, the *Cartesian path to the transcendental Ego* and to its apodictic critique, which has yet to be carried out.

The further need, which was to get to know transcendental subjectivity according to its individual forms and types of forms of its transcendental life, in order that *Ego Cogito* not remain an empty word for us, we satisfied in a manner that we concurrently constructed, step by step, a *novel path to the Ego Cogito*. The *guiding clue* was hereby the following. The same content that we retained under the possible | *hypothesis*, that the world of experience does VIII, 126/127
not exist, as our remaining subjective life, which exists even in that event, we also retain when we, as reflecting subjects, *cease* any co-positing of the experienced world, and thus in general *abstain* from any position-taking with respect to its being or non-being or any other ontic modalities. In short, if we inhibit any interest in the being of the world, transcendental subjectivity comes into our view.

But here the following thought concerning a novel and seemingly easier path to transcendental subjectivity seems obvious: Does it

not suffice—without beginning with that long-winded critique of the experience of the world and bringing to evidence the possibility of its the non-existence—immediately to enact the *Epoché* of the disinterested self-observer concerning individual acts? Does this not suffice, especially if I add that I enact this bracketing with respect to all of my acts at once, through which I would have to gain my pure subjectivity?[1]

We attempted, at any rate, to carry through this new thought regarding our path, and our procedure, accordingly, was the following; we said to ourselves: Let us leave aside this entire earlier train of thought. Let us, instead, start out with the natural naive I, which carries out any random acts and thereby is related in the natural manner to any random intentional objects. Then we can, at first without thinking of a transcendental subjectivity, without having any ideas about it whatsoever, carry out with respect to every individual act a similar *Epoché* in a manner just as easily comprehensible as the one which we, related to the world and its experience, carried out on the Cartesian path.[2]

We simply distinguished the I that naively carries out an act and the I that, positioning itself above it, reflects upon the former, and we demonstrated the possibility that this [reflecting I], reflecting naturally, at the same time could become a disinterested I. We thereby clarified the concept of interest, which we firstly defined as experiential interest and in general cognitive interest and then also as interest of the heart and the will. | The exclusion of all participation VIII, 127/128 in the respective interest on the part of the reflecting I meant an exclusion of taking over any of the positings of this I, of all validities enacted by it, but also an inhibition of all practical intentions on the part of the reflecting I, and to practice critique in this respect and to go cognitively after the true being. What the reflecting I now, in the theoretical attitude, finds in such an *Epoché*, is the phenomenologically pure act; this purity is a phenomenological one, but of course only in a first and incomplete, not yet transcendental sense. What

[1] Cf. Husserl's two critical comments on this paragraph, cf. Appendix 10, pp. 513 f.—Ed.

[2] Cf. Husserl's further critical comment on this sentence, cf. Appendix 10, p. 514—Ed.

we have gained thereby is, as we predicted but what will only clarify itself in the following, only the phenomenological purity in the sense of empirical psychology.[1]

We proceeded in this line, observing the main types of acts individually and reducing them to such phenomenologically pure contents; we busied ourselves to demonstrate with respect to them the wonderfully intertwined *intentionality* and thus at the same time attempted to bring to a first understanding the peculiarity of subjective being and subjective accomplishment, as it manifests itself in every type of such acts. At any rate, such analyses will be necessary if we want to show that through the phenomenological method a new realm of experience *vis-à-vis* common experience reveals itself.

We were engaged in this investigation. But I immediately want to give you a view ahead, so you may understand how through such individual reducing with respect to the acts of the empirical-human I ultimately a path shall be opened in order to gain transcendental subjectivity, to make experiencable that I which would remain even if the entire world would not exist, thus even if my lived-body did not exist and hence there would no longer be talk of an I in the ordinary sense, that of a human being.

The answer to this question is: Instead of carrying out, as a reflecting I, the reduction as described, that is, with respect to individual acts and nexuses of acts, and in direction to what each of these acts posits individually, I constitute | myself as transcendental- VIII, 128/129
phenomenological I, and that is, in the form of the subject practicing transcendental-phenomenological reductions and that firstly makes its own transcendental subjectivity the open-endless field of its phenomenological experience and research in general. It is now the question what this is supposed to mean. The answer is: I become this transcendental spectator and my *Epoché* itself becomes a *transcendental* one by being encompassing and radical in a sense that the earlier psychological reduction has not yet known.[2] For, if I practice the phenomenological reduction with respect to an *indi-*

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[1] Husserl writes in the margin of the last two sentences: "No!" Cf. Appendix 10, p. 514. Husserl later crossed out "not yet transcendental" on p. 330, l. 33 above. — Ed.

[2] Cf. Husserl's critical comment (as well as on pp. 345 ff.); cf. Appendix 10, p. 514 — Ed.

vidual "I perceive," "I recollect, phantasize, think, desire" and so on, to its purely subjective content (the psychological one), then I still have a *multitude*. What stood before us, thus, was, on the one hand, the proof that this reduction to be enacted with respect to an individual act and this phenomenology purity leaves open yet a higher and new purity to be achieved, and that a certain expansion of the *Epoché* must lead not only to an all-encompassing *Epoché*, but also an *Epoché* leading to the transcendental reduction, which absorbs, as it were, everything psychological; indeed (as we will then understand) that it would lead to an even farther-reaching one than we accomplished earlier on the Cartesian path. For, not only I, who is subject of this phenomenological reducing, gain myself as transcendental I on this path—I gain, also including foreign subjectivity in this method, transcendental *intersubjectivity* or, as we can also say, the transcendental I-universe, as transcendental community of individual I's, construed transcendentally.[1]

Thus, as this recollection has now shown, these at times so very difficult analyses were not about a mere exercise in individual analyses that were more or less dispensable, as if we had lost track of the great, unified train of thought of a philosophy in the making. Instead, we were engaged in a rigorous | systematic path, and that is, VIII, 129/130 of a novel shaping and deepening of the phenomenological method, for which our analyses were necessary. These gave us, in their phenomenologically individual reductions, basic cornerstones above which the higher, the transcendental-universal reduction should become erected, stemming from a basic idea, which is not far-fetched and should become understandable soon.

Let us, hence, take up again the train of thought of our earlier investigation, bringing them to conclusion in brief and easily understood terms.

The more immediate purpose of this interrupted investigation was to show through a phenomenological analysis that with respect to the main types of acts that presented themselves as presentifying—such as the remembering, expecting, pictorial acts, those of reproductive phantasy—that their intentional relation is not a sim-

[1] Cf. Appendix 10, pp. 515 f.—Ed.

ple one, as it seems and expresses itself at first blush.[1] It seems as in *recollection* a remembered past is simply presentified, in *anticipation* an expected future, in an *image* a depicted object, in *phantasy* a fiction, just as in perception something perceived. But this is not how things in truth stand. We already demonstrated this briefly in a Cartesian reduction in the case of recollection and anticipation; in a more thorough but then also difficult analysis we demonstrated this with respect to phantasy. It thus became clear that we have to distinguish in every such presentification between the straightforward direction of gaze—or the direction of gaze at that which means, in the primary sense, the presentified and what at first becomes visible alone—and, secondly, a hidden act and act-gaze which is itself co-presentified, whose I is a necessary correlate of the presentified I of the presentified object. To have conscious in phantasy a pasture, to be devoted to it straightforwardly in phantasy, this is not as simple a matter as perceiving a pasture. For by necessity a co-phantasized I belongs to the phantasized pasture, not I who is now here, but a phantasy-modification of my I, I who *quasi*-exists in this pasture | VIII, 130/131 directed at it in perception, conscious of it in this or that manner of appearance. This phantasized I and the phantasized act of seeing belong to the necessary content of the phantasy of the pasture, which, accordingly, is not conscious in a simple intentionality as a truly perceived one. Likewise the memory of yesterday's walk is something seemingly simple, as if I had here nothing but the present I and the remembered image of the walk, only the latter conscious in a subjectively modified manner *vis-à-vis* the walk as given and running off in perception, but by and large conscious in an equally simple manner. But a further observation shows once again that something past as recollected can only be conscious by being conscious to me as something that was perceived by me and that I, thus, am part of the reproduced past as reproduced I, not as the I who I am now, but as the I that I was and was present then, as having experienced this or that. The same is the case with anticipations concerning an anticipated event and of a necessarily co-posited I and I-act, in which what is coming will or would be perceptually present. | VIII, 131/132

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment on the following; cf. Appendix 10, pp. 515f.—Ed.

⟨Section Four VIII, 132
Phenomenological Psychology, Transcendental Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy⟩

⟨Chapter One
The Accomplishment and Problematic of a Phenomenological-Psychological Reduction⟩

Lecture 47: ⟨Intentional Implications and Iterations⟩

We now have to clarify everywhere in the same manner—if in this way the recollected (or anticipated) experience is only conscious for me as such by being conscious for me as such as perceived in a recollected past (or to be perceived in an anticipated future)—that a purely subjective content is contained in every such intentional content, namely, the purely subjective [content] of this implied past perception or future perception. The phenomenological reduction with respect to a recollection or anticipation, thus, demands that I carry this reduction over into the recollected past or into the anticipated future. In other words, the phenomenological reduction demands that I, naively transposed into the past, practice a reflective grasping with respect to the past I and its past act and in general with respect to all acts that it has conscious as having carried them out as a recollected past I, and that I put into play that disinterestedness in theoretical observation, in which the purely subjective content of the respective acts as acts of the past I comes to the fore. The same goes for the future I and its acts, inasmuch as they are intentionally contained in the respective anticipating; likewise, of course, with respect to all acts which still carry in themselves, in the manner of these *presentifications* |—*vis-à-vis* the I that, as present, VIII, 132/133 actually carries out these acts—an I implied in their intentionality with their implied acts. Concerning the phantasizing acts, such an I is intentionally implied in the mode of the "as if," precisely as co-phantasized I that carries out acts in the respective phantasy world.

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Of course, the purely phenomenological [content], which is gained from the implied acts as phantasized acts, is here itself merely a phantasized one. But regardless, the phenomenological reduction achieves here what is to be achieved necessarily; it shows how every phantasy, as a present real act of the phantasizing, hence real I, has conscious its phantasy objectivity, and how to all imagined objectivity corresponds an imagined pure subject as one through which alone something objective can appear and validate itself also for a phantasy subject.

The intentional implications which will have to be considered here, multiply themselves as simple presentification and phantasy—as already the somewhat more complicated [phenomena of] image and indication (for instance, through a marker)—imply possibilities of multi-layered repetition, of *iteration*. Instead of a simple recollection we can also have a recollection of a recollection. And once the latter has passed we can recollect that we had a recollection of a recollection, and so on. An image can be an image of an image, which itself, in turn, can be an image, and so on; as when we have a reproduction, for instance, a sketch of a statue, and then later the reproduction of this sketch itself. Again, a phantasy can be, instead of a simple one, a phantasy of a phantasy, as when I dream myself into a phantasy world in a manner that in it, I fall once more into phantasizing, and that, too, is ideally repeatable.

On the other hand, we do not only have iteration in one and the same act-type concerning their intentional intertwinements, but just as the different intentionally modifying act-types can reach over to one another intentionally—for instance, as recollections of expectations, as expectations of recollections, phantasies of memories—likewise also all iterations of the one modification can reach over into the intentionality of every other one |. Let us illustrate with a VIII, 133/134
few words what we said with regard to phantasy. Phantasy is a title for a universal modification which, as we had already mentioned earlier, stands opposed to all non-phantasizing acts as positional acts. We can juxtapose ideally a respective phantasy act to every real, every positional act. But this is to say: All types of phenomenological results that we gain through reduction from positional acts—simple or iterated recollections, anticipations, and so on—can be transposed without further ado into phantasy, only there they take on

there the modification of the "as if." All we need to do is to expose in general phenomenologically the special peculiarities, which phantasy accomplishes as phantasy, and [then practice] the systematic reduction with respect to the basic types of positional acts and with respect to the type of their iterations.

The acts that we had in mind and were working on here, harbor, in the form of intentional implication, in turn acts within themselves, but acts of the identical I. If I have a recollection, then I, the recollecting I, as the subject of the act, am of course not an intentional content of the act. But regardless—in a modification, in that of my subjective recollected past, I am nevertheless part of it. Every appropriate reflection tells me: I, the identical one, who now recollects, was part of what was recollected; and likewise everywhere concerning the acts we considered thus far.

But let us now consider a novel and very peculiar form of acts, to whose intentional achievements presentifications contribute—the acts of so-called *empathy*: Through them I have as *Ego* in a type of perception consciousness of the existence "in the flesh" of other subjects, any other *alter Egos*. But I have this by virtue of understanding-into[a] certain things, so-called "other lived-bodies," a co-existing mental life belonging to them. Lived-bodies are objects, in which mental being, mental life "expresses" itself. If I perceive them, I also experience this expression, and through it the other mental life as one expressing itself, as manifesting itself in the manner of a co-presence. I *notice*[b] their mental life, which expresses itself step by step, although I cannot see it itself, although I can never perceive it itself truly. We have here, as we know, a type of *original* | VIII, 134/135
indication, which derives its power from a perceptual presence of my lived-body in its intertwinement with my mental life as well as from the typical similarity of the other lived-body, firstly as bodily being, with my own. This similarity in this connection originally motivates a presentifying function, an indication of a similar mental life. The latter, however, is not indicated in the manner of recollection or anticipation, which would allow an identification of the co-presentified I-subject with myself; it is an I, yet another one. This peculiar intentional structure of this type of perception, which owes

[a] *einverstehen* [b] *ich sehe es ihnen a n*

a main element of its achievement to a presentification, requires an I, but yet not myself as an implied subject; it creates for me the consciousness: another I stands opposed to me, and without it, the word "another I" or "fellow human being" would be for me words without meaning.

If we unravel here, with respect to empathy, the intentional implications and bring to relief their phenomenological contents reductively, then we happen upon something in principle novel and peculiar. Just as we can practice the phenomenological reduction concerning our own acts—present and intentionally implied, real and imagined acts—we can likewise practice such a reduction with respect to the acts of the other who becomes conscious to us through empathy.[1] We can place ourselves imaginatively, as it were, into their act life, living in it, and practice *in them* reflection and phenomenological *Epoché*, as if we were them ourselves, and the same goes for each of their acts, for their perceptions, their recollections, their anticipations, their phantasies, and so on, we can expose the purely subjective [element], that of the other, just as we can do so with respect to our past or our imagined I, our remembered or imagined acts, and so in general.

Admittedly, the situation is more complicated concerning the acts of others who are given in empathy. We are dealing here with an intentional modification of what is given to me in an original form, through the peculiar and complicated indication via the experience of a lived-body. The modification of the *alter* manifests itself as an intentional character |, which modifies all conceivable VIII, 135/136 types of my own acts correspondingly. All intentional contents which I could, perhaps, make explicit with respect to myself, could present themselves *to me* in the same manner in this modification of the *alter*, hence characterized as intentional contents in acts of the other. Furthermore, we can say in an essential generality, that experiences of *every* genus and type, which I have actually experienced and could phantasize as *my own*, I could also understand in empathy into an *alter Ego*. This concerns also the empathies themselves, they, too, could express themselves in or by means of

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment; cf. Appendix 10, p. 516—Ed.

another lived-body. Accordingly, I can experience another as someone who himself experiences in turn another in this mode of the "other" *alter*, who, in turn, again experiences a fourth person in this manner, and so on. These are, in fact, very quotidian events of intentional implication. You see, we are dealing here once more with a modification that can undergo iteration. The modification of the *alter*, in which a subject and subjective life are given, modified, as intentional object of an empathizing act—in contrast to the manner in which something subjective is given unmodified and *originaliter* in the perception of myself—can layer itself upon another in repetition. Something mental, which is experienced as something empathized of an empathized person, contains then an intentional mediacy.

Analogously, something recollected has firstly, *vis-à-vis* something perceived, the modified character of "having been perceived," or "having occurred in memory"; moreover, the intentional object of a recollection of a recollection has the corresponding iterated intentional character referring to two presents—a current and a past one. The same is hereby given in an immediate and a mediate intentionality and identifiable as the same; I recollect something, and at the same time I recollect it as something that I recollected yesterday. Likewise I experience something, and at the same time I experience that my fellow man is directed at the same thing in his experience, that a third person observes that this fellow man is directed at it, and the like.

A special and very important case of the experience of empathy, in which another person is given to me as one who | in turn is VIII, 136/137
directed at a second person, consists in the case that I myself am co-experienced as this second person and that this mediate empathizing experience coincides with my experience of myself; that is, I experience the person sitting opposite me as one who is directed at myself in his experience. Hence, on the basis of this most originary form of being-*for-one-another*-reciprocally the manifold *I-you-acts* and *we-acts* become possible, acts which in turn can be empathized by others and by communicative pluralities as unities. Hence the most multi-layered communal life becomes possible whose strange peculiarity it is that not only many subjects as such live, but they live in a way that each and every one of them has, through the intentionality

of empathizing experience, all others as his others; as co-existing, partly in the form of originary experience, partly in that of a determinate or open indeterminate knowing, they are in his existential field. But not enough yet: immediately or mediately, partly in reality, partly in practical possibility to be achieved, he is with all others in a *social nexus*, and this is owed to the communicative, the specific social acts, I-you-acts, we-acts, and so on, "trafficking" with them, actually or possibly, experiencing from them personal effects and exercising effects on them; but all that in the context of one's—and everybody's—intentionality, such that "everybody" knows himself as somebody, as a member of a *personal effective community* extending itself into indeterminate endless expanses, and ultimately [into the community] of a humanity.

Only one other class of acts needs to be included in this consideration. Certainly we can also practice the phenomenological reduction with respect to any random acts of reflection, and hence no less with respect to the *acts of the phenomenologically reducing reflection* itself. In other words: Just as I, in a simple perception, can bracket the perceptual object and, reflecting upon the reflection itself, take the perceptual object only as something perceived on the part of a phenomenologically pure perception, I can likewise bracket the object of the phenomenologically reflecting act and strive to achieve the phenomenological purity of this act. The act of the phenomenological | reflection, in which I achieve the per- VIII, 137/138
ception as my pure experience, has as object precisely this pure experience, thus this phenomenological datum. Nothing stands in the way of inhibiting my ontic interest in this phenomenological datum and, proceeding as usual, to establish an exclusive interest for the fixation of the phenomenologically pure experience of the phenomenological *Epoché* concerning the perception which I had just performed. This occurs, obviously, in a reflection of the second level, with an *Epoché of the second level*. What has just happened here in the example of a perception, can occur in any random act, and hence we arrive, in a random iteration, at infinities of phenomenological reductions, at least ideally, layered on top of one another.

Concerning such lines of iteration, which proceed from a random simple act of phenomenological reduction (which does not

yet itself reduce a phenomenological act), one has to say, obviously, that they expose stratified lines of phenomenologically pure data, layered upon one another; but not in the manner as if the results of the reduction of the higher levels would somehow improve or complement the lower ones. For, what I have exposed as the purely subjective [element] in phenomenological experience, wins and gains nothing by my becoming aware now once again in reflection that the phenomenological exposing itself is again itself an *actus* and that I, interested in exposing it as a pure *actus* in pure experience, have to, once more, perform upon it, this act of a higher level, a reduction. These acts, as *acts of method*, are, indeed, not there from the beginning, but are put into play by myself for a methodological purpose, only this is peculiar, that they can, always anew, be put into play *iteratively* — which is the case with every iteration. It is clear that if I should have an interest in delimitating a circle of observation in which only something purely subjective in the phenomenological sense should come to the fore, that in this case the phenomenological purities of all such levels of reflection belong in my circle in the same manner, and that I should demand no regress of reductions *in infinitum* in every special case where I want to single out a special phenomenological datum |: as if the higher reflections firstly VIII, 138/139 had to complete the datum in question and as if the latter were not already something phenomenologically pure, and finished in itself.[1]

Lecture 48: ⟨The Problem of the Transition From the Psychological Reduction With Respect to Certain Acts to the Universal Phenomenological *Epoché* and Reduction⟩

But we need to make use of the individual analyses and ask the question, first of all, whether it is possible to glean from them a phenomenological *plus ultra*. We know of the latter under the title "transcendental subjectivity" from the Cartesian path to the reduction. This knowledge shall now serve us only as a means for

[1] Cf. Appendix 26, pp. 622 ff. — Ed.

the *critique* of the accomplishment of such individual reductions taking place on the ground of the natural attitude and in which our previous procedure had taken place, and as a means to motivate the decisive thought which could help us overcome the *inadequacy* of this procedure. We achieve hereby, of course, merely a guiding motivation for the invention of the constructive additional piece of the *new method*. This motivation, hence, does not itself belong to the method of the reduction, which, as a matter of course, has to be grounded in itself. With the knowledge of transcendental subjectivity we make use, at the same time, of the main idea, already long familiar: that everything objective which ever exists for me and has ever existed for me, which will ever count as existing for me in any sense, can only have derived its meaning, manner of appearance, validity from certain achievements of my own consciousness. From this follows that wherever I retain a rest remaining from an already reduced objectivity in objective intertwinement, a rest where the reduction has not been carried out, hence a content of objectivity posited *simpliciter*, instead of being posited in the regress to the having-it-conscious as a merely intentional objectivity of this act, [from this it follows that] I do not yet have true and entirely pure subjectivity.

Let us consider, from this general perspective, the phenomenological reductions concerning the different acts that | we carried out, VIII, 139/140 and let us imagine that one would proceed in general only in this manner, concerning all types of acts as such. From the very beginning I was hereby in the natural attitude, I, as *psychologist*, begin as I, this human being in the well-known world, and not only of my real surroundings, whose familiarity I have acquired in my past life to a normal degree. Also ideal "worlds" exist for me; for instance, I have learned mathematics and know the world of numbers, different types of ideal mathematical manifolds, such as Riemann's manifolds, Lobachevsky's, and so on. Nobody has demanded of me, as psychologist, that I renounce all of these worlds, all these objectivities that I have come to know and understand. The continuation of my methodological reducing of the respectively observed individual acts to ever-new individual acts demands only certain reductions with respect to *them* and *their* intentional objectivities. And what I grasped there as something subjective, nobody ever

demanded of me to put out of validity the objectivities of every type, which were and are mine as such. Only those which were posited *in* or *of* the respective acts as valid were bracketed, but only temporarily, in order to achieve the pure act contents. If the world with human beings remains in the background and as acquired habitual possession, then every act, for instance an act of my perception, memory, empathy, which I reduce to its purely subjective content respectively, remains for me as *my* mental act, *of this human being*, the moment that I direct my observing gaze again at my own lived-body. My lived-body is constantly there in my field of perception, even if I do not attend to it, if I do not direct an act of *seizing* perception at it. Since it *remained valid* for me as this constantly existing one, whether attended to or not, just as any other world of my experience external to my lived-body, it and the world has, so to speak, always a say in this matter. Things are the same when I intend the unified interiority, the unity of the pure soul. The psychologist stands precisely on the ground of the objective apperception "human being" and enacts an abstractive stance in which he gains purely this one component of mere physical corporeality and then, in an opposite attitude, | the component "pure soul," but precisely VIII, 140/141 as this, a component. In other words, every new validity that I put into play, carrying out new acts, entangles itself, following its own sense belonging to it, with the old validities, which now have been newly activated. Hence, everything purely subjective that I gain in reduction, carries with itself constantly and unaffected by this reduction an *objective component of validity*, stemming from that *entanglement* with objective validities, the ones that were never inhibited. If human beings are constantly in my field of validity, then their lived-bodies and the acts animating these lived-bodies belong to the unities of validity. If I make explicit phenomenologically the purely subjective [element] of these acts, of my own and those of others, then it is for me without further ado *the* purely subjective, which *co-exists with this or that lived-body*; hence [it is] the purely subjective [element] of this or that *human being*, in a word, his *pure subjectivity* and my own, if I practice the reduction with respect to myself.

Hence what we indicated earlier becomes confirmed. The phenomenological procedure that we had practiced up to now with

respect to different types of individual acts, accomplishes nothing else, and can accomplish nothing else, *than to* expose the *mental interiority in its purity* and to bring to light the *intentional implications* hidden in it.[1]

This accomplishment is by no means meager. Yes, we can say, this phenomenological reduction firstly accomplishes what one thought one could practice, since Locke, without any methodological artistry in the manner of a simple experience, a *mere receptivity*, namely a *purely psychological*, a so-called *inner experience*. It has become evident precisely through our analyses and the clarification of its breadth that *experience of something purely psychic*, and already purely psychic perception of oneself, *is nothing less than a mere receptivity*, that it requires, rather, the burdensome practice of a specific *method*, the method of the *Epoché*. | VIII, 141/142

Now how should this mere method of psychologically pure experience open a path to *transcendental* subjectivity, how should it be possible to lead it beyond the exposing of *human* mental life and beyond a *purely psychological* analysis and to transition into a viewing of transcendentally pure life and into the accomplishments of transcendental analysis? Which modifications and enhancements of the method may be required, which type of expansion of the *Epoché up to an absolute universality* is already anticipated by what has been said previously.

Let us reflect upon our entire present situation of this phenomenological reduction up to now, which leads to a merely psychologically pure content of an intentional experience and, carried out in natural universality, would lead to the purely mental content of the entire world, hence to the universality of pure souls of all human and animalic creatures.[2]

It lay in the very starting point from the natural attitude and in retaining it, that for me, the phenomenologically active subject, everything counted as valid that had counted for me before. The *Epoché* that I practiced, even if I may have practiced it *universally*, that is, according to the general will to subject *every* of my and

[1] Cf. Appendix 21, pp. 575 ff. — Ed.
[2] Cf. Appendix 21, pp. 575 ff. — Ed.

others' acts to an *Epoché*, left the natural ontic validity of all of these acts untouched. Whether or not we were talking about, for instance, perceptions, my own or of others given to me in natural experience, they were inadvertently those of my human I and those of other humans or animals. The disinterestedness of the *Epoché* which I practiced with respect to the actual being of the respectively perceived objects, and likewise concerning those objectivities posited in the respective other acts, was by no means *absolute* and radically *pure disinterestedness*, but only a relative one; namely only with that intention of exposing for those acts that which remains for me as existing in them, if the respective perceiving or otherwise active I should err, and what belongs in any case to the actual being of these acts, it may be as it may concerning the being or non-being of the objects posited in them. | I thus had the aim of VIII, 142/143 achieving the act-experiences of the respective act-subjects as pure experiences and according to their pure experiential contents. But this was not even to say that I, the psychologist, wanted to put out of play *in general* my own position-taking of belief in these perceptions, in general in these posited things, values, and so on; instead, I wanted this and did this only relatively, concerning my aim. Hence I was able to retain as a reality very well and *concurrently* the house seen by the other person and could achieve the pure perceptual experience of the other by bracketing the ontic reality of the house seen by him. For it was precisely in this manner that I ascertained that to his perception belonged merely the intentional objectivity: "house" of this individual content, of this manner of appearance, and so on, the perceptually meant and posited house as such, which remains in any case as a moment of the perceptual act itself, remains as what it is, even if it turned out that the house in reality did not exist. I have thus not inhibited as such and absolutely my position-taking concerning the actual existence of the intentional objects of the respective acts, and even less my other ontic positings, my entire habituality of validity through which the real world exists and has validity constantly for me, with all of its experienced realities and also many ideal realities which I had known as existing in my earlier life and which now remain untouched in my sphere of experiential possessions (habitual convictions).

But now we also see how something else and novel is possible, *which pulls asunder the entire ground from this natural attitude* and puts out of power *all* validities which are precisely the ones that create this ground.[1]

Indeed, nothing stands in the way of grounding a *universal Epoché*, as a *universal decision of the will* in the sense of inhibiting all my interests *entirely*, through which not only is valid what is valid for me now, but *through that which habitually held for me in the past still | holds*; moreover, through which, on the basis of this basic VIII, 143/144 ground of validity, *will hold valid* in natural manner whatever will hold valid for me in the future; or rather, would hold valid for me, if I did not intervene through my *Epoché*. With this universal decision of the will, insofar as it is meant as one that is continually valid, I rule my further life. For, in its constant enactment I have to put out of play every enacted validity or each one that offers itself for enactment, I have to reject, in the manner of bracketing, its power of being-valid-for-me. I speak of "offering itself." For at first the universal *Epoché*, which now enters the stream of my life, changes nothing concerning the essential structure of this life. It does not change the fact that I constantly *find myself* as related not only to these or those individual things, humans, numbers, political or ethical ideals with which I concern myself concretely, in real acts, and with personalities that are intertwined with realities; instead I know myself also as co-related to an entire world, to the real universe to which these things, these human beings belong, and at the same time, perhaps, as co-related to certain ideal realms to which the respective ideal objects belong with which I currently busy myself. This is to say that that phenomenological *Epoché* and reduction that I have to enact in carrying out my universal will must *reach beyond the individual act in question*; or that the unraveling of implications belonging to each one leads in itself beyond it insofar as every object has its objective horizon, every validity has its *horizon of validity*. This, however, indicates manifold lines of continuous intentional intertwinement, for which exists the constant demand

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment to the following as well as up to pp. 332 ff.; Appendix 10, p. 516—Ed.

for the phenomenological reduction, always to be considered anew.

What plays the main role in this train of thought is, thus, the difference between the *current validity* lying in the active enactment of acts, and the *potential* or perhaps *habitual validity*, which is a special mode of validity which reveals its meaning and its accomplishment by being translated into a respective actuality. This is a difference that can be made evident prior to all science, prior to all theory, purely from the natural ground, | in *natural reflection. Correlatively* VIII, 144/145 we have the difference of *objects*, which are the respective *thematic* objects of acts, and all other objects belonging to the *unthematic objective background*.

To be more precise we will have to say the following. Every object of a specific act of perception directed at it carries with itself its—albeit unnoticed—spatial *background*. A turn of attention, and it becomes noticed concerning these or those objects belonging to it. The talk of "turn" of attention is conspicuous; it expresses that what it directs itself at was already present in the field of consciousness as background objectivity, just unnoticed, that is, not as a thematic objectivity of an act. Thus here belongs (and upon closer inspection this goes for every act in a certain sense) a peculiar structure to the *concrete perceptual act*, according to which we will have to distinguish between, so to speak, *the consciousness of foreground*, that is, the specific direction of the I and the I-act to its *theme* with all that belongs here to the theme in itself; on the other hand the *consciousness of background*, the *horizon of consciousness*, which makes conscious the spatio-thingly background. This horizonal consciousness indeed expresses an essentially different mode of consciousness *vis-à-vis* the specific being-directed-at …, looking-at, grasping, being-actively-engaged-with-something. *Turn of attention* is nothing but the transition of that mode to the other. Hereby an identifying overlap occurs, a consciousness of unity and identity which, in turn, explicates itself in judgment and predication in the evidence: the same thing to which I now pay specific attention, was already earlier in my field of perception, it already stood there, I had just not paid attention to it. | VIII, 145/146

⟨Chapter Two
The Opening of the Realm of Transcendental Experience Following the Second Path⟩

Lecture 49: ⟨The Horizons of the Living-Streaming Present⟩

To remain with perception a bit longer, we never have, strictly speaking, something perceived without an horizonal consciousness, no matter how we may fixate and limit what is perceived.[1] Not only that an entire thing, in the manner in which it imposes itself in its entirety, has its horizon; rather, everything that is perceived thusly has, so to speak, within itself its background, each is given only as presenting itself through a seen front *side* with something unseen inside and an unseen back side; regardless whether we pay attention exclusively to these sides as what is "actually" perceived of the thing, it is in consciousness not the thing itself or a thing for itself, but only that *of* the perceived thing, which happens to fall into the actual grasping of the self [of the object]. What is unseen is here not co-present in the field of the actual perceptual appearance, it does not become, through a mere shift in attention, something grasped in itself, actively perceived. It is "non-intuitive" consciousness, perhaps also extremely indeterminate, as is obviously the case with a still-unknown object; but this consciousness empty of any intuition is nonetheless consciousness, a horizon of consciousness, into which no ray of the active being-directed-at aims. But it *can* at any moment aim into it. In this case we *attend to* precisely the unseen [side] of the thing, and perhaps this leads to the question of how, more determinately, the thing may look from the other side, or it may lead to the wish to see it from the other side; we circumambulate it and produce new seeing. But even the most indeterminate consciousness is not entirely empty of meaning, it is at the very least meant as a spatial object, something colored, and so on. Hence, a most gen-

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical comment on the following; Appendix 10, p. 516—Ed.

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eral predelineation is present as necessarily limiting the meaning; a predelineation, which receives its postdelineations and complete filling-ins[a] through actual perceiving, again through syntheses of identification. | VIII, 146/147

We have just demonstrated, for each perceptual thing, [the existence of] a necessarily non-intuitive *inner horizon*. But there is also an *outer horizon*, which is also necessarily non-intuitive. For, we have to point out that the outer horizon of a perceptual object, that is, its spatial and spatio-thingly surroundings, cannot only be grasped as the unnoticed perceptual field from which the noticed object protrudes. Instead, we have to distinguish in the entire outer horizon the realm of still-perceived intuitability and the unintuited empty horizon, which continually attaches itself [to this still-perceived intuitability]. Consciously, the perceived [object] does not end, where the perceiving comes to an end; space as the field of actually and possibly known and unknown objects extends endlessly. Into these wide horizons, too, attention can direct itself; from them, too, the I can be intentionally "affected," to turn to them and to enact special graspings of what is there consciously, although it is not seen: as when we now direct our attention to the hallway outside. In this case, a moment of the horizonal consciousness, which belonged constantly to our perceptions, is, so to speak, awoken, and it receives its filling-in through a presentifying intuition. The spatial *plus ultra* belongs to the meaning-content, with which the space of this room is perceived in perception, and to this belongs the hallway with the known pillars, stairs, and so on. [All of] this is not conscious explicitly, literally in individual acts; it is not from the beginning before our mental gaze in the unity of a colorful image; and even less so, since the empty consciousness and the affections stemming from it are presuppositions for the possibility of a full, and then intuitive consciousness of the object. And yet, it designates a unity of validity, with many special validities to be explicated, but all of them centered around what we have given as the specific perceptual object, this lecture hall. Once we penetrate "through explication"

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[a] *Nachzeichnungen und vollen Ausmalungen*—Husserl is playing on the metaphorical meaning of *Vorzeichnung* and *Nachzeichnung*. *Zeichnen* means to sketch, *ausmalen* is to color or fill in a shape (e.g., with color).—Trans.

into the empty horizons of the respective presentifying intuitions, the same repeats itself over and over.

In this and a similar manner everything currently perceived has an empty outer horizon which at first, as these examples | illustrate, VIII, 147/148 ⟨is⟩ a realm of a certain pre-determination, from which something actually perceived refers to something immediately or closely co-present or to be expected, which is thereby co-conscious only darkly, empty of intuition. At each moment, such a pre-determination cannot only in principle be made intuitive, but it can thereby be made explicitly understandable as *possibility of experience*, and in these cases of an experience to be realized *most immediately*. That which is intuitively presentified *counts* as something that can be experienced: indeed, as something that I, through a steady continuation of my active experience in certain familiar directions—for instance, by approaching it, circumambulating it, touching it—*would* perceive, or perhaps as something that would have to explicate itself as something that I would have to experience, if I only did not intentionally disrupt the course of experience, and the like. In our examples, what was pre-determined was that which was to be attained in a relatively immediate execution of possible experience. Spatial proximity is also experiential proximity. Yet, obviously, co-present objects can also be awakened, through recollection, from greater distances; a horizon of familiarity reaches from the next street into the street system of our city and an immediate association can awaken these familiarities. These, too, reveal themselves as givennesses of a possible and realizable experience.

No matter how, precisely, the description may run its course here, it is clear that these possibilities are not mere phantasy possibilities, but that they are carried by a positional consciousness of validity. Attention can direct itself into such horizons through activating [them]. Then, what was pre-determined and what was perhaps made intuitive, becomes conscious as co-present reality, perhaps in a modified mode of validity—of presumability, of dubitability, or of probability—but in any case in a certain mode of validity. But the empty horizon actually encompasses the entire world, and it too as a horizon, an endless horizon of possible experience. In this activating disclosure, the experiencing consciousness is lead into systematically connected strings of possible perceiving running

their course, strings in which little by little ever new regions of the world would (have to) come to perception, and in an ideal totality of a possible | perceiving, all mundane realities. But this, of course, VIII, 148/149 does not mean that each perception *really* encompasses such an infinity, as a real infinity of empty predelineations and thereby of systems of possible perception. And yet, the infinite realm of what is as yet unknown and not yet determined is somehow predelineated in every perception, or in its empty horizon of consciousness it is in a certain manner represented and predelineated *as validity* in a certain *inactual* manner. For except for what is predelineated at each moment in a certain meaning of the intuited content of actual perception as co-existent or presumably co-existent, indeed the unitary style of the continually streaming possible experience is for the least part predelineated; thus precisely this [fact is predelineated], that every new experience must yield new predelineations, that the continual actual experience would have to fulfill these, would have to determine them in greater detail, but that it would perhaps also have to determine them otherwise; [furthermore it is predelineated] that anticipations can be disappointed, that for this [anticipated experience] something else, something completely unknown, can take its place, and likewise always again. Infinite space surrounding every experiencing is not a form that the experiencing agent could populate, above and beyond actual experience and validity, with random phantasies; instead, it is a *form of possible existence of validity*, which—no matter how indeterminate it is with respect to number and type and distribution of actual things, and even with respect to the manner in which *thingly* reality as such continues—is always still a form of *validity*, a form for infinite possibilities, which are not mere phantasy possibilities.[1]

The horizon of consciousness encompasses, with its intentional implications, its determinacies and indeterminacies, its known realms and open spaces,[a] its proximities and distances, not merely a surrounding in the *present*, one existing in the now; instead, as already has become clear from recollection and anticipation, which

[a] *Spielräume*

[1] Cf. Appendix 26, pp. 622 ff.—Ed.

we already considered, it also encompasses open infinities of *past* and *future. To the living streaming present itself belongs | at all times* VIII, 149/150 *a realm of immediately conscious past*, conscious in the immediate reverberation of the immediately bygone perception; likewise a realm of the *immediate future*, conscious as immediately coming, towards which the streaming perceiving rushes, so to speak. But behind this immediately retentional past lies the realm of the, so to speak, sedimented *finished pasts*, which is equally now conscious in a certain sense as an open horizon, into which a searching and awakening gaze can direct itself, a realm of what can be reawoken through recollections. On the other side, we have, likewise, an horizon of the *open endlessly far future*, into which our future acts—premonitions, hopes, preconsiderations, decisions, positings of purposes—direct themselves.

Thusly my *conviction of the existence of my surroundings* documents itself entirely originally already in the structure of every phase of my streaming experience, namely in the form of a horizon belonging to it and which modifies itself in this streaming according to its inscriptions or predelineations. At all times, it encompasses, in the peculiar manner described, infinities of implied validities.[1]

Were we to delve deeper, a great field of ever new investigations would open up before us: concerning the systematic and changing structure of these implications, which, however, abides in its general style; concerning the manner of explications belonging to them, explications through intuitions and with respect to the structure of the world itself as conscious and explicated as valid. For instance, one would have to investigate here the manner in which abiding *validity* springs *from originarily instituting acts* and how, then, this abiding continual validity manifests itself; furthermore, how validity and validity unify themselves to a *harmonious validity*, but also, how one validity comes to *fight* with another validity, a conviction with another conviction, how here some validities can suffer a de-validation, an annulment, after which they can only live on in this character of *annulment*, of *nothingness*; how then, | VIII, 150/151

[1] Cf. to this and the following Husserl's critical remark, cf. Appendix 10, p. 516—Ed.

upon closer inspection, the world as ontically valid for the experiencing agent in a given moment is a title for the entire stock of positive validities unified through concordance. On the other hand, one would have to investigate the *structure of the world* itself *as ontically valid*, the world which, no matter how in individual cases ontic convictions may change (straightforward valid reality becomes *annulled appearance*, and the like), the world itself abides as existing in its general structural form: at all times, it is spatiotemporal-causal physical nature, at all times it contains deeply rooted within it a manifold of bodily-animate creatures, of animalic creatures, of animals and humans, standing in social relations, forming societies, communities, and the like. At all times, a manifold spiritual form of subjects who are engaged with nature manifests itself in nature. Hence, mere nature and mere animality are never actually experienced, but instead a surrounding animated[a] as culture—with houses, bridges, tools, art works, and so on. These most general structures of the at all times valid world are constantly at hand for every experiencing agent, it is a constant world of experience, constantly there and ready for practical doing. These are such structures as intentionally implicated contents in the respective living horizon, in the animating and revealing activities, and in the further living actions of continual acknowledgment and knowledge founded in them, in continual novel valuings, novel positings of goals, of active re-creations.

In these last reflections, we mainly considered the horizon of the world as horizon of the actual surroundings. But we also have, as abiding precipitations of validity from acts, in which *ideal objectivities* and open infinities of ideality receive their primal instituting, our *ideal "worlds,"* if we want to call them so. Hence, for instance from acts of pure counting and the continual forming of [the numbers] 2, 3, 4 …, precisely with this subjectively concluding consciousness of the "and so on"—of the "we could thusly add on again and again" unit for unit—we gain the consciousness of the validity of the being of the infinite line of numbers. The latter belongs, once formed, to our habitual cognitive possession, of which we have to say, again, that it, although unawakened during whole spans of one's lifetime |, VIII, 151/152

[a] *vergeistigte Umwelt*

is nevertheless present in my distant horizon—just not the spatial one, to be sure. In recollection, this horizonal emptiness comes into a special relief, in the renewed counting the current number or line of numbers has the character of a known and only renewed one—of a reactivation of something what was our own all along, but only sunken into the mode of emptiness.

Precisely the same then holds for all arithmetic formations of theoretical acts related to the line of numbers, where one again can point to the relation of harmonious validity or the exclusion from the unity of harmony resulting from contradiction.

Lecture 50: ⟨The Endless Temporal Stream of Life and Possibility of a Universal Reflection and *Epoché*⟩

Whether we now consider the unity of the actual world or the different unified realms of ideality, our life carries itself out in a constant intentional relation to universes of subjectively concordant validities, at the highest to the total universe encompassing all of them, the universe of all ontic validities stemming from primally instituting acts—acts of very different meanings. Unmistakably, the *real* world has a special position, that is, a certain basic position, ultimately by virtue of the fact that it is belongs to the structure of the real world valid for me that I myself, the conscious subject, am, as a human being, a member of this same world. For in this manner every formation, not just real, but also ideal as stemming from my active life—regardless of its ideality—must be rooted in the world. If my life has, for me, the experiential validity of a human life, playing itself out in the world in this spatial and temporal position, then, by virtue of this fact, every theoretical formation of mine is related back, from the originally creative theoretical act, to its spatiotemporal position and to my real human existence, my psychophysical being at this very position. For sure, every theoretical formation then takes on, in the intersubjective nexus of the human community, as such a part of intersubjective science, a manifold of worldly relations yet: a relation to the first scientific discoverer | and VIII, 152/153
its real documentation for the objective tradition, to the different pupils and their original acquisition, and so on. The same is the case,

of course, with respect to all ideal objectivities, such as those of art and of all other objectivities, which take on an intersubjective validity and effectiveness through objective expressions.

All of this complements what we had discovered in earlier intentional analyses of individual types of acts under the title *intentional implication*.[1] We can now see the extent to which this title reaches, the manner in which it encompasses infinite open horizons. We can also see how incomplete a phenomenological reduction is that proceeds piecemeal and, unconscious of these infinities, only practices the methodological bracketing with respect to individually emerging ontic validities, value validities, practical validities, which only excludes the interest in validity with respect to them and turns the gaze towards that purely subjective [remnant], which remains untouched by the question regarding the right of this validity. But at all times hidden validities and endless spaces of validities remain. In truth we stand in the *all-totality of an endless nexus of life*, in the infinity of my own and of intersubjective, historical life that, in the manner in which it is, is an all-totality of validities continually producing themselves *in infinitum*, but which explicate themselves *in infinitum* by penetrating the horizons of the present, past and future. It is clear that there can be no talk of a complete unraveling and explication of these manifolds, to be carried out freely at random. I only mention the wide realms of current oblivion, for which the grace of awakening associative motives is lacking in wide stretches of life, or lacks in duration.

On the other hand, there is a radical modicum to *posit out of action all validities at once*, validities which the streaming life bears within itself as constituting, and this modicum is given to us by the demonstrations just given concerning the constant horizonal consciousness accompanying every actual living present and into which the attending | and seizing gaze can immerse itself at every moment. VIII, 153/154

Let us begin with the following consideration. To the active egoic life belong different possible reflections. Once I have carried out different individual acts or any random individual affections, I can

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark to this passage, cf. Appendix 10, p. 516—Ed.

reflect upon these actions and affections.[a] I then have reflections, for instance, which articulate themselves in sentences of the form "I perceive this or that," "I judge this," "I like or dislike this," "I desire or do this or that." Or, also, something awakens my interest, it repels me and the like. In these cases, I can direct at these bygone acts not only reflective experiences and theoretical acts, but also reflective valuings and willings, thus, for instance, I can decide that I want to carry out this or that act in the future. But reflections can also pertain to whole stretches of life, for instance, I oversee yesterday or my pleasant time as a student or I direct my gaze at the coming Easter holidays and their presumed course of events. Of course I can also make respective *decisions, which pertain to the entire stretches of life*. For instance, I can subject the coming holidays to a rule of the will, to form them according to my purposes; in a certain manner I can also make stretches of past life the topic of my will, as when I critique my life during my time when I was a student.

Finally I can also gain a universal overview over my entire life and make decisions pertaining to my whole life, and in a similar manner as for limited stretches of life. In this manner I can carry out a *universal critique of my entire life up to now* and concurrently wish to form my entire future life: be this under the aspect of a universal value valid for me uncritically, such as power, success, and the like, or be this in the noblest sense of ethical self-reflection, self-critique and self-governance. Once we follow this noblest sense and search for its limit shape, as it were, we arrive at a peculiar reflective self-governance, related to this universal overview of life. Included in it | would be, obviously, an inhibiting, at once, of all validities, VIII, 154/155 that were valid for me before, and of all validities that would ever be valid for me in the future (enacted in the same naiveté). This universal *Epoché* with respect to all validities is carried out here as a foundation for and with the intent towards a universal critique

[a] *Vice versa*. [Boehm takes this comment to mean that the sentence should read, more correctly, as follows: "Once I have experienced any random individual affections and carried out different individual acts, I can reflect upon these affections and actions." Cf. his editorial comment in Hua. VIII, p. 524. — Trans.]

and to a universal self-forming, to be achieved from sources of truth and genuineness, or to a forming of a new and true life.[1]

What we notice here, and what is the reason why we made recourse to the possibility—well-known to us as ethical human beings—of an ethical universality, is the following, that here *universal reflection is connected to universal Epoché*, which in this case joins an encompassing universal ruling of the will, but which, in itself, already presents a universal ruling of the will. To be sure, what we call ethical self-ruling is, according to its normal type, by no means of the indicated limit-form and accordingly, the inhibiting of all validities encapsulated therein, although related to the universal horizon of life, is not meant in the sense of a rigorous universality as inhibiting all validities. But at the very least ethical life and its ethically reflective manner, inasmuch as we think it to be very well possible in its rigor, can prepare us to glean the possibility of a rigorous universal *Epoché*, albeit for different purposes.

Let us consider, first, what kind of achievement this universal overview over our life is, which is already familiar to us; it becomes clear that we are not literally talking about a viewing, not about an actual reproduction of past life in a continuity of explicit intuitive recollections, as if I would have to re-live my past, as it were, episode for episode; and even less are we dealing with an explicit pictorial imagining concerning the probabilities and possibilities of my future life. The imagining and grasping-as-existing in this overview has, as is apparent, the character of an anticipatory and vague grasping of distances [in the future], and has this character necessarily. For my life in its universal temporal extension is constituted for me at each moment and prior to any | active grasping VIII, 155/156
and viewing as a horizonal unity, in the manner of a vague imagination from afar. I can turn to this vagueness and this distance [in the future], I can approach it more and more, I can, in the continual consciousness of the same, draw out ever more contours belonging to it, make it ever clearer to myself, namely through an ever greater richness of reproductive individual intuitions. But this

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remarks to this and the following; cf. Appendix 10, pp. 516 f.—Ed.

process of a clarifying sketching-in and coloring-in of what is at first entirely vague—but yet not entirely meaningless—does not change the fact that all results will yet again bear the type of vagueness, of relative distance despite the approximation, so that I have before me ever new possibilities *in infinitum* of further sketching-in and coloring-in. At all times I grasp in anticipation the unitary and endless temporal stream of life, I grasp it, and yet only from afar. At all times its time is itself an empty and vague time, beset with recollected contents, which, in their only relative proximity and determination, determine individual temporal stretches in vague individuality and which have before themselves, in eternally infinite distances, time itself as a pure idea, with absolutely individual temporal points.

Now if I gain an overview, in this manner, over my life in its universality and am continually conscious of it as a whole, if I, approximating it, grasp it ever more, grasp ever more determinateness, I then thereby also understand the general character of life as intentional life.[1] I understand it as an essential character pertaining to it as such as this type of life and necessarily to all of its extensions and phases. Accordingly, to reflect upon myself, either upon individual stretches of life or my life in its entirety, means to find myself in relation to objectivities, which are conscious in this life precisely as positional or *quasi*-positional, and in whichever ontic modes. *But above to life all belongs necessarily, and in each stretch, positionality*. At all times entities are there for the *Ego*, existing as valid. We can here include in this concept of ontic validity also other validities, such as those stemming | from the heart and the will; VIII, 156/157
namely insofar as, for instance, to feel a value is not itself an act of active believing, active grasping, which brings the being of the value as value to position; but the value-grasping[a] feeling does bear the value in itself consciously, such that it is at any moment ready to be experienced, ready as existing to be seized in an immediate grasp. Accordingly, values and practical formations belong themselves to

[a] *wertnehmend*

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark to this passage; cf. Appendix 10, p. 517—Ed.

the general sphere of being, belong to the respective world, which is instituted as its surrounding world from the *Ego*'s own achievement of consciousness and positing and for itself.

Lecture 51: ⟨Transition to the Universal *Epoché* and Reduction. The Pure Universal Life and Its World of Experience⟩

Thus, to gain an overview over my life means at the same time, and turned correlatively: to gain an overview over the world, which is the world, to be sure, formed and always newly reformed in a manifold metamorphosis of content, in my intentionality, in my judgmental certainties and probabilities, in my value positings and activities.

Exactly what we had said concerning reflection upon a single act and its act-objects holds for a universal reflection upon one's entire life as intentional life. The reflection upon a perception, for instance that of a house, yields as its subjective [correlate] not something like a mere I-perceive, but instead an I-perceive-this-house. And hence the reflection upon my entire life yields not a mere life without the objects conscious in its experience, without its real and ideal worlds, but precisely these as well, and as correlates; they may be, by the way, as vague and distantly imagined as they may be, corresponding to the degree of intuited distance of the reflective representation. Furthermore, and again in the sense of the analogy between individual and universal reflection, the viewpoint upon intentional objectivity precedes that upon act and life. Only after having seen the house naively, can I reflect upon the "I see the house." And likewise, the simple gaze surveying my surrounding comes first, and upon it follows then the reflection upon my life, which was the one positing the world.

We can describe this state of affairs, as we see it, altogether as follows: | If I now direct a universal reflection at my life, then my VIII, 157/158
attending gaze, deviating from my individual theme occupying me at present, penetrates the completely vague horizon, my current one now. It thereby directs itself to the realm of my valid objectivities, a realm which is therein unconscious in its speciality but yet conscious

in vague generality. More specifically, I direct my gaze, following the guiding clue of the temporal form in its mode of givenness, at first at my world of recollection, which is now given at first glance as an entirely vague distant image: to it belongs the real world in the way that it was experienced by me, and, rooted in it, also the manifolds of ideal objectivities that I formed in these or those connections. All of this is encompassed therein without differentiation. This distant image entails a potentiality for free acts of bringing-closer and of producing ever new relative near formations, in the consciousness of the ever more complete distinctness and clarification of this identical objective past, which was mine, coming about in ever new and ever further spanning "syntheses." The egoic reflection upon this life itself can now follow this lead, and indeed from the very beginning. Already at the beginning I gain in one single act of the past, which was mine, reflecting upon myself, as I experienced it then, being its intentional subject—to be sure, in completely vague imagination and ontic positing—[I gain] my past life, as life in relation to my experienced objectivity; something similar, obviously, would hold for the other tendency of the reflection upon life, the one directed into the open future.

And now we make the transition to universal *Epoché* and reduction. It is analogous to those psychological individual reductions that we practiced earlier, reductions with respect to reflective acts, which were directed at limited objects—individual objects or object-regions—but in any case [they were] not [directed] at the universal surrounding and its correlative total life. Let us now see how this universal reduction comes about and to what extent it indeed achieves a peculiar accomplishment, which in principle transcends all these earlier psychological reductions.

1.) At first we need to keep in mind that the overview over my life and my experienced world that I carry out, say, now, | is also an act. VIII, 158/159
Its object is precisely the intentional relation of this life, my entire life, to its objective totality which came and comes to be posited in it. Of course I can reduce this act, as any other one, thus I can bracket the object just designated, and then I gain the purely subjective [moment] of this act of my self-surveillance. Here I already have something purely subjective that has put out of action the entire validity implicitly encapsulated *in the horizon* of my act, and which

holds in validity only the horizonal consciousness itself as positing. But this reduction yields but the purely subjective [moment] of the *present*.

2.) My reductive interest, however, is not supposed to be merely interest in the pure subjectivity of the present, but also an interest in my *past and future*; and indeed, for them, too, I gain something purely subjective in the sense of an absolute purity. To be sure, my past and future are in existence for me as valid only—now, that I am supposed to reduce—thanks to my present horizon. Hence, if I want to gain something transcendentally pure from them, I must not put it out of validity entirely. I begin by allowing it to be valid as such, the way it gives itself. I now direct my gaze, say, towards my life's past, which as such entails a relation to the objective world which was posited in it as my surrounding, and which I, hence, co-posited in the way I found it before me then, that is, in the way that I posited it as valid then. I now practice the reduction, in the way I learned it for reductions with respect to other acts of recollection. That is, I inhibit the belief in these as total correlate of this co-posited surrounding of the past as the total correlate of my retroactively grasped entire life; I inhibit every ontic interest concerning this surrounding itself. No matter how things stand with the actual having-been of the world that was valid for me in perception, and likewise with the number formations, scientific theories and so on that I meant in my entire past life or supposedly understood, and so on: this much is certain—this remains valid—that I have lived, that I have experienced them, have held them to be real, have posited them as valid. Whatever I may grasp [out of this past life], even if it never existed, it would nevertheless be something past as meant by me. And | likewise, if in VIII, 159/160 general all these surroundings never existed, they would be the surrounding of my life. I am thereby not saying that it be possible that in general these past worlds never existed; for as little as their actual being or non-being interests me regarding their possible being. In this attitude which excludes every interest in being, or what is the same, prior to all questions about being or non-being, about possible being, probable being, and so on, this is certain for me, what this very question presupposed: namely, that I had in my past life this realm of objects in my field of consciousness and posited them as valid. The inhibition of all ontic interest, this is its purpose, yields the insight

that the ontic belief in my past life remains entirely unaffected by any existential position-taking with respect to the objective world, on which this life then took a position: in the manner of experiencing meaning, of thinking, of valuing, and of acting.

Thus it becomes plain that the past life is positable without in the least presupposing its intentional surrounding, or that it is in itself what it is, and posits what it posits, as a pure life; a correlative expression would be: it exists in the manner that it is a priori unnecessary to posit any existence of what is posited in it as existing. If I now do the same for the future stretch of my life, posited as anticipated in my present, then I gain my entire pure life as a stream of life absolutely encapsulated within itself; it may be as it may with the being or non-being of the universal world, which ever existed for me, exists or will exist. Thereby it has become demonstrated that I can observe my pure universal life purely in itself, I can bring it to continual pure givenness and can even perhaps investigate it scientifically without ever needing in the least as a premise any position-taking to any objectivity whatever; or what is the same, that I can observe it in an *Epoché* with respect to all objectivity, which is equal to an annihilation for any exercising judgment. During this *Epoché*, nothing whatsoever remains for me of an objective existence, not even the slightest possibility of existence, even less of real or possible qualities of naively given objects.

This universal *Epoché* becomes possible through the essential | peculiarity of my life that it has in every phase of the present an—albeit empty—consciousness of distance, an horizonal consciousness, and creates it anew continually and implies in it in a universal manner all of what was ever objective for me and will be, and implies in it as an intentional correlate my entire life, thus also co-implied life. Every living present encompasses in its concrete intentionality the entire life "in it," and together with this objectivity conscious in perception in this present it bears within itself horizonally the universe of all objectivities, which ever had validity for me, and in a certain sense even those which are yet to be valid for me in the future.* VIII, 160/161

*Hence temporalization of the entire monad and of the entire monadic totality at every moment of life, in every experience.

Furthermore, this *Epoché* becomes possible by virtue of me also being able—as much as I can transform and then *realize* step by step every empty special consciousness arising in my horizon as standing in relief, into a consciousness grasped from an I—to transform the empty consciousness of the unitary horizon into a seizing total consciousness; this, too, I can then transform into *active* processes of realizing intuition. To speak in greater detail, an emptily arising recollection or an unintuitive premonition, arising in the background while I am actively engaged with something completely different, can take on the form of enactment of an act; I turn to the past or the expected, anticipated. After that I can bring the respective objectivities closer, I can make them intuitive, I can enact the respective thinking explicitly and intuitively.[1] But likewise also concerning the universal horizon: for instance, firstly [I can] turn the attending act-gaze to the universal objective past, which was mine, and then to my past having-lived-in-relation-to-it. I can then proceed with clarification and explication in the manner described above.

And again it belongs to the possibility of the *Epoché*, that the | VIII, 161/162 distant consciousness of the universal horizon not only bear within itself the entire life and its experienced world as a world that bears ontic validity from this life in it implicitly, but that an anticipating validity and a current validity are here inseparably intertwined; for instance, the validity carried out in recollection in the past life and its continual validity, in which it is now still valid, albeit perhaps modified. And finally it belongs to the possibility of the *Epoché* and the reduction as transcendental to be enacted along with it, that I can establish myself in every present as a uninterested observer of myself, but not only in the manner of psychology and its special reflection. Instead, once I have directed my retrospective distant gaze at my entire life—as my life in relation to my entire world, which had validity for me in this very life—I inhibit with one stroke, which indeed becomes possible through the act-unity of this universal consciousness, each and every validity with respect to the entire

[1] Husserl remarks on this sentence, and perhaps the entire passage: "Imprecise." Cf. Appendix 10, p. 517—Ed.

world as conscious in my horizonal distance, with respect to the universe of all realities and idealities; I inhibit each and every validity, I say, that they ever had and still have and may ever have for myself and through myself; and I inhibit as such, just as every objective ontic interest, equally every value interest, practical interest. Having in view and in my direction of interest my life that continues to be what it is, and which gives itself the validity that it gives, I then gain the *purely universal life*, and the worldly universe becomes transformed into *the universal intentional objectivity as such*, in the way that it belongs as an inseparable *correlate* to this life itself. This universal reduction remains in power during all explications and illustrations that I practice. Grasping my life is not yet its explicit self-grasping in its own unique existence. My life *itself*, beyond my immediately present life now, or even more narrowly: beyond that which I now have in a special phenomenological seizing of an act of the present now originarily enacted in the original shape, there is a *limit idea* lying in eternal distance, which itself implies in turn an infinity of limit shapes and infinite distance points. But I can in relative determinateness and approximation—and in the first | VIII, 162/163 and foremost sense this holds for the infinite realm of the past—presentify through intuitions random singularities, stretches of life, I can, through more or less clear recollections of the far past, transform them ultimately into a "perfectly clear" one, whereby this clarity at all times carries with itself an empty horizon of unclearness and indistinctness. If we now look at what is so *clear* no matter how perfect it is, we find, and essentially, that it has an inner *horizon of relative unclarity*, it still has a relative distance, it still has its possibilities to become *yet* clearer, ever new intermediate stretches of emptiness, and so on. But at any rate, it is the *form of proximity* of pure life and carries within itself the evidently ideal possibility of universal explication, of the phenomenological reduction that can always again be enacted anew.

Concerning the attainability of a merely relative proximity the same holds, by the way, also for natural and unreduced recollection. As much as we may count this as natural experience, as much as we may gain through it judgments of experience concerning the natural past, and even natural-rational ones, we can now say: *The method of the phenomenological Epoché* and reduction, in this manner of

proceeding from the distant horizons to the proximities, *opens up a new realm of experience. Indeed, it itself creates a novel kind of experience*, a novel kind of perception, recollection and anticipating expectation, a kind of experience that had to be *unknown* to natural human life and to humanity as a whole prior to [the advent of] phenomenology.[1] | VIII, 163/164

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark to this and the prior passages; cf. Appendix 10, p. 517—Ed.

⟨Chapter Three
The Philosophical Significance of the Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction⟩

Lecture 52: ⟨Philosophy as Systematic Self-Unfolding of Transcendental Subjectivity in the Form of a Systematic Transcendental Self-Theorizing on the Basis of Transcendental Self-Experience⟩

After having now carried out the new method of the transcendental reduction in its entirety and after having constructed it itself in a methodological ascent from its lower stratum of a merely phenomenological-*psychological* reduction, we may well say that it has enriched us enormously in this methodological grounding. Not only [is it the case] that the *Cartesian* reduction, based on the proof of the possible non-existence of the experienced world, had a direct but only limited result. Through the starting point of the non-existence ⟨of the experienced world⟩ it led our considerations to subjectivity, but only *as experiencing* and thereby as unaffected by this non-existence. What was needed, henceforth, was a further development of the method, we had to show, then, that no cognitive positing of the world could remain in validity, but we also had to show that no validity of ideal objectivity could remain in power. In short, if we really wanted to delimit the entire circumference of pure subjectivity as transcendental, we were in need of additional investigations only at whose end the method as a finished method would be the equivalent of the one we had developed now. But even if this were yet to be achieved, our *novel* procedure has the great *advantage that it opens up for us the broadest and deepest understanding of the structure of subjectivity itself, upon which rests the possibility of the Epoché*, and thereby a deepest understanding of its pure significance. Were we to be already full-fledged phenomenologists, we could say, the new procedure yields not only the method of the phenomenological reduction, but at the same time *a phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction*.

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Our considerations have reached a certain conclusion. It is now necessary to reflect upon the path thus traveled. Our | original goal VIII, 164/165
was a philosophy, a universal science from absolute justification. The guiding principle of absolute justification that we chose was that of apodicticity. Precisely this principle led to the demand put to the beginning philosopher, to subject all pre-given sciences, in general each and every pre-conviction, all prejudices to an "overthrow." The attempt to gain a positive beginning, a first sphere of cognition, to be justified absolutely, led our gaze to the realm of the continually streaming world-experience, which lay there prior to all theoretical activity. But it, too, bears in itself a belief, which, often enough, turns out to be deceptive in individual cases. What was necessary, hence, was a universal critique of the existence of the world which comes to a continual ontic positing in continually streaming world-experience. Hence we, hence I as a beginning philosopher was first led to the Cartesian path and then to the construction of a deeper and richer method of universal *Epoché* and reduction.

But now, enriched by the insight gained thereby and looking back at the beginning, this very beginning stands before us now in a new light. For we can now say: The overturning of all presuppositions was, at the beginning, a meaningful and necessary demand, but as an initial demand also necessarily a completely vague one. If it should really come to fruition practically, it demanded a systematic elucidation and clarification of what was implied in it vaguely. A beginning of this explication is that the total realm of natural experience and ultimately the universe of all our natural validities, including the continual validities from our earlier life and the anticipations naturally co-grounded in them, would have to be included in the so-called overthrow. In other words, we see that a radically elucidating and clarifying reflection upon what this demand for overthrow implies for me, the beginner, is nothing but the development of the systematic method of the phenomenological *Epoché*. The question that concurrently stirred me inwardly, what I could and may claim as first [evidence], points me thereby necessarily towards transcendental subjectivity, such that the method becomes *eo ipso* the method of the transcendental reduction. For | it becomes VIII, 165/166
plain that to question everything, my entire stock of knowledge, presupposes a universal ground of being and makes it evident at the

same time, a ground that is at all times one that is ready to be experienced and that remains *unquestioned*. In this method, however, this ground is not a merely emptily postulated one or one merely talked about emptily and distantly[a] with the proposition "*Ego Cogito*," but this ground immediately comes before our eyes concretely and in its own essential peculiarity as an infinite transcendental *life*, as a life that, if we limit ourselves to our own life immediately graspable in immediate transcendental self-experience, bears on the one hand a centering in the *Ego*, the transcendental "I," and, on the other, the relation to manifold intentional objectivities, each one an intentional unity of manifold modes of consciousness. What is great and astonishing coming to the fore here is that even if, as I indeed can, I renounce each and every possible worldly belief, yes, every possible belief that I bear within myself as beginner, and could bear within myself, when I hence cease to take myself as child of the world, as natural human being—that I then have lying before me an endlessly open field of a *novel experience*, indeed that I have prepared it for myself precisely through this method: *the experiential field of my transcendental subjectivity*. What makes this field immediately most relevant to me, the beginning philosopher, is this apodictic evidence of the I-am, already becoming apparent in this first grasping. This bold radicalism, really to overthrow *everything*—all that was valid for me and could ever be valid—⟨opened up⟩ for me an apodictically evident validity, an entity that was not and could not be encapsulated in this totality. *The ontic universe of the world child is not the ontic universe as such*.

But perhaps things are just such that to surrender everything means to gain everything, that this radical renunciation of the world is the necessary path to view the *ultimately true reality*, and thereby to live an *ultimately true life*. Perhaps in this unseeming evidence of the *Ego Cogito*—and in the mediately grounded evidence of transcendental intersubjectivity—lies all possible truth and science in absolute justification and in the sought-for | ultimately sufficient philosophical meaning. Perhaps it is true in the most rigorous understanding that *self-knowledge*, but then only radically pure or *transcendental* self-knowledge, is the only source of all ultimately VIII, 166/167

[a] *in leerer Sachferne*

and highest genuine, satisfying scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge, which makes possible a "philosophical" life. In that case, *philosophy itself* would be nothing but the systematic unfolding of transcendental subjectivity in the form of a systematic transcendental self-theorizing on the basis of transcendental self-experience and its derivates.[1]

The talk of the "feathered soul,"[2] as Plato called it, can give a very vague anticipation of the newly intuited transcendental subjectivity, befitted with the wings of a longing transcendental intuition, arousing philosophical wonder, that all *bracketed validities*, or all of its worlds that have been placed out of validity, still *remain contained within the bracket*. In other words, for me as phenomenological I, as the uninterested theoretical observer of myself and my world, all of these worlds do not exist in a naive manner, but insofar as they had taken on all validity, which they have for me, as my worlds in my acts of consciousness, I indeed can observe this taking-on of validity; and more precisely, I can observe wherein consists that within myself which we call "convincing oneself of being and being-thus, finally seizing it and bringing it to an experiencing and any other evidence." Every evidence, in which I as a *naturally* experiencing and cognizing agent grasp anything real as itself and any truth as truth itself, I have, as a transcendental observer, immediately and originarily in my intuiting. Indeed nothing has been lost here. To the contrary; what I had as existing *simpliciter*, I now have as something had in my having, I have it at once with the consciousness previously hidden to myself, a consciousness in which it was conscious, in its experiencing and thinking, in the great nexus of that subjective intentional | accomplishment, from which it springs according to VIII, 167/168 meaning, manner of appearing, and mode of validity. And no matter how far this accomplishment reaches back further into as of yet hidden depths of transcendental subjectivity, I do already know that these horizons of every current and past consciousness are to be uncovered in their latent implications.

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[1] Cf. Appendix 23, pp. 591 ff. — Ed.
[2] Cf. *Phaedrus*, 251b. — Trans.

Does not the idea suggest itself that in a universal investigation of transcendental subjectivity, according to all of its essential possibilities and factual realities, ultimately must lie all falsehood and all truth, all merely meant being, but also all true being according to its ultimate meaning, which must be a transcendental meaning that is accomplishment? Are not, viewed from the elevated and all-overseeing transcendental standpoint, reason and unreason titles for transcendental accomplishments, aimings and attainments or also failures, which can be made plain in their entire hidden structural nexus? Must not the complete clarification of that nexus of accomplishments that achieves for the naturally-naive cognizer a true being and any theoretical truth, precisely because this is being carried out in the transcendental sphere, thereby make visible precisely the true being of this true being itself and this truth itself, that is, truth itself as the unitary point of accomplishment and as inseparably contained in its nexus? Nothing else, indeed, does the transcendental observer do, than to observe without any blinders and to become aware, in this unfolding, that being and entities, that truth and true state of affairs arise in the subjective life of cognition, as cognitive motivators of certain motivations, as intentional unities in an intentional activity, in which alone they are what they are, and mean what they mean.

Hence, the guiding idea cannot be dismissed that, no matter that the natural totality of the world with all natural-dogmatic ontic positings of the a priori and empirical sciences of the natural level of cognition remains in *Epoché* in this transcendental method, not only is no truth lost, but that all truth, but in a higher sense, is gained. The transcendental method is a path, through exclusion of all natural truth, through universal overthrow, to realize from | out VIII, 168/169 of itself all truth, but then as absolute, absolutely justified truth, to rescue it from the hidden relativity of its validity and to place it upon the absolute ground, on which all relativities stand in a clear thematic view and become the absolute theme of cognition in universal encompassment. But the goal is far, the way is fraught with hardship and must be paved for the first time. One cannot search without a guiding idea. But the paths, the theories preparing them, must be worked out step by step. And we must steer clear of the

fundamental mistake of traditional philosophy, to think that vague and plausible possibilities were already theories.[1]

Lecture 53: ⟨The Problem of Intersubjectivity⟩

⟨a). *The Possibility of Transcendental Naiveté on the Part of a Pure Phenomenology and the Philosophical Task of an Apodictic Critique of Transcendental Experience*⟩

Now, we have to keep in mind here, at first, that this apodictic evidence of the *Ego Cogito*, in which I initially gain an understanding of transcendental subjectivity, is in itself only a beginning and not an end; [in the sense] that it is indeed an apodictic evidence, but that it very quickly arouses a bundle of enigmatic questions within me concerning its true meaning, its scope, its limits. To mention just one: the I-experience, I-think, and so on, in the momentary now seems to be truly apodictic, also my transcendental past is certain to me; but does not recollection, thanks to which alone I can have the past, deceive me often enough? Could not, in the end, my entire transcendental past and future be a transcendental semblance? Thus, before us still stands the great task of the *apodictic critique of transcendental experience*.[2]

And not only that. We have ceased being children of the world, we have renounced the universal natural experience, the universal | natural cognition in all of its dogmatic-natural forms, and thereby we even implicitly renounced all natural valuings and practical actions, inasmuch as they may yield any cognitive objectivities from them. The new transcendental experience opened up before us, infinite within itself, and yet at the same time encapsulated within itself. With precisely it, we have, as is evident, a field of novel theoretical cognition (just as we have no less other purely transcendentally direct acts and act-achievements). The totality of natural sciences is relinquished, in their stead transcendental sciences must arise here, VIII, 169/170

[1] Cf. Appendix 26, pp. 622 ff. — Ed.

[2] Cf. Appendix 22, pp. 583 ff. — Ed. Cf. also Hua. XXXV, *Einleitung in die Philosophie* of 1922/23, where Husserl carries out this critique. — Trans.

as disciplines of a new, completely self-encapsulated *scientia universalis*, from which it is a priori certain that it has utilized no premise from any of the dogmatic sciences, and could ever utilize them. At a first glance this is indeed all true and self-evident, but more precisely self-evident only from the standpoint of a certain higher naiveté. There can, hence, also exist a transcendental naiveté—as parallel to natural naiveté—which now, however, takes on a special sense.

Let us consider the following, which is also important because it illuminates the theoretical structure of this beginning philosophy in a similar manner as the structure of the Euclidian elementary geometry is illuminated through mathematicians putting out of play certain axioms and then showing which geometrical propositions and theories remain untouched by the former, whereby their independence from these axioms becomes demonstrated and thereby the deductive structural nexus of this entire science becomes revealed. In a similar intent, we point out that the entire doctrine of the transcendental reduction can be *separated* from the motivation of the beginning philosopher. Were the purpose of a philosophy (in our sense) completely irrelevant to us, were we to drop it altogether, we could still practice the phenomenological *Epoché* at the psychological and transcendental level and could carry out all analyses of consciousness belonging to them. Then one could oppose to one another naive and transcendental experience and naive and transcendental science, precisely in the sense of "naive," which can only be defined as being opposite to "transcendental." On the other hand |, we can also define a *second* notion of naive cognition if we VIII, 170/171 mean by it all cognizing, which is not guided by the *idea of an absolute cognition*, a cognition from absolute and all-sided justification; we can then also, and more generally, mean this opposition with respect to *every type of position-takings*, to any type of rationality,[a] respectively. In this second sense of *naive*, then, can be considered not only natural cognizing, which remains untouched by the transcendental *Epoché*, but *also cognizing on the ground of transcendental subjectivity*, so long as the latter has not been subjected to an *apodictic critique* and so long as no question as to absolute justification within transcendental cognition has been raised.

[a] *Vernunftleben*

Just as natural science, in the way it has been historically handed down, lets itself be guided by the evidence of external experience and is interested exclusively in expanding it as much as possible, to let it speak in all directions in which it has not yet spoken, and thereby seeks to balance all disagreements stemming from one-sided and imperfect experience in order to secure future concordance, and as it then, as a whole, places faith in the logical evidence in the predicative sphere and merely seeks to perfect it as much as possible: in a similar sense one can proceed in the newly opened sphere of transcendental experience. One can bring transcendental realities and possibilities to the highest possible clarity and then proceed by distinguishing systematically the main types of transcendental appearances and to describe them systematically, thus [one can proceed] by attempting to draft in a similar sense a *transcendental-descriptive phenomenology*, just as in the history of natural science[a] there exists already such a descriptive-classificatory typology of the intuited types of organic species and developmental forms.[1]

Furthermore, just as we turn our gaze away from factical reality with respect to the givennesses of external experience and in their stead observe the possibilities to be modified in free phantasy | and VIII, 171/172 can thereby ground eidetic sciences and already find them grounded partially—for instance, pure geometry with respect to ideally possible spatial formations—one could construe [phenomenology's procedure] here in the same manner, that is, in the transcendental sphere, one could think of an (a priori) eidetic science of the formations of transcendental appearances that are possible in general. One could distinguish the pure eidetic types of possible acts—thus for instance the eidetic types of perception, recollection, anticipation, phantasy, liking, disliking, and so on, and likewise—as falling thereunder, special eidetic types such as thing-perception, perception of animated creatures, perception of self and other, and so forth. With respect to them one can then inquire, which eidetic structures are contained in each type according to possibility and necessity, and

[a] *Naturgeschichte*, literally natural history or history of nature; surely what Husserl means is the history of natural science.—Trans.

[1] Cf. Appendix 23, pp. 591 ff.—Ed.

so on. All of this could be carried out in the same *naiveté*, in the same faith in the evidence of experience and the evidence of the intuition of possibilities, the evidence of logical inference, and so on, just as in the objective science, thus *without an actual pretense to philosophy*. We would then have *a rational and an empirical phenomenology prior to all philosophical interest* and prior to any philosophy itself. How such a phenomenology would look in concrete execution, is not our business here. But its possibility deserves to be spelled out before actually executing it.

But we shall emphasize clearly and entirely without doubt one thing, the most basic and most comprehensible: If I, carrying out the phenomenological reduction, or as we also say, to indicate the *habituality* of this reduction, *in the phenomenological attitude* survey my transcendental life, then I have, to the extent that this intuitive realization may succeed, a homogeneous continuum of transcendental self-experience: insofar as this unfolding yields *concordant* self-intuition. Occasional discontinuities—as when, in the process of clarification of a transcendental self-recollection, certain disagreements arise—balance themselves out in a similar manner as in my natural-objective recollection. For instance, different recollections may have merged with one another, overlapped, but in a further clarifying approximation these overlaps and confusions | will dis- VIII, 172/173
entangle themselves in a concordant intuitive continuity of *one* recollection. Nothing is decided, whether this is necessarily the case in apodictic necessity, but, in any case, it belongs to the most familiar style of recollection. Hence I have *de facto* a steady transcendental universe of transcendental experience, just as I have an empirical universe from natural, objective (external and internal) experience. I have it as existing for me by virtue of the concordance of transcendental experience, which always re-establishes itself, and by virtue of the experiential belief, which documents itself, as it were, in the horizon of each present, *in* this abiding style of concordance that always re-establishes itself. Just as the real universe of the world is given as the one infinite nexus of concordant external experience, the irreal subjectivity, the infinite totality of my transcendental life, is given as a continual unitary nexus of a possible transcendental experience.

⟨(b). *Transcendental Egology ("Solipsistic Phenomenology") and the Transition to the Intersubjective Reduction*⟩

Leaving aside for a minute longer the specifically philosophical interest, let us continue by showing the extent to which we will serve this interest precisely through these considerations.

The transcendental reduction, in the manner in which we systematically unfolded it, was a reduction to transcendental subjectivity. Oftentimes we called it, in Cartesian manner, a reduction to the *Ego Cogito*, and thus it seemed as if we were dealing here, as a matter of course, with a *reduction to my own, that of the reducing agent's, transcendental Ego and my own life*. And how else could one meaningfully speak of any other transcendental subjectivity? The transcendental *Epoché* with respect to my worldly universe encompasses also the exclusion of all lived-bodies, as objects in space. The *Epoché* with respect to my own corporeal lived-body does not touch my innermost life, in which this lived-body is now a spatio-thingly phenomenon of experience. But what concerns the other human beings and animals, one cannot foresee how they should yield more in the transcendental reduction than those phenomena posited in my empathizing positings |. If I, as phenomenologist, may VIII, 173/174 no longer "take as valid" in a natural manner things, thus also the other lived-bodies, as existent realities, then any foothold is canceled out as indicating another's conscious life, which only exists for me as appresented through his lived-body that I experience. A transcendental phenomenology can, thus, *it seems*, only be possible as a *transcendental Egology*. As phenomenologist, I am necessarily a solipsist, albeit not in the common preposterous sense rooted in the natural attitude, but yet indeed in the transcendental sense.

The beginner may perhaps think at this point—if he does not yet have that winged premonition that lets him search for all true externality in internality—that at one point one will have to give up the phenomenological *Epoché*, the time will come again when one can again experience and think in the natural manner and satisfy the natural sciences.[a] Well, then alien subjectivity will also finally

[a] *natürliche Wissenschaften*, meaning the sciences of the natural attitude—Trans.

assert its right, only that somehow phenomenology supplies hitherto unknown methodological aids, which can benefit natural experience and the sciences of experience and henceforth all dogmatic sciences.

However,[1] that this amounts to a misunderstanding of the true sense of the phenomenological reduction and of what it achieves must be clear to everyone who has appropriated the full content of our demonstrations concerning the transcendental meaning of alien experience, of so-called empathy, thus who takes together all that we have said about the transcendental reduction in empathizing presentification of alien subjectivity and what we furthermore said about the phenomenological content of the givenness of my own lived-body and that of the other, on the other hand, | and about the VIII, 174/175 manner in which an alien psyche announces itself in this manner. Of course the result of these considerations will be that, for me, my own transcendental *Ego* and my own life have the preponderance of a *first, of an originary givenness*, insofar as I have a direct access only to myself through self-experience, with self-perception, self-recollection and self-anticipation; *alien* subjectivity, which is, for its part, only directly experiencing with respect to itself, I can only experience in the *mediate manner of indication*, which makes [alien subjectivity] conscious to me through a presentification of its self-perception, its self-recollection, and so on. Herein lies, hence, an *intentionality of the second order*, a mediate one.[2]

Let us pay attention to the manner in which *transcendental subjectivity* as such, *in levels of relative immediacy and mediacy, is given* and only exists, because it is given in these levels, *levels of an intentional implication*. The immediacy, in which I am given to myself as a transcendental *Ego*, has its levels as well. *I am given to myself entirely immediately* only in my *living present*. Only from it do I have

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[1] The original passage, which was later crossed out by Husserl, reads: "That none of this can be the case, however, this will become clear precisely through a deeper understanding of what is to be achieved through the *Epoché*. For myself, as I must confess, the first insight into the phenomenological reduction was a very limited one, in the sense described above. For years I saw no possibility to craft it into an intersubjective one. But finally a path opened up, which is of decisive importance for the enabling of a full transcendental phenomenology and—on a higher level—of a transcendental philosophy. I shall describe it now briefly."—Ed.

[2] Cf. Husserl's critical comment; Appendix 10, p. 517—Ed.

the most immediate form of experience, that of perception. Of my *past* and *future* I have only recollection and anticipation, and herein lie already intentional *mediacies*, as we have discussed in detail. But if we take a closer look, *also the sphere of the present has a similar structure*, which allows us to distinguish intentional immediacies and mediacies. We now arrive at the *streaming limit point of the pure now*, or, correlatively, at the pure self-perception of this momentary, primally living now, and to a stretch of *originary retention* and an *original protention*, whose intentionality is a mediate one. This does not keep us from speaking of a concrete self-perception and a concrete present.

Very analogously I say, and with good reasons: *my* transcendental | I is alone given to me originarily, namely from original VIII, 175/176
self-experience; *alien* subjectivity is given to me mediately, not immediately, in the sphere of my own self-experiencing life, but it is indeed given, namely it is *experienced*. Just as something past *as* past can only be given originarily through recollection, and something in the future only through anticipation, *something alien as alien* can only be given originarily through empathy. Originary givenness in this sense and *experience* are identical.

Of course we need to mention that one's own presence, one's own past are in themselves non-independent; only the entire unity of my life given in originary experience, to which belong my entire past and the anticipated future, is a full concretum. On the other hand, while my present, experienced in originary form, can only exist, as we just said, in the unity of my entire life, the same cannot be said without further qualification for the relation of this entire life to intersubjective life, or in the relation of my *Ego* to the totality of the other *Ego*s with whom I stand in community. At least this cannot be claimed in such a cavalier manner; to the contrary, it *seems* conceivable that I am alone, or that in my entire field of experience no foreign lived-bodies would ever appear, through which I could experience, in the manner of empathy, foreign subjects. It is possible, in any case, to practice a phenomenological *abstraction* or to delimit the phenomenological experience and research based on experience, such that one only moves about in the concrete unitary nexus of one's own transcendental subjectivity and, disregarding any empathy, takes no alien subjectivity into consid-

eration. This, of course, means that one would have to conceive one's own life in modification, similarly as in the case of the transcendental exclusion of the experience of objects. But this is not to say that the phenomenological reduction yields only one's own *Ego*, but, instead, that the reduction is practiced in a limited manner. It is even possible for very important methodological reasons to deliberately delimit oneself in large stretches of investigation, hence to draft at first a *systematic Egology*, so to speak, a *solipsistic phenomenology*. | VIII, 176/177

As an aside,[1] in order to bring to full evidence the manner in which the transcendental reduction in the medium of the firstly experienced own *Ego* brings transcendental *intersubjectivity* to experience and how, hence, the bracketing of the spatial world and thereby of alien lived-bodies and alien human beings by no means puts out of action the alien pure *Ego*s with their *cogitationes*, one will have to consider the following: Let us now, for a moment, pursue this fiction indicated earlier. Or more pointedly: If I imagine that alien lived-bodies never had appeared in my surrounding, there would exist for me, accordingly, only things which, insofar as they bear a spiritual meaning, whichever cultural predicates, only point back to my own active accomplishments. For the sake of simplicity I imagine that I have my surrounding in a constant and uninterrupted certainty, that no semblance appears. If I now practice the phenomenological reduction, that is, if I inhibit, as transcendental observer, all naiveté, in which I have this world existing straightforwardly, then I retain [the world], instead, as intentional objectivity of my transcendentally pure life, and firstly, at any rate, of my life in the form of spatio-thingly experience. Thereby I investigate how the naive having of the world on the part of my naively experiencing I actually looks; the world, which is supposed to be, as is presupposed, experienced by this I as constantly existing. Here, the phenomenologically-reflectively clarifying exposition and systematic description of the unity of experience, in which at first a random individual thing is experienced in naive ontic certainty, led to very

[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark on the following up to p. 380, l. 19; cf. Appendix 10, p. 517—Ed.

extensive analyses, in which we had to pay attention not only to actual, but also to possible experience.

A thing is given to me in perception as an abidingly existing thing in a synthetically concordant perceptual continuity, in whose run-off the thing is continually conscious as one and the same; but in every perceptual phase I have it in a special how of its subjective manner of givenness, in changing orientation of near and far, left and right, and so forth. With the change of orientation goes hand in hand a change of the perspectival manner of appearance; | the thing VIII, 177/178 appears in ever-new aspects. At all times we need to distinguish what is actually seen and what is only co-seen, what is relatively self-grasped and only co-grasped in anticipation. I am hereby *co-participant* in changing manners and move in the free "I can" my eyes, my touching hands, and so on, and have the consciousness that the visual aspects running their course belong to the respective positions of my eyes, freely to be chosen, that the tactile aspects belong to the respective positions of the touching hands and fingers, and so on.

These manifolds of what is intentionally encapsulated in this subjective experiencing—which we call the continually perceiving consciousness of the straightforwardly existing thing—have a steady style of connection; only when they run their course according to the latter, does perceiving have the character of a continual concordance, of a continual self-confirmation of the intentional ontic positing, as a positing of the respective objective sense. Only then do anticipations, which continually reach beyond what is actually perceived, confirm themselves; only then can the thing itself appear, according to the always only partially realized meaning, continually in ever new peculiarities and sides, thereby at the same time confirming itself and determining itself ever more closely. What also belongs to the style and meaning of experience, however, is the free self-enactment of the subjective lines of appearance running their course and the consciousness of the *free potentiality*, to be able to bring into view, in manifold manners, *other* perceptual paths and other unseen aspects of the thing: but this, of course, through freely active approaching, circumspection, touching, and so on. The respective lines of appearance according to their systematic style of running their course are known a priori and are hypothetically

constructible for everyone as a freely possibly initiated mode of perceiving. Only so long as this style confirms itself, only so long as the appearances truly run their course accordingly, only to that extent do the intentionalities continually succeeding one another have the character of *fulfillment*, or which is to say the same, only so long the intentional *object* is continually one and the same and conscious in this self-confirmation *as actual*. The I in the naive attitude becomes doubtful or even surrenders what was previously experienced as existing, in the consciousness of | mere semblance — VIII, 178/179 this is to say, as one becomes convinced through transcendental reduction and the observation of this experiencing consciousness, that the appearances no longer run their course in the familiar and expected lines of appearance, but that appearances intentionally *compete* with other appearances.

It is then not difficult also to characterize the *discrete* synthesis, according to which *disrupted* perceptual continua can be brought to a unity of concordance through recollection; as when I become conscious that what was seen earlier and then not seen and now again seen are one and the same, and then how I, in general, become certain that something exists while I do not see it. Here, too, one can become convinced that we are dealing here with systems of actual and possible perceptions and that here *possible perception* is a title for a *positionality that confirms itself*, and indeed in its own manners. But ultimately one arrives at the overwhelming insight that all that belongs, all in all, to the abiding and continually confirmed *conviction of one world* — a world of things which I at times experience, then do not experience, partly know, partly do not know — is, transcendentally speaking, nothing but a certain descriptive system of actual and possible experiences of a steadfast eidetic structure, experiences and possibilities of experience, which have a continual transcendental nexus, which I can run through in a transcendental experience[a] and constructive intuition. Every piece of natural experience[b] translates into a respective transcendental experience[c] and authenticates itself in the latter according to its true meaning.

I can thereby see that the *existence of the thing itself*, of the object of experience, *is implied* inseparably *in this system of transcendental*

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[a] *Empirie* [b] *Empirie* [c] *Empirie*

nexuses and that this thing is, accordingly, inconceivable without such a nexus and would be a downright nothing without it.[1]

But once we include the *possibility and actuality of other subjects*, |, from which we have abstracted just now, [and consider] that VIII, 179/180
other subjects can bear within themselves the same systems of experience and stand thereby in a relation to one another in the way that the intentional *object* of the system of *one* subject is the *same* as that of *another* subject. From here it is clear that, as long as I cannot know anything of other I's, the existence of the actual world, which is my theme of possible experiences and possible thoughts, *reduces itself* to a self-encapsulated, albeit variegatedly endless, system of transcendental experiences of the type "external experience," and reduces itself to [the notion] that in this system of continual concordance lie intentional experiential lines as continually confirming themselves, they lie in it as *immanent poles* in this system, as posited and at all times concordantly identifiable. The *transcendence of the world* bears thereby no metaphysical secret whatsoever, it is of a different species, but in the most general terms it is of the same genus as the *transcendence of numbers* or any other irreal objectivities.

In this manner, the real world becomes reduced to a universe of intentional correlates of actual and possible intentional experiences of my transcendental I and is inseparable from them as their correlate. Up to now, the subject is, hence, when it experiences the world and is given to it as a world-child, always with itself, without knowing it, namely in the self-encapsulated circle of its own transcendental subjectivity.

When now, among the things [in the world] so-called alien lived-bodies make their appearance, thus when my surrounding displays other human beings and animals, then of course their corporeal lived-bodies, as experienced and experiencable *by me*, become reduced, once more, to systems of subjective appearances within *my* own transcendental subjectivity; nothing is taken from their experiential reality purely for me; this reality is merely clarified according to its concretely full and true meaning.

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[1] Cf. Husserl's critical remark; cf. Appendix 10, pp. 517f.—Ed.

How do things stand, now, concerning the alien conscious life and its expression in alien lived-bodies? To pose the question already means answering it. The alien lived-bodies are, as things, realities for me, and are such so long [as they exist], so long as they are indubitable certainties for me, never to be surrendered, the experiential style predelineates the concordant courses [of experience] and the continual course | of this style. But if this is the case, then the VIII, 180/181
analogy with my lived-body indicates something else yet, namely alien conscious life, and what is indicated there is now no longer something transcendental-subjective from my own circle of life. I can now only take into consideration the alien mentality according to its transcendental content. The latter is what is indicated in transcendental purity, and thus I have, together with my universe of living appearances encompassed in the title *Ego Cogito*, mediately co-experienced in the indication of empathy *a second transcendental life*, and so in general many other [transcendental lives].

The transcendental reduction, accordingly, yields directly my *Ego*, mediately this and that *alter Ego*, and as such, in general, an open manifold of alien subjects indicated or to be indicated through experienceable lived-bodies. But this indication is itself an experiential certainty and has its peculiar manner of confirming itself concordantly.

Lecture 54: ⟨The Path of the Phenomenological Reduction to Transcendental Idealism and the Latter's Phenomenological Meaning as Transcendental Monadology⟩

As mentioned, misinterpretations of the meaning and the achievement of the phenomenological reduction promote the belief that a pure phenomenology would only be possible as a transcendental Egology. Such misinterpretations can only be prevented through a deepest immersion into this meaning, which we attempted in these lectures. Indeed, these are clarifications that are unparalleled in their scope in the entire [history of] philosophy, because it is from them that the entire philosophy and, as we can also say, the general structural form of all *worldviews* that are a priori acceptable depend. *In the phenomenological reduction*, rightly understood, is predelin-

eated in essence *the marching route towards transcendental idealism*, just as *phenomenology as a whole* is nothing but *the first rigorous scientific form of this idealism*. It is the first precise concretization of its genuine meaning and the first real | proof for this idealism in the VIII, 181/182 most compelling form conceivable, in the form of an execution as the most rigorous science. But we can only sketch here what can be gleaned initially, and here we have to emphasize the following with respect to the question of transcendental solipsism that occupied us earlier.

Already on the ground of the natural attitude, reflection teaches me that any entity of which I can ever know, of which I can ever speak meaningfully, can only be something known from my knowledge, something experienced in my experience, something thought in my thinking; in short, something conscious in my consciousness. And even if something came to me through a supernatural revelation, then such a revelation would again come upon me as a consciousness.

If I proceed in this direction, I will say to myself that any cognitive distinction that I may make falls entirely into the domain of my cognizing subjectivity, hence any distinction that I make between mere meaning and correct meaning or between meaning as such and cognition grounded with insight, in which a meaning is produced as *true* and an entity meant in it comes to be given as true [fall into this domain]. *Here, truth and true being present themselves, too, as appearing in cognizing consciousness, realizing themselves as occurrences in consciousness itself.*

But if I then make the transition to the phenomenological reduction, this means that I take this insight into the subjectivity of all cognitive episodes more seriously than the naturally-naive reflecting person ever does and I make clear to myself: as long as I still have—prior to my cognition and existing in itself—an existing world and as long as I only go back in individual cases from the cognized object to its subjective cognizing, I still have left cognitions out of consideration; indeed all those cognitions from which this world existing in itself has its validity. It has, to be sure, validity for me only insofar as *I* have given it validity. I may not overlook the habitual validity, the implicit horizonal intentionality, which, without having carried out an explicit cognitive act, nevertheless bears within itself

implicit validities. I, hence, inhibit all naiveté of | validity and of all VIII, 182/183
objective being holding valid and establish myself as observer, who grasps in his own experience how this really comes to pass which is called: "something is *there* for me as thing, as a human being, as art and religion, as state and people, and so on; it holds valid for me as my reality, I am certain of it as existing, I believe in it, I experience it, I know it, and so forth." As transcendental observer I have, in a universal embrace, the concrete, cognizing-living subjectivity, in which everything that is vague or clear, erroneous or insightful plays itself out, and in which all entities as meant in my meaning and, if I am lucky, as experienced in my experience, grasped in my grasping, insightful in my insight, disclosed in my disclosing, are contained.

All appearances of my cognizing life, those of my factical life running its course and having run its course, but also those to be construed in pure possibility—to be constructed a priori according to their general, eidetically necessary and eidetically possible formations—all of these are now in my realm of investigation. Herein will lie, as is obvious, the great task of *eidetic phenomenology*, to gain clarity as to which types of cognitive occurrences are conceivable and under which eidetic laws they stand. It is evident from the outset that what I call, in the natural attitude, an object *simpliciter*, an objective nexus, a state of affairs, and so on, [any object] of which I can ever know, that is real for me in any way possible, that (I say) every such objectivity is a unity of identity, intentionally conscious in manifold actual or possible conscious experiences. In all of these experiences, this objectivity is meant, in all of them it is—regardless of the very different modes of subjective appearances—meant as its identical objective meaning and in the mode of certainty of belief. That what is meant is in all of these modes the same is to say that such manifold conscious experiences with their manifold modified manners of appearances produce, in synthetic concatenation, an overarching consciousness of one and the same existing object, which, however, can only be conscious in different subjective modes. Of course there are cases, and it is a known type of possible occurrences |, that such a synthetic consciousness cannot retain its unity VIII, 183/184
of identity, that two different consciousnesses aim, at first, at a unity of meaning, but that they separate themselves in conflict, and that, then, in further occurrences to be described in greater detail, not

only the certainty of belief becomes modified to mere assumption and doubt, but that also the consciousness of naught, so to speak, of the crossing out of being, arises.

In contradistinction to what has just been said, the naively cognizing person has always anew the practical conviction that being and non-being are not something merely contingent and relative, but that in every case of cognition a true being is to be achieved through one's own cognitive activity, and indeed as a correlate of complete insight—or at least to be completed in due course. Or, as one also says, the cognizing person knows himself to be in possession of the faculty of *reason* and can work out in processes of rationally guided cognizing, that of insight, something final—*vis-à-vis* all merely subjective or presumed validity—or at least approximate such a finality. Certainly, it is then the task of transcendental phenomenology, in the universal nexus of transcendental subjectivity and after doing research into the general structures necessarily belonging to a transcendental life as thoroughly intentional, to investigate those special eidetic possibilities that the title "reason and rational action" encompasses. Here it will also be necessary to come to ultimate clarity and to meaningful determination concerning the notions of "true being" or "ultimately authenticated being" from their transcendental origin.

If I now reflect upon my cognitive situation, into which the transition to the transcendental-phenomenological attitude has placed me, and reveal to myself that I now encompass, in absolute universality, all actual and possible cognitive objectivities that can ever be valid for me as truly existing and can ever appear to me, and that I find them here, and must find them there, as something cognized from their cognition, as intentional moments of concrete conscious achievements in which they arise as valid units—then it seems, initially, that I have to say: everything that I can ever intuit as actually existing | is nothing other than an intentional occurrence of my VIII, 184/185
own—that of the cognizer's—life; of course, not clinging to a passing individual experience, but clinging to the entire motivational nexus which runs through the intentionality of my life, and especially clinging to my contents of meaning and appearance which arise in my primal instituting and then become habitual, and the cognitive possibilities arising from them; but all that according to

fixed eidetic laws of transcendental life. It is by virtue of the latter that something arising in the mode of evidence of a true being intuited in itself, even after the contingent act has passed, can be authenticated anew in novel cognitive activities, authenticated as this identical true being, and in a renewed evidence, and that it is impossible for an evidence to arise that stands in conflict with it and which could ever demand to cancel out a self-given true being.

Regardless of which difficult transcendental investigations will have to be carried out for a complete comprehension and scientific fixation of truth in correlation with its evidence and its motivational nexuses, its style and its result seem to be predelineated in advance. It seems that if the accomplishment of cognizing and the attainment of a final truth are supposed to become comprehensible, that this could only occur in this style and with such a result. But then we are in an uncomfortable situation—precisely that of transcendental solipsism. For is not all of this to say that all true being only designates an ideal polarity which forms itself in the motivations of my own transcendental life and can only be contained in it? Are not also my fellow human beings and their psychic interiorities only what they are as such unities of identity having their origin in my life and only have a meaning correlated to my intentional experiences? The other indeed lives his life, he can practice within himself the transcendental reduction just as well as I can and can find himself as absolute subjectivity and can apprehend me as *alter Ego* just as well as I apprehend him in my life. As much as I am for myself, and not only as an intentional occurrence in the other's cognitive life, the same holds, of course, *vice versa*. | VIII, 185/186

There must be truth in these statements, and hence the question arises, how we can gain transcendental clarity for them and how we can reconcile what we have just claimed with what has been said before.

The following idea will have to take on a decisive significance. The authenticating evidence in which an object is given to me and in which it authenticates itself as existing reality, can be an immediate or a mediate one. The evidence of perception is an immediate one. If this evidence, as in all external perception, is at all times mixed with anticipatory intentions, there nonetheless belongs to perception precisely this evident consciousness of an immediate self-grasping;

the perceptual object is "evidently" conscious as there in the flesh. In a continually concordant external perception we have the form of an originary confirmation, which displays what is perceived in a constant fulfillment of anticipatory intentions at all times as the identical one in the flesh from ever new sides and realizes it thereby continually in cognition, brings it to ever more perfect realization of its self in such cognition. In this case, hence, the thing itself in its true being is the idea of something identical and identifiable which would disclose and confirm itself in the further continuation of my experience as the identical one and in its selfhood in the flesh. As much as I can bring into play new experiences in my stream of consciousness, and in new nexuses of life that can be synthetically unified with earlier ones, this is how far the correlative existence of the thing reaches; it is what it is, as something identical with my experiencing realizations that can be possibly be unified to a concordance, and it has all the qualities that could ever arise in such nexuses.

Now let us now imagine that in my surroundings lived-bodies had never appeared, so that I would have no idea of alien subjectivity. Indeed, then, every objective reality, the entire world which would now be something lifeless, would be nothing but a connected plurality of intentional poles, as correlative unities for systems of my possible and actual experiences; these would be unities that would realize themselves in endlessly concordant progressions (in manifold progressions to be chosen from the respective system of experience), or would be realizable as lived-bodily givennesses. Here, "true being" | would be the idea of a possible constructability VIII, 186/187
of the respective correlative identity—the substrate of identical qualities identical with itself in the manifold of its appearances in which it displays itself—of the respective courses of my experience continually confirming itself as concordant, in possibility; and outside of the ideal systems of my possible experience, it, the thing would be—in the sense in which it *exists* for me as "actual" or "in truth"—nothing.

But if we now permit alien lived-bodies [to enter], then also other human beings exist for us. We have experience of them in the mode of empathy. This experience, too, has its manner of progression in continually concordant confirmation. In a continually

concordant empathy we are and remain in the self-confirming certainty of the immediate existence of this human being before us. Everything that his mimicry, his words indicate, what they let us expect as actions and the manner in which these actions will run their courses, all of this fits together well and forms a system of self-confirmation. But upon closer inspection, this immediacy is, after all, merely a relative one, and the confirmation is, especially with respect to the other's subjectivity, a confirmation through a merely harmonious indication, which confirms itself in its motivation in a constant change—although it is an indication that is special as an actually self-giving experience through its originary motivational rootedness, and hence an "appresenting" indication. I can only have an original experience, an actual perception, of myself and of the objectivities themselves that I perceive as well, that I also experience directly. The circle of my ideally possible *perceptions* encompasses merely *my* stream of life and of all possible modifications that I can bring into it with my own activities. It also encompasses, furthermore, all those intentional unities that I institute and can institute in my life through constitution, in the nexuses of actual and possible objective perception, in which I realize them progressively in the flesh.

But if I now gain an overview in the transcendental attitude over my entire cognitive life and of the cognition that I have of alien subjects, and consider this life in its accomplishment, then it is and remains a *cognition confirming itself*, | even if it does not confirm VIII, 187/188 itself for me in the manner that this co-indicated and co-cognized subjectivity becomes originarily experienceable for me, perceivable for me, which is something that it cannot do in principle. With the same justification, in general, with which objects exist for me, namely from a continual empirical confirmation, the alien lived-bodies exist for me as well as objects, but then the alien souls exist for me with the same justification. In a transcendental clarification, all objects belong to my life, they are unities of a possible concordant perception (as an original realization) constituted in my life. On the other hand, the alien human subject is, in a transcendental clarification, indeed a second transcendental subject; it is not an object realized or realizable originarily in my life like another thing, hence it is not merely a unity of my possible perceptions, but it is very

well something justifiably indicated through certain unities of my experience, and it is indicated as an alien I. This indication, I want to emphasize, has its natural right, the right of empirical confirmation. The insight that what stands before me as an alien lived-body, as a thing among other things, is in truth an intentional correlate of one of my perceptual systems, does not render this lived-body a fiction (as it is possible for each object), it takes nothing away from its existing reality that it has. It also takes nothing away from the intentional function that it has accrued in my life, namely to indicate alien subjectivity empirically and in confirmation.[1]

Hence, the phenomenological reduction leads to two universal structures of life founded within one another: 1) my life, and every transcendental life of any *Ego*, constituted for itself in originary experience. It is a universal stream of life in the form of an original self-consciousness, that is, of "innermost" perceiving, and what says the same, of a conscious realization of oneself for oneself. This perceiving is an attending, active self-grasping only in exceptions and in individual cases, but it is a constant perceiving in the sense of appearing to itself in the original. Here, every perceptual | VIII, 188/189 self-presence is furnished with ever new horizons, which are freely accessible through self-recollections and self-anticipations.

In this stream of life as appearing-to-oneself, systems of special living nexuses arise according to the factical course of its life and concurrently on the basis of universal eidetic laws, and, more specifically, systematic nexuses of actual and possible perception of spatiotemporal objectivities, and correlatively perceptual unities constitute themselves, these objectivities themselves, a universal world of objects as partially realized, partially realizable through continual "external" perceiving. Here we have to point to a peculiarity, namely the originary-perceptual constitution of my own existence as lived-body, as the originary-perceptual double unity "my own lived-body," as the bearer of my sensual fields, as systems of my perceptual and volitional organs, and so on.

2) Through the experience of alien lived-bodies rooted in the experience of my own lived-body, an experience which has merely

[1] Cf. Appendix 25, pp. 604 ff. — Ed.

a secondary character with respect to the psychic side, I have alien subjectivity co-experienced in the realm of my subjectivity. Here, the universal phenomenological reduction, in a descriptive community with my own life streaming in an originary perceptual self-realization, yields a second transcendental life, and in general it is just as manifold—in an open infinity—as I can experience objects constituted within myself as lived-bodies. Precisely because alien subjectivity does not belong in the realm of my own perceptual possibilities, it does not dissolve in intentional correlates of my own life and its structural order. Indeed, it gives itself with an empirical right, according to its own meaning as an entity that is in itself and for itself and can have for me only the manner of givenness of "other." Only subjectivity can be for itself in a genuine and absolute sense. Being-for-itself is appearing-to-oneself, is being as a transcendental living process of objectification, hence being with the classical title *Ego Cogito*.

If we take into consideration alien transcendental life in its community with one's own, then we achieve the | further insight that VIII, 189/190
due to this community the intentional constitution of my world of objects also joins in community with the intentional constitution that the other carries out, that is, as the constitution of one and the same world of objects. Just as I, in the realm of *my* life, bring a perception of an object that I now carry out to a synthetic unity with another perception reproduced in recollection—in the consciousness of the same thing which exists presently and which also existed in the past—I can likewise, through *empathy* into the other, bring a perception empathized by *him* and carried out by him to a synthetic unity with my own perception, knowing it is the same object perceived by both of us. And likewise *vice versa*. The same holds for *ideal* objectivities, for instance, the line of numbers or a scientific theory, which I realized in myself by constituting them, and for those objectivities that an other created and understood in his thought. All true objectivity for me is true for everyone and has its transcendental being as a constitutive cognitive unity, which is, or can be, constituted in everybody's cognitive life as intentional correlate. The only absolute being, however, is subjective being,[a] as being

[a] *Subjektsein*

originarily constituted for itself, and the entire absolute being is the being of the universe of transcendental subjects standing in actual or possible community with one another. Hence, phenomenology leads to *monadology*, anticipated by Leibniz in an ingenious *aperçu*.[1]

[1] Cf. Appendix 26, pp. 622 ff. — Ed.

SUPPLEMENTAL TEXTS

1 [Hua. VII, 208]

Kant's Copernican Turn and the Meaning of such a Copernican Turn in General*

How is cognition of objects possible from pure reason: propositions a priori, principles that are to count for things in themselves? But this question quickly reveals itself as containing the further question: How is experiential cognition of things[a] (objects[b]) possible in the manner of mathematical natural-scientific cognition?

If we acknowledge the comprehensibility of simple judgments of perception and empirical generalities gained from mere inductive generalization (empirical generalization), then this means: this is entirely comprehensible, I find here nothing remarkable that such judgments—presupposing concordance in intuitive experience—count as valid, that I can confirm them always anew and that other human beings can do so as well—natural, normal human beings.

But what about the principles of the method, according to which we gain exact natural-scientific judgments about things, thus what about the exact empirical science—not the descriptive natural science, which clings to judgments of perception; a science which is merely a preliminary stage of exact cognition on the part of exact natural science?

Judgments of perception are merely subjective. Their universality pertains to the circle of human beings who concur with me regarding our sensibility. And also regardless of others: every sensible property depends upon my respective sense organs and the normality or anomaly of their functioning.

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*February 1924.

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[a] *Gegenständen* [b] *Objekten*

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The method of exact natural science in Modernity renders us independent of this relativity and creates determinations | for the VII, 208/09
perceived objects of nature that everyone can test regardless of the contingency of sensibility. The specific sensible qualities are hereby completely eliminated from these determinations, they become only *indices*, signs for "true" qualities, which are a result of the method. *Vice versa*, he who knows these true qualities, knows how the things determined from them will *look* for him, can create a "representation" of them in the framework of his intuitive surrounding—and he can, accordingly, orient his practical activity through them.

If one now takes a look at the concepts which the method determines, then these are, on the one hand, temporal and spatial concepts, on the other hand concepts such as substrate, property, connection, totality, unity and plurality and the like, logical concepts, general concepts of judgments, which have, however, a real meaning thanks to the natural-scientific method. A stock of concepts, one could say conversely, must be accessible for everyone a priori and at all times and must have the capacity to determine things, if, that is, things are to be cognizable in objective truths.

Regressively: If there is to be a cognizable truth, a truth, which is indeed a truth, hence one single truth, valid in and of itself, which is to serve as a judgmental norm for everyone, then concepts have to exist which have a necessary relation to objects and to truths valid for them. They may not depend on the contingency in which cognitive functions function in individual subjects. An a priori has to exist—as a sphere of necessities of intersubjectivity; a conceptual system and a system of original truths has to exist, if, that is, all objects are originarily only existent for us through sensible perception, originary truths, which make possible, as principles, a method, which, in turn, makes possible a method of objective truth concerning nature[a] for our cognition: hence conditions of the possibility of intersubjectively valid predicates, to the extent that intersubjectivity is to include every possible co-experiencing and co-judging agent, who is capable of cognizing rationally.

This is obviously a formal reflection, and if we were to put it even bolder, more formally, it would have to read as follows: Let us imag-

[a] *Naturwahrheit*

ine subjects related to an infinite surrounding, which is perceivable for all of them and in a manner that they, standing in a relation of reciprocal understanding, can exchange | their perceptions and their VII, 209/10
judgments of perception, such that they can indeed know that they are related to the same things in their surroundings. That "exchange" is possible, this is not yet to say that these subjects—no matter how rational they are—could cognize a true world in the form of truths valid in themselves. It does not suffice that they have understanding, can judge and have truths of judgment, that they are logical minds (or even that they have formed a logic scientifically; that they can form a logic is implied in saying that they have understanding, that they are rational subjects). But this does not suffice for a world cognizable in principle, a world to be cognized from their perceptions. Even if a world already appears to them, this is not to say that a world exists for them and as such and that it is, thus, cognizable for them in principle. In order for that to obtain, certain conditions have to be met. I said, "even if a world already *appears* to them": in general it is conceivable that not even this is the case, in which case it then becomes questionable whether they could arrive at a true personal self-consciousness and at an actual employment of their reason or whether reason remained an empty possibility for them. That a sensibly intuitive world appears to them is itself one condition of the possibility that subjects are to be able to have a true cognition of the world. And for this *appearance* conditions a priori are themselves to be assumed (Transcendental Aesthetics).

If appearances are really to let objects appear, which they are not themselves as experiences and which exist *in themselves vis-à-vis* the former, thus if they have a being in truth, then it must be conceivable that they authenticate themselves in progressive perception, in the transition, thus, from perceptual appearances to new perceptual appearances, and at the same time, on a higher level, a manner of authentication has be to conceivable which refers to these stretches of not-being-perceived, which is demanded in terms of the in-itself, and so on. One can now ask what one can infer from this for the essential form of such a transcendent object as an object of possible "experience," that is, of possible confirmation in harmonious perception or possible perception and its derivatives, memory and anticipation. | VII, 210/211

But one can also ask what else one has presupposed, possibly what one can or must presuppose, for instance the open infinity of objects of possible experience and experiential confirmation, which has consequences for the relation of the immanent time of appearances and the objective time of objects (that the latter has to be distinguished from immanent time). Moreover, since every appearance can be repeated many times over and since the time for its individuation in coexistence does not suffice, a form in which objective coexistence (of objective concurrence) is ordered ⟨is necessary⟩, which itself has to exhibit itself in the coexistence of appearances themselves in appearance, just as objective time must exhibit itself in appearance in the immanent order of appearances. And so on. Thus, intuited and intuitable open forms for all intuitable objects must exist, ordered forms in which one can orient oneself, and they must already belong to mere possibility in phantasy (in mere phantasy-representation of possible transcendent objects), because they belong, precisely, a priori necessarily to appearances as appearances of transcendent things,[a] of "objects."[b]

Kant's arguments concerning space and time derive their power from the unexplicated presupposition that sensible appearances are not only to mean merely immanent data and complexes of sensation of these appearances, but appearances of *things*, which appear, and are supposed to appear, in the impressions "within ourselves," that is, as our experiences. In other words, we have external perceptions and these are, on the one hand, our own experiences—as that which is "internally perceivable," which appears within—on the other hand these are indeed perceptions of spatiotemporal existence external to us, and this means: Things present themselves to us in consciousness, and completely as a matter of course, things with respective spatiotemporal determinations such as spatial form, temporal form, position in space and time, sensibly qualified as thus and so, things that are in and of themselves or appear to be, which appear in experience in all manners as what they are or as what appears of their being, but which are not themselves experiences, something subjective-psychic.

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[a] *Gegenständen* [b] "*Objekten*"

This calls for reflection and one needs to ask: Which components of what appears, and as meant as belonging | to the perceived VII, 211/212
thing, are to be distinguished generally? And if we then distinguish between the specific qualities, that is, such thingly qualities which present themselves psychically in sensible data of impression, and spatiotemporal determinations, one needs to make the further distinction between unique or repeatable determinations. But here we find the distinction to be restricted to the spatiotemporal ⟨components⟩: a) the generalizable duration, form, and so on, as such, b) the individual position in space and time, the *principium individuationis*. The general spatiotemporal determination individualizes itself, and *through it* the sensible qualities.

Accordingly one needs to consider here: What accounts for the radical difference between spatiotemporal and the specifically qualitative determinations? Here the titles "space" and "time" make their appearance, not as qualities but as universal forms into which the spatiotemporal qualities insert themselves in a certain manner through individuation. Here the peculiarity comes to the fore in the Kantian arguments: if we let perception vanish somehow in phantasy, if we cross out in thought the perceptual object, then "general" space remains, of which its form covers a certain spot. Instead of the thing we have then a piece of empty individual space. And if we do so accordingly with all things, then empty space as such remains, the pure and general form of individual space-time-shapes and hence of possible things of perception and of possible things in general. Every thing carries general space along with it, of every perceptual thing one can effectuate an infinity in the process of possible intuition, every thing is "geometrically" movable, starting from every thing one can construct an infinite space, and it is the same space which can be generated from any thing, and so on.

What is the meaning of the necessary intuitability of space? It is the necessary individual form of possible things as things of possible perception that are only to be intuited spatiotemporally. If I freely vary any perceptual appearance or a possible appearance (in pure phantasy), then concerning optical, haptic (and so on) qualities, I arrive at no necessity. At best I notice here the necessity | of *some* sensible qualification. Contrary to that I arrive VII, 212/13

in general at a necessity concerning the spatial form and spatial position, namely at the necessity that only the spatial (and temporal) "quality" individualizes itself at a certain position and that this individuation has to effectuate itself in general space and time by all formations "inscribing" themselves into these forms. ⟨Furthermore I arrive at⟩ the necessary possibility of a change of position (possibility of the intuitive movement) during the possible identical conservation of the shape, [and] at the possibility of generating the forms of all possible positions, changes and shapes in intuitive construction. Here, thus, I encounter an essential lawfulness that is "intuitive" and that prescribes the rule to the possible modifications of all perceptual appearances that are to be given (perceived objects as such) and thus to all possible "appearances." (Transcendental Aesthetics: conditions of the possibility of perceivability.)

What, now, with transcendental logic in contradistinction to this? Are the respective appearing objects, factically given objects, if they satisfy the transcendental-aesthetic conditions (especially the spatiotemporal determinations), also already cognizable in exact natural science, are they determinable in their individual existence and in their individual determinations? Do the mathematical laws suffice as laws of the form of possible individuation?

Let us reflect once more upon the limits of the transcendental-aesthetic or what determines its peculiar meaning. If I imagine a perceptual scenario and view the perceived [thing] in its possibility, then I can find the general necessities of the shape and position and individuation, of the change of shape and position, the possibility of qualitative change, and so on. This means, I remain, in perceiving, with each object concerned, and this belongs to the essence of external perception, that I perceive this individual thing and its peculiarities and, while I remain with it, can always perceive something new. To be sure, when I, returning to what was perceived in it earlier, find the same feature without alteration, can I then really already say for sure that it has not changed in the meantime, | and VII, 213/14
that, while changing, it has only taken on *again* its old quality? I can only discern changes that occur in my current perception. Others I suppose, without having perceived them, without convincing myself of them in perception or being able to convince myself afterwards.

In any case, as far as perception ranges and is to range, indeed as far as possible perception is presupposed, necessities have to be fulfilled: whatever is to appear to me, has to satisfy "transcendental-aesthetic" conditions.

If I suppose *unperceived* non-change or change, this means: I have not perceived it, but in the appropriate position to it I could have perceived it, and it would then have had to satisfy aesthetic conditions. Hence I can put into action free variation within the necessary spatial form and can expose the respective essential laws as such, which are the conditions of the possibility of objects of possible experience, as possible perception.

But now the question is: If—as is necessary for objects that are to be perceivable—the aesthetic conditions are fulfilled, *which ones* must be fulfilled in order that a *thingly object*,[a] if it exists in truth, be cognizable, even if it is not perceived? Thus already what is not perceived in an object is in question.[b] An object is a temporal-spatial entity, it exists in itself, we intend what it is, at every moment of its existence in duration, and concerning every spatial position of its shape for every temporal moment. Since the cognizing agent can only cognize that things are in truth from his perceptions and memories in general, the question becomes: Which cognizable lawfulness must be fulfilled with respect to the objects, which are and were given aesthetically, such that, for the cognizing agent, a cognition of the aesthetic objects and of the world beyond the aesthetical is to be possible, and thus that for him in general, the truth of an existing world is and can be grounded?

How can we "infer"*[c] from what objects in their perceived or remembered spatial or temporal being-thus show and | have shown, VII, 214/215
to that which is not given in perception? (This is Hume's problem of the inferences from matters of fact.) Only when this inferring is possible as the determination of individual real being of some-

*This "inferring" is firstly an anticipatory being-certain, with respect to the future it is an anticipating. This, however, is the presupposition for empirically grounded predicative concepts and judgments, hence for empirical truths concerning actual realities.

[a] *Dinggegenstand* [b] *kommt in Frage*: alternative trans. "becomes a candidate [for what is cognizable]."—Trans. [c] *reale Wirklichkeiten*

thing not experienced, can one speak legitimately of a truly existing world, indeed more generally, of a (possible) world already existing possibly in truth.

Or rather: Which conditions have to be fulfilled, which cognizable properties—and cognizable as principal necessities—must things, objects of possible "intuition" as such have—thus in general and in, so to speak, formal generality—in order that objects of possible intuition are to be, at the same time, objects of possible empirical cognition (of an anticipation and evaluation which is legitimately to be carried out based on experience, of harmonious perception)? In other words—[which conditions must be fulfilled] in order for individually determining truths, authenticatable by every rational creature, to be cognizable, that is, concerning *all* determinations pertaining to the objects themselves?

This is joined by, or rather, this contains also the following problem: Because the perceivable qualities of the things are what is aesthetically contingent and are only subject to the law of necessity to be spatiotemporally "formed," one can already anticipate that it must be prescribed a priori to the sensible objects in their sensible qualities that they must stand under rules—rules of a certain form enabling individual determinations.

a) But now we find in the *factum* of the given perceptual manifold of the world given to us by this manifold the peculiarity that a lawfulness and rule-bound dependence exists for every cognizing agent, insofar as he has a *lived-body* and the appearances of all other objects depend on his lived-bodily appearances (appearing qualities), and those of the lived-body depend on "it itself."

Well understood: For the haptically tampered eye, which is "put out of commission" through the closing of the eyelids, all | visual VII, 215/16
appearances are absent; for the visually tampered, the "burnt" finger all external appearing qualities[a] are absent, and anomalous ones take their place, and so on. The lived-body is a system of organs, which function in relation to one another, and a more precise description would be needed to show how these manifolds depend mutually upon another when we move from the organs themselves to the manifold of their appearances.

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[a] *Merkmalserscheinungen*

Entangled in these functional dependencies are, however, the internal appearances pertaining to the own lived-body of the experiencing and cognizing agent, which pertain and are accessible only to him, internal appearances, which in turn hang together with the entire rest of the hustle and bustle[a] of his psychic life, which, in turn, is accessible to him alone immediately in perception. Hence we have for every experiencing agent *de facto* a special relativism, and he can only ever say how the thing is in relation to his lived-body and how the latter is in relation "to itself." In order for an object and a world to be accessible concurrently for many agents, sufficient transcendental-aesthetical conditions have to be fulfilled, but even if they are, there is no guarantee that the object identified by many is the identical one with respect to every feature of its appearance. It would be conceivable that an intersubjective communication, thus a "common external perception" could arise, but that not all perceptual propositions on the part of the different subjects coincide. It is possible that a concordant perceptual world appears for some or for each individual separately and becomes identified as the identical one by all (as must be the case to a large extent, in order for them to be in a relation of empathy at all), while no world common with respect to all features would be agreed upon. On the other hand, such a full commonality could exist for many, but not for all, namely a common one with anomalous exceptions. It would be possible that every one has *his* regularity with respect to his lived-body, or on average all could have ⟨the same⟩, but again certain exceptional persons would not, and so on.

Here we have to say, upon closer reflection: We had to distinguish earlier α) the conditions of the possibility of continually harmonious individual subjective perceptions of a thing or nexus of things and β) the conditions of the possibility of the same | continually harmonious perception as a communicative perception (and memory). VII, 216/17

We inquire here as to the *cognizable* objective determinations. What structure must solitary perceptual objects have, those of a solitarily conceived individual subject, and which structure to be experienced in perception? Further, if determinations of the perceptual object are to be communicatable, which qualities—that is,

[a] *Getriebe*

cognizable qualities—must the objects have? Here we happen upon, not structures pertaining to the intuitive object itself according to its intuitive content, but rules of the dependency upon the lived bodiliness of the respective experiencing agent. The question then becomes: How far must this dependency reach, and which rule of harmony of all of these individual dependencies is necessary ("a priori") and must be cognizable in principle in order that all intuited qualities can be identifiable despite this relativism, which is a harmony of as many relativisms as experiencing individuals; for example, as when I say, the color of an object, which I see through blue-tinted glasses, is the same as that which all others see without glasses?

Here one presupposes the *factum*, the factical type of dependencies of external appearances (external perceptions in the ontic sense) upon those of the lived-body and its organs; moreover the psychophysical dependencies. Is this a mere *factum*, or do essential necessities obtain here, in order for external appearances to be possible at all and a unity of appearances in continual external intuitive experience?

b) The new question now is the following: What further rules of appearances in their spatial coexistence and temporal order must obtain, rules, thus that prescribe how what is, and can be, realized individually with respect to intuitive qualitative content in spatial and temporal places depends on what is realized in other spatiotemporal places; what rules that, more precisely stated, must obtain a priori, or rather formations, forms of special rules, in order that the respective experiencing agent can, on the one hand, infer from what he intuits in his sphere of intuitions what is not intuited, | and VII, 217/28
not [on the other hand] merely with respect to the psychophysical (and somatic) dependencies? Would, for instance, a determination of unexperienced sides of the object of the past, or in general of unexperienced objectivities (events, etc.) of space and time, a construction of non-intuited thingly contents, which, however, could have been intuited, be conceivable without *causality*, as causality obtaining between objects? This holds for the experiencing subject for itself, and accordingly for all subjects belonging to the unity of a possible communicative nexus, for which an experiencable common surroundings is to be conceivable.

But yet something important is missing. Everybody has his psychophysical rule and his intuitive surroundings, everybody has his sensory data, his sensible-intuitive features. Can one conceive a cognizable lawfulness, according to which one could construct a priori (in advance), which impressional data, which appearances according to their sensible content I and even everyone will ever have?* A psychophysical rule is only conceivable in cognition as an inductive-empirical rule, which presupposes that I already had the genus and special species, types of sensible data, which I infer only, for instance, in an analogical amplification. Hence it is inconceivable that a lawfulness become cognizable according to which every cognizing agent could constitute the endlessly many infinities of manifolds (those of the open infinite number of real and possible subjects); not even a god could accomplish this. Thus, how can the cognition of a world, of a common surrounding, be guaranteed for an open infinity of cognizing subjects communicating with one another?

Certainly part of this is that all appearances that a subject could ever have with respect to this universe, thus for all individual objects, and that every subject are determined in advance and are even accessible. In its appearance to the experiencing agent, the thing discloses to him that it is and what it is, to be sure in relation to his lived-body and his subjectivity and to other things. Were an appearance indeterminate, the object, too, would be indeterminate.

But the constructability of the universe of appearances, which | VII, 218/19
is the equivalent of the fact that in all possible appearances of all possible subjects standing in a possible reciprocal communication one and the same true world, authenticating itself in communicative experience, presents itself, can also mean something else. Not that I would have to be able to construct all possible appearances as such, my own and those of others. Assuming the impossible ideal case that I would be able to construct all appearances (thus, to know all

*Herein lies as an a priori according to which impressional data run their course in regularity, such that appearances constitute themselves and that appearances can further sustain themselves in nexuses of harmony. Which regularities? Only the appearances themselves can exhibit them, by exposing their structure of meaning and constitution.

data of impressions), which could yield every possible variation of *my* lived-body, which enables its self-preservation; and assuming that I could then construct *all* appearances, which would yield a harmonious world for me in relation to my lived-body: then it would by no means be the case that I could construct the appearances, which all other possible cognizing subjects would have to have in relation to this world (and accessible to me): if they have indeed this same world in common with me. They could indeed have types of lived-bodies, with respective psychophysical rules and impressional data, which are in principle inaccessible to me.

But assuming that I find a method of cognition that derives from my appearances extra-sensible objective determinations, that every other person could practice this method on his senses, and further that that person would have to find the same extra-sensible objective determinations: then it could still be the case that we would have, with *these* determinations, a means to construct backwards, and based on this method, the appearances belonging to these determinations, and every one his own, and ones that are perhaps accessible to others imperfectly or not at all. It has to be possible to construct a method and a system of methodological results terminating in judgments, which, unlike the judgments pertaining to sensible experience, can truly be a common good for all rational cognizing agents, judgmental results, which—cognizable as truth necessarily valid for everyone—would determine every worldly entity individually and completely; but complete in the sense that everyone could construct, starting from his intuition, the intuitive meaning of these non-intuitive determinations in the form of a construction of the respective intuitive manifolds, of the possible perceptions. | VII, 219/220

But in the end it is not necessary to presuppose this ideal case. It suffices that every rational creature, starting from his circle of intuition, could learn all rules of experience and of the practice of method belonging to it in a progressive perfection and that the reign over a realm of concordant appearances extend itself ever further and would take on, through this extension itself, the guarantee for the possibility of further progresses and further approximations to a world in itself, to be presupposed rationally, as a substrate of possible truths. Here we still have room for a priori considerations. It is,

especially, not necessary that all subjects be rational, that all have a lived-body at their disposal which would be sufficiently capable of cognition and would supply the necessary presuppositions for objective cognition. There may be bodily and psychophysical "cripples," as long as there are at least some straight-grown "humans."

But the being of the world presupposes rational and normal subjectivity.

To be sure, this is what becomes plain from this entire reflection. And [the being of the world] presupposes not some random factical rational subjectivity, but one whose sensibility obeys a universal ruling, whose form and expression can only be conceived as expressible via the world which constitutes itself as a phenomenon of cognition.

The question on the part of the human being in the natural attitude as to the ground of the *factum* of this world becomes, in the transcendental attitude of interiority, the question as to the ground of the being of these factical subjectivities and of the constitution of the world which takes place in them, including that of all factically fulfilled conditions of the possibility of such constitution. What meaning the notion of "ground" at play here can have and what it possibly is that does not let us rest in peace with this *factum*, that is a new question referring to a higher level of transcendental research.

One question that might arise here is which form such a method, as a manner of grounding necessarily objectively valid judgments and truths, would have to have. It is clear from the outset that all concepts of an objective theory have to be purely logical ones, but ones that, gained in this method, have taken on a real meaning.— | VII, 220/21

The appearances of all subjects, which are and are to be related to one and the same object, and thusly to every object, in a possible intersubjective exchange, have to be determined in themselves. Every subject must have access to every as of yet unexperienced object, through one or many paths of intuition—and not merely in this empty generality, as if free phantasy could occupy these paths (spatiotemporal paths of somatic function) at random with aesthetical harmoniously connected intuitions; instead the possibility would have to exist to anticipate the appearances as entirely determinate ones.

Here now we can consider the function of *anticipation* with its different modalities, which necessarily interweaves itself with experience as perception and memory prior to all conceptual-judging thinking. Anticipation relates to association and obeys intuitable rules.

But these unities and anticipations of expectation unfolding themselves in a subjectivity do not suffice, for instance, anticipation based on frequent repetition. On the one hand, we are still in the realm of the individual subject, on the other hand, not even then a random association will suffice. A thing's repetition of appearances (perceptions), which are to conform to a "truly existing" object, has to be determined objectively. Random associations create, in the individual subject, only random anticipations, which perhaps fall apart again.

It has to be possible that I appropriate for myself, in the course of my experience (as a result of my anticipation), such systems of perceptions and that I expect, in my direction toward the appearing object, such features and complexes of features as occurring in perception, that I can always remain in my positing it as concordantly experienced, confirming itself in anticipation—both solipsistically as well as later in communication with others and on the basis of acknowledging their experiences.* This presupposes that the appearing | things obey, in their ontic features, fixed temporal laws, or rather VII, 221/222
temporal-spatial-qualitative laws. "Association" and "anticipation" here refer to perceptual features that are to be anticipated, accordingly, in future perception.

Anticipation can span into the intersubjective realm, as long as the communicative subjectivities have similar lived-bodies func-

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*Supplementary elucidations: Here the expansion of the concept of experience is taken into account, that is, through anticipation (expectation), and concurrently the forms of unification in their constitutive meaning; accordingly the expansion of the meaning of a concordance of experience, in which the object of experience remains posited, uninterruptedly, as empirically true.

But at the same time one has to take into account from the outset what gives a priori unity to all that is conscious in a consciousness, to the unities that are necessarily already co-conscious and at the same time conscious, the given formations of unity, manners of unification. This is the presupposition, the basis for association, which is in itself a manner of the formation of unity.

tioning in *one* normality. The regulation encompassing the sensible qualities cannot by necessity be intersubjective.*

If, however, a true world is to be cognizable for all real and still possible subjects of an extensible communication (for "everyone"), if, hence, everybody should have the right to say, not only, "I cognize a world in my experience, as a *world for me*," and not only to continue, "others also cognize a *world for themselves*, which, however, despite identification in certain determinations, is yet not the *truth in itself*"; if instead there is to exist one *single* world as individually and intersubjectively determinable, then this objective world[a] must be sufficiently individually determinable through extrasensible features, those which do not depend on the "contingent bodily constitution" on the part of the experiencing agents. These determinations may not be sensible qualities of the specific sort, but also not *koiná*, not spatial or temporal form *in the manner in which they appear to the senses*. On the other hand, the experiencing agent has immediately nothing other than appearances, partly perceptual appearances of actual momentary perception,† partly reproductions of the latter as memories, partly anticipations as sensible anticipations of future appearances, and modifications of such anticipations (such as hypothetical anticipations under sensible-intuitive circumstances). My anticipations with their thoroughly sensible content must run their course—and each in its own way for everyone—in such a way that a concordance always again reconstitutes itself in the synthesis of appearances | despite occasional VII, 222/223 disappointment of anticipations and that, the more perfect experience becomes, the more filled with content, it will always have the form: I indeed get to know objects and the entire world ever better and cross out illusion, semblance as merely subjective *vis-à-vis* rightful perception and experience. Inasmuch as I can intervene in the course of my experience and can co-determine willfully the

*Here I presuppose the relation of sensibility, of subjective appearances and their components, to subjective lived-bodies. Hence, one would have to draft a transcendental theory of the a priori, which is the basis of the somatic and the psychophysical.

†But I do not have sensibly appearing data in themselves, but forms of unity encompass them.

[a] *Dingwelt*

course of perceptions, I can also arrange this course with the intention of getting to know more precisely the objects and the world, of stepping out further into open space with the intention of learning more, and into time filled with the unknown or what has perhaps been forgotten.

On the other hand, this continual "getting to know better" of a world, which is *mine*, is not yet getting to know an intersubjective world *for all*.

There is only one thing possible here: that all sensible determinations stand in a lawful nexus with non-sensible determinations, which are necessarily common to all rational subjects as subjects of possible perception and experience.

The systems of location[a] of space and time are necessarily common [to all], they must be, as principles of individuation, titles for intersubjective cognizability in order that in general the same objectivity be cognizable as the same. By the same token, all primary qualities—duration, spatial form, relative positions in space—must be cognizable intersubjectively, despite their sensible, also lived bodily-psychophysically determined manners of givenness. In thought, which is necessary communal, real-mathematical concepts need to correspond to them, as opposed to merely sensible concepts.

Of course we all share in common the entire material of formal-logical and formal-ontological concepts, and of course [all of them] in their relation to what is perceptually given, to what is real. But here we have to consider, in complete generality, the forms of unity and forms of the unfolding of the manifolds, such as sameness, difference, identity, connection to a whole, part and part in a whole, substrate and accident, relation, and so on, which belong to any conceivable intuition (not just external intuition) and to any conceivable originally generating consciousness (as consciousness of something objective of any form whatsoever); [to these forms also belong] condition and what is conditioned, |, collective, disjunctive; VII, 223/224
in short, all that belongs, or can belong, to all possible sensible intuitions in activity and passivity and what is itself not "perception":

[a] *Stellensysteme*

through all of which, to be sure, a special concept of perception, intuition comes into relief *vis-à-vis* a broader concept.*

All that is of concern here lies prior to the rational function of conceptuality and of judgment in the form of *logos*, and on a higher level the latter also comes into play, thus instead of a "sensible sameness," this "*quasi*-quality" and the "sensible" spontaneous transition from this same item to that one, in the "sensible" spontaneous apprehension of relation—the conceptual judgment of sameness, the *logos* a = b, and thusly everywhere. There is no such thing as pure sensibility, everywhere [there is] intentionality, spontaneity. The "understanding" that conceives is not actually productive, lest it be in supplying a judgmental function that later separates itself from intuition, in analytic thought, but especially, as "reason," in the creation of the *idea*, and therein lies: [a creation] of the exact concept (of the purely logical one, which makes possible an actual logical judgment).† But these concepts related to "making possible"[a] are of little help here.

What do we learn, thus, from the Kantian Analytic?

Not the trivial aspects: if the objects of experience are to be cognizable in their truth, it has to be possible to make true judgments about them and to authenticate these judgments. These judgments have to obey general logical forms of judgments, the latter need to differentiate themselves in application to and realization of the experienced reality; the ontological concepts—such as object, quality, plurality, and so on—which are contained in the logical forms of judgment, must take on real meaning and must, in order to become forms of cognition, somehow "schematize" themselves, and so on. What, instead, marks the inner genius[b] and value of the Kantian | VII, 224/225

*a) I perceive a thing, I am directed at *it*, while I get to know, in the flux of my perceptual experiences in which it is continually perceived, ever new features, or rather, I get to know *it* in these as its determinations.
b) "A thing comes to appearance" to me and affects me, I tend toward perception in the sense of (a), I have a potential perception, which is transformed into an actual one in the effectuation of this tendency.

†But this is claiming a lot. Logical cognition, not as cognition of logic but as scientifically grounded cognition, elevates us above the sphere of sub-logical spontaneity into that of logical science.

[a] *Vermögensbegriffe* [b] *Innerlichkeit*

thinking[a] and the unheard-of novelty in history is that he is the first to pose the problem of investigating the a priori conditions of possibility for the fact that a cognizing (communicative) subjectivity can come to the rightful conviction of the existence of a real world and can cognize this world.

Here the Copernican turn consists in something quite innocuous—and yet something crucial for genuine philosophy. Humankind had, up to now, taken the given world of experience precisely as given, it had placed the cognizing agent as a human being in the midst of this world, in the manner in which he finds himself indeed as part of this given world. And given this, the only question asked was how cognition itself, as a fact of reality, came to be in the human being, also how it, in order to be legitimate, had to be realized technically, and so on. Cognition is a practical purpose in the world, just like the shoe for the shoemaker.

Technical logic and doctrine of cognition ⟨only inquired into⟩: How must cognition of the truth, of true being, be furnished purposefully? Being able to attain it and, in special cases, having attained it, is a matter of course, as in every other technical skill. The basic rules, for instance of non-contradiction, of axioms, are types of attainments or failures that are taken for granted, and in their generality they are, again, taken for granted. Thus, one *has* the world, one has objectivities pregiven, of every type, and one asks, how they are or how they can best be attained starting from what is already given in itself. One *has* them already and lives in this belief.

For Kant, the problem lies in a totally opposed and novel direction: If a world exists for me as a matter of course and if I find constantly new things of this world in my experience, and find myself as creature with a body and soul as a thing among things in this world, then this existing-for-me, and even finding-things-directly—is itself a mundane cognizing: and all processes of cognition, starting from the hustle and bustle of simple perception, memory, expectation, anticipation of open horizons, to be filled in through experience, all sorting out, connecting, relating, all the way up to achievements of scientific cognizing, [all of these] are subjective processes. They are processes of a subjective meaning, of a subjective cognizing deed,

[a] *Gedankenbildung*

which | nevertheless is considered, more often than not, deceptive, VII, 225/226
as semblance, as illusion and the like, of a subjective so-called understanding, authenticating, judging, scientific reasoning. If we here talk of objects and relations of semblance, realities, probabilities, then they are objects posited in the subject itself, posited and subjectively "understood" "truths," thus themselves belonging to subjectivity. Also the being-external-to-me of a world is a subjective finding in me, also space and time of the experienced world are in me as represented, intuited, considered, thus as such subjective. This is no devaluation, but simply the expression of an undeniable, necessary state of affairs. And this state of affairs now harbors *the problem* of understanding, in one's own immanent cognizing, which directs itself to naive cognizing and what is naively cognized as such—[the problem] of understanding what, so to speak, this looks like what cognizing subjectivity can achieve and does achieve as an authentication of truth of a world cognized within [this very subjectivity], and what are the subjective conditions of the possibility for such an authentication of truth to be possible a priori, that this subjectivity, thus, cognizes legitimately the being of the world, and precisely this world, from its own autonomy and its self-understanding.

Kant took the step toward the transcendental turn, as we know from his development, completely originally, realizing within himself the general developmental tendency of philosophy since Descartes. In truth, the problem of modernity was posed through the Cartesian discovery of the *Ego Cogito*, in truth this was already the discovery of transcendental subjectivity, only it was understood neither by himself nor by most of his successors. Kant also did not realize that already Leibniz' Monadology, in the meaning given to it by its creator, was a first attempt at a transcendental theory, and he realized even less that Hume, his great antipode in the critique of reason, had drafted in the great work of his youth a nearly pure transcendental philosophy, but in the form of an absurd sensualism. Hume's *Treatise* had remained nearly without effect in the eighteenth century and never came into Kant's field of vision.

Apart from the predecessors in the transcendental attitude, Kant's problematic is not only completely original, | but *new*. Leibniz VII, 226/227
provided a transcendental aperçu and no actual systematic theory for the clarification of transcendental subjectivity and the world

constituted in it. But Hume was, as we said, a skeptic; he sought to demonstrate on the transcendental ground of subjectivity, relying purely on itself in cognition, that an objectively valid cognition was an illusory semblance, that a true nature and world as such was an insane specter arising in subjectivity for completely irrational reasons; it was a philosophy of the as-if,[1] thus an antiphilosophy.

Kant, however, drafted a transcendental-scientific theory of the possibility in principle of the construction[a] of a true objectivity in transcendental subjectivity, or rather, of a first attempt, albeit very one-sided and limited in its problematic, of creating here the most necessary science, which makes comprehensible to us, through a clarification of the essential conditions of the cognition of the world taking place in pure subjectivity, the world itself in its actual and true meaning.

Kant's problematic is an incomplete one, and for that reason it cannot be resolved neatly. One can apply to transcendental subjectivity, what Kant said for its peculiar form of reason. Incidentally, he knew very well that completeness counts for everything here. Coming from Wolff's ontology, he is, also in transcendental philosophy, always essentially oriented ontologically. He is interested in the necessary ontological formations that an objective reality is to have if it is to be cognizable and if it is to be grounded in cognizable truths valid in themselves, in rigorous sciences. That our nature is spatiotemporal and obeys purely mathematical laws, that it is causal and that an empirical science—which, however, is guided by mathematical method—is valid for it—this is no contingent *factum*. But only when lawfulnesses of this type exist, something like a world of objects can be experienced and determined from experience. Thus, only for this reason can the cognizing agent rightfully claim to presuppose a true nature in his cognitions, because the experienced objects, in the manner in which they are experienced, have a mathematical and natural-scientific structure. Without | such an ontological VII, 227/228
form [nature] could in no way be objectively determined.

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[a] *Aufbau*

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[1] Allusion to H. Vaihinger, *Philosophie des Als-Ob* (*Philosophy of the As-If*), cf. also above, p. 149—Trans.

But of course, once something thusly cognized builds itself up in cognition as cognized, in subjective processes, as it is everywhere assumed as a matter of course in Kant's doctrine, then such a theory can only yield an actual clarification and rigorous scientific solution, when it takes into account the entire subjectivity in all its functional essential components, which thusly is active in cognition. Kant was not yet able to do so, he only made small steps in this direction in the first transcendental deduction.[1] In his further development, he never made the entire somatic-psychophysical rootedness of intuitive and thinking cognition, which he presupposes everywhere, into a transcendental theme and thereby fell back into an ambiguous anthropologism, which harbored ill-begotten metaphysical consequences and shrouded from the very beginning the notion of the a priori, of the transcendental concepts of the conditions of possibility, the notion of transcendental apperception, in unscientific obscurities. In a certain respect one has to conclude that Kant posed the problem just too primitively, because he had not yet understood the entire system of correlative, and thereby inseparably linked, problems. And it is from here whence there derives the milieu of profound obscurity spreading out over the entire system and that nobody has yet been able to bring to pure clarity.

On the other hand, it is Kant's immortal merit that he—despite being, as a child of his time, almost exclusively oriented to natural science and its causalism—immediately set out to apply the path of the transcendental problematic to all forms of possible objectivity, and this means for him, to the moral and the aesthetic world. Furthermore, he also draws the spiritual consideration of teleology of the world into the circle of his transcendental considerations. The latter was, to be sure, not completely sufficient, and he did not penetrate through to a concrete and all-sided transcendental problematic of the human life of culture, thus of the given world insofar as it is not merely nature but spiritual world. Nonetheless he opened the path in this respect for his successors, who were not constrained by natural-scientific presuppositions and who were even

[1] Husserl presumably means the Transcendental Deduction of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781.—Trans.

less | inclined towards an overvaluation of the being of nature. He VII, 228/229
is also ontologically oriented in the Critique of Practical Reason and the Power of Judgment. His transcendental ethics contains one of the greatest improvements that ethics has ever made; it is to be seen as a first breakthrough of a formal ethics, which has a similar relation to concrete ethics as formal logic to the material sciences. But of course he erred by considering this empty, albeit theoretically most valuable, *formal* ethics already ethics *itself*.

2

Descartes and Skepticism.[1] (*Ad* Lecture 9) VII, 330

I. The incomprehensibility of cognition as cognition of the world—the being of the world itself as encapsulated in the subjectivity of this cognition. Skepticism takes its foothold in this "mere" subjectivity.

II. The problem of the radical grounding of the (positive) sciences, leading back to the *Ego* which "alone is given apodictically." Science as mediate cognition—"inferential"—has to be led back, in the unity of a deduction, to the apodictic *Ego*.

III. Addition: Descartes—his originality and his aberration—the *Ego* the "pure soul," in it the "world" conceived as correlate of cognition, representation of the world in the pure soul. Absolute grounding of cognition = realistic manner of inference from the pure soul to the "external world," the extra-psychic world.

⟨I⟩

Starting point is the enigma of cognition, through which the existing world exits for me, for us, and therein again [are] we, the cognizing agents. The incomprehensibility of cognition and of the cognized world as encapsulated in the subjectivity of cognition.

a) Objectively directed opinion, cognition, good and bad one, evidently confirming or not confirming [opinion or cognition], all of this takes place within me, | the cognizing agent, and that my VII, 330/331
opining intends something objective, the existing world, this is, in itself, my opinion, my experience, my certitude taking place within me. The self-evident certainty, the self-evidence of the being with the generally known meaning "world," which lies in speaking of *the*

[1] From the 1920s—Ed.

world (which I want to cognize, cognize scientifically), is indeed also my self-evidence, my opinion underlying every question on the part of scientific cognition, which is just not explicitly made conscious to myself.

Are not all scientific propositions, propositional formations, theories, are not all wrong opinions in this sense, but also in the manner of insight, and even what is valid to me in apodictic insight—to me, the cognizing agent—my own subjective formations of cognition, opined in my opining, intuited in my intuition of this or that sense, and as such inseparable of my meaning, belonging to it—thus subjective? And does this not also hold for pre-scientific world-opining and even world-experience, which is the constant soil in the transformation of uncritical experience to scientific experience in the service of scientific accomplishments?

Is, thus, all opined objectivity, but also every entity that is for me in truth and as such confirmed something subjective, a subjective formation in its "being in itself"?—is not this confirming itself an accomplishing within me, is, thus, not objectivity entirely and in principle subjective as a certain meaning of truth? But how are we to understand this? How is objectivity to be understood as accomplished formation—how does naive and scientifically confirmed objectivity come about in my conscious life, since I—cognizing and living through cognition respectively—do not "know" of *that* what it itself is as accomplishing and in the manner in which it accomplishes? How does cognizing life itself become thematic and itself known? But is all of my being with all conscious life and accomplishment in the world objectively existing?

b) "How are we to understand"—this has yet another flavor, one which already beckons earlier—from *skepticism*.

If objectivity is "only" subjective opinion, is, then, the being-in-itself of a world not a semblance, does this not hold for every cognizing agent? How can one person know that what he opines within himself and what confirms itself, coincides with that of the other and is one and the same? World is supposed to be an objective world, a world in itself for everyone. How can I, how can any human being as such cognize *that* a world, and *the same* world, "the" world, exists for everyone? Everyone can only cognize it as his opinion. How else can I cognize fellow human beings as the ones opined

within myself? I cannot even say: "true is for every human being what appears to him," but only "true is for me what appears to me." "Everyone"—this is itself my opinion, which does not transcend me. Thus I end in solipsism, which, as it seems, Gorgias has asserted. There is nothing objective, no objective science. Only my | being VII, 331/332 and that of my opining is given, and even apodictically given, and nothing else is at all conceivable.

Hence the incomprehensibility of cognition:

1) How is cognition as immanent achievement of the cognizing agent—as an achievement, in which in himself objectivity comes about as cognitive formation, as subjectively cognized as such—to be investigated, how is the entire edifice of this achievement to be elucidated? What is a result [of this achievement] here is a result from me, in me, and yet is supposed to be objective. This leads to:

2) How can we understand that I, the cognizing agent, cognize *myself* as objective in my cognizing achievement and as a cognitive formation, and that I also cognize others and cognize them as cognizing agents, as conscious subjects in general just as myself and as agents, who communalize themselves with me in successful or erring cognizing, and so on, in short, as co-subjects standing alongside me in objectivation, indeed, [subjects] on whom I count as critics? How can we understand that all cognizing and cognition is "in" me and is also, as cognized being, being-for-myself, and yet that I am not the only I, but that other I's have to be cognized by me and have to be acknowledged as coexisting with me and co-responsible for objective being with me through the communalization of cognition?

And how are we to understand that for me and for the others that are cognizable for me (and this includes: others that are conceivable for me), co-subjects of the same world—as existing for us all, hence constituted by all of us consciously in a communalization of cognition—[that these others] have to exist, as human beings existing in the same world and cognizing, as human beings, the same world?

In historical motivation, this skeptical questioning comes first and bears within itself implicitly the motivation for the first question, namely: How do I understand cognition as achievement within me, through which I build up the world and in it other human beings in their significance and ontic validity?

⟨II⟩

Instead of the problem of cognition: the problem of the method of the radically autonomous grounding of a philosophy, which bears in itself all special sciences.

I myself have to take responsibility for objective truth and science, I the cognizing agent; ultimate truth of science must be "apodictic," has to be evident for me from apodictic foundations. Genuinely founded science is such that it does not presuppose unfounded presuppositions; a founding—if genuine knowledge is to become possible—must be carried out such that I, proceeding apodictically from my apodictic foundation, arrive at objective knowledge and the edifice of a science of the world, to which I aspire. | VII, 332/333

Everything that holds valid for me, I have myself posited as valid with its meaning, or it belongs to the horizon of my possibilities to cognize it, possibly in evidence. Everything standing under the title "objective world," is firstly given in sensibility; here I can fall into deceptions and can be forced to strike out meant being. Do I have an immediate apodictic certainty of the world, in individual cases and globally? Is it not conceivable that it, though experienced, nonetheless does not exist? All questioning, doubting, negating presupposes myself as existing—my existence is there as existing—and already implicitly presupposed—together with everything that is valid for me, and is valid as real or possible, as semblance, as meaning or countermeaning. My existence is apodictically certain.

Does this not seem to end up as a matter of course [in the following]: in the order of founding of being, this founding of my own being comes first, and it alone is immediately founded in apodictic certainty, or it alone can be founded at any point. I must now carry out all other founding of being on this absolute ground, thus that of the objective sciences, of philosophy. Does herein not lie, as "self-evident," that objective science can only be founded "mediately," through inference alone, and then comprehensively founded on the immediate ground of the I-am? Hence: I must find a path of mediate—inferential—founding; logic tells me, traditionally, mediate cognizing is inferring; hence something of the sort of what goes on in mathematics—starting from the *Ego Cogito*, as axiom, to the mediate truths?

⟨III⟩

It will be good to add the following:

Descartes' novel problem of cognition is initially not the problem how in us human beings, how in human subjectivity, which has in itself its personal consciousness, its experiencing, thinking and so on, objective cognition comes about; rather, Descartes' originality consists therein that he, in his search for the method of ultimately founding universal, and specifically objective science, tells himself: I myself am responsible for all truth and reality that is to count for me, I must not ask anybody else, I must not ask them how things stand with them. Others are themselves beings for me, from me, from my experiencing, thinking, and so on, and thus the whole world including all human beings. I have to go back to myself, to my lonesome *Ego Cogito*, and I must found within myself cognition as objective cognition, within myself, through my own reasoning.

I always already have the world pregiven in ontic certainty through "sensibility." But can I presuppose it without further ado and inquire into its true properties? Is it not a mere meaningful figment[a] of my experience? How can I understand, how can I found | VII, 333/334 its objectivity? I have to, thus, call it into question as existing objectively, while I, the inquirer, necessarily exist—no matter what the answer may be.

But not [I] as a human being, nor as a soul of my body. I do not have myself as a human being pregiven. My lived-body has itself taken on within myself objective validity or must take it on in its ontic truth. My being as conscious I, however—this "pure" soul, this *Ego* of its immanent *cogitations* with its *cogitata*—is at first not yet objective soul, soul in the world, an objective bodily being, which indeed is in question; and its being, the being of this *Ego*, is presupposed in all questioning and doubting, in all possible cognitive activities, insofar as I, no matter what I question or doubt or affirm, already have myself and find myself apodictically evident and belonging to [its bodily being] as its *Cogito*, as its conscious life. If I was at first the lonesome human being, lonesome as thinker, then I am now in a new lonesomeness, no longer human being,

[a] *Sinngebilde*

but *Ego*. With this *Ego*, "mine," of the one who reflects, and not mine among other human beings, thus in the world, transcendental subjectivity is discovered, which I can only discover as reflecting upon myself in the most radical questioning-back of validity—and not, say, another: another [I] is, to be sure, another-for-me.

Here we find the great difficulty of the relation of this *Ego* of the transcendental attitude of world-renouncement to the human I, and here is the first great temptation to later equate the pure *monas* with the soul in the world, hence the temptation to identify the transcendence of the external world *vis-à-vis* my human subjectivity with the objectivity of the world which authenticates itself in my realm of consciousness as *Ego*. Descartes succumbs to this temptation and hence to the fundamental error of viewing the conscious world, or the experienced realities, which authenticate themselves inwardly as *cogitata*, as mere *ideae*, representations of the truly objective world, of a world outside, external to the *Ego*, and hence of asking realistic questions.

Instead of the countersensical problem of realism the true problem is to clarify what this anonymous, completely unknown life of consciousness with its manifold *cogitata*, of the manifold manners of appearance, and so on, looks like and what sense here the in-itself, the "for-everyone," the other take on in their achievement of consciousness and how, on the path from primordiality to the others and from there to the world-in-itself, all confusions concerning objectivity and the in-itself resolve themselves.

3

A Difficult Point in the Critique of Descartes (ad Lecture 10)*

VII, 335

⟨I⟩

Descartes construes the exposing of pure subjectivity as that of a real substance and its epistemological independence from all nature as an epistemological independence of another type of substance (and firstly of the physical body) that is not indubitably grounded in its existence. This substance is insufficiently grounded, because its grounding in the *Ego* through evidence entails the problem of the transcendent validity of evidence, which needs to be solved first. The moment this evidence receives a provable legitimacy, nature legitimately exists for the cognizing agent, that is, as complex of substances of an altogether different type than the *Ego*. Other *Egos* then exist as well, of course, due to their experiencable connectedness with objective lived-bodies (although here the investigation lacks clarity and distinctness of cognition which is to be grounded on the experience of empathy—indeed, what is lacking is a rational psychology of similar rationality as that of rational physics).

In what does the absurdity of this position consist? In general, Descartes wants to prove the validity of this evidence. But does not every proof, as carried out in evidence, authenticating itself only by its own evidence in every step, presuppose the validity of evidence? The validity of immanent evidence cannot be called into doubt for the purpose of the proof; every doubt, which is to be uttered, every assertion of the dubitability of evidence presupposes the same type of evidence. Every question that is posed in relation to it, every reflection, which is carried out with respect to it, presupposes it. The validity of transcendent evidence can only be called into question,

* 1923.

where it is itself is secured—through immanent evidence—as fact. We can also express it as follows, saying essentially the same:

Which rational questions in general can be posed to an evidence? And in what sense? In that sense, say, which is the Cartesian one, whether an evidence or a type of evidence is at all "valid," cogent, gives a legitimacy for the belief that it really be the objectivity of whose being the cognizing agent has evidence? But how can a rational answer to this question look, how else than that I now intuit that it is real what was meant in the former evidence? I must have, hence, an evidence of this reality, hence a second evidence directed at the same objectivity, and directed at it in the same sense, I must consider such an evidence at least possible, with respect to which I could measure the "right," the adequacy of the first evidence. If I now, however, call one of them in question, why, then, should another one have a better grounding and be sheltered from a question, from a doubt? | VII, 335/336

Here one could offer the distinction between perfect and imperfect evidence and the difference between different evidences, which presumably concern one and the same objectivity, but which concern it only with respect to parts and moments of this objectivity; and in a way that they, as evidences under reservation, have entities only in a certainty which bears within itself the expectation that further evidences—but different in content—can be generated as confirmations: as in external perception. The same object can be given in many evidences, without these evidences being mere repetitions.

Here we have, thus, evidences of a different internal structure, which are necessarily related to each other, and evidences which, in themselves, speak to us, as it were, and which we can ask to what extent, with which "range," they claim to be justifications, and under which reservations. Concerning those other cases, differences of complete insight and half-clear, unclear insight, it is again the evidence in itself that we can interrogate, in which way it is to be taken, what it itself has given as evidence and how it contains this very evidence. And we can then see that an unclear evidence predelineates within itself possibilities of clarification, of transformation into clear evidences—originally unclearly confirming or justifying evidences, or to the contrary, evidences correcting them in this or

that respect—and thereby poses tasks for us, if we desire cognition in the fullest sense. Does one not at all have to consider and interrogate the experience, which we call evidence, what is implied in it, and does one not find, then, that it is the consciousness of self-having, of self-grasping of a meant objectivity, which is, as such, a norm for every other consciousness, which is not the experience of a self-seizing? Is it not absurd to call the possibility of the cogency of an evidence into doubt?

⟨II⟩

Let us consider, to advance one step, the peculiar independence of the existence of the *Ego* and its realm of *Cogito* from the existence of the world, which served, for Descartes, as the main foundation for his alleged discovery of the dualism. This is apodictically certain: I am as a transcendental I, regardless whether my experienced word really is or not. Absolutely evident is neither its being or its non-being; absolutely evident is, rather, the possibility of both (which would, of course, require a deeper elucidation). Does now, as Descartes inferred, the independence of my transcendental existence from the world imply a separation—let alone a separation of different substances? And does the relation of my transcendental *Ego* (this *Ego* that I grasp and intuit absolutely directly in transcendental reflection, and not, say, invent) to the world also imply, even as a meaningful possibility, a relation of causality? We immediately see that "separation" just as "combination" to a | whole of pieces VII, 336/337 just as much as dependence of change of separate things—that all of these are all objective notions, related to the spatial form of coexistence of what is to be separated or combined, thus notions that are frowned upon.

But if we remain in the realm of the pure *Ego*, it is clear that, as long as we continue to conceive it as experiencing the world, its relation to the world is never severed, but at all times a given. The experienced world does not have to exist—but who intuits this possibility in apodictic evidence: I myself, the transcendental *Ego*; and how does it intuit it? As possibly to be intuited in sensible experiences themselves, which then run their course exactly

such that every one of my experiential certainties becomes, instead of confirmed, rather refuted through those certainties of newer experiences. I can construe courses of experiences to myself, which do not preserve a unity of the experienced world, which abides unanimously and in invariance and which eventually destroy every belief in experience. Likewise, however, I seize the possibility of the true being of the world in the framework of my *Ego*, I only have to imagine the style of my real experience extended *in infinitum*, such that the experienced things display themselves individually as semblance-things or as seemingly existing thusly, but that on the whole a unity invariably preserves itself, which does preserve a steady identity for all different determinations concerning their being-thus.

Already Descartes happens upon the fundamental peculiarity of the *cogitatio*, which we call external perception, likewise that of external memories, phantasies and the like, [he happens upon the fact] that they are in themselves a consciousness of things, of something spatial, worldly. He touches tenderly upon the wonder of all wonders, consciousness. But miracles are enigmas that are destined to be transformed into comprehension. All research begins with wonders, and research ends with their demasking and their transformation into bright cognition. Descartes only touches it, and since he does not penetrate further in this direction, he does not glean what this really means, the absolutely evident divergence of the existence of the *Ego* from the existence of the world, which is experienced in the *Ego* and somehow cognized, then evaluated and acted upon. He does not notice that the existence of the world for me, who believes in this existence, has for me a meaning that is to be made apodictically evident, without which my talking [of the world] would be meaningless, and that this meaning becomes evident to me in the construction of the idea of a system of experience, which is harmonious *in infinitum*, as a system of freely variable courses of my experiences, and that, furthermore, therein lies delineated a steady lawful style of my experiences as my *cogitationes*.* And he

*Whether or not the idea of my existence is exhausted herein: in any case, being and the course of nature stand in a wondrous essential relation to the *Ego*, and more precisely to the course of the lived experiences that are possible for me in the

does not see that | the non-existence expresses, in terms of meaning, VII, 337/338
a correlative style of disharmony in the universe of my possible *cogitationes*. He is the arch father of psychologism which permeates the entire modern transcendental philosophy and which it could never, in principle, overcome; he is in this function already through the fateful turn from the *Ego* to the *mens*, which, in conjunction with the absurd metaphysical dualism, firstly enabled Locke's epistemology.

On the other hand, he is also the father of all genuine transcendental philosophy, insofar as from that point on the demand of relating back to cognizing subjectivity all objectivity and all science determining it in the logical forms of theory was felt as a necessity and had to be felt as such, just as much as all attempts to fulfill this science in scientifically compelling clarity and non-contradiction failed. In this regard, the Cartesian achievements are highly significant and certainly never to be lost.

⟨III⟩

Yet, regardless how badly things may stand with respect to the rigor of the Cartesian analyses, indeed already [stand badly] concerning the methodological clarity about the general level that it needs to uphold in order to attain a goal: an ingenious instinct governs the general train of thoughts, so much so, that they terminate, in fact, in a great discovery, which is at the same time the discovery of the beginning. The latter already achieves the next step of the argument, or rather, this discovery leads *us* in our consistent transformation of the Cartesian thoughts to general necessities. This step to the at first so innocuous *Ego Cogito* lies in the simple demonstration that this proven possibility of the non-being of the objective world (of the universe in the encompassing sense),

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way that every change in nature would have to necessarily condition changes for my consciousness. On the other hand, it remains the case that the non-existence of the world does not disrupt my existence and that the I-am has an evidence that is independent of [the world's] existence or non-existence. Since also the non-being of the world meant in experience, no less than its being, prescribes a law to my *Ego*, it is immediately clear that one cannot talk of causality here. How is that which does not exist to practice causality?

which I constantly experience, does not jeopardize the *factum* that I myself, who experiences it, exist. And furthermore I can say in absolute indubitability, in apodictic certainty: I am as the one who presently carries out these meditations, as presently feeling, valuing, striving, and so on, in this or that manner. I am absolutely certain of all of that, I can view it, and every time I do so, I have, to be sure, a certainty with respect to experience, but one of apodictic character. What I experience thusly cannot, while I experience it, not exist. Here I have a field of experience that, while I experience it, apodictically excludes the possibility of the non-existence of the experiencing agent. Accordingly I have here a realm of apodictically certain predications with respect to experience: and it is precisely this realm that I needed and sought for the sake of the necessary beginning. *Ego Cogito, Ego sum*.

Thus, I, who exist, have constantly two realms of existence | as potential realms of perception ready at my disposal, correlated to two types of experiences. One has the title "world," and, although it exists constantly for me, it bears contingency regarding cognition for me. Nothing in it can ever come to adequate perception, nothing objectively perceived needs to exist. The other [realm] has the title "I am," and here I have something absolute, which excludes every ontic negation in the experience of myself. VII, 338/339

But the opposition of these spheres of existence is not something like that of I and external world, and the opposition of the respective experiences is not that of internal and external experience: in that case I could have spared myself the entire train of thought and the subtleness of apodictic detailed work. *This* I—or the soul—which is the theme of psychological self-experience and of psychology, belongs to the objective world; to it belongs the entire human being with body and soul, with his personal I and his psychic experiences. But it is precisely the fundamental methodological function of the critique of experience that has just been executed, to exhibit apodictically the possibility of the non-being of the entire world—as given through objective ("sensible") experience—and the possibility of the assumption of this non-being and this on the basis of what is absolutely non-negatable on the basis of this assumption—hence under the universal hypothesis of the non-existence of the world—as something, which thus contains nothing of the world and its realities

within itself. The basic idea here is that first "sensible" experience—namely, spatio-thingly experience—is in principle "inadequate," its certainty is a priori presumptive and remains so in all progressive confirmation, *never* guaranteeing apodictically the being of what is experienced. Thus firstly, the universal physical nature is possibly-non-existing, regardless of its being experienced harmoniously. But with the possibility of the hypothesis of the non-existence of nature also the hypothesis ⟨of the non-existence⟩ of the universe of all objects becomes possible, which also derive their creditworthiness[a] from sensible ("natural") experience, objects, hence, which are also experienced in an experience, which is founded in natural experience. This, however, concerns all experiences of human beings and animals and of all of their psychic life, which is in any way sensibly mediated (through so-called empathy, through "expressions" on the part of lived-bodies). And in this manner I, thus, strike out, with the *possible* assumption of the non-existence of nature, the entire world, as it were, for myself; and if now a sphere of being nonetheless remains, then it is not a last tag-end and little piece of the world, since, indeed, no piece of the world can be separated off from it and could be made independent of the rest of the world in any meaningful way. It is also not something concretely real outside of the world, since, as can easily be seen, all internality and externality of concrete realities only make sense within the unity of the world.

Now one may object: But whether I say *Ego Cogito* or "I am," | VII, 339/340 whether I say it *simpliciter* or with the fictitious hypothesis of the non-existence of the world—is it not still *I*, am I not still this human being, who moves experientially in space, touches with his hands, looks around with his eyes, and so forth? Of course it is I; but what makes me a human being, hence a member of the world, and indeed with the meaning that I associate with the word "human being," this by no means belongs into the realm of the apodictic evidence, which determines the "*Ego*" and encapsulates it apodictically within itself: Just as, in each individual case in order to gain this my *Ego*, for instance in the seeing of a house, I need to satisfy the methodological demand of excluding the existence of the experienced world on the objective side, thus, put out of play the existence of this house,

[a] *Kredit*

and in the hypothetic case as if it were not, likewise I must practice the same method on the subjective side. I must convince myself to what extent the experience of this subjectivity has derived its content mediately or immediately from natural experiences, hence it would be co-affected through a possible non-existence of the world. What this method demands is a radically executed suspension of that natural attitude of life and theoretical attitude, in which the world is there for me; only this radicalism yields a new attitude, which we call the transcendental-phenomenological one, in which nothing of the world exists, but the *Ego* exists. This *Ego* is precisely the peculiar residuum that remains for me as apodictically necessary and as in no way negatable, as when I, with respect to every *Ego Cogito* of the natural attitude—such as: I experience this house, I judge about sun and moon, I think through a physical theory, I express my condolences to the grieving person, and so on—as when I, as I say, practice that methodological reduction with respect to every *Ego Cogito* and everywhere on the side of the *Ego*, the *Cogito* and the *cogitatum*. And then I gain, as a respective *Ego*, the *Cogito* and the *cogitatum* of the new attitude. Only the latter is not affected by the possibility of the non-existence of the world and is my absolute "phenomenological" givenness, as it were the artificially pure residuum of the method, which we from now on want to call that of the phenomenological reduction. Only through it do we attain (to designate it, too, with a novel term) the transcendental I and transcendental subjectivity as such in the sense of phenomenology—and we attain it as self-givenness in phenomenological experience.

Already Descartes was underway to the transcendental I and touched upon it with the question: What is that *Ego*, of which I am absolutely certain, what belongs to it, what does not? Certainly not my body, as sensibly experienced. Hence the current "I am" does not imply: "I, the human being, am." And we entirely agree with Descartes' words, and we would further continue, deepening this train of thought: in objective experience, in which I experience any human being, as a human being, I experience at bottom a corporeal body, a thing of nature, and in this natural experience is founded the entirely different experience | of a subjectivity, of an I and its VII, 340/341
psychic life, belonging to it, expressing itself in this corporeality as bodiliness. In this being-founded, the psychological experience

derives its sensible root from bodily experience. The soul is a soul of the lived-body, empirically bound to the latter, indicating and expressing itself in it according to rules.

Descartes, however, who, in the hastiness of his reflections, does not make the method clear to himself, a method which was newly predelineated to him with the attainment of transcendental subjectivity, seeks to transform, due to the causal interpretation of external experience, the instinctive causal inference to the transcendent into an exact one, and the blind instinctive inference into a scientifically certain one; furthermore [he seeks to show] that the true essence of transcendent nature can only disclose itself in the form of mathematical natural science and that all true being of the entire world of experience can only determine itself in the sense of a two-substance-doctrine. As is known, his path led via a theological theory of evidence. The full, absolute reality, which can be cognized by the *Ego*, wound up as God and the God-created world of bodies and souls; thereby, now, the world could also find a teleological explanation, above and beyond the exact research, achieved by the exact sciences, into its own essential qualities.

This philosophy was, as every philosophy of a similar methodological type, afflicted with the absurdity that it purported to be philosophy, universal science from absolute justification, but pursued paths, whose ideas were not derived from absolute justification, indeed which would have been found to be absurd in such a justification.

The *Ego Cogito* in its transcendental purification is the necessary beginning for every philosophizing person; but it is only the beginning—the beginning of a philosophy beginning to constitute itself—if one sees that with this title an endless field of labor is opened up for concrete research, which is not only itself absolutely justified, but to which all other sciences that are philosophical in the radical sense are related back according to the possibility of their cognition. This, now, is to be truly attested to in the continuation of our meditations,[1] it is to be seized and to be determining for the grounding of a science of transcendental subjectivity, which is to

[1] Cf. esp. part two of the lecture *First Philosophy*—Ed.

precede everything else. This science, starting purely from the I, which philosophizes and determines itself here as transcendental I in the method of the reduction described earlier, and conceives itself and relates itself purely to this one individual transcendental I, would be, to be sure, a method of most wondrous type; it would be *its* Egology, a science of *its* transcendental subjectivity and of the universe of what it encompasses in transcendental and apodictic founding.

For Descartes, this pure subjectivity does not become the field | VII, 341/342 of egological research, which would have to provide the foundation for a philosophy which were to be founded in apodictic evidence, but it is a mere "Archimedean point," upon which the world lost in methodological skepticism were to be regained as absolutely certain through secure inferences. His problem is that of ancient skepticism with respect to the existence and knowability of the objective world, which is allegedly perceived and scientifically cognized in subjectivity. Gorgias' and Protagoras' basic of idea of skepticism was the following: The world is only given to me, the cognizing human being, as experienced by me and conceived in my thought. Subjective experience, subjective representing is not what is represented. In general one says and admits that something could be represented or appear without existing. Hence, I at all times have only my subjective appearances, my representations. But how can I then ever claim that more exists than my representing and my thinking, that something represented and thought exists in itself?

For Descartes thus, this amounts to a proof that the world of natural experience and of empirical science really exist. Implicitly lay already in the skeptical argumentation the contrasting between pure subjectivity and its being-in-itself and being-for-itself and, on the other hand, of the allegedly objective world. But it was not until Descartes' method, and especially the method of the apodictically possible exclusion of the existence of the world, that the possibility was available of fixating the pure content of the *Ego*, and it now seemed to yield the firm ground for inferences. But if one looks closer, this entire intention of Descartes, the "proof," is absurd. What lies at the bottom of the arguments of ancient skepticism, as a matter of course, is the fateful mistake, spreading from Descartes to Locke and Empiricism and from there into newer philosophy, that the

Ego Cogito presents the universe of my immediate givennesses and *would comprise them*. To be sure: it designates as a fact what is alone apodictically certain, and the universe of actual and possible individual facts that I can posit with apodictic evidence. But immediate givenness is not identical to apodictic givenness, and that the thing which I perceive, does not have to exist despite my perception of it and that it is therefore not a real moment of perception itself and does not belong to the pure *Ego*, this is merely to say that external perception is inadequate and presumptive; but it is not to say that external perception is not in truth given immediately. It does not say that external perception is a mere semblance; it does say that perception is a mere inference, only not conceptually grasped, a blind, "habitual" causal inference to an "external" analogue or to a causational something as such.* | VII, 342/343

Hence it has been, since Descartes, a persistent doctrine of philosophy that the only immediate givenness for the cognizing agent are his own "ideas," that all external perceptions are actually no perceptions at all, no true self-grasping of the perceived and that only "internal" perception be perception in the genuine sense. The cognizing I is, thus, as experiencing locked away from the external world, and the absurdity of a causal indication of something unexperienced in an experience, which can only experience its own "ideas," [which are] distant effects of this unexperienced something, is to help against solipsism: an absurdity, since this indication could only mean an indication for this *Ego* encapsulated within itself, if already a respective authentication would have been known by it or could have been interpreted by analogy—if, thus, what is in principle unexperiencable would be experiencable in principle after all and would have already been experienced in analogous cases.

Since one talks about experiences speculatively instead of studying them according to their own essence in pure subjectivity, one does not see that this anticipation, intrinsically belonging to the essence of thing-perception, is directed at possible continuations of

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*With regard to the sensible "ideas," already Berkeley had denied, in his ingenious originality, the meaningful possibility of an inference to respective material substances, to transcendent objects, but without success, since he held on to the principle of causal inference to something transcendent (God as transcendent cause).

perception to ever new perceptions of the same [thing], one overlooks that the presumptivity of perceptive belief grounded therein could never give it, as belief in the existence of the thing, the character of a mediate belief and could never take from perception the character of immediate self-grasping. It is and remains self-grasping [of an object], as long as these presumptions confirm themselves, as self-grasping [of the object] with the same persistent presumption.

One does not see that being-true is the correlate of an experience which is possible as harmonious *in infinitum* and that accordingly, if the thing that is experienced is real as thus, each and every one of its external perceptions is actual self-grasping, and remains thus, and that to even consider possible another form of self-grasping of it is an absurdity.

4

⟨A Critique of the Regressive Method of⟩ Kant ⟨and Neo-Kantianism⟩. Ad Lecture 26.*

All philosophers taking their cue from Leibniz are afflicted with the absurdity of dogmatism in philosophy and theory of knowledge, thus also the Kantian critique of reason. That it avoids naturalism, psychologism, historicism in the ordinary sense—that is, in the ordinary sense of an explicit grounding of epistemology on natural science, on psychology (the empirical science of animalic psychic life as facticity in the nexus of psychophysical nature) or even on history—is only to say that it avoids one of the very widespread forms of absurdity. But it is not so certain that it, for that reason, really escapes the specific charge of psychologism. At the least one may be permitted to raise the question whence Kant derives all the knowledge as to the psychic capabilities which he presupposes from the very beginning in his critique of reason, while he at the same time does not present them as essential necessities and indeed cannot present them as such, since he only acknowledges one type of essential necessities, the analytical ones. Even if they should be derived from pure consciousness, the great claim to rigorous science could not be made so long as the meaning and the legitimacy of such assertions, and in general all assertions in the immanent sphere, had not been subjected to a scientific investigation. A transcendental epistemology can only be carried out in the framework of a universal epistemology, and the latter only as a science of pure consciousness. But regardless: everywhere in Kant's critique of reason lies, at its foundation, a dogmatic objectivism that operates with transcendent metaphysical suppositions.

When Kant presupposes the plurality of subjects and attributes general properties to them, these presupposed cognitions stem obvi-

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* 1924.

ously from a re-translation of the empirical worldview onto Leibniz' monadological philosophy. There is, as is known, a lot of talk of "us human beings," and one does not notice—if to the epistemologically researching I a plurality of other I-subjects is only given in the naturalized form of human beings, through a translation of bodiliness, as is the case with all external nature, into transcendental appearances—that at first only the *Ego* of precisely this researcher [considering this] becomes apparent and that the transcendental | VII, 369/370
possibility of positing the other I has first of all to be considered scientifically. All regressive "transcendental" methodology in the specific sense of the term*—much-used by Kant and preferred in Neo-Kantianism—operates with presuppositions, which are never systematically sought for, never scientifically ascertained, and, especially, not ascertained on the purely transcendental ground. Never does one make this ground itself into a theme for research, never does one consider that no scientific investigation can come off the ground without considering a ground, a sphere of originally intuitive givennesses prior to all conceptual thought [considered] in the attitude of a theoretical interest, without preparing it for scientific purposes and developing a rigorous method that this ground demands from itself by necessity. All regressive methods obviously hang suspended in mid-air, as long as such a ground is not given and prepared and as long as progressive methods of cognition have not been attained, of which the regressive method is need of as positive presuppositions.

One may not dare to object to us here that the ground and point of departure of this method is the fact[1] of mathematics, physics, of the objective sciences in general, as to whose possibilities and conditions of possibility one inquires, and that this fact is indeed fixed.

*The regressive method ⟨takes its point of departure⟩ from the *factum* of objective science and correlatively from the idea of an objectivity (one which exists "in itself" *vis-à-vis* everyone's cognition), which determines itself (as an endless task) as identical in progressive approximation for each cognizing agent.

[1] In the following passages, Husserl alternates between *Tatsache* (fact) and *Faktum* (*factum*), the latter of which was a central term of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Hermann Cohen famously maintained that the regressive transcendental method needs to start out with the "*factum* of the sciences" (*das Faktum der Wissenschaften*). In the translation, "*Faktum*" is rendered as *factum*, "*Tatsache*" as fact.—Trans.

For precisely this "fact" has become thoroughly questionable once epistemological reflections begin, because it has become incomprehensible through and through. Objective science, as a system of objectively valid theories (of "truths in themselves"), its theme, the world with its worldly forms space and time (according to Kant the themes of mathematics), both are *given* for the cognizing agent as constituted intentional units *in consciousness*, both are, each in its way, transcendent in the sphere of immanence: both are facts *simpliciter*, as long as their being (being as being-in-itself of reality and being as validity-in-itself of truth) remains unquestioned, as "self-evident" facts in their immanently enacted evidence. In other words, as long as we live in the naive-natural attitude and think scientifically, we have given as a matter of course the world as a unity of concordant experience (as "indeterminate object of empirical intuition"), just as, furthermore, we have given the fact of science as historical *factum* of culture—from historical experience—and the fact of its existence as the theoretical unity of truth in intuitive theoretical thought. Once now, instead of the naively enacted cognition (as experiential intuition and conceptual thought) with transcendent content, the reflective cognition with its directedness at the *Ego Cogito* sets in, | then that first cognition, which, as naively VII, 370/371
enacted, was cognition of its objects but not itself the object of a cognition, becomes the cognitive theme of an immanent experience and an immanently directed thinking. While now, however, its objective existence and its being-thus are "absolutely indubitable" as experience, the possibility and the meaning of its transcending, the claim to justification of "evidence," in which the "confirmation," the "verification" of the meant being-"in-itself" of transcendent objects is to be grasped, become questionable.

It is clear, accordingly, that the presupposition of the fact of science (as that of the fact of the experienced world implied within it itself) has an entirely different meaning than the presupposition of a fact that is presupposed in the realm of the natural attitude and any natural science (that is, science yet untouched by any epistemological investigation), and which is then accompanied by the consideration to what extent it be possible; so, for instance, in the case of the presupposition of a fact of nature given through experience, where the consideration as to the conditions of possibility

apparently has the meaning of a regressive consideration of a priori and empirical necessities, through which it could be explained under the given circumstances. Also purely mathematical considerations could be included here, which aim at viewing evidently given truths and theories with the intention of seeing whether they may stand, if certain axioms would or would not hold valid in a changed content, or if, thus, the validity of *certain* axioms can count as the "conditions of the possibility" of the respective truths and systems of truth. But in these cases the ground for all considerations, prior to its theoretical investigation, is the region pregiven to the respective sciences. The presupposed facts are themselves given through experience and thought and as belonging to this ground, and the conditions of possibility considered here concern nexuses of necessity between what is given determinately and what is co-implied in the general givenness of the region encompassing indeterminate-infinite horizons.

An entirely different sense is that of the transcendental-regressive question. Of course: the world and science are given, evidently given in the manner in which indeterminate infinite universes are given. It is not the task now to take hold in their ground and to continually practice knowledge and scientific cognition; it is not the task of bringing into the right relationship, in cognition, one part of the world with another, one truth belonging to one part with another truth [belonging to another]. The world and science of the world as a whole, as a universe of present and future objective science as a whole, has nothing external to itself in the natural attitude that could be related to it. Things stand entirely differently when we switch over into the epistemological attitude and when the givenness of the world and of all objective sciences become a problem within ourselves. Now the world | and science are, for the epistemological researcher, not a fact *simpliciter*, it is not reality existing *simpliciter*, which he wants to further cognize, scientific truth is not truth valid *simpliciter*, which he wants to "discover" in figures of thought, develop in theories, make explicit according to their necessary nexuses; instead [the world] is posited in cognizing subjectivity as "meant and intuited fact" in its immanent experiencing and theoretical accomplishing, more precisely in activities creating ever new meaning, in [subjectivity's] exhibiting "evident" confirmations and reasonings. This being-a-fact as an immanent achievement in imma- VII, 371/372

nence, which immediately is transformed into the fact *simpliciter*, the moment we fall back into the natural attitude, is precisely the problem: The "fact" constitutes itself in pure consciousness—and no matter how one may oppose Kant's doctrine, according to which the "understanding" prescribes to nature its laws: the fact that the epistemologically understood existence of the objective world and the existence of the validity of objective science constitutes itself in the framework of pure consciousness in manifold manners of experience of specific types and order, in motivational nexuses, which render "facts" as unities of intentional achievements possible and real—[all of] this is, once pure consciousness has been firmly grasped, at bottom self-evident.

Accordingly, not the fact *simpliciter* but the "fact" in quotation marks, precisely the one immanently "meant," experienced, thought, proven, theoretically cognized fact "as such," is the starting point of the regressive interrogation; and it is now evident that the "universe" in quotation marks here is not more than an intentional unit, which, as such, is nothing for itself, in no way a being-in-itself or -for-itself and something closed off. Instead, it is what it is at once with the universe of pure consciousness and of the pure I of this consciousness; and this "at once" is not to say that it is a member of a real nexus, or a piece of the same ⟨*scil*. of the universe of consciousness⟩, but that it is something meant owing to the essence of this consciousness. Thus we have now, in truth, a different universe as the only one that now is valid as absolutely given. All regressive interrogation has its intuitive and theoretical ground in this givenness.

Only the following can be meant, hence: How is the *factum* of the givenness of the world and of science to be understood as fact? More precisely: How does this "it is fact for me," "the world is given for me," and given as "objectively" existing in space and time, "there exists for me in my cognition this theoretical system of truths, this objective science," which asserts precisely what this world is—how does all of this look concerning experiencing, relating, connecting, conceptual cognitions, in which it consists immanently, and how is one to understand through them that | in the universe of consciousness the objective universe and the universe of determining truth belonging to it constitute themselves? If I then already understand VII, 372/373

that this constitution is no absolute necessity of thought, that sense-giving, positing, concordant persistence of an intentional objective universe means, for the stream of consciousness, a teleology as it were, which distinguishes a system of ordered possibilities from a universe of other possibilities, I can then ask: Assuming that for me, that for a consciousness in general, such a fact as that of an objective world existing for [such a consciousness] is supposed to be constituted, which "conditions of possibility" are to be explicated for this, which ["conditions of possibility"] for merely intuitive experience and which ones for scientific cognition, which determines what is given in sensible intuition as objective, and yet in all kinds of relativities, in logically formed truths, which are valid "in themselves": in which relativities this objective givenness may have to appear, in which sensible manners of appearance it may happen to appear? Without delving further into the problematic, which would become quite complicated for a presentation with more precise distinctions, this much is evident, that all [of the above], and all means for cognition, which would be acceptable for a meaningful solution, must lie in the framework of givenness for pure consciousness and that every theory dealing with these problems is absurd if it (precisely by not having made entirely clear to itself the meaning of such problems) utilizes something other than what is to be exhibited in the pure consciousness of the cognizing *Ego*, and makes use of other methods than those that are predelineated through the essential content of this I and this consciousness.

If we, however, approach Kant's critique of reason from these normative criteria, then this critique by no means meets them—essential conditions of its meaningful possibility, thus also of its scientificity. Kant's transcendental research, may it proceed regressively, as a transcendental method in that specific meaning of transcendental, or in any other manner, operates with a stock of convictions, which have never been established on the absolute ground of the *Ego Cogito*, which have never really been formed transcendentally and grounded scientifically.

In a transcendental philosophy, each and everything is transcendental; nothing is and nothing may be what does not have one and the same methodological character through the pure and exclusive attitude towards the pure I and I-consciousness, and this character

determines the necessary and most general meaning of the transcendental, to which the so-called (in the ordinary sense) epistemological problems and their possible solutions subordinate themselves. Kant was never seized by the great gravity of the Cartesian meditations and was never thereby forced to bring to an ultimate purity and clarity the necessary meaning of a transcendental-epistemological problematic. Therefore he also never carried out a radical reflection upon the ground on which the epistemological reflecting agent necessarily places himself | with these questions and how and with VII, 373/374 which method this ground, from which all motives for a solution [to this problematic] have to be taken, is to be taken up as a theme for scientific labor, let alone that he ever would have truly carried out a piece of radical immanent research. Constantly he builds theories on the basis of doctrines concerning sensibility and understanding (as two branches of human cognition, which spring, perhaps, from one common root, which, however, is unknown to us) and concerning all other capacities, concerning different experiences belonging to them, acts, genetic processes (such as reproduction and association), laws valid for the latter, whose cognitive source and whose transcendentally justified meaning have never been ascertained—doctrines, which cannot have been derived from psychology as "natural science," which itself is subject to the transcendental questions; [doctrines], which are never to be justified by a hasty monadological interpretation of psychological doctrines (that is, via a monadological reduction of every animalic creature to its psychic interiority). Never does he consider transcendentally, as already mentioned, the plurality of monads, which is obviously utilized constantly (which Kant alone can mean, where he speaks of "us human beings," since the lived-bodies—according to the genuine monadological, only systematically further developed interpretation of physical nature—⟨can only consist⟩ of manifolds of appearances "in us," in the monadological interiorities).

This suffices for a general critique, it suffices for the realization that Kant's critique of cognition, in the manner in which it posits its problems and methods, contradicts the meaning that is (so to speak) inborn to the theory of cognition, that it thereby belongs affirmatively to the *pre*-forms of scientific epistemology, while itself not being a science, and the latter not in the least degree, which already

could "hold valid as science," as much as the meager beginnings of Archimedean and Galilean mechanics were already a beginning and basic stock of true science. And accordingly, all demands that have been put by such a critique of cognition to a *metaphysics*, "that is to come forth as science,"[1] are illegitimate, as lacking scientific grounding; indeed, as norms thusly derived they contradict the genuine meaning of a science of reason as much as that of a metaphysics and of a philosophy as such. A philosophy, if it has a specific meaning at all, is not only science in general, but science of complete "clarity and distinctness," of ultimate justification, which tolerates in no way and in no direction hidden abysses, overlooked problem-dimensions, intermingling of correlative directions of cognition. [Philosophy] is precisely meant to represent the idea of complete cognition, the ultimate *telos* lying in the essence of cognition and it is meant to regulate all becoming cognition following this idea. Philosophy in this old Platonic meaning is either nothing or it exists as the intention towards the most rigorous science in the most radical and ultimate sense. | VII, 374/375

No natural science is philosophy, thus ultimate science; each becomes philosophy, if it is elevated to the level of "ultimate" science. It belongs to the essence of philosophy, unlike the natural sciences, not being able to begin by simply taking and ascertaining a naturally pregiven sphere of cognition as field of research and to proceed from ascertainment to ascertainment and only reflects insofar as it retraces in every step the justification of this step and the method of grounding and of proceeding. Natural science in the natural attitude and in the framework of natural attitudes does all this, striving after the cognitive goal of intuitive truth.

It belongs to the essence of philosophy that it does not begin naively but begins with a reflection upon a radical beginning, that of a radical science, an ultimately grounded one *per se*, or a presuppositionless one, and it itself then begins by giving itself the necessary beginning as a necessary one. Philosophy can only come to life with a reflection and a beginning, whose type has been classi-

[1] Husserl here alludes to the title of Kant's *Prolegomena zu einer zukünftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (*Prolegomena to a Future Metaphysics that is to Come Forth as Science*).—Trans.

cally predelineated by Descartes. His philosophy is ephemeral and only lives on as a memory of the historical power for the culture of beginning Modernity. But truly immortal will remain its discovery of the true beginning and its ethos, which it has set for itself as result of its reflection upon the goal of an absolutely grounded philosophy itself.

It is precisely this ethos which demands, as a genuinely philosophical ethos, that a new philosophy cannot ground itself upon older ones but instead, insofar as it cannot accept all previous philosophies as genuine ones, it must begin anew with the will to establish the ground for its work in the radicalism of ultimate grounding and to not make a single step which does not correspond to this ethos, not a single step which has not become the beginning for a philosophical development, for that which, according to absolute method and absolutely grounded method, has not been grounded consistently. This radicalism has not been bequeathed by Descartes to his predecessors, Kant also did not practice it, and because he did not enact it, he has not created an abiding philosophy, indeed no pure and genuine philosophy whatsoever. This critique would miss the point had he, as ethical personality with a vocation, set for himself the goal, as a called-upon representative of his time for this time itself, to form for himself a universal worldview, a world-wisdom, which would have been able to give him the right stance *vis-à-vis* God, the world, his fellow human beings and had it been able to guide him in a practical-ethical manner; then no objections could be made against him. But Kant desired philosophy as rigorous science, he believed himself to be a representative of this completely different philosophy, which grounds all theoretical position-taking and, in further consequence, its axiological and practical position-taking in absolute truth. He was directed—just as we, who want to keep alive and honor the spirit of the Platonic tradition—not towards an extra-scientific wisdom but at science. | And it was precisely in VII, 375/376
this respect that he failed. This is also shown in that he aimed one-sidedly at a transcendental discussion of objective cognition, of world-cognition, and did not see that every epistemology has to be universal in a higher sense, that it must encompass every cognition which is again also immanent, that it, hence, must be related back upon itself.

Hence, this [critique] goes even further than the reproach that Dilthey has rightfully brought forth against him, that his critique of reason does not attempt a critique of *historical* reason, no critique of cognition whatsoever in the human sciences and has not even seen it in its necessity. In the meaning of philosophy lies not only a universality in the transcendental investigation of all possible transcendental problems of cognition, that is, according to all possible transcendent scientific problems, but a radicalism, which, in going back from such cognition to a cognizing of this cognition in the sphere of immanence, goes back even one further step and must make this cognizing itself a theme, this cognizing-as-epistemologist, and thus must make, in general, the cognizing of pure consciousness and of the conscious I into a theme. An absolute science of pure consciousness, which encapsulates in itself thematically all iterations, in which consciousness elevates itself in reflection to a consciousness of a higher level and hence generates a reflective intentionality, enacts itself in cognitions; cognitions, which itself are of the type of consciousness of the higher level, and this, too, belongs to the encompassing problem of cognition. Just as the type of iteration, in which mathematical operations and concept-formations can effect themselves *in infinitum*, does not limit mathematical cognition, but instead implies insights which reach beyond all iteration and its infinity; in the same manner must it be possible to control the iterations of consciousness and gain insights which govern the principles of all immanent cognition and its possible reflective levels. Epistemology is necessarily related back upon itself, and the seeming circularity of this being-related-back must come to a resolution through insights into laws, from whence it becomes entirely comprehensible, from whence arises precisely the insight, that all iterations in consciousness obey them.

In [Kant's] aftermath, attempts to move these problems forward in the direction of a radical philosophy are not lacking, especially attempts at a critical transformation of the Kantian philosophy and in the direction of its radicalization. Maimon, Reinhold and Fichte, as is known, are to be mentioned here; but what is also known is their hastiness and their reverting back to immanent mythologies or violent constructions of immanent teleologies, from which no positive gain could be made.

An immanent philosophy must be absolutely "clear and distinct," it must be absolutely transparent, and rely on absolute givennesses in all steps. Everything that is utilized [for such a philosophy] must be demonstrated, must be made visible as absolutely given.

5

Meditation on the Idea of an Individual Life and a Communal Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility [1]

VIII, 193

If we take cognizing in its fullest extension, in which it includes reason and unreason, what is non-intuited and intuited and so on, it encompasses the entire sphere of judgment, the predicative as well as the pre-predicative, any type of I-acts of believing that something be thus and so, and all modalities of belief. Despite the manifold of the special cases of cognizing or judging in the broadest sense, there are still plenty of other genuses of I-acts left, thus, any form of loving and hating, pleasure or displeasure, wishing, desiring, willing. On the other hand, all these I-functions do not lie alongside each other, but interpenetrate one another. Through each cognizing judging goes a tendency of striving and willing, yes even a valuing, insofar as the one who is practically directed at truth takes truth in a positively valuing manner and therefore as telos of his will. On the other hand I

[1] 1924. As the editor remarks, this text was written in close connection with lecture thirty (above, pp. 221–230). The beginning of the present text, until p. 441, l. 4, which partly overlaps with the lecture (cf. above, p. 227, l. 1–p. 229, l. 16), seems to have been a summary of Landgrebe's in his typescript and replaces the following text in Husserl's original manuscript—Trans.: "The introductory remark, which I had completed recently, would have required an expansion. If my remark connected philosophy as a universal science to all types of reason, thus also to all norms of a possible active life, then the idea is at hand that the idea of philosophy as science—absolute and universal science—is the function of a philosophy in the broader sense: that of a human life which absolutely justifies itself; it would be necessary, accordingly, to sketch this idea and to unfold it and to show that the all-sided scientific unfolding of this idea as a practical purposive idea necessarily belongs to the possibility of a community that is rational in the highest sense and that philosophy, in the fullest consequence of the scientific unfolding of this idea, lies in the traditional sense of absolute universal science itself. Philosophy as science is not one of humanity's theoretical dalliances [*Liebhaberei*], but a necessary element and a means of its path towards freedom of reason. This path must, however—if a true rational humanity is to be possible—have the shape of a becoming that determines itself freely and as such precisely that of a science from absolute freedom."

can, for instance, pass over from an act of purely valuing pleasedness into a judging attitude, in which I predicate what is "pleasing" in the object, a predicate which is pre-predicative and which has its origin in the heart[a] prior to being grasped in an experience; likewise other predicates, such as those | of good and evil, of the beneficial and VIII, 193/194 the purposive or harmful, have their origin in the willing connected to the valuing heart. Things are the same when we look around the different realms of culture; culture encompasses formations of praxis, which are, as such, apprehended in comprehension through a empathic understanding[b] of the respective acts of the heart and the will. And what has been grasped thusly can become the object of an experiential grasping and predicative determination and even of a scientific problematic.

In this manner, the universality comes clearly to the fore, by means of which the realm of cognition encompasses all types of achievements stemming from the subjectivity of the heart and the will, and to be sure, correlatively, a similar encompassment through which the valuing heart and the will in striving and acting reach across the entire subjectivity and all of its intentional functions. This means for science, however, that in it, as the objectivation of cognizing reason, also all valuing and practical reason mirrors itself and also objectivates itself; or that in the cognitive formations of theoretical truth all other truth, hence every truth with respect to values and praxis, expresses itself in predicative forms, determines itself and also takes on cognitive forms of reasoning. It is the heart that values purely within itself, and it is the active will that forms, purely within itself or as itself, the beautiful work. The truth, the unity of the value and then of the work express[1] themselves originally naively again in the heart, in pure satisfaction. But ultimately the genuineness of this truth of valuing *takes responsibility* in cognizing, which predicates in the judging attitude and its logical forms concerning value and non-value and which relates the contingently experienced value-intuition comprehensively back to generally intuited value norms and gains thereby a higher responsibility, as responsibility of cogni-

[a] *Gemüt* [b] *Nachverstehen*.

[1] Reading *bekunden* instead of *bekundet*—Trans.

tion. The highest and ultimate responsibility, however, arises in the cognition in the transcendental attitude concerning the ultimately constitutive achievements of the heart and the will.

Thus, we may also call this transcendental philosophy, at which we aim, *a theory of cognition* |. But what it sets as its task is nothing VIII, 194/195
less than a limited doctrine which sketches "formal"-general clarifications of the possibility of the complete and legitimate meaning of all cognition as such (and especially of all scientific cognition). To be sure, such a *formal epistemology* belongs to the intention of a transcendental philosophy as well, as it becomes an inner necessity stemming from our historical setting and our "absolute situation." But above and beyond that it wants to be a universal theory, which bears within itself as universal science all cognition as such, and which not only encompasses them in the way of the something, the empty form, which is a part of all pure general concepts and which encompasses in logical-mathematical generality the infinities of individualities remaining indeterminate. A universal philosophy will, thus, be *both* a theory of all theories as theories *in forma*, of all sciences as sciences, of all cognitions as cognitions (of all truths as truths)—in short, an *absolute formal theory of cognition and of science*; *as well as* a universal theory, which develops all special theories in themselves substantially and systematically, precisely as a *universal (total) and absolute science itself*. But the latter presupposes and includes *eo ipso* the former; it includes it because even a formal theory of possible theory is itself a theory.

But in this process, the idea of *responsibility* for this universal science takes on a heightened meaning. For if all other theories, [theories] of which individual disciplines whatsoever, receive their ultimate and complete justification in [this universal science], then it is itself not in the happy position, as they, to have above it yet another instance to which it could address itself for this purpose; but as the theory of all theories it is referred and related back to itself; everything it establishes must afterwards find its justification from out of itself, and thus it finds itself indeed in a *circle*, but an unavoidable one and lying in the nature of its matter—a circle, according to which | it has responsibility not only for all other disciplines but VIII, 195/196
above all *self-responsibility* in the most radical and absolute sense.

Such a universal philosophy, however, is not a product of labor on the part of an individual philosopher lying in the finite, unless we attributed to him omniscience as a possible subjective goal of his development, [omniscience] whose correlate would indeed be philosophy in completion. In like manner, philosophy is not a product of a community of philosophizing individuals lying in the finite, as it can also, as a community, never achieve omniscience, since it is clear that science, as a communal product and communal possession, is at the same time a communal possession in *that* sense—and this holds for every conceivable developmental form in time—that every single scientist must be able to realize in himself the total acquisition of science as intuitable total truth.

Hence, *omniscience* is a goal *lying in infinity*, and we accordingly have to distinguish two things: on the one hand the absolute idea of a philosopher or a community of philosophers as omniscient, and correlatively the *absolute idea of philosophy*, a universal unity of all knowledge, as the *telos*, as the absolute purposive idea guiding every philosopher and every community of philosophers, as an absolute, universal idea, at which all realizations are directed in their striving; on the other hand, in accordance with this, the *idea of a progressus*, that is, in its manner of an *absolute* progressus, of the absolute and pure progressus, or rather, once again, a correlation of progressuses: on the one hand, that of an ascending development in the ever more perfect, ever further-reaching realization of an absolute and universal science, and on the other hand that of the parallel development of the philosophical subjectivity, which develops, in a consistent ascent, to an absolutely knowing subjectivity, to a truly philosophical one in ever further expansion and in ever greater perfection.

On the side of the theoretical processes and contents we have, thus, the progressus of philosophical culture or philosophical science, not, however, as an historical *factum*, but as a "genuine philosophy," which develops as an ideal philosophy *in infinitum* towards the absolute | purposive idea of a total science and total truth, VIII, 196/197 directed at this absolute *telos*. It is the becoming universal science, constantly standing under the idea of absolute justification and universal truth from such justification, consciously guided by this idea and concurrently by the will to assign absolute perfection to the

respective formation in the process of becoming at every step and in every phase, in which it realizes or strives to realize this absolute perfection of that very step, of that phase and of that becoming.

If we now recall what was said at the outset about that universality with which philosophy encompasses all types of achievements on the part of subjectivity, then it is clear that this idea of absolute self-responsibility—a responsibility for full and absolute truth—to which the philosophizing subject is beholden, must have a deeper meaning. If we consider that every type of human acting, willing and feeling can become a scientific object, of sciences, which thematize them theoretically, and if we further consider that every theoretical cognition can then take on a normative turn, according to which it becomes a rule for a possible praxis and so on, then we understand that philosophy—as universal science called upon to provide the primal fount from which all sciences derive their ultimate justification—we understand that such a philosophy cannot be a theoretical dalliance of humankind, that, rather, a philosophical life must be conceived as a life in general from absolute self-responsibility: the individual personal subject, as a subject of personal life, truly wills to decide freely in all of its life, in all of its praxis, in a manner, that is, that it can all times take responsibility for the rightfulness of its decision before itself.

But we are led even further. The individual subject is a member of a community; and accordingly we have to distinguish between the self-responsibility of the individual and self-responsibility of the community. The community, however, can only take responsibility for itself in the individual personal subject. The self-responsibility of the individual, who knows himself to be a member and functionary of the community, encompasses also the responsibility for this type | of practical life and thus includes a responsibility for the VIII, 197/198
community itself. I can take over or reject a social function and I can fulfill it in different manners, I am responsible for this. On the other hand, just as the community is not a mere collection of individuals existing externally to and alongside one another, but a synthesis of the individuals through interpersonal intentionality, [which is] a unity instituted through the social living-and-effecting-for-and-in-one-another; accordingly, self-responsibility, the will to self-responsibility, rational reflection on the meaning and the possi-

ble paths of such self-responsibility for a community is not a mere sum of the self-responsibilities taking place in the individual persons and so on, but again a synthesis, which precisely intertwines the individual self-responsibilities and establishes an inner unity between them. What arises then is a horizon for possible personal effects and reciprocal effects, for the institution or preservation of real or possible social networks, of effective networks, through which the personalities of a higher order can arise. My self-responsibility extends to all others (and possibly into their self-responsibilities), with which I work together, or which I effect or wish to effect, and *vice versa*. Everybody is co-responsible for everybody else and for everybody's decisions and actions, albeit in different measure: to the extent that I could ever effect him, now or earlier, him or, in the social plural, a plurality or totality, to this extent I can and must take responsibility. On the other hand, in this real and possible nexus it belongs to my self-responsibility that I make the other responsible, that I possibly turn against him and against the violations that he commits against the demand of his self-responsibility or possible self-responsibility. And once I have seen the necessity within myself to enact self-responsibility and to choose for myself a life of universal and absolute self-responsibility and to sketch the normative idea for it, then I can and will see what would be the best for me and for everyone and that the demand of such a philosophical life stemming from myself to everyone and from everyone | to myself is VIII, 198/199 to be posed; also, that I must attempt to enlist everybody for this idea and make everybody take responsibility for it, that he decide for such a life and live accordingly.

The question as to how—ideally—a plurality and possibly a totality of persons, which stand in a possible relation of communication or are already connected via personal relations to communities, can lead such a life for which they can absolutely take responsibility, leads to the question whether such a communalized life is conceivable without a community of wills directed at such a life from absolute responsibility; moreover, whether such a life is possible without conceiving its idea scientifically and cognitively, and thereby a normative science of it (an ethics); further [this leads to] the question as to the possibilities and necessities of the origin of this idea and such a science, the origin in the individual persons and

of the development towards a purposive idea of the community itself as community. One would have to investigate the necessary developmental stages towards this idea, at first that of the pre-rational life of the individual and of the communities that form pre-rationally, and the first pre-scientific motives that bring into view this idea: the development of exemplars, exemplary individual acts and personalities, which then find imitation and later true following. By apprehending their doing through cognition, something general becomes visible in them; at first individual norms arise—as generalities of ought—normative rules and ultimately laws. They become established as general knowledge and at the same time as laws of willing (generalities of willing, taken up into the willing itself as general will[1]). Then later knowledge departs from the historically given *factum*, no longer limited to raising this *factum* to the level of the general, and seeks to carry out its task in free activity. The will to knowledge strives to grasp pure possibilities and to understand the pure law that governs them. To carry this out systematically and universally is the task of a formal and universal doctrine of norms, of a formal "ethics." It deals with the idea of personal pluralities as such, | standing in possible reciprocal understanding, every ⟨individual person⟩ related, as person, to its surroundings and all together to the same world, with the basic functions of personality, the basic forms of personal activity and personal achievements. Starting from the formal generalities in the highest sense, it arrives at the specialties that are included therein, that is, included as formal-constructive ones. It proceeds from the possible worlds as such to the possible essential forms of communities, of communal formations, cultural systems, and then further to the possible sciences, arts, political formations, and so on. It distinguishes the rational forms of "genuine" sciences, arts, and so on [from its non-genuine forms]. VIII, 199/200

The highest axiological form of a community, or that to be cognized as having the highest value in absolute rational cognition, would be a community which bore in itself this rational cognition itself, a community which would carry out this absolute valuing in itself, thus, which would be conscious of its absolute value and

[1] Reading *allgemeinen* instead of *allgemeine*—Trans.

which would be absolutely valuable, stemming from the will to be of absolute worth. This is an idea. But if it belongs to the idea of an absolutely valuable community that it cannot be realized a priori as *static*, but that it can only *become* more valuable into infinity, or rather, if two ideas belong together here which are *a priori* related to one another: the *pole-idea of absolutely realized value* lying in infinity—the value of a community which constantly acts as thoroughly and absolutely rational—and the *idea of an infinite progressus of perfection* towards this idea, then one can see that both of these correlative ideas would have to be realized in a rational community of the highest *developmental form*, of a community, that is, which, while not living absolutely rationally, has, however, the absolutely best possible developmental form towards this absolute static idea.

The most perfect form (we can also say) of a communal life that is, in its essence, afflicted with imperfections, is that of a consistent development towards the pole-idea of absolute perfection, and then—this belongs to the perfection in development itself—the absolute idea and the idea of the consistent *progressus* in this community belonging to it | must be the *consciously guiding purposive idea*. It is then further to be understood that the condition of the possibility of such a *progressus* is firstly the development of a *progressus* towards a universal science, which is coordinated with this idea. Taken in full, this science, since we have to take this community concretely with its intentional surrounding, would be *philosophy*, universal and absolute science; and the infinite *progressus*, in which this science is placed towards the absolute final idea of omniscience and absolute justification, would be correlative to and run alongside the infinite *progressus* of humanity towards the final idea of a life of absolute perfection, in which there is no more room for error, sin, and so on, [a life] in which the will follows no longer any other goals than that which is understood as good in absolute evidence and in which this insight is enacted for every possible purpose. For every genuine scientific cognition is at the same time practically normative, already for the reason that every scientific cognition, as a truth exposed once and for all, henceforth imposes norms on all possible cognitive activitites, which are correlated to this truth by realizing or pursuing it. The specific normative sciences, here the formal-eidetic

VIII, 200/201

ones, have a special function in this regard. In any case, *cognizing reason is the function of practical reason, the intellect is the servant of the will*. But the servant enacts within himself functions of the will, directed at forms of cognition themselves, which are, precisely, the necessary means to guide the will everywhere and to show it the right purposes and paths. *The will to cognize is presupposed for all other willing, if this willing is to possess the highest value*.

Here, however, cognition and the universal philosophical science delineate the absolute eidetic and empirical boundaries, which the will, as rational will, has to recognize and that delineate for it the manifold possibilities of a rational freedom. Science does not just calculate, let alone once and for all, what the subject of willing has to do in each case, as if the will merely | had to utter its realizing VIII, 201/202 "yes" to the cognitive result that was unambiguously and firmly calculated before. Essentially, leeways of non-comprehension, indeterminateness, danger, error, sin, and so on, always remain. The infinite *progressus* of cognition is a *progressus* of a narrowing of boundaries and of dangers, but it is an endless *progressus*, and into infinity danger, sin, and so on, remain.

6

Reflection as Activity. On the Phenomenology of Reflection Upon the Goal of a Universal Science (ca. 1924)

VIII, 203

⟨I⟩

As a philosopher I reflect before I act, just as any other reflective rational human being. Just as I have, in general, only awoken as a genuine rational human being the moment I oversee my entire life as an open horizon of my entire possible future activities and my past life as the motivational soil of my possible future as a whole, and evaluate both practically-rationally: I am likewise only awake as a genuine philosopher once I carry out this overview and practical evaluation for my cognitive life as a life in purely theoretical interest. This life, however, is related from the very beginning to the others living alongside me. Practical life as such is acting effectively besides others, with others, in recognition of others and thereby it is the achievement of something that is not isolated in the world practically forming itself, but something that creates, in conjunction and intertwinement with other achievements, the communal surrounding, which continues to shape itself. The acquisitions are in part private possessions, partly communal acquisitions. Accordingly, *theoretical life is a branch of the general practical life*, whose practical field is cognition, and, on a higher level, the unity of a theory, at highest the unity of a universal theory. Just as reflection is required for the possibility of a rational life as such, it is analogously, required for that of a philosophical life of cognition that theoretical life reverts back to itself from its first naiveté of research that pursues the respective cognitive interests straightforwardly |, in free VIII, 203/204
reflections; [it is likewise required] that this naive process of cognition is inhibited and a new life is staged, in which the results of free cognition function as formal norms for a new and now truly rational cognitive praxis, which has become conscious of its principal right.

Quotidian practical life—the life excepting science and its *ratio*—pursues "mundane" purposes, finite, temporally limited ones. They are posed in the course of life and they are attained in experience; this suffices for the practical continuing validity, it suffices that they are factually not affected through a modification into appearance (due to the contradiction with persistent experiences and the entire harmony of experience). Once achieved in consciousness, they are often enough dropped, they lose their interest. And even where they continue to hold valid practically, as achieved possession, the unbroken conviction and the natural testing of this possession suffices for him who possesses them.

But the scientist knows himself as a member in a continuous, endlessly living community, his product is for that reason not merely his property or of that of contingently co-interested scientists. It is a truth that is to continue to hold valid in the recognition and insight of all future scientists—for all eternity. The life's vocation of a scientist serves the production of "eternal" values, which are to withstand every possible critique on the part of future generations. Every future ⟨scientist⟩ is equally interested in the genuineness of truth, which lies in its ever identical, original and necessary attainability. It is, for him, not only an acquired possession, but a step on the way to the attainment of new truths, and its ungenuineness would render all of its offspring bastards.

Here it would be foolish to acquiesce with simple evidence and to trust that future evidence will always again confirm ⟨the existing one⟩. For the infinity of the sphere of truth and the manifold relations of inference, which make what is cognized later dependent upon earlier ones, bears the danger that not only an individual truth be mistaken, but that the entire systems of truth, built up by generations, collapse.

What is essential, thus, in this grounding [of science] lies in | VIII, 204/205
that we are dealing in science with supra-temporal goods and supra-individual ones, hereby especially those that are not accumulated in the manner of a monetary treasure individually and independently of one another and are bequeathed in this way as a collection—where one individual counterfeit one does not cancel out the genuineness of the others—but instead we are dealing here with a totality which is in the state of becoming into infinity, a "sys-

tem" of truth, where an order of lower and higher levels obtains and where every truth is a foundation for new truths: but only if it is genuine truth.

Such motives, hence, had to lead to the greatest self-responsibility, to the most earnest critique. But to a logic? For the Greeks at the time of Sophism such motives could not at all be guiding. What comes earlier are the beginnings of the art of land-measuring, the art of measuring in general, and the art of calculation; at the same time the beginnings of philosophical cosmology. One had not yet thought of a science for eternity and for humanity, for generations of researchers into all future.

If we *today* consider sciences that are at work and in living development, we can very well doubt that a logic and methodology for the enablement of rigorous science is necessary, whether it is to be raised, through an improved logic, to the higher level of scientificity. Thus, which motives can determine us, and which ones had to determine the historical beginnings? And which motivation is predelineated "in itself" through the essence of a science that is at first formally delineated?

⟨II⟩

In general, where human beings pursue practical purposes, one has to distinguish practical *reflection* and its result form the *executing activities* and their result, the achieved work. We can also say, the practical reflection is an inner action and yields, if successful, an inner formation of work,[a] as the mental plan, the inner sketch for what is to be realized in external acting |. Inwardly a "thoughtful" VIII, 205/206
practical anticipation, a pre-intent of the path of the external action and its end—what is aimed at, say, the work—is formed, and that is itself, as I said, an action and an achievement which is not separated, in the "interiority" of its ideal being, from the being of the "realizing" action and its work, which is, to be sure, not necessary and does not always ensue.

[a] *Werkgebilde*

But what about cases where the action is from the beginning aimed at "*spiritual*" goals? Such goals will have their objective (and thereby intersubjectively graspable) character in the style of the achievements of objective culture. But they are to be regarded concerning their ideal meaning and being, purely in their external shape, and ⟨are⟩ in this ideality "the same," regardless of how they have taken on a sensibly objectified externality or whether they have taken on such a shape at all. The artwork *could*—this is certainly only one, but at any rate also a practical, possibility—be fully formed by the artist purely internally, without having taken on "reality" in external form at the same time, without having "really" been carried out externally. But already this manner of speaking indicates that it belongs to the normal meaning of such a spiritual work from the very beginning to be sensibly-objectively shaped, thus it also belongs to what one aims at from the very start in effecting action—it is to be, as artwork, an object in the world, and not merely a subjectively construed one, a mere thought of a work, hence at best an archetype, a plan for the work—while indeed an intent would be possible, in which one would have aimed exclusively at the pure inner forming of the meaningful image for itself, precisely the one which makes up the spiritual meaning of the sensibly embodied work.

What, now, about the distinction between reflective doing, inner planning and plotting, and external realization in the sphere of spiritual works?

Here we would have to say at the outset: In a certain sense *every* work and the corresponding action are something spiritual—only through their spiritual meaning or their significance [are they] action and work, and hence what is conceived in inner reflection enters, in the external execution, into the latter and | its action (more pre- VIII, 206/207
cisely: the practical preconception, the sketch, comes to be, in this synthesis, a fulfilling, realizing identification with the external action and the work). But in the case of spiritual works in the specific sense, the sensible externality does not belong, in its *individuality*, to the work—as a spiritual work, as this unique artwork. The uniqueness is not, as in the case of a hammer, at the same time that of the physical-thingly being. A literary work, a symphony, and upon closer inspection also a portrait do not have their identity rooted in

the physical identity of the audible word-sounds, the musical tones and their physical uniqueness, and so on.

As an aside, spiritual things, "cultural objects," can be characterized, concerning the relations of reflective achievement in the pre-sketch and in its realization, just as all other works of sensible praxis. The spiritual one, too, is not distinguished from the latter and freed from its physical individuality, as long as one has not taken measures to multiply it, which renders the factical, individual creation a mere *exemplar*, besides others of the same work.

But we have thus far not plainly drawn out the *main difference* between the realm of actions and deeds or works, which comes into consideration especially for the special case of "spiritual" works, the *works of ideas*.

If I conceive the "idea," the complete plan how this soil here is to be tilled, this does not yet "benefit" me in any way, I thereby do not harvest any fruit of the soil. Things would already be different if I sketched *in general* the idea of the best possible tilling of the soil (in our climate, considering the general nature of the soil in this landscape, and so on), as something by which I can or want to benefit the farmers here by mitigating their work of thought. This could be an individual purposive idea or a general one, related, however, to an empirical circumference. Also many others in this community could be interested in this, and hence the linguistic embodiment makes the internally construed purposive idea (construed with the respective manners of realizing it) "objective," as something in our surroundings to which everybody has access. | VIII, 207/208

An idea can also, however, be an *end in itself*,[1] a value in itself, I construct it for the sake of its "beauty" and realize it in external embodiment in order to create for myself, with the help of this realization, a sort of possession of the same which facilitates my going-back-to-it in order to enjoy it once again in its original self-being. The idea itself is the value here (the phantasy would be equal to the "reality" if it were steady and lively enough—if only I as an individual would be at stake); which is why "reproductions,"

[1] Although *Selbstzweck* is usually translated as "end in itself," it is important to note, in this passage, how Husserl uses the term *Selbst-* in different combinations, e.g., *Selbstwert* (worth in itself), *Selbstverantwortung* (self-responsibility).—Trans.

if they are truly indistinguishable, insofar as they recall the idea identically, take no preference before one another, and not even the original ⟨has a preference before them⟩, were it not the case that other reasons would play a role here as well. If I created a sketch in inner doing and without any external embodiment, then this would already be the work itself, if it were indeed an internal perfect sketch and completely identifiable, habitually repeatable.* Only because this perfection is not to be attained in general and, on the other hand, because an artwork is to become public property† and for that reason requires externality, the externalization has to be taken up into the intention and into the work itself. The individual real embodiment is a means in order to make accessible to all fellow humans the spiritual work, the actual cultural work. Only then is it objective for everybody and for myself, fixated, at all times accessible, a possession.

The moment, however, other purposes join in with the work, the moment it is there for something else, for the sake of realizing its value in subjects *originaliter*, it is no longer a purely spiritual work but an object of utility. Yet we have two cases where its peculiar meaning as a spiritual work necessarily comes into question for the effect of this utility and where it does not (the artwork in the house of the snob, which in reality does not function as an artwork at all, but only as "the famous work of the famous R.," which is miles apart from the snob society's comprehension).

The creative achievement of the genuine artist, of the creator of a spiritual formation of worth in and of itself, lies, hence |, in the VIII, 208/209 inwardly reflective achievement that inwardly fulfills itself, and all real externality is irrelevant and only a means lying external to the value itself for the sake of objective representation, thus a form of utility.

But now we discern a peculiarity, a unique peculiarity, in the spiritual sphere of *science*, in the realm of the value genus "scientific truth." All values of this type unite themselves to the unity of a universal value that is to be continually created and produced, and

*This is not the case when I, as is usual, want to create an objective work.

†Indeed, it always is supposed to become it, this is its destiny.

they only are, in general, values in this infinite nexus; hence at all times relative. The work of every science is something infinite, and all these infinities belong to an all-encompassing science, universal science.

In science, as in every spiritual achievement aimed at something ideally valuable in itself, the reflection beginning with a relatively unclear, vague and distant idea and further via goals and paths leads to what is intended in the mode "it itself." The clarification, the purely spiritual phantasy formation in the sense of the fulfillment of the aiming intention creates, in a temporal order, value products, and that is, as intermediary products, belonging to the ultimately intended value, be it as a preliminary stage (a draft), which is already of the type of value of the goal, be it as a piece of the final work, as building it itself up. In science, the expository and clarifying activity leads to ever new spiritual end formations, for instance, in the deductive science to axioms, conclusions (the nexus of analytic premise and conclusion), proofs. But each of these ends is only a *relative* end, just as its value is only a relative value, which enters, in progression, into the higher value, is included in it, sublated in it, and is not lost, but yet remains merely a relative value. The creative activity fulfills itself—and in this fulfillment it necessarily aims further, through its goal and beyond, into infinity. The creative deed of the individual researcher never fulfills itself in something singular and only has meaning in that the individual knows himself as a *functionary* and as a member of a generation of researchers reproducing itself into infinity, whose correlate—as infinite theory—is science.

If, in order to enable science as such, | a general reflection VIII, 209/210 is required (as becomes clear), what science "as such" actually demands as a formal-general idea, then the internal work of this reflection is the construction—in making explicit and fulfilling clarification—of the formal-general idea of "science" in general and from there necessarily of the idea of a universal science as such—and also this result itself belongs, as a basic element, to the science which is to be carried out. Here we have the peculiarity that in a certain sense this idea of a possible universal science, of a philosophy as such as the *preliminary sketch* of this philosophy itself to be carried out comes into relief—as a preliminary sketch regarding the universal form according to which such a universal science is

to be carried out; but [it is also peculiar] that, on the other hand, this spiritual sketch itself belongs to the *system* and to the universal theory of philosophy *itself*. Matters are similar to making drafts of a map in geography, where the first geographical achievement strives to be a formal grid for the special work that is to ensue, the form to be filled out subsequently, which is, however, already part of this science itself.

Once this empty idea of a universal science comes into view or once the question as to its possibility and the manner of its realization is raised, then what is required is a universal reflection concerning the goal and the paths to be pursued, a reflection, which does not aim to be, and in a certain also is not, the executing activity itself. For rational reflection, which is not straightforward critique of someone who is finished [with this reflection], but merely a reflection as to how one could have acted and how goals and paths would have had to be construed, allows for *norms* of "reason" to be explicated, norms, which, depending on the goals in question, can be more general or more concrete, as the case may be. Here, norms are practical truths—true goals, true paths. Accordingly, one will also have to *distinguish* a general reflection upon the "possibility" of this universal science, that is, upon the general form of its truth, upon the general essential conditions of its genuineness, from the science itself following these norms.

But here one will have to emphasize that this distinction only has the meaning of a distinction between *first science*, which explicates the *norms* in reflection, in | which the idea that has become distinct VIII, 210/211
and clear lays itself out in its essential parts, and the *ensuing order of sciences* which stand *under* these norms and which have become formed according to *this order*. Insofar as both are *inseparable*, the work of *reflection* is not to be viewed as something *prior to* the universal science, as something external to it, but as its *beginning and grounding element*.

Thus it becomes clear from the outset that a universal science must have as its necessary beginning a reflection, whose goal is the doctrine of the norms for such a science, hence this doctrine is itself a science of its possible truth and genuineness according to its basic essential conditions.

7

Path Into Transcendental Phenomenology As Absolute and Universal Ontology Via the Positive Sciences and Positive First Philosophy (1923)[1]

The basic concept of science and the relativities and one-sidednesses of the sciences and of the ontologies. The overcoming of relativism through the transcendental-phenomenological universal science.

Scientific Propositions.

We understand, as mathematicians, the method of geometrical assertions, we have evidence, and when we hear something geometrical, we place ourselves in the geometrical attitude required, enact the respective normal motivations that are presupposed for the evidence. How is it possible that the application of geometry to *physics* has its difficulties? That one can argue whether physical

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[1] 1923.

The path into transcendental phenomenology as absolute ontology, which overcomes all relativities by starting out from positive ontologies and the universal positive ontology (path of the lecture course of 1919/20).*

First question: How can one ground an ontology in positivity? All *onta*—all real ones in the real world—are relative upon one another. There are ontologies under the nexus of a universal ontology—as a universal a priori science of the world, of a world as such.

The second item: An entity is an entity of cognition, all entities for us are something appearing, meant, authenticating themselves (and so on) in subjective modes: relativity upon cognizing subjectivity.

Only a transcendental universal science discloses and makes thematic all relativities and [only in this all-science] an ontology as absolute ontology is possible, encompassing the relative ontologies of the world.

Basic idea of these meditations: the guiding clue of my Freiburg investigations and lectures.

* Husserl gave a lecture course in the winter semester of 1919/20, *Einleitung in die Philosophie* [*Introduction to Philosophy*], which is now published in Hua.-Mat IX.—Trans.

space is the same as the geometrical (the | Euclidean), whether the VIII, 219/220
geometrical space is not a mere limit case, in relation to which physical space presents a mere approximation, but not in the sense in which one construed geometrical purity as a limit case of empirical formations and positions [in space]? What would be the question in this case? Investigation into the geometrical "idealizing intuition," investigation into the possibilities obtaining here. If there are different ones, they would have to express themselves in different axioms. The evidence of Euclidean axioms (or the complete and concrete system of Euclidean-geometrical axioms) would then be evidence for *one* of the possibilities. It could not exclude other possibilities that were only incompossible as holding valid together with the former, but on the other hand compossible in the sense of typical possibilities within the genus (represented through an absolutely necessary group of axioms). Here the question becomes, which essential character space *as such* must have, as *the form of every possible intuitable nature* (transcendental-aesthetically), which is to exist in itself and is to confirm its identity; one asks whether the "exact" characteristics of space, which the possibility of a pure persistence of identity prescribes, encompass something *general*, which can yet *differentiate* itself, in order for different types of spaces to result within the pure and exact idea "space as such" and "geometry as such." But *nature as such* leads us, as a correlate, to perception and to the lived-body of perception as such; nature and subjectivity is "intuitively" inseparable. Can we stop here transcendental-aesthetically? Geometrical evidence is a branch of evidence in the ontology of nature, we are related to possible nature as such.

Everything in external perception is given—and can only be given, essentially—in a *relativism*. Evidently given (namely, perceived) are appearances, sensible things, in strata; visible thing, tactual thing and so on. ⟨They are given⟩ in relation to the lived-body of the experiencing agent, and this relation is part of the constitutive meaning of the appearing objectivities, not of the meaning of nature, but part of the fully constituted meaning of the world (of the total constitutive meaning encapsulated in complete constitution). ⟨They | are objectivities⟩, which are only experiencable insofar as the VIII, 220/221
lived-body, as co-functioning, is co-present in the field of intuition;

and every modification of the possibilities of experience co-modifies the functioning lived-body as functioning.

In external perception we have a certain necessary structure of meaning by virtue of which a direction of gaze or of apprehension, that at the *identically appearing object* as object of adumbrating appearances, is preferred. But the motivation—objectively speaking: the objective conditionedness—also goes in a different direction, towards the co-present and functioning lived-body, and in addition towards functioning subjectivity as such. We have, thus, an intuitive correlation—albeit no longer purely intuitive to the senses—of which the one member is always presupposed, with its system of modifications, while the other is in the preferred view of apprehending experience, and this direction of viewing is preferred in normal descriptive observations. What lies in the opposite direction, is thereby presupposed in a certain normality and only comes into the noticing view, when this normality of the "perceptual circumstances" and the respective typicality of the course of perception is interrupted. Here we have to attain clarity with respect to all correlations, all truth here is relative and relative in very different ways. The lived-body is itself experienced as part of nature, since the lived-body as functioning is related back upon itself. And what, then, with all kinds of *psychic* anomalies? Schizophrenia, and so on.

The evidence of external perception is self-giving of the experienced, but experience is here not merely an anticipating co-grasping beyond what is actually experienced, [it is] a necessary togetherness of self-giving and anticipation. In this respect we have possibilities of continual perception, which would bring what is anticipatorily co-grasped to an anticipated self-grasping, at least if we take the case of continual harmonious confirmation. But such a self-giving, even if we construe it as continually confirming itself into infinity, would still have a necessary milieu of motivational forces, which would never enter into the circle of noticing intuition here, that is, which do not belong to the | continual manifolds of exhibiting VIII, 221/222 presentations, never enter into the circle of the appearing sides of the object. We have a circle of correlative appearances and functions of the lived-body, of subjective kinaestheses, of localized sensible fields and sense-data and so on, which determine and condition the

continually changing objective meaning (the presented as such), but which remain unseized and indeterminate.

The evidence of ordinary external experience is a *one-sided* evidence, even if I may get to know the appearing thing in "all-sidedness," according to all its objectively-real[a] peculiarities—to be sure, in the infinity of external experiences. But this infinity cannot be controlled, it is unrecognizable as infinity, if I do not comprehend the continua of external experience or the continually constituted unities of sensible-intuitable characteristics *in their motivational relation to functioning subjectivity*.

The relativity of the intuitive thing has a certain significance, which by no means only means that what is intuited can only be conceived as in this or that relation to *other entities*, as if it were arbitrary for the thing to stand in such relations and if it were a mere matter of my mere relating, to place it in the relation to this or that. It may seem so to some (the naive human being and the researcher of nature may sometimes speak in this manner), as if the world could exist without experiencing human beings, without experiencing functioning lived-bodies, without a seeing eye, a hearing ear, and so on. But first it is to be made clear, concerning *intuitive* nature, that the substrate of the judgments with respect to perception, the "sense-intuitive" thing, stands in necessary relations to the respective functioning lived-body and functioning subjectivity as such and that the intuitive thing as such can only exist in correlation with other intuitive things that are not merely of the character of a thing, not to mention the necessary nexuses ⟨existing⟩ between intuitive things under the title "experiencable (inductive) causality."

What belongs inseparably to the essence of an object (as existing | possibly) according to its typicality, we also call, as what determines it, its *meaning*,[b] what is contrary to it, is counter-sensical.[c] But its type is not given prior, but must firstly be acquired intuitively, and this type is predelineated, *implicite*, but not pregiven explicitly, through self-giving intuition, through possible perception. The latter, however, must be transformed into "*fully evident*" intuition, in which lies the system of *complete meaning-giving*, from which alone the "*complete essence*," the entire meaning of this type, generally that of the VIII, 222/223

[a] *ding-realen* [b] *Sinn* [c] *widersinnig*

objective region, can be derived. For the object of nature this means: we must derive from perception the concrete and full system of perception, a system in which would lie the *"fully" perceived thing*, that is, according to all essential directions, which belong inseparably to the perceived as such.

Although *thing* is a region of its own, it is thereby not a complete and independent one. The physical thing is *no "substance,"* and likewise, physical nature is no concrete unity in the ultimate sense. I must continue on. Next I must take the correlation of nature and functioning subjectivity, I must consider nature and lived-bodiliness, lived-bodiliness and psychic spirituality—all in relation to one another; these relations are, precisely as essentially correlative, co-determining of meaning. The universe of intuition, as possible perception, must be viewed in totality and fixated in its essential typicality, if I want to make completely comprehensible the origin of all worldly truth, and at first truth of nature, or better: the complete and genuine *meaning*, which tolerates no empty, yet indeterminate or even unnoticed horizons.

Only from these primal sources* can I derive adequate concepts and the respective axiomatic systems, which are necessary to form the foundational concept of the a priori *ontology*. Of course it becomes clear here that the *a priori ontologies themselves | are* VIII, 223/224 *essentially related upon one another* and are not mutually independent, separable from each other. They all are *one-sidednesses* of the a priori. It becomes clear that, the moment we strive for complete evidence and firstly that completeness of possible experience and possible eidetic intuition, which takes into consideration *all* essential necessities that also concern any experienced object or essence in focus, that we arrive at the universe of all intuitabilities as such—and thereby at the *universe of subjectivity as constituting*. At first we may begin to describe appearing objects as such and then make explicit their essential properties and we may know nothing of phenomenology—nothing of transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive functions. But pursuing the essential dependencies, we

*Primal sources: Pure and rigorous scientific cognition presupposes the construction of a *complete possible experience*—complete in the sense that it *gives voice to* all horizons.

delve into ever-deeper intuitive nexuses—and ultimately, unavoidably, we arrive at the *total nexus* of subjectivity as transcendental. *There can be no independent sciences*. All truth is relative—all being is relative—all perceptions and experiences already harbor these relativities. What is not already connected synthetically in *intuition*, what does not already lie in it intentionally and spreads out in syntheses of fulfillment, *logos* cannot bring to concepts. No science can have fully evident foundations; only phenomenology can provide them for itself and can bring forth rigorous science—and truly, fully satisfactory science—precisely by grounding it in the universal nexus of the total science, related to the totality of ultimate being, hence related to absolute subjectivity, as the primal unity, in which all real and possible experience, self-giving of any possible type forms itself according to subjective essential laws and ⟨in which⟩ thereby every possible objective being constitutes itself according to essential laws.* | VIII, 224/225

*The only thing missing here is the discussion of the difference between the relative natural a priori, which is always "relative," and of the formal, "absolute" a priori. ⟨In other words⟩, what is missing to complete this felicitous exposition is the following fundamental discussion:

The starting point was the ontology of nature, natural mathematics, connected to the essential relativity of the object of experience (of the object of perception), in relation to normal lived-bodiliness and normal subjectivity as such. This relativism must become completely clear in all directions and must be mastered conceptually; the ontological a priori has, then, its levels and correlations that must be scientifically fixated in all directions.

On the other hand, we do have an empty *formal a priori*, formal objectivities and higher-level theoretical formations. These, *too*, are correlates, namely to transcendental constituting subjectivity. But here matters are indeed different than concerning a geometrical, a natural-ontological (and so on) a priori; what is missing here, on the ontological side, are the peculiarities and correlations that co-determine meaning, what remains is only the *general* constitutive correlation. Hence, in a certain sense an arithmetical proposition is an apodictically valid and irrelative truth-in-itself.

Hence this must be clarified in all directions and only then are the most general considerations given above purely grounded.

(But this is taken into consideration in my lectures on the theory of science—as immature as they may have been at the time—and in the *Introduction* lecture of 1919/1920 [cf. footnote 1, p. 459, above] through the fact that I presented the analytic first and later clarified its empty-formal meaning together with the idea of a formal science of mere consequence of judgment.)

Every attempt to break through to complete evidence leads into transcendental phenomenology. Must there not be, accordingly, *two correlative paths into phenomenology*?

1.) namely the path: *the given world*, intuitively given; the universal ontology of the world with all special ontologies leads to a universal intuition of the world as an eidetic consideration of the world, the axioms of this universal ontology must be the essential descriptions of a possible world as such. Here, nature leads to lived-bodiliness, to the psychical, to the spiritually achieving subjectivity, to the insight that subjectivity is world-constituting, transcendentally absolute, that all being is the correlate of transcendental subjectivity, which encompasses everything objective as correlate of subjective constitutions; that all being, transcendentally viewed, stands in a universal subjective genesis, and so on. (This is precisely the path of my *Introduction*-lectures in the winter of 1919/20; it is already the path of my lectures on the theory of science, *Logic*, of 1910/11 in Göttingen.)[1] | VIII, 225/226

2.) The other path is the "*Cartesian*" one, beginning with the empty *Ego Cogito*, static eidetic typology of pure subjectivity. Every such *eidos* is indeterminate, however, in its horizon; what is required is a universal *Egology*, which investigates the *Ego* and the I-totality concretely as universe and treats of it in the manner of a universal science. (This is the path of my phenomenological lecture courses and the *London Lectures* and their broader execution in 1922 and 1923.)[2]

⟨The guiding clues of these two paths can briefly be characterized as follows:⟩

1.) "Objective" experience, objective cognition, objective judgments, natural in the narrower sense; in the *meaning* of cognition

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[1] On the lecture of 1919/20 cf. footnote 1, p. 459. In the winter semester 1910/11 Husserl held a lecture course on *Logic as Theory of Cognition*, now published in Hua. XXX. Husserl published a fragment of this lecture course in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, appendix I, Hua. XVII, pp. 299–313, "Syntactical Forms and Syntactic Matter, Essential Forms and Essential Matter." — Ed. & Trans.

[2] The *London Lectures* of 1922 and the "broader execution" in the 1922/23 lecture course *Einleitung in die Philosophie* are now published in Hua. XXXV. With "my phenomenological lecture courses" Husserl presumably means his lecture courses in general. — Trans.

nothing "subjective" as such is posited. The cognizing subject and its cognizing life, but also its valuing, acting [life], is put out of play; this does not preclude that essential correlations obtain between what is posited with meaning and the positing, cognizing subject, correlations which are utilized for new cognitions, which now place the objective and subjective in essential relation to one another.

2.) "Subjective" cognition. *Difficulty*: the psychological-subjective [cognition] as objective cognition of the subjective; anthropological cognition, somatological [cognition] among it; on the other hand, purely transcendental [cognition].

In the one case I move around in the realm of objective cognition, universally in the cognition of the world, and find eidetic connections. How do I arrive from there at the highest regions within the world—and at the specialized a priori ontologies? Is a specialization conceivable here? On the other hand I can indeed draft an ontology of nature and leave the functioning lived-bodiliness indeterminate; it may make its essential demands and may play its necessary role as co-functioning, but I do not investigate it. Likewise in every respect. I live through, when I carry out the natural-ontological evidence, certain constitutive functions, among which, the functioning of the | VIII, 226/227 perceiving lived-body, in the form of fitting possibilities, and then the motivation is provided, in which the self-givenness of ontological possibilities and essences arises. Therein consists the "naiveté." If, however, I then turn my gaze to the lived-body and the entire subjectivity, then I can, once again, do ontological research. For the lived-body, too, gives itself as a thing and is to obey the ontological determinations of nature; on the other hand, it has its *own* ontological a priori, and likewise the "soul" has its own, but it is also related to the lived-body and to nature.

In fact I already stand here in the [realm of the] constitutive, but with plenty of naiveté. Only in the *ontology of nature*, of purely physical nature, can I completely evade subjectivity, forget it, as it were,* leave it out of play theoretically or exclude it deliberately.

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* Accordingly one must not say: No ontology of nature may actually be constructed straightforwardly and self-obliviously, and only in the case of geometry it is seemingly different. It is simply an old tradition. Also the researcher of nature (Galilei) who aims at a principal grounding had to make the subjective thematic and had to

What I have then is a cognition of being, which can only posit itself as absolute through such a self-oblivion, and a nature, which is only seemingly independent (a substance), but is, in truth, bound to essential correlations.

Why can a dogmatic science not justify itself absolutely, expose its foundations absolutely, arrive at complete evidence?

I have full evidence of essences when I reign over a *totality* of essential possibilities and essential necessities, when I modify the possibilities in all directions, which allow for a modification, and hence gain every essence in the totality of its essential correlates and understand it.

And from here one must show that only a transcendental science, which encompasses all possible objectivities in the universe of all possibilities, encompasses them precisely in [the universe of] transcendental subjectivity, and that [this science] thereby yields "substantial" cognition [and] can gain full insight and ultimate truths or can proceed forward in its investigation under the *idea of finality* and become systematic philosophy. | VIII, 227/228

All truth is relative: Ultimate science overcomes this relativism by showing the path and pursues it; a path, which secures for us the reign over all relativities and all essential correlations. If this is to be realized, it must be possible to construct a priori systematically the essence of transcendental subjectivity in a system.

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exclude it *methodologically*. Thus, the subjectivity of the manners of appearance, of the surrounding worlds, and so on, belongs to the *method* in order to grasp the "non-subjective."

8

Attempt at a Distinction of the Stages on the Way to a Science of Transcendental Subjectivity (December 1925)

Different paths lead to the same desideratum of a science of transcendental subjectivity.

1.) A *first path* was attempted in the lecture courses.[1] It departs from the awakening of the "epistemo-ethical" conscience, which can be motivated through a *critique of the sciences*: They lack in truth that type of full rationality that is constitutive for the idea of science. Its theories are, to be sure, formations created in evidence; but the naively enacted evidence leads to basic concepts and basic propositions that lead, in their consistent evaluation, to contradictions (continuum, paradoxes, and so on).

One can now go the *Cartesian path*, that of a radical new beginning leading to the *Ego Cogito*, in the correct self-understanding [leading] to transcendental subjectivity: a first ground of experience—originally a ground given to me, the one who reflects phenomenologically, in perceptual originality—that promises an absolutely justified cognition. One can anticipate in due course that all principal questions that can ever be posed by any of the naturally grown sciences in general and ultimately through all conceivable sciences as such—and once again posed through the idea of an absolute justification itself—have to be posed on this ground regarding their meaning and possibility, for an absolutely justified science to become possible |. Indeed, it soon becomes plain upon deeper reflec- VIII, 251/252
tion that the path to absolute cognition and science necessarily leads via an *absolute cognition of the possibility of absolute cognition*, and it then can only then lead further to the absolute justification of the "objective," "dogmatic" sciences or to their recasting in absolute

[1] Husserl apparently means the lectures *Introduction to Philosophy* of 1922/23 (Hua. XXXV) and *First Philosophy*. —Ed.

justification. This holds especially for all *sciences of the world*, but also for *metaphysics* related back to it, and on the other hand for the *normative sciences*.

I later put it as following:

a) What is required is the *phenomenological reduction*, as a reduction to actual and possible transcendental subjectivity or to its actual and possible transcendental experience.

b) This calls for an *apodictic critique of transcendental experience*, but also a critique of "*logical*" cognition which may be established on this transcendental ground of experience as "phenomenology." Hence what is required is a phenomenology and a critique of its cognition. What is shown here is that this apodictic critique of phenomenological cognition is related back to itself, iteratively. This, thus, is what genuine *First Philosophy* is about (i.e., at first "naive" phenomenology and [then] apodictic critique, as the most radical critique of cognition, related to [the former]).

2.) The *second path* I conceived as taking its point of departure from the *contrast of the mythical-practical worldview and the worldview of theoretical interest*. In the latter respect lies the actual beginning: the establishment of purely theoretical experience and cognition, of the "sober" worldview, from which arises autonomous culture, communal life and communal accomplishments in sober "reason"—and under the guidance of doxic reason. I then wanted to view the *world of "purely theoretical" experience*. It gives itself as existing, as continually abiding as identical and harmonious in the stream of experience. I want to come clear on what belongs to the world of experience |, when I conceive of experience in all VIII, 252/253
earnestness in the pure identity of the experiencing agent, hence as continuing to exist in pure harmony. I reflect, thus, upon experience and the world of experience and pursue the universal structures that this pure world of experience exhibits and then—in an eidetic modification in free variation—which it must exhibit as a necessary system of invariants.

This is to yield the systematic distribution of the possible sciences of the world. What about the logic of my procedure of thought in these investigations?

In exhibiting the structure of nature I happen upon the fact that nature is at first given in subjective givennesses. I want to

pursue the identity of what is experienced and must eliminate everything subjective, but I must describe it in a certain manner. The latter, then, enters into psychology, as everything subjective.

Ontologically, I arrive at intuitive (aesthetic) nature and its general structures, those which it necessarily has as experienced (as perceived). And correlatively I immediately see the interweavings with the merely subjective, with the "psychological." Thus I derive, on the one hand, ontological structures, on the other hand essential connections between the appearing nature, the nature of empirical life, and the subjective life itself. Then, however, I have to carry out an investigation of the lived-body and the psyche, again ontologically and in subjective respect, namely insofar as the subjective, too, "appears"; likewise the alien subjectivity—[through] empathy. I carry out universal description and arrive at essential structures that enable "descriptive" science.

I push further and stand before the problems of relativism, of normal and abnormal descriptions and worlds, the ⟨problems⟩ of mathematizing idealization of spatiotemporal extension, the ⟨problems⟩ of exact determination, of truths-in-themselves.

At which point do I arrive at a *logic* in the natural order of things?

My meditations occur in a [process of] thinking and linguistic description of my thoughts and my thought-actions, of my respective goals and means—as the functional thinking on the part of the philosophical subject as one that expresses itself. | Now *prior to the* VIII, 253/254
beginning—⟨namely the beginning⟩ of reflection upon the structure of the world of experience—I necessarily had to make *a different beginning*: general meditations upon the goal of cognition and of science, upon norms that I posit for myself in the natural attitude. Hereby I meditate on my own, and especially also on insight, evidence, critique of evidence, I make clear to myself how judging life can become cognizing life and can justify itself. And insofar as this is to be the guiding norm for scientificity and is at first such a norm for myself, I also have to say to myself: What I myself ascertained in these meditations, conforms to my norms and has the character of scientificity—to the extent that they turned out well. For it is not impossible that I have to add or modify many a thing in my further pursuit, because—be it through indeterminateness in gen-

eral issues, be it through oversights of possibilities which are also in question—what I have accomplished thus far does not suffice.

Accordingly, already in this beginning part a piece of pure and formal *logic* is erected—such that its idea exists only in a constitutive becoming. Now I do pursue "meditations," in order to consider a "philosophy" according to its possibility and its realization, and it is not yet clear, thus, that I am to actually expand this beginning part as the beginning of a logic, that I should construe its idea as science at this juncture.

But on the second path it is probably the best to explicitly introduce, immediately after these meditations, or in a seamless continuation of them, the idea of a logic and to attribute to us the right to bring it underway as a science—as the *first* science that is to be executed. In order to be permitted to do this, I must reflect, thus, upon my methodological procedures in these meditations upon predicative utterances—as assertions concerning any objects whatsoever as valid for me—upon evidence, apodicticity, and so on, and must convince myself whether these meditating assertions themselves correspond methodologically to the norms that I have sketched in them. No matter whether this is a first attempt at science on the basis of conscientious reflection, in the striving for pure evidence, it nevertheless does count for me as | scientific, VIII, 254/255
and thus *after* the reflection confirming this, my method itself is authenticated as scientific, as valid for me in this manner.

Moving further, I will, hence, have to introduce new concepts that define the notion of judgment, I will distinguish determining judgments and existential ones and judgments of truth, concerning certainty [I will distinguish] the primal mode and its modal modifications. I will then go on to sketch a doctrine of the forms of judgments and their modalities.

In noetic respect, I will have to distinguish, from the outset, confusion and clarity in judging thought and will have to expose the special evidence in which distinctness consists, through which, in asserting in judgment, the judgment as unity of meaning—and that is to say, as the judgment that is identifiable in distinctness and comes to self-givenness in a judgment itself—is itself grasped. This, then, is precisely the purpose of the scientific doctrine of forms, whose realm is, thus, given in apodictic evidence.

Furthermore one will then proceed on to the basic concepts of the logic of non-contradiction or consequence, and its way is to be predelineated for it itself.[1] When I proceed in this manner, then the first science at which I arrive is analytical logic and mathematics. It takes on a normative, practical meaning. It is possible, perhaps, to

[1] The text from here to "critique of their applicability." (p. 476, l. 23 below) is absent in the *Husserliana* edition of 1959, because the editor was not able to locate the missing pages at the time (cf. Hua. VIII, p. 538, where Boehm speculates that the missing pages were "probably destroyed"). These pages have since been found (signature A III 4/92–94) and the editorial omission is rectified in the translation. However, it is an Archive policy that texts from Husserl's unpublished writings may not be published in translation prior to the original German. Hence, in the following the original of the missing passage—Trans.

"Wenn ich so vorgehe, dann ist die erste Wissenschaft, die ich gewinne, die analytische Logik und Mathematik. Sie nimmt eine normative praktische Wendung an. Es kann wohl schon das Verhältnis von theoretisch sachlichem Interesse und Interesse an Sollensbestimmungen erörtert werden.

Die erste Wissenschaft ist 'Wissenschaftslehre', aber formale, Wissenschaft von der Form möglicher Wissenschaft.

Warum doch keine erste Philosophie erwächst, das weiß man auf diesem Wege noch nicht. Allerdings wenn man in der Naivität die universale Weltwissenschaft als Philosophie definiert, so ist das erste Philosophie. Aber erst später kann man sehen, dass die Forderung letzter Begründung und letzter Selbstverständigung durch eine solche Weltwissenschaft nicht erfüllt werden kann und dass diese Forderung nicht etwa eine Pedanterie ist, sondern die notwendigste aller Forderungen der theoretischen Autonomie.

So hätten wir also als I. Teil: natürliche Logik oder: die ersten logischen Besinnungen und der Weg zu einer natürlichen Logik. Wann hat diese Logik keine Sorge vor 'Paradoxien'? Als bloße Konsequenzlogik gefasst, muss sie alle ihre Begriffe aus der Evidenz der Deutlichkeit schöpfen. Wenn sie also Unendlichkeitsbegriffe einführt, so muss dafür Sorge getragen sein.

Die historische Arithmetik und Algebra ist als Größenlehre erwachsen in Verschmelzung mit Geometrie, zunächst von ihr nicht getrennt. Es kommt aber sehr viel darauf an, dass die formale *mathesis* in ihrem echten Sinn erkannt und danach in reiner Methode in der ihr spezifisch zugehörigen Evidenz der Deutlichkeit ausgebildet wird (anschauungsfreie Analysis, Arithmetik). Jeder Begriff muss seine exemplarische Klarheit haben; auch der Begriff der Deutlichkeit, die ja hinsichtlich ihrer Gegenstände auch eine Klarheit ist. Klarheit des bloßen Satzes als Satzes ist nicht Klarheit der ihm zugehörigen Wahrheit. Nur ist das Beirrende, dass die Rede, 'ein Satz sei klar' (ist mir klar, ist jedem klar), immer besagt, dass er auf entsprechende bewahrheitende Anschauung zurückgeführt oder zurückzuführen sei, in der die Wahrheit, die den Satz als Bedeutungsstruktur enthält, sichtlich ist, und der Satz in seiner Adäquation, in der Anpassung an die Wahrheit, an die 'Sache selbst'. Wie mir scheint, stammen alle Paradoxien daher, dass die Begründung der

already discuss the relation between theoretical, substantial interest and interest in normative determinations.

The first science is "doctrine of science,"[a] but formal, it is science of the form of possible science.

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[a] "*Wissenschaftslehre*"

Mathematik nicht von Anfang an in der nötigen prinzipiellen Klarheit vollzogen wird. Das erfordert eine Besinnung auf die wirklich radikalen Anfänge und bei jeder neuen Leistung eine neue Besinnung, inwiefern wirklich eine Selbstgegebenheit zustande kommt, inwiefern das Erzielte wirklich erzielt, der Weg wirklich Weg ist. Keine Tradition! Keine Vorgegebenheiten, nur was man sich selbst gegeben, was man nicht willkürlich gesetzt ⟨hat⟩, sondern in der Selbsterzeugung als evidentes Erzeugnis wirklich vorfindet.

In der Durchführung erfordert das beständige Reflexion vom vermeintlich gegebenen Gegenständlichen (Substrat, Sachverhalt etc.) auf das Subjektive der leistenden Aktion, ein Zurückversetzen des leer, symbolisch Gedachten in die subjektive Ursprünglichkeit, in der es zur Selbstgegebenheit kommt. Aber so sehr diese reflektive Einstellung auf die Weise der Gegebenheit und in der Evidenz auf das erkennende Handeln ein Stück intentionaler Forschungsweise ist, so ist doch nicht eine volle intentional-konstitutive Forschung hier erforderlich für den Aufbau einer geklärten positiven Wissenschaft, und hier einer positiven (dogmatischen) Mathematik. Wir haben ja schon wiederholt davon gesprochen, dass das In-Betracht-Ziehen der Erkenntnishandlung mit ihr nur wieder eine Objektivität höherer Stufe in den Griff nimmt; die tieferen konstitutiven Synthesen, aus denen sie selbst entspringt, bleiben außer Frage.

Worauf es—damit im Rahmen der Positivität eine volle wissenschaftliche Mathematik gewonnen wird—alleine ankommt, ist die Herstellung einer vollkommenen apodiktischen Evidenz und die Herausstellung der Prinzipien dieser Apodiktizität.

Hierbei ist zu bemerken: Alle ont⟨ischen⟩ Prinzipien der Rechtfertigung der Mathematik gehören selbst in die Mathematik. Also hier ist Vollständigkeit der mathematischen Prinzipien die Voraussetzung der Rechtfertigung. Andererseits hat aber die Rechtfertigung auch noetische Prinzipien, es bedarf auch einer formalen Noetik, einer formalen Lehre des denkenden Handelns, Leistens.

Dahin gehört der Bestand der Reflexionen über Denken und Gedanken etc., mit denen die Meditationen anfangen, nur dass es nachher prinzipieller Formulierung bedarf und einer ausdrücklichen Zueignung als formaler noetischer Logik. Diese macht die erste vortranszendentale Erkenntniskritik aus.

Ich bemerke noch: Gemäß unseren Ausführungen boten sich zwei Begriffe von dogmatischer Mathematik an: 1) die aus der Intention auf strenge Wissenschaft naiv erwachsene und historisch überlieferte formale *mathesis*. Ihr tritt gegenüber die radikale, über Bedingungen durchgängiger apodiktischer Evidenz reflektierende und dadurch kritisch reformierte *mathesis*—mag diese Reform von 'Mathematikern' herstammen oder von Philosophen. Jedenfalls kann eine so reformierte Mathematik als philosophische in erster Stufe bezeichnet werden. In Relation zu ihr hieße dann die historisch überlieferte naive mathematische Wissenschaft dogmatisch.

It is still unknown why there still does not arise a first philosophy on this path. Yet, if one defines, in naiveté, universal science as philosophy, then this is first philosophy. But only later one is able to see that the demand of ultimate grounding and ultimate self-comprehension cannot be fulfilled through such a science of the world and that this demand is not some pedantry, but the most necessary of all demands issuing from theoretical autonomy.

Thus we would have as the first part: natural logic, or: the first logical reflections and the path towards a natural logic. How long does this logic not worry about "paradoxes"? Conceived as mere logic of consequence, it must derive all concepts from the evidence of clarity. Once it, thus, introduces infinite concepts, it must deal with them at that time.

Historical arithmetic and algebra has arisen as doctrine of magnitudes in combination with geometry, at first not separated from one another. But much depends on understanding formal *mathesis* in its genuine sense and [how it] then becomes carried out in pure method in the evidence of clarity belonging specifically to it (non-intuitive analysis, arithmetic). Every concept must have its exemplary clarity; the same goes for concepts of distinctness, which is, regarding its objects, a clarity as well. Clarity of the mere proposition as proposition is not clarity of the truth corresponding to it. But it is misleading that the phrase "a proposition is clear" (it is clear to me, is clear to everyone) always means that it leads back, or is to be led back, to a corresponding verifying intuition, in which the truth, which contains the proposition as a meaning-structure, is evident, and the proposition in its adequation, in fitting with the truth, to the "matter itself." It seems to me that all paradoxes stem from the fact that the grounding of mathematics is not

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2) Nachdem eine höhere Stufe erklommen ist, spaltet sich der Begriff der Philosophie, der philosophischen Begründung und Klärung und damit der Begriff des Dogmatischen. Es bedarf, so heißt es dann, einer Mathematik (und einer Wissenschaft überhaupt), die sich vorerst des absoluten Bodens versichert hat, auf dem alle Theorie und sonstige Leistung erwächst—des transzendentalen Bodens. Nun heißt die transzendental fundierte Mathematik allein die philosophische. Ist die philosophische der vorigen Stufe reinlich ausgeführt, so bleibt sie zwar nach dem Gesamtbestand ihre Sätze bestehen, aber durch Rückbeziehung auf den transzendentalen Boden und die transzendental konstitutive Erkenntnis haben diese Sätze ihren letzten Sinn und die letzte Kritik ihrer Anwendbarkeit gewonnen."

carried out from the very beginning in the necessary principal clarity. This requires a reflection upon the truly radical beginnings and in each new accomplishment [it requires] a new reflection, to what extent a self-givenness truly becomes established, to what extent the attained is actually attained, to what extent the path [traveled to attain this truth] truly is a path. No tradition! No pregivennesses, only what one ⟨has⟩ given to oneself, what one has not posited arbitrarily, but only what one actually finds in one's own creation as evident creation.

In actually carrying this out what is demanded is a constant reflection from what is seemingly given as objective (substrate, matter of fact, and so on) back to the subjective [element] of achieving action, a placing-back of what is thought as empty, as symbolic, into its subjective originality, in which it comes to self-givenness. But as much as this reflective attitude, with respect to this manner of givenness and in the evidence of cognizing acting, is a piece of the intentional research, nonetheless one does not need an intentional-constitutive research at this point for the construction of a clarified positive mathematics, specifically a positive (dogmatic) mathematics. Indeed, we have repeatedly said that taking into consideration the deed of cognizing yet again considers only an objectivity of a higher level; the deeper constitutive syntheses, from which it itself emerges, remain out of question.

What alone matters—in order to gain an encompassing scientific mathematics in the framework of positivity—is the furnishing of a completely apodictic evidence and the exposition of the principles of this apodicticity.

Here we have to note: All ont⟨ic⟩ principles of the justification of mathematics belong themselves to mathematics. Here, thus, the completeness of the mathematical principles is the presupposition for this justification. On the other hand, this justification also contains noetic principles; what is required is also a formal noetics, a formal doctrine of thinking, acting, achieving.

To this belongs the stock of reflections concerning thinking and thoughts, and so on, with which the meditations begin, only that one later requires a principal formulation and an explicit acquisition as formal noetic logic. The latter is the first pre-transcendental critique of cognition.

I add: According to what we said, two concepts of dogmatic mathematics suggested themselves: 1) the naively grown and historically-handed down formal *mathesis*, which grew out of the intention towards rigorous science. It is opposed to the radical *mathesis*, which reflects on the conditions of continuous apodictic evidence and which is thereby critically reformed—no matter if this reform stems from "mathematicians" or from philosophers. At any rate, a mathematics thusly reformed can be called philosophical at the first level. The historically handed-down naive mathematical science would then be called, in relation to it, dogmatic.

2. Once a higher level has been attained, the concept of philosophy, of philosophical grounding and clarification, and thereby the concept of the dogmatic itself, split apart. What is needed, one is told then, is a mathematics (and a science in general), which has secured for the time being an absolute ground, from which all theory and other achievements grow forth. Now, only the transcendentally grounded mathematics is called philosophical. Once the philosophical [mathematics] of the previous level has been carefully crafted, it does remain standing with respect to the entire stock of its propositions, but by being related back to the transcendental ground and transcendental constitutive cognition, these propositions have acquired their ultimate meaning and the ultimate critique of their applicability.

The development of the idea of a formal *mathesis* proceeds via the doctrine of pure forms of meanings to a specific analytics—as a logic of non-contradiction. From there the path leads to a formal logic of truth. Here the relation to possible objects must soon be dealt with. Only thereby arises the true idea of a formal ontology, which ultimately leads back to individual objects as such with the respective formal laws of individuality (for instance, every object [is] a temporal one, every one is a *tode ti* of a substantial essence, and so on).

Likewise of course a corresponding noetics.

But we are not yet finished here. Already before we proceed to the individual and ultimately possible objects *in forma*, I arrive at the difference between things, values, goods. Formal logic was a logic of judgmental propositions (substrate propositions, predicative propositions). If we take, instead of judgmental propositions,

propositions of value, propositions of wishing and willing, then we arrive, analogously, at the concepts of truth (in an extended sense): judgmental truth (at which the logic of judgment | aims as logic of VIII, 255/256 truth), truth of value, practical truth. ⟨What becomes necessary is⟩ a doctrine of forms regarding propositions of these novel classes, corresponding, analogously, to [doctrines of] consequence in valuing, wishing, willing; with conditions of the possibility of the respective "truths." In cognition, all other truths are expressed in truths of judgments. Accordingly, formal logic becomes expanded by a logic (formal as well) of value propositions and value truths and so on; in a certain sense it is narrower, since from the standpoint of the logic of judgment, propositions entering into the sphere of value and willing are "material" specializations. On the other hand, with respect to the fact that already judging refers back to judging subjectivity, and that the *latter* can, in the same universality, be, at the same time, also valuing [subjectivity] and desiring-willing [subjectivity], the formal character of the new spheres has a generality just as great [as in the formal logic of judgment], and the concept of the formal receives a necessary expansion, just as the concept of a formal logic.

If we now proceed from the most general character of formal logic to the formally predelineated special cases, then the formal idea of the "something" as substrate of judgment (ontic something) differentiates itself, as do the formal idea of the valued something or value as such, good as such, purpose as such, and so on. Corresponding to the *a priori* predelineated formal groundings we arrive at an individual something, pre-valuative, hence also pre-practical, hence we arrive at something ultimately formal, which we can call *thing* (nature, value-free being, but still in formal generality). If we take the latter not as mere proposition, but as being-in-truth, and at first as eidetic being-possible (eidetic singularity), we then arrive at the formal logic of individuality as pure nature.

Standing in positivity, after leaving the *mathesis universalis* (expanded into the axiological and practological formal-mathematical—thus a science of the something-as-such, but in mere significance), we have *the world pregiven* and can find in it the mundane pre-valuative through unbuilding—as "mere" nature, namely physical nature and, in the eidetic attitude, as possible nature as such.

Since every other truth can concurrently be the theme of cognition (just as [it can also be] the truth pertaining to the ontic logic[a] as such), | there is, accordingly, not only a scientific logic of facts, but VIII, 256/257
also a logic of real values and purposes (formal in a novel sense). Or: There is not only one formal a priori science of the formality of real being as such and of predicative ontic truth (judgmental correctness) as such, but also one of the formality of real values as such or of value-being as such and of value-truths as such, and so on—again noetically-noematically.

What else, then? The a priori belonging to *personal community* is partly a mere a priori of facts,* partly however an a priori of purposiveness and of formations of value objects—or, in a higher sense, of objects of absolute ought—say, of certain life forms of individual human beings and communities themselves.†

Ultimately, hence, the *logic of an ethical humanity*, the logic of *cultural formations* or the logic of the *cultural sciences*, the *developmental logic towards a genuine humaneness* in its steps and of the steps of its products and of the life producing them.

To the a priori of concordant experience and of experienced being (in the logos) corresponds, on a higher level, the a priori of concordant valuing and action, and of a world not given as fact, which factually corresponds here or there to value norms, ethical norms as well, but of an ideal world which would have to be willed and awakened in a genuine human life, in a community raising itself to genuineness.

How, then, do *technologies*[b] relate to the "theoretical" science of values, goods, absolute purposes, duties, rights, of human beings?

After having derived the "logic" of humanity and of human "culture" or the logic belonging to the spiritual sciences, the question becomes whether other a priori sciences | remain. The only one VIII, 257/258

*Human beings and animals as objective facts lead, at first, perhaps to personal reflection, but then they do lead back to intentional life and thereby to an intentional psychology; it was precisely the discussion of the latter that was skipped here.

†But at this point the unbuilding would have to set in: nature and naturalized spirit—on the other hand personal spirit (and so on) as "fact"—and then in the "spiritual" or personal sphere as a sphere capable of standing under norms—the normative formations and the special normative sciences.

[a] *die seinslogische Wahrheit* [b] *Kunstlehren*

remaining would be "*metaphysics*." The world, as it is as a fact, is of such a character that the human beings living in it live ⟨not only⟩ a relatively valuable life, that is, that they can create a culture, but that they at all times live into an open horizon of meaning, that they—individually and in community—posit value goals for themselves to an increasing extent, correlatively, that they can form for themselves an ever more beautiful and better world. But already the being of the world as fact contains a teleology. The world exists "in itself," in truth—the theme of a natural science, and so on; this is not necessary, a world would not have to exist, and it is conceivable that a world-somewhat-like-it[a] exist, without truth-in-itself.

But even differently still. Every human being stands under an absolute ought, which is directed at him as an individual; and likewise the human being in community. This absolute ought stands in relation to values, the human being satisfies himself if he follows them. But the world is such that it is not a meaningless world, which does not care about the fulfillment of absolute ought. Even if in individual cases some absolutely demanded purpose is not fulfilled, life as a whole is constituted such that life can fulfill itself in the absolute good. No blind fate—a God "reigns" over the world. The world "strives" towards absolute goals, values, it prepares the way for them in the hearts of human beings; human beings could realize, in their freedom, a divine world—to be sure, only through divine grace, which would have to motivate them and enable them, to strive for it in the highest state of consciousness and willpower.

[a] *eine Ungefähr-Welt*

9

The Cartesian Path and the Path of Universal Phenomenological Psychology Into Transcendental Phenomenology[1]

VIII, 275

Two path into philosophy as universal, all-sided science, dominating over all relativities—⟨by⟩ excluding the problems of apodictic justification.

Two paths:

a) the Cartesian;

b) ⟨the path⟩ of universal phenomenological psychology.

I.) How can one realize a universal science? (The way of transcendental philosophy since Descartes.)

1. In positive science there is only relative cognition, [there are only] relative insights with horizons.

2. We take the path of the transcendental reduction (universal transcendental cognition as universal self-cognition, encompassing within itself universal world-cognition). Thereby I construct myself as philosopher—I derive my general essence as I of cognition as the norm of my true I of cognition for my empirical praxis of cognition—I as functionary of the community of cognizers—we construct ourselves as genuine humanity of cognizers. Possibilities of value-truth and practical truth are included therein. From the "we" we construct, on transcendental ground, the "true world" as substrate of genuine cognition. Self-cognition as self-creation and world-creation (in its truth). This is the path of the I-am, We-are—by excluding the problems of apodictic justification.

II.) ⟨Second⟩ path: ***"The world is"*** *as starting point, thus a dogmatic starting point. Radical execution of the principle of cognition from experience. Pursuing all nexuses—the subjective | manners of* VIII, 275/276
givenness. Full, concrete nexus. The cognized in cognition. The regres-

[1] 1923, but cf. the note p. 499—Ed.

sive path to cognizing subjectivity [*is*] *not yet the regressive path to transcendental subjectivity. Scientific consideration of subjectivity—for this purpose we already have psychology and human sciences*.[a] *Conceived as universally executed—all positive sciences are dissolved in human sciences, in a universal human science*.* *What kind of science* [*is this?*] *Psychology and human sciences in the ordinary sense. The "noetic" disciplines, too, as positive sciences. The abstractness of all positivity, also of noetic, logical, ethical positivity. Abstraction from the Ego Cogito in the ordinary sense. What is required is a noetics in a novel sense (phenomenological), which sublates all abstraction. One-sidedness* [*even*] *of genuine personal psychology. Common concept of action: a positivity of a higher level; comment on this: modes of directedness and modes of appearance. Full universality alone leads to full concretion: every object is a correlative occurrence of subjectivity. The insight that the full and pure subjectivity in total would persist, even if the world would not exist …*

Procedure: the given world, description of its universal structural typicality. Eidetic variation, cognition of the correlation, at first in its psychological form. ***Psychological reduction***.† | VIII, 276/277

*Let us presuppose the attitude towards a universal science; the way that offers itself naturally is, then, that of positivity with the goal of a positive science of the world. The consistent path leading from science of nature to science of spirit [*Geisteswissenschaft*] leads to nature being intentionally encompassed in spirit and spirit [being encompassed] in spirit itself. Natural science and nature itself, science of the world and the scientifically understood world itself as such become one formation in universal spirit. This motivates the idea of an absolute science of the spirit [*Geisteswissenschaft*] as way to an absolute universal science.

†Not worked out in further detail. This entire consideration, on the two paths of the *Ego Cogito* and of the natural concept of the world, is carried out in a certain naiveté. Science is cognition from insightful inference; it does not want to permit anything without reason, and wants to permit ⟨especially only⟩ what is "objectively" inferred; it practices persistent critique, hence. But the philosophical considerations are carried out merely in naive evidence, and in like manner, the philosophical universal science, which is to be derived from them, was construed as carried out in naive evidence.

What is lacking, hence, is a theory of transcendental-phenomenological evidence—a reflection upon the conditions of the possibility of apodictic cognition and science—a theory of scientific reason as transcendental, absolute reason—and a grounding of this universal science from apodictic principles, principles that have

[a] *Geisteswissenschaft*

The intentional relatednesses-back. a) The scientific subjects experience and think; they have at all times a manifold of experienced objects—an entire world—which count for them as existing, which they experience in part as actual, in part posit without experience in judgments; just like all human beings. As scientists they aim at being that is "true" in itself and at true, correct judgments. They pursue experience and the judgmental evidence grounded upon experience and seek to determine the universal nexus of being that is "true" in itself as the substrate-system of ultimately true judgments that are valid for them. This is what scientific theory achieves.

b) All striving for truth and this entire subjective life of cognition, in which experiencing, explicit and conceptually judging thinking, idealizing thinking of the irrelative, successful insightful judging, ascertaining fact, of axioms, of proofs, of objective possibilities and probabilities, and so forth, [in which all of this] is carried out, has its peculiarities, its nexuses, [all of that] is a possible theme of research. In such research, the pre-scientifically and scientifically cognizing subjectivity becomes thematic, thus it becomes itself experienced, considered, and it becomes the field of a cognitive activity aiming at true being, true judgments and theories *about it*, an activity on the part of the scientific persons active in the way of cognition and science.

c) If the scientist—not limited as a specialist, but rather universally interested—aims at *universal* cognition, at the universe of all that exists in truth, then he will find himself, at first in his experience in which he attempts this universal overview, opposed to the "world," which he already experiences pre-scientifically as spatiotemporal world as the unified totality of all realities existing for him. To this totality belong also the human beings and he himself, as a human being, cognizing, as a scientist, with body and soul; what belongs to this is also his entire experiencing and thinking as much as his entire passive and active life, his judging, valuing, acting life; hence the entire process of his scientific doing and of everything that gives itself therein subjectively. What gives itself to him sub-

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been radically tested as to their apodicticity (and its "range") (phenomenology of the phenomenologizing subjectivity).

jectively is this or that existing object, in these or those manners of givenness, it gives itself to him as existing | and existing-thusly, and VIII, 277/278 it further gives itself—in due process—as perhaps existing otherwise, as doubtful with respect to the properties that at first existed for him, then again as really so, as confirmed "true," or else in the further process of experiencing apprehensions and in conflict with what is experienced as confirmed as what turns out as non-existing, existing-differently, as illusionary semblance, and so on. Also true being and true judgment, which have been prepared scientifically, make their appearance here, in the subjective nexus, *as* subjective, in the concrete nexus of all the cognitive activities and in general of subjectivity, which lives and dwells psychically. To be sure, true being is not supposed to be something subjective, it can be understood as identical in many subjective evidences and evident inferences—and understood as something which, once exposed, can again and again be exposed as identical in a way that a judgment contradicting it is evidently impossible. But this does not change the fact that true being, objective being, that is, as evidently itself existing as thus and so, appears in subjective nexuses, thus also co-investigated in them, if, that is, the entire subjectivity, in all of its life, in all of its passive and active achieving, is to become a theme.

The paradox of being-related-back. I as a universal scientist, investigating the world systematically, direct my perceptual attention at nature, at animality, at bodily-psychical unities of experience. Pursuing all nexuses and dependencies, I also arrive at the dependencies of intuitive unities of experience—of physical objectivities, and at first their sensible adumbrations of form, color, and so on—on the *lived-body* of the respective experiencing agent and of his *psychical*—appearing itself as more or less bodily dependent—*apperceiving* and other types of activity; likewise *vice versa* [I arrive at] the dependencies of bodily occurrences on the psyche of this lived-body. I as a universal scientist then have to also investigate all achievements that occur within me and the [constituted] formations as formations, and beyond my own subjectivity, [I have to investigate] other subjects and subjective achievements and [constituted] formations, finally also the nexuses of subjects, the communities, communal achievements, communal formations. | VIII, 278/279

Among the subjective and intersubjective formations of *culture* then appear all formations of value, all external works, but also all theories, all pseudo- or genuine sciences, all pseudo- or discovered genuine truths; perhaps, ultimately, then, if it were to be accomplished, *also universal science itself*, which is aimed at here. If it were already accomplished, it would have to exist, so it seems, *twice*, once as universal theory of the world, and secondly: in the special science of human culture it would appear as one of the products of culture, as a special product of scientifically creative subjectivity in the process of history. It is the same as it is with the positive individual sciences: mathematics—the theory of numbers, and so forth, and in the nexus of cultural history: mathematics—as a becoming product—and one having become—of mathematizing humanity. Only that we have, for *universal* science, the peculiar situation that it finds *itself* as theme among all other themes as universal theory; likewise the philosopher [finds himself] as subject of philosophy, and so on.

Furthermore: The *world*, the universal theme of universal "philosophy," is at the same time the world as meant, judged, theorized world [and as such] co-thematic in the scientific treatment on the part of the thematic subjects and subject-communities belonging to the world (hence in psychology and human science). A universal psychology encompasses the scientists of the world and the sciences of the world itself as their psychic formation—and it encompasses itself. ⟨The world⟩ is thematic, once *simpliciter* and as such—and it appears in the theme itself, and that is, in the special theme "cognizing subject," as meant, intentional world and perhaps as cognized with evidence. This holds valid for the world-cognizing subjects in the way that they are thematic *simpliciter* and also belong to this theme for themselves—and then further, by being thematic for themselves, *the following* is once again contained in the theme, *that* they are thematic for themselves as meant, and so on.

History. History encompasses thematically the cognized world as cognized, cognizing subjects as such | and history itself as historical formation. History as science, as cognition, encompasses also the cognizing historians and their cognizing, in which, once again, stands, as cognized, this historian and history and the science of history, and so on. VIII, 279/280

In universal cognition of cognizing subjectivity according to realities and possibilities, should we not have to find, on the correlative side, the whole world, and therein again these subjectivities themselves with all their actual and possible cognitions, and once more with their true objects, thus once again [objects] of the world itself, and once again it [, the world], itself? The relatedness of the I back to itself—extended to the relatedness of evidently cognizing subjectivity as such, actually and possibly, back upon itself and thereby all further special relatednesses-back.

The starting point of the previous consideration was: we scientists have a world—just as all human beings. It is at this world that our entire life alongside with and prior to science is directed, we live into it in a manifold of passive and active manners, it is into it that we research. We investigate nature and create natural science. Researching universally, we then also arrive at subjectivity experiencing in the world, at our entire active and passive life; of course also at scientific life with all its results, also ultimately at the world itself, as it exists in truth and the manner in which truth is valid for us, respectively—in the process of reaching ever "more perfect" cognitions—as substrate of universal science that determines it in theories or as substrate of scientific subjectivity that cognizes it and creates for it true theories; all that in the *factum* but also with respect to possibilities.

If we consider that subjectivity, that all of us only have a world by experiencing it and only know of the world by reflecting upon the experienced [world], if we do not overlook that our subjectivity, under the title "experiencing and thinking," relates itself back to what it experiences and thinks, or that this [what is experienced and thought] lies in its own consciousness, as how and in what manner it is seized and understood[a]—then it seems that what we | said VIII, 280/281
has an especially serious meaning, namely *that an investigation of subjectivity itself*—an internal investigation of being and life that is carried out in it—*leads to all cognition, to all truth and to the true world*.

This, hence, provokes the question, whether or not research into subjectivity, pursuing purely its inner workings—could be a path,

[a] *ergriffen und begriffen*

or could be shaped into a path, an independent path that is, to a universal cognition of the world.

The first and natural path of a science of the world is that of "positivity," that of the natural attitude. Living naturally, we have the world and can also encompass it in a universal "overview," and as we live into it and investigate it, as always, we can posit for ourselves the goal of a universal science of this constantly existing, pregiven world for us, and we can then attempt to attain [this goal] through an ordering of the regions of the world and through systematically ordered and interrelated special sciences. We then move, as in Modernity, from nature to spirit and even where we investigate spirit—in human sciences—not naturally, psychophysically, we take it as spirit in the world, in nature, a sibling of pure nature. If we proceed in this manner, then we find, were a full universal human science to be formed, encapsulated in it, once again, natural science, and so on, as we showed.

But is, accordingly, not another path possible, as already said above, which pursues, from the very beginning, subjectivity in its purity, as the path, in which everything that exists is something conscious and perhaps something cognized in truth? Do both paths—that of natural positivity and the one to be drafted (as of now unknown, how), the "purely" subjective one—have their equal right for a universal science, a fully sufficient one?

How is an observation of subjectivity at all possible, in which possible attitudes? Is it only possible, as is the case for the human being in natural life, such that spirit is an object in the world, filed into it, or is it not also possible such that spirit is investigated, so to speak, *prior* to the world and as the one who constitutes [the world] in itself?

How can the task of universal science be fulfilled in full satisfaction |, how can it be approached in a first attempt and how can it be VIII, 281/282
continued? Can I begin at random and continue at random? Which path is the necessary one here? Can one at all ground an absolute science in a natural external observation of the world? Does one not need to posit an "*internal* observation" for this?

It needs to be shown: In positive science, I achieve only relative cognition. I see and understand, and in identification I proceed in a continual conformation and authentication from seeing to seeing,

from insight to insight—⟨but I always ever achieve⟩ merely relative insights, with horizons. Do I not encompass everything, when I say: the world and—going even further—the real world and the possible worlds?

Universal transcendental cognition as universal self-cognition, encapsulating in it universal world-cognition.

I.) I go the path of the transcendental reduction; at first, I observe my universal transcendental subjectivity, my absolute *Ego*, I investigate it in its essential structures, in its essential formations and the constitutive formations contained therein (among with, those that indicate other *Egos*). In so doing, I construct myself at the same time as "philosopher," as the I that understands itself according to its general essence in essential truths, and construct for myself thereby the norm of the genuine I of cognition—of the transcendental one—for its empirical praxis of factical transcendental world-cognition. But I achieve this not only for myself, but as functionary of the community of cognition, of the community of true humanity of cognition, I help in *us* constructing for ourselves a genuine humanity of cognition as such.

Communal self-cognition. What occurs here more concretely and ever more concretely is objective world-cognition, actual and possible, *in* transcendental self-cognition (personal-plural self!). The possible praxis of forming values becomes possible as well. I make myself, and we make ourselves, bearers of possibilities of value truth and practical truth, and thereby we realize a perfect (in a higher sense) cognition and world of cognition. The true world, a possibly true world as substrate of genuine cognition, becomes built up, constituted | from the transcendental I and from the transcendental VIII, 282/283
"we," as from transcendental ground.

"Self-cognition," hereby, is the foundation for the constitution of the "true" being of the self in itself. It is a self-re-creation that transforms the self from the in-itself to the in-and-for-itself, it explicates it for itself, "discloses" it and re-creates it in this disclosure as a development (doxic unfolding, explication, concrete practical unfolding, free self-development) into its true self. In this self-creation of ourselves, however, we also create the true world; it, too, transforms itself from the state of a tendentious blind in-itself into that of sci-

entific in-and-for-itself, that is, it is precisely this for us; that is, in the realization of its truly true being in constitutive subjectivity. But special analyses would be required to build up the sense of "true" self and "true" world (genuine humanity, and so on).

This is my transcendental path of the *Ideas* (the path of modern transcendental philosophy since Descartes (who was oriented towards an epistemology and a critique of reason), a path which never came to a radical self-understanding and thorough execution, goes, in a certain manner, into this direction as well).

II.) But behold, is *another* path then not possible that has long given me trouble to find the correct form and path of pursuit? The two natural points of departure: of the "I am" and of the "the world is," are they not *both* starting points and, if correctly developed, entryways into universal science, into genuine philosophy: thus both ultimately leading to the same [result], at first in an epistemo-critical naiveté, then in absolute justification? It is certainly not the case that I want to speak in favor of splitting up the positive sciences! And it is also not the case that I do not want to give their current method their full due![1]

Let us begin "dogmatically," but directed at the actual universality of world-cognition. Let us implement the genuine principle of positivity, or the genuine principle of grounding all cognition in experience: experience understood, in complete generality, as self-giving. How can I proceed? How can I get beyond positive science? | VIII, 283/284

For starters, I keep an eye on universality and remain steadfast in my will to radically realize it. Hence I truly pursue *all* nexuses. I take everything that is given, as it is given in experience and insightful cognition of a higher level; but then [I remain] not only in the thematic perspective towards this givenness, but also in the ⟨perspective⟩ towards the subjective manners in which it is given, the manners of appearance, also the full subjective doing and experiencing in general, thus truly in all directions.*

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*Immediately and initially it would have to be made clear: Everything that is

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[1] Reading this sentence as a double negative, i.e., Husserl affirms that he wants to give the methods of the positive sciences their full due.—Trans.

Examples: I am, say, practicing mathematics and take the mathematical not only, as it becomes present to me and stands before me in mathematizing, as the thought-"formation" "mathematical theory," but [I take] this theory precisely as a formation of mathematizing [thought], which is itself now thematic, and thereby in the concrete nexus of my personal history; and likewise intersubjectively in the nexus of history as such and as history of the theory, or what says the same: of the theory in its intersubjective theorization and its historicity.

As a mathematician I practice mathematics "abstractly," I live in the evidence of the mathematical, and then I have only it itself (the theory)—but only abstractly. At first it is something mathematical as becoming, as something produced in my mathematizing, at first only of this momentary [act of mathematizing]. In further practice it becomes habitual and it gives itself as something identical to a "repetition" of the same inferences, theorizings, and thus as the one proof, the one theory, which is "in itself" *vis-à-vis* the repetitious subjective doing and the corresponding concrete conscious processes; then, in transition into intersubjectivity, the community of mathematizers, it is *vis-à-vis* them also something "in itself," as identical, which every apt mathematician, every actual and possible one, could have found (or perhaps has found or could have found) as *the identical* "truth" in actual subjective acts or ones to be actually or possibly carried out. From the very start I think as a currently active mathematician |: what I have created, demonstrated, gained, VIII, 284/285 is nothing merely subjective, but "in itself." But how can I come to know this in-itself, and what does it actually mean for me? Well, I understand that, *as* something identical of repeated and repeatable, as repeatedly actualizable habitual insights—and mine as much as those of others, actual and possible ones—it is to be found—at times my own insightful experiences, at times, in the manner of empathy, encompassing my own and others'—as intuitable in evident syntheses as self-giving identity. Hereby I have the possible cognizers and their abiding cognitions as an evident open infinity of self-giving possibilities, and in addition to this the insight that, no

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given in natural-practical life as itself existing and valid as real becomes later a mere appearance of …

matter when or who would ever enact these or those possible formations of insight, he would have precisely "the same." On the other hand I also understand that, if *I* realize this sameness with insight, everybody could realize it, and I understand the "nativity" of these identities, and so on. All of this leads to syntheses and correlates. If I consider this—and this already means: if I also make again here something seen with insight into a theme, as seen with insight of this seeing itself and the repeatable post-meanings, empty meanings and so on, and thus at the same time with what is seen with insight precisely also this seeing with insight, with the respective habitual acquisitions—then I free myself from "unconscious" "abstraction" of positivity and I see the positive itself at the same time as mere abstractum, as something dependent, essentially inseparable from consciousness, as real and possible consciousness, and inseparable from conscious subjects and their abiding acquisitions of validity.

Likewise everywhere. Everywhere I take cognition together with what is cognized, as something belonging together essentially, and the cognized in a co-consideration of all of its actual and possible subjective modes and of the cognizing subjects, to which they belong in actuality or possibility.

All of this I consider and effectuate, without knowing anything of a transcendental subjectivity and without ever speaking of it. The step that I take—from naive positivity (the positive sciences) to the consistent co-consideration of the respective cognizing subjectivity or its (and all respective) subjective modes of what is positively cognized— |does not yet have the character of the step back to a VIII, 285/286
transcendental subjectivity.

Now I reflect: among the positive sciences—those related to the objective world in general—stand also *psychology* and the manifold *human sciences*. They deal from the very start with subjectivity. If, as is self-evident, it is also demanded for them that what *they* cognize becomes thematic and investigated in correlation with the subjective modes of cognition, then this demand seems to be superfluous concerning their kind [of research]: at least when we do not take special human sciences of the spirit[a] individually, but all at once and concatenated through the general human science, thus uni-

[a] *Spezialwissenschaften vom Geiste*

versal psychology (of individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity). While the *natural sciences* wear, according to their own meaning, an abstracting blinder, through which precisely everything subjective, all spirit, is blocked out, then the totality of the subjective would indeed seem to be the *theme* of the general human science, and according to the generalities and in the specialities of the totality of the special sciences of the spirit.

The noetic disciplines as human sciences, sciences of rational subjectivity, eidetically or empirically considered, of their rational acts and—therein—their rational formations.

If I, thusly, go beyond natural science and deal with its givennesses with the corresponding noeses, if I practice, hence, natural science in transforming it into a natural-scientific *noetics*, then the latter is from the very start a human science; thus my demand here is to dissolve natural science into human science, into universal psychology. Likewise: I lead noematic logic and formal *mathesis universalis* back to a logical *noetics*, and likewise everywhere. If I have from the start human sciences, then the cultural formations lead back to the subjective acts constituting them, which constitute cultural objects with their spiritual predicates, and back to the corresponding persons that thereby become thematic as well. If the personalities in turn become systematically a theme, and in addition in the most general manner in the general psychology of personalities, then, | naturally, all subjective formations and that means, all VIII, 286/287 objective formations that can be produced in subjectivities, at once with their subjective noeses, must be investigated.* In a certain sense this is also correct, if one conceives of the idea of human science broadly enough, whereby, however, ultimately all science that has succumbed to the demand of bringing its theories together with the corresponding noeses to a scientific treatment, would sublate itself into a all-general science—a *universal "human science."*

*Once the essential connection between subjective modes and true being has become clear, then the objective world corresponds to the cognitive correlate "subject-intentional world as such." This subjectively cognized and cognizable world as such—this is actuality and potentiality of evidences of different levels, and so on.

But among the natural sciences of the world we will not factically find such an all-sided or even universal science of the subjective under the title "human sciences," none that would even have an idea of the vastness and type of the goal of a universal science of the subjective indicated above. Not without reason one distinguishes *among* the positive sciences as such (the sciences of the *world*) natural sciences and sciences of the spirit. The latter are—disregarding the confused historical psychology of consciousness—sciences of human personalities and their personal products.[1] Part of these are, to be sure, also the cognitive formations, and we have indeed, as a human-scientific logic (= as "noetic"), a doctrine and a normative doctrine of logical actions (forming concepts, forming insights, making correct inferences, and so on). Noematic logic, logical analytics, circumscribes the products, which are to be gained in evident cognizing, according to their form, the noematic-logical laws and their theories. These evident formations (their forms and laws, respectively) are brought into relation to the cognizing worldly-personal subject | and are viewed *as* formations of cognizing action, which is VIII, 287/288 self-giving in original production. Thus, the theme is logical action according to its steps of action: the construction of practical formations according to their practical intermediary steps, but not differently than in the other human sciences where, for instance, in aesthetics, the aesthetical work precisely of the creative person is observed, only that one here pursues the aesthetic motivations (the aesthetical premises) and in the previous case, the cognitive premises; here the logical, there the aesthetical steps of the products, in which the final product is achieved through action—regardless of the further motivations of the extra-aesthetical and extra-logical sphere, which can equally be, and actually are, considered in historical human sciences.

[1] The meaning of this sentence becomes clear subsequently: The human sciences as personal sciences deal with persons as active and their actions (in the broadest sense)—not with the actually constituting consciousness. [Husserl refers here to the exposition below, as of p. 499, l. 15—Ed.]

The abstractness of all "activities." I-acts in human science as constituted "streams." Positivity ("abstractness") of the human sciences.

But now one needs to keep in mind that this entire consideration, this first thematic of subjective achievements, is still "abstract." The noetics (the normative doctrines of reason) as positive sciences all share with all positive sciences, also the human sciences, the basic flaw of abstractness. In order to clarify this "abstraction," whose sublation translates into phenomenological subjectivity, let me expound the following.

To reflect on the I as judging or valuing means reflecting on its motives for judgment, that is, on its judging positions, "in view of which" other judgments become necessary as consequences or as insights into their states of affairs; this now means pursuing these positions and their concatenations to active creations with formations, but not yet bringing into view and to thematically investigating the concrete life of consciousness, which essentially bears these positions within itself: I as active I, I, willing, realizing, aimed at a final goal, that towards which I act—correlatively the whence of the beginning, what is my beginning, my first "premise," next, what I do with it, | what first I create, which practical possibilities I have VIII, 288/289 and which, when realized, lead to the goal, which leads further from there, and so on.

I-acts, such as "I mean that," "I posit this as substrate (subject), then this as predicate," or "I posit a hypothesis, and thence the following proposition ensues" and so on—these are structural lines of activity (of acting), which issue forth from the I to what emerges noematically and which have, in the case of originary fulfillment of the practical intention—hence in every step of directly realizing acting—a *subjective character*, precisely that of self-grasping—of self-grasping of an object (experience) or of an essential generality or of a consequence, and so on—of having-attained-it-itself, of a self-realization.

Ego Cogito in the ordinary sense and that of human science. Double meaning of "intention." Whoever sees and grasps by seeing: "I see this or that," has thereby not yet knowledge and perhaps no idea of all the subjective [elements] that this I-see makes concrete. The "I see" expresses the intending-straightforwardly, the I's aiming-at the object and, as seeing, being-with-it-by-attaining-it, and proceeding

further in self-realization. ⟨But⟩ already on the noematic side one has not yet brought into view the changing manners of appearance, aspects, orientations, and so on, for the reflection upon the I-acts in the ordinary sense. [This reflection] is, accordingly, not yet the perspective onto the concretion of I-consciousness, in which the *Ego Cogito* in the ordinary sense only constitutes, as it were, one form, one structure. It is, hence, still *something abstract*,* and thus all assertions in the human sciences—also all assertions of a logic, an ethics, an aesthetics, which are both noematically and noetically oriented, as technologies,[a] as practical disciplines—still have the character of a naive positivity, and in order to overcome it, a *noetics of a novel meaning* (of a concrete, phenomenological one) is required, which aims at sublating *all* abstractions, everything which is still a one-sided assertion |, is to be seen precisely as such and, hence one has VIII, 289/290 to proceed in every conceivable direction to universality, which everywhere makes possible full concretion, fully sufficient cognition. All personal psychology—the genuine one, not sensualistically falsified—as valuable as it may be in the framework of positive science, has remained stuck in *one-sidednesses* of positivity as such. Legitimately, traditional logic and ethics, in their double-sidedness of noematic-noetic consideration, belong into the (empirical and eidetic) nexus of a personal psychology; however, a higher level of noetic-scientific consideration of conscious subjectivity is necessary to grasp it in its fully concrete life, into which factor, as well as everything noematic and ontic, equally all acts, all actions of subjects, as subjective formations. Acts, actions are, according to the notion that we all have [of them] and which merely express what comes into the view in natural I-reflection alone and abstractly, positivities of a higher (reflective) level *vis-à-vis* the primary positivities of "pure nature."

*It should be explained in detail that this abstraction in the spiritual act concerns *both*: at once the subjective modes of the thematizing acts (= actions; judging, valuing, and so on), which, as such, give rise phenomenologically to many new reflections, and the themes themselves (the practical formations), which have their, albeit hidden, manners of appearance.

[a] *Kunstlehren*

Hence, *universality*—here meant as that universality of research which inquires, as it were, regarding the totality of the world as world of cognition and for every conceivable object of cognition, into *all* essential correlations belonging to the object as positive theme, as theme of experience and as theoretical theme of science—leads alone to full concretion. The demand is not to ignore the *object*, but to see it in its *objective concretion* as the essential correlate of these or other actual and possible occurrences of subjectivity, which constitute it intentionally and which are inseparable from it as meaning, and thereby to take [the object] in to subjectivity and to investigate it there together with *its* subjective [element].

It is difficult to avoid ambiguous talk. For sure the notion is comprehensible that in the investigation of subjectivity—in actualities and potentialities—its world with all objectivities makes its appearance as "*formation*," but also inseparable from its "*forming*," whereby this forming itself may not remain in the naive manner of positive reflection, it may not itself | remain abstract. The uni- VIII, 290/291
versality that universal science aims at and demands, intends to conceive thoroughly the correlative consideration of every unity as cognitive unity with respect to the world, [which is] the total universe of objects existing for us; and thereby, in the cognition of the inseparable unity of individual subjectivity and intersubjectivity as constituting in community, it is the task to make precisely this unity into a theme for research—in the concrete manner which then encompasses the universe as its correlative formation. The more detailed construction of a systematic method is a matter of special considerations. All investigations are one-sided, but this one-sidedness has to be understood and to be overcome methodologically by a mastery of all aspects of unity.[a]*

*Here it needs to be shown further: If I pursue the universal and pure total subjectivity in psychological apperception, I discover that, if I think it through to a complete universality, it encompasses already, ultimately, nature, the psychophysical world, therein it itself, that it is, thus, the absolute in its being, unaffected even if the being of the world remained in question, and then that the world is an index, and so on—parallelism.

[a] *Einheitsgesichtpunkte*

While writing this I see that, judging from the hints on the last page,[1] everything that is grasped by the psychologist of spirit bears an abstraction concerning the acts and act formations, an abstraction that is to be enacted in several manners: In an act we have an action (activity in the broad sense) of the I, which is directed at a goal, and here we have the deeper transcendental modes of being directed at—striving, with the intention to …—and the modes of appearances of that towards which they are directed, those of the appearing, of what is realized in the fulfillment of the striving intention. Now one can bring everything under the title[a] mode of "appearance," the I-action has its own "manners of appearance" just as the objectivity towards which it strives and what enters into it itself "intentionally" and in the fulfillment of the intention as what is realized in the mode of "itself." Look at all that stands under the title "mode of appearance"! Then also the phenomenological modification of the object where determinations manifest themselves, but also the manifestations in the I in its habituality, and so forth. But indeed | one needs to distinguish: the world, the universe VIII, 291/292 of *pregivenness*—and the *actual* world: actual as what is thematically experienced, considered in thematizing acts of thinking, as a thematic substrate of thought formations—judging, determining—actual in evaluating thematizings, in phantasy modifications of what is experienced, in considerations and experiences of practical possibilities (as "to be realized" by me), in executing, acting realizations. *Also part of it*: what is inactual but can again be actualized. Two forms of actualities! The latter: which realizes *anew* the pregiven entity in its being, which interprets it, confirms its being, further determines its being-thus, striving for its ontic truth—hence: from actuality of "acting" ⟨arises⟩ inactuality as a mode of actuality. But *world* exists from constituting activity; what constitutes transcen-

[a] *Reading* "unter den Titel" *instead of* "unter dem Titel"—Trans.

[1] Husserl means his own previous reflections prior to this paragraph. What now follows, Husserl designates as "comment on the last two pages." This refers to p. 493, l. 1, up to here—Ed.

dentally is not constituted, is not pregiven—it only becomes for the phenomenologist thus through phenomenology.

I can attempt to proceed as follows:

Natural concept of the world. Concerning the prescientific world factually pregiven to me, I attempt a description of its factical universal structural typicality. I soon arrive at the human beings that are factored into the world, who are, in spiritual regard, personal subjectivities just like I am and as which I count myself as part of the world—as existing in the world, as acting into the world, experiencing, thinking, modifying what is real. I now eidetically modify these subjectivities given in experience and in pure intuition of possibility. I see them as constantly experiencing the world and their correlation to the possible experiences and possible worlds of experience. I see that possible world leads back to possible subjectivity, in which the empirical appears, just as all kinds of objectivity (also ideal) as such. Subjectivity itself exists, I see, by "appearing" for itself and by being cognizable for itself.

I start out from examples, I take examples from the cognition of nature, of personal and cultural cognition as guiding clues of intentional analysis, but a psychological one, I elevate myself to a universal egological attitude, insofar as I do *not*, | as on the Cartesian VIII, 292/293 way, immediately "exclude" the entire natural world.

(If I do that, I must then *still* take such individual guiding clues and seek the principles of a phenomenological method and of a critique of all cognition—at first immanent and then (positional) objective cognition arising in immanence. I thus begin, pursuing the meaning of the Cartesian method, with a *Discours de la méthode* and *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, leading into a predelineation of the structure of a genuine philosophical science and of a scientific system. Here I must, afterwards, consider the formal structure of the naturally posited, naturally pregiven-constituted world—firstly as world of experience and then as world of theory, which is the theme of the different sciences—and take it as guiding clue for concrete phenomenological work. But the Cartesian method wants to be a *grounding* of the sciences through a *critique of reason*.)

Opposed to this, I said, I can also *begin with the natural observation of the world*, by exposing the structures of the natural "rep-

resentation of the world" and pursue the sciences of the world related to it:* in the question what these sciences may lack for their completion and to what extent their conjunction really is on the trajectory to being an actually sufficient universal science. Here, of course I must also arrive at constitution, but at first at the cognitive correlation in its psychological form. But what is guiding here is merely the incompleteness of speciality *vis-à-vis* the completeness of universality. Every positive theme, each of its objects harbors an abstraction, it harbors uninvestigated "sides," each of them refers to subjectivity, and so on. I am led to the *psychological reduction*, to the modes of appearance, which authenticate themselves in experience (in experience of every objective region), on the other hand [I am led to] egoical thematic relations on the part of empirical subjectivity (or of the I of persons and souls), to the | intentional VIII, 293/294 objectivities and the different forms of positings and "propositions" and "positional meaning" (theses and themes).†

By transitioning to full universality and disclosing all anonymous correlations, all essential opennesses and necessary connections, I then arrive at transcendental idealism with the full phenomenological reduction. At first I arrive at universal pure intersubjectivity, at the totality of souls "existing in the world" and purely internally conjoined with one another. What is required, then, is a next step in order to give up the natural-positive standpoint, which would be, in full universality—and universality of the psychological *Epoché*—a non-sequitur, a contradiction; say, on the path of the critique of Cartesian cognition of pure subjectivity's independence of the being of the world.

Every experiential objectivity (as region) is a guiding clue for a constitutive system of possible phansiological nexuses, syntheses of appearances, on the other hand of possible thematic nexuses, of

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*Here one would have to consider explicitly the necessity to overcome the descriptive level of the sciences—and especially of the natural sciences—through idealization.

†Perhaps "positional meaning" is a good term to describe what plays the thematic role for the human sciences and the normative sciences themselves, and what is not yet fully phenomenological. Here I do not yet have sufficiently clear distinctions. Thematic intentionality and phansiological intentionality (the modes of "appearing").

syntheses of true propositions. Science in the fullest and ultimate sense, *universal science*, is a universal system of *objective theory (in infinitum)* and correlatively a universal system of theory of experience of all levels (theory of *phánsis, constitutive theory*), whereby the thematic nexuses, the theoretical ones, again have their *phánsis*; they have their experience and manners of appearance of this experience—and so *in infinitum*.

Of course it is very difficult to sharply draw the levels of the structure of the world in this process, the levels of the sciences and the philosophical method of "true cognition" in the ultimate sense. But the same obtains on the first path. At any rate, it is a beginning. And by the way—the enormous difficulty is the "unlocking" of the implicit potentialities, the unlocking of the horizons, the clarification of the pregivenness of the world as abiding pre-validity. | VIII, 294/295

The further reflection[1] immediately transitions to the "normative disciplines," which aim at logical "truth," aesthetical and ethical "truth," genuineness. Science, art, technology, ethical existence (ethical personality, ethical behavior) are here conceived as standing under norms of "truth," directed at "normative goals." Any praxis whatsoever has its goals, which the active agent experiences, in his consciousness, as more or less perfectly attained. But this, too, is to be derived from personal, and that is, practical life; what has become conscious as perfect attainment, as fulfillment of active striving and which has given the experience the abiding meaning of fulfillment at first, later loses this meaning, just as every such experience is subject to a later critique, motivated through the experience of modalization, a critique which precisely wants to ascertain whether this attainment was a truly perfect one. But also what withstands such a critique becomes relative, insofar as *the goal itself* becomes relative. ⟨All⟩ of this, ⟨however⟩, also goes for the means, the intermediary goals, the path.

1) The goal as goal is (as existing truly) originarily given in the fulfillment, which is true fulfillment when it withstands, as purely fulfilling, every critique. It is evidently given "a priori" in the evident

[1] The text that now follows was written, as Husserl remarks, "apparently a few years later ⟨as the previous one, written in 1923⟩, or as correction of the old pages." Husserl also calls it a "supplement" to pp. 492 ff.—Ed.

"anticipatory imagination" of the goal as the end of a path leading to it, evident to me as practically possible. Aiming-at means positing future reality in a pre-willing, means positing of the will. A realizing action comes to an end in an actuality that has now become present, as given in the mode of will of the realized reality. But the latter still has its horizon of will lying in objective presence, as apperceptive co-presence of what is "actually" perceived, and so on. This is what critique aims at.

2) But now there is oftentimes the possibility of a different type of critique of the goal of which I already have evidence as mine or as what I have attained in truth just as I had intended. This novel critique pertains to | the possibility that I become conscious of the VIII, 295/296 fact that *I could have desired something better*, or even the possibility of my insight that this goal is one that I absolutely should not have willed, or that it contradicts an absolute ought.

This already indicates that the cases are different, and one speaks of an ought in different senses, and only in certain ⟨cases⟩ of an ought in a pregnant, namely an absolute, sense. I have, "stupidly," chosen the less pleasant, the less useful, where I could have chosen the more pleasant and more useful. I was "impractical," I have chosen the longer path where I would better have chosen the shorter one, and so on. *On the other hand*: I have chosen something merely pleasant and useful, where I could have and "should" have chosen a *kalón*. Hence, not only our paths, but also our goals, and these themselves under different concepts of ought, become distinguished and criticized, according to manifold preferences, which do not concern the mere material content of the goals, but the further and furthest open horizon of one's own and of the intersubjective practical life and its possible goals. In each of these in principle different forms of preferability there may exist *their* best [option], but perhaps all of these have ultimately a relation to *one* best [option] of the form "*absolute ought*," even those that are already of this form. The latter, insofar as also absolute ought may stand under principles of preferability, above which governs a highest absolute ought.

Here is not the place to pursue this relativism. At any rate, even goals have, besides their factical being (their possibility in a possible realization and its reality in the fulfilling realization itself), possible dimensions of perfection and imperfection, with corre-

sponding dimensions of critique and evidence. The critique refers not only to actual acting, aimed at the current actual goals, but also to the habitual goals, the abiding practical interests: from current life arises—and from its critique of the current-conscious driving goals—a steady tendency: towards what is practically the best, which would not be crossed out in the further nexus of aiming | life, that VIII, 296/297 one can remain with the goals and does not have to understand that one could have, instead of them, chosen something better; hence ⟨the tendency⟩ towards a lifestyle of universal practical harmony (thus also, and above all, intersubjectively) with a system of goals, which could remain forever without remorse.

In addition, actual and meant evidences stand before us (as such subject to critique), in which an absolute ought and an absolute preference stand before us, albeit once more in a relativity, which does not annul this character, but which relativizes, in the comparison of goals, this absolute preferability to certain presuppositions, to practical regions which are to be made comprehensible—to normal situational generalities. We thus arrive at regions, at fields of absolute norms, here understood as absolutely to be implemented in their situation, absolutely preferable goals. Insofar as they are to be grasped in generality in genus and even in eidetic generality (in the relativity of its situation, to be grasped in essence), we have absolute norms in the ordinary sense, that is, eidetic-general norms with eidetic-generally valid (and that is, themselves absolutely valid) normative propositions. Into this essential generality *enters* the relation to the situation, correlatively grasped in essential generality. Such norms are those of ontic truth, not only of formal-logical but of logical truth as such, and ultimately also of pre-logical situational truth; again the norms of aesthetic truth, those of ethical truth, of the truth of absolutely correct personal action; but also of the ethical truth of the person itself, that is, of its being as true and genuine person (the true and genuine human being)—as an idea in a thoroughgoing striving for what is genuine and true of the ⟨person⟩ living in activity and thereby renewing itself in absolute normative thematization of its entire life—perhaps through a conversion—a person that shapes himself under the absolutely normative idea of the person of an absolute ought; and likewise for the community. This ethical truth of the person is itself absolute

"formal" truth—form for an absolutely genuine ethical doing or ethical personhood in its current situation (historical, human and thereby in its surrounding world). | VIII, 297/298

If one now talks of normative sciences, of logic, aesthetics, ethics, then these are precisely ⟨sciences⟩ of the distinct basic types of absolute norms, and ultimately also of their reciprocal being-related-unto-each-other (their reciprocal intertwinement) and their syntheses to ultimate absolutenesses.

Let us continue from here and consider the domains of the *human sciences*, then they are, as sciences of humanity, ordered according to special humanities and correlatively ⟨they are sciences⟩ of the *surroundings* which is conscious for these humanities and shaped ever newly from their individual-personal and communalized life. Everything is thematic here what human beings are conscious of,* what they find consciously as existing for them (in certainty, in questionability, in probability, as semblance, and so on), what has a spiritual form stemming from their life (from what they suffer from "being," from what they value in this or that way, from being practically motivated by valuing), [what has a spiritual form] from their active doing: the world of things as a human world of culture, as world of products, purposeful formations, usable goods, utilities, inutilities (= what is indifferent or harmful), and so on. On the other hand the human beings themselves ⟨are thematic⟩ as correlatively in the process of a steady becoming as persons, in the transformation and development of their characters (and so on) and perhaps putting themselves and their fellow human beings, ⟨their⟩ comrades to work practically, hence cultivating [them].

A special area of human science is here the normative praxis on the basis of normative evaluation of the spiritual formations and of the human beings themselves. On the one hand, and at first, the question is

1) what human beings as such have factically willed and striven for and what they have in truth brought to a complete or incomplete realization *in the past*, what thereby has come about in terms of for-

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* "Conscious": whatever is already *valid* actually or potentially for human beings as human beings as such and for these or other human beings in particular, valid as existing, as valuable, as good, as a goal of actual or "possible" life.

mations, in which typicality, and so on; on the other hand, what they have had before their eyes factically as absolute norms—singular ones or laws of norms—and how clearly they have grasped them and to what extent they have realized them; | VIII, 298/299

2) finally the evaluation of humankind and its spiritual surroundings as standing under absolute norms (from the standpoint of the human scientist), regardless whether the evaluated ⟨humankind⟩ was guided by these [norms] or not; also, to what extent humankind as a development is to be understood as standing under the idea of absolute norms, and so on.*

We thus have

1) the factual sciences of the human spirit, that is, in earthly finitude;

2) the a priori sciences of the human spirit:

a) the a priori of a human person according to its unique essential structures, in its relative concretion as a personal individual, as abiding in its affections and actions, and as such on the basis of a spiritual passivity;

b) the a priori of a human community, human being-together-with-one-another in the world as a personal being-together; on the other hand

c) in general the correlative a priori of human surroundings, of the world as experienced surroundings of the human being and human community: included therein the psychophysical a priori; the universal a priori of the human spirit in its implications—implying the universal a priori of nature, of the experienced world as such, also of nature and world as such as logically true, as existing in ontic possibilities, as the world in human practical possibilities and as the ideally best possible surroundings of the individual and communal human being in every ontic possibility as practical for him. The human being as person = subject of acts, thus always "potential" in his possibilities.

The universal a priori of purely personal intersubjectivity in its immanent logified infinity—the absolute, universally pure human-

*In the relativity of everyday life we evaluate ourselves and the others ⟨as well⟩, and that is (1) by presupposing at first their factical thoughts and deeds, also their factical norms, but then (2) absolutely: so in general.

subjective a priori ⟨has⟩ as branches: the a priori of judgmental truth (ontic truth, matter-of-fact-truth in the broadest sense), the a priori of a pure absolute ethics, and so on—these are branches, and yet they embrace one another.

Ethics in the ordinary sense, doctrine of beauty in the ordinary | VIII, 299/300
sense are related back to earthly situations, to factical-historical humanities. But the moment that we *logify* the rational, "normative" disciplines, that is, relate them to the supposed infinity, we transcend the earthly.

The universal a priori of *the* world, the one existing for us, yields the essential generalities of the ontic possibilities of our horizonally experienced-meant world, conceived as developed according to every harmonious ontic possibility, which would attribute to this factically meant world the unity of a true being in spatiotemporal infinity and ⟨thereby would provide⟩ a modification of this endlessly multifaceted *factum* "existing world" (with its infinite ontic possibilities) as eidetic singularity. This *universal a priori of the world*, a priori of a possible world, existing as such in truth *in infinitum*, implies the a priori of every possible nature (the nucleus of the world) and the a priori of spirituality, occurring in the world as possibility—possibly psychophysically—as singular or intersubjectively conjoined, communalized, implying one another intentionally. This spiritual a priori, however, implies the a priori of nature. We do not have, accordingly, an a priori doctrine of nature *alongside* an a priori doctrine of spirit, and yet we have the a priori of psychophysics. But spirituality as such existing in the world is itself an apperceptive formation, just as the world as such. The moment we include the correlative a priori of the world, that of *constituting ultimate subjectivity*, everything changes.

As long as we research or act (and so on) as human beings, conscious of ourselves as human beings in natural validity, we have as the correlate of our being the world: the external world, and us along with it: as total world. The moment we transcend our human existence, through the phenomenological reduction, towards universal apperception and towards transcendental subjectivity as the locus of its accomplishments, we have, as existing totality, the transcendental I-universe, and, as *constituted*, the world of the natural human being. As human beings we accomplish the constitutive psychological, and

iterated the same over and over as psychologically apperceived; as transcendental subjects we accomplish the transcendental, also once again iterated. To | the worldliness or humanness belongs the VIII, 300/301
psychologizing iteration of the subjective, every reflection is psychological apperception of what is reflected, and the potentiality of this iteration already belongs to the pregivenness and its horizon. The phenomenological method firstly enables transcendental experience (and so on), that is to say, on the ground of the "world" reduced as transcendental phenomenon. From there the I "free of presuppositions" *creates* transcendental pregivenness. Everything that is now pregiven as transcendental is then carried over into the psychological.

10

Husserl's Critical Notes on the Train of Thought [of Part II of the Lecture]*

VIII, 310

ad 208 ff.: Insufficient.

ad 230–235, l. 8: Rework and shorten significantly.

ad 235, l. 9–239: Instead of the following elucidations ⟨from 235, l. 1⟩ until p. 239, the principle of indubitability should be introduced first, in the same vague manner in which it appears in Descartes' *Meditationes* at first, and not immediately developed, in the extreme form, into the principle of apodictic indubitability (see also the recapitulation beginning p. 238, l. 9). For in order to shatter the belief in the certainty of the world, it suffices to apply this principle already in its vague version. Applied in the latter sense, it leads, through the exclusion of the world, to pure subjectivity, in which again | different VIII, 310/311 givennesses would have to be distinguished, apodictically certain ones and such that are not apodictic. The necessity of positing the principle of indubitability in its extreme version thus only discloses itself when one has already reached the ground of pure subjectivity through the application of this principle in the vague version, and it then leads to the distinction between the transcendental and the apodictic reduction (p. 284). Thus, in what follows until then, the talk of "apodictic" reduction or critique should be avoided.

On this note: No, I have no special reason to doubt that the world not exist. But I ask myself if it is indeed so completely certain that …, and if I reflect upon, say, mathematical evidence, I become aware that one here has to distinguish between empirical and apodictic indubitability.

ad 240, l. 27–29: Why?

On the same passage: On the train of thought.

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* 1924 and 1925.

The principle of adequate cognition. Principle of evidence with the levels apodicticity and adequacy.

Should I consider no cognition as absolutely justified which does ⟨not⟩ have and attain the goal of adequacy? Or shall I also accept cognitions, processes of cognition with certain methodological achievements of the type that the progresses in its *method* is guaranteed through apodictic and adequate principles, and that I may not reach actual adequacy in the respective spheres of cognition, but nevertheless *approximation* to this goal: the goal an ideal pole? Perhaps there lies in this [sphere of cognition] also a type of apodicticity under the title "empirical science," which I cannot oversee at the outset?

Questions:

Can there be a thoroughgoing apodictic cognition of the world? If I view, at the outset, the *cognition of the world* as the actual goal of all, and of all scientific, cognition?

If not, what can apodictic and adequate cognition achieve, how for does it reach, and to what extent can the *cognition of the world* become a "science" after all in apodictic cognition? What does "*science*" as the form of justification, the form of grounding, the form of cognition, mean, if I cannot simply equate science with *apodictic* cognition of something to be cognized? Perhaps the science of the world is apodictic through and through, if it, as shaped "absolutely," does not merely want to posit the *world simpliciter* apodictically, but *world-presumption*, thing-presumption, and so on, and if all theory is related to empirical presumption and itself remains presumptive and remains, in every modification, *relatively* apodictic, and so on?

1) The proof that external experience is not apodictic, and certainly not adequate, correlatively, that the experienced world does not have to exist. | VIII, 311/312

On its ground all natural sciences move about, they are all mundane. If they desire final cognition of "the" true world, apodictic cognition hence, then there can be no such sciences that could ever satisfy me. I *then* no longer need a critique of empirical sciences— but also [I need not] attempt to erect such sciences.

But let us leave this issue aside, in what sense experience could be a ground for sciences after all, whether or not, albeit in a modified sense, an apodictic science is possible.

2) What the critique of mundane experience at all times *presupposed*: my experiencing I and experienced life. Hence transition to the *Ego Cogito*. Here we have an assertion that cannot be crossed out, on the ground of an experience that cannot be crossed out. The transcendental I—later transcendental intersubjectivity.

3) The apodictic critique of the *Ego Cogito*.

Just as in the *Kant Speech*,[1] I can immediately approach transcendental subjectivity; perhaps directly following the thought: Is there a type of experience that is apodictic and always presupposed? Thus [I may] critique only briefly external experience, or not at all, and then merely ⟨expound⟩ the idea: whatever I cognize, one cognition is apodictic prior to all testing of this cognizing and is "presupposed." I, thus, arrive at cognitive life itself, and what would now ensue would be the interpretation of this *Ego Cogito*. Is the *Ego* the psychophysical one? And so on.

ad 247: What is *lacking* here is a description of the objective, always pregiven world and the *doctrine of unbuilding*, which is indispensable for a clean presentation.

ad 268ff.: The lack of the doctrine of unbuilding becomes palpable here.

ad 280, l. 29–281, l. 2: This can be desired from the outset.

ad 285ff.: On the critique of my presentation: The now following overview over the realm of transcendental subjectivity is given still prior to all apodictic critique. At this point one should mention that this overview will *later* take on *the function of opening up a second path to transcendental subjectivity* (see pp. 329f.), which can be entered completely independently of the first "Cartesian" one and without a view to its motivation. The point of departure here is the reduction with respect to individual acts, which is carried out in the following exemplary analyses.* | What is gained through these VIII, 312/313

*The exemplary analyses with the purpose of gaining an overview over pure subjectivity range from pp. 286–291 and then again from 316–322. What lies in the

[1] "Kant and the Idea of a Transcendental Philosophy" (Hua. VII, pp. 230–287; trans. T.E. Klein & W.E. Pohl, in: *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 5, Fall 1974, pp. 9–56) was a speech that Husserl gave in 1924, the 200th anniversary of Kant's birth and was to be worked out for publication in *Kant Studien*. The text was never published by Husserl, however.—Trans.

individual reductions, whereby the exclusion of the world is always merely *partial* and relative, is not transcendental purity in the strict sense, but merely a purity in the sense of empirical psychology (cf. also pp. 310ff.). From there the path leads to genuine transcendental purity through a universal reduction circumscribed on pp. 345ff.[1] The advantage of this second way to transcendental subjectivity *vis-à-vis* the Cartesian is that it immediately also offers the possibility of including intersubjectivity in the reduction (cf. pp. 331f and pp. 336ff.).

ad 291, l. 7 andff.: ⟨Here⟩ the following problem is being tackled: how one is to clarify the meaning and accomplishment of the transcendental *Epoché*; hence a phenomenological theory of the *Epoché* on the basis of a theory of reflection as such. The subsequent transformation of the meaning of this "novel path" to transcendental subjectivity p. 329. Cf. pp. 340ff.

ad 291, l. 8–314, l. 10: In order to improve the train of the presentation: the elucidations following now (⟨from pp. 291–315⟩) on the latent and patent *Ego* as well as the notion of interest and the disinterested spectator are to be seen at this place as an *excursion* as it were, since they interrupt the path of leading up to transcendental subjectivity on the second path, namely starting from reduced individual acts. They can be viewed as pieces of a phenomenology of the acts of the phenomenological *reduction*, and at first related to the *individualized acts* of this sort. All that is said here can, however, also be related to the universal reduction discussed later.

ad 296ff.: Important with respect to the cleanliness of the train of thought:

Exclusion of all positions *in* the experiences:

1) If I start out from naiveté, I do not yet have phenomenological acts, and I then exclude the position-takings in all acts—in all *presentifying* acts, of course.

2) If I *have* already carried out phenomenological acts, then I can reflect upon them, and this reflection is a new phenomenologi-

middle, pp. 291–315, is to be seen as part of a phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction.

[1] But cf. also Texts 21 (pp. 575ff.) and XXV (Hua. VIII, pp. 621ff.)—Ed. Text XXV is not included in this translation—Trans.

cal experience, ⟨a reflection, namely⟩, where I have from the very start something transcendental, if I only hold steadfast the exclusion which I have already enacted. But what is therein *posited* is, once again, a transcendental experience. If I could do this in the manner that I still have the latter as present, then it would not have to be excluded; for it is phenomenological positings, after all, that I want to enact.

ad 298, l. 34–309, l. 9: Naturally, now one will have to consider even more whether the train of thought is in good order.

I begin with the doctrines of natural reflection, splitting of the *Ego*, | and so on, *but consider only doxic acts and doxic reflections— something that needs to be stressed more sharply*—and now the question becomes if it is still possible for me to already introduce *the concept of interest and disinterestedness in the doxic sphere*, from p. 290, l. 9–p. 295. VIII, 313/314

Is this helpful as preparation and as foundation for a first, narrower concept, and does it fit well with the later one?

ad 303, l. 23, and ff.: On the path: as of p. 302 excursion on the theory of theme, interest, attitude:

What now follows has, besides its function as part of a phenomenology of the phenomenological reduction, also the other function, namely to point out that the reduction can be enacted with respect to every type of acts and not only with respect to the cognitive ones, by virtue of the fact that the attitude of the disinterested spectator necessary for the reduction is possible with respect to all types of acts.

ad 302, l. 23–309, l. 9, *especially as of* 304, l. 13: Acts in main action and supporting action: *main action* is a title for *what is thematic and what belongs to the unity of a theme*. Unity of interest—on this p. 306.

But here we will have to make yet finer distinctions. *Different main actions can intersect with one another*. What is missing here is the *concept of attitude*, which is an essential part of the main action. Then the *change of attitude*. Habituality and steadfastness of the attitude, for instance during the labor of one's occupation. But several "occupations," several habitual main actions, several thematic spheres of one subject can exist alongside one another, they can interfere with one another and can alternate at times

purposely and without interference. Interferences from affections, which belong to no thematically grounded sphere. *Dispersed actions and unconnected acts. "Concentrated" acts*, which belong to a thematic universe or a special theme. The interweaving of themes and thematic actions.

Acts belonging to the unity of a *total act* (to a thematic attitude) and sudden ideas, either from other thematic spheres, or without being thematically organized in the subject, and so on.

Hence, all of this is to be completely reworked. *It is the question at which place* [*in the presentation*] *the general theory of the theme is to be dealt with, to which all of this belongs*.

Within a total act, all acts, as partial acts, have a *function of unity*. To this belongs not only the difference between *acts of a final goal*, in which the final theme (purposive theme) ⟨is itself relevant⟩, and *acts of means* (premises). Partial acts can also be | coordinated, and VIII, 314/315 not only as coordinated means to an end. Even without it, partial acts of an entire total act can be coordinated, insofar as they are coordinated as ends, without at all functioning as "means." This is the case, when I look around, purely in experience, and take in one thing after the other. But already the apprehension of properties, of parts has an element of the means, of serving [a purpose]. The details are a matter of formal logic, axiology and practology.[1]

ad 309ff.: How to continue, as of p. 309:

Up to here runs the quite imperfect attempt, to be reworked, at a clarification of the concepts *interest, theme, thematic universe, attitude*.

Perhaps it will also be good and even indispensable to discuss *that thematic modification*, which every act of the heart can experience in itself, namely the *modification of the act of the heart into a doxic-thematic act*, hence the transformation of the thematic-valuing behavior into a thematic-doxic one, as an experiencing and *judging positing of the value as doxic theme*; and likewise everywhere.

Accordingly, one would have to mention beforehand that the normal talk of *noticing* (in general *attending-to*) generally means

[1] P. 305, l. 29–p. 307, l. 7 in the present version of the main text have perhaps already been redacted in consideration of the above critical notice—Ed.

a *seizing-from-the-I*, that the *general* talk of *perceiving, experiencing* means precisely *a noticing* perceiving and experiencing; on the other hand one has to distinguish noticing and attending-to in a specific sense, the latter then means being-directed-*thematically* (and actually this would not merely have to be understood in a doxic sense, hence perhaps also axiologically, and so on). The attending experiencing in this sense, the thematic one, and that means purely doxically thematic, is experiencing in the so-called theoretical interest, an expression fitting only for scientific observing, which is experimenting. What we mean, in philosophical, and of course specifically in logical, parlance, by *thinking* is always thematic thinking, thinking in the theoretical interest, in the theoretical attitude.

After these important preliminary considerations it will be necessary to study the self-reflections, which are contained in acts of all classes.[1]

ad 311, l. 7: Discuss other concepts of disinterestedness (disinterested critique)! | VIII, 315/316

ad 314, l. 14 and ff.: If now this overview of the types of givennesses of the phenomenological reduction, interrupted p. 290, continues and now the *acts of presentification* are presented, acts as such, whose intentional relation is a double one, then this serves to transition to the *expansion of the reduction to intersubjectivity*, a step taken p. 336.

ad 328, l. 9–333: Concerning a reworking for improvement:

1) On the original, Cartesian path [I should] mention with just a few words the infinity of transcendental subjectivity, of the stream of

[1] After this note follows the revised version of the text, which has been inserted by the editor in the main text, cf. above, p. 308, l. 7–25. This text replaces the original version, which reads: "After the I has enacted for a certain stretch all such acts in naive devotion, or also after its full completion (say the I which at first lives in the shaping of a scientific theory or in the attitude of a continual aesthetic observation or an external labor), it can become aware of its doing or what it has done; it can transition into the attitudes and possible actions of reflections upon itself.

Once I, who has naively carried out such random complex actions, establish myself as a reflecting I, then the act of reflection does not have to be simply of the type of the reflections preferred thus far, thus, for instance, not simply of the type of perceiving reflection or also reflections upon memory, related back to my past acts of the I." — Trans.

transcendental life: without speaking of the effect of the reduction on memory and expectation, and so on.

2) Transition to the second path, which is a modification of the Cartesian one to the extent that it steers directly at the *Ego Cogito* and *nos cogitamus*. The earlier overview in [the realm of] transcendental subjectivity is carried out independently of the Cartesian path and by practicing special "phenomenological reductions." But then one needs to proceed systematically, in main types, beginning with perception. Regarding external perception [one needs to discuss] the adumbrations, manifolds of adumbrations, their syntheses, their associative connections. I will need this later on in the reduction to the I-universe.

I need to use parts of the lecture of the previous year (1922/23).[1]

ad 329, l. 34–p. 330, l. 7: But later I am forced to acknowledge that there is an obscurity in the guiding idea of the first paragraph. What does this mean, "to bring into play the phenomenological *Epoché* with respect to individual acts"? Thematic acts, acts of interest, have their *theme*; to exclude *this* from the interest of the observer does not yet mean excluding the *external horizons*, which are still present positionally. Indeed, this is shown later. What is demanded is to exclude *all horizons*, also those that just come to the fore in the course of the disclosure and that are continually opened up anew. What is demanded is a *universal Epoché*.

But now one has to acknowledge from the start that I will never come to an *end* in individual reductions and that I, *as psychologist*, do not merely have individual acts before me as theme, but the *entire human being* and *an entire soul*. Their unity is my guiding clue from the beginning. One can say: Just as the objects and the world, likewise also the soul or the monad give themselves originarily, but only as the unity of an infinite manifold of manners of givenness and only by way of orientation, namely around the mental presence with its explicable horizon. Thus, *from the very start | a universal reduction is demanded*. VIII, 316/317

Hence, this is not a "*psychological reduction*," to merely practice the reduction in individual cases, but in individual cases on the

[1] This lecture is now published in Hua. XXXV—Trans.

ground of the whole. Just as this whole is only given in an indeterminate and general anticipation, *the reduction of this whole is a reduction in anticipation*. It is carried out in a universal will, to which obey, then, all individual reductions, as now demanded in consequence.[1]

Also ad 329, l. 34–330, l. 7: This was supposed to be the reduction on the part of the psychologist. But this is misleading. What is demanded of the psychologist is from the very start a universal reduction, and through it all individual reductions.

ad 330, 15–18: "to practice anticipating reduction regarding the entire psychic subjectivity, furthermore regarding the entire intersubjectivity in the world, and by consequence regarding all individual ⟨acts⟩"! This is how it should have been phrased.

ad 330, l. 30–331, l. 3: No.

ad 331 f. and ad 345: Against these expositions one should have to object that when I, the psychologist, want to expose every pure psychic nexus, just as mine, the one which constitutes my pure psyche in its totality—and I do want the pure psyche as such—*I indeed will have to enact a universal phenomenological reduction*. For all validities for me, all entities for me are indeed posited as valid from my own intentional life. All individual reductions with respect to individual acts, hence, take place within one general and a priori all-encompassing reduction and yield the individual pure acts as moments of the one pure total psyche.

The further exposition as of p. 345 is indeed helpful in another context, namely as description of the manner in which every horizon intentionally implies theses of validity (intentional implications of validities of these horizons) and the manner in which an anticipatory *Epoché* reaching through these horizons has been enacted, wherever a transcendent object has been bracketed. Furthermore that the bracketing of something real—with respect to its unthematic real background and the external horizon indicated by it, a horizon that, too, bears implications of validity, and accordingly also is, and needs to be, bracketed—entails a universal bracketing. All

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[1] This note is separately dated with "1925." On it and the following notes cf. Text 21 (pp. 575 ff.).—Ed.

that, and what is exposed here is the disclosure of what is gained *implicite* as what is purely subjective through such an *Epoché*. One can also put this under the question: If I enact with one stroke a universal bracketing—what kind of subjectivity is here to be gained structurally? | VIII, 317/318

This [is to be included] as an introduction to the description of intentional implications.

But precisely through the discussion of the horizon arises the objection that not a single objectively directed experience is really reduced to purity if one only reduces its *thematic* content—or in general real content—and thusly, as if the intuited were isolated.* *Every single experience "mirrors" the total nexus of experiences*, I must enact universal reduction from the beginning to gain even a single [experience] as purely psychic.

It is clear, thus, that the universal *Epoché* concerning the entire objectivity ⟨must⟩ also be part of the methodological stock for the psychologist.

(But one does not have *presuppose* the unity of the individual pure monad, its monadic being or that of the psychic total interiority, say as a historical prejudice. One first has to *show* that to every human being belongs a "monad." The lectures' procedure in the descriptions of the individual reductions—to be understood as demonstrations of the intentional implications in the different types of intuitions, and so on—can only serve to this end. The discussion of horizons is treated from the very start precisely as a part of this doctrine.)

ad 332, l. 31 and ff.: On the doctrine of implications or disclosures: Here one would have to proceed systematically: at first the *intuitions*, and here one would have to demonstrate the distinction between thematic objectivity and unthematic one, but lying in the field of intuition; on the other hand *horizonal* implications, concerning the empty horizons belonging to the theme, and once again the horizons not belonging to the theme.

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*This is still not neatly stated: cf. the distinction, of implications, between real and horizonal ones.

Furthermore *empty consciousness* or consciousness through expression and the like. But is this at all helpful? How is one to proceed here, and what are the essential and most general distinctions?

ad 337, l. 9–13: Has the phenomenological reduction of the other body been forgotten here?

ad 345: see ad 331.

ad 347ff.: From here [we have] a systematic consideration of the horizonal consciousness as consciousness of validity belonging to every real and ideal object existing for us; and finally [a consideration] that there exists for us at every moment and in the total unity of our subjective life *one* universal horizon of validity, whose intentional unraveling leads to the intertwined unity of all objectivities that are valid for us at once as real and ideal worldly entities.

This excursus belongs to the doctrine of intentional intertwinement | of all intentionality in a life, indeed in intersubjective life, VIII, 318/319 which provides a unity of a psychic life and unity of a communal life. This also [belongs to] the doctrine of implications.

ad 351, l. 15 andff.: Here one would have to add: synthesis of horizons of individual moments to a synthesis of a validity which nevertheless unifies itself to a unity despite all change. This also indicates itself in the following.

ad 356, l. 4: Use this elsewhere, in the unified presentation of a doctrine of implications.

ad 356: Critique of the inclusion of the ethical *Epoché* and an objection against this use of the term "life" for my purposes: cf. the appended note in longhand.[1]

Likewise ad 356: The universal ethical *Epoché*. I have overlooked here that the ethical *Epoché* has an entirely different universality than the phenomenological one. It concerns all and every validity that was put into play in personal acts of my life up to now. But this does not mean: all validity as such that has its origin in me. For instance, the ontic validity of the world is not affected. But not even all validity carried out in *egoic acts* as such, as already becomes clear from the example, thus not the active experiences and judgments of experience [are affected].

[1] The "appended note in longhand" is the note that follows now—Ed.

In general, the meaning of this ethical *Epoché* is to be determined precisely—it concerns originally all acts related to absolute ought and what is relevant in this respect in the universal practical field.

In general one has to take into consideration everywhere that to speak of *life* in the natural sense of the term—namely mine, and in general, personal life—always presupposes *the pregiven world*, the surrounding world as that to which my personal actions and passions are related. *That*, however, I have by no means overlooked in what follows.

Accordingly, pp. 356ff. have to be reworked.

ad 357, l. 14–18: But the natural talk of life and overview of life only leads to personal intentionality, and not to the passive-constitutive one.

ad 361, l. 30–35: Imprecise.

ad 364: What is lacking now is the true character of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction *vis-à-vis* the universal psychological reduction. But what is lacking even *earlier* is the *intersubjective reduction as psychological*.

ad 375, l. 23: This would have to be expanded: interpretive experience.

ad 377, l. 10–380, l. 19: These pages were marked as 00.[1]

ad 379, l. 35–380, l. 2: Intentional immanence: An explanation is missing. Not in all intentional experiences, and *au fond* not in all representations-of … (by which an intentional relation is established | in all founded [acts]) the represented object is truly ideally VIII, 319/320
immanent such that in the case of identifying congruence the identity and the identical (as the same intentional objects) is originarily given and to be seized. This is the case with appearances in the pregnant sense of perceptual appearances, self-giving and originarily giving ones: this is case in the enacting of the syntheses, and at first the continual ones. The continual seeing is precisely for that reason a real seeing of the object. Already in the case of discrete seeing one has to reconsider.

[1] Husserl had the habit of marking manuscripts that he deemed worthless with zeros in the margin—Ed.

It is still the case, and naturally so, in the case of intuitive recollection. But what about the case of an unclear indication, in the case of unclear and indistinct anticipations? But there are also distinct ones, and in the logical sphere [there is] the "distinct" judging *vis-à-vis* the indistinct one. Indeed, this is a matter of the greatest principal importance.

11

The Principle of Sufficient Reason For Every Scientific Judgment* (Ad Lecture 28)

VIII, 329

Sufficient grounding: question, intention toward decision, theoretical interest, question as to justification, theoretical question, and so on.

Principle: Everything questionable for cognition must allow itself to be reduced to something unquestioned and must be able to be brought to unquestioned understanding. What does "questionable" and "unquestioned" mean with respect to cognition?

What is meant is apparently the unquestionedness of "sufficient" grounding. Questions concerning cognition are questions of justification. The term "cognition" is not without its problems. It is equivocal. We are from the very start in the attitude of science, we do not merely want to judge in general, but we want to "cognize," and we already were and are cognizers when we posit questions as to justification. We do not only strive for judgments, ultimately for certainties, but for grounded judgments, and once we have grounded ones, the grounding is not always and not without further ado "sufficient" grounding. We strive for fully sufficient ⟨grounding⟩: hence not only judgments are grounded and become judgments whose rightfulness is evident, whose appropriate right has been exposed and which, hence, have acquired for us the confirmed character of cognitions; instead, cognitions are themselves tested, they are investigated, as grounded, concerning the measure of their rightfulness, grounding is expanded, deepened, perfected, such that the judgment of cognition becomes a more perfectly grounded one, a perfectly grounded one according to its idea.

Questions. Wishful intention, directed at decision: this presupposes uncertainty, perhaps doubt, a tension between conflicting

* 1924 and 1925.

convictions or also between conflicting judgmental tendencies, judgmental suggestions.[a] The answer is the fulfillment ⟨of the wishful intention⟩, providing, with satisfaction, the certainty (or | probability) and thereby the "it all fits together quite well." VIII, 329/330

A special question is the *question as to justification*. We need to distinguish here:

1) The wishing intention, directed at the self-having or at the "it itself" as such. Already in empty anticipating, pre-meaning, as the empty form of experiencing intuition, we have the wishful intention towards self-grasping, towards perceiving, towards remembering and, practically, towards the realizing striving, which aims at realizing an experiencing intuition; likewise concerning a meaning and experiencing that relate to something else;[b] likewise in predicative judgments (of the logically higher level) concerning the wishful intention towards a self-grasping of the "insight," of the predicative content in its selfness. This, of course, is not to be confused with the wishing that *A* exist, that *S* is *p*, or with the desiring of *A*, terminating in the "consummation" of *A* itself.

The intention towards the "self" is the *theoretical (doxic) interest* in the first sense, the interest which, becoming practical, becomes a practical striving for truth, for cognition (in the first sense).

2) This is not the interrogating intention that expresses itself in the *question as to justification*.[1] Origin of questions of justification: The question of justification, taken literally, is precisely the question as to the right, and this question is put to a judgment; I who puts it, puts it to a judgment that is, as just carried out or recurring, precisely my conviction. I ask: is my judgment correct? *Does* it *have* right?, and, in a slight shift of meaning, Do *I* have the right to judge in this manner?, and again: Does the judgment have a *ground* or grounds (in the plural)? Grounds = grounds of justification. At first one needs to say here: I already must have judged about grounds of justification and about rightfulness, in order to interrogate them later; likewise as, in order to arrive at a judgment, I must

[a] *Urteilsanmutungen*. [b] *Beziehendes Meinen und Erfahren*

[1] Here and in the following, Husserl is playing on the literal meaning of justification, *Rechtfertigung*, playing on the cognate *Recht*, which is here translated as "right" as well as "justification" — Trans.

first have seen, explicated and predicated. Here, the self-having is prior. But the later empty meaning "far removed from the matters" in its unfulfilledness has a deficiency. To want to attain the things themselves and the states of affairs, conceptual contents, that is then the theoretical striving. Then one experiences—in the attainment itself or in the transition to the attainment (or its opposite)—the correctness or incorrectness, the being-correct or being-incorrect; and this, too, becomes the theme of mere meanings, of judgments far removed from the matters; and further, then, [this becomes] the theme for questions, namely with respect to uncertainties (as judgmental modalities, modalities of the *positio*, of the subjective validity), as intentions towards decision.

We thus have:

1) the striving towards the self, strivings on the part of the theoretical interest—then as special case

2) the striving towards the self of the correctness of an "experience" or of a judgment (of an empty experience, so to speak, or of an experience | concerning its empty components or special elements [of this experience], which allow for a more mature fulfillment). VIII, 330/331

Here we have correlative occurrences. The judging is to transition into intuiting and the judgment itself into its insight (noematically). Here then appear the differences of immediate and mediate insight, that is, of the things or states of affairs themselves arising in immediate or mediate fulfillment. The proposition (the judgment) fulfills, justifies itself, it is a correct, true proposition, it orients itself to the true proposition itself (truth in a different sense).

The theoretical interest in the specific sense as the interest in grounding, laying down norms; to this are added then the ascertainment, fixation in the conservable expression and memorization of the grounding. First grounding: primal instituting of the grounding.

3) Every judgment that has undergone grounding has the character of being just to the norm,[a] of the *orthòs lógos* or of the *orthè dóxa*. Testing, the wish for such a testing: hence, once more the striving after the re-enstatement of the grounding, post-instituting.

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[a] *Normgerechtigkeit*

4) The self-giving and grounding can be a more or less perfect one, in different senses. The wish to get closer, to a "mature" or all-sided self-giving or to a self-giving with respect to new sides.

Thus a higher level: evaluation of the grounding.

5) All of this does not have much to do with *questioning* in the first place. But now it is possible that judgments become doubtful or that from the very start uncertainties exist and that intentions arise towards decision, interrogating intentions. And these can be, then, in the theoretical attitude (as a habitual direction toward insight), directed not only at decision, but at *insightful* decision. Also the *justification* (in the theoretical attitude precisely towards the justification which is a habitual one for the scientist) can be uncertain: not only the conviction has transformed itself into uncertainty, but the conviction lacks justification, one's own or someone else's conviction. One *inquires* about it. Or an opinion concerning justification transforms itself into an uncertainty with respect to the justification, and the justification is called into question. Or the grounding as such is in terms of judgment (in terms of belief) a conviction, but now one becomes uncertain and the grounding becomes questionable. Or the justification of the grounding does not become questionable *per se*, but it becomes questionable in its imperfection, one becomes uncertain of one's belief in its perfection and strives for perfection and asks: How far does the grounding extend, is it perfect, how can I achieve perfection? And so on.

Thus, many things are intertwined here. In general, the theoretical intention towards grounding is not yet an interrogating intention. But insofar as I know as being in the theoretical attitude that opinions | at times can be fulfilled, at times become disappointed in the VIII, 331/332
effectuation of a theoretical intention to fulfillment, I take up, as a rule, an interrogating attitude.

Here one notices: Just as I, in general, do not immediately give up a conviction the moment that other conflicting convictions arise, such as the doubt whether it will withstand—thus also whether the conflicting ones ⟨will withstand⟩—modalizes its character and yet does not annul its character of "I believe it" (turns it into mere assumption); it is likewise in the case of proofs that "momentarily" cause me to reconsider and that I test for that reason with the question: "Is this really true?" There is a difference whether I have

not yet really decided (that is, taken a firm stand) or if I merely say: "it seems so," and then furthermore also: "it seems to be the case but of course one thing conflicts with the other" and "I doubt" whether it is this or that: *or* whether I have decisions, say old, firm convictions, and added on to this newly decided convictions, where I only later notice how they collide with each other and when I then "become doubtful," unsettled, how things stand, how they will resolve themselves.

A first notion of "questionable" would be the intentional character of the question itself, precisely the one that our language expresses in the general meaning of the word "question." The ordinary meaning of "questionable" is the following, however:

Questionable is that which can be called into question.

In a certain sense I can call into question *every* judgment that is not given to me evidently, and in a certain sense in turn [I can call into question] every evident judgment that is not completely evident. But then the "calling into question" is metaphorical talk. For I call, accordingly, also every intention towards insight and towards perfect insight a questioning with respect to insight and grounding. At all times I can immerse myself into asking as if I were really uncertain and could ask, and would ultimately ask for justification: whereby I then would also strive for the justification itself, only that it would have the form of the decision. But in general, all striving-for-testing, which wants to convince itself over and over (to call upon the witnesses), is motivated, in the scientific attitude, through the idea that *memory* could deceive, that the fulfillment would perhaps not be a completely perfect one, and so on. But this is not an empty but a real possibility which, becoming conscious, makes it doubtful to a certain extent how things stand here and now. And thus even evident certainty, which has become a habitual possession, leads once more to uncertainty, to doubt and to questioning. Everything becomes questionable once again. But I do strive towards unquestionable cognition, unquestioned convictions. This is, to be sure, a problem peculiar to phenomenological description: the problem of an individual-subjective and intersubjective certainty | of scientific ascertainments and the idea of their firm stand in evidence that can always again be produced—as an idea to which one can approximate oneself practically. "Moral" certainty. VIII, 332/333

Modality of ailing[a] *certainty*. Just like in the case of a conviction that I have already grounded much earlier, and, coming back to it, I am not entirely sure whether I could again ground it and whether it actually stands as justified. Similarly, but not entirely identically, when convictions are rejected through new convictions or when it becomes noticeable afterwards, in the confrontation of convictions, that they do not conform to one another.

One notices the differences *vis-à-vis* mere *suggestions*, for which I was not decided and am internally actually still ⟨not⟩ decided, that is, suggestions in conflict with one another (contradicting one another). For if one suggestions falls by the wayside for whichever reasons (I come to the conviction of the respective negative judgment), then all the other suggestions, speaking generally, remain suggestions. At the very least, they do not have to yield a decision. On the other hand, when a *conviction* is contested through another conviction or when it falls ill, through the fact that another suggestion arises which speaks against it, then, in general, the confirmation of this claim will restitute the contested conviction to a pure certainty. I had not yet given it up and I retain it—now in good conscience.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason as Principle of Adequacy and Apodicticity. Science is not naive cognition from theoretical interest. To its essence belongs, rather, *critique*, principal critique. It aims at justifying cognizing deeds in every step from principles, in order to inscribe into every step the consciousness of necessity, the consciousness that in general a cognizing of such form is a necessarily correct one, that a path of this type, of cognizing grounding in proceeding from the grounding to the grounded, is a path appropriate to its goal.* This characterizes scientific-genuine cognition. Scientific cognition is not only in general a cognizing deed with the con-

*The double meaning of grounding is not taken into consideration ⟨here⟩: 1) Adequation to the evidence of the propositional content presupposes the experience of its objective substrate; 2) the authentication of experience through further experience. There is also no talk of the meaningful form of *objective* validity. What is intended here is a general form of expression, which does not pre-judge for these differences that have yet to be created.

[a] *Angekränkelt*, from *krank*, ill. A rather colloquial term, meaning something like "a little bit ill."—Trans.

sciousness of goal-appropriateness, not in general cognizing in the consciousness of evidence; rather, it connects *critique* of this evidence or rather, it connects with the straightforward consciousness of the evidence, with the straight consciousness of the truth* in its respective | shapes (immediate truth, inferential truth, and so on) VIII, 333/334 the consciousness of the necessity of its necessary validity, which is to say here that it critically observes the naively attained truth, the meant state of affairs in the mode of fulfilled self-givenness, as merely a meant truth, and that it, in carrying out the critique, analyzes what is meant and assesses whether truly everything that this judgmental meaning means is actually self-given, truly bears the character of self that accounts for truth, hence that it bears within itself this truth itself as the entire truth that is meant.

From given cognition, that is from the material given in the mode of fulfillment, it transitions to the *principle*, which in general is insight: to proceed in this manner is necessary in general—namely, every evidence, every cognition, fulfilling self-grasping of the truth is only then full and genuine evidence, self-grasping, fulfillment of what is meant in the judgment, when it brings all meaning components to fulfillment, and only then does it include falsehood by necessity.

The *practical principle* reads: to allow no judgment as valid in science (instead of inhibiting it through *Epoché*), to go along with none of them in [science] and to fixate it as such a ⟨judgment⟩ that has its *fully sufficient ground of cognition*, which has gained its ascertainment through a critical measuring of the meaning *vis-à-vis* the self-having, which has proven its *adequation* through a methodological exhibition of the perfection of the fulfillment of the total meaning through a fulfillment of all partial meaning, all implied co-meanings. As long as something is co-meant, which lacks authentication, which lacks the ground that carries it, it is possible that the meant does not exist. On the other hand, full adequation excludes non-being, a judgment that is evident "through and through" is itself correct as a whole, it has its truth itself within itself and in *apodictic*

*Of the consciousness "to have it worked out," to have attained the truth-goal, which one has set out to attain.

necessity, it cannot be false. But this is a truth that can be made evident in principal generality and [is] itself an adequate and apodictic truth.

If falsehood is a *non-value* or is the possibility that a judgmental meaning would have to be sacrificed in the transition to fulfilling intuition (through disappointment, through conflict with the respective intuition, which fulfills it partially), [if it is] not something willed, not something to be striven for, then the principle to not allow a "blind" (non-evident) judgment and not one that does not authenticate itself completely through adequate grounding, is a *principle of practical reason*, it has its *practical apodicticity* in its common generality.[a]

This reflection, thus, leads to a general principle that is at the same time theoretical and practical. As theoretical, it is the "definition" of adequate or "sufficient" grounding, in which already lies, as a practical element, the *possibility* of such a grounding; furthermore, the further principle that every adequate grounding necessarily ascertains truth, that is, that it excludes, as such, falsehood, in pure | generality; or the principle that what is judged in such a grounding as existing and existing-such, can impossibly be non-existent, that it is inconceivable that it not exist or be differently [is all included in this principle]. VIII, 334/335

Every truth of genuine science is by necessity apodictic.

As practical principle—since truth as such is the highest and principal goal of science and thereby possibly falsehood is to be absolutely and principally to be avoided according to its essence—it is the highest principal order of science, as a special case of the principle, to strive as such and only for truth in judging, to not permit a judgment as one that is adequately grounded.

Its categorical imperative reads: "*Judge adequately in pure apodicticity*." Never settle with naive evidence but only with the one that you could in principle transform into apodictic evidence. Or: *Judge only with an absolutely sufficient reason*.

Herein lies, thus, a demand for the critique of evidences and of the testing of their range. In the absolute demand of evidences, of original groundings (groundings, thus, related to self-giving), which

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[a] *generellen Allgemeinheit*

are complete, *seems* to lie a rejection of all judgments of incomplete and non-apodictic grounding.

Yet it is not impossible that in certain entire spheres of judgment the naive, necessarily preceding evidence is of such a type that, by identity of its objective meaning, it can by no means be transformed into an adequate one or that entire spheres of objectivity do not at all permit an adequate cognition; on the other hand, however, [it is not impossible] that every such evidence, on the way through critique of its range, yields the concurrent insight that through *relating-back to a hypothesis* or in some other way from an inadequate evidence an adequate one of a modified content is to be attained and that on this way adequate groundings and pure truths for all possible objectivities are to be attained, albeit not adequate cognition of its being and being-thus *itself* and any other states of affairs existing for them in general.

But this hint is, from the beginning, not yet more than merely a warning to utilize the principle of sufficient reason in the wrong way and to reject it, say, a priori as one that is ridiculously overextended: since it is almost a matter of course that a science of nature, for instance, could not run its course in apodictic-adequate cognitions of nature. But this may not count as a presupposition here but rather as a motive for a modesty that is to be practiced for the time being.

12

The Initial Questions[1] VIII, 355

We stand before the initial questions. We have come to the conviction: The sciences up to now are insufficient—in | the naiveté VIII, 355/356 of their positive grounding of truth. Transcendental subjectivity, constituting life and achieving of experiencing, thinking, grounding, theorizing, through which meant and true being, meant and scientifically true theory constitutes itself for the cognizing agent, remains anonymous. Complete science must also be science of the transcendental origins.

Human sciences ⟨are⟩ indeed sciences of consciousness, but themselves positive. All positive sciences suffer from this not incidental but essential incompleteness due to their positivity.

These convictions arose from an all-encompassing critique of science, a critique which ⟨pursued⟩ the course of the entire history of philosophy up until, and including, the present.[2]

If we recall the idea of philosophy which animated Plato's philosophizing, then it was that of a science, and ultimately an all-encompassing science that justifies in absolutely sufficient manner: that is, in a manner that it not only grounds rationally, but which also makes the *episteme* itself, the grounding capacity and the essence of its achievements which create apodictic validity of truth, the theme of its investigations. Without an insight into the essence of rational achievement as such, no rational formation, no truth, no theory, no science can have ultimate justification. Without an ultimate self-cognition on the part of the scientist as such every justification of science remains incomplete.

We saw how this idea, since Descartes' turn of the thematic gaze towards subjective justification and the transcendental *Ego*, took

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[1] From the manuscripts on *First Philosophy* (1923/24), part II. This text can also be read as a variant to the first part of lecture 31 (pp. 231–235, l. 8)—Ed.

[2] See the first part of the Lecture Course, *First Philosophy*, lectures 1–27.—Ed.

on a new, deeper content, but how unclearly the emerging idea of a subjective grounding of cognition and an idealistic interpretation of the world suggested by it took effect theoretically, how it itself required ever new critique.

The desideratum for a truly originary philosophy and novel philosophy precisely through this originariness, and for a novel science in every special respect became ever more pressing and ever clearer in its content, a type of science which makes the ultimate ground of all grounds (namely the ground from which spring all actual and possible grounds), hence transcendental subjectivity, the primal theme of theoretical research and which shows, in further pursuit, *how* the desired systematic whole of all genuine cognition springs from this primal ground, *how* purposive-conscious work shapes the appropriate method | and inaugurates, through it, a *universitas sci-* VIII, 356/357
entiarum, which, in its entirety, would be permitted to claim the principal character of absolute grounding and thereby absolute justification, where it makes no more sense to seek justifying reasons behind it. If one actually succeeded in investigating every possible meaning in a manner that thereby its meaning-giving would be investigated, then, indeed, no possible question would remain open. Indeed, everything that exists for us is, for us, "content" or "meaning" of our actual or potential cognition.

This is, thus, the yield of our entire reflections up to now: the idea of a total science of primally grounding subjectivity—as guiding idea or purposive idea for an infinite process of cognition, infinite, just as already is [the process] of every science in naive positivity, but in an essentially different developmental form. It is apparent that this idea, as it arose in the motivation of our critique of the history of ideas, cannot yet have the value of a clear and distinct idea of this intended science. What we have, at first, is not more than a very vague practical intent, that of a certain process of cognition that is yet to be achieved, that hovers before us in a vague and distant idea. How should we, from here, arrive at a more determinate idea and come so far that we can actually begin?

But now we also have to consider that the intent to a novel science arose in our critique in a sense that calls into question the validity of every historically pregiven science, and even pregiven cognition as such. The sciences up to now, at least the rigorous ones

of modernity, may re-constitute themselves according to the main content of their theories and even methods in the systematic edifice of the new science—only that they here spring from deeper supporting grounds, which expand the horizons of insight to all sides; but prior to this allsidedness they have the stamp of insufficiency, they remain in question.

But now our critiques have at the same time exposed the *sources* of this insufficiency. It already became practically certain to us that all groundings lead back to that primal ground of transcendental subjectivity and that, prior to everything else, an absolute research pertaining to this grounding science, precisely the transcendental one, is required.

But are we well advised to claim such insights that arose in the course of our critical reflections (such as the sketchy exhibitions of the transcendental-constitutive sphere and first tentative ideas how it is to be tackled) for the attempt of an actual erection of this novel science as something pregiven? A critique does not belong to the system. The system is the science itself. To erect it means to create and utilize every building block for itself, the first at the first place and accordingly every one at its proper place. We have to consider that the idea of science as such | bore within itself, from VIII, 357/358
its historical origin, the idea of universal cognition from absolute grounding, or what is to say the same, the idea of a cognition to be absolutely justified, and that this idea was the primal norm of all our critiques. None of the factical sciences was able to satisfy it and ⟨this for the reason that⟩, as it was shown, the transcendental problems of origin either were not at all seen or were posed in misleading ways. What was required was, at first, the burdensome clarification of transcendentally pure subjectivity as the true primal source of all cognition and of thorough scientific investigation of this subjectivity. This we saw, as mentioned, through critique. But does not, when we ⟨clear up⟩ the possibility of such a science, purely systematically, by merely starting out from the idea of a philosophy as an absolutely grounded universal science or as a science that could justify itself absolutely, and by clearing up how it is to begin and proceed as absolute, but does not [to repeat] everything have to reveal itself of what is required in terms of possible and necessary presuppositions, thus also, whether it requires an absolute grounding, in the question

what "absolute grounding" could mean and what it can achieve, the exposure of transcendental subjectivity? If there "is" a philosophy of this sense guiding us, a universal science of absolute grounding, then it belongs to it itself, according to its sense, to expose the absolute ground from which it departs and upon which it grounds everything in absolute manner, perhaps to first of all lead up to it and to expose its absoluteness as such through clarification and determination.

13

What Is Given as Apodictically-Absolute, As Presupposition of All Striving for Cognition.[1]

VIII, 363

I want to secure myself, I want to ground my judgments in a way that they are safe from deceit.* Does the idea of security assume the first position? At any rate I can say at the outset: I want to see whether my opinion is correct, whether what I mean can really be demonstrated; and while I am enacting a self-having: I want to see whether my evidence is "genuine," what is really self-given in it.

My entire life is carried out as awake in a belief. From naiveté arises, at first within its framework, the desire for critique or the demand for critique, with well-grounded and firm cognition as its goal; we can posit as equal to this: well-grounded assertion in which what is asserted here as existing, exists once and for all for me and for everyone else, thanks to the grounding that can always again be carried out and that is "compelling" again and again and for everyone. The assertion is to be an assertion of the truth. And | truth VIII, 363/364 is what holds valid once and for all, as compellingly grounded once and for all, or as to be grounded—for everyone.

But how is this supposed to be possible, and what does this mean: compellingly grounded? At first I will now say: My judgments may be motivated very differently, but I can attain truth only when I prescribe norms to my judging, following experience, seeing and insight. They are to adequate themselves to what is experienced, what is seen with insight. I must judge "with insight," if my judgments are to have, for me, lasting validity, and not blindly. Blind judging errs frequently—precisely because, the moment that experience sets in

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*Prior presumption: The world *is*, and it is cognizable for that very reason, and for that reason it can be brought to cognition again and again and harmoniously through normal experience.

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[1] Circa 1923—Ed.

and combines itself with the judgment, when my blindly acquired meaning takes measure with what is seen, the acquired meaning does not fit with the seen. Meanings that contradict experience, with what is given with insight, I cannot maintain, I must give them up; there is nothing to be done about this, the canceling out of the meaning occurs immediately and necessarily, the moment that clear experience suggests the opposite.

But now I also notice that experiences do not necessarily "remain firm," that they—something which happens often enough already in pre-scientific life—can be devalued through other experiences; likewise insights through new insights. This compels me to new reflections.

To deploy a term that encompasses all cases, let us introduce the word *intuition*[1]—since we speak of experience in ordinary life only with respect to real objectivities in sensible intuition and will not say of, say, a general conceptual insight (for instance in a mathematical context) that we had in ⟨it⟩ experience of something mathematical. Opposed to this intuition we have non-intuitive meanings. Under the title *meaning* we mean, necessarily, either predicative judgments, judgmental certainties, or other experiences that have, related to the former, the character of *believing with certitude*; as, for instance, in external perceptions, which are acts of belief prior to all intertwinements with conceptual grasping and predicating; certainties, that is, and what is certain in them is the respective objectivity, the respective state of affairs, be it with or without the conceptual form and determination meant or not meant in the respective experiences. Dark and very non-intuitive and yet non-conceptual meanings, such as consciousness of objects in the nearest surroundings not seen at present, belong here as well, and all the more the respective intuitive presentifications.*

*What is missing here: meanings of *habitual acquisitions* from actual belief, and so on.

[1] Husserl's coinage here is "*Erschauung*," which stems from *schauen*, to view or observe, which he distinguishes from *Erfahrung*, experience, on the one hand, and *Einsicht*, insight, on the other. Since its meaning is not altogether different from the more common term *Anschauung*, the term has been translated as "intuition."—Trans.

Meanings of all types and forms are "modalizable," | their cer- VIII, 364/365
tainty of belief or being can become modified, can become doubtful, questionable, mere possibility, probability, but can even become naught. Every such modification concerning such a meaning—and even a meaning sprung from experience—is a devaluation for the function of cognition, and the modification into negation, the modification of intuitive certainty into the *quasi*-intuitive consciousness, which we call *semblance*—a consciousness in which what is viewed takes on the character of naught, of what is crossed out—says as much as total devaluation. The ontic validity *simpliciter*, in which the objectivity was intuited in the previous certainty, modifies itself into false, crossed-out validity, non-validity, the experienced being into experienced semblance. From now on the previous experience, as often as we revert to it—and likewise, in general, the earlier intuition—is called a mere seeming experience, seeming evidence.

The norm-prescribing reduction of all meanings to intuitions, thus, means a reduction to genuine and not seeming intuitions. Apparently I—and all of us who want to test and perhaps "secure" meanings by finding appropriate intuitions (experiences, insights) against which they can "validate" themselves or against which they shatter—was guided by the conviction that there are "genuine" evidences, experiences and insights in the sense that we apparently presuppose when we talk of "genuineness": that such intuitions, once enacted, receive their validity once and for all and for everyone, that they are only repeatable in the identical sense and in complete certainty and that they allow, in the overview over the repetitions, only ever again the same objectivity in the same unshattered being to be viewed subjectively and intersubjectively; likewise, that no other genuine intuitions, which are understood as related to the same objectivity, can ever enter into contradiction with the respective viewings. In short, *genuine intuitions are not modalizable*, or, as we can also say immediately, what is intuitable in a genuine manner as existing can never be intuited as non-existent or existing as dubitable.

If there were not something like *genuine* intuitions, whose very genuineness we could grasp, and of which we can ensure ourselves in intuiting—and again in genuineness—*then all striving for cognition would be meaningless*. Why did I strive, above and beyond

my "blind" meanings, to respective intuitions, why did I believe I was in need of this norm-prescribing, if not because I was of the conviction that the path of experience and insight would be the way to a reshaping of my convictions in the sense of *completeness*?[1] | VIII, 365/366 Truth means to me, as a goal for cognition, as much as what can be cognized completely, and likewise every true being: it is completely experiencable, intuitable, as a substrate of completely intuitable predicative truths. Whence can I derive such ideas, if not from my own cognitive life (and then, furthermore, from our communalized [cognitive life])? *That* a truth in itself exist, or a being in itself, this is of course itself a judgment, and if it is not to be an empty meaning, then I must derive it with insight. But when insight, intuiting of every type would be, so to speak, always again insight until further notice, when every one of them would ultimately be modalizable in the end, if everything that was intuited in it temporarily as being-certain could afterwards still be canceled out, *if I could have no intuition of a special type ⟨as insight⟩ into an ⟨un⟩breakable being that I intuited as unbreakable once and for all, as given apodictically "absolutely," as absolutely indubitable, as absolute norm for all meanings directed respectively—then all talk of truth valid in itself and all striving for truth would have lost its meaning*.

Accordingly, all practical striving and acting has its meaning only in that I, having reached the goal, can become practically certain that I have reached the goal and that I, being on the way, ⟨can be certain that I⟩ really approximate the goal. If this certainty of the path and the goal, despite occasional errors, could never and in no way be brought to absolute intuition—something which an action rationally presupposes—then one could no longer speak, even in practice, of rationality.[2] ⟨But⟩ also the striving for truth is practical and realizes itself as an action.

Certainly the nonsense of the talk of being recurs on all levels. If I attempt to see all cognition, thus also all meaning and intuition and

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[1] The words from "if not because I was of the conviction" to "in the sense of" were stricken out by Husserl with red pen—Ed.

[2] The sentence was amended by the editor, but it is perfectly understandable without the amendments, and we have opted to leave the sentence as it was written by Husserl—Trans.

correctness prescribed as norm accordingly, as merely subjective and only holding firm as approximate and at certain times, then the question becomes whence I could know this (if I wanted to claim it) and I limit myself to the mere possibility, whence I then could know of this possibility. But a possibility, too, is something that one can merely mean and that needs to justify itself in the intuited authentication.

To presuppose any random entities as matters of course, the things surrounding me, the earth, outer space, my fellow humans, me myself and whatever else—this means presupposing absolute teleological points of cognition, which can come to a realization and ultimately to an insightful realization in the course of striving for cognition. It means presupposing that there are genuine insights, "genuine" intuitions which, in themselves, would again be intuitable in a genuine manner, | and [it means that] starting from them one VIII, 366/367 could consider ways of cognition (a cognition that is purely oriented to such intuitions) as constructible, through which one could ultimately convince oneself of entities as entities and could approximate oneself to their properties, albeit piecemeal and stepwise. *Without an absolutely grounded cognition such a presupposition for all striving for cognition is untenable*.

Through this meditation I have made clear to myself conditions of the possibility of a consistent striving for cognition, conditions of its subjective rationality. But what I have exposed here are *preliminary postulates*, guiding ideas for my further thought in which I want to make clear and distinct to myself how cognition can earnestly be brought underway as indeed realizing truth and as absolutely certain of this truth.

What must the ways of a genuine and absolute science look like, a science in which its scientists attain absolute certainty, absolute regarding their respective goals, absolute regarding their methods? All of their propositions must stem from such an absolute intuition and must derive from it, as practical, as at all times accessible again, its absolute appropriation to its norms. Genuine science is a systematic nexus of progressing cognitive formations, unified in their intertwinements, formations that we call theories, linguistic nexuses of propositions, whose certainty can be absolutely justified at all times and by everyone. *Hence, absolute justification presupposes*

absolute intuition. Such an intuition with respect to the predicative judgments and judgmental formations then leads further back to *pre-predicative intuitions*. We stand, thus, in the vast *realm of the dóxa* as such, of meaning, of ontic believing, and as is widely known— this teaches already the fleeting glance at the pregiven sciences (which I therefore do not presuppose as genuine ones)—we find here *mediacies* of believing, of being convinced, mediacies in different senses that lead back to *immediacies* in their "grounding" and norm-prescribing justification. Accordingly, likewise the intuitions: if we call the mediate intuitions of the predicative sphere *insights*, then the pre-predicative ones would have to be called *experiences* in the widest sense, and from this class we would again have to separate out *simple experiences*, say external perceptions or memories, directed at straightforwardly apprehended things. Yet this expression "straightforward experience" is also still very broad *vis-à-vis* the ordinary understanding, as it will become plain later.

If we now ask: Where are these initially postulated genuine or absolute intuitions, and how can this genuineness itself be cognized?—then we are led back at first to the question | of the *immediate absolute intuitions*, thus of *absolute experiences*. The general experience that experiences lose their force of certainty, that they modify themselves into experiences of semblance or must be modalized in some other manner, demands a *general critique of experience*, and this, in turn, demands an *initially naive* study of this experience according to its different forms, a study that, to be sure, can accord in its naive evidence with norms of absolute intuition that are supplied afterwards, a study which needs to verify itself in subsequent critique. VIII, 367/368

Let us consider the basic characteristics that are encompassed in the meaning of an absolute intuition.

Believing is not a matter of fancy. I cannot make myself not believe or modalize my belief-certainty or modalize the respective modalization once again at will. To all modalizations belong motives, and these are themselves belief-acts; only meanings can influence meanings, and this is to say, can force modalizations to ensue, in the unity of a consciousness encompassing them all. Thus, also intuitive meanings I cannot doubt or negate at will. But this does not exclude that, while I enact them or while I still retain

them, as enacted from original intuition, I still consider it possible that they become doubtful or naught. Every experience of modification of an external experience of a thing into an experience of semblance yields a type of possibilities as to how that which was predicted earlier becomes possible. While I carry out an external experience I can—whether under all circumstances or under certain ones—imagine that I modalize this experience by approaching [the experienced thing], such that what is now experienced as existing in certainty or existing ⟨thusly⟩ nevertheless does not exist or exists differently.

This, however, is not meant to be a general characteristic of intuitions. If *absolute* intuitions exist, then they must be of the character that I, while enact them originarily or still retain them, can "*in no way whatsoever imagine*" that the experienced would not exist or would be doubtful or only possible in the sense which has an opposite possibility besides it, for which a case can be made as well. The fact that I cannot conceive and imagine it, this must itself be an intuition and not any random mere meaning. The supposition of non-being, modalized being, posited at once with the intuited ontic certainty, must be an absolutely evident impossibility, one and the other must be given evidently as irreconcilable; but this in generality: Every time I have such an intuition, the attempt to intuit the modalized being as irreconcilable with the supposed being must become evident. ⟨This, then, must count⟩ as an *apodictic principle*.

14

On the Possibility of the Non-Existence of the World (ad Lecture 33)*

VIII, 391

More precisely one would have to distinguish:

1) the possibility of the dissolution of the concordant structure of the perception of the world;

2) the very possibility that this world and a world as such ⟨would be⟩ a "nothing."

For once this dissolution had taken place, then the open possibility remained that *anew* a world-phenomenon constitute itself, and in a way, that, reconnecting to the earlier periods of concordant belief, one and the same world would again attain the value of validity. Is this the only manner in which a world-belief can arise anew, | that VIII, 391/392 it takes up the world-belief that was motivated already earlier and continues it? A closer consideration would find reasons for this and show that streams of a total experience [of the world] that is at times concordant, at others not, cannot bear several, temporally distinct worlds within themselves, but if at all, only *one*, in one world-space and one world-time.

But if we ask, what then is to be said for the interim period of the granted disharmony, we would have to answer that it is only conceivable in a manner that this entire period has the *character of an empirical semblance*, and more precisely the character of *insanity*, of a disharmony lying in the factical course [of world-experience], which, as factical, has so to speak not exploited all real possibilities that existed for the experiencing *Ego*. And that they were real possibilities, this is to say, for its part, that in the interconnection of motivations of both periods that occur through syntheses of memory precisely such possibilities are motivated, precisely in the form that one and the same world existed in the interim, but that it could

*On the lectures 1924.

not manifest itself to the experiencing agent in the facticity of his experiential course, that it thus could not have been experienced by him.

Furthermore: We formed the idea that disharmony could perhaps occur in a manner that the experiential belief destroyed itself. We can now go on to say: the possibility that the world in truth would not exist has the significance of an idea, namely the idea of a disharmony going on into infinity, but which is not supposed to be an arbitrary one. But what is contained in this sub-clause [, 'but which is not supposed to be an arbitrary one']?

The opposite idea of a true world is an idea motivated in the belief-structure of concordant perception, motivated as the identical-ideal pole of a belief; and here lies, in mundane perception, precisely the anticipatory belief that it will remain mundane perception and will experience, correlatively, a "uniform natural course."

How in the other case? The empirical world-belief is destroyed. Of course it can be reinstated. But this is an empty possibility for which nothing can speak in favor. But what, then, with the disharmony, which is now current? Can disharmony motivate future disharmony?

At any rate, it is always possible that a world "constitutes" itself. If it does so, then it demands (or does it leave the possibility open?) a past world. But why is it not conceivable that I have, in succession, different "worlds," which are, precisely, "created" and destroyed?

To the one world, the posited unity of presumptive experience, is opposed, not a possibility under the title "*nothing*," but instead an infinite amount of *ficta*, which are equally without value, which are all without validity, every one of them a possibility and correlate of a possible positive harmony. | VIII, 392/393

The problem of the existence of the external world. The possibility of the non-existence concerning reality.

In experience concordantly running its course I cannot but have nature given in certainty and remain in this certainty, thus also with respect to the certainty, contained therein, of the being of a future nature. In experience, thus, lies initially nothing of ⟨mere⟩ probability.

But what now, if I experience a break in this concordance? Then it occurs on the ground of an experience that remains in certainty and of the past continuity of experience. Without this there is no possible "certainty" of doubt and no transition into nothingness. As long as this ground of harmony remains and its continuity in these doubtful lines [of experience], a solution of this doubt, of this contradiction must be possible here: that is, I have the evidence of the "I can pursue further experience, I can pursue this continuity," and the evidence that, of the conflicting horizons and possible experiential lines for the two members of the contradiction, necessarily one or the other will expose itself and will fit to this harmony. If one of them, then not the other, which is congruent with it. All of this needs to be shown and made comprehensible in greater detail.

In which form do I arrive at the self-givenness of the non-existence of a thing? In the form: it is a mere spatial semblance, it is nothing, *it is empty space*. But since concordant experience is presupposed here, can not everything simply be nothing, can everything dissolve in "empty space"? Things are not so easy.

Could it not be that for everything it could become apparent *in a succession*, that it is semblance of nothingness, empty space? Of course not to become apparent in the sense of a valid semblance of nothingness in the ordinary sense, where instead of the naught something else is real. Furthermore, if there were at all times a ground of experiential certainty for what becomes apparent as semblance, then something of this ground—by adjusting novel striking out of semblance, and so on—must at all times hold valid and then, once more, not be valid, by annulment of certainty. But here a phenomenology of a priori possibilities is needed. Semblance in experience and a dream of an experience and experiential reality, which itself contains semblance, and so on, is something different [in each case], and all of this needs to be considered.

At any rate, what is required is a careful phenomenology of possibilities, likewise of the constitution of a world, likewise of all possible forms of semblance, of non-existence, and so on; and this with respect to an *Ego* and a community of *Egos*, which is to be considered in addition [to the individual *Ego*].

15

To What Extent Can One Even Posit the Demand for Apodicticity With Respect to a Cognition of Being?[1] Ad Lecture 36.

Parallelizing of the I-am and the world. Absolute and relative apodicticity. Cognition aims at being or the being-thus of objects of cognition whatsoever. Do cognitions have to be apodictic for being and being-thus, in order for us to be permitted to say with justification that they are and are thusly? Or: Do all truly existing objects, | all objects of possible science, have to be apodictically experiencable and accordingly also cognizable? And now even adequately! Even the I-think is, albeit apodictically cognizable—namely, to be brought, as experience, at all times to the form of an apodictic positing of being—not *adequately* cognizable. And every special judgments with respect to facts that I can utter within my pure subjectivity, insofar as it goes beyond the content of what is apodictic of it—including the apodictic structural form—can also no longer be grounded apodictically, namely, it does not bring about apodictic concrete contents. But there is still apodictic here, for instance with respect to the past, that I had a *certain* past and that I can, in the presupposed ideal I-can, always again bring about reproductions, that I can approximate to my "true" past, perhaps through correction, through penetrating the contents of memory, through a constant clarification of them, through an analysis and reflection of them, to what extent one must distinguish what is actually remembered and not remembered and to what extent everything that is actually remembered actually belongs to the unity of the remembered past in a recollection or to what extent different and disjointed pasts

VIII, 396/397

[1] 1925. Cf. also the manuscripts on reduction of the I-am to what is actually perceived and, on the other hand, reduction of the world to what is actually perceived. [The text of these manuscripts to which Husserl refers is to be found below as Text 21, pp. 575 ff.—Ed.]

have merged together. Here I have, thus, a clear idea of what can be called a rational goal of cognition that is directed to an object that can be authenticated, or what can be called rational justification of the ontic positing of an object, while, at the same time, the goal of cognition, the true, can not be given apodictically and adequately in any cognition.

What follows from this for the *cognition of nature* is that it is rational in a same sense—as long as it moves within the general harmoniousness of external experience and does not become aware of the fact of this harmoniousness (a purely subjective one), which is itself not apodictic, as a rational one, and of the principle that, *as long as* this fact is rationally fixed, every mundane judgment is rational that fulfills the conditions of evident yet empirical indubitability. Presupposing the infinitely open fact of harmoniousness as *hypothesis* (as long as it may exist, and then necessarily in this form of openness), what results is the *relative apodicticity* for the form of the world, but also for the being of the concrete world, while its concrete ontic content that goes beyond the form is not apodictically cognizable. But every entity is again accessible a priori, to the essence of harmonious experience also belongs the presupposed ideal possibility of the "I can always again experience and step closer in experience," and it also belongs to this that, in free experience and experiential thinking towards a closer determining and correction, an approximation to a mundane entity (as correlate of the hypothesis and in its relativity of cognizability) is possible—then especially translated into "intersubjective accessibility"—just as this entity is nothing other than an index of this approximation in experience and theory. | VIII, 397/398

What, then, is the goal of the striving for cognition—under the titles "truth" and "true being"? Cognition aims at *being*, this means: at attaining being itself. But this means: cognition as meaning is to be transformed into the fullness of being itself and shall thereby become fulfilled meaning, only such a meaning can utter with insight that and how being itself is and can thereby be a directly confirmed meaning. Precisely in this manner it has its *right*, because it at the same time, as being right, bears rightness in itself as fulfilled and rests with *that* itself which it wanted to attain or which the cognizing agent wanted to attain in his meaning.

But fulfillment of meaning in the consciousness of self-grasping and self-having can be something merely relative. Cognition can become an erroneous cognition, the self-grasping can turn out to be erroneous in that this first self-having bears unfulfillments within itself and that in this respect, in the pursuit of fulfillment, possibilities remain open for contradiction and annulment.

Cognition, and especially scientific cognition, would be absolutely satisfied when and to the extent that it attained absolute finality in apodicticity and at the same time in *adequation to an apodictic content. But no cognition of facts*—no *mundane* and no *phenomenological-subjective* one—*is of this sort*. No temporal being is cognizable in apodicticity: not only for us, but because it is itself apodictically cognizable that this is impossible.

Empirical apodicticity. But what is well possible—and solely meaningful—is a cognition of facts that is "indubitable," that is, so to speak, empirically apodictic, be it in the peculiar form of phenomenological-empirical judgments of fact or mundane-empirical ones.

a) In the one case there is, and indeed for all such facts, an apodictic ground of experience fixed in the *I-am*, fixed through absolute cognition of its existence in its absolute structural form. The universe of all phenomenological data is the unity of the concrete I-think, which is the content, an as of yet indeterminate and determinable distant goal of an apodictic positing; but with the near point of the currently streaming present as something that is apodictically and adequately, thus concretely given *of* the I-think. Furthermore, what is also in need of being exposed as apodictic, as belonging to the apodictic [core] of the I-think, is that for the I exists a priori the free possibility of approximating itself to itself in all of its concrete being *in infinitum*, and that each attained level of approximation yields no absolute truth that can count as apodictic as such, but a relative truth. For that which fulfills, what offers itself in the mode of self, has the certainty of empirical indubitability; | a progress VIII, 398/399
in experience is possible, namely conceivable, which itself would demand a relinquishing of the meant concrete being, although it has the normative form of the self-there, irrespective of the apodicticity that something here actually subsists that is secure in its character and in its structural form. But for the judgment, for the belief in

being and being-thus, this possibility bears no weight, *as long as* the cognition running its course in the sense of approximation, of the evaluating getting-closer, yields no experience, no belief resting on self-givenness, which contradicts the experienced content through its own [content] and thereby modalizes the belief. I can see a priori that a consistent approximation is possible ideally-practically that determines, progressively, the apodictic being harmoniously and ever more closely. Every actual course that is self-given in the form of a consistent approximation yields an empirically indubitable truth that is originally grounded and that is valid as long as no originary motives for doubt arise. The fact that these cannot arise always anew, no matter how I experience, is itself apodictically certain. And this consistent approximating is the method of justification. *I thus have a practical goal that is a rational one in the practical sense*. Every progress towards approximation bears within itself—this is something that needs to be emphasized more sharply—a *necessary horizon of future indubitability*, a necessary future expectation that things will remain this way and will bring us ever closer to the true self. It is not an expectation as such, but one that is motivated and originarily grounded in the self-giving and in the progress of harmonious self-giving, an expectation that is apodictic in this modality of certainty.

b) In the sphere of experience that gives us the *universe* we are one level higher. Here the experiences and the experiential syntheses are occurrences within the I-am, everything belongs to them that has been shown to be apodictic in them. Here we will likely also have to discuss that, insofar as I have an apodictic cognition in memory, every originary conceptual fixation that I have enacted in the living present necessarily passes over into memory, even if I could no longer originarily gain such a fixation from memory alone, if the latter did not already have such a fixation as well. This concerns the certainty not to lose certain predicative contents that I had already derived from self-giving.

Also in the mundane sphere that is self-given through external experience (while external experience is itself immanent givenness), I have *empirical indubitability*, on the merely apodictic basis of my subjectivity; I find an empirically indubitable subjective fact of harmoniousness of my external experience—as a continual style

in which it lets | a nature appear harmoniously. Every external expe- VIII, 399/400
rience is self-giving of its external object, and the entire external experience is the self-giving of the world. In the fact of the empirical indubitability of the style of the entire external experience lies an indubitability with respect to the being of the world. Every belief in the world as existing is indubitable, insofar as the previous style of harmoniousness originarily motivates as originarily giving the expectation of its continuation. In the continual progress lies a continual confirmation: with respect to this, one can easily attribute an apodictic necessity to the belief. As long as it runs its course in this manner, every new belief of every new phase is *necessarily* indubitable, it is a necessary belief, insofar as nothing annuls it and can annul it. Expectation is original self-giving of what is to come as such, as to be expected as empirically necessary, and it is self-giving that confirms itself concurrently in the progress and concurrently offers a foothold for the right of the future. The being of the world is not plainly apodictically certain, but it is ⟨given⟩, on the basis of the indubitability of the concordance of experience as such, in *relative apodicticity*, insofar as—if this concordance is fixed, under the hypothesis that it [is valid], as long as it is valid—it is no longer possible to doubt the existence of the world or to negate it. But if the latter is now rationally grounded, then it offers a ground for rational judgments of experience with regard to the world.

If I investigate the essence of external experience in pure subjectivity and the latter in a universal concordance of external experience, then I cognize apodictically the essential structure of a world—as a world of possible concordant external experience—and the essential structure of all relations between an experiencing I, experienced actions and appearances and appearing objects running their course therein. I cognize the essential connection between the idea of an existing world and the system of possible experiences as a system of possible actions of access on the part of the experiencing I to the entity existing in this indubitability, that is, to the world according to all individual thingly entities factored into it. In this apodicticity of essential investigation I cognize that while every individual experience has, as self-giving, its grounded and grounding certainty, it can ⟨nevertheless⟩ deceive, but that every progress of experience, in terms of bringing [what is experienced] closer and

in terms of concordant certainty, not only yields, as such, new certainty, but that it creates, for the future and for every free interfering and future of experience created through it, an originarily grounded expectation, whose correlate is the necessity of experienced being—a relative necessity that it be real; the impossibility that it not exist.

Now, of course experience can run its course differently and can carry motives for doubt and negation with it. But I do in fact know apodictically that, presupposing the empirically indubitable concordance | of experience (an internally indubitable fact), an entity VIII, 400/401 grounds every experience and that being is a correlate of the system of its accessibilities. Every systematic experience in the form of an experience of access, every experiment, creates for me, thus, a relative indubitability that derives its right from apodictic sources. Hence, I can pose the rational task of getting to know, in experience and experiment, "the" world and to create for me the empirically indubitable knowledge that is purely derived from self-giving in experience and those modalized self-givings that are rooted in it, and I can pose the task of establishing a theory to be modeled on the ground of experience, which, to be sure, will itself move in approximation toward the idea of a true theory. And it will be the task of a logic of nature to expose, based on the apodictic structure of nature and its a priori, the essential shape of a universal theory of nature and of the form of its approximation.

Clarification of the ontic mode "being through appearances" and of the relative apodicticities that can be rooted therein. On the apodictic critique of objective experience. I experience in the here, I perceive this table with these or other characteristics of the front side and indeterminate anticipation beyond it. Correlatively: This there is reality for me, it is grasped in itself, it exists, and apodictically so. For I cannot at all conceive the "not," insofar as I take the experienced, the perceived as such of this content, of this mode, which inseparably belongs to this perception. This continues when I continue the experience in terms of a concordant synthesis, and then I must posit the object—this table as determining itself this or that way, but also in the current mode of being open indeterminately; what is an entity here is correlatively an entity of this mode, and that is, precisely given apodictically as an entity of this mode. As everywhere

else, there lies in the necessity, in the "I cannot do otherwise," an essential law: I—or an I in general that experiences in this manner—cannot do otherwise than to posit the experienced in this mode as existing.

Now I add: The active I-experience is an effecting of my freedom, and to the modal content of the experienced belongs the "possibility" of further experience, in egoic relation the belief [that] I can continue, can step closer, and so on, and accordingly produce in freedom new experience—in the unity of a synthesis of concordance. My modal entity is this there, which appears in this or that manner and which would appear, in the free continuation, this or that way, which would determine itself ever more closely in this continuation, and this I believe, and I cannot do otherwise. All of my experiencing has an horizon of possible activity and—correlatively—practically possible appearances, which would continue to arrive in the case of unhampered freedom. In the course of the factical and free course, everything given modally | is indubitable, and among this, undoubt- VIII, 401/402
edly, the "coming" of the appearances arriving now, which precisely confirms in the fulfillment what was "predicted" in the presumed freedom as co-effect.

But this freedom does not have to exist factically, and what arrives indubitably does not mean what actually arrives. It is not necessary that what is posited and what is presupposed with a sense of anticipation will be, but [what is necessary is] that it now realizes the modality of what is given now as thusly and accordingly carries with itself an horizon of what is "to be expected," "to be predicted," "presumed" in the case of freedom.

If I imagine myself as enjoying complete freedom and if I imagine that these predictions would fulfill themselves in ⟨continuing experience⟩ in intuitions—in a consistent synthesis, *in infinitum* and no matter in what way I would enact my freedom, which experiential paths ⟨whatsoever⟩ I might pursue—then I have, through every one of the infinitely progressing lines of modalities of the object, as constituted in the How of appearances, the object in the How of the infinite syntheses of these appearances; and if I pursued every path in every direction, [I would have] an object that constitutes itself all-sidedly as pole of appearances, whose anticipations, whose indeterminate previewings would have become fully determined

intuitions. Of course this is not actually doable, as little as the infinite line of numbers with the totality of the numbers belonging to it.

But what does this idea now accomplish? In experiencing life itself I have at all times the "appearances" and the modal certainty of what can be presumed, what is continual and most proximately as presumable and which is certain as non-negatable as a pale, indeterminate ⟨presumability⟩ of further continually implied presumabilities. In continuing experience I have syntheses again and again, implying new such syntheses as predictions, and as long as no break occurs, I have, precisely, these identical things, the identical world as existing in the further course of its determination. What is identical here I must fixate, and conserve in the concordantly gained determinations and in the arising of closer determinations. There is no other actual being for me. In the break I run up against "devaluation" as semblance, and this implies, I now no longer have what is identical in the flexible synthetic milieu of determination that is either grasped and determines itself as appearance, or I have lost it from sight, but it can then be cognized anew through a linking-up with [earlier] syntheses. In this case, modalization of empirical belief or empirical being arises and I gain new empirical being.

Now one could object: every objective meaning (in certainty) puts me in a bind, insofar as I am not at liberty to modalize the belief. What is, hence, the difference *vis-à-vis* the experiencing | meanings? VIII, 402/403 To this one has to reply: It belongs to the essence of every meaning that I, if it is an unclear meaning or one utterly devoid of intuition, can inquire into its actual meaning, and this leads, perhaps, via a mere clarification to a complete making-intuitive. What, now, lies in the meaning that is now clear? What does its clarity mean? Apparently it consists in the accomplished possible experience and explication, conceptual grasping and other "logical" work directed at possible experience (perhaps of manifolds of possible experience). But herein lies, I could—and in every communalization of cognition: we could, anybody and everybody could (insofar as they are free in their actions)—produce fulfilling experiences and enact the respective acts of thought in a "fitting" manner.

If I expose what is actually meant, what is experiencable for me and us and everyone, then I see, accordingly, that I not only [actually] mean this, but also "can mean"—for it is possible that I,

striving from a vague meaning on to a realization of what is actually meant, arrive at a point where this clarity is in conflict with other experiencables and becomes thereby annulled, that is, that I must forfeit my meaning. *The possibility of experience does not mean a mere imaginability in phantasy*; but instead, it means, I can approach it, I then can, from the bodily here and what is currently experienced in my close surrounding, in perception, seeing with my eyes, touching with my fingers, and so on, proceed further, and then I will presumably, but generally in certainty, arrive at the respective experiences—irrespective of a certain indeterminacy of all prediction, which however, as again is certain and indubitable in further consequence, will become further sketched in in the process. Hence, experience is that to which the *intention*, which is called objective meaning, refers. In actual experience lies ultimate "confirmation," grounding, and all mediacy lies, concerning the experiential possibilities (as anticipations of belief of experiences to be produced), grounded in the immediacy of actual experience, whose content is the closest surroundings.

Hence, current experience ⟨is⟩ not any random meaning, but that meaning which has the "self" in the mode of immediate having within it, that to which all other meaning—as mundane—strives. On the other hand, however, every experience is, within itself, at the same time anticipatory meaning, and as actual experience concerning what is actually perceived of the objective, at the same time inactual, unfulfilled experience concerning the horizons, which are horizons of possible experiencables (correlates of my freely possible experiencing doing), which run their course *in infinitum* and which, again and again, through actualities ⟨and⟩ inactualities, refer to ever new experiences.

The world is at all times the world of endlessly connected | VIII, 403/404 actual experience, with infinities of free possible experiences to be unfolded. Every existing thing is experienced in certainty as appearing and something identical of an open infinity of practically possible concordant appearances. It is experienced in certainty—that it, it is itself given as existing, but precisely as entity of this mode of the appearing of an appearance, which co-means[a] an infin-

[a] *mitmeint*

ity of appearances as practical possibilities of realization and at the same times seizes and pre-means[a] what appears as the identical of this possible realization. And this furthermore in a manner that everything that appears as itself and what is meant in the mode of certainty hangs together with all other thingliness in the *world* in the unity of a universal experience, which is a unity of harmoniousness and is, as that, self-given—and which is at the same time the infinity of pre-meaning. *Worldly being*—and at first *nature-being—is an ontic mode of its own, it has its meaning from this type of experience* with the infinities implied in it—implied in every thing-belief and world-belief that has the form of an originary self-giving, at which all objective meaning aims and in which it all fulfills itself, while the execution of this fulfillment of the experiential intentions in turn means the bringing-closer, the closer determining of the things of experience—or the exclusion of semblances, but on the basic ground of an experiential harmoniousness which generally constitutes itself and conserves itself after excluding the rest. *Through the fact that experience in this style constantly continues its course, it continually gives and confirms the being of the world*, which indeed only exists as the unity of the totality of appearances continually confirming itself with the open infinite unitary horizon of possible appearances, with things of possible experience, of a horizon which, as consistent belief of experiential possibilities of a certain general unitary structure, confirms itself as valid in the continual fulfillment which is never to be completed.

It lies in the mode of a being through experiences of the type described that in the framework of concordance, individually experienced things (and only that can have the character of perceptual certainty) carry a certain apodicticity with themselves. Namely where I have such self-giving—entities in the mode of appearance, of pre-meant horizons, of such revealability through possible experiences—there I can conceive no experience as possible, hence nothing given in this ontic mode as object that I could ever "find" in free further course—⟨and⟩ that would conflict with what is experienced thus far.

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[a] *vormeint*

But is this not an entirely wrong-headed assertion, since I can see that *every* experience of mine ⟨can⟩ dissolve at some point into semblance, that, hence, indeed experiences could come about that urge me to cancel out my current experience retroactively? Here | VIII, 404/405 it will be important to forge clear concepts, to clarify the equivocal expressions of my earlier terminology. If I now have an experience, if I perceive this table here itself, then there lies in the mode of this self-having-as-existing an infinity of possibilities of the "I can proceed in experience, or not proceed, I can look around, touch, and so on," and if I imagine in clarity these subjective possibilities as realized, then I gain, correlatively, as predictions, possible experiences, possible appearances of the same thing. *These implied possibilities are not random meanings* concerning my abilities and concerning that which would then come, *but originarily motivated predictions from the current present*; as such it can be exemplified with the special case of the prediction of what is to come immediately, which constantly appears in the current free enactment of experiencing. It is not something randomly meant, but something predicted, not random as expected, but to be expected in pre-*viewing*.[a] It is a self-grasping, not of the future as such, as it takes place in the realizing present, but of the future as the "coming"; it is something modal, a modification of the self-having of something present, a becoming given in the mode of "coming," and in a way that it is always also "conceivable" that something else comes nonetheless, against the evidence of prediction.[b] *The possible appearances that are implied in the intentionality of present experience apodictically exclude other possibilities*—but possibilities of this type of *prediction*.[c]

For further elucidation one needs to add that the experiential possibilities included in current experience (here understood as possible units of experiences, appearances) *are by no means fully determined*, as if the predictions to be derived here were fully determined in content. Only a certain style is predelineated, which the clarifying construction of the effects of such possibilities fills out in intuition, but in a way that it will be prudent to distinguish the

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[a] *voraus*-sichtlich—Husserl here puns on the term *voraussichtlich*, i.e., presumably/predictably, but meaning literally "to be viewed ahead"—Trans. [b] *Voraussicht* [c] *Voraussicht*

variables from what is firmly predelineated, what current present experience of this table predelineates for its experiential possibilities as motivated predictions. If I now *imagine* experiences as such of this table that I see now—or also experiences of other things—then I am *not free, but bounded* through my table-experience as a direct "finding," self-grasping and having of this table. No experience as one that is ⟨not⟩ possible in the sense of a prediction and none that is in conflict with a prediction can belong to this table—to this table that I experience now and that I thereby have given as itself existing.

On the other hand it is not impossible that experience *conflicts* with experience, that one is annulled as experience through the other |, that that which appears in the mode of self-there becomes VIII, 405/406 crossed out as "*semblance*." In other words: The experience as experience, the living, uninterrupted one, predelineates for everything actually possible a *style of predictability*, of possibilities motivated through it and in it—*as long as it is indeed experience* and provides the ground for being that exists in [experience] itself. At all times I experience this and that, and then necessarily in the horizon of a world, and [I experience] that a continually existing world is there for me, this is itself a continual experience, itself given; thereby, thus, a structure of universal possibilities for what can be experienced in "the" world, what can be predicted in it and what can appear in it as fulfilling predictions [is given].

But it is at all times *imaginable* that experience continues to run its course against all expectation and that instead of what was predicted something else happens, and ultimately something which devalues the entity into a non-entity. Everything that appears through appearance in the modality of being is *in suspense between being and non-being*, namely as always available *possibility*—which by no means is to say that it is "very well possible," by no means is to say that the slightest moment of prediction (of non-being) speaks in it its favor. And that, I could show, also holds for the universe, as "object" of universal experience.

But if I presuppose that this world exists, as nevertheless harmoniously appearing through corrections and confirming itself—either that it actually exists into infinity, namely into an infinite future and in relation to a community of experiencing agents continued into a

future infinity, or into an indeterminate distance, in the manner in which we ⟨assume⟩ a created world for the time when God decides to annul it—then this presupposition of an existing world prescribes to the existing world ⟨precisely⟩ an apodictically necessary structure—and of all possible experiences of it—and thereby also an apodictic rule for all experiencing subjects.

We would have, accordingly, a *relative apodicticity*, and for all experience an apodictic structure, a form for the world itself and for the experiential manifolds and for the subjects [in it]. Standing on this ground of the existing world, say in the naiveté of the natural human being, we have then fulfilled the basic condition of an apodictic science.

16

Nature and Nature-Experiencing *Ego*[1]

For every now in which an *Ego* lives, we can state a priori:

1) An *Ego* that experiences a nature and has, following this experience, experiential cognition of nature, *is possible*, experiencing precisely in this manner | in which it experiences, *without there actually being a nature*. The assumption that this nature not exist does not annul the existence of this nature-experiencing *Ego*. VIII, 406/407

2) Let us now form the "*idea*": *In infinitum* I experience nature concordantly, and the concordance of the further course of my experiences, thus the consistent confirmation of the being of nature, reaches (we assume) *in infinitum* throughout my entire factical life, and be it even ideally infinite. Assuming this is the case, can then nature not exist? Should anyone say, this is an evident impossibility, a contradiction, then one has to answer: The natural is indeed at all times given but "one-sidedly." Hence, the idea of a process of concordant experience that goes on *in infinitum* also does not yield the idea of an *adequate* experience that would guarantee the impossibility of non-existence.

3) Let us, hence, vary the ideal type of *in infinitum* concordant experience; let not only my *actually* continual experience be concordant *in infinitum*, but also my "*possible*" one, which I can enact freely, which I was and will be able to enact. I, the experiencing *Ego*, am not only passive in experience, but also, as possibly actively experiencing, also active. No matter how I may comport myself as actively experiencing, it shall *always* be the case that concordance has to be preserved.

Or even better: discordances occur, but they ultimately will balance out in the form of a higher concordance; that in the manner of sub 2) as well as sub 3). That is, I form the idea of a possibility

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[1] From the manuscripts on *First Philosophy*, Part II; probably 1924—Ed.

of experience as such, according to which, in the freedom of my ability to experience, discordances must always again be dissolved in higher concordances, ultimately in a manner that a nature were to be produced as the correlate of an ideal universe of actual experiences and those to be enacted in freedom (in all temporal modes), a universe that would remain firm *in infinitum*. To determine exactly what is to be posited here as ideally possible in the idea is not easy. But one understands that we are dealing with an infinity of *possible* experience, which would be equivalent to the true being of this experienced nature itself.

4) Let us imagine *many subjects* related to the same nature; could not the experiences of one of them run their course steadily in the manner of this idea and give this idea itself, in the course of this style, an unbreakable power of empirical truth, and the experience of another, however, [run] such that for this [other] subject another true nature, or partially the same, would be given, but given with incompatibilities? Conditions of the possibility of the community of one and the other *Ego* and the necessity that one *common* nature constitute itself.

But must this nature be true in the ultimate sense, must it exist in itself, determinable in theoretical truth through natural science? And so on.

17

All Being Presupposes Subjectivity. Ad Lecture 38[1]

To call into question all sciences—to newly conceive sciences, in the most perfect manner. The standpoint prior to all sciences. Universal logic, normative regulation of cognition.

Prior to all sciences I have experiencing life. If I imagine that I did not yet have any logically-conceptually formed knowledge, then I would [still] have experience.

But also experience has its validity and non-validity, its confirmation and disappointment.

We call an experience perception when it gives the experienced being in its originary self; not presentified. An experience has what is experienced in the consciousness of self-having, and yet incomplete. From the very start: anticipation. Is there an experience that gives [what is experienced] apodictically? Every experience is giving, as certainty, as uncontested, concordantly proceeding perception, indubitability. Being certain does not only mean: not to doubt, but it is incompatible with doubting. Apodictic impossibility of non-being. Adequate perception = complete perception. Is there apodictic perception, experience? Is there an experience upon whose validity all other experiential validity depends, always presupposing it?

If every experience would presuppose another one, this one in turn another, and so on, and if none of them were apodictic, then, it seems, every experience would hang suspended in mid-air. Therefore there are experiences and thereby cognitions of the lowest level that are called upon to bear the edifice of cognition. To make them and their entities into a theme, this seems to be the first task: the first science of the first being.

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[1] From the manuscripts on *First Philosophy*, Part II; probably 1924—Ed.

To be truthful: All conceptual truth presupposes experience, all conceptual content presupposes experienced being, all being presupposes individual being. All individual being presupposes subjectivity.

18

Double "Latency" of the *Ego* (ad Lecture 40)[1] VIII, 408

The following has not been taken into consideration in the *doctrine of reflection*:

The mature human being is a social creature, and all sociality is carried out through reflection. As a social creature he lives in the habitus of constant reflection, he constantly converses with others and converses constantly also with himself, he has himself as practical and—enclosed therein—as valuing and doxic theme, just as the others. | VIII, 408/409

Just as, according to the laws of the formation of apperceptive continuing validity and apperceptive conferment, not only the attentively seen things are there for us, but necessarily have their spatio-thingly backgrounds, and just as the respective manifold of unattended-to things ⟨are⟩ nevertheless perceived *as things*, ready to be attended to, but are already—on an unclear, undeveloped apperceptive level—precisely things for us, and spatially oriented, already fitted with an "approximate" special meaning-content—it is the same with the *Ego*, regardless of the unattended-to other *Egos* in the field of perception. But this means: One needs to distinguish a *double latency of the Ego* for itself:

1) the original latency of the subject that has not matured to "self-consciousness";

2) the latency of the *human Ego*, which is a subject of acts. Namely:

I am always apperceived for myself as human *Ego*. Even when I am fully devoted to mere observation of nature and am "self-oblivious," I am in my field of perception as human *Ego*. Here one needs to distinguish the associative mesh through which my psychic life is united with my bodily processes and that likely accomplishes

[1] From the manuscripts on *First Philosophy*, Part II; probably 1924—Ed.

a form of pre-constitution, of the objective apperception that has its validity originarily from *acts* and which now objectifies me in the background as subject of acts. Here it is, of course, the question whether I am now also in higher reflective acts upon myself at all times *objectified* as a higher-level split-off *Ego*. In general, every reflected *Ego* that has become thematized is certainly a human *Ego*; but does the supposition, that every hidden *Ego* is a humanly apperceived one, not lead to an infinite regress? Or is it an infinity through an intentional implication that does not demand an absurdity? Or finally: Is the apperception present only on the first level, but *afterwards* slightly overlapping on new levels? One may rightfully say: With the onset of an "*Ego Cogito*" of the polarized *act-form* the pole takes on the reflective form *"Ego* = I-human," and then immediately an intentional form of emptiness that once more recedes into the background-*Ego* in the same manner. The latter, however, bears within itself *implicite* as horizonal form the peculiarity that it is to be disclosed *in infinitum*, in infinite chains. Every explication demands the same form "*Ego*," according to its meaning. Hence an infinite implication, similarly as every thing-perception bears it in its empty horizon, and in every direction of possible disclosure.

But how can this form be unbuilt? For sure, it cannot be an essential necessity. And how can I convince myself of it, thus, of a possible *Ego* that is free from this apperception? Is this not the same difficulty as in the question of the explication of pure sensations, since sense data are always somehow apperceived as thingly, no matter how indeterminate? Can I inhibit, | as I can inhibit the tendency VIII, 409/410
towards the enactment of validity, likewise the tendency towards apperception in a certain manner?

But what kind of divisive, somewhat unclear phrasing! Apperception is indeed positing of this or that apperceived meaning. In the natural attitude I reflexively participate in the natural apperception of the human being. But if I already existentially inhibit in the reflection of the first level the *world*, thus also my physical body, then the apperception "I-human" is inhibited, and this translates accordingly to the background-*Ego*, just as it might also be suggested through my appearing lived-bodiliness, not the apperception "human," but the *inhibited* apperception. Here one needs to keep in

mind that the world—and my lived-body—continues to appear and the index-motivations continue to exist as immanent ones. Accordingly, the apperception of the *Ego* as the *Ego*-pole of my lived-body is always there anew. On the other hand, I can conceive it, just as every empirical apperception, as constant presumption, as annulled, as perishing.

19

What Kind of *Ego* Is It That I Cannot Cancel Out? (Ad Lecture 40)[1]

What kind of *Ego* is it that I cannot cancel out? That I have to posit in necessity? Not the phenomenon human-I, but the I that is no longer phenomenon, that is not an intentional object of experiencing, thinking, and so on, the *Ego* that I actually find in everything that I think, precisely as the *subject* of the I-think, and I find it even if I have "bracketed" myself, the human being, the I in the ordinary sense.

One can say: When I, living in the continual naive-objective experiencing, find the world and now suspend it in the Cartesian manner, then I arrive at the *phenomenon* of this continual experiencing, and in the form "I experience the world," and in this case, when I have led this continual experiencing from the beginning via my *human Ego*, the latter is from the start suspended as well. And yet I have the necessary *Ego*. Then I have for the entire stream of my life *the absolute life as phenomenon*, and therein at all times the *I* as subject of this stream, but as *transcendental* I, and in different manners. I find it as the continual *Ego* in the "I now experience this thing, I remember, I expect," and so on, be it ⟨as the I⟩ of the respective individual experience, be it in a thoroughgoing ⟨continuity⟩ in the transition of one to the other [experience], while the phenomenon that just ran off is still alive intentionally. But I also find it both in the actuality of this living stream in which I swim, and also "in" the recollections, | as recollected *Ego*, unified with the *Ego* which is VIII, 410/411
now the subject of the phenomenon of recollection; likewise in the expectations as the *Ego* that belongs to the coming as coming *Ego*, which is, of course, posited presumptively, but still as pure *Ego*.

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[1] From the manuscripts on *First Philosophy*, Part II; probably 1923 or 1924—Ed.

Higher-level reflection. Furthermore: I can also practice new reflections, I can revert back from the "I think" to the "I think (that I think)," and I can bracket this "I think" once again and then arrive anew at the pure I as subject of the phenomenon "I think" and accordingly [I can do the same with respect to] every phenomenon and of the entire stream of phenomena, which is then, however, bracketed.* But here we find the peculiarity that the phenomenon of the phenomenon is an individual phenomenon in this sense that it is "tucked in" among the phenomena of the first level. The first *Ego Cogito* "succumbs" to the phenomenological reduction not because I can practice the phenomenological reduction once more with respect to it. It is already absolute, and when I practice once again phenomenological reflection and reduction, then I only employ them in order to arrive at the phenomenon of the second level. But if I go back to the previous first level, then the new reflection is factored into that nexus, as a new phenomenon. And this holds, when I once more reflect on a higher level, for the higher reflection [as well].†

I thus have

1) at first the naive stream of life that does not need to have any reflection whatsoever, pure devotion to the things;

2) of it I only *know* through the first reflection and reduction: only through them I see the experienced, thought, valued (and so on) objectivity as intentional correlate of pure subjectivity of the respective piece of life and the pure *Ego* itself, for which it exists, and now exists looking back at it.

3) But then I also see in further reflection that the previous first phenomenological reflection is itself a phenomenon and a piece of life in the nexus of the life that streamed by without I-consciousness, as awakening of the pure *Ego* (perhaps before that, of the empirical one). And I see that also every pure phenomenon and the pure streaming life (therein perhaps reflection and reduc-

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*But I can also turn the absolute I-think anthropologically: I, the human being, carry out the absolute I-think.

†It is not to be overlooked that we cannot maintain apodictic evidence here, but that we forego the apodictic reduction and only practice the phenomenological reduction, as reduction to the "stream of experience."

tion) exist *for* the I, that it belongs to the I as the one I—*in every reflection I find myself, and the identical I, in necessary congruence with itself*. I see that the life that streams on, so to speak in the naiveté of *Ego*-lessness was only not aware of the I, but that the I was there. I see, especially, that this life | is not exhausted in VIII, 411/412 the waking life in the form of the actual "I think" (of the I that is directed attendingly, grasping, position-taking or quasi-position-taking), but that there is such a thing as *background phenomena*, which are, however, not without *Ego* in the true sense. I become aware of this *affection* and what belongs to it, I now know that necessarily at all times my life (also when it is reflected life in which I am conscious of myself) contains moments of naiveté, that my *Ego* cannot be awake for everything and that even when it practices universal reflection and encompasses its entire life in a certain way, *one thing* is not included therein: the direction of the gaze, in which the reflecting *Ego* directs itself at its manifold life and at itself as subject of this life, the grasping and positing, the thematic comportment, and so on. *Again and again, thus, an ungrasped "I think" is present, and thereby also the Ego of this I-think*, in the manner in which it is the *pole* therein. But if reflection *grasps* it, then it becomes evident once more that this pole, which only now becomes visible, is the "identically same" *Ego* pole, as which it was grasped.

This, precisely, is what is peculiar and yet evident, that the I, as pure I, is a thousandfold and makes its appearance a thousand times in separate acts—and yet cognizable as *the same in numerical identity*.

To be sure, the *Ego* is here an object in the broadest sense and has in this thousandfold a thousandfold modes, and ⟨this Egoity⟩ is for itself an intentional object which, as with all intentional objectivities, is only conceivable as objectivity in this or that mode: while at the same time the objectivity is cognizable as the identical one (object pole) through all these modes.

On the other hand, in all reflections the *Ego* is objective—and at the same time the *Ego* is present at all times, which is *not* objective. This not-being-objective only means not-being-attended-to, not-being-grasped. The respective "not objective" *Ego* is, however, as the later reflection and grasping teaches us, "there," it is the living

subject. Just as reflection is present, and only not-grasped reflection (as in reflection of the next higher level), likewise its *Ego*.*

Thus, *the being of the Ego is at all times being-for-itself, is at all times being and being-for-itself through self-appearing, through absolute appearing, wherein the appearing necessarily exists*. And the *primal mode of the appearing*, prior to the self-grasping, is for that reason still an *appearing* of a special shape. In this appearing it "appears," it is, in other words, in this respective unreflected life the pole as *Ego* that is "unconscious" | of itself, and now there is at VIII, 412/413 all times the possibility that a new life with a new pole makes its appearance, which grasps the pole of that earlier life, whereby this pole (the *Ego*) has the mode of being grasped; this, however, would presuppose a new reflecting life with an ungrasped pole, which, then, becomes grasped again "afterwards."

One would have to add, in conclusion: Even if I bracket the "I-human," then I can nonetheless see afterwards that I am, as pure I, *contained in* the "I-human," that is, that there is, in the I-human (just as in any random I-human-experience, in the empirical I-think), something *that cannot be canceled out*.

*The *Ego* as the *Ego* of the grasped phenomenon is, precisely, the grasped *Ego*, and essentially the grasped phenomenon as "object" of the grasping is not grasped grasping, and the I as grasping *Ego* of this grasping is not grasped.

20

Critique of the Two Steps By Which I Had Arrived At the Idea of the Reduction In 1907 and 1910. (Ad Lecture 46)[1]

The phenomenological reduction opens up the field of experience of "transcendental subjectivity." No "world"-belief is permitted as "premise," in the broadest sense, as carried out naively. In a word: the general thesis is inhibited. What can, then, be posited and what is then the unified universe of possible experience? I would then have to speak of "transcendental" perception (on the part of transcendental subjectivity) and of transcendental experience in general, whose subject carrying this out I am myself, as phenomenologizing and thereby anonymous *Ego*.

The elucidation of the theme "transcendental subjectivity" and the new perceptions arising here which, put into validity systematically, creates greater difficulties than I had originally imagined.

1) Firstly, it is probably better to avoid the talk of phenomenological "*residuum*," likewise that of "*bracketing of the world*." It seduces one into thinking that the world now is no longer a theme for phenomenology and that instead only the "subjective" acts, manners of appearance, and so on, relating to the world, would be the theme. In a certain, well-understood manner this is correct. But when universal subjectivity in its full universality, that is, as transcendental, is put into rightful validity, then there lies within it on the correlative side, as existing rightfully, the world itself, in all manners in which it exists in truth: a universal transcendental investigation, thus, encompasses as its theme also the world itself, in all its true being, thus all worldly sciences, and that is, as eidetic science of the transcendental [it encompasses] all a priori ontologies of the world,

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[1] Presumably 1924. From a convolute on whose cover Husserl remarks: "Prepared to be worked out in '1924' = on the planned 'book' of 1924," that is, material for the planned elaboration of the lecture on *First Philosophy* into a book—Ed.

and as "empirical" science of the transcendental, all factical sciences of the factical world.

2) But we need to be vigilant also in another respect and we must keep dangerous presuppositions at bay. It could seem, at first, entirely self-evident that the subjectivity arrived at through the reduction as "residuum" would be my own "pure" subjectivity, that of the phenomenologizing *Ego*.* What is left unsaid here is the following: In the natural objective experiential attitude I find myself as all others as human beings with a physical lived-bodiliness and a mental being or life. When I now practice the phenomenological *Epoché*, then I inhibit every "objective judgment" (*dóxa*). Thereby every judgment about | real things, thus also my and every lived- VIII, 432/433
body, is subject to the reduction, thus also the others. Does, hence, my mental life, and I in this life, as *Ego* in the *Ego Cogito*, remain? But also my pure mental life exists in the world. To reduce it would merely mean to abstract the level of the mental out of the existing world. Instead, I want to gain the transcendentally "pure" *Ego* and egoic life. Every objective apperception is supposed to be inhibited, also that of myself as I-human, as psyche.

I assume that in natural life I practice natural reflection for the time being and thereby apperceive myself as human person. I observe this as phenomenologist: The validity of this apperception is subject to the reduction, and it then belongs purely as such, as pure consciousness, to that which is to count as part of my transcendental sphere of experience. Thus the reduction means reduction to "pure" ⟨consciousness, produced⟩ through the "purification" of my humanness and especially of my psyche, the purity of the "mental side" of the object "I as human" that is valid for me in the natural attitude. Hereby, in this reduction, I originally emphasized too much the stream of consciousness, as if it was all about a reduction to it.

This was, in any case, my first idea in introducing the phenomenological reduction in 1907.[1] In it lay a principal error, although it is

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*My private *Ego*, so to speak.

[1] Cf. Husserl's *Five Lectures* on *The Idea of Phenomenology* of 1907, Hua. II [Hua.-Collected Works, VIII]—Ed.

not quite easy to see through it.* It becomes rectified through the "expansion" of the phenomenological reduction to the monadic intersubjectivity in the lectures of the fall of 1910.[1] Already then I explained: | It could seem as if the reduction to the "stream of VIII, 433/434 consciousness" would result in a new form of solipsism. But the difficulty dissolves once we make it clear to ourselves that the reduction does not just lead to the *current* stream of consciousness (and its *Ego* pole), but that every object of experience—and the entire world as valid in the respective streaming experience (and at first as nature)—as it was said in 1910, is "*index*" for an infinite manifold of *possible* experiences. The further explanation rested on the demonstration of the *double reduction* that all presentifications can undergo, namely reduction of the presentifications as current experiences and reduction "*within*" the presentifications. Thereby the system of "motivations" becomes disclosed that belongs, in originary rightfulness, to every naively posited "existing" thing whose respective ontic validity—as I would call it today—does not concern the merely momentary experience, but which *intentionally implies* the entirety of this system of possible thoroughgoing experience, a system that is rooted in the momentary experience, but, only as horizon to be sure, a system as fully determined in style. Accordingly, in the factical stream of the world-experiencing life lies—and anew from every moment of experience as novel and modified—an infinity of presumptions, in rightful (= concordant) motivation, always intentionally implied in the universal presumption of the horizon of the existing world, which is continually valid for me, which, modifying itself from moment to moment, preserves the *style* that is always disclosable as the a priori style of the constitution of

*Check to see whether here, with the reduction to the *Ego Cogito*, really only the reduction to the stream of consciousness was meant!

[1]The lecture course to which Husserl refers here is *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the Göttingen lecture of 1910/11. This lecture is published in Hua. XIII, pp. 111–194 [Hua.-Collected Works, XII]. Husserl refers to this lecture in many passages of his unpublished and published works, e.g., in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Hua. XVII, p. 250, and in the "Epilogue to my *Ideas*," Hua. V, p. 150, n. 2 [Hua.-Collected Works, III, p. 417]—Trans. [this note has been updated from Boehm's in light of the fact that this lecture has since been both published and translated].

the respective things and their entire perceptual surroundings, and so on—and to be further and further disclosed, starting from their perceptual meaning.

Through taking up the phenomenological attitude, every objective judgment—as judgment as such-straightforwardly—is put out of action or frowned upon; but what comes into effect is the entire realm of experiential life, in general, intentional life and the rightful power in the intentionally disclosed nexus, a power lying purely in it and to be taken from it in each case, to be "disclosed" from it—or ⟨that rightful power, which lies⟩ in the further process of possible experience, possible intentionality to the further experience, which is demanded now. Upon closer inspection, to be an "*index*"* is nothing other than this: If a perceptual object stands before my eyes straightforwardly, an object that holds valid for me *simpliciter*, then the purely phenomenological reflection, in which I have this "I perceive" and its belief as datum, yields the insight that from here these or other further actual and possible perceptions (albeit not in unambiguous determinateness) are motivated—after positing | VIII, 434/435 kinaestheses—and that, when I put into play the respective kinaestheses, they "must come" in this or that style within their realm of possibilities. The given perception is the core of an "inductive"† system that I can explicate, construct and that bears originarily within itself its rightfulness, if I hold as fixed the identity of the experienced-meant object as goal of my perceptual doing. After having clarified this—albeit only in raw outline—the next great step was to show that just as my own primordial conscious experiences are motivated, with their respective objective meaning-contents and positings, that also others' conscious experiences, although not "originarily" motivated for my conscious nexus, are motivated—under the title of empathy.

Or: Every object of the type "human being" is an index of a system of a new sort, founded in the already comprehended system of the type "bodily thing"—comprehensible as a system from the

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*Within external perception.

†Inductive: When I look purely at the manners of appearance among their kinaestheses, then we have here indeed an inductive system of the if-then, and with this [system] I have been operating since 1910.

standpoint of *my* primordiality. Through an empathizing experience, an "induction" to "alien" mental life and alien *Ego* is enacted, a novel presentification of "consciousness," an appresentation not of my, but of the other's consciousness, to which ⟨belongs⟩ a system of possible such presentifications (in unison with the constitutive experiences of bodiliness)—as a system of intention and fulfillment, in which for me an other is there, and in rightful manner. If the constitution that is carried out *within myself*, as "existing other human being," is observed purely phenomenologically, then there lies in it not only *my* system of experience of concordant actual and possible empathy, but what is in validity here is the *other* in presentification, but as pure subjectivity.

On the first level of primordial founding I have not lost nature, but I have, instead of (primordial) nature, nature as such experienced *simpliciter*, as pole at first of my, of primordially own constitutive experiences, and as verifying themselves in truth therein, although with the constantly open possibility of non-being, precisely due to presumptivity. This also holds for the lived-body, my own and the other's. If I now elucidate constitutively the other and in general the object-type animal, and do so purely constitutively, then I have an expanded constitutive system—a system of my pure intentionality, but encapsulated therein, intentionally justified through concordant verification, the other himself and *his* constitutive life, that is, his intentional life; but the other not in an originariness of the first, primordial type, in which I ⟨experience⟩ myself and in which he experiences himself, but instead in secondary originariness as the other who is originarily experienced by me and in me, | and ultimately VIII, 435/436
as an opposite human being, as opposed to me, given originarily as "other," and in the same originariness constantly authenticatable according to the form of the style that I can disclose in each case. (Of course, nature, just as human beings and world as such ⟨are⟩ mediately constituted through the other.)

The phenomenological reduction is nothing other than a change of attitude in which the world of experience as the world of possible experience is observed consistently and universally, and that is, where the experienced life is observed, in which what is experienced is a respective—and universal—experiential meaning with a determinate intentional horizon.

But of course, a more specific clarification must now set in. If the phenomenological reduction is not a reduction to my private subjectivity, I must nevertheless distinguish between my own being and life, as originarily lived within myself and as a finding in first originariness in phenomenological reflection, and on the other hand the being and life of all others for me that manifests itself within myself, but as "mirrored" and which is to be disclosed within myself, in the manner in which it is induced as given to me originarily with the physical lived-body.*

The reduction to transcendental subjectivity is, to be sure, a reverting back to *my* pure *Ego Cogito*, but this must not be misunderstood as a limitation to my being and my conscious life in the sense of my *private* [life], as if I were only allowed to posit as existing my own private own being and my own life, in which I exist, thus merely my stream of consciousness. From the beginning it spells "*Ego Cogito—cogitata*," and the latter are valid for me purely as *cogitata*. And when I—"explicating" the horizons of implications—observe my cogitating life and the manner in which it unifies itself synthetically and therein then how the *cogitata*, as continually preserved identities, constitute themselves as object poles—with their identically remaining and consequently verifying properties (ontic matter)—and when I, instead of studying individual such *cogitata* and lines of self-verification, make thematic the universal style of verification of my entire life, ⟨my⟩ concrete-full life of validity and the style of its essential horizons and continual new formations of horizons; then I find, in my reduced sphere, not only myself and my life and therein what is meant *as such*, but, as always and necessarily meant, above all a uniform primordial nature, verifying itself uninterruptedly, existing for me | truly and necessarily valid VIII, 436/437 for me due to this open "infinite" verification; this nature I cannot call into doubt—*as* nature of such concordant universal experience. Nature, in phenomenological attitude, is "meant" for me in the

*The "induction," which is mentioned above everywhere, is intentional "explication." In my streaming present is implied my past and future—primordially—in primordiality (and thereby already in my living present) is "implied" foreign present, foreign primordiality. [The solving of] all secrets lie[s] in the clarification of implication and explication, horizon, index, and so on.

special manner of continual concordant experience—albeit with a constant presumption of horizons. This concordance is one that runs its course in special experiences of individual things in the milieu of background experiences; the individualities perhaps modalize themselves (correction). In individual cases, this concordance is one that leaves it open that the motivational situation could change and that I could now be inclined to give up the ontic certainty that was necessary thus far, and so on. In this manner, hence, nature, at first my own private one, is phenomenologically constituted. But it is so at first only as primordially constituted within me "*originaliter*." Only as such is it a verified unity, purely from my own conscious life.*

If I bracket the world and go back to my *Ego Cogito*, as that which is prior in itself (necessarily "presupposed"), then I must, to be precise, again practice the reduction in the realm of the *Ego Cogito* (and its *cogitata* as *cogitata*) itself: In itself, my *Ego* and conscious life precedes all my habitualities†—in itself even my living conscious presence precedes, ⟨namely it precedes⟩ my conscious past and many other aspects—but at first I shall leave this aside and begin necessarily with the reduction only to my conscious life as such and my habitual I as the one that lives therein and takes on habitualities (without such more fine-grained reductions, which become very important later on). Then the next reduction is the one lying on the sides of transcendencies, as reduction to primordial nature, constituted in first originariness. Then the first thing, which I delimit on the side of the *cogitata* as correlate, but as a truly existing transcendent ontic sphere (transcendent to my being), only one which takes on its ontic meaning purely from my primary-originary life, is, hence, nature purely as "originarily" constituting itself as transcendent in my primary, my primordial life. But nature means,

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*Its verification as total nature is inauthentic, "hidden verification"—not verification as responsible grounding—that is in need of explication (something which is in need of special clarifications). Among the authentic verification lies the inauthentic one as presupposition.

†My *Ego*—this is obviously what I later call my primordial *Ego* and primordial life—but in a ⟨peculiar⟩ sense, not in that which is in question in the context of empathy!

in the natural attitude, *objective* nature, in the sense of the one that possibly takes on ontic determination from *everyone* as possible co-experiencer.*

What, now, about the others? Are they also, in the same | sense VIII, 437/438
as reduced nature (as reduced to its original possibility of being experienced by me), unities belonging to me myself, existing "in" me as constituted in me, and as such inseparable from my universal verifying life and its habitualities? Only if I had the others in my sphere as transcendental sphere, I could not only posit them but also *objective* nature, in the validity of something constituted transcendental-intersubjectively.

Now, if I inquire about the others, then they are at first bracketed, as the ones that are experienced worldly and posited from world-experience, as *human beings* determined as having body and soul. But they do exist for me, as what they are, in their entire ontic meaning, precisely in the manner of concordance of the synthetically unified manifold of *my* experiences, and these are experiences of a special and apparently many-leveled sort that are very insufficiently designated by the term "empathy." They are experiences of human beings, of animalic creatures.

If everything that exists for me, the transcendental *Ego*, is in truth only such as the unity of my verifying life and deriving its meaning therefrom, is there not everything my own meaning-formation, as such not only belonging to my life, but also inseparable from its being? It is indeed "implied" in the latter, intentional unity encapsulated ⟨in⟩ it? But in the manner of primordial nature? What is primordial is for the being, which exists for me, what is essentially prior, ⟨the⟩ the founded validity. This indeed holds for every other lived-body, as body that is primordially-egologically present and verified for me. Here the problem of the constitution of alien subjectivity or of the other human being sets in, and thereby of being-human as such: the primordial founds what is for me not primordial. Here, accordingly, another reduction plays ⟨a role⟩: a reduction of the bracketed human being to his lived-body, and that is,

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* 1) My life, originarily accessible to myself—others' lives, merely empathized; 2) my primary-originary (primordial) life—others and their primordial life; these two distinctions must not be blurred!

purely as constituted in my primordial sphere. From there we arrive next at the co-indicated "alien" transcendental subjectivity as motivated through [the other's lived-body] in my primordial-egological motivation. Only once I have gained the other transcendentally, I have another *Ego* and distinguish what is my own and what is of another, myself as bearer of validity and the other as implicitly valid. And only from there ⟨we arrive at⟩ the ontic meaning of the human being as member of the world and ⟨at the ontic meaning⟩ of the world itself.

The transcendence of the other, and thereby the transcendence of the objective world, objective nature, the other human beings, and so on—*vis-à-vis* the transcendence of primordial nature. My own primordial life, as actually existing as real in its own immanent time—my original stream of consciousness—; "implied" in my living streaming presence, my presence as primal source, in this primal source lies the "true being," the one that can be rightfully explicated, verified in this stream of consciousness. | VIII, 438/439

In my life, the one that can be constructed through explication in the indeterminacy of its possibilities, a primordial "world" constitutes itself as basic ground of the ontic validity [called] "world," primordial "things," and so on. What does this mean: they are "inseparable" from me, from my primordial being—from the stream of consciousness, *insofar* as horizons of potentiality belong to it, insofar as I am precisely that which lies in it, the I of potentialities? I, too, am not a "real" part of the stream of consciousness. On the other hand, the latter is nothing without me as the I of potentialities, which is already presupposed as constituting [this stream] from the source. Things—entities, these primordial ones, are what they are, inseparably relative, inseparable from their being constituted in me. Second level: the others, constituted in me on the basis of primordiality, inseparable from me on the second level. The others, however, are implied in me as other I's, and every one of them inseparable from the other.

21

Critique of the Wrong Presentation of the Difference Between Psychological and Transcendental Reduction in the Winter-Lecture of 1923/24 (Ad Lecture 48)[1] VIII, 444

On the "universality of pure souls" (343, l. 27): It would also have to read "*total unity*,"[a] with respect to the fact that perhaps | one could demonstrate a pure mental unity connecting souls with souls. VIII, 444/445

In general, one could object to the intention of the entire presentation [as follows]:*

It is not clear why the emphasis is on the continual reduction with respect to *individual acts*, and then [the reduction] to the individual minds (as if there were not a monadic community). If I want to observe and describe the individual minds in their purity, then there indeed already lies in the traditional idea of soul (at least since Descartes) that ⟨the soul⟩ is a self-encapsulated unity of all that is mental (of an *Ego* or of a lived-body). (Indeed, this is the psychological version of the Cartesian proof of the pure mental substance, of the pure *animus*.). In order now to arrive at my own pure soul (as the only one of which I have original experience) precisely in originariness, I have to indeed practice a *universal Epoché* with respect to the world and all ideal objectivities that are valid for me: precisely with respect to the insight that everything objective, whether real or ideal, that is valid for me and ever will be and can be valid for me, can only do so in my validity, in my experiential belief, in my perceiving or remembering experiencing, and so on, with the

* Objections to the presentation already as of p. 341, l. 22 and then with respect to all that follows.

[a] *Alleinheit*. Husserl coins this neologism from *All-* (all) and *Einheit* (unity).—Trans.

[1] What is meant is *First Philosophy*. These self-critical observations were probably penned in 1925. The references were adjusted to the pagination in this edition—Ed.

experienced things, then further as what is thought, which, in turn, refers to what has been experienced, and so on. Thus, this must all be included in a presentation that necessarily runs a different course!

This psychological universal *Epoché* (and not only the continuing individual *Epoché* with respect to individual acts) is for me, as psychologist, merely a means for purification. My positive universal field on which I stand, into which I thematize, and ⟨in which I⟩ chose a region to be the target of my cognition, is the *world*, and my region is precisely the mental in the world. This creates, of course, its own difficulties. I hold the world in general validity, I have it from the start and at all times in unquestioned validity—in ultimate validity—in it everything subjective (psychic, spiritual in every sense)—also I, the psychologist, like all human beings—appears as worldly; everything in the enactment of psychophysical apperception.

The motive of the reduction presented in greater detail. But now the human beings—and especially their subjective life—have the peculiar quality of existing as something worldly, and at the same time of experiencing, of judging, of "meaning" in different manners worldly things, objective things, individually and ultimately also universally. Accordingly we have not only the objective, as physical and psychical, *externally* bound together, the mental appended to the bodily-physical as its foundation, but also at the same time something mental "*internally*," "meaning" something bodily-physical, but also related to the rest of the objective | world. This precisely VIII, 445/446
demands that the psychological *reduction* is carried out everywhere in mental life; and if my own soul, that of the psychologist, is in question, then I must enact a *universal* reduction, a universal exclusion of the world. *Notabene*, for this purpose I must also bracket the other human subjects who are, obviously, not part of my soul.

Now immediately I have to add that, in respect to the exhibition of everything purely mental in the world and of a pure psychological intersubjectivity, after having practiced the reduction concerning *my* subjectivity and have gained *my* pure *animus*, I have to proceed once more in a similar manner with respect to other human beings given to me in empathy: If I earlier practiced universal reduc-

tion with respect to the world valid for *me*, then I practice now the reduction with respect to the world valid for the *other*, while *I* now posit the world concurrently and once again posit other lived-bodies and human beings. The exclusion of the world, and precisely with respect to the world valid for the other and the qualities valid for him, and so on, is the means of reducing the soul "empathized" in him to purity, a purity that is at the same time objective, valid for me as psychologist, as soul of the lived-body given to me, externally experienced by me.

Just as with all objective experience and experiential cognition (namely as spatio-worldly), the latter gains the character of intersubjective validity and of objectivity in this second sense in intersubjectivity, namely related to the manifold of psychologically actively functioning subjects. We together cognize in this method the objective-worldly purely-mental that becomes the theme of a general doctrine of the soul purely as such from "inner experience"; inner experience in a novel sense, that of the reductive self-experience and reductive empathetic experience, as modification of pure self-experience.

But we have to make one further step that no psychology has taken so far. Namely, opposed to the individual reduction, that of the individual souls, there is a reduction to the one purely mental communal nexus in the world, which connects souls to a mental and thereby personal community. It is the path that leads from my reduced soul, and at first running its course therein, to the other souls communicating with me.

Noteworthy is the apparent distinction that has to be made between

I) the meanings, convictions, insights that I have as functioning psychologist: a) in part as "basic" convictions that create for me a field of pregivenness, a world in which I stand, perhaps also sciences that I presuppose, such as physical biology, physics; b) in part convictions that I furnish for myself as scientist; | VIII, 446/447

II) on the other hand, those opinions, in general those intentional experiences that I have as themes, that I count as part of my soul, of me as co-object in psychology. But now one will say: this would have to include all functioning acts and habitualities. The functioning act-life, in which psychological thematizing and its work is carried out,

is it not at the same time part of the theme? I can reflect upon it, and the moment I do it, it is something mental and a psychological theme.

If I remain in the natural attitude and retain the having of the world, then a reflection upon my functioning life leads to me as human being, precisely as in relation to itself and functioning in every way, and this is repeated in all reflections. I can also see in general that I, the human being, can reflect anew at all times and am at all times functioning anew prior to the reflective apprehension and that I find, and have to find, this functioning through reflection as my human functioning. It is evident in this attitude that every content of self-reflection factors into the content of my soul of my lived-body and, at once, me as human being. This holds, of course, for all actual and possible reflections that I "empathize" into others, and thereby I also distinguish in the others: functioning I, as at all times necessary content for this I of unthematic subjectivity that perhaps remains abidingly anonymous, among which, the thematically-being-directed itself in all of its actions—and what is thematic for this I, and especially what is psychically thematic. Both belong to the respective human being.

If I practice psychological reduction with respect to myself, if I reduce, suspending the world valid for me, to perceptual appearances, to being-directed-at … in perception, to all "merely subjective" remaining for me, then every natural reflection becomes a phenomenological one, I then find all hidden subjective passivities and activities, I find the functioning I that can always again reflect upon itself—upon the specific I as center, upon its acts, upon its reflections of always higher level directed at itself and its acts.

If I at first gain, in this manner, the universal purity—of universal pure subjectivity—in the psychological attitude and with intention towards the universal and perhaps unified mental, then, as is obvious, the transition into the transcendental [sphere] is very close at hand. As psychologist I have retained the world in final validity and have only sought and found the purely mental in the world—namely in the manner such that I can systematically disclose and describe it. But I actually grasp the transcendental [sphere], the pure spirituality, and—during the reduction—nothing remains of the world that, so to speak, only stays in the background of validity—and even final

validity—a validity that does not interfere in the least with the content of my thematic givennesses and observations and only endows it all with a horizonal index—purely "mental." Is here | not the idea VIII, 447/448 nearly immediately at hand that I have disclosed for myself a realm of universal experience and cognition, which is independent of all worldly experience, all positing of the world and thereby cognition of the world?

I had presupposed the world and I am now still positing it. But is it not I who posits, and is it not evident that I only have, and had, a world through these types of experiences and subjective habitualities and that the world, humanness and everything objective makes itself in this or that manner in the subjective, such that here, as I ⟨see⟩ in transitioning to pure possibilities and eidetic necessities that essential laws obtain which belong to every worldly validity and verification of this validity—according to which true being is an index of a special typicality of subjectivity, and so on? Is it not evident that the being of subjectivity, in the manner in which it reveals and cognizes itself in purity, precedes every other cognition, such that the former is presupposed ontically in everything that is ascertained objectively, and furthermore that objective truth in its authentication presupposes the authentication of pure subjectivity for itself and according to its subjective validity? The functioning life is what it is, in and for itself, its true being is cognition of a cognizing authentication enacting itself in itself on a higher level and is only valid from there, but at first [it is] validity, to be viewed in finality on the part of the I of this life itself.

I must see, thus, that the world posited *simpliciter* is not valid *simpliciter* and cognizable in finality prior to the cognitive positing on the part of pure subjectivity. What comes first, in terms of cognition and being, is pure subjectivity, and the world is what it is—and what it is according to being and cognizability—the correlative formation of this subjectivity, belonging to the latter itself. I may, putting myself to action methodologically as phenomenologist, bracket the world for a certain purpose, that means, not wanting to judge with respect to it straightforwardly—in the pursuit of the pure subjective nexuses, according to reality and motivated possibility, one gains the world as correlate, hence *within* the purely subjective. The *Epoché* is a suspension of the presupposition of the world, suspension of

the straightforward-judging and judging-*simpliciter*—now the world exists within pure subjectivity, gained as moment in it (albeit not as an experience in it). The natural world is world, posited in an unconscious, undisclosed tradition; the world exhibited in transcendental subjectivity is the one posited in the disclosed tradition as "formation," as comprehended true idea, and posited precisely in its truth as [something] subjective. The *Epoché* frees me from a prejudgment; the phenomenology founded on the *Epoché* discloses the locus of origin, from which springs the right of the positing of the world and its true meaning.

This is all obvious to the psychologist, once he has penetrated to pure intersubjectivity. In the cognition | that the experience and VIII, 448/449
cognition of the world in straightforward attitude is a naiveté, that it stands on no independent experiential and justified ground, but that there is only the one, universal ground, standing absolutely for itself and grounded for itself: that of transcendental intersubjectivity, on which all truth and all truthful being has its intentional source, [in realizing this] the psychologist would hence have to become a transcendental philosopher. But this result is only reached for him in a certain rightful exploitation of this cognition, and not in a relinquishing of psychology.

For sure, the objective world is no fiction, it is precisely what it is from natural experience, although natural experience is "abstract," harbors hidden and (known only to the psychologist) subjective subgrounds and functional presuppositions. The natural world bears within itself the objectified spirit, the souls, the human persons, the animals, and so on. Thus the tasks remain, namely the demand for a disclosure of the purely mental worldly nexus, and so on. The situation is now as follows: The pure phenomenologist sees this factual type "human world" and sees the essential possibilities and essential necessities existing for a subjectivity, that it constitutes within itself a physical nature, an organic and an objectified spirituality, a distribution of souls in space. Thereby he also sees—or he can see—all original methods of objective cognition, thus also those of psychology. Hence, the perfect situation [after exploiting these insights] will be such that transcendental phenomenology is worked out once and for all and for all purposes, ⟨the transcendental phenomenology⟩ that is, hence, no internal psychology—and that it serves, for

the psychologist, nonetheless at the same time as inner psychology. As a psychologist he can—something that would be, to be sure, a renouncement of ultimate scientificity—remain naive-dogmatic, he does not need to see what has become obvious for him: the transcendental turn through the psychological reduction. Well, then he would view and utilize the transcendental-phenomenological insights while disregarding the transcendental trains of thought, as pure psychology; [only then] there would lie a purpose in constituting separately a pure psychology, whereas the entire system of its tasks and doctrines is developed in transcendental phenomenology, identical in content.

But if he places himself on the transcendental ground, as he must with the intent toward ultimate scientificity, and as every dogmatic researcher must, then he enacts a special science on the ultimate ground, from sources of ultimate justification, ultimate evidence. He then stands in the universal nexus of cognition and is a philosopher, just as his objective science becomes transformed into a branch of philosophy, of the science from ultimate sources of cognition that leads back every relative entity, that is, afflicted with undisclosed relativities, to absolute being, ⟨of that science⟩ in which alone every cognition can be fully sufficient, fully | comprehended and VIII, 449/450 indubitable. Then psychology is merely a member and an organ of philosophy, of the one, universal, absolute science.

To be sure, the difference between the enactment of the world-*Epoché* as *Epoché simpliciter* (in the way in which the positing of the world was positing *simpliciter*) and the world-*Epoché* as *Epoché* under the hypothesis of the general thesis of the world and as means of gaining, within the world, the pure soul, becomes transferred to the transcendental standpoint and takes on a certain modification. The world-*Epoché* here is total, absolute. If I, in the transcendental-philosophical attitude and with scientific knowledge, posit the world—and again straightforwardly experiencing and judging—then this straightforward positing is only relative. I know what the being of the world means; the positing has an horizon, I can activate it and clarify its subjective correlate, as phenomenology has already done, as readily available cognition, to be reactivated [at any moment]. But now I am not thematically interested in this subjectivity, although it is co-valid, outside of the thematic sphere. I

judge straightforwardly, that is, unreflectedly—this no longer means: positing the world absolutely, but judging about it straightforwardly, while now every judgment has a transcendental horizon that simply does not come to expression. This accords with the *Epoché* that I enact as psychologist. Now the latter means: where I have the thematic unity animal, human being, sociality, and ultimately the world as shot through with spirituality, ensouled in manifold manners, there I determine myself to a one-sided direction of judgment (or already direction of experience), in a way that I do not co-enact the positing of the world enacted in all human subjects (and so on), also within myself, but that I exclude it for the sake of purity. The *Epoché* is, thus, a relative one, although it can be, as we know, be transformed at all times into a transcendental one. I then gain pure subjectivity—the same one that is transcendental—anew, but as objectified in the transcendental one, which is, thereby, the same as the transcendental one. Hence, grasping myself as pure and absolute I and then objectively as human I, I cannot but say: I am the same, only I am at one time apperceived as human I—of course by myself as transcendental I.

The self-referentiality of the I and of concrete subjectivity (monad), its being as being-for-itself, is only a paradox if one is, as it were, merely habituated to realities. It does bear wondrous peculiarities, but indeed they are accessible to intuition, to explication, to comprehension, and accordingly this wonder is merely that of the novelty of insights opening themselves up.

22

The Immanent Adequation and Apodicticity and Immanent Time As Apodictic Form of Objective Subjectivity (Constituting Itself for the Living *Ego*) or Subjective Objectivity of Itself Constituting Itself in the Streaming-Presentifying I-Am.* (Ad Lecture 53, a)

Perception of the thing (or of the world) and self-perception "I am"—reduction of thing-perception and the perception "I am" to what is actually perceived.

The reduction to what is actually perceived, the pure presence in streaming, leads, with respect to the *thing*, to the *appearing side*; with respect to my *Ego* it leads to the *immanent presence*, to an *adequate*, thus *apodictic givenness. There* the appearing—*scilicet* the appearing side of the thing—is given inadequately and non-apodictically, and adequately given is only the "appearance of …" and the "appearing as such," although, indeed, the appearing side is "self-appearing," self-appearance of the thing; on the other side it is the I-presence itself, namely, *what of* the concrete *Ego* | is actu- VIII, 465/466
ally perceived [as] now-streaming: What is actually perceived in the streaming now, to whose pure content we reduce, ⟨is⟩ an absolute self, and no longer something that is presented through a presentation. Of course it is presence *of* the concrete I, and this "of" is inseparable from it; this is to say that here is an *intentional horizon* and that the concrete subjectivity is something *presented* in a certain sense, which is, however, *peculiar* to this subjectivity, and something which is always again presented (for itself). But here we have the *reduced presence*, which, as *presenting* (namely as that wherein the concrete I and everything that is not-present belonging to it becomes represented in memory or in any other way) is *not once again presented*, not once more appearing in the sense that

*November 2, 1925.

it is merely given as the end point of "*intentions*" *that first have to fulfill themselves*, let alone that [this presence] could only be given in this manner. This is rather the case for everything *non-present of the Ego*, everything that is present as self-given in originarily giving perception (hence ⟨not given⟩ in inner consciousness—and thematic—in a seizing grasping that reaches through this consciousness); but precisely not for the streaming realm of this perception.

There is, hence, a fundamental difference between that originality in which a *thing* gives "itself" in perceptions, and that in which something *immanently subjective* offers itself in subjectivity, *although* it can be seen apodictically that a thing cannot present itself *in no way differently* as *originaliter* in its manner. It is, in general, entities from *appearances that are in themselves immanent givennesses* and as such have the primal originality that excludes in principle a non-being or being-different during perception, precisely because the perception of it is absolute perception, absolute fulfillment that does not have to intend something through an appearing self—concerning the presence in question now. Every appearance has its inner horizon—and not only the outer horizon—*a horizon even with respect to what is "actually" perceived in it*, and this horizon is a *title for an infinity* of ⟨implications⟩ encompassing it that are to be explicated by the subject in a certain sense from out of itself (although not in a concrete determination implicated in advance). To every appearance here belongs an "infinity" of appearances that, although they run their course one after another and then would no longer present the object in its reduced presence in the *now*, [appearances that] are nevertheless related back to it—as appearances that I now could have had and that would belong to the Now | and which, if indeed VIII, 466/467 others would run their course, and in the style of concordance, present a thing as changing in its changed later phases. This may be a very incomplete description, yet it suffices to make the *contrast* clear, and to make clear the meaning of a non-immanent "*transcendent*" objectivity that presents itself through absolute occurrences, called appearances, *vis-à-vis* the meaning of an *absolute being*, which presents itself absolutely, and then as subjectivity for itself, that is, in the sphere of self-perception, in its reduction to what is actually self-perceived.

Now the *adequation*, this form of originary self-giving, concerns also the *ontic modalities*, at first as the *temporal modalities*. The *concrete streaming present*, the immanent as enduringly persistent and yet giving itself in the streaming persistence with changing content—say a fluctuating sensed tone or even a judgment, actively created by the *Ego*-center, in subject-positing, positing of relations, and so on, that *unfolds a uniform meaning, meant in discretions* in the stream of its immanent continuity—is given in its absolute originariness *as* persisting and unfolding *itself* in this or that manner.

But this concrete present as apodictically and adequately given I must *reduce*. I then have not the infinity of my life, let alone my I itself—as I who I am and am not only as my lived life but as the subject of my potentialities and my life possible through them. Thus: I must reduce to the living stream of the now-persisting life, insofar as it is *living "phenomenon"* and has its living but streamingly changing range—without an actual limit, and yet limited, and limited through change. This is the concrete present appearance of my life that comes to an experiencing (actually objective) self-giving through disclosure in recollections, and so on.

Adequately given to me is the subjective streaming present. "I reduce to what is *actually perceived*." But here it is important to distinguish the different attitudes and their respective givennesses:

1) *The direction of the view toward the streaming now* and what is given therein. I proceed from now to now, as it streams, I go along with it and cling to what is absolutely originarily given, the actually perceived. ⟨It is⟩, for instance, a sensed tone, or a tone as such, spatially appearing. I follow the rolling of the car,* going along acoustically. What appears | is the objective rolling. I reduce, I practice *Epoché*, then I have this appearing itself, streaming from now to now. I pay attention to this appearing, going along with it, and within it, say, to this tone-now, wherein what is objective adumbrates itself. But both are—albeit to be distinguished—now in question. If I do so, the objective appears at all times, it constitutes itself as unity VIII, 467/477

*Or I follow the process of judging, of the awakening of its sensed contents—reflexively, as observer.

of appearance. But this, that which persists, the temporal process of rolling, *appears*, while I *do not posit it as valid and do not have it as theme*.

2) But there is more that appears. Also when I make the *immanent* purely my theme, then, while I pursue purely my streaming appearances of the objective, *something appears that I thereby do not make, and do not have to make, my theme*: namely the *appearances themselves in their flux* are constituted as unified *precisely as the course of this flux*, in which every new appearing now is the welling point, while the past momentary appearances are, precisely as past, moments of the concrete *past of the process of streaming*; and this whole [structure] is, at once, in every new now the *appearing process of this streaming*—as appearing with an ever new now. Of course to this also belongs the *horizon of the future* of the novel nows and of the appearances of the process, constituting the anticipation of future streaming.

3) If I now say that *in* the streaming of the immanent present, and reducing to it and directed exclusively at it thematically, *I grasp something adequate that is given apodictically*, then this means that I have in this direction of gaze *pure fulfillment of my meaning intention* and that it is inconceivable that I hereby enact a modalization of this certainty.

On the other hand, this is *not a temporal-modal givenness*: what I grasp here is not the temporal mode "present" as present of my streaming life in contradistinction to the other temporal modality "past" or "future life"—or present, past, future concrete subjectivity. Therein lies, of course, its ontic positing, its objective ⟨positing⟩, but in the how of temporal orientation. But not only that. What is, above, adequately grasped as streaming fulfilled now is *not* grasping of the streaming present in the *second* sense, as grasping of the *present of the stream of presences*, in which this stream would be posited, but in the manner in which it its now living-persisting temporally-modally, enduring from now-appearance to now-appearance, and yet by holding on to the pasts. It is precisely from this temporal modality, reduced to the living streaming, as far as its actual vividness reaches, that apodicticity is further demonstrated. | VIII, 468/469

On the other hand: a *thingly occurrence* is, in the absolute endurance of its appearances, not equally *absolutely appearing oc-*

currence—but thusly appearing originally as is appropriate for a thing: with a horizon of an infinity of unfulfillednesses that provide later possibilities for contradictions and annulments. And lastly this difference continues on through all modalities of being and of intuitions making being conscious—and in further consequence of all meanings with respect to the same [thing] (as having the disposition of being fulfilled through intuitions): the immanent recollection—the recollection of something transcendent; correlatively an immanent past—and a transcendent one; ⟨and so on⟩. Everything is somehow affected by the difference: according to the essential relations of all basic forms of intentionality, also the modalities of certainty [are affected].

In the *primal originality of the immanent as such*—which, in turn, has its differences of originality, insofar as perception within immanence again presents a primal-original achievement for all other modalities of intuition and meaning—lies *the source of all apodicticity, at least for individual being*. Also a God cannot make it so that mundane being is absolutely given to him, and not as something appearing in transcendence (which would be a contradiction). Also for him, world-perception and thing-perception are presumptive *in infinitum*.

The immanent givenness of the I-am has its adequation and its impossibility of being stricken out not only in the *present*, as reduced in the sense of what is *actually perceived* and of the reduced concrete present. *I can disclose in freedom the horizons of the present*, can proceed from recollection to recollection and, while necessarily the perceptual present continues, *live in recollection*. Of course we have to distinguish here between the *recollection that has its presence*, and the *past that is being recollected*, and a *new manner of presentation* comes to the fore: *In the present the past "appears."* I find here, for one, the I-can-"always-again," on the other hand I see a *general structure*: the endless past, "always again" to be awakened from every point in the I-can, the past which is *adequately given* in a generality that we call *form*—as past and as *order of the pasts*—and which cannot be stricken out, while the individual concrete content is a limit, an idea, but an idea in the realm of the adequate-apodictic. My presence-I in its streaming persisting, as existing now as streaming, is visible as *dependent*, it cannot be without its pasts. But its

ontic | positing is absolute, *only from the perceptual present can the perceptual present of the past have its hold*—the memory giving it is itself present, and its apodicticity bears that of the memory within something—as far as the latter reaches. VIII, 469/470

I can also see adequately that the present sinks into the past and that "the" past cannot individually be stricken out, although its concrete content is not absolutely given. I can see that the form has a content, and must have one, that presents itself in what can be currently awakened as "*appearance*," but this presentation, what shines through this appearance, is *absolute*; and one can see in principle that this form is inconceivable without content and that this type of appearance is *absolute appearance*. By running through the absolute nexus of the pasts, I discover, in the absolute synthesis of the appearances of something remaining identical—the pasts with identical content, ⟨the recollections of⟩ the identical event, and so on—that every "repetition" of "the identical past" in separate present recollections, which hang together as one in separate present recollections, gives "what remains identical" in a different "subjective" mode—mode of appearance (temporal orientation). I can "always again" come back to what remains identical and see in principle, generally—in adequate and apodictic givenness—that the mode must change and that a past content remains identical. Where something immanent is in question, it is the past immanent [moment] itself—always again appearing in a novel manner, in a new temporal modality (modality of temporal orientation).

Hence, in the current present and in the freedom of presently running productions of recollections my past itself, as the *temporal order, as the temporal order of my experiences themselves, is preserved*. I, who exist, am the *concretely* existing I in the temporal form belonging to me, the one that is now present, which sinks back into the past and which assumes its position in the "objectivity" (in the in-itself) of this temporal form and assumes this position "forever"—for *me*, who has to say that what is present now becomes something past and then is the unity of appearance of an infinity of possible recollections—freely to be produced by me (if I am not hindered)—and thereby always again as something accessible for me in the synthetic consciousness of the same, which can always again be cognized.

But my present life also has a horizon of the future of what is to come, the "pre-expected," and *also this form of "coming" cannot be stricken out*, it is to be disclosed adequately and cognizable as *necessary form*. This "coming" is | again a *moment of the present*, VIII, 470/471
precisely that of *anticipating*, in which the coming is conscious. But this anticipation is not a field of *what can be awakened*, but a field of *primarily-making-intuitive*, pre-presentification.

But something important is still missing; for it has not been discussed *that every recollection has a future horizon*, that of the *finished future*, insofar as every past is a past present, whose past expectation has *occurred* with a certain content; and from here every recollection has a future horizon—*to be awakened through recollection*, every one refers forward to further recollections that terminate in the streaming present. This is projected toward the current pre-anticipation as future that is anticipated as *future past*. But the future presented in this manner has before it the original anticipation of which we spoke above.

1) The ***current presence****-I that merely lives* ***in its present****; 2)* ***the I that is objective for itself****, that has experience of itself and* ***synthesis of experience****, identity with itself—* ***in the manifold*** *of experiences of itself that belong to its stream of life.*

I experience myself as I, as concrete I, that is experienced as identical in repeated experiences: I am *objective* for myself. In my being lies that I at all times perceive myself (in the broader sense of the term)—self-perception is a basic structure of my being. I not only exist, but even if I do not say that I exist, self-perception, whose predicative expression is the I-am, is a constant moment of my life.

I can direct my seizing gaze at *my perceptual present*—with respect to *what I actually perceive of myself there. This presence, too, is something objective*, an objective moment of my subjectivity that is posited subjectively-objectively in the I-am. Just as this I exists as in itself in this respect, as it is something identical in manifold self-experiences—of self-perception, but also of the manifold of self-recollections that can be awakened and of other self-seizings reaching back and ahead—in the same manner this moment of present belonging to me is something identical in this presence-perception and in manifold recollections. Every such recollection,

as belonging to a new present, is the medium through which I say, as the present I of this recollection: I was. The past I is that which was as present. The past present is the present of an experience that is always again cognizable as identical in all recollections—and as such it is objective, it has its position in subjective time. The I, however, as something objective, has no place in subjective time, | but it is omni- VIII, 471/472
temporal in the form of the time belonging to it. Its life fills this time, and it "itself," namely as the *Ego* pole from which emanate all actions and at which all affections direct themselves, exists (in a manner peculiar to it) above its time and its life, [it is] everywhere identical in its temporal continuity and not, as its experiences, individuated in time. The concrete I, I who currently lives in the present and had a past life, which was present, am omni-temporal, but as a concrete I, I fill the time which is mine. I am objective for myself insofar as I experience myself as identical for all time. But "I am" means: I live now and I live continually. In this current sense, that of current life, I am not objective, I am only in the now, and ever again only now. That I was means that I am no longer as who I was, I am only now, but of course as the one to whom it belongs that he existed and existed as someone.

I am objective—something identical in manifold self-experiences; but this manifold itself belongs to my present and past life, to me myself. I am—and in my being I have self-experience—as pulse of my being. I am and I was—and I am identical in the unity of my time, but that means: [I am as] correlate of possible syntheses that take place within myself.

23

Difficulties Concerning the Deepest Grounding of Philosophy as Universal Science on the Way of the Phenomenological Reduction (ad Lecture 53, a)*

The necessity, for phenomenology itself, of working through all naivetés. Two main steps: 1) naive phenomenology; 2) theory and critique of the phenomenological method practiced (critique of phenomenological evidence).

Difficulties with the ***beginning*** *of the phenomenological reduction.*

Its motive ⟨is⟩ the presuppositionlessness of ultimately grounded science. Such a science must have a beginning in *immediate* cognition, which may not depend upon any presumptions that have yet to be grounded or which may even leave open the possibility of deceit, the possibility of non-being. The step back to *ultimate presuppositions* must lead *ultimately to apodicticity*, to an *immediate cognition* of being which makes non-being inconceivable.

The *presupposition of positivity* ⟨is⟩ the *world*, as that which is *pregiven* through experience, which is to be cognized mediately through | thinking [arriving at] truths in themselves.† The being of VIII, 472/473 the world, as the world of spatiotemporal realities, is always already "presupposed." A positive science does not begin without presuppositions, the scientist who has chosen *a region*, say as physicist the general physical facts, as his theme, *presupposes* that it be *given as reality* in his (and all actual and possible) experiences, and every individual physical thing with which he works, he "takes" from experience. He does not ask how experience grounds entities, how [say] nature-experience grounds nature as existing in certainty, although he—as everyone else—knows very well in a certain way that experience can be overturned into seeming experience, that experiential

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*Approximately 1923.

†Mediately—what kind of mediacy?

certainty can be overturned into certainty of non-being, of mere semblance and that one can convince oneself thereof practically in certain very familiar manners. But this knowledge, this practical familiarity has not sprung from a *theoretical investigation* of experiencing—and of the entire conscious life in which we become certain of the world as existing. As a scientist, I constantly move around in my scientific life in subjective activities, in manners of my life in which something worldly becomes conscious as existing, in which it appears this or that way, in which something appearing makes its appearance in modes of certainty—and perhaps evident certainty. In the results [of this research], nothing remains of this subjective [element], but only in the objects existing and existing-thusly. But in his scientific doing, ⟨the scientist⟩ must constantly consider his entire methodology as well, and radical grounding presupposes that he make the method, the life in which it consists, that he make the achievement that it brings about and the range of this achievement a *theme*. Ultimately fully universally: He may *presuppose* nothing as already existing for him, already fixated and ascertained according to being or being-thus, what he has not actually and consciously ascertained, and this through "compelling" grounding.

Hence, *the most rigorous science would demand that initially nothing of the world and ⟨also nothing⟩ of the being of a world as such*, as something wherein something—what is thematic here, say—that already exists, *would be presupposed. The beginning would hence be nothing—nothing worldly*. What remains? Of course *this subjectivity itself*, in which the world already gives itself as existing—in the form of this or that reality and horizon. The beginning cannot consist in the question: what can be said of the earth in generally intuitable truth—where the being of the earth is presupposed, or even universally: what can be said of the *world* (which is constantly experienced as a matter of course and in each case | perceived in these or those VIII, 473/474
perceptual contents)?, but instead: What makes the *being* of any realities, of an earth, of a nature, of a world as such, certain—and thereby the first [question would be]: how does this subjective [element] look, ours and ultimately mine, that of the experiencer, in which worldly being and being-thus is conscious to me, and how does all the subjective being and life look, whose *own being prior*

to the question regarding being and non-being is certain and is presupposed in any assertion about it? And how does, then, all the cognizing carry itself out therein, which grounds objective being and being-thus? *Ultimate* objective grounding presupposes, hence, the investigation of the purely subjective and of the purely conscious activities running their course in it—the systematic investigation of pure subjectivity in itself precedes that of "objectivity."

Of course, immediately at the threshold stands the difficulty

a) of *transcendental psychologism*: The subjective = the subjects and their conscious life—are we not ourselves in the world, humans, and so on?

b) likewise the difficulty of the *range of apodicticity* of this subjective sphere—or the difficulty of the delimitation of this apodicticity.

What concerns the latter (ad b), the beginning is, in any case, naive self-reflection; and hence one can perhaps proceed (ad a) in the following manner:

1) The world as pregiven to me—and through my experiencing and other life—presupposes, as its actual being and being-thus as being in question, precisely my own being in its life; firstly: The pregiven world contains me as human being—everything contained in it, the universe of what is real, presupposes my bodily existence, my bodily functioning: thus the pregiven world—in its ontic certainty and verification—presupposes the certainty of my lived-body or that of my human existence. I practice the transcendental reduction by seeing that the world existing for me—with this human existence—is a unity of validity of my manifolds of actual and possible ontic validities, contents, appearances, and so on, that all of that lies in an ultimately achieving life, in myself, the ultimately functioning "I." In this respect I have, thus, arrived at the *ultimate ontic sphere*, which exists for me—I in my pure being for myself.

But what about the *knowledge of this existence* and of the manifold of entities under the title "I am"? *Does this not lead to infinite regresses*, since I, knowing myself, would also have to have knowledge of this knowledge; but in what I know the knowledge of this "what" is not yet known, or: *vis-à-vis* the cognition of any entity the cognition of this cognition is something new, | something different? VIII, 474/475
If I stick to experience, I can say: Through the phenomenological reduction a pure I as field of experiences opens up for me; but my

experiencing of my own being, say my experiencing of my reduced experience of the worldly, is thereby not itself something experienced, as I would have to ⟨have the latter in turn in experience⟩, in order to have knowledge and cognition of it; and if I reflect, then I have again in this reflection something that would yet have to be experienced (thematically)—and so *in infinitum. Hence one first needs to ask how self-cognition*—cognition of this transcendental-pure *Ego* in its totality—*is possible*, although it is certain without further ado that I can arrive at experience of what belongs to me, *piecemeal*.

But even more: If it seems very easy to get from actual experience at least to a cognition of individual subjective [elements], then it becomes plain upon closer reflection that here, too, questions are to be posited. *Is not experience something ephemeral*, something that passes by flowingly? How can I arrive at an *abiding cognition*, a valid proposition of an identical meaning that would abide from now on, in identical authenticatability? Every new experience that I make, or when I rely on recollection, every recollection and every repeated recollection is once more something ephemeral that I can observe in experience—but how does the *acquisition of cognition as abiding* become possible, and what is this, this "abiding acquisition"? Certainly not merely an experience arising in the Now and from then on abiding. If I refer to an *evidence*, and especially to an *apodictic* evidence, I do not only ask: how does it look?, but: How does it extend beyond experiencing, or the fleeting moment, how does it transcend this moment?

If a science as ultimately grounded, ultimately justifying itself is to be drafted, can one ignore such questions?

2) But could one want to, on the other hand, tackle them *from the outset*? One will have to say: What we criticize must already exist. We critique any achieving life concerning its achievement, we critique positive science—as achievement of a scientific life, of a striving, producing life. We critique the world experienced in natural experience—as an achievement of meaning and ontic meaning of this meaning[a] carrying itself out in the nexus of experiencing life. *Life as achieving comes first*, something occurs in it, something is

[a] *Seinsmeinung dieses Sinnes*

meant therein, something experienced, experience is rectified, semblance is crossed out, thinking acts are carried out, are connected, corrected, and so on. And this life, lived in its achieving course, what is not itself thematic however, is being thematically inquired into, becomes thematic in the critique and according to its meaning (its goal), its ways, its | attainment or failure. Of course one can—and VIII, 475/476 perhaps one must—again disclose the critiquing life on a higher level, that is, it needs to be made thematic and in turn critiqued. *Life comes first*, and that is, life directed systematically at these or other goals, and living in them: is it not correct to put into play a "naive" cognitive life concerning "transcendental subjectivity," a science of this subjectivity (thus of my own, if I am to be the cognizer), which, accordingly, cognizes naively, just as, on the ground of the naturally existing world, the positive sciences do? I then follow a naive evidence and a scientific goal that naively guides me. If I am certain of the abiding existence of my pure subjectivity and evidently able to direct my experiencing gaze at it at all times, then I can also describe it according to its characteristics, thus ascertain truths pertaining to this subjectivity's own peculiar essence; just as I can, in the natural attitude towards nature pregiven to me in natural experience, through active pursuit seize upon experience that I pursue with theoretical interest and I can treat it in descriptive sciences with respect to individual realities, generally types and universal, at all times invariant structures. Directed straightforwardly at the experiential givennesses and observing and describing them in the enactment of concordant continuous experience, I pose no questions concerning the possibilities of an abiding experiential truth from fleeting acts of experience and expression.

The regressive path of grounding an absolutely justifying science (grounded to the ultimate), hence, leads from exhibiting the presupposition lying in the *pregivenness of the world* for the positive sciences, as already for pre-scientific experiential life, to the demand of a grounding of this presupposition; in its consequence [it leads] to the demand of a "bracketing" of the existence of the world (its consistent remaining-suspended) and to the exhibiting of the ground of this experience and of being to which the being in question and every path of decision and grounding is beholden. This ontic ground must now become thematic as cognitive presupposition for an ulti-

mately grounded cognition of the world. Prior to all cognition on the part of positive science lies necessarily the cognition of pure (transcendental) subjectivity.

The *first task* here is, obviously, to make thematic this novel ontic sphere through an observing experience and to subject it to a systematic description. However in this path we are dealing *at first* only with the ultimately functioning pure subjectivity, *to the extent that it brings the world to pregivenness* and to valid cognition—as presumably always already existing for me, the cognizer, and further to be known in experience and thought—and with presumed right. | VIII, 476/477 I reflect that all validity-for-me occurs in my own conscious life, with all of its verification as my own achievement, such that, hence, ultimately clarity and meaning and right of this validity demands, precisely, the study of the egoic life in which this validity occurs. This egoic life thereby undergoes a necessary "purification"—through the transcendental reduction. But if one now wants to investigate this "world-constituting" cognitive life—or the pure I with respect to the latter—then one can oversee from the beginning that the pure I reaches much further than what one can grasp at first, and that, in any case, it needs to be studied in its whole concretion. At any rate we posit this as the task without at first knowing how great it is and how great the range of cognitions resulting from this—let alone [without knowing] that these [cognitions] will have to encompass the entire universal philosophy.

I said, universal "*description*" is the first task concerning the science of pure subjectivity. Indeed, the description is supposed to be *scientific*, that is, following the demand to be ready and thus in a position to provide ultimate justification. Here we are in an odd situation. For if we pose the general question how such descriptive cognition is to be possible—say, with respect to the fact that experiencing is a momentary experiencing, flowing and passing, and that abiding cognition is to be gained therefrom, while this being of abiding cognition can once again only be seen in passing evidence—; if we pose such questions, then we operate in them already with concepts derived from description and which already bear within themselves abiding validity—as presupposition. Already every taking for granted of the *Ego* and any of its contents as existing presupposes that subjective [elements] are distinguished from

one another and that something identical is exhibited in it, and so on. The possibility of the cognition of being is presupposed—and for it, justification must be given.

It becomes obvious that it is impossible to proceed differently than, at first following naive evidence, from an evidence-*simpliciter*, to derive from it systematic descriptions—and especially essential descriptions, in general insights—and then to convince oneself once again, in repetition and reflection and reflective descriptions, to what extent undisclosed presuppositions lie in the method of these straightforward descriptions, to what extent exhibiting them leads to new subjective-descriptive results, through which the *range* of those descriptions can be clarified and delineated; but this so long as the repetition becomes an iteration of such results, to the insight that one might be able to proceed always again reflectively, but that thereby no new essential insights can be derived. Essentially what lies herein is that a universal description of essences, which transcendental subjectivity enacts as cognizing-thematizing itself, must bear its system within itself according to which— |beginning VIII, 477/478 in naive description and proceeding systematically—it necessarily must arrive at such descriptions in which all naiveté is sublated; ⟨such⟩ that this amounts to leading, at the same time, to a critique of its own procedure while limiting its range, and ultimately [this must lead] to a universal description in systematic order whose naiveté is completely eliminated and must only be augmented by higher[-level] descriptions which determine this range.

At any rate, the order of the "phenomenology" of the pure *Ego* is as follows:

1) a *naive-straightforward phenomenology*;

2) a reflective one of higher order: as a *theory and critique of phenomenological reason* (critique of the *phenomenologizing Ego*) or of the phenomenological method or a critique of phenomenological evidence. One can see that thereby all radical epistemology is carried to an end.

As concerns, at the beginning, the *problem of psychologism*, the reduction to the *Ego* is, of course, at first understood as that to the *human soul*, although it will be proven that the decision concerning being or non-being of the world—the proof of its apodictic existence as pregivenness and of my human existence in it—already

presupposes me as *Ego*. But with respect to the latter, it is tempting to say: "The being of my *Ego*, concretely taken as my soul, precedes, in the order of cognition, all other real being, and apodictically so. All mediate cognition of realities in the world rests upon immediate cognition in which the real is directly experienced; but this experience is necessarily sensible experience and carries itself out as bodily functioning of my *Ego*, thus as my mental doing. At first, hence, I do not have the world as such, but instead this little part of the world: my soul." But is not the soul *worldly*, an element of the spatiotemporal real world, only as *ensouling* the real organic body, which is what it is, as a dependent part of the world? But, must I then say once again, is this not the "soul," purely in itself, in its experiencing life in which this bodily lived-body is meant as existing and putatively authenticated—and its being an organ for all sensible experience of reality as such is again authenticated? *If this authentication is in question, then the being of the soul as soul is thereby in question*. It is now, indeed, *pure* subjectivity, in which the authenticating of the world, of nature and therein bodiliness, constitutes itself, and in which, if subjectivity enacts this validity of bodiliness, and perhaps with apodictic full right, thereby *it* relates *itself within itself* apodictically to the bodily lived-body constituted within it and grants *itself* as soul a *worldly validity*, while the granting of the | worldly validity of itself now still stands *prior* to the VIII, 478/479
[validity of its lived-body]. But at the beginning one need not make a decision in this respect, no conclusive interpretation of the evidence of the world ⟨needs to be furnished⟩. It is enough that at the beginning, due to the reduction, no soul of a human being stands in the world as concrete entity, but a subjectivity that bears *within itself* the "phenomenon" human being (I, this human): that is, ⟨subjectivity⟩ in its transcendental life, which constantly enacts worldly validity, the evidence of the world of experience.

24

Alleged Difficulty that One, Remaining Within the *Epoché*, "Never Returns to the World"[1] (Ad Lecture 53, b)

The way of philosophy ⟨is that⟩ of the most radical freeing of all presuppositions—ultimately of the presupposition of worldliness; ⟨the path towards a⟩ transcendental edifice, newly erected, of a universal science ⟨starting from⟩ the transcendental *Ego*, which is, hence, the subject of philosophical cognition. I, the presuppositionless I, enact a course of "presuppositionless statements"; "presuppositionless"—this is to say at first: free of all natural-worldly, natural-human presuppositions. I put into words what I see in this presuppositionlessness and can always again see. The abstention of the presupposition of worldliness and the new way of philosophy, which does not presuppose the being of the world, allows no prejudice for being or non-being (also none for a modality of being, as possibility or even as probability); [doing so] leaves it for me, the transcendental and phenomenologizing subject (as which I have begun to be active, and therein lies, to posit myself), *open that I arrive, in the nexus of transcendental experience and cognition itself, at the being of the world*—as to be posited by me, the transcendental *Ego*. If the way (of the disclosure of the transcendental sphere of being) leads me, at first, to my transcendental life as *Ego*, to the immanent-temporal sphere of ownness, and if the "world-phenomenon" belongs to it, if I then arrive at transcendental intersubjectivity and its transcendental-immanent temporality: then, if I have remained in this style [of inquiry], the positing of the world would become possible *through the fact that* it would reveal itself to me that the *phenomenon world*, if I *reach universality* in this direction, would take on the ontic meaning of *world in itself* as transcendental idea.

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[1] Approximately 1924—Ed.

Concretely, the following comes to be posited in the transcendental attitude: the transcendental meaning and the meant as such, the current present life of the transcendental *Ego* | and the world VIII, 479/480
meant therein as such—and as believed with this or that content; further ⟨this world⟩ as believed as such by me and those that transcendentally exist with me, ultimately as one and the same world, preserving itself synthetically in the entire concrete we-community in its entire monadic temporality in the concordant belief through corrections, with the constant presumption of the preservation of this style, which confirms itself concordantly in future corrections. But now I see that what I as natural I had in constant certainty as world, and what we had in constant certainty as world, is nothing else [than this]—that true world in the natural sense is nothing other than the idea predelineated in this path of confirmation.

As long as I have not come to grasp the *full universality* of transcendental subjectivity, that is, as *inter*-subjectivity, in transcendental experiencing and thinking, and therein have understood the *world as correlate of this intersubjectivity* (as the universal synthetic phenomenon of the world of actual and presumptively possible experience, ⟨and that is, as⟩ communal experience), in other words, as long I have not transcendentally interpreted transcendental subjectivity in its full circumference as one that lives in the state of humanness or natural worldliness (and finds itself as human community in the world as the only [such community]) and have not understood myself and my We in this manner transcendentally—so long endures the *tension between the representation of the world*—and, individually, the merely subjective human representation of worldly things—*and the world itself*, the existing, actual world. World-representation, thing-representation means here: what is represented as such in my and our human representing. It is not until I have taken up the ultimate transcendental standpoint and have grasped from it the infinity of transcendental all-subjectivity—that which finds itself in the world and finds itself as living into the world in worldly, subjective experiences—in its totality, that *this tension vanishes, and the difference between representation and actuality vanishes*.

It appears as an *unbridgeable contradiction*, if one begins transcendental-philosophically and starts out with the transcendental

Ego, with the I that corresponds transcendentally to the human-I and as to be posited first, and with its own life as one that represents the world. *How should one be able to, if one remains in the Epoché, ever get beyond world-representations*? Does one seriously want to declare the world an "illusion," a semblance? Does one want to say: There is no actually existing world, there are only my representations of the world? And if one finds certain ways of transcendentally getting access to others and their representations of the world, thereby indeed declaring them as being nothing other than nexuses of representations | of the world and at best of other experiences, experiences belonging to them—what would be changed? VIII, 480/481
Nothing more than that we have several pure psychic subjects and several streams[a] of representations of the world. In this manner we do not reach the actuality of the world, and if it is true that presuppositionless philosophy can only start out *as transcendental* (as pure phenomenology of consciousness, or purely psychology, as many readers of my *Ideas*[1] substitute for the former) and be carried out from there, then it seems clear that this presuppositionlessness can *help us*, who want to cognize *the world, in no way*, as long as [this presuppositionlessness] remains in the pure transcendental attitude, hence moves in the circle of mere representations of the world. *Is not the entire enterprise wrong-headed*, since it stubbornly wants to remain in the "transcendental" sphere but at the same time wants to cognize it through thinking; granting that *thinking* could achieve anything here, why not exercise it in order to transition from the *representation* to *actuality* and to inquire, through thinking, into the actual reality represented in the representations, and answering this question through thinking?

Those who make such objections do not realize how naively they are speaking and thinking, they do not know how much they overlook that concrete problematic or, where it has already arrived at the stage of concrete work, push it aside, [the problematic] on which depends all true philosophy, indeed, in whose solution alone it fulfills

[a] *Reihen*

[1] *Ideas to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Book I (Hua. III/1)—Ed.

its meaning, gains its field of labor in which are encapsulated all conceivable scientific problems and all problems of humanity as such. It is completely pointless, it would itself be an empty counter-arguing if one were to enter into such empty speculations, so far removed from the matters themselves. The construction of phenomenology itself according to its method, its problematic and concretely executing work is the only possible answer here. In firstly grounding and executing transcendental phenomenology, the necessity becomes plain to begin an absolutely justifying, that is, a rigorous cognition in the true sense of *transcendental*, or what is the same, to begin with the *cancellation of the world-presupposition*. To continue to be fearful of a seeming evaporation of the actuality of the world means to *shrink from* an indubitable necessity. In further execution that exhibits necessities step by step, from which one cannot recoil in any way, the worry concerning the actuality of the world and of the cognition of the actual world becomes alleviated all by itself, and it becomes alleviated through an incomparably novel and insuperably insightful *understanding* concerning what actual being of the world and actual being as such | *means*: what it means in natural life itself, VIII, 481/482 whose essence has become the universal transcendental theme.

It becomes utterly clear now what experience and thought are capable of achieving, it becomes clear that *thinking*, as an achievement itself taking place within transcendental intersubjectivity and only to be authenticated in the latter, *cannot in principle leap over this subjectivity*, that transcendental subjectivity ⟨can⟩ ever only predelineate within itself transcendental subjectivity, that ideal transcendental formations, in turn, can once again only remain within the transcendental, that their ideality, their in-itself can never mean a transcending of the transcendental sphere (despite consisting of transcendental individual acts and individual subjects, factical individual nexuses, and so on) and that in general real and ideal being that transcends the total transcendental subjectivity is a *nonsense*, as such to be understood absolutely.

Yet ascertaining this state of affairs—of transcendental-phenomenological idealism—is by far not what exhausts the entire content of phenomenology, just as little as it marks its theme. [Transcendental-phenomenological idealism] is the result that predelineates the *form of all meaning of being*, to which all conceivable

ontological problems have to remain bound. All *philosophical* ontologies are *transcendental-idealistic ontologies*. All regions of *onta* are regions of *onta* that are, in their actual, transcendental-philosophically clarified ontic meaning, transcendental idealities, unities constituted in transcendental all-subjectivity.

25

Ground-Laying of Transcendental Idealism. The Radical Overcoming of Solipsism. (Ad Lecture 54)*

The idea of finality.

How nature constitutes itself and can become the theme of a natural science; how in the Ego subjects, one's own and foreign ones, constitute themselves; how lived-bodies, how human beings, how a surrounding (and so on), how community and then transcendental community constitute themselves.

Transcendental clarification of the difference in the ontic meaning: being of nature (and objective world)—being of subjects as human-subjects—being of the subjectivity of monads.

Content

Contingency of the judgments concerning external experience. Empirical indubitability not absolute. Lack of finality in principle. The meaning of this finality. The idea, encapsulated in natural science and its scientific judgments concerning reality, of a certain finality | VIII, 482/483 *(of a novel type). Relative finality—related to the respective status quo of experiential knowledge, subject to a corresponding harmonious progress of further experience = natural-experiential-scientific finality.*

1) The style of the entire external experience. To this also belongs the experience that every discordance will again dissolve into a concordance. Originary rightful presumption that this style will preserve itself. Belonging to this: the idea of the existing real world which continues to be valid. The general thesis is the foundation for natural science, for theories of nature under the idea of finality. Consistent approximation to finality, but no absolute finality. The certainty of theories [*is*] *never absolutely given and given in adequate insight.*

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* 1923. On the lectures ⟨on *First Philosophy*⟩ 1923/24.

2) Absolute finality of egological experiential knowledge. One can foresee that, accordingly, an adequate theory of pure subjectivity as theory of experience must be possible.

a) Attitude on the part of the Ego towards its pure subjectivity in solipsistic limitation. Phenomenological Epoché. In this attitude, observing description of two manners of experiencing and judging, in general manners of being active: I) straightforward, natural attitude, II) attitude towards pure subjectivity, the transcendental one. II) presupposes I). Inquiry into the possibilities of transcendental life. In it my nature as pole system. The true being of nature for me. Everything objective is only conceivable as title for subjective occurrences. The being of what is really immanent—the transcendent being (that of objects) [is a] unity from originary (perspectival) presentation, realizing itself progressively in perspectives. It has, accordingly, no absolute self; existent in constant presumption. The factum of nature encapsulated in the factum of my subjectivity or my possible experiences.

b) The other subjects for me and their actuality in relation to that of the objects of nature. The other subjects are not given as perspectival unities, not in ideal immanence as are thing-objects. The manner in which they are given. The self-human-experience, at first self-lived-body-experience (and then experience of the human-I, the personal one). Original relation of my I to my lived-body; through the latter relation to extra-bodily realities. The pure I, the person, distinguishes itself and constitutes itself vis-à-vis its own lived-body and the external world. My human-I as double-sided unity, to it belongs my lived-body and my personal I—opposed to this the external world. The pure personal I is no unity of adumbrations. The human and purely personal "I do" [*is*] *no* [*object of*] *transcendental experience.*

Empathy: the manner in which other human beings are experienced by me. Transcendental clarification of the difference between the ontic manner of the things and that of other human beings and of the difference of their transcendence. Community of separated subjects. Clarification of the different | constitutive unities from the constitution of community. Every thing is intersubjectively perceivable for everyone—persons are only perceivable for themselves. Clarification of the different objectivity and transcendence of the subjects and of the VIII, 483/484

things. Radical overcoming of solipsism, both of the naive one—and ⟨possible⟩ in the natural attitude—and the transcendental one.

In all judgments with respect to experience and in all knowledge with respect to experience, no matter how perfect, lies a *contingency*, by virtue of which no certainty, no matter justified it may be, is a *final* one; none is of this sort and can be transformed into one of this sort such that judgments arise that, once grounded, are grounded once and for all: that they are unshakeable in their certainty. In a certain sense, "empirical" certainties, too, are indubitable, insofar as nothing speaks against them: Namely what is grounded in concordant experience, what is derived from it is in certainty, remains continuous certainty, as long as the concordance abides, as long as no new experience—or one that flares up or an older one which was ineffective up to now—speaks against the abiding certainty. As long as this is not the case, every doubt is impossible. Doubt, just as negation, is not a matter of fancy, but presupposes a motivation. But opposed to this we have a *different* indubitability in view, which characterizes *final cognition*. It is grounded together with the indubitable insight that no conceivable course of further grounded (insightful) cognition could demand (motivate) the relinquishing of the certainty in question and of the insight grounded in experience—be it a relinquishing in the form of a possibly insightfully grounded doubt, be it in the form of a negation (which is, by the way, equivalent).

Every *judgment with respect to experience*, every judgment as such ⟨in relation to⟩ the world as fact and its special realities, thus also every natural-scientific judgment (no matter how exact-physicalistic it may be) is only indubitable in the first sense. It lacks finality *in principle*. It is, in principle, not grounded in the sense of the once-and-for-all, as certainty that no future experience could ever alter. To be sure, all well-grounded—and especially scientific—judgments with respect to experience have finalities *included* in them or they are to be *modified* into such judgments—in a modified sense. For I can always say: at the current status of my (or also of intersubjective) experiential knowledge—*subject to a concordant course of future experience—the certainty is final*. Or: Every certainty of this sort has a *presumptive validity*, a presumptive right, in relation to all time. | VIII, 484/485

Style of the factical course of external experience.

Furthermore one needs to say: Judgments with respect to experience that are well-grounded must indeed be relinquished often—and [must be] sometimes excluded entirely, as judgments with respect to mere semblance, partly they must tolerate modifications of their meaning—modifications that they again transform into certainties. But this means: a concordant course of experience—and concordant certainty with respect to it—always re-establishes itself through breaks of concordance—the negating exclusion of what does not concord combines with the replacement of other states of affairs in lieu of the ones that were discarded, which factor into the concordance and are given and demanded in the nexus of experience.

The empirical right of the belief in the world—as rightful foundation of an empirical world-cognition. Idea of the existing world in the general thesis—as a foundation for a natural science. Natural science and the idea (presumption) of an existing nature; related to it the idea of a final theory of nature.

We have, hence, not only experiences *simpliciter*, but also experience that discordance will again dissolve into concordance and that a uniformity of experience has a validity whose correlate is the uniformity of an experienced *nature*. We presume with empirical right, in empirical insight, that this will always remain this way, and correlatively, that an experienced world exists.

And the well-grounded conviction now follows this, namely, that, according to a *valid idea of an existing world*, a construction of judgments and theories with respect to experience would be conceivable which would have the status of *finality*; thereby, namely, that [this idea] *anticipates* the course of that concordance of possible experience which lies behind all discordances, all deceiving semblances and in which lie those positivities that must lie priori to[a] its negativities, nullities. *Natural science* is guided by the idea of a true nature and of a true theory; and even if does not seriously believe that it will be able to actually find it, it still believes in the possibility, together

[a] *zugrundeliegen*

with the possible expansion of experience and of the experiential motives that create rightfulness that becomes disclosed therein, of being able to carry through an *ascension* of science and its theories, according to which—in a consistent approximation to this idea—theories arise that should be ever better adapted to the course of "nature itself" and thereby approximate ever better to the idea of a true theory of nature.

No theory of nature has adequate insight and is thereby absolutely final.

Here we have, thus, *a finality as idea*, | but by no means as one VIII, 485/486
that is *self-given* and *absolute* finality that would be derived from the insight that this certainty could never be uplifted—through which new insights whatsoever that this would be absolutely inconceivable. *All empirical finality is relative to experience up to now and is merely presumptive validity*.

Absolute finality of immanent knowledge with respect to experience.

But opposed to this, already the *knowledge with respect to experience* that grounds egological experience is absolutely valid, final. This implies: If I hold on to what is perceived and identify it in a random recollection, it at all times retains its identical right—a right that could not experience an increase or a diminishment, not through any future experience. Every single *Ego*logical experience bears within itself its absolute right, and not a merely presumptive one. The question as to the reliability of recollection belongs into a different context. Presupposing it, or taking it as far as it reaches, every external perception (reproduced perhaps in later recollections with their right) can later lose its certainty; not so immanent perception. Immanent experience grounds final knowledge, what it grasps as existing cannot be relinquished: to the extent that repeated recollection is really only reproduction of perception and manifests itself as such, to this extent the right remains absolute, the entity remains existent.

But I can also say with respect to the *current* immanent perceptual present—concerning the perceptually grasped processes of experiences, acts, and so on—: while I live in immanent present in this manner, observe it purely, I cannot conceive, I can see as

impossible, that perhaps future perceptual occurrences of this sort could ever change anything concerning the right of this experience.

I am absolutely certain of myself—of my identical I in the present and the past, of my experiences, at first in the current present and then, in objectively identifying seizing, as a unity of repeated recollection: of every experience as identical in its immanent temporal order and related to my identical I.

⟨But then comes⟩ the next question: Is it not self-evident, then, that the finality of the purely subjective experience is the foundation of an experiential theory of subjectivity? Likewise ontologically: The ontology of nature and the doctrine of essences of pure subjectivity have fundamentally different foundations. Subjectivity as possible is adequately given. Nature as a possible nature is given as the idea of a consistent presumption. | VIII, 486/487

Attitude of the solitary Ego towards its pure subjectivity—phenomenological Epoché.

Let us consider the *solipsistic Ego* in its life and according to the possibilities enclosed in it a priori. Or rather: *I reflect and carry out the phenomenological attitude*. I abstain from a judgment with respect to the universe; indeed, I abstain from *all* judgments that I have formed thus far, which I bear within myself in my abiding meanings, convictions, all of which I in one way or another accept as my convictions when reactivated, no matter how they arose or were grounded. I remain in the state of pure observation with respect to *my* transcendental subjectivity, that is, I observe how I lived thus far, how I experienced, thought, and so on. And if I then, intermittently, go back into the natural attitude, I can again proceed in this manner. I can once more reflect and ⟨view⟩ this as phenomenological *Ego* in reflective observation, just as I did it earlier simply in that I spoke of my phenomenological attitude and its viewing and what was viewed; and in the same manner once again, iteratively. I then see that I can live in *twofold manners of experiencing and judging, two manners of behavior* and manners of a uniform streaming life and can be *active in twofold manners as Ego*:

1) In the straightforward, natural attitude I carry out egoic acts, and as a judging person—and limiting myself to this—I have posited these or other objects, they are valid for me; and in the process of

consciousness, in enacting identifications, in the concordant process of experiences, in the verification of the judgments, they are for me precisely the ones that they are, namely as ones that are valid for me as judgments. They are those substrates of authenticated predicates that authenticate themselves for me as actual in verification; and if I have not authenticated ⟨them⟩, then they are still valid for me, thanks to my judgmental activities, as those in which they have come to a determining positing—and they are valid as determined in this manner as long as counter-motives, negations do not cancel out the old judgments, which modify what has been valid thus far as existing into non-being, and so on. In this manner, I have a multitude of existing objects, many possible and actual ones, many authenticated ones and cognized as truly existing, and so on. Perhaps I set myself the goal to expose the *truth* writ large and to work out the systems of true objectivities—through authentication of truth and through exclusion of falsehood, non-being. The true worlds, so to speak—the real world, the ideal worlds, the mathematic manifolds, and so on—are then goal-ideas—partially realized, with yet open horizons of what has not yet been attained.

In all of this I judge with respect to these unities, and not about transcendental achieving subjectivity; even when I judge about myself and about subjective activities, I then judge ⟨with respect to⟩ things, | numbers, and so on, as such—as valid actualities—and *in addition to this* with respect to the activities related to these entities. VIII, 487/488

2) I leave the natural attitude the moment that I exclude from my sphere of judgment everything valid up to now and everything that stood firm as one and existing in the identifying and determining sphere of judgmental activity, and turn my attention to pure subjectivity and to myself, my experiences, my doing, which, as hidden to itself in natural judging, now becomes the theme of reflection. And now I judge anew, enact a new life which again must be hidden to itself; I judge with respect to my transcendental life up to now and that was hidden to itself up until now and with respect to my further life, insofar as it still has a naive form. *All transcendental experience presupposes natural experience, it is an inversion*[a] *of the natural one*, and this holds generally. As I said, I can repeat this and

[a] *Umbiegung*

can now pursue in general the possibilities of my transcendental life—of my absolute and indubitable possibilities—*my* possibilities, my absolute ones, and *therein* I find *nature*, the world, the ideal possibilities and necessities, and so on—as poles of identity of certain acts and courses of acts, in certain characteristics.

What kinds of changes can occur in these poles concerning their properties, how things stand with the ideas of finality, the ideas of true being—*vis-à-vis* what is merely temporally valid and experienced as existing in truth, and yet will again have to be relinquished under the title of semblance, error, and so on—all of this I can investigate a priori.

I see that I must encounter everything that appears in the transcendental sphere, everything that I have ever found naturally, what I have spoken of as worldly, have authenticated as final actuality, and that everything that appears here as existing truthfully—and authenticated as such—is indeed a subjective occurrence in the transcendental *Ego*; everything objective is only conceivable as a title for subjective occurrences ⟨and⟩ syntheses of ⟨such⟩ occurrences—as identified ⟨and⟩ pointing towards authenticating experience: ⟨as⟩ conceived and insightfully viewed as belonging under ideas of infinite concordance of experience, and cognized with insight as something that can always again be intuited, and so on.

Immanent being really[a] *belongs to the transcendental sphere, transcendental being is the unity of original presentation, always ever only realizing itself as appearing in subjective presentations, hence no absolute self.*

Yet what has been said is in need of a limitation, and in a certain sense in need of a correction.

1) Perception is self-giving consciousness. We take it as transcendental. If we take a perception that *absolutely grasps* the perceived, then what is absolutely grasped | is not only "meant" in perception VIII, 488/489
as itself-present in the flesh, but the self in the flesh is realized in it and inseparable from it, it is "*immanent*" to it. Such an entity, hence, immediately belongs to the transcendental-subjective sphere.

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[a] *reell*

2) But if the perceived is something *transcendent, then in ⟨this perception⟩ the perceived can only "appear" in the flesh*, that is, what is absolute in the perception is a content in which the appearing *presents itself originarily*.

If it is the *meaning* of the transcendent to be the unity of such an immanently enacted and original presentation, then it *is* nothing other than what actualizes itself as such a unity subjectively. It hence has *no absolute self*—and only the self of an original presentation. Transcendent external perception is *presumptive* and carries with it the certainty of the possibility of potentially *proceeding ad infinitum* in concordant perception and potentially bringing to self-presentation, piecemeal on a certain path, everything that the object will be. But to this also belong the possibilities that what the thing *was* could have been brought to presentation in every respect; and *for every moment in time* it holds that the object is in truth for this moment in time—any determination that it might have—an *idea*. Hence, what does not belong to the entity here is *the idea of an all-sided and complete perception*, even if pursued *ad infinitum*. It is at all times the *idea* of something that can be experienced, a something of which one can have experience or could have had it and it is what it is ⟨as⟩ substrate of an indeterminate sum total[a] of determinations, each of which is, or was, to be authenticated through experience.

All of this, hence, is insufficiently described. How can the system of open possibilities be described which, subjectively motivated, delimit the possibility of experience for each thing and every point in time of the thing? Regardless of how the more precise description may be, it must refer back to the fact that *actual experience*—in the form of actual perception or recollection, and among these latent recollection and actually grounded motivation belonging to it—*predelineates a system of possibilities of experience as such, among which a concordant one*, in which precisely the *possibility* of positings, of empirical judgments is predelineated—and thereby [the possibility] of experiencable and authenticatable *substrates* of these judgments. *These substrates are inseparable from subjectivity as substrates and they lie encapsulated within* [*subjectivity*] *itself*, albeit not always as actualized poles, substrates. The transcendent objects | VIII, 489/490

[a] *Inbegriff*

lie encapsulated in subjectivity as unities of possible concordant experiential manifolds; ⟨in this subjectivity⟩ lies a rule that can be exhibited, a rule of experiences possible for it, anchored in the facticity of their actual perceptions which now run their course, or have run their course and are conserved in memory, where they can be reawakened. *Factical nature lies encapsulated in the factum of my subjectivity as subjectivity of possible experience* and of judgments with respect to experience that are supposed to be able to be concordant and which at the same time rightfully presume concordance.

Are other subjects also merely unities of perspectival presentation?

What is to be said now if I have *others' lived-bodies and other subjects* in the realm of my experience? Are they, too, merely unities of presentation of my possible experience? In a certain sense—yes. Indeed I experience the other's lived-body just as other things. And do I not experience the other human beings and animals? This, too, in a certain sense. But we also see the *difference*: A mere thing is in all respects in which it is, something experiencable—and experiencable for me, the cognizer; in this respect similar to my life, to everything that presents itself, or will present itself, in the unity of my stream of life. As concerns the latter, it is at every moment of its time only actual as experienced, something which does not hold for the transcendent thing-reality. *The immanent*—this is an equivalent [term] for it—*is itself a real moment of my life* and only lies in it in this manner, really.[a] The *thing-transcendence* does *not* lie therein *really*, but *ideally*, namely as a substrate-unity that arises in actual or possible experiences, in perspectives, in experienced meaning-contents and has the peculiarity that it, although it appears in the respective experience that we call appearance of it, can be exhibited as appearance, as appearing in the flesh but *that it is something identical in different separate appearances temporally apart from one another*. In the synthesis this identity of the appearing something of temporally distinguished appearances can be self-given. On the other hand it can be given in this manner, and thereby the object as the identical one can be self-given—and

[a] *reell*. In this paragraph, Husserl uses the distinction *reell*—*irreell*, which has been translated as "real" and "irreal," respectively.—Trans.

yet it cannot be in "in the sense of truth." Being truthful means: Based on previous concordant experience, in which it was given or in which it is concordantly motivated in certainty, ⟨for the thingly-real⟩ *the idea of an infinite system of experience* (of such possible concordant experience of it) is "predelineated": I must attribute to it in judgments existence and existence-as-thus according to certain determinations—and according to open determinations, yet firm in their shape—in certainty, while I at the same time must leave open as open possibility | its being-different or its non-existence. Hence VIII, 490/491 the thing is at all times *something to be experienced*, and yet at all times a *presumptive* something; it is certain at all times as substrate of possible enactment of experience and of judgments to be made, at all times, where it is actually experienced, as substrate of certain experiential determinations, given and identifiable by judgmental certainties—but in principle inconceivable as something else.

Ideal immanence of the external object.

This, thus, is what the *ideal immanence of the thing-object* in experiencing consciousness or in experiencing concrete subjectivity means: It is a potential pole of possible concordant experiences and experiential judgments and actualizes itself in actual experiences which, once they occur, expand the system of finished and confirmed concordance of experience by a new confirmation.

The experience-of-self-as-human-being, the human-I experiencing itself; at first: its own lived-body.

If we now consider one's *own lived-body*, it, too, is a thing-object, but it is also a lived-body and has a stratum of characteristics that no other thing has. It is my *organ*, organ for my perceiving doing, but also, say, of my pushing, pulling, and so on, effecting doing into the thing-world. It is my organ and formed from a system of organs related to each other, each of which is freely movable by me. *Touch of the lived-body by other things is something different than touch of these things amongst themselves*: "I" am being touched—the lived-body has a field of touch, and this is a field of immanent data. In the manner in which my lived-body *functions as lived-body*, and in which the specific bodily occurrences belong together, have their empirical-associative connections, something

typical reveals itself: from the very beginning it is apprehended as a unity of possibilities of bodily functioning, its external appearing displays a harmony of expression with the inner occurrences, the inner being-affected of the I with its corresponding living contents (sensations of movement, data of touch, and so on) and the inner I-do, such as the I-move-the-hand, -the-eye, I-push-with-the-hand.

The original relation of my Ego to my lived-body—and through the latter the relation to the world external to my lived-body. The pure I (personal) different from the lived-body and the external world: this Ego as a special unity vis-à-vis my entire surrounding. My human-I—belonging to it my lived-body ***and*** *my personal I: hence a double unity. The unity of the personal I is no unity of adumbrations. The pure personal I-do not to be mistaken with transcendental experiencing.* | VIII, 491/492

Hence my lived-body has, besides the thingly properties, yet another stratum of different, subjective, properties, in the same substrate. I, in my passivity and activity, am related to this thing in a special fashion, and at the same time it mediates through my sense organs (in which I am active in sensing and acting) the experience of all other things and mediates my practical power over them. I, as acting (and so on) in this lived-body and as related through it to the world, am also empirically one, apperceptively one with this lived-body—and yet distinguish myself from it, as on the other hand, in unity with it, [I distinguish myself] from the "external world." I distinguish myself ⟨from my lived-body and from my surrounding⟩ as subject of this lived-body and of this surrounding: as affected by the latter, as active in relation to it, interacting with it, as using this lived-body as organ, operating with it everywhere, I myself take on a *unity of my own*, the unity of my "*human*" experiences (experiential convictions), my habits, my knowledge, my abilities, virtues, and so on. This means: I am I in the ordinary sense, human-I to which belongs its bodily organ, and this I is a double unity unified with the bodily substrate, in which an egoic substrate of its own is the bearer of personal properties and in which the lived-body has correlative properties, related to the *Ego*, which are experienced here in the thing-substrate with its thingly properties.

All of these are already *formations in my transcendental subjectivity*, and its actuality is actuality "constituted" in it. Also the personal unity, the I as person, is a substrate-unity—although of an entirely different structure than the thing-unity, since the personal I does not constitute itself through adumbrating appearances and has its manner of personal experience of self, and at first of the perception of self, which *presupposes* the perception of the lived-body (with, once again, its specific perception of its own lived-body) and of the spatial things of the surrounding, external things. The I-suffer and I-do is not the mere transcendental experiencing and being-intentionally-related, but is afflicted with an "*apperceptive*" *stratum*, a presumptive apperception—say, as the "habitual" style of my behavior, as doing in the empirical I-can and according to a certain capability. In general, I am the subject of capabilities, and my doing is perceived as realizing capabilities.

Other human beings, experienced by me.

What now, when I experience *another's lived-body* as lived-body? Here I experience "at first" a thing as any other—as substrate of my experiencing appearances and possible appearances of such sort in general; at first—that is, it is in any case a stratum, and it is necessarily there, of this intentional structure that would have to be in place even if all alien bodiliness were taken away and I would become a *solus ipse* |. This living body[a] there is apperceived, however, as VIII, 492/493
lived-body—and yet not really perceived in its higher level of determination specific to a lived-body. I "cognize" this thing there as lived-body according to that external typical identity with my lived-body with respect to typical forms, manners of movement and the like, which have in my own body an egoic parallel and which they here now have in apperceptive transfer (through normal transfer over of what is experienced once to typical analogues, but without comparison). Hence there is an *Ego* (as personal, actual *Ego*) and a lived-body as an organ of this *Ego*, but [it is] an *appresented Ego*, a co-positing of an egoic present, occurring through presentification, a present which is not mine; mine—that is, the only one that is actually perceptually experienced, the only originarily present

[a] *Leibkörper*

one, in my originarily presenting, that is, perceiving consciousness. And due to the fact that the *Ego* is appresented, it is co-given as *Ego* that perceives its lived-body, moves its lived-body as perceptual organ, perceives its surrounding through it, and so on. For this *Ego*, its lived-body is constituted in its system of experience, and the unity of experience which is mine, now has a parallel in the unity of experience that is his: and both, the unity of my experience and the open possibilities of experience, and the unity of the experiences carried out by the appresented *Ego* and possible ⟨for him⟩ (⟨which is for me⟩ an appresented, hence presentified substrate of presentified experiences and possibilities of experience), are in original congruence; what I see as living body is the same that is also seen by the *alter Ego*; and likewise for the entire surrounding, which would require further elucidation.

But it is now clear that the *transcendental interpretation of the essence of thing-reality and of the essence of a personal reality* must come to very different conclusions. A second person is appresented as a functioning subject "in" this bodily analogue over there, ensouling it into an organ. But actually this appresentation means that the appresented other relates in a certain sense to the substrate of *his* experience of his own lived-body, apperceived as thing in the zero point of the surrounding experienced as oriented around him. But since the other is appresented as empirical person, transcendental subjectivity, too, is apperceived, the transcendental second subjectivity in which this person constitutes itself—and this person in relation to his surrounding oriented around his living body in this or that way. And this person thereby relates himself *to the surrounding as a surrounding constituted purely in this second transcendental subject*, at least where it is a purely experiencing *Ego*, perceiving with eyes and ears, and so on.

By virtue of the fact that this appresenting apperception arises in *my* | transcendental subjectivity, the latter, hence, has come into VIII, 493/494
contact with a *second* one; or: it exists, I am motivated to *posit* it, to posit it as originarily justified, when the apperception "other lived-body and other person" *confirms* itself in the further course of experience, that is, of the ever new apperceptions of this sort running concordantly. Hereby the identifying congruence of the other lived-body constituted in me, existing for me in direct per-

ception, is at the same time confirmed *in the manner of appearance that* [*the other lived-body*] *has* and that it alone can have; since for ⟨the other⟩ his own lived-body is the zero-body, the central member of the spatio-thingly world oriented around it, just as for me my lived-body is such for my surrounding appearing as oriented around myself.

Clarification of the order of constitutive unities through expansion into intersubjectivity.

In further consequence, *spatial things* perceived by *me* and perceived in the form of orientation with the respective ones co-seen by *him* and then perceived in his form of orientation. And to this, then, belongs quite a lot: the fact that he perceives my lived-body as an external thing, as I do his, that every change in position of his lived-body or my lived-body results, for us, in shifts in the manner of the appearance of the things or their thing-aspects, and so on, shifts of such a manner that would indicate themselves in such words: If I were to stand at "his" place, then I would have "the same" manners of appearance as he has from his position, and *vice versa*, and so on. By the coming-into-action of empathy the other, the other *person* is not only there for my I-personal subjectivity and other, in turn, for mine, but *the other transcendental subjectivity is presentified in mine and vice versa*.

At once, thereby, *my thingly surrounding* is characterized in the *personal* manner of relation *as intersubjective surrounding, identical surrounding for everyone*, everyone namely, who is appresented and appresentable in my subjectivity: constituted as identical not only in *one* transcendental subject alone but in a communally connected *totality of such subjects*, substrate-pole for everyone, substrate-pole for his possible perceptions and all systems of possible perceptions of others, with the corresponding substrates, appresented in him, substrates that identify themselves as identical substrate.

As concerns the *personal subjects*, they, too (just as their lived-bodies and all their spiritual actions), are objective, that is, *can be intersubjectively experienced*. They are unities, | substrates of proper- VIII, 494/495
ties and relations that *everyone* constitutes within himself originarily in perception, namely in his transcendental, absolute subjectivity, [unities] which now every other can experience.

But here we have the great *difference*, that *everyone can perceive every thing*, and that is, that everyone has constituted within himself originarily every thing, or has *implicite* co-constituted it, such that *the thing-world would* merely be changed, but *unaffected in its existence if other subjects would not exist*; just as it, on the other hand, *abides* as what it is, if it is not actually perceived by any onlooker. That it is constituted in subjects belongs to its essence, it is nothing other than the substrate of a constitutive system. But whether this or that subject exists or does not exist and whether this or that [subject] has actually developed thing-perceptions, developed "capacities" of external apperception or not, this is not relevant. Only subjects as such must exist, and at the least one, who are fitted with such functions that in the further course of their life a world-apperception would have to develop.*

As concerns, on the other hand, *personal creatures*, in this case *in every transcendental subjectivity only one can originarily-perceptually* constitute itself; it is also for that reason that every person can *perceive or originarily experience only himself* as person according to his personality, his conditions, his activities, his character traits. For personal apperception is such that it draws into its apperceptive spell the entire *transcendental* subjectivity of this person that consequently appears as purely mental interiority. Every transcendental subjectivity builds up, in this sphere, a type of apperception, a self-representation, in which it encompasses its entire transcendental life—actual and possible, reflectively grasped and graspable in possible reflections.† | VIII, 495/496

*This must be phrased more carefully.

†An important comment needs to be added here:

1) What constitutes itself originarily-perceptually, or can constitute itself in perception, also belongs originally, as correlate, to *this* subjectivity, it is hence immanent to it, albeit not really [*reell*] immanent to its real experiencing.

2) What can constitute itself in a subjectivity *only* through appresentation, *not*, however, through perception, that is also no longer immanent to it, *neither really immanent nor ideally immanent*. All such transcendence, all such going above and beyond on the part of a subjectivity beyond itself is made possible through *empathy, an original interpretation. Here is the only transcendence that deserves this name properly*, and everything else that might also be called transcendence, such as the objective world, *relies* on the transcendence of alien subjectivity and has its meaning in that through this interpretive experience a community of transcendent subjects in

Hence a transcendental life is carried out such that it includes its *Ego* pole in an apperception and its contents of sensation, but also furnishes contents of feelings with apperceptions through which the *Ego* constitutes itself *as person of a personal life, as possessing a lived-body* and as a *bodily-minded creature*, as animal and human being, related to a surrounding, and that it at the same time knows of itself as a *comrade* of a personal manifold of human beings who stand together in actual and possible relations of agreement, and now in relation to a *world, which is an all-communal world*, and a world of nature and of culture. *This world-totality encompasses all mental interiorities of the individual subjects—and it is, on the other hand, nothing else than the constitutive unity of a manifold of absolute subjects*, in which it constitutes itself as world. *To every empirical Ego corresponds a transcendental Ego. The world* is the universe of constituted being and *demands a transcendental interpretation*, through which it becomes cognized as constituted. Not all being is nature, not all being is spiritual being, is personal, is mental being, but all *objective being* of this type is what it is, as "product" of absolute subjectivity, developing and shaping itself transcendentally: [absolute subjectivity] which one may no longer understand personally.

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relation [495/496] to each other constitutes itself and in that the objectivities immanent to every individual subject, if they are not really immanent, can be experienced and cognized as identical through intersubjective identification. In this way, *the world is intersubjectively-ideally-immanent*.

Every "entity" is an idea: an X, valid, justifying itself, determining itself more closely or differently *in infinitum*, and yet a necessarily abiding X in validity; it is an idea or only objectifiable as idea, as ideal pole (the latter for what is really immanent). Accordingly, the above difference belongs to the ideas.

Ideas, however, can constitute themselves *adequately*, such that they are given as *complete* in closed constitution (originary self-giving); for instance, the *ideal objects of mathematics*.

Other ideas, however, can also experience *inadequate*, and *only* inadequate, self-giving, such as the *things* through perception with an originary presumption *in infinitum*. Here [we have] necessary indeterminacy and determinacy. In the one case, one can simply take over the constitution from every other subject, in the other, every alien subject can determine more closely what is indeterminate.

Against solipsism, both the personal and mental one, and the transcendental one. The phenomenological reduction is no reduction to a solus ipse.

A solipsism that says: I, the mental creature, *alone* exist, everything else is mere phenomenon—this is nonsense. *Ego* presupposes non-*Ego*, lived-body and thing, *Ego* in the natural sense is person.

But also the modification of solipsism into the transcendental [realm], | which already makes the correct distinction between *Ego* VIII, 496/497
and transcendental subjectivity and which believes that the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental interpretation of nature would annul every possible positing of alien subjectivity, also a transcendental one, is nonsense. The transcendental interpretation of empathy provides the self-justifying transition into alien subjectivity, and thereby into transcendental [alien subjectivity]. Just as I, in my transcendental subjectivity, do not only have justified experience of what I directly perceive, but also have justified recollection, justified expectation, associative anticipation, presentification, in the same manner [I have] a presentification, based on the same justification, of transcendental consciousness—as empathy.

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Ground-Laying of Transcendental Idealism
Phenomenological Reduction and Absolute Justification[1] VIII, 497

And now on the "phenomenological reduction." What was it actually meant to achieve? The reduction to transcendental subjectivity. For that purpose, I have "bracketed" the natural positing of the world or the existence of the world and every natural ontic judgment about the world. Indeed, I have followed this method in order to make *visible* the transcendental ground, and in its encapsulated peculiarity, *to make use of the possibility of the non-existence of the world*, that is, to operate with the *assumption* that it in fact[a] does not exist, and thereby to expose the apodictically necessary being of the *Ego Cogito* as the sphere of reflective phenomenological experience (that which gives this *Ego Cogito* itself).

Yet when we thus have, in the framework of this *Cogito, the world only as phenomenon* and now pursue the actual and possible experiences and experiential cognitions of the world, it is then, *purely in this framework*, also my problem *what makes a world-cognition a justified one* and when objective judgments are justified and "scientific" in the highest sense and when the cognizing subject can claim its intentional objectivity as true and how the rational achievement of objective scientific cognizing is to be understood in every respect.[2]

If I, once I have attained the *Ego*, have subsequently made clear to myself that everything that "exists" for me, hence the entire world, into which I effectuate and from which I constantly let myself be effected, only exists for me as *intentional objectivity of my experi-*

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[a] *in Wahrheit*

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[1] According to Husserl, perhaps already as early as 1921, but perhaps more likely around 1924—Ed.

[2] The beginning of the text up to here was crossed out in Husserl's manuscript—Ed.

ence and all other representations, all thought-acts related to them that can be derived from experience, and so on, |—then the entire VIII, 497/498 task of an ultimate justification of my objective cognition is led back to freeing in this purely egological attitude naive experience and naive experiential thinking, the naive scientific thinking from its naiveté and to shape it in the purely phenomenological sphere (perhaps through an appropriate modification) such that it satisfies, through and through, the demands of an ultimate justification. For that purpose, however, I have to get to know phenomenologically the cognitive achievement *as such*—at first entirely generally, prior to all questions concerning justification—according to their types, forms, essential possibilities, and then I have to bring to light in all directions and to understand the essence of *rational consciousness* and of cognizing reaching its aim, perhaps the essentially possible perfections and imperfections of this success; I have to ⟨attain⟩ a *cognition of cognition* according to all of its possibilities and achievements, the success and its failure, and to investigate this goal itself—the goal as itself conscious and perhaps consciously given—and I have to bring it to adequate cognition, to self-giving and clearest intuition. After that I have to form all cognitive notions and all normative notions in original creation.

In this research, thus, we are dealing with the *essence of transcendental subjectivity as such* and of its consciousness (its types, forms, synthetic unities of *Cogitos*); it is, in general, the I, its activity and passivity as such, its manner of acquiring knowledge and other achievements as such (in the form of habitualities), and so on. And especially, we are dealing with the essence—the transcendental essence—of the *subjectivity of cognition* as such, more specifically, with the essence and essential conditions, conditions of the possibility of *valid, goal-oriented*[a] *and self-attaining cognition*, with the essence and the possibility of *groundings, authentications of judgments* and, correlatively, with the essence of the *self-grasped goal* in genuine attainment and of its *truth*, with the *meaning of truth* arising therein, with its essential characteristics in relation to the standing and abiding in-itself of truth—as related to the possibility of attaining and self-seizing of the goal that is always again to be

[a] *zielrichtiger*

renewed—and of its acquisition as such, to which one can always revert back, in the certainty that it will withstand all [other attempts at] grounding, and so on; all of this in generality, and yet according to all special types of possible cognition.

Phenomenology as Radical Theory of Cognition.

Cognition as justified, "genuine" cognition, true being as the intentional [correlate] of cognition, and, in the correlative character of the | genuineness or truth, the existence-in-itself of the intentional object *vis-à-vis* cognition—these are the *correlative titles* of the essential investigation which brings about ultimate comprehensibility through the all-sidedness, in which it investigates transcendental subjectivity, and in these respects, brings about ultimate comprehensibility by bringing to a self-giving intuition and to an ultimately conceivable clarity of determination all possible occurrences of cognition and in relation to cognition (for instance, to what extent the subject is itself cognizing-achieving, and the like). VIII, 498/499

Here, to be sure, something other is achieved than in natural cognition, which is a cognition of a lower level, straightforward cognition. Here we do not investigate objectivity *simpliciter*, for instance physical nature, but we investigate cognition, cognition as cognition of nature. Here we do not practice natural science, but theory of natural-scientific cognition—but in transcendental purity, hence purely in the formations of transcendental subjectivity and its proper nexuses.

Of course I make no ontological hypotheses in order to build upon them scientifically; that is, I do not practice natural science and ontology of nature. For the entire science of the possibility, of the essence of natural-scientific cognition and subjectivity cognizing nature as such and in general and of the essence of natural truth and of nature itself as cognized in cognition of every type—all the way up to scientific cognition—*is not science of nature simpliciter*.

I make *no presuppositions* stemming from natural science, or now, in the eidetic attitude, no presupposition stemming from the ontology of nature. It offers me no "premises." I also do not carry on my research under the hypothesis of the non-existence of nature—despite the phenomenological reduction. As concerns the latter, the supposed possibility of this non-existence only serves to bring

me into the transcendental attitude, to make me aware of concrete subjectivity as transcendental with all of its actual and—what really matters now—its purely possible formations and to bar me from transitioning into the empirical-psychological attitude, into the objective one, in which I posit the world as such in natural manner, instead of positing it as phenomenon of absolute subjectivity; in the eidetic attitude: that I posit a possible world as such, instead of positing it as phenomenon in the consciousness of possibility, instead of positing it as the world of possible experience, as its intentional correlate.*

But upon closer reflection, I do not only relinquish the conviction of the existence or the possibility of a world, but | an actual VIII, 499/500
Epoché with respect to it is also not demanded of me. I can at first study the essence of cognition and the possibility of genuine cognition *in general*; then I am not speaking specifically of the cognition of nature, hence also not of nature. However, in studying the possibility of genuine cognition, one which attains its goal, I happen upon its *correlate—true being* (in the mode of possibility), and therein lies that when I comprehend and ascertain such genuine cognition as *possibility*, that I also *posit therein possible being*, as a general possibility and as an exemplary possibility in particular cases.

But if I, then, happen upon, as a *particular* essential type of possible cognition, that of possible cognition of nature, and meaningful[a] cognition of nature, upon the *possibility* of nexuses of cognition of a genuine, complete natural science that I construe as having constructed it by "myself" in systematic nexuses of grounding, then I have *co-posited* in the construction of such a *possible cognition* of course also *the possibility of a nature*, as correlative possibility.

The transcendental reduction can, accordingly, not have the meaning of suspending possible nature, just as in the *annulment* of the purely eidetic attitude for the purposes of the *application* of eidetic phenomenology and of the restitution of the attitude towards

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*On the method of the *Ideas* [*Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*].

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[a] *triftig*

my *factical* transcendental *Ego* not, say, every judgment of mine with respect to the world is annulled in the manner of a consistent inhibition of every natural experiential belief. I now have in the *factum* my actual life with all of its actual or meant knowledge that I have acquired as a philosopher, and to this belongs *as factum* the phenomenological knowledge that I have achieved as philosopher, [and to this belongs] the *philosophical will to an ultimately possible knowing*, and an absolute one, to philosophy: precisely with this I also have my own cognitive possibilities at my disposition, not only with regard to myself, but with regard to nature that I experience: I can *bring about* a perfect cognition of nature as possibility, [I can bring about] as a possibility this nature factically experienced by me, and I can strive towards my philosophical goal on the basis of eidetic phenomenology.

I *now* enact not a merely natural-naive natural science, just as I did not draft, as eidetic phenomenologist, natural-naive ontology of nature; instead, just as I achieved, eidetically, the ontology of nature *as* a formation of reason cognizing nature (itself investigated by me), and in the entire nexus (constructed by myself systematically) of *possible* nature-constituting experiences and nature-determining thinking (determining as justified), then I achieve, as factual science, the empirical natural science *as formation* of *factical* reason cognizing empirical factical-nature, and so on. | VIII, 500/501

This philosophical achievement has its own essential demands that I can grasp in higher reflection. Accordingly, I can achieve a phenomenology of nature only by experiencing straightforwardly and in naive attitude and practice an experiential thought and *then, in reflection*, transition over into transcendental consciousness and then observe, in the transcendental nexus, everything that is experienced itself according to all of its real and intentional determinations and concatenations and, guided by the unity of the thing as guiding clue—that is, concerned with the concordance of possible experience—study the nexuses and their structures, in contrast to this the counter-nexuses of non-concordance; likewise for the theoretical achievements. But here one also has to consider that a higher-level formal phenomenology has already exhibited the *most general* [features] for experiencing (perceiving, original self-giving, and so on) and logical thinking, which, then,

merely transposes itself to the experiencing and thinking of nature, but here it demands its own specializing-individualizing[a] investigation.

But now matters are not as they occur in *factical historical development*: as if a dogmatic foundational science for itself would have its existence and its right for all times and that then a phenomenological science would have to *follow* or that the first [science] could remain in isolation and the other only *supplemented* it. Of course one could construe at first a possibility of such an isolation and in the manner that the phenomenological science would not lead to a repetition of the contents of the dogmatic one. The naive I-experience is sublated into the phenomenological I-experience-that-I-experience. But nevertheless, one could say:

If I, experiencing straightforwardly and carrying out experiential thinking, proceed in *natural complete evidence*, I arrive at complete straightforward science.* If I then become a phenomenologist and—on the basis of the investigation of phenomenological subjectivity, and more specifically of general phenomenology and especially of phenomenology of the logical and phenomenology of the experience of nature—have clarified the meaning of nature as a transcendental achievement of "sensibility" and the meaning of theories of nature as such on the basis of a phenomenology of the *mathesis universalis*, I can then phenomenologically interpret particular theories of nature on the part of natural science and I have, accordingly, not only straightforward natural science but in addition—as supplement—a science related to it, clarifying it phenomenologically.

This was my own opinion in the past. But now it seems to me, or rather I am certain, that already a straightforward natural science | VIII, 501/502 is not possible in completeness, because only an experience which is analyzed and comprehended constitutively can become the basis for such a science, and [I am] also [certain that] ⟨only⟩ a phenomeno-

*The temptation lies in this "complete evidence": it does not fall from the sky and into the laps of ordinary researchers, but as "complete" it only *exists* in the form of phenomenology.

[a] *spezialisierend-besondernd*

logical logic, which contains in itself the genuine epistemological noetics, enables a method of science that justifies itself at every step, hence a logically exact method.

The meaning of bracketing is, thus, that of an admonition not to judge straightforwardly ontically and to proceed from ontic to ontic judgments, not to pursue straightforwardly the objects of the region and their nexuses, in a natural effectuation of evidence; instead [it means] to obey the demand: that every judgment at first uttered straightforwardly should be placed into the nexus of judging subjectivity, and should be studied as judged in the judging, as inferred in the inferring, and so on.

To be sure, straightforward judging, inferring, theorizing necessarily comes first. But to justification, and to a thoroughgoing, complete justification, which concerns every step [on the way of science], belongs methodological reflection upon the positing-as-valid and its motivation, [reflection] upon the inferring taking place passively and actively, upon intention and fulfillment in all constitutive steps and checking, to what extent the respective intention comes to fulfillment all-sidedly and completely, to what extent unfulfilled horizons arise at once with fulfillment, and so on.

If I investigate, thus, in the "egological," in the transcendental-subjective sphere the possible experience of a world given to an *Ego*—a psychophysical world, containing animals and human beings—then it lies in the meaning of transcendental research that I have enacted a *bracketing* with respect to *possible* worlds.

To immerse oneself in the imagination of possible worlds and to then investigate, in purely eidetic attitude—and of course in a purely intuitive generalization of essences—the essential demands for a possible world as such, this is *ontology*, this is *straightforward* cognition of a world in general as such.

But I, as transcendental philosopher, as *ego*logist, who investigates my possible transcendental subjectivity as such, and here specifically my possible subjectivity, to the extent that it cognizes in pure possibility any world, experiences it and, pursuing its experiential meaning, brings it to a continuous experience all-sidedly and concordantly, and practices possible experiential science on this experiential ground—I as *ego*logist do not investigate straightforwardly these possible worlds or the possibility of a world as such

and I do not practice straightforward ontology, but I study precisely the *manner of cognition* of a possible world, and purely as such, in pure immanence. I do not enact this possible experience and possible theorizing (in imagination), but instead I enact a reflective experiencing of the second level, | in which this experiencing and VIII, 502/503 theorizing is my theme; and nothing other is now to count as valid for me as what is given in [this theme] as essential moments and essential laws. I only let the cognized count after I have observed and understood it as cognized on the part of the transcendentally enlightened cognizing, and have taken it precisely in that sense in which it, as transcendental reflection shows, has derived its meaning from this cognitive achievement itself.

In principle it would be *conceivable* that an I aims, in its cognizing, so radically and purely at the truth that it does not rest until it has gained ultimately possible evidence, that is, until it has revealed the edifice of intentions, in which validity supports validity (motivation), and has led the intention to fulfillment in every respect and has led to the ultimately possible self-giving of what is meant. But it is the style of science *to convince oneself constantly of the correctness and genuineness of the goal*, from step to step, thus from the subjective side, to constantly ask oneself *in noetic respect*: What do I mean here, and to what extent is this cognition truly grounded, is my guiding meaning truly authenticated, to what extent are yet undisclosed horizons in validity, to what extent is the co-meant still present? To what extent, thus, does this meaning depend on presuppositions, on motivators, which have not yet come into view, into fixation? To what extent, thus, may I make use here of an evidence or an evident truth, which I have attained there? Are the "circumstances," to which it was related, the same here? I have to fixate everything that contributes to the sense-giving and makes this sense relative.

Finally one must furnish a *normative doctrine of cognition*, which works out the general rules of reflection for a scientific procedure and for every special region a special *methodology* of cognition, which does not require carrying out a special epistemological reflection for every current step in cognition—which would make all enactments of cognition impossible—but which makes it possible that every cognizing agent has the possibility at every step, on the

basis of a formed habitus, to connect [his findings] with general insights, justifying himself, to point to them as providing comprehension and justification and thereby to secure ⟨his procedures⟩.

Every radical scientific procedure is "epistemological," and presupposes an "epistemology"—in the framework of a general transcendental phenomenology, to which it belongs entirely.* On the other hand, every phenomenology of this type |, carried through in VIII, 503/504 consequence, must arrive at *all possible objectivities as objectivities of possible cognition* and must start out with these for all [objectivities], to grasp them as given straightforwardly, but as pure possibilities and pure essential types—and as straightforward meantnesses and possible experiencednesses—and then overturn this straightforward attitude into the transcendental one, thus it must study the meaning, the experiencing, the offering-itself-as-true-being, and so on, according to its essence and its possibilities. But then it quickly turns out that these are not separate tasks (unity of all being, unity of all cognition): Accordingly, all *ontologies* lie in the region of phenomenology—but as correlates of cognition. But therein consists the phenomenological reduction and the achievement of ultimately possible justification of cognition that can be attained in the framework of transcendental phenomenology, of justifying achievements of all types and forms of evidence in their inseparable unity. Phenomenology itself constructs all possible forms of genuine justification and thereby all possible *norms*, normative ideas for cognizing and for what is cognized, for truth and true being, for theory as genuine theory, but thereby also for all possible *valuing* and *willing*, individually-personally and socially; it demonstrates that in all such "genuine" acts of the heart lie at the same time cognitive achievements, at first "experiences," original self-givings of values, of genuine goods, and so on, and that upon these higher-

*But to this one has to say that the epistemology following *after that* is still naive logic; thus, this last step has not been presented adequately here. Here we already have pieces of an a priori logical noetics; a priori laws of a goal-oriented cognitive doing could already be developed in naiveté (as psychological epistemology), and this would not actually be transcendental phenomenology (an actual transcendental logic). Thus here the higher level is in question: the meaning of this transcendental logic and at the same time the meaning of all that is objectively cognized. There remains a dimension of "riddles."

level experiences again are grounded theorizings, scientific thinking. In short, the *epistemology of the human sciences* belongs into the egological framework just as the epistemology of nature and of animalic mind. And transcendental consciousness is from the very start universal consciousness, encompassing all consciousness, also the entire intentionality of the heart and the will; all of this not alongside one another, but in its inseparably unity, as it turns out.

The *science of the Ego Cogito*, transformed into the science of all that is possible that I, the *Ego*, as transcendental, can construct, is, thus, the *eidetically all-encompassing* [*science*].

The Alter Ego.

By encompassing all possible modifications of my *Ego*, I concurrently encompass all possible natures of my *Ego* as well and all my modifications, which are unities of possible experience for an *Ego*. But I also attain all possible *alter Egos*—not only as intentional objectivities in the possible *Egos*, but as *alter Egos* who are rightfully cognized as analogically-co-perceived and justified; they are "others" for me, but are an *Ego* for themselves, respectively; the phenomenological reduction for them only means that I cannot take their possibility into consideration, *before* I have transcendentally fixated | the rightful *meaning** of this possibility from the manner VIII, 504/505 of cognition via empathy.

Thereby I then attain, furthermore, the "meaning" of the "objective" world and of "objective" (intersubjective) world-science, at first that of nature and that of natural science ⟨of it⟩ as nature intersubjectively existing-in-itself and that of an existing human world and further the meaning of socialities, of socially constituted world-events, of the cultural world; and hence ⟨I attain⟩, for all that exists in rightful truth, its rightful meaning—from cognition as possible inter-individual and communicative cognition, which creates meaning and rightful meaning.† And necessarily this totality is *transcendental, but phenomenological "idealism,"* which does not *deny* physical nature, material being, in order to enthrone *in its stead* mental being

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* "Meaning" here is to say: the correct transcendental interpretation.

† Indeed, every region has its constitutive regional meaning and its correlative transcendental meaning.

as the true being, *but instead* [an idealism], which derives from clarified cognition—cognition giving sense to all being and all truth (and from the cognition that this sense-giving cognition is that on the part of the transcendental *Ego* and of a possible multiplicity of *Egos* communicating with it)—*the absolutely evident insight that all being is intentionally related back* (and essentially so) *to the being of Egos*. These, in turn, are related back *only upon themselves*, since they are intentional for themselves and constitute themselves for themselves, while they can constitute themselves *for one another* only mediately—through constitutive achievements of their own subjectivity, called things and lived-bodies—as *alter Egos*.

Monadology.

Accordingly, *only the Egos* exist *absolutely* in their communicative relatedness-back-upon-themselves. They are in their *community the absolute bearers of the world*, whose being is a being-for-them and being-constituted-for-them. They are, as absolute *Egos*, not *part* of the world, they are no *substances* in the sense of empirical "realities"—indeed, that is, as members of the world, substrates of "real" properties, which have their *true* being in the world. They are *the absolute*, ⟨they are the subjectivity⟩ without whose cogitative life, which is a cognizing constituting through and through in the broadest sense of the term, all *real* substances *would not exist*.

But insofar as they do not only exist *for themselves*, but *for one another*, as *alter Egos*, they are *Ego*s and they can only exist in this manner through a *substantializing sense-giving*, which they attribute to one another reciprocally and then, in this reciprocity, attribute | VIII, 505/506
to one another themselves[1]—in the substantialization or *realization of animality and humanity*. They have therefore a *double being*: an *absolute being* and a *appearing-for-themselves-and-for-another*—from an apperception they achieve by themselves—as animalic and human subjects, animating lived-bodies in the world and belonging, as animals and human beings, to the substantial-real world. And in [this world] then all *socialities* find their place, whose *absolute* being,

[1] That is, which they attribute to one another in general and then individually, one by one.—Trans.

however, consists in the absolute being of every *Ego* in itself and in the absolute being of every I-you-relationship, every communal relationship issuing from an I to another or to several other I's, whose index is called, *passively*, nature; *actively*, however, it is the active-determining effecting which emanates from one I into the other through the medium of the positing of nature, or *vice versa*, which takes in the other's acts and hence makes itself the bearer of functional alien spirituality.

Only phenomenological idealism gives the I and gives the absolute communicative subjectivity (which is the absolute of humanity) *true autonomy* and gives it the power and meaningful possibility of *absolute self-forming* and of the forming of the world according to its autonomous will. And only this absolute subjectivity then becomes the theme of further investigations directed at the absolute, hence of all *theological* and *teleological* investigations, to which belong all absolute questions as to *development* and of the "*meaning*"—the transcendental-teleological one—*of all history*.

Viewed absolutely, every *Ego* has its *history*, and it only exists as subject of a history, of its history. And every communicative community of absolute I's, of absolute subjects—in full concretion, to which belongs the constitution of the world—has its "*passive*" and its *"active" history* and only *exists* in this history. *History is the grand fact of absolute being*; and the ultimate questions, the ultimately metaphysical and teleological ones, are identical with those as to the absolute meaning of history.

GERMAN–ENGLISH GLOSSARY

As guiding clue the translators agreed upon (usually) *one focal translation* for each German word, which in certain cases has been varied by using other terms, where it seemed appropriate and even necessary. The focal translation is separated from other translations by a semicolon. The original German term has not been supplied in footnote when deviating from the focal translation.

a priori, apriorisch	a priori
aussprechen/Aussprache	to utter/utterance
aussagen/Aussage	to assert; to utter, to articulate/assertion; utterance, expression, articulation, statement
Aussagesatz	declarative statement
ausschalten	to suspend
sich ausweisen	to authenticate itself
äußere	external
äußerlich/Äußerlichkeit	exterior/exteriority; outward/outwardness
ausweisen/Ausweisung	to authenticate/authentication
Bedeutung	signification; meaning
begründen/Begründung	to ground/grounding; to justify/justification, to reason/reasoning, giving reasons; to found/founding
Bestand/Bestände	constituent(s); element(s); item(s); content
bestimmen	to determine; to guide
sich bewähren/Bewährung	to verify/verification
Bewußthaben	conscious having; consciousness of something
Ding/dinglich/dingartig	(physical) thing/thingly/thinglike
ego	ego
Einsicht/einsichtig/einsehen	evidence, insight/evident, with insight/see (or grasp) with insight *or* insightfully
einstimmig/Einstimmigkeit	concordant/concordance
endgültig/Endgültigkeit	final(ly), teleological(ly)/finality
erleben/Erlebnis	to experience/lived experience
erfahren/Erfahren	to experience/act of experience,

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	experiencing; experience
Erfahrung	experience
erkennen/Erkenntnis	to know/knowledge; to cognize/cognition
erkennen	to know, to acknowledge, to cognize; to understand
erleben	to experience
Erlebnis	lived experience; experience
erschauen	to behold; to grasp (mentally), to intuit
evident/Evidenz	self-evident/self-evidence; evident/evidence
Fiktum	figment
fixieren/Fixierung	fixate
fundieren/Fundierung	to found/founding
Gedanke	thought
gegenwärtigen	to present
geistig	intellectual; spiritual
Gegebenheit(en)	what is given, given item(s); given(s); datum/data; givenness
Gestalt	form/formation/shape/structure; configuration
gestalten	to (creatively) form, realize, configure
gewahren	to perceive attentively
Grund/Gründe	ground(s), reason(s), cause(s)
herausstellen	to highlight, to identify, to emphasize
Ich	ego, (the) I
inner	internal
innerlich/Innerlichkeit	interior/interiority; inward/inwardness
intendieren	to intend
Kenntnisnahme	process of taking notice
Konsequenz/Inkonsequenz	consequence/inconsequence
konsequent	consistent
Leib/leiblich/Leiblichkeit	lived-body, bodily, bodiliness
leisten/Leistung	to achieve/achievement; to accomplish/accomplishment
mannigfaltig	manifold
meinen	to mean; to intend; to opine
Meinen	act of meaning, meaning-act; supposing; opining
Meinung	opinion, belief, view; meaning; "meaning"
Mensch im Großen	man writ large
normieren/Normierung	to prescribe norms/normative regulation

originär	originary/original
phantasieren/Phantasie	to phantasize/phantasy
psychisch	psychic, mental
prinzipiell	fundamental/principal/in principle/on principled grounds/for reasons of principle
Problemgehalt	subject matter
Rechenschaftsabgabe	giving of account
Recht	right; legitimacy; authority
rechtfertigen/Rechtfertigung	to justify/justification
reell	genuine; real
sachlich	actual
Satz	proposition; statement; sentence
Seele/seelisch	psyche/psychic; soul
Selbsterfassung	self-grasping
Sinn	sense; meaning
sinnlich	sensible; sensuous
Thema	subject matter; topic; theme
überhaupt	whatsoever, at all, as such; *simpliciter*
unbeteiligt	nonparticipating
Urteil	judgment
Unstimmigkeit	discordancy
verknüpft	connected, interconnected
vergegenwärtigen/Vergegenwärtigung	to presentiate/presentiation
vermeinen	to suppose; to mean
Verträglichkeit	compatibility
Verwirklichung	realization
vielfältig	various, diverse
vollziehen	to carry out; to enact
vorstellen/Vorstellung	to present (to oneself); to represent (to oneself)/presentation; representation
Vorzeichen	sign
Vorzeichnung/sich vorzeichnen	preliminary indication; predelineation/to predelineate, to prefigure
Widersinn/widersinnig	countersense/countersensical; absurdity/absurd
wirklich/Wirklichkeit	actual/actuality; real/reality
Wissenschaft/wissenschaftlich	science/scientific
Wissenschaftslehre	doctrine of science/theory of science
Wissenschaftstheorie	theory of science
Ziel	goal/telos
Zweck/zweck-	purpose/purposive

Zweckidee	purposeful idea
Zwecksinn	purposeful/teleological meaning/teleological significance

INDEX OF NAMES

Aristotle 3, 18, 26, 32, 37, 51, 54f., 58, 77, 189
(Saint) Augustine of Hippo 64

Bacon, Francis 172, 222
Berkeley, George, Bishop of Cloyne 113, 116–118, 138, 145, 152–156, 158f., 162, 178–180, 186, 429
Brentano, Franz 109, 170
British Empiricism 130, 224

Cambridge Platonism 88
Columbus, Christopher 66

Descartes, René 3, 8, 60, 63–69, 71, 74–76, 78–82, 90, 93, 96, 99, 103, 106, 108, 125, 135, 147f., 152, 164, 183, 188–190, 195, 197, 199, 208f., 224, 226, 233, 239, 284, 329, 409, 413, 415, 417–419, 421–423, 425–429
Dilthey, Wilhelm 440

Eudoxos 36
Euclid 36, 39, 371, 460

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 440

Galilei, Galileo 438, 466
Gorgias 60f., 415, 428

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 188
Herbart, Johann Friedrich 251, 327
Hobbes, Thomas 90, 96, 104, 131, 155
Hume, David 105, 138f., 145, 147, 149, 156, 159–167, 169, 173, 175–179, 181–187, 203, 224, 297, 397, 409f.

James, William 170

Kant, Immanuel 20, 188, 195, 197–200, 202–204, 252, 391, 393–395, 397, 399, 401, 407–411, 431–433, 435–437, 439

Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm 74, 156, 158f., 183, 188, 191, 197, 199–204, 390, 409, 431f.
Lobachevsky, Nicolai 341
Locke, John 73, 77f., 80f., 85–108, 113f., 119, 124–128, 130–133, 137–139, 145–159, 163, 165, 172, 178, 183, 191f., 200, 204, 343, 423, 428f., 491

Maimon, Salomon 440

Neo-Kantianism 199, 431–433

Occasionalism 194

Plato/Platonism 3, 8f., 11–19, 25, 31, 33, 33–39, 44, 54, 58f., 63f., 71f., 77, 88, 90, 131f., 134, 143, 147, 149, 188, 197, 204, 207, 209, 224, 307, 368, 438f., 528
Positivism 145, 167, 224
Protagoras 60, 428

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Riemann, Georg Friedrich Bernhard 341

Scholastics/Scholasticism 109, 150
Socrates 8–12, 16, 152
Sophists/Sophism 8f., 11f., 33f., 54, 58, 60–62, 147, 152, 207, 224, 453
Spinoza/Spinozism 104, 183, 188, 194, 198
Stoics/Stoicism 18f.

Wolff, Christian 410