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Selected Works of Ramon Llull

c Sed qz nobis datu tam qđ eos omo qui ista lib legt magnificet
ñ intelligitis in ꝑdõe diuinis dignitatibz actibz ipso de subtilius
tractos mirabilios z etnos sine quibz ipe diuine dignitates omo
latissime ampleti essent ab etno qđ non decet. Actus ño caꝛ di
cꝛ bonificatiuñ bonificabile bonificare z sic de aliis emũbz suo
modo. Sed qa nos istos actus ꝑdõe duabz solẽmodo dignitat
ibz attribuimꝰ ut tam videꝰ. Sapientie videlicet z voluntatis
manifestũ est qz hoc qđ nos in omibz aliis dignitatibz diuinis
ampliatẽ relinquimꝰ. Scilicet in bonitate magnitudine et
. . . . . nitate. potestate gria. virtute veritate z pietate

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intellectus audire placet per ꝑdõe diuinas dignitates z actus eaꝝ
nobis manifeste ostendam. diuinã tamen psonaꝝ. in una sim
plicissima essentia z natura. scilicet ptis z filij z spũ scti.

SELECTED WORKS OF
RAMON LLULL
(1232–1316)

Edited and Translated by
ANTHONY BONNER

Volume I

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Todo objeto cuyo fin ignoramos, es provisoriamente monstruoso.
J. L. Borges, *Una vindicación de la cábala*

Burlarse de tales operaciones es fácil, prefiero procurar entenderlas.
Ibid.

Lullum, antequam Lullum noscas, ne despicias.
A. Oliver in *Raymundi Lulli Opera Medica*

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Preface

I HAVE TRIED in this anthology to offer a selection of Ramon Llull's writings representative enough so as to give a reasonably accurate picture of the man's system and his place in the history of European thought and literature. This, of course, is a cliché of all such anthologies, and in the case of a person like Llull who wrote almost three hundred works, the cliché is particularly utopian. But with Llull there is a core around which his other works gravitate: this is the Art, which he firmly believed God had given him on Mount Randa, in his native Majorca, and upon which his fame in the Renaissance was grounded. Since the Art was conceived as a system around which all other knowledge could be organized, and since it was in fact the backbone of all the rest of Llull's thought, it is naturally the basis for this anthology. I accordingly have chosen the principal work from each of the two phases of the development of the Art, the *Ars demonstrativa* and the *Ars brevis*. The anthology opens with the *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men,* the main work in the field—that of apologetics—for which Llull conceived the Art. It is placed first, not only because it preceded the other two works in point of time, but also because being a popularization of the Art, it serves as an excellent introduction to the methods of the Art. The *Principles of Medicine* has been included to show the reciprocal relationship between the Art and science, the former being used to articulate the basic principles of the latter, and the latter being used as the foundation for the analogical reasoning of the former.

It would have been wrong, however, to overweigh the balance in favor of the Art. Llull was, after all, one of the originators of Catalan literary prose and an important precursor of the novel. I accordingly have included *Felix* with its splendid panorama of medieval life and attitudes, thus at the same time including Llull's finest narrative work, the *Book of the Beasts*, which forms Book VII of *Felix*. Llull was also the first of the great Spanish mystics, and I have therefore included the curious but in many ways very characteristic little composition, the *Flowers of Love*.[1]

[1] In addition to these positive reasons for choice of works, there were three negative considerations: 1. a desire to avoid works already translated into Engligh (the only transgres-

It is important nonetheless for the reader to realize that these different sides of Llull's output, the literary-mystical side and that of the Art, are not the manifestations of a divided personality in which the reader or critic must make some sort of choice or take sides (as did Allison Peers half a century ago in favor of the literary-mystical). It was a question of tactics, of what audience Llull was trying to persuade; the message, however, never varied nor did the basic system by which it was articulated. One of the purposes of my notes is to bring out this overall unity, to show how the different sides are interrelated.

These six works are preceded by a general introduction divided into three sections. The first contains a translation of the *Contemporary Life,* surely one of the most extraordinary of medieval autobiographies. To this I have added commentary and notes to put Llull's account in its proper setting and to give the reader the essential results of modern research. The second is a short essay in which I try to give the principal aspects of Llull's thought and system, and which I hope will serve to orient the reader among the wide variety of topics and methods touched on in this anthology. The third is the briefest of outlines of a vast subject—the influence of Llull's thought and the history of Lullism. Even though in the anthology itself I have tried to present what one might call Llull's Llull, one free from later accretions or deformations, I felt it important to give the reader at least a glimpse of why and where Llull was so important in the centuries following his death.

Underlying this attempt to present at least the essential core of Llull's work and to show the unity of his thought, there lies another aim, that of redressing a balance. In this I can make little claim to innovation. It is now a long time since Prantl felt he had to apologize to the reader of his *Geschichte der Logik im Abendland* for having devoted so much space to such stupidity as Llull's, and since Littré said that "L'*Ars magna* a péri pour jamais, et nous trouvons aujourd'hui Leibniz bien bon d'avoir prétendu découvrir quelque perle en ce fatras." Ever since the pioneering works of

---

sion here was that small portion of *Felix* represented by the *Book of the Beasts*); 2. a desire to avoid giving extracts; 3. reasons of space. These three considerations made themselves *felt* negatively only in the case of the *Flowers of Love*; see the Introduction to that work, n. 23, for details.

Keicher, Longpré, Carreras y Artau, and Yates, the balance has been redressed, not only among specialists, but also among historians of philosophy; one only has to glance at what Gilson or Copleston, for example, say about Llull to find fair and balanced accounts. The same cannot be said, however, for historians of logic; one has only to read Bocheński and the Kneales, as another example, to find puzzlement and confusion. To be sure, Llull poses a serious problem, since his system—the Art—lies outside the central tradition of formal logic, which goes in a more or less straight line from Aristotle to the mathematical logic we have inherited from Boole, Frege, and Russell. There are, however, intimations of the beginning of a change; Risse in his *Logik* (see the List of Abbreviations below) has a separate section entitled *Die lullistische Tradition (Kombinatorik. Lingua universalis. Mathematisierung)*. This is the tradition that so fascinated the young Leibniz and that has important connections with modern computer science and information theory. In this area Llull was a remarkable innovator, and it is his innovations I hope to have presented to the English-speaking reader so that he can judge them for himself and assign them the place they deserve in that perhaps ancillary branch of the history of logic to which they belong.

I have, however, tried very strictly to keep myself from interpreting Llull in the light of modern trends, or from seeing him through the eyes of his followers. I have tried just to *present* him. The notes, to be sure, contain many explanations of obscurities in the original, but I have tried to carry out this task by citing other works by Llull himself, even limiting myself to drawing, whenever possible, on works of the same period of his production as the one being commented upon. In this domain I have also, of course, relied heavily on modern scholarship, but always trying to use it in terms of presenting what before I referred to as Llull's Llull.

This desire has also led me to make what might be called a *critical* translation. Over the centuries Llull's text, in passing from one copyist and editor to the next, has suffered countless little variations, which continually harrass the scholar trying to get at what Llull was saying. Thus when no modern critical edition was available, I went back to the oldest manuscripts in order to establish a text that is at least reasonably reliable, and I have given in the

notes any substantial variants from whatever editions the reader could have occasion to consult. This technique might also help to make the nonspecialist wary of anything that pretends to be *the* text of a medieval writer, or any edition that pretends to be "definitive." Barring very special circumstances, such a thing does not exist. There are too many places in almost any medieval work where, through the haze of variants presented by the manuscripts, we can only guess at what the author intended; and the fewer the manuscripts, the more difficult it is for us to judge what went wrong and where in the transmission of any particular passage. The only honest solution is to give the reader the variants whenever they seem to be important and let him judge for himself.

Another purpose of my notes, in addition to stating where I got my information, has been to tell the reader where to go if he should want to look further into any particular topic, and especially where Llull himself discusses that topic. My hope is, of course, that these foci of information will prove useful for further research.

Finally, a word about the translation itself. There are three problems facing anyone attempting such a task: the conceptually involuted nature of some of Llull's sentences, the language of the correlatives (see below: "Historical Background and Life," n. 128; and *Book of the Gentile*, Book III, n. 16) and the structural nature of Llull's technical vocabulary (see "Llull's thought," text at nn. 44–47). The first two caused him to apologize during his first visit to Paris for his inept way of expressing himself, and to ask his university audience to attend more to the matter than the form of his discourse. In spite of these apologies, however, Llull himself knew perfectly well that the form and matter of his message were inseparable. To give in, therefore, to the translator's temptation to smooth over what he considers "rough places" would have been to falsify this message. Instead I have tried to give the modern reader an impression equivalent to that presumably received by one of Llull's contemporary readers. Involuted sentences are left involuted; for the neologisms of the correlatives I have tried to find equivalent English neologisms; and in a measure similar to that observed by Llull, I have tried to translate each concept of his technical vocabulary always by the same English term (with a warning to the reader whenever I have deviated from this practice).

Lest the above sound forbidding, it must be said on the other hand that Llull, when the occasion demanded, was capable of displaying a first-rate literary gift, one befitting his primordial place in the history of Catalan literature. My only hope is that in these occasions as well, the translation has not been too unsuccessful in finding an English equivalent.

THERE remains the pleasant task of thanking the many people and organizations which have helped me in the course of this translation. First there was the initial enthusiasm of Princeton University Press, and above all of my editor there, William McGuire, who helped get the project started. Robert Brown ably carried out the daunting task of copyediting the vast, complicated typescript and preparing it for the press. The extended work necessary to complete this anthology was made possible by grants from both the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Translations Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The encouragement from and facilities offered by the Maioricensis Schola Lullistica of Palma and its director, Sebastián Garcías Palou, were of enormous help not only at the beginning but throughout the entire project. The Raimundus-Lullus-Institut (of the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität of Freiburg im Breisgau) and its directors Helmut Riedlinger, Alois Madre (who very kindly lent me the typescript of his forthcoming Latin edition of the *Ars brevis*), and Charles Lohr (about whom more in a moment) have been unfailingly kind in giving me access to a vast fund of bibliographical information, in answering queries, and in letting me photocopy needed material. The staff of the Biblioteca Pública in Palma, with its large collection of Lullian manuscripts and early printed editions, were most helpful. The same is true for the Biblioteca Bartolomé March, whose director, Lorenzo Pérez, very kindly let me consult his own unpublished catalogues of the Lullian manuscript collections in various European cities (Paris, Munich, London, etc.). The Franciscan convent in Palma and its librarian Father Amengual have also been unfailingly generous in letting me consult Salvador Galmés's Lullian material which is now in the convent's possession. For specific queries, Professor Raymond S. Willis of Princeton University has patiently (and entertainingly) carried on a long correspondence with me to clear up some matters

of social history in *Felix*. John R. Ulbricht helped me in matters of astronomy, Antoni Jaume kindly put his collection of eighteenth-century Lullian editions at my disposal, and Arthur A. Cohen read the introduction and Book II of the translation of the *Book of the Gentile* and made excellent suggestions. Michael McVaugh kindly read the *Principles of Medicine* and gave me the benefit of his unrivaled knowlege of medieval medicine in the form of invaluable suggestions in connection with that work. And the Semitic scholar Kenneth Brown read the introduction and Book IV of the *Book of the Gentile*, not only offering countless suggestions and corrections, but also saving me from a few real howlers.

Six people have, however, contributed in very special ways to this anthology. The first is David Rosenblatt, of Washington, D.C., whose encouragement from the very first was unflagging, who has acted as my guide in matters concerning the history of logic, and who has read the general introductions and the two works of the Art and offered valuable suggestions. The second is Francesc de B. Moll, who has helped not only indirectly as co-author of perhaps the finest historical dictionary of any Romance language, the *Diccionari Català-Valencià-Balear,* which was constantly by my side, but also directly in being forever ready to spare the time to answer queries as to meaning in the original. The third is Jocelyn Hillgarth, of the Pontifical Insitute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, who not only helped with his advice and encouragement and has allowed me to consult his magnificent library at Son Torrella, but has also read and made invaluable comments on the introductory material and the entire *Book of the Gentile*. He moreover used my translation of that work for a seminar in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, passing on to me some interesting comments made by his students there. The fourth is Jordi Gayà, of the Maioriscensis Schola Lullistica and editor of its *Estudios Lulianos*, who, throughout the five years this anthology was in preparation, has been my surest guide in Lullian studies, who has answered queries in number far exceeding the call of duty, and who has read a great deal of the typescript and made many pertinent suggestions. The fifth is Charles Lohr, of Freiburg, who not only has made his own knowledge and that of the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut readily available to me, but also has read all the various introductory sections and made hundreds of invaluable

suggestions and corrections of content, scholarship, focus, wording, and style, all in the direction of accuracy, clarity, and readability. The sixth is my wife, Eve, who has not only read the entire text twice and typed it all, but has also, with a mind better equipped and trained than mine in matters philosophical, contributed with her countless suggestions and corrections more than I can say to the accuracy of the final version. To them all my deepest thanks. Whatever mistakes and awkwardnesses remain are still mine, but without this help they would have been far more numerous.

Puigpunyent, Majorca A. E. B.
February 1981

List of Abbreviations

Actas	*Actas del II Congreso Internacional de Lulismo. Miramar, 19–24 Octubre 1976.* Vol. 1, Palma, 1979; reprinted in *EL* 22, 1978.
AIEC	*Anuari de l'Institut d'Estudis Catalans,* Barcelona.
Antología	*Antología de Ramón Llull,* ed. M. Batllori, 2 vols., Madrid, 1961.
Artus, *Ars Brevis*	W. W. Artus, "The 'Ars Brevis' of Ramon Lull. A Study," Ph.D. dissertation, St. John's University, 1967.
AST	*Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia,* Barcelona.
Avinyó	J. Avinyó, *Les obres autèntiques del Beat Ramon Llull: Repertori bibliogràfic,* Barcelona, 1935.
BAE	*Biblioteca de Autores Españoles,* Madrid.
Batllori, *Món*	M. Batllori, *Ramon Llull en el món del seu temps,* Barcelona, 1960 (see below, "Historical Background and Life," n. 26, for more details).
Blaise, *Lexicon*	A. Blaise, *Lexicon Latinitatis Medii Aevi,* Turnhout, Belgium, 1975.
Bonner, "Cronologia"	A. Bonner, "Problemes de cronologia lul·liana," *EL* 21 (1977), 35–58.
Bonner, "Notes"	A. Bonner, "Notes de bibliografia i cronologia lul·lianes," *EL* 24 (1980), 71–86.
Bonner, "Situación"	A. Bonner, "La situación del *Libre del gentil* dentro de la enseñanza luliana en Miramar," *Actas* 1, 49–55, *EL* 22 (1978), 49–55.
BRABLB	*Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona,* Barcelona.
Breviculum	Karlsruhe, Badische Landesbibliothek, St. Peter perg. 92 (see below, "Llull's Influence," text at n. 23).
Bru	R. Brummer, *Bibliographia Lulliana: Ramon-Llull-Schrifttum 1870–1973,* Hildesheim, 1976 (unless otherwise stated, references are to catalogue numbers).
BSAL	*Boletín de la Sociedad Arqueológica Luliana,* Palma.
Ca	T. and J. Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la filosofía española: Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV,* 2 vols., Madrid, 1939–43.

Colomer, *Edad Media*	E. Colomer, *De la Edad Media al Renacimiento: Ramón Llull—Nicolás de Cusa—Juan Pico della Mirandola,* Barcelona, 1975.
DCEC	J. Corominas, *Diccionario crítico etimológico de la lengua castellana,* Madrid and Bern, 4 vols., 1954.
DCVB	A. M. Alcover and F. de B. Moll, *Diccionari Català-Valencià-Balear,* 10 vols., Palma, 1931–68.
Dufourcq, *Maghrib*	Ch.-E. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux 13e et 14e siècles,* Paris, 1966.
EF	*Estudis Franciscans,* Barcelona.
EL	*Estudios Lulianos,* Palma.
Electorium	Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. lat. 15450 (see below "Llull's Influence," text at n. 22).
ENC	*Els Nostres Clàssics,* Barcelona.
ER	*Estudis Romànics,* Barcelona.
EUC	*Estudis Universitaris Catalans,* Barcelona.
García, *Miramar*	S. García Palou, *El Miramar de Ramon Llull,* Palma, 1977.
Gayà, *Correlativos*	J. Gayà, *La teoría luliana de los correlativos; Historia de su formación conceptual,* Palma, 1979.
Gottron, *Kreuzzug*	A. Gottron, *Ramon Lulls Kreuzzugsideen,* Abhandlungen zur mittleren und neueren Geschichte 39, Berlin and Leipzig, 1912.
Hillg	J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France,* Oxford, 1971.[1]
Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*	J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516.* Vol. 1, *1250–1410: Precarious Balance,* Oxford, 1976.
Hillgarth, *Problem*	J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire 1229–1327,* The English Historical Review, Supplement 8, London, 1975 (see below, "Historical Background and Life," n. 1, for the relation between these two works).

[1] See the important review by M. Batllori in *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies* 51 (1974), 311–18, reprinted in his *A través de la història i la cultura* (Montserrat, 1979), pp. 257–67.

HLF	*Histoire littéraire de la France,* citing the article on "Raymond Lulle, ermite" by E. Littré and B. Hauréau in Vol. 29, Paris, 1885, pp. 1–386, 567–8, 618.
Johnston, *Semblance*	M. Johnston, "The Semblance of Significance: Language and Exemplarism in the 'Art' of Ramon Llull; with the Text of the 'Rhetorica Nova' from Paris B.N. ms. lat. 6443C," Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1978.
Keicher, *Stellung*	O. Keicher, *Raymundus Lullus und seine Stellung zur arabischen Philosophie. Mit einem Anhang, enthaltend die zum ersten Male veröffentlichte "Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita,"* Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 7, Münster i. W., 1909.
Llinarès, *Gentil*	Raymond Lulle, *Le livre du gentil et des trois sages,* ed. A. Llinarès, Paris, 1966 (cf. below, *Book of the Gentile,* Intro., n. 29, for more details).
Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*	Raymond Lulle, *Le livre des bêtes, version française du XV^e^ siècle avec traduction en français moderne, introduction et notes,* ed. A. Llinarès, Paris, 1964.
Llinarès, *Lulle*	A. Llinarès, *Raymond Lulle, philosophe de l'action,* Université de Grenoble, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines 33, Grenoble, 1963.
LNT	*La Nostra Terra,* Palma.
Longpré	E. Longpré's article "Lulle, Raymond (Le Bienheureux)" in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* IX, 1, Paris, 1926, cols. 1072–1141.
McVaugh, "The Mediaeval Theory"	M. R. McVaugh, "The Mediaeval Theory of Compound Medicines," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1965.
McVaugh, *Villanova*	*Arnaldi de Villanova, Opera medica omnia. II. Aphorismi de gradibus,* ed. M. R. McVaugh, Granada and Barcelona, 1975.
ML	*Miscel·lània lul·liana,* Barcelona, 1935 (a collection of articles that had previously appeared in *EF* 46, 1934, and 47, 1935).

MOG	*Raymundi Lulli Opera omnia,* ed. Ivo Salzinger, 8 vols. (numbered I–VI, IX–X), Mainz, 1721–42 (see below, "Llull's Influence," n. 79). Repr. ed. F. Stegmüller, Frankfurt, 1965. (References are given in the form "*MOG* I, 434 = Int. vii, 1," where "434" refers to the continuous pagination of the reprint, and the last number refers to the first page of the seventh internal numeration of the original edition.) See also below, *Quattuor.*
MRABLB	*Memorias de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona,* Barcelona.
Obras	*Obras de Ramón Lull,* ed. Jerónimo Rosselló, 3 vols., Palma, 1901–3.
OE	Ramon Llull, *Obres essencials,* 2 vols., Barcelona, 1957–60.
OED	*The Oxford English Dictionary,* 13 vols., Oxford, 1884–1933.
OL	Ramon Llull, *Obras literarias,* Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, Madrid, 1948.
Opera medica	*Beati Raymundi Lulli Opera Medica,* Palma, 1752. (See below *Principles of Medicine,* Introduction at n. 36, for more details.)
Opera parva	*Beati Raymundi Lulli Opera Parva,* 5 vols., Palma, 1744–6. Vols. 1, 3, 4 repr. as *Opuscula,* ed. E.-W. Platzeck, Hildesheim, 1971–3; Vol. 2, *Logica nova,* repr. ed. Ch. Lohr, Frankfurt, 1971–2.[2]
ORL	*Obres de Ramon Lull,* ed. Salvador Galmés et al., 21 vols., Palma, 1906–50.
Pasqual, *Vindiciae*	A. Pasqual, *Vindiciae Lullianae,* 4 vols., Avignon, 1778.
Peers	E. Allison Peers, *Ramon Lull, a Biography,* London, 1929 (repr. Brill, Leiden, 1982).
Pereira, "Le opere"	M. Pereira, "Le opere mediche di Lullo in rapporto con la sua filosofia naturale e con la medicina del XIII secolo," *EL* 23 (1979), 1–35.

[2] Vols. 2 and 3 are not numbered as part of this collection on their title pages, but not only are scholars reasonably sure they were intended as such (see RD, p. 308, and Platzeck in Vol. I, pp. ii–xi, of the reprint, as well as in *EL* 15, 1971, 87–92), but several copies in their original bindings which I have consulted in Palma are so numbered on the spine.

Pla	E.-W. Platzeck, *Raimund Lull, sein Leben, seine Werke, die Grundlagen seines Denkens (Prinzipienlehre)*, 2 vols., Biblioteca Franciscana 5–6, Rome and Düsseldorf, 1962–4.
Platzeck, "Miscelánea"	E.-W. Platzeck, "Miscelánea luliana. Investigaciones publicadas en los últimos veinte años sobre la vida y la interpretación de las doctrinas de Raimondo Llull," *Verdad y Vida* 31 (Madrid, 1973), 381–454. (A revised and expanded translation of an equivalently titled German article in *Antonianum* 45, Rome, 1970, 213–72.)
Pring-Mill, "Analogical"	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, "The Analogical Structure of the Lullian Art," *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Essays Presented by His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer on His Seventieth Birthday*, Oxford and Columbia, S.C., 1972, pp. 315–26.
Pring-Mill, "Grundzüge"	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, "Grundzüge von Lulls Ars inveniendi veritatem," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 43 (1961), 239–66.
Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, *El microcosmos lul·lià*, Palma, 1961.
Pring-Mill, *Número*	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, *Ramón Llull y el número primitivo de las dignidades en el "Arte general,"* Oxford, 1963. (A reprint with corrections and additions of an article in *EL* 1, 1957, 309–34; 2, 1958, 129–56.)
Pring-Mill, "Potencias"	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, "Ramón Llull y las tres potencias del alma," *EL* 12 (1968), 101–30.
Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian"	R.D.F. Pring-Mill, "The Trinitarian World Picture of Ramon Lull," *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 7 (Hamburg, 1955–6), 229–56.
Probst, *Caractère*	J.-H. Probst, *Caractère et origine des idées du Bienheureux Raymond Lulle*, Toulouse, 1912.
Quattuor	Raymundus Lullus, *Quattuor Libri Principiorum*, ed. R.D.F. Pring-Mill, Wakefield, Paris, and The Hague, 1969. (A photographic reprint of the last four works in *MOG* I—the "Principles" of Theology, Philosophy, Law and Medicine—with an introduction by Pring-Mill.)

RD	E. Rogent and E. Duràn, *Bibliografía de les impressions lul·lianes,* Estudis de Bibliografia Lul·liana 2, Barcelona, 1927. (References to catalogue numbers.)
Riquer, *Història*	M. de Riquer, *Història de la literatura catalana,* Vol. 1, Barcelona, 1964; 2nd ed., 1980.
Risse, *Logik*	W. Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit,* Vol. 1, *1500–1640,* Stuttgart and Bad Cannstatt, 1964.
ROL	*Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina,* ed. F. Stegmüller et al., 10 vols., in progress (Vols. 1–5, Palma, 1959–67; Vols. 6ff., Turnhout, Belgium, 1975–).
Rossi, *Clavis*	P. Rossi, *Clavis universalis: arti mnemoniche e logica combinatoria da Lullo a Leibniz,* Milan and Naples, 1960.
Rossi, "Legacy"	P. Rossi, "The Legacy of Ramon Lull in Sixteenth-Century Thought," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 5 (London, 1961), 182–213. (See "Lullism," n. 19, for the relationship between these two works.)
Sala-Molins, *Amour*	L. Sala-Molins, *La philosophie de l'amour chez Raymond Lulle,* Paris and The Hague, 1974.
Sala-Molins, *Choix*	Raymond Lulle, *L'Arbre de Philosophie d'Amour, Le Livre de l'Ami et de l'Aimé, et Choix de textes philosophiques et mystiques,* trans. and ed. L. Sala-Molins, Paris, 1967.
SMR	*Studia Monographica et Recensiones,* Palma
Stone, *Gentil*	H. Stone, "A Critical Edition of the 'Libro del gentil e de los tres sabios' (Castilian Text)," Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1965.
Sugranyes, *Docteur*	R. Sugranyes de Franch, *Raymond Lulle, Docteur des missions,* Schöneck-Beckenried, Switzerland, 1954.
Yates, "Art"	F. A. Yates, "The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to It through Lull's Theory of the Elements," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 17, London, 1954, 115–73.
Urvoy, *Islam*	D. Urvoy, *Penser l'Islam. Les présupposés islamiques de l'"Art" de Lull,* Paris, 1980.

Zetzner ed.	*Raymundi Lullii Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso Artem universalem,* publ. by Lazarus Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, and reprinted with additions in 1609, 1617, and 1651 (see below "Llull's Influence," text at nn. 60–63 for details).

Bibliographical Note

A. General Bibliographies

For all Lullian publications up to 1868 see RD; for those from 1870 to 1973 see Bru; for publications since 1973, see the reviews and bibliographical notices in *EL*. Other useful recent bibliographies are those of M. Batllori in *OE* II, 1359–76 and of E.-W. Platzeck in Pla II, 231*–66*, and in his "Miscelánea."

B. Llull's Works

I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND LISTS OF WORKS

See at the end of Vol. II below, the Chronological Catalogue of Works.

II. EDITIONS

Catalan. A collected edition was begun with *Obras*, 3 vols., 1901–3, and restarted on a much sounder philological basis in *ORL*, 21 vols., 1906–50, which it is hoped will now be continued. *ENC* has also put out good editions of *Blaquerna*, *Felix*, the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, and the poetry. *OE*, 2 vols., 1957–60, is an excellent anthology and widely used, in spite of textual defects (the *ENC* editions of *Blaquerna* and *Felix*, for example, are preferable).

Latin. The first important Latin anthology was that of Zetzner in 1598, reprinted in 1609, 1617, and 1651. Between 1721 and 1742 appeared the magnificent eight folio volumes of *MOG*. This in turn stimulated the publication in Majorca of the five volumes of the *Opera parva*, 1744–6. In our times the critical edition of *ROL* is well under way, with nine of its projected thirty-five volumes already published.

III. TRANSLATIONS

The best bibliographies of translations are those in Bru, pp. 13–18, and in Sugranyes, *Docteur*, pp. 148–9.

English. Except for the translations of the *Book of the Order of Chivalry* (see item II.A.14 in the catalogue of works at the end of Vol. II for details), all are by E. Allison Peers. His 1923 translation of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* and that of 1925 of the *Art of Contemplation* were both incorporated (with the first much improved) into his 1926 translation of *Blaquerna*.[1] In 1926 he also brought out a partial translation of the *Tree of Love*, and in 1927 translations of the *Book of the Beasts* and of the *Contemporary Life* (for which see n. 43 to the "Life" below). The *Art de contemplació* sometime listed as translated by Lejau Frost is not a translation but a doctoral dissertation containing a critical edition of the Catalan text of the work, of which only the excellent fifty-page introduction seems ever to have been printed (Baltimore, 1903).

French. The medieval French translations of the *Book of the Gentile, Blaquerna, Doctrina pueril*, and the *Book of the Beasts* have been published by A. Llinarès (see List of Abbreviations under his name). Part of the first had been edited in 1831, and the last was also edited by G. E. Sansone (Bru 120).[2] Llinarès has also published the seventeenth-century translation of the *Liber novus physicorum* (in *EL* 11, 1967, 41–66), as well as the eighteenth-century partial translation of the *Liber de intellectu* (in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 38, Paris 1971, 193–270). The medieval French texts of the *Libre de clerecia* and the *Book of the Order of Chivalry* were published in *ORL* I, and the latter was edited again by V. Minervini (Bari, 1972).

Among modern French translations, there is the excellent anthology of Sala-Molins, *Choix*, as well as a smaller but also good anthology in the back of Sugranyes, *Docteur*. As for individual works, there are French editions of the *Ars brevis*, 1901, and the *Desconhort*, 1862 and 1938, as well as no less than a dozen translations of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* (see item II.A.17c in the catalogue of works in Vol. II here).

Spanish. In Spanish there are two good anthologies, the *OL* of 1948, and the *Antología* of 1961; there is also the *Obras filosóficas*, Madrid, 1933, which I have not seen. The medieval Spanish text

[1] Or *Blanquerna*, as Peers and other scholars have written it, following traditional spelling (see *Felix*, Bk. I, n. 34, for a discussion of the problem). For fuller bibliographical references to these translations and editions, see the Catalogue of Llull's Works at the end of Vol. II.

[2] For the *Gentile* and the *Book of the Beasts*, see the introductions to the *Gentile* and *Felix* for more detailed bibliographical references.

of the *Book of the Gentile* was edited in Stone, *Gentil*; that of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* by G. M. Bertini (see Bru 87). The sixteenth-century translation of the *Desconhort* has been re-edited many times (see item III.22 in our catalogue). Of the many eighteenth-century Spanish translations, that of the *Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect* of 1753 (RD 364) was reprinted in 1928 (Bru 80), and that of *Blaquerna* of 1749 (RD 342) in 1929 (Bru 82), both with introductions by E. Ovejero y Maury. Recently there has appeared an excellent translation of the *Proverbs of Ramon* by S. Garcías Palou (Madrid, 1978). For other Spanish translations, see Bru, p. 14.

German. The *Contemporary Life* has been translated by E.-W. Platzeck (see n. 42 to the "Life" below). For translations of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, the *Book of the Beasts*, and other fragments, see Bru, p. 17, and Sugranyes, *Docteur*, p. 149.

IV. MANUSCRIPTS OF LLULL'S WORKS

A catalogue that would do for Lullian manuscripts what RD does for Lullian printed sources is badly needed. Barring that, one has to manage with the monographs listed in *OE* II, 1361–2, and Bru, pp. 32–5, to which one must add the remarks in Hillg, p. 138, nn. 7 and 8.

C. Studies

I give no general bibliography because the number of works necessarily consulted in an anthology such as this is so great as to make a single listing almost meaningless. However, the reader who wants bibliographies of specific areas of Lullian studies can consult the following: for the historical background, the "Historical Background and Life," n. 1; for biographies, n. 26 to the same section; for the Contemporary Life, nn. 42–3 there; for Llull's thought, n. 1 to the corresponding section; for the history of Lullism, "The Influence of Llull's Thought," nn. 1 and 19. For works on apologetics, the Art, medicine, and mysticism, he should consult respectively the introductions to the *Gentile*, the two works of the Art, the *Principles of Medicine*, and the *Flowers of Love*. Other specific topics are treated in the notes corresponding to the individual sections of *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, *Ars brevis*, Part X, and *Felix*, Book VIII.

FRANCE

Poitiers

AQUITAINE (To England)

Carlat

Rocamadour

Toulouse

Montpelli

Muret

NAVARRE

Roussillon

Urgel

KINGDOM of

Saragossa

Aragon

Catalonia

Barcelona

Tarragona

ARAGON

Valencia

KINGDOM of

Valencia

Ibiza

Santiago de Compostela

PORTUGAL

CASTILE

Toledo

Navas de Tolosa

Cordoba

Murcia

Limit of Catalan Language

Seville

Granada

GRANADA

Gibraltar

Ceuta

Algiers

Oran

Tlemcen

MOROCCO

Fes

Minorca

Pollença

Deià

Miramar

Valldemossa

La Real

Palma

Randa

Llucmajor

Majorca

The Western Mediterranean ca. 1300

Lyon
Vienne
Valence
Avignon
PROVENCE
Aix-en-Provence
Marseille
ajorca
Minorca
lajorca
Genoa
Pisa
Porto Pisano
Corsica
GENOA
PISA
Alghero
Sardinia
Venice
PAPAL STATES
Aquila
Rome
Anagni
Lucera
Foggia
NAPLES
Naples
Salerno
Messina
SICILY
Mediterranean
Bougie
Constantine
Tunis
Djerba
Africa

Map of the Western Mediterranean, ca. 1300

The Western Mediterranean, ca. 1300

THE MUSLIM STATES

1. Ifriqiyah, corresponding more or less to modern Tunisia and part of Libya, ruled by the Hafsids. For Ibn Khaldun it was the leading Islamic state of the period, and it was the most important area for Catalan commerce with North Africa.

2. A branch of the Hafsids succeeded, during the years 1285–1309, in establishing an independent emirate in the area around Bougie and Constantine (what is now eastern Algeria).

3. The central Maghrib—roughly the western two-thirds of present-day Algeria—constituting of the domains of the Abd-al-Wadid dynasty, whose capital Tlemcen and its port of Oran were important in the Majorcan gold traffic.

4. Morocco, ruled by the Merinid dynasty, although more in the Castilian zone of influence, yet maintaining its share of trade with Catalonia and Majorca.

5. Granada—all that was left of Muslim Spain—subsisting as a prosperous, independent state under the Nasrid dynasty until 1492.

THE CHRISTIAN STATES

Castile, which played only a minor role in the Mediterranean, although its newly conquered (1248) port of Seville was rapidly becoming an important center of trade.

6. Aragon with Catalonia and Valencia.

7. The Kingdom of Majorca, made up of three unconnected and dissimilar pieces: (1) the Roussillon, including Cerdanya and Capcir to the west, lying along the only really passable portion of the eastern Pyrenees, and a strategically important buffer region between France and Catalonia; (2) Montpellier, with its school of medicine and university, providing, mainly through its port of Lattes, the principal Mediterranean outlet for the commerce of France; (3) the Balearic Islands, of which Minorca had not been conquered from the Muslims until 1287.

8. France, the first power in Europe, and its capital, Paris, the intellectual center of the West.

9. Provence and Naples, separate areas under the single rule of the Angevin dynasty, first Charles I of Anjou and then Charles II the Lame (see Table 1).

10. Genoa and Pisa, rival maritime powers, the former controlling Corsica and a third of Sardinia, and the latter the remaining portion of Sardinia.

11. The Papal States, location of the papacy until 1305, after which it moved to France, and from 1309 on in Avignon.

12. Sicily, from 1285 to 1409 under a separate Catalan dynasty (see Table 1).

During Llull's active lifetime there was for the most part an equilibrium among these states. Historians have spoken of a Catalan empire, but Hillgarth has rightly pointed out that it was more apparent than real. The Catalans exercised a certain amount of what today would be called economic imperialism—especially in the Balearics, Sicily, and North Africa—and a certain sporadic naval hegemony, but for the most part those states, and even those dynastically tied to Aragon, competed with one another as quite independent units. Majorca, for example, not only was commercially dominant in Bougie, but had its own separate consulates in nine other towns of the Maghrib. More than anything, Llull's world was that of a Balkanized western Mediterranean, a kind of latter-day maritime *reinos de taifa*.

Acknowledgments

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Historical Background and Life of Ramon Llull

Historical Background

RAMON LLULL is in many ways a perplexing figure. During his long life (1232–1316) he amassed a confusing number of claims to our attention: as a Christian philosopher in the Neoplatonic tradition; as the first of the great mystics of the Iberian Peninsula; as the first European to write prose novels on contemporary themes; as the first writer to use a Romance vernacular to discuss theology, philosophy, and science, and as one of the creators of literary Catalan; as a missionary, Christian apologist, and founder of a school of oriental languages for the purpose of training missionaries; and finally as the inventor of the "Art," a complex system, using semimechanical techniques combined with symbolic notation and combinatory diagrams, which was to be the basis of his apologetics in addition to being applicable to all fields of knowledge.[1] And behind all this there seems to lie a paradox, that of a figure coming from a small island in the western Mediterranean and from what nowadays is considered a minority culture, developing one of the most universalist of systems, one which he presented to popes, kings, sultans, and universities in Spain, France, Italy, and North Africa during his lifetime, and which brought him extraordinary fame throughout Europe in the Renaissance. If, however, we want to understand this apparent growth from geographical and cultural microcosm to macrocosm, we have to know more about Llull's background. For the small island of Majorca was strategically placed at the center of the commercial wheel of the western Mediterranean, and probably only a handful of thirteenth-century European cities were more cosmopolitan than Llull's birthplace, the island's capital. Moreover, the Catalan language and culture, to which Llull gave such an impulse, were, within this wheel, not at all in a position of minority at the time.

[1] This initial characterization is taken largely from Pring-Mill's excellent summary in the 1967 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

To get some feeling for this situation, one must know a bit about the dramatic changes that took place in the Iberian peninsula in the beginning of the thirteenth century.[2] Before then, and indeed from the beginning of the eighth century, the western Mediterranean had been, in Pirenne's phrase, a Muslim lake, and the Iberian Peninsula had been dominated by, or politically joined to, North Africa. The Spanish Christian kingdoms, locked into the space between the Muslims to the south and the mountains and sea to the north, were laboriously reconquering and resettling the center of the peninsula. During the twelfth century their progress had been slow, opposed as they were by two great North African Muslim empires, first of the Almoravids and then of the Almohads. At the same time, the Aragonese crown had been expending much of its foreign energies dabbling in the patchwork rivalries of the semi-independent principalities of southern France.

Then at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Almohad empire collapsed, while the little principalities north of the Pyrenees were swallowed up by the northern French heavily backed by the papacy in its effort to stamp out the Catharist heresy and regain spiritual control of Occitania.[3] Looked at from the view-

[2] For the historical background of Spain in the Middle Ages, there is Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca and London, 1975), which is reliable and quite complete. Gabriel Jackson, *The Making of Medieval Spain* (New York, 1972), is far shorter, less purely factual, more suggestive, and superbly illustrated. Angus MacKay, *Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500* (London, 1977), perhaps the best of these three books, is particularly good on constitutional, social, and cultural developments. On the important Muslim side of the question, there is W. Montgomery Watt, *A History of Islamic Spain*, Islamic Surveys, 4 (Edinburgh, 1965), by a leading Islamic scholar. On more limited periods around the time of Llull, there is Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, particularly important for our purposes because written by one of the leading Llull scholars today. The expanded version of one chapter of that book, Hillgarth, *Problem*, concentrating as it does precisely on the area and period in which Llull lived, is essential reading for anyone interested in the background to Ramon Llull. These are, of course, only the works written in English; for a full bibliography of our area and period, see Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, pp. 420–4. I have omitted J. Lee Shneidmann, *The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, 1200–1350*, 2 vols. (New York, 1970), because it is unfortunately so inaccurate and misleading as to be unusable; see Hillgarth's review in *Speculum* 47 (1972), 345–53. As for works in other languages, Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, is fundamental for understanding the international mercantile position of Majorca in Llull's time. Although perhaps not as readily available in English-language libraries, the *Atlas de les Illes Balears, geogràfic, econòmic, històric* (Barcelona, 1979), contains excellent historical maps.

[3] These changes were symbolized, and indeed catalyzed, by two crucial battles. First, in 1212, was that of Navas de Tolosa, in the mountain passes leading from Castile into Andalusia, where combined Christian forces from northern Spain and southern France overwhelmed a Muslim army. Cf. Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 15, 93, 133, 169, and 571; as well

point of the Spanish Christian states, the result was a 180° reversal of the north-south power structure: a power vacuum to the north became a barrier, while the barrier to the south became a power vacuum, one into which all the Christian states stepped with extraordinary speed. In the space of twenty-two years (1226–48)[4] the Muslim possessions in Iberia were reduced to the petty kingdom of Granada.

The Aragonese monarchy, paralyzed by a royal minority, took longer than the other Christian states to go into action; but once it did, its speed was if anything even greater. In the space of only sixteen years it moved south into the Balearic Islands (1229–35) and down the Mediterranean coast past Valencia (1238–45).[5] The extreme rapidity of this conquest entailed the sudden absorption of a large Muslim population, and a desperate search for settlers in an attempt to redress what was felt to be a serious social imbalance.[6]

As for the Aragonese monarchy that had led this portion of the conquest, it was a hybrid affair born of the marriage in the mid-twelfth century of the heiress of the kings of Aragon with Ramon Berenguer IV, count of Barcelona. Afterwards, each of their descendants styled himself King of Aragon *and* Count of Barcelona. Thus the son of Ramon Berenguer and the Aragonese princess was King Alfonso II of Aragon and at the same time Count Alfonso I of Barcelona (ruled 1162–96); their grandson was King Peter II of Aragon and Count Peter I of Barcelona (ruled 1196–

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as other works mentioned in n. 2 above: O'Callaghan, pp. 333, 354; Jackson, pp. 81, 82, 88; and Montgomery Watt, pp. 107–8. In the following year of 1213 was fought the battle of Muret, on the Garonne south of Toulouse, where a small northern French force backed by the Church defeated the combined forces of southern French nobility and the Aragonese crown (the king of Aragon himself died in the battle). Cf. O'Callaghan, pp. 341, 362–3; Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, p. 29; Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, p. 243, and *Problem*, p. 13.

[4] That is, from the fall of Baeza (1226) to that of Seville (1248); cf. O'Callaghan (n. 2 above), pp. 338–54. The latter conquest gave Castile its first southern Atlantic port, which was soon to take on major importance in the economic life of the country.

[5] The capital of Majorca was taken by assault on 31 December 1229, but the last pockets of resistance on the rest of the island were not cleared up until 1232. In that last year, Minorca became tributary to the Catalan crown (it was not conquered until 1287; see below, n. 102). Ibiza was conquered in 1235. As for Valencia, the campaign began in 1232; the city itself surrendered in 1238; and the rest of the kingdom was not subdued till 1245.

[6] For Valencia, this imbalance was particularly dramatic (see the introduction to the *Gentile*, below, text at n. 6). For Majorca it was less so, nor was there, because of the island's almost immediate economic boom, such difficulty in finding settlers.

1213);[7] and their great-grandson, as a result of presiding over the conquest of the Balearic Islands and Valencia mentioned above, was able to *add* titles, without being able to effect any real fusion between the two original ones, or for that matter between any of them. This was James I the Conqueror (ruled 1213–76, one of the longest reigns in European history), who was finally able to style himself King of Aragon, Majorca, and Valencia, Count of Barcelona and Urgel, and Lord of Montpellier.[8]

The original joining of Aragon and Catalonia, however, remained dynastic and little else. The two regions had separate laws, customs, and privileges, and, as one historian has put it, any attempt to develop central institutions for the whole confederation was sure to meet with jealous resistance from both countries. In social structure the two areas were also different, Aragon being more rural, feudal, and landlocked, while Catalonia was more mercantile, urban, and maritime in outlook. Lastly, the two areas spoke different languages: a dialect of Castilian in Aragon and Catalan in Catalonia.[9]

The relative weight of these two regions, however, was very unequal. Even though the kingly title came from Aragon, and new kings were crowned in Saragossa, the demographic, economic, and cultural motive force behind the expansive strength of the kingdom came from Catalonia, and the effective economic, cultural, and administrative center was Barcelona. That it was the Catalans who overwhelmingly carried out the southward expansion is clear from the fact that their language was implanted almost everywhere in the newly conquered lands. It was also the Catalans who provided the strong mercantile class which, in close alliance

[7] Catalan historians give their kings Alfonso and Peter one unit less than most other historians. Granted—as is pointed out a bit further on—that the Catalans were dominant in every way in the Aragonese confederation, it seems unnecessary to prefer, in the purely ceremonial question of titles, the numeration as counts to that as kings. Note that this Peter II was the king killed at Muret (see n. 3 above).

[8] James I, called "the Conqueror" by Spanish historians, set down his remarkable achievements in the first of the four great Catalan medieval chronicles. The second was that of Desclot, covering mainly the reign of Peter III (II); the third that of Muntaner, famous for its narrative of the Catalan expedition to Asia Minor and Greece; the fourth that of Peter IV (III). They have all been published by F. Soldevila in *Les quatre grans cròniques* (Barcelona, 1971). For further bibliography and English translations, see Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, p. 421, to which one must add the superb recent translation and edition by M. and J. N. Hillgarth, *Pere III of Catalonia, Chronicle*, 2 vols. (Toronto, 1980).

[9] Hillgarth, *Problem*, pp. 2–3.

with the monarch, provided a principal motive force of the expansion, and the importance of ports such as those of Palma[10] in Majorca and of Valencia was not lost on them. Nor did they stop there: soon most of the important North African trading centers were dotted with Catalan and Majorcan consulates.[11]

Since the language of this expansion was Catalan, and since that was also the language of Ramon Llull, some facts about it must be made clear.[12] Before the beginning of the thirteenth century, Catalonia lived very much within the cultural orbit of the brilliant troubadour world of southern France. In addition to the understandable attraction of that world, which was felt with almost equal strength in many other parts of twelfth-century Europe, two other factors contributed to the Catalan orientation. The first was its geographic proximity as a younger, as yet not so culturally defined, region; the second was a language which, even though of a separate Romance development, was not very far from Provençal. Catalonia, in fact, produced a considerable galaxy of troubadours, all writing in the standard Provençal koine.[13] But then with the changed situation at the beginning of the thirteenth century came a severance of the umbilical cord. After that, southern France began to lose its attraction; it became a land of persecution from which people more and more frequently took refuge in Catalonia. At the same time the Aragonese crown, or rather the portion of it represented by the Catalans, became a Mediterranean power, which in the next century would take its forces as far as Greece and Turkey; and it was precisely this imperialism that gave the Catalans a sense of their own identity. And it is a curious fact that this sense of identity was tied up not only with a feeling that

[10] This is the Roman and modern name. In the Middle Ages the name was the same as that of the island and was expanded to "the city of Majorca" if there was any possibility of confusion (the same situation still exists with Valencia and Ibiza). Cf. Gabriel Bibiloni, "La ciutat de Mallorca: consideracions sobre un topònim," *Randa* 9 (Barcelona, 1979), 25–30, as well as the text corresponding to n. 60 below.

[11] See Hillgarth, *Problem*, pp. 50–1, especially for the interesting relationship between monarch, nobility, and bourgeoisie. For the Catalan consulates, see Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 98ff. and 518–19. For the Majorcan consulates, see the commentary on the map and n. 157 below.

[12] The most recent and complete history of the Catalan language is Manuel Sanchis Guarner, *Aproximació a la història de la llengua catalana*, of which only Vol. 1, *Creixença i esplendor* (Barcelona, 1980), has appeared. In English there is a chapter on the language in William J. Entwistle, *The Spanish Language* (London, 1936).

[13] See the long chapter on the Catalan troubadours in Riquer, *Història* I, 21–196.

they were carrying out a divine destiny, but also with a feeling for their language as an expression of that destiny.[14] Moreover, the first monuments of the language are the chronicles that set down the exploits of the expansion, and the works of Ramon Llull, whose goal was to proselytize in the new lands; it is also noteworthy that one of the models in the formation of this language was that of the royal chancellery at the center of the ever-increasing web of administrative and diplomatic activity. It was this thirteenth-century prose that weened the language from the tutelage of Provençal and gave its definitive literary form; it was this language that the chronicler Ramon Muntaner vaunted as "the finest in the world."

By the time the initial expansive movement was over, Catalan was spoken in a pennant-shaped area stretching from the northern frontier of Roussillon in southern France westward to Andorra, and from there all the way south past Valencia to Alicante, in addition to the Balearic Islands.[15] Moreover, as a result of the dominant role of Catalan and Majorcan merchants in the western Mediterranean, it became a kind of lingua franca in the area. By 1300 it had become one of the international languages of diplomacy as well as of trade.[16] Nor was it surrounded as it is nowadays by a few national giants, linguistically speaking. The language units, like the political units, of the thirteenth-century western Mediterranean were much smaller and more equal in strength than they are now. All this is important for the reader to realize that Llull's use of Catalan (in addition to Latin) for a proselytism which was so international in aim was not the anomaly it might seem to modern eyes.

With regard to this internationalism, some points must be made about the island of Majorca, where Llull spent the first half of his long life. Its social structure was as different from that of its parent

[14] See Josep Miquel Sobré, *L'èpica de la realitat. L'escriptura de Ramon Muntaner i Bernat Desclot* (Barcelona, 1978), for an excellent exposé of this relationship between language and epic destiny.

[15] In the fourteenth century it was also transplanted to Sardinia with the Catalan conquest of that island, and it is still spoken by the inhabitants of the town of Alghero (Alguer in Catalan).

[16] Hillgarth, *Problem*, p. 54, where he also says, "It was employed by Sicilian nobles, and, on occasion, by the Angevin King Robert of Naples. It was understood by the French popes of Avignon and could be used by a lay ambassador, who did not command Latin, to address a papal consistory."

Catalonia as is that of any frontier area from its home base. Settlers came from all over Catalonia, and even from Aragon, as well as from Montpellier, Marseille, and other parts of southern France. There were also important communities of Genoese and Pisan traders.[17] Muslims constituted perhaps a third of the population of the island.[18] Most were slaves as a direct result of the conquest, while some had been brought in subsequently by slave dealers.[19] But there was also a certain number of free Muslims working as artisans, small traders, and tenant farmers.[20] Numerically less significant, but very important in the economic, mercantile, and even diplomatic life of the island, were the Jews. They were of first importance to the crown as a source of revenue and as bankers; because of their knowledge of both the Islamic and Christian worlds and their respective languages, they made ideal ambassadors to represent the Catalan king in North Africa; lastly, they were leading intermediaries in the gold trade which, from tropical Africa, passed through Sijilmasa, Tlemcen, Oran, and Majorca.[21] The fact that the island had such an excellent port situated almost exactly halfway between Barcelona and Algiers[22] placed it at the center of an extraordinary movement of ships and merchants to and from every port in the western Mediterranean, from as far away as Alexandria to the east, and Seville and the Atlantic coast

[17] Hillgarth, *Problem*, p. 18, and Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 34–5.

[18] Havelock Ellis, "Ramon Lull at Palma," *The Soul of Spain* (London, 1937), said that Llull's birthplace was still among "the most nearly Moslem of Christian cities." Cf. Hillg, p. 2, n. 7, where one will find historians' estimates, which vary from half of the population (perhaps 25,000 out of 50,000) to one-fifth (some 10,000). Guillem Rosselló Bordoy, in his communication to the Lullian Congress of Miramar in 1976, as yet unpublished, estimated the Muslim population as 40% of the total in the first half of the thirteenth century. See also Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 182ff. and especially 184 and 189.

[19] Ricardo Soto Company, "La población musulmana en Mallorca bajo el dominio cristiano (1240–1276)," *Fontes Rerum Balearium* 2 (Palma, 1978), 65–80, 549–64. For a general view of medieval Mediterranean slavery, the standard work is Ch. Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale*, Vol. I (Bruges, 1955); see also his article in *Bulletin historique belge de Rome* 42 (1972), 141–87.

[20] Elena Lourie, "Free Moslems in the Balearics under Christian Rule in the Thirteenth Century," *Speculum* 45 (1970), 624–49.

[21] Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 139–44, as well as additional interesting details on pp. 329, 446 and n. 5, 465 and n. 4. See also Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, pp. 239–40 and 274–5, as well as his *Problem*, p. 20.

[22] See Hillgarth, *Kingdoms*, p. 247, and *Problem*, p. 19. The Arab geographer al-Isidri (*Description de l'Afrique*, ed. Dozy, Leyden, 1866, p. 64) said Majorca was one day's sailing from Barcelona and one from Denia, two from Sardinia, and three from Bougie.

of Morocco to the west.[23] After 1280, Majorcans began to use the direct sea route to England through the Strait of Gibraltar; there is even a possibility that Majorcan sailors were the first to do so.[24]

The reader, however, must beware of imposing on this picture a modern image of a sunny, altruistic coexistence of different races and religions. Everything in the Middle Ages was more sharply contrasted. Commercial rivalries were more intense, piracy was the order of the day,[25] relationships between subjugator and subjugated were brutally frank, and tolerance a matter either of economic interest or of momentary balance of power. But it all worked, and the impression is predominantly one of buoyancy and optimism, at least until the economic and social decline of the fourteenth century, which Llull did not live to see.

The First Thirty Years[26]

Ramon Llull was born in 1232 or early 1233 in Palma, the capital of Majorca.[27] His father, who had come from Catalonia with the conquering armies of James I just three or four years before, had

[23] Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 31, 68, 138, 320, 422–3, 464, 543, 572, 577; Hillgarth, *Problem*, pp. 21, 41–3; O'Callaghan (n. 2 above), p. 405.

[24] The earliest known date for such trade refers to Genoese galleys trading with Flanders in 1277–8. In 1281 we find a Guillem de Bona of Majorca loading wool in London. It was Roberto S. Lopez, in *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 29 (1951), 1163–79, who suggested the possibility that Majorcans may have preceded the Genoese; see Hillgarth, *Problem*, p. 44.

[25] See Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 157, 573–6.

[26] Any bibliography of works on Llull's life must begin with the biography contained in Pasqual, *Vindiciae*, Vol. I, a truly remarkable work, on which all modern biographies are immediately or mediately based, and whose only defect was to interpret many fictional passages in *Blaquerna* and *Felix* as being autobiographical (making for quite incredible early voyages) and to continue the pious legend of Llull's martyrdom. Longpré, cols. 1072–88, excellent in its concision and documentation, is more critical, even though Llull is still presented as a martyr. Peers, although very complete and still useful, is marred by a spirit less critical than Longpré's (he still recounts the early voyages, martyrdom, etc.). Salvador Galmés, *Dinamisme de Ramon Lull* (Mallorca, 1935), is still credulous on the matter of the voyages and a bit confused on early chronology, but otherwise good. (A slightly retouched Spanish translation was published in *OL*, pp. 3–39.) In more recent times, Batllori, *Món*, is succinct, accurate, elegantly written, and particularly suggestive on Llull's historical and spiritual background. (This work is an expanded Catalan translation of the "Ramon Llull, en su mundo" printed in *Introducción a Ramón Llull*, Madrid, 1960, and in *Antología* I.) The biographies in Pla I, 3–59, and in Llinarès, *Lulle*, pp. 23–167, are useful, but it is Hillg, pp. 1–134 which contains the greatest body of detailed research and on which I have been most able to rely.

[27] The date is made on calculations working back from later dates in Llull's life (cf. n. 50 below). This is the version of the best informed scholars: see Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 13–14; Pla I, 9; Hillg, p. 1, n. 4; and Platzeck, "Miscelánea," pp. 388–9. Some scholars, however, such as Longpré, col. 1074, and Llinarès, *Lulle*, pp. 74–5, prefer 1235.

also been called Ramon.[28] The family name seems originally to have been Amat, and Llull a sobriquet that had slowly replaced it.[29] We are not sure whether the family was noble or of the merchant class, but the lands granted to the father after the conquest, as well as the son's later position at court, would indicate a noble origin.[30] The former's wife, Isabel de Erill, came to Majorca in 1231, when the island was already pacified, and their only son, Ramon, was born a year or two later.

His upbringing and education must have been typical of his class, which meant that it provided him with almost none of the intellectual training he was to need when his life took its definitive course. He seems to have written troubadour poetry and been attached to the court of James I, and particularly to that of his son, the future James II of Majorca, who was ten years Llull's junior.[31] He presents this part of his life as profligate, and he repents for it in sometimes moving Augustinian fashion in the *Book of Contemplation*.[32] In any event, his position as a courtier, with the resultant travels through Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, undoubtedly earned him considerable knowledge of the world.[33]

[28] For details of Llull's family and background, see Peers, pp. 5–7, as well as Ca I, 239.

[29] The old Catalan spelling was Ramon Lull or Luyl; in Latin sources it appears as Raymundus Lul, Lullus, or Lullius. This last form gave rise to the Spanish Raimundo Lulio and the English Raymond Lully. Ramon Llull is the correct form in modern Catalan (without accent; Ramón is only written with an accent in Spanish). See Ca I, 233, n. 1, and the references there, as well as Peers, p. 5, n. 2, and Miquel Colom, *Onomàstica lul·liana* (Palma, 1977), pp. 52 and 54. For the change from Amat to Llull, see J. Miret y Sans, "Lo primitiu nom de familia d'En Ramon Lull," *BRABLB* VIII (1915), 305–7, quoted in Ca I, 239, n. 3.

[30] See the references in n. 28 above, both of which, along with OE I, 19, Llinarès, *Lulle*, p. 59, and Batllori, *Món*, p. 7, treat the family as noble. This does not necessarily contradict the reference in Hillg, p. 2, to the father as "a rich citizen of Barcelona," given the position of the Catalan urban patriciate of the time, whose members Llull frequently refers to as *nobles burguesos* (cf. *Felix*, Bk. v, n. 3 below).

[31] Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 21, quotes a report drawn up in 1373 by the Archbishop of Tarragona to the effect that Llull had as a young man been a page in the court of James I. The problem lies in the authenticity of the report, which some scholars very much doubt; Lorenzo Pérez in "La muerte y el martirio de Ramón Llull," *Revista Balear* 5 (1969), p. 21, for instance, refers to it as "surely apocryphal." Pasqual's original assertion, however, has found its way into the modern literature; cf. Peers, p. 10, and Llinarès, *Lulle*, p. 76.

[32] For his early life and character, see Salvador Galmés, *Dinamisme de Ramon Lull* (Mallorca, 1935), p. 5; Ca I, 257ff.; Hillg, pp. 27–37; Colomer, *Edad Media*, pp. 26ff.; and Riquer, *Història* I, 208–10. Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 19, n. 3, however, suggests one should take these confessions with a grain of salt, since at the end of the *Book of Contemplation* (ch. 366, 26) Llull admits to having exaggerated for effect, "like the troubadour who boasts of being in love so as to improve his poem."

[33] For the travels, see Peers, pp. 13–15. For excellent arguments against the cliché of Llull as a hopeless utopian, see Hillg, pp. 27ff., as well as the remarkable portrayal of court intrigue in the *Book of the Beasts* in Bk. VII of *Felix* in Vol. II here.

Sometime before September 1257 he married Blanca Picany, by whom he had two children, Domènec and Magdalena.[34] The acquisition of a family does not seem to have changed his life style much; many years later he commented laconically that he had been "married and with children, reasonably well-off, licentious and worldly."[35] We also know that, around that time, he was appointed seneschal (i.e., administrative head of the royal household) to the future James II of Majorca.[36]

And this is all we know of more than one-third of Llull's long life. He seems to have considered these years as wasted, valuable only as a negative example; in the autobiography that he recounted to his friends—as we shall see in a moment—he omits this part of his life altogether.

Conversion and Preparation

We know about the remainder of Llull's life[37] from a document almost unique among the literature of medieval thought. This is an autobiography known as the *Vita coaetanea* or "Contemporary Life," which, at the "instance of certain monks who were friends of his, he recounted and allowed to be put down in writing."[38] Most scholars assume that these friends were the Carthusian monks of Vauvert, a monastery formerly located approximately on what is now the southern part of the Luxembourg Gardens in Paris.[39] From internal evidence it can be established that the work was composed at the end of August or the beginning of September of 1311, at the end of Llull's last trip to Paris.[40] Not long after Llull's death it was included in the vast anthology called the *Electorium* that was put together by his disciple Thomas le Myésier.[41]

[34] For the date of marriage, see the document reproduced in Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 22, and discussed in Peers, p. 16, which latter see also for the children.

[35] See the "Life," text at n. 182 below.

[36] See the "Life," §2, below, and Hillg, p. 27. Two dates have been suggested for the appointment, 1256 and 1262; cf. Hillg, p. 3, n. 10, and for the earlier date, Riquer, *Història* I, 207.

[37] Or at least most of it: the "Life" has gaps of nine years (1265–74) and eleven years (1276–87), a five-year period (1302–7) dealt with in most summary fashion, and the five years from the end of the narration to Llull's death (1311–16).

[38] See §1 below.

[39] Cf. M. Batllori in *OE* I, 31. For the location, see Llinarès, *Lulle*, p. 120, n. 206.

[40] Cf. *ROL* VIII, 262.

[41] For le Myésier and the *Electorium*, see "Lullism," text at nn. 20–2 below. The *Breviculum*, also described there, has an abbreviated form of the "Life" in and around the twelve miniatures, seven of which are reproduced here.

This Latin version, copied (and later printed) many times,[42] was translated into Catalan in the fifteenth century, probably in Majorca.[43] Many earlier scholars preferred the Catalan version, but nowadays all scholars agree that the Latin version is older and more likely to be authentic, in spite of two or three specifically Majorcan details that the Catalan version was able to record from local tradition.[44] It is the Latin version of the "Contemporary Life" we translate as follows, with interpolations to make it a continuous narrative,[45] and notes aiming to distill the large body of modern biographical research.

¶1.[46] To the honor, praise, and love of our only Lord God Jesus Christ, Ramon, at the instance of certain monks who were friends of his, recounted and allowed to be put down in writing what follows concerning his conversion to penitence and other deeds of his.[47]

I

¶2. Ramon, while still a young man and seneschal to the king of Majorca,[48] was very given to composing worthless songs and poems and to doing other licentious things. One night he was sitting beside his bed, about to compose and write in his vulgar tongue a song to a lady whom

[42] For years the standard edition was that of B. de Gaiffier in *Analecta Bollandiana* 48 (1930), 146–75, which only recently was supplanted by that in *ROL* VIII, 271–309, which is the one used here. For a complete bibliography of MSS, previous editions, and translations, see pp. 261–70 there, plus item IV.47 in the Catalogue of Works here in Vol. II. The translations I have consulted are those into French in Sugranyes, *Docteur*, pp. 24–50, and in Sala-Molins, *Choix*, pp. 18–44; into Spanish in *Antología* I, 51–84; into German in E.-W. Platzeck, *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull* (Düsseldorf, 1964).

[43] The standard edition of this Catalan version is that of Francesc de Borja Moll, *Vida Coetània del Rev. Mestre Ramon Lull segons el ms. 16432 del British Museum* (Palma, 1933). Particularly useful is the edition in *OE* I, 31–54, with elaborate notes by M. Batllori. It was the Catalan version (and not the Latin as many have said) that Peers translated into English in *A Life of Ramón Lull* (London, 1927); the confusion perhaps comes from the fact that he included the Latin "Life" (untranslated) as an appendix.

[44] The best discussion of the relationship between the Catalan and Latin versions is that of M. Batllori in *OE* I, 31–2, to be completed by Hillg, p. 46, n. 2.

[45] I.e., filling in the gaps mentioned in n. 37 above.

[46] The Arabic numerals represent the divisions introduced by de Gaiffier (see n. 42 above); the Roman numerals, introduced in *ROL* VIII, reflect the major divisions of the "Life" as given in the manuscript sources (cf. *ROL* VIII, 266–7).

[47] For the Franciscan implications of the phrase *conversio ad poenitentiam*, as well as of many other passages of the "Life," see Antonio Oliver, "El Beato Ramón Llull en sus relaciones con la Escuela Franciscana de los siglos XIII–XIV," *EL* 10 (1966), 47–55. Other parts of this important article appeared in *EL* 9 (1965), 55–70 and 145–165; *EL* 11 (1967), 89–119; and *EL* 13 (1969), 51–65.

[48] Literally, "seneschal of the table of the king of Majorca." The Catalan version has "seneschal and major-domo," which are in fact synonyms. In English one could also use the word *steward*. It should be noted that at this point James II was not yet king but heir to the throne of Majorca.

he loved with a foolish love; and as he began to write this song, he looked to his right and saw our Lord Jesus Christ on the cross, as if suspended in midair. This sight filled him with fear; and, leaving what he was doing, he retired to bed and went to sleep.

¶3. Upon arising the next day, he returned to his usual vanities without giving the vision a further thought. It was not until almost a week later, however, in the same place as before, and at almost exactly the same hour, when he was again preparing to work on and finish the aforementioned song, that our Lord appeared to him on the cross, just as before. He was even more frightened than the first time, and retired to bed and fell asleep as he had done before.[49]

Again on the next day, paying no attention to the vision he had seen, he continued his licentious ways. Indeed, soon afterwards he was again trying to finish the song he had begun when our Saviour appeared to him, always in the same form, a third and then a fourth time, with several days in between.

¶4. On the fourth occasion—or, as is more commonly believed, the fifth—when this vision appeared to him, he was absolutely terrified and retired to bed and spent the entire night trying to understand what these so often repeated visions were meant to signify.[50] On the one hand, his

[49] The Catalan version has this second vision appearing the night after the first. The version recounted in the text of the *Breviculum*, on the back of the miniature in which we see Llull composing his song and looking up at the five apparitions of the crucified Christ (Pl. I), says that the figure of Christ on the cross appears larger, bloodier, and more wounded on the second night than on the first. This would mean that the increasing size of successive apparitions (drawn all together in one scene) in the miniature is not a matter of perspective as would appear to the modern eye, but rather a literal transcription of the text.

[50] Llull himself refers to these five apparitions of the crucified Christ in st. 2 of the *Desconhort*, as well as in a more general way in st. 12 of the same poem and in the opening stanza of the *Cant de Ramon*. The story so often told in past centuries of his conversion having been provoked by a lady whom he had been pursuing, and who finally allowed him to come to her rooms, where she undressed and revealed a breast eaten away by cancer (see Peers, pp. 17–18), is a legend undoubtedly based on a somewhat similar episode in *Felix* (see Bk. VIII, n. 112); apparently it arose in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century. For a detailed discussion of the origin and transmission of this legend, see Gabrial Llompart, "La leyenda del desengaño en la conversión de Ramón Llull," *AST* 36 (1963), 283–98. See also T. and J. Carreras Artau, "Dues notes del lul·lisme trecentista," *EL* 16 (1972), 231–9; and Hillg, p. 3.

Most scholars agree (working backwards from later dates; see the calculations in n. 64 below and in Hillg, p. 1, n. 4) that Llull's conversion took place in 1263. Since, as we will see in §9 below, this was three months before the feast day of Saint Francis (see n. 56), it must have taken place towards the end of June or the beginning of July. We also know from a passage in the *Book of Contemplation* (ch. 70,22–3) that Llull was over thirty at the time of his conversion, which, working backwards, is how we arrive at the date of 1232 or the beginning of 1233 for his birth (see n. 27 above). Lastly, for the interesting coincidence that this year of 1263 was also that of the famous disputation of Barcelona, see n. 55 below.

PLATE I. Llull's vision of Christ and his two pilgrimmages.
From *Breviculum, fol. 1*^{v}.

PLATE II. Llull listening to a sermon and taking the habit.
From *Breviculum*, fol. 2[r].

PLATE III. Llull's dispute with his Muslim slave.
From *Breviculum*, fol. 3^{v}.

PLATE IV. The vision on Mt. Randa and Llull teaching in Paris. From *Breviculum*, fol. 4[r].

conscience told him that they could only mean that he should abandon the world at once and from then on dedicate himself totally to the service of our Lord Jesus Christ. On the other hand, his conscience reminded him of the guilt of his former life and his unworthiness to serve Christ. Thus, alternately debating these points with himself and fervently praying to God, he spent the night without sleeping.

At last, as a gift of the Father of lights,[51] he thought about the gentleness, patience, and mercy which Christ showed and shows toward all sorts of sinners. And thus at last he understood with certainty that God wanted him, Ramon, to leave the world and dedicate himself totally to the service of Christ.

¶5. He therefore began to turn over in his mind what service would be most pleasing to God, and it seemed to him that no one could offer a better or greater service to Christ than to give up his life and soul for the sake of His love and honor;[52] and to accomplish this by carrying out the task of converting to His worship and service the Saracens who in such numbers surrounded the Christians on all sides.

Coming back to himself, however, he realized that he had none of the knowledge necessary for such an undertaking, since he had scarcely learned more than a bare minimum of grammar.[53] This thought worried him, and he began to feel very sad.

¶6. While turning over these doleful thoughts in his mind, suddenly—he himself did not know how; these are things only God knows—a certain impetuous and all-encompassing notion entered his heart: that later on he would have to write a book, the best in the world, against the errors of unbelievers.[54] Since, however, he could conceive neither the form nor manner of writing such a book, he was most amazed. Nevertheless, the greater and more frequent was his wonder, the more strongly the inspiration or notion of writing the aforementioned book grew in him.

¶7. However, thinking again, he realized that, even though in the course of time God might bestow on him the grace for writing such a book, he could still do little or nothing alone, especially since he was totally ignorant of the Arabic language, which was that of the Saracens.

[51] James 1:17.

[52] This desire for martyrdom is a constantly recurring theme in Llull's early works, and especially in the *Book of Contemplation*; see *OE* II, 1260, n. 41, for a list of passages as well as other references. See also Hillg, p. 33 and n. 165.

[53] I.e., very little Latin. See n. 63 below.

[54] The phrase between dashes is from 2 Cor. 12:2–3. The idea of "a book, the best in the world," seems to have been realized first in the *Book of Contemplation* (text at n. 80 below), and then in the first work or works of the Art (see n. 88 below).

It then occurred to him that he should go to the pope, to kings, and to Christian princes to incite them and get them to institute, in whatever kingdoms and provinces might be appropriate, monasteries in which selected monks and others fit for the task would be brought together to learn the languages of the Saracens and other unbelievers, so that, from among those properly instructed in such a place, one could always find the right people ready to be sent out to preach and demonstrate to the Saracens and other unbelievers the holy truth of the Catholic faith, which is that of Christ.[55]

¶8. Having therefore firmly made up his mind about these three intentions, that is to say: to accept dying for Christ in converting the unbelievers to His service; to write the above-mentioned book, if God granted him the ability to do so; and to procure the establishment of monasteries where various languages could be learned, as is explained above—early the next day he went to a church that was not far from there and, amid tears of devotion, fervently begged our Lord Jesus Christ to deign to bring about in a way pleasing to Him those three things which He himself had mercifully inspired in his heart.

¶9. After that he returned to his own affairs. Since he was still too imbued with his worldly life and licentiousness, he was quite lukewarm and remiss in carrying out the above-mentioned three projects for the next three months, that is, until the feast day of Saint Francis.[56] Then on that feast day, a certain bishop preached in the Franciscan convent, explaining how Saint Francis had abandoned and rejected everything so as to be more firmly united to Christ and to Christ alone, etc.[57] Ramon, incited by the example of Saint Francis, soon sold his possessions, reserving a small portion for the support of his wife and children; and, in order to ask the Lord and His saints for guidance in the three things the Lord had placed in his heart, he set out for the shrines of Saint Mary of Rocamadour, Saint James, and other holy places,[58] intending never to return.

[55] The idea of language monasteries for missionaries was not new—the Dominicans had already established some; see the introduction to the *Gentile* for details. Pring-Mill has suggested ("Grundzüge," p. 242, and *Microcosmos*, pp. 22–23) that this orientation towards proselytism and apologetics might have been influenced by the disputation of Barcelona of this same year of 1263, which achieved considerable fame. For the disputation itself, see the *Gentile*, introduction, n. 8.

[56] 4 October; see n. 50 above.

[57] This scene is depicted in the left half of the second miniature of the *Breviculum*; see Pl. II (as well as Hillg, p. 450).

[58] The first is a well-known shrine in the Dordogne; the second is Santiago de Compostela, in northwest Spain. Between the two it would have been only natural for Llull to have followed the well-known pilgrim's route, in which case the "other holy places" would have been the many shrines and churches on the way. The Catalan translation has Roca-

II

¶10. Having carried out these pilgrimages, he prepared to set out for Paris, for the sake of learning grammar there and acquiring other knowledge required for his tasks. But he was dissuaded from making this trip by the arguments and advice of his relatives and friends and most of all of Brother Ramon of the Dominicans, who had formerly compiled the *Decretals* for Pope Gregory IX,[59] and those counsels made him return to his own city, that is, to Majorca.[60]

¶11. When he arrived there he left the grand style of life[61] which he had previously led and put on a lowly habit of the coarsest cloth he could find.[62] And in that same city he then studied a bit of grammar,[63] and

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tallada (i.e., Montserrat in Catalonia) for Rocamadour; see Batllori in *OE* I, 37, n. 31, and Garcías Palou in *EL* 18 (1974), 196–7, for the possible origin of this confusion. In the *Breviculum* the scenes of Llull at these two shrines appear on fol. 1^{v} (Pl. I) i.e., before the bishop's sermon, on fol. 2^{r} (Pl. II), but perhaps the order was dictated more by considerations of space and aesthetics than chronology (cf. Hillg, p. 449). The text on fol. 1^{r}, however, has things in the right order (see *ROL* VIII, 278, the variants to 91/105).

[59] Saint Ramon de Penyafort (ca. 1185–1275) compiled the *Decretals of Gregory IX* (pope from 1227 to 1241), which were formally promulgated by the Vatican in 1234. He was master general of the Dominican Order from 1238 to 1240. For his involvement in missionary work, see the introduction to the *Gentile*. The reason for the aging Dominican's advice is surely to be found in the fact that by then there was probably a Dominican Studium Arabicum or missionary school that had been functioning in Majorca for more than a decade (see L. Robles, "El 'Studium Arabicum' del capítulo Dominicano de Toledo de 1250," *EL* 24, 1980, 23–47, and Garcías, *Miramar*, pp. 269–80), to which, in view of Llull's expressed vocation, it would only be natural to send him. It is interesting to note that a document of 1250 cited in the above works shows Ramon Martí to have been a pupil there.

[60] Cf. n. 10 above.

[61] Thus, *relictis ritibus sollemnioribus*, in most sources; some sources, however, instead of *ritibus*, have *vestibus*, "clothes."

[62] See Hillg, p. 178, n. 120, for this emphasis characteristic of the Franciscan Spirituals on the habit "de panno vili." It might have been this, in contrast to the former courtier's raiments, that caused the mockery of friends mentioned in the Prologue to the *Gentile*. On the right half of the second miniature of the *Breviculum*, Llull is receiving this habit from the same bishop who preached the sermon (some two years before!); cf. Pl. II and Hillg, p. 450.

[63] I.e., of Latin. A considerable amount of ink has been spilled as to how well Llull ever learned Latin. See Antoni Rubió y Lluch, *Sumari d'unes lliçons en els Estudis Universitaris Catalans* (Barcelona, 1911; previously published in *EUC* 4, 1910, 281–98); Gottron, *Kreuzzug*, pp. 62–3; Ramón d'Alós, "El manuscrito Ottoboniano Lat. 405. Contribución a la bibliografía luliana," *Trabajos de la Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia en Roma* 2 (Madrid, 1914), 101, 114; Salvador Bové, "Ramón Llull y la llengua llatina," *BRABLB* 8 (1915), 65–88; Ca I, 267–8; Llinarès, *Lulle*, pp. 91–2. The consensus is that he learned it well enough to read it, write it, and even lecture in it effectively, although inelegantly and not without grammatical errors (hence the modesty of some of his statements, and his preference for writing in Catalan and having better-trained people translate his work into Latin).

having bought himself a Saracen, he learned the Arabic language from him.[64]

Between that sentence and the next of the "Life" there intervene nine years of study, the crucial formative years about which we know nothing except by inference and deduction. That Llull's training must have been more than purely linguistic, as the autobiography implies, is clear; that he was more than the somewhat innocent self-taught mystic and literary figure earlier scholars tried to present is also clear.

The list of works and authors that Llull mentions in the earlier stages of his production, although brief, is not uninteresting. There is the Bible, the Koran, and the Talmud, as well as Plato and Aristotle.[65] Of Aristotle's works he cites in the *Doctrina pueril*[66] no less than ten: the *Metaphysics, Physics, De coelo,*[67] *De generation et corruptione, Meteorologica, De anima, De somno et vigilia, De sensu et sensato, Historia animalium,*[68] and the spurious *De plantis.*[69] In another early work there is a possible citation of Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of Saint Victor. He also seems to have been familiar with the Latin tradition of logic as represented by the *Summulae logicales* of Peter of Spain.[70]

[64] Most scholars assume that, after Llull heard the bishop's sermon in the autumn of 1263, he must have spent about 2 years, or at least 1½, in the settling of his affairs, the long pilgrimage, the stay in Barcelona, the buying of the slave, and the establishment of a new life of study. Llull would therefore have begun his studies in 1265, which accords with what he later states as the time spent working to carry out his missions: 30 years in the Prologue to the *Tree of Science* and in sts. 3 and 14 of the *Desconhort*, both written in 1295; 45 years in the *Phantasticus*, written in 1311 (see text at n. 182 below; this would give 1266, but 45 was undoubtedly a round number). Cf. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 14–15.

[65] For this and the following lists, see Ca I, 268–9.

[66] Ch. 77, where, for the benefit of his son, he gives a brief characterization of each work.

[67] Also mentioned in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 331,30.

[68] Possibly the same work mentioned in the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. VI, ch. 19; cf. n. 9 there.

[69] See David Ross, *Aristotle* (London, repr. of 1977), p. 12 for the curious history of this work.

[70] The citation of Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of Saint Victor appears in an added paragraph found in the margin of one of the Catalan MSS of the *Libre de demostracions* (see *ORL* XV, 18, n. 5, and Pla II, 152*, n. 75, for discussions about the authenticity of this addition) and from there found its way into the Latin translation of the Mainz edition (*MOG* II, 183 = Int. v, 7). The other authors listed in Ca I, 269 are all cited in works dating from 1298 or 1308 (cf. Hillgarth in *EL* 7, 1963, 8), and therefore possibly constitute a later "crash course" to do battle with the Parisian schoolmen. For Peter of Spain, see the Lohr thesis cited in n. 78 below, pp. 20–6, 36–7.

Scholars have suggested that it was in the Cistercian monastery of La Real near Palma that Llull could have become acquainted with these (and surely other) works, partly because he mentions this monastery twice in the "Life" (see below), and partly because this would explain a slight doctrinal retard on Llull's part, his Augustinianism, a certain anti-Aristotelianism, and perhaps his mystic exaltation.[71] Other scholars have suggested the Cistercian college of Valmagne at Montpellier.

It may also have been in Montpellier at this time that Llull acquired his medical knowledge. From the *Principles of Medicine*[72] we know that he was acquainted with the medical writings of Avicenna, Matthew Platearius, and Constantine the African. The first of these he undoubtedly encountered in the translation already available in European medical circles.[73] Quite another matter is his direct contact with Moslem culture through the slave he purchased.

First of all we know that he learned Arabic well—well enough to be able to dispute with Muslims and well enough to write major works in that language.[74] As to his knowledge of Arabic culture and Islam, he mentions, as we said above, the Koran;[75] we can

[71] Cf. J. Carreras i Artau in *OE* I, 21. Hillgarth disputed this point in two articles, "Una biblioteca cisterciense medieval: La Real (Mallorca)," *AST* 32 (1959), 89–191, and "La biblioteca de La Real: Fuentes posibles de Llull," *EL* 7 (1963), 5–17, to which Carreras replied in *EL* 7 (1963), 99–100. See also Platzeck, "Miscelánea," p. 392. For the general question of Llull's relations with the Cistercians, see the various articles by Gabriel Seguí: "El cenáculo del B. Ramón Llull," *AST* 15 (1942), 75–92; "La influencia cisterciense en el Beato Ramón Llull," *EL* 1 (1957), 351–70, and *EL* 2 (1958), 245–72; and "Relaciones del Císter y de San Bernardo con el Bto. Ramón Llull," *EL* 8 (1964), 171–189; as well as Andreu Caimari's notes to the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 43–5, 46.

[72] See Dist. V, ch. 14, of that work and the notes there. For Llull's relationship with Montpellier, then the seat of the most renowned medical school in Europe, see the introduction to the same work, below.

[73] The same is doubtless true of his contact with, or rather campaign against, Averroes in Paris during the years 1309–11; see §43 of the "Life" below.

[74] Such as the first version of al-Ghazzali's logic, the *Book of Contemplation* (see immediately below for these two works), the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (see §19 of the "Life" below), the *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar saraceni* (see n. 163 below), the *De secretis sacratissimae Trinitatis et Incarnationis* of Sept. 1312, and the *Ars consilii* of July 1315. Other possible late works that might have existed in Arabic versions are the *Libre de consolació d'ermità* of Aug. 1313, the *Liber de accidente et substantia* of Oct. 1313, and the *Liber de Deo et suis propriis qualitatibus infinitis* of July 1315 (cf. S. Garcías Palou, *Ramon Llull y el Islam*, Palma, 1981, pp. 100–106). The usual thesis that the first version of the *Book of the Gentile* was in Arabic should probably be rejected (see the introduction as well as Prologue, n. 4, of that work below).

[75] See, for instance, the *Hundred Names of God* specifically written to outdo the Koran (cf. *ORL* XIX, 79 and 81).

see from Book IV of the *Gentile* that his knowledge of the Muslim religion was reasonably sound; and his *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* was based expressly on Sufi models;[76] but the only Islamic author he mentions specifically, and in whose case we can be sure that his contact came directly from the Arabic, was al-Ghazzali.[77] It was apparently during these years of intellectual apprenticeship that he wrote a compendium (in Arabic; this version is now lost) of al-Ghazzali's logic, which he then translated into Latin (under the title of *Compendium logicae Algazelis*), and finally into Catalan verse (the *Lògica del Gatzel*).[78] Aside from this early venture into the purely logical side of al-Ghazzali's writings, there must have been other connections—one cannot help thinking—with this Islamic thinker whose teachings had played a central part in the spiritual life of the Almohads and whose doctrines were in essential ways close to those of Llull.[79]

It was also, in all probability, towards the end of these nine years of intellectual apprenticeship that he wrote the vast *Book of Contemplation*,[80] also first written in Arabic, which contains the

[76] For Llull and the Sufis, see the introduction to the *Flowers of Love*, in Vol. II below.

[77] For proof that Llull's knowledge of al-Ghazzali came directly from the Arabic text, see pp. 11–20 of the Lohr thesis cited in the following note. Another work Llull cites is an as yet unidentified Arabic *Book of Questions and Queries*, for which see *Gentile*, Prologue, n. 4 below. As for *Kalila and Dimna*, the principal source of the *Book of the Beasts* (see the introduction to *Felix*, in Vol. II below), we do not know whether Llull read it in Arabic or in one of the translations already circulating in the West. For other works undoubtedly read in translation, see n. 73 above. Ever since Charles Lohr's article, "Ramón Llull, Liber Alquindi and Liber Telif," *EL* 12 (1968), 145–60, one must reject supposed references to Ibn Tophail and to the Arabic philosopher al-Kindi in the *Liber de fine*.

[78] See Charles Lohr, "Raimundus Lullus' Compendium Logicae Algazelis: Quellen, Lehre und Stellung in der Geschichte der Logik," doctoral dissertation, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1967, which not only compares these versions with one another and with the original Arabic source, but also contains an edition of Llull's Latin version. It is important not to confuse, as some have, this thesis with Lohr's "Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text," *Traditio* 21 (1965), 223–92, which is a publication of Gundissalinus' translation of the logic from al-Ghazzali's *Maqāṣid*, which had become standard in Western scholastic circles and which has nothing, directly at least, to do with Llull. See also Miguel Cruz Hernández, *El pensamiento de Ramon Llull* (Madrid, 1977), pp. 65ff., for some interesting suggestions.

[79] See Charles Lohr in *EL* 17 (1973), 113–23; and Hillg, pp. 19–20.

[80] See "Llull's Thought," text at n. 14 below for this pre-art stage of Llull's production. For a discussion of the reasons for placing these two works here, see my "Cronologia," and especially n. 48; for a dissenting opinion, see Lohr's thesis, pp. 34–7. Note that in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 129,14, Llull refers to himself as being "about forty years old" (cf. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 13, n. 1), which would place it in 1272–3.

germs of most of Llull's later thought, and which surely constituted his first attempt at writing the "best book in the world."[81]

Nine years later it happened that, while Ramon was away, his Saracen slave blasphemed the name of Christ. Upon returning and finding out about it from those who had heard the blasphemy, Ramon, impelled by a great zeal for the Faith, hit the Saracen on the mouth, on the forehead, and on the face. As a result the Saracen became extremely embittered, and he began plotting the death of his master.

¶12. He secretly got hold of a sword, and one day, when he saw his master sitting alone, he suddenly rushed at him, striking him with the sword and shouting with a terrible roar: "You're dead!" But even though Ramon was able, as it pleased God, to deflect his attacker's sword arm a bit, the blow nonetheless wounded him seriously, although not fatally, in the stomach. By means of his strength, however, he managed to overcome the Saracen, knock him down, and forcibly take the sword away from him.

When the servants[82] came running to the scene, Ramon kept them from killing him, but allowed them to tie him up and put him in jail until he, Ramon, decided what would be the best thing to do. For it seemed harsh to kill the person by whose teaching he now knew the language he had so wanted to learn, that is, Arabic; on the other hand, he was afraid to set him free or to keep him longer, knowing that from then on he would not cease plotting his death.

¶13. Perplexed as to what to do, he went up to a certain abbey near there.[83] where for three days he prayed fervently to God about this matter. When the three days were over, astonished that the same perplexity still remained in his heart and that God, or so it seemed to him, had in no way listened to his prayers, he returned home full of sorrow.

[81] Cf. nn. 54 and 88. Hillg, p. 30, refers to it as "the greatest work he wrote and one of the most extraordinary books of the Middle Ages." Batllori, *Món*, p. 12, calls it the *summa* of medieval mysticism, comparable to Aquinas' theological *Summa* and to Penyafort's *summa* of Canon Law. One can also follow a development of Llull himself through the vast extension of this work (some million words), from the more direct, personal style of the first books, to the algebraic notation of the later books, a clear prefiguration of the Art. For an extended analysis, see Ca 1, 548–76, as well as Peers, pp. 43–81.

[82] The Latin word *familia* can mean either "family" or "servants, household." Since, however, one presumes from §9 above that he was at this point living apart from his family, and since the Catalan version translates the word as *companya de casa*, I have preferred "servants."

[83] The Catalan translation, perhaps following a local tradition, specifies that it was the abbey of La Real.

When on the way back he made a slight detour to the prison to visit his captive, he found that he had hanged himself with the rope with which he had been bound. Ramon therefore joyfully gave thanks to God not only for keeping his hands innocent of the death of this Saracen, but also for freeing him from that terrible perplexity concerning which he had just recently so anxiously asked Him for guidance.[84]

Illumination; Beginnings of the Art

III

¶14. After this, Ramon went up a certain mountain not far from his home, in order to contemplate God in greater tranquillity.[85] When he had been there scarcely a full week, it happened that one day while he was gazing intently heavenward the Lord suddenly illuminated his mind, giving him the form and method for writing the aforementioned book against the errors of the unbelievers.[86]

Giving thanks to the Almighty, he came down from the mountain and returned at once to the above-mentioned abbey,[87] where he began to plan and write the book in question, calling it at first the *Ars major*, and later on the *Ars generalis*.[88] Within the framework of this Art he then

[84] This story is beautifully represented in three separate scenes in the third miniature of the *Breviculum* (Pl. III; cf. Hillg. pp. 450–1). See also the reference to this incident in *Felix*, Bk. VII, ch. 39.

[85] The Catalan text, again more precise on local tradition, specifies that this was Mount Randa, a solitary hill rising 1,800 feet above the plain some 15 miles east of Palma. The "home" from which it was "not far" might have been a property called Punxuat, only 2½ miles from the foot of Randa; see Garcías Palou in *EL* 18 (1974), 89–96.

[86] The scene is depicted in the upper left-hand corner of the fourth miniature of the *Breviculum* (see Pl. IV and Hillg. p. 451). The "form and method," as is clear not only from the phrase itself, but also from the work written as a result of its discovery (see the next paragraph), can refer only to the structure of the Art (for which see the next chapter, on "Lull's Thought"). This is of capital importance. The theological, philosophical, and natural conceptual framework was already present in the *Book of Contemplation*; the problem was how to give it all *form* and make it *demonstrable* to Muslims and Jews. Llull's conviction that the Art was given to him by God is clear not only from other passages of the "Life" (§16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24), but also from many passages in the works (see Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 61–2, 68). It was this experience, of course, that earned him the title of *Doctor Illuminatus*. The usual date given for this event is 1274, calculated as the end of the 9 years of study begun in 1265 (see n. 64 above). This would mean that Llull was about 42 when he *began* the principal part of his life's work.

[87] The Catalan translation (as well as some of the Latin sources of the "Life") again specifies that it was the abbey of La Real.

[88] *Ars major* is the subtitle of the first work of the Art, the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* or *Brief Art of Finding Truth*. *Ars generalis* is a generic name Llull used from 1294 on in referring to works of the Art, or to the Art itself, even though no individual work bore that title until the *Ars generalis ultima* of 1305–8 (see my "Notes," *EL* 24, 1980, 85). As for this being the new edition, as it were, of "the best book in the world," see n. 54 above.

wrote many books (as we will see below)[89] in which at great length he explained general principles by applying them to more specific things, in accordance with the capacities of simple people, as experience had already taught him.

When he had finished the book written in the aforementioned abbey, he again went up the same mountain. And on the very spot where he had stood when God had shown him the method of the Art he had a hermitage built,[90] where he stayed for over four months without interruption, praying to God night and day that by His mercy He might bring prosperity to him and to the Art He had given him for the sake of His honor and the benefit of His church.

¶15. While he was staying in this hermitage, there came to him a handsome young shepherd of cheerful countenance, who in one hour told him as many good things of God and of heavenly matters, especially of angels, and other things, as another ordinary person—or so it seemed to him—would have taken at least two entire days to recount.

Seeing Ramon's books, the shepherd got down on his knees, kissed them fervently, and watered them with his tears. And he said to Ramon that those books would bring many benefits to the Church of Christ. The shepherd also blessed Ramon with many blessings of a prophetic nature; and, making the sign of the cross over his head and over his whole body, he left.

When he thought about all this, however, Ramon was astonished, for he had never seen this shepherd before, nor had he heard mention of him.[91]

¶16. Later on, upon hearing that Ramon had written several good books, the king of Majorca sent for him and had him come to Montpellier,

[89] A reference to the list of works attached as an appendix to the "Life" in the *Electorium*; cf. n. 175 below. For the specific works referred to—that is, those written within this cycle of the Art—see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 45, as well as the introduction to the *Principles of Medicine*, text at nn. 19–24.

[90] The Oratory of Cura, cared for by Franciscan friars, now occupies the spot on Mount Randa where Llull is thought to have built his hermitage.

[91] This second illumination—or second stage of the previous illumination—with the appearance of the angellike (or Christlike, according to Hillgarth) shepherd, is depicted in the central part of the fourth miniature of the *Breviculum* (see Pl. IV and Hillg, p. 451). As Hillgarth points out, however, the speeches, and especially the speech put in the shepherd's mouth concerning the correlatives (cf. the front and back covers of Gayà's *Correlativos*), are quite anachronistic. Antonio Oliver, *EL* 10 (1966), 50–1 (cf. above, n. 47, and Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 24, n. 14), points out interesting similarities between this apparition of a handsome young man after a period of prayer with the similar illumination of Joachim da Fiore. Trías Mercant, in "La ideología luliana de Miramar," *Actas* I, 25 = *EL* 22 (1978), 25, on the other hand, suggests a parallel between aspects of this scene and Islamic prophetic tradition (perhaps stemming from Sūra 18 of the Koran).

where he was staying at the time. When Ramon arrived there, the king had his books examined by a certain Franciscan friar,[92] and especially certain meditations he had composed as devotional material for every day of the year, with thirty individual paragraphs assigned to each day.[93] These meditations the friar admiringly found to be full of prophecy and Catholic devotion.

In that same city Ramon then wrote a book based on the Art he had been given on the mountain, and this book he called the *Ars demonstrativa*, and he read it there publicly. He also wrote a *Lectura* on this same work, in which he explained how primary form and primary matter constitue the elemental chaos, and how the five universals, as well as the ten predicaments, descend from this chaos and are contained in it in accordance with Catholic and theological truth.[94]

¶17. At that same time Ramon also obtained an agreement from the above-mentioned king of Majorca that a monastery be built in his kingdom, that it be endowed with sufficient property, and that thirteen Franciscan friars be sent there to learn Arabic for the purpose of converting unbelievers, as was stated above. To them and to those succeeding them in the same monastery, the sum of five hundred florins was to be provided every year from the aforementioned property for their maintenance.[95]

Once again the "Life" makes a leap in time, this one of eleven years.[96] Formerly Lullists filled up this interval with accounts of travels all over central Europe, the Near East, and Africa (as far afield as Ethiopia and the empire of Mali), but nowadays most

[92] Wadding, in the *Annales Minorum*, Vol. 5 (Quaracchi, 1931), p. 182, suggested this might be Bertran Berenguer, "formerly professor of Sacred Theology in Montpellier"; cf. Peers, p. 118, n. 5; *ROL* III, 6; and Garcías, *Miramar*, p. 54, n. 36.

[93] A reference to the *Book of Contemplation* with its 366 chapters (an extra one for leap year), each divided into 30 paragraphs.

[94] The *Ars demonstrativa* is the work translated here. The *Lectura* is a reference to the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, the middle portion of which (printed separately as the *Liber chaos* in *MOG* III) is what is being discussed in the latter part of the paragraph. Since these works, which constitute the beginning of a new cycle (see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 16 below), cannot have been written before 1283, as I hope to have shown in my "Cronologia," pp. 45–7, we can only assume that a confusion has crept into the text concerning different sojourns of Llull in Montpellier (i.e., that of the previous paragraph, which must have taken place around 1274–5, and this one, around 1283–4; cf. text at n. 104 below).

[95] This is a reference to the monastery of Miramar, situated on the magnificent, rugged northwest coast of Majorca. It is presumed that Llull's request to the king took place in 1275 and that the first community of Franciscans began their study of Arabic there towards the beginning of the next year. The foundation was confirmed by a papal bull of 17 October 1276, issued by John XXI (the well-known logician, Peter of Spain). See Garcías, *Miramar*, passim and especially p. 312, for the above sequence of events.

[96] That is (barring the problem of n. 94 above), from 1276 to 1287.

scholars reject these travels or regard them as doubtful at best.[97] For our purposes it is perhaps more important to understand that it is at the end of this period that we see Llull emerging on the international scene, precisely after the scene had undergone some important changes.

The first change was domestic, but not without international repercussions. In 1276, the year of the foundation of the monastery of Miramar, King James I died, bequeathing the central portion of his kingdom—Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia—to his elder son, Peter III (II of Catalonia), and the peripheral areas—the Balearic Islands, Roussillon, and Montpellier—to his second son, James II. This second, heterogeneous, unconnected amalgam of three bits of territory constituted the kingdom of Majorca, which was to live a more or less independent existence until reabsorbed by the Aragonese crown in 1349.[98]

The second change involved the Sicilian Vespers of 1282 and their enormously complicated aftermath. First, and most obviously, the bold seizure of the island by Peter III (called Peter the Great by the Catalans) caused the Angevins of Sicily to be replaced by a separate Catalan dynasty, the only important member of which, for Lullian history, was Frederick III (1296–1337), the nephew of Llull's patron, James II of Majorca (1276–1311).[99] It is important to understand, however, that like Majorca, in spite of Sicily's dynastic ties to Aragon, by Frederick's time it constituted a truly independent kingdom, with no administrative or military control exercised by the parent nation.[100]

Perhaps the greatest consequence of the Sicilian Vespers was to bring down on the relatively small state of Aragon-Catalonia-Valencia the formidable combined hostility of the Angevins of Naples-Provence, of their cousins the kings of France, and of the papacy, from whom the Angevins had held Sicily in fief.[101] In the

[97] Cf. n. 26 above and n. 109 below, as well as Llinarès, *Lulle*, p. 97, n. 106.

[98] See the map and par. 8 of the explanation on the back of the map. I say "more or less" because of the annexation of the Balearics to Aragon during 1285–98, for which see below.

[99] See the genealogy in Table 1. For Llull's connection with Frederick of Sicily, see text at nn. 188–9 below. Some reference works give the Fredericks of Sicily and the Jameses of Majorca one number less (II and I, respectively, in this case), which although perhaps more logical, is not in keeping with the usage of modern Hispanic scholarship.

[100] See Hillgarth, *Problem*, p. 37, and the explanation accompanying the map here.

[101] Hillgarth, *Problem*, is especially good on the relative weakness (especially financial) of the Aragonese crown.

TABLE 1. KINGS OF ARAGON, SICILY, FRANCE, AND NAPLES



NOTE: This table is limited to those important for understanding Llull's life and the relevant politics; it omits the complicated situation of the rule of Sicily in 1291–6. Persons marked with an asterisk were married to offspring of Charles II the Lame (Yolanda to King Robert himself); their spouses' names are omitted because the fact of the interrelation of the two houses is more important than the details (for which see Batllori, *Món*, p. 38). For the variant numbering of Peters and Alfonsos, see "Historical Background and Life," n. 7; for those of James of Majorca and Frederick of Sicily, see ibid., n. 99. "Aragon" before dates of rule means king of Aragon, count of Barcelona and, from 1238 on, king of Valencia.

ensuing struggle, the geographically incoherent little kingdom of Majorca was in a most unpleasant position: if its king, James II, sided with this powerful trio, he risked losing a third of his kingdom—the Balearic Islands; if he sided with the apparent underdog, Aragon, he risked losing two-thirds—Roussillon and Montpellier. *Realpolitik* combined with a mistrust of his ambitious brother, Peter III of Aragon, made him choose the former course. So when the French invaded Catalonia in 1285 and were, to everyone's astonishment, driven out again with great losses, James was promptly stripped of the Balearic Islands.[102] For thirteen years he lived in Perpignan and Montpellier, until, as an indirect result of the Treaty of Anagni of 1295, the Balearics were returned to him in 1298.[103]

This situation had considerable repercussions on the life of Ramon Llull from 1285 onwards. Already in 1283 we find him in Montpellier writing his great novel, *Blaquerna*, and shortly after that, probably also in Montpellier, beginning the second cycle of the Art, comprising the *Ars demonstrativa* and the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*.[104] As a result of his royal patron's loss of Majorca, it is quite likely that between 1283 and 1287, when the "Life" takes up again; Llull did not return to the island. After that, and except for a very brief visit there in 1294, we do not find him visiting Majorca again until 1300. This new situation doubtless also played a role in the abandonment of Miramar.[105] But from the kingdom of Majorca in the larger sense Llull was never far away for long, for he continued using Montpellier as a base during his numerous travels.

It is also indicative that in this changed political situation we now find Llull entering into relations with the kings of France and

[102] Another result was that in 1287 the Catalans, fearing other possible "treasonable" activities in the midst of their Mediterranean sphere of influence, conquered the island of Minorca.

[103] Hillgarth, *Problem*, pp. 30–1. The territory returned included the newly conquered Minorca.

[104] For this stay in Montpellier, see *ROL* III, 8–9. For the date of *Blaquerna*, about which there has been considerable discussion, see my "Cronologia," n. 64. For the spelling *Blaquerna* as opposed to *Blanquerna*, see *Felix*, Bk. I, n. 34 below. For the *Ars demonstrativa*, the *Lectura*, and this cycle of the Art, see n. 94 above and the references there.

[105] Cf. Hillg, p. 48, and Garcías, *Miramar*, pp. 248–68, for evidence that between 1292 and 1295 the monastery of Miramar ceased to exist.

Naples, the allies of his patron and the enemies of the king of Aragon. Indeed, Llull seems to have had no relations with the king of Aragon until, significantly, the year 1299.[106]

With respect to Llull's subsequent travels, two facts are of interest. First, the only non-Mediterranean place to which he ever traveled was Paris. Second, if we draw a wavering line from Paris through Montpellier and Majorca down to Bougie, in North Africa, the only occasions after 1287 when Llull ventured west of this line were a brief visit to Barcelona in 1294, a stay in Perpignan and Barcelona in 1299, and several months in Barcelona in 1305. The Iberian peninsula evidently was to play almost no part in Llull's later life.

International Aspirations and Psychological Crisis

IV

¶18. After this he went to the Papal Court, to see if he could persuade the pope and the cardinals to establish similar monasteries throughout the world for teaching various languages.[107] But when he arrived at the Court, he found that the pope, called Honorius, had recently died.[108] He therefore left Rome and made his way to Paris, there to communicate to the world the Art which God had given him.[109]

¶19. Ramon arrived in Paris in the time of the Chancellor Berthaud, and

[106] Except possibly for a visit on the brief trip of 1294 mentioned above.

[107] "Similar" to Miramar, mentioned in the previous section of the "Life" (§17). Llull's hopes might have been raised by the fact that the pope in question, Honorius IV, had already (January 1286) tried to promote the teaching of oriental languages at the University of Paris; see Longpré, col. 1080, and Peers, p. 200.

[108] Honorius died in April 1287.

[109] In the margin of the *Electorium* is written here: "First journey to Rome; first journey to Paris; first time he lectured"; cf. Hillg, p. 354. If this note is by le Myésier himself, as seems likely, it would constitute strong evidence for discounting early voyages. And le Myésier would have been in a position to know, since it was probably at this time that the two men met (see Hillg, pp. xxiv and 159). The "he lectured" refers to the lectures or public readings mentioned in the following paragraph; it is from this moment on that we find Llull referred to as *magister* (see *OE* I, 41, n. 71). Hillgarth comments (Hillg, p. 150) that "Lull had, it is true, taught publicly at Montpellier some years before, but it is significant that the *Life* regards his first real communication of the Art to the world as taking place at Paris." The third scene of the fourth miniature of the *Breviculum*, with le Myésier depicted as a student, is doubtless meant as an illustration of these lectures (see Pl. IV and Hillg. p. 452).

at the special order of said chancellor he read a *Commentary* on the *Ars generalis* in one of his lecture halls.[110]

Having read this *Commentary* in Paris, and having observed the attitude of the students there,[111] he returned to Montpellier,[112] where he once again wrote and lectured on a book, this one entitled the *Ars inventiva veritatis*.[113] In this book, as well as in all others he wrote from then on, he used only four figures, eliminating—or rather disguising, because of the weakness of human intellect which he had witnessed in Paris—twelve of the sixteen figures that had formerly appeared in his Art.[114]

Having duly accomplished all these things in Montpellier, he set out for Genoa, where, staying but a short time, he translated into Arabic the above-mentioned book, that is, the *Ars inventiva*.[115] With this accomplished, he made his way to the Papal Court, attempting, as on previous occasions, to have monasteries established throughout the world for the teaching of various languages, as was said above.[116]

[110] The same marginal hand in the *Electorium* specifies that the personage in question was Berthaud of St. Denys, who became chancellor in December 1288. The *Commentum artis generalis* mentioned here is undoubtedly the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae* (II. B. 14 in the catalogue here). See my "Notes," *EL* 24 (1980), 77–80, for Llull's itinerary in 1287–9, and n. 29 there for the identification of the *Commentary*. It was undoubtedly during this same stay in Paris that Llull wrote *Felix*, from which (Bk. VIII, ch. 89) we can infer that he also then had his first interview with King Philip IV the Fair (for whom see n. 140 below).

[111] The implication is that these first Parisian lectures of Llull's were by no means a success. The communication gap, already large, was apparently made larger by the language of the correlatives (see n. 128 below); in the very *Commentary* mentioned here he apologizes for using such an "Arabic manner of speaking" (*modus loquendi arabicus*; see *MOG* III, 450 = Int. vi, 160, as well as my "Notes," p. 79). The greatest problem, however, as is clear from the next sentence of the "Life," came from the proliferation of figures and terms of the Art at this stage.

[112] Another marginal note in the *Electorium* adds the date of 1289 next to this return to Montpellier. Llull might merely have gone *through* Montpellier on his way to a general Franciscan chapter in Rieti that summer, and even perhaps visited Rome again (see Pla I, 22–3; *ROL* III, 10–11), then returning to Montpellier to write and lecture.

[113] Written at the beginning of 1290; see my "Nota suplementària a 'Problemes de cronologia lul·liana,'" *EL* 21 (1977), 222 and n. 12. With this work begins the ternary phase of the Art; see p. 57 below and Section III in the catalogue in Vol. II here. The *Art amativa*, finished on 9 August of the same year, was probably also written in Montpellier (see *ORL* XVII, pp. xii and 388, n. 3). He was certainly still there on 26 October, when he was given a letter of recommendation by the general of the Franciscan Order, Raymond Gaufredi, authorizing him to teach the Art in the Franciscan convents of Italy. See Hillg, pp. xxiv, 53 and 54; *OE* I, 41, n. 75; *ROL* III, 11; Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 186; Batllori, *Món*, pp. 23–5.

[114] See the introduction to the *Ars brevis* for more details on these changes.

[115] This means that Llull probably had the forthcoming trip to North Africa already in mind (cf. *OE* I, 41, n. 76).

[116] On this second visit to Rome, where he doubtless arrived towards the beginning of 1291, Llull probably entertained high hopes of obtaining some kind of backing from Nicholas IV, the first Franciscan pope. Presumably influenced by the fall of Acre, the last

But seeing that he could accomplish little of what he wanted there as a result of obstacles put in his way by the Papal Court, and after giving the matter due consideration, he returned to Genoa. His idea was to take passage there for Saracen lands, so as to see whether at least alone he could accomplish something among them by debating with their wise men, using the Art given to him by God to prove to them the Incarnation of the Son of God, as well as the Blessed Trinity of Divine Persons in the highest unity of essence, in which these Saracens do not believe, but rather blindly assert that we Christians worship three Gods.

¶20. Since it soon became known among the Genoese that Ramon had arrived, with the intention of traveling to the land of the Saracens in order to convert them, if he could, to the faith of Christ, the people were most edified by this, hoping that through him God would accomplish some significant good among the said Saracens. For the Genoese had heard that Ramon himself, after his conversion to penitance, had received by divine inspiration on a certain mountain a sacred science for the conversion of unbelievers.

But just when the Lord was thus visiting Ramon with an outburst of joy on the part of the populace, which for him was like a kind of dawn, He suddenly began to try him with a very serious affliction.[117] For when the ship and everything else were ready for sailing, as we mentioned before, with his books and other belongings already on board, there came to him on several occasions a kind of fixed idea that if he traveled to the land of the Saracens they would slaughter him the moment he arrived, or at the very least they would throw him into prison forever.

Therefore Ramon, fearing for his skin, like the apostle Saint Peter during the Passion of the Lord,[118] and forgetting his previously mentioned intention to die for Christ in converting the unbelievers to His worship, remained in Genoa, held back by a kind of paralyzing fear, abandoned to himself, by permission or dispensation of God, perhaps to prevent him from becoming too vain or presumptious.

But after the ship had set sail from Genoa, Ramon, on account of the huge scandal against the faith created in the eyes of the people by his not leaving, suffered such remorse of conscience that he fell into a profound despair, firmly believing that he would be damned by God. This thought brought him such inward pain of heart that outwardly his body became

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Christian stronghold in Palestine, in May 1291, he wrote his first work trying to promote a crusade, the *Libre de passatge*, containing the *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*, preceded by *A Petition to Nicholas IV* (see item III, 10 in the catalogue of works).

[117] Job 7:18. The text of the "Life" is much closer to the Vulgate than to the King James version.

[118] Mat. 26:69–75; Mark 14:66–72; Luke 22:56–62; John 18:17.

wracked with fever and he became gravely ill. And languishing thus in Genoa for a long time, without revealing to anybody the cause of his grief, he was brought almost to nothing.[119]

V

¶21. Finally, when the feast of Pentecost arrived,[120] he had himself carried or led to the church of the Dominicans, and when he heard the friars singing the hymn *Veni Creator*, he said to himself with a sigh, "Ah! Is it possible that this Holy Ghost could save me?" And in this feeble state he was led or carried to the friars' dormitory, where he threw himself down on a bed. While lying there, he looked up at the highest point of the ceiling, and he saw a tiny light, like a pale star, and from the general area of the star he heard a voice which said to him: "In this order you can be saved."

And thus Ramon sent for the friars of the house and asked to be clothed at once in their habit; but the friars put off doing it because the prior was away.

¶22. Upon returning to his own lodgings, Ramon remembered that the Franciscans had accepted the Art which God had given him on the mountain much more willingly than the above-mentioned Dominicans.[121] Whereupon, hoping that said Franciscans would promote the Art more efficaciously for the honor of our Lord Jesus Christ and for the good of the Church, he thought that he would leave the Dominicans and enter the Franciscan order.

While turning these things over in his mind, there appeared next to him, as if hanging on the wall, a band or cord like those that the Franciscans wear around their waists. And when he had been consoled by this vision for scarcely an hour he looked farther off and saw overhead that same light or pale star he had seen earlier while lying in bed at the Dominican convent. And he heard the star say, as if threatening him: "Did I not tell you that you could only be saved in the Dominican Order? Be careful what you do!"

[119] Ps. 72:22, in the Vulgate; numbered 73:22 in the King James version, where "And I was brought to nothing" is, as in the newer Vatican Latin version, rendered as "So foolish was I."

[120] Or Whitsunday, which in 1293 fell on 17 May (see Alexandre Olivar, "Cincogesma-Pentecosta: Una precisió cronològica en la vida de Ramon Llull," *EL* 10, 1966, 103–5, for a setting right of confusion caused by the corresponding term of the Catalan version). Earlier authors, nowadays followed only by Platzeck (Pla I, 24–5 and his "Miscelánea," p. 400), maintained that this took place in 1292 (when Whitsunday fell on 29 May). Both are possible, and to a certain extent dependent on the date of the following Tunisian voyage, for which see n. 132 below. In any case, Llull was around 60 when overtaken by this psychological and spiritual crisis in Genoa.

[121] See, for instance, Gaufredi's letter of recommendation mentioned in n. 113 above.

¶23. Ramon, therefore, considering that on the one hand he would be damned unless he remained with the Dominicans, while on the other hand his Art and books would be lost unless he remained with the Franciscans, chose (which was most admirable of him) his own eternal damnation rather than the loss of the Art which he knew he had received from God for the salvation of the many and especially for the honor of God himself.

And thus, in spite of the disapproval of the aforementioned star, he sent for the Guardian of the Franciscans, whom he asked to give him their habit. The Guardian agreed to give it to him when he was nearer death.[122]

¶24. Therefore, although Ramon had lost hope of God's wanting to save him, he all the same decided to confess superficially and to make out a will, so that neither the friars nor the people would consider him a heretic.

When, however, the priest brought Christ's body before him and, standing in front of him, offered it to him, Ramon felt as if a strange hand were twisting his face from a position looking straight ahead to one looking towards his right shoulder, and it seemed to him that at the same time Christ's body, which the priest was offering him, passed over to the opposite side, that is, toward his left shoulder, and that it said to him: "You will suffer the punishment you deserve if you now receive me." But Ramon, firmly sticking by the decision he had taken, namely that he would rather be eternally damned than have his Art perish because of his bad reputation—that Art revealed to him for the honor of God and the salvation of the many—now felt as if a strange hand took his still turned head and twisted it straight again. In this position, seeing Christ's body still in the priest's hands, he straightway fell off his cot onto the ground and kissed the priest's foot. And in this way he then received Christ's body, so that, beneath such pretended devotion, he would at least save the above-mentioned Art.

What a wondrous temptation, or rather, it would seem, dispensation of divine trial! In olden times, the patriarch Abraham "against hope be-

[122] "Guardian" is the Franciscan title for the superior of the convent. This short paragraph is as near as we shall get to anything factual concerning Llull's de jure joining the Franciscans. In favor of his having become a friar of the Third Order of Saint Francis is the evidence of the artist of the *Breviculum*, a statement to that effect by the inquisitor Eymerich, the fact of his having been buried in the Franciscan Church of Palma as opposed to that of his own parish, and a tradition that goes back at least to the fifteenth century. That he was not yet a member of the order in 1304 is clear from a passage of the *Liber de praedicatione* (*ROL* IV, 360), where he refers to the "followers and brothers" of Saint Francis in a way which makes it clear that he does not number himself among them. For a good summary of the pros, see A. Oliver in *EL* 10 (1966), 55; for the cons, Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 29, n. 28. None of this evidence is very conclusive; the only thing certain is that Llull was very close to the Franciscans in thought and spirit.

lieved in hope";[123] this man, however, obstinately preferring that Art or doctrine, by which many people could be converted to understanding, loving and worshiping God, to his own salvation—like the sun which, though covered by a cloud, nevertheless keeps on burning—despairing of God in a wondrous way beneath a certain darkness of mind, proved that he loved God and his fellow man infinitely more than himself, as can be clearly gathered from the foregoing account.[124]

¶25. While Ramon was still detained by this grave feebleness of body and soul he heard a rumor that there was a galley in port about to leave for Tunis. Upon hearing this, as if awakening from a deep sleep, he had himself and his books carried at once to the ship. But his friends, seeing him at death's door and feeling sorry for him, dragged him off the boat against his will, which made him very unhappy.

First Missions

VI

Nevertheless, not long afterwards,[125] finding out about another ship, of the sort the Genoese commonly call a bark, preparing to go to the above-mentioned Saracen city or kingdom, that is to say, Tunis, he had himself, along with his books and whatever else he needed, carried to this bark, against the will and advice of his friends.

As soon as they had left port and the sailors had the ship under way, Ramon suddenly became joyful in the Lord, and through a merciful illumination of the Holy Ghost, he regained not only the health of his enfeebled body, but also the hope which, beneath his former darkness of mind, he had thought forever lost. And this to such an extent that within a few days, to the amazement of everybody traveling with him

[123] Rom. 4:18.

[124] The extraordinary events of §21–4 were omitted from the early eighteenth-century editions of the "Life" (those by Custurer and Sollier in the works listed below in "Llull's Influence," n. 85), presumably because they were considered embarrassing. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 192–6, found them so astonishing as to make him doubt the authenticity of the "Life." Sugranyes, *Docteur*, pp. 37–38, still doubts the objectivity of the passage, and even Longpré, col. 1081, seems hesitant. Modern scholarship, however, is surely right in finding the description too detailed and unusual to be inauthentic; see Peers, pp. 235–41, and Hillg, p. 97, n. 199. Llull himself referred to the episode some three years later in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 815. For a psychological interpretation, see Joan I. Valentí, "Dues crisis en la vida de Ramon Lull," *LNT* 7 (1934), 341–56, and B. Mestre Mestre, *Patografía de Ramon Llull* (Palma, 1978), pp. 154–62, where Llull's crisis is referred to as a case of "melancolia involutiva."

[125] All the Latin sources except two are missing the negative; but in the circumstances and in view of the "a few days later" of the Catalan version, this is probably the correct reading.

and even of himself, he felt in as good a state of mind and body as ever before in his former life.

¶26. Giving due thanks to God, they soon afterwards entered the port of Tunis, where they disembarked and entered the city.[126]

Ramon, after slowly gathering together, day by day, those most versed in the Mohammedan religion, said to them, among other things, that he knew the foundations of the Christian religion well in all its articles, and that he had come with the idea of converting to their sect if, having heard the foundations of their religion, that is to say, that of Mohammed, and having debated with them over this matter, he found them more valid than those of the Christians. And when men more knowledgeable in the Mohammedan religion started coming to him daily in greater numbers, explaining the foundations of their religion so as to convert him to their sect, he was easily able to answer their arguments, saying:

"It is proper for every wise man to hold to that faith which attributes to the eternal God, in whom all wise men of the world believe, the greatest goodness, wisdom, virtue, truth, glory, perfection, etc.,[127] and all these things in the greatest equality and concordance. And most praiseworthy is that faith in God which places the greatest concordance or agreement between God, who is the highest and first cause, and His effect.

"However, as a result of what you have set before me, I see that all you Saracens who belong to the religion of Mohammed do not understand that in the above and other similar Divine Dignities there are proper, intrinsic, and eternal acts, without which the dignities would be idle, and this from all eternity. The acts of goodness I call bonificative, bonifiable, and bonifying, while those of greatness are magnificative,

[126] For Tunis, see the explanation on the back of the map. It is important for the reader, however, not to imagine Llull's trip there as a stepping *totally* into a foreign world. It was a place familiar to Genoese, Pisan, and Catalan merchants. The Catalans, for instance, had their own *funduq* there, a kind of merchants' inn with warehouse and Christian chapel, and they usually had a consul to sort out their legal and commercial problems. The sultan's militia, moreover, was composed of Catalan mercenaries; the idea being that since they would be less prey to the factional feuds so common in North African politics, they would have greater personal loyalty to the sultan. So Llull undoubtedly had friends and people willing to help him there; he was alone only when he ventured into the dangerous area of preaching directly to the Muslims.

[127] Many sources, including the *Breviculum* and the Catalan MS, have "honor [this only in the Catalan MS], goodness, power, glory, perfection, etc." In either case, the list of Divine Dignities, or attributes of God (for which see "Lull's Thought," text at n. 29 below), is somewhat patchy. The scene of Llull's arrival in Tunis and subsequent discussions with the Muslim doctors is beautifully depicted in the ninth miniature of the *Breviculum*, all the speeches of which are taken directly from this section of the "Life" (see the frontispiece here, as well as Hillg, pp. 22–3 and 459).

magnifiable, and magnifying, and so on for the other aforesaid and similar Divine Dignities.[128]

"But since, as I already see, you attribute those acts only to two Divine Dignities or Reasons,[129] that is, to wisdom and will, it is thus clear that you leave the other above-mentioned dignities, that is, goodness, greatness, etc., in a state of idleness, consequently placing inequality as well as discord between them, which is not right. For by means of the substantial, intrinsic, and eternal acts of the Dignities, Reasons, or Attributes, taken equally and concordantly, as they should be, Christians clearly prove that in one completely simple Divine Essence and Nature there exists a Trinity of Persons, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

¶27. "This I will be able to do with the help of God, using clear arguments based on a certain Art divinely revealed, as it is believed, to a Christian hermit not long ago, if you would care to discuss these things calmly with me for a few days.

"You will also be shown, if it pleases you, in the most rational way, by means of this same Art, how in the Incarnation of the Son of God, through the participation, that is to say, union, of Creator and creature in the single person of Christ, the first and highest cause agrees and accords with its effect in the most rational way; and how this becomes apparent in the greatest and noblest degree in the Passion of Christ the Son of God, which He voluntarily and mercifully deigned to suffer in the humanity He had taken on in order to redeem us sinners from the sin and corruption of our first forebear, and to lead us back to that state of glory and divine fruition on account of which and for the final purpose of which the Blessed Lord created us."[130]

[128] These are the famous Lullian correlatives, which were quite as unusual in the original Latin (or Catalan)—*bonificativum* (*bonificatiu*), *bonificabile* (*bonificable*), and *bonificare* (*bonificar*)—as they are in present-day English; notice (n. 111 above) how in Paris he had felt obliged to apologize for this "Arabic manner of speaking." Notice, too, how they make their appearance in the "Life" precisely when Llull is first arguing with Muslims, and precisely, too (as becomes clear in the following paragraph, and as is often the case with the correlatives), in connection with proving the doctrine of the Trinity. These three correlative terms are best understood when associated with the trio of *potentia* ("power" or "potentiality"), *objectum* ("object"), and *actus*, or as Pring-Mill put it ("Trinitarian," p. 243), with agent, patient, and action. For a complete discussion of this doctrine, see Gayà, *Correlativos*.

[129] For "Divine Reasons" as a synonym for dignities, see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 28 below. For a commentary on the previous and following arguments, see Walter W. Artus, "El dinamismo divino y su obra máxima en el encuentro de Lull y la filosofía musulmana," *Actas* I, 155–97 = *EL* 22 (1978), 155–97.

[130] Llull's speech in the last two sections gives his apologetic method in a nutshell: the dignities and correlatives used to prove the Trinity and the Incarnation, the two Christian dogmas which had proved the greatest stumbling block to Muslim and Jewish understanding of Christianity, and which no previous method had been able or willing to deal with in any reasonably convincing way. See pp. 58ff. below for more details, as well as *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 8.

VII

¶28. When it seemed that Ramon was already enlightening the minds of the unbelievers on these subjects, it happened that a certain man of no little fame among these Saracens, who had understood Ramon's words and intention, begged and entreated the king[131] to order the beheading of this man, who was trying to subvert the Saracens and who with audacity and temerity was attempting to destroy the Mohammedan religion.

A council was convened, and at the instigation of the above-mentioned notable and of several other councilors, the king's will was already inclining towards Ramon's death. One of the councilors, however, a man of prudence and knowledge, tried to prevent such a crime by persuading the king that it would be dishonorable for him to kill such a man, who, even though he was attempting to spread his Christian religion, nevertheless seemed to possess abundant maturity of goodness and prudence; and he added that in the same way a man who dared to enter Christian lands for the sake of imprinting the Saracen religion on their hearts would be considered a good Saracen.

The king, therefore, giving in to these and similar words, desisted from executing Ramon; he did, however, immediately order him to be expelled from the kingdom of Tunis. When he was taken out of prison, however, he suffered many insults, blows, and vexations at the hands of the multitude.

¶29. At last he was taken to a Genoese ship which was about to set sail. And while he was on his way there, the king decreed that he was to be stoned to death if he were again found in the country.

Ramon was immensely unhappy about this, for he had already arranged for the baptism of some men of considerable reputation as well as many others whom he was aspiring to lead to the full light of the orthodox faith before his departure. While this man of God found himself afflicted by the pangs of this dilemma, it happened that the ship to which he had been taken set sail for its own land.

When he saw this, Ramon felt that tribulations were pressing in on him from all sides. For if he left, he saw that the souls which he had already prepared for Christian worship would slide back into the trap of eternal damnation; but if he ventured to stay, he was already familiar with the madness of the Saracens who were quite prepared to kill him.

Nevertheless, all aflame with the love of God, he did not fear to face the dangers of death if only he could obtain some effect of salvation for these souls. And getting off the ship that was leaving, he secretly boarded

[131] Abu-Hafs, the Hafsid sultan of Tunis (1284–95).

another one that was entering the same port, for he hoped to be able to find some way to get on land without the hindrance of their brutality and violence, so that in the above matter he could carry out the good work he had begun.

¶30. While this was the way things stood, it happened that a certain Christian, similar to Ramon in bearing and dress, was walking through the city, and the Saracens seized him, thinking he was Ramon. When they were about to stone him, the man in question cried out: "I am not Ramon!" Looking into the matter, they found out that Ramon was on the ship, and the other man managed to escape from their hands.

Ramon remained there three weeks, but seeing he could do nothing in the service of Christ, he left for Naples,[132] where he stayed, lecturing on his Art, until the election of Pope Celestine V.[133]

VIII

¶31. After this, Ramon went to the Papal Court to obtain from the pope something he had long desired for the sake of the faith of Christ, as was said above, and there he wrote some books.[134]

Some time later, Pope Celestine V was succeeded by Pope Boniface VIII, whom Ramon entreated with all his might to have some useful

[132] Llull must have returned to Europe sometime during the last three months of 1293, since the *Taula general* was begun in mid-September in Tunis and finished in mid-January of 1294 in Naples (see *ORL* XVI, 517). The Latin MSS give the dates as 1292–3 (followed by Pla II, 25*), but, as Galmés (*ORL* XVI, p. xii, n. 2) and Hillgarth (Hillg, p. xxiv, n. 11) point out, the Catalan MSS in this case seem to represent the original version and therefore carry more weight. It should be mentioned that it is at about this time that Llull begins to date his works, usually giving the place in which they were written (see my "Notes," pp. 80–1 for details), thus permitting us to follow his career more closely.

[133] In addition to lecturing prior to Celestine's election (5 July 1294), we know that on 1 February Llull received permission to preach to the Saracen colony established at Lucera (near Foggia) by Emperor Frederick II some years before, and that on 12 May he was granted a safe-conduct to visit the Muslim prisoners in the Castel dell'Ovo in Naples. See Pietro Egidi, *Codice diplomatico dei saraceni di Lucera* (Naples, 1917), pp. 32–3, and Ramon d'Alòs-Moner, "Moviment lul·lià, 1921–1926," *AIEC* 7 (1931), 373–9, both cited in Miguel Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia," *Revista de Filosofía* 2 (1943), 266, n. 46.

[134] The "Life" omits a rapid trip to Barcelona, where we find Llull on 30 July (see Martí de Barcelona in *ML*, p. 166 = *EF* 46, 1934, 326), and to Majorca, where he dedicated the *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* to his son, whom he had not seen in a long time (see my "Notes," pp. 81–2). The phrase "went to the Papal Court" could mean that Llull went to Aquila, where Celestine V was crowned and remained at least until the beginning of October, or it could simply mean that after his trip Llull went back to Naples, where the pope resided from then till December. Of the two works Llull addressed to this pope in order to obtain "something he had long desired," the first was his *Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium*, which is usually called simply the *Petition to Celestine V*; the second was the *Flowers of Love and Flowers of Intelligence*, translated here in Vol. II, the introduction to which the reader may consult for more details about Celestine V and why Llull placed such hopes in him.

things done for the Christian faith.[135] And even though he suffered considerable anguish following the pope from one place to another, not for a single moment did he desist in his attempts, assuming the pope doubtless would deign to listen to him, since he was not petitioning for his own benefit or for some prebend, but rather for the public good of the Catholic faith.

¶32. At last, however, seeing that he could obtain nothing from the pope,[136] Ramon made his way to the city of Genoa, where he wrote some other books.[137]

He then went to see the king of Majorca,[138] and after having had an interview with him, he went on to Paris, where he gave public lectures on his Art and composed many books.[139] Later on he had an interview with the king, entreating him with regard to certain things of great usefulness for the holy church of God.[140]

But seeing that he could obtain little or nothing with respect to such things,[141] he returned to Majorca, where he stayed for a time, trying by means of both disputations and sermons to bring the innumerable Saracens living there to the path of salvation. He also wrote several books there.[142]

[135] On 13 December, Celestine V resigned. Boniface VIII was elected on 24 December in Naples and crowned a month later, on 23 January 1295 in Rome. To him Llull sent another *Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium*, almost identical in content to the previous one, and usually called the *Petition to Boniface VIII* to distinguish it from the first. He also addressed to him the *Apostrophe*.

[136] This lack of success of an Art which for Llull was undeniably God-given was not only puzzling but profoundly discouraging. He gave vent to this discouragement in a moving poem called the *Desconhort*, probably written in September 1295 (see my "Notes," n. 50, for the much-vexed question of the date of this poem), and to a lesser extent in the Prologue to the *Tree of Science*, begun on 29 September (and finished on 1 April 1296). For a discussion of this second "crisis," see Valentí (n. 124 above).

[137] We know nothing about the books he wrote during this stay in Genoa.

[138] This was probably in either Montpellier or Perpignan, since James II had not yet recovered Majorca (see text at n. 103 above).

[139] For the many and important works he wrote during this stay of 1297–9 in Paris, see: Hillg, p. 154; *ROL* v, 118; and the catalogue in Vol. II here, nos. III. 28–40.

[140] This was probably Llull's second interview with Philip IV the Fair (see n. 110 above), the nephew of James II of Majorca, whom Llull had just seen in Montpellier or Perpignan. For Llull's relations with the French king, see Hillg, pp. 49–52.

[141] Bringing a second bout of discouragement, poured out this time in the *Cant de Ramon*, perhaps the most beautiful poem Llull wrote, and certainly one of the gems of medieval Catalan literature.

[142] On his way to Majorca, he stopped in Barcelona, where he wrote the *Dictat de Ramon* (along with a *Commentary* on it) and the *Oracions de Ramon*, dedicated to James II of Aragon (not to be confused with his uncle, James II of Majorca) and his queen, Blanche of Anjou. On 30 October 1299 he obtained permission from the king of Aragon to preach "in the synagogues of the Jews on Saturdays and Sundays, and in the mosques of the Saracens on Fridays and Sundays, throughout our lands and dominions." Cf. A. Rubió y Lluch, *Doc-*

¶33. While Ramon was laboring at these tasks the news happened to be spread abroad that Cassan, the emperor of the Tartars, had attacked the kingdom of Syria and was trying to bring it all beneath his dominion.[143] When he heard this, Ramon, having found a ship about to embark, sailed to Cyprus, where he discovered that this piece of news was completely false.[144]

Seeing himself frustrated in his intent, Ramon tried to find some other way in which he could employ the time granted him by God, not in idleness, but rather in work acceptable to God and beneficial to his fellow man. For he had stored in his vigilant heart that advice of the Apostle who said: "Let us not be weary in well doing: for in due season we shall reap, if we faint not";[145] and of the Prophet who said: "He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him."[146]

¶34. Ramon accordingly went to the king of Cyprus[147] and eagerly entreated him to exhort certain unbelievers and schismatics, namely Jacobites, Nestorians, and Muslims,[148] to come to hear him preach or to dispute with him. At the same time he begged the king of Cyprus to send him, once he had done what he could for the edification of the above-mentioned people, to the sultan, who was Saracen, and to the king of Egypt and Syria, so that he could instruct them in the holy Catholic faith. The king, however, was not interested in any of these things.

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uments per l'història de la cultura catalana mig-eval, Vol. I (Barcelona, 1908), pp. 13–14, as well as Peers, p. 296, n. 3, where much of the document is quoted. Since the king of Majorca was at this point a vassal of the king of Aragon, this permission was doubtless valid in the Balearics, hence the "disputations and sermons" there. Note that Llull's return to Majorca was probably conditioned by the island's finally having been returned—in August 1298—to his friend and patron, James II of Majorca. As for the works he wrote during this stay in Majorca, see the catalogue in Vol. II here, nos. III.43–9.

[143] This was Ghazan, the Mongol khan of Persia, who in December 1299 and January 1300 conquered most of Syria—Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus (see René Grousset, *L'Empire des steppes*, Paris, 1960, pp. 457–8).

[144] What was false was the rumor, apparently circulated throughout Europe, that Ghazan had conquered Jerusalem (see Hillg, p. 74, n. 90). What was not so much false as disappointing, for Llull at least, was that almost immediately after this brilliant campaign, that is, in February 1300, Ghazan was forced to abandon Syria to deal with troubles on his border with Turkestan, thus allowing the Mamelukes to reoccupy the country (see Grousset, n. 143 above).

[145] Gal. 6:9.

[146] Ps. 125 (126):6.

[147] This is Henry II, of the French family of Lusignan, last king of Jerusalem (1286–91) and king of Cyprus (1285–1324) during the island's period of greatest splendor as the chief Latin emporium in the eastern Mediterranean.

[148] This is an interpretive translation: the last two names appear in the original as *Nosculinos* (*Nasculinos, Nestorinos*) and *Momminos* (*Momininos, Moniminos*). The latter is interpreted by Harada in *ROL* VIII, 295, as being a transcription of the Arabic *al-muʾminīn* = "the faithful," and thus referring to Muslims.

Then Ramon, trusting in "he who preaches the word in great virtue,"[149] set to work among them with sermons and disputations, with the sole help of God. But, persisting as he did in preaching and teaching, he fell sick with a serious bodily illness.

Two people waited on him, a clergyman and a servant, who, not setting God before themselves[150] and forgetting their salvation, plotted to strip with their criminal hands this man of God of his belongings. And when he found out that they were poisoning him, he gently dismissed them from his service.[151]

¶35. Upon arriving in Famagusta, he was cheerfully received by the master of the Temple, who was in the city of Limassol, and he stayed in his house until he had recovered his health.[152]

After this, Ramon sailed to Genoa, where he published many books.[153] He then went on to Paris, where he successfully lectured on his Art and wrote several books.[154]

[149] Ps. 67:12 in the Vulgate. The corresponding passage of the King James version (68:11) is somewhat different: "The Lord gave the word: great was the company of those that published it."

[150] Ps. 53:5 (54:3).

[151] It was in September 1301, during this first part of his stay in Cyprus, at the monastery of St. John Chrysostom in Buffavento, near Nicosia, that Llull wrote, in Catalan, the *Rhetorica nova* (see the Platzeck work cited in n. 42 above, p. 170), which he translated into Latin in 1303 in Genoa.

[152] This was the last grand master of the Knights Templars, Jacques de Molay, who was later to be tried along with other leaders of the order and burned at the stake in 1314. The narrative, however, is unclear here. How could Llull, upon arriving in Famagusta on the east side of the island, be received by de Molay, who was in Limassol, some sixty miles away on the south coast? Moreover, it leaves out a trip to the mainland, specifically to Ayas or Lajazzo (Yümurtalik in modern Turkish, the town on the Gulf of Iskenderun, from which Marco Polo left on his famous journey) in Lesser Armenia (Cilicia), where Llull wrote the *Libre què deu hom creure de Déu*. There is even a possibility that while there he managed to make his way down to Jerusalem (cf. Pla I, 18–19, and Hillg, p. xxv). Batllori (*OE* I, 49, n. 126) has tried to explain the confusion of this passage by saying that Llull could have left Cyprus on this journey, and then returned to the port of Famagusta on his way to Limassol. This, however, explains neither the peculiar phraseology of the sentence nor the fact that he wrote the *Liber de natura* in December 1301 in Famagusta, *before* the other work, which he wrote in Ayas in January of 1302.

[153] Suddenly the "Life" becomes very schematic here; the five years between Llull's departure from Cyprus in 1302 and his arrival in Bougie in 1307 are disposed of in fourteen lines. At the beginning of this period we can discount a visit to Majorca on the way to Genoa (the end of the *Thousand Proverbs* on which some scholars have based such a visit—"written and dictated by Master Ramon Llull of Majorca, on his return from overseas"—indicates only his place of origin). A year later we find him in Genoa, finishing the *Logica nova*, in May of 1303. For the next two years we find him alternating between there and Montpellier, spending even more time in the latter town (see *ROL* III, 11–13, and *ROL* V, 119). As to the "many books," this is indeed the case; see nos. III.54–72 in the catalogue in Vol. II here. In addition to the *Logica nova*, the most important of these are the vast *Liber de praedicatione*, the *Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect*, and the *Liber de fine*.

[154] This trip to Paris, which the "Life" presents as being both successful and productive, is otherwise undocumented, nor do we know of any works written there during this period,

Last Missions

IX

In the time of Pope Clement V he left Paris and went to Lyon,[155] where he resided for a while and entreated the pope in favor of something of the greatest benefit for the faith, that is, that the pope himself found monasteries in which suitable devout men would come together to learn the languages of different nations, so that they could preach the Gospel to all the unbelievers in accordance with the Lord's command which says: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature."[156] But this petition was of little interest to the pope and to the cardinals.

¶36. From there, Ramon, after returning to Majorca, sailed to a certain Saracen land called Bougie.[157]

In the main square of the city, Ramon, standing up and shouting in a loud voice, burst out with the following words: "The Christian religion is true, holy, and acceptable to God; the Saracen religion, however, is false and full of error, and this I am prepared to prove."

Upon saying such things and using the Saracen language to exhort to the faith of Christ the multitude of pagans gathered there, many of them rushed at him with impious hands, wanting to stone him to death. While these people were raging at him, the high priest or bishop[158] of the city sent emissaries with orders to bring this man before him.

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or even exactly when this trip took place. If, as stated here, it preceded the visit to the pope at Lyon, the only "hole" in Llull's schedule of these years is between May and December 1304 (see *ROL* III, 13). From then to April 1305 he was in Montpellier (ibid.). From June to September 1305 he was in Barcelona, where he received two grants from James II of Aragon and wrote the *Liber praedicationis contra Judaeos* as well as the *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* (see Hillg, p. 65), and in October he was present at the meeting between that king, James II of Majorca, and Pope Clement V in Montpellier (ibid.). The other possibility is that the "Life" has made another chronological mistake, and that the Paris trip took place between the visit to Lyon and the next stay in Majorca, that is, at some time in 1306, when Llull's life is much less well documented (see Hillg, p. 47, n. 3, as well as the following section of the "Life").

[155] This is the first French pope, Bertrand de Got, who was elected on 5 June 1305 and crowned on 14 November at Lyon, where he resided for three or four months (1 Nov. 1305 to 2 Feb. 1306, according to Riedlinger in *ROL* v, 120; 29 Oct. to 27 Feb., according to Batllori in *OE* I, 50, n. 129).

[156] Mark 16:15. Llull undoubtedly wrote a *Petition to Clement V*, but it has not survived. In November 1305 in Lyon, however, he began the last and greatest synthesis of the Art, the *Ars generalis ultima* (see §41 below).

[157] This trip is usually placed in the spring of 1307. At that time the splinter Hafsid kingdom of Bougie and Constantine (see the map and its accompanying explanation), ruled by Abu-l-Baqa Halid (1302–11), was very much a commercial fief of Majorca.

[158] *Antistes vel episcopus*, the mufti or cadi of the town; cf. Hillg, p. 26. This and the ensuing scenes are depicted in the tenth miniature of the *Breviculum* (see Pl. v and Hillg,

Once Ramon was before him, the bishop said, "What has made you indulge in such folly as to dare to attack the true religion of Mohammed? Don't you know that anyone who dares to do such a thing is liable to be put to death?"

Ramon answered, "The true servant of Christ who has experienced the truth of the Catholic faith should not fear the danger of physical death when he can gain the grace of spiritual life for the souls of unbelievers."

¶37. To which the bishop replied, "If you believe the religion of Christ to be true, and consider that of Mohammed to be false, give me a necessary reason to prove it." For this bishop was well known as a philosopher.

Ramon answered, "Let us both agree on a common point, then I will give you the necessary reason." Since this pleased the bishop, Ramon questioned him, saying, "Is not God perfectly good?" The bishop replied that He was.

Then Ramon, wanting to prove the Trinity, began to argue thus: "Every being which is perfectly good is so perfect in itself that it does not need to do good, nor ask for any, outside itself. You say that God is perfectly good from eternity and for all eternity, therefore He does not need to ask for, nor to do good outside Himself; for if He did, He would then not be perfectly and absolutely good. Now since you deny the most blessed Trinity, let us suppose that it did not exist; in that case God would not have been perfectly good from eternity until He produced, in time, the good of the world. You do believe in the creation of the world, and therefore, when God created the world in time he was more perfect in goodness than before, since goodness is better diffusing itself than remaining idle. This, I claim, is your position.

"Mine, however, is that goodness is diffusive from eternity and for all eternity. And it is of the nature of the good that it be diffusive in and of itself, for God, the good Father, from His own goodness generates the good Son, and from both is breathed forth the good Holy Ghost."[159]

¶38. Astounded by this reasoning, the bishop did not give a single counterargument; rather, he ordered him to be thrown into jail at once. A crowd of Saracens had gathered outside, waiting to kill him, but the bishop issued a decree that in no way should anyone conspire to kill this man, for he himself intended to subject this man to an appropriate death.

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p. 460), much of the text of which is taken from these sections of the "Life." For an analysis of this second trip to North Africa, see Armand Llinarès, "Le séjour de Raymond Lulle à Bougie (1307) et la 'Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar saraceni,'" *EL* 4 (1960), 63–72.

[159] For a commentary on this argument, see Walter W. Artus, (n. 129 above), pp. 176–77.

Upon leaving the bishop's house, and on the way to jail, Ramon was beaten with sticks and with fists, and forcibly dragged along by his beard, which was very long, until he was locked in the latrine of the thieves' jail, where for some time he led a painful existence. Later on, however, they put him in an ordinary cell in the same jail.[160]

¶39. The next day, however, the Mohammedan clergymen gathered before the bishop, asking that he be killed. After having begun the council by discussing the best way to do away with him, they decided to have him appear before them. And if they could establish that he was a man of science, then he would be put to death at once; but if he turned out to be a foolish and stupid man, they would let him off as a fool.

Upon hearing this, one of them who had sailed with Ramon from Genoa to Tunis and who had frequently heard his discourses and arguments[161] said to them, "Beward of having him brought here to the tribunal; he will bring up arguments against our religion that we will find difficult or impossible to answer."

They therefore agreed not to have him appear before them, and shortly thereafter they changed him to a less severe prison. Then the Genoese and Catalans residing there got together and asked that he be put in a more decent place, which was done.

X

¶40. Ramon remained in jail there a half a year. During that time clergymen or emissaries from the bishop would visit him frequently and seek to convert him to the Mohammedan religion, promising him wives, honors, a house, and large amounts of money. Founded as he was, however, on a firm rock,[162] Ramon, the man of God, said, "If you wanted to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and would consider abandoning this mistaken religion of yours, I would offer you the greatest of riches and promise you eternal life."

Since they frequently insisted on these matters, it was agreed that each side would write a book in which each would confirm its religion by the most effective arguments it could find; the religion of the side which made use of the strongest arguments would be considered the truer one.

[160] All this with a man now about seventy-five!

[161] Either the "Life" is wrong in mentioning Genoa and Tunis here, or the Muslim remembered Llull from his previous journey in 1293, fourteen years before. In any case, it gives us an interesting glimpse of Llull not neglecting a single opportunity to preach to Muslims, even buttonholing their doctors of the law on shipboard.

[162] Matt. 7:25; Luke 6:48.

And when Ramon was already working hard on his book,[163] it came to pass that an order was sent from the king of Bougie, who at the time was residing in Constantine, that Ramon was to be expelled from the country immediately.

¶41. So he then boarded a ship anchored in the harbor, and the captain of the ship was given strict orders that this man was not to be allowed back on shore.

On the journey to Genoa, when the ship was near the Port of Pisa, about ten miles offshore, a great storm arose, and the ship suffered the violent blows of the tempest on all sides, until at last it sank. Some were drowned, while others, with the help of God, escaped; among the latter were Ramon and a companion of his, who, even though they lost all their books and clothing, and were almost naked, managed to make it to shore in a rowboat.

Upon arriving in Pisa, some citizens received him with honor. And there this man of God, although old and weak, persisting in his labor for Christ, finished his *Ars generalis ultima*.[164] Of this *Art*, as well as of other books of his, one could say that only those who aspire, not to the glory and empty philosophy of this world, but rather to a firm love and knowledge of God as the ultimate goal and supreme good, are worthy of its immense efficacy and delectable and perfect knowledge.

¶42. Having there finished the above-mentioned *Art* along with many other books,[165] and wanting to incite the Pisan community to the service

[163] The first (Arabic) version of the *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar saraceni*, lost in the shipwreck recounted in the following section, and rewritten (in Latin) in Pisa the following year (see n. 165 below). The Prologue and end of the *Disputatio* confirm some details of the story told here; cf. Llinarès (n. 158 above). For the king mentioned later in the sentence, see n. 157 above.

[164] Begun in Lyon in November 1305 (see n. 156 above) and finished in Pisa in March 1308. In January 1308, also in Pisa, Llull finished its companion work, the *Ars brevis*, translated here. Between the beginning of the larger work and the end of the smaller—that is, for all of 1306–7—we know of only three other works that Llull wrote: the brief *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis*, the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam*, and the first version of the *Disputatio* written in the prison of Bougie—a remarkably fallow period for Llull, in sharp contrast to the renewed frenzy of literary activity that was to begin now (cf. nn. 165, 167 below) and was to last until the end of his life. The *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima* are numbered 142 and 146, respectively, in the Platzeck catalogue, which goes to no. 291; this means that this man of 75 is now numerically midway through the totality of his production. To be sure, none of these remaining works is of the length of some of the earlier works—see n. 2 to "Llull's Thought"—but the fact of the matter is nonetheless astounding.

[165] In the first five months of 1308 in Pisa, he wrote eight works, including the *Ars generalis ultima* and the *Ars brevis* mentioned in the previous note, and the new Latin version of the *Disputatio* mentioned in n. 163 (see nos. III.76–83 in the Catalogue at the end of Vol. II here). It is after this that Llull begins the post-Art phase of his production (see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 18 below).

of Christ, he proposed to their council that it would be good for their city to found an order of Christian religious knights devoted to doing continual battle against the treacherous Saracens for the recovery of the Holy Land.

Acceding to his pleasing eloquence and advice, they wrote letters to the pope and to the cardinals concerning this worthy project.

Having obtained these letters in the city of Pisa, he set out for Genoa, where he obtained similar letters. There many devout matrons and widows flocked about him, while the noblemen of that city promised him 25,000 florins in aid for the Holy Land.[166]

After leaving Genoa he went to call on the pope, who was then residing in Avignon.[167] Seeing, however, that he could obtain nothing of what he intended there, he went on to Paris, where he gave public lectures on his *Art* and on many other works that he had written earlier.[168] A great crowd of masters as well as students came to these lectures. To them he not only expounded a doctrine reinforced by philosophical arguments, but also professed a wisdom wonderfully confirmed by the high principles of the Christian faith.[169]

[166] See Hillg, p. 100, for interesting comments on this aspect of Llull's activity.

[167] This is a tremendous simplification of Llull's travels and labors from mid 1308 to mid 1309. In May 1308 we find him back in Montpellier, where he finished the *Ars Dei*. During the summer he possibly met Clement V, as well as Philip IV, in Poitiers, to both of whom he says he "offered" the *Ars Dei*—see Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 269; Salvador Galmés, *Dinamisme de Ramon Lull* (Mallorca, 1935), p. 48; Peers, p. 337 & n. 4; Hillg, p. 49, n. 10, and p. 103. On 4 September, a letter from his Genoese merchant friend Christian Spinola to King James II of Aragon tells us that Llull was in Genoa at the time, and that he probably went on from there to confer with Arnold of Vilanova in Marseille (Hillg, pp. 67–68, 102, 103; Pla 1, 33–35). From October 1308 till April 1309, we find him again in Montpellier, where he wrote some eighteen works (see nos. IV.1–18 in the catalogue here at the end of Vol. II), including a letter to the king of Aragon and the important *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae* (see Hillg, pp. 69 and 101). It was therefore probably during the summer of 1309 that he had his audience at Avignon with Clement V (who had not taken up residence there till March of that year; see Batllori in *OE* 1, 53, n. 157).

[168] Cf. Hillg, p. 124, especially for an interesting parallel with previous failures at the Papal Court followed by visits to Paris. Llull probably arrived at the French capital in the fall of 1309, because by November of that year we find him finishing the *Ars mystica theologiae et philosophiae* there. He was to stay two years, till September 1311, a period that is extraordinarily well documented—we even know that he lived on the rue de la Bûcherie, on the Left Bank, one street in from the quai opposite the Cathedral of Notre Dame. See *ROL* v, 123–7, and the chronology on pp. 512–14, as well as Riedlinger in *EL* 12 (1968), 89–93, and Hillg, pp. 108–20. We have italicized the word *Art*, because rather than to the Art in general, it here undoubtedly refers specificially to the *Ars generalis ultima* and the *Ars brevis* (for which see the following note).

[169] Three documents bear witness to the success of these lectures. The first is one of 10 February 1310, in which forty masters and bachelors in Arts and Medicine attest that they have heard and approved of Llull's lectures on the *Ars brevis*. The second is a brief letter of commendation from Philip IV, dated 2 August of the same year. The third is a letter of commendation from Francesco Caroccioli, chancellor of the university, written on 9

¶43. He saw, however, that as a result of what had been written by the Commentator on Aristotle, that is, Averroes, many had strayed considerably from the straight path of the truth, especially of the Catholic faith, saying that the Christian faith was impossible with respect to the intellect, although true with respect to belief. Since this was deplored by the community of Christians, Ramon therefore set out to disprove this concept of theirs by demonstrative and scientific means, managing to refute them in many ways. For if the Catholic faith is unprovable by the intellect, then it is impossible for it to be true. And on this subject he wrote several books.[170]

XI

¶44. After this, knowing that the holy father, Pope Clement V, was to celebrate a General Council in the city of Vienne during the calends of October of the year 1311, he decided to go to this Council to see if he could obtain three things for the restauration of the orthodox faith.[171]

The first was the establishment of an adequate place where men of devotion and vigorous intellect could be brought together to study different kinds of languages so as to know how to preach the doctrine of the Gospel to every creature.[172]

The second was that of all the Christian military religious orders a single order be made, one that would maintain continual warfare overseas against the Saracens until the Holy Land had been reconquered.[173]

September 1311, only a few days before Llull's departure from Paris. The three documents are reproduced in H. Denifle and A. Châtelain, *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis* II (Paris, 1891), no. 679 on pp. 140–1, no. 684 on p. 144, and no. 691 on pp. 148–9; in *MOG* I, 109–11; and in Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 276–7, 282, and 291. Cf. Hillg, 118–19 and 155, as well as *ROL* V, 132, 138–41, and 150.

[170] He wrote thirty-five works during these two years in Paris (see the list in *ROL* V, 152–3), all of which, except for six that are lost, have now been published in *ROL* V–VIII. Many of them are devoted to refuting Averroist doctrines. The modern bibliography on this anti-Averroist campaign of Llull's begins with Ernest Renan, *Averroès et l'averroïsme* (Paris, 1852); the latest, most comprehensive, and best discussion of the subject is contained in Riedlinger's extensive introduction to *ROL* V (brought up to date in the Preface to *ROL* VI). For a briefer and earlier résumé, see F. van Steenberghen, "La signification de l'oeuvre anti-averroïste de Raymond Lull," *EL* 4 (1960), 113–28. See also his review of *ROL* V in *EL* 13 (1969), 91–103.

[171] For the Council of Vienne, see text at nn. 181 & 183 below.

[172] Cf. Mark 16:15. This along with the following two requests also appear in three works Llull wrote at about this time. First, they appear in the *Liber natalis pueri parvuli Christi Jesu*, written in January 1311 and dedicated to the king (cf. below and *ROL* VII, 69–70); then they appear in the *Petitio in concilio generali*, included in the *Liber de ente quod simpliciter est per se et propter se existens et agens* as Dist. VI (cf. *ROL* VIII, 239ff., Ordinationes 1, 2, and 6) and written at about the same time the "Life" was dictated (September 1311); lastly, they appear in the opening chapter of the *Phantasticus* (for which see text at n. 182 below), written shortly after the dictation of the "Life."

[173] This is similar to the request at the beginning of §42. The idea of the fusion of the military orders is one that Llull had been proposing for almost thirty years (see Hillg, pp. 71–2; *Blaquerna*, Bk. IV, ch. 80, as well as the note in Vol. IV, 59 of the *ENC* edition).

PLATE V. Llull's trip to Bougie (1307), where he is stoned and imprisoned. From *Breviculum*, fol. 10[r].

PLATE VI. Llull and le Mýesier discussing the latter's compilations. From *Breviculum*, fol. 11^{v}.

The third was that the pope rapidly prescribe a remedy against the opinions of Averroes, who in many ways had proven to be a perverter of the truth, so that through the intervention of intelligent Catholics, who were not concerned for their own glory but rather the honor of Christ, an opposition be made to said opinions and to those holding them, which opinions seemed to block the way to the truth and to uncreated wisdom, that is, to the Son of God the Father.

On this subject Ramon wrote a little book called the *Liber natalis*,[174] promising, moreover, that he had cogent philosophical as well as theological arguments against them, which arguments he discussed with the greatest clarity in other books of his.

This servant of God, true interpreter of the supreme truth and of the great profundity of the Trinity, wrote amidst his daily labors more than a hundred and twenty-three books.[175]

¶45. By now forty years had elapsed since he had first directed all his heart, all his soul, all his strength, and all his mind toward God.[176] In this period of time he had written books continually and with great diligence, whenever he had free time to do so.

He could justly have uttered the words of the prophet David, "My heart hath uttered a good word: I speak my works to the king. My tongue is the pen of a scrivener that writeth swiftly."[177] Truly his tongue was the pen of that uncreated scribe, that is the Holy Ghost, who gives "the word to them that preach good tidings with great power,"[178] of which the Savior spoke to the Apostles, saying, "For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you."[179]

Wanting his books to be of general usefulness to everyone, he wrote many in the Arabic language, since that was a tongue he had learned.

His books were distributed throughout the world; but he had them collected principally in three places, namely, the Carthusian monastery

[174] Cf. n. 172 above.

[175] In the *Electorium* the "Life" is followed by a catalogue of 124 works of Llull (cf. Hillg, 335–47, and *ROL* VIII, 304–9). The difference of one comes from two works listed under one heading; cf. *ROL* VIII, 303, n. to lines 726/727.

[176] Cf. Matt. 22:37; Mark 12:30. The "forty years" is a bit mysterious, especially in view of the forty-five years of labor mentioned in the *Phantasticus*, written within the next month or so (see n. 64 above and text at n. 182 below). It could make sense only if interpreted to mean the beginning of his literary production, which must indeed have taken place around 1271 (cf. n. 80 above).

[177] Thus in the Vulgate (Douay version), Ps. 44:2; the King James version (Ps. 45:1) has, "My heart is inditing a good matter: I speak of the things which I have made touching the king: my tongue is the pen of a ready writer."

[178] Thus in the Vulgate (Douay version), Ps. 67:12; the King James version (Ps. 68:11) has, "The Lord gave the word: great was the company of those that published it."

[179] Matt. 10:20 (substantially the same in both versions).

in Paris, the house of a certain nobleman of the city of Genoa, and that of a certain nobleman of the city of Majorca.[180]

The Last Five Years

Llull must have left Paris soon after dictating this "Life," probably in the month of September 1311. A bit later we find him writing the *Phantasticus*, or, to give its full title, the *Disputatio Petri clerici et Raymundi phantastici*, which is the account of a dialogue with a priest he supposedly met on his way to the Council of Vienne.[181] Llull accused the priest of being worldly and cynical, while the priest accused Llull of being hopelessly impractical and idealistic—in short, a *phantasticus*. Llull replied:

> I was married and with children, reasonably well-off, licentious and worldly. All of this I willingly left in order to honor God, procure the public good, and exalt the Holy Faith. I learned Arabic; several times I ventured forth to preach to the Saracens; and for the sake of the Faith I was arrested, imprisoned, and beaten. For forty-five years I have labored to move the Church and Christian princes to act for the public good. Now I am old and poor, yet my purpose is still the same, and the same it will remain, if it so please God, until I die.[182]

The Council of Vienne lasted from 16 October 1311, to 6 May 1312. There Llull obtained a partial but genuine success. Of the three purposes expressed in the "Life," the first, for the establishment of schools of oriental languages, was fulfilled by Canon 11 of the Council, which ordained the teaching of Hebrew, Arabic, and "Chaldean" at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Salamanca, and the Papal Court to students who were then to become missionaries.[183] The second purpose was partially fulfilled, for although a new order was not founded, the goods of the Templars, the brutal

[180] These are, respectively, the Chartreuse of Vauvert, for which see text corresponding to n. 39 above; Perceval Spinola, of the same Genoese merchant family as the Christian Spinola mentioned in n. 167 above; and Llull's son-in-law, Pere de Sentmenat, for whom see n. 186 below. Also Hillg, p. 142 for more details.

[181] A city on the Rhone, just south of Lyon.

[182] P. 312 of the Müller edition. Cf. Peers, p. 357, and Hillg, p. 57.

[183] See Hillg, p. 128, and principally Berthold Altaner, "Raymundus Lullus und der Sprachenkanon (can. 11) des Konzils von Vienne," *Historisches Jarhbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft* 53 (Münster, 1933), 190–219, as well as Ernesto Bellone, "Cultura e studi nei progetti di reforma presentati al concilio di Vienne (1311–1312)," *Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum* 9 (1977), 67–97.

dissolution of whose order had begun some five years before, were now transferred to the Hospitalers—a solution apparently acceptable both to Llull and to the king of France.[184] Only his petition against the Averroists went unheeded.

In May we find Llull in Montpellier, where he wrote *De locutione angelorum*, in which he confirms that he had personally presented these petitions to the pope and cardinals at Vienne, and that two of them had been conceded.[185]

Probably in June Llull went on to his native Majorca, where he was to stay almost a year, until May 1313. It must have been a very different Majorca for him, for his old friend and patron James II had died in 1311, and had been succeeded by his son King Sancho (1311–24). Llull did, however, write seventeen short works there, and drew up his will.[186]

In May 1313, at the age of 81, Llull set out on a new venture. First he went to Messina, one of the favorite residences of Frederick III of Sicily.[187] Llull had placed considerable hopes in this king. As early as 1296 he had sent him three works via his friend Perceval Spinola,[188] and from May to September of the previous year of 1312 he had dedicated five works to him.[189] Llull had thus been preparing the way for his encounter with this monarch, who had befriended Arnold of Vilanova and the Franciscan Spirituals even after the latter had been officially proscribed by the Council of Vienne. It is probable that Llull also learned of Frederick's plans for reform, which included the linguistic preparation of missionaries to Islam.

Llull stayed a year in Messina, where he wrote thirty-seven short works. He seems, however, to have had little success in obtaining help from the king for his forthcoming mission to Tunis, which

[184] See Hillg, p. 127.
[185] Ibid.
[186] IV.54–70 in our catalogue; most of these works are still unpublished. The will (IV.71), drawn up on 26 April 1313, was published by F. de Bofarull y Sans, "El testamento de R. Lúll y la escuela luliana en Barcelona," *MRABLB* 5 (1896), 453–7. In this will Llull again mentions the three places he wants books of his to be collected, and it is here that we find out the name of his son-in-law (see n. 180 above).
[187] Cf. Hillg, p. 129. See the genealogy in Table 1 for Frederick's relationship to the kings of Aragon and Majorca.
[188] Cf. *ROL* I, 11.
[189] Nos. IV.53–7 in our catalogue in Vol. II. Cf. Pla II, 67*–68*, nn. 192–5, Hillg, p. 109, n. 258, and *ROL* I, 12.

must originally have been one of his principal reasons for coming to Sicily.[190]

Help did arrive from another quarter, however, but as part of a political imbroglio in which Llull became at least marginally involved. In 1311 the throne of Tunis had been usurped by the courtier Abu Yahya Ibn al-Lihyani after years of scheming. But his success was only partial, and a younger member of the displaced Hafsid dynasty was able to set himself up in Bougie, with the clear aim of reuniting all of Ifriqiyah again—a wish he was to fulfil in 1318. In the meantime, al-Lihyani's position was not at all secure, and he found himself having to rely more and more on the Catalans, with whom he had had relations going back many years and who had indeed helped him to power. To ensure their continued interest in his cause, he had let it be known he might be interested in converting to Christianity. The kings of Sicily and Aragon had taken the bait, and for several years now there had been secret negotiations going on between the three.[191]

That Llull was unaware of these negotiations, on a subject so dear to him, seems unlikely. What his specific role was, however, when he set out for Tunis in the autumn of 1314,[192] is unknown. It is significant that at the beginning of November, the king of

[190] See Hillg, pp. 132–3, and *ROL* I, 13.

[191] See Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, pp. 488–90, for this background.

[192] Some scholars (Peers, p. 368; Stöhr in *ROL* I, 14, with the map facing p. 18; Pla I, 39) have Llull take a roundabout route: Messina–Majorca (in May), Majorca–Bougie (August), and Bougie–Tunis (September). This route is based on a supposed letter from Llull to some magistrates of Palma which makes Llull set out from Majorca to Bougie on 14 August (text in *ROL* II, 205–8; cf. Pla II, 81★). This letter, however, was first produced in 1612 to help in the process of canonization, in order to show some sort of historical evidence for Llull's going to Bougie, where the legend of his martyrdom had him stoned to death (cf. pp. 539ff. of the Custurer, *Disertaciones*, mentioned in n. 85 to "Lullism," below), and *not* to have Bougie as a mere stopping-off place on a roundabout route from Messina to Tunis (cf. Batllori, *Món*, p. 61). Galmés, *Dinamisme de Ramon Lull* (Mallorca, 1935), p. 53, n. 3, found this document suspect on both lexical and orthographic grounds; Hillgarth (Hillg, p. 145, n. 40) refers to it as "an obvious forgery." I agree; there does however, remain the not necessarily related but nonetheless curious fact that we have no works of certain date between the *Liber de civitate mundi*, dated Messina, May 1314, and the *Ars consilii*, dated Tunis, July 1315: a year and two months in which all we have is a (lost) letter to James II of Aragon, to which the three letters commented upon in the following paragraph were an answer, and which was written from Tunis sometime before the beginning of November 1314. For the remaining works that *could* have been written during this period, see nos. IV.L7–15 in the catalogue of works in Vol. II here, and the corresponding note.

Aragon wrote three letters: one to Ibn al-Lihyani recommending Ramon Llull, one to the sultan's interpreter, Joan Gil, also recommending Llull; and one to Llull himself, informing him that he had written the other two.[193]

As a result of the sultan's peculiar game, it must have been an unusual atmosphere Llull found himself breathing in Tunis: one where the hostility of his former North African visits was replaced by a certain perhaps uneasy receptiveness to Christianity, while the Catalans were present in greater numbers than ever, not only in the Sultan's militia and the usual merchant colony, but also as chaplains, envoys, interpreters, and so on.[194] Llull must have been able even to dispute with Muslims and preach to them in comparative peace. He had time there not only to write some twenty-five smaller works, but also a larger *Ars consilii* apparently intended for the sultan.[195] We also know that during the summer of 1315 Llull wrote to James II of Aragon to have him send a former pupil, a certain Fray Simó de Puigcerdà, to translate some of his works, and especially the *Ars consilii*, from Catalan into Latin.[196] If Fray Simó arrived at all, it could not have been before late November 1315.[197]

This would scarcely have been in time to be of much help, for Llull's last works were written in December 1315 in Tunis, at which point he disappears from history.[198] Most scholars agree that he must have died sometime between then and March 1316,[199] aged eighty-three or eighty-four, either in Tunis, on the ship sail-

[193] Edited in *ROL* II, 399–401, which see for earlier editions.

[194] Dufourcq, *Maghrib*, p. 491. Dufourcq cites the anecdote of a Tunisian ascetic who one day shouted at the sultan, "O *faqih* Abu Yahya, what you are doing is unlawful. Allah has forbidden anyone to ask for the help of a polytheist." Dufourcq suggests this might be a reference to Llull and the advice offered to the Sultan in the *Ars consilii*, of which more in a moment.

[195] See nos. IV.109–15 and IV.L6–20 in the catalogue of works in Vol. II here.

[196] We have four letters written between 5 August and 29 October from the king to various Franciscan officials trying to have the man sent to Tunis (edited in *ROL* II, 402–5, and *EL* 3, 1959, 71–2), a request which seems to have met with considerable bureaucratic red tape.

[197] Cf. Hillg, p. 133, n. 367.

[198] Cf. Hillg, p. 134. The works are the *Liber de maiori fine intellectus, amoris et honoris* and the *Liber de Deo et de mundo*, both dedicated to the sultan. See *ROL* I, 17.

[199] Peers, p. 374; *ROL* I, 18; Llinarès, *Lulle*, p. 127; Pla I, 40; Hillg, p. 134, n. 369. J. Tarré in "El darrer quinquenni de la vida de Ramon Lull (1311–1315)," *SMR* 14 (1955), 38–9, makes a case for 16 March 1316.

ing back, or, as seems likely from one piece of testimony, in Majorca.[200] The only thing certain is that Llull was buried in the church of San Francisco in Palma, at first in the sacristy, then beneath the pulpit, and at last, in 1448, in the beautifully sculptured tomb in a chapel to the left of the choir, where his body still lies.[201]

[200] The testimony is that of a fifteenth-century *MS* which claims to have gotten it from "a very old book"; cf. Tarré (n. 199 above).

[201] Lorenzo Pérez, "La muerte y el martirio de Ramón Llull," *Revista Balear* 5 (1969), 23. As Pérez has shown in the rest of this excellent article, it was at about the time this final tomb was constructed, i.e., in the middle of the fifteenth century, that there grew up the legend of Llull having been martyred in Bougie. As pointed out in Batllori, *Món*, pp. 61–2, and in his article "Certeses i dubtes en la biografia de Ramon Llull," *EL* 4 (1960), 320, as well as in Hillg, p. 134, n. 369, it began as a transposition of many of the details of Llull's previous two trips to North Africa, and principally that of 1307 to Bougie. It was accepted by Renaissance biographers, and it picked up what seemed like a piece of irrefutable evidence when, at the opening of the tomb and the examination of the relics in 1611, the skull was found to have wounds in it. But, as Lorenzo Pérez points out, upon the reopening of the tomb in 1915, it was found that the skull had "two parallel fissures of 15 and 10 mm, respectively, in length and 1 mm in depth, apparently made by a cutting instrument a long time after death, as is shown by the clean white color of the incisions, contrasting with the yellowish color of the rest of the skull." Pérez suggests these cuts could have been inflicted on the skull during the fire in the sacristy where the body was buried for a while, or perhaps even by the fanatical piety of later devotees. I give these details, because like many legends, that of Llull's martyrdom dies hard, and, based on the inspection of 1611 and apparently in ignorance of that of 1915, it still finds tentative acceptance in such recent writings as Pla I, 40; Platzeck, "Miscelánea," p. 390; and *ROL* I, 17–18.

Llull's Thought

FOR THE PAST hundred years Ramon Llull has been known primarily as a man of action, a mystic, and a literary figure—as the founder of Catalan prose and one of Catalonia's greatest medieval writers. This picture is not wrong; it is incomplete. To try to understand the whole Llull is a difficult and somewhat complicated task,[1] one that presents two initial hurdles.

The first is what might be termed the man's multiplicity. Llull is the author of a vast number of works—263 according to the Catalogue of Works in Vol II here—on countless subjects and in numerous literary forms.[2] The second is the very originality of his Art, which is at the center of this multiplicity and around which all the rest of his thought is organized. Not only is the Art visually peculiar, with its letters, charts, and movable wheels, but its functioning is at the root of an original method, and this very originality has caused Llull to use traditional terminology in a new way. There has been the natural tendency to want to fit his work into

[1] The first modern work to treat Llull's thought seriously was Keicher, *Stellung*. Probst, *Caractère*, which followed in its footsteps, has worn remarkably well and is still very helpful. Longpré, cols. 1112–34, precise and penetrating, remains fundamental. The móst complete and balanced analysis of Llull's thought is probably that in Ca I, 335–640, which was also the first text to try to come to grips with the Art. Frances Yates in her "Art" was the first to put Llull's scientific writings in proper perspective with respect to the Art, and to bring out the basic role of "elementary exemplarism." The school of "English Lullists," as some have called it, was continued by two scholars. The first was R.D.F. Pring-Mill (see his works in the List of Abbreviations, plus his articles on Llull in the 1967 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and in the 1973 edition of the *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*) who furthered our understanding of the structure and functioning of the Art, and of the role of Llull's analogical methods. The second was J. N. Hillgarth (see again the List of Abbreviations), who attacked the problem of the historical role of Llull's thought with notable success. Two recent monographs I have found helpful are Gayà, *Correlativos*, which studies the development of a fundamental mechanism of the Lullian system, and Johnston, *Semblance*, which studies the doctrines of *semblança* and *significació* in the light of medieval and modern semiotic theory. Pla I, although very complete and carefully researched, is not as helpful nor as sure an interpretive guide as it might be (see n. 3 below).

[2] 237 works preserved, plus 26 lost works. The catalogue in Pla II has 292 works, of which 256 are preserved. The figures of the Freiburg editors of the Latin works are 280 works, of which 240 are preserved (see *ROL* I, p. ix). The difference stems from questions of authenticity, of grouping of works, etc. The length of these works varies from short pamphlets, to medium-sized works, to seven works of around 150,000 words (the *Libre de demostracions, Liber de quattuordecim articulis fidei, Compendium Artis demonstrativae, Blaquerna, Felix*, the *Art amativa*, and the *Ars generalis ultima*), three works of around 250,000 words (the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, and the *Liber de praedicatione*), one work of slightly over 400,000 words (the *Tree of Science*), and one of almost a million words (the *Book of Contemplation*).

some preexisting category, and indeed the path of Lullism is strewn with the wreckage of such attempts.[3] It is the great merit of the brothers Carreras y Artau that they were the first to see the Art clearly as something sui generis.[4]

Aside from the sheer number of works, the product only of Llull's feverish energy, both of these problems have rational explanations within the context of Llull's aims. First we must understand that Llull was primarily and perhaps uniquely interested in *persuasion*, and this at all intellectual and social levels of society.[5] This interest accounts for the variety of forms he used, ranging from purely scholastic treatises addressed to the Parisian arts faculty to doggerel for the easier memorization of the rules of the Art; from the complicated treatises on the Art to charming dialogues like the *Gentile*, where the mechanism of the Art is disguised beneath the device of the "flowers" of a tree to make it more palatable to less sophisticated audiences; from long didactic novels like *Blaquerna* and *Felix* to collections of short mystical aphorisms, proverbs, questions and answers, and sermons.[6]

Llull's shrewd estimation of the audience for which a work was intended also led him, like any good polemicist, to modify the tone he used in accordance with circumstances. Not only does he vary his style, say, from the endless chain of allegorical stories of *Felix* to the more insistently demonstrative arguments of the *Gentile* and the semi-algebraic shorthand of the *Ars demonstrativa*; he sometimes even shifts his political or social point of view for the sake of persuasion. One often feels that the oscillations between pacifism and bellicosity present in his crusading plans are determined to a certain extent by the temper of a particular moment or by the mood of a particular royal or papal court. One also feels that the tolerance or intolerance he shows—toward Jews, for instance—was very much conditioned by the audience he was writ-

[3] Platzeck's studies, for instance, suffer from trying to see that every Lullian tree is of the same species as that of some predecessor or contemporary, and not always seeing that the Lullian forest is something quite new and different.

[4] Ca 1, 345. See also Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 20.

[5] To call him a popular philosopher, as have Longpré, col. 1112, and Ca 1, 339, is accurate in only a limited sense. Llull would very much have liked to persuade both the Islamic and Christian intelligentia, nor does one imagine the *Ars demonstrativa* or the *Ars generalis ultima* as works written for popular consumption.

[6] Cf. Ca 1, 282, 468, for this multiplicity of forms.

ing for: what would have been normal in the pluralistic society of Majorca (the *Gentile*) becomes unthinkable in the intolerant surroundings of the French court (*Felix*).[7] Llull sought to persuade in order to save souls; consistency of personal social convictions was for him less important.

Closely related to this question of audience was another factor making for multiplicity: that of language. When writing for Muslims, Llull wrote in Arabic.[8] When writing for Christian lay audiences, he used his native Catalan, which, as I have pointed out, was at that time a lingua franca in much of the western Mediterranean.[9] For a clerical audience he would of course either write directly in Latin or have a Catalan original translated into that language.[10] He also had some works translated into French, Provençal, or Italian.[11] As a result of these translations, and as a result of the fact that many of the works were intended for more than one of the aforementioned audiences, a number of works are extant in more than one language, sometimes even in fairly different versions.

Another aspect of Llull's multiplicity, and that which perhaps has caused most confusion, is the wide variety of subjects and fields of knowledge he wrote about. Here we must keep in mind that when Llull wrote on philosophy, it was not as a philosopher, and when he wrote on science, it was not as a scientist. He was less interested in those subjects for themselves than as tools to further his main purpose, the conversion of unbelievers by means of a method based on the general principles that govern the natural order of the universe.[12] For the sake of explaining this natural order as he understood it, he was forced to make incursions into all the sciences of his day; at the same time, since the principles he pro-

[7] One has only to compare the empathy felt for the Jew in Book IV of the *Gentile* with the traditional but all the same shocking antisemitism of *Felix*, Bk. I, ch. 11.

[8] Cf. "Life," n. 74, above.

[9] Cf. "Life," text at n. 16, above. One should add that, in spite of these divisions of audience, Llull was still the first European to write philosophy and theology in the vernacular (see Longpré, col. 1112, and Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 16).

[10] See "Life," n. 63 above for Llull's knowledge of Latin.

[11] See "Translations, Manuscripts, and Editions," in the introductions to the *Gentile*, and *Felix*, below, for a sampling of this situation.

[12] As Pring-Mill put it ("Trinitarian," p. 230), "Being a philosopher and a theologian was purely incidental to this purpose. He was not interested in shaping doctrine or in devising a new philosophical system. What he wanted to do was to create a thoroughly practical art of finding truth as the basis of practical arts of conversion and salvation."

pounded were general, it was instructive to show how they applied to the particular sciences. Thus those particular sciences supplied him with both buttresses and display windows for his main system. This is why he wrote treatises on theology, philosophy, logic, and jurisprudence; scientific works (on medicine, astronomy, and geometry); mystical works and pedagogical works; works one could classify as sociological (such as his manual for knighthood),[13] polemical (such as his anti-Averroist tracts of 1309–11), or political (on crusades, missions, social reforms, etc.); and works on such specialized fields as the arts of rhetoric and of memory. Even the few more personal works he wrote are still concerned with this principal, and one could even say only, mission of his life.

A last aspect of Llull's multiplicity is what, for reasons that will become clear in a moment, one is tempted to call diachronic, that is, of his continuous evolution. If the theme which he spent his life developing with such an enormous number of variations never varied, the method of presentation did. And since Llull's originality lies precisely in this method, it is of first importance to realize how it developed.

To present this development in very schematic form, mentioning only the works translated here and a few crucial others, one can divide Llull's production as follows:

1. Pre-Art phase, ca. 1272–4, occupying the latter part of the nine years of study, but prior to the vision on Randa and the systematization of the Art. This period includes the various versions of al-Ghazzali's logic, as well as the *Book of Contemplation*.[14]

2. Quaternary phase, ca. 1274–89, from the vision on Randa to the unhappy first teaching experience at Paris. In this period the principles of the Art usually appear in groups of sixteen (hence the name). Algebraic notation is extensively employed and the four elements are used as a basis for analogical reasoning.

This phase may be subdivided into two cycles, which differ in structural details, but are mainly characterized by the grouping of a series of satellite works around a central work of the Art.

[13] The *Book of the Order of Chivalry*.
[14] See "Life," text at n. 80, above.

a. Cycle of the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, ca. 1274–83, which includes the *Book of the Gentile* and *Principles of Medicine.*[15]

b. Cycle of the *Ars demonstrativa*, ca. 1283–9, which includes *Felix.*[16]

3. Ternary phase, 1290–1308. The principles of the Art appear in groups of nine. As a result of the "weakness of human intellect," the number of figures is reduced and the algebraic notation vanishes from the actual discourse of the Art. The elements, too, lose their prime role as an analogical model. Rather than being divisible into cycles, this period shows a more or less continuous line of development from the *Ars inventiva veritatis* of 1290 to the *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima* of 1305–8, and includes the *Flowers of Love.*[17]

4. Post-Art phase, 1308–15. Interest in the mechanization of thought is largely abandoned for concentration on specific logical and philosophical problems. This period includes the Parisian anti-Averroist campaign of 1309–11, at the end of which Llull dictates his "Life."[18]

[15] As well as the other Books of the *Principles of Theology, Philosophy*, and *Law* (cf. the introduction to the *Principles of Medicine*, pp. 1113–14), in addition to *Blaquerna* (with the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*) and the *Doctrina pueril* (see section II.A in the catalogue at the end of Vol. II).

[16] For the list of satellite works directly dependent on the *Ars demonstrativa*, see section II.B of the Catalogue in Vol. II. For details of the differences between these two cycles, as well as the conjectural dates at which they began and ended, see my "Cronologia," *EL* 21(1977), 39ff.

[17] It also includes the *Tree of Science* and the *Proverbs of Ramon* so often cited in the notes to this translation (see section III of the catalogue for other works). For a discussion of the more important changes between the quaternary and ternary phases, see the introduction to the *Ars brevis*, as well as n. 29 below. The importance of this change has been recognized since Llull's time; see the phrase quoted from the "Life," §19, as well as the eleventh miniature of the *Breviculum* (Pl. VI here; see also Hillg, pp. 179–80. In our times it has been admirably discussed by Pring-Mill in his *Número*.

[18] This represents a double modification of the scheme presented in my "Nota suplementària a 'Problemes de cronologia lul·liana,'" *EL* 21 (1977), 221–4. First, as a result of translating and annotating the *Ars brevis*, I have become convinced that the breaking up of the ternary phase into cycles, although not necessarily incorrect, is neither particularly significant nor helpful (see what I say in the introduction to the *Ars brevis* text at nn. 16–20, about the development of the ternerary phase being more or less continuous; at most one could speak of two periods of intense Artistic *activity* within that phase—cf. my "Notes," p. 86). Second, as a result of conversations with Charles Lohr, of rereading Gayà's *Correlativos*, pp. 175ff., and of becoming more familiar with the newly published works in *ROL* V–VIII, I have become convinced that this post-Art phase does indeed represent a new orientation in Llull's thought. There might be some overlapping, such as logical preoccupations beginning with the *Logica nova* of 1303, but from 1308 on we find an increasing tendency to focus on logical problems (syllogisms, new kinds of fallacies, proofs by the superlative degree, etc.), as well as on problems of philosophy and epistemology (cf. the

We have spoken of the originality of the Art. This too has a rational explanation within the context of Llull's missionary aims. Since his purpose was to convert Muslims and Jews, he realized not only that any appeal to authorities was useless,[19] but also that he would have to try to offer some sort of proof for the Christian mysteries such as the Trinity and Incarnation.[20] The former problem had also been recognized by his Dominican predecessors (Penyafort, Aquinas, and Martí), but Llull felt strongly that their lack of success was due to their unwillingness to face up to the latter problem.[21] The attempt to prove the Christian mysteries by any usual means, however, involved the danger of rationalism. Llull was only too aware of this danger,[22] but he sidestepped it, avoiding any confrontation between faith and reason, by basing his arguments on a faith acceptable to all three religions—as well as on other considerations of a nature general enough to be equally acceptable to all three.[23]

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replacement of the seventh dignity, *sapientia*, by *intellectus*, which is directly connected with the importance of a works such as *De modo naturali intelligendi*). Aside from these changes in method and approach, the break between the third and fourth phases coincides with a four-month fallow period (June–September, 1308), after which Llull was never to return to Italy (if we discount Sicily, which was then a separate kingdom). Circumstantial evidence can also be found in the fact that the first eighteen works of the new phase appear in a block in Vatican Ms. Ottob. Lat. 832, in almost perfect order and with only a few omissions (see n. 94 to the Catalogue here in Vol. II). Also in the first *Electorium* catalogue (see Hillg, pp. 335–47) there seems to be a clear break around the mysterious no. 90: after that (nos. 91–124) all the works belong to the fourth phase, and before that all except three works (nos. 37, 64, 78) belong to earlier phases (see the remarks in Hillg, p. 346).

[19] Because they just led to arguments over interpretation; see Llull's discussion of the matter in the text corresponding to *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 22, as well as Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, p. 23.

[20] See the "Life," §§26–7, and n. 130, as well as *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 8.

[21] See *Felix*, Bk. I, ch. 7 and n. 36, where he tells the probably true story (repeated in *six* other places in his works; cf. *Gentile*, introduction, n. 12—the problem was clearly not unimportant to Llull) of the missionary (identifiable as Ramon Martí) bringing on himself the ire of the sultan of Tunis by dissuading him of the truth of Islam, but then being unable to persuade him of—or rather prove to him—the truth of Christianity. For the specific setting of this story, as well as Llull's relations to Penyafort, Aquinas and Martí in general, see the introduction to the *Gentile*.

[22] He discussed the problem of faith vs. reason in many works. An entire distinction (Dist. 36, chs. 238–54) of the *Book of Contemplation* is devoted to the subject, and later on he wrote two works, the *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* and the *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto*, specifically on this topic. See also the texts corresponding to *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 14, and *Felix*, Bk. I, nn. 18 and 27, of this anthology. The two most general and complete discussions of the subject are in Longpré, cols. 1122–6, and Ca I, 514–23. As might be expected, this theme loomed large in the later history of Lullism; see Alois Madre, *Die theologische Polemik gegen Raimundus Lullus* (Münster, 1973), pp. 89–99.

[23] In this he was helped not only by the common Semitic origin of the three religions, but also by their having undergone the same Greek (i.e., Aristotelian and Neoplatonic)

The latter considerations were principally psychological (the three powers of the soul),[24] ethical (virtues and vices),[25] and scientific (the four elements and the medieval medical theory based on them),[26] in addition to many lesser bits and pieces of the Aristotelian world view common to the classical and medieval worlds.

Much more important and characteristic were the generally acceptable premises permitting Llull to base his arguments on a common faith. A particularly clear and explicit formulation of these premises is found in the *Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita*.[27] Llull begins with a series of propositions about God: God exists, He is one, He is the first cause of all things, etc. He then turns to the divine attributes commonly accepted in all three religions (though in different forms at different times; often in connection with the Neoplatonic axiom *Bonum est diffusivum sui*). Llull calls these attributes properties, virtues, reasons (*rationes*), or, most often, dignities.[28] In the *Declaratio* he enunciates five propositions about them:

1. God has His own substantial Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, and Glory.[29]

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influences during the Middle Ages. This is the common ground of faith that occupies Bk. I of the *Gentile*.

[24] That is, memory, intellect, and will, the *acts* of which form Figure S; see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 53–5 and n. 46 there for details and references.

[25] See the *Gentile*, Tree 4 (as well as 2 and 5), and *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, Figure V.

[26] See the *Ars demonstrativa*, pp. 331–3, 338–54 and 439–44, as well as the *Principles of Medicine*.

[27] In Keicher, *Stellung*, p. 98.

[28] In addition to the usual meaning of the word, *dignitas* was also the common scholastic translation of the Greek *axioma*, and it may well be that Llull chose the word because of this double meaning. See Hélène Merle, "*Dignitas*: signification philosophique et théologique de ce terme chez Lulle et ses predecesseurs médiévaux," *EL* 21 (1977), 173–93; as well as Blaise, *Lexicon*, s.v. *dignitas*.

[29] This is the nine-version of the dignities found in the last or ternary phase of the Art; cf. the Alphabet in Part I of the *Ars brevis*. They form Figure A of the Art, under which, in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, the reader will find the sixteen-version characteristic of the quaternary phase of the Art (see Pla I, 107 for the various lists). For a long time there was considerable polemic as to whether these dignities were of Christian, Muslim, or Jewish origin. Nowadays, with less passion and more common sense (see, for instance, Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory*, London, 1966; Penguin ed. 1978, pp. 178–9) it can be seen that they correspond to a concept of the Names of God common to all three religions, stemming ultimately from the Old Testament and reinforced by early Neoplatonism. In Christianity they represent a tradition going back through Scotus Erigena to Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine—see Frances Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 23 (1960), 1–44. In Islam they correspond to the *hadras*, and in Judaism to the *sefirot*—see Miguel Cruz Hernández, *El pensamiento de Ramon Llull* (Madrid, 1977), pp. 74–8. This does not mean, of course, that they have the same function in Llull as they have in Islam or Judaism.

2. These attributes or dignities are concordant with one another, without any contrariety. This plus their substantiality in God make them convertible one with another, and thus they entail no plurality in the Divine Being.[30]

3. These dignities are real. (Probst speaks of the archetypal, Platonic nature of Llull's universe and stresses his extreme realism, citing a passage where Llull uses the dignities to show that the universals really exist outside the soul.)[31]

4. Because they are real, the dignities are at the greatest distance from nonbeing. (This proposition provides the foundation for the ontological character of Llull's logic, which we will discuss in a moment.)

5. Each of the dignities has its effect in the world in accordance with the individual creature's capacity to receive the likeness of the first cause, and the degree of this capacity depends on the creature's concordance with the dignities.[32] (This is the fundamental notion of the dynamic *activity* of the dignities, which is crucial to Llull's system and which, halfway through the cycle of the *Ars demonstrativa*, gave rise to the doctrine of the threefold correlatives of action.)[33]

Creation is thus conceived as a similitude or likeness of the divine perfections. The dignities are the exemplars according to which the divine activity brought the universe into being. Or as Nicholas of Cusa put it, "The first foundation of the Art is that everything God created and made, He created and made in the

[30] For the convertibility of the dignities, see the references in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 6.

[31] Probst, *Caractère*, p. 83, citing the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 113 = Int. iii, 97, where Llull shows that the five predicables (genus, species, difference, property, and accident) and the ten predicaments (substance, quantity, quality, etc.) are real. The later *Liber de quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis* is entirely devoted to proving the same thesis.

[32] "The semblances of God are impressed upon each creature in accordance with its possibility of reception," *Compendium Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 366 = Int. vi, 76, cited in Rossi, "Legacy," p. 187. It is important to realize, however, that each dignity does not act individually on its counterpart; they all act together (cf. the convertibility commented on in n. 30 above) through the first cause, and in relation to the created world through the matter-form-connection trilogy that makes up the chaos or *hyle* of the trunk of the *Tree of Science* (cf. *OE* 1, 562, as well as the diagrammatic analyses of the *Liber correlativorum innatorum* in Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 194ff.).

Schematically it is a question of



as opposed to



[33] For the correlatives, see "Life," n. 128 above.

likeness of His dignities."[34] This was quite in line with the archetypal orientation of medieval thought, which tended to see the world as a theophany or manifestation of God,[35] and which we find reflected in the frequent metaphor of the world as a book in which one can learn about God, or a mirror in which one can see His image. For Llull the problem was accordingly reduced to one of finding the "significations which creatures give of the Beloved."[36]

Or to put it another way, given Llull's realism and the exemplarist structure of his universe, the problem was one of adapting his arguments to this structure, to make the *modus intelligendi* conform as closely as possible to the *modus essendi*,[37] so as to make evident ("to manifest," "to reveal" are, with Llull, usual synonyms of "to demonstrate")[38] any particular truth. As Frances Yates has put it, Llull's was an "Art of thinking which was infallible in all spheres because based on the actual structure of reality, a logic which followed the true patterns of the universe."[39] It was a system based on the notion coming from Saint Augustine and running through Anselm and Bonaventure: *ordo et connexio idearum est ordo et connexio rerum*.[40]

Now on this very broad base, it was Llull's idea to show that the Christian mysteries were part of the very structure of this universe, which would therefore be incomplete or imperfect without them. The arguments he used to "demonstrate" this relationship he called "necessary reasons."[41] Taken by themselves they

[34] Cited in Rossi, "Legacy," p. 188, and Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 155. Cf. Ca I, 481–4.

[35] Cf. Otto von Simson, *The Gothic Cathedral* (Princeton, 1974), pp. 53–4, 141; and Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 43.

[36] The *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, v. 57 (cf. also v. 40), cited in Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, pp. 51–2. See also *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 50.

[37] *Ars inventiva veritatis*, *MOG* v, 38.

[38] See Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 95 and 110, for these synonyms in connection with the more general doctrine of "signification."

[39] Yates, "Art," p. 117, as well as pp. 159 and 165. See also Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 165–6, and the remarkable quotation from the *Proverbs of Ramon* given in the text at n. 79 below.

[40] Probst, *Caractère*, pp. 56 and 66.

[41] The bibliography on this subject is vast; the most important studies that will lead to others are: S. Garcías Palou, "Las 'rationes necessariae', del Bto. Ramón Llull, en los documentos presentados, por él mismo, a la Sede Romana," *EL* 6 (1962), 311–25; L. Eijo Garay, "Las 'razones necesarias' del Beato Ramón Llull, en el marco de su época," *EL* 9 (1965), 23–38; J. J. Gracia, "La doctrina luliana de las razones necesarias en el contexto de algunas de sus doctrinas epistemológicas y sicológicas," *EL* 19 (1975), 25–40; J. Stöhr, "Las 'rationes necessariae' de R. Llull, a la luz de sus últimas obras," *EL* 20 (1976), 5–52. See also Longpré, col. 1125; Ca I, 521–2; and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 117 and 125.

are, as many critics have pointed out, merely arguments of congruence;[42] seen in proper perspective, however, they are the tip of an iceberg, the pinnacle of the vast ontological and analogical structure of the Art. And if we are to understand the Art, we must realize that, as Llull himself was careful to point out, it is neither logic nor metaphysics.[43] The best clue to its nature may be found in the word *art* itself, which was the usual scholastic translation of the Greek τέχνη. It was thus a technique; it was not a body of doctrine, but a system.[44] Or to put it in contemporary terms, it was a structure.[45] The very idea of showing that the system of the universe would be incomplete without the Christian mysteries is what nowadays we would call structuralist. So is the way in which Llull approaches philosophy or theology. He scarcely ever discusses a concept by itself, in the manner of Aristotle, Aquinas, or Scotus, presenting different sides of the question or what predecessors have said about it, and so on. Instead, he either presents it immediately as part of a cluster of concepts, its importance deriving from the place it occupies in a given gamut or from its relation to its limiting concepts; or he presents it in terms of how it functions,[46] very much in the manner of modern mathematicians who never tell you, for instance, what a real number is, but only what it does. Above all, as I have already said, Llull presents us with a totally structured universe, the *modus essendi*, over which he lays another structure, that of the *modus intelligendi* deriving from and intimately related to the first.[47]

[42] Llull himself was aware of this objection: see text at n. 64 below. Pring-Mill in his *Pregó de Setmana Santa* (Felanitx, 1970), p. 7, aptly refers to Llull's "*raons* analògicament *necessàries*."

[43] Or rather it is both at once, as Llull himself points out in the *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 55 = Int. ii, 1; in the *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis*, *MOG* V, 324 = Int. iii, 24; and in the *Ars generalis ultima*, Part X, ch. 14, Art. 87. See Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 185–6, for a discussion of the first and last, and the *Ars brevis*, Part X, n. 48 below, for the last.

[44] Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie au moyen âge* (Paris, 1944), p. 552, defines the word *ars* as referring to "le mode d'exposition et la technique d'une science."

[45] Cf. the suggestions in this direction in Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, pp. 26, 39, 169–72, and in Miguel Cruz Hernández, *El pensamiento de Ramon Llull* (Madrid, 1977), p. 86.

[46] One thinks particularly of Lullian definitions, for which see *Ars brevis*, Part III, n. 1 and the references there, as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 218, where the structural nature of these definitions is discussed.

[47] Cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 23–4. The resulting edifice is of the most astounding complexity and consistency, which can only be fully grasped by reading the *Tree of Science*, or by making a schema of its structure. I know of no other work of the mind that so resembles a Gothic cathedral in its immensity, intricacy of design, and interrelation of parts, to say nothing of its exemplarist, analogical, and archetypal conception (for the role of which in Gothic architecture see Simson [in n. 35 above], pp. 35 and 115).

But these two *modi* do not actually constitute the Art; they are only its substructure. The Art's relation to these *modi* is threefold: (1) it specifies their foundation, (2) it uses them as a basis for a *modus operandi*, by which (3) it "finds" or "demonstrates" the truth—what one might call the *modus probandi*. As Llull phrases it: "The *matter* consists of the figures and terms of the Art itself. The *form* is to be found in the descent from a given universal to particulars, which descent consists in the ordered discourse of the acts of the soul by means of the mixture of the triangles of Figure T in the remaining terms of the figures. Through their ordered mixture the desired result is achieved, which is the necessary affirmation of the truth or negation of falsehood. This is what we declare to be the *purpose* of this Art."[48]

That the terms of the Art are the foundation of the Lullian universe and discourse is abundantly clear. The reader need only turn to the alphabets and descriptions of figures at the beginning of the *Ars demonstrativa* and the *Ars brevis* to be convinced of this fact, as well as of the important differences between how these foundations are formulated in those key works of the two phases of the Art.

As for the alphabet and figures of the Art, a word of caution must be given. The letters do not stand for variables, as in Aristotelian logic or post-Cartesian algebra, and the figures have no symbolic or magical value.[49] The letters function as constants, standing for the above-mentioned basic terms of the Art, and they have three purposes: (1) to provide a kind of notational shorthand, not only avoiding the constant repetition of terms, but also providing the kind of conceptual concision, mechanization, and simplification we have learned to expect of mathematical logic and of

[48] *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, Prologue, *MOG* III, 205–6 = Int. iv, 1–2. He begins by saying that "like other sciences, the Art has a quadruple cause, to wit, its author, form, matter, and purpose. The author could be said to be God, to whose magnificence the Art is dedicated, while its immediate author is of no importance, since he is vile and sinful." The four causes correspond, of course, to the four Aristotelian causes—efficient, formal, material, and final. The phrase "acts of the soul" in the text refers to the components of Figure S; cf. n. 24 above.

[49] Cf. Ca I, 366; this in spite of the idea, however intriguing it may seem, first put forward by Lavinheta in his *Explanatio* of 1523 (see "Lullism," text at n. 46 below; I have used the edition of 1612—see RD 168—p. 41) and reiterated by Platzeck in his "La figura 'A' del Arte luliano y la esfera inteligible de Plotino," *SMR* 9–10 (1953–4), 19–34, as well as in Pla I, 196 and 346, that the circular Figure A symbolizes God like Plotinus' "sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere." An idea more typical of the Renaissance and less typical of Llull would be hard to find.

algebra;[50] (2) to make absolutely clear what the principles *are* on which the Art is built and to keep the structural foundations of the Art ever-present in our minds;[51] (3) to facilitate the combinatory art, the systematic juxtaposition of pairs or triads of concepts from various subsets of the Art.[52] The function of the figures, on the other hand, is (1) visual ("so that the senses can help the imagination, and the imagination the intellect," as Llull puts it);[53] (2) mnemonic ("so that the memory can more easily recall the universal principles" of the Art);[54] and (3) to show how the elements of the Art are grouped and how within each of these subsets they are basically related.[55]

In assessing the importance of the alphabet and figures, we must navigate between the many commentators who seem to think that, having described them, they have described the Art, and others who claim that they are a relatively unimportant accessory aspect of the fundamental and essential working of the Art itself. That the first outlook is incorrect will become evident in a moment. The second would seem to be nearer to the truth, in that one *could* work the Art without them. But here two objections present themselves.

In the first place, without the alphabet and figures, one could work the Art only with great difficulty. There are stretches of the *Ars demonstrativa* where to substitute concepts (especially those of Figure S) for the letters representing them would be the equivalent of returning to pre-Cartesian algebra where, for instance, to express $4x^2 + 3xy - 2y^2$, one had to say "four times the square of a number, plus thrice the product of that number times another,

[50] Cf. the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 335, 30, as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 23. This mechanization corresponds to some extent—an extent it is important not to exaggerate—to Leibniz's famous ideal of, "If controversies were to arise, there would be no more need of disputation between two philosophers than between two accountants. For it would suffice for them to take pen to hand and sit down to their abacuses (with a friend to witness, if they liked), and say to one another, 'Let us calculate!'" Cf. L. Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz* (Paris, 1901; repr. Hildesheim, 1969), p. 98, as well as p. 100, n. 2.

[51] Cf. *Compendium Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 293 = Int. vi, 1, and *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 9.

[52] Cf. *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 9, as well as Artus, *Ars Brevis*, p. 142. This is the side of the Art that most fascinated Renaissance Lullists and Leibniz.

[53] *Compendium Artis demonstrativae* (loc. cit. in n. 51 above). See also the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 331, 2; *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 9; *Ars inventiva veritatis*, *MOG* V, 2; as well as the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist I, ch. 1.

[54] *Compendium Artis demonstrativae*, loc. cit.

[55] *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 9.

less twice the square of the second number." Furthermore, without the alphabet and figures, the overall plan or structure of the Art would be unclear, as would be its combinatory machinery. In this connection it is significant that even when Llull writes more popular versions of the Art (such as the *Gentile* or the *Tree of Science*), he still relies on the visual symbolism of the tree to provide the reader with the necessary orientation.

In the second place—and here we are for a moment looking at Llull through modern eyes—we have to understand the place held by the alphabet and figures in the history of symbolic methods. Like certain logical diagrams (the *pons asinorum*, the logical square, Venn diagrams, flow charts, etc.), Llull's figures afford the basis for calculation in accordance with prescribed rules to ascertain validity or invalidity. So in effect he presents a kind of symbolic computation, one that takes a significant step toward the mechanization of thought (which, of course, makes Llull a forerunner—remote to be sure—of modern computer science and information theory).[56] Realizing this, we can reassess the role of the alphabet and figures in the Art as one of enlarging and facilitating our possibilities of intellection and, by systematizing them, of ensuring a certain methodological correction and completeness.

The *modus operandi* or "form" of the Art, Llull tells us, is a descent from the universal to the particular. This is a point he insists on repeatedly, even naming one work the *Art of Finding Particulars in Universals*.[57] The universals are, of course, the basic terms of the Art, and the descent is effected by finding how a given particular is related to one or more of these universals.[58]

[56] Much of the content of these remarks on the role of the figures and alphabet I owe to private communications from David Rosenblatt. On Llull's role as the first to attempt the mechanization of the process of logical derivation, see N. I. Styazhkin, *History of Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 67.

[57] This is the *Ars inveniendi particularia in universalibus*. He insists on the theme in the *Ars universalis*, *MOG* I, 483 = Int. viii, 1; the *Principles of Philosophy*, *MOG* I, 668 = Int. x, 2; the *Compendium Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 293 = Int. vi, 1; and the *Taula general*, *ORL* XVI, 299.

[58] There is also the important matter of the ascent from particulars to universals (see the sentence following *Ars brevis*, Part 2, n. 5), or, as Llull puts it elsewhere, from effect to cause (see the *Compendium Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 364 = Int. vi, 74, quoted and commented on in Longpré, col. 1118), or using what he calls the "transcendent points" (see *Ars demonstrativa*, Bk. III, n. 11). For the double process of ascent and descent, see Ca I, 464ff., and above all Llull's important *Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect*.

The purpose of the Art is the "finding" or "demonstrating" of the truth. This also is a point which Llull insists on over and over again,[59] and which appears in titles such as the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (the *Brief Art of Finding Truth*), the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (whose English translation would be almost identical), and the *Ars demonstrativa*. This is, of course, in keeping with the dialectical origins and aims of the Art, as well as with Llull's basic plan of approaching his apologetics from the most general possible standpoint. Pring-Mill has suggested that Llull may have adopted this plan partly as a tactic for masking the apologetic function of the Art.[60]

A further point in connection with Llull's method concerns his conception of deduction or "demonstration." To start on the basis of faith was not enough to avoid the charge of rationalism; he also had to adopt a non-Aristotelian method of demonstration consonant with the premises he had chosen. This was what Gilson, in connection with Saint Bonaventure, has called the "logic of analogy."[61] Sometimes it was comparative, sometimes it was, as Frances Yates has said, "a diagram of proportions having analogies with other proportions."[62] This is true especially concerning the operation of the elements when used as "metaphors" for the thing

[59] In addition to the passage quoted in text at n. 48 above, see *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, MOG* I, 433 = Int. vii, 1 ("By means of these five figures a person can find the truth in a short time."), and the *Ars universalis, MOG* I, 483 = Int. viii, 1 ("The final purpose of this Art is to find *Y*," where *Y* = truth), as well as the passages quoted in Ca I, 458, n. 2.

[60] Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," p. 238, For the important concept of "finding," which has reappeared repeatedly in the last two paragraphs, see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Mode 6, and n. 16 there.

[61] Étienne Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 1953), p. 184, cited in Ca I, 347, and Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 16, n. 68. All of ch. VII, *L'analogie universelle*, pp. 165–91, of Gilson's work is important for an understanding of this mode of thought. See also the interesting remarks of I. M. Bocheński in his *History of Formal Logic* (New York, 1970), p. 179, where he points out the relationship between medieval analogical reasoning (specifically in Thomas Aquinas) and the concept of isomorphy in modern algebra, and where he points out the necessarily structural nature of this approach. In private conversations, Jordi Gayà has suggested possible Arabic sources for Llull's analogical logic, which resembles methods used in Islamic law. See the concepts of *ḳiyās*, *dalīl* and *'illa* in the *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, as well as Llull's mention of the Arabic word *rams* in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 352, 7.

[62] Yates, "Art," p. 165. The instrument used to carry out this comparative and analogical logic was Figure T; see the interesting characterizations of it commented on in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 23, and the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, n. 21. Note also its extraordinary importance in the latter work, where it occupies Dists. II–IV.

to be demonstrated.[63] The obvious charge that these were mere proofs of congruence was one Llull was quite aware of; he even wrote a short *Quaestio de congruo* to show that his demonstrations from analogy could be valid as long as they led to conclusions that could not be denied without denying generally accepted principles.[64]

Closely allied with the analogical nature of Llull's reasoning is its ontological character. Taking the idea of evil as a privation, he fits this originally Neoplatonic notion[65] into a scheme of concordance between goodness, truth, affirmation, and being on the one hand, and between evil, falsehood, negation, and nonbeing (or privation) on the other.[66] Since the culmination of the ladder of being is God, it is but a small step to having the first series accord with perfection, "greater nobility," and merit, and the second with imperfection (or defect), "lesser nobility," and blame.[67] These then are used as criteria against which his analogical arguments are measured,[68] thus closing the gap between the *modus*

[63] For Llull's specifically elemental exemplarism, the fundamental text is Yates, "Art," pp. 151–5. See also the important passage commented on in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 39. For a general presentation of this analogical and exemplarist method, which Llull often refers to as "metaphorical," see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, ch. 13, 3, as well as the passage commented on in the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, n. 36, and all of Dist. X. This "metaphorical" method is, of course, at the heart of the "examples" out of which the cloth of the novel *Felix* is woven. For a good analysis of the broad spectrum of literary uses of this exemplarist technique, which even spills over into the proverbs, see Jordi Rubió in *OE* I, 105–7, 109, as well as in *EL* 5 (1961), 142–3.

[64] See Platzeck's analysis following his edition of the work in *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 8 (1957), 13–32. Notice that these analogical methods are largely abandoned in the ternary phase of the Art.

[65] From Plotinus, it passed into Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius, and from there into the later Christian West; see Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (London, 1972), pp. 28 and 52.

[66] See the *Introductory Rules to the Ars demonstrativa, ORL* XVI, 294, and the Latin version in *MOG* IV, 16 = Int. ii, 6, as well as the *Liber de novo modo demonstrandi*, Dist. I (*MOG* IV, 596 = Int. xiv, 2, and *Opera parva* V, Palma, 1746, pp. 41–2). Cf. Probst, *Caractère*, p. 88, and Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 66, n. 32.

[67] See Colomer, *Edad Media*, pp. 66ff., where this line of argument is clearly presented. Notice that the concepts of Being–Nonbeing, Perfection–Imperfection, Merit–Blame, belong to Figure X (see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, as well as the *Gentile*, Bk. I, nn. 2, 7, and 9).

[68] Another related technique is that of demonstration by degrees of comparison, in which Llull establishes an analogy between the positive, comparative, and superlative degrees of adjectives and the sensible, intelligible, and divine worlds on the one hand, and with the three proofs of *quia, propter quid*, and *per aequiparantiam* on the other hand (cf. Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," p. 251; Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 230–1; Hillg, pp. 236–7). Often Llull uses the superlative degree alone (the *via eminentiae*), a technique the reader will find much used in the *Gentile*, and which took on great importance in the post-Art phase (see Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 25, 29, 34, 37–40, 180, 185).

essendi and the *modus intelligendi*, and permitting one author to refer to the Art as a "calculus of being,"[69] and another to describe it as "onto-theo-logical."[70]

The final point to be discussed in relation to the Art is the applications or uses for which it was intended. In Distinction III of the *Ars demonstrativa* this topic is discussed exhaustively, with the presentation of sixteen "modes" or areas in which it can be used; here it is only necessary to point out the five of these applications that were of primary importance to Llull. In the *Compendium artis demonstrativae*,[71] he divides these five into three of a more theological nature and two of a more scientific nature:

1. "To understand and love God." In the *Ars demonstrativa* the sixteen "modes" are *preceded* by the statement that the primary aim of the Art is to know and love God.[72] It is also the principal theme of *Felix*,[73] and in general it is a topic on which Llull never tires of dwelling.[74]

2. "To be attached to virtues and to hate vices." This state is achieved by what Llull calls "accustoming,"[75] and it is the means of arriving at the knowledge and love of God. It is a process which checks passions or evil desires through the virtues of *temperance* (or *prudence*) until *fortitude* can take over, allowing *justice* to like

[69] Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 229: "Llull's own program served to reformulate the conventional elements of logic as a symbolic calculus of being . . . achieved . . . through the pervasive Realism of his metaphysics."

[70] Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 57: "Few medieval systems have come as near as Llull's to the Platonic and Hegelian ideal of a logic that is at the same time an ontology. And it could not be otherwise, since the order of being and of thought meet in God, in whose infinite thought reality is precontained in the idea. As a result the onto-logical nature of Llull's thought is essentially theo-logical, with which it fully achieves that onto-theo-logical structure which has rightly been indicated as characteristic of metaphysics." See, on this subject, J. M. Bocheński's illuminating remarks on "Logique et ontologie" in *Ontologie und Logik: Ontology and Logic*, ed. P. Weingartner and E. Morscher (Berlin, 1979), pp. 19–21.

[71] *MOG* III, 293 = Int. vi, 1.

[72] See the opening paragraph of Dist. III.

[73] Notice the insistence on the theme in the Prologue.

[74] See *Gentile*, p. 115, as well as many other places in Llull's work. Jordi Gayà in "El conocimiento teológico, como precepto, según Ramón Llull," *EL* 18 (1974), 47–51, points out that to love God was a Christian precept (cf. *Mark* 12:30 and *Luke* 10:27), but to couple loving with knowing God was more characteristic of Muslim theology. Sometimes Llull expands the precept to include all three of the Augustinian powers of the soul, remembering, understanding, and loving (cf. text at n. 24 above); see, for instance, *Gentile* Bk. III, text at n. 58, *Felix*, chs. 46–7. In *Felix*, ch. 51, n. 45, the connection with Figure S is pointed out, which in turn leads us to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, part ii, compartment 15, par. 3, where this precept is represented by the compartment [E A].

[75] See *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, mode 15, as well as *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 99.

truth and dislike falsehood. At the same time it is the only way to carry out one's duty in *being* man (note again the analogy between virtue and being, as opposed to vice and nonbeing). Lastly, it is by using the Art to love virtues and hate vices that permits one to dispel doubt in view of action.

3. "To confound the erroneous opinions of unbelievers by means of cogent reasons." This was the raison d'être of the Art. In another work he expanded on the theme, saying that "the subject of this Art primarily consists in demonstrating the truth of the holy Catholic faith through the use of necessary reasons to those who are ignorant of it, as well as reassuring those who already know and believe it, removing the doubts people might have concerning it, and confounding the errors of the infidels who despise it and busily do what they can to destroy it."[76] Notice the use of the phrase "necessary reasons" precisely in this context; Llull tends to use this term, which we have met before and will meet again many times, only in connection with proving the articles of faith.[77] Notice, too, how this application of the Art entails a variety of activities. In the *Ars demonstrativa* it appears under two headings, those of "Guiding" and of "Disputing."[78] The first is more or less the general heading for all the various facets of this application of the Art; the second is the specific method to be used for "confounding the errors of the infidels." Lest it be thought the latter method ever departs far from the structured, exemplarist Lullian universe, I offer the following statement from the *Proverbs of Ramon*: "Disputation requires an artificial order which is the image of the natural order of the powers of the body and of the soul."[79]

4. "To formulate and solve questions."[80] This is a constant of the Art, almost no work of which is without its final section giving questions (and answers) based on the subjects treated. Because of its generality, this aspect is closely connected with the next.

[76] *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* v, 359–60 = Int. v, 1–2.

[77] See n. 41 above. There are occasions, such as in the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, 433 = Int. vii, 1, where Llull uses the phrase in connection with something else—in this case solving questions—but they are rare.

[78] Dist. III, modes 7 and 13, respectively.

[79] Ch. 248, no. 2, quoted in Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, p. 32.

[80] *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, 433 = Int. vii, 1, and *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis*, *MOG* v, 301 = Int. iii, 1 ("The subject of the Art is a general *artificium* for solving questions"). See *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, mode 10 on "Solving" for more details.

5. "To be able to acquire other sciences in a brief space of time and to bring them to their necessary conclusions according to the requirements of the material." As Paolo Rossi put it, this made the Art a "science of sciences," offering "a key to the exact and rational ordering of all knowledge, whose various aspects are comprised in and verified by it."[81]

These are, of course, tremendous claims. They did not, however, seem exaggerated to many in the generations that followed Llull—as we will see in the next section. It was only with the more empirical outlook which followed Galileo and Newton that they began to seem ungrounded. In our own age, with its reduced hostility to aprioristic modes of thought, with its greater interest in the philosophy of the Renaissance when Llull was a figure of such importance, with its interest in alternate forms of logic, with its search back to Leibniz and beyond for the roots of symbolic logic and computer science, the Lullian Art can be seen as a fascinating and even unique facet of man's attempt to explain the world about him and to order the pathways of his own processes of thought.

[81] Rossi, "Legacy," p. 185. See also Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," p. 233, as well as text at nn. 12–13 above. In the *Ars demonstrativa* Llull places this application under the heading of "Teaching"; cf. Dist. III, mode 12 and n. 34.

Llull's Influence: The History of Lullism

ALTHOUGH the point of this anthology is to present the Llull of his own time, as opposed to the often different personage later generations chose to see in him, the reader would all the same get a distorted picture if the force that Lullism represented in European thought from Nicholas of Cusa in the mid-fifteenth century to Leibniz in the mid-seventeenth were not even mentioned. Given, however, the extent and complication of such a history, all I will be able to do is just that—mention it, give a bare indication of the leading threads and, in the notes, point out where the interested reader can find further material.[1]

Before going into Lullism proper, however, two questions should be cleared up. The first is the battle over Llull's orthodoxy, with his detractors accusing him of heresy and his followers trying to have him canonized. The second is the large amount of apocryphal literature, mainly on alchemy and the Cabala, that became attached to his name.

Questions of Orthodoxy[2]

Goaded by the excesses of a group of Valencian Lullists influenced by many of the ideas of the Franciscan Spirituals, the Dominican inquisitor general of Aragon, Nicholas Eymerich (1320-99), began a campaign against the doctrines of Ramon Llull, and primarily against his supposed rationalism. The campaign culminated in

[1] The fundamental work on the history of Lullism, the one from which all others stem, is that contained in Ca II, 9-437. The same author (Joaquim Carreras i Artau) did an excellent outline of the subject in *OE* I, 69-84. Although limited for the most part to single countries, there are the excellent histories of French Lullism in Hillg, pp. 135–320, and of Italian Lullism in Miguel Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia (ensayo de síntesis)," *Revista de Filosofía* 2 (Madrid, 1943), 479–537 (this is the second part of the study; the first on pp. 253–313 covers Llull's contacts with Italy during his lifetime). For further general bibliography, see n. 19 below.

[2] In addition to the works listed above, see also Longpré, cols. 1134ff., and above all Alois Madre's recent and valuable *Die theologische Polemik gegen Raimundus Lullus* (Münster, 1973).

1376 with two events: The first was the publication in January of his notorious manual on inquisitorial methods, destined to become what might be called the standard work in the field.[3] Among other things, it contained a list of a hundred errors of Ramon Llull, which was to become the standard list in *that* field.[4] In the meantime a papal commission had been formed to look into Eymerich's accusations, and very shortly after his book appeared, that is, on February 6, a papal bull was promulgated censuring Llull and condemning twenty of his books.[5] This aroused considerable anger at all levels of Catalan society, and the king had Eymerich exiled. Even though Eymerich kept up his campaign from Avignon, Llull's followers began a campaign of rehabilitation that was finally won in 1416, with the promulgation by the Papal Court of what has become known as the "definitive sentence," invalidating the bull of forty years earlier.

The second condemnation of Lullist doctrines came from an almost equally authoritative source—the Faculty of Theology of the University of Paris. In 1390—the same year that Pierre d'Ailly became chancellor of the University—his pupil Jean Gerson (1363–1429) caused the Faculty of Theology to publish an edict prohibiting the teaching of Lullist doctrines.[6] This was a result of various circumstances, such as the new and extreme nominalism being promulgated in Paris, the association of Llull's ideas with the mysticism of Jan van Ruysbroeck (which Gerson opposed), a distaste for Llull's frequently involuted language, and the opposition (like that of Eymerich) to Llull's supposed rationalism.

The damage these two condemnations did was enormous. The second not only cut off what must have been a considerable interest

[3] For earlier editions of the *Directorium Inquisitorum*, see the index of RD, as well as Madre (n. 2 above) p. 73, n. 6. There are also two modern editions, one in French, *Le manuel des inquisiteurs*, ed. L. Sala-Molins (Paris and La Haye, 1973), and the other in Spanish, *Manual de Inquisidores* (Barcelona, 1974).

[4] The list appears in Madre (n. 2 above) Anhang 1, pp. 147–57, as well as in Pasqual, *Vindiciae* II, where each is answered in turn.

[5] For a list of these works, see Madre (n. 2 above), p. 158. Part of the battle over Llull's orthodoxy has centered on the authenticity of this bull. His partisans have always claimed it was a forgery, and it has certainly never been found among the papal registers (see Longpré, cols. 1136-7). J. Carreras i Artau, however, upholds its validity (*OE* I, 71, n. 7), on the ground that the Roman Curia has always maintained its legitimacy, without which the "definitive sentence" of 1419 would make no sense.

[6] For important corrections of detail and focus on the subject of Gerson as presented in the bibliography of nn. 1-2 above, see M. Batllori, "Entorn del lul•lisme a França" in *A través de la història i la cultura* (Montserrat, 1979), pp. 244-5.

in Llull in Paris, but forced serious thinkers concerned with his doctrines (Sibiuda, van den Velde, Nicholas of Cusa) to disguise this fact in their published writings. The damage the first did was perhaps even longer-lasting. Later Lullists were indeed able to show that of Eymerich's hundred propositions, some were gratuitously attributed to Llull, some were the result of an alteration of the original text (Eymerich was a master of the out-of-context quote), many were inoffensive, and the rest could be interpreted as being in agreement with dogma.[7] But in spite of the "definitive sentence," there lingered the feeling of something suspiciously heterodox about Llull's doctrines. And all his enemies had to do in later years to block attempts at canonization was to republish Eymerich's work, thereby effectively bogging down the proponents in the quagmire of a laborious defense. Veneration of Llull was, however, permitted within the Franciscan Order and locally in Majorca by decree of Leo X (early sixteenth century), Clement XIII (1763), and Pius IX (1847); his feast day was set on 3 July.[8]

Llull as Alchemist and Cabalist

In 1332, only sixteen years after Llull's death, there appeared the first alchemical work associated with his name: the *Testamentum*, apparently written by a Catalan alchemist living in London.[9] Perhaps this geographic fact was responsible for the early connection of the Lullian alchemical legend with England. The most usual version of the legend stated that Llull, after learning from Arnau de Vilanova the art of transforming base metals into gold, had gone to England to make gold for King Edward III on the condition that the profits would be used to finance a crusade to the Holy Land; after making a considerable amount of gold, however, and seeing that the king was not carrying out his part of the bargain, Llull left England without revealing his secret. In any event, many other alchemical works were written under Llull's name, until the list of works he was supposed to have written on this

[7] Thus Pasqual in *Vindiciae* II, for which see Ca II, 34.

[8] Longpré, cols. 1134-5, is still the best source on the *cultus* of Ramon Llull.

[9] J. Batista Roca, "Catàlech de les obres lulianes d'Oxford," *BRABLB* 8 (1915–16), 205–6, and P. Bohigas, "El repertori de manuscrits catalans. Missió a Anglaterra," *EUC* 12 (1927), 419–27.

subject reached the number of seventy-seven.[10] In the Renaissance they were printed over and over again—in some cases more often than his genuine works.[11] Indeed there must have been many circles in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe where the lengendary Llull had thoroughly displaced the real Llull.[12] His great eighteenth-century editor, Ivo Salzinger, was a "believer."[13] Even nowadays, in spite of Luanco's epoch-making study of over a hundred years ago, which definitely laid bare the web of fabrications,[14] one still finds otherwise reputable works of reference trundling out the legend of Llull the alchemist.[15]

The history of Llull the Cabalist is quite different and rests on a single work, the *De auditu cabbalistico*. Modern scholarship has shown that this work, which has long been recognized as spurious, was written by an Italian doctor and scholar, Pietro Mainardi (1456-1529) from Verona, who taught in Ferrara and in Padua.[16] His point of departure seems to have been an attempt to carry out Pico della Mirandola's ideal of harmonizing the Lullian Art with the Cabala.[17] In any case, it was subsequently printed as a work of Llull, and as such it was given fame by Giordano Bruno and

[10] See Salzinger's catalogue in *MOG* I, 50-1 and 66–72 = Int. ii, 4-5 and 20-6, as well as the Lullian alchemical section in L. Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*, Vol. IV (New York, 1934), pp. 3–64, and the index of Lullian incipits in L. Thorndike and P. Kibre, *A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), cols. 1153–6.

[11] See the index of RD, pp. 393–4, which is very instructive to compare numerically with the list of genuine works preceding it.

[12] Our present-day distaste for apocrypha must not make us lose sight of the fact that these works form an important part of the history of Lullism, and even an important part of European thought in those centuries. The bibliographical and editorial groundwork needed to elucidate properly the history of this movement, however, is immense. For the meager list of modern works on the subject, see Bru, p. 70.

[13] See text at n. 78 below.

[14] José Ramón de Luanco, *Ramon Lull (Raimundo Lulio) considerado como alquimista* (Barcelona, 1870). See also *HLF*, pp. 271ff.

[15] For instance, in M. Daumas, *Histoire de la science*, Encyclopédie de la Pléiade (Paris, 1957), pp. 345–7; cf. A. Llinarès in *Les Etudes Philosophiques* 22 (Paris, 1967), 440, and Hillg, p. 312, n. 228. For more on the subject of Llull and alchemy, see *Felix*, Bk. VI, ch. 36 and n. 10 there.

[16] The discovery was made by Paola Zambelli and presented in an article rich in details on Italian Lullism of the period: "Il 'De auditu kabbalistico' e la tradizione lulliana nel Rinascimento," *Atti dell'Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Colombaria"* 30 (Florence, 1965), 115–247. Cf. the good résumé and review by J. Carreras y Artau in *EL* 10 (1966), 95–101.

[17] In addition to trying to harmonize the arch-anti-Averroist, Ramon Llull, with the Averroism that Mainardi himself had imbibed in Padua!

then printed in the famous Zetzner anthologies of Llull's works.[18] It was thus a more serious work, which received the consideration of important Renaissance figures who were also interested in the genuine Llull.

Lullism Proper[19]

The history of Lullism begins with a man who was not only a disciple of Llull's but also perhaps one of the most remarkable, tireless, and faithful transmitters of his doctrines. This was a canon of Arras, doctor in medicine and "socius" of the Sorbonne, Thomas le Myésier (d. 1336), whom we have already met in connection with the "Life."[20] His major contribution to Lullism consisted in compiling an anthology of Llull's thought and works that he called the *Electorium*, and this in four versions: a *magnum*, a *medium*, a *parvum*, and a *minimum*, of which the second and fourth are now lost.[21] The first, always referred to simply as the *Electorium*, is a huge manuscript now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris.[22] The third, known as the *Breviculum*, roughly the same format but one-tenth the length, and now in the Badische Landesbibliothek in Karlsruhe, is justly famous for its magnificent series of twelve miniatures depicting various episodes from Llull's life.[23] Le Myésier's minor contribution to Lullism consisted in

[18] See text at nn. 60–63 below.

[19] In addition to the works cited in n. 1 above, there are three important recent works: (1) Rossi, *Clavis*. ch. 2, pp. 41–80, of this work was translated with slight changes in the same author's "Legacy" (this chapter, however, concludes with Lavinheta, so that the original *Clavis* must still be consulted for the later Lullism of Giordano Bruno, Alsted, etc.); (2) Risse, *Logik*, ch. 7, "Die lullistische Tradition," pp. 532–60; and (3) Johnston, *Semblance*, ch. 5, "Epilogue and Conclusion: Lullism and the Lullian Arts of Language in the Renaissance," pp. 239–89 (with comments on and corrections of Rossi, *Clavis*).

[20] See "Life," text at n. 41 above. For le Myésier, see Hillg, pp. 158–64 et passim, as well as Hillgarth's brief outline in *EL* 16 (1972), 113–23.

[21] In the last miniature of the *Breviculum* (see Hillg, pl. XII) only the first three are shown, but the existence of four is attested by a marginal note in le Myésier's hand in the largest anthology (cf. Hillg, p. 162).

[22] Ms. lat. 15450. It measures 363 × 280 mm, and has almost 500 folios (it originally had at least 560). For a detailed description, see Hillg, pp. 348–97, and for a slightly briefer description (based on notes of Hillgarth), see *ROL* v, 216–30.

[23] St. Peter, perg. 92. It measures 345 × 277 mm, and contains 44 folios (it originally had at least 61). For a detailed description and discussion of the miniatures, see Hillg, pp. 446–67. The miniatures themselves are reproduced in plates I–XII at the back of the same book. Seven of them are reproduced here, nine of them are reproduced in *OE*, and all of them in Sala-Molins, *Amour*, between pp. 160 and 161.

bequeathing his collection of Llull's manuscripts to the Sorbonne, thereby making a second center, along with the Chartreuse of Vauvert,[24] where students and copyists could work in later times.

We know something of the activities of a few other disciples in Paris,[25] and a few in Valencia in the 1330s,[26] but otherwise the history of Lullism during the fourteenth century is still largely unexplored. We know that Llull's doctrines must have continued to be taught in Paris, for otherwise Gerson would not have bothered to have them suppressed in 1390. They must also have been studied and taught elsewhere, since a great number of works were copied and translated into other languages. But to date this has only given us a few isolated names and unrelated bits of information.[27]

In the fifteenth century, the increasing number of Llull's adherents are divisible into two currents of development.[28] The first was centered in Catalonia, Majorca, and Italy, and involved figures relatively unknown in the general history of European thought, but who were important as teachers and propagators of Llull's thought or printers of his works. The instigators of this movement were the Lullian schools of Barcelona and Majorca. After their

[24] For Llull, the Chartreuse of Vauvert and the manuscripts there, see Hillg, pp. 156–7.

[25] Or rather one other disciple, Pierre de Limoges, who in addition to being a doctor of medicine like le Myésier, was also an astronomer. Also like le Myésier, he left his library to the Sorbonne. This library included five Lullian codices now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (mss. lat. 16112-14, 16119, and fr. 24402) which are among the earliest preserved, having been copied in Paris around the year 1300 or perhaps even a bit earlier; see Hillg, p. 158.

[26] See Josep Tarré, "Un quadrenni de producció lul•listica a València (1335–38), *SMR* 6 (1951), 22–30. This was the group which, in addition to turning out works attributed to Llull himself, caught the eye of the Inquisitor Eymerich; see "Questions of Orthodoxy," above.

[27] The first basis of a serious study of fourteenth- (and even fifteenth-) century Lullism must be a proper bibliography of Lullian manscripts, something equivalent to what Rogent and Duran did for Lullian printed editions. The indices to the microfilm collection of Lullian MSS in the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut of Freiburg could provide the basis for such a bibliography. But otherwise, only a few of the main collections have been properly catalogued (see Hillg, pp. 137–8, and Bru, pp. 32–5).

[28] For an excellent summary of fifteenth-century Lullism, see N. Batllori, *El lul•lisme del primer renaixement* (Palma de Mallorca, 1955); reprinted in *Ponencias del IV Congreso de Historia de la Corona de Aragón (25 de septiembre a 2 de octubre de 1955) celebrado en Palma de Mallorca* (Barcelona, 1976), and in the same author's *A través de la història i la cultura*.

first contacts with Padua and Venice in the 1430s,[29] the period of their greatest importance and influence began in the 1480s. It was then that Pere Daguí (or de Gui), chaplain to Ferdinand and Isabella, was teaching in Majorca;[30] that his writings, and especially his *Janua artis magistri Raymundi Lulli*, which was to play such a role in the diffusion of Lullism, were printed;[31] and above all, that the works of Llull himself was first printed.[32]

The second current of development, in France, Germany, and also Italy, involved leading figures in the history of European thought. Although men like Sibiuda, van den Velde, and Nicholas of Cusa were certainly influenced by Lullist doctrines or employed them in varying degrees in their own works, they rarely cited their source by name, often for fear of censure in the wake of Eymerich and Gerson. The earliest of these figures was the Catalan Ramon Sibiuda (?-1436) who studied and then taught at the University of Toulouse.[33] His *Liber creaturarum* (also called *Theologia naturalis*) was translated and commented on by Montaigne, and

[29] For the Lullian school of Barcelona see Francisco de Bofarull y Sans, "El testamento de Ramón Lull y la escuela luliana de Barcelona," *MRABLB* 5 (1896), 435–79; and José María Madurell Marimón, "La escuela de Ramón Llull, de Barcelona. Sus alumnos, lectores y protectores," *EL* 6 (1962), 187–209; 8 (1964), 93–117, 229–35; 9 (1965), 93–103; as well as Hillg, p. 277, n. 46, and p. 281, n. 71. There are no equivalent monographs on the Majorcan school—or rather schools, for in reality there were two, first one on Mt. Randa and then one in Palma; see Ca II, 63–7, and Hillg, pp. 147–8. For the connection between these schools and Italy, in addition to Ca II, 68 and 81, see Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia" (n. 1 above), pp. 483–8, and *El lul•lisme del primer renaixement* (see the previous note), p. 10.

[30] For Daguí, see Ca II, 65–7, 69, 72–6, and 77–9. For further details and bibliography, see Lorenzo Pérez Martínez, "El Maestro Pedro Daguí y el lulismo mallorquín de fines del siglo XV," *EL* 4 (1960) 291–306.

[31] Barcelona 1482 (RD 4), Rome 1485 (RD 7), Barcelona 1488 (RD 8), and Seville 1491 (RD 13). His *Tractatus brevis formalitatum* was printed in Barcelona 1489 (RD 12) and in Seville 1491 (RD 14), while his *Opus de formalitatibus* or *Metaphysica* appeared in Barcelona 1489 (RD 9) and possibly in Seville 1491 (RD 15).

[32] They are the *Ars generalis ultima*, Venice 1480 (RD 1); the *Ars brevis*, Barcelona 1481 (RD 3), Rome 1485 (RD 6), and Barcelona 1489 (RD 10); the *Tree of Science*, Barcelona 1482 (RD 5); and the spurious *Logica brevis et nova*, Venice 1480 (RD 2) and Barcelona 1489 (RD 11). For the non-Lullian authorship of this last work, see Charles H. Lohr, "Ramón Llull, 'Logica Brevis,'" *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), 144–53, as well as *EL* 16 (1972), 1–11. These works by Daguí and Llull (genuine and apocryphal) occupy the first fifteen numbers of RD, and are thus the works by which the Art was first divulged. See Hillg, p. 284 and n. 88, for more details on early Lullian editions.

[33] His name was also written Sebonde and de Sabunde, to say nothing of eleven other variants (see Ca II, 102). See the long essay in Ca II, 101–75; as well as Hillg, pp. 274–75; Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 249–51; and above all Batllori (n. 6 above), pp. 253–7.

even influenced Pascal. Its encyclopedic aims, its realist and exemplarist metaphysics, and its proselytizing goal were of clear Lullian filiation.

Another figure was the Fleming Heimeric van den Velde (ca. 1390–1460), who, after studying in Paris, exported the antinominalist doctrines of the "Albertist" school to Cologne.[34] His chief importance for historians of Lullism lies in the fact that in 1425–6 he was the teacher of Nicholas of Cusa. In spite of certain chronological problems, it was probably he who introduced the brilliant pupil and later cardinal to Ramon Llull.[35] The interest of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) in Llull has long been recognized. Even though he seldom mentioned Llull in his writing, the large collection of Lullian works he collected and annotated is still intact at the hospital he founded in his native Kues, and the exemplarist nature of his own thought is clearly rooted in that of the earlier Majorcan.[36]

The other two figures usually cited as belonging to this second current of development are Bessarion (ca. 1400–72) and Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), but here the evidence merely shows that they were familiar with and, in the case of Pico, interested in Llull's Art.[37] Llull's doctrines cannot have been a shaping influ-

[34] For van den Velde, see Colomer, *Edad Media*, pp. 78–118, whose two studies reprint or summarize earlier studies of Colomer's (see p. 14–15 of the same book for bibliography). See also the résumé in Hillg, pp. 270–73, as well as the text recently published by R. Imbach in *EL* 23 (1979), 185–93.

[35] In addition to the studies cited in the previous note, see Batllori (n. 6 above), pp. 247ff. for clarifications of detail and another possible path of transmission. For Cusanus' contacts with the Paduan Lullist Fantino Dandolo, who was himself in contact with members of the school of Barcelona, see Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia" (see n. 1 above), pp. 484–87, and *El lul•lisme del primer renaixement*, p. 10. [Addition of Dec. 1983: The role of Paduan Lullism in Cusa's formation now seems to have been not only more important but prior (1417–23) to that of van den Velde in Cologne (1424–5), whose attitude towards Llull appears to have been more reserved and negatively influenced by Gerson's criticisms. See the two important studies: Ch. Lohr, "Die Exzerptensammlung des Nikolaus von Kues aus den Werken Ramón Lulls," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 30 (Freiburg, 1983), 373–84, and E. Colomer, "Noves dades entorn del 'Lul•lisme' de Nicolau de Cusa," *EL* 25 (1981–3), 67–81.]

[36] The fundamental modern work on this subject is E. Colomer, *Raimund Llull und Nikolaus von Kues. Studien aus Handschriften der Kueser Bibliothek*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie II (Berlin, 1961), distillations of which are the various articles reprinted in his *Edad Media* (for specific bibliography, see pp. 14–15 of the latter book). See also: Hillg, pp. 270–75; Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 188–89; and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 245–48 and 251.

[37] Bessarion's Lullism is deduced from his close friendship with Nicholas of Cusa and from an anecdote concerning a hunting party, on which he is said to have asked where a hare had gone, only to have his host answer, "Apply the rule of C D K of the *Ars magna*

ence on their thought as they were for Sibiuda and Nicholas of Cusa.

Toward the end of the century, however, Lullism takes on a completely different aspect: it leaves off the fitful, semiclandestine air it had before then, and assumes the role of first importance in European thought that it was to maintain until the seventeenth century. The first center from which this new influence spread out was Paris, and its first major representative was the humanist theologian Jacques Lefèvre d'Etaples (ca. 1455–1536).[38] Lefèvre was familiar with Ramon Sibiuda and Nicholas of Cusa, so it was perhaps natural that he should have become fascinated with Llull; but, through his reputation, his extraordinary energy, his influential circle of pupils and above all his publications of Lullian works,[39] Lefèvre did more than any other person for the resurgence of Lullist studies. His interest in the Majorcan was chiefly in the mystical, ascetic, and moral side of his works, whereas that of his friend and best-known pupil, Charles de Bovelles (1479–1553), was more in Llull's metaphysics and rational theology. In addition to propagating Lullian doctrines in his own works, Bovelles was the first to publish a "Life" of Llull and to be in contact

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and you will find the hare." This is, of course, the reply to the question of *Where*? in the *Ars Brevis*, Part IV, Rule I. Cf. Ca II, 197–98, for all this (I have corrected the G D K there to C D K). Note that such a joke would have been pointless unless the host had known the guest to be quite familiar with the Art. To this one must add that Bessarion was in contact with the important Lullist and anti-Lullist Fernando de Córdoba (cf. Batllori, *El lul•lisme del primer renaixement*, p. 11, as well as text at n. 80 here below). Pico della Mirandola owned one or two copies of the *Ars brevis* and/or *Ars generalis ultima*. We also know that he was interested in discovering a combinatorial method that would partake of both the Cabala and the *Ars Raymundi*, and that several other doctrines of his seem to reveal a certain Lullian influence. Cf. Ca II, 198–200; Hillg, pp. 280–4; Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 256, n. 168; Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 190–1; and Miquel Batllori, "Giovanni Pico e il lullismo italiano del Quattrocento," *L'Opera e il Pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell'umanesimo. Convegno internazionale (Mirandola: 15–18 settembre 1963)* 2 (Florence, 1965), 7–16, translated into Catalan and reprinted in Batllori's *A través de la història i la cultura*, pp. 269–77.

[38] For Lefèvre d'Etaples (Faber Stapulensis) and the Parisian movement of these years in general, see J. M. Victor, "The Revival of Lullism at Paris, 1499–1516," *Renaissance Quarterly* 28 (1976), 504–34; as well as Hillg, pp. 283–93: Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 260–5; and Ca II, 201–14.

[39] The *Libre de Sancta Maria*, the *Libre de clerecia* (these two in Latin translation), the *Phantasticus* and the *Liber natalis* in 1499 (RD 24 and 25); the first two books of the *Book of Contemplation* together with a Latin version of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* in 1505 (RD 35); and Latin translations of the *Proverbs of Ramon* and the *Tree of the Philosophy of Love* in 1516 (RD 62).

with Spanish humanist circles where Llull was then much in fashion.[40]

This Spanish movement seems to have had its origin in the Majorcan school of Pere Daguí mentioned above. His pupil Jaume Janer was important, not only for his own writings, but also as founder of the Lullian school of Valencia, where he was the teacher of the humanist Alonso de Proaza.[41] The best known of all the Majorcans of this period, however, was Nicholas de Pax.[42] Both he and Proaza were in contact with Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros (1436–1517), archbishop of Toledo and finally regent of Castile. Cisneros was himself an ardent Lullist, and in the University of Alcalá de Henares, which he founded in 1508, he instituted a chair of Lullian philosophy and theology, whose first incumbent was Nicholas de Pax. Through Bovelles, who was a friend of the cardinal and corresponded with Nicholas de Pax, this group was in contact with the Parisian Lullist group.[43]

But the most important contact between the two groups came from the greatest Lullist of this period, the Franciscan Bernard de Lavinheta (d. ca. 1530).[44] The contact was more one of ideas and outlook than personal, for almost nothing is known of Lavinheta's background, nor even whether he was Spanish or French. We only know that before coming to Paris he taught at Salamanca. The brand of Lullism he brought there was that of the Lullist school of Barcelona and its interest in the Art. He was the first, as a trained theologian, to teach the Art at the University of Paris, thereby giving it the official sanction it had lacked for a century and a half. His publication of Lullian works at Lyon, Paris, and Cologne in 1514–18 was very influential throughout Europe.[45] His own *Ex-*

[40] For Bovelles (Bouelles, Bouvelles, or Bouillé) see, in addition to the works mentioned in n. 38 above, J. M. Victor, *Charles de Bovelles (1479–1553): An Intellectual Biography* (diss. Columbia University, 1971); the same author's "Charles de Bovelles and Nicholas de Pax: Two Sixteenth-Century Biographies of Ramon Lull," *Traditio* 32 (1976), 313–45; as well as J. Gayà, "Algunos temas lulianos en los escritos de Charles de Bovelles," *EL* 24 (1980), 71–86.

[41] See D. W. McPheeters, *El humanista español Alonso de Proaza* (Valencia, 1961).

[42] See Ca II, 253–4, as well as the work cited in n. 40 above.

[43] For the relationship between these two centers, see Marcel Bataillon, *Erasme et l'Espagne. Recherches sur l'histoire spirituelle du XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1937), pp. 55–70, 667–68.

[44] For Lavinheta, in addition to the works cited in n. 38 above, see Hillg, pp. 318–19; Rossi, "Legacy," 207–11; and Risse, *Logik*, pp. 536–7.

[45] Of the sixteen works listed in RD as published between December 1514 and April 1518 (nos. 52–68, discounting the doubtful no. 64), ten were edited by Lavinheta and one (RD 57) by a pupil of his. See Hillg, p. 289.

planatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli, first published at Lyon in 1523, was enormously important, because its mixture of interest in the Art with encyclopedism, alchemy, and artificial memory was to become characteristic of the Lullism of this and the following century.[46] All it lacked was a treatment of Llull's system as an art of discourse, which was supplied by one of his pupils in a work called *In rhetoricam isagoge*, published in 1515.[47]

It was this now completed mixture that appealed to the first German commentator of the Art, Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535).[48] In his *In Artem brevem Raymundi Lulli commentaria*, written apparently in his youth but not printed till 1531 at Cologne, he presented the Lullian Art, to use Johnston's phrase, as "a pan-sophistic art of discourse."[49] Now the curious thing is that this reduction of the Art to a rhetorical and dialectical formalism, to which Agrippa had given the finishing touches, was precisely what he himself criticized in his later *De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum* (Cologne, 1530). There he said it was a method based on a few tricks for permitting somebody to talk on any subject and to get the best of his rivals; it was more for showing off one's cleverness and for ostentation of learning than for the acquisition of knowledge. In short, he has nothing but sneers for

[46] Cf. Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 262–5. Lavinheta's work was reedited in Cologne 1612 (see RD 78, 168 for these two editions) and in our day by E.-W. Platzeck (Hildesheim, 1975).

[47] The author was a certain Remigius Rufus Candidus of Aquitaine (if this was not a pseudonym). The work was printed under Llull's name, and as such it found its way into the Zetzner edition (see n. 61 below). The work is analyzed in Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 265–71; see also Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 192–4.

[48] For Agrippa see Ca II, 216–23; Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 183–5; and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 272–9.

[49] *Semblance*, p. 5. This commentary on the *Ars brevis* was perhaps the most widely read work in the history of Lullism; it was printed seventeen times between 1531 and 1651. See the index of RD, as well as text at n. 63 below. When he wrote it, his enthusiasm for Llull was boundless, affirming that "the Art contains nothing trivial, it does not deal with specific objects; precisely for this reason it is to be regarded as the queen of all arts, an easy and sure guide to all sciences and all doctrines. *The Ars inventiva* [i.e., the Art in general, not the specific work] is characterized by its universal applicability and certainty; aided only by this Art, men will be able, without being required to possess any other knowledge, to eliminate all possibility of error and to find 'de omni re scibili veritatem et scientiam.' The arguments of the Art are infallible and irrefutable; the principles and theorems of each particular science are illuminated by it and derive their validity from it; finally, because it embraces every science, the Art has the task of ordering every facet of human knowledge." Cf. Rossi, "Legacy," p. 184, whose translation I quote here.

what he calls "loquacious Lullists," a species he himself had helped to invent.[50]

After this outburst of Lullist activity in the first three decades of the sixteenth century, there is a peculiar gap of some fifty years taken up largely by an editorial deluge of pseudo-Lullian alchemical works.[51] Then in the 1580s there is a strong resurgence of Lullism, this time in two well-defined centers.

The first involved the court of Philip II of Spain, who was himself an admirer of Llull.[52] Not only were scholars at the court charged with collecting works of Llull, with drawing up catalogues, and with defending the cause of Llull's orthodoxy with the Papal Court, but one even finds that Pedro de Guevara, tutor of two of the Infantas, was himself an ardent Lullist who wrote two treatises on the Art. The King also supported the architect of the Escorial, Juan de Herrera, in the founding (1582) of a mathematical-philosophical academy in Madrid, in whose program the Art of Llull was to have a prominent place. In addition, Herrera wrote a curious *Tratado del cuerpo cúbico conforme a los principios y opiniones del Arte de Raimundo Lulio*, in which he tried to use the Art as a foundation for mathematics.[53]

The other center involved a revival of the French-German connection of half a century before. Two lesser stars in this new galaxy of Lullists were Pierre Grégoire of Toulouse (1540–97), whose vast *Syntaxis Artis mirabilis*, which appaeared between 1583 and 1587, was based on Llull and his commentators (mainly Lavinheta and Agrippa),[54] and the Venetian patrician Valerio de Valeriis, whose *Opus aureum*, a commentary on Llull's *Tree of Science*, was

[50] And which was later to spell the death of Lullism; cf. text at n. 83 below.

[51] Of the thirty Lullian works printed between 1541 and 1578 (nos. 91–120 in RD) for instance, seven are works *on* Llull (four of them by Agrippa), one is a publication of the *Ars brevis*, one a publication of the apocryphal *Art de confessió*, and the remaining twenty-one are pseudo-Lullian alchemical works!

[52] For Spanish Lullism in the latter part of the sixteenth century, see Ca II, 260–8.

[53] Recently edited by E. Simons and R. Godoy under the title of *Discurso del Señor Juan de Herrera, aposentador Mayor de S. M., sobre la figura cúbica* (Madrid, 1979). See also J. Carreras i Artau, "El lul•lisme de Juan de Herrera, l'arquitecte de l'Escorial," *Miscel•lània Puig i Cadafalch* I (Barcelona, 1947–51), 41–60; and L. Pérez Martínez, "Nuevos documentos sobre el lulismo de Juan de Herrera," *EL* 14 (1970), 71–82.

[54] Ca II, 234–5 is amusing on the pretentiousness of this encyclopedia; see also Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 194–5. It must be noted, however, that Leibniz cited Pierre Grégoire as one of the precursors of his own *Ars combinatoria*; cf. Louis Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz* (Paris, 1901; repr. Hildesheim, 1969), p. 38, n. 1, and p. 39.

first published in 1589.[55] By far the greatest figure of this generation, however, was Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), whose interest in Llull dates almost exclusively from his sojourns in France and Germany.[56] His activities in this field, which he combined with his interest in other aspects of Renaissance philosophy, are too complex to be treated in any detail here. Suffice it to say with Frances Yates that "the three strands of the Hermetism, the mnemonics, the Lullism are all interwoven in Bruno's complex personality, mind and mission,"[57] and that, in addition to influences clearly discernable in his own thought, during the 1580s he wrote no less than seven works specifically on the Lullian Art.[58]

The next generation produced the great encyclopedist, Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638).[59] In addition to publishing Lullist works by Lavinheta and Bruno and writing about Llull in many of his own works, he produced the *Clavis artis lullianae* with the intent of reconciling Llull's logic with that of Aristotle and Ramus and of defending Llull against his attackers.

Perhaps the most important event in the Lullism of this period, however, was not the appearance of any new figure or work but the publication of an anthology by Lazarus Zetzner of Strasbourg, entitled *Opera ea quae ad adinventam ab ipso Artem universalem*, which, for the next century or so, was to become the standard work on Llull. It is therefore instructive in understanding seventeenth-century Lullism: it contained six genuine works by

[55] For Valerio de Valeriis see Ca II, 235–7; and Rossi, "Legacy," pp. 195–7.

[56] For Giordano Bruno see Ca II, 225–33; Rossi, *Clavis*, pp. 109–23; Risse, *Logik*, pp. 540–2; and Frances A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (London, 1964; paperback repr. Chicago, 1978).

[57] Yates, *Giordano Bruno*, pp. x, 206, and 324. Miss Yates says (p. 271) that Bruno even mentioned "among those who in solitude have achieved the vision and gained marvelous powers, Moses, Jesus of Nazareth, Ramon Llull, and the leisured contemplators amongst the Egyptians and Babylonians."

[58] These are: (1) *De compendiosa architectura et complemento artis Lulli* (Paris, 1582; RD 128); (2) *De lampade combinatoria lulliana* (Wittenberg, 1587; RD 135); (3) *De progressu et lampade venatoria logicorum* (Wittenberg, 1587; edition not listed in RD, but see Ca II, 228, and Yates, *Giordano Bruno*, p. 307); (4) *De lulliano specierum scrutinio* (Prague, 1588; RD 137); (5) *De progressu logicae venationis* (Strasbourg, 1598; RD 144); (6) *Medicina lulliana* (written 1589 but never published; see Ca II, 229); (7) *Artificium perorandi* (written 1590–91 and published posthumously by Alsted in 1612; not in RD, but again see Ca II, 229). Many of these works were subsequently reedited, and notably nos. 2–5 in the Zetzner editions (see text to nn. 62–6 below).

[59] For Alsted see Ca II, 239–49; Rossi, *Clavis*, pp. 179–84; Risse, *Logik*, pp. 543–4 (as well as 477–85); and above all Alois Madre, "Raimundus Lullus and Johann Heinrich Alsted," *EL* 4 (1960), 167–80.

Llull,[60] four other works falsely attributed to him,[61] four commentaries by Giordano Bruno,[62] and the *In artem brevem* by Agrippa von Nettesheim.[63]

The first edition of this anthology appeared in Strasbourg in 1598.[64] It was reprinted in 1609 with the addition of the *Opus aureum* of Valerio de Valeriis.[65] This second edition was reprinted in 1617 and again in 1651.[66] Immediately after the second and fourth editions, Zetzner brought out Alsted's *Clavis artis Lullianae*,[67] which is sometimes bound together with those two editions.[68]

This mixture of Llull, pseudo-Llull, and Renaissance commentaries, emphasizing a general art of discourse, constituted the "package" in which Llull was presented to seventeenth-century readers, including Leibniz,[69] and it must be kept in mind when discussing their vision of Llull.

The next twist in the path came from perhaps the strangest character in the history of Lullism, the German Jesuit Athanasius Kircher (1601–80), scientist, mathematician, cryptographer, and student of Egyptian hieroglyphics.[70] With the idea of perfecting Llull's Art, he published in Amsterdam in 1669 his vast *Ars magna sciendi*.[71] This work begins by reforming the alphabet of the Art, inventing little symbols (a heart for *Concordantia*, a donkey for

[60] They include the two most important works of the last period of the Art, the *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima*; two polemical works, the *Liber lamentationis philosophiae* and the *Apostrophe*; and two logical works, the *Tractatus de conversione subjecti et praedicati per medium* and the *Tractatus de venatione medii inter subjectum et praedicatum*. (For the *Apostrophe* and the *Tractatus de venatione medii* see nn. 49 & 81, respectively, to the Catalogue of Works in Vol. II here.)

[61] One was yet another logical work, the *Logica brevis et nova*, for which see n. 32 above. Then there was the *De auditu cabbalistico* discussed in text at n. 16 above. Two were rhetorical works by the Lavinheta pupil, Remigius Rufus (see n. 47 above), the *In rhetoricam isagoge* and the *Oratio exemplaris*.

[62] See the end of n. 58 above.

[63] See text at nn. 48, 49 above.

[64] RD 144. Cf. n. 69 below.

[65] RD 162. Also added was a brief, schematic *Tabula abbreviata commentariorum artis inventivae* by Agrippa von Nettesheim.

[66] RD 180 and 233.

[67] RD 163 and 234.

[68] Thus in copies in the Sapiència and in the Public Library in Palma.

[69] It was apparently the first edition of 1598 that Leibniz read; see Ca II, 313.

[70] For Kircher see Ca II, 309–13; Couturat, *La logigue de Leibniz*, pp. 541–3, and Risse, *Logik*, pp. 550–2.

[71] RD 265.

Animalia, etc.) and continues with what Martin Gardner calls a fascinating mixture of science and nonsense.[72]

A much more serious attempt to reform the Lullian Art was Leibniz's *Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*, published in 1666 when he was only twenty.[73] Leibniz's relation to Llull is peculiar. The *Ars combinatoria* was of capital importance to him as one of the foundations of his universalist endeavors, and he acknowledged his debt to Llull as the first to have propounded such a method.[74] He later felt, however, that the Lullian Art was "a mere shadow of the true Combinatory," whose secrets Llull had scarcely penetrated.[75]

Leibniz's interests in a universal language, encyclopedism, and a general science constituted the side of his thought that was a continuation of Renaissance endeavors and that ultimately stemmed from Llull's Art as a system which would provide a key to universal reality. Here, however, the relationship was much more remote. It was as if Llull had begun a tradition which had spread out into many strands, all of which Leibniz had tried to gather together again, albeit in a very different way, four hundred years later.

The last representative of German Lullism in the baroque period, Ivo Salzinger (1669–1728),[76] was a person curiously athwart

[72] Martin Gardner, "The Ars Magna of Ramon Lull," in *Logic Machines and Diagrams* (New York, 1958), p. 24 and n. 14.

[73] Age is relative, especially with a person like Leibniz who, at fourteen had already read and absorbed Aristotle's *Organon*. For Leibniz's Lullism, see Ca II, 313–22, J. Carreras y Artau, *De Ramón Lull a los modernos ensayos de formación de una lengua universal* (Barcelona, 1946); Erhard-W. Platzeck, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz y Raimundo Llull," *EL* 16 (1972), 129–93; and Rossi, *Clavis*, pp. 235–58, all of which are based on the earlier and fundamental study of Louis Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz*. See also the interesting remarks in G. Thiel, *Sense and Reference in Frege's Logic* (Dordrecht, Holland, 1968), pp. 5–8.

[74] He also acknowledged as precursors Bruno, Agrippa, Pierre Grégoire, Alsted and Kircher, among others (see Rossi, *Clavis*, p. 239). The debt to Kircher was to the latter's *Polygraphia nova et universalis* (Rome, 1663) and to the work that Leibniz knew the older man was then carrying out on his *Ars magna sciendi*. When it came out three years later, however, Leibniz was disappointed.

[75] For Leibniz's various judgments on Llull, see Ca II, 315–18 and 321. For more general criticisms, see *OE* 1, 78–79. On the other side of the balance, one should notice the interest in Llull evinced by Leibniz's great rival, Isaac Newton (1642–1727). From J. Harrison, *The Library of Isaac Newton* (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 183–4, we know that he owned eight volumes of Llull: one the Zetzner edition of 1609, another an edition of the *Ars generalis ultima* (Frankfurt, 1596), and six of spurious alchemical works. Significantly, of these eight volumes, the two that are dogeared and contain marginal annotations in Newton's hand are alchemical.

[76] For Salzinger see Ca II, 323–48, and Hillg, pp. 311–17 and 319–20.

two eras. By his interest in Alsted, Kircher, and Leibniz, by his attempt to interpret the Art as a valid system of universal knowledge,[77] and by his attempt—perhaps the last serious one—to defend Llull as an alchemist,[78] he was the last of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lullists; by the monumental Mainz edition of Llull's works for which he was responsible,[79] Salzinger was the first of modern Llull scholars, and the one who has perhaps done more for *that* cause than anyone since.

It would not be fair to give a history of Lullism without presenting his detractors, of whom there were many. With the advent of the Renaissance, his critics divided into two schools: those who continued to harry his reputation over questions of orthodoxy, and those who were opposed to him on purely philosophical grounds. The division came with the Spanish humanist Cardinal Fernando de Córdoba who, in the latter part of the fifteenth century, defended the Lullist Pere Daguí in Rome against charges of unorthodoxy, while at the same time attacking Llull mercilessly as a thinker in his *De artificio omnis et investigandi et inveniendi natura scibilis*, which itself presents a scheme of universal knowledge employing some devices from the Lullian Art.[80]

[77] In his vast *Revelatio secretorum artis Raymundi Lulli* printed in *MOG* I, 253–432 = Int. vi, and its companion piece, the more succinct *Praecursor introductoriae in algebram speciosam universalem* printed at the beginning of *MOG* III. In addition to the works cited in the previous note, see Yates, "Art," pp. 172–3 on the *Revelatio*.

[78] In his *Perspicilia Lulliana philosophica* printed in *MOG* I, 213–52 = Int. v; cf. the *Principles of Medicine*, Dists. I, n. 29; V, n. 5; and VI, n. 19.

[79] The project took shape in Düsseldorf in 1710 with the backing of the Elector Palatine. A large manuscript collection (now in the Munich Staatsbibliothek) was assembled, but the death of the patron retarded work on the edition. A new patron, the archbishop and elector of Mainz, was found, and all the materials were transferred to that city, where the first three volumes appeared in 1721 and 1722. In spite of the death of Salzinger in the spring of 1728 and that of the second patron six months later, the new editor, Philip Wolff, published Vols. IV–V in 1729 (or actually 1730 and 1731, respectively). In 1737 he brought out Vol. VI, and finally Vols. IX–X in 1741–2. For reasons that have remained mysterious (difficulties with the projected publication of alchemical works? Jesuit pressure?), Vols. VII and VIII never appeared. For more details on this edition (always abbreviated *MOG* for Moguntia, the Latin name of Mainz), see Adam Gottron, *L'edició maguntina de Ramón Lull* (Barcelona, 1915), as well as *OE* I, 79–80, the long article under RD 302, Juan Muntaner Bujosa, "Para la historia de la edición maguntina," *EL* 3 (1959), 89–94, and Friedrich Stegmüller's introduction to Vol. I of the Minerva reprint of the Mainz edition.

[80] For Fernando de Córdoba see A. Bonilla y San Martín, *Fernando de Córdoba* (¿1425–1486?) y los orígenes del Renacimiento filosófico en España (Madrid, 1911) and Miquel Batllori, "El gran cardenal d'Espanya i el lul•lista antilul•lià Fernando de Córdoba," *EL* 2 (1958), 313–16; as well as Ca II, 283–4, and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 252–6.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, with the rise of modern science with its more empirical, rational view of the world, it was only natural that Llull should fall from favor. Francis Bacon called the Art "a method of imposture" whose object was "to sprinkle little drops of science about, in such a manner that any sciolist may make some show and ostentation of learning."[81] Once again, however, we find Bacon following this with a description of a universal science not without points of similarity to Llull's system.

The same could be said of Descartes, whose method, although so essentially opposed to a system like Llull's, was not without certain points of similarity to it. His chief contact with it, however, seems to be anecdotal, and involves his distaste for the loquacity of an old man he met in an inn, who said that by using the Lullian Art he could speak on any topic for an entire hour, on a second topic for another hour, and so on for twenty hours.[82] It turned out, however, that this old man had learned how to manipulate the Art by means of Agrippa von Nettesheim's *Commentary*. Notice, in fact, how the words "ostentation" and "loquacity," which appear in connection with Bacon and Descartes, respectively, both appear in Agrippa's comments cited above. What Bacon and Descartes were criticizing, therefore, was more the Renaissance misuse of Lullism as an art of discourse than Llull's Art itself.[83]

The more popular brand of anti-Lullism is best represented by two literary texts. The first is from Rabelais, who has Gargantua advise his son Pantagruel to master astronomy, "but dismiss divinatory astrology and the art of Lullius as fraud and vanity." The second is Swift's portrait in *Gulliver's Travels* of the professor of Laputa, whose machine for rotating hundreds of cubes with words written on them to generate random sentences is thought to be a satire on Llull's Art.[84]

[81] *De augmentis scientiarum*, Bk. VI, ch. 2. For Bacon see Ca II, 301–2; and Gardner (n. 72 above), p. 2.

[82] For Descartes see Ca II, 299–301, as well as the earlier J. Bertran i Güell, *Influències Lulianes en el sistema de Descartes* (Barcelona, 1930). For both Descartes and his contemporary, Mersenne, see Hillg, pp. 296–8.

[83] In addition to text at nn. 49–50 and 69 above, see Rossi, *Clavis*, pp. 142–6, where the texts of Bacon, Descartes, and Agrippa are compared.

[84] For Rabelais and Swift, see Gardner (n. 72 above), p. 2, and for the former, Ca II, 279.

It was during the Enlightenment, however, that Llull's reputation sank to its lowest ebb, with scarcely anyone, outside of Salzinger's little group in Mainz, a few Majorcan patriots and, curiously enough, a group of scholars in Russia, left to defend him.[85] It was then too that he received his most famous and extended attack, at the hands of Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1676–1764), the very Spanish monk and scholar who did so much to introduce the Enlightenment into Spain.[86] In his *Cartas eruditas* he attacked Llull violently enough to arouse a host of counterattacks, which he then answered, only to arouse more.[87] Out of this mass of rather useless polemic there arose one defender of Llull who backed up his arguments with scholarship rather than rhetoric. This was the Majorcan Cistercian Antonio Raymundo Pasqual (1708–91),[88] who had studied for a short time in Mainz under Salzinger. His principal salvo against Feijóo was fired in the *Examen de la crisis del padre don Benito Gerónimo Feijóo*.[89] This led him further into Llull scholarship, resulting in his monumental *Vindiciae lullianae*, which is still of considerable service to scholars. On his death he left in manuscript twenty other works on Ramon Llull, only one of which, the *Vida del Beato Raymundo Lulio, mártir y Doctor Iluminado*, has since been published.[90]

[85] The most important of these Majorcans (before Father Pasqual, whom we will meet in a moment) was the Jesuit Jaime Custurer (1657–1715), whose *Disertaciones históricas del culto inmemorial del B. Raymundo Lullio* was very influential (see RD 283 and Ca II, 355–56). A contemporary and correspondent of his was the Belgian Bollandist Jean Baptiste Sollier (1665–1740), whose *Acta B. Raymundi Lulli* came out in Antwerp, 1708, and was then reprinted in Vol. v of the month of June of the *Acta Sanctorum* in 1709 (RD 291 and 292, respectively; see Ca II, 328–30 and 356–7). The other Majorcans were those responsible for the great flurry of printing in Palma between 1735 and 1760, in the wake of the Mainz edition (cf. RD 309–75, and especially the remarks under nos. 325, 327, and 375). For the Russian Lullists, see N. I. Styazhkin, *History of Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 54–5.

[86] On Feijóo, see G. M. Colombás, "Feijoo y el lulismo," *EL* 7 (1963), 113–30, where the relevant previous literature is cited. See also Madre (n. 2 above), pp. 15 and 37, as well as A. Llinarès, "Un aspect de l'antilullisme au XVIII[e] siècle: les 'Cartas eruditas' de Feijoo (1675–1764)," *Bulletin Hispanique* 64 bis (Bordeaux, 1962), 498–506.

[87] One can follow the battle by judicious use of the index in RD, leading one to the authors' notes on the works described.

[88] For Pasqual, see Ca II, 364–8, 372–6; Platzeck's two articles in *AST* 14 (1941/3), 183–97, and in *Revista Española de Teologia* 1 (Madrid, 1940), 731–65, continued in 2 (1942), 257–324; and Sebastián Trias Mercant's seven articles listed in Bru, p. 86.

[89] 2 vols. (Madrid, 1749–50; RD 344 and 350).

[90] 2 vols. (Palma, 1891; Bru 220).

With Father Pasqual ends the history of Lullism proper. After him, with the publication of the Catalan works, begun with the poetry in 1859,[91] and the bibliographical work of Littré and Hauréau in 1885,[92] begins the era of modern scholarship.

[91] *Obras rimadas de Ramon Lull*, ed. Gerónimo Rosselló (RD 412). This was not followed up till the *Obras* of 1901–3 and the *ORL* of 1905–50.

[92] In their article in *HLF*, so admirable bibliographically and so objectionable in its attitude towards the Art (cf. Yates, "Art," pp. 117 and 154).

THE BOOK OF THE GENTILE AND THE THREE WISE MEN

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Introduction

THE *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men* should be seen not only as Llull's most important apologetic and polemical work, but also as part of a long tradition of such works. To take the second aspect first, it was only natural that Judaism, Christianity, and Islam should feel defensive in each other's presence. All three were of Near Eastern Semitic origin, all three were revealed religions (or religions "of the Book," as the Muslims put it), and all three had major struggles trying to assimilate Greek thought. Moreover, ever since the Jewish diaspora and the Muslim conquest of so much of the Mediterranean basin, they lived in close proximity to one another or, as in the case of Spain, actually intermingling. The intent to convert others was natural under such circumstances.

The specific sources, however, of Llull's *Book of the Gentile* are difficult to establish, and the difficulty has only been compounded by his statement in the prologue that he wrote it "following the manner of the Arabic *Book of the Gentile.*" Some critics have held that this referred to a previous Arabic version by Llull of this work; others have claimed, more reasonably, I feel, that he must be referring to a work by a predecessor.[1]

The fact is, however, that no one knows what book he is referring to. Some scholars have suggested Judah Halevi's *Kitāb al-Khazari* (*Sefer ha-Kuzari* in Hebrew), one of the best known apologetic and polemical works of the Middle Ages. Although indeed written in Arabic, it was a work of Jewish polemics, and the form is very different from that of the *Gentile.*[2] One scholar has sug-

[1] See Prologue, n. 4, for further details regarding this passage.

[2] It was translated into Hebrew, less than thirty years after it was written (see n. 5 below for the date), by Judah ben Tibbon, and again somewhat later by Isaac ben Judah Cardinal. See the introduction to the English translation by H. Hirschfeld (London and New York, 1905). Based on the historic fact of the conversion of the Khazars to Judaism, it opens with three perfunctory dialogues of the Khazar king with a philosopher, a Christian, and a Muslim occupying a page or two each, while the remaining 250 pages are occupied with the rabbi's discourse on Judaism, with only occasional questions from the king. As the Spanish Hebraic scholar J. M. Millás Vallicrosa has pointed out in his edition of Llull's *Liber praedicationis contra Judaeos* (Madrid and Barcelona, 1957), pp. 23ff. (which see for earlier bibliography on the subject), the form of this work is very different from that of the *Gentile.* As I hope to have shown in my "Notes," n. 28, the form of *al-Khazari* is much closer to that of another work of Llull's, the *Liber super Psalmum "Quicumque vult,"* for which is might well have served as a model.

gested a work on the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian religions by the Persian historian Mohammed Shahrastani, called the *Book of Religions and Philosophical Sects*. Although more a historical and comparative treatise, this is probably the work with the fewest obstacles as a model for the *Gentile*.[3]

If we were to assume that the phrase "the Arabic *Book of the Gentile*" did refer to an earlier version by Llull himself, then a possible model for *that* work would no longer have to be sought among treatises written in Arabic. This would throw open the door to other possibilities, such as Peter Abelard's *Dialogus inter philosophum, Judaeum et Christianum*, which bears certain resemblances to Llull's work.[4]

None of these, however, seems to offer a really satisfactory solution to the problem; they are also relatively early predecessors.[5] In the thirteenth century the political situation in Spain brought on a new demand for apologetics. As I pointed out in the General Introduction, in the space of twenty-two years (1226–48), Muslim possessions were reduced from a third of the entire Iberian Peninsula to the area covered by the petty kingdom of Granada. This sudden absorption of new lands had a different effect on the crown of Aragon than on Castile. In the latter, a nation of 3 million

[3] English edition by W. Cureton, 2 vols. (London, 1842–6). Cf. Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 19. If we consider works written in Arabic, but from the Christian point of view, then there are two other possibilities involving the *Liber Alchindi* or *Alquindi* and *Liber Telif*, which Llull mentions in the *Liber de fine* (Palma, 1665, p. 102; Gottron, *Kreuzzug*, p. 88). As Charles Lohr has shown in "Ramon Llull, Liber Alquindi and Liber Telif," *EL* 12 (1968), 145–60, the first most probably refers to a treatise entitled *Risālat al-Kindī*, and the second perhaps to one known as the *Contrarietas alfolica*, but in neither case does their form bear the slightest resemblance to that of the *Gentile*. For the broader background of Christian polemics written in Arabic, see not only the aforementioned illuminating article by Lohr, but also the classic work on the subject by M. Steinschneider, *Polemische und apologetische Literatur in arabischer Sprache*, Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes VI,3 (Leipzig, 1877, and recently reprinted).

[4] Cf. R. Brummer, "Un poème latin de controverse religieuse et le 'Libre del gentil e los tres savis' de Ramon Llull," *EL* 6 (1962), 275–6. The Latin text has recently been edited by R. Thomas, *Petrus Abaelardus: Dialogus inter Philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum* (Stuttgart, 1970), and even more recently translated by J. Payer, *Peter Abelard: A Dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew and a Christian* (Toronto, 1979).

[5] All three were written within ten years or so of one another: Judah Halevi's work in 1130–40, Shahrastani's at about the same time, and Abelard's in 1141–2, toward the end of his life (he left it unfinished). These dates follow closely on the first period of Christian recovery in the face of Islam (and hence of further intermingling of the different religious groups) with the Norman conquest of southern Italy and Sicily, with the Spanish conquest of much of the central tableland of the Iberian Peninsula, and with the First Crusade, all at the end of the eleventh century.

conquered some 300,000 people in Andalusia, with the resultant increase of only 10 percent in population; whereas Aragon and Catalonia, with a combined population of half a million, found that in Valencia alone they had taken on 150,000 people, representing an increase of 30 percent.[6] Ideologically, the reaction to this situation in the Crown of Aragon was a peculiarly specific one, set in motion by the Dominicans, at the instigation of their third master general, St. Ramon de Penyafort, and his disciple, Ramon Martí. A brief table of their activity in the field of missions, polemics, and apologetics should give some picture of the situation.[7]

ca. 1245	Ramon de Penyafort organizes, in Tunis and Murcia, and perhaps Majorca, schools of Arabic and Hebrew studies for missionaries.
1256–57	Ramon Martí writes his *Explanation of the Creed.*
1260	Ramon Martí writes his *Summa against the Errors of the Koran.*
1263	Ramon de Penyafort is present at the famous disputation of Barcelona, between Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides) and Fray Pablo Cristiá, which is held in the Royal Palace in the presence of King James I.[8]
1264	Ramon de Penyafort and Ramon Martí are members of the commission formed to supervise the implementation of restrictive measures adopted in the wake of the disputation.
1267	Ramon Martí writes his *Capistrum Judaeorum.*

[6] Gabriel Jackson, *The Making of Medieval Spain* (London, 1972), p. 94.

[7] An excellent modern summary of this movement, with bibliography of previous works on the subject, can be found in R. I. Burns, "Christian-Islamic Confrontation in the West: the Thirteenth-Century Dream of Conversion," *The American Historical Review* 76 (1971), 1386–1412, 1432–4.

[8] See Cecil Roth, "The Disputation of Barcelona (1263)," *Harvard Theological Review* 43 (April 1950), 117–44; the translation of the Hebrew text of the debate in O. S. Rankin, *Jewish Religious Polemic* (Edinburgh, 1956), pp. 177–235; and Robert Chazan, "The Barcelona 'Disputation' of 1263: Christian Missionizing and Jewish Response," *Speculum* 52 (1977), 824–42. For further bibliography, see L. Robles, *Escritores dominicos de la Corona de Aragón, Siglos XIII-XIV* (Salamanca, 1972), pp. 66–7, and for the general background, with special reference to Ramon Martí, Ca I, 42–54 and 147–70. For a possible influence of the dispute on Llull, see n. 55 to the "Life" above. For more on Llull and Martí, see J. Cohen, "The Christian Adversary of Solomon ibn Adret," *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, N. S. 71 (1980), 48–55.

1268–69 Ramon Martí, in Tunis, is unsuccessful in his attempts to convert the sultan, al-Mustansir.[9]

1270–72 Saint Thomas Aquinas, at the request of Ramon de Penyafort (a request transmitted by Ramon Martí, who had been a fellow student with Aquinas under Albert the Great), writes his *Summa contra Gentiles*.[10]

1278 Ramon Martí writes his *Pugio Fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos*.

This was the *general atmosphere* in which Llull conceived his apologetic and polemical mission; but his *concrete* relation to these three men and their writings is difficult to determine. We know that Llull met Penyafort, but we do not know how much or what sort of specifically missionary impulse the aging Dominican gave the young convert.[11] As for Ramon Martí, Llull surely knew of his teachings, but all we can say with reasonable certainty is that he seems to have disapproved of Martí's missionary methods.[12] As for Aquinas, any connection seems unlikely, especially since the latter's great apologetic works were still so recent when Llull, out

[9] According to the *Liber de fine* (Palma, 1665), pp. 52–4, this was when the incident recounted above in "Llull's Thought", n. 21, took place. Llull even states there that if Martí had been successful, Saint Louis's subsequent crusade to Tunis in 1270 would not have been the disaster it was, but rather the beginning of the recuperation of the Holy Land.

[10] The date traditionally given for Aquinas's work was 1259–64, but Pierre Marc in his introduction to the edition of the *Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium, qui dicitur Summa contra gentiles*, Vol. I (Turin and Paris, 1967), proposed the new dates. As Burns says (n. 7 above, p. 1409), "There now seems little doubt that Aquinas used Martí's earlier *Capistrum* (1267), while Martí later drew upon the *Contra gentiles* for his own *Pugio*." It is only fair to say, however, that J. A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino, His Life, Thought and Work* (New York, 1974), pp. 131 and 360, disagrees with this new chronology and prefers the traditional dates to Marc's, which he finds "far from convincing," without offering, it must be said, many convincing counterarguments of his own.

[11] See the "Life," § 10 and n. 59 above.

[12] See again "Llull's Thought," n. 21 above. The fact that Llull, a man normally so unwilling to criticize others, repeats this story no less than seven times surely signifies a strong condemnation on his part of Dominican methods, or at least a strong implication that the Art could deal with precisely those problems that had caused the Dominicans' failure. In addition to the passage from *Felix* given in the note cited, and to that in the *Liber de fine* cited in n. 9 above, the story is told in the following works: *Blaquerna*, ch. 84 (the problem of conversion by both faith and reason is discussed in a more general way in ch. 43; cf. the long note in the *ENC* edition, Vol. IV, pp. 37–9); the *Book of the Five Wise Men*, *MOG* II, 126–7 = Int. iv, 2–3; *Disputatio fidei et intellectus*, *MOG* IV, 480 = Int. viii, 2; *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto*, *MOG*, IV, 574 = Int. xi, 4; *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. E. Longpré in *Criterion* 3 (Barcelona, 1927), 276–7. The last of these passages is reproduced at the beginning of the article by Ephrem Longpré, "Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí, O. P.," *BSAL* 24 (1933), 269–71, repr. in *EL* 13 (1969), 197–200, in which he identified the missionary in question as being Ramon Martí.

of touch with Parisian scholastic developments, started elaborating his system (i.e., the Art) for proving Christian doctrine, and started writing the *Book of the Gentile*. We do know, however, that at some point Llull became acquainted with the *Summa contra Gentiles*, as he cites it in a work writted in 1309,[13] but when this contact took place is still unknown.

In discussing possible sources and parallels, however, we must not forget, as mentioned before, Llull's very special outlook, with his almost mystical belief in the Art as an instrument of persuasion and conversion. For it is important to realize to what extent the *Book of the Gentile* is based on the methodology of the Art.[14] Rather than give a general outline of this dependence here, I suggest the reader turn to the introduction to the *Ars demonstrativa* for an idea of the components of the Art, and then use the notes I have provided to the text here for specific points of comparison. In this way he will gradually become aware of how the *Gentile* is built on the structure of the Art, how it uses the Art "to confound the erroneous opinions of unbelievers by means of cogent reasons."[15] At the same time, this increasing awareness will provide him with a relatively simple introduction to the functioning of the Art.

The *Book of the Gentile*, however, is not a work *of* the Art, but rather a popular presentation of Llull's apologetic arguments in accordance with the method and structure of the Art. It has no charts or symbolic notation, and the whole mechanism is sugar-coated by Llull's literary skill and his continual emphasis on the humanity of the four disputants. We have the Gentile's tears of sadness at the beginning and of joy at the end; the Jew's sorrow at the successive captivities of his race; and the Saracen's assertion of the temporal efficacy of his religion (resulting in the Muslim possession of the Holy Land). Then, too, there is the aspect of

[13] *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto*, *MOG* IV, 572 = Int. xi, 2. The date of the work, however, is uncertain; four MSS give 1304, four give 1308, and eight (along with most modern authorities) give 1309 (see Stegmüller's introduction to the Minerva reprint of *MOG* IV). Note that this is one of the works mentioned in the previous note as containing a criticism of Aquinas's former fellow student, Ramon Martí. In the *Excusatio Raymundi* of 1308 he also mentions Aquinas (along with Richard of Middleton and Giles of Rome); cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 183, and Pla II, 148*–9*, n. 13.

[14] Cf. Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 22, n. 84; Millás Vallicrosa (n. 2 above), pp. 24–7, and my "Situación." Note that in the *Liber de fine* (Palma, 1665), p. 114, Llull himself refers to the *Gentile* as a work of the Art, albeit a "special" one.

[15] Cf "Llull's Thought," p. 69.

this work on which so many have commented, the exquisite courtesy of the participants towards one another. Perhaps, as has been suggested, Llull simply wished to offer a model of how such discussions should be conducted. Perhaps he also hoped in this way to make his Christian convictions more acceptable to his Muslim and Jewish adversaries. His tact even leads him to introduce an ending most surprising in a piece of medieval polemical literature.

This mixture of the very abstract reasonings of the Art with the literary and psychological skills Llull could use so effectively is what gives this book its unusual flavor. This mixture is also, undoubtedly, what makes the book a success *as a whole*, without all of the individual parts being necessarily so successful. The reasonings of the Art, for instance, are more interesting in Books I and III, and less so in Books II(that of the Jew) and IV (that of the Saracen), where sociological considerations (i.e., Llull's presentation of popular Judaism and Islam) are more interesting. The Saracen's final description of Paradise, for example, is surprisingly beautiful when one considers that it was written by a man horrified at such a purely sensual conception of Heaven.

As was stated at the beginning, the *Book of the Gentile* is not only Llull's most important apologetic and polemical work, it is also his most general one. He wrote other works defending the Articles of Faith, all or in part,[16] or producing counterarguments to the doctrines of the Jews,[17] of the Muslims,[18] or of dissident Christian sects,[19] but none of these presented the three major re-

[16] For works written on the articles of faith, see Bk. III, n. 3, below, and for those written specifically on the Trinity and Incarnation, see n. 8 of the same Bk. III.

[17] *Liber praedicationis contra Judaeos* dating from 1305 (see n. 2 above). The work is in the form of fifty-two sermons, presumably one for each week of the year.

[18] *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, for which see the "Life," § 40 and nn. 163 and 165. There is also the interesting but as yet unpublished *Liber per quem poterit cognosci quae lex sit melior, major et verior* finished in February 1313, written for Christian merchants trading in Muslim countries, enabling them to answer and not be tempted by the arguments of Muslims and Jews. Cf. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 316; Hillg, pp. 245 and 393; and E. Colomer, in *EL* 12 (1968), 138.

[19] There is the brief *Liber de Sancto Spiritu* written shortly after the *Book of the Gentile*, in which two Christians, one Latin and the other Greek, meet in a similar setting, a tree next to a fountain where Lady Intelligence is watering her palfrey, and who even refers them to the *Book of the Gentile*. The Gentile himself, however, is here replaced by a Saracen who wants to know which of the two sects he should choose.

More important is the *Book of the Five Wise Men* of 1294, which consists of a dispute between a Catholic, a Greek, a Nestorian, and a Jacobite, who are then joined by a Saracen. The point of their discussion is to try to iron out differences among various Christian sects in the face of the possible danger of the Tartars (i.e., the Mongol rulers of Persia) converting to Islam.

ligions together, allowing each to give its arguments in detail.[20] For this reason we may suppose that this work was conceived for use in Llull's missionary school at Miramar.[21]

A good indication of the importance Llull himself accorded the work is the number of times he referred to it and recommended it to his readers in later works.[22] That his disciple Thomas le Myésier shared the same conviction is evidenced by the pivotal role the work plays in the *Electorium*, where it forms the centerpiece of the central seventh part, toward which the rest of the anthology is directed, and which deals with "the knowledge and love of God and the salvation of all men."[23]

Exactly when Llull wrote the *Book of the Gentile* is a question on which no two critics have agreed. The problem has been complicated by what I think are misunderstandings about supposed references to the work in the *Book of Contemplation*, about Llull's statement that he wrote it "following the manner of the Arabic *Book of the Gentile*," and about the statement at the end of the French manuscript that it was "translated from Arabic into Latin, Romance, and Hebrew." If I have been successful in showing that the first two refer to another, non-Lullian work, and that the last is merely one of the many howlers of the French manuscript,[24] then we can take more literally the statement at the end of the Latin and Spanish versions[25] (along with the evidence in the structure of the work itself) that it was written as part of the first cycle of the Art, dependent on the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*,

[20] With the possible exception of the *Liber super Psalmum "Quicumque vult,"* but here, as in the *al-Khazari* (see n. 2 above), the rival religions, in this case Judaism and Islam, are dispatched in a page or so each.

[21] See my "Situación," pp. 54–5. The date and purpose of the work, along with the importance Llull clearly accorded it (see the following note), all make this use most probable.

[22] Ibid., pp. 49ff. The ten citations of the *Gentile* are surpassed only by citations of general and basic works of the Art (in addition to the *Tree of Science*), made for evident methodological reasons. None of the other apologetic works come near to the Gentile in importance: the *Book of the Five Wise Men* is cited three times, and the others once or not at all.

[23] For the *Electorium*, see "Lullism," text at n. 22 above. Notice too that it is the only work allotted an illustration—a magnificent two-page miniature, for a discussion of which see text at n. 34 below.

[24] See my "Cronologia," pp. 35–8 and 44, where this whole question is discussed in detail.

[25] See the phrase in square brackets at the end of the Epilogue and the corresponding note.

and therefore after the illumination of Randa.[26] If it was written as a text for Miramar, this would place its composition between 1274 and 1276.

Translations, Manuscripts, and Editions

The popularity of the work is attested not only by the number of manuscripts in which it is preserved, but also by the fact that we possess medieval translations of the work from the original Catalan into Latin, French, and Spanish.

As can be seen from Table 2, the French translation is preserved in a single manuscript, P. Although it dates from Llull's lifetime, it is so hopelessly full of mistakes as to be almost useless.[27] It has, however, been edited twice: partially in the early nineteenth century,[28] and completely in more recent times by Armand Llinarès,[29] who has made a valiant attempt to sort out at least some of the many errors of the original.

The Spanish translation, done in 1378 by a certain Gonzalo Sánchez de Uceda, is of a far higher quality and in fact constitutes an important element for textual comparison. The single manuscript, C, has been transcribed by H. R. Stone in a doctoral dissertation.[30]

The Latin translation, which dates from Llull's lifetime and which was undoubtedly done by someone connected with his circle in Paris, is preserved in sixteen manuscripts. The oldest of these, manuscript L, since it dates from around 1300 (not long after the translation) and since it belongs to one of a group of

[26] And within that cycle—for which see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 15 above—it has a particularly close relationship with the *Principles of Theology*; see my "Situación," p. 52, n. 10.

[27] Moreover it is missing a large section of Bk. III, that corresponding to pp. 207–52 below, which constitutes almost a quarter of the entire work. For the unreliability of the MS, see my "Cronologia," p. 36 and n. 17.

[28] BK. IV appeared in the *Roman de Mahomet, et Livre de la loi au sarrazin*, ed. Reinaud and F. Michel (Paris, 1831; see RD 396).

[29] Raymond Lulle, *Le Livre du gentil et des trois sages: version française médiévale complétée par une traduction en français moderne* (Paris, 1966). The last part of the title refers to the missing portion of the MS, which Llinarès has supplemented with a translation from the Catalan text of *OE*.

[30] Stone, *Gentil*. As I hope to be able to show in my forthcoming Catalan edition of the *Gentile*, another MS of this Spanish translation usually cited as being in the Biblioteca Nacional of Madrid, not only disappeared from that library in the nineteenth century, but is undoubtedly to be identified with the one now in the British Library, who acquired it from an English bookseller in 1843.

TABLE 2. MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITIONS OF *THE BOOK OF THE GENTILE*

Century	*Catalan*	*Latin*	*French*	*Spanish*
13th–14th		L = Paris, B.N. lat. 16114	P = Paris, B.N. fr. 22933	
14th	O = Oxford, Bodleian, Can. It. 147 F = Palma, Bibl. Publ. 1071 S = Palma, Sapiència olim F.129	L^1 = Berlin, Staatsb. lat. 465 L^2 = Munich, CLM 10497 L^3 = Palma, Bibl. Publ. 1062 L^4 = Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732	E = Paris, B.N. lat. 15450	C = London, B.M. Add. 14040
14th–15th	D = Palma, Bibl. Publ. 1025	Oxford, Bodleian, Arch. Seld. B.25		
15th		Rome, Vat. lat. 9344 Rome, Bibl. Casan. 1414 Mainz, Stadtb. II, 234 Salamanca, Bibl. Univ. 1875		
17th	Palma, S. Francisco 4 (a copy of S)	Munich, CLM 10594	Munich, CLM 10564 Munich, CLM 10575 Paris, Mazarine 3501 Paris, Mazarine 3506	

TABLE 2. *Continued*

Century	*Catalan*	*Latin*	*French*	*Spanish*
18th		*MOG* II, 1722		
19th			*Roman de Mahomet*, Paris, 1831	
20th	*Obras* I, 1901 (Rosselló) *OE* I, 1957		Llinarès, *Gentil*, Paris, 1966	Stone, *Gentil*, diss. 1965

NOTE: No manuscripts or editions of *The Book of the Gentile* were produced in the sixteenth century.

codices belonging to Llull's Parisian disciple Pierre de Limoges, is of undeniable authority.[31]

From this source there developed two clear manuscript traditions, represented by the two Latin columns in the table. The left-hand column contains the manuscripts descending directly from L, and includes the text of the Mainz edition (*MOG*), which probably derives more immediately from one of the manuscripts now in Munich.

The right-hand column represents the tradition descending from manuscript E, which is the *Electorium* of Thomas le Myésier.[32] This uses the text of L, with the following changes:

1. The entire prologue was replaced by a long introduction written by le Myésier, using some material from Llull's prologue, some from a work by Jean Quidort de Paris, and some of his own invention.[33]

2. Instead of five miniatures with one tree each, we have here a magnificent two-page spread with all five trees, the Gentile, the three wise men, and the woman on horseback (whose name le Myésier changed from Intelligentia to Sapientia).[34]

[31] For Pierre de Limoges and the group of MSS to which this one belongs, see "Lullism," n. 25 above.

[32] For the *Electorium*, see n. 23 above.

[33] Le Myésier entitled this introduction *Parabola Gentilis iuvans ad disponendum christicolas*. For details of its contents, see Hillg, pp. 386 (item 118) and 243–4, and for a transcription of part of the text, pp. 439–45.

[34] The number of flowers are greatly reduced, and the first tree does not even have the proper binary combinations—just one dignity per flower. See Prologue, n. 12, for more information.

3. The introductory paragraphs of Books II–IV were removed, their substance appearing as a series of three charts embedded in le Myésier's introduction.[35]

4. The last third of the Epilogue was removed.[36]

The Catalan original was first edited by Gerónimo Rosselló,[37] but defectively. He did not know of the existence of the best manuscript, O, and made little use of F,[38] basing his text on S, which is less reliable than either, and comparing it with D, which has many mistakes and isolated, nonsensical readings.[39] At the same time, he compared it with the Latin text of the Mainz edition, and where he considered some of the latter's readings preferable, he would retranslate the eighteenth-century Latin text back into Old Catalan and substitute it for the original, occasionally adding his own improvisations. Rosselló's text, as the only one available, was reproduced in the *Obres essencials* edition, along with a certain number of typographical errors and an occasionally excessive modernization of language.[40] This text was also used as the basis for the Spanish translation of the parts of the work that appeared in Batllori's *Antología*, and for the French translation of other parts that appeared in Sala-Molins's *Choix*.

Given this state of affairs, I thought it best to establish a new text based on O, comparing this manuscript throughout with F and S, and with the other manuscripts appearing with sigla on the accompanying table for variants of importance. I will warn the reader whenever this translation differs substantially from the available printed texts, but as briefly as possible, so as not to overburden the notes with material perhaps of interest only to the specialist. For less important textual changes, I refer the scholar to my forthcoming edition of the Catalan text.

[35] See the corresponding sections below, and the notes where I have translated le Myésier's charts.

[36] See n. 3 there.

[37] In *Obras* I (1901).

[38] Possibly because F lacks the first 8 folios (see Bk. I, n. 10 below). Towards the end, perhaps realizing his mistake, he began to use F a bit more.

[39] D does, however, derive from the same source as C (the Spanish MS), making the latter a valuable, and in fact often preferable, source for this branch.

[40] When, in the notes, I give a reading of Rosselló's, the reading of *OE* is to be taken as identical, unless expressly stated to the contrary.



The Tree of the Divine Virtues

PLATE VII. *The Book of the Gentile*, Tree 1.
Adapted from Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732.



Tree of the Created and Uncreated Virtues

PLATE VIII. *The Book of the Gentile*, Tree 2.
Adapted from Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732.



Tree of the Divine Virtues and the Seven Mortal Sins

PLATE IX. *The Book of the Gentile*, Tree 3.
Adapted from Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732.



The Tree of Virtues

PLATE X. *The Book of the Gentile*. Tree 4.
Adapted from Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732.



The Tree of the Virtues and Vices

PLATE XI. *The Book of the Gentile*, Tree 5.
Adapted from Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1732.

SUPREME HIGH GOD, honorable in all honor, with Your blessing, grace, and help, and with a view to honoring and serving You, I begin this book called the *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men.*[1]

PROLOGUE

SINCE for a long time we have had dealings with unbelievers[2] and have heard their false opinions and errors; and in order that they may give praise to our Lord God and enter the path of eternal salvation, I, who am blameworthy, despicable, poor, sinful, scorned by others, unworthy of having my name affixed to this book or any other,[3] following the manner of the Arabic *Book of the Gentile*,[4] wish to exert myself to the utmost—trusting in the help of the Most High—in finding a new method and new reasons[5] by which those in error might be shown the path to glory without end and the means of avoiding infinite suffering.

Every science requires words by which it can best be presented, and this demonstrative science needs obscure words unfamiliar to laymen;[6] but since we are writing this book for laymen, we will here discuss this science briefly and in plain words. Trusting, however, in the grace of He who is the fulfillment of all good, we hope to be able to enlarge on this book, using this same method, but with words more appropriate to men of letters, lovers of speculative science. For it would be an

[1] This is how the invocation is worded in the two best Romance MSS (O, C) in which it appears. Rosselló's version is a free retranslation into Old Catalan of the elaborate and much expanded medieval Latin rendering!

[2] See "Life," text at nn. 17–21 above for the Muslim and Jewish population of Llull's Majorca.

[3] This self-abasement is characteristic with Llull in his early works. In spite of this passage's nature of a *topos* of Christian humility, it may well be, as suggested in Hillg, p. 31, n. 151, autobiographical in origin (see the "Life," § 11 and n. 62).

[4] It seems to me, from the wording, that Llull is here referring to a work by another author. The idea that he is referring to an earlier Arabic version by himself of this same work has received support more apparent than real from a passage in the Epilogue of the untrustworthy medieval French translation (see n. 8 of the Epilogue here). For a discussion of the possibility that the work referred to here is the same as the *Book of the Gentile*, also called the *Book of Questions and Inquiries*—a work surely not by Llull—mentioned in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 77, 3; 188, 24; 366, 18, see the first part of my "Cronologia."

[5] That is, the Art and necessary reasons, for which see "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 41 and 76 above.

[6] Notice Llull's consciousness of the difficulties inherent in the vocabulary necessary for his Art. Cf. Riquer, *Història* I, 245–6.

injustice to this science and to this Art not to demonstrate it with a suitable vocabulary, nor to explain it with the subtle reasonings by which it is best demonstrable.

This work is divided into four books. In the first book we prove that God exists, that in Him are contained the flowers of the first tree, and that the Resurrection exists. In the second book the Jew tries to prove that his belief is better than those of the Christian and the Saracen. In the third book the Christian tries to prove that his belief is worthier than those of the Jew and the Saracen. In the fourth book the Saracen tries to prove that his belief is worthier than those of the Jew and the Christian.

By divine dispensation it came to pass that in a certain land there lived a Gentile[7] very learned in philosophy, who began to worry about old age, death, and the joys of this world. This Gentile had no knowledge of God, nor did he believe in the Resurrection, nor did he think anything existed after death. Whenever the Gentile thought about these things, his eyes filled with tears and weeping, and his heart with sighs and sadness and pain, for he was so fond of this worldly life, and he found so horrible the thought of death and the notion that after death he would be nothing, that he was unable to console himself or stop crying, nor could he drive the sadness from his heart.

While in the midst of these thoughts and tribulations, the Gentile conceived in his heart the idea of leaving his land and going to a foreign land, to see if he could find a remedy for his sadness. Once there, he chose a path that took him into a great forest full of springs and lovely fruit-bearing trees by which the life of the body[8] could be sustained. And in this wood there were many wild beasts and many birds of different kinds, and he therefore decided to remain in that secluded place to see and smell the flowers, and because he thought that the beauty of the trees, of the springs, and of the river banks[9] might bring him

[7] In the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 72, Llull defines Gentiles as "people without religion, and who have no knowledge of God," some of whom "worship idols, others the sun, moon, and stars, others beasts and birds, and others the elements." They are "Mongols, Tartars, Bulgars, Hungarians from Lesser Hungary, Kumans, Nestorians, Russians, Ghanians, and many others." The Gentile here, however, has more in common with Abelard's philosopher (see the introduction above) than the above list of more or less primitive peoples might imply. Note that later on (p. 197 below) he is referred to as a "master" of philosophy; cf. Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 101.

[8] Rosselló mistranscribed the *cors* ("body") of all the sources as *cor* ("heart").

[9] Thus, *riberes*, in all sources save D, from which Rosselló got his *erbes* ("grasses").

some relief from the grievous thoughts which so tormented and afflicted him.

When the Gentile was in the depths of the wood and saw the river banks and the springs and the meadows, and that in the trees birds of different kinds were singing so sweetly, and beneath the trees there were roe deer, red deer, gazelles,[10] hares, rabbits, and many other beasts pleasing to the eye, and that the trees were laden with flowers and fruits of sorts which gave off pleasing scents, and when the Gentile tried to console and cheer himself with what he saw, heard, and smelled, there came to him the thought of death and of the annihilation of his being, and then pain and sadness increased in his heart.

While the Gentile was in the midst of these thoughts, by which his sadness was increased and his torments multiplied, a desire came to him to return to his native land; but he realized that such thoughts and sorrow as he suffered could not be driven from his heart without some help or chance occurrence. He therefore curbed his desire to turn back, and went on from spring to spring, from meadow to river bank, trying to find some pleasant sight or sound by which he could rid himself of his thoughts; but the farther he went and the more beautiful the places he found, the stronger the thought of death weighed down on him.[11]

The Gentile picked flowers and ate fruit from the trees to see if the scent of one or the taste of the other would bring him some relief; but when he remembered that he had to die, and that a time would come when he would be nothing, then his pain, tears, and tribulations were multiplied.

Amidst these tribulations the Gentile did not know what course to take, because of the great anguish his thoughts had brought him. He knelt down and raised his hands and eyes heavenward, and he kissed the earth; and while crying and sighing most devoutly, he said, "Alas, wretched creature! Of what wrath or pain have you become captive? Why were you conceived and brought into this world, if you can find no one to help you amid your tribulations? And if there exists something which has in itself such virtue that it can help you, why does it not

[10] See my "Cronologia," pp. 37–8, for the introduction of this animal and the word for it, both unknown in medieval Europe. I suggest there that the only reason for introducing such an exotic creature in a mere description of a *locus amoenus* is that Llull—at least in the more conventional parts of the book—was practically translating from the "Arabic *Book of the Gentile*" discussed in n. 4 above.

[11] For an interesting discussion of the Gentile's anguish at the thought of death, see Sala-Molins, *Amour*, pp. 100–5.

come and take pity on you? And why do you not drive from your heart those thoughts which never cease multiplying the grievous torments you suffer?"

After the Gentile had spoken these words, a desire entered his heart to leave, and to go from one place to another until he could find some relief. While wandering, like a man distraught, from one place to another through the wood, he came upon a lovely lane, which he decided to follow until he could find some solution to his state of anguish.

It happened that while the Gentile was walking along this road, three wise men met upon leaving a city. One was a Jew, the other a Christian, and the third a Saracen. When they were outside the city and saw each other, they approached and greeted each other in friendly fashion, and they accompanied one another, each inquiring about the other's health and what he intended to do. And all three decided to enjoy themselves together, so as to gladden their spirits overtaxed by studying. The three wise men went on so long talking about their respective beliefs and about the things they taught their students, that eventually they came to that same forest in which the Gentile was wandering. And they came to a lovely meadow with a lovely spring watering five trees, the same five trees depicted at the beginning of this book.[12]

Next to the spring there was a very beautiful lady,[13] very nobly dressed, astride a handsome palfrey, which was drinking from the spring. The wise men, upon seeing the five trees, which were most pleasing to the eye, and upon seeing the lady, who was of agreeable countenance, went up to the spring and greeted the lady most humbly and devoutly, and she most politely returned their greetings.

The wise men asked the lady her name, to which she replied that she was *Intelligence*. And the wise men asked her to explain to them the

[12] Like the illustrations reproduced here, medieval MSS invariably have (unless cut out by unscrupulous hands) five separate miniatures with one tree each, with the human figures distributed according to the artist's taste (or removed altogether as in L and L^4), and occasionally with the "conditions" (see n. 17 below) included. For le Myésier's idea of putting five simplified trees in a single miniature, see n. 34 to the introduction above; this miniature appears on facing folios (457^v–458^r) of E (reproduced in *OE* I, facing p. 1056), and this was the representation the Mainz editors took over, probably, as suggested in Hillg, p. 386, through the intermediary of one of the seventeenth-century copies of the *Electorium* such as CLM 10564, for the illustration in *MOG* II (reproduced in Yates, "Art," p. 154).

[13] Rosselló has "damsel" from D; all other sources, however have "lady," a reading confirmed by subsequent references to her. Notice also that le Myésier changed her name from Intelligence to Wisdom (see n. 34 to the introduction above).

nature and properties of the five trees, and what was the meaning of the writing on each of their flowers.

The lady replied, saying: "The first tree, on which you see twenty-one flowers, represents God and His essential, uncreated virtues, which virtues are written on the flowers, as you can see.[14] This tree has, among others, two conditions. One is that one must always attribute to and recognize in God the greatest nobility in essence, in virtues, and in action; the other condition is that the flowers not be contrary to one another, nor one be less than another.[15] Without knowledge of these two conditions, one cannot have knowledge of the tree, of its virtues, or of its works.

"The second tree has forty-nine flowers, on which are written the seven virtues of the first tree and the seven created virtues,[16] by means of which the blessed achieve eternal blessedness. This tree has, among others, two conditions. The first is that the created virtues be greater and nobler where they most strongly symbolize and demonstrate the uncreated virtues; the second condition is that the uncreated and created virtues not be contrary to one another.

"The third tree has forty-nine flowers, on which are written the seven virtues that are on the first tree, along with the seven vices, that is to say, the seven deadly sins by which the damned go to eternal fires. This tree has, among others, two conditions. The first is that the virtues of

[14] See the miniature. Twenty-one because we have a combination of seven concepts taken two at a time, or

$$\binom{7}{2} = \frac{7 \cdot 6}{1 \cdot 2} = 21.$$

As for the seven concepts, they are the so-called dignities, for which see "Llull's Thought," text nn. 28–34 above. Note the important definition of them as God's "essential, uncreated virtues," comparable to that in the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (*MOG* I, 434 = Int. vii, 1) where Llull states that "we do not say that [these virtues] are cardinal, nor theological, nor that they are accidental, but essential."

For the tree symbolism common in Llull's popularizing offshoots of the Art, see p. 65 above, as well as Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 6, n. 4, where it is pointed out that, as opposed, for instance, to the *Tree of Science*, in which the whole tree is used as a functional symbol of the interrelation of concepts, here only the flowers are used. They are, moreover, used exclusively as a popularizing substitute for the "compartments" of the Art; cf. Bk. I, n. 1 below and the references given there.

[15] Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 104, observes that the conditions of this first tree are given in typically Anselmian terms.

[16] The three theological and four cardinal virtues, which can be combined with the seven "uncreated virtues" in $7^2 = 49$ ways, and similarly for the seven deadly sins of the next tree. Note that these virtues and vices constitute Figure V of the Art (see the *Arts demonstrativa*, Dist. I, Fig. V).

God not be concordant with the vices; the second is that everything which causes the virtues of God to be better represented to the human understanding by means of the vices should be affirmed, and that anything contrary to the above-mentioned greater representation, or which lessens the contrariness between the virtues of God and the sins of man, should be denied, excepting cases of conflict with the conditions of the other trees.

"The fourth tree has twenty-one flowers, on which are written the seven created virtues. This tree has, among others, two conditions. The first is that none of these virtues be contrary to another; the second is that whatever enhances them or, by their agency, causes man to have greater merit, must be true, and the contrary must be false, provided it not conflict with the conditions of the other trees.

"The fifth tree has forty-nine flowers on which are written the seven principal created virtues and the seven deadly sins. This tree has, among others, two conditions. The first is that the virtues and vices not be concordant with one another; the second is that the virtues most contrary to the vices be most lovable, and the vices most contrary to the virtues be most detestable.

"The above-mentioned ten conditions are themselves governed by two other conditions or principles. One is that all these conditions be directed toward a single goal; the other is that they not be contrary to this goal. And this goal is to love, know, fear, and serve God.[17]

"These conditions govern the flowers, which are principles and doctrine to rectify the error of those who have no knowledge of God nor of His works, nor even of their own beliefs. Through a knowledge of these trees, one can console the disconsolate and calm those in anguish. And by these trees one can subdue temptation and purify the soul of guilt and sin; and by the use of these trees—for someone who knows

[17] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 72–74. Note that in later works Llull always refers to the "ten conditions of the *Book of the Gentile*," tacitly omitting these last two somewhat different "meta-conditions," which bring the total up to twelve. These references, moreover, show the extraordinary importance Llull attached to them. In the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, v. 287, for example, he writes: "Tell me, fool: in what way can you know that the Catholic faith is true and that the faith of Jews and Saracens is false and wrong?—He replied: In the ten conditions of the *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men*." Earlier in *Blaquerna* (ch. 24) he had even stated that they could be used to elect an Abbess! (For similar references in other works of Llull's, see my "Situación," p. 53.) His disciple le Myésier evidently agreed as to their importance, for in the margin of the *Electorium* he wrote: "In these conditions of the trees lies the entire virtue of all of Ramon's Arts" (cf. Hillg, p. 386).

how to pick their fruit—a person can escape infinite pain and achieve everlasting peace."[18]

When the lady had spoken these words to the three wise men, she took leave of them and went on her way; and the three wise men remained by the spring, beneath the five trees; and one of the wise men began to sigh and to say: "Ah! What a great good fortune it would be if, by means of these trees, we could all—every man on earth—be under one religion and belief, so that there would be no more rancor or ill will among men, who hate each other because of diversity and contrariness of beliefs and of sects! And just as there is only one God, Father, Creator, and Lord of everything that exists, so all peoples could unite and become one people, and that people be on the path to salvation, under one faith and one religion, giving glory and praise to our Lord God.

"Think, gentlemen," the wise man said to his companions, "of the harm that comes from men not belonging to a single sect, and of the good that would come from everyone being beneath one faith and one religion. This being the case, do you not think it would be a good idea for us to sit beneath these trees, beside this lovely fountain, and discuss what we believe, according to what the flowers and conditions of these trees signify? And since we cannot agree by means of authorities, let us try to come to some agreement by means of demonstrative and necessary reasons."[19]

The other two agreed to what this wise man had said. And they sat down and began to study the flowers on the trees and to recall the conditions and the words the lady had spoken to them; and they decided to hold their discussion according to the manner the lady indicated to them.

Scarcely had they begun their discussion, however, when they saw coming toward them the Gentile who was wandering through the forest. He had a long beard and long hair, and he came like a man exhausted, and he was thin and wan from the pain of his thoughts and the long journey he had made. His eyes streamed with tears, while ceaselessly his heart sighed and his mouth moaned. And because of the

[18] There follows in *MOG* II, 24–5 = Int. ii, 4–5, a long paragraph beginning "Ait ergo Sapientia . . . " and ending " . . . in praehabita figura" (transcribed in *Obras* I, 10, n. 4) which is not by Llull. It is part of le Myésier's introduction to the *Gentile* (note how the woman is called *Sapientia*) and appears at the top of the left-hand page (fol. 457^{v}) of the miniature of the *Electorium*.

[19] Llull's apologetic method in a nutshell, including the use of "necessary reasons"; cf. "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 19–23, and 76 above.

great anguish of his suffering, he was thirsty and needed to drink from the spring before he could talk to or greet the three wise men.

When the Gentile had drunk from the spring and had recovered his breath and spirit, he greeted the three wise men in his language and according to his custom. And the three wise men returned his greeting, saying they hoped that the God of glory, who was Father and Lord of all existing things, and who had created the whole world, and who would resuscitate the righteous and the wicked, would protect, console, and help him in his suffering.

When the Gentile heard how the three wise men greeted him, when he saw the five trees and read what was written on their flowers, and when he saw the peculiar bearing of the three wise men and their peculiar clothing, then he began to think things over and to wonder greatly at the words he had heard and at what he saw.

"Good friend," said one of the three wise men, "where have you come from and what is your name? You seem to be suffering and disconsolate over something. What is wrong, and why have you come to this place, and is there some way in which we can console and help you? Let us know what is on your mind."

The Gentile answered, saying he had come from distant lands, that he was a Gentile, that he had been wandering about this forest like a man out of his wits, and that chance had brought him to this place; and he recounted the pain and affliction which temptation[20] had brought him. "And since you have greeted me, invoking for me the help of God, who created the world and who will resuscitate men, I am filled with wonder at this greeting of yours, for I have never heard anyone speak of the God you mention, nor have I ever heard anyone speak of resurrection. And whoever could explain or prove the resurrection to me by convincing arguments would banish the pain and sorrow from my heart."

"What, my good friend!" said one of the wise men, "You do not believe in God nor have hope of resurrection?" "No, my lord," replied the Gentile, "and if it is something you could explain in such a way that my spirit would have knowledge of the resurrection, please do it; for, as you surely know, my grievous sorrow comes from feeling the approach of death and believing that after death I will be nothing."

20 "Temptation," which, although missing in Rosselló, is in all the best sources, should here be taken in the older sense of "test, (painful) trial." Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 108.

When the wise men heard and understood the Gentile's error and how he suffered because of that error, then charity and pity entered their hearts, and they decided they would prove to the Gentile that God existed and had in Him goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love and perfection;[21] and they would prove these things by the flowers that were on the five trees, thus giving him knowledge of God and His virtues, and of resurrection, and thus gladdening his heart and putting him on the path to salvation.

One of the wise men said: "What method shall we use to prove these things? Perhaps it would be best to follow the method shown us by the Lady of Intelligence.[22] But if we use all the flowers to prove these things, it will take too long. I therefore propose that we use only some of the flowers to investigate and prove God's existence, the existence in Him of the above-mentioned seven virtues, and the existence of the resurrection. One of you could begin by the first tree and use it in your proof; and the next get his proof from the second tree; and so on, in order, until we have, by the five trees, proved and demonstrated to the Gentile what he needs to know."

The other two wise men agreed to what the third had said, and one of the wise men began, saying: "Which of us will begin?" Each of them wanted to be polite and give the other the honor of beginning. But the Gentile, seeing them arguing among themselves and not starting, begged one of the wise men to begin, for he was most distressed at their delay in beginning something he so desired.[23]

[21] These are the dignities written on the flowers of the first tree. Normally in this period of Llull's production they are sixteen in number (see "Llull's Thought" text following n. 14 above), but here he reduces them to seven to be able to combine them more easily with the seven virtues and seven vices. Note that the same seven dignities reappear in the *Principles of Theology*, a work, as I have said (n. 26 to the introduction above) closely related to the *Book of the Gentile*.

[22] Thus in the best sources; only D (followed by Rosselló) and the Latin sources have the more expected "by Lady Intelligence."

[23] As Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 104, n. 19, points out, Llull is purposely vague about which wise man is speaking when what is under discussion are the beliefs common to the three religions. And it is precisely this common ground that is explored in the following Bk. I; cf. pp. 59–60 above, as well as Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, p. 25.

HERE BEGINS THE FIRST BOOK

THE FIRST TREE

1. Goodness Greatness[1]

"IT IS CLEAR to the human understanding that good and greatness accord with being;[2] for the greater the good, the more it accords with essence, or with virtue, or with both together. And evil and smallness, which are contrary to good and greatness, accord with nonbeing; for the greater the evil, the more it accords with lesser rather than with greater being. And if this were not the case, and the contrary were true, it would follow that everybody would naturally prefer nonbeing to being, and evil to good; and they would prefer lesser to greater, and lesser being to greater being. But this is not true, as reason demonstrates to the human understanding, and as bodily vision shows us in its representation of visible things.

"Sir," said the wise man to the Gentile, "you see that all the good which exists in plants, living things, and all other things of this world is limited and finite. Now, if God were naught, it would follow that no good would be in accord with infinite being, and that all existing good would be in accord with finite and limited being, and infinite being and nonbeing would be in accord with one another. Since, however, finite good accords with lesser being and infinite good with greater being (because infinity and greatness are in accord, as are finiteness and smallness); therefore it is re-

[1] These "flowers" containing binary combinations of Lullian constants are identical to the "compartments" of the Art, as found, for example, in the headings of *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II. The only difference is that in a more popular work such as the *Gentile* they are not written inside a little box; they are, however, similarly written without the connecting "and", *pace* the Latin versions and Rosselló. Cf. also Prologue, n. 14, Bk. III, nn. 10 and 15; and the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1, n. 4.

[2] Notice how "it is clear to the human understanding" corresponds to the letter *C* of the Figure S (see Tables 4 and 5 of the *Ars demonstrativa*), how "good" and "greatness" (along with all the other concepts of the first tree) belong to Figure A, "accord with" to Figure T, and "being" to Figure X. Such correspondences continue throughout the work, but from now on I will point out only a few of those that seem most significant.

vealed and demonstrated that if finite goodness, which is lesser and in accord with nonbeing, is in being, how much more fitting, without any comparison, that there should exist an infinite good and that it be in being. And this good is, my dear friend, our Lord God, who is the sovereign good of all goodness, without whose being there would follow all the above-mentioned inconsistencies."[3]

2. *Greatness Eternity*

"If eternity were naught, then everything which exists would necessarily have a beginning, and if everything which exists had a beginning, it would follow that beginning was its own beginning. Yet, as you can see, my good friend," said the wise man to the Gentile, "this is something to which reason will not consent. For everything that has a beginning must take its beginning from something which has neither beginning nor end, which thing is God of glory, as we will show you by the following argument:

"You see that the sky moves, and that night and day it turns around the world. Now, everything which moves must be limited and finite in size; therefore you can see that the size[4] of this world is finite. Thus, since eternity is in disaccord with beginning and end (for if it had a beginning and an end it would not be eternity), therefore it is demonstrated that eternity is much more in accord with greatness, which is infinite, than with the world, which is of finite and limited size. Hence, just as the size of the world is in accord with limitedness, so it is in accord with beginning; and it would accord with end, that is to say with nonbeing, if it were not sustained by the eternal, infinite greatness which gave it beginning. This being the case, therefore, it is clear that eternity,

[3] This is the classic proof of the existence of God by means of the degrees of perfection or of being, with a long history from Plato to Aquinas, and often used by Llull. Cf. Colomer, *Edad media*, pp. 69–70.

[4] The original has *quantitat*, which is, of course, the Aristotelian category. In the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 396), Llull defines it, however, as "that by which things are measured, such as the length, breadth, and depth by which a body is measured, or such as the way, by means of two or three or more, we measure numbered things," which corresponds quite closely to the first meaning given in the *OED*, "Size, magnitude, dimension," as well as to the original more strictly numerical Aristotelian meaning. Cf. also Bk. II, n. 7 below.

which is more in accord with infinite than with finite greatness, is that God we are seeking."

3. Eternity Power

"It is evident that eternity and power are in accord with being, for if that which is eternal did not have the power to be eternal, it would follow that, through lack of power, it would not be eternal. And if eternity did not, through its own power, have eternal existence, and were sustained[5] in its existence by some power which was not eternal, it would follow that greater power would lie in those things which had a beginning rather than in those which were eternal, and that is impossible; by which impossibility is proved God's existence, which is eternal by His own power, from which power there issues forth influence and grace upon the souls of men and upon angels, that they may last eternally."

The Gentile answered, saying that it might be possible for the world to be eternal and to have within itself the power to be eternal. The wise man, however, demolished his argument by saying that just as the world, through lack of power lacked infinite size, so, by lack of power, its limited and finite size was in disaccord with eternity, which has no beginning or end.

4. Power Wisdom

"It is true that power, wisdom[6] are in accord with being, for without power, wisdom would not have the wherewithal to exist. Now, just as power, wisdom are in accord with being, their opposites, lack of power and ignorance, are in accord with nonbeing. For if they were in accord with being, it would follow that power, wisdom would be in accord with nonbeing, and if this were the case, things that have power, wisdom would naturally want to have lack of power and ignorance, in order to have being, and this is not true. Thus, if lack of power and ignorance are in being,

[5] The "were not sustained" of *Obras* I, 19, is corrected at the back of the volume, a correction overlooked in *OE* I, 1061a.

[6] Note the lack of "and" between paired Lullian constants in the text as well as the headings (cf. n. 1 above), a usage as unusual in Old Catalan as in modern English, and which will reappear again and again in this text.

even though they are in accord with nonbeing, then all the more reason for power, wisdom to have their being in something that has no lack of power nor any ignorance—which thing is God, for in all other things there is a lack of perfect power and of perfect wisdom."[7]

5. *Wisdom Love*

"Wisdom, love are in accord with being, for the more wisdom knows[8] about being, the more love can love that being.

"In another way, wisdom, love disagree in being, for wisdom knows what being it is that love does not love; and there are certain things wisdom knows, which love would prefer wisdom not know; and there are certain things which wisdom knows are worthy of being loved, but which love does not love; and there are certain things which wisdom knows are unworthy of being loved, but which love loves.

"In another way, wisdom, love disagree in being, for that which wisdom cannot know, love can love in the light of faith; and there are certain things which wisdom can know through tempered will, which it cannot know through excess of fervor or insufficiency of will. Thus, since wisdom and love are in accord with being, but disagree in being, if such wisdom, love have being in human being, then all the more reason for them to have being in some other thing in which they would be in accord and not opposed to one another—which thing is God. And if God were nothing, it would follow that wisdom and love would not be better in accord with being where they could not oppose one another than where they could oppose one another, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is proved that God exists."

6. *Love Perfection*

"Love, perfection are in accord with being; and being and perfection are in accord with one another, as are nonbeing and defect.

[7] Note the two important concepts of Figure X: (1) *perfecció*, with its synonyms *accabament* and *compliment*, always translated into Latin as *perfectio*; and (2) *imperfecció* or *defalliment* ("imperfection, lack, defect, deficiency"), translated into Latin as *imperfectio*, or more usually as *defectus*.

[8] In Catalan there is a repetition of the same root, *saviesa sab*, which balances with *amor més pot amar* of the following clause, a parallelism that is continued with great insistence and effect throughout this section.

Now, if nonbeing and defect are in accord with being and with perfection in man and in the things of this world, how incomparably more fitting it would be for being and perfection to be in accord in something that had no nonbeing or defect. And if this were not the case, it would follow that being and perfection could be in accord in nothing without their contraries, nonbeing and defect, also being present. But this is impossible, and by this impossibility it is demonstrated to the human understanding that there exists a God in whom there is no nonbeing or defect, and in whom there is being and perfection; for in man and in everything else there is nonbeing, in that there was a time when they did not exist, and there is defect, in that they do not possess every perfection; yet they do have some perfection, in that they are in being, which being is perfection in comparison with nonbeing.

"If there existed no being in which love and perfection would be in accord without nonbeing and defect, love would naturally love defect as much as perfection, since without defect it could not have being or fulfillment. But this is not true, and therefore it is shown that there exists a God, in whom love and being and perfection are in accord without nonbeing and defect. And if love and perfection are in accord in a being which has privation, that is, nonbeing, and has defect, it is because of the influence, or rather, the abundance of God, which is in accord with being, perfection without any nonbeing or defect.[9]

"By the above-mentioned six flowers we have shown and proved God's existence, and by proving God's existence, we have proved in Him the existence of the above-mentioned flowers, without which God could not have existence. Now, since He exists, it necessarily follows that the flowers, that is to say, His virtues, exist. And, just as we have proved God's existence by the above-mentioned flowers, we could as well have proved it by the other flowers of the tree. But since we want to make this book as short as possible, and since we still have the Resurrection to

[9] "Being" and "nonbeing" (with its synonym "privation"), added to the "perfection" and "defect" of n. 7, constitute the most important subset of Figure X in this cycle of the Art; cf. the tree of the *Principles of Medicine* as well as Dist. 1, n. 13 there. See also, for these four concepts, "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 66–7 above; Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 40; and W. W. Artus, "*Esse* and the author of the *Liber contemplationis in Deum*," *EL* 21 (1977), 145–71, and especially p. 164.

prove, there is no need to exemplify God's existence by the other flowers of this tree. Instead, by five flowers of this tree we will prove the resurrection, which could as easily be proved by the other flowers of the tree. Insofar, however, as the essence of God is concerned, we do not mean to imply that the flowers have any diversity; it is only in relation to us and to our understanding that they present themselves as diverse, by the diversity of their actions."

7. *Goodness Eternity*

"The goodness of God is eternal, and the eternity of God is the goodness of God. Now, since eternity is a much greater good than something that is not eternal, if God has created man's body to be everlasting, there is even greater goodness in the purpose (that is to say, the reason for which God created the human body) than would exist if the body had an end (that is to say, nonbeing), after which it did not exist. This being the case, if man's body rises up again and lasts forever after the Resurrection, God's goodness and eternity will be exhibited in greater nobility and in greater results. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, one should attribute greater nobility to God, therefore it necessarily follows, according to divine, eternal influence,[10] that through that influence there come grace and blessing to the human body, by which it may achieve resurrection and be everlasting to the end of time."

8. *Greatness Power*

"In nature, greatness and power are in accord, for by nature a grain of seed brings back a plant or tree of its lineage; yet it does not bring back that same tree, but another. And the same thing occurs with the generation of men, and of beasts, and of birds, for by nature a man issues forth from a man and woman by generation, and one beast from another; yet it does not bring back the same man who has died, nor the same beast, but another man and another beast.

[10] Here begins MS F. For a facsimile of the first folio preserved, see J. García Pastor, J. N. Hillgarth, and L. Pérez Martínez, *Manuscritos lulianos de la Biblioteca Pública de Palma* (Barcelona–Palma, 1965), p. 72.

"Now if nature had such great power that it could cause that same man and that same beast and that same tree which has died to return to life, it would have greater power than it really has. Thus, if God did not resuscitate that same man who dies, He would not demonstrate His power to be greater than that of nature; but since His power is greater than the power of nature, if He did not do that which would show His power to be greater than that of nature, it would be contrary to His very power, to His love, perfection, goodness, wisdom, and the other flowers of the tree. This, however, is inconsistent; by which inconsistency it is shown that the Resurrection will take place and that the body itself will rise up, in order to show that God has greater power than nature."

When the Gentile had heard these words and recalled the other proofs given previously, cheer entered his troubled soul and his heart began to rejoice; and he therefore asked the wise man if the beasts and birds would also rise up from the dead. The wise man replied that they would not, because neither beasts nor birds had the use of reason, or of free will; and if they did rise up from the dead, God would be acting against His justice and His wisdom, and this is contrary to the conditions of the trees.

9. Eternity Wisdom

"As we have already said, eternity and power are in accord, and power and wisdom are in accord, and therefore eternity and wisdom must necessarily be in accord; for if they were contrary in God, then eternity would be against the power that is in accord with wisdom, and wisdom would be against the eternity that is in accord with power, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is clear that eternity and wisdom are in accord, by which accord it is shown that God knows Himself to be eternally wise in matters of justice; for if He knew that He were unjust, He could not consider himself eternally wise. Now, since there are many evil men whom God does not punish in this world, and since many saintly men in this world, for love of God and for the sake of charity and justice, do penance and sustain hunger, thirst, cold, torments, death, and receive no reward in this world, therefore is the resurrection made manifest; for just as man is that thing which does good or evil in this world, so justice should reward or punish that

thing which is man; which thing would not be man if it had anything less than a human body, and justice would not be in accord with the flowers of this tree, and the flowers would be contrary to one another."[11]

10. Power Love

"Sir," said the wise man to the Gentile, "the love residing in man can love as much as it wants to want, but it cannot have as much as it can want; and therefore it is demonstrated that the will can more readily love than have that which it wants to have.[12] Now if, in man, power and love were in accord, so that the will could have everything it could want, there would follow greater concordance, perfection, and equality in man's being than there is now when the will does not have the power to have everything it can want. Thus, since greater concordance and greater perfection and greater equality are more in accord with being than are lesser concordance, perfection, and equality, it follows that if in being there exist lesser concordance, perfection, and equality, then in being there must exist greater concordance, perfection, and equality. If this were not the case, there would follow disaccord between being and greater; and lesser, defect and inequality would be more in accord with being and greater, perfection and equality, which is impossible; for if it were possible, greater and nonbeing would be in accord, as well as lesser and being, which is inconsistent. By this inconsistency it is shown that there must necessarily exist something in which power, love can be mutually in accord, and where love can want and have everything it can want;[13] and that something can properly only be God, for nothing else could have as much as it could want."

[11] The added "if the resurrection did not exist" of the Mainz edition (and which Rosselló faithfully retranslated into Old Catalan), although in none of the sources, at least seems to represent Llull's intended meaning.

[12] Llull is here ringing more changes (see n. 8 above) on linguistic roots, an effect often lost in translation. There are (1) *poder* ("power") and *pot* ("can"), (2) *amor* ("love") and *amar* ("to love"), (3) *vol* ("wants"), *voler* as a verb ("to want"), and *voler* as a noun synonymous with *volentat* ("will" in the sense of "desire, wish"). Note that among the last two, *amor* and *volentat* are often interchangeable in the list of Lullian dignities. Note also that the last word in the sentence is "have" in all sources except S (followed by Rosselló), which has "love."

[13] Thus in all sources except the Mainz edition (followed by Rosselló) which has "everything that power can want."

11. Wisdom Perfection

"The more perfect the work, the more evident is the wisdom of the master who made it. Now if God has created man with the intention that he rise up from the dead and be eternal, then God's intention in creating man was nobler than it would have been had He created him with the intention of his not being eternal. And the nobler the intention and the greater the consideration it betrays, the greater the work is shown to be, and by the greatness and nobility of the work the greater wisdom of the master is made much more evident. Thus, since, according to the condition of the first tree, one should attribute greater nobility to God, and since by this greater nobility the Resurrection is made manifest, therefore the Resurrection is provable and demonstrable."

When the wise man had proved that God exists, that He has in Him the flowers of the first tree, and that the Resurrection must also exist, then the other wise man began to prove these same things by the second tree, and he chose some of its flowers to prove those same things the first wise man had proved by means of the first tree.

THE SECOND TREE

1. Goodness Faith

"Faith is a good thing, for through faith a man believes and loves that which his understanding[14] cannot understand; and if there were no faith, man would love nothing he did not understand. Now, since man cannot understand all things, and since the understanding is led to understand through faith, because through faith a man can love that which he does not understand; and when a man loves a thing and does not understand it, he wishes to understand it, and this desire makes him understand it sooner than he would if he did not desire it; for this reason, it is clear

[14] *Enteniment* ("understanding") is always translated into Latin as *intellectus*. Often this is best translated by the equivalent English "intellect," but in many cases such as this it would sacrifice the typically Lullian insistence on a semantic root (*l'enteniment no pot entendre* in Catalan; *intellectus non potest intelligere* in Latin). Occasionally also it has to be translated as "mind." Cf. *Felix*, Bk. II, n. 6, and Bk. VIII, n. 53. For the problem of faith vs. reason, which raises its head here, see above "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 22–23.

that goodness and faith are in accord. And since that disbelief[15] is a bad thing which disbelieves the truth that the understanding cannot understand (because it is contrary to faith, which is a good thing), it is therefore shown that, if God exists, the faith that believes it is greater and better, and the disbelief that disbelieves it is greater[16] and worse; and there is greater contrariety between faith and disbelief than there would be if God did not exist. Thus since, according to the condition of the fifth tree, greater contrariety between virtue and vice is more in accord with being than lesser, in order to make virtue and vice both seem greater, so that virtue be more lovable and vice more detestable, therefore it is shown and made manifest that God exists; for if God did not exist, it would follow that that by which virtue and vice were less divergent and diversified would be more in accord with being than that by which they were more diversified and opposed. And if this were not[17] the case, it would follow that virtue would not be so lovable nor vice so hateful. But since that by which virtue is more loved and vice more hated is in accord with being, and the contrary with nonbeing, therefore God is demonstrable to the human understanding, and on account of this divine being, faith, and the contrary of faith are more diverse and contrary one to the other."

2. *Greatness Hope*

"The greater a man's hope in God, the more is expressed his hope that in God there is greatness of goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, mercy, justice, and the other virtues[18] consonant with God. Now, if in God there were no greatness in these aforementioned virtues, hope could not bring about an increase in that greatness which places its hope in the virtues of God, but rather it would follow that the greater a man's hope in the

[15] *Descreença*, "disbelief" or "unbelief" in the sense of "lack of faith." The Latin version translates it as *infidelitas*, and later in the same sentence Llull refers to it as "contrary to faith." Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 63.

[16] Thus in most of the medieval sources; only S, C, and L^3 (followed by the Mainz editors and Rosselló) have "lesser."

[17] Of all the Romance MSS, only S (followed by Rosselló) lacks the negative.

[18] The Latin sources have "virtues or dignities". Note that he adds two to the seven normally used in the *Gentile* (see Prologue, text at n. 21 above) and ends the list with a vague reference to yet others.

virtues of God, the more his hope would be dissimilar and contrary to the virtues of God. And from this there would follow yet another inconsistency, which is that hope would be more in accord with greater quantity through that which does not exist, and with lesser through that which does exist. This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility it is revealed that in God there is greatness, that is to say, infinity of goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, mercy, justice; and by this greatness it is shown that these very virtues exist in God, for without them, the aforementioned greatness could not exist in Him."

3. *Eternity Charity*

"It is only right that man should have charity, that is, love of God,[19] since God is eternal. Thus, if man is resuscitated, and if through the influence of God's eternity man will live eternally in glory, the more lovable is God's eternity through man's charity towards God than it would be if man were finite and not resuscitable. And since the greatest concordance between eternity and charity is in accord with being, according to the conditions of this tree, and the least concordance (contrary to the greatest) is in accord with nonbeing; and since being and truth[20] are in accord, as are nonbeing and falsehood; therefore the Resurrection is shown to exist, since without it neither charity nor eternity would signify so great a concordance between God and creature,[21] as they do if the Resurrection exists."

4. *Power Justice*

"Power, justice are in accord with eternity; for thus God could judge creature eternally if the creature existed without a beginning,

[19] Note this definition of "charity." In the *Tree of Science* (*OE* I, 640) Llull defines it as that by means of which "men love God and His works, love one another and love themselves"; cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 65. At one time this meaning was not infrequent in English (cf. *OED*, s.v. charity, 1,b); in fact *caritas* was the usual translation of the New Testament Greek ἀγάπη.

[20] S (followed by Rosselló) has "charity," but all the other sources have "truth." Note that "truth" and "falsehood" constitute Figures Y and Z of the Art.

[21] "Creature" is interestingly defined in the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (*MOG* I, 477 = Int. vii, 45) as "that thing which has being after nonbeing." In Middle English it was similarly used without the definite article, in phrases such as "the bigynnynge of creature," thus applying not only to the thing created but also to the act itself of creation (see *OED*, s.v. creature). Note that it is one of the constituents of the blue triangle of Figure T of the Art (cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, Fig. T).

just as he could judge it eternally if the creature existed without an end. Now, if the Resurrection did not exist, it would mean that if creature could exist without a beginning, God could not, with the Resurrection, make eternal use of His justice. Thus, to show that God could use justice eternally without beginning in creature, if the creature could exist eternally without a beginning, wisdom, will, perfection, and the other divine virtues have ordained that the Resurrection exist, and that justice have the power to preserve the body eternally, even though in torment, and that it endure, so that God can make use of His justice with it. And since, by this, God's power and justice will be more demonstrable, therefore, according to the conditions of the trees, the Resurrection is demonstrable."

5. *Wisdom Prudence*

"Prudence is freedom of heart which knows how to, and wants to, choose good and avoid evil, or to choose greater good and avoid greater evil.[22] Now since, by the aforementioned property, prudence is in accord with virtuous being, how much more fitting that there exist concordance between wisdom and virtuous being, without wisdom having to exercise itself as wisdom by choosing good and avoiding evil or by choosing greater good and avoiding greater evil. For insofar as the choice of the aforementioned contraries is[23] in agreement with nonbeing, and lack of eternity is in accord with prudence, nevertheless—and even though prudence be in accord with nonbeing and imperfection—prudence exists. Thus, if prudence exists, how much more fitting it would be for wisdom to exist where it did not agree with nonbeing or with imperfection; for if it did not, it would follow that being and perfection would not be in accord with being,[24] and prudence and

[22] O, S, and P have "lesser evil," while F, D and the Latin sources have "greater evil," which latter reading seems preferable in view of the meaning and in view of the end of the following sentence. "Prudence" thus ethically defined is standard with Llull; see the text corresponding to Bk. III, art. 7, n. 42 below.

[23] One could also read, "For insofar as the choice of the above-mentioned contraries is concerned, it [i.e., wisdom] is."

[24] Thus in all the Romance MSS. The Latin MSS end "with being or in being." The Mainz editors omitted this addition, but changed the previous "being" to "wisdom," giving the more logical "wisdom and perfection would not be in accord with being," reading adopted by Rosselló.

imperfection would be in accord with being. But it is impossible for that which has less nobility to be better in accord with being than that which has greater nobility, since it is only natural for being and greater nobility to be in accord, as well as nonbeing and lesser. This being the case, therefore, it is clear that wisdom is in being; which wisdom is God, for no other wisdom exists without imperfection, which imperfection is in accord with nonbeing."

6. *Love Fortitude*[25]

"In the heart of man, love and fortitude are in accord, for through love a noble heart is made strong against evil and deception, which qualities are hated by love, which loves courtesy and good manners. Now, if in man love has a noble heart so strongly disposed against vice, and if man is a creature and mortal and full of defects, how much more fitting for there to exist love in God, and that through this love God be a lover of good and a shunner of evil. And if this were not the case, it would follow that man would be nobler in loving, in hating,[26] and in strength than God. This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility it is made evident to the human understanding that in God there exists love."

7. *Perfection Temperance*

"Temperance is midway between two extremes; by this is signified that temperance can be in accord with imperfection, in that it is possible that, through intemperance, it not be in fact midway between the above-mentioned two extremes. Now, if temperance is in accord with being and with perfection, bounded as it is by two extremes contrary to one another and contrary to it, how much more fitting that there exist some perfection which is not between extremes and which is infinite in goodness, greatness and the other flowers of the first tree. And if this were not the case,

[25] "Fortitude is that state or virtue by which men have strength against vices and strive to attain virtues"; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 638.

[26] The Latin Sources have "desiring."

it would follow that temperance, situated as it is between two extremes which are in accord with imperfection and with nonbeing, would be more in accord with being than perfection would be. This, however, is impossible; and by this impossibility is made manifest that perfection which is God and which is appropriate to nothing but God.

"The human body, insofar as it has a beginning and is mortal, is midway between beginning and end. Thus, if the body were not resuscitated, temperance would be in accord with lesser perfection, whereas it would be in accord with greater perfection if the Resurrection existed, and the greater the perfection of temperance, the greater is the significance given to God's perfection which created it. And since the significance which better demonstrates God's perfection should be granted and loved, the Resurrection is therefore an appropriate thing to be demonstrable and lovable."

THE THIRD TREE

1. Goodness Gluttony

The other wise man said: "Goodness and gluttony contrast with one another in the being in which they exist, for goodness conserves being and gluttony corrupts it; nevertheless, they exist in one and the same subject. Now, if goodness, which is a virtue, and gluttony, which is a vice, are in accord in man's being, how much more fitting it would be for goodness to exist in something where there was no vice nor any possibility of vice; for if this were not the case, it would follow that there would not be such great contrariety between good and evil, as there would be if good existed in something containing no evil. And since we should grant the greatest contrariety between good and evil, it is therefore shown that God exists; for if God did not exist, there would be less contrariety between good and evil. And if being were more in accord with lesser contrariety between good and evil rather than with greater, it would be possible for good and evil to be one and the same thing; but since this is impossible, it is therefore shown that God exists."

2. *Greatness Lust*[27]

"The greater the lust, the greater the sin; and the greater the sin, the more it is in disaccord with being. And if such were not the case, it would follow that chastity would not accord with being, or lust with nonbeing; this, however, is inconsistent, and by this inconsistency is revealed the existence of greatness in God. For if greatness can exist in lust and sin, which are in accord with nonbeing, how much more appropriate that divine greatness, which is in accord with being, exist in God.

"If in God there were not greatness of justice, who could punish man for great lust? And if the Resurrection did not exist, how would great lust be punished? And if, because of great lust, there can exist great injustice[28] in man, how much greater the chance that there exist in God great justice by reason of great goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection! This being the case, you should know, Gentile, that for all the reasons given above, it is shown that in God there is greatness and that the Resurrection will come; for if such were not the case, all the above-mentioned inconsistencies would follow."

3. *Eternity Avarice*[29]

"Avarice and generosity are contrary, and generosity and eternity are in accord; therefore avarice and eternity are contrary. Now, if the Resurrection exists, God's justice will punish physically and spiritually, eternally without end, the miser who dies in sin of avarice; and if the Resurrection does not exist, He will only punish him spiritually. And since it is worse to be punished

[27] "Lust is the vice that confounds carnal copulation by diverting it from the purpose for which it exists. For it is the purpose of carnal copulation to restore and multiply . . . the human species"; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 653–4. Its opposite is, of course, chastity; see also Tree 5, "Hope Lust" below, and *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 71.

[28] *Injúria* in the original, but Llull always uses this word in the older Latin sense (from *in-jurius* meaing literally "un-lawful" or "un-just") as the opposite of *justícia* (cf. n. 34 below, as well as *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 66).

[29] In addition to the more usual idea of avarice as causing "money to lay idle in the coffers of the miser, and wheat in granaries" (*Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 653), Llull gives it a more bluntly social definition in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 62: "Avarice is the amassing of things that are superfluous to any one person but necessary to the poor, of which things, through an insatiable desire, the poor are deprived, and by which deprivation the poor suffer hunger, thirst, cold, nakedness, illness, sorrow, and death."

both physically and spiritually than just spiritually, since the punishment is greater and since eternity, generosity are thus more in accord against guilt, avarice, therefore the Resurrection is revealed.

"If that by which God's virtues are more in accord against man's vices were not given necessary expression, then it would not be impossible for God's virtues to be in accord with creature vices. This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility is denoted the necessary significance existing in that by which is more greatly exemplified the accord among God's virtues for the use of creature against the vices existing in man."[30]

4. Power Accidie[31]

"Accidie dislikes public and private good, and for this reason accidie is contrary to charity, which loves public and private good. And since power and charity are in accord, then power and accidie must be in disaccord; for if they were not, it would follow that charity would not be in accord with power, or would not be contrary to accidie. But since power and charity are in accord, and power and accidie are in disaccord, if accidie is able to dislike good and to love evil, which is contrary to good, how much more appropriate that there exist some charity which has such great concordance with power that it can love good without being able to love evil. Now since such charity and such power could exist in nothing else but God, therefore God is demonstrable—God in whom there must exist the above-mentioned power and charity, in whom they could not exist unless God Himself existed."

[30] In order to deflect the reader's astonishment, if not help him in his perplexity, I give the original: "E açò és impossíbil; per la qual impossibilitat és significat que de necessitat és feta significansa necessària en so per què més és significada concordansa enfre les vertuts de Déu a uzar de creatura contra·ls vicis qui són en home."

[31] I use the older ecclesiastical term ("Li quars pechié de pereche, con apele en clerkois accidie," Ducange, s.v. *acedia*) because Llull himself always does, clearly distinguishing it from *peresa* ("sloth" or "indolence"), as in his *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 45, no. 1: "Accidie is indolence of the will that is negligent in loving God." His usual definition is even more clearly ethical: "Accidie is the vice by which men are lazy to do good, and take pleasure in the ills of others and sadness at their prosperity"; *Tree of Science*, *OE* 1, 654. Cf. Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 7, n. 11.

5. *Wisdom Pride*

"Pride and ignorance are in accord, for when a proud man, through pride, thinks himself nobler and more honored, he is in fact viler and more despised by others, and for this reason ignorance and pride are in accord. And since pride is in accord with ignorance, which is contrary to wisdom, therefore there is contrariety between wisdom and pride. Now, since ignorance is in accord with minority and with nonbeing, and wisdom is in accord with majority[32] and with being, it is therefore clear that wisdom must exist in some being in which there is no pride or ignorance; for if this were not the case, it would follow that wisdom would not be more in accord with being than pride, ignorance. Thus, wisdom without possibility of ignorance can exist in nothing except a being who is the perfection of goodness, power, love; and therefore it is shown that in God there is wisdom."[33]

6. *Love Envy*

"Love and justice are in accord, and since envy is in accord with injustice, which is contrary to justice,[34] therefore there is disaccord between love and envy. Now, since love is good and envy evil, we should accord them the greatest contrariety—the same by which good and evil are most contrary; for to grant such contrariety is to grant greater concordance between love, justice, against envy, injustice; and it is to grant that man has greater merit for having greater love, justice, and greater blame for greater envy, injustice than for lesser. Thus, to deny the existence of the Resurrection, is to deny the greater concordance of love, justice, and to deny greater merit, greater blame and greater punishment. But since to deny these things is inconsistent, according to the con-

[32] "Majority" and "minority" (along with "equality") constitute the yellow triangle of Figure T (for which see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1). The corresponding adjectives, which have already appeared frequently, are "greater," "lesser," and "equal."

[33] The beginning of this sentence is difficult in the original sources; Rosselló solved the difficulty by changing it to "Thus, wisdom can exist in nothing where there is possibility of ignorance except in a being . . . "

[34] *Injúria qui és contrària a justícia*; cf. n. 28 above.

ditions of the trees, therefore the Resurrection is made manifest to the human understanding."

7. *Perfection Ire*[35]

"Ire and charity are contraries, and charity and perfection are in accord, whence it follows that perfection and ire are contraries; for if they were not, it would follow that charity and ire were in accord, and if they were in accord, it would be possible for two contraries to be one and the same thing, which is impossible; for if different things which are condordant cannot be one and the same thing, insofar as they are different (and precisely because of this difference, even though they might be concordant and less than contrary), how much less can different things which are contrary and not concordant be one and the same thing. And if charity, ire could be one and the same thing, without ire being contrary to perfection, there would follow the possibility of charity, ire, and charity and perfection being equally in accord and disaccord in being one and the same thing in a given subject. Yet, since in a given subject perfection and created charity are in accord by a king of conjunction, and charity and ire are in disaccord by a kind of disjunction, it is therefore shown that perfection, ire give evidence of the Resurrection. For if the Resurrection exists, the more contrary is ire to God's perfection, in that ire, by the imperfection with which it accords, will be more punished than if the Resurrection did not exist; and the greater the punishment meted out to ire, because it accords with the contrary of perfection, the better God's perfection is demonstrated. Now, if God did not do that by which His perfection were better demonstrable, it would be contrary to His very perfection, and this is impossible; for which reason the existence of the Resurrection is made manifest."

When the wise man had proved and revealed to the Gentile the above-mentioned arguments by means of the third tree, then the other wise man began to prove them by means of the fourth tree.

[35] In the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 66, Llull defines ire as a "perturbation of thought that destroys accord between will and intelligence," which is similar to that in *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 9, def. 17, which in turn is repeated in the *Introductorium magnae artis generalis* (Lyon, 1635), p. 8, along with another more ethical definition: "Ire is the vice by which the will unthinkingly hates good and loves evil."

THE FOURTH TREE

1. Faith Hope

"Matter and form and generation are in accord with plurality and with unity:[36] with plurality by virtue of their difference, which is the difference between matter and form; with unity they are in accord because through generation they comprise one body and one substance. Yet matter and form and corruption are in accord with plurality and with the destruction of unity: with plurality they are in accord insofar as matter and form are different; with destruction of unity insofar as matter and form finally separate, by which separation the body is annihilated and ceases to exist. Now, this being the case, if God exists, faith and hope are in better accord in both plurality and in unity; in plurality insofar as each reveals itself as a greater and nobler virtue if God exists than if God does not exist; in unity insofar as together they unite the better to share the same object if God exists than if God does not exist. And since being should accord better with that with which unity and plurality are more in accord, and nonbeing should be in disaccord with being and plurality; and the contrary of unity should accord with nonbeing against being, it is therefore shown that it necessarily follows that the thing by which faith, hope are more in accord with being must exist, which thing is God, without whose being they could not accord as well as they do. And they would be more in accord with nonbeing than with being if God did not exist; for faith believing God to exist, and hope trusting in God, are greater than they are when faith does not believe in God, and hope does not trust in God. Thus, if God did not exist, faith, hope would be greater taking as object that which did not exist, than taking as object that which existed. Since, however, it is impossible for that which does not exist to give rise to nobler

[36] Some Lullian definitions of concepts used in this section are: "Matter is the passive subject that is possessed by form," *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 126, no. 1; cf. the *Ars brevis*, Part x, "Hundred Forms," no. 13. "Form is that which gives existence to a thing, as the soul gives existence to the body," *Taula d'esta Art*, *ORL* xvii, 393; cf. *Ars brevis*, loc. cit., no. 12. "Generation is the birth of substance in species, and corruption is the consumation of substance," *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 146, no. 1; cf. *Ars brevis*, loc. cit., no. 79. "Unity is that by which a single thing is single, and causes or produces a single thing; plurality is an aggregate of things in some way different from one another," *Introductorium magnae artis generalis* p. 10; cf. *Ars brevis*, loc. cit., nos. 3–4.

virtue than that which does exist, therefore God's existence is made manifest; for without His existence, nobility and multiplicity of virtues would be more in accord with that which does not exist than with that which exists, and that is not true."

2. *Hope Charity*

"Hope loves[37] through charity, and charity loves through hope; for the greater the hope, the greater charity should be, and the more a man loves that which he trusts, the more he loves greater hope. This being the case, it is therefore clear that just as bodily eyes see through the air, so, spiritually speaking, hope makes use of its properties through charity, and charity through hope. Now if in man, in whom there can exist the contrary of hope and of charity, hope has something to be in accord with, and charity has something to be in accord with, how much more fitting is it, without any comparison, that God's charity have something in God to be in accord with, such as goodness, greatness, and other flowers of the first tree. And if in God charity is in accord with these flowers, then it follows that they exist in God, as does charity. And if these flowers were not in God, charity would be nobler in man than in God. This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that in God there are virtues without which God could not be nobler than man."

Question. When the Gentile heard hope discussed in this way, he asked the wise man if hope exists in God.

Solution. The wise man replied, saying that hope could not be in God, for everything that is in God is God. And since hope partakes of faith, which is in accord with ignorance, therefore faith, hope are not in accord with divine being; for if they were, perfection would be in disaccord with goodness, greatness, and the other virtues of the first tree, which is impossible.

Question. "How," the Gentile asked, "can God give man hope if He himself has no hope?"

Solution. The wise man replied: "God can give man hope, body, money, and other things, without man's being those things that God gives him, or God's being that which He gives; and man can

[37] Thus in all medieval sources; the Mainz edition (followed by Rosselló), however, has "hope hopes."

give that which he is not, as when he gives money or other things, which are not man. In this way, and even more so, God can give those other things by way of creation and possession, just as man can give money, horses, castles, by way of possession. And for this reason God is superior to nature, which cannot give what it does not have."

3. Charity Justice

"Charity, justice are in accord against ire, injustice. Now, if in man, who is finite and in whom the contrary of charity and justice can exist, charity, justice are in accord against ire, injustice, then in God[38] charity, justice must necessarily be in accord against ire, injustice. Thus, if the Resurrection exists, there is greater concordance in God between charity, justice against the ire and injustice of the sinner who is guilty of bodily and spiritual misdeeds, than there would be if the Resurrection did not exist. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, one must attribute the greatest concordance to God, for this reason the Resurrection is made manifest."

4. Justice Prudence

"Justice and prudence are in accord with human existence, and human existence and eternity are not in accord, since eternity has no beginning or end, and human existence is in accord with beginning and end. Now if God did not exist, justice and prudence would have to be eternal, without human existence, or they would have to have begun by themselves or by some other thing that derived its beginning from a thing that began by itself. Yet since, without human existence, justice, prudence cannot exist in man, and since man has a beginning and an end by reason of being engendered and being mortal, and since nothing can begin by itself alone, therefore is made manifest the existence of God, who, by the act of creation gives a beginning and end to justice, prudence and gives them human existence as a subject."

[38] After "God," the Mainz edition (followed by Rosselló) adds "who is infinite (and) in whom the contrary of charity and justice cannot exist."

5. *Prudence Fortitude*

"If God exists, prudence can be more knowledgeable than if God does not exist; and fortitude can be more contrary to its contrary and can be greater if God exists than if God does not exist. For if God exists, it is possible to know infinite goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection; and if God does not exist, it would be impossible for infinity to be known in the above-mentioned things, since if God does not exist, nothing would be known as being infinite. And since being is in accord with greater prudence,[39] fortitude, and nonbeing is in accord with lesser prudence, fortitude, therefore it is clear that in God there is wisdom and strength, through the influence of which man has prudence and fortitude."

6. *Fortitude Temperance*

"If the Resurrection exists, then a noble heart can be more strengthened against sin and wrongdoing than if the Resurrection did not exist, for by expecting resurrection, a person sets his heart on bodily happiness without end in celestial glory. And since the greater the sin and wrongdoing, the better they accord with nonbeing and the more they are contrary to being, therefore it is shown that there must necessarily exist that by which wrongdoing and sin are more contrary to being and better in accord with nonbeing.

"If the Resurrection exists, temperance can be more firmly placed midway between two vices than if the Resurrection did not exist, by reason of man's desiring bodily happiness in glory and fearing infernal punishment. And since the midpoint that is more clearly and purely between two limits, which are vices, is farther from both extremes than is the midpoint that is not so perfectly tempered, therefore that by which temperance can be greater must necessarily exist, according to the influence and disposition of the flowers of the first tree. And if this were not the case, it would follow that the contrary of temperance would accord better with majority and being than temperance, and that temperance would

[39] Thus in all medieval sources; the Mainz edition (followed by Rosselló) has "wisdom."

accord better with minority and nonbeing than its contrary. This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility the Resurrection is made manifest."

When the wise man had proved the above-mentioned things by means of the fourth tree, the Gentile asked the other wise man to prove, by means of the fifth tree, God's existence, the existence in Him of goodness, greatness, and the other virtues, and the existence of the Resurrection. He wanted very much to know, however, if God had created the world, or whether the world was eternal or not. But the wise man replied that in the other books he would be shown that God created the world, and that the world had a beginning.

THE FIFTH TREE

1. Faith Gluttony

"If God did not exist, there would follow an inconsistency between being and circumstance and chance;[40] for if God did not exist, chance would be more in accord with being than circumstance. Yet since those things that take place by circumstance are more numerous and frequent than those that take place by chance, and since circumstance and being are in accord, as well as chance and nonbeing, therefore God's existence is made manifest, without whose existence there would be contradiction among the above-mentioned things.

"If God did not exist, faith would believe and disbelieve by chance, for there would be nothing to lead it to believe the truth nor to punish the soul for any wrongdoing, and by taking away its grace and forsaking it, the soul would believe falsehood. And since it is a manifest truth that the soul, by the light of some sort

[40] "Circumstance," which translates the Catalan *occasió*, appears here in the Latin version as *causa*, and at the end of the sentence as *occasio sive causa* (just *causa* in the Mainz edition). Note, however, the definition in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 165, no. 2: "Occasion is the instrument of cause and effect." It is therefore equivalent in Llull to "ground," "circumstance," or "opportunity." The following "chance" is a translation of the Catalan (and Spanish) (*a*)*ventura* and Latin *fortuna*. Both, however, have identical definitions: the Latin in *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, 480 = Int. vii, 48; and the Catalan in *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 95, as "that which happens by chance, without having been ordained by the mind." Cf. *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 61.

of grace, is led to believe the truth, and by guilt is made ignorant of the truth, therefore it is shown that God exists, who, with the light of Divine Grace, illuminates the soul so that it believes the truth, and who, because of the sins committed by the soul, forsakes it; as a result of which forsaking, the soul sometimes believes falsehood, thinking it to be the truth.

"The soul, in itself, has no virtue by which it can believe the truth, since its understanding does not understand by necessary reasons the truth it believes. Now when the soul believes something to be true, there must exist something nobler than the soul which helps it to believe that which, by its own powers, it could not believe, and that thing is God.

"Faith is virtue, and virtue and truth are in accord; and gluttony is a vice, and vice and falsehood are in accord; and since truth and falsehood are contraries, therefore faith and gluttony are contraries. Now if God did not exist, faith and gluttony would be equally in accord with chance, and if they were, the same would be the case with truth and falsehood; and because truth and being are in accord, as well as falsehood and nonbeing, therefore it is clear that God exists, by whose existence truth and being are in accord, as well as falsehood and nonbeing, by which accord faith is in accord with circumstance, and gluttony with chance, and the conditions of the trees are, as a result, also in accord."

2. *Hope Lust*

"It is evident that hope and spiritual things are in accord, and that lust and bodily things are in accord. Now if in God there is no goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, which are spiritual virtues, then hope, which is a spiritual virtue, would, in the soul of man, be in accord with greater nobility than in God. Now since this is impossible, it is therefore shown that God exists and has the above-mentioned virtues, without which man would be in accord with greater nobility and God with lesser, and that is contrary to the conditions of the trees.

"Lust and chastity are contraries: through chastity, hope awaits reward by merit of chastity, and for lust, justice gives fear of punishment by reason of guilt. Now if the Resurrection does not exist, the pleasure a man has from lust is greater than the bodily

reward he awaits, which would not exist without the Resurrection. And since hope, which is a virtue, is in accord with being, and luxury, which is a vice, is in accord with nonbeing, it is therefore shown that the Resurrection exists, in which man will derive bodily profit from chastity and punishment for lust. And if this were not the case, hope and lust would not be so contrary, and since the greatest contrariety[41] is in accord with being and the least with nonbeing, according to the condition of this tree, therefore the Resurrection is demonstrated."

3. Charity Avarice

"Charity and generosity are in accord; and since avarice is contrary to generosity, therefore charity is contrary to avarice, and avarice is contrary to charity. Now it is more contrary for avarice to be present in the same being in which there exists charity, than in a being in which there exists no charity. Thus if charity exists in man, in whom there also exists avarice, how much more fitting that charity exist in something in which there can exist no avarice, which thing is God. And if God did not exist, it would follow that being would have more to do with contraries than with noncontraries, which is impossible, since in one and the same being one contrary must be in accord with nonbeing and the other with being, or otherwise they would not be contraries.

"Charity and spiritual nature are in accord, and the soul, by its corporal nature, allows avarice to exist in it, in order to destroy order in action and habit. Now if God did not exist, bodily nature would all the better follow its own course, and it would be more in accord with truth than spiritual nature, with the result that the soul would be in accord with lesser nobility and the body with greater nobility. For if God did not exist, the soul would more often err in thinking of God and the next world and that which did not exist, than the body with its five bodily senses dealing with bodily things. Thus, since the soul is the form and complement of the body and the body is corruptible and mortal, therefore it is demonstrated that the soul is nobler than the body, because of which greater nobility it is in accord with greater truth than

[41] The Latin version helpfully adds, "between virtues and vices." For other numerous minor changes in these last two paragraphs, see my forthcoming Catalan edition.

the body, because of which greater truth God is made manifest, without whose existence the soul could not be so naturally in accord with being and with truth as the body."

4. *Justice Accidie*

"The human body is the means by which the rational soul is in accord with either merit or guilt; for without the body, the soul could have no merit through justice or guilt through accidie, since the body is the instrument by means of which the soul can make use of its virtues or its vices. Now if the Resurrection exists, and God causes to reign in glory that body which was the instrument of justice, and punishes in Hell that body which was the instrument of accidie, then God's justice is in accord with the justice of the just man, and God's justice is more contrary to the accidious man than it would be if the Resurrection did not exist. And if things were thus in accord, and this accord were not present in being, then this accord would be in accord with being and with nonbeing, and its contrary would also be in accord with being and with nonbeing. Each of these concordances, however, is a contradiction, which contradiction is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that the Resurrection will take place, from which event there follows no inconsistency."

5. *Prudence Pride*

"It is more impossible[42] for pride and the contrary of prudence to exist in man at the same time that prudence and humility exist in him, than it is for pride, prudence to exist in a stone; and if this were not the case, there would be no contrariety between the above-mentioned contraries. But since a stone is a body without a soul, it is impossible that there exist in it the contraries either of virtues or of vices; for if they did, it would be a body with soul. Now if there were something that made it impossible for imprudence and pride to exist in man, it would still be more impossible for imprudence and pride to exist in him than in a stone;[43]

[42] Thus in all medieval sources, except for S, which has the *im-* crossed out by a later hand. The Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) were the first to come out unequivocally for the positive.

[43] S, followed by Rosselló, has "for imprudence and pride to exist in a stone."

and this is because it is possible for the contrary of imprudence and pride to exist in man. This being the case, therefore, and since prudence and humility are in accord with being and their contrary with nonbeing, and since their contrary is accidentally in accord with being in order to make prudence, humility accord with nonbeing, and since prudence, humility are accidentally in accord with nonbeing by reason of their contrary being accidentally in accord with being, it is therefore clear that if pride imprudence, prudence humility have a subject in which they exist, then how much more, without any comparison, there must necessarily exist something in which wisdom, humility have their being, and in which neither imprudence nor pride can have being, and that thing is God. And if this were not the case, it would follow that a stone and bodies without a soul, or those with only an irrational soul, would be in accord with greater nobility and would be better in accord with being than man, insofar as a human being could not accord with being without[44] possibility of virtues and vices. But since man is of a nobler nature than creatures without a soul or with only an irrational soul, for the simple reason that he can be a subject for virtues, then there must exist some essence nobler than man, one which has virtues and cannot be subject to vices; and that essence is the God we are seeking."

6. Fortitude Envy

"Fortitude is a virtue and envy a vice, and since virtues and vices are contraries, therefore fortitude and envy are contraries. Thus, if in God there is goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, then the more similar is fortitude to God than if in God there were none of the above-mentioned virtues. And the more God is similar to fortitude, the more dissimilar and contrary He is to envy; for if He were not, it would follow that fortitude and envy would not be contraries. But since they are in fact contraries, and since fortitude and envy are more contrary to one another if in God there exist the above-mentioned virtues (because, as a result, fortitude is more similar to God and more contrary to envy), therefore it is clear that in God there exist the virtues of

[44] S, followed by Rosselló, omits "without," leaving a phrase one would have to translate as "accord with the existence of the possibility of virtues and vices."

the first tree, without which God and envy would not be as contrary as they are, nor would fortitude be as contrary to envy as it is. And since that by reason of which fortitude is more similar to God and more contrary to envy, and God is more contrary to vices and more similar to man's virtues, is something that must be granted (respecting the conditions of the first tree), it is therefore made manifest that in God there exist goodness, greatness, etc."

7. *Temperance Ire*

"Intemperance and ire cannot exist in the soul without the body, and intemperance and ire do not die in the soul of the sinner who dies in the sin of intemperance and ire; for if they died by the death of the body, they would more appropriately be similar to the body than to the soul. But since they are more in accord with the soul than with the body, according to the nature of corporal and spiritual things, and since the soul is immortal, therefore the guilt of intemperance, as well as ire, remains in the soul of the sinner. And because the body was the occasion for the soul's sinning, therefore the body should be resurrected and punished for intemperance, ire for as long as the soul shall last; and if this were not the case, it would represent a failure of justice, perfection in God, and there would not be such a great contrariety between temperance and intemperance, nor between charity and ire, as there would be if the Resurrection existed, and the conditions of the trees would be demolished. And because all these things would be possible if the Resurrection did not exist, and because they are in fact impossible, therefore the Resurrection is demonstrated and made manifest to the human intelligence."[45]

When the three wise men had proven to the Gentile, by the flowers of the trees, God's existence and the existence in Him of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and when they had made the Resurrection evident to him, and when the Gentile remembered and understood the reasonings exposed above, and when he looked at the trees and the flowers,

[45] The corrections to Rosselló's text in this paragraph are too numerous to give here; please see the variants in my forthcoming edition.

then a divine radiance illuminated his understanding, which till then had been in darkness, and made his heart desire salvation. And by God's virtue, the Gentile spoke these words:

"Alas, sinful creature! You who for so long have received divine gifts in this worldly life from the Lord on high, who gave you being, whose goods you have eaten and drunk, who gave you your clothing, gave you children, and gave you whatever wealth you have, who has kept you alive and has honored you among people, you have never, for a single day or even for a single hour, thanked Him for all these things, nor have you obeyed His commandments. Ah, miserable wretch! How you have been deceived by ignorance, which so clouded the eyes of your soul that you did not recognize that Lord who is so honorable, so glorious, so worthy of honors!"

When the Gentile had spoken these words, he felt his soul unburdened of the torments and sorrow with which error and lack of faith had so long and grievously tormented him. Who could recount the joy and happiness the Gentile felt, or tell you of the blessing he bestowed on the three wise men?

The Gentile knelt down on the ground, raised his hands heavenward, as well as his eyes, which were filled with tears and weeping, and with fervent heart he worshiped, saying: "Blessed may You be, glorious God, Father, and mighty Lord of all that is! I give You thanks for having deigned to remember this sinful man, who was at the door of infinite, eternal condemnation. I worship You, O Lord; I bless Your name and ask Your forgiveness. In You I place my hope; from You I await blessing and grace. If ignorance made me not know You, may it please You, O Lord, that the knowledge You have now instilled in me make me love, honor, and serve You, and that from now on, for the rest of my days, my bodily and spiritual strength be employed in nothing save honoring and praising You and in desiring Your glory and blessing, and that in my heart there be nothing but You."

While the Gentile was worshiping our Lord God in this way, to his soul came rememberance of his land, of his father, of his mother, and of the lack of faith in which they had died; and he remembered all the people living in that land who were on the path to eternal fire without realizing it, and on which they found themselves for lack of grace. When the Gentile remembered these

things, because of the compassion he felt for his father, his mother, his relatives, and all those who had died in his land and had lost the glory of God, he wept bitterly and said to the three wise men:

"Ah, wise men! You who have been blessed with the gift of grace, have you no pity for the many people who are in error and have no knowledge of God nor feel any gratitude toward God for the good they receive from Him? And you, whom God has honored so much more than others, why do you not go and honor God among people where God is dishonored, where nobody loves Him, nor knows Him, nor obeys Him, nor has hope in Him, nor fears His high dominion? For the sake of God, I pray you, gentlemen, go to that land and preach there, and indoctrinate me so that I may honor and serve God with all my power. And may it please you to teach me how, by the grace of God and by your doctrine, I may know and be able to lead to the path of salvation so many people who are on the path to eternal fire."

When the Gentile had spoken these words, each of the three wise men replied, saying the Gentile should convert to his respective religion and belief. "What!" cried the Gentile, "Are the three of you not of a single religion and belief?" "No," replied the wise men, "we differ as to belief and religion, for one of us is a Jew, the other a Christian, and the other a Saracen." "And which of you," asked the Gentile, "has the better religion, and which of these religions is true?" Each of the wise men answered, speaking one against the other, each praising his own belief and blaming the other for what he believed.

When the Gentile heard the three wise men arguing, and each saying that the other's belief constituted an error for which a person would lose the blessing of Heaven and go to infernal punishment, if formerly his heart had been full of ire and sorrow, now it was even more so, and he said: "Ah, gentlemen! How much happiness and hope you had given me, and how much sorrow you had banished from my heart! But now you have plunged me into much greater ire and grief than before, for then I had no fear of enduring infinite suffering after my death. But now I am sure that if I am not on the true path, every kind of punishment is waiting to torment my soul endlessly after I die. Ah, gentlemen, what stroke of fate is this which has lifted me out of the great error my soul was in, only to have it plunged back into even

greater griefs?" Having said this, the Gentile could not help crying, nor can I describe to you how disconsolate he was.

For a long time the Gentile was disconsolate and his soul was belabored by oppressive thoughts; but in the end the Gentile begged the three wise men as humbly and reverently as he could that they debate before him and that each give his arguments as best as he could, so that he could see which of them was on the path to salvation. The wise men answered, saying that they would gladly debate in front of him, and that in fact, before he had arrived on the scene, they had already thought about debating, in order to investigate and find out which of them was on the true path and which in error.

One of the wise men said: "How shall we organize this debate we would like to have?" One of the other wise men replied: "The best way to organize it, and that by which we can best and most quickly declare the truth to this wise and noble Gentile who so sincerely asks us to show him the path to salvation, is to keep to the method the Lady of Intelligence showed us, and with the flowers we used to prove to this wise man God's existence, the existence of virtues in Him, and the existence of the Resurrection, each of us should try to prove the articles in which he believes, and because of which he thinks he is on the true path.[46] And whoever can, according to his belief, make the articles in which he believes best accord with the flowers and with the conditions of the trees, will reveal and demonstrate that his belief is better than the others."

The other two wise men agreed with what this wise man had said. And since each wanted to honor the other, each hesitated to begin. But the Gentile asked which religion had come first, and the wise man said that of the Jews. And the Gentile therefore asked the Jew to be the first to begin.

Before beginning, the Jew asked the Gentile and his companions if they were going to raise objections to what he said; but upon the Gentile's suggestion, it was agreed among the three wise men that none would contradict the other while he was presenting his arguments, since contradiction brings ill will to the human heart,

[46] For an interesting note on articles of faith as the principal defining doctrinal points of a given religion, see Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 9, n. 20.

and ill will clouds the mind's ability to understand. The Gentile, however, requested that he alone be allowed to answer their arguments as he saw fit, the better to seek the truth about the true religion, which he so wanted to understand, and each of the wise men granted him his request.

HERE BEGINS THE SECOND BOOK [1]

First, the Jew prayed, saying, "In the name of the one, almighty God, in whom we place our hope of being delivered from our captivity." And when he had finished his prayer, he said that the articles in which he believed were eight, namely:

To believe in only one God.

The second article is to believe that God is the creator of all that is.

The third is to believe that God gave the Law to Moses.

The fourth is that God will send a Messiah who will free us from our captivity.

The fifth article concerns the Resurrection.

The sixth concerns the Day of Judgment, when God will judge the righteous and the wicked.

The seventh is to believe in heavenly glory.

The eighth is to believe in the existence of Hell.

When the Jew had enumerated his articles, he then began with the first article.[2]

[1] The rest of the title in Rosselló is another one of his retranslations from Latin into Old Catalan, a practice that kept him busy through the following list of articles and that I have silently corrected according to the best Catalan MSS. On the subject of Llull and Judaism, or the "Old Law" as he called it (cf. *Felix*, Bk. I, n. 49), see the interesting account in *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 69, as well as the *Liber praedicationis contra Judaeos*. The best modern studies are the introduction to the latter work by Millás Vallicrosa, and Eusebio Colomer's excellent, "Ramón Llull y el judaísmo en el marco histórico de la Edad media hispana," *EL* 10 (1966), 5–45, and 12 (1968), 131–44. See also Y. Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain* (Philadelphia, 1966), Vol. I, pp. 183–5, 417–18.

[2] I have been able to find no exact correspondence between this list of Jewish articles of faith and any historical list (see the entry in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*). The best seems to be that between these (listed first) and the famous thirteen articles of Maimonides (listed second), which is as follows: 1 = 2, 3 = 8, 4 = 12, 5 = 13, 6 = 11. Adding Maimonides' first article (on the existence of God) taken care of in Bk. I above, the score, although not bad, is far from conclusive. This introductory section of Bk. II, incidentally, is missing in the *Electorium* (see the Introduction at n. 35 above), having been replaced by a chart earlier in the MS (fol. 453^{v}—in the middle of le Myésier's introduction to the *Book of the Gentile*) which is interesting in showing the various articles of the Jewish faith acceptable to the other two religions:

Article 1. ONE GOD

THE JEW said to the Gentile that there were many conclusive arguments by which he could prove the existence of only one God. "But among others, there are four arguments by which I want to prove it briefly, using the flowers of the trees; of which four arguments this is the first:

"As we can see, it is evident that the world[3] is directed toward an end; and that everything nature does, it does with an end in view. And this direction and this course of nature signify and demonstrate the existence of only one God; for if there were many Gods, there would be many ends, and some men would naturally be disposed to love one God, and others to love another. And the same thing would happen with other creatures, for each creature would differentiate itself from the next in order to show that the God who created it was different from the other God who had not created it. And if each God had not ordained this in His creature, then His goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, would be imperfect; and if such were the case, it would be impossible for Him to be God. For just as it is not fitting for a creature to be creator, thus, and even less so, is it fitting for imperfection of goodness, greatness, etc., to be God, for to God befits all nobility, according to the conditions of the trees.

"The second argument is as follows: either the greatness of God is infinite in essence and in goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, or it is not. Now if there are two or three or more Gods, it is impossible for God's greatness to be infinite in essence and in the above-mentioned virtues; but if there is only one God, it is possible for God's greatness to be infinite in essence

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

[3] Thus in all the Romance MSS; the Latin sources (followed by Rosselló) have "man." The medieval Latin translator probably mistook the original Catalan *lomo* as something akin to *l'ome* rather than the *lo mon* it was meant to be.

in all the above-mentioned virtues. And since possibility and being are in accord, as are impossibility and nonbeing, it is therefore shown that there is one God, whose essence is so great in goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, that no other essence or thing can limit or contain it, but rather it limits and contains all things within itself, and is essentially inside and outside all other things, for if it were not, it would be limited and finite."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew: "According to the workings of nature, we know that the four elements are mixed in every body composed of them, and that in such a body each element exists essentially, virtually, and operatively.[4] Similarly there could be many Gods, each mixed among the others, and that the greatness of each be infinite in essence throughout all the virtues and throughout all places."

Solution. The Jew answered, saying: "It is true that in a compound body, each element is limited by the other, according to its own virtue, for the power of fire is limited by the power of water, which is contrary to it, and the power of water by that of fire, and the same happens with air and with earth. And just as one is limited by the other in virtue, so the operation[5] of one is limited by that of the other, since their workings are different and contrary. This is why each element wants to be simple, by itself and without the other elements, for if it could be without the others, it would be more in accordance with its own being and with its own virtue than it is when mixed with the others. And therefore it is shown that if there were many Gods, the power, goodness, etc., of each would be limited and bounded by the power, etc. of the other, and that it would be better for there to be one God who existed in His own essence, and in His power, etc., than for there to be all those other Gods; and He would be more in accord with being, and it would be more impossible for

[4] Notice this kind of precursor of the theory of the Correlatives, where "essentially" would correspond (see above, "Life," n. 128) to the noun ("goodness"), "virtually" to the first adjective ("bonificative"), and "operatively" to the verb ("bonifying"). For the last two, see the following note.

[5] "Virtue," in the sense of "power, capacity, efficacy," corresponding to the correlative *potentia* (see ibid.), and "operation," in the sense of "performance, work, result, effect," corresponding to *actus* (ibid.). The former was a basic term of medieval medicine, hence its appearance here with elemental theory (cf. the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. 1, ch. 5, n. 28).

there to exist in Him envy, pride, imperfection, than if He were mixed with other Gods. And because the greatest nobility, and that by which God is most in accord with being, must be granted, according to the condition of the first tree, and because, as a result, faith, hope, charity, etc., can better be in accord with goodness, greatness, etc., and can be greater and more contrary to the vices, therefore it is demonstrated by these conditions that there must of necessity exist one God.

"The third argument is as follows: if there were one God in one place entirely by himself, and another God beyond that God in another place, and yet another God beyond that place, there would have to be an infinite God who bounded and included these Gods, and this one would more properly be God than the others. And if this were the case, it would follow that, above and beyond the lesser Gods, the greater God would be infinite, and at the same time He would be limited and bounded by the lesser Gods, according to the six directions inherent in anything placed in space, that is to say, up and down, right and left, and forward and backward.[6] And if this were true, it would follow that God would be a body, and if He were a body, He would be finite, for every body must be finite, if it is to be consistent with form, surface, and matter. Now since it is a contradiction for God to be both finite and infinite (the greater God would be bounded by the lesser Gods, and would be infinite beyond the lesser Gods), it is therefore shown that it is impossible for there to be more than one God, without whose unity and singularity it would not be possible for perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., to be in accord with Him."

Question. The Gentile said, "Perhaps there could be one God in one place and another God in another place, and thus many Gods, infinite in number[7] and finite in size."

Solution. The Jew replied: "Perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., are in accord with infinity of essence where

[6] If one divides each Cartesian coordinate of three-dimensional space into its positive and negative components, one gets these "six directions"; cf. *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 49. This concept probably arose (already with the Greeks; cf. Plato *Timaeus* 43B), as an expansion into three dimensions of the four cardinal points or "directions" of the compass.

[7] Thus in all the Romance MSS; the Latin sources (followed by Rosselló) have "works." For the following "size", which is *quantitat* in the original, see Bk. I, n. 4; this passage offers a good example of why it cannot be translated "quantity."

there is perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., and are in disaccord with the limit of things bounded in space and multiplied in number, for with infinite number there cannot be perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., in each finite thing. For if there were, perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., would be as noble in a finite thing as in an infinite thing. This, however, is impossible, and by this impossibility it is shown that perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., is in accord with an essence infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., and is not in accord with many finite essences, even when they are joined together; for if it were, perfection would be the same in an infinite as in a finite thing, and that is impossible.

"The fourth argument is that hope can more fully develop by trusting in one God, Lord of all things, and charity can more fully develop by loving one God, infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., than they would if there were many Gods, or if there were one God divided into the two or three parts of which He was composed. And since that by which hope and charity are in accord with majority is in accord with truth, and their contrary with falsehood, according to the conditions of the trees, it is therefore shown that there exists only one God."

Question. "Sir," said the Gentile, "just as charity is better in accord with perfection the greater it is and can be in loving one God infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., than it would be in loving one or more Gods who were finite, so the will of a man who dislikes a God who is evil and has infinite evil is more noble in its dislike than the will which can dislike nothing more than finite and limited evil. And since the more noble dislike should be granted, it is therefore evident that there exists one evil, infinite God, who is the origin of all evils and whom it is possible for man to dislike."

Solution. The Jew replied: "It is true, Sir, that with respect to charity, created will would dislike more nobly if it disliked a God whose evil was infinite rather than finite. But since the evil God would be contrary to the good one, and the good God would not have goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., if He did not destroy the evil God, therefore it is not right that all that by which the will could dislike greater evil should exist, for created will cannot be in accord with a nobility that would be contrary to the nobility of the creator. And if the good God did not destory the

evil God, so that created will could be improved, He would love his creature more than Himself, which would be an imperfection in Him. And if the good God could not destroy the evil God, they would be equal in power, which is impossible; for if it were possible, being would just as appropriately accord with infinite evil as with infinite good. Since, however, good and being are in accord, as well as evil and nonbeing, and since perfection accords with good and with being, and is in disaccord with evil and with nonbeing, it is therefore evident that it is impossible for infinite evil to exist; for if it did, being and nonbeing would be equally in accord with eternity and with infinity, and that is impossible."

After the Jew had proved to the Gentile that there was only one God, he asked the Gentile if he felt satisfied with the proof he had given him of God's unity by the above-mentioned four arguments, or if he wanted him to pick more of the flowers of the trees, proving God's unity with more arguments. But the Gentile replied that he was quite satisfied with the proof, and if he had contradicted him, it was only the better to seek the truth. He did, nevertheless, beg him to explain what sort of a thing God was, and what He was in Himself, for he very much wanted to know what God was.

"Sir," said the Jew, "by virtue of God and by the light of Divine Grace, the human understanding arrives in this world at a knowledge of what God is not, that is to say, we have good reasons for knowing that God is not a stone, nor a man, nor the sun, nor a star, nor any bodily thing, nor any spiritual thing which is finite or imperfect. We also know that God is good, great, eternal, powerful, etc., as was proved in the first book. And these things are sufficient for us to know while we are in this world. But what God is in Himself, no man can know, for no one can even know what his own soul is, so how can he know what God is. Nor is it necessary to know such a thing in this world, but in the next world it is known by those who are in glory; and if we knew it in this world, the next world would not be nobler than this one. Since, however, the next world must be nobler than this one, therefore has God ordained that man may not know in this world what he should know in the next."

Article 2. CREATION

"IN ORDER to prove that God is creator, we will pick seven flowers—among the many we could pick—from the five trees, and by these it will be made manifest to the human understanding that God created the world; and by each of these flowers we will give a manifest demonstration."

1. Goodness Eternity

"Eternity is a good thing, since good and being are in accord with eternity, and eternity and being with goodness. Now if eternity were a bad thing, nonbeing and goodness would be in accord against being and eternity; and if they were, all men, plants and animals would naturally wish not to exist, which is impossible, since everything that is likes being and dislikes nonbeing."

The Jew said to the Gentile: "If the world is not eternal and God did not create it, then the world must have received its beginning from itself or from something else. From itself it could not have received it, for nothing cannot begin something; for if it did, nothing would be something. And if the world had received its beginning from something else that was not God, and if that something had received its beginning from something else which had had a beginning, and so on to infinity, and if God had not been the beginning of any of these beginnings or things begun, it would follow that goodness would be more in accord with begun beginning than with eternity, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is shown that if the world had a beginning, it must have received it from eternal goodness, or from something else that had received it from eternal goodness. And since we have proved the existence of only one God, in whom there is eternal goodness, it is therefore made manifest that if the world had a beginning, it must have received it from God, or from something else that had received its beginning from God.

"If the world is eternal and not created, it is equal in duration to the eternity of God; but since the world is divisible into parts containing imperfection and evil, that is to say things which are

limited in magnitude,[8] and which are corruptible, mortal, capable of suffering, and ignorant; and because these things are bad, in that they have imperfection of good, therefore the world is not so well in accord with goodness, as goodness, in which there is no division or evil, is in accord with an eternity in which there are no parts nor anything having beginning or end. It is therefore shown that the good there is in this world has a beginning; for if it did not have a beginning, it would be as much in accord with eternity as the goodness of God. And if created good has a beginning, how much more fitting that evil should have a beginning; for if evil were eternal without a beginning, eternity would not be in accord with goodness, in that it would be in accord with the contrary of good, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that the world is created and begun."

Question. The Gentile asked the Jew if God created evil.

Solution. The Jew replied that evil can be considered in two ways: one is evil of wrongdoing, the other is evil[9] of suffering. Now since evil of wrongdoing is contrary to good, it must therefore not have been created; and since evil of suffering is in accord with God's perfect justice in punishing sin, and with God's perfect wisdom in making evident the blessing of grace, evil of suffering must therefore have been created by the sovereign, eternal goodness.

2. *Greatness Power*

"Greater power is shown to exist in God if the world is created by the power of God, than if the world were eternal; for it is a greater power to create out of nothing a world so vast and beautiful, than it would be if the power of God had not created the world. And since that by which God's greatness and power are more in accord with one another and are best demonstrated to the human understanding should be granted, according to the first

[8] *Quantitat* in the original; cf. n. 7 above.

[9] The Romance *mal* (and Latin *malum*) has, as this passage makes clear, two meanings, one moral ("evil") and one physical or psychological ("hurt, harm"). Since English insists on distinguishing the two concepts, my translation of "evil" for both requires a bit of indulgence on the reader's part.

condition of the first tree, it is therefore shown that the world was created from nothing and had a beginning.

"If the world were eternal and enduring by its own power or by the power of God, it would be more inappropriate for it to have an end in size, in time, and in duration, than if the world had a beginning and God created it. And the more inappropriate it would be for the world to have an end and come to nonbeing, the less would be revealed the greatness of divine power that could annihilate the world, than would be the case if the world had a beginning and were created; for it is closer to nonbeing, which has come from nothing, than is something eternal that was never nothing. And the closer it is to nonbeing, with the power of God keeping it from returning to nonbeing, the greater the power revealed in God, in that He preserves it and can return it to nonbeing; and the greater the power, the more is revealed greater goodness in God.

"Stranger, more inappropriate, and more contrary to reason is the notion that divine goodness and power, which are one with eternity, which in turn conflicts with the having of a beginning and an end, can reach a state of nonbeing, than is the notion that what was created and came from nonbeing can reach a state of nonbeing. Thus the notion that considers the power of God as being so great that it can destroy the world, supposing the world is eternal, is close to the notion that God could not exist, even though He is eternal; and the notion that considers the world as having been created, and that God can bring it to an end, since He created it from nothing, is far from the notion that God could not exist. And since the notion most in accord with conceiving God's great power should be more readily granted, it is therefore evident that the world received its creation from God's great power."

3. Perfection Charity

"Perfection, charity, in the things of this world, signify that the world was created; for fire and the other elements seek their perfection engendering and corrupting engenderable and corruptible things in which they do not find their perfection. And therefore

day and night they do nothing but engender and corrupt by natural appetite,[10] this being the way in which they find their fulfillment. Thus, if the world were eternal without beginning, that is, without beginning and end, the natural appetite of the elements would be defective, and there would be generation and corruption, without there having been a first man, a first tree, a first beast, or a first bird, and similarly with other things. And if there were no firsts in the above-mentioned categories, there could not be a last; and if there were not, the elements would be forever imperfect, desiring perfection without ever achieving it, and that is absurd and contrary to the influence of divine perfection, which equally and eternally would have been the cause of imperfection and of the desired perfection; which desire would be imperfect if it desired eternally and never achieved fulfillment. And since this is absurd, according to divine love and perfection, it is therefore demonstrated that the world was created, and that imperfection had a beginning, by which perfection is made evident."

The Jew said to the Gentile: "We have shown and proved by physical arguments that the world was created; now we want to prove it spiritually, that is to say, by means of the soul. It is evident to the human understanding that the rational soul cannot be fully satisfied in this world; and therefore, just as the elements physically try to seek out their fulfillment and do not find it, as we said before, so spiritually the soul seeks out its fulfillment and does not find it; for as soon as it has something it has always wanted, it immediately wants something else. And since this constitutes imperfection of charity, it is therefore clear that the soul is created; for if it were eternal, it would be free of imperfection. And if it did have imperfection, then sovereign perfection and love, that is to say, God, would have been the cause of eternal imperfection, and that is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the trees; by which impossibility and contrariety it is shown that the soul is created. And the creation of the soul betokens the creation of bodily nature; for if the soul, which is of a nature nobler than that of the body, is created, how much more fitting it is for the body

[10] In the common medieval acceptation of "desire, inclination, disposition, tendency." In the *Tree of Science* (*OE* I, 558b) Llull states that in creatures lacking the use of reason, *wisdom* manifests itself as *instinct*, and *will* as *appetite* (cf. Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 15, n. 46, and above all *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," nos. 27–8).

to be a creature; for if it were not, the nobler thing would be in accord with nonbeing, and the less noble with being and eternity, which would be contrary to the perfect charity of our Lord God."

4. *Perfection Justice*

"In God, perfection, justice are in accord. Now since the Resurrection exists, as was proved in the first book, it is therefore clear, by the Resurrection and by the above-mentioned flower, that the world was created. For if the world were eternal, God would eternally have to create primordial matter out of which the bodies of rational creatures would be composed; for the primordial matter of this world would not suffice for so many resuscitated bodies with souls, deserving reward or punishment, for which they should be resuscitated, according to God's perfect justice. And since it is absurd to imagine that God increases primordial matter infinitely, along with the space necessary for it, or that God's justice is not perfect, therefore it is absurd to deny the creation and affirm that the world is eternal without a beginning. For by such a denial one denies that the world is finite in size or that it occupies a finite space; and from this denial follows the affirmation that God is an eternal creator of souls, of bodies, and of places infinite in number, which is impossible, against the conditions of the trees, and a contradiction."

5. *Eternity Pride*

"If eternity and pride were in accord with one another, it would follow that eternity would be in accord with pride against humility, which is in accord with goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that eternity and pride are in disaccord; by which disaccord it is made manifest that the world was created."

Question. The Gentile replied, saying, "Humility and pride are contraries, and man is subject to humility; therefore human nature accords with eternity, which accords with humility; therefore, through humility, man is of eternal nature, and, through pride, he is of created nature."

Solution. The Jew replied: "If, in man, divine eternity accords with humility against pride, it is thanks to the influence of the gift

of grace, given to man against punishment of pride; and thus is made evident an eternity that in Latin is called *aevum*,[11] an eternity with a beginning and no end, one created by the sovereign eternity that is without beginning and end, which created it to reward man for humility and punish him for pride, so that eternally without end he will have knowledge of the flowers of the first tree.

"If the world were eternal, man would be of eternal nature and would be in an eternal place, and the eternity of God would not be so contrary to pride nor to a proud man as it is if the world is created; for then pride, man, man's nature, and the place he occupies would be equal in duration to God's eternity. And since that by which God's virtues are most contrary to the vices should be granted, according to the conditions of the third tree, and since, if the world were created, God's virtues are better shown to be contrary to pride than if the world were eternal, therefore it is made evident that the world was created."

6. *Hope Charity*

"If the world was created, there is greater concordance between hope, charity in loving God and in trusting God, and the more contrary they are to their contraries, which are vices, than would be the case if the world were eternal. For the greater is God's grace to man, if upon him and upon everything he eats, drinks, and needs for his necessities He has bestowed a being which had not previously existed eternally, than it would be if man and the things he needed came from eternal being. And the greater the grace God has bestowed upon man, the greater the charity man can feel towards God; and the greater the charity man can and should feel towards God, the greater the hope he can and should have in God; and the greater the charity and hope man can and should have, the greater the love God has and should have towards man. And from this there follows no inconsistency if the world was created; and if the world were eternal, there follows inconsistency and contrariety, by which inconsistency and contrariety it is shown that the world is not eternal. And if this were not the case, it would

[11] All the MSS have *aevum*, except for the Spanish MS, which has *eviternidat*, the more usual scholastic term for an eternity with a beginning and without an end.

follow that hope, charity, consistency, concordance[12] would be in accord with nonbeing and imperfection, and their contrary would be in accord with being and perfection, which is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the fourth tree."

7. *Prudence Accidie*

"Prudence and accidie are contraries in that prudence is a virtue and accidie a vice. Now if the world were eternal and prudence knew that it was, accidie would not be so contrary to prudence nor to the virtues, which are in accord with prudence, as it would be if the world were not eternal.[13] For accidie, insofar as it dislikes public and private good, makes man negligent and lazy, and takes pleasure in evil, is in accord with nonbeing, in that it desires that which is not in accord with being and dislikes that which is in accord with being. Thus if prudence knew that the world were eternal, it would know that, if the world were not eternal, accidie would be more in accord with nonbeing than with being; but this is something impossible to know, since it is a contradiction. For if the world were eternal, accidie, insofar as it would have an eternal subject, would be more strongly in accord with being than if its subject, that is, the human species, were not eternal; and insofar as the results of accidie are contrary to being and in accord with nonbeing, its subject accords better with nonbeing if the world was created than if it were eternal. And seeing that, by the eternity of the world, there would be a contradiction in what prudence would know, and prudence would not be so contrary to accidie, therefore it is shown that the world is not eternal, since contradictions cannot exist, and since that by which prudence and accidie are most contrary should exist, according to the conditions of the fifth tree."

Question. "I am quite satisfied," said the Gentile, "with the demonstration and evidence by which you have proved to me that the world was created. But pray tell me, what was God doing before

[12] Rosselló, altering the already altered text of the Mainz edition, omits the last two terms, but they are in all medieval sources.

[13] The negative, seemingly so essential for the meaning, is found only in the medieval Latin and Spanish translations; the Catalan sources all lack it.

the world was created? For God is a nobler thing if He exists and acts eternally, than if His works had a beginning."

Solution. The Jew said: "The main reason why the Philosopher[14] tried to prove that the world was eternal was to honor the first cause, that is, God; of which first cause philosophers a long time ago acquired understanding, and they said that just as it was the cause and purpose of all things and was eternal, so the thing caused, that is, its effect, should be eternal; and this thing caused they said was the world. We, however, who believe that the world was created, honor God more and attribute greater honor to Him by saying that God has in Himself an eternal task in loving and understanding Himself, glorying in Himself, and understanding all things,[15] and by saying that this task is primary, and prior to the task God had and has in being the cause of the world, than the philosophers who knew nothing of the task God has in Himself and did not attribute to Him a task within Himself, but rather a task which is neither in Himself nor of Himself, that is, the world. And they said that this latter task was equal to Him in eternity. But since, according to the first condition of the first tree, one should attribute greater nobility to God, it is therefore demonstrated that the world was created by God, who is the first cause, and that the task He has in Himself, He had in Himself prior to the thing caused, that is to say, the world."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew, "I find it impossible to understand how something can be created from nothing."

Solution. The Jew said: "It is in the nature of the human intellect to understand differently if a thing exists or not, and how that

[14] The Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) changed this to a plural. The singular of all early sources, however, clearly indicates the usual medieval antonomasia for Aristotle (cf. *OED*, s.v. philosopher). Should there be any doubt, the Spanish MS has "el filosofo Aristotil." The fact that it is plural in the next part of the sentence does not change things (as Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 77, n. 102, suggests it might), but merely means that Llull is there talking about philosophers in general. This preoccupation with the doctrine (associated with Averroists) of the eternity of the world was a constant throughout Llull's life. It is discussed in early works such as the *Lògica del Gatzel* (sts. 40 and 42) and the *Book of Contemplation* (chs. 7, 14 and 196; see *OE* II, 1259, n. 13, for more references), as well as in many late works (see the list in *ROL* VI, 77 n.). Cf. W. W. Artus, "La creación, señal de la filosofía luliana," *EL* 17 (1973), 131–63 (this passage of the *Gentile* is discussed on pp. 150 and 160), as well as the earlier J. Tusquets, "Posició de Ramon Lull en el problema de l'eternitat del món," *Criterion* 1 (Barcelona, 1925), 95–114. W. W. Artus also comments this passage in *Actas* I, 179–84 = *EL* 22 (1978), 179–84. Note the curious fact that it is the Jew who presents the arguments here (cf. Llinarès, *Gentil*, p. 11, n. 24).

[15] The Latin translator has "all other extrinsic things." To some of the members of Hillgarth's seminar in Jerusalem (see Preface above) this line of argument seemed Cabalistic. For a discussion of this theme, see Longpré, col. 1121.

thing is made; and how, by the above-mentioned consistencies and inconsistencies, it is proved that God is creator. But the way in which God makes something out of nothing cannot be understood by intellect in the thing created. And do you know why? Because the intellect, when confronted with nothing, understands nothing; and since the intellect cannot understand how a thing is made out of something about which it understands nothing, that is why you cannot understand something about which you understanding nothing. But when it is a question of the perfect divine will, which has perfect power, perfect wisdom, you can understand how God can create something out of nothing, for His will can will it, His power can do it, and His wisdom knows how to do it.

"It is evident to your intellect that you have a soul and a body; but the way in which the soul is joined to the body you cannot understand. Now if your intellect fails to understand that which is in your own self, how much more reasonable it is for you to fail to understand something which is not in you. It is therefore sufficient for you to understand whether such a thing does or does not exist, and in this world there is no need for you to know how the thing was or was not created."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew, "Neither the firmament, the paths of the heavenly bodies, nor their movements are corruptible, which shows they are eternal without a beginning."

Solution. "The firmament and the paths of the heavenly bodies, by being limited in magnitude, show that they were created; for eternity, just as it is in disaccord with a duration that has a beginning and an end, so it is in disaccord with a magnitude that is finite, limited, localized, and mobile. And thus it is with the firmament, which engenders the beginning and end of time, with which beginning and end eternity is in disaccord. Now the reason the firmament, the paths of the heavenly bodies, and their movement, are not corruptible, is that God created them incorruptible, in order to demonstrate His great power. For if God had not created incorruptible things,[16] He would not demonstrate so forcibly His great power, which can create and annihilate incorruptible things. But since philosophers did not have a perfect under-

[16] Thus in the Romance MSS. The Latin version has, "had created corruptible things of this sort"; Rosselló has "had not created corruptible things." At the end of this sentence, S (followed by Rosselló) adds "as easily as with corruptible things."

standing of divine power, knowledge, and will, nor of His perfection, and since they saw that the firmament and the paths of the heavenly bodies were incorruptible, they were therefore of the opinion that these things were eternal, without beginning and end, and for this reason they denied the Creation."

Article 3. THE OLD LAW[17]

"IN ORDER to prove that God gave the Law,[18] we must pick flowers from the five trees by which we can prove it; which proof we will carry out as briefly as possible using seven flowers."

1. Goodness Greatness

"If God has given a law to His people with commandments as to what things a person should do to honor and obey God and to attain supreme happiness, and what things a person should not do in order to avoid God's malediction, then the greater is the goodness revealed in God and the greater the demonstration given of celestial glory and infernal punishment, than if God had given no law nor made commandments as to what man should do or should avoid doing.

"Just as doing good is in accord with being and doing evil is in accord with nonbeing, so a commandment is in accord with being and in disaccord with nonbeing. Now since a commandment to do good and to avoid evil is in accord with being and in disaccord with nonbeing,[19] and being and good are in accord and nonbeing and evil are in accord, if God had not made a law in which he had commanded people to do good and avoid evil, God would have made a concordance of commandment and nonbeing, and of good and evil against commandment, being and good, insofar as com-

[17] Thus in all the MSS (cf. n. 1 above). For the error of the Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) in changing the title to "Article Three: The Law God Gave to Moses," see the following note.

[18] The additional "to Moses" of the medieval Latin translator (followed by the Mainz editors and Rosselló) appears in none of the Romance MSS. The lack of the name Moses here and in the title is significant because, as García Palou points out (*OE* I, 1140, n. 20), what is being demonstrated here is not that God dictated a law to Moses, but the more general fact that, in addition to a natural law, there should exist an explicit divine law to direct men in their lives.

[19] The Mainz edition (followed, inevitably, by Rosselló) adds "and to do evil is in accord with nonbeing and in disaccord with being," but this is in none of the MSS consulted.

mandment, would not exist. And if this were the case, it would follow that in God there would not be great goodness in power, wisdom, love, perfection; and since one must attribute great goodness to God, according to the conditions of the trees, it is therefore evident that God gave the Law to man.

"Celestial glory and infernal punishment are so great that commandments have to have been given to man, and this disposition has to have been made by God, in order that man could achieve everlasting life. Now if worldly things, which are small, are in accord with temporal commandment, how much more so are celestial and infernal things, which are great and without end. Thus if neither law nor commandments had been given by God's goodness, it would follow that God's great goodness would be more in accord with things of little use, and in disaccord with things of great use. And if this were the case, it would follow that a material cause would be a final cause, and the final cause would be material, and what is lesser good would be greater good, and greater good would be lesser. And if this were the case, it would follow that God's great good would be less than any other good, and greater evil would be less than any other evil, which is impossible."

2. Eternity Power

"Since eternity and power are in accord in God, it would be inconsistent for them to be in disaccord in God's works. Now if God has given man a law, and has told him what he should do and what he should refrain from doing, then man has been more guided toward doing good and avoiding evil than he would be if he had been given no law. And if man does good, divine power is better in accord with man in giving him eternal glory; and if man does evil, God's power is better in accord with man in giving him infinite punishment. Now if there were no law, divine power would not have such great accord with its works. and divine eternity and divine power would not accord so well in the task of sentencing man to eternal glory or eternal punishment. And since one should grant that by which the divine virtues are best demonstrated in the results and use they have in creatures, it is therefore made evident to the light of intellect that God has given the Law."

3. *Wisdom Prudence*

"In God, wisdom, perfection are in accord, which accord impels prudence to be in accord with God's wisdom. Thus, if God has given the Law, prudence is even more in accord with God's wisdom, which impels it to accord better with fortitude against vices, and with charity to make man love God, his neighbor, and himself. Now if no law were given, all those who believe that a law had been given would be in falsehood and error, and it would follow that prudence would be more in accord with God's wisdom in those people who believed falsehood and error than it would be with those who did not believe that a law had been given, and this is impossible. For if it were possible, falsehood, error, and ignorance would be good things, and their contraries bad; and prudence would be more in accord with fortitude and charity through ignorance than through wisdom, and that is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that God has given the Law."

4. *Power Justice*

"Justice and ignorance are contraries, and therefore justice and wisdom are in accord in man. Now when a man does not have the power to judge what he does not know, the power of justice is defective; but when a man has wisdom and knows what he should judge, then his justice has power. Thus since in man, who is a creature and a mortal and finite thing, there exists a concordance between power and justice, how much more fitting that there exist a concordance between the divine power and the created justice which is in man; for if there did not, the concordance existing between one created virtue and another would not come from the influence of the uncreated virtues, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is shown that created justice and divine power are in accord that power should give grace to justice,[20] and that justice receive grace through which it may be against ignorance and injustice. Now if God has given the Law, His power

[20] The original has *en donar lo poder gràcia a la justícia*, without the *e* ("and") Rosselló added before *gràcia*, which changed the meaning to "in giving power and grace to justice." The Latin MSS, which differ slightly from the Mainz edition, have *in eo quod potestas praebet gratiam justicie*, which confirms the fact that "power" is the subject of the verb, as does the *el poder* (as opposed to *al poder*) of the Spanish MS.

has illuminated justice with the light of wisdom as to what it should do and judge and avoid; and if God has given no law, it has only been illuminated by natural law. And since created justice has greater fortitude against ignorance and injustice by the Law of Grace and by natural law than by natural law alone, if God did not use His power in giving that by which created justice had greater power against injustice, ignorance, it would follow that divine power would be in accord with accidie, and against perfection, divine love, and this is impossible and against the conditions of the trees; by which impossibility and contrariety the Law of Grace is made manifest."

5. *Faith Hope*

"Through faith man believes in God, and through hope man awaits the grace and blessing of God. Thus if God has given a Law of Grace, faith, hope are more strongly in accord; and if God has not given a Law of Grace, they are not so strongly in accord in the contemplation of God. Now if the Law of Grace were not agreeable to God's will, and if He had not wanted to give it to man, it would follow that the more faith, hope would be in accord in the contemplation of God, the less pleasing they would be to God's will, which is impossible and against the conditions of the trees. For if it were possible, it would follow that God's will would be contrary to goodness, greatness, perfection, and that it would be in accord with accidie, envy, which is impossible; by this impossibility it is shown that God has given a Law of Grace by which faith, hope are better in accord with being against their contraries which are in accord with nonbeing."

6. *Temperance Gluttony*

"Temperance and gluttony are contraries, and therefore temperance is in accord with obedience and gluttony with disobedience. Now if a Law of Grace is given, it follows that commandments are given against gluttony, which accords with nonbeing, in order to strengthen temperance, which accords with being. Thus if no Law of Grace were given, it would follow that the grace of God would be contrary to being and in accord with

nonbeing; and if it were, this would mean that God and nonbeing would be in accord with gluttony against being and temperance, and this is impossible and against the conditions of the trees, and against this Art, by means of which the Law of Grace is made manifest."

The Jew said to the Gentile: "Using many other flowers, I could illustrate and make evident to you the Law of Grace which God gave to the Prophet Moses on Mount Sinai, in which law are written the Ten Commandments, along with many other commandments, and in which law the creation of the world and the origins of the Holy Fathers were revealed to Moses.[21] But since we have already given enough proofs that God gave a Law of Grace, and since I am afraid of wearying my companions with superfluous words, I don't want to go through all the flowers of the trees by which a Law of Grace is provable."

Question. "I am quite satisfied," said the Gentile to the Jew, "with what you have told me; but please tell me the truth: do Christians and Saracens both believe in the Law you mention?"

Solution. The Jew replied: "Christians and Saracens indeed believe that God gave the Law to Moses, and each believes that our Law is true. But because they believe other things that are contrary to our Law, therefore, and insofar as they believe these things contrary to our Law, they disbelieve our Law. Moreover, we and the Christians agree on the text of the Law, but we disagree in interpretation and commentaries, where we reach contrary conclusions. Therefore, we cannot reach agreement based on authorities and must seek necessary arguments by which we can agree. The Saracens agree with us partly over the text, and partly not; this is why they say we have changed the text of the Law, and we say they use a text contrary to ours."[22]

Article 4. THE MESSIAH

THE JEW said to the Gentile: "We believe in the advent of a Messiah who will come to deliver the Jewish people from captivity, and

[21] "Holy Fathers" is a reference to the patriarchs Adam, Noah, Abraham, etc. For the "many other commandments" see Exodus 20ff. (cf. *OE* I, 1140, n. 21).

[22] An excellent summary of the reasons for not basing interreligious disputes on authorities; cf. pp. 58 and 116 above. For an interesting summary of the Muslim accusations that the Biblical text was corrupt and incomplete, and that Jews and Christians had misrepresented the Revelations entrusted to them, see N. Daniel, *Islam and the West* (Edinburgh, 1960), pp. 47 and 53.

who will be a prophet and a messenger of God. Now, to prove the coming of a Messiah, we must pick from the trees the flowers necessary for this proof."

1. *Greatness Wisdom*

"In God there is great wisdom, which has created and ordered all existing things. And since the world is the work of God, it is only proper that the world be ordered; for if it were not, the work produced and created by God's great wisdom would not reveal great wisdom in God, because the more perfect and better ordered is the product, the better is represented the master who ordered it.

"We have proved that God gave the Law. Now if the Law God gave had no subject in which it could exist and be ordered, then the greatness of the wisdom that gave the Law would be less evident. Thus, since we are in bondage to all peoples through the errors of our first forefathers, and since, on account of this bondage of ours, we cannot properly keep and carry out the Law God gave us, which we would keep and could carry out in a more ordered manner—in that order proper to it—in freedom, if we had such a thing, therefore God must necessarily send a Messiah to deliver us from our bondage, and to make us free, with kings and princes as we used to have. And if this were not the case, God's great wisdom would be contrary to the holy Law He gave us. And since it is impossible, and opposed to the conditions of the trees, for God to be contrary to his works, it is therefore evident that a Messiah must come."[23]

2. *Goodness Charity*

"God's goodness and the charity we feel towards God are in accord, for if they were in disaccord, it would follow that charity was not a virtue or that there was not perfect goodness in God, and each of these two inconsistencies is impossible. Now since, through our great charity towards God, we endure and have long

[23] Cf. Nahmanides' citation of Maimonides in the Disputation of Barcelona of 1263 (translated in O. S. Rankin, *Jewish Religious Polemic*, Edinburgh, 1956, pp. 199–200) on the subject of the Messiah who will gather "the dispersed of Israel" and deliver them from their persecutors—the Christians and Muslims. On the theme mentioned here and elsewhere in Bk. II of the Jews' sufferings making them worthier, see ibid., p. 191.

endured this harsh captivity in which we are so insulted and scorned by the Christian and Saracen nations to which we belong and by which we are humiliated and tormented, and to whom we must pay tribute and redemption money every year; and all this hardship we willingly suffer and undergo so that we may love God the more and not leave the Law or the path He has marked out for us; it is therefore necessary that God's goodness, which is full of mercy and grace, be moved to compassion, and that it send us His messenger and deliver us from our captivity, in order that we may love, honor, and serve Him. Thus, if God's goodness did not help us and bring us succor amidst our hardships and tribulations—and all the more so since we could be free if we chose to abandon the Law by which we live—then it would mean that in God's goodness there was no perfection of greatness, power, love, which is impossible; and by this impossibility it is made evident to our charity and hope that God, by His great goodness, will send a Messiah who will deliver us from our captivity."

Question. The Gentile asked the Jew, "Have you been in this captivity of yours for a long time?"

Solution. The Jew replied, "We were in two previous captivities: one lasted seventy years and the other four hundred; but this one has lasted more than twelve hundred years.[24] As for the first two captivities, we knew why we were in them; but as for our present captivity, we do not know why we are in it."

The Gentile said to the Jew, "Perhaps you are in a state of sin, and therefore contrary to God's goodness, and perhaps you do not realize you are in this state of sin and thus do not ask forgiveness of God's goodness, which is in accord with justice; by which justice He does not wish to free you until you have acknowledged your sin and asked forgiveness for it."[25]

[24] The "previous captivities" are those of Babylon and Egypt. As for the third, all sources for this passage give its duration as being MCCC or MCCCC years, which was puzzling since the Jewish exile traditionally dates from the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. After finding almost identical passages in *Blaquerna*, ch. 84, and *Felix*, Bk. I, ch. 11 (cf. n. 51 there), however, both of which have MCC, it became clear that all sources for this passage in the *Gentile* must stem from one with an excess of *C*s.

[25] Garcías Palou (*OE* I, 1140, n. 29) relates the Gentile's somewhat surprising answer to the reprobation of Israel in Romans 11.

3. *Power Hope*

The Jew said to the Gentile: "It is clear that hope is a virtue; for if it were not, despair would not be a vice. Now since in us power and hope are in accord, in that we hope God will help free us from our captivity, which hope we could not entertain if we had no power of hoping; and since God's power is greater than ours, then if our power, which is lesser, is in accord with virtue, how much more fitting that God's power, which is greater, should be in accord with our hope. And if this were not the case, it would mean that our power and our hope, which place their trust in God's power, would be in greater concordance with one another than God's power with our hope. And since this is impossible (for if it were possible, our power would be in accord with greater perfection than God's power), it is therefore impossible that divine power not bring us release from our captivity, from which we hope to be released through the great perfection inherent in the power of our Lord God.

"The entire Jewish people hopes that through the virtue and power of one man, the Messiah, all the power of those men in this world under whom we are in servitude will be conquered and overcome. Now in order to show how great is the power of God, who will bestow on that man—that is, the Messiah—such great power, and who has ordained that we have great hope in the fact that by one man we may hope to be delivered from our bondage to so many men, therefore God has ordained that we be in our present captivity and that we be freed, through the power of God, by the power of one man alone. And for this reason it is proved that a Messiah must come to deliver us, and as a result, we have greater hope and greater evidence of God's great power. And since that on account of which we have greater hope and greater knowledge of God's power is in accord with being and with the conditions of the trees, therefore it is shown that a Messiah will come to deliver us and to fulfill our hope."

4. *Faith Justice*

"Faith and justice are in accord in the Jewish people, for we all believe that the tribulations we suffer in our captivity are on ac-

count of God's justice. Our faith and our justice are therefore in accord with God's justice, which justice must be in accord with our faith and with our justice; for if it were not, it would follow that concordance and charity would be more in accord with our faith, justice than with the justice, charity of God, which is impossible. And by this impossibility it is shown that God will send a Messiah to deliver us, without which mission and delivery it would not be revealed that God's justice, charity were as well in accord with the created virtues, as the created virtues were with the uncreated virtues. And since uncreated justice, charity should have greater concordance with created virtues, than created virtues with uncreated virtues, according to the conditions of the trees, it is therefore shown that the Messiah will come, and that He will be sent by divine justice, charity to satisfy our faith, justice.

"The more we are tormented and afflicted by our captivity and have faith that this fate of ours is just, and the less our understanding knows the reason why we are in captivity, the greater is our faith, and the greater too is our justice in that we have decided to endure those tribulations from which we could flee if we wished. And since we must concede the truth to that by which faith and justice are more strongly in accord with majority and with being against their contraries which are in disaccord with greater[26] and with being, because they are in accord with lesser and with nonbeing, and since the coming of the Messiah must be in accord with that by which our faith and our justice are in accord with majority, it therefore must necessarily come to pass, according as has been ordained by divine disposition—which is not contrary to faith, justice—that a Messiah will be sent to deliver the people of Israel."

5. *Fortitude Pride*

"In fortitude, humility is in accord with virtue and force;[27] and in pride, force is in accord with vice. And since pride and humility

[26] *Major* in Catalan, thus more obviously referring to the previous "majority" (cf. Bk. I, n. 32 above).

[27] Thus in all medieval sources; the Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) omitted "and force." Perhaps "strength" would have been a better rendering of the Catalan *força*, but it would have disguised the connection with *fortitudo* so important to this section.

are contraries, therefore the force of humility is different and contrary to that of pride. And since virtue is in accord with being and vice with nonbeing, therefore the force that is in accord with humility vanquishes and dominates the force that is in accord with pride. And if this were not the case, it would follow that virtue would not be in accord with being, nor vice with nonbeing, or it would follow that force would be in accord with nonbeing and fragility[28] with being, which is impossible. And by this impossibility is revealed the force that exists with humility in the heart of Jews, which vanquishes and dominates the force that exists with pride in the hearts of Christians and Saracens. For no matter how many disgraces and torments of captivity they inflict on the Jewish people, they will not force them to give up or renounce the holy Law God gave Moses. This being the case, and since that by which fortitude is most contrary to the pride of Christians and Saracens (by which pride they hold us in captivity) should be in accord with truth, according to the conditions of the tree containing this flower of fortitude and pride, therefore God must send a Messiah who will utterly destroy the pride of the Christian and Saracen peoples who hold us captive, and who will make us lords, and them serfs and captives of ours."

Question. "Do you mean to tell me," said the Gentile to the Jew, "that if I, who am free, became a Jew I would be in the same bondage as you? And I would be leaving my own error, only to become a serf through the sin which you say is yours, since it is that sin through which you are in captivity! That," said the Gentile, "does not seem to me to fit in with the dispositions which must have been ordained by divine wisdom, goodness, power, justice; for it would be sounder and better, in accord with the conditions of the trees, if a person who is sensually free with regard to his body and captive through error with regard to his soul could renounce his error and enter a state of bodily freedom, the better to observe his Law, and not change over from his own error to another's guilt and sin, than if he was in sin and therefore in captivity."

[28] *Fragilitat* is one of the Lullian contraries of "fortitude" or "force" (cf. *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, 479 = Int. vii, 47). The other is *frevoltat* (cf. the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 658, and *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 68).

Article 5. RESURRECTION

THE JEW said to the Gentile, "As for this article of Resurrection, there is no need to give another proof, for it was clearly enough proved in the first book." The Gentile replied,[29] "And well satisfied I am with that proof, and blessed be the five trees, along with their conditions and flowers, which have illuminated my soul to hope for Resurrection." "Yes," said the Jew, "but you should know that with regard to this article of Resurrection the Jews are divided into three opinions:

"The first opinion is that of some Jews who do not believe in the Resurrection. They give as their reason that since the body is of a corruptible nature, it cannot be returned to the same state it was in before death, and that, without eating and drinking, it could not maintain itself nor withstand the punishments of Hell, and that Paradise is not a fitting place for men to eat and drink, nor is it a place for physical bodies, which need something solid to support their weight. And for these reasons, along with many others, they deny and disbelieve the Resurrection. But I do not belong to this sect, for I believe in the Resurrection, and I am sure that the divine power, which has perfection in all things, can sustain a body in heaven, even though it is not a natural place for a body, just as the soul can exist here below in this world, which is a place for corporal things. And just as God, through His virtue and His power, has made the soul incorruptible and immortal, so He will be able to preserve the body and make it be immortal without eating and drinking in whatever place He wishes, by way of demonstrating His power and His justice. And if God did not have the power to do this, the flowers of the first tree would lack perfection, and all the conditions of the trees would be destroyed.

"The second opinion is that of some Jews who believe that the Resurrection will take place after the end of the world,[30] and that

[29] This phrase, like the "said the Jew" at the beginning of the next sentence, is in none of the MSS save the Spanish one; but without it, one is asked to believe it is the Jew who is satisfied with the proof and glad to have found out about the Resurrection!

[30] The Latin translator rendered this phrase *post finem saeculi*, implying, as Rosselló suggested (*Obras* I, 101, n. 6), that Llull does not mean the physical annihilation of the earth, which would make no sense in view of the following clause, but rather the end of our world or the world as we know it. The members of Hillgarth's seminar in Jerusalem pointed out that the first opinion was Sadducean, the second that of Maimonides (as Rosselló pointed out in the same note cited above), and the third the one most commonly held in the thirteenth century.

after the Resurrection there will be peace throughout the world, and there will be only one sect, which will be that of the Jews; and they will have wives and children, and they will eat and drink, and they will commit no sin, and in that state they will remain for a long time. These Jews say and believe, however, that a time will come when all will die, and from then on there will be no Resurrection, and the souls of those who die thus will know glory, without their bodies resuscitating. This is an opinion held by many Jews, and one which I myself held before coming here and reading the flowers of the five trees, as explained in the first book.

"The third opinion is that of some Jews who believe in the Resurrection, and believe that we will all rise up from the dead after the end of the world, and the good will have eternal glory and the wicked will be punished for a certain time; and then, when God will have punished them for the sins they committed in this life, He will pardon them and give them glory for ever and ever. Some men, however, will remain in Hell for ever, but these are few in number and so guilty that they are not worthy of ever being pardoned. I am now of this opinion, and this is the opinion in which I want to remain, even though the Jews who share it are fewer than those who share the previously mentioned opinions."

The Gentile said: "I am amazed that you Jews can be divided and separated into different opinions over the above-mentioned article, which is so important. It seems to me, in fact, that your differences of opinion are due to either a lack of knowledge or a disdain for the next world."

"So great is our desire, Sir," said the Jew, "to regain the freedom we once enjoyed in this world, and so great is our desire that the Messiah come and deliver us from our captivity, that we hardly give a thought to the next world. And this situation is made worse by the fact that we are continually busy with our task of trying to live among peoples who hold us in captivity, and to whom every year we pay a very large tribute, without which they would not let us live among them. And there is yet another impediment we suffer, in that our language and alphabet is Hebrew, which is no longer used as much as it once was and has become curtailed through lack of knowledge. And for this reason we do not have as many books on philosophical sciences and other subjects as we need. We have, however, one science called *Talmud*, which is great, but whose interpretation is so great and subtle a task that

this impedes us from having any knowledge of the next world; and above all, because of this study, we incline toward the law, so that we can find fulfillment in the things of this world."[31]

Article 6. THE DAY OF JUDGMENT

"This article is provable by the flowers of the five trees; for if there were no Day of Judgment, the conditions of the trees would not exist. But since they must necessarily exist, it is therefore made manifest by the flowers that the Day of Judgment will take place. Of these flowers we will pick six to prove this article."

1. Greatness Power

The Jew said to the Gentile: "So great and supreme is God's power that to all men it is demonstrable both particularly and universally. And because God's great power ought to be demonstrated to everyone universally, it is fitting that all of us be congregated in one place and that together we witness God's great power. For this reason we will all come together in one place where God will judge the righteous and the wicked: to the righteous He will grant everlasting bliss, and He will sentence the wicked to infernal punishments; and no man will be able to avoid or oppose God's sentence. Now if the Day of Judgment did not exist, God's great power would not be so demonstrable in the presence of such an assembled multitude, and it would follow that God's goodness, greatness, wisdom, love, perfection, would be contrary to God's greatness, power. But this is itself contrary to the conditions of the trees; by which contrariety the Day of Judgment is made manifest to the human understanding that knows how to perceive the significance of the flowers of the trees."

2. Perfection Wisdom

"Just as, in the course of nature, through the influence of the heavenly bodies, the generative influence is brought to bear on

[31] Hillgarth reports from his Jerusalem seminar, however, there were many works written in Hebrew at the time. Moreover, if by the phrase "books on philosophical sciences" Llull was referring to books on metaphysics rather than just philosophy, the statement would be truer.

earthly bodies, thus, and incomparably more so, from the perfect wisdom of our Lord God is brought influence and benediction on the created wisdom that exists in man. Now, when we are all brought together on the Day of Judgment, and realize that God knows all the good and evil things each man has done and will judge each of us according to our deeds, then we will have greater knowledge of God's wisdom than we could by any other means; for each of us will know his own sentence along with that of the others, all together at one time and in one place; and through this knowledge each person's wisdom and knowledge will increase. And those who are on the path to salvation will feel charity and bliss in proportion to their knowledge of God's sentence; and similarly those who are on the path to damnation will feel sad and accursed in proportion to their knowledge. Thus, since this judgment accords in this way with the perfect works of our Lord God and with the created wisdom that should be in men, and since this wisdom should be very great in order to have knowledge of the very perfect and great wisdom of God, therefore the Day of Judgment is made manifest, for without it the above arguments would not be made so manifest, nor would the conditions of the five trees be so well observed."

3. Greatness Justice

"You should know, Gentile, that it is customary among us that the greater the sentence, the more testimonies are required, and they should be given by people nobler and more just, and before more and better people. Thus the greatest sentence possible is for all people who ever were, are, or will be to be congregated in one place in order to be judged by God in one another's presence, and for the sentence to be either everlasting glory or infernal fires. Now if such a sentence were greater than another sentence where not everybody was congregated, nor was judged by God, nor to such great effect, and if this lesser sentence were in being and the greater sentence were nothing, there would follow contrariety and inconsistency between greater justice and greater sentence; and greater justice would be better manifested if the greater sentence existed than if the lesser sentence did. Thus if God's will wanted the lesser sentence to exist and not the greater, then God's will

and God's great justice would be contrary to one another insofar as God's will would not love that by which God's great justice would be best manifested. But since it is impossible for God's justice and will to be contrary to one another, therefore in the concordance existing between God's perfect justice and love is made manifest that the Day of Judgment will take place, and on that day God's great justice will be made manifest to one and all; and each person will recognize in himself, in others, and all together, that great divine justice."

4. Power Pride

The Jew said to the Gentile: "My dear son, well you know that power and justice are in accord against pride and injustice; and this is why princes have been established on earth, so they can be just and powerful against proud and unjust men. Now, in order to show that God's power and justice are in accord against sinful men who are full of pride and injustice, and in order that these men be vanquished, subdued, and confounded by God's power and justice, God wants the Day of Judgment to take place, so that all men together may have knowledge of God's great power and great justice, which power and justice they will see in the act of judging, confounding, and subjugating these proud and unjust men. For if the Day of Judgment were nothing, then God's power and justice would not be so readily made manifest to people in its action against pride and injustice. And because that by which God's power and justice are best made manifest to the human understanding must necessarily follow, according to the conditions of the trees, therefore the Day of Judgment is made manifest."

5. Faith Hope

"That by which faith, hope can better contemplate God must necessarily be ordained by the perfection present in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love; for if it were not, this would mean that faith, hope could better contemplate God than God himself could ordain or desire as to how much He should be contemplated and adored, which is impossible. For if it were pos-

sible, it would follow that perfection would be in better accord with created than with uncreated virtues, which is impossible; and by this impossibility the Day of Judgment is manifestable, for without it, faith, hope could not contemplate God as well as they can when faith believes and hope expects the sentence of God in the presence of all His people."

6. *Fortitude Lust*

"Fortitude can be greater against lust in the absence of people than in their presence; for, in the human heart, shame subdues lust when a man is in the presence of people, before whom he is ashamed to commit adultery. Therefore, in the heart of a man who loves chastity, fortitude cannot be as contrary[32] in front of people as in secret. Thus, since fortitude and lust are more contrary to one another in the absence of people than in their presence, as we have just said, therefore the merit of fortitude should be revealed to people, and a person's guilt through lust should be made manifest to people. And if the contrary were the case, perfection and justice would be contraries in God, which is impossible; by this impossibility is made manifest the Day of Judgment, in which fortitude, lust will be manifestable to one and all, so that a man will be better rewarded for each and every virtue by God's justice, and more punished and shamed in the presence of everybody."

Question. After the Jew had proved the above-mentioned article to the Gentile by means of the above-mentioned six flowers, the Gentile said to the Jew: "If God is invisible, how will He be able to judge people who will not be able to see Him?[33] Both the sentence and the carrying out of it would be better if the people could see who was giving the sentence. It would therefore appear that if God is not seen on that day, the conditions of the trees would be altered."

Solution. "It is true," said the Jew, "that God is invisible; but just as He showed Himself by some visible semblance to Moses when he gave him the Old Law, so on the Day of Judgment he

[32] The Latin version adds a helpful "to lust."

[33] As Garcías Palou points out (*OE* I, 1141, n. 36), the Gentile here presents the Jew with a problem that Christian theologians were able to solve through Christ's combined divinity and humanity.

will take on some semblance to show Himself to all His people when He gives sentence."

The Gentile replied: "That semblance will not be of God, and therefore it is not God who will give the sentence, but a semblance. Thus, if possible, it would be good for the one judging to be God Himself, and that He be seen by everyone He will be judging, since it is only fitting for a judge to be seen by those he judges."

Article 7. PARADISE

"ONE COULD prove this article by all the flowers of the five trees; but, for the sake of brevity, we will pick only six flowers to prove the existence of Paradise."

1. Goodness Greatness

"God's goodness is infinitely great in eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection; for if it were not, this goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love would not be perfect; and if it were not, God would not exist, since God must have the above-mentioned goodness, greatness. Now, since God's existence was proved in the first book, it is therefore made manifest that God's goodness is infinitely great in eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection. And this manifestation made to the human understanding signifies and demonstrates the existence of Paradise; for if Paradise did not exist, in God's works there would be no perfection of justice, liberality, goodness, and His will would accord with envy, avarice, and this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the trees; by which impossibility and contrariety Paradise is shown to exist."

2. Eternity Love

"Having proved the existence of God, we have thereby proved that, in divine eternity, divine love is not in accord with beginning, middle, or end,[34] for if it were, one thing, in God, would be eternity (which is not in accord with beginning, middle, or end),

[34] These three terms, used with characteristic insistence throughout this proof, constitute the red triangle of Figure T, for which see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1, Fig. T.

and another would be divine love. Now since eternity and love are a single essence, since they are one and the same thing (for otherwise they would not constitute one God, and we have already proved the existence of one God), it is therefore proved that divine love has no beginning, middle, or end. And therefore from divine love comes the influence to love rational creature and give him eternal glory without end, in order to show that divine love has perfection in eternity giving eternal glory to creature, which glory is Paradise without end. Thus if Paradise did not exist, God's justice would lack perfection; and if Paradise were not eternally without end, divine love would, in eternity, lack the perfection to love eternally any rational creature loving God; and it would follow that divine power could not, that divine wisdom would not know how to, and that divine will would not want to love rational creature everlastingly. And if this were the case, there would be imperfection of love, power, wisdom, goodness, greatness in eternal goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is demonstrated that Paradise exists and lasts without end.

"It is certain, Gentile, that creature cannot receive eternity without beginning, for if it did, it could be caused without beginning and without end, and, receiving influence from its cause, it would be equal in duration to its first cause; but it is impossible that the thing caused can receive as much as the cause can give, for if it did, they would be equal in the amount of giving and receiving. But since cause, in terms of the dignity of power, should have precedence over the thing caused, having greater power to give than the thing caused to receive, therefore creature cannot be without beginning, and the first cause has power that would give creature being without beginning if the thing caused could receive it. Now if the glory of Paradise were finite and not of eternal duration without end, it would not be evident that God, who is first cause, could give eternal duration without beginning, if the thing caused, that is creature, could receive it. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, everything by which God is more demonstrable in His goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection should be made evident, therefore the duration without end of celestial glory is manifestable."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew: "It is clear that in eternity end is as out of place as beginning, and beginning as out of place as end. Thus, if God can give eternity without end and a creature can receive it, as you say, it would seem, according to your words, that a creature can be caused without a beginning."

Solution. The Jew replied: "There is a very great difference between the influence a creature can receive from God with respect to being eternal without end, and the influence a creature cannot receive toward being without a beginning, for the influence it can receive toward being lasting without end is due to the perfection of the first cause that created this duration without end. And the reason that a creature cannot be without a beginning is because this is in accord with created perfection, so that it may be lasting without end. Thus, if a creature were without beginning, it would not have received the creation of perfection by virtue of which it would be lasting without end; and if it had not, it would follow that it would be eternal without beginning and would have an end, which is inconsistent and against the conditions of the trees."

3. Perfection Charity

"If we suppose that Paradise exists, created charity can be more perfect in loving divine perfection than if we suppose Paradise does not exist. Now that by which charity can have greater perfection in loving God's perfection in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love is better in accord with being than that by which charity cannot so well love God's perfection in the above-mentioned virtues. Thus, if God did not love that by which charity is best disposed to love the above-mentioned virtues, and if He loved contrary things, things as a result of which charity cannot love as much, it would follow that created charity would be better fitted to love perfectly than God's perfection would be fitted to create charity, which is impossible. For if it were possible, that by which charity would be more fitted to love would be uncreated, which in turn is impossible; and by this impossibility it is shown that Paradise exists—without the existence of which charity could love more than God could perfect."

4. Eternity Avarice

"In God, blessed may He be!, eternity and generosity are in accord; for if they were not in accord, it would follow that God's

generosity in giving to His creatures would come from some other source and not from Himself, or that eternity would not be God, and each of these two things is impossible. Now since eternity and generosity are in accord in God, and since generosity and avarice are contraries, it is therefore made manifest that through generosity God's eternity is contrary to avarice. Now since, according to the conditions of the trees, one should grant that by which eternity and avarice are most contrary, therefore one must grant the existence of Paradise; for if it exists, eternity is more contrary to avarice than if Paradise did not exist. Now if that by which eternity and avarice are least contrary existed, there would exist in God that by which eternity and generosity were least in accord; and if this were the case, that which is greater and nobler would accord with nonbeing, and that which is lesser and less noble would accord with being, which is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the trees; by which impossibility and contrariety Paradise is manifestable.

"It is natural for a good craftsman to make his work durable, and through avarice many a craftsman would make his work less durable, if there were no generosity to give the work what it needed to be durable. Therefore duration, wisdom, and generosity are in accord with the work done by a craftsman having perfection of wisdom and of generosity. Now since in God wisdom, eternity, generosity, perfection are in accord, therefore Paradise is demonstrable; for if Paradise were nothing, God's work would not be so durable, for it would contain imperfection of duration, either through imperfection of power, of wisdom, of eternity, or of will, which imperfection would be in accord with avarice. And each of these things is contrary to God's perfection, by which perfection God's work is shown to be durable; by which duration Paradise is manifestable."

5. *Faith Hope*

"If Paradise exists, faith, hope are much better in accord than if Paradise does not exist; and if Paradise does not exist, faith, hope are better in accord through that which does not exist than that which does exist. But this is impossible, namely that something which does not exist can be as great an instrument of concordance as something which does exist; for if it were possible, it

would follow that instrumentality and concordance and majority would be in accord with nonbeing, and their contraries with being, which is impossible. By this impossibility Paradise is demonstrable in the great concordance existing between faith, hope, when faith believes Paradise to exist, and hope awaits celestial glory."

6. *Prudence Accidie*

"Prudence, accidie are contraries, which contrariety is greater in big things than in little ones; for the more prudence there is in bigger things, the greater is virtue; and the greater the virtue, the more contrary it is to vices. And the same thing happens with accidie, for a person is more accidious against greater good than against lesser. Now if Paradise exists, prudence can as a result be more contrary to accidie and accidie to prudence, than if Paradise does not exist. And because that by which prudence and accidie are more contrary should exist, according to the conditions of the trees, therefore Paradise is revealed in the greater contrariety existing between prudence and accidie."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew, "I feel quite satisfied with the proof you have given me concerning celestial bliss; but I would like you to tell me if, in that celestial glory you mention, a man will have a wife and will engender children, if he will eat, drink, and sleep there, and so on for other aspects of this present life."

Solution. The Jew replied: "Paradise is not a place for all those things you mention, for in all of them there is imperfection, and all of them are given to man in this world so that he may live, and so that the human species not disappear from the earth. The truth of the matter is that Paradise is a place of perfection where man will achieve the fulfillment of all blessings by seeing God; by which sight he will achieve such fulfillment that he will need none of these temporal things."[35]

Question. The Gentile replied, "If in Paradise a person neither eats nor drinks, it follows that in Hell there exists no hunger or thirst; and if there is none, what will be the punishment in Hell of those guilty before God of gluttony and drunkenness?"

[35] The members of Hillgarth's seminar in Jerusalem have pointed out that this view is close to that of Maimonides, for whom celestial bliss is more abstract.

Solution. The Jew replied, "In Hell the guilty must suffer hunger and thirst in order to demonstrate God's justice; but if in Paradise there were food to satisfy the glorified body, it would not be signified that the actual sight of God would suffice to give glory to the human body; and if it did not, God's goodness, greatness, and so on would lack perfection, which is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the trees."

Question. The Gentile said, "I would like to know if in Paradise a person will remember this world, and if people will recognize one another."

Solution. The Jew replied: "If in Paradise a person did not remember this world, he would not remember the merit a man has from doing good works; and if he did not remember this, he would not know God's justice. And if people did not recognize one another, then none could have glory in the glory of the others; and if they did not have this, divine will would be in accord with accidie, envy, imperfection, which is impossible."

Article 8. HELL

The Jew said to the Gentile, "To prove the existence of Hell, it will be enough for us to pluck one flower from each tree."

1. Greatness Power

"Everything God has created He has created for the purpose of demonstrating His great power, which power would be made much more evident to His people if Hell existed than if Hell did not exist. But insofar as God, by His power, will be able to conserve the sinner's body eternally in Hell's fire, without its being consumed by that fire (and this at the same time that those in Hell suffer great hunger and thirst, heat and cold—hardships which, through God's power, will last forever and in which He will eternally manifest and demonstrate His justice), so will the reason why God created man be more in accord with being than it would be if Hell did not exist. And since that which causes the goal to be more in accord with the reason why God created man is in itself in accord with being and its contrary with nonbeing, therefore Hell is demonstrable."

2. *Eternity Justice*

"The sinner, when he sins, sins against eternal justice, which justice is in God, and he sins against eternal goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and therefore it is only proper that the sinner's blame be of infinite duration. And if this were not the case, God would lack perfection in infinite greatness, by not carrying out justice in eternity. And since it is impossible that God lack eternal use of justice, therefore the man who sins must be guilty to the point of suffering eternal punishment, which punishment would not exist if Hell were not everlasting."

Question. The Gentile said to the Jew, "If the sin committed by the sinner is finite and limited in time, how can it be that, for this sin, he suffer punishment eternally without end?"

Solution. The Jew replied: "According to what was said and signified above, this is the way things must be according to God's great justice. For if the punishments of Hell come to an end, then the men leaving Hell would have to rise to glory; which glory they would have without exercising free will and without having chosen to love God and to love justice, since they have died in sin, after which death they have no freedom to choose good and avoid evil. Now, for the reason you mentioned, there are many Jews who think that the punishments of Hell will come to an end, but I do not agree with them, believing instead that Hell's punishments will be eternal. For if they were not, the conditions of the trees would be destroyed; moreover, those who are in glory would not have received so much grace from God if Hell were not everlasting as they would if Hell were everlasting. And since that by which those who are saved have more glory and receive greater grace and feel greater charity towards God should be in accord with being, according to the conditions of the trees, therefore Hell is shown to be everlasting."

3. *Love Ire*

"Divine love loves eternally without end those who are in glory. And do you know why? Because divine love and goodness are in accord to love eternally without end the saints in glory; for if they did not, it would follow that the glory that the saints have in

Paradise would have to come to an end, and we have proved that this glory will endure without end. Now, just as love accords with divine goodness in loving the saints in glory forever, so it accords with divine justice in hating forever the sinners placed in Hell, whom it would not with justice hate forever if they were not punished forever by justice."

4. Prudence Fortitude

"Prudence and fortitude are virtues that are contrary to their contraries, which are imprudence and weakness of heart. Now if Hell exists, prudence, fortitude are in better accord against their contraries, and the better they are in accord against their contraries, the more they are in disaccord with the existence of imprudence and weakness of heart. Thus if Hell did not exist, great divine justice would be more contrary to imprudence, weakness of heart, if Hell existed than if Hell did not exist.[36] And the more God's great justice is made evident to the human understanding, the better prudence and fortitude are in accord with being. And since from the existence of Hell there follows the above-mentioned great concordance, and from the nonexistence of Hell the above-mentioned disaccord, and since being and concordance are in accord, as well as nonbeing and disaccord, therefore Hell is manifestable."

5. Charity Accidie

"Charity and accidie are contraries, for through charity man is a lover of good and dislikes evil, and through accidie man is a lover of evil and dislikes good. Now if Hell exists, a person, when he thinks about infernal punishment, is readier to love good and shun evil than he would be if he thought and believed that Hell's pain did not exist or that Hell's punishments were finite. And the more Hell's punishments are instrumental in making a person love good and do good works and shun evil, the more contrary he is to accidie. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, that by which virtues and vices are most contrary should be in accord with being, and that by which they are less contrary should be

36 "Phrase peu cohérente" as Llinarès (*Gentil*, p. 103, n. 340) rightly remarks. The text, however, is substantially similar in all sources.

less in accord with being, and this in relation to infinite duration, therefore Hell is made manifest to the human understanding that considers such matters."

When the Jew had proved the above-mentioned articles, the Gentile let out a sigh of great sadness, saying: "Worthless wretch! And to think of the danger you were in for so long a time, and what endless suffering you would have had if you had died in your former state of error and darkness." After the Gentile had spoken these words, the Jew asked him if he was satisfied with the articles of his religion, which he had proved. He replied that he was quite satisfied, with the possible reservation of what he might hear from the other wise men. "But please tell me where Hell is, and what sort of punishment is suffered by those who are sent there."

The Jew replied: "On this question the Jewish people are divided into different opinions, for some believe that Hell is in this world in which we live, others say it is in the middle of the earth, and others say it is in the air; some say Hell is nothing else but not seeing God and realizing that one has lost the Glory and the sight of God;[37] others say that Hell consists in having the body forever in fire, ice, snow, brimstone, and boiling water, and among devils, snakes, and serpents who ceaselessly torment it. And the punishment of the soul will be all the greater when it no longer desires to exist, but knows it will exist forever and its torments will never cease, and knows it has lost everlasting glory."

When the Jew had spoken these words, and many others that would take long to recount, the Jew said: "We have proved and demonstrated how the Jewish people have a true religion and are on the path of truth by the way we have made our articles accord with the flowers of the trees and with their conditions. For if our religion were not on the path to salvation, we could not have made the flowers and the conditions of the trees accord with the articles we believe, which accord we have demonstrated and signified, blessed be the Lord! And since the religions of the Christians and Saracens are contrary to ours, it is clear that they are in error, for everything contrary to the truth must be error. Therefore you, Gentile, will do a greater wrong than before if you leave the way of salvation and take the road by which sinners descend to everlasting fire and lose glory without end."

[37] The members of Hillgarth's seminar say this fourth opinion is that of Maimonides.

HERE BEGINS THE THIRD BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION[1]

"WHICH OF YOU two will be the first to speak?" inquired the Gentile. The Jew replied: "According to what we decided, the Christian should speak first, since his religion preceded that of the Saracens." The Gentile therefore asked the Christian to begin to prove his religion, and the articles in which he believed. The Christian replied by asking the Saracen if he wanted him to begin as the Gentile had suggested, and the Saracen replied that he was in agreement.

The Christian knelt down and kissed the earth, and he raised his thoughts to God and his eyes and hands heavenward. Before his face he made the sign of the Cross, while saying, "In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, one God in trinity, and trinity in unity." When the Christian had paid homage to the divine Unity and Trinity, he again made the sign of the cross, and in honor of Jesus Christ's humanity he said, "*Adoremus te, Christe, et benedicimus tibi, quia per crucem tuam redemisti mundum.*"[2]

When the Christian had finished his prayer, he said that the articles of his religion were fourteen in number, of which seven pertained to the divine nature of Jesus Christ, and seven to His human nature.[3] "Those pertaining to His divine nature are: One

[1] The word *lei* (or *lig*) in Llull can mean either "law," as in "the Law God gave Moses," or "religion" as here.

[2] The Antiphone "We worship Thee, O Christ, and bless Thee, for by Thy cross Thou hast redeemed the world." Note also the immediate emphasis, as García Palou points out (*OE* I, 1141, nn. 45 and 48) on the dogmas of the Trinity and Incarnation; cf. n. 8 below.

[3] Llull wrote two important works devoted exclusively to the articles of faith: The *Liber de quattuordecim articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae Fidei*, and the *Liber de articulis fidei* or *Apostrophe* as it is usually known. He also deals with them extensively in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 245–54; *Doctrina pueril*, chs. 1–12; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 687–710, 833–34, 968–74, and 1003–4; and the *Liber clericorum* (cf. Avinyó, no. 126). He deals with them partially (eleven of them) in the *Libre que deu hom creure de Déu*, (nine of them) in the

God, Father and Son and Holy Ghost, creator, re-creator,[4] glorifier. Those pertaining to Jesus Christ's humanity are: conceived by the Holy Ghost, of Virgin born, crucified, descended into Hell, rose up again, ascended to Heaven, will come to judge the good and the wicked on the Day of Judgment."[5]

Before beginning to prove his articles, the Christian said to the Gentile: "I would have you know, Gentile, that the articles of our faith are so sublime and so difficult to believe and understand that you will not be able to comprehend them unless you apply all the strength of your mind and soul to understanding the arguments by which I intend to prove the above-mentioned articles.[6] For it often happens that one gives a sufficient proof of something, but since the person to whom the proof is directed cannot understand it, he thinks that no proof has been given of something that is in fact quite provable."

Article 1. ONE GOD

"God is One, and in one God we believe; and we say that this God is simple[7] and perfect, and is the consummation of all good;

Principles of Theology, and (six of them, those that are most essential for his purposes: Trinity—counted as three articles—Incarnation, Creation, and Resurrection) in three works: the *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis*, the *Disputatio fidei et intellectus*, and the *Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos Fidei Catholicae*. For works limited to the four articles included under the Trinity and Incarnation, see n. 8 below.

[4] For the concept of "re-creation," see Article 6 below and n. 33 there.

[5] As with the introductory section to the previous book (see Bk. II, n. 2), this one is replaced in the *Electorium* by a chart on the same earlier folio of that MS showing the various articles of the Christian faith acceptable to the other two religions.



[6] There is a similar passage about the difficulties of understanding the doctrine of the Trinity in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 2. In the Spanish MS of the *Gentile* (ed. Stone, p. 112), there is a curious marginal note referring the reader to the proofs of the Trinity found in *Felix*; see Bk. I, ch. 4 of that work below.

[7] In the sense of "not composite or compound."

and in Him are all the flowers of the first tree. Thus all the nobility that the Jews and Saracens can attribute or ascribe to God's unity the Christians attribute and ascribe, and much more even than the Jews and Saracens can assign and attribute to Him. And this is because they do not believe in the Holy Trinity nor in the glorious Incarnation of the Son of God.[8] Now, as to the existence of one God, the Jew gave a perfectly adequate proof; if, however, you want me to prove it by many other arguments, I am prepared to do so."

The Gentile replied: "I am quite satisfied with the Jew's proof of the unity of God, so that you do not need to prove this first article, since it is already proven. You can therefore begin to prove the other articles in which you believe."

Articles 2–4. TRINITY

"IN ORDER to prove the existence of trinity in God, we first pick the flower of

1. Goodness Greatness[9]

from the first tree, by which we will prove, according to the conditions of the five trees, that God must necessarily exist in trinity. And by proving the Trinity, we will be proving three

[8] It was these two dogmas that aroused strongest opposition among or were most misunderstood by Jews and Muslims, and proofs of which therefore formed the cornerstone of Llull's apologetics (cf. pp. 34–5 with n. 130 and p. 58 above, as well as p. 217 below). In his *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione* Llull said, "Since the Jews and Saracens are against the Holy Trinity and Incarnation, we have therefore written this book" (cf. J. M. Millás Vallicrosa in his introduction to the *Liber praedicationis contra Judaeos,* Madrid–Barcelona, 1957, p. 62). His *Liber de Trinitate in unitate permansive in essentia Dei* begins, "Since infidels laugh at Christians on account of their belief that in God's essence there is a Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we therefore . . ." On the same subject he also produced the *Liber de secretis sacratissimae Trinitatis et Incarnationis*. Written originally in Arabic, it was apparently used as the basis for a dispute held in Fez in the presence of the king of Morocco in 1394 between the leading local doctors of Islam and the captain of the Christian militia of Morocco, Juan González de Villadares, along with a cousin of the king of Portugal, all before a notary to attest to the proceedings. See F. Vendrell de Millás, "La tradición de la apologética luliana en el reino de Fez," *EL* I (1957), 371–6; M. Ruffini, "Una disputa a Fez nel 1344 sul 'Liber de Trinitate' di Raimondo Lullo in un MS. inedito del sec. XV°," *EL* I (1957), 385–407; and Millás Vallicrosa on pp. 63–6 of the edition cited above. See M. Batllori, *A través de la història i la cultura* (Montserrat, 1979), p. 26, for a correction of the date of 1344 appearing in Ruffini's title.

[9] Only two MSS, F and S, understood this curious placement of the heading in the middle of a sentence (and not repeated before the following paragraph as in the Mainz edition and Rosselló).

articles, namely, those of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and we will be proving how these three articles are one essence, one God.

"God's goodness, greatness is either finite or infinite eternity, power, wisdom, love. Now if it is finite, it is contrary to perfection; if it is infinite, it is in accord with perfection. And since, according to the conditions of the trees, it is impossible for God's goodness, greatness to be contrary to perfection in eternity, power, wisdom, love, it is therefore demonstrated that God's goodness, greatness are infinite eternity, infinite power, infinite wisdom, love, perfection.

"It is clear that the greater the good, the more strongly it accords with eternity, power, wisdom, love; and the lesser the good, the closer it is to imperfection, which is contrary to perfection. Thus, if in God there exists one begetting good which is infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and which begets a good infinite in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and if from this begetting good and this begotten good there issues forth a good infinite in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection, then the flower[10] is greater in God than it would be if the above-mentioned things did not exist in God; for each of the above-mentioned things is as good or as great by all the flowers of the tree as would be God's unity without the existence in it of trinity. And since, according to the conditions of the tree, one should grant God the greatest good, therefore the Trinity, by what we have said above, is demonstrable."

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian: "According to what you say, it follows that God's unity would be in a state of greater goodness if there were four or five or an infinite number of those good things you mentioned, than there would be with only three; for goodness, greatness accord better with the number four than with three, or with five than with four, or with an infinite rather than a finite number. This being the case, therefore, according to

[10] The Spanish and Latin sources (followed by Rosselló) add "of goodness, greatness," with the peculiarity that in L, the Latin MS that dates from Llull's lifetime and belonged presumably to his disciple, Pierre de Limoges, the two words are written inside a box, just as in the "compartments" of the Art (cf. Bk. I, n. 1 above, and n. 15 below).

what you say, in God there should be an infinite number of good things—begetters, begotten, and issue."[11]

Solution. The Christian replied: "If in God there had been more than one begetter, one begotten and one issue, then each begetter would not be infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, for it would not be sufficient unto itself, as a begetter, to beget a thing sufficient so that an infinite goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection could be begotten; nor would each begetter and each begotten be sufficient to bestow infinite goodness, greatness, etc. on an issue from both; nor would all the infinite number of begetters, begotten, or issue be sufficient to have perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., for infinite number cannot have perfection, since increase of infinite number and perfection are in disaccord. This being the case, there would, therefore, according to the perfection of the flowers, exist imperfection in God, and the flowers would be contrary to one another, if in God there were infinite begetters, begotten, and issue."

Question. The Gentile said, "An aggregate of four or five or a thousand can contain greater good than an aggregate of three; therefore, if there were three or four or a thousand good things in God, then God's goodness would be greater than if there were only three."

Solution. The Christian replied to the Gentile: "This problem can be solved by the same argument given above, for in God there cannot exist more than one begetter, one begotten, and one issue if each of these three is to have the property of being complete and perfect.[12] And if there were more than three, none of the three would be perfect in itself, nor would it have complete goodness, greatness, eternity, etc. For just as it is not fitting for there to exist many Gods, and just as one God is sufficient for the possession of all the goodness, greatness, etc. of all of them together, and could even have more than all of them put together could have, so one begetter is sufficient for the possession of all the goodness, greatness, etc., which two or more begetters might have, and even

[11] The original has *proceyts*, which means literally "products," and refers, of course, to the procession of the Holy Ghost.

[12] The Latin sources (followed by Rosselló) add, "in goodness, greatness, and the other above-mentioned properties."

of more than they could have; for if there existed two or more begetters, between them they could not have an infinity of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., whereas one alone could have it. And the same would be the case with two or more begotten, and two or more issues."

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian, "The same must follow from God's unity; for if this unity is not sufficient in itself to be infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., without three distinct divine persons, then it contains within itself imperfection of goodness, greatness, etc."

Solution. The Christian replied: "That is not true, for if there existed no distinct personal properties in God, there would be in Him no activity by which, from infinite good in greatness, eternity, etc., would be engendered infinite good in greatness, eternity, etc. For if in God infinite good in greatness, eternity, etc. did not come from an infinite begetting good and an infinite begotten good, the flowers of the trees would not be in a condition of perfection, and the above-mentioned activity of God's unity would be defective, which activity is infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., and which activity, along with the three distinct persons, each having its own distinct property infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., constitutes the actual divine unity, which is a single essence and at the same time a trinity of persons. And since being and so glorious an activity as that just discussed are in accord, and lack of the above-mentioned activity and nonbeing are in accord; and since being in which there is activity for the good is in accord with greater nobility than being in which there is no activity; and since one should grant and attribute greater nobility to God's essence; therefore the fact that it necessarily follows that in God there is activity in trinity is made evident. For if there were not, there would exist contrariety among the flowers of the first tree, and this is impossible; by which impossibility the Trinity is demonstrable."[13]

[13] This whole paragraph is based on the concept of *obra*, for which there is no satisfactory English equivalent. Sometimes I translate it as "works," and sometimes as "operation" (which is close to the *operatio* the medieval Latin translator invariably uses, as it is to the *operació* Llull occasionally employs as a synonym; cf. Bk. II, n. 5 above); then sometimes I translate it as "action," and sometimes, as here, "activity." For the important concept of the "activity" of the dignities, see "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 30–33 above, as well as the section on *Agentia* in Sala-Molins, *Amour*, pp. 29ff.

2–4. Power Wisdom, Power Love, Wisdom Love

"In order to prove the Trinity, it will be best if I pick the above-mentioned three flowers at once from the first tree.

"It is clearly fitting, Gentile, for the sun to give light and for fire to give heat. And do you know why? Because the sun derives its brilliance from itself alone, as does fire with heat; thus if it were not fitting for the sun to give light nor for the fire to give heat, the sun and fire would be in disaccord with the very things they are and derive from themselves, which is impossible. For if it were possible, each would be in accord with corruption and privation, by the inconsistency of each's usage within itself, which is impossible and against the rules of philosophy, of which you are called 'master'.[14]

"God, blessed may He be! is His own power, His own wisdom, and His own love. Now if, as we said above, it is fitting that use be made of the sun and fire, which are creatures, how much more fitting that use be made of the above-mentioned flowers, in order that God may make use of power, wisdom, and love in creatures. For if this were not the case, it would follow that the sun and fire would be more in accord with perfection of power than divine power, wisdom, love, which is impossible. By this impossibility is signified the fact that if the above-mentioned compartments, that is to say, the flowers,[15] can be used with creatures, how much more fitting that they be used with, and derive benefit from, themselves. And if this were not the case, it would follow that God would be more in accord with activity outside Himself than activity within Himself, which is impossible. By this impossibility is signified the fact that God's power must of necessity empower, His wisdom make wise, and His love love,[16] and this in infinite

[14] The degree entitling a man to teach in the university, a meaning that the two best MSS (O, F) emphasize by using the Latin form *magister* rather than the Old Catalan *maestre*, perhaps to divorce it from the meaning of "craftsman, artisan" used in Bk. I, Tree 1, "Wisdom Perfection," above. For this as an indication that Llull's Gentile is closer to Abelard's philosopher than to a mere pagan, see Prologue, n. 7.

[15] More proof of the correspondence between the "flowers" of the *Gentile* and the "compartments" of the Art; see n. 10 above.

[16] A foretaste of the language of the correlatives (see n. 128 to the "Life" above), but here only the verb of action is used. The translator is left with three possibilities: the first is to leave the word in the original Catalan and add an explanatory phrase, which is what the medieval Latin translator did, putting for the first two of these three verbs, "*poderejar*,

goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection; which necessity could not exist without distinction of personal properties, that is, properties distinct one from another and yet which together form a single divine essence, infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc., and that that essence be three personal properties distinct by personal, essential, begetting generation, by personal, essential, begotten generation, and by personal, essential, proceeded procession, each of them containing all the flowers of the first tree, and being all together a single flower containing all the flowers of the trees.[17] This being the case, therefore, because of the above-mentioned necessity, the Holy Trinity after which we have been inquiring is signified and demonstrated."

5. *Eternity Perfection*

"Infinite power that begets infinite power, infinite wisdom and infinite love; infinite wisdom that begets infinite power, infinite love; infinite love that begets infinite power, infinite wisdom; and infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite love that issue from the above-mentioned infinite begetter, and from the above-mentioned infinite begotten one—these above-mentioned three are more strongly in accord with the above-mentioned flower than would be a single essential power, a single essential wisdom, and a single essential love that were not composed of the above three. And since that which is most in accord with God's eternity, perfection should be attributed to God, therefore it is appropriate that God accord with everything by which eternity, perfection are best in accord with God. For if they were not, it would mean that the human understanding could better understand, and human consideration could better consider, a nobility of eternity and perfection other than that of God, which is impossible. For if it were

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hoc est potestatem facere," and "*savejar*, hoc est sapientiam operari"; the second is to use (or create) an equivalent neologism in his own language, which is what the Mainz editors did here with "possificare" and "sapientificare," and what I did with "empower" (used in the older meaning of "to bestow power upon, make powerful"); the third is to use a circumlocution like my "make wise." Because of the close relation between the structural nature of Llull's thought and the technical vocabulary used to articulate it (see Preface), I have preferred the second solution, only resorting to the last when the only available neologism is something as grating as "sapientize."

[17] F and S (followed by Rosselló) have "tree," which would seem more correct, but the plural is in the best MS, O, and in the Latin sources (the passage is missing in D and C).

possible, God's eternity and perfection would be finite and limited, as a result of which the flowers of the tree would be contrary to the above-mentioned flower, which is impossible. By this impossibility the Trinity is signified and demonstrated to the human understanding which understands, and to human consideration which considers the significance and demonstration presented above."

6. *Greatness Power Love*

"If man is able and willing to create his own likeness, there is greater power and greater love shown in creating his own likeness than in creating something that is not of his species nor is as noble as man. Now if in God there is a God who[18] is able and willing to beget a God similar to Himself in being God, and in being eternal and infinite in perfection, then greater power and will is shown than if He did not possess such power and will. And since the greatest power, will should be attributed to God, and since all things, according to the course of nature, like to beget their likeness in terms of species, therefore the Trinity in God is signified and revealed."

Question. The Gentile said, "How can God make an eternal likeness to Himself if everything that is made must have a beginning?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "Since a creature cannot exist without a beginning (otherwise it would not be a creature), therefore God, when it is a question of creature, can make nothing without a beginning. But since God is greater than creature, He therefore has in himself the ability to receive and carry out the act of begetting without beginning; for if He did not have it, He would not be absolutely greater in power than the highest creature."

7. *Wisdom Perfection*

The Christian said to the Gentile: "The ultimate reason, that is, the principal reason why God created man is so that man can know

[18] This second "God" is missing in S (and hence in Rosselló), leaving a phrase one would have to translate "there is that (or something) which."

and love God. And God's second intention in creating man is so that man can participate in glory with God eternally without end. And if the contrary were the case, it would follow that the above-mentioned flower would be contrary to the other flowers of the first tree, which is impossible; by this impossibility it is made manifest that man was principally created to know and love God, and secondarily to glory in God. This being the case, the Holy Trinity of God is demonstrable. For if God is at the same time one and in trinity, it is much clearer throughout the world and throughout the regions into which it is divided, that He should be known and loved, than it would be if He were one without being in trinity. For the world is one and is made up of only three things, no more no less: that is to say, one existence divided into the animal, the sensual, and the intellectual.[19] Of an animal nature are all living, feeling things, which are composed of body and of sensitive soul.[20] Of a sensual nature are all things which are corporeal and have no life. Of an intellectual nature are angels, souls, and everything incorporeal. And these three natures are the world, and the world is these three natures. Each of these three natures is one nature and at the same time all three without individuation. This being the case, God's trinity and unity are therefore made manifest by the unity and trinity that are in all creatures. Whence, if God were in unity and not in trinity, the unity in which creatures exist would signify, to the human understanding, His unity, and the trinity existing in creatures would falsely signify the existence of trinity in God. And if creatures did not exist in trinity, and had been created only in unity, they would better signify God if God were only in unity than they do having been created in trinity. And if God had not created creatures in that state by which He were best signified to be known and loved, this would constitute a defect in God's wisdom and perfection. And since it is impossible for any defect to exist in God, it is therefore demonstrated that that by which His creatures best demonstrate God to man must be true, by which truth the Trinity is demonstrable."

[19] These are the three categories of "creature" in the blue triangle of Figure T; see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, Figure T, par. 2.

[20] "One of the constituent parts of the soul which is concerned with sensation and which is characteristic of animals." *OED*, s.v. sensitive. Cf. *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 6.

8. Goodness Charity Power[21]

"If you could do a good deed that was infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and if you had good will and perfect charity, you would do the above-mentioned good deed. Now since God has perfect charity, perfect goodness, and perfect power, it is only fitting for Him to do what you would do if you had the power. And if He did not do it, you could have a will better than God's, presuming you had God's power. And if you, who are a creature, could have a will better than God's, then perfection would not accord with charity in God; but since this is impossible, it is therefore signified that in God, God the Father[22] does what you would do if you had the power in the perfection in which God must have His power, His goodness, His wisdom, and His will. This being the case, the Trinity is made manifest, according to what the preceding flower signifies by the preceding words."

"The more lesser charity resembles greater charity, the greater it is in goodness and virtue than that charity which is not so similar to greater charity. Now if God is in unity and trinity, man, who is in unity and trinity, more closely resembles God than he would if in God there were not unity and trinity; and the more man resembles God, the readier he is to be good and to have greater charity towards God, towards himself, and towards his fellow man. Thus, since, according to the conditions of the second tree, one should grant that by which created charity and goodness are more in accord with the uncreated goodness and charity of God, therefore, according to these principles, that is, these conditions of the second tree, the Trinity is made manifest."

9–10. Goodness Charity, Greatness Charity

"If the soul's action in understanding and loving God constitutes greater and better charity than that which exists when it understands and loves itself or another creature, then it must necessarily be the case that God acts with greater charity when He understands

[21] Rosselló followed S in omitting the third term.

[22] Thus, *Déu pare* in all sources except S, which has *Déu poder*, which Rosselló "corrected" to *seu poder*, "His power."

and loves Himself than when He loves and understands some other thing. And if this were not the case, it would follow that the activity God carries out in Himself, understanding and loving creatures, would be equal to the activity He carries out in understanding and loving Himself, which is impossible. For if it were possible, His goodness would be as great outside Himself as within Himself, which is impossible and against the conditions of the trees. By this impossibility and contrariety it is made manifest that God necessarily carries out some activity signifying plurality; for without plurality, any activity in Himself would be impossible. And if there were no activity in Himself, His great goodness would be greater if He produced[23] within Himself goodness and greatness similar to Himself, than if there were lack of activity in Himself. And since goodness, greatness, charity accord better with a being possessing action than with one not possessing it, therefore in God goodness, greatness, charity must be in accord with activity; if not, created being, which by its nature accords with action, would be in accord with greater nobility than uncreated being, which is impossible. By this impossibility activity is shown to exist in God by the preceding flowers and explanation; by which activity plurality is signified, and by which plurality the Trinity is shown to exist in God's unity."

11–12. Goodness Charity, Power Charity

"Created charity can love created goodness in itself, and therefore, because of the difference existing in creatures between goodness, power, and charity, charity can be the lover and have a beloved. And since such power can be greater and better in lover and beloved than in lover without beloved or beloved without lover, it follows that in God goodness, charity should accord with power, by which in Him there may exist a lover who is not, according to one personal property, the beloved; that the beloved should be, according to another personal property, the lover and have a beloved;[24] that from these two, lover and beloved, there

[23] For the concept of *obra* on which this paragraph is based, see n. 13 above. The verb *obrar*, however, I have had to render as "produce."

[24] Rosselló has, "that the beloved *not* be, according to another personal property, the lover, and *the lover* have a beloved." The words I have italicized are in none of the sources. For other textual problems with this passage, see the forthcoming edition.

issue forth another personal property which is lover and beloved; and that all three, lovers and beloveds, be a single essence, within itself loving, or loved by, its infinite goodness and infinite power. And if this were not the case, it would follow that goodness, power would be more in accord with created than with uncreated charity, and that is impossible; by which impossibility the Trinity is made manifest.

"In this world there would be greater goodness, power, charity in man if he loved God both freely and of necessity than if he loved God through free will alone. And since God's charity accords with greater goodness, power than created charity, God should therefore possess the nobility created charity would possess if it could. And if this were not the case, it would follow that uncreated charity could not have the goodness that created charity cannot have, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is made evident that God's charity necessarily has the power and freedom to be lover and beloved, in order that His goodness accord with perfect power. This being the case, therefore, the Holy Trinity is demonstrated by necessity and by perfect, complete liberty; which is model and form for the human understanding to know the Holy Trinity we are seeking."

13. Power Prudence

"The greatest impossibility there is is that God does not exist, and therefore the greatest possibility there is is that God exists. Now the greatest impossibility[25] there is against corruption is generation in which there is the greatest possibility against corruption; and if this were not the case, it would follow that generation and corruption would not be contraries. Thus, since corruption and possibility[26] are contrary to all created generation, there must exist in God generation to which corruption and impossibility are not

[25] Thus in all MSS (except for L, which crosses out the *im-* of *impossibilitas*). After this word, the Mainz edition, followed by Rosselló, adds, "there is against generation is corruption, and the greatest possibility . . . ," which certainly makes more sense than the original. But could eleven MSS all be identically wrong? See the following note.

[26] L has *im-* added above the word. Following this lead, the Mainz edition (followed, of course by Rosselló) has "impossibility." "Possibility" here, as being in accord with corruption and contrary to generation, would seem to be consonant with the "impossibility" commented on in the previous note, which is against corruption. But then what about the intervening "possibility"? And what is Llull getting at?

contrary; and if this were not the case, prudence could have no knowledge of how God's greater possibility and power accord with being, nor of how the greater impossibility of God's not existing and the possibility of God's existing are in accord with power. And since that by which prudence can best know God's power in being should exist, according to the conditions of this tree, it is therefore shown that in God generation exists against corruption, which is in accord with nonbeing; and by this generation and corruption, paternity and filiation is shown to be in God.

"That which is most contrary to inequality is equality; and that which is most contrary to contrariety is concordance. Now if in God there exist equality and concordance, it necessarily follows that prudence recognizes in God greater power against inequality and contrariety not existing in God, than if there were no equality and concordance in God. And since the greatest result prudence can achieve in recognizing God's great power must exist, according to the conditions of the tree, therefore equality, concordance must necessarily exist in God; and if there is equality, concordance in God, there must be plurality in Him, for without plurality there could be no equality, concordance in Him. And because there is plurality in God, therefore, by God's power, the Trinity is shown to prudence by means of equality, concordance."

14. Goodness Pride

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Pride is against goodness, for a proud man prefers base to noble things and resents his neighbor's good fortune. Therefore humility, which is its contrary, is in accord with goodness that prefers the nobler to the lesser good, increases both greater and lesser good, and loves the good that is midway between greater and lesser good.

"If in God's goodness there is one good that gives of itself infinitely in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection to a good that is infinite in goodness, greatness, etc.; and if the preceding good makes this gift without any lessening of itself; and if from the good that gives and from the good that is given there issues forth a good infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., and there is equality among the good that gives, the good

given, and the good issued from them; if such is the case, God's goodness is more contrary to pride than it would be without the above-mentioned good given and good issued. For in the latter case, the gift would not, in God's goodness, be so nobly given nor would it accord so well with humility, by which lesser humility God's humility would not be so contrary to pride. And since, according to the conditions of this tree, one should grant the greatest contrariety possible between pride and God's goodness, it is therefore made manifest that there is in God a good that gives all of itself to the given good, and that from the good which gives and the good given there issues forth a good which is given. And since this must be the case, according to the conditions of the tree, therefore the Trinity is made manifest."

15. Greatness Pride

"If pride had in itself such great power that from itself it could beget pride infinite in greatness, in power, and in eternity, and if from both there proceeded a pride that was infinitely great in power and in eternity, and if together they constituted a pride[27] infinite in power and in eternity, it would be impossible for humility to conquer the above-mentioned pride, or to exist at all. And since pride accords with lesser and with nonbeing, and humility with greater and with being, therefore there must necessarily exist in God a humility that is greater than any pride one could conceive, estimate, or imagine. And if this were not the case, human thought could conceive a pride greater than God's humility, and man's soul would be greater in conceiving pride than God's humility in greatness, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is shown that in God there is one humble entity which from all of itself begets another entity humble in infinite goodness, greatness, etc., and from the begetter and the humble begotten, there issues forth infinitely in goodness, greatness, etc. another humble issue, and that together these humble entities are a single essence humble in infinite goodness, greatness, etc., in which the Trinity is made manifest, according to the preceding demonstration."

[27] The Latin sources have "an essence."

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian, "If in God there is such great humility as you claim, and since humility and pride are contraries, how is it that God's humility does not prohibit the existence of pride, which is evil?"

Solution. The Christian said: "If God did not give man freedom to be either proud or humble, God's wisdom would be contrary to man's humility, by which he can gain God's merit and grace. And because the flowers of the second tree are not, nor should be, contrary to one another, according to the conditions of the tree, and because in the first tree there cannot exist contrariety between one flower and another, therefore God's humility allows pride to exist, so that created humility, through that which is uncreated, can oppose pride, thereby having created humility honoring uncreated humility.

16. Love Avarice

"In man, love, avarice are contraries, because a loving man is in accord with generosity, which is contrary to avarice in the beloved. And avarice takes and does not give, and is in accord with despair against hope, which accords with love and generosity. This being the case, therefore, by means of the above-mentioned virtues and vices, the Holy Trinity about which you asked is represented by the contrariety existing between virtues and vices. For if in God there is a lover who, in God, loves a beloved so intensely that he gives all of himself to him—if this lover gives all of himself and is infinite in goodness, greatness, and in all the flowers of the first tree, then in the lover there must necessarily exist infinite generosity in goodness, greatness, etc. And the greater the generosity, the more divine love is contrary to avarice. And since the greatest contrariety between these two should be granted, as was decided at the beginning in the conditions of the trees, therefore trinity is denoted by the primary condition of this tree, which trinity is in lover and beloved; and each lover and beloved is lover and beloved, and from both there issues forth lover and beloved, and together they are a single essential love, infinite as lover and beloved in goodness, greatness, etc.

"If avarice had infinite power, it would destroy all generosity, because no other power can oppose infinite power. And since God

has infinite power, God must, by His infinite generosity, be contrary to avarice. Now if in God there is an entity infinite in generosity which gives infinite generosity, then the generosity it gives must necessarily come from its own generosity, for if it gave from some other generosity, its own generosity would not be infinite. And if in God there is generosity without an entity to give that generosity infinitely in goodness, greatness, etc., there would not exist in Him infinite love which loved to give such a noble gift as one that is infinite. And if in God there were lack of love to give at the same time that there were a perfect gift to give, there would exist contrariety between love and giving and loving. Hence, since it is impossible for the flowers of the first tree to be contrary to one another, the Trinity is therefore demonstrated, as is made evident by the preceding argument."

17. Faith Hope

The Christian said to the Gentile: "If trinity did not exist in God, there would be no activity in Him, that is, there would be no inner activity in God, and the best activity that would exist in being would be that which God had in creatures. Now since, according to the conditions of the trees, God's inner activity must be better than that He performs in creatures (because if this were not the case, there would be no perfection of activity in goodness, greatness, etc.), therefore it is demonstrated that in God there has existed and exists activity independent of the activity He performs in creatures,[28] which activity is that of the Father begetting the Son, and of the Holy Ghost proceeding from Father and Son, and of all three persons being one God, and this activity must be infinite in goodness, greatness, etc. And if this is the case, the faith that believes in such activity is greater, and, insofar as it is greater, is more in accord with being than it would be if it were lesser and did not believe in the Trinity. Now since it is impossible for faith to be lesser on account of something that exists in God and to be greater if something existed in God that is not there, therefore trinity is made manifest, in that faith can be greater if trinity exists than if it does not exist; for no faith can, by not believing in the

[28] See the commentary of W. W. Artus in *Actas* I, 185 = *EL* 22 (1978), 185.

Trinity, be greater than the faith which believes that God is one person who begets another infinitely in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and that from both there proceeds another person infinitely in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc.

"If in God there had been no activity before the world existed, man's hope could not be so great, nor could man, through hope, have such confidence in God, without the existency of Trinity and without God having activity within Himself. And a person could lose hope of having eternal existence thinking that just as there was no activity in God before the world existed, there would come another time when nothing existed, and everything would come to an end. But when a person believes that God is eternally and infinitely active within Himself, then under the influence of so great and marvelous an activity, a person can hope that the world will last eternally without end. Now, since that by which man's hope in God is greater, as well as that by which it accords better with faith and being, form part of the conditions of the fourth tree, and since hope can be greater and can be more in accord with faith if trinity exists, therefore, in this greater hope and in the greater accord with faith, the Trinity is represented and manifested to the eyes of the human mind which considers what we have just said."

Question. The Gentile said, "According to what you say, faith, hope could be greater if in God there existed a quaternity of persons, or a plurality of infinite persons, than when there is only a trinity of persons in God."

Solution. The Christian replied: "If in God the activity of three persons were not enough, and more were needed for Him to have perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., hope could not be so great nor so contrary to despair.[29] Nor would faith believe in such a noble divine paternity, filiation, and procession if God's perfection needed two or more paternities and filiations, or three or more processions. Now since in God there are no more than three persons, as we have already proved in our previous replies, and because, if there were, faith and hope would be less, therefore your question is contrary to the nobility concordant with the plu-

[29] Another case of similar roots lost in translation, in this case that in *esperança* ("hope") and *desesperança* ("despair").

rality that must exist in God, and with the majority and concordance that must exist in faith, hope."

18. Charity Justice

"Charity, justic are in accord against ill will and injustice. Now, if there is trinity in God, charity, justice can accord much better in man than if there were no trinity in God, for by trinity it is understood that in God there is a charitable, just begetter who is infinite in charity, justice, which infinity of charity, justice is infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, perfection. Created charity and justice can, therefore, be greater through the influence of the above-mentioned uncreated charity and justice than they could be without the charity and justice of the above-mentioned begetter. And the same is true for the Son and for the Holy Ghost, if each is charitable and just for Himself and in Himself, infinitely in goodness, greatness, etc. Now since, according to the conditions of this tree, it follows that created charity, justice can be greater in man if there is trinity in God than if there is not, therefore the Trinity is made manifest."

19. Prudence Fortitude

"Through trinity and unity the actuality[30] of the intellect in understanding is more strongly increased than through unity alone. Thus, if in God there is trinity and unity, the human intellect can better understand God than if there is no trinity in God, just as man can understand more about a plant than about a stone, and more about a beast than about a plant, and more about man than about a beast. This is because there are more things in a plant than in a stone, and more in a beast than in a plant, and more in man than in a beast.

"If there is trinity in God, the human intellect can be ignorant of more things in God than it could if there were no trinity in God, just as the intellect can be ignorant of more things in a plant than in a stone, and more in a beast than in a plant, and more in

[30] *Actualitat* from the medieval Latin *actualis*, which meant "active, practical," referring to the carrying out of a thing, the passing from the potential to the act itself (as opposed to *virtualis*). It must not be confused with "activity," which we have used to translate *obra*. Note that the following "of the intellect" is missing in Rosselló.

man than in a beast. For the more aspects there are to a thing, the more the intellect can be ignorant concerning it. Now this being the case, and since that by which man's intellect can understand and be ignorant of more things in God accords with the conditions of the first and the fourth trees, then that same thing must be in accord with being to demonstrate that the intellect can be very noble in understanding great things in God, and that these great things are very noble precisely in that the intellect cannot grasp all their nobility. Trinity is therefore exemplified in that by which the intellect can be nobler and loftier in understanding and can be better prevented from not understanding. And because these two conditions are in accord, according to the nobility of God and the nobility of the created intellect, so that the latter may know the great nobility that is in the flowers of the first tree, therefore trinity has been shown to exist in God.

"The more the human intellect strives to understand God, the more it accords with strength and the more it causes prudence to increase; and the more the intellect is constrained so that it cannot understand all of God's nobility and gives to the faith which believes that which it cannot understand, the more the intellect fortifies faith and mortifies itself, from which ensues a greater concordance between prudence and fortitude. And because this greater concordance can exist through divine trinity, and because without the presence of trinity in divine nature there could not be such a great concordance between prudence, fortitude, therefore, in this greater concordance which is in accord with the conditions of this tree, the Trinity is signified and demonstrated."

20. Charity Envy

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Charity and envy are contraries, for by charity a person is in accord with generosity and loyalty, and by envy with cupidity and deceit. Whence if a person has charity towards God, he is even more contrary to envy than when he has charity towards his neighbor; and this is because in God there is greater generosity and truth[31] than in any creature. And if a person is envious of God's good and honor, his envy is

[31] Thus in all medieval sources; the Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) changed it to "charity."

more contrary to charity than it would be if he were envious of his neighbor's good and honor; and this is because the good and honor befitting God is greater than the good and honor of any creature.

"According to the preceding argument, trinity is shown to exist in God, because that is what is signified by the above flower. For if in God there is charity which from itself begets charity equal to itself, and from the begetting charity and the begotten charity there proceeds charity equal to that of the begetter and the begotten, and this by will of the begotten and the begetter, then envy is farther from any similarity with God's charity than it would be if there were no charity in God, as was said before. And since that which causes envy to be farther from any similarity with God must be granted, according to the conditions of the first tree and of this fifth tree, therefore trinity is demonstrable in the greater contrariety existing between divine nature and envy and sin."

21. Fortitude Ire

"Man is a subject in which fortitude and ire are contraries. Now, when ire conquers fortitude in the human heart, then fortitude is conquered by weakness and lack of spirit. And when fortitude conquers ire, then ire is conquered by perfection and nobility of spirit. Thus the more fortitude conquers and dominates greater ire, the greater it is in virtue; and the more ire conquers greater fortitude, the greater ire is in vice and sin.

"It is clear that each of two things similar to one another is reinforced against its contrary and anything dissimilar to it. Now if God is in trinity and unity, the more similar to Him is man, who is one in trinity, that is to say soul and body and the junction of both, which three constitute one man, than he would be if God were one without trinity of persons. Now, since man is obliged to love God more than anything else, and since many creatures are similar to man in unity and trinity, man would be obliged to love something dissimilar to him more than something similar. And because by loving something similar man can be more contrary to something dissimilar to him, such as ire, which is not fitting for man, therefore by loving a God similar to him in unity and in trinity he can be stronger against ire than he would be if,

loving something dissimilar to himself, he struggled against ire, since nothing is as contrary to ire as God. This being the case, therefore, trinity is shown to be in God by the greater similarity man should have with that he should most love; and it is shown by the fact that man, the more similar he is to God, the stronger he can be against ire. And since that on account of which fortitude can be strongest against ire should be granted, according to the conditions of this tree, therefore trinity, by these conditions, is revealed."

22. Hope Accidie

"It is clear that accidie is more contrary to greater hope than to lesser, for people are more indifferent about desiring less noble things than more noble things. Now if in God there is infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., which engenders infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and if from both there proceeds something else that is infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and all together the three constitute a single essence infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., if the soul of the just man wishes to know these things in God and has hope that he will know them in Heaven, he has greater hope of knowing great and marvelous things in God than he would have if he did not wish to know the above-mentioned three things in God. And the greater the hope man can have in knowing great things, the more he can be contrary to accidie. And since that by which hope and accidie are most contrary should be granted, according to the conditions of this tree, therefore the Trinity we have been discussing is in accord with affirmation and in disaccord with negation. For if it were in accord with negation and in disaccord with affirmation, it would follow that that by which hope and accidie were least contrary would be in accord with affirmation, and that by which they were most contrary would be in accord with negation, which is impossible and against the conditions of this tree. For if it were possible, it would follow that hope and accidie would accord to be a single thing which would at the same time be a virtue and vice, but this is impossible and constitutes a contradiction."

When the Christian had proved the existence of Trinity in God by means of the above-mentioned five trees, he said the following words: "Blessed be the Lord, by whose virtue we have knowledge of the glorious Trinity through the significance of the flowers and the conditions of the trees. Now if you, Gentile, do not feel satisfied with the demonstrations I have given you of the Holy Trinity of our Lord God, I will pick more flowers from the trees, by which your understanding might receive divine illumination and be elevated to having knowledge of God's Holy Trinity."

The Gentile replied: "There is no need for you to pick more flowers to prove the Trinity. But please tell me how these three divine persons can be a single divine essence, without its being composed of these three persons."

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Composition can only exist with finite and limited things; therefore when it is a question of things infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., it cannot be. And if simplicity could not exist with reference to things infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., those things we refer to as infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., would be finite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, etc. But since they are infinite, for this reason—that is to say, because of their infinity and infinite power—they can together constitute one simple, divine essence, without any composition."[32]

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian, "Tell me why the Trinity which is in God consists of paternity, filiation, and procession, and not of some other thing which is neither Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost."

Solution. The Christian replied: "According to the conditions of the first tree, the greatest nobility a person can envisage should be attributed to God; now since, as we have already proved, there must be Trinity in God, we must acknowledge the Trinity in those virtues and properties by which God's trinity is most nobly exemplified and demonstrated to our intellect. Thus, since begetting, begotten and given (that is, proceeding from another) are closer in nature to one another than are other things not joined by generation or procession, therefore they must exist in God's unity and trinity, so that one divine person is closer to the other in virtue,

[32] See the commentary of W. W. Artus in *Actas*, I, 189 = *EL* 22 (1978), 189.

in nature, and in goodness, greatness, etc., in order to be a single essence that is good, great, eternal, powerful, etc. And if this were not the case, it would follow that perfection would be contrary to goodness, greatness, etc., and this is impossible, by which impossibility it is shown that the Trinity in God must necessarily consist of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

Question. The Gentile said, "In nature, a father precedes the son, and therefore if in God there is a Father and Son, the Father must precede the Son."

Solution. The Christian replied: "There is a very great difference between created and uncreated nature. This is because eternity and perfection are in accord with uncreated nature, which is not the case with created nature. Therefore the generation and procession that exists in God is different from the generation and procession that exists in creatures. So, just as stone, being stone, cannot be man, thus the Son of God and the Holy Ghost, having perfection and eternity, cannot have a beginning or end; for if they did, they would not have perfection and eternity, which is without beginning or end. But since you have a beginning and end, therefore, by reason of a nature different from that of sovereign good, you can come after your father and you can precede your son in time."

Question. "Tell me, Christian, how the Father begets the Son."

Solution. The Christian replied: "Consider, Gentile, how a blade of grass is begotten from another, and how one man begets another, and you will see that, just as you have to take into consideration the difference in manner of begetting between grass or plants and animals, so you must take into consideration the difference in manner of begetting between that which the son of God received from the Father and that of creatures, for God's begetting is of a loftier and nobler kind than that of creatures. Thus, just as when you think of the begetting of creatures, you have to imagine the operation and properties of those creatures, so with the begetting the Son of God receives from the Father you must consider the flowers of the first tree, by which the begetting is exemplified. For since the divine Father loves and understands Himself as well as His own goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., He begets a Son like Himself in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and since He loves and understands that which is equal to Himself in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., a Son is begotten who is equal to the

Father in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc. And if the Father did not have such understanding, desire and will, He would be lacking in the flowers of the first tree, by which flowers the Father has the aforesaid knowledge, will, and power to beget the Son."

Question. The Gentile asked the Christian how the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and from the Son.

Solution. The Christian replied, saying: "This question can be answered by means of the solution to the preceding question, for the flowers of the first tree exemplify how it takes place and how it is different from the way one creature proceeds from another. For insofar as divine perfection accords with goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and since the Father understands and loves Himself as well as the Son he begat, and the Son understands and loves the Father as well as Himself, then from both there must proceed another person equal to them in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., and this is the Holy Ghost about which you ask. And if from the understanding and love of the Father and Son, as well as from their goodness, greatness, eternity, power, perfection, there did not proceed another person equal to the Father and Son in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., this would constitute a defect in the intellect and will of the Father and of the Son, which is impossible."

Question. The Gentile said, "Why does the Holy Ghost not proceed from just one person instead of from both of them?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "The more the Father as well as the Son are in accord with nobility, the less noble would be the Holy Ghost if it did not proceed from both persons. Thus, in order for the flowers of the tree to be more in accord with the Holy Ghost, it must proceed from the Father and from the Son."

Question. The Gentile said: "Why from the Holy Ghost does there not proceed another person equal to it in goodness, greatness, etc.? Or why does the Son not beget another person equal to Himself in goodness, greatness, etc.?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "Just as you feel yourself to be complete as a human being and with no deficiencies as a man, thus, and incomparably more so, the Father must realize that there is such perfection of goodness, greatness, etc. in Himself, in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, that he has no desire to be Father to

another Son nor to have another Holy Ghost proceed from him; for if He did, He would be desiring superfluity. And this same perfection is found in the Son and the Holy Ghost, and this is the reason for the preservation of perfection in the flowers of the tree, and in each of the persons. And if this were not the case, it would follow that neither in the persons nor in the flowers would there be perfection of goodness, greatness, etc. Hence, in the divine essence there must not be more than one paternity, one filiation, and one person of the Holy Ghost."

Question. The Gentile said, "Please tell me if from the Father, loving and understanding the Son, there proceeds the Holy Ghost, or if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, who loves and understands the Father, or if the Father, understanding and loving the Holy Ghost, begets the Son."

Solution. The Christian replied: "The Son in His totality is begotten by the Father in His totality, and the Holy Ghost in its totality proceeds from the Father and Son each in His totality. And if this, as you inquire, were not the case, the above-mentioned totality would not accord with the flowers of the tree, and perfection would be contrary to the flowers, and this is impossible; because of which impossibility, as well as by the condition of the flowers, it is demonstrated that the totality is as you inquire."

Question. "Tell me, Christian, why is there a trinity of persons in God? And why would God not be complete without this trinity? Why would two persons not be enough for everything for which three persons are required?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "It is evident that there must be trinity in God, as we have already proved by the flowers of the trees. Moreover, we can add that being, in creatures, is more in accord with the numbers one and three than with any other number, since every creature exists as one substance and as the three individuals of which that substance is composed, just as a body that could not exist as a unit without length, breadth, and depth; and length, breadth, and depth that could not exist together without the body's being a unit. Thus, since the numbers of one and three are more befitting to creatures, it is therefore only fitting that God's being, which is more perfect than that of creatures, should be in accord with the numbers one and three. For if it were

not, it would follow that being and number would accord better in creature than in God, which is impossible; by which impossibility it is demonstrated that God must be one essence which is in three persons, with no more nor less. For if this were not the case, there would be no concordance in the flowers of the first tree, nor would its conditions be respected."

Question. The Gentile asked if one of the persons in God could be nobler than the other, or if one could be lesser than the other; and he asked if each person was present in God of His own accord.

Solution. The Christian replied: "If one person were nobler than the other, then there would be imperfection in the one who was less noble. And if in God one person could be less than another, God's unity could be without trinity, but we have already proved that there must be trinity in God. And if in God each person were not present of His own accord, He would not be perfect in goodness, greatness, etc., but since each is in fact perfect in goodness, etc., therefore each is present of His own accord."

Question. The Gentile asked the Christian if the wise men accompanying him understood that he believed the above-mentioned Trinity to exist in God. And the Christian replied, saying: "The Jews and Saracens do not understand the Trinity in which we believe, and they think we believe in another trinity different from the one we really believe in, one that does not exist in God, and this is why we cannot agree with them, nor they with us. But if they understood the Trinity as we believe it to exist in God, the force of reason, and the concordance of the flowers of the first tree along with its conditions, would make them see the truth of the Holy Trinity of our Lord God."

Article 5. CREATION

THE CHRISTIAN looked at the five trees, wanting to pick flowers to prove the Creation to the Gentile. But the Gentile said that he did not need to prove the Creation of the world, for the Jew had already proved it quite satisfactorily. The Christian therefore omitted the proof of this article and picked flowers to prove the following article, which concerns

Article 6. RE-CREATION[33]

1. Goodness Greatness[34]

The Christian said to the Gentile: "No good is to be found in nothing, for if some good were there, it would follow that nothing were something. Thus, if from nothing God causes some good to exist, then God's great goodness is made to seem greater through such an act than it would be if He made one good from another good. If God, however, united to Himself some good that came from another good, and caused this good to be one with His person, the result would be greater good in the good that would be one with Him and in the good from which that good came, than in the good which is created from nothing. And this is due to the nobility of the divine good, of the good coming from some other good and united to God, and of the good from which came the good united with the divine good. For the good which is created from nothing is only a single good with respect to creation; but God's good, the good united with the divine good (that is, Jesus Christ's humanity), and the good from which came Christ's humanity (that is, our Lady Saint Mary) are three goods, which is why there is greater good in this arrangement than in creating good from nothing. And if this were not a greater good, the goodness, greatness, eternity, and other flowers of God[35] would be contrary to perfection and majority, which is impossible; for if it were possible, minority and imperfection would be in accord with the flowers of the first tree, which is impossible.

"You have understood, Gentile, that, according to the conditions of the first tree, the greatest nobility a person can contemplate or understand should be attributed to God; for otherwise the flow-

[33] In the strict etymological sense of "the action of creating again; a new creation," or as Garcías Palou says (*OE* 1,p. 1142, n. 52), in the sense of remaking that which had been undone (by Adam's fall). In the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 37, no. 13, Llull says, "The first man sinned through pleasure, and Jesus Christ re-created the world through suffering." Sala-Molins (*Choix*, p. 399) translates it as "redemption," but Llull's term has a much broader implication. Llinarès (*Gentil*, p. 11, n. 27) suggests the idea might have come from Saint Bonaventure.

[34] The "Goodness and Charity" of Rosselló and *OE* must be due to a slip of Rosselló's; it is in none of the sources.

[35] Llull has telescoped "the flowers of the first tree" with "the dignities (virtues, or attributes) of God."

ers of the tree, contemplation and human understanding, would not be in accord with one another. To grant and recognize that God is the creator of everything that exists, is to recognize God's great goodness. And to say, think, and recognize that God wishes to be one with some created good is to recognize and love better God's good and the good united with Him, and in this way God's good is better exemplified in infinite greatness, eternity, power, etc. And since, according to the conditions of the tree, whatever makes God's great goodness more evident is affirmable, therefore re-creation is affirmable; which re-creation was brought about by the good God has in Himself and by the good united with Him, which good He took from another created good, which is our Lady Saint Mary.

"In nothing there is neither guilt nor sin; for if there were, nothing would be something. Thus to remove guilt or sin from some good, is a greater thing than creating something from nothing, since guilt and sin are things contrary to good and merit. Thus, if one must attribute creation to God, which is not such a good thing as removing guilt and sin from good, how much more one should attribute to God the re-creation of good where there was guilt and sin. And because in this task of re-creation there is greater good than in creation, it is therefore only right that for the carrying out of such a task there should exist more good than for creating good from nothing; which greater good is the union that takes place between created good and uncreated good, in order that created good, corrupted by guilt and sin, may be re-created and exalted by its union with uncreated good. Now since the greater and better task better signifies and demonstrates the great goodness of our Lord God than the lesser task, therefore in this greater demonstration of God's great goodness, re-creation is represented to the human understanding, which has knowledge of this greater significance; and this re-creation is the union of the Son of our Lady Saint Mary, glorious Virgin—may she and her virtue be blessed!—with the union[36] of the Son of God. By which union, and by the suffering of Jesus Christ's human nature, the world was re-created from original sin which we had from the first man, that is, Adam, who disobeyed God's command, as a

[36] This perplexing "union . . . with the union" is in all the sources.

result of which we are mortal, suffer hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and ignorance, and have many other defects we would not have if Adam had not sinned. And if the Son of God had not become incarnate and had not died when He was a man, we would all have gone to Hell's fires for ever and ever. But by the sanctity of the union of the Son of God with Christ's human nature, who are one person, and by the sanctity of the precious blood Christ spilled to re-create the world, all those who believe in re-creation are delivered from the power of the devil and are called to glory without end."

2. *Power Charity*

The Christian said to the Gentile: "It is clear that God created creatures and their properties to exemplify His great power and charity.[37] He therefore gave fire the property that it would, in burning wood, extend its size infinitely, as long as it were given an infinite amount of wood and infinite space in which to burn, in accordance with the place we are in. But since fire does not have infinite material, it does not burn an infinite amount. Thus if fire,[38] which is a finite and limited creation, has this power and property, and since it does not have this power and property from itself, but rather as a gift from God, how much more power has God to place infinite good in a creature, if the creature could receive it! And if this were not the case, it would follow that God's will and power were contraries, and that God had given greater power to fire than to Himself, which is impossible.

"If God created a creature, made that creature be better than all others, and gave it greater power, wisdom, will than all other creatures, then the fact that God could make a creature infinite in power, wisdom, charity if the creature could receive it would be better exemplified than if God did not make such a creature. And since that by which God's power and charity is best shown to place infinite good in a creature, if the creature can receive it, must

[37] A clear formulation of Llull's exemplarist doctrine (cf. above "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 34–7, above). The verb I have translated as "to exemplify" is *significar*, which is to be taken in the literal etymological sense of "to be or act as a sign or symbol of"; see Johnston, *Semblance*, ch. 3, for a discussion of Llull's doctrine of "signification."

[38] Thus in all sources save S (followed by Rosselló), which has "the body."

exist, therefore it is only fitting that God should have made a creature nobler in virtue and virtues than all other creatures. And because of the fact that this creature can be better than all other creatures, if it is joined to, so as to become one with, God's nature, it is therefore nearer to being infinite in virtue, if it could receive it,[39] than it would be if it were not joined to or united with God's power and charity. And since that by which God best demonstrates His power and charity must be granted, therefore, in this granting, which accords with being against its contrary, that is to say, negation, is manifested the re-creation we have been seeking.

"If created power and created charity exist in created man, and this man is one with the uncreated person, there can be greater concordance of power and love between uncreated power and uncreated charity on the one hand, and created power and created charity on the other, than there would be if the uncreated and the created person were not a single person. And since one must grant that by which the uncreated virtues and the created virtues are most in accord, as well as that by which it is most impossible for them to be contrary, therefore the uniting of the created person with the uncreated person can be manifested, by which manifestation re-creation can be represented."

3. Perfection Gluttony

"Re-creation is a greater thing than creation, for God created Adam, but in Adam occurred the sin of gluttony when he ate of the fruit, and the sin of pride when he disobeyed God; but in Jesus Christ's humanity there can occur no sin. Now the undertaking in which there can occur no sin is nobler and more perfect than the undertaking in which there can occur sin, and the more perfect the undertaking, the more contrary it is to guilt and sin. This being the case, and since the man who is united with God can be more contrary to gluttony and pride than the man who is not united with God, therefore that man who can be more contrary to sin can be more perfect, and the greater his perfection, the better God's perfection can be exemplified in him. And since that by which God's perfection is best demonstrable must exist, therefore re-creation is demonstrable in God's greater exemplification.

[39] The Latin sources are more specific, having "infinity" for "it."

"God's perfection is better suited to forgiving than to creating, for forgiving an offense is a greater thing than creating, since nothing is not contrary to God, whereas offense is contrary to God. Now, Adam's sin being general, it constituted a greater offense than if it had been particular; and the greater the offense and injury, the more compassion in forgiving and curing signifies greater perfection when it is a question of curing a general sin rather than curing a particular offense.

"If the sin were not general, God's perfection would accord with goodness, greatness, power, etc., in creating general good, yet it would not accord with compassion in forgiving general offense. And because God's perfection and compassion are one and the same thing (since everything in God is one and the same thing), therefore general offense is shown to exist in the human race, which in turn makes apparent the operation of compassion in curing general injury; by which generality re-creation is made manifest."

4. Faith Hope

"Faith is that by virtue of which a person believes in God and in the glory of Paradise; and hope is that by virtue of which a person trusts in God's mercy, as well as in His justice. So just as you, Gentile, see bodily things with your bodily eyes, so do faith, hope, which are spiritual eyes, see God's works spiritually; and the greater the faith, hope, the better a person sees God's works. Now if God was willing to become man, and underwent death in order to re-create man, faith, hope can as a result be greater than they would have been if God had not become man or died for man; for the more God does for man, the greater the faith and hope man can have against disbelief and despair, which are vices and faults and sins. And since greater faith, hope accord better with being than lesser faith, hope, therefore, according to the conditions of the trees, that which gives rise to greater faith, hope accords with being; in which greater being is made manifest the re-creation about which you ask."

5. Justice Ire

"The greatest gift God can give a creature, and the greatest gift a creature can receive, is for God to make that creature one with

Himself and, for the re-creation and exaltation of creature, to want that creature, which is one with Himself, to suffer a passion and death greater than the passion or death any other creature could suffer. Thus, if God became man in order to re-create the world, and if that man died for justice's sake and in order to put peace between humankind and God's ire, which man had incurred through the sin of his first progenitor, then justice is greater and ire lesser. And because greater justice and being are in accord, and because lesser ire accords better with being than greater ire, therefore in the above-mentioned majority and minority, the resurrection is signified, according to the conditions of the trees.

"Justice seems greater if a king is punished by death than if a peasant is punished, and there is greater justice and mercy in the innocent man who wants to bear the guilt of a guilty man who suffers justice. Thus the greatest justice God can do in creature—and that which best accords with mercy—is for Him to wish to be a man who is innocent and yet should be punished for the guilt of all mankind. And if this were not the greatest justice, it would follow that majority was contrary to the flowers of the first tree, and this is impossible; by which impossibility re-creation is made manifest.

"If the Son of God took on human nature and this man died to save God's people, then the justice of God and the ire of sinners in Hell (who will be full of ire when they are damned) will be more contrary. And if the man who remembers in this present life that the Son of God took on human nature and died to redeem him from the power of the Devil is given cause for ire, he can better subdue his ire by the above-mentioned remembrance than could another who did not believe that the Son of God had become incarnate, nor that He had as a man suffered death to save mankind. And if the Christian, who has better grounds for subduing his ire by reason of his beliefs, does not do so, God's justice is better suited to increase punishment in him rather than in a man of different beliefs. This being the case, because of the above-mentioned examples, it is therefore revealed to the human understanding that the re-creation you ask about is in accord with being and with all the conditions of the trees.

Article 7. GLORIFICATION

THE CHRISTIAN said to the Gentile, "In order to prove this article we will first pick the flower of

1. Wisdom Love

which is in God, as was proved in the first book.[40] Thus if God had not created man with the intention of giving him glory without end, there would exist contrariety between this flower and eternity and perfection; and if God had created[41] man to have everlasting glory, then this flower would accord with eternity, perfection. And since that by means of which there exists no contrariety between the above-mentioned flowers must accord with being, according to the conditions of this tree, and that by means of which they are contrary must accord with nonbeing, it is therefore evident that after the Resurrection God will give everlasting glory to those granted salvation."

2. Perfection Hope

"We have proved that in God there is activity of personal properties, which activity is different in each of them, because each of the divine persons is different. Now since God is the sovereign good for all creatures, then His activity must be above all other activity, and therefore the most perfect activity in which man can place his hopes is that existing in the three divine persons. Thus if the soul places its hope in this activity, it has the most perfect hope it can have; and if it had hope, and this hope could not attain perfection, then God's perfection would be contrary to its hope. And if it were, God's will and God's perfection would be contrary to one another, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made evident that God's perfection should give fulfillment to hope. For if it did not, a man's soul would be nobler in hoping than God's perfection in fulfilling that hope, and this is impossible; by which impossibility the celestial beatitude in which we place our hope is made evident."

[40] Bk. I, Tree 1, Flower 5.
[41] Thus in all sources save S (followed by Rosselló), which has "had not created."

3. Eternity Ire

"If God gave heavenly glory after the Resurrection and that glory were not eternal, it would follow that a person would have eternal ire over the loss of the glory he would have witnessed. And if this were the case, it would follow that God's eternity and justice would be contrary to one another in infinite goodness, greatness, power, etc., and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that God will bestow glory everlasting without end. And if God did not give glory after the Resurrection, He would be doing something contrary to the concordance of the flowers by which the Jew proved the glory of Paradise; by which proof the above-mentioned article is exemplified, without which article the glory of Paradise could not be provable."

4. Hope Fortitude

"If a man who has hope of heavenly glory is tempted to commit some sin, he will have greater strength against that sin than a man who had no hope of heavenly glory. Thus, if heavenly glory exists, hope and fortitude and truth are in accord; and if heavenly glory does not exist, hope and fortitude are in accord with falsehood against truth, and they are greater as a result of what is false than of what is true. And since truth and hope are in accord, and despair and weakness and falsehood are in accord; therefore heavenly glory is signified by the fact that faith, fortitude accord better against their contraries and against falsehood. And if this were not the case, there would exist in being something contrary to the conditions of this tree."

5. Prudence Accidie

"Prudence is choosing greater good and avoiding greater evil;[42] and through accidie a person is negligent about choosing greater good and avoiding greater evil. Greater, however, is that accidie by which a person is more negligent in choosing greater rather than lesser good and in avoiding greater rather than lesser evil. Now this, for the reasons given above, being the case, God can

[42] Cf. the text corresponding to Bk. I, n. 22 above.

be shown to be the glorifier; for if glory did not exist, the punishments of Hell would not exist, nor could one choose greater good or avoid greater evil so well, than is the case if heavenly glory and infernal punishment exist. And because, according to the conditions of this tree, that by which prudence, accidie are most contrary must exist, therefore in that which accords with being is demonstrated heavenly glory, without which whatever is not in accord with being would exist and whatever is in accord with being would not exist, and the conditions of this tree would be destroyed."

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian, "You have given me sufficient proof of the above-mentioned article; but could you please tell me how God will glorify the saints in Heaven."

Solution. The Christian replied: "The way in which God glorifies the saints is something too lofty for the human intellect to understand in this earthly existence; for if it could understand it, it would have as much glory in this world as those who are in glory in the next world. But I can explain something about what you ask by means of the following example. You know that it is characteristic of essence to be, of intellect to understand, and of will to love,[43] and so on for similar things. Now if with your mind's eye you saw the way your intellect accords with understanding and your will with loving, and if you saw how each of these things was distinct and different from the other, you would have a most agreeable pleasure in seeing these things. For to see a ship being made could give you greater pleasure than seeing a bench being made; and if you saw the sun and the moon and the stars being made, and the sky, sea, and earth, and everything there is in the world, it would give you greater pleasure than seeing just a ship being made. Thus, if you are in glory and see how the Father understands and loves Himself, and how, in understanding and loving Himself, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, He begets the Son and has the Holy Ghost proceed from Father and Son; and if you saw how the Son, in understanding and loving the Father,

[43] The first two pairs have the same roots in Catalan: *essència-esser* (for which see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 2 and the corresponding note) and *enteniment-entendre* (for which see Bk. I, n. 14 above). For the third pair, and the often synonymous nature of "will" and "love" in Llull, see Bk. I, n. 12 above. Much of the material of this "Solution" reappears in *Felix*, Bk. IX, chs. 117–18.

the Holy Ghost, and Himself, is begotten of the Father and has the Holy Ghost proceed from Him; and if you saw how the Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and Son, loving and understanding the Father, the Son, and Himself; and if you saw the begetting and proceeding in God of infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and saw how all three persons are a single essence, infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., you can imagine what glory your soul would have—the very glory, in fact, you will have if you enter into the glory of Paradise.

"In glory you will see Jesus Christ's human nature be one with God the Son; and you will see how the Son of God took on human nature; and you will see how this divine and human nature constitutes a single person, and how God the Son and the humanity He took on understand and love one another; and you will see how this human nature is finer and nobler than any creature that exists or could exist; and you will see how Christ's humanity loves and honors our Lady Saint Mary; and you will see all the saints of glory honor Jesus Christ and our Lady Saint Mary; and you will see the ranks of angels and of archangels, and the ranks of martyrs, virgins, and confessors, all singing and giving glory and praise to God and to the human nature united with God. So, with this in mind, you can get some idea of the glory you will see if God calls you to His glory without end.

"In Paradise a person will neither eat, drink, nor lie with a woman. And since in this world the human body labors for the love of our Lord God, therefore, in order to reward the body in glory, you will see and hear the body of our Lord Jesus Christ united with God the Son. And when you think that your body and that of Jesus Christ are of one nature, and that His body was sacrificed to redeem you, the glory you will receive upon seeing that body so glorified is something about which you must not ask, for I could not describe it to you—nor could anyone describe the look of love He will give you."

After proving the above-mentioned article to the Gentile, the Christian said to him, "According to the way it was decided you would know which religion was better than the others, you can see by the above-mentioned glory that the Christian religion is worthier than the others, since the best and greatest glory is more in accord with the conditions of the trees than lesser glory, which

is contrary to greater glory; which greater glory cannot be so well exemplified by the religion of the Jews or that of the Saracens as by that of the Christians."

Article 8. CONCEIVED BY THE HOLY GHOST

1. Goodness Greatness

The Christian said to the Gentile: "God's goodness is great in eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection. Now, in order to exemplify goodness as great as God's, it is only right that, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, the Son of God unite human nature with Himself in the womb of our Lady Saint Mary; for to extract a good as noble as Christ's humanity from the human race, which was corrupted by sin, constitutes a good greater than all other created good. And if the human race did not consist of corrupted good, God's goodness would not be so greatly exemplified as it is. And since that by which God's goodness is best exemplified is in accord with being, that is incarnation, therefore in this concordance of being the above-mentioned article is exemplified, without which article the operation of God's great goodness would not be so manifestable.

"If from corrupted good is extracted an uncorrupted good, greater and better than all created good was before it was corrupted, the better God's great good is demonstrated. And if from corrupted created good is extracted created good equal to created good extracted from uncorrupted created good, then uncreated good is shown to be greater by its extraction of incorruptable created good from corrupted good than it would be by extracting incorruptible good from uncorrupted created good. And since that by which greater influence and greater good better exemplify greatness in God's goodness accords better with being than lesser influence and lesser good, therefore it is clear that the above-mentioned article is true.

"If our Lady Saint Mary, glorious Virgin—blessed may she be and blessed may we be by her!—conceived, through the operation of the Holy Ghost, a son who was God and man, then she is nearer to the great goodness of our Lord God and farther from our own

intellect in its ability to encompass all the greatness of the good which is in our Lady's Son and in our Lady herself. And the farther the human intellect is from understanding the good created by God's goodness, the farther it is from understanding the goodness, greatness of God which this good has created in our Lady and in her son. And because that by which God's great goodness is all the more exalted by not being understood by our intellect is in accord with being, and because God's goodness and greatness accords better with that which is better in accord with being rather than with that which is not so much in accord with being, therefore the conception performed by the action of the Holy Ghost is made evident by necessary reason.

"We have proved the existence of trinity in God; thus, the greatest good that can be performed lies in the operation of the Trinity, and the greatest good the Holy Ghost can perform in creature is, by His operation, having the Son of God unite creature to Himself, and having our Lady, who is a creature, be partly creature and partly mother of the Creator. Now if the Holy Ghost disliked such a good and such an operation between creator and creature, that would be contrary to the greatest and best goodness that can exist between creator and creature; and if this were the case, it would be contrary to God's great goodness, which is in eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, and this is impossible; by which and in which impossibility the conception by our Lady of the Son of God through the operation of the Holy Ghost is demonstrable."

2. *Love Justice*

"Divine love more strongly and expressly instills, impresses, and accords justice in man because the Son of God became incarnate, than it would if He had not become incarnate. And since justice is good, and injustice evil; and since greater justice better exemplifies divine love than lesser justice; and since faith, hope, charity, prudence, fortitude, temperance, are in better accord through greater justice than through lesser; and since by greater justice they are more contrary to the vices than by lesser justice; therefore, according to the conditions of this tree, it is made evident that the Son of God is conceived by the Holy Ghost. For if He were not, the above-mentioned flower would be contrary to

the above-mentioned concordance and conditions, which is impossible."

3. Power Prudence

"The power, wisdom, and love of God accord with one another in perfection in three ways, that is to say, that through the power a thing can be done, through wisdom there is the knowledge to do it, and through will there is the desire to do it; and of course through perfection it should be done. Now if this concordance did not exist, there would follow contrariety among the flowers, which cannot be. Furthermore, the greatest power God can have in creature is to be able to unite that creature to Himself; and the same is true of His knowledge and His desire and His perfection. And the greatest power a creature can understand or desire for itself is that it understand and love itself for being one person with divine nature. This being the case, because of the nature and property of the above-mentioned flower and because of the conditions of this tree, it is therefore clear that the Son of God became incarnate.

"If the greatest power which does or can exist is a power infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., one begetting power infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., and one where from the begetter and from the begotten there proceeds power infinite in goodness, greatness, etc., then it necessarily follows that the greatest power that does or can exist between infinite and finite power, is for infinite power to unite finite power to itself. And if this were not the greatest power existing between infinite and finite power, it would follow that infinite power would not be greater than finite power, or that finite power would be greater than infinite power, which is not right. And if prudence did not understand infinite power as being greater then finite power, it would be contrary to the flowers of the first tree, which is impossible. By this impossibility is demonstrated, according to the conditions of this tree, the necessary existence of that thing by which power, prudence are best in accord; by which necessity the above-mentioned article is demonstrated."

4. *Perfection Accidie*

"Perfection and accidie are contraries, for in perfection there is no defect that accords with accidie, nor is there in accidie any perfection that is contrary to defect. Now if the Son of God has taken on human nature, God has infused greater perfection into human nature than He would have had He not taken on human nature. And the greater the perfection He has put into infused[44] human nature, the more uncreated and created perfection are contrary to accidie and to everything in accord with accidie. And since the greatest contrariety possible between perfection and accidie is grantable, therefore in this greatest contrariety the Incarnation of the Son of God is manifestable."

5. *Faith Hope*

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Faith and disbelief[45] are contraries, as are hope and despair. Now since faith and hope are virtues and their contraries are vices, the greater are faith and hope, the more they are in accord against their contraries. Thus, if the Son of God became incarnate, then the faith which believes in the Incarnation and the hope which hopes for the Incarnation cannot exist in man in a higher degree than they do. And if the Son of God had not become incarnate, faith, hope could in man be in greater accord and present in a higher degree than they are. And because that by which faith, hope have greater nobility should accord with being, according to the conditions of the tree, therefore in this majority and concordance of being is exemplified the holy humanity which the Son of God took in our Lady, that just and glorious Virgin."

6. *Fortitude Gluttony*

"Fortitude and temperance are in accord against intemperance and gluttony. And since man eats and drinks every day, and since

[44] Thus in the best MSS; Rosselló has "the perfection God infused into," which is a loose retranslation of the Latin version.
[45] Cf. Bk. I, n. 15.

the things he eats and drinks are pleasing to the taste, God has therefore ordained that fortitude, temperance be against intemperance, gluttony, in order that the soul find pleasure in exercising fortitude, temperance. And since—in order that he might gain merit many times a day by mortifying gluttony—God wanted man to have great strength and great temperance, God therefore wanted to take on human nature for the sake of saving man, so that man, in order to honor God and love that which is agreeable to God, should mortify gluttony with greater temperance and greater fortitude; which greater temperance, fortitude can better exist in man through the Incarnation of the Son of God than without the Incarnation, in which the Conception of the Son of God is better exemplified."

Question. The Gentile said to the Christian: "Why did not all three divine persons become incarnate? Why was the person of the Son the only one to take on flesh?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "The better to signify how each of the three divine persons is distinct from the other, God's great wisdom ordained that only one person should become incarnate, to avoid the appearance of confused distinctions between the divine persons. And in order to show that one paternity, one filiation and one person of the Holy Ghost is sufficient in God's Trinity, the Son of God alone wanted to become incarnate; for if more than one person were needed for the Incarnation, greatness, perfection would not be exemplified in God."

Question. The Gentile asked the Christian why it was the Son of God who had become incarnate, and not the Father or the Holy Ghost.

Solution. The Christian replied: "So that the human intellect could better understand the conditions and concordance of the flowers, God wanted to ordain greatness, perfection to be exemplified in His works. And since the Son of God was begotten, and since in taking on human flesh He begat man, therefore, with relation to creature,[46] unity of person is more fitting between the Son of God and son of man than between man and paternity or between man and Holy Ghost, since the act of begetting befits the Son of God and son of man."

[46] Thus in all medieval sources; the Mainz editors (followed by Rosselló) wrote "nature."

Question. The Gentile said, "Please tell me what the Jews and Saracens have to say about this article of Conception."

Solution. The Christian replied: "To our great shame, we Christians are negligent about explaining and demonstrating our belief to unbelievers, and they are stubborn of heart and coarse of intellect when it comes to understanding our religion. We thus do not believe that Incarnation which they think we believe, and our belief in the Incarnation of the Son of God is different from what they imagine, and as a result we cannot agree and are opposed because of differing opinions."

Article 9. BORN OF VIRGIN

1. Goodness Greatness

The Christian said to the Gentile: "The more one good is greater than another, the more its influence must be greater and better than that of the lesser good. Now the greatest and noblest birth there is or can be is the birth of the Son of God, who is born of God the Father; which birth takes place in infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., where infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, etc. is born from infinite goodness, greatness, etc. Thus if there is brought about a unity of good born infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc. with good created, finite, and born, and if both goods are born of a virgin woman, then this is the greatest and noblest birth that can take place in creature, namely for God and man to be born of a virtin woman who is just, holy, and virtuous. And if this were not the noblest birth that could take place in creature, then the birth of God the Son, who is born of God the Father, would be no more noble than any other birth. Now just as it is right for good to bonify and for greatness to magnify,[47] so must significance signify; and the greater the good, then the greater the signification by which the significance should be made. Therefore, according to the conditions of the tree, God wanted to take on human nature in a virgin woman, and He wanted to

[47] Here we have two more correlative verbs (cf. n. 16 above), the first of which the Latin translator again felt the need to explain—*bonificare, hoc est bonum facere.* As for our English equivalents, "bonify" is a legitimate if rare word meaning "to do or make good," and "magnify" should be taken in the etymological sense of "to make great."

be one person with human nature, and He wanted that person to be born of a virgin in order to exalt the nativity which takes place in creature, thereby demonstrating the great nativity which takes place in the Creator.

"In creature[48] there can be no birth without beginning and corruption of woman. In God, however, the Son is born only of God the Father, without a beginning. Moreover, the conditions of this tree are that the flowers should not be contrary to one another, so if the Son of God wanted to be born of a virgin woman, without his desire being contrary to eternity, which has no beginning, and if desire and power are in accord that God and man can be born of a virgin, then it is made clearer to the human understanding that the flowers can in no way be contrary, than it would be if the Son of God did not want to be man, nor to be born with human nature from a virgin woman. And since that which best signifies the impossibility of the flowers' being contrary to one another must necessarily exist, therefore (in this impossibility) is made manifest the Holy Nativity we are seeking, in which we find the above-mentioned necessity by which is signified the concordance of the flowers of the first tree."

2. Power Perfection

"The greatest perfection in natural works is for one thing to be born from another, according to the course of nature. Therefore, the greatest and noblest power which nature can have is that, through its works, one thing can beget another, and one thing can be born from another. And if this were not the case, it would follow that natural perfection and natural power were contrary, which is impossible; by this impossibility the birth of God and of creature in which Christians believe is made evident. For, from the influence of the birth[49] of God the Son, born of God the Father, there must derive another birth, less noble than the birth of God the Son from God the Father and yet nobler than the birth that takes place in a creature following the course of nature, in order to betoken greater perfection and power in God than in creature; which creature has no power or perfection over itself, for if it did,

[48] Once again (cf. n. 46 above) the Latin version (followed by Rosselló) has "nature."
[49] Rosselló has "nature," which is in no other source.

its power as well as its perfection would be uncreated, which is impossible. Thus if the Nativity were not supernatural, then power, perfection would not accord so well in the works taking place between God and creature as they are with the Nativity being supernatural, and with the Lord of nature taking part in that Nativity along with nature itself. And since greater concordance between power, perfection signifies greater nobility in God than lesser concordance, and since the greatest nobility should be attributed to God, according to the condition of the tree in which is found the flower of power, perfection, therefore in this condition is signified the Nativity of Jesus Christ, God and man, and the virginity of our Lady Saint Mary.

"God's power and perfection accord so well in infinite goodness, greatness, etc., that in nature they have given the sun's rays the power to traverse glass and illuminate a room, without corrupting the glass and without the ray of sunlight being itself corrupted.[50] Now if the sun's disk could pass intact through the unbroken glass, without corrupting either the sun or the glass, the greater the perfection of power and virtue that God would have placed in the sun and in the glass, than if the sun could not pass intact through the unbroken glass, nor the glass itself remain unbroken if the sun's disk passed through it. And since by God's power and perfection nothing can prevent a glorified body from passing intact through another intact body, and since, according to the condition of the flower, God ordained how this passage of a glorified body should be exemplified, and that this passage would be exemplified if a man were born of a virgin, therefore it is only fitting that a man be born of a virgin, in order to exemplify the above-mentioned passage to the human intellect, without which birth neither the flower nor its conditions would be so clearly manifested."

3. Wisdom Charity

"In God there is wisdom, and in man charity. Now the greater charity there is in man through God's wisdom, the more man's charity can love God's wisdom. Thus, if the Son of God took on

[50] Some of the Latin sources, including the Mainz edition (followed by Rosselló) have "interrupted."

human nature, and was born into the world with that human nature, and illuminated that human nature with a wisdom greater than that of all the angels and of all men, and infused it with a charity greater than all the rest of created charity, it follows that in the birth of the human nature which the Son of God took on, there was born a created wisdom and charity greater than all the rest of created wisdom and charity. And if greater wisdom and charity were born here, the better uncreated wisdom, love will be known and loved. And since that which best contributes to knowing and loving uncreated wisdom, love, must accord with being and with truth, therefore in this greater concordance with being and truth is made manifest Jesus Christ's Nativity."

4. Perfection Avarice

"You of course know, Gentile, that in perfection there is no avarice, for if there were, imperfection would be contrary to avarice. Nor in avarice is there any perfection, for if there were, perfection and imperfection would be in accord. Now if one animal is born from another, such a birth is more perfect than if a tree is born from another, because nature is nobler in an animated body rather than in one inanimate[51] with respect to the senses. And if a man is born of woman, such a birth is more perfect than if an animal is born from another. And do you know why? Because man is born with a rational soul, and an animal is born with a soul lacking in reason. This being the case, if therefore a man is born of woman and that man is God, then such a birth is more perfect than all the births of the rest of mankind. And the greater the perfection of the birth, the more is made manifest God's liberality, which is contrary to avarice, which avarice is against liberality. You should therefore realize and understand, Gentile, that God most demonstrates his generosity there where he brings greatest benefit to creature; and the more generous He shows Himself to be, the better He makes it evident that one should be an enemy of avarice. And since, in order to bring about this greater evidence of perfect generosity, the birth of God with and in creature is necessary, therefore the birth of God and man is made evident.

[51] Thus in all sources save S (followed by Rosselló), which has "animated."

"God gives woman a more perfect gift when He gives her a son than when He gives her a daughter. And do you know why? It is because man is more perfect than woman. And if God gave you as a son to your mother and caused you to be born not only with your natural wisdom, but also with whatever you might have acquired from us wise men, He would be giving her a nobler gift than if you had been born ignorant. Thus, if God gave our Lady Saint Mary a son as wise at birth as He was after He was born, He gave her a more perfect gift than He would have done if He had been born ignorant. And if that son had such liberality that He gave all of Himself to redeem[52] manking and to sustain poverty, torments, and a harrowing death, He was more contrary to avarice than He would have been if He had not given Himself to the above-mentioned things. Thus, since the perfection of uncreated generosity is better exemplified by greater created generosity than by lesser, therefore in the above-mentioned greater and lesser is exemplified the Nativity about which you inquired, according to the conditions of the trees and their flowers."

5. Prudence Charity

The Christian said to the Gentile: "The more you understand, the more you can love or not love that which you understand; and the more you can love or not love it, the more you can understand it. Thus, if God is man and was born a man from woman who remained a virgin, and if this is something you understand and love, the greater is the above-mentioned flower than if you love and do not understand it, or if you understand and do not love it. And if this were not the case, it would follow that prudence and charity were contraries, and that prudence and the contrary of charity were in accord, and that charity and imprudence were in agreement, and that is impossible; in which impossibility it is made clear that that by which prudence and charity are most in accord is in agreement with being. And if it disagreed with being, its contrary would agree with being; and it would follow that

[52] Thus, *reembre*, in O, S, D; without the *m*, as it appears in F, it means "to receive," and thus it was interpreted by the Spanish and Latin medieval translators (followed by the Mainz editors and Rosselló). If the latter interpretation is correct, this part of the sentence should read, "He gave all of Himself to mankind to receive and sustain poverty."

being would agree better with that by which prudence and charity were less in accord than by that by which they were most in accord, and it would follow that being and greater virtue would be contrary, which is impossible. For if it were possible, it would follow that God would be in accord with lesser being against greater being, and this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the trees, in which contradiction is signified the Nativity of the Son of God.

"By the miracles and works God performs against the course of nature you can better increase the disposition toward prudence in your understanding as well as toward the charity that loves knowledge, then you can by miracles performed only in creatures. This being the case, therefore, the disposition toward prudence and charity can more greatly increase in your soul, if God performs a creaturelike miracle in Himself, taking on human flesh and being born of a virgin, than if God only performed miraculous deeds in creatures. And since that by which the above-mentioned disposition is greater in knowing and loving God must accord with the conditions of the trees, therefore in the greater example of a miraculous deed performed in God and in creature, the birth of God and man is exemplified."

6. Justice Pride

"Justice, pride are contraries. Now in our father, Adam, and in our mother, Eve, guilt and sin were born through pride. Thus, since pride and injustice are in accord against justice, humility, therefore, according to the conditions of the flowers, it was only fitting that justice, humility be in accord in the birth of a creature finer than any other, in order that in creatures there exist greater justice and humility than all the guilt and sin which was born in man through injustice, pride. And if this were not the case, the conditions of the flower would be destroyed, and in the flower of perfection, justice there would be contrariety, which would signify concordance in the flower of perfection, pride, which concordance is impossible; in which impossibility it is made evident that the Son of God was born with human nature, so that in human nature there would be born greater virtue of justice, humility."

Question. When the Christian had proved the above-mentioned article to the Gentile, the Gentile asked him: "Tell me, this woman you mention who gave birth to the Son of God, of what king was she a daughter? Or what sort of nobility can a woman have so that God would want to take on human nature in her and be born from her?"

Solution. The Christian replied: "It is true that our Lady was of the house of David, who was the noblest and most honored king the Jews ever had; yet the father of our Lady Saint Mary was not a king, nor was her mother a queen; they were instead humble folk. And our Lady was a woman poor in earthly possessions, but in virtues she was richer and nobler than any other creature, with the exception of her Son. In fact, this woman was so poor that when she gave birth to the savior of the world, she had no house in which to do so, and she gave birth in a stable, which is a lowly house for animals. All this was to show the great humility of the Son of God, who is more contrary to pride than any other creature. For if the Son of God had wanted to be born of a queen, ruler of all the kingdoms in the world, He could easily have done so; but it would not have signified so great a concordance of humility, justice against injustice, pride."

Article 10. CRUCIFIED

1. Greatness Eternity

"You of course realize, Gentile, that glory and passion[53] are contraries, and therefore you can understand that passion, insofar as it accords with nonbeing, is against eternity; and glory, insofar as it accords with being, is in accord with eternity. Now since being and nonbeing are contraries, and nonbeing is in accord with lesser and being is in accord with greater, therefore greater accords

[53] Llull uses this word in two senses, both derived from its original meaning of undergoing something or suffering. The first is that of Christ's Passion, and often as a synonym for the final event of the Passion, the Crucifixion—and hence for this article itself. The second is that of the Aristotelian category—the opposite of "action"—in which case it could be translated as "affection, passivity." I have used the English "passion," even though it is obsolete in the second sense, because it is historically correct and is the only one capable of conveying both meanings, including the original one of "suffering." Note that the Latin translator expanded it here to *passio seu poena*, where the second noun means "punishment, suffering, pain."

with eternity, which concordance was signified by Jesus Christ's Passion, for in that Passion the Son of God wanted to signify that in Him greatness and eternity are in accord. For if the Son of God was one person with Jesus Christ's humanity, and that humanity died a death brought on by the Passion it suffered, and from the man He was He was transformed by death into nonman, and if the Son's nature persisted in its greatness and eternity, with no alteration of infinite goodness, greatness, etc.; then as a result the Son of God showed Himself to be impassible and immortal, more so that he would have without the union of the humanity He took on and without the Passion and death of this human nature. And since that by which the Son, in order to signify His greatness, eternity, best shows Himself to be immortal and impassible is affirmable, according to the conditions of this tree, therefore—in this affirmability—is Jesus Christ's Passion made manifest.

"Angels and rational souls are immortal creatures; and since soul and body form a single person, that is, a single man, and since upon annihilation or death of that man the soul does not die but persists, as a result—through actual experience—the immortality of the soul is made more evident to the human understanding than the immortality of an angel. It is therefore evident that God, in order to show His immortality, wanted the Son to be one with man, and that in the death of this man there be nothing causing the Son's immortality. And since that by which the immortality of divine nature is best exemplified should accord with being, therefore in this accord with being is made manifest the Incarnation of the Son of God and the death of the humanity he took on."

The Christian said to the Gentile: "We believe that the deity remained with Jesus Christ's body, which hung on the cross while His soul descended into Hell; and we believe that the soul did not separate from the deity, even though it left the body. Thus if the deity was in this way one with Christ's humanity after His death as well as before, even though that human nature was no longer man after its death, this constitutes an even better demonstration that greatness and eternity are present in God; for, when the Son was on the cross in body while His soul was in Hell to rescue Adam and the prophets from the eternal fire, His greatness was made manifest, and when the unity of divine nature with human nature remained, even though the man who had human nature

had died, the eternity of the unity of the Son of God was made manifest. Now if He was thus one with human nature, even though that human nature was mortal, how much more readily is He one in essence with the Father and with the Holy Ghost, which are immortal. Thus, in order to demonstrate this unity of persons in the deity, He wanted, by means of the Passion and the union with man, to show His greatness, eternity; and by this desire, which accords with perfection, Jesus Christ's Passion is made manifest; and without it, greatness, eternity would not be so perfectly manifested in God."

2. *Love Charity*

The Christian said to the Gentile: "According to the condition of the first tree, one should recognize in and attribute to God the greatest love one can; for if one did not, it would be contrary to God's nobility, which is in accord with infinite goodness, greatness, etc. Now this being the case, the conditions of the second tree follow from those of the first, that is to say, that whatever thing better obliges a person to love God is in accord with being; for if it were not, it would follow that to love God were a bad thing, and this is impossible; in which impossibility it is shown that God, to the degree that His love accords with infinite goodness, greatness, etc., wanted to be man, the better to love man; for the beloved is more loved by the lover when the lover wants to be his beloved, than if the lover did not want to be the beloved. Thus in this greater love is demonstrated God's wanting to be man; and God's love of man, because of His wanting to be man and to die for mankind when He was a man, and because such a great love could not exist in man without God having become man and without Jesus Christ having died for mankind, in this great love is signified the Passion of that man God wanted to be. And if this were not a true signification, it would follow that the conditions of the trees were false, which is impossible.

"According to the above conditions, whatever most disagrees with contrariety between God's love toward man and man's charity toward God is in accord with being, and whatever is the cause of contrariety between God's love and man's charity is in accord with nonbeing; by which nonbeing and by which cause, charity

cannot exist in man when he is against God's love. Therefore, since in no other way is there such disaccord with any possible contrariety between God's will and that of man, as with God's being man and that man dying to save mankind, it is therefore shown that God became man and that man died for mankind, in order that man's will would not be contrary to divine love."

3. Goodness Gluttony

"It is clear that, in Adam, divine goodness honored human nature over heaven, sea and earth, and over everything found on earth or composed of the four elements, for in none of these things is there a creature as noble as man. And since Adam sinned by gluttony and disobeyed God in his earthly paradise, therefore in Adam and through Adam human nature was made baser than that of all the above-mentioned creatures, for by shame and sin Adam ran counter to God's goodness, to which none of the above-mentioned creatures are contrary. This being the case, it is only right—in accordance with God's goodness and with the conditions of this tree—that if Adam destroyed what God had so exalted, God should restore human nature to a state higher than its former situation; which nobler state would be incomplete without human nature being one person with infinite goodness, greatness, etc., by which person our nature would be re-reated, in order to restore concordance between us and the final cause for which we were created, that is, to contemplate God in His glory."

4. Charity Justice

"Just as charity makes you love God all the more, so justice makes you detest injustice; and the more you detest injustice, the more you love justice; and the more you love justice, the more you are capable of loving God. This being the case, concordance is therefore signified between charity and justice in serving God. Now if it is true that God became man and condemned that man to passion and death in order to carry out in him the great service God would have from the charity and justice present in that man, and that He even chose to condemn that man to death in order to save every man loved by that man or who is a lover of that

man, then it is clear that in you, in me, and in that man there can be greater concordance between charity, justice, and that we can be more easily contrary to the contraries of charity, justice, than if God had not been man or that man had not died to save mankind. And since, according to the conditions of this tree, that by which the virtues are in accord with being must be acknowledged, therefore in these conditions and in the above-mentioned flower is signified the holy Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ."

5. *Hope Avarice*

"Avarice is contrary to hope, which is why poor people despair of rich, avaricious men and place their hope in generous, liberal men. Now if God became man, and that man died to save you and me and the others, think to yourself if there could be any better way to make you trust or hope in God, or make you more contrary to avarice. And since by the Incarnation of the Son of God and by the Passion of Jesus Christ you can have greater hope and can be more contrary to avarice, therefore in this greater hope and in this greater contrariety between hope and avarice is exemplified the Incarnation of the Son of God and the Passion of Jesus Christ.

"The Saracens claim that Jesus Christ did not die. And do you know why? Because they think they are rendering Him honor by saying that He did not die. But they do not understand the honor that is His in being the hope and consolation of every man, no matter how poor or guilty he may be, and for whom the hope would not be so real if He had not been God or died to save mankind."

Question. "I am astonished," said the Gentile, "that Jesus let Himself be killed, if He was as noble a person as you claim."

Solution. The Christian replied: "You hear and do not understand, and it is this hearing without understanding that gives rise to your astonishment, which would be dispelled by hearing and understanding. This being the case, try therefore to understand how in Jesus Christ's human nature and in His passion and death God demonstrates the perfection of the flowers of the first tree, as well as those of the second and fourth. And just as in a mirror your features are revealed, so in evil men and in those who are

contrary to God are revealed the above-mentioned flowers by means of the flowers of the third and fifth tree, without which third and fifth trees they would not be made so evident to the human understanding."

Article 11. DESCENDED INTO HELL

1. Greatness Perfection

The Christian said to the Gentile: "The greatest perfection that can exist in a creature is that it be united to its creator and be a single person with its creator. Now if this be the noblest perfection in a creature, then the noblest action possible in a creature must be to act toward another creature as God would act. Now if this action is the greatest and noblest that can exist in a creature, then the noblest action to which a creature can be subjected must reside in that creature itself; for if it did not, it might be able to receive a nobler action than it had in itself, from which it would follow that greatness and perfection would, in this flower, contrast with goodness, eternity, power, etc., and would accord with avarice, accidie, and pride, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is shown that in creature there is as much action and dominion as it can contain, according to the conditions of the trees; by which action and power to contain is signified the Incarnation of the Son of God. And by the Incarnation, as well as by the above-mentioned flower, is signified the Passion of Jesus Christ; and by the Passion is signified the dominion Jesus Christ's human nature has over creature, which creature signifies, according to the flower, that Christ's soul descended into Hell to free Adam, Abraham, and the other prophets, so as to fulfill their hopes and forgive their wrongs, and this it did in conjunction with divine nature, with which it was joined and through which it had greater perfection than all other creatures in signifying in God the existence of the above-mentioned flowers.

"The sun's perfection consists in its ability to send its rays over a dunghill and unclean places without itself becoming dirtied; and the soul's perfection consists in being one with the body, without being corruptible because of the body's corruption. So, just as the sun and the soul have something by which their perfection is de-

monstrable, similarly it is only fitting that God's perfection have something by which it be demonstrable; for if not, it would follow that God's perfection would not be greater than the perfection of the sun or of the soul, which is impossible. By this impossibility God's perfection and greatness are demonstrable, from which demonstrability it follows that Christ's soul descended to where the souls of the prophets were being tormented, without itself suffering torment, thereby demonstrating its perfection, which it had through divine perfection, as a sign that divine nature was with it there in Hell without either the deity or the soul suffering. For if Christ's soul did not suffer, how much less did the deity suffer in Hell, even though it was there essentially! Thus since, without the descent of Christ's soul, divine greatness, perfection would not be so well signified, and since that greatness, perfection should be revealed, as befits them and according to the conditions of this flower, therefore, in the congruence of the signification of the flower is signified the fact that Christ descended into Hell in order to signify the flower."

2. *Greatness Eternity*

"Infinite greatness cannot be moved from one place to another, since every place is in fact bounded and finite; nor can eternity be alterable or changeable, since every alterable and changeable thing must have a beginning. Thus, in order to signify God's greatness and eternity, Christ's soul, which is one with the Son of God, who in turn is one with Christ's body, descended into Hell to signify that the Son was in both the body and the soul, even though the body was in one place and the soul in another, and the body was alterable from life to death, and the soul movable from one place to another. And since such a signification indicates the presence of this flower in the person of the Son, and since such a signification must be made if Christ descended into Hell, therefore, according to the conditions of the tree, it is clear that Christ's soul descended into Hell."

3. *Power Justice*

"If one should attribute to God's power greater nobility than that of any other power, then to the soul joined to divine power

one should attribute greater justice than to any other creature. Thus, in this greatest created justice is exemplified the greatest uncreated power which that created justice has exalted over all other created justices. Now if the soul of Jesus Christ descended into Hell in order to demonstrate His justice, so that, by this justice, divine power be manifestable, it follows that this justice better demonstrates God's power. And since that by which God's power is best manifestable is in accord with truth and being, therefore in this truth and being is made manifest the fact that His soul descended into Hell."

4. Goodness Pride

"God's goodness created the angels in Paradise and placed Adam in an earthly paradise; and through pride the devils fell from Heaven and Adam was expelled from his earthly paradise. Now in order to show that His goodness is greatly opposed to pride, God wanted to be so humble as to join to Himself that created humility which was in Christ's human nature, which was humiliated to death in order to restore what man had lost through pride, and in order that the Heavens might recover that virtue[54] by which God's goodness would be signified and made evident in them. Now in order to bring out this signification, Christ's soul had to assume, in Hell, the humility of the body that had died on the cross as well as God's goodness, which called out to the souls of Adam, Abraham, and the other prophets and saints to rise up to the heavens from which the devils had fallen through pride. And since the above-mentioned demonstration could not be so fittingly made without His soul's having descended into Hell, therefore, in this greater fittingness, according to the conditions of the tree, is shown that Christ's soul descended into Hell to call the saints who were there to everlasting glory."

5. Faith Hope

"Abraham and the other prophets all believed and had hopes in the coming of a Messiah, whence the present-day Jewish belief

[54] Rosselló got his "truth" from the Mainz edition, where it seems to be the result of misreading the *virtutem* of the MSS as *veritatem*.

that the Messiah will come to deliver them from their earthly captivity. But the Christians believe that the Messiah has already come and has fulfilled the prophets' desire, which was for human nature to be exalted through union with God, and for it to be re-created from original sin. And since this desire of the Christians accords with majority and with greater necessity than that in which the Jews believe, therefore faith, hope are more in accord with majority through our belief than through that of the Jews. And since greater and being are in accord, therefore in the majority and being of faith, hope, the faith of Christians is shown to be true, which faith could not be true if we believed that Christ's soul had descended into Hell and this were not true. And because our faith is shown to be true in the greater concordance of faith, hope, therefore it is evident that Christ's soul descended into Hell."

6. Charity Ire

"If Christ's soul descended into Hell to deliver the saints and Christ's body died to re-create them, greater charity is thereby revealed in Christ's soul; and greater charity is revealed in God if He is one with Christ's soul and body; and the greater is the ire of those in Hell, and the more their conscience is a cause of pain. And since that by which charity and ire are farthest from one another, and by which charity accords with greater glory and ire with greater punishment must exist, according to the conditions of the tree, therefore, in the greater disparity between charity, ire, and in the conditions of the tree, is signified the fact that Christ's soul descended into Hell, in order to signify the greater distance and alienation which must exist between charity, ire."

Article 12. RESURRECTION

1. Greatness Perfection

"It is clear that every creature tends towards a goal, that is, the goal that most suits him. Now if there exists a creature who is the final cause of all other created goals, and the final cause of this creature is God, greater perfection is shown to exist in God and

in creature than would be the case if there were no creature who, as mediator between God and creatures, were the goal of all creatures. And since that by which greater perfection is best revealed in God and in creatures must accord with being, according to the conditions of the tree, therefore is made evident the Incarnation of the Son of God in creature; by which creature is signified death, which is the final cause of His Resurrection; by which Resurrection the above-mentioned flower is better signified than by any other resurrection; the nobility of which nobler resurrection reveals its existence in preference to any other less noble resurrection. For if it did not, the above-mentioned flower and the conditions of the trees would be contrary to one another, and that is impossible."

2. *Power Hope*

"Souls have hope of recovering their bodies in order to regain the humanity they once had with their bodies. Now if the body of Jesus Christ rose up from the dead, those souls who realize He is in Paradise have greater possibility of entertaining hope than if His body did not rise from the dead. And the greater the souls' possibility of entertaining hope in the Resurrection, the greater the power they receive from divine power; and the more they receive, the more they know and love it, and as a result the more divine power makes use of grace and empowering[55] in the souls of saints in glory. This being the case, if Christ's body rose up and is in glory, the flower and conditions of the tree are better in accord. For this reason, because of the better concordance and because of the conditions of the tree, the Resurrection is demonstrable."

3. *Perfection Accidie*

"In many places in this book it has been proven that the Son of God became incarnate, and that the flesh he took on died to save mankind and to exhibit the perfection of God and the perfection God placed in creature. Thus by God's will, that which the Son of God desired was accomplished in Christ's body, which would not have been accomplished had the body not risen. For

[55] Cf. n. 16 above.

if it had happened that Christ's body had not risen, there would have been greater perfection in His body than in the Son of God; for the body, by its passion and death, would have carried out the will of the Son of God, and the Son of God would be in accord with accidie against that very body with which He was one, and this is impossible; by which impossibility the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ is demonstrable."

4. Faith Hope

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Neither the Jews nor the Saracens believe that any body has yet arisen from the dead. And you, when you were wandering through the wilderness, were in grief because you had no hope or belief in resurrection. Think to yourself, therefore, if you would not have more joy against your former grief if you had faith and hope in resurrection as a result of some body having risen from the dead, then you would have if you believed that no body had ever risen from the dead. Now that by which faith and hope in the existence of the resurrection better accord with the increase of your joy in that resurrection, accords better with the flower, than that by which there is less joy to counter the grief you felt when you did not believe in resurrection. And since that by which faith, hope best agree against grief must be in accord with being, therefore in this greater concordance, Christ's Resurrection is made evident."

5. Justice Gluttony

"Your body, my body, and that of others were made mortal through the sin of gluttony, which our ancestor Adam committed. Now justice and temperance, which are contrary to injustice and gluttony, must exist in some man so that our body can recover that immortality for which every human body was created, but which, by the accident of the above-mentioned sin, was made mortal. Thus, since Christ's body died for justice, that is to say, so that supreme temperance might mortify gluttony and supreme justice might mortify injustice, it is only fitting that if through the wrongdoing of one body mortality came into being, then by the merit of another body, immortality should reappear. And if

this were not the case, it would follow that injustice, gluttony had greater power against immortality than justice, temperance against mortality, which is impossible. By this impossibility, the Incarnation and Resurrection are made manifest, as well as the fact that the flesh the Son of God took on must arise from the dead before any other body; for if it did not, the conditions of the trees would be vitiated, and that is impossible."

Article 13. THE ASCENSION

1. Greatness Perfection

"The sun by day and the moon by night give greater light than all the other heavenly bodies. Now if in Heaven there is one creature who, more than all other creatures, has been the cause of glory being nobler, then one must as a result recognize greater perfection in God. Thus, if Jesus Christ's human nature were on earth and not in Heaven, there would be no creature in Heaven who would bestow the perfection of glory on all other creatures, thereby properly exemplifying God's perfection. And if there were not, it would follow that God's will and power would be contrary to the above-mentioned flower, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that Jesus Christ's human nature ascended to Heaven.

"If Jesus Christ were still on earth and had not ascended to Heaven, the justice and charity in the souls of the saints in Heaven would be more agreeable to the flower than Jesus Christ's justice, charity, and this is impossible; by which impossibility Jesus Christ's humanity is shown to be in Heaven."

2. Wisdom Justice

"It is clear that this world is not a fitting place for a glorified body, nor for a rational soul. Now if Jesus Christ's humanity, which died to save us, was not in its proper place, God's wisdom and Jesus Christ's justice would be contraries; and if they were, created justice and uncreated justice would be contraries; on account of which contrariety, uncreated wisdom, which accords with uncreated justice, would be contrary to created wisdom and

created justice, which are in accord, and this is impossible; by which impossibility is made manifest the Ascension of our Lord Jesus Christ's holy humanity.

"God's wisdom knows of many a saint and many a martyr honored in this world, and He knows of many princes honored in this world. Now if Jesus Christ's human nature were in this world, those people we have just mentioned would be more honored than Jesus Christ in this world. And if they were, God's wisdom would recognize[56] the existence of injustice in Himself, and Jesus Christ's wisdom would recognize the existence of justice in Himself. But since God's wisdom and Jesus Christ's humanity are one person, and since justice and injustice are contraries, therefore, according to what we have said, the Ascension of Jesus Christ is made evident."

3. Power Pride

The Christian said to the Gentile: "The devils fell from Heaven through pride, and Christ's body met death through humility, so that we might rise up to the place from which the devils fell. Now if through Christ's coming and death we can rise up to Heaven, as we have proved in showing that Jesus Christ must be a re-creator, then of necessity Jesus Christ, by His divine and human power, must be able to ascend to the heavens before any other man. And if He did not, it would follow that His power would be no more contrary to pride than our power, and this is impossible; in which impossibility, as well as in the conditions of the trees, Christ's Ascension is declared to the human intellect which seeks it by this method."

4. Hope Charity

"You should know, Gentile, that if Jesus Christ is in Heaven and you have hopes that He will help, pardon, and forgive you, then you can love Him more and have greater hope in Him than you could if Jesus Christ were on earth and you thought He was in Heaven, or if He were in Heaven and you thought He was not

56 "Would recognize" here and at the end of the sentence translates *sabria* while disguising its connection to *saviea* ("wisdom") in Catalan (cf. Bk. 1, n. 8).

in Heaven. Now since that by which hope, charity can best be in accord must itself be in accord with being, therefore in this greater concordance, according to the conditions of the trees, the Ascension is demonstrable."

5. Charity Ire

"If Jesus Christ is in glory, then the greater the charity the saints in glory would have towards one another and each toward himself than they would if He were not in Heaven. And if this were not the case, the saints in glory, each of whom has greater glory through the other, would be more in accord with glory than would be Jesus Christ's humanity, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that Christ is in glory, and that through His glory the saints have greater charity one towards the other. And the greater their charity, the farther it is from the ire of the damned, whose ire is greater the more the blessed are glorified. And since, according to the conditions of the tree, that by which charity, ire are most strongly contrary agrees with being, therefore, in this greater contrariety between charity, ire is made manifest the Ascension of the Son of God."

Article 14. JUDGMENT

1. Greatness Power

From the first tree the Christian picked the above-mentioned flower in order to prove that Jesus Christ will come on Judgment Day to judge the good and the wicked; but the Gentile said that he didn't have to prove the Judgment Day, since the Jew had already proved it quite adequately. The Christian, however, replied, saying that insofar as he believed that Jesus Christ was both God and man, and that it was fitting that he who will give the sentence should be both God and man, then he should prove that he who will give the sentence must necessarily be both man and God.

The Christian said to the Gentile: "If you had such great power that by yourself you could judge all men who are in Glory and in Hell, you would not be a creature, but rather a creator. And

do you know why? Because God is the only one who can have such power. Now the power by which you, creature that you are, could be transubstantiated into a creating being, must reside in God; for if it did not, God would not be creator solely through His own power. And if you could beget an infinite power that could judge all men, you would be an even better God for begetting such a power than for creating a creature. And do you know why? Because it is a greater thing to beget infinite power than to beget a creature. This being the case, we have therefore demonstrated to you that in the sovereign good there is someone who begets infinite power; for if you were God capable of creating a creature, how much more fitting that in God there be a God capable of begetting infinite power, which is more than creating a creature. This being the case, we have therefore demonstrated to you the existence of infinite generation in God, by which we have demonstrated to you the existence of Trinity in God; by which in turn is made manifest the sentence God should give to man. For if, in order to create a creature, you had to be transubstantiated into a divine being, how much more can and should a creature, who is united with infinite power, be judge of all creatures, according to the conditions of the tree."

2. *Greatness Wisdom*

The Christian said to the Gentile: "Justice is in accord with greatness, wisdom; for the greater the wisdom, the more justice is directed toward judging wisely and the farther it is from ignorance. Now if the judge who will give the sentence on Judgment Day is a man, and that man knows all the good and evil things other men have done, and that man has such great wisdom, by reason of being joined in a single person with infinite wisdom, which God has in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., how much God's great wisdom, therefore, will be better shown to be great and to be concordant with justice than it would be if man were not God. And since, according to the conditions of the tree, that by which this great wisdom is best exemplified and best accords with justice should exist, therefore, in this greater exemplification, it is demonstrated that the judge who will give the sentence must be both God and man; for if he were not, God's will would be

contrary to that by which the above-mentioned flower were best revealed to the human understanding, and that is impossible."

3. *Greatness Justice*

"You may be sure, Gentile, that among us, the more a man does greater good or greater sin, the more he can be judged to deserve greater merit for his good or greater punishment for his wrongdoing. And therefore, wherever justice can judge most, there it shows its actuality[57] to be greatest. And if this were not the case, it would follow that you would receive no greater recompense for giving yourself to God than for giving away a penny, and that you would receive no greater punishment for killing a man than for committing a venial sin, and that is impossible.

"In God justice and mercy are one and the same thing, and therefore mercy is equally in accord with the same greatness with which justice is in accord. Now the more you sin and feel contrition for your sin, the more God's mercy will be able to forgive your greater guilt and sin. And the more He forgives you, the more you will be able to understand His mercy.

"You perhaps do not know, Gentile, that among Jews or Saracens there are not so many monks, martyrs, almsgivers, nor men who abandon the world as among Christians. This means that God's great justice is better suited to meting out great recompense to these men rather than to others who do not do so much for the love of our Lord God. And if this were not the case, it would follow that greatness, justice would be contraries, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is made clear that these men are on the true path, that in which justice can best give them glory. And if they are, and if they believe that the judge will be God and man, then it follows that he who will give the sentence will be both God and man.

"If the Son of God who is not only as noble a lord as you can conceive, but is even greater than you can imagine, if He, in order to save His people, wanted to become a man and have that man suffer poverty, torment, and death for the sake of man, then Chris-

[57] Cf. n. 30 above.

tians who sin against this man are greater sinners than infidels who sin in ignorance against Him. And if they are worse sinners, they can be condemned to greater suffering or forgiven greater sins than other men. And if this be the case, justice and mercy can be better and more greatly exemplified among Christians than among any other people; and if so, then the Christians must be on the path to salvation. Thus if they believe the judge to be God and man, so it must be; for if it were not, they would be in error, and it would follow that those on the true path would be those for whom justice, mercy did not accord so well with creature's use of such greatness, and this is impossible; for if it were possible, the conditions of the trees would be destroyed, and this is impossible."

4. Love Ire

"If the judge is God, the sentence will be more agreeable and truer, more to be loved and feared, than it would be if the judge were some other being who was not God. And if the judge is God, His essence should be intelligible to the souls of those He will judge and sensible to their bodily nature. And if God and man were not one person, it would be impossible for Him properly to act as judge, since God is invisible to bodily eyes and His essence is not visible to the spiritual eyes of the sinners He will condemn to infinite punishment, who could therefore not suffer at the sight of Him, nor feel ire towards His sentence. And if they did not, the sentence itself would give them no passion or ire, and this is impossible; for if it were possible, the vision would be contrary to the sentence, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made evident that the judge must be God and man."

5. Charity Justice

"Charity and justice are in accord; and the better they accord, the more contrary they are to hatred and injustice. Now if the Son of God is man, and that man comes on Judgment Day and shows the charity He had towards his people, by showing the cross on which He suffered passion and the wounds He suffered to save His people, greater charity will be revealed against hatred, injus-

tice. And where greater charity is revealed, there greater justice is demonstrated. And since whatever reveals greater charity, justice is affirmable, according to the conditions of the tree, it is therefore revealed that Jesus Christ will come to judge His people on the Day of Judgment. For if He did not, the flowers of the first tree would be contrary to the above-mentioned flower, which is impossible; by which impossibility it is revealed that Christ's justice would be better disposed to treat those who in this world had treated Him with hate, injustice."

6. Hope Pride

"Hope and pride are contraries, because of the concordance of hope, humility, which are contrary to pride, despair. Thus if you entertain hope of being judged by a man on the Day of Judgment, then the more your hope accords with humility. And if you are so proud that you do not believe that a man can or should judge you, then your pride, despair have taken on even greater proportions. And since hope, humility are in accord with being, and pride, despair are in accord with nonbeing, therefore, according to the conditions of this tree, that which increases hope and humility accords with existence, and that which increases pride, despair is in disaccord with existence. This therefore being the case, it is made evident in the above-mentioned majority that both the Son of God and man will give the sentence on God's people on the Day of Judgment."

When the Christian had proved his articles to the Gentile by means of the conditions and the flowers of the trees, he said: "You should know, Gentile, that the God of Glory—blessed may He be!—gave man memory to remember, reason to understand, and will to love[58] God and His works. Thus, the greater the remembrance, intelligence, and love the soul has towards God, the nobler it is and the more it accords with the final cause for which it was made and created. This being the case, if you remember, understand, and love God better through what I have said to you in

[58] These are the three Augustinian powers of the soul, for which see "Llull's Thought" above, text at n. 24, and mainly *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 53–55, with n. 46 there. See "Llull's Thought" n. 74 above for their connection with the precept of knowing and loving God.

proving my articles, than through what the Jew has said or what the Saracen will say (because by their arguments you cannot remember, understand, or love God as profoundly as you can by what I have told you), therefore my religion is shown to be true. And since whatever nobility the Jews and Saracens can, according to their beliefs, attribute and ascribe to God, we can also attribute, and even more than they, insofar as we believe in the Trinity of God and in the Incarnation of the Son of God; and since, by what I have said, you can better make your memory, reason, and will accord with the flowers and the conditions of the trees, according to the disposition and the new manner of disputation given and shown us by the Lady of Intelligence, therefore you should believe my words and my arguments if you want to find supreme happiness in God's glory."

When the Christian had spoken these words, the Gentile answered him, saying: "I have heard your words and understood your arguments. But before I reply to these words, I want to hear what the Saracens believe and how they make their articles accord with the flowers and the conditions of the trees. I would therefore like the Saracen to tell me what he has to say."

HERE BEGINS THE FOURTH BOOK[1]

WHEN THE Saracen saw that the time and hour had come for him to speak, he went to the spring and washed his hands, his face, his ears, his nose, and his mouth; and afterwards he washed his feet and other parts of his body, as a sign of original sin and cleanliness of heart.[2] Afterwards he spread a cloth[3] on the ground and knelt three times, touching his head to earth and kissing the ground; then, raising his heart, his hands, and his eyes heavenward, he said: "In the name of God the Merciful, the Mercifying, to whom all praise be given, since He is Lord of the world;—Him I adore and in Him I trust, for He leads us on the straight path of salvation."[4] And the Saracen spoke many other words, as was the custom in his prayers.

After finishing his prayer, the Saracen said to the Gentile that the articles of his religion were twelve, namely: to believe in one God; Creator; Mohammed is Prophet; the Koran is the law given

[1] A modern Spanish translation of Book IV (with the Epilogue) appears in *Antología II*, 388–461. For an earlier edition of the medieval French translation of this book, see n. 28 to the introduction above. Curiously enough, Islam is not a subject Llull discusses very much; aside from isolated remarks in various works, the only other extended discussion is that in *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 71. The most recent work on the subject is Urvoy, *Islam*. Note that the protagonist of this section is always referred to as "the Saracen." This term, which originated as the late Latin and Greek name for the nomads of the Syrian-Arabian desert, had by the Middle Ages come simply to mean "Muslim." Cf. N. Daniel, *Islam and the West* (Edinburgh, 1970), p. 14. In other works, Lull uses derivatives of *sarraí*, such as *sarraïnesch* to refer to the Arabic language, and *sarraïnitat* meaning "Islam." The Spanish medieval translator, doubtless reflecting Castile's political and commercial orientation toward northwestern Africa, invariably renders the word as "moor."

[2] Regarding these ablutions made to achieve the *ṭahāra* or purification, which constitutes a necessary prelude to prayer, see the Koran, 5:6.

[3] Thus in the two best Catalan MSS (0, F), in the medieval Spanish version and in one of the Latin MSS (L^4). A cloth of any kind spread on the ground can be used by a Muslim as a substitute for the prayer rug or *sajjāda*. The "head" of S, the remaining Latin sources, and all modern editors is absurd, especially in view of the fact that Llull asks us to believe that the Saracen "spread" it on the ground.

[4] This invocation is a free version, perhaps written by Llull from memory, of the "Opening" (*Al-Fātiḥa*) of the Koran. Note that he translates *Allāh* as "God," which is often reserved for the related *ilāh*, and it is interesting to see him dealing with the terms *raḥmān* and *raḥīm*, both derived from the root *rḥm*, by means similar to those used with his correlatives, rendering them as *misericordiós* and *misericordiejant*, which I have, in an attempt to retain this structure, translated as "the Merciful, the Mercifying," rather than the more usual "the Compassionate (or Beneficient), the Merciful."

by God; the dead man, upon being buried, is asked by the angel if Mohammed is the messenger of God; all things will die, except God; Resurrection; Mohammed will be heeded on the Day of Judgment; merits and faults will be weighed; all will pass along the path; the twelfth article is to believe in the existence of Paradise and Hell.[5]

Article 1. TO BELIEVE IN THE EXISTENCE OF ONE GOD

WHILE THE Saracen was looking at the trees, in order to choose the flowers he would need to prove the existence of one God, the Gentile said to him: "You don't have to prove the existence of one God, because the Jew has already proved it quite adequately." But the Saracen replied that he wanted to prove that God was not divisible, not separated into parts, nor compound. "Rather, in every way He is one, without there existing in Him any trinity or plurality. For if there did, then He would have to be compound,

[5] See the individual articles below for an explanation of some of these excessively simplified titles. In Islam there is no fixed, agreed-upon list of articles of faith or *ʿaqāʾid* (plural of *ʿaqīda*, "belief"). Llull's list, however, agrees quite well with those articles most generally accepted and which are based largely on those found in al-Ghazzali's *Iḥyā ʿulūm al-dīn*. See the article by W. Montgomery Watt on *ʿaḳīda* in the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, as well as B. Justel Calabozo, "La ʿAqīda ahl-al-Islām (Credo de los musulmanes) de Ibn ʿArabi de Murcia," *La Ciudad de Dios, Revista Augustiana* 190 (El Escorial, 1977), 317–43, and especially p. 319.

This introductory section, like those of the previous two Books of the *Gentile* (see Bk. II, n. 2, and Bk. III, n. 5), is replaced in the *Electorium* by a chart on the same earlier folio of that MS showing the various articles of the Mohammedan faith acceptable to the other two religions.



1. One God.
2. Creator.
3. Mohammed is Prophet.
4. The Koran is the Law given by God.
5. The dead man in the tomb is asked by the angel if Mohammed was Prophet.
6. All things will die except God.
7. Resurrection.
8. Mohammed will be heeded on the Day of Judgment.
9. An account must be given to God on the Day of Judgment.
10. Faults and merits will be weighed.
11. They will pass along the path.
12. Paradise and Hell.

and His goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, would have to be contrary to perfection; and since this is impossible, it is therefore evident that God does not exist in Trinity."

When the Saracen said this, the Christian wanted to reply, but the Gentile said it was not his turn to speak, and that he himself would answer the Saracen. The Gentile therefore said to the Saracen: "Surely you remember that I put that same question to the Christian.[6] Now, from what you say and from what I heard the Christian say, I realize that the Christian believes certain things concerning the Trinity of God, which are different from what you think he believes. It therefore seems to me that you cannot agree and live beneath the same faith and belief as the Christian. But let us leave this problem and continue with your articles, for there is no need to discuss this first article any further."

Article 2. CREATOR

THE SARACEN wanted to prove that God is the creator of the world and of all that exists; but the Gentile said there was no need to prove again that God was the creator, since the Jew had proved it quite adequately. "But I would like you to tell me if God created evil or guilt or sin." The Saracen replied: "We believe that God created all things, and we believe that God created evil, good, guilt, sin, and merit, and that all things come or have come from God. For if there existed something that had been created by or had come from another, then there would be two Gods, and that is impossible; by which impossibility it is proved that good and evil both come from God."

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen: "One of the conditions of the second tree is that the flowers of the first and second trees not be contrary to one another. Now if what you say were true, it would follow that God's will would be contrary to justice and in accord with injustice. For if God has created sin, He must have loved to create it; for if He had not wanted to, He would not have created it. And if He created sin and guilt, then He is wrong to punish those he puts in Hell for indulging in the sin He created. And since it is impossible for there to exist contrariety among the

[6] Bk. III, Arts. 2–4, pp. 196 and 213.

flowers of the first and second trees, it is therefore impossible that God created sin."

Solution. The Saracen replied: "You know, Gentile, that God—blessed be He!—has perfect wisdom, as has already been proved in the first book.[7] Now if God has perfect wisdom, it follows that God knew about sin before the world existed, and knew that if He created the world, man would sin. And since God knew it, and God created man and the world, it is therefore evident that God created sin and provides the opportunity for sin to continue existing.

The Gentile replied, saying: "God has perfection in His power, knowledge; for if He did not, there would be a limit and end to the greatness of His power and knowledge; but since they are without end, therefore, in this infinity of power and knowledge, is signified the fact that God can know about sin without either His power or knowledge, or even His will, being a cause of that sin. And if God did not have such power that He could know, without wanting to be a cause of, sin, then His power, His knowledge, and His will would not have perfection. But let's leave this question and continue with the other articles, for I don't want to ask you anything more about this article."

Article 3. THAT MOHAMMED IS PROPHET

1. Goodness Greatness

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "There was a time when all the inhabitants of Mecca and of the City of Yathrib,[8] where Mohammed was Prophet, were idolaters and had no knowledge of God, and were in the same error as you when you came here and had no knowledge of God. Now just as you needed consolation in your state of sorrow, so the above-mentioned people needed the help and enlightenment of faith. And since God's goodness is great, He had pity on those people who were going astray through ignorance, and He decided to enlighten them and give them

[7] Bk. I, Tree 1, Flowers 4–5.

[8] This place-name appears as *Trip* in the Catalan and Latin sources, and it corresponds to the modern Medina (*Madīnat al-Nabī*, "The Prophet's City," which explains Llull's use of the word "City" here and not before Mecca).

knowledge of Himself and His glory. And that is why He sent Mohammed as Prophet, so that he could enlighten them and give them knowledge of God; which enlightenment and knowledge are in accord with God's great goodness, with which they could not accord if there had been no prophet. And since one good should accord with another, therefore, in God's good and in the good Mohammed did when he guided those who had strayed, lies the proof that Mohammed is the Prophet of God."

The Gentile replied, saying: "According to what you say, it would follow that God's perfection is not in accord with His great goodness, as of necessity should be the case, for in the country I come from there are just as many people going to perdition, without anyone giving them knowledge of God. And since God's goodness does not satisfy all needs, it is therefore contrary to greatness, with which it would be in accord if it could satisfy all needs. And if God's goodness is contrary to greatness, it cannot possibly accord with perfection; and this is contrary to the conditions of the trees."

The Saracen replied, saying: "It is clear that God gave man free will to do good and avoid evil. Now, if everyone were on the true path, those who are in fact on the true path would have nothing on which they could exercise their free will. God therefore allows some people to remain in error so that we, who are on the true path, can, for the love of God, go preach to them, convert them, and bring them to the path of salvation, so that we, as a result, may be more glorious in God's glory."

2. Power Prudence

"It is customary for a king to practice on his subjects whatever customs he wants. Now since in man God has created prudence by which he can know God's great power, therefore, in order to demonstrate this great power, God has, at various times, sent prophets and transmitted customs to demonstrate that God has the power to make certain statutes at one time and others at other times. And this is why He sent the prophet Moses to give the law to the Jews, which law God saw fit to conserve until the coming of the prophet Jesus Christ, who was the spirit of God and was born of a woman who was holy and a virgin; and he gave the law

to the Christians, which lasted until He sent Mohammed, who revealed to us the Koran, which is our law and the word of God. Now if God did not bring about these changes of customs and laws by different prophecies at different times, prudence would not be so enlightened in its knowledge of God's power. And since that by which prudence can know God's power must be in accord with being, therefore, in this being and in the concordance of God's power and of prudence, it is made clear that Mohammed was God's messenger."

The Gentile replied: "According to the flowers of the trees and their conditions, it follows that God did not send one prophet to oppose the other, nor for one to deny or disbelieve what the other had prophesied about God. Thus, since the Christian religion and yours are contrary to one another, it is impossible that both be God-given. And if they are, then the flowers of the first tree must be in accord with falsehood against truth, which is impossible. Furthermore, if the situation were as you claimed, it would follow that God should send another prophet who would refute what Mohammed has said, and then another one after that, and so on infinitely until the end of the world, and that is impossible and against God's wisdom, perfection. For any craftsman should love his work, so that by this love his work can achieve perfection, provided, of course, he has the necessary wisdom and power."

3. Wisdom Pride

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "Mohammed was an uneducated man who could not read or write, and God revealed to him the Koran, which is a book of great wisdom and the most beautiful composition[9] there is or could be; for all the men in the world, or all the angels or devils, could not compose so beautiful a work as the Koran, which is our law. Now since those men whom wisdom has made proud and vainglorious customarily look down upon those who are less wise, therefore God wanted to enlighten Mohammed, who had such great wisdom that he was able to divulge the Koran, which is the word of God, without becoming

[9] The original has literally "dictation," which is closer to the point the Saracen is trying to make about the method of elaboration of the Koran; but the more usual medieval meaning of this word is "composition," which has fewer secretarial connotations in English.

proud, in order to destroy pride and vainglory by exemplifying the humility of God, who so wanted to exalt the wisdom and humility in Mohammed. And since Mohammed had greatness of wisdom and humility, in this greatness of wisdom and humility is signified the fact that Mohammed was a prophet."

4. Charity Justice

"It is only fitting that one should revere and honor a man who has charity and justice. Now since Mohammed is honored in this world by so many people, it is only right that in him justice accord with God's charity; for if it did not, God would not allow him to be as honored as he is; and if He did, it would follow that injustice and honor would accord with charity against charity, dishonor[10] and justice, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown—by the honor with which God has so greatly honored Mohammed—that Mohammed is Prophet."

The Gentile replied to the Saracen: "According to what you say, it follows that Jesus Christ, who is so honored in this world, is God, and that His apostles and other martyrs, who are so honored in this world, died on the true path. For if God did not allow those who died in falsehood to be honored in this world, then what was said of Christ must be true; and if it were, then your religion would not be true, nor would Mohammed be worthy of being honored or of being a prophet."

5. Hope Gluttony

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "According to what is recounted in the Koran, which is the word of God, in Paradise there will be many great blessings: there will be all kinds of food that will be most pleasing to eat; there will be beautiful clothes, beautiful palaces, and beautiful rooms; and there will be many beds with many beautiful women with whom one will experience agreeable bodily pleasures.[11] Now in order to destroy the gluttony, avarice, and

[10] Thus in all sources, except S (followed by Rosselló) which has "honor."

[11] As Peers (p. 92) says, "Llull makes much of Moslem ideas on Paradise and of their materialism, on which, as we have seen, he lays great emphasis, evidently considering it to be one of the most vulnerable characteristics of the Saracen's creed." See Art. 12 below for a more detailed presentation of the Muslim Paradise, which is described in many *sūras* of the Koran. See also Llull's interesting remarks on this subject in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 97–8, and especially 98,9.

lust of this world, God sent Mohammed so that people would place their hopes in the delights of Paradise and therefore not sin with the delights of this world. And since that by which hope and gluttony can be most contrary to one another must accord with being, and since hope and gluttony can be most contrary if there is the above-mentioned happiness in Paradise, therefore in this greater contrariety, according to the conditions of the tree from which we picked the above-mentioned flower, is signified the fact that Mohammed is Prophet."

The Gentile replied: "According to the conditions of the flowers, it follows that if one flower signifies the existence of a certain thing, then that flower must not be contrary to the other flowers, which signify the nonexistence of that thing. For if this were the case, the flowers could be contrary to one another, and that is impossible."

Article 4. THE KORAN

1. Power Love

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "Mohammed was an uneducated man who could not read or write, and the Koran is the most beautiful composition there is or could be. Now if it were not for God's will and action, Mohammed could not have written or composed such a beautiful composition nor put together such well-ordered words as those of the Koran. And since it is by God's power that the Koran is such a beautiful composition, and since it was transmitted by Mohammed who was illiterate and did not himself have the power to compose such beautiful words, therefore the Koran must be the word of God.

"Power and love are in accord in God, and since in the Koran there are so many blessings that God promises those who know His glory, therefore the Koran shows us God's great love for His people. And since no other religion promises men so many blessings as does the Koran, it is therefore evident that the Koran is more pleasing to God than any other law. And if this were not the case, it would follow that one could love God more if He promised lesser blessings rather than greater ones, which is impossible and against the conditions of the trees.

"If the Koran were not God-given, it would be contrary to the truth; and since truth has power over falsehood, and truth is pleasing to God and falsehood odious, and since the Koran cannot be refuted by the doctrines of the Christians nor by those of the Jews, it is therefore evidently God-given, in order to show the concordance existing between the power and will of God, which accord is based on the fact that the power can and the will wants what the Jews and Christians do not have the power to refute, even though they have the will to do so."

2. *Power Justice*

"You should know, Gentile, that for both Christians and Jews the most honored and sought-after place in the world is a city called Jerusalem. In the beginning of the world, it was the principal city of the prophets. In that city Jesus Christ was crucified and killed, and there is His tomb, according to what the Christians believe. And this city the Saracens holds, have, and possess in spite of the Christians and Jews. And in that city the Koran is taught publicly, and no book or doctrine is so honored there as is the Koran. Now all of this bears witness to the power and justice of God, for since neither Christians nor Jews believe in the Koran, God punishes them in the most honored and sought-after place they have. It is therefore clear that the Koran is the word of God; for if it were not, it would follow that the power of God and justice would be contrary to the justice of the Christians and Jews, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made manifest that the Koran was transmitted and sustained by the power of God."

3. *Wisdom Envy*

"In order to show that His wisdom is contrary to envy, God sent down to earth the Koran, in which He promises the many blessings men will have in Paradise, in order to prevent people from being envious of the temporal delights of this world, and to prevent some men from being envious of the wives and riches of others; for in Paradise there will be such a great abundance of these things that there should be no need for people to be envious in

this world. And since the Koran promises more and greater blessings than any other religion, in order to prevent envy in this world, therefore if it were not the word of God it would, according to the conditions of the trees, mean that envy and God's wisdom could be in accord, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown that the Koran is the word of God."

4. Hope Charity

"To promise many noble things signifies charity, and the more charity is signified, the more hope is increased. Now this being the case, wherever hope, charity can best accord to exist in great quantity and actuality, there, according to the conditions of the trees, truth is revealed. And since the Koran promises greater blessings than any other book, therefore, according to the concordance of hope, charity, it is shown that the Koran contains the truth; by which truth it is shown that God had it transmitted in order to increase hope, charity in man."

5. Justice Ire

"The greater the justice, the more ire can be increased by injustice in men punished by justice. Now since the Koran promises so many blessings to those who will be in glory, those who will be in Hell for lack of obedience to God will have greater ire when they remember the glory they have lost, which in this world was promised to them and revealed by the Koran, than will have either the Jews or Christians, to whom less glory is promised in their religion than is promised in that of the Saracens. And since whatever causes greater contrariety between justice and ire gives greater evidence of truth than that which causes lesser contrariety between them, therefore, in this greater and lesser contrariety of justice, ire, it is shown that the Koran is the word of God."

Article 5. THE QUESTIONING OF THE DEAD MAN IN THE TOMB

THE SARACEN said to the Gentile: "We believe that when a man dies and is buried, two angels[12] ask him five things, namely: Who

[12] Called Munkar and Nakīr; see F. M. Pareja, *La religiosidad musulmana* (Madrid, 1975), pp. 83 and 150.

is God? From whom comes His law? What is His law? Is Mohammed His prophet? Is Mecca to the South?[13] And if God has given him the grace to reply that God is his creator, his law comes from God, his law is the Koran, and that Mohammed is the messenger of God, and if he grants that Mecca is to the south, then, until the Day of Judgment, he will lie happily and comfortably in his tomb, and he will see Paradise with the glory God promises the blessed, and he will see the infernal punishments he will have escaped. And if that man denies the above-mentioned things and does not know the answers he should give, then the tomb will be tightened around him and he will be in pain and sadness until the Day of Judgment, and he will see the infernal punishments awaiting him, and he will see the glory of Paradise which he has lost.

"The above is an account of what Saracens believe happens to men when they die. Now, to prove this article, we will first pick the flower of

1. Greatness Power

"So that God may prove the greatness of His power, in that by His power dead men can see the above-mentioned things from inside the tomb, He wants the above-mentioned questioning to take place. And since, without this questioning and vision, God's power would not be so demonstrable, and since that by which God's power is demonstrable accords with being, therefore in this greater demonstration and vision of power is the above-mentioned article shown to be true."

Question. The Gentile said: "How can a dead man see all these things, when his body is without a soul, and since a body without a soul cannot see nor understand nor speak nor answer?"

Solution. "Some of us believe that God returns the soul to the body; others believe that the soul remains between the body and the winding sheet. Therefore, by virtue of divine power and by the fact that the soul is still in the tomb, a man can answer and

[13] Instead of the "who is God" of the Catalan and Spanish sources, the Latin and French sources have "what is God." Llull's use of the word "south" is curious; the Arabic term is *qibla*, which means the direction of prayer, i.e., towards Mecca, which from Spain would be more east than south. Was Llull here relying on some Middle Eastern source for his information?

see all these things. And if God's power were not powerful enough for the dead man to do these things, it would follow that greatness and power were contraries in God, and this is impossible."

2. *Greatness Justice*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "It is clear that God's justice is greater than the justice found in man. And therefore, according to God's great wisdom, there must be some arrangement by which it is made manifest that God's justice is greater than man's; which manifestation can be seen in the fact that man's justice is only effective while he lives, whereas God's justice is there before a man is born and after he dies; and this is made manifest by Heaven and Hell, which existed before man existed, and which exist after his death, when God demonstrates His justice by judging the dead man according to how he answers the above-mentioned questions. And since that which better illustrates how God's great justice is greater than that of men must accord with being, therefore, in this concordance with being, the above-mentioned questioning is made manifest."

3. *Goodness Ire*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "By God's great goodness is revealed the ire God feels towards the ire that makes people blameworthy and sinful. Now in order to give a sign of this great goodness and of the ire He feels towards vice and sin, God wants to reveal His glory and the punishments of Hell to the dead man in his tomb, to show that He loves glory and hates the punishments of Hell, and that a person can choose blessedness and avoid damnation in the tomb if he gives the above answers to the angels. And since a person is given more time to choose good and avoid evil if the above-mentioned questioning truly takes place than if it does not, and since by this greater amount of time the contrariety between God's goodness and the ire inherent in vice is best shown to exist, therefore, in this greater amount of time in which a person can choose blessedness and avoid damnation, is signified the fact that the above-mentioned questioning is true."

4. Faith Hope

"Greater is the amount of faith and hope which can exist in man if the questioning takes place than if it does not. For if a sinner can do nothing during his life to save himself, at least at his death, when the angels ask him the above-mentioned questions, he will be able to choose salvation and escape damnation. And since that by which faith, hope can best accord should be granted, and since, if the questioning takes place, they can accord better, therefore, in the majority of faith, hope, and in this greater concordance, is signified that the questioning must be true, according to the conditions of the tree."

5. Charity Avarice

"It is in the nature of charity that it gives a man occasion to concede the truth; and it is in the nature of avarice that it makes a man deny the truth. For this reason charity and avarice are contrary to one another; on account of which contrariety charity accords with liberality against avarice, and avarice accords with hatred against charity. This being the case, the above-mentioned concordance and contrariety therefore show that the questioning must be true; for if it is true and the dead man tells the angels the truth, then the better this accords with charity, generosity against avarice and hatred; and if he denies the truth, the better this accords with avarice, hatred against charity, generosity. And since that by which charity, avarice are farther from one another and more strongly contrasted must accord with being, therefore, in this greater concordance with being, the questioning is shown to be true."

Article 6. DEATH

1. Power Perfection

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "We believe that everything dies, except God; that is to say, men, angels, devils, and all living

things. And this death will take place when the Angel Seraphim[14] sounds the trumpet and then himself dies. And nothing that has life will remain alive, with the sole exception of God. Now to prove this article, the above-mentioned flower is suitable; for if all living things die, then power, perfection will be better signified in God, for greater power and perfection exist in a thing that is not mortal than in one that is mortal, since mortality signifies imperfection, and immortality perfection. And because that by which God's power and perfection accord with greater nobility should be granted, according to the conditions of the tree, it is therefore shown that everything must and will die, with the sole exception of God."

Question. The Gentile said: "According to the way I understand it, the conditions of the trees are so arranged that if greater nobility is shown to exist in God by one manner than by another, then one should assign less nobility to the contrary manner. Now if all things die, it is true that God's power and perfection will seem greater in terms of the use made of His perfect, immortal power. But since even angels and the souls of saints who deserve life rather than death would die, God's perfection would be against justice and against goodness, since death brings suffering and harm, which suffering and harm should not exist without guilt. Now since it is impossible for divine perfection to be against God's justice, goodness, it is therefore shown that what you say is not true."

Solution. The Saracen replied: "What you say would be true if God did not revive angels and souls again. But since they will all be alive again, and God will give them everlasting life, therefore God will be doing them no wrong in having them die, but rather He would be wronging Himself if in creatures He did not make use of His virtues so that they were seen in their greatest nobility and perfection."

Question. The Gentile said, "Death is the separation of body and soul. Now if angels have no body, how can they die?"

[14] Thus (here and in Art. 7 below) in all sources. *Israphi* is an alteration of Rosselló's, based on the more usual Arabic name for the "Lord of the Trumpet," which is *Isrāfīl*; but *Sarāfin* (from the Hebrew *Serāfim*) is an acceptable variant. See the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. Isrāfīl.

Solution. The Saracen replied, "Angels will die by becoming nothing, and this is what we mean when we say they will die."

The Gentile replied, "By making them become nothing, God would be contrary to that which accords with being, since the good angels, by the fact of serving God, deserve to have being; and if they are naught, God's virtues accord with nonbeing against being, and that is impossible."

2. *Perfection Justice*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "Just as silver or gold is purified in fire, so the saints shall receive purification in death, for every vice and imperfection will be annihilated in death; and this death will be one of justice, in which justice their perfection will be purified. Thus, in order to demonstrate that God's perfection accords with justice and with the purification of angels and saints, God will want all things to die.

"It is evident that nothing is perfect or immortal, with the sole exception of God. Now if that which is immortal never meted out death to that which is mortal, it would not mete out justice as a sign of its perfection and immortality, nor would mortality be made actual, and this would be an offense to its perfection and immortality, and this is impossible; by which impossibility it is made evident that everything that exists, except God, must necessarily die."

3. *Power Pride*

"In order to confound pride, along with the error and arrogance[15] of those who think they are of an eternal nature, God wants all things to die as a sign of His eternal power, which can destroy everything that exists and has brought from nonbeing that which is created. And since, without the death of everything, the above flower would not be composed of such great contrarieties, and since the greatest contrariety is in this case affirmable, therefore this article is provable, that is to say, by the greater contrariety between power, pride existing in this flower."

[15] It is curious that for this *ergull* all the Latin sources have *lasciviam*.

4. Charity Justice

"Charity and justice are in accord. And since charity and fear of God are in accord, therefore fear of God and justice are in accord against hatred, injustice and contempt. And since death signifies fear of God, therefore God will want all things to die, so that man will fear and love Him, and will be afraid to die another time. Now if everything dies, the opposition between the above flower and its contrary flower will be better signified. And since the greatest contrariety between virtue and vice must accord with being, and since by the death of everything it does in fact accord better with being, in this being, therefore, is signified the existence of this article, without which God would be in accord with nonbeing against being, which is impossible."

5. Charity Ire

"Charity and prudence are in accord against ire and imprudence. And since something which dies can know better what death is like than something which does not die, therefore knowledge and prudence accord better in knowing about death in that which dies than in that which does not die. And the greater prudence can be in knowing about death, the greater charity can be in whatever is brought back from death to life, rather than in that which never died. This being the case, it follows that angels and saints will have greater wisdom in knowing what death is, if they die, as well as greater charity when they arise from the dead, than they would have if they were immortal and did not die. And since that should accord with being by which charity, prudence accord better with majority, therefore in this majority it is demonstrated that this article accords with being.

"If wicked men and devils die, greater will be their ire at existing once again than if they did not die. And since that which is greater ire is more contrary to charity, therefore in this greater ire this article is signified; which greater ire would not exist in sinners without this article."

Article 7. RESURRECTION

WHILE the Saracen was looking at the first tree, trying to choose a flower with which to prove the Resurrection, the Gentile re-

membered that in the first book the Resurrection had been proved quite satisfactorily, and he therefore said to the Saracen: "You don't have to prove the Resurrection, for it was already proved well enough in the first book. But do please tell me in what way you Saracens think you will arise from the dead."

The Saracen replied: "We believe that when all living things are dead, after forty days there will fall from the sky a rain as white as milk, and then men and beasts and birds and all other living creatures will germinate like grass. And the Angel Seraphim will sound the trumpet again, and the people will rise from the dead and shake the earth from their heads.

"Fire will come from the sky and the heat of the sun will be very great; and because of the great heat, people will lie down on the ground, which will be exceedingly white. And they will be bathed in sweat and their tongues will hang out, and it will seem to them that this day lasts fifty thousand years.[16] More angels than all the men living on earth will come down from the first heaven; and from the second there will come twice as many; and then from the third, and so on, from one heaven to the next each time doubling the number, until the seventh heaven, from which God, along with the angels from that heaven, will descend, saying, 'I would be unjust if, on this day of Resurrection, any living creature escaped my taking revenge upon him for whatever injustice he had done.' This, Gentile, is the way we believe the Day of Judgment will be, and there are many other things I could tell you, but it would take too long to recount. Since in this discussion we have agreed to talk as briefly as possible, I have therefore told you concisely what our Prophet Mohammed says in the Koran, and what our wise men say in their commentaries upon our Law."

Article 8. HOW MOHAMMED WILL BE HEEDED

THE SARACEN said to the Gentile: "We believe that Mohammed will pray to God on behalf of his people and will be heeded. Now, before I prove this article by means of the flowers of the trees, I

[16] "The Day of Judgment will be as 50,000 years, yet for Allah it will be like the opening and closing of an eye," Pareja, (n. 12 above), p. 185.

want to tell you how we believe Mohammed will pray to God and be heeded.

"On the day that everyone will rise from the dead, God will gather them all together in one place, and they will be suffering greatly from the heat to which they will have been subjected and from the sweat in which they will be bathed, for some will be in sweat up to their ankles, others up to their knees, others to their throat, others to their eyes, and yet others will be in sweat like frogs in water, and this will depend on how sinful each person has been.

"While these people are in pain and sweat, they will agree to go to Adam and entreat him to beg God to take them out of this pain, and to place in Paradise those who should be saved, and in Hell those who should be damned. But Adam will reply, 'I would be ashamed to beseech God, since I disobeyed Him when I ate of the fruit He had commanded me not to eat'; to which Adam will add, 'Go to Noah and have him pray for you.' They will go to Noah and beseech him as they did Adam. Noah will reply, 'I am not worthy of beseeching God nor of being heeded, for I forsook my people who perished on the day of the flood, and I would be ashamed to beseech God. But go to Abraham and ask him to pray for you.' They will then go to Abraham and tell him the same thing they told Noah. Abraham will reply, 'I am not worthy of beseeching God, for I lied twice: once when I told my father I had not broken the idols but that they had broken by themselves, and the other time when I said that my wife was my sister and not my wife.[17] Thus, since I am not worthy of beseeching God nor of being heeded, I advise you to go to Moses and ask him to pray for you.' They will go to Moses and ask him to intercede for them. Moses will reply, 'I am not worthy of beseeching God nor of being heeded, for I killed a man and I commanded that all those who believed in the Golden Calf, making an idol out of it and worshiping it as if it were God, should die.[18] So I advise you to go to Jesus Christ and ask him to intercede for you.' They will

[17] Abraham twice said his wife was his sister: once it was to the Egyptians (Gen. 12:11ff.) and the other time to Abimelech, King of Gerar (Gen. 20:2ff.). The story of Abraham and the idols is in the Koran, 21:51ff.

[18] The story of Moses killing an Egyptian who was mistreating a Jew is in Exod. 2:11–12; that of his commanding the slaying of the worshipers of the Golden Calf is in Exod. 32:27–8.

go to Jesus Christ and beseech him, but he will turn down their request, saying that he is not worthy to beseech God nor to be heeded, 'and I would be ashamed to beseech God on your behalf, since, without God's permission, people worshiped me and believed in me as if I were God.' And he will advise them to go to the holy Prophet Mohammed, so that he may pray for them. They will go to Mohammed, imploring him to beseech God to take them out of the pain in which they are, and to save whoever is to be saved and to condemn whoever is to be condemned. Mohammed will answer saying that he will gladly intercede for them; and at once, before God's throne, he will kneel down and bow to the ground, and he will beseech God to deliver them from their suffering, and to put in Paradise whoever is to be saved and in Hell whoever is to be damned. While Mohammed will be beseeching God in this way, the voice of God will be heard in the sky, saying, 'Mohammed, today is no time to pray or to implore. Ask and it shall be given; beseech and it shall be granted.' Mohammed will then say that God should ask people for an accounting of their actions, so that whoever should go to Paradise may go there and whoever should go to Hell may go there. And God will reply that it will be done as Mohammed asks.

"This is one way, Gentile, that we believe Mohammed will beseech God and will be heeded. There is another way in which Mohammed will beseech God and be heeded: that is after God has passed judgment sending the good to Paradise and the wicked to Hell, and some sinners from among Mohammed's people will find themselves in Hell, then Mohammed will pray for those people, and God will take them from Hell because of Mohammed's prayers. And we believe in these two kinds of intercession, which of necessity must exist, as is signified by the conditions and flowers of the trees. And of this truth I offer the following proofs."

1. Greatness Perfection

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "You have heard what our beliefs are on the above-mentioned matters. Now since, according to the conditions of the tree containing the above flower, one should grant God the greatest nobility, which would consist in His giving Mohammed a nobility so much greater than other no-

bilities in being heeded, therefore one can demonstrate God's greater nobility and kindness, for in the greater nobility of him who is beseeched is signified the greater nobility of the beseecher. And the greater the nobility one attributes to beseecher and beseeched, the more forcefully is declared and made manifest God's great perfection; for which declaration and manifestation there must exist the above-mentioned article, without which it would not be as declared or manifest."

2. *Love Justice*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "We find that all the above-mentioned prophets, as we said before, committed sin after becoming prophets; on account of which sin they declined to beseech God, as we have recounted; but we do not find that Mohammed committed any sin after becoming a prophet. Thus, in order to demonstrate that God dearly loves justice and hates injustice, which is sin, Mohammed was honored over the other prophets in being heeded. And since this demonstration of the above flower would not be so complete without the above-mentioned article, therefore, according to the conditions of the trees, God wanted this article to accord with truth, in which concordance this article is provable." When the Saracen had finished these words, both the Jew and the Christian wanted to reply, but the Gentile did not permit it.

Question. The Gentile said, "Tell me, did Mohammed commit any sin before he became prophet?"

Solution. The Saracen replied, "The truth is that Mohammed sinned through ignorance before he became a prophet, in that he believed in idols, as was the practice in his country, and in which practice his father and mother, who were idolaters, had brought him up."

3. *Love Pride*

"God loves humility and feels ire toward pride. And since knowledge gives opportunity for pride, God, in order to demonstrate His love of humility and His dislike of its contrary, wanted Mohammed to be heeded above all other prophets; for

Mohammed was an uneducated, illiterate man, and through his humility had greater valor in beseeching God than the other prophets, who lacked his valor and courage, even though they could read and write, and were men of great knowledge. And since this article so appropriately signifies the above flower, therefore, in this great significance of the flower, the above-mentioned article is shown to be true."

4. *Faith Hope*

"It is evident that neither Jews nor Christians[19] believe or hope that by some man's prayers anyone will leave Hell having once entered. Now since, as a result, faith, hope are lesser among Jews and Christians, and greater among Saracens, who believe and hope that by Mohammed's prayers sinners will be able to leave Hell, and since, according to the conditions of the tree, that by which faith, hope accord with greater quantity should be granted, therefore the truth of the above-mentioned article is proved."

Question. The Gentile said: "What you say about the conditions of this tree is true, except for the fact that there must not follow any disaccord with the conditions of the other trees. And such a disaccord would follow if what you say were true; for then God would prefer greatness between faith, hope than between perfection, justice, and this is impossible; which impossibility proves that you do not understand the conditions of the trees as they should be understood."

5. *Charity Envy*

The Saracen said: "In order to increase charity and subdue envy, God will want Mohammed to be heeded over all other prophets, and all the prophets to love Mohammed and not to be envious of the honor God bestows upon him above all others. And since, without the above-mentioned article, the above flower would not be so clearly exemplified, nor charity so increased, nor envy so subdued, and since that on account of which this is more the case accords better with being than that on account of which this is

[19] Two MSS, S and D, followed by Rosselló, have "Saracens," but all other sources have "Christians," which is clearly what is wanted in the context.

not so, therefore the above-mentioned article is necessarily demonstrated, according to the conditions of the trees, by which conditions the above-mentioned article is provable."

Article 9. TO GIVE AN ACCOUNTING

"YOU SHOULD know, Gentile, that God will ask for an accounting from all men, the good as well as the wicked, and we will all have to give an account of the good and evil we have done in this life. And God will punish a man who will wrongly have done injustice to his neighbor and yet have done some good, in such a way that the reward he should have had from the good he did will be given to the man he had wronged. And in the event that he has done no good, God will give him the punishment intended for sinners who had done some good; and this he will do to demonstrate His justice. And not only will God ask for an accounting from men, but also from the beasts and birds, and He will punish them for the wrongs they have done against one another. And after punishing them, He will command them to turn into earth; and they will all turn into earth, and from then on they will be nothing."

Question. The Gentile said, "What good will come from the resurrection of the beasts and the birds, or from the accounting they will give, if they will then become nothing, since they have no discernment and no knowledge of God's justice?"

Solution. The Saracen replied, saying, "The good that will come from the resurrection of beasts and irrational creatures lies in the fact that sinners will want to turn into nothing like irrational creatures, and instead they will have ire and suffering as a result of remaining in being."

Question. The Gentile said, "When will the balancing of the account be finished, with so many creatures having committed so many injustices one against the other?"

Solution. The Saracen replied: "According to our beliefs, the accounting will take no longer than it takes an egg to cook, and this will be as a demonstration of the greatness inherent in the power, wisdom, and perfection of God. Now that you have understood the way in which God will ask living creatures for an accounting, we should return to the procedure agreed upon for

our discussion, and prove the above-mentioned article by the flowers of the trees."

1. Wisdom Perfection

"It is clear that God's wisdom accords with perfection. Now as a demonstration that God's wisdom is perfect, each creature must be made to give an account, in order that God's wisdom be seen to be perfect in knowing everything His creatures have done. Thus, if this article were not agreeable to God and were not true, it would follow that there would be a contrariety between God's wisdom and perfection, in that His perfection would not have wanted to ordain that His wisdom be recognized as perfect and complete. And since it is impossible for God's wisdom and perfection to be contrary, therefore it follows that the above-mentioned article is true."

2. Perfection Justice

"Since in God there is concordance of wisdom, perfection, and since God's perfection is in accord with justice, in order to demonstrate that His wisdom accords with everything which is in accord with His perfection, God wants to demonstrate that His wisdom accords with justice, which is why He saw fit to ordain that on Judgment Day an account shall be given in front of everybody, and that each creature shall be judged according to his deeds. And since this sentence and this accounting are a subject in which God's perfection and justice will be made manifest, and since this subject could not exist without the above-mentioned article, it is therefore made manifest that this article is true."

3. Power Pride

"By means of this flower we will show that God's power is in accord with greatness against the proud and unjust who have committed injustices and wrongs against poor, humble, righteous people; for then God will punish them in front of everyone, and they will have no power to oppose the power of God. And since, according to the condition of the flower, everything which best states that God's power will prevail over the proud must accord

with being, and since this statement could not be so clearly made without the above-mentioned article, it is therefore shown that the above-mentioned article is true."

4. *Hope Justice*

"The more hope and justice are in accord against their contraries, the greater they can be, and the more they accord with being; and the greater they are and the more they are in accord, the more forcibly they signify God's virtues. Now if it is true that the above-mentioned article is true, a person wronged can have greater hope in God's justice, and the person who did the wrong can have greater fear of God's justice than would be the case if the above-mentioned article were not true. And since everything by which man has greater hope in and greater fear of God's justice must accord with being and with truth, it is therefore demonstrated that the above-mentioned article is true."

5. *Temperance Ire*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "Temperance is a virtue that lies midway between two vices.[20] And the more firmly temperance lies midway between two vices, the greater it is and the farther it is from these two vices; and the farther temperance is from these two vices, the greater these vices are seen to be and the more in disaccord with temperance and with being. And since, according to the conditions of the flower, everything by which temperance is best contrasted with and farther away from these two vices must be true, it is therefore true that the article of giving account is true, since in this article, as recounted above, it is stated that God will make one good deed equal to another, to increase one merit with another and one glory with another; and in sinners He will bring about a concordance of one sin with another in order to

[20] In the sense of their constituting two extremes. Cf. the *Libre d'intenció*, ch. v, "Temperance," where Llull says temperance is on the side of justice "between two extremes, which are concordant with injustice, which is a sin." The concept is further clarified in a passage from the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 58, where he tells his son, "Temperance is the restraining of desire lying between two extremes contrary to one another in quantity. Now if you, Son, want temperance, then you must increase the lesser and decrease the greater, and you must so raise the lesser to the greater and lower the greater to the lesser that you turn them both into an equal virtue."

increase their punishment, taking blame away from just men wronged and giving it to the wrongdoers, and giving the merit of the wrongdoers to the wronged."

Article 10. MERITS AND FAULTS WILL BE WEIGHED

THE SARACEN said to the Gentile: "We believe that God, after receiving an account of good and evil, as we have stated above, will weigh the good and bad deeds a man has done in this world. And if a man's good deeds outweigh his evil ones, then he will be saved; and if the evil outweighs the good, he will be damned; and if his good and evil deeds are of equal weight, he will go to a place between Paradise and Hell, and he will stay there as long as God sees fit. Now, to prove this article, we should first pick the flower of

1. Power Wisdom

"It is true, Gentile, that God's power and wisdom are in accord; and in order to demonstrate this concordance, which they have in goodness, greatness, eternity, etc., God's power should know all the good and evil men will have done; therefore, in the weighing, He will find out which man is more good than evil, which is more evil than good, or which is equally good and evil. And this wisdom of God, who can know so much, will be made manifest on Judgment Day by his weighing of good and evil. And since without His weighing of good and evil it could not be so manifestable, and since that by which God's power and wisdom is best made manifest to people must accord with being, therefore this article of giving an account is necessarily true."

2. Greatness Justice

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "It is customary among us for kings, princes, and great lords to hold court, where they have people gather and where they display their wealth in order to show their greatness. And the reason they carry out their justice on thieves and murderers in public is to show the abundance of their

justice. Now everything they do in this world to demonstrate their greatness and justice is done to exemplify this article in which we, who are Saracens, believe. And this is why God, in order to demonstrate His great justice, will weigh good and evil, to show that His justice is so great that no one will be done injury or wrong. And since without this weighing of good and evil the immense greatness of God's justice could not be so well demonstrated, and since that by which it is best demonstrated must agree with being, therefore this article must necessarily accord with being."

3. Perfection Pride

"Perfection and humility are in accord against imperfection and pride; for the more the proud man imagines himself to be worthier, the less worthy he is and the more defects he has; and the more the humble man humbles himself and imagines himself to be worthless, the worthier and more perfect he is. Now this being the case, and since God's perfection is contrary to pride, in order to show that the pride of arrogant men is powerless against the perfection of God, who loves humility, He will confound the pride of arrogant men with humility, giving greater weight to the humble than to the proud, who think themselves to be of greater weight than humble people. And since the above-mentioned flower is better revealed to the human mind if this article exists than if it did not, therefore this article must necessarily exist, so that the above flower be made more manifest, and the contrariety existing between perfection, pride be better revealed, as well as the concordance existing between perfection, humility, that between pride, imperfection, and the contrariety existing between humility, pride."

4. Charity Justice

"If this article is true, then you can have greater charity, justice in loving God, yourself, and your neighbor than you could have if this article were not true, and you can better accord charity, justice against hatred, injustice. And since that by which you can best be virtuous accords with being, if that by which you cannot be so virtuous (which is contrary to that by which you can best

be virtuous) were true, then it would follow that God's greatness was contrary to the greatness of the above flower; and if it were, it would accord with lesser and with envy, accidie. But this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of all the trees; by which contrariety is signified the fact that the above-mentioned article is true."

5. Charity Ire

"Charity and ire are contraries, since charity[21] is a virtue and ire a vice. Now if God weighs good and evil, and separates the good from the evil, and the evil from the good, then there will be greater charity on the one hand and greater ire on the other than there would be if they were all together; for together one would confound the other. And since what we say is true, and must be true in order for charity to be greater in those who will be saved and ire greater in the damned; and since, if good and evil are separated and weighed, charity will accord with greater virtue and ire with greater vice; therefore, according to the conditions of the flower, this article of weighing is shown to be necessarily true."

Article 11. THE PATH TO PARADISE AND HELL

THE SARACEN said to the Gentile: "We believe that on the Day of Judgment there will be a path over which the blessed who shall be saved will pass. This path will take a thousand years to climb, a thousand to traverse, and a thousand to descend, and below it will be Hell, into which those unable to pass will fall. This path will be as narrow as a hair or the cutting edge of a sword; and some will pass over it as quickly as lightning, others like a horse galloping, others like a man running, and yet others like a child crawling, and everyone will travel along that path according to his merit; and if he does not deserve glory, he will fall from that

[21] Thus in all sources save S (followed by Rosselló), which has "truth."

bridge into Hell.[22] Now this, which is one of the articles we believe, we will first prove by the flower of

1. Goodness Greatness

"God's glory is identical with His great goodness, for God has no glory in anything outside Himself. Now, since God's goodness is infinite in greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection, it follows that His glory, which is His goodness, should be so great that it is infinite by all the above-mentioned flowers. And this being the case, whoever goes to God's glory should go there with great difficulty, the better to deserve glory in God's great goodness. And since the path we described is so high, so long, and so narrow—with Hell below it—therefore men will pass over it with greater danger and will take a longer time, thus making themselves worthier of great glory. And since that by which one has greater glory accords better with being than that by which one has lesser glory, therefore, according to the conditions of the tree, the above-mentioned article is proved."

2. Wisdom Prudence

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "It is in the nature of the intellect that the more subtly it understands, the better—through its understanding—it accords with prudence; and the greater the prudence, the greater becomes a man's conscience concerning the faults he has committed against God and against his neighbor. And the greater are man's prudence and conscience, the more they accord with the wisdom of God, who is all-knowing. Now if the path truly exists, as we believe, then those who pass over it will have greater prudence and conscience than they would if the path did not exist or people did not pass over it. And since whatever causes prudence, conscience to accord better with God's wisdom must be true, therefore this path is shown to be true."

[22] In Arabic this path is called *al-ṣirāṭ* or "the bridge." Llull's description of it as being as narrow as a hair or the cutting edge of a sword, as well as its passing over Hell, is indeed part of Muslim tradition. Its length, however, is often given as even greater, with some traditions maintaining that it is in seven sections, the last of which takes 640,000 years to cross. Cf. Pareja (n. 12 above), pp. 146, 150, and 185–6.

3. *Love Ire*

"It is customary and natural for love to lighten hardship. Now, just as the paths to Paradise are difficult and very laborious, so a person should be strengthened and vitalized, and should gain fortitude from much loving, and should be strong and love God. And the stronger a man is through loving (and love makes severe hardships seem lighter), the more he is loved by God. And since that by which God's love and man's love can best be in accord must exist, and since by the above-mentioned path they can be better in accord, therefore it is demonstrated that the path about which we have been speaking truly exists.

"Ire and love are contraries. Now if those who travel the path crawling and going slowly, and who cannot travel as rapidly as those who go like lightning, if these people are not irate, and if the strength of great love satisfies them and keeps them from being irate, then the more love will be contrary to ire. And since that by which love is most contrary to ire should be true, therefore the above-mentioned article must be true, without which article love could not be so contrary to ire."

4. *Hope Justice*

"Open your mind's eyes, Gentile, and see how the path in which we believe is the opportunity and cause of great hope, justice in men. For whoever passes over a bridge so long, so high, and so narrow, is put, as you can well imagine, in great peril; and the greater the peril and the longer it lasts, the more hope and justice must exist in men. And since, as a result, hope and justice can be better in accord and can be greater, therefore it is shown that this path truly exists."

5. *Justice Pride*

"Justice destroys pride, since pride tries to ascend through injustice. Thus, those proud people who will fall from the path that takes a thousand years to climb will fall from higher up through pride and injustice than they would if the path did not exist. And since that by which justice is most contrary to pride must be true,

therefore the above-mentioned article must exist; for if it did not, it would follow that the flowers of the first tree would be contrary to that by which justice, pride were more contrary to one another, and that is impossible; by which impossibility it is demonstrated that the article is true."

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen, "According to what you say, it follows that another path, longer and higher than the one you described, must exist, so that justice should be even more contrary to pride."

Solution. The Saracen replied: "What you say would be true if, by another consideration, there did not result an inconsistency with the flowers of the first tree. But since, as far as we have heard, neither Christians, Jews, nor any other people believe in a path greater than the one in which we believe, it is therefore incongruous that the path you mention exist and be unknown; for if it did exist and were unknown, this would result in an inconsistency in the flowers of the first tree, which is impossible."

Question. "If what you say is true, tell me what those who crawl along the path will eat and drink, and where such a path would fit, for the whole world is not big enough for a path as long and as high as you describe."

Solution. The Saracen replied, saying: "According to the Koran and according to the Proverbs of Mohammed,[23] God will command the earth to expand so that everybody will fit on it on Judgment Day, and He will make the same commandment with respect to Paradise and Hell, so that those who enter them will find room. And this will better exemplify the greatness inherent in God's power and will, for as God commands, so shall it be. I therefore answer you, saying that the world will expand until the path will fit in it."

Question. "According to what you say, earth, Paradise, and Hell should be expanded infinitely and an infinite amount of people created, the better to manifest the greatness of God's power and will."

Solution. The Saracen replied, saying that nothing can be infinite, since nothing can be equal to God's greatness, which is in-

[23] These are the *Ḥadīth*, narratives or traditions of the Prophet, embodying the *Sunna* ("the Way"), second in importance only to the Koran itself for Muslims.

finite; and therefore everything God creates must be finite and in a quantity suitable to the thing created, according to the conditions of the trees.

Article 12. PARADISE AND HELL

THE GENTILE said to the Saracen: "There is no need to prove Paradise or Hell, for they have already been proved quite satisfactorily. But I would like to know what you believe the glory of Paradise will be like."

The Saracen replied, saying: "We believe there are two ways in which we will enjoy the glory of Paradise; one is spiritual glory, and the other is physical glory. Spiritual glory is seeing God, and loving and contemplating God. This is the glory we will have in Paradise, according to what our Prophet Mohammed says in his Proverbs, where he states that those in Paradise will see God in the morning and in the evening, for if they lean out of any of the windows of the palaces in which they will be living, God will appear to them. And that vision will be so great a glory that no heart[24] can conceive it nor any mouth describe it.

"We will have physical glory through all the five bodily senses with which we served God in this present life. For if in Paradise we did not experience glory through our five senses, God would have neither perfect justice nor perfect goodness; by which imperfection physical glory is shown to exist in Paradise. So, in order that your soul may rejoice in the blessings you will receive in Paradise if you convert to our faith, I want to recount briefly the glory a person will experience in each of the bodily senses."

1. Sight

"We believe that in Paradise a person will have beautiful palaces with beautiful rooms made of gold, silver, and precious stones, such as rubies, emeralds, sapphires, pearls, and other similar stones; and because of the way they are cut, and because of the

[24] The heart as the seat of the mental or intellectual faculties (cf. *OED*, s.v. "heart," 12). The medieval Latin translator rendered it as *mens*. Cf. Epilogue, nn. 1–2. For Llull's understanding of the devout Muslim's belief that those in Paradise will see God with their bodily eyes, see N. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, pp. 148–9.

stones themselves, which will be as large as big mountains, these palaces and these rooms will be very beautiful to behold.

"And in these palaces there will be many cloths of gold and silver and silk adorning the walls; and there will be many beds and mats and carpets of gold and silver and silk; and in these palaces there will also be many beaufiful women and maidens,[25] all very nobly dressed and most agreeable to look upon.

"In the valleys and meadows there will be many springs and streams, and many trees bearing leaves, flowers, and fruit, and casting lovely shade. In fact, the beauty and grace of all these things will be such as to make them almost impossible to describe or recount.

"In Paradise we will see angels, who are a beautiful thing to see, and are very large and pleasing. And we will see the prophets and saints, and ranks of different people according to the way in which they will have served God in this world. And each person will be shining and resplendent, and very nobly dressed. Now this being the case, you can understand how great will be the glory of Paradise with all these things to be seen."

2. Hearing

"To hear the singing of angels, men, and women all praising and blessing God will, as you can well imagine, give great glory to all those who hear it, and all the more so considering how many will be singing these songs of sweetness, glory, and honor.

"In Paradise, if you succeed in entering, you will talk with your friends and companions about anything you wish, about everything you did in this world and about the glory you are experiencing; and those with whom you talk will talk to you similarly, and speaking and hearing such words will give a person great pleasure."

3. Smell

"I cannot find words to describe the glory which the blessed in Paradise will experience upon smelling the scents there; for in Par-

[25] Thus in O; "young men" or "pages" in F; lacking in all other sources, including Rosselló. Surely this is a reference to the "houris" (from the Arabic *ḥūrīya*, "virgin of paradise; nymph"). For these descriptions of the Muslim Paradise, see n. 11 above.

adise there will be scents of ambergis and musk, of leaves, flowers, and fruits in everything a person will eat or drink, dress in, or touch. And the breeze, which will be gentle and pleasant, will bring this scent, which will be so pleasant to smell that all the scents of this world will be as nothing compared to those of Paradise."

4. *Taste*

The Saracen said to the Gentile: "My dear friend, believe my words, hear and understand the blessings a person will have in Paradise, and let it be these that you seek. For in Paradise there will be rivers of water and wine, of milk, butter and oil; and by the river banks and springs there will be many lovely trees, beneath whose shade a person will sit, eating and drinking whatever he wants; for if he wants to eat fruit from the trees, he can have some at once, and if it is meat or some other thing he desires, it will appear before him at once, prepared in whatever way he wishes. In fact, how could anyone possibly describe to you the flavor, the sweetness, and the pleasure a person will find in the food, in the drink, and in the above-mentioned things, and especially since in Paradise he will have much greater ability to eat and drink a lot than in this world! For just as the glory of Paradise is greater than the glory of this world, thus it is only right that in Paradise a person have greater power to eat and drink a great deal than in this present life."

5. *Touch*

"One derives happiness and pleasure in this world from handling, touching, and feeling, and therefore in Paradise one will have glory handling, feeling, and touching soft, smooth cloth, and lying on cushions and soft beds with sheets and bedspreads of silk.

"In order to give great bodily pleasure, in Paradise God has created for man many beautiful virgin maidens reserved for the blessed who will be saved, and in lying with whom men will have great pleasure, and who will never grow old, and whom a man will find intact every time he lies with them."

"In Paradise a man will lie with the same wives and women he had in his house in this world and with whom he had lain. And according as some men will be worthier of greater glory than others, they will have more maidens and more women—and more beautiful ones—in their beds than any other men.

"In order to increase the glory of Paradise and make it greater than the glory of this world, God will increase man's capacity to lie with women in Paradise; and for this reason men will lie much more with women in Paradise, so that they may have great glory.

"You should know, Gentile, that in Paradise men will have all the glories you have heard me describe. And in Paradise there will be many other glories I haven't told you about, glories that would take long to recount and which are so great I could not describe them to you."

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen, "If things are as you say, then there must be filth in Paradise, for according to the natural order of things, from a man who eats and drinks and lies with women there must come forth filth and corruption, which filth is an ugly thing to see and touch and smell, and to talk about."

Solution. The Saracen replied: "What you say is true according to the world in which we live. But in the next world it will be just the opposite, as a result of divine influence and power, which can ordain and improve anything."

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen: "As I understand it, the ultimate purpose for which man is made is to have glory in God; yet according to what you say, it would follow that man existed to have glory in the above-mentioned things. And if he did, the result would not be the purpose for which man was made; and if he did not, it would follow that in God wisdom would not accord with power, love, perfection, and this is impossible and against the conditions of the trees."

Solution. The Saracen replied, "Man was created principally to know and love God, and it follows that, according to God's justice, perfection, men should be recompensed with the above-mentioned happiness, without which men could not be recompensed."

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen, "If God is just and gives many women to a just man in Paradise, and the juster the man has been, the more women he will have to lie with, so that his glory will be greater, it therefore follows that to a woman who

is juster than a man and juster than another woman, God should give her many men to lie with in Paradise, so that she may have greater glory."

Solution. The Saracen replied, "God has honored man more than woman in this world, and therefore in the next world He wishes to do greater honor to him than to woman."[26]

Question. The Gentile said to the Saracen, "Pray tell me, is it true that all you Saracens believe you will, in Paradise, have the sort of glory you just described to me?"

Solution. The Saracen replied, saying: "It is true that among us there are differing beliefs with respect to the glory of Paradise, for some believe it will be as I said, and this they take from a literal interpretation of the Koran, which is our law, of the Proverbs of Mohammed, and of commentators' glosses on the Koran and the Proverbs. But there are others among us who take this glory morally and interpret it spiritually, saying that Mohammed was speaking metaphorically to people who were backward and without understanding; and in order to inspire them with a love of God he recounted the above-mentioned glory. And therefore those who believe this say that in Paradise there will be no glory of eating or of lying with women, nor of the other things mentioned above. And these men are natural philosophers and great scholars, yet they are men who in some ways do not follow too well the dictates of our religion, and this is why we consider them as heretics, who have arrived at their heresy by studying logic and natural science. And therefore it has been established among us that no man dare teach logic or natural science publicly."[27]

When the Saracen had finished talking and had recounted everything required to prove his religion, he spoke the following words

[26] If the Gentile's voice here can be taken as Llull's, this remarkable little exchange constitutes an interesting reflection of the differing attitude of the two cultures towards the role of women.

[27] Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 115, n. 35, says this was the opinion held by Avicenna, al-Ghazzali, and al-Farabi. Llull, however, seems also to be referring to al-Ghazzali's famous attack on the philosophers (and especially Avicenna and al-Farabi), whom he censured for relying too much on "logic and natural science," and mainly for rejecting the resurrection of the body. Cf. F. C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy* (London, 1972), pp. 115–16, and M. Cruz Hernández, *La filosofía árabe* (Madrid, 1963), pp. 117, 120. See also the comments in Yates, "Art," p. 161. J. Dagenais in his "New Considerations on the Date and Composition of Llull's *Libre de Bèsties*," *Actes del segon Col·loqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amèrica, Yale, 1979*, Montserrat, 1982, p. 137, suggests this might be a reference to the Brethren of Purity (for whom see *Felix*, Introduction, n. 18).

to the Gentile: "Now you have heard and understood my words, O Gentile, and the proofs I have given of the articles of our religion. And you have heard of the blessings of Paradise, which which you will have everlastingly without end if you believe in our religion, which is God-given." And when the Saracen had spoken these words, he closed his book and finished speaking, and to the two wise men he made salutation according to his custom.

EPILOGUE

THE END OF THIS BOOK

When the Gentile had heard all the arguments of the three wise men, he began to recount everything the Jew had said, and then everything the Christian had said, and similarly with what the Saracen had said. As a result, the three wise men were very pleased, for the Gentile had understood and retained their words; and together they said to the Gentile that it was clear they had not spoken to a man without heart[1] or ears. After recounting the above matter, the Gentile stood up and his understanding was illuminated by the path of salvation, and his heart began to love and to bring tears to his eyes, and he worshiped God saying these words:

Prayer

"Ah! Divine, infinite, sovereign good, which is origin and fulfillment of all good! To Your holy goodness, O Lord, I give reverence and honor; to it I attribute and give thanks for the great happiness I have received.

"Lord God, I adore and bless Your greatness, which is infinite in goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, perfection.

"Glory and praise be given to Your eternity, O Lord, for it is without beginning or end in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, love, perfection.

"Lord God, that power You possess, which is infinite in Your goodness, greatness, eternity, wisdom, love, perfection, I worship and fear and honor above all other powers.

"Lovable God, who within Yourself have infinite wisdom in Your goodness, greatness, eternity, power, love, perfection, and in everything You have created, Your wisdom, O Lord, I love and worship with all my physical and spiritual strength.

"Your love, which is not an ordinary love, but a love above all other loves, a love which is perfect in Your perfect goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom—that love of Yours, O Lord,

[1] Cf. Bk. IV, n. 24 above, and n. 2 below. Here the medieval Latin translator rendered it as *intellectus rationabilis*.

I worship and love, and to it, with all my will, with all the strength of my intellect and will all that Your love has seen fit to give me, I give everything, O Lord, to serve and honor and praise Your love every day of my life.

"Divine perfection, You who are the light and cure of all imperfections, who are the hope of all sinners, and who are infinite through all Your goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, love, to You I turn and to You I ask forgiveness and grace and counsel and help as to how to serve You and to recover, through You, the days I lost through ignorance and wrongdoing."

After the Gentile, with sighs and tears and true contrition of heart, had worshiped the flowers of the first tree, he beseeched and asked God's grace and blessing to give him the flowers of the fourth tree, saying these words:

"Ah, true faith, you who have taken so long in coming to enlighten my intelligence that my past days are lost and irrecuperable! Ah faith, which is unknown in the land I come from, on account of which ignorance so many men go to everlasting fires! Sweet faith, you are welcome in my soul, for it has been enlightened through you and in you, and you have banished from my mind the darkness in which I have existed all my life. Pain, ire, despair, anguish, tribulations, all these you have banished from my heart. To the God of glory I give thanks for you, and I beg that, by His virtue, you remain in me as long as I shall live, and that I serve you by recounting and spreading abroad your virtue and your fame and your honor.

"Hope, my friend, where have you come from and where have you been? Do you know the despair I have suffered for such a long time? While despair tormented me so grievously, why did you not come and help me against your enemy? Hope, you who are the consolation of the disconsolate, the wealth and treasure of the poor, you who strengthen the weak against the strong and cause the God of Glory to be in the heart of those who desire and love Him, you have entered my heart so strongly that from now on I shall no longer fear your contrary who has so long been my mortal enemy. In you, through you and with you I place my trust and hope in my Lord's great power, that He fulfill my desire to honor and serve God, and make Him known among those who

neither love nor know Him. I shall not despair of my poor power, knowledge, and will, nor shall I despair of my grievous and many sins, for you make me remember the great mercy of that Lord who can accomplish anything, can give any grace and can forgive any sin."

While the Gentile was saying these words, he frequently knelt down and kissed the ground, and raised his hands and eyes heavenward. He then conceived the desire, with the help of created charity, to worship and contemplate uncreated divine charity, worthy of all honor.

"Ah charity, lovable virtue! Whoever has and loves you is pleasing and lovable by that divine charity which eternally and infinitely loves whatever loves. Charity, you who give of yourself to everyone who will have you, and of whom they may take as much as they want, by what stroke of fortune were you willing to have me beneath your sway without my recalling, knowing, or loving you? Fortune, who has long been my enemy, has, by putting me in your hands, healed all my injuries; but since I am a poor sinner, and since you have made me so love God and my neighbor, how could I repay the great good I have received through you? Alas, wretched creature that I am! In what poverty and misery are all those who neither love nor know charity! And of what use to a man's heart are riches and blessings without charity? Sweet God, You who have enlightened and warmed me by the fire of charity, enlighten and warm with charity all those poor people lacking in charity who live in the land I come from, by which poverty they will be brought, through paths of darkness, to infinite, everlasting fire, where torments will not cease and where hope will be unable to hope for any alleviation.

"Do not let us forget justice in our prayer, for divine justice knows all my faults and can rightly punish me for all my failings. Whatever divine justice does with me, whether it punishes me and condemns me to everlasting torment, or pardons me to everlasting blessing, in every way I worship and bless God's justice. Let Him do with me what He will, for charity makes me love, fear, and worship God in His justice, which is always on the side of righteousness. And therefore, let my justice make me desire whatever God's justice would do with me.

"Prudence, you who are the light of salvation by which wise men go to the divine radiance that illuminates all those who love it, my understanding has long been in darkness because you were not part of it. But since you have now brought me such happiness, I beg you from now on not to let my soul be without you. And may it please the high, excellent, lofty, sovereign good that through you I may have knowledge and light from sovereign wisdom, which gives its light to you and to all other lights; and that through grace and the illumination of this sovereign light you may help me to give light and direction to so many men who are in a state or in times of darkness, ignorant of the path of salvation.

"Fortitude, who strengthens noble hearts so they do not succumb to wickedness or deceit, would you strengthen the weak heart of a lazy, fearful man so that he could suffer the hardships, dangers, and deaths necessary to give praise, glory, and blessing to the name of that Lord who is worthy of all honor and who wishes to be so honored that for the sake of serving Him no torments are feared? Could charity, justice, prudence, and you (together, perhaps, with hope) agree to come to my land and there do the same good I have received from God through you?

"Temperance, abstinence, patience, perseverance, and the other virtues, what are you doing? Do not sleep, for the vices that are your contraries are awake night and day, and they never cease their work of destruction in the hearts of people who are gluttonous, lustful, avaricious, accidious, proud, envious, and full or ire."

While the Gentile was speaking these words, he realized and saw that his eyes were not crying or shedding their usual tears. And in order that his heart bring to his eyes the water it once had—that which had bathed his eyes in tears—he wanted to recall in his heart the seven mortal sins, and he therefore said:

"Ah, how evil is the servitude of those who are serfs and captives of gluttony! For gluttony gives its servants continual torments; and it spares no one, neither rich nor poor; it brings death closer, and fattens our bodies, so that in a short time they become food for worms.

"Lust, you who not only soil the body, but also soil and deface the memory that recalls you, as well as the intellect that under-

stands you and the will that desires you. And you are such a filthy thing that you are ugly and horrible to see and touch.

"Avarice, you who impoverish the rich and bring the poor beneath your sway, you who make men despair of God who alone can dispense every good, what do you do in this world to make the rich despise the poor and the poor hate the rich?

"Accidie, you who are a sign of damnation in those beneath your sway, and you who make men so indolent in praising and loving God (who is worthy of such praise and such great honor), when will you reward those whom you keep needy and poor, and why do you send them to Hell since they carry out so well your command not to love?

"Pride, if humility were naught, what would you be? And if humility raised you up instead of pulling you down, how great you would be! And just because you cannot be in glory, why do you prevent the humble from going there? For theirs is the glory you have lost and from which you have fallen.

"Envy, you who are sadness of soul, if you do not die while there is still time, when will you die? And if you are never satisfied envying what you do, why do you still desire it? And if you are always taking, when will you give? And if in so many things you employ deceit and treachery, is there nothing in which you are true and loyal?

"Ire, you who are darkness of thought and darkness of intellect and mortal will, contrary to charity, what are you doing among us, and why do you keep us from loving the honor of our Lord, who loves the honor of all His servants and scorns all those who follow you?"

While the Gentile was speaking these words, he realized and saw that his eyes were still not shedding tears, and he said: "Ah, miserable wretch, what is it that keeps your eyes from crying? For if you do not do so, when you can, for joy at the great happiness that came to you by chance (how, you do not know), and if you do not cry for your wrongs and for your sins while you have the chance, when will you cry, you worthless thing? And yet before this day you were crying, because you thought that after your death you would be nothing."

While the Gentile spoke these words, along with many others it would take too long to recount, his soul endeavored to recall,

understand, and love divine virtue, which at last enabled his heart to bring tears to his eyes.

For a long time the Gentile cried sweetly and devoutly, saying: "Ah, God of virtue! How great is the difference between the tears I used to shed and those I am shedding now! For those tears tormented and afflicted the thought of my heart,[2] and these tears are so agreeable and pleasant, and they enliven my soul with such great happiness that I would want no better happiness in the whole world than to have my soul remain in this uninhabitable spot in a continual state of loving, and my eyes forever in tears. Yet I must go from land to land, and I must return to my own land, and I must spread word of God's honor among those who do not know God—that God through whom such good has come to me. To this end I must strive all the days of my life; and may it please you, Lord God, to let neither hunger, thirst, heat, cold, poverty, weariness, people's scorn, sickness, torments, nor being abandoned by one's lord, nor leaving one's wife, sons, daughters, friends, or worldly possessions, nor to be exiled nor to suffer cruel death, nor any other thing, banish from my heart the thought of your honor nor the praising of your glorious name.

"Lord God, You who give and forgive so many things, may it please You to forgive Your guilty sinner who asks Your forgiveness and who begs the blessed saints in glory to thank You for the good You have done me, for which I alone could not thank You sufficiently. In this hour, O Lord, forgive this sinner who gives You his soul and all his powers, so that he may go in Your path and perform those deeds by which You wish to be served by those beneath Your sway."

In this way the Gentile worshiped and blessed and thanked his Lord and his Creator. And so great was his endeavor to worship and praise God and to beg forgiveness for his faults, that the three wise men had great pity on him, and marveled at how nobly he prayed. And so great was the devotion they saw in the Gentile that in their souls their consciences made them uneasy and reminded them of the sins in which they had persevered; and all the more so when they realized that the Gentile, in so short a time,

[2] Cf. Bk. IV, n. 24, and n. 1 here above. Rosselló has "my thought and my heart" which vitiates the concept.

had conceived greater devotion in giving praise to God's name than they who had known of God for a long time.[3]

How the Three Wise Men Took Leave of the Gentile

When the Gentile had finished his prayer, he went to the lovely spring and washed his hands and face, because of the tears he had shed, and dried himself with a white cloth he carried, the one he had formerly used to wipe away his continual tears of sorrow. He then sat down next to the three wise men and said: "Through God's grace and blessing, I happened to meet you gentlemen here where God saw fit to remember me and take me as His servant. Blessed be the Lord, therefore, and blessed be this place, and may God bless you, and blessed be God for making you want to come here! And in this place, where I have received such good fortune, in the presence of you gentlemen, I want to select and choose that religion which, by the grace of God and by your words, seems to me to be true. And in that religion I want to be, and I want to work for the rest of my life to honor and proclaim it."

When the Gentile had spoken thus and stood up in order to kneel, and kneeling, proclaim the religion he preferred, he saw far away, coming through the forest, two gentiles who were from his land, whom he knew, and who were in the same error in which he had once been. And the Gentile therefore said to the three wise men that he wanted to await the arrival of these two Gentiles, so that he could proclaim the true religion in their presence. The three wise men then stood up and most agreeably and devoutly took leave of the Gentile. Many were the blessings the three wise men wished on the Gentile, and the Gentile on the three wise men; and their leave-taking and the end of their conversation was full of embraces, kisses, tears, and sighs. But before the three wise men left, the Gentile asked them in astonishment why they did not wait to hear which religion he would choose in preference to the others. The three wise men answered, saying that, in order for each to be free to choose his own religion, they preferred not knowing which religion he would choose. "And all the more so since this is a question we could discuss among ourselves to see,

[3] Here ends the text of the *Gentile* as presented in the *Electorium* of Thomas le Myésier.

by force of reason and by means of our intellects, which religion it must be that you will choose. And if, in front of us, you state which religion it is that you prefer, then we would not have such a good subject of discussion nor such satisfaction in discovering the truth.'"[4] With these words, the three wise men returned to the city from which they had come. But the Gentile, looking at the flowers of the five trees and recalling what he had decided, waited for the two gentiles who were coming.

What the Three Wise Men Said as They Returned

One of the three wise men said: "If the Gentile, who was so long in error, has conceived such great devotion and such great fervor in praising God, that he now states that in order to do so he would not hesitate to suffer any hardship or death, no matter how harsh it were, then how much greater should be our devotion and fervor in praising the name of God, considering how long we have known about Him, and all the more so since He has placed us under such obligation by the many blessings and honors He has given us and gives us every day. We should debate and see which of us is in truth and which in error. For just as we have one God, one Creator, one Lord, we should also have one faith, one religion, one sect, one manner of loving and honoring God, and we should love and help one another, and make it so that between us there be no difference or contrariety of faith or customs, which difference and contrariety cause us to be enemies with

[4] This extraordinary lack of desire on the part of the three wise men to hear the Gentile's opinion, leaving the entire book, as it were, up in the air, has been the subject of considerable comment. Perhaps the most convincing interpretation is still that of Mateo Obrador in his introduction to Rosselló's edition (*Obras* I, xxxix), "in which," he says, "one sees an ingenious device on the part of the author to hold back the solution of the religious problem, in order to leave the reader freedom to inquire and ask himself, as is said at the end of the book, 'what religion . . . the Gentile chose in order to find favor with God.'" Llull must, of course, have believed that the Christian arguments are more convincing, or that the Jewish and Muslim arguments are more easily refutable, as he makes quite clear in *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 79. Perhaps, as Hillgarth says (Hillg, p. 24), he also "implicitly recognizes here the necessary role of grace in Christian theology in perfecting the work begun by reason." D. Matas Rosselló ("La doctrina teológica de Ramon Llull en el 'Libre del Gentil e los tres savis,'" diss., University of Barcelona, no date, p. 45) sees it as "an example of Llull's ecumenical spirit," a notion perhaps not as farfetched as G. Colom Ferrá (*EL* 13, 1969, 144–5) would have us believe, especially in view of the Gentile's remarkably "non-denominational" prayer in the preceding section, and the plea for world unity in the following one (see the next note).

one another and to be at war, killing one another and falling captive to one another. And this war, death, and servitude prevent us from giving the praise, reverence, and honor we owe God every day of our life."[5]

When this wise man had finished, another began to speak, saying that people were so rooted in the faith in which they found themselves and in which they were raised by their parents and ancestors, that it was impossible to make them break away by preaching, by disputation, or by any other means man could devise. And this is why, as soon as one starts discussing with them, showing them the error of their ways, they immediately scorn everything one tells them, saying they want to live and die in the faith their parents and ancestors gave them.

The other wise man replied, saying: "It is in the nature of truth to be more strongly rooted in the mind than falsehood, since truth and being are in accord, as are falsehood and nonbeing. And therefore, if falsehood were strongly opposed by truth, continually and by many people, then truth would necessarily have to vanquish falsehood; and all the more so since falsehood never receives any help, great or small, from God, and truth is always helped by that divine virtue which is uncreated truth, which has created created truth for the purpose of destroying falsehood. But since men are lovers of temporal possessions, and lukewarm and of little devotion in loving God and their neighbor, they therefore care little about destroying falsehood and error; and they live in fear of dying and of suffering illness, hardship, and poverty, yet they do not want to give up their wealth, their possessions, their lands, or their relatives to save those who are in error, so they may go to everlasting glory and not undergo infinite suffering. And they should do this mainly in order to be counted among those who praise the name of God and proclaim His virtue, for God wants it to be proclaimed among all nations, and every day He waits to see how we will honor Him among those who dishonor, despise, and are ignorant of Him; and God wants us to do what we can to exalt His glorious name among us. For if we do what we can

[5] One of Llull's clearest statements of his ideal of unity for the sake of peace, of a human unity that would reflect divine unity, doing away with "difference and contrariety" and leaving only "concordance." Cf. Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 25. This, of course, was one of the aspects of Llull's teaching that most interested Nicholas of Cusa.

to praise God, how much more would God do as a result of having His name praised! For if He did not, it would be contrary to Himself and to His honor, which is impossible and against the conditions of the trees. But because we do not prepare ourselves to receive God's virtue and blessing, nor to be his valiant servants, who praise him, strengthened by stout hearts to face any hardship to exalt His honor, God therefore does not bestow on us that virtue which must be present in those who, through God's virtue, would destroy the error of people on the road to damnation who think they are on the road to salvation."

While the wise man was speaking these words and many others, the three of them arrived at the place where they had first met by the city gates; and there they took leave of one another most amiably and politely, and each asked forgiveness of the other for any disrespectful word he might have spoken against his religion. Each forgave the other,[6] and when they were about to part, one wise man said: "Do you think we have nothing to gain from what happened to us in the forest? Would you like to meet once a day, and, by the five trees and the ten conditions signified by their flowers, discuss according to the manner the Lady of Intelligence showed us, and have our discussions last until all three of us have only one faith, one religion, and until we can find some way to honor and serve one another, so that we can be in agreement? For war, turmoil, ill will, injury, and shame prevent man from agreeing on one belief."

Each of the three[7] wise men approved of what the wise man had said, and they decided on a time and place for their discussions, as well as how they should honor and serve one another, and how they should dispute; and that when they had agreed on and chosen one faith, they would go forth into the world giving glory and praise to the name of our Lord God. Each of the three wise men went home and remained faithful to his promise.

Here ends the *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men*. Blessed be God, by whose help it was begun and finished, and in whose

[6] Many commentators have pointed out the exquisite courtesy with which the participants in this debate treat one another. That it was unusual in such disputes is perhaps less important than the fact that Llull is trying to set up a model of how such disputes (based, of course, on the mechanism of the Art) should be carried out.

[7] Thus in all sources save F and the Latin texts (followed by Rosselló), which have the slightly more logical "two."

charge it is committed and placed, and for whose honor it is newly edited [and extracted from the *Brief Art of Finding Truth*, which most thoroughly investigates the cause and principles of all things in all fields of thought, in the liberal as well as the mechanical arts];[8] which book constitutes a doctrine and method for enlightening clouded minds and awakening the great who sleep, and for entering into union with and getting to know strangers and friends, by asking what religion they think the Gentile chose in order to find favor with God.

May he who dictated and wrote this book, as well as he who reads and studies it, find favor in God's glory, and be kept in this world from those paths leading to infernal fires, on which those who incur God's ire find themselves.

[8] The important passage inside square brackets appears only in the medieval Latin and Spanish translations, but since the latter is expressly translated from the Catalan and is in all other respects so close to the original, we can only assume that this passage was in the original, and for some reason was omitted from the archetype of three of the extant Catalan MSS (the fourth, D, which derives from the same archetype as the Spanish translation, is unfortunately missing the entire last two paragraphs). The work referred to is the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, the chief work of this cycle of the Art. Notice, incidentally, the efficacy Llull attributes to it here.

In place of the passage in square brackets above, the medieval French translation has, "translated from Arabic into Latin, Romance, and Hebrew," which, considering the almost total unreliability of the single MS in which it is preserved, should not, I feel, be taken as seriously as it has been since it was first printed in 1831. For details on this point, see my "Cronologia," p. 38.

ARS DEMONSTRATIVA

Introduction

READERS approaching the Lullian Art for the first time are usually either alarmed or intrigued (depending upon whether their training is literary or logico-mathematical) by the circles and rectangles, and by the symbolic notation, that is, by what Llull referred to as the "figures" and the "alphabet" of the Art. But as I pointed out in the introduction on "Llull's Thought" above, their role is something other than it may first appear. The figures are not symbolic, and the letters do not stand for variables. They are mnemonic devices for exhibiting the basic structural components of the Art, for showing how these components are organized and grouped, and for facilitating the combinatorial and calculational mechanisms of the Art.

To see how they work in the specific case of the *Ars demonstrativa*, turn to the accompanying reproductions from the Venice Manuscript.[1] Plate XII shows seven circular figures, at the centers of which are written the first and last six letters of the medieval alphabet, i.e., A S T V X Y Z.[2] On Plate XIII are five figures: the first three are circular figures with the Latin abbreviations for Theology, Philosophy, and Law written inside them; the fourth is the Elemental Figure, and the last the Demonstrative Figure.

Starting with Plate XII, the figure in the middle is that of A, representing God; it is a circle around the rim of which are written sixteen of His attributes or dignities, seven of which we have already met in the *Book of the Gentile*.[3] In the lower left-hand corner is Figure V in two colors, blue for the virtues and red for the vices—which virtues and vices we have already met in the *Gentile*.[4] In the lower right-hand corner is Figure X containing a series of paired concepts, predestination–free will, being–privation, and so on.[5] In each of these three figures should be noted the crisscross

[1] For more information about this important manuscript, see below, n. 25.

[2] See below, text at n. 8 for the remaining letters of B through R.

[3] See *Gentile*, Prologue, nn. 14 and 21. The number of 16 is basic to the quaternary phase of the Art; see "Llull's Thought," text following n. 14. For more details, see n. 9 below as well as Dist. I, nn. 2–3, also below.

[4] See *Gentile*, Prologue, n. 16.

[5] Opposite each other, and not side by side as in modern printed texts. In Table 4 I have numbered each group 1–8 so the reader can easily pick out the components of each pair (1 with 1, 2 with 2, etc.).

lines connecting the concepts on their circumferences. These lines represent all the possible binary combinations of the concepts, which binary combinations will appear as "compartments" of the Second Figures I will discuss later. Omitting the upper two figures, to which I will return in a moment, there are, to the left and right of A, the Figures of Y and Z, each representing a single concept, truth and falsehood, respectively.

Now turning for a moment to Plate XIII, the reader will find the Figures of Theology, Philosophy, and Law, which are partly external to the Art (in that they represent three of the principal fields to which the Art can be applied) and partly internal to it (in that, except for the Figure of Law, they are used to a limited extent in the general mechanism of the Art).[6] They correspond to Llull's earlier books on the *Principles of Theology*, the *Principles of Philosophy*, and the *Principles of Law*, while the Elemental Figure corresponds, although in a looser way, to the *Principles of Medicine* translated here in Volume II. The Elemental Figure is also external and internal to the Art: external as a basis for answering questions relating to natural science, and internal as a foundation for Llull's analogical reasoning, for what Frances Yates has called his "elemental exemplarism," so important at this stage of the Art.[7] Since the Demonstrative Figure represents a mechanism for combining all the other figures, it will be discussed later.

There are now nine figures—A, V, X, Y, Z, the Elemental Figure, and the Figures of Theology, Philosophy, and Law—containing all the constants of the Art. The problem of how to connect these constants, how to relate and compare them, is solved by one of the two remaining figures on Plate XII. This is Figure T, which, even though it is drawn inside a circle like the other figures, in reality consists of five interlocking triangles in five different colors, each of which is composed of a triad of concepts such as difference–concordance–contrariety/beginning–middle–end/, and so forth. Llull himself compares Figure T to the tool the artisan uses to "fashion the artificial form," and indeed it is the instrument the person working with the Art uses to make it function.

[6] In this Introduction we are just giving an overview of the role of the figures in the Art; for detailed descriptions of each figure, see Dist. I below.

[7] See "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 62 and 63.

Mention of the person using the Art, or the "artist" as Llull calls him, brings up the one remaining figure on Plate XII, Figure S, representing the rational soul. Again it is drawn inside a circle for the sake of convenience; in reality it consists of four interlocking squares, each of which represents different combinations of the acts of the Augustinian powers of the soul (i.e., memory remembering or forgetting, etc.).[8] Now it is precisely these combinations which, curiously enough, occupy the central portion of the Alphabet of the Art, that from B through R, as can be seen in the Prologue. In addition to this geometrical and alphabetical representation, however, Llull conceived another, which, mnemonically at least, is probably the most convenient for the reader; it is the hand from the same Venetian manuscript, which appears on Plate XIV, and which is in schematic form in Table 5. Notice that each vertical column in this schema corresponding to a finger on the hand, corresponds in turn to one of the squares of the original Figure S on Plate XII. Notice too how the quaternary structure of this figure makes it similar to the Elemental Figure, a fact of which Llull makes use in his arguments *per analogiam*.[9]

Figure S, like Figure T, is a connective or relational figure; but instead of working internally among components of the Art, Figure S works externally, connecting these components to the outside world, to the "artist" or to those to whom the Art is directed (infidels, gentiles, etc.). It is this figure which supervises their intellectual, emotional, and ethical relationship to the concepts of the Art, and gives them proper access to its mechanisms.

[8] But by no means all the possible combinations; see Dist. I, n. 10.

[9] Cf. Dist. II, nn. 57, 69, and 70. Notice also how both Figure S as well as each of the Elemental Figures have sixteen compartments, a fact which surely gave rise to the number of sixteen for the dignities in this phase of the Art. The only point of discussion among scholars is *which* of those two figures gave rise to the number. Pring-Mill, who originally suggested the Elemental Figure, would seem to have common sense on his side, since the quaternary nature of elemental theory was something accepted by everyone in the Middle Ages. Platzeck, who suggested Figure S, has on his side the curious fact that, in spite of its apparent artificiality of arrangement (see the previous note), Figure S appears during the Pre-Art Phase, in the *Book of Contemplation*, before the structuring of the Art, before any appearance of the Elemental Figure, and in fact before *any* of the other figures of the Art. The most complete exposition of Pring-Mill's side of the argument appears in his "Potencias," pp. 117ff.; Platzeck's arguments appear in Pla I, 113–14 and n. 142, as well as in his "Miscelánea," pp. 425–7. For brief summaries of the discussion, see Pring-Mill, *Número*, pp. 56–8, and *Quattuor*, p. xvii.

In sum, the Alphabet consists of all twenty-three letters of the medieval alphabet,[10] divided into two groups: A S T V Y Z, which refer *only* to figures of the Art,[11] and B-R, which refer to terms *inside* Figure S. The roles of the figures can perhaps be clarified by a very loose analogy with a computer: if A, V, X, Y, Z, the Elemental Figure, and the three Figures of Theology, Philosophy, and Law contain the basic data, Figure T provides the processing unit, and Figure S constitutes the terminal or control unit assuring correct access to the data and processing.[12]

Now all the figures described above are what Llull calls "First Figures." Intermingled with the initial pages of text in the manuscripts, one finds large triangular arrays which he calls "Second Figures."[13] These are merely tabular representations of all the possible binary combinations of concepts from the corresponding First Figures, with each "compartment"[14] corresponding to one of the transverse lines of the circular First Figures.[15]

The Ninth or Demonstrative Figure, as Llull calls it, which I omitted describing before, provides a semimechanical way of combining the concepts of the other figures, as well as making available a secondary use of the Alphabet.[16] But since the only possibilities of this figure that Llull specifically exploits in the *Ars demonstrativa* are those contained in its very simplified Second Figure, there is no use burdening the reader with a description of it here.

The First Distinction contains a detailed account of the contents of each of these figures. It should be read carefully, for a great deal of material is presented in a very condensed form.

The Second Distinction exhibits the "conditions" of the Art, but not as in the *Gentile* and the *Book of Principles of Medicine*, as

[10] Our twenty-six letters minus any distinction between I and J or U and V, and without a W.

[11] Or to the concepts these figures represent, such as A for God (and/or His attributes), etc. The important thing to remember is that A S T V Y Z represent subsets of concepts of the Art, whereas B–R represent individual members of the subset S.

[12] Llull himself refers to S and T as *figurae agentes* and A, V, X, Y, and Z as *patientes*, "after the manner of objects," in the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* II, 473 = Int. vii, 41 (quoted in Ca I, 374).

[13] Correspondingly interspersed among the text of Dist. I here below.

[14] *Cambra* in Catalan; *camera* in Latin. See Dist. I, n. 4 below.

[15] See text following n. 5 above.

[16] See Dist. I, nn. 4 and 43, where the meaning of this last phrase is explained.

something externally imposed on the mechanism of the Art, but rather as something achieved in the process of learning to use that very mechanism. In this distinction we survey successively the ten compartments of the Second Elementary Figure and the twenty-eight compartments of the Second Demonstrative Figure,[17] "introducing T," as Llull puts it, into each one. This means that each compartment is followed by five paragraphs, one for each triangle of Figure T, displaying all the possible ways in which the components of that compartment can (or cannot) be related. And it is precisely this "can (or cannot) be related" which constitutes the conditions of the Art.

It is also in this Second Distinction that the "artist" learns to use the mechanism of the Art. For the binary combinations of the compartments are not static, mechanical concepts presented to a passive reader; they are combinations that he has to investigate actively, precisely by this mechanism of "introducing T" into them and hence by extracting from each all its relational and conceptual possibilities.[18]

The Third Distinction gives a set of sixteen modes, which constitute the different applications or uses to which the Art can be put. And in the course of presenting them, Llull also explains *how* to use the Art for each of these ends.

The tenth of these sixteen modes, that on the solving of questions, points to the Fourth Distinction, which occupies slightly over half of the entire work, posing and solving 1,080 questions. After one question at the end of a little prologue, we begin with thirty-eight questions corresponding to the compartments of the Second Elementary and Demonstrative Figures as they appeared in the Second Distinction. Each of these thirty-nine questions is answered by a string of (mostly) binary compartments, followed by an explanation of how the symbolism of these compartments should be interpreted. The remainder of the work consists of 1,041 questions, corresponding to the Second Figures of A, S, T, V, X, Theology, Philosophy, and Law, each answered *only* by a string

[17] There are actually more. When he gets to [S S] he stops to discuss ten compartments representing all the combinations of the four "species" of S (i.e., of E I N R; cf. Dist. I, n. 13), and when he gets to [T T] he stops to discuss the five triangles of T individually.

[18] This mechanism, so fundamental to the Art, became more formalized in later stages. See the *Ars brevis*, Figures III–IV and the Table, as well as the "Evacuation," "Multiplication," and "Mixture" of Parts 6–8.

of compartments, with the explanation to be supplied by the reader, who has presumably learned how to do it from the previous thirty-nine questions.

It is perhaps in this question of the interpretation of the symbolism that the *Ars demonstrativa* is most difficult to work out in detail. To help the reader, I have provided in appendixes at the end of this work schematic replies to two questions, the first under the Elemental Figure and the first under the Demonstrative Figure, as examples of how Llull's somewhat laconic explanations[19] could be worked out in full.

One must realize, however, that Llull did not consider the difficulties involved to be at all insurmountable.[20] This work probably came closer than any other to his goal of a proselytism based on an ideal like that of Leibniz's "let us calculate,"[21] and it was also one of the works in which—for a time at least—he placed most hopes. One has only to read the thinly disguised autobiographical passage in *Felix* about how "a man who had long labored for the good of the Roman Church came to Paris and spoke to the king of France and to the University of Paris about establishing monasteries in Paris for the teaching of the languages of the unbelievers, and about translating the *Ars demonstrativa* into those languages and sending people with this *Ars demonstrativa* to the Tartars to preach to them and show them the Art,"[22] to realize the importance Llull attached to this work.[23]

One can also judge the importance he attached to it by the fact that, within the quaternary phase of the Art, it constituted a modification of the previous cycle and the initiation of a new one. The *Ars demonstrativa* in fact constituted one of those principal works

[19] Llull's expressions of "as one can clearly see," "as is evident," etc., have often reminded me of the famous "il est aisé à voir," which Laplace sprinkled throughout his *Mécanique céleste*, and which caused a later mathematician to say that he never came across the phrase without feeling sure that he had hours of hard work before him to fill up the chasm and find out and show *how* it plainly appeared. Cf. R. E. Moritz, *On Mathematics and Mathematicians* (*Memorabilia Mathematica*) (New York: Dover repr., 1958), Nos. 985 and 986.

[20] But he knew they existed; see his "Exhortation against Despair in Acquiring This Art" in his *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 87 = Int. ii, 33, where he says in effect that any science is initially difficult and forbidding.

[21] Cf. "Llull's Thought," n. 50 above.

[22] *Felix*, Bk. VIII, the end of ch. 89, and n. 168.

[23] See also Dist. III, Mode 7, "Guiding," below, where he also discusses the missionary uses of this version of the Art, as well as the need for translating it into foreign languages. For other claims about its usefulness, see Modes 6, 12, 13, and 14 of the same Dist. III.

around which Llull wrote a series of satellite works in the form of introductions, commentaries, or applications.[24]

Finally, there is the evidence of the beautiful manuscript he had copied out, and which he personally sent to the doge of Venice at the end of 1289 or the beginning of 1290, when he was already, perhaps regretfully, having to abandon this presentation of his system for the simpler one of the *Ars inventiva veritatis*.[25]

It is also curious to note that this is one of the few works explicitly mentioned in the "Contemporary Life."[26] There we are told that he wrote it in Montpellier, where he also gave public readings of the work. As I think I have been able to show, this must have taken place in about 1283.[27]

Translations, Manuscripts, and Editions

The importance Llull's followers attached to this work is attested by the number of manuscripts in which it is preserved—twenty in Latin and one in Catalan. In addition, we know from an inventory of 1338 that the Sorbonne possessed a copy of this work,[28] and from an inventory of 1373 that the library of King Charles V of France contained two copies of the work.[29] Interest in the *Ars demonstrativa* was, however, much greater in the Middle Ages than in later periods, as can be seen from Table 3.[30]

[24] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 16 above. For a list of the works directly and indirectly dependent on it, see section II. B of the Catalogue of Works at the end of Vol. II here.

[25] Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, VI, 200. It has a dedication written in Llull's own hand (the only other extant autograph of Llull is a dedication in the Latin MS of the *Book of Contemplation* he gave to the monks of Vauvert—Paris, Bibl. nat., ms. lat. 3348A—see the reproduction in *OE* II, facing p. 192; R. d'Alós in "El manuscrito Ottoboniano Lat. 405," *Trabajos de la Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia en Roma*, Madrid, 1914, pp. 101–2, ventured the hypothesis that part of that Vatican MS, compiled near the end of Llull's life, was also autograph). For a description of the Venetian MS, see Obrador y Bennassar, "Ramón Lull en Venecia," *BSAL* 8 (1899–1900), 302–5; for the date of the MS, see my "Nota suplementària a 'Problemes de cronologia lul·liana,' "*EL* 21 (1977), 221–2.

[26] "Life," § 16. It is also one of the very few works mentioned in the text of the miniatures of the *Breviculum*; see Hillg, pl. XI and p. 179.

[27] Cf. n. 94 to "Life," § 16. This was the date originally suggested in Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 114, 159ff., and 370, repeated in Peers, p. 154.

[28] See Hillg, p. 158, n. 38.

[29] L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque impériale (nationale)*, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1881), pp. 139 and 153, cited in Hillg, p. 197, n. 80.

[30] Nineteen MSS from the Middle Ages vs. two from the seventeenth century. This amount of copies is perhaps more significant in view of the length of the work and the difficulty (and hence expense) of copying it. Note that of the three oldest Latin MSS, those in Bergamo and in the Ambrosian of Milan may well be direct copies of the Venice MS.

TABLE 3. MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITIONS OF THE *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*

Century	*Catalan*	*Latin*
13-14th		V = Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI 200
		Bergamo, Bibl. Civica, Δ.7.5
14th		Milan, Bibl. Ambrosiana, P. 198 sup
		Milan, Braidense, AM x.47
	A = Mainz, Priester-seminar, A.1	Bologna, Univ. 926 (522)
		Rome, Casanatense 1535
		Oxford, Bodleian, Digby 192
		Dhún Mhuire, Killiney, Franciscan Library, B 100 (fragment)
15th		B = Palma, Bibl. Prov. 1030
		Rome, Casanatense 1414
		San Candido (Innichen), VIII.C.13
		Munich, CLM 10539
		Montpellier, Med. H. 165
		Cambridge, Trinity Col., RL 66
		Saint Bonaventura, N.Y., Franciscan Institute Library, 4
		Bourges, Bibl. de la Ville, MS Lat. 82
		Padua, Bibl. Capitolare, B 38
		Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 617
17th		Munich, CLM 10588
		Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 17825
18th		M = *MOG* III, 1722, Int. iii.
20th	*ORL* XVI, 1932 (Galmés)	

NOTE: No manuscripts or editions of the *Ars demonstrativa* were produced in the sixteenth or nineteenth century.

The initial question concerning these sources is the relationship between the Latin and Catalan versions. Two factors, it seems to me, make it undeniable that the Catalan text, at least in the form in which it has come down to us, is a translation from the Latin. First, there are the large amounts of Latinisms, not only the words and phrases mentioned by Rubió, such as *ergo, e converso, immediate mediate*, and *metaforice loquendo*,[31] but others, such as *preterea, com-*

[31] Cf. *OE* I, 92.

odo (from *quomodo*), *operals, nunc, agit, essendi* and *operandi, orbis,* and even *differunt in numero*,[32] some of which would be inexplicable without the presence of a previous Latin text. Second, the Latin text is more complete: six of the "compartments" of the Second Distinction are missing from the Catalan text.[33] One must emphasize, however, that we have proved only that this particular version of the Catalan text is a translation from the Latin; in what language or languages Llull actually wrote the work is a different problem, about which we can only conjecture.[34]

This translation was therefore done from the Latin version of the Mainz edition (abbreviated M in the notes),[35] corrected throughout on the basis of the Venice manuscript (V), which is of unquestionable authority. It was also compared with Palma, Bibl. Publ. 1030 (B), and with the Catalan text (A) as edited by Galmés. The reader is informed of any differences of substance from the readings of M, with the exception of some passages where V is identical with the text of B transcribed in Galmés's footnotes.[36]

[32] Cf. *ORL* XVI, 67, 178, 187, 197, 206, 226, 244, 254, and 257. Others mentioned by Galmés in *ORL* XVI, p. xiv, n. 3, such as *superbia, velocitat, aumentació, defectus, rationes* (usually written *raciones*), and *odium* fall more into the category of usual Lullian neologisms, for which see F. de B. Moll, "Notes per a una valoració del lèxic de Ramon Llull," *EL* I (1957), 177ff., much of which was reproduced in *OE* II, 1353.

[33] See Dist. II, nn. 50 and 54. There are many places where individual sentences are abbreviated or simplified in the Catalan version. And it indeed does seem to be a question of simplifying, and not of the Latin text's being an expansion as in the *Gentile*.

[34] There are two possible conjectures: Rubió's (see *OE* I, 92 and *EL* 5, 139) that the two texts were written almost simultaneously on the basis of a primitive rough draft in Catalan; my wife's suggestion that the work was written in Latin for the Paris audience and then translated into Catalan as part of the process of dissemination outlined in the quotation from *Felix* given above.

[35] Unfortunately, the text in *MOG* III is one of the least satisfactory of the Mainz edition; the editors even apologize for it at the end of the volume. Not only is it the usual hybrid or eclectic text, but in this case one with numerous errors. Moreover, the corrections at the back of the volume (abbreviated M′) are all taken from the Catalan MS (which was surely owned by Salzinger or his patron), thereby further clouding the picture of this edition as an independent text.

[36] Other differences that can be easily inferred from Galmés' *apparatus criticus* have also been omitted.

GOD, YOU WHO ARE the enlightenment of every intellect that understands You, and the sovereign bliss of every will that loves You, with Your supreme virtue, grace, and blessing, here begins this *Demonstrative Art*.

PROLOGUE

1. SINCE THIS *Demonstrative Art* follows the model of the *Brief Art of Finding Truth*,[1] we will therefore take the Alphabet from that *Art* and place it in this one, which Alphabet is as follows:[2]

A stands for God.

B stands for memory remembering; C for intellect understanding; D for will loving; while E stands for the act of B C D.

F stands for memory remembering; G for intellect understanding; H for will hating; and I the act of F G H.[3]

K stands for memory forgetting: L for intellect not knowing; M for will loving or hating; and N the act of K L M.

O stands for the act of B F K; P for the act of C G L; and Q for the act of D H M; whereas R stands for the combination of O P Q.

S stands for the intellective soul;[4] T for principles; V for virtues and vices; X for predestination or objectification;[5] Y for Truth; Z for Falsehood.

2. There are three kinds of demonstration. The first is by equivalence,[6]

[1] This is the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, the principal work of the previous cycle of the Lullian Art; cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 15 above.

[2] This is the first time the Alphabet of twenty-three letters is expressly and systematically presented in the Art (cf. Ca I, 400; *OE* I, 63, and Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 6). For details of its structure, see introduction, text at nn. 10–11 above. Note how, in contrast to the Alphabet of the *Ars brevis*, each letter stands only for one concept. In fact none of the peripheral letters of the Figures A, T, V, or X is used at all; they are only present for *possible* use with the Ninth or Demonstrative Figure (see Dist. I, nn. 4, 43 below). In practice, when Llull uses a term from one of these figures, he always uses the word rather than the letter symbolizing it.

[3] Further study of the Lullian system will show that B C are not really the same as F G (which Llull uses as basic investigative tools; cf. Dist. I, n. 9 below), because each of these pairs is inseperable from its third component or power of the soul, the will, which either lovers (D) in the first case, or does not love (H) in the second, thus influencing how one considers the other two powers. Note also that for letters D, H, and M, the word *diligens* (Cat. *amant*) can be translated "loving" or "liking," and the word *odiens* (Cat. *desamant*) as "hating," "not loving," or "disliking."

[4] "Intellective soul" is synonymous with "rational soul." Note that S is a subset whose members are the previous B–R.

[5] These two words undoubtedly refer to the first and last terms ("predestination" and "object," respectively) of Figure X, the description of which, with accompanying notes, see in Dist. I below.

[6] This demonstration, based on the "equivalence" between the dignities of God and their acts, was to assume great importance in Llull's system (see n. 8 below). Later he wrote an entire work

that is to say, when a demonstration is made by means of things equal to one another, as for instance when one demonstrates that God cannot sin, because His power is of the same essence as His will, which in no way desires to sin, and this will is of the same essence as justice, which is completely opposed to sin, which accords with injustice. And since the Divine Dignities are all equal in essence and nature, one can clearly construct a demonstration by equivalence; and the same follows for the virtues, properties, and entities[7] of creatures.

3. The second kind of demonstration is when an effect is proved by its cause, as in: when the sun is shining, it must be day. The third kind of demonstration is when the cause is proved by the effect, as: it is day, therefore the sun must be shining.[8] It is with these three kinds of demonstration that this Art is constructed, and the first is stronger than the others, since it is based on the dignities of God; and the second is stronger than the last.

4. The principles of this Art are clearly provable by themselves, as can be seen in the figures and practice of this Art, some of the principles being provable by means of others. But since we have wanted this Art to be as brief as possible, we have therefore given as suppositions at the beginning of this Art the principles that make up the figures. All the same, those principles of the Art that most need to be proved will be proved in the Questions.

5. This Art is divided into four distinctions, of which
The First discusses the disposition of the figures,
The Second discusses their conditions,
The Third discusses the purpose for which this Art has been devised, and
The Fourth and last contains questions in which the Art itself is exemplified.

on the subject, the *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam* (III.71 in the Catalogue of Works in Vol. II here). The English translation of "equivalence"—used only for lack of any better word—should not be taken in its usual logical meaning (i.e., as a translation of the Latin *aequipollentia*, or as the concept symbolized by "≡"), in which second-intentional sense it is never used by Llull.

[7] For Llull's peculiar use of the word "entity," see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 1.

[8] These are the two classic proofs of *propter quid* (or *a priori*) and *quia* (or *a posteriori*); cf. Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 61, and Pring-Mill, "Grundzüge," p. 255. The first time Llull divides proofs into these three categories is in the *Principles of Theology* (*MOG* I, 610 = Int. ix, 4), where he refers to the innovating first one merely as *demonstratio necessaria*. In the first stages of his production, however, one usually finds him vacillating. There are, for instance, quite different divisions in the *Logica del Gatzel*, st. 37; the *Libre de demostracions*, Bk. II, ch. 13; and *Blaquerna*, ch. 78, par. 2. But with the cycle of the *Ars demonstrativa*, this threefold dividion of demonstrations *per aquiparantiam, propter quid*, and *quia* becomes a constant of Llull's system. See for instance the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, *MOG* V, 45–7; *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), pp. 82–3; *Ars generalis ultima*, Part VII, ch. 3, and the work cited in n. 6 above, in addition to many others.



PLATE XII. *Ars demonstrativa*, Figures A S T V X Y Z.
From Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI 200, fol. 3^{v}.

TABLE 4. THE ALPHABET OF THE *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*

A		S	T	V	X	Theol-	Philos-	Law
God		*Intellective Soul**	*Principles*	*Virtues and Vices*	*Predestination or Objectification*†	ogy	ophy	
goodness	B	memory remembering	God	faith	[1] predestination	essence	first cause	formal law
greatness	C	intellect understanding	creature	hope	[2] being	life	motion	material law
eternity	D	will loving	operation	charity	[3] perfection	dignities	intelligence	law
power	E	the act of B C D	difference	justice	[4] merit	act	firmament	common law
wisdom	F	memory remembering	concordance	prudence	[5] supposition	form	form	special law
will	G	intellect understanding	contrariety	fortitude	[6] immediately	relation	matter	natural law
virtue	H	will hating	beginning	temperance	[7] reality	order	nature	positive law
truth	I	the act of F G H	middle	gluttony	[8] power	action	elements	canon law
glory	K	memory forgetting	end	lust	[1] free will	articles	appetite	civil law
perfection	L	intellect not knowing	majority	avarice	[2] privation	commandments	power	customary law
justice	M	will loving or hating	equality	pride	[3] imperfection	interpretation	habit	theoretical law
generosity	N	the act of K L M	minority	accidie	[4] blame	first intention	act	practical law
simplicity	O	the act of B F K	affirmation	envy	[5] demonstration	second intention	mixture	nutritive law
nobility	P	the act of C G L	doubt	ire	[6] mediately	glory	digestion	comparative law
mercy	Q	the act of D H M	negation		[7] reason	punishment	composition	ancient law
dominion	R	the combination of O P Q			[8] object	eviternity	alteration	modern law

Y	Z
truth	falsehood

NOTE: Colors for X, Y, and Z here are based on the text of the *Introductorium Artis demonstrativae*. (MOG III, 61 = Int. ii, 7). However, they are not used in the text. Those used for these three figures in Pl. XII seem to be the illuminator's arbitrary choice.

* For letters D, H, M under Figure S, see Prologue, n. 3 below

† The numbers in Figure X have been introduced merely to indicate the pairing of concepts (1 with 1, etc.).

TABLE 5. THE ELEMENTS AND THE FIGURE S OF THE *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*

Elemental Figure

The Figure of Fire

fire	air	water	earth
air	fire	earth	water
water	earth	fire	air
earth	water	air	fire

The Figure of Air

air	fire	water	earth
fire	air	earth	water
water	earth	air	fire
earth	water	fire	air

The Figure of Water

water	earth	air	fire
earth	water	fire	air
air	fire	water	earth
fire	air	earth	water

The Figure of Earth

earth	water	air	fire
water	earth	fire	air
air	fire	earth	water
fire	air	water	earth

Figure S (the Powers of the Soul)★

				the combination of
	E	I	N	R
the act of	B C D	F G H	K L M	O P Q
	D	H	M	Q
the will	loving	hating	loving or hating	D H M
	C	G	L	P
the intellect	understanding	understanding	not knowing	C G L
	B	F	K	O
the memory	remembering	remembering	forgetting	B F K

★ Based on Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI 200 (see Plate XIV).

The Square of Elements



The Elemental Spheres (the sublunary world) with the lighter elements outside and the heavier inside.





PLATE XIII. *Ars demonstrativa*, the Figures of Theology, Philosophy, and Law, and the Elemental and Demonstrative Figures. From Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI 200, fol. 4[r].



PLATE XIV. *Ars demonstrativa*, Figure S as a Hand.
From Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI 200, fol. 197^{v}.

HERE BEGINS THE FIRST DISTINCTION

THE FIRST DISTINCTION is divided into twelve figures,[1] which are: A S T V X Y Z, the Elemental Figure, the Demonstrative Figure, and the three figures of principles. Following this order, we will first deal with A, and then with the others.

Figure A

This figure is divided into two figures, First and Second.

The First Figure is circular, with A in the center, as can be seen at the beginning of this Art.[2] This figure is made up of 16 compartments, with transverse lines extending from one compartment to another to indicate that all these compartments are concordant with one another, without any contrariety existing between them.

In these compartments are written the sixteen dignities we understand to exist in God, which are: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will,[3] virtue, truth, glory, perfection, justice, generosity, simplicity, nobility, mercy, and dominion. These dignities comprise the principles of this Art, and in them are established the other principles of the Art, by examining the universal, in which the particular is found artificially, by concording the compartments of the figure without contrariety, and introducing T into the compartments to the degree that it can be introduced therein.

[1] The figure of sixteen given in the "Life," (§19), in the *Breviculum* (Pl. VI and Hillg, p. 179), and repeated by subsequent authors (cf., for instance, Ca I, 399) seems to have originated as a mistake on le Myésier's part, perhaps as a result of a confusion with the *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, which does have sixteen. This confusion was given further sanction by the editors of *MOG* III, who correctly preceded the *Introductoria* with its sixteen figures, but then followed it immediately (i.e., with no intervening figures of its own) with the *Ars demonstrativa*, making it look as if those sixteen applied to both works.

[2] This is the figure "quae est imperatrix et domina omnium figurarum," according to the legend over the figure in the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (*MOG* I, Fig. 1).

[3] The Catalan version has *amor*; the Venice MS has *amor* crossed out and replaced by *voluntas*, which is what the Mainz edition has. (For this vacillation between "love" and "will," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12). For the dignities in general, see "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 28–33. This particular list of sixteen, which was used throughout this cycle of the

The Second Figure of A



The Second Figure of A is divided into 136 compartments, as is clear from the illustration, in each compartment of which are written two dignities from the First Figure, for which reason all of the First Figure is contained in the Second, as will be clear if one takes the Demonstrative Figure and combines all the compartments of its outermost circles.[4] In the compartments of this figure lie the principles and rules for investigating those particulars which the artist is seeking, and which he does by choosing the compartments that represent those particulars and introducing T in them according to the conditions of Distinction Two. And in each compartment of this figure, B must remember the blue triangle of T,[5] with C understanding that A is one sole God, that He is

---

Art, differs only in the last four, which in the previous cycle based on the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, were mercy, humility, dominion, and patience (cf. Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 5, and my "Cronologia," pp. 40–1).

[4] For these Second Figures and their "compartments," see introduction, text at nn. 13–15 above. For reasons of economy, it has been impossible to print these Second Figures with the gridlines of the manuscripts, which show more clearly that each binary combination of concepts is indeed within a "compartment" or box. The same is true of compartments appearing in the text itself. See for instance below under "The Second Figure of S," par. 5, where the boxes of the original manuscripts—E A Y | I A Y | M Y | M Z—are set as [E A Y | I A Y | M Y | M Z]. For the identity between these compartments and the flowers on the trees in the *Gentile*, see Bk. I, n. 1 of the latter work. For more details on the construction of these Second Figures, see Pring-Mill, "Analogical," p. 319. The last clause in the text above is a suggestion that the "Artist" try it out for himself, substituting the dignities for the letters of Figure S in the two movable outer circles of the Ninth or Demonstrative Figure (cf. n. 43 below, as well as Prologue, n. 2 above). As for the number of compartments, it is the result of a combination with repetitions of 16 elements taken 2 at a time, hence

$$\binom{16+2-1}{2} = \binom{17}{2} = \frac{17 \cdot 16}{1 \cdot 2} = 136.$$

[5] That of God, creature, and operation; see the description of Figure T below.

one in essence and nature, that each of the dignities is the other,[6] and that their activity is both within and outside themselves, as is proven in this Art.

Figure S

1. Figure S is divided into two figures, First and Second.

The First Figure is circular and is composed of four squares as can be seen in the beginning of the Art. In these squares are all the letters between A and S,[7] and in the middle of the figure there is an S, as can be seen from the illustration.

2. The four squares of this figure are composed of the acts and of the privation of the acts of the three powers of S, which powers are memory, intellect, and will.[8]

3. It is with these three powers that S apprehends or rejects objects, as is clear from the Alphabet of letters, from which the squares are composed in the following way: B C D E should be colored blue, F G H I black, K L M N red, and O P Q R green.

4. Just as the sensitive power works through the five senses, so S works through its three powers by means of the four above-mentioned squares, apprehending as objects A T V X Y Z, the Elemental Figure, and the other objects pertaining to this Art.

5. E always and continuously apprehends objects by means of B C D; I apprehends objects sometimes by means of F G H, and sometimes by means of F G without H; the reason for this being that F G, sometimes without H and sometimes with H, examines the universals, seeking the particulars according as they are lovable by D or hateful by H.[9]

6. By means of E I one formulates in this Art questions, ar-

[6] For the convertibility of the dignities in God, see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 30 above; Dist. II, part ii, comp. 1, par. 1 here below; the passages corresponding to *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 96–7, nn. 197, 201; and *Ars brevis*, Part II, n. 2, and Part IX, n. 2.

[7] *Ab A. usque ad S.* (in Catalan, *de A. tro a S.*) must be noninclusive, i.e., meaning "from B to R," since those are the only letters on the corners of the squares. As pointed out before, these are the letters occupying the central portion of the Alphabet given in the Prologue. Since this occurs with no other figure, it shows the importance of Figure S, at least during this quaternary phase of the Art; for it disappears altogether at the beginning of the ternary phase (cf. *Ars brevis*, Introduction, text at nn. 8–9).

[8] For the three Augustinian powers of the soul, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 53–5 and n. 46 there. For a differentiation of the powers from their acts in terms of the virtues and vices, see Dist. II, part ii, comp. 19, par. 2 below.

[9] F G together form the basic investigative tool of the *Ars demonstrativa*; cf. Dist. II, part ii, comp. 8/2, par. 2, as well as Dist. III, mode 6, pars. 1–2.

guments, and solutions, as well as necessary propositions. N, however, is the vehicle for suppositions, faith, and belief, whereas R is the vehicle for doubts.[10] Furthermore E is in this Art for the first intention, and I N R for the second; likewise I is for the first intention and N R for the second, and N is for the first and R for the second.[11]

7. The conditions governing E I N R are many, as will appear in Distinction Two, and we will therefore deal with them there, according as T is introduced into their compartments.

The Second Figure of S

BB CC DD EE FF GG HH II KK LL MM NN OO PP QQ RR
BC CD DE EF FG GH HI IK KL LM MN NO OP PQ QR
BD CE DF EG FH GI HK IL KM LN MO NP OQ PR
BE CF DG EH FI GK HL IM KN LO MP NQ OR
BF CG DH EI FK GL HM IN KO LP MQ NR
BG CH DI EK FL GM HN IO KP LQ MR
BH CI DK EL FM GN HO IP KQ LR
BI CK DL EM FN GO HP IQ KR
BK CL DM EN FO GP HQ IR
BL CM DN EO FP GQ HR
BM CN DO EP FQ GR
BN CO DP EQ FR
BO CP DQ ER
BP CQ DR
BQ CR
BR

1. This figure is derived from the first, combining the letters one with another, by which combinations are formed the 136 compartments of which this figure is composed.[12] One can also form these compartments using the two outer circles of the Ninth Figure of this Art, revolving them so as to put letters opposite one another, thereby forming the compartments of this figure.

2. It is a general rule in this Art that a B taken by itself signifies memory, and a second B remembering; and the same is true of C D, as well as of the individual letters of I N R. Furthermore, one B

[10] As Pring-Mill has pointed out ("Potencias," p. 122), this figure does not represent all the possible combinations "of the acts and of the privation of the acts of the three powers of the soul"; it gives only those Llull considered important. A simple way to remember them (this is a mnemonic device, not an interpretation) is to think of E as applying to the theologian, I to the skeptical philosopher, N to the simple man's unthinking faith, and R to the man beset by doubts (perhaps our Gentile). A good introduction to the various combinations is provided by the passages corresponding to *Felix*, Bk. VIII, nn. 45, 66, 79. More complete interpretations are to be found here below in Dist. II, part ii, comp. 8, and especially under the compartments of [E E] [I I] [N N] and [R R]. This figure first appears in the pre-Art stage, in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 331; cf. Pring-Mill, "Potencias," p. 121, and Pla I, 316.

[11] The latter half of the sentence, after the semicolon, is simplified in A to "and I is for the first in comparison with N R." For the doctrine of first and second intention, see below under the description of the Figure of the Principles of Theology, and especially the beginning of Dist. III. For more details and references, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 244.

[12] For the number of 136, see n. 4 above.

signifies one S, and another B another S, but this according to the kind of relationship where the part signifies the whole; and this is true of each species and individual of S,[13] as F G, with T, survey each compartment, according to the instructions given in Distinction Two, compartment [S S].

3. This is the figure the artist uses to survey and consider the compartments of the other figures in relation to the objects that he apprehends, by changing the compartments according to different circumstances and objects, as many times as necessary, until he finds the particular he is seeking. The compartments of this figure are principles that are set out in the Second Distinction, where T is introduced into said compartments, according as it can be introduced scientifically and properly. The entire Art operates through this figure, with the help of T; and S and T are developed in A V X Y Z according to the conditions of T, until one finds the particular in the universal by necessary reasons.

4. In the form of the Alphabet inscribed on the two outer circles of the Ninth Figure, one will find represented the Second Figure of A, as well as that of T V and X, along with the figures of the Principles of Theology, Philosophy, and Law.[14] And by means of this Second Figure of S, all of the above-mentioned figures can be included in the Ninth Figure.

5. As we have pointed out before, M is double, and thus must be judged by means of E I A Y Z, according to the compartments [E A Y | I A Y | M Y | M Z], for by what precedes or follows in the compartments it is known when it loves or hates; because the first compartment signifies that M hates Z, whereas by the second it is clearly shown that M loves the same Z.

Figure T

1. Figure T[15] is divided into two figures, First and Second.

The First Figure is circular and is composed of five triangles of different colors, as appears in the illustration at the beginning of this Art. Of these triangles, one is blue and has "God" written in one corner, "creature" in another, and "operation" in the third.

[13] Thus in all Latin sources; instead of "but this according . . . individual of S," the Catalan MS has, "which signification is similar for C D, as well as the individual letters of I N R," which might be a copyist's distracted repetition of one of the previous lines. For the terms "species" and "individual," see the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, MOG* I, 434 = Int. vii, 2, where Llull says that Figure S "is divided into four squares . . . which are E I N R; which squares are the four *species* of S, which in turn are composed of the *individuals* B C D, F G H, K L M, O P Q."

[14] Cf. n. 4 above, as well as Prologue, n. 2, and the description of the Ninth or Demonstrative Figure below.

[15] Figure T is the only other figure besides A that is conserved throughout all the stages

Another triangle is green, with "difference" written in one corner, "concordance" in another, and "contrariety" in the third. Another triangle is red, with "beginning" written in one corner, "middle" in another, and "end" in another.[16] Another triangle is yellow, with "majority" written in one corner, "equality" and "minority" in the others.[17] The last triangle is black, containing "affirmation" in one corner, "doubt" in another, and "negation" in another, as is clearly shown in the illustration at the beginning of this Art.

2. Over the angle of the blue triangle in which "God" is written, there are three words, namely: "unity, essence, dignities"; over the angle in which "creature" is written, there are the following words: "sensual, intellectual, animal"; over the angle in which "operation" is written, there are these words: "intellectual, natural, artificial."[18]

3. Over the green corner in which "difference" is written, there is "between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual." Likewise, over the corner with "concordance" there is "between sensual and sensual, between sensual and intellectual, between intellectual and intellectual," and the same thing is also found over the triangle in which "contrariety" is

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of the Art (the concepts of V reappear in the ternary phase, but not the figure itself). Its structure in the *Ars demonstrativa* is almost identical with that in the previous cycle of the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (see n. 18 below for a minor exception). In the ternary phase of the Art—see for example the *Ars brevis*—it lost its first (blue) and last (black) triangle, a loss that had already taken place in the medical works—see the *Principles of Medicine*. For a general interpretation of this figure, see E.-W. Platzeck, "La figura 'T' del arte luliano y la doctrina de las significaciones (un capítulo de la gramática especulativa medieval)," *SMR* 9–10 (1953–4), 35–49 (but see Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 147–48 and 169, n. 15 for a correction on the matter mentioned in the subtitle), as well as Pla I, 200ff. and 317.

[16] These three terms of *principium* (*començament*), *medium* (*mijà*), and *finis* (*fi*) have three sets of translations in English. First, there is the temporal one in the text. Second, there is the causal of "origin," "means," and "purpose." Third, they can be rendered as "principle" (e.g., *Començaments de medicina* = *Principles of Medicine*), "intermediary," and "goal." I have chosen the translations to fit the circumstances, only warning the reader when there is any chance of his not recognizing the origins of the terms.

[17] The Latin and Romance homonyms of "majority" and "minority" come respectively from *major* and *minor*, "greater" and "lesser" (cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 32), so one could also translate these three terms as "greater," "equal," and "lesser."

[18] The three extra words over each corner refer to the senses in which the principal concept of that corner can be considered or used. For an interesting explanation (with examples) of this use, see the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 299ff. = Int. vi, 7ff. Note that the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* cycle of the Art, instead of "essence" and "dignities," had "Trinity" and "virtues" over the word "God," which detail constitutes the sole difference between Figure T in these first two cycles of the Art.

written. This is to show how there are three ways in which things can differ from one another, and how concordance and contrariety between them should be considered, that is, in what manner they differ, in what manner they accord, and in what manner they are contrary to one another.

4. Over the red corner in which "beginning" is written, there is "time, quantity, cause";[19] over the angle in which "middle" is written, there is "extremities, measurement, and conjunction";[20] and in the angle with "end" there is "final cause, termination, and privation."[21] This is to signify that "beginning" takes its existence from time, quantity, and cause, "middle" is that which exists between extremities, measurement, and conjunction, and "end" is final cause, termination, or privation.

5. Over the yellow angle in which "majority" is written one finds "in substance and substance, in substance and accident, in accident and accident," and in each of the other corners the same thing is written, because according to the circumstances, majority, minority, and equality must be considered in terms of substances and accidents.

6. Over the black angle in which "affirmation" is written, one finds "being, nonbeing, and possible or impossible," and the same thing is written over the other two black angles, in order to show that every affirmation, doubt, or negation must necessarily refer to being or nonbeing. And everything that is affirmed, denied, or doubted must necessarily be possible or impossible.

[19] As Llull explains in the *Compendium* (above note), "'Time and quantity' denote the accidental origin (*principium*), whereas 'cause' signifies the substantial origin, that is to say efficient, formal, material or final," which last are, of course, the four Aristotelian causes. This statement can be further clarified by realizing that Llull divides the ten Aristotelian categories or predicaments into "substance" (the first category) and "accidents" (which constitute the remaining nine, and two of which are precisely "time" and "quantity"). All this becomes clearer and more explicit in the ternary phase of the Art—see for instance the description of Figure T in *Ars brevis*, Part II.

[20] Again from the *Compendium*, n. 18 above: "The conjunctive middle is that which joins several things into one, such as form and matter with their accidents, or which leads something from its beginning to its end. The middle (or means) of mensuration is that by which equal or unequal things are measured substantially or accidentally. The middle between extremes is whatever is closed within extremes, as a body within its surfaces, etc."

[21] Once more from the *Compendium*, n. 18 above: "In these three terms is included the entire meaning of 'end.' Final cause is taken in the sense of ultimate purpose, which claims to be more perfect; this end is the opposite of privation. The terminative end is that which terminates something with respect to itself, as a surface does a body, or that by which something is extended no farther, like the boundary of a field or the limit of any quantity, time, number, place, motion, action, passion, etc." For more detailed interpretation of this important red triangle, see *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam Generalem*, *MOG* v, 382–4 = Int. v, 24–6.

7. Furthermore, in the middle of these five triangles there is a T, which signifies and includes all the things denoted by these five triangles.

8. Together with these five triangles and their respective angles, each of which has three species beneath it, S goes seeking the universal, following the modes contained in the distinction on *Intention*,[22] mixing one triangle in another and introducing triangles into the compartments of the figures, according to the conditions of the Second Distinction. Thus, just as the artisan fashions the artificial form by means of his tools, so S does what it does in this Art by means of T, introducing it objectively into its powers, and introducing it into the compartments of the figures, insofar as it can be admitted into them.[23]

The Second Figure of T

God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	
creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat	
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm		
operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat		
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor			
differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat			
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal				
concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat				
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end	major					
contrar	begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat					
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle	end						
begin	middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat						
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin	middle							
middle	end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat							
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar	begin								
end	major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat								
God	creat	operat	differ	concord	contrar									
major	equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat									
God	creat	operat	differ	concord										
equal	minor	affirm	doubt	negat										
God	creat	operat	differ											
minor	affirm	doubt	negat											
God	creat	operat												
affirm	doubt	negat												
God	creat													
doubt	negat													
God														
negat														

1. From the First Figure is derived the Second, which is divided into 120 compartments, obtained by combining the 15 compartments of the First Figure.[24] T must be introduced into each compartment, in accordance with the conditions for discovering the particular thing that is being sought after;[25] and if it cannot be found with one compartment, then it must be sought with another, always choosing the compartments of T and S in which the particular is best represented and to which that particular has a greater likeness than it has to any other compartment.

[22] Dist. III below.

[23] Note the similarity between this characterization of Figure T and that in the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, ch. 3.

[24] Combination with repetitions of 15 elements taken 2 at a time, hence

$$\binom{15+2-1}{2} = \binom{16}{2} = \frac{16 \cdot 15}{1 \cdot 2} = 120.$$

[25] For this introducing of T into T, see Dist. II, part ii, comp. 14.

2. Each of these 120 compartments is universal, in conjunction with theconditions of the other compartments, and each one is a subject or matter with respect to S, so that it may investigate therein the particular it is seeking, from which matter proceeds the form presented to E, which in this matter signifies the particular which, as a result of C, is appropriate to D, and as a result of G, is appropriate to H, making Y accord with E, and with H taking Z as object.

Figure V

1. Figure V is divided into two figures, First and Second.

The First Figure is circular and is composed of fourteen compartments, seven of which correspond to virtues and the other seven to vices, as appears in the circular figure of V at the beginning of this Art. The seven virtues contained in this figure are: Faith, Hope, Charity, Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance; and these seven virtues are called "Blue V" in this Art, since they are written in blue. The seven vices are the seven mortal sins, that is to say: Gluttony, Lust, Avarice, Pride, Accidie, Envy, Ire; and these vices are called "Red V" in this Art, since they are written in red.[26]

2. This figure has transverse blue and red lines, and in the middle of these lines there is a V half red and half blue, to show that it includes both the virtues and vices. The blue transverse lines going from one compartment of the virtues to another signify and show that the virtues are all in accord in two ways: one is when they simply accord with one another, the other is when they accord with each other in being contrary to the vices. And the same is true of the vices, which have red lines extending from one compartment to another, which vices accord with each other and are contrary to the virtues.

3. This figure is offered as an object to S, so that by means of it S may gain merit, and through merit gain glory, and through glory love and know God; and the red V exists so as to be an object with respect to H. This being the case, V exists through D and H, depending on the final cause and depending on its origin. Blue V is a creature, whereas red V is a nonthing; or in other

[26] Cf. introduction, text at n. 4 above.

words, it is privation, towards which S inclines when H is assigned blue V and E red V as their objects.

4. According to the above explanations, one can see how V is composed of principles with which we can investigate the particular we are seeking, for V has many offspring derived from its compartments in accordance with the way in which S takes them as object, and these are: Chastity, Conscience, Devotion, Disbelief, Despair, etc.[27]

The Second Figure of V

faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	
hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire	
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie		
charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire		
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride			
justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire			
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice				
prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire				
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt	lust					
fortit	temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire					
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper	glutt						
temper	glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire						
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit	temper							
glutt	lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire							
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud	fortit								
lust	avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire								
faith	hope	charity	justice	prud									
avarice	pride	accidie	envy	ire									
faith	hope	charity	justice										
pride	accidie	envy	ire										
faith	hope	charity											
accidie	envy	ire											
faith	hope												
envy	ire												
faith													
ire													

1. This Second Figure is derived from the First, and it is composed of 105 compartments, made by combining one word with another.[28] And each compartment is a universal in which one should seek the particular according to the conditions of the Second Distinction, putting T in each compartment until E finds the particular that suits it in accordance with Y and until I has formed the particular that suits it in accordance with H.

2. This figure is double and therefore should be judged by means of A Y Z, or in other words, when the compartment [E A V Y] is made, then blue V is indicated, but when the compartment [E V Z] is made, then red V is indicated; and this is because blue V accords with A Y, whereas red V always accords with Z. And the same thing happens with I N R as happens with E, depending on the nature of the species of S.[29]

[27] For the concept and enumeration of additional virtues and vices derived from the basic fourteen, see the earlier *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, *MOG* I, 435 and 439–40 = Int. vii, 3 and 7–8, and the later *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, pp. 644ff.

[28] $\binom{14+2-1}{2} = \binom{15}{2} = \frac{15 \cdot 14}{1 \cdot 2} = 105.$

[29] For the "species" of S, see n. 13 above.

Figure X

1. Figure X is divided into two figures, the First and Second.

The First Figure is circular and contains sixteen compartments, which are: Predestination, Being, Perfection, Merit, Supposition, Immediately, Reality, Power, Free Will, Privation, Imperfection, Blame, Demonstration, Mediately, Reason, Object.[30]

2. In this figure there are transverse lines going from one compartment to another in order to show that its compartments are sometimes concordant with one another and sometimes contrary, and this both immediately and mediately. This figure is therefore most necessary for this Art, introducing as one does T into it so that E can find Y and I can find Z.

3. In the middle of this figure there is an X which stands for and includes all the compartments of this figure, and according to the antecedent or consequent of the solution, it stands for one or several compartments and not for certain others. Therefore the Art does not wish to have all of X implied in the solution to a question, but rather that only one or several compartments of X be assigned to a question or its solution, according to the conditions of the Second Distinction.

[30] This figure is also called the Figure of Opposites because of the pairing of concepts (cf. The Second Figure of X, par. 2 below, as well as *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 296 = Int. vi, 4). He used yet another name in the text corresponding to Prologue, n. 5 above. It is also worth remarking that, of the basic figures, this is the one that has undergone the greatest changes in the transition from the first to the second cycle of the Art; see my "Cronologia," pp. 40–1, and Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 57–8, for a tabulation of these changes. Lastly, the reader should be warned that the use of adverbs ("Immediately" and "Mediately") as nouns is in the original (*immediate* and *mediate* in both Latin and Catalan).

The Second Figure of X

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object
predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason
being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med
perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons
merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame
suppos immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva imperf
immed real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w priva
real power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power free w
power free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real power
free w priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed real
priva imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos immed
imperf blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit suppos
blame demons med reason object

predes being perf merit
demons med reason object

predes being perf
med reason object

predes being
reason object

predes
object

1. The Second Figure of X is composed of 136 compartments,[31] and it is derived from the First; likewise, each compartment of this Second Figure is universal, and in it one can find the particular by introducing T into it in accordance with the conditions of the Second Distinction.

2. Furthermore, Predestination and Free Will are concordant in reality through A, whereas they are opposites according to C L; and Being and Privation are contraries immediately, but concordant mediately; and the same follows for the other terms of X of which this Second Figure is composed, as is exemplified in the Second Distinction.[32]

Figure Y and Figure Z

Y exists in this Art through first intention, and Z through second intention; and thus D is impelled towards Y and H towards Z, so that N, by destroying R, can be converted into E I. We will discuss these two figures, that is, Y and Z, in the Second Distinction, there being no need to treat them extensively here, since no other figure is derived from them.

The Elemental Figure

The Elemental Figure is divided into two figures, First and Second.

1. The First Figure is square, as appears in the illustration at the beginning of this Art. The figure is composed of the following compartments—fire, water, air, earth—and[33] it is subdivided into

[31] Cf. n. 4 above for the number of compartments.
[32] Dist. II, part ii, comp. 23.
[33] The previous part of this sentence in M wanders off into a description of the Second

four figures each of which contains sixteen compartments, to show how the elements exist in mixture and how they enter in composition through digestion, and how one element is dominant over the others according to complexions and humors.

2. Fire is assigned the color red, air blue, water green, and earth the color black, and this is so the colors differentiate the compartments, insofar as a certain color is better suited to one element than another. The elements are measured in degrees, as is clear from the compartments of this figure, which compartments represent supposites[34] as well as mixture and digestion, as is explained in the *Principles of Philosophy* and *of Medicine*.[35] The simple and compound forms can be found in these compartments, each form having its own matter. But we will not discuss this any further here, for in the Second Distinction we will discuss it as much as needs be for this Art, which we want to make as brief as possible.[36]

The Second Elemental Figure

fire air water earth
fire air water earth

fire air water
air water earth

fire air
water earth

fire
earth

1. The Second Elemental Figure is composed of ten compartments,[37] and it concerns the principles of nature. It is placed in this Art in order to answer questions concerning nature, in accordance with how T enters conditionally into the compartments, forming them in the Ninth Figure.

Figure, which is out of place and in none of the sources consulted. The translation follows V and B, of which A, as usual, is a slightly abbreviated version. The text of A is quoted in Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 40, n. 122.

[34] Since this technical term reappears again and again in the *Ars demonstrativa*, we are forced to use the obsolete English equivalent of the Latin *suppositum*, which meant "a being that subsists by itself" (*OED*, s.v.; see also Llull's own definition in the *Taula d'esta Art*, *ORL* XVII, 396), rather than the vaguer "individual" or "substance" which might do in a more literary passage (cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 101, n. 223).

[35] The question of degrees and mixtures occupies Dists. II–V of the *Principles of Medicine* translated herein; in the *Principles of Philosophy*, mixture and digestion occupy Dists. XIII and XIV, respectively (*MOG* I, 686–9 = Int. x, 20–3).

[36] Dist. II, however, does not really give an explanation of this figure. The unusual disposition of the Elemental Figure, along with what one might call its color code, has caused a certain amount of confusion among scholars (see F. Yates, "La teoría luliana de los elementos," *EL* 4, 1960, 58ff.). As Pring-Mill rightly pointed out (*Número*, p. 40), the key to it is in Llull's *Liber exponens figuram elementalem Artis demonstrativae* printed at the beginning of *MOG* IV. For the similarity between this figure and the central portion of the second branch of the Tree of Medicine, see the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, nn. 10–11.

[37] Since there are 4 elements, we have

$$\binom{4+2-1}{2} = \binom{5}{2} = \frac{5\cdot 4}{1\cdot 2} = 10$$

2. This Elemental Figure is of primary importance to the Art, for by means of it the artist is led to knowledge of the other figures. This is because in the workings of nature are signified the intrinsic and extrinsic works of A S V, as can be seen by letting T examine the Elemental Figure and A S V with X Y;[38] this is why in the Art the Elemental Figure is used to give various kinds of similes, examples, and metaphors, according to the conditions of the Second Distinction.[39]

3. The first compartment of [fire fire] as well as the other compartments of the elements, signify in T the comparison of one term with another, that is, of A and A, creature and creature, works and works, unity and unity, essence and essence, dignity and dignity, animal and animal, intellectual and intellectual, sensual and sensual, natural and natural, artificial and artificial, intellectual and intellectual;[40] and the same is true of the other triangles of T. Thus expressions such as fire and fire, air and air, etc. imply similar terms in the angles of T, as is explained above. This being the case, therefore, in each angle of T one can form a compartment in the Ninth Figure, by comparing one term with another, as, for instance, God and God, etc., as has just been explained.

The Ninth Figure

1. The Ninth Figure of this Art, called Demonstrative, is divided into two figures, First and Second. The first of these figures can be found at the beginning of this Art, among the other so-called First Figures.[41] It is composed of six revolving circles along with a wheel situated in the middle in which there is a triangle repre-

[38] Thus in V and B; A has "Y Z"; the printed sources combine them, putting "X Y Z."

[39] After Salzinger in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 291 = Int. vi, 39, it was Frances Yates who in modern times first pointed out the importance of this paragraph, mainly in her "La teoría luliana de los elementos," *EL* 4 (1960), 62 (cf. Pring-Mill in *EL* 7, 1963, 168). Pring-Mill then analyzed it in his *Número*, pp. 47–50, in his "Grundzüge," pp. 259–60, and even more closely in his "Analogical," pp. 321–3, which I strongly recommend for a clear and forthright English presentation of the elemental basis of this phase of the Art and how it operates *per analogiam*. For the general setting of this "elemental exemplarism," as well as further references, see "Llull's Thought," n. 63.

[40] A omits the last three pairs. M omits just the last pair, surely thinking it was a copyist's mistaken repetition of the previous "intellectual and intellectual," not realizing that it was needed to complete all the terms of the blue triangle (see Figure T, par. 2 above).

[41] It is curious that this figure has gone unrepresented in printed editions of the *Ars demonstrativa*: in *ORL* XVI because it was missing in the two MSS (A and B) at Galmés's disposal; in *MOG* III because the editors printed in its place the much more elaborate Figura Universalis belonging to the *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*. As Carreras i Artau rightly pointed out (Ca I, 399), it is introduced here for the first time in the Art.

senting the five triangles of T. It is made up of circles, each inside the other, like weights inserted one in another,[42] with a pin in the middle, which keeps the circles in place. The two circles immediately adjoining the center wheel are made up of the Elemental Figure, the next two circles are made up of A S T V X Y Z, and the outermost circles—those containing all the others—are made up of the Alphabet of S, and of A T V X, as well as of the Principles of Theology, Philosophy, and Law;[43] and many other principles of science can exist in this Alphabet, according to the disposition of this Art.

2. This figure contains and includes all the other figures of this Art, as is explained above; moreover, all the compartments of the other figures can be formed by revolving the circles of this figure in the right way, and T must be introduced into each compartment in order to demonstrate those things being investigated, respecting the proper form of each compartment and following the rules of the Second Distinction.

The Second Demonstrative Figure

A A S S T T V V X X Y Y Z Z
A S S T T V V X X Y Y Z
A T S V T X V Y X Z
A V S X T Y V Z
A X S Y T Z
A Y S Z
A Z

This figure is composed of twenty-eight compartments,[44] and it is general to all the other figures of this Art. Thus, as one goes forming compartments of this figure by turning the circles, one must introduce T into said compartments, observing the conditions of each compartment, affirming or denying; for if the affirmative runs counter to the conditions of the compartments, then it must be converted into a negative, and vice versa; and in this point lies the entire strength and disposition of this Art, being as each compartment is universal and in each one can investigate the particular one is seeking; which particular has a greater resemblance to one compart-

[42] This simile is crossed out in V and is lacking in B. A has "a semblansa de marc"—"like a frame." In many MSS and early printed books the revolving circles were held in place by a bit of string knotted at both ends to keep it in place. As for the wheels themselves, Llull suggests they should be made of metal (see the variant to the previous sentence from Ms B given in *ORL* XVI, 18, n. 3, as well as Dist. III, nn. 29–30 below, and the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 298 = Int. vi, 6); in all the Lullian revolving figures I have seen, however, the circles are made out of paper or parchment.

[43] Llull means that any of the sets of letters from B to R (or B to Q in T, or B to P in V) from any of these other figures can be substituted for those of Figure S, as he has already suggested (see the texts corresponding to nn. 4 and 14 above).

[44] $\binom{7+2-1}{2} = \binom{8}{2} = \frac{8 \cdot 7}{1 \cdot 2} = 28$

ment than to another, as can be discovered by introducing T into each compartment, insofar as is appropriate, respecting its conditions and those of the compartment.

The Figure of the Principles of Theology

life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	
dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter	
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory		
act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter		
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int			
form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter			
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int				
relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter				
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's	interp					
order	action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter					
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's	com's						
action	art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter						
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action	art's							
art's	com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter							
life	dign	act	form	relat	order	action								
com's	interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter								
life	dign	act	form	relat	order									
interp	1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter									
life	dign	act	form	relat										
1 int	2 int	glory	punish	eviter										
life	dign	act	form											
2 int	glory	punish	eviter											
life	dign	act												
glory	punish	eviter												
life	dign													
punish	eviter													
life														
eviter														

1. This figure has been added to the Art in order to make said Art more general.[45] The principles of this figure are: Essence, Life, Dignities, Act, Form, Relation, Order, Action, Articles, Commandments, Interpretation, First Intention, Second Intention, Glory, Punishment, Eviternity.[46] From these sixteen principles is made up this figure containing 136 compartments,[47] which are the universals in which, by means of T, the particulars of theology should be investigated in accordance with the conditions of the Second Distinction.

2. In this figure "essence" refers to the being of A; "life" refers to the life of this essence; "dignities" in this figure refers to those dignities denoted in the Second Figure of A; "act" is the operation of those same dignities; "form" is the ordering of that operation; and "relation" is the act corresponding to each dignity, such as bonification to goodness, magnification to greatness, eternalization to eternity, empowering to power,

[45] Thus in V and B. M adds "for the more principles it contains, the more general it is," while the Catalan text has "for the fewer principles . . ."

[46] We now begin with the three figures corresponding to the first three of the books of *Principles* (see introduction, text at n. 6 above) from the first cycle of the Art. This one corresponds to the *Principles of Theology*, but as the reader can see by comparing this list with that in *MOG* I, 607 = Int. ix, 1, there have been numerous changes, and in fact only half of the original terms have been retained. This in sharp contrast to the figures of Philosophy and Law, which are almost identical to their predecessors. This is undoubtedly why he goes into the "principles" of theology so thoroughly here, and does not even bother listing the terms for the other two fields in the descriptions of the figures below.

[47] For the number of compartments in this and the following two figures, see n. 4 above.

understanding to wisdom, etc.;[48] for since there is goodness in A, there must also be bonifying, and similarly for the other dignities. We say there is "order" when each Divine Dignity makes intrinsic and extrinsic use of its act; "action" means that A has action in all creatures; "articles" are those things that N believes concerning God; "commandments" are those things that A commands man to do for the sake of V Y against V Z; "interpretation" is that which is done of the Scriptures; "first intention" is final cause; "second intention" is what has reference to purpose; "glory" is Paradise; "punishment" is Hell; and "eviternity" is eternity which has a beginning but exists without end, and it is for this eviternity that S was created.

3. All these principles are provable per se, and conditionable according to the conditions of the other principles, that is, of A S T V X and according to the Second Distinction and the disposition of this Art.

The Figure of the Principles of Philosophy

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter
1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos
motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest
intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt
firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit act
form matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power habit
matter nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet power
nature elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's appet
elem's appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature elem's
appet power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter nature
power habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form matter
habit act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't form
act mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel firm't
mixt digest compos alter

1 cau motion intel
digest compos alter

1 cau motion
compos alter

1 cau
alter

This Figure of Philosophy is composed of 136 compartments, made up from the sixteen principles of philosophy, which principles are written in the compartments of this figure. In a book called the *Principles of Philosophy* we discussed them, giving proofs and conditions. Thus, according as these principles were proved and conditioned in that book, they are to be used in this Art to investigate whatever particular of philosophy one is seeking, by introducing T into each compartment, according to whether it can be admitted into said compartment, re-

[48] For these correlative verbs and the problem of their English equivalents, see *Gentile*, Bk. III, nn. 16 and 47. As to the individual principles discussed in this paragraph, for essence and its relation to being, see *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 2 and n. 6, in addition to the very similar passage corresponding to the *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 43. For the dignities, see n. 3, above; for form, see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 36; the commandments are of course the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament; for first and second intention see n. 11 above; for glory and punishment, see Bks. IX and X of *Felix*; for eviternity, see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n.

specting the conditions of T, of S A V X Y Z, and of the above-mentioned compartments, and following the rule of the Second Distinction.

The Figure of the Principles of Law



1. This is the Figure of Law, composed of the sixteen principles written in the compartments of this figure, which compartments constitute 136 universals in which one can investigate each particular of law. This investigation should be done by introducing T into each compartment, according as each compartment or compartments of the figure is concordant with or similar to a given particular or particulars, for according to the quality of the particular and the difference between compartments, any particular accords better with one compartment than with others.

2. In a book called the *Principles of Law* we proved and conditioned the principles of this figure, and thus in accordance with those conditions and with the rule of the Second Distinction we make use of these principles in this *Demonstrative Art*, since all questions and cases pertaining to law can be directed to those sixteen principles, according to the disposition of this Art.[49]

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11. For a more detailed discussion of all these terms, see *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 238–41 = Int. iv, 42–5, as well as *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 529–30 = Int. viii, 27–8.

[49] The lack of the expected Fourth Figure of the Principles of Medicine is accounted for by its place having been taken by the Elemental Figure (see introduction, text following n. 6, as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 59).

HERE BEGINS THE SECOND DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF CONDITIONS

1. The Second Distinction of this Art is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the conditions that apply to the Second Elemental Figure; the second deals with the conditions that apply to the Second Demonstrative Figure. Thus in these two figures are included all the conditions of this Art, to which conditions we submit all the compartments by introducing T into each of the compartments of the above-mentioned two figures, in order to condition these compartments, so that through their conditioning all the other compartments belonging to A S T V X Y Z may also be conditioned.

2. Since we feel sensually and understand intellectually, and since we feel first and afterwards understand, we therefore intend first to condition the first part, which has to do with sensuality, and then condition the second part, which has to do with intellectuality.[1]

THE SECOND ELEMENTAL FIGURE

The Second Elemental Figure is divided into ten compartments, as has already been explained. We therefore propose to deal with them in order, first with the first compartment, and then one after the other with the rest. And according to the way we condition one of these compartments, it will mean that others are to be conditioned in the same way, so that by means of the conditions of one compartment one can condition other compartments. Since, however, we propose to introduce diverse conditions, avoiding repeating similar conditions, we will therefore vary the

[1] This whole little prologue is analyzed in Pring-Mill, *Número*, pp. 41–3. See also introduction, text at n. 17.

conditions of the compartments from one to the other as much as possible.

1. The Compartment of [Fire Fire]

1. With the blue triangle in the compartment of fire fire, this compartment is conditioned in the following way, namely, that each fire is a creature and A is the Creator, and that fire is an artificial work of A, as well as having its own natural work; and this work is something each fire has as a symbol of the natural work A has within Himself, as well as of that work He has outside Himself. And therefore in itself simple fire produces[2] a compound from itself; and since in this work there are accidents proceeding from the virtue of substance to which universal matter is subject through composition of the elements, therefore simple fire cannot operate in itself as perfectly as can A, which is one in essence, entity, work, and substance, without any composition. This being the case, if any particular which is being sought accords with what has already been said about the above-mentioned compartment, it is affirmable; if, however, it is contrary to the conditions of this compartment, that is to say, if it states that A is not Creator, nor fire a creature, nor the work of A superior to that of fire in nobility, simplicity, and virtue, then such a particular is clearly deniable.

2. By means of the green triangle we understand that there exists a difference between simple fire and compound fire; for the simple form of simple fire has simple fiery matter, which underlies simple fiery form; and fire in a compound is part of simple fire, existing in a substance composed of all four elements, and in matter combined and composed out of fiery, airy, watery, and earthly matter, which matter underlies the common form of fire, air, water, and earth, and from the common matter and form is constituted the supposite[3] in which simple fire and compound fire are concordant

[2] The translation disguises the derivation of *operatur* (Cat. *obra* as a verb) from *opus* (Cat. *obra* as a noun), which latter is translated as "work" in the rest of this passage; cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, nn. 13, 23. For simplicity and composition of the elements, see the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 227–30 = Int. iv, 31–4, which contains an extended commentary on this compartment and on the next one of [Fire Air] . See also *Felix*, Bk. IV, n. 3. The reader unfamiliar with the medieval theory of the four elements—to say nothing of Llull's special use of it—would do well to read Bk. IV of *Felix* (especially chs. 19–21) before embarking on Dist. II of the *Ars demonstrativa*.

[3] Cf. Dist. I, n. 34.

in the way of generation and relation, and contrary through action and passion, visibility and invisibility, generability and ingenerability, corruption and incorruption. This being the case, if any particular which is being sought is in disaccord with this compartment, according as we put the green triangle in it, then such a particular is deniable in the answer to the question; if, however, it accords with the compartment and with the green triangle, then the particular is affirmable. And this same rule applies to all the other compartments and to all the triangles, as well as to each of their angles.

3. By means of the red triangle we understand that simple fire is the origin[4] of compound fire, since because simple fire cannot operate in itself without the other elements, it begins in its entity and nature to engender compound fire, which would be completely simple if the other elements were not present. Since they are present, they themselves are the means by which simple fire originates compound fire in itself; and since simple fire seeks within itself the perfection of its operation, it therefore has a natural tendency toward its own end, and hence it is the origin and end of simple fire, while compound fire is the means and object of its operation.

4. The yellow triangle in this compartment shows that simple fire has greater virtue than compound fire, and therefore virtue remains in potentiality in simple fire on account of its very great greatness, since all of it could never fit in compound fire. And when the supposite fails, then from that very great virtue which was existing potentially there issues forth a virtue that enters another individual substance, thereby conserving the virtue that existed in compound fire. And since simple fire from its own nature engenders compound fire, therefore the two are equal in species and entity, like the Father and the Son, who are equal in species and in nature.[5]

5. By means of the black triangle one must, in the compartment, affirm everything by which the conditions of the triangle are upheld, and deny everything by which these same conditions are annulled. And one must doubt everything by which some con-

[4] For the terms "origin," "means," and "end" used in this paragraph, see Dist. 1, n. 16.
[5] Thus in V and B; the printed sources have "human nature."

ditions are both contrary and concordant to others, and by which some triangles both annul some and uphold others.

2. *The Compartment of* [Fire Air]

1. By means of the blue triangle, this compartment of fire and air is conditioned to be a creature of A; and it is also conditioned by the fact that fire works in air by producing heat and giving it to the air.

2. By means of the green triangle one discovers the difference between fire and air, in that fire is by nature hot and air by nature moist; as well as the concordance between the two, in that both have a tendency, fire to heat air, air to receive this heat; and also contrariety between the two, in that fire receives dryness, which is contrary to air,[6] and air gives the heat it receives from fire to water, through heated moisture.

3. By means of the red triangle we understand that fire is the origin of the working of air, for air, upon receiving heat, works on part of the water in itself, for it could not work without mortifying cold; and air is the beginning of the mortification of heat, for, through a great abundance of humidity in which there is little heat, cold is increased in relation to dryness in earth. And the intermediary between fire and air is the dryness and cold existing between the two, that is, the dryness which fire receives from earth and bestows on air by infusing it with its heat, in which dryness there is the cold which water infuses in earth, and which dryness, thus cooled, fire receives from earth. And the goal of these two is the supposite for the generation or corruption of which both have a tendency, according as the supposite is more inclined towards the quality of one element than towards that of another.

4. By means of the yellow triangle we understand fire to be greater than air with respect to its sphere, its velocity,[7] and the

[6] I.e., fire receives the dryness from earth, which is contrary to air. For an explanation of this and the next clause, see the opening paragraphs of *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 19, and of the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, ch. 2, which are synthesized in the chart of elemental relationships in Table 5. In fact, throughout this part of the *Ars demonstrativa*, references to the motion of the elemental qualities will make it advisable for the reader to keep this chart readily available.

[7] For the spheres of the elements (where fire is outer- or uppermost), see the same Table 5. See also the *Liber chaos*, *MOG* III, 250 = Int. v, 2, where not only are the four spheres described, but the "velocity" of fire is discussed.

nobility of its virtue, while air is greater than fire in the conservation of life and in a sanguine body;[8] and the two are equal in justice according to their proportion in the supposites into which they enter in mixture, digestion, and composition.

5. Metaphorically speaking, fire affirms that, by heating air, it will achieve its fulfillment and will mortify water, but since air infuses heat into water, or in other words, into matter subject to humidity, then fire has doubts about achieving the desired goal; and therefore by corruption it denies that it can find its perfection in that supposite which it corrupts; and the same thing can be understood about air.

3. The Compartment of [Fire Water]

1. By the blue triangle we understand God to be creator of the entire compartment of fire and water, and thus all the workings of this compartment must be created. Moreover, fire works in water, as well as the reverse procedure, which is contrary to it, as a sign that the work which A has in itself is concordant, without any contrariety.

2. There is diversity[9] between fire and water, in that fire heats air, while water cools earth. There is concordance between fire and water, although only through intermediaries, for fire is concordant with air in heat, which air accords with water on account of its humidity, and water, because of its cold, accords with earth, which, because of its dryness, accords with fire. And there is contrariety between fire and water, because fire, in itself, in air, and in earth, mortifies the water that has entered air, with earth giving dryness (which contains cold) to fire, and with fire giving this water to air as it gives the heat by which water has been mortified; and the same thing happens with the mortification of heat, which water does against fire.

3. In a choleric body fire is the origin of water; moreover, fire is the means by which air receives water that is heated, dried, and

[8] A reference to one of the four humors, for which see Dist. III, n. 5 below, and *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 28. As pointed out there, blood corresponds to the "quality" of moisture, and hence to air.

[9] "Diversity" is a common Lullian synonym for the "difference" of the green triangle of Figure T.

moistened as a result of the turning back through each other that the elements do; and the purpose, that is, the final intention, of fire is the constraining of water, whereas the final intention of water is what it does out of its own free, natural inclination when it submits to fire.

4. Fire is greater than water by its form, whereas water is greater than fire by its matter; and therefore fire is of greater virtue than water; at the same time they are, in absolute terms, equal to one another as to quantity of lightness and heaviness, since just as fire is light in relation to itself, so water is heavy in relation to itself.

5. Metaphorically speaking, the more fire is inclined to assimilate its accidents to its substance in entity and nature, the more it affirms and is of the opinion, so to speak, that it should expel and remove water from that substance so that it might simplify and purify that substance from all contrariety and composition, and the greater the domination of fire in this task, the more its accidents help it achieve its intention, and the more they make water be inclined toward its negation, so that fire may find its perfection in that body.[10] But the more water resists fire, showing it how impossible it is for water to be expelled from that substance, the more fire falls into doubt, so to speak.

4. *The Compartment of* [Fire Earth]

1. A is the creator of the compartment of fire and earth, and therefore the compartment is a creature; and since fire could not give heat if it did not receive dryness from the earth, one can therefore, through this activity of fire, understand that A, whose works are greater and nobler than those of fire, works in itself, without having in itself the need to receive any perfection outside of its own nature.

2. There is diversity between fire and earth in that fire receives and earth gives; for fire evacuates earth, by receiving dryness from it, and earth fills up fire by entering into it. Earth, when it proceeds from fire and enters air with heat, is concordant with the action of fire, with which fire it is contrary when it enters it with cold and when the fire itself enters into the air with dried heat.

[10] Thus in A M; V B have "in that substance."

3. Fire is the origin of the ascent of earth, as is earth of the descent of fire, which descent fire carries out till it is beneath the sphere of water;[11] and the intermediary between fire and earth is the matter of fire that is subject to drying, and the matter of earth that is subject to emptying.[12] But the final cause on account of which fire descends to receive dryness is that it seeks the simple conjunction of fiery matter and form so that it may be a simple body; and the same thing happens with the ascent of earth.

4. In a grain of pepper, fire is present in greater degree than earth, for fire is in the fourth degree and earth in third; this is because fire is hot naturally by itself, and dry because of earth, and because pepper is of a hot and dry complexion.[13] There is equality between fire and earth in that fire exists in the first degree when water is in fourth, and earth is in first when air is in fourth.[14]

5. Everything by which fire and earth are naturally more concordant is affirmable, and consequently everything by which natural appetite or inclination is greater in them is affirmable; therefore everything by which fire and earth are less concordant is deniable, as well as everything by which natural appetite is less in them, like the appetite of fire and earth, which would be less if fire and earth existed in their spheres as simple bodies, with water and air being between fire and earth, impeding the interaction of fire and earth;[15] thus, if it is more doubtful that fire and earth exist in their spheres as bodies than as nonbodies[16] as a result of a greater natural appetite, then the greater doubt must necessarily be deniable, and the lesser doubt affirmable.

[11] The elements are "light" or "heavy" in accordance with the spheres they occupy (see n. 7 above), and this is the cause of their tendency to "ascend" or "descend." When two of them enter into composition (which Llull is describing here), the lighter (or heavier) partner tends to pull the other up (or down). Llull wrote an entire treaties *On the Lightness and Heaviness of the Elements,* where this question of elemental motion is gone into in some detail (see *Opera medica,* Int. iv, 3–4).

[12] For this concept of (simple) matter constituting the intermediary in the formation of complexions, cf. the *Principles of Medicine,* Dist. II, the beginning of ch. 7

[13] For the degrees in pepper, see *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 19, and *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. V, ch. 15. For complexions, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 28.

[14] See the diagram of qualities and degrees in the *Principles of Medicine*, Table 10 in that work, where the first degree of heat in S equals the first degree of dryness in O.

[15] This is a notion Llull often explains in terms of the disposition of the elements in the first column of the first of the four elemental figures; cf. *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 349 = Int. vi, 59, par. 6.

[16] Thus in V B; M has "if it is doubtful whether fire and earth do or do not exist in their spheres as simple bodies"; A leaves out the clause altogether. For the nonbodily nature of the (simple) elements, see also Comp. 9, par. 5, and Comp. 10, par. 2, below.

5. *The Compartment of* [Air Air]

1. A is the creator of simple air and compound air; and that air which is simple operates beneath the rule and influence of A, as well as beneath the rule of intelligence and of the life of the firmament, which is the Quintessence,[17] and beneath this regularity simple air operates naturally in compound air, having a natural inclination to conserve the individuals of those species which it finds most suitable, even though it has no discernment,[18] and which it conserves through universal principles, namely matter and form. For just as an arrow, which, by means of the impulse or impetus of a bow, is set in motion toward the place designated by the archer's imagination, lacks any natural inclination or motion, so in the contrary sense, by the influence of supreme principles, air must have a natural inclination to generate the purpose for which the aforementioned species possess the faculty of conservation; and this necessity exists so that in nobility of effect is symbolized nobility of cause.

2. Between simple air and compound air there is a difference, for compound air exists accidentally and by means of various different accidents, since simple air, in making up compound air, does so out of accidents which come neither from its virtue nor its nature, but which are in fact the parts and forms of fire, water, and earth. Hence every substance is by nature and entity distinct from its accidents, which distinction would not exist if each accident could come from simple substance and virtue. This being the case, therefore, on account of the difference between substance and accidents, there exists concordance and contrariety between substance and accidents, according as the elements are, by their qualities, different, concordant, or contrary.

3. Final intention is the origin of the principle[19] of second intention; means is the intermediary between these two intentions; but since simple air comes before compound air in terms of no-

[17] Llull is here using terms from the Figure of Philosophy, in which "intelligence" can be synonymous with "angel" (cf. Pla II, 174★, n. 177), and "firmament" is the term for the abode of the planets and the signs of the zodiac (cf. Dist. IV, text at n. 127 below). For the Quintessence or Fifth Essence, see *Felix*, Bk. IV, n. 16.

[18] Thus, *discretionem*, in V and B (Galmés, *ORL* XVI, 31, n. 1, misread the MS abbreviation as *distinctionem*); A M have "intention."

[19] *Principium principii* (Cat. *comensament del comensament*); cf. Dist. I, n. 16 above.

bility, it therefore comes before compound air in terms of final intention, through which priority simple air is the origin of compound air, while the other elements are intermediaries between them.

4. Simple air is a common and absolute part, beneath which lie all the parts of compound air, together with the other parts of the other compound elements. It is therefore clear that simple air is greater and compound air lesser; and simple air enters compound air to the degree that the parts of the other compound elements allow it to enter into composition. Equality between simple and compound air exists in a supposite, with one simple part measured against many compound parts according to quantity, and with these parts existing along with other parts of the other elements; and these many parts from which compound air is produced are beneath the simple part of air in virtue and regimen, and this simple part has majority over the other parts, as is explained in the *Principles of Medicine* and *of Philosophy*, where we discuss the seventh point.[20]

5. It must be affirmed that compound air is the act or operation of simple air, since, just as C cannot understand without B, so simple air cannot operate without the composition of moisture, heat, cold, and dryness. This being the case, it must be denied that the air which enters into water does not differ from the air which water introduces into earth, since air enters water by means of generation and earth by means of corruption, which corruption accords with minority, while generation accords with majority; and in this matter there is no room for doubt.

6. *The Compartment of* [Air Water]

1. A is the creator of this compartment of air, water, and in accord with this relationship, air and water are creatures of A; moreover, A operates this compartment by bonifying, magnifying, willing, etc., without any movement of its own goodness, greatness, will, etc., whereas air cannot operate in water without movement, time, place, etc.

[20] *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. VI, ch. 17 (see n. 3 there), and *Principles of Philosophy*, Dist. VIII, Quarta Ratio. See also Comp. 8, par. 3 and n. 27 below.

2. There is a difference between air and water, because air is moist and water is cold. And there is concordance between them, since air gives moisture to water, and water receives this moisture unto itself, with air emptying the subject of its moisture and filling the subject of the cold of water; but because air introduces into the subject of the cold of water matter that is heated and subject to moisture and heat, therefore air is contrary to water; and because water gives over that heated matter to the subject of the dryness of earth, therefore water is in like manner contrary to air.

3. Air is the beginning of the entrance of fire into water, by receiving heat and giving it to water along with moisture, and this beginning is initiated when it begins to join one part to another, that is to say, one point to another, and when it places certain parts in others. And this beginning is the means by which time, place, motion, quantity, quality, action, and passion exist in the intrinsicality of the substance, which has within itself the second act of its accidents, which arise from its virtue. And its purpose, once the parts of the elements are duly joined and united, is to constitute the substance itself; and the same thing is true of water in earth, earth in fire, and fire in air.

4. Air and water have majority without any intermediary, whereas they have minority with an intermediary, that is to say that the activity of air in giving and water in receiving, without any intermediary, is greater than that of air and water, when water passes through earth and fire into air along with dryness, which is contrary to air, and with heat, which is contrary to itself, in which contrariety there is equality between air and water, on account of which equality justice is naturally formed;[21] for when water traverses earth and fire and arises in air, then it is as mortified as is air when it traverses water and earth and arises in fire.

5. It must be affirmed that water is in the second degree, fire in the third, and earth in the first in that supposite in which air is in the fourth degree;[22] and one must not imagine that, when air enters into composition with water it loses[23] its simple form, for in that case nothing would conserve its nature in a supposite con-

[21] Thus in V B; A M have "natural justice is formed."
[22] Cf. *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. 1, ch. 1, species O.
[23] Thus, *es desviu* ("sacrifices, gives up"), in A; V B have *denudet* ("lays bare"), while M has the opposite, *non amittat* ("does not shed").

taining the common matter and form underlying the simple forms of all the elements, which forms would then exist in privation in each supposite which had no common simple form essentially underlying all particular, natural forms.

7. *The Compartment of* [Air Earth]

1. God is the Creator of this compartment of air earth, as well as of its operation, and therefore this compartment has two acts, one of which is primary and the other secondary: the first is one of existence, and the second of operation.

2. Air and earth differ in matter and form, as well as in their spheres; for the sphere of air is circular, whereas that of earth is round, with only one surface.[24] Air and earth are contrary through their qualities and motion, as well as in many other ways; whereas they are concordant through intermediaries, such as fire and water. For on account of the concordance which fire has with air in giving it heat and which that same fire has with earth in receiving dryness from it, and on account of the concordance which water has with air in receiving moisture from it and which it has with earth in giving it cold, fire and water passively establish within themselves concordance of air and earth.

3. Air is the beginning of the mortification of earth, for air begins in itself to mortify earth when it receives heat from fire, which heat comes accompanied by dryness and cold, which cold is the means by which air mortifies earth in giving moisture to water, so that its purpose—the destruction of earth—is fulfilled; and earth does the same thing to water, insofar as it mixes with the other elements.

4. Air in itself has majority, whereas the earth present in air is in minority, and vice versa; for when air enters water it is in greater quantity than when, through water, it enters earth, which earth increases in its mortification of air and decreases in the increase that air takes on in water, in which it mortifies the earth that travels over [25] through fire and air, finally arriving at the water itself. But since fire and water are equal in their amount of heaviness and

[24] The wording is confusing, but as can be seen from Table 5, what Llull means is that air forms a hollow sphere, whereas that of earth is solid.

[25] Instead of the "travels over" of V B, A M have "is born there and brought forth."

lightness, that is to say, just as fire is swift in its tendency to rise because of its lightness, so water is swift in its tendency to sink through its weight, therefore air and earth must be similarly equal in their amount of lightness and heaviness, with air being light and earth heavy.

5. According to the course of nature it must be affirmed that just as the parts of a tree are born and issue forth into branches, and from branches into flowers, from flowers into fruit, and from fruit into seed, and in each birth and issue the parts are renewed, as has already been explained, so air is born and issues forth into water by generation, into earth by corruption, and into fire by temperament, and in each of these places renewal takes place. This being the case, it therefore cannot be denied or doubted that air and earth, in the substance in which they are mixed and compounded with other elements, produce the accidents of the substance in the very substance itself, joining some parts to others, with parts being born and issuing from some parts into others, and with some elements entering and issuing from other elements in the normal way.

8. *The Compartment of* [Water Water]

1. God is the Creator of this compartment of water water, and the compartment is His creature; moreover, the activity of water in fire, in earth, in air, and in itself is also His creature.

2. There is a difference between active water and passive water, in that from active water generation is brought about, and from passive water corruption. The concordance, on the other hand, existing between active and passive water is due to their natural appetite, for active water attracts passive water to itself, so that it may release it from passivity, while passive water desires active water, so that it may have natural activity against heat.[26] The contrariety between the two kinds of water, however, is with an intermediary, for as long as active water attracts passive water, it similarly and unwillingly attracts the heat beneath which passive water lies, and this passive water enters into active water with heat; and because of this entry of heat, active water becomes pas-

[26] For action and passivity in the elements, see the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. IV, the end of ch. 12.

sive and passive water becomes active, and in this way one element is transformed into another.

3. When simple water has a desire to become part of a body where cold dominates in the fourth degree, then it begins to divide itself into various points, so that it may generate compound water, and then from itself it gives three points to air, two to earth, and only one to fire. And these six points make up compound water, while simple water retains the seventh point in order to control and conserve its simple form in said compound water, of which simple water is the origin, by means of the six separate points, of which three are given to the air, and so on for the others, as has already been explained.[27] And the purpose of this is so that there may exist a certain supposite, which supposite is a certain being underlying the above-mentioned origins, which origins are the essence of that being.

4. Simple water has majority through its own simple form and through the simple matter which is subject to that form; and it has minority because in a continuous quantity it cannot have a simple conjunction of its matter and form, which conjunction it therefore seeks in discrete quantity through the difference of parts that are contrary, contiguous, and extended in length, width, and depth in compound water, which is equal to simple water throughout the entire body, existing in discrete quantity for all the continuous quantity of simple water from which that elemented body arises.

5. One must affirm that, according to nature, there is an intermediary between simple and compound water, that is to say, the three other compound elements in compound water. Nor should we doubt that, between the simple form of simple water and the simple subject of that form, which is simple matter, there is an intermediary, that is to say, the other three elements along with water compounded with those elements, which intermediary is a supposite existing as an individual of the species; since if the compound were not an intermediary between said simple form and its simple subject, then we would have to deny the workings of nature, for the conjunction between that simple form and its mat-

[27] For this system of points, see the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. x, n. 14.

ter would be so strong that compound water could not issue forth from earth nor fire, nor could it be generated in air.

9. *The Compartment of* [Water Earth]

1. It was ordained by the Creator that His creature exemplify Him his works, just as does compound water, which works in compound earth beneath the work that simple water works in simple earth, with compound form and compound matter following the disposition of simple form and matter, in the same way that the matter and form of wood follow the simple form that the craftsman imagines in his work.

2. There is difference between water and earth in that water receives moisture and earth cold; and because moisture and cold are concordant in water, and moisture and dryness are contrary in earth, therefore water and earth are concordant in one way, while contrary in another.

3. When simple water begins to enter into composition, in an instant it arises in earth and issues forth from air, and thus as soon as air begins to arise in earth and traverse water, then at once water begins to enter into earth, giving it coldness, and receiving moisture from the air from which it proceeds. And as a result of such means, there is constant beginning, until through generation it achieves its purpose, which is perfection. And then there begins the corruption that does not cease until the supposite comes into privation.

4. Water is greater in earth because of the proximity of its work than in fire, where the work is distant, because proximate work is without intermediary, with water giving its cold directly to earth, along with which cold water must also give its form and matter in order that composition take place; and also because cold cannot be removed from the form and matter[28] that are inseparable from it. The work, however, is distant when water acts against fire through an intermediary, entering fire by means of earth, for in that fire water cannot give as much cold to the earth present in that fire as it can in proximate work. And in the same way, also because of the proximity and remoteness of its work, as we

[28] Thus in V B; A has "the form or subject"; M combines them, putting "the form and matter or subject."

have explained in the case of water, earth is greater in fire than in air. This being the case, as a result therefore of the above-mentioned majority and minority of water and earth, the equality of water and earth is clearly exemplified in the proximate and distant work of both; for in its proximate work, the water working in earth is equal to the earth working in fire, and in its distant work, the water working in fire coming to it through earth, which is the intermediary, is equal to the earth working in air and coming to it through the intermediary of fire; on account of which equality an equity is brought about, one which is midway between the aforementioned majority and minority.

5. One should affirm that, according to the course of nature, the water entering earth is not a body, just as the vegetative power which is set in motion throughout a tree is not a body; for if it were a body, it would follow that one body entered another, which entrance is to be denied without the slightest hesitation.[29]

10. The Compartment of [Earth Earth]

1. Creature is the proximate work of A, whereas the work of this creature is distant work, and this is as a result of the comparison of being and privation; for creature is more proximate work to A than is the work of that creature, such as the work of simple earth generating compound earth, which compound earth is creature and effect of A and not the creature of simple earth, but only its work.

2. There is difference between simple earth and compound earth, both through accident and substance. The difference through accident is the result of heat, quantity, etc., while that through substance is as a result of corporeity and incorporeity; because simple earth present in a compound vegetative body is not per se a body, even though it is of a corporeal nature, and is a substantial form, being a form with respect to compound earth, with that earth being a body together with the other elements; which substantial form gives form to mixed earth by being in concordance with it through the universal, substantial, incorporeal form beneath which all the simple forms lie in concordance and

[29] Cf. n. 16 above.

contrariety, according to what is necessary for the generation of some supposites and the corruption of others for the sake of the preservation of the species.

3. If simple earth were the origin of all compound earth in such a way that it would not have over it two principles, which are universal form and primary matter, then simple earth would so transmute compound earth to its own simplicity that through the privation of universal means there would be brought about the destruction of the natural tendency by which simple earth affects compound earth, and by which, in this compound earth, fire, air, and water carry out their purpose, that is, the fulfillment of their work.

4. The earth that is newly born in fire is greater in strength than the earth that, traversing fire, is born and decays in air; and therefore the motion of earth is in greater majority in children than in old people, since earth passes through its contrary more often in an old person than in a child. This being the case, the majority and minority of earth exemplifies the equality existing between earth and earth, which equality is a question of both matter and form; for the earth that passes through fire into air is equal in form to the matter of earth that only passes over into fire, even when it is not as passive in fire as in air, and even when earth is naturally greater through form than through matter; and thus they become equal to one another in their different passings over, times, movements, and places.

5. One must affirm that iron is impelled towards a magnet because the earth that is in iron is attracted to the great simplicity of earth that is present in magnetite, which causes the magnet to draw the iron to it, since in no other mineral is there such simplicity of earth as in magnetite.[30] Now since this cannot be doubted or denied, it is thus affirmable that when, in the human body, compound earth is blocked so that it cannot receive the influence of simple earth, then that is the cause of illness, just as its opposite can also be the cause of illness, as when the pores are too open

[30] See *Felix*, Bk. VI, ch. 35, and the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, ch. 5, for similar explanations of magnetism; for a slightly different explanation, see *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 170 = Int. iii, 154. The reading of the last clause ("since in no other . . .") is from B V; A M have "since earth has greater simplicity in iron (A: in it) than in any other metal."

and through them the influence of simple earth can pass too rapidly towards compound earth, as is exemplified in a simple laxative medicine, which has so great an inclination towards a simplicity similar to itself that through indigestion it is rapidly ejected from the stomach along with its similar or contrary humor.

Here ends the first part of this Second Distinction, in which we have given the rule as to how the particular we are investigating should be sought in the natural and in the universal by means of the compartments, which we have conditioned in the universal with T, and of which in some particular principles we have given examples.

HERE BEGINS THE SECOND PART OF THE SECOND DISTINCTION WHICH TREATS OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE SECOND DEMONSTRATIVE FIGURE

THIS PART is divided into twenty-eight compartments, corresponding to those in the figure, which compartments we condition with T, introducing T into each compartment, in order to exemplify how the particular should be examined in each compartment by means of T, insofar as a given compartment accords with that particular; because if it is not found in one compartment, then it must be sought diligently among the other compartments until it is found, not forgetting, however, the forms and rules of the compartments and of T, and forming the compartments in the First Demonstrative Figure.

1. The Compartment of [A A]

1. Into A A we first introduce the blue triangle, so that A A be understood to mean that unity, essence and dignities are a single creator of sensual, intellectual and animal creatures, as well as of natural, intellectual, and artificial works.[31] A A should also be understood as referring to the intrinsic work of the unity, essence

[31] Note how *all* of these terms belong to the blue triangle of Figure T (see Dist. 1, Figure T, par. 2, above).

and dignities of A, with goodness bonifying, greatness magnifying, eternity eternifying, etc., through the unity and essence of A, with goodness working in itself and bonifying in greatness, and so on, and conversely. And if this were not the case, it would be impossible for A to have perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, will, justice, etc., or it would be possible for bonifying, etc., to exist as evildoing, etc., which is clearly impossible.

2. There is no difference between unity, essence, and dignities, for if there were, there would be many A's; but since in A there are many dignities that are the same single A, in which all of the dignities are one and the same thing, they are therefore concordant without any contrariety, with the magnifying of greatness existing in the bonifying of goodness, along with the eternifying of eternity, etc., and conversely. Therefore, there exists only one A, which is good, great, eternal, etc., and which is goodness along with its bonifying, greatness along with its magnifying, etc.

3. In A there is no beginning, middle, or end, for if there were, its greatness and eternity would be limited and finite. Since in A, however, there is goodness making its bonifying specific in greatness, eternity, etc., and conversely, therefore it must be the final intention of the will to want, of wisdom to understand, of goodness to bonify, greatness to magnify, and so on for the rest; for if the will wanted, wisdom understood, goodness bonified, and so on without intention, then there would be evil in goodness through the privation of good, and in greatness there would be smallness through the privation of the great, and in wisdom and the other dignities there would be imperfection, and in glory there would be suffering. This, however, is impossible, by which impossibility it is shown that in A there is final intention, one that is eternal and immense,[32] and one that influences all those intentions here below which have beginning, middle, and end.

4. In A there cannot be majority and minority, for majority could not be in it without minority of greatness, which would then be deprived of immensity, goodness, etc., which privation is impossible. But since in A there must be equality of bonifying,

[32] This word, of which Llull makes much in the next two paragraphs, should be taken in its more etymological meaning of "immeasurable, boundless, endless."

magnifying, etc., therefore the goodness must be equal to greatness and so on, without which equality there would, in A, be minority removing greatness from goodness and bonifying, from immensity and immensifying, which deprivation is impossible.

5. A exists; for if it did not exist, no good would exist without evil, no greatness without littleness, no eternity without beginning; and the same thing would be true of perfection, which would not exist without imperfection, nor would justice exist without injustice, nor nobility without baseness, and so on for the others. But since goodness, greatness, etc. are concordant with being, and their opposites with privation, therefore one should not doubt that A exists, nor should one deny the existence in it of goodness, greatness, etc.; because if there were no goodness, greatness, etc. in A, then it would be impossible for A to exist, since this existence is in accord with no being in which there is not immense goodness, greatness, etc., and in which, through bonification, there is no goodness in greatness, nor, through magnification, any greatness in goodness, and so on for the rest, which bonification is so great, etc., and which magnification is so good, etc., that it could only accord with a being that is A.

2. *The Compartment of* [A S]

1. A is Creator and S a creature, for if it were not a creature, it would be farther from the work of the bonifying of goodness, the magnifying of greatness, than it would be as a creature created from nothing through the great influence of bonifying, magnifying, etc. Since, however, greater proximity of work accords with being and with the greatness of these compartments [E A V Y | I V Z | M A Y],[33] while lesser proximity of work accords with privation against the greatness of these compartments, therefore it is demonstrated that S is a creature.

2. There is difference between A and S, in that everything which A bonifies, magnifies, etc. intrinsically in itself, is A; for if it were

[33] For the last compartment M has [M A V Y], which is in none of the medieval sources consulted. The first compartment means "the rational soul remembering, understanding, and loving God, virtues, and truth"; the second, "the rational soul remembering, understanding, and hating vices and falsehood"; the third "the will loving God and truth."

not A, then A would be greater through goodness and lesser through bonifying, and the same would be true of the other dignities and their acts, which is impossible. With S, however, this is not the case, for E is not S, nor are B, C, or D S; but since A created S in its likeness, giving it the likeness of goodness and bonifying, greatness and magnifying, duration and enduring, power and empowering, wisdom and knowing, will and wanting, and so on, therefore A is concordant with S when S follows the rule in which A has made it similar to itself, according as S can receive this likeness; but when S does not follow this likeness in B C D, then there is contrariety between A and S according to the compartments of [E V Z | I A V Y].[34]

3. A is the cause, that is, the origin, and S is its effect, and [E V Y | I V Z | M A V Y][35] are the intermediaries by which S is on the path leading to the goal for which it exists, which is having A as its first intention, and itself as second, so that, in glory, A may be the object of E without end and without intermediary, in which object there can exist neither time nor motion.

4. A is greater than S, and thus S is less than A. But since S lasts without end, therefore in duration S is equal to A, so that A may, in its likeness, make use of justice and mercy without end, which use would be in privation if S were mortal, and in this privation of S, goodness, justice, wisdom, and will would be deprived of greatness, which privation of greatness is impossible.

5. S, by affirming the existence in A of all nobility of goodness and bonification, etc., and denying the existence in A of all imperfection, increases E in A V Y, and I in V Z, and removes all doubt from N and destroys R; and when S affirms and denies the opposites of all these things, then it lessens E in A V Z, I in A V Y and N in A V Z, and it increases R in doubt and negation of A V Y.

[34] "The rational soul remembering, understanding, and loving vices and falsehood," and "the rational soul remembering, understanding, and hating God, virtues and truth." Hereafter, I will interpret compartments only when there is some special problem. The reader would do well to keep Table 4 (or Table 5 for Figure S) available until he has familiarized himself with the symbols. He should also keep in mind the double meanings of M and V explained on pp. 324 and 328–9.

[35] Note the minor differences with the compartments discussed in n. 33 above (including the last compartment, which here has four letters in all sources).

3. The Compartment of [A T]

1. By means of the blue triangle we understand T to be the creature and work of A, for the difference and concordance existing between the world and A must be creatures; since if they were not creatures, the bonifying of good, etc. would not exist in such a magnification of greatness as it would if the diversity of the world and the concordance which it has with A were creatures; and the same is true of the contrariety and concordance which the elements have with one another. The concordance of E V Z, however, as well as the contrariety of I V Y cannot be creatures or the work of A, for then goodness, justice and will would be in littleness.[36] And these things we have said about the green triangle in the blue one could similarly be said about the red, yellow and black ones.

2. The diversity of the world cannot diversify A, since if it could diversify it, it could include it, and if it could include it, then it could lessen its simplicity; nor can the concordance of the world and its parts make anything concordant in A, for if it could make anything be intrinsically concordant in it, then the contrariety of the world could make something be intrinsically contrary in A; this, however, is impossible and contrary to the greatness of A.

3. A is the origin of all principles[37] which accord with [E V Y | I V Z | M V Y], and the same is true for all means and all ends that accord with these compartments; and this must be the case, because in A there is every perfection of goodness, greatness, etc., and because in everything that is not A, there is an imperfection of goodness, etc. in comparison with the perfection A has in its goodness, greatness, etc. Thus if A were not the absolute perfection of all being, it would follow that imperfection were the perfection of its subject, which is impossible.

4. A has a greatness that is greater than any majority outside of the entity of A, and therefore there cannot be any minority in A, for it would then be possible for minority to destroy majority and equality, equality, which is impossible. If in A, moreover, there were no equality, it would be impossible for it to have goodness

[36] "Privation" in M.
[37] Same wording in the original as in n. 19 above.

and bonification, greatness and magnification, and so on; which goodness and bonification must be present in A, so that there be equality there, so that no other thing be equal to A, and so that A's understanding and willing not be greater than the bonification of its good and the magnification of its greatness.

5. One can affirm that A is a being having every possibility of goodness, greatness, etc., and every possibility of V Z being impossible in A; and since each possibility and impossibility is affirmable in A, therefore one can deny that A is a being in which there is possibility and impossibility against goodness, greatness, etc. This being the case, one can therefore deny the existence of any doubt in A, since if there were any, there would be ignorance in the wisdom of A, and minority in its greatness, which is of course impossible.

4. *The Compartment of* [A V]

1. A is Creator and blue V is its creature, and therefore blue V is the work of A in S, and thus a work of S itself. It is a work of A, since it is a creature created in S out of nothing; and it is a work of S, since S makes use of blue V according to the final intention for which blue V was created in S. Red V, on the other hand, is not a creature, but rather a work of S acting against blue V. Indeed red V cannot be a creature, since it is against the justice of A, the creator of all created things; it is, however, a work of S, for S, because it was created from nothing, descends along with red V into nothingness against A and blue V, and against its own being.

2. Between A and V there is difference, concordance, and contrariety. There is difference in that in A there is no faith, hope, prudence, or temperance. There is concordance in that A illuminates faith with Y, for since A is Y itself, and since A is good, just, merciful, powerful, etc., therefore it bestows hope; since it is lovable, it bestows charity; since it is just, it bestows justice; since it is intelligible, it bestows prudence;[38] since it is strong, it bestows strength, and since it has equality within itself it therefore instills temperance. Since, however, in A there is nothing of red V, and red V contradicts, with respect to blue V, the influence

[38] For Llull's use of the word "prudence," see the passages corresponding to *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 22, and Bk. III, n. 42.

that blue V can receive from A, therefore there is contrariety between A and red V.

3. A is the origin, means and end of blue V. It is the origin since it is its creator; it is its end, that is to say, its final intention, since, through blue V, S is impelled toward its creator; and A is its means, since through A, S can make use of blue V. A, however, is not the origin, means, or end of red V, since red V is against goodness, greatness, etc. of A. It is therefore impossible for A to be the origin, means, and purpose of red V, for if it were, there would be evil in A's goodness, littleness in its greatness, and so on, which is impossible.

4. A is greater than V, and consequently V is less than A. And even though blue V is greater and red V lesser, it does not follow that the majority of A is further from minority as a result of blue V than as a result of red V, since A created the greatness which blue V has over red V. But since A created S to last without end so that A can use its goodness and justice in S, therefore S is equal to A in duration, so that goodness, justice, etc. can make the following compartments last: [E A V Y | I V Z | E V Z].[39]

5. When S affirms that A exists and possesses all the dignities, then S has faith, hope, charity, etc. If, however, S denies that A and its dignities exist, then it deprives itself of all of blue V. When, on the other hand, S has doubts about A and its dignities, then it forms R, which is the intermediary between blue V and red V. Now this being the case, to the degree that S, by affirming A, increases blue V in itself, so does it mortify red V as well as R in itself, which demonstrates that in A there must necessarily be everything by which blue V increases and red V diminishes.[40]

5. *The Compartment of* [A X]

1. A has perfect wisdom, and therefore X,[41] which is predestination, is the creature and work of that which, in A, is predes-

[39] Cf. the similar compartments commented on in nn. 33 and 34 above. The last two presumably refer respectively to those to be rewarded with Paradise and condemned to Hell.

[40] Thus in V B; A M have "by which blue V increases in virtue and red V diminishes in vice."

[41] "S" in the three medieval sources consulted. Galmés (*ORL* XVI, 48, n. 1) suggests this might be the correct reading, but it is difficult to see how Llull could have meant anything but "X" here.

tination; and justice, which is A, together with free will leads that which is predestined to perfection. For if free will did not exist, it would follow that justice would be working imperfectly in that which wisdom knows perfectly.[42] This, however, is impossible; by which impossibility it is shown how X is partly the creature and work of A, and how it has in itself the work of a creature, insofar as it accords with the perfection that is in A and in its compartments.

2. There is diversity between A and X; since all the compartments of A form a single concordance without any contrariety, whereas the compartments of X are distinct and contrary. In X there are compartments that accord with the compartments of A, as can be seen in the figure, and there are also compartments contrary to them; but there is no need to give any example of these, since all this is self-evident.

3. A is the origin of everything predestined, of every being, of every perfection of creature, as well as of every merit[43] that accords with justice, and the same is true of all the compartments of X that are contrary to blame. And A is the means and purpose of everything that in X exists with the intention of forming these compartments [E A V Y | I V Z].

4. A is concordant with majority and X with minority, because A has in its entity no being concordant with imperfection, privation, blame, etc., which concordance accords with minority. And since in X there are predestination, being, and perfection, therefore X has within itself things equal to A, that is, predestination, being and perfection, which are A.

5. When C affirms that predestination exists, then it affirms it with the perfection of wisdom; and when it affirms that free will exists, then it affirms it with the perfection of justice. And when it affirms that wisdom, justice, and perfection are A, then it affirms that predestination and free will exist. When, however, C affirms that predestination exists and denies that free will exists, then it

[42] Llull always discusses predestination and free will in terms of wisdom and justice, in the sense that God's wisdom would be imperfect without predestination and His justice imperfect without free will. They are thus concordant in God, no matter how contrary they might seem to (uncomprehending) human reason. Cf. compartments (and paragraphs) 5,5; 11,3; 11,5; 20,2; and 23,2 below, as well as *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 100.

[43] Note that "predestination," "being," "perfection," and "merit" are all components of Figure X (cf. n. 113 below). For "merit" and "blame" see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 80.

is subverted in N into having doubts about negation and affirmation. When, on the other hand, B remembers and C understands that predestination and free will exist, as is explained above, then C understands that such a doubt exists in Z, as do predestination and free will in Y; since if the latter were in Z, it would be impossible for B to have remembered that C had understood that predestination and free will existed. Now this being the case, therefore just as we have introduced the black triangle in predestination and free will, in the same way we have given a method as to how the triangle can likewise be introduced into other compartments of X, always keeping in mind the conditions of the compartments of A.

6. *The Compartment of* [A Y]

1. A is Y, and it is the creator of that Y existing in the red triangle,[44] which Y is the work of A, and which, being verified by means of blue V, works against red V with E I N when S forms the following compartments: [E V Y | I V Z | M V Y Z].

2. Between Y that is A, and Y that is a creature as a result of blue V, there is a difference, in that one is creator and the other creature. But since Y that is cause is A, and Y that is effect is creature, therefore there is concordance between A and Y, which concordance is contrary to that Y which accords with red V and with Z.

3. A is the origin of all created Y, and this created Y is the means by which S attains the goal for which Y was created, with S having the following compartments: [E Y | I Z | M Y Z].

4. A is concordant with majority, and created Y with minority, and therefore however much E can receive from Y, which is A, it is less than A itself, since everything that E receives from A it receives with created Y. But because created Y is known and loved by the totality of A, it therefore exists equally throughout the totality of A, for if it did not, the essence of A would have partial and not total knowledge. And since Y is created and limited, it is therefore less than A, and the equality created Y has with A does not exist by itself, nor is it anything resulting from the being and

[44] Cf. comp. 26, par. 3 below.

entity of Y, but instead it is, as a result of the greatness of A, the act of A's compartments.

5. To affirm with Y the existence in A[45] of everything that is in A, is to deny with Y whatever is not in A; and to deny whatever is in A, and to affirm that whatever is not in A is in A, is against Y; which Y is greater through affirmation than through negation; for if this were not the case, it would not be greater through denial, which accords with affirmation, than through doubt, which accords with Z; and this is clearly impossible.

7. *The Compartment of* [A Z]

1. A is concordant with Y, which is contrary to Z, and therefore it is impossible that A be the creator and maker[46] of Z, and consequently that Z be the creature or work of A, since creation can only be fittingly attributed to God, who must carry it out in terms of His greatness of goodness, etc. If, however, you raise the objection that heat is the creation and work of A, even though heat is contrary to the coldness of water which is the creature and work of A, I would answer by saying that the contrariety of fire and water does not contradict A, its compartments or its natural work, whereas Z absolutely contradicts Y as well as A and its compartments.

2. There is diversity and contrariety between A Z, as is evident; nor can there be concordance between A Z since wisdom knows that the will hates in proportion to how much justice is contrary to it.

3. A is the origin of S, and any S which has E in Z is subject to that Z. And since S is so much the result of A that it can have these compartments [E A V Y | I V Z], which accord with A, it is therefore demonstrated that A is not the origin of Z, for if it were, it would then be impossible for S to form compartments that would be contrary to Z. But since S comes from nothingness, which accords with imperfection, and since Z and imperfection are in accord and S can incline its being toward imperfection, as

[45] Thus in the Catalan version. The Latin texts have "in ipso" for "in A," which gives a reading for this first clause that one *could* translate as "To affirm with Y that whatever it contains is contained in A."

[46] The "and maker" is missing in A M.

something coming from its original nothingness, therefore, by this means, S, having the compartments [E V Z | I A V Y],[47] is the origin of Z, which origin is counter to the final intention of the compartment [E A V Y], to which end S was created.

4. A and majority accord, as do Z and minority. Because of this it is impossible for A Z to be equals, even though Z be equally known by wisdom and detested by the will eternally for the entire infinity of wisdom and will.

5. Every affirmation and denial made concerning A with Z must be against A,[48] and therefore it is impossible for doubt and Z to be in A, because it would then be possible for affirmation and denial, which accord with Z, and to be present in A, which is impossible and against the greatness of A and its compartments.

8. Compartment of [S S]

This compartment signifies the species of soul: rational, sensitive, and vegetative; moreover the first S signifies the first act and the second S the second act.[49] But since we want this Art to be as brief as possible, we will deal only with rational S, and from what we will state about it the reader will be able to deal with the other aforementioned species.

S has three powers, namely memorative, intellective, and volitive, which are set out in the Alphabet given at the beginning, as the reader can see for himself. We therefore intend to introduce T into S through E I N R, and since E is first, we will begin by introducing T into it, and then into I N R, thus following the established order.

[47] Note the pairs of opposites Llull establishes: [E A V Y] vs. [E V Z], and [I V Z] vs. [I A V Y], which compartments we have already met in the passages commented in nn. 33 and 34.

[48] Thus in B V. A, however, has "against A M Z," which both the Mainz editors and Galmés read as "against A in Z." Of the three choices, none seems impossible; the second is only the most improbable.

[49] For the constituent parts of man, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 44. For the repeated letters, see Dist. I, the Second Figure of S, par. 2 above. In Llull a first act is when something potential becomes actual (as when the tree existing potentially in the seed actually becomes a tree); a second act is when that thing carries out its destined operation (as when the tree bears fruit, the intellect understands, etc.); cf. *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 3.

8/1. THE COMPARTMENT OF [E E][50]

1. E is the act of B C D, which are creatures of A. And since S is a substance and its virtue is emitted through B C D, therefore E is formed from the form of B C D, and the virtue of S is the matter of B C D, as they form E, which is the work of S and a creature of A, when E is in A V Y; but when it is in V Z, then it is simply the work of B C D, which transform their acts to a nature contrary to S and its virtue, which acts are in accord with privation and opposed to the nature of the red triangle.[51]

2. There is difference between B C D, for B has to do with the universal aggregate and with the conservation of numerous particulars; C with the search for Y by means of the many particulars, wherein is formed the universal that accords with B; D, on the other hand, loves the objects of B C, and therefore there is concordance of B C D in E, just as the four elements are concordant in a compound supposite. Contrariety among B C D exists when they form E against A V Y, or when E has an unusual dependence on one power rather than on another; for just as fire converts earth to its own nature more readily than does air,[52] so it sometimes happens that D converts E to its own nature more readily than do B or C, and vice versa.

3. In E, B is the origin of remembering, C of understanding, and D of loving or willing. The means, however, is the common virtue of S, which, from substance, enters B C D, where the generation of E takes place, which is the goal of said virtue, when E exists in A V Y, which in turn are the goal of E. For just as in the trunk of a tree onto which apple, pear, and peach trees have been grafted, there is a single virtue and matter going forth to all

[50] Here begins a series of compartments, 8/1–8/10, that are *within* S—that is, from the Second Figure of S—and hence not strictly from the Second Demonstrative Figure. For the reader trying to find his way around the original editions, the Mainz editors numbered these compartments 9–18, afterwards (rather confusingly) beginning again with 9; Galmés numbered them 1–4 instead of the expected 1–10, because six of the compartments are missing in A (see n. 54 below). Note that these ten compartments represent all the combinations of only the four squares or "species" (cf. Dist. 1, n. 13) of S, i.e., E I N R.

[51] I.e., opposed to the end or purpose of S.

[52] Thus in V B. M has air being converted rather than converting, moreover it follows this phrase with what is surely a retranslation of one that in A is *substituted* for it: "for just as fire is contrary to water in a choleric supposite." To complete the confusion, M then alters the remaining part of the sentence to go with this addition.

three, which issues in different forms, so one and the same virtue is the medium that issues in the different powers from which come different operations.

4. Insofar as the powers are different, some are greater than others in their specific tasks, like fire which, in a choleric complexion, is greater than the other elements. The equality of the powers exists in their virtue and form, for they work on E with one and the same virtue. If, however, one of the powers were greater than another in form, the result would be a disorder contrary to the green, red and black triangles, according to the meaning of the compartments of [E A V Y | E V Z], which are in accord with the equality of powers by means of the above-mentioned triangles.

5. Fire bestows heat and receives dryness, along with which it receives the cold that earth first receives from water, and thus fire, by means of earth, receives cold and gives dryness to air, which it heats and which crosses into water with heat, dryness, and moisture, and in this way is brought about the mixture of all four elements in the vegetative power, in which the digestive power exists intrinsically; and its work appears extrinsically in the being that is a body which is elemented and sensed.[53] Now this situation exemplifies how B intrinsically receives virtue from S, infusing it into C D, and vice versa; and as a result, affirmation or negation is intrinsically formed. But just as the digestive power is corrupted by means of some accident, which happens because of the irregularity of the intrinsic operation of the elements, in the same way doubt is formed in E, when B C D are in disaccord, by which disaccord the operation of B C D is transformed into N R, which accords with doubt.

8/2. THE COMPARTMENT OF [E I][54]

1. Because A is lovable and not hateful, it created E I in S, so that S might be the subject in which E I existed, with E loving

[53] "Sensed" in the Lullian correlative meaning of "acted upon by the senses," or "that which a person senses" (cf. the *Taula d'esta Art, ORL* XVII, 398), corresponding in this case to "elemented," which, although obsolete in English, is the exact equivalent of *elementatum* (Cat. *elementat*), "composed of (any or all of) the four elements."

[54] This along with five other compartments from within Figure S (cf. n. 50 above) are missing in A, which has only the four compartments with repeated letters, [E E] [I I] [N N] and [R R]. Cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 60, n. 215.

A as well as V Y, but with I having V Z as its object, which V Z exist accidentally, and for which V Z I is created, which also exists accidentally so that E may use V Y without descending to V Z.

2. There is difference between E and I, for E has to do with liking good and I with disliking evil; moreover E is superior in dignity and I inferior. E, however, always exists through B C D, whereas I sometimes exists through F G without H and sometimes through F G H. This is because F G are in this Art discursive elements for the investigation of a particular thing without H, and therefore H should not take part in this investigation, lest it provide an obstacle for N seeking a particular thing in E or in I, with respect to which particular E I as investigative agents are in accord for the purpose of using it; since when F G in this investigation are surveying that thing then E has an effect on I, just as the Lord has an effect on a servant of His, bidding him to do things for the Lord Himself.[55] When, however, the particular has been discovered, then E loves it, if it is lovable, and I hates its contrary. If, however, it is hateful, then it is given over to I to be hated, and E loves its contrary. Thus E I are related after the manner of act and habit;[56] for, with one of them existing in act, the other exists in habit; but when they are contrary, one of them is like a disobedient servant of God, and their contrariety exists through B C D being defective with respect to A V Y. And when E receives V Z and I receives V Y, then E I are accidentally concordant in V Z against A V Y, by which concordance they are on the way to existing in perpetual contrariety, world without end.

3. The goal of E is A V Y, and thus E is the origin of I, like the cause of an effect, with A, however, existing as the means, through creation and the influence of grace, by which E sets I against V Z; but when E is in V Z and I in A V Y, then E is the origin of I, contrary to the purpose for which I exists, and I is then the means by which E exists contrary to its own origin and purpose.

[55] This is the justification for F G being used as the basic investigative tool of the *Ars demonstrativa* (cf. Dist. I, n. 9 above), as we will have occasion to see again and again.

[56] Two of the principles of philosophy; cf. Dist. IV, part ii, the sections corresponding to nn. 157–60 below.

4. E is greater than I, for more of the virtue of S is infused into B C D than into F G H. This is because more virtue can be taken in by B C D than by the others, with goodness and lovableness being in accord with greater virtue, and evil and hatefulness with lesser virtue, since good is related to being, which accords with majority, while evil is related to privation, which accords with minority. E I can, however, be equal to V Y Z according with justice, like the four elements in an elemented body, in which these elements are graded according to the proportion of the nature generating and conserving that elemented body; but when, as the result of some contrariety, E I are unequal, then they are like the elements that are corrupted in an elemented body contrary to proportion and justice.

5. E and affirmation are in accord, as are I and negation, which agreement or concordance must be thus, since E and majority are in accord, as are I and minority. For affirmation and majority are in accord, as are negation and minority, since the purpose of negation is affirmation, and that of I is E. And since doubt and minority are in accord, F G can conduct their examination investigating Y Z, in order that E have Y and I have Z as objects.

8/3. THE COMPARTMENT OF [E N]

1. A created N for the sake of E, so that it could be its light of faith and hope, and so that M could make up for what E could not accomplish, just as in an elemented body, one element renews and preserves that which another element cannot preserve; and since M has to do with both loving and hating, while E has only to do with loving, and I only with hating, therefore M is the instrument by which E is impelled towards A V Y and I toward V Z.

2. There is difference between E and N, since more of S's virtue enters E than N, which occurs because E receives the influence of S through B C D, whereas N receives it only through M. Hence, just as E N differ in majority and minority, they similarly differ in every triangle of all of T. The concordance and contrariety, however, of E N is according to how they can accord in different and distinct things, for just as the elements in a compound can be in concordance or contrariety, so can E N be in concordance or contrariety in A V Y Z, which are revealed by F G when they

survey the triangles of T in the Elemental Figure, which is the mirror and image of S and its powers,[57] so that E may be in A V Y and I in V Z, with M making up for the defects of both.

3. Insofar as E exists through B C D, it is the origin of M, and insofar as M, through the infusion of A, exists without K L, it is the origin of E; therefore M is the means by which faith and hope exist in E, and the more E rises by this means, the more M rises by loving A V Y and hating V Z. And since M exists so that E may exist, and E is the goal of M, as well as being the means by which M exists, therefore N accords with supposition, and E with demonstration, which demonstration is the purpose of the supposition that F G examine in order to destroy doubt, which doubt is the means existing, through K L, between E N so that K can be converted into B, L into C, and M into D, and this conversion is the goal of N.

4. In one way majority accords with E, and in another with M, just as fire accords with majority in choler but with minority in phlegm.[58] Since E receives A V Y through B C D, and N receives them only through M, then E is greater than M; but when the influence of A V Y is greater in M than in E, then N is greater in M than E in B C D. The equality of E N consists of the means by which they rise to majority and descend to minority, just as the people coming and going on a road are equal as to the places they are coming from and going to.

5. Since E is nobler than I, therefore M has greater concordance with E than with I, and because E and affirmation are in accord, as well as I and negation, it therefore follows that M is more in accord with affirmation than with denial. And therefore M supposes there to exist some being in Y or in Z, so that E can affirm and I deny, with Y serving as object with respect to E, and Z with respect to I. But when N does not follow the greater accord that it should have with E I, then it is more inclined toward denial than toward affirmation, as a result of which there arises doubt in E I N, and N does not want to suppose, but instead it denies

[57] For this structural correspondence between Figure S and the Elemental Figure, see pp. 309 above, nn. 69,70 below, and Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 27–29.

[58] From Dist. III, n. 5 below, and the root of the tree in the *Principles of Medicine* it can be seen that heat (and thus fire) is dominant in choler, whereas cold (and thus water) is dominant in phlegm.

possibility, by which denial F G have nothing which impels them to investigate Y Z; and thus affirmation and denial exist in potentiality or in habit, whereas doubt exists in actuality, as a result of which R is formed as the subject of the contrariety of E I N in those people having contrary sects and religions, and fighting wars.

8/4. THE COMPARTMENT OF [E R]

1. A created R for the sake of E I N, for without R the transformation of E into I, of I into N, or vice versa, never could be carried out; for just as without a common matter and form the transformation of natural forms could not be carried out, so these three species of S could not be transformed one into the other without the fourth species of S, that is to say, R, which is in the relation of a subject to E I N, so that in it they may exercise their operations of transformation and conversion one into the other.

2. There is difference between E and R, since E is the result of the acts of B C D, whereas R is the combination of E I N. And since R cannot exist without E, therefore E R are concordant; moreover by this concordance it frequently happens that E comes to rest in R, because of S rejecting some objects in which it has encountered pain, sorrow, and disgust and taking up other objects of less difficulty than the first. But since E has to do with being and R with privation because of K L, therefore there exists contrariety between E and R, by which E avoids R, and R attracts E to itself.

3. Since R exists for the sake of E, and not the reverse, therefore E is the origin[59] of R; but when it happens that E is in privation and R in being, and that E, from potentiality or habit, is brought to the act, then R, through its own matter, is the origin[60] of E, and by this means each species is the origin of the others, yet the principal goal lies in E.

4. Majority accords with E and minority with R, as a sign that simplicity accords with majority and composition with minority, so that being and privation may have a greater distance between themselves in simplicity than in composition. And since E is

[59] In the sense of "final cause"; cf. Dist. 1, n. 19.

[60] Here "origin" is in the sense of "material cause." "Matter" should be understood in the sense of that which is to be remembered, understood, and loved.

greater than I N, R has greater equality with E than with I N; but when R is greater through I or N than through E, then R is nearer to privation than to being, and E has greater equality with being than with privation.

5. Affirmation and negation are contraries in R, and concordant in E I N, and therefore doubt accords with R, by which accord R is the subject of doubt, so that in E or in N there may exist affirmation, and in I or in N negation. Nevertheless it frequently happens that, as a result of the contrariety of V Y against V Z, affirmation and negation are contraries through E I without R and without there existing any doubt.

8/5. THE COMPARTMENT OF [11]

1. I, which has V Z as its object, is the creature of A, and is the result of F G H, which serve B C D when E has A V Y as its object; but when I has A V Y as its object, it cannot be a creature, for if it were, A would be against its own compartments and against V Y by the red triangle, which is impossible. It is nevertheless true that I which has V Y as its object is the work of F G H, which, counter to the virtue from which they stem, form I. And thus it is clearly shown that neither E nor I belong to the entity of S, for if they did, they would be creatures when E was in V Z and I in A V Y, which is manifestly impossible.

2. The green triangle exists in I, since there is diversity among F G H, in that F receives influence from B, G from C, and H from D, and the concordance of F G H is against V Z; but when they are against A V Y, then their concordance turns into contrariety of their entity and nature, on account of which I is transformed against the red triangle.

3. F G H are the origin of I, and I is the thing originated, so that it may be against V Z. For just as fire, through an intermediary, is contrary to water, so must I be the intermediary by which F G[61] are contrary to V Z, and F G be the intermediary by which E is against V Z, with the goal being for I to serve E.

4. The yellow triangle exists in I according to that disposition by which it exists in E, which sets I in motion. Nevertheless,

[61] Here and in the next clause, A and M have "F G H," which seems more a distracted copying of the beginning of the paragraph than a reading consonant with something "contrary to V Z."

according to the bodily disposition of a particular man, it sometimes happens that one act is greater than another, as is clear from the sensitive faculty, for as the power of one sense perishes, that of another is increased;[62] and thus according to the particular disposition of the body, the act of one power is greater than that of another. When, however, the body is well disposed to F G H, then they are equal in I.

5. F G in I have to do with doubt when seeking Y Z, but once having found Y or Z, then H has to do with negation, while affirmation remains in habit in E, which has Y, and which impels I towards Z; and the same is true of I Y and of E Z. This being the case, it is therefore shown that affirmation and E are in accord, as are negation and I; and since E and majority are in accord, as are I and minority, it therefore clearly follows that affirmation accords with majority and negation with minority.

8/6. THE COMPARTMENT OF [I N]

1. A created I N so that by means of A V Y they could help E against V Z; for I N exist for the purpose of serving E, with I working in N and vice versa, in the following way: with I hating K L in N in such a way that K is converted into B and L into C, and with N wanting G to survey A S T V X Y Z so that D can have Y and H can have Z as their objects.

2. There exists difference between I and N, for I remembers and understands what H hates, whereas N does not remember or understand what M loves or hates. As a result of this difference, I N are sometimes concordant and sometimes contrary; for when they are concordant, they exist in F G, because it is they who survey the objects that M loves or hates, so that M can be converted either into D or into H, and M, loving the diligence and swiftness of F G in their examination, desires, hopes, supposes, and believes that as a result they will have a sense of direction in their examination; but when I exists through F G H against Y, and N through M against Z, or when I is against Z and N is against Y, then there is contrariety between I N,[63] by which contrariety doubt is engendered as against affirmation and negation.

[62] Thus in V B. Instead of "for as the power . . . increased," A has "in which that which one member loses is restored in another." M combines them, tacking a retranslation of the Catalan version onto the end of the Latin version.

[63] Thus in M; V B, however, have "Z N."

3. When it is a question of acquired knowledge, I is the origin of N, but when it is a question of infused knowledge, M is the origin of I,[64] and thus knowledge is the intermediary between I and N, while the goal, which is knowledge, is the very goal of I N, since, when F G are surveying by means of some universal in which they are seeking a particular and cannot find it, then I is converted into N, which process is initiated because of the degradation of F into K and G into L, and M loves or hates that thing which H would hate if F G could find the particular being sought. When, however, it happens that M, through a great abundance of love or hate induces F to remember and G to understand, then N is the means for I, in that it is the means by which K is converted into F and L into G.

4. Majority accords with I in one way, and with N in another. When majority accords with I, then this should be understood as happening through F G, which accord with majority, and through K L, which accord with minority; but when M has such fervor in loving A V Y and in hating V Z that H cannot hate as much as M can love and hate, then as a result it exists on a greater level of excellence than F G H. When, however, I through F G is greater than N through K L, then M makes up for the defect in N coming from K L, and the result is equality between I N.

5. When F G are surveying and investigating a particular, then affirmation exists through the concordance of I N, with M supposing and believing that particular to have been found by F G, for which reason M sets F G in motion in this investigation. When, however, F G cannot find that same particular, then negation exists through H hating the defect that F G sustained in their search. But since M wants F G to survey, then once again F remembers and G understands what it was in which they were defective, and then doubt rises anew from these three, that is, from F G M.

[64] Thus in V B, while M has the more expected "N is the origin of I"; see, however, the last sentence of this paragraph. The other terms in this sentence are defined by Llull in the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* (v. 241): "The lover said that infused knowledge came from will, devotion, and prayer, whereas acquired knowledge came from study and understanding." Note their connection with two powers of the soul. Acquired knowledge is the path of the Art (see the beginning of the Epilogue in *Felix*); infused knowledge is that of mysticism. See Ca I, 591–2, as well as Peers's translation of *Blaquerna*, p. 248, n. 1.

8/7. THE COMPARTMENT OF [I R]

1. A created I R among the acts of the powers of S, so that the operations of S might be ordered with respect to its powers, since when I suffers some defect in F G H through excess or deficiency, I has recourse to R, taking from what R contains of E N, strengthening itself, or diminishing the amount of F G H, in this way increasing R, in order to have temperament and justice within itself.

2. There is a difference between I and R, since I is a simple species of S, whereas R is a composite species made up of E I N, and because of the inherent difference between simplicity and composition, it follows that I R are sometimes concordant and sometimes contrary. Now their concordance or contrariety comes from the fact that through too great or too small an amount of F G H, I does or does not form part of R: when I forms part of R, then it is concordant with it and contrary to itself, since by giving up part of itself, it accords with R by tempering itself; I is contrary to it, however, when it abandons R and thus deprives it of being, and vice versa.

3. Insofar as I is a part of R, it is the origin of its own portion of R, and since R contains something of E N, it can therefore be the origin of increasing or decreasing the part it has from I. Thus R is the means and subject in which the increase or decrease of I E N in R takes place, so that from it follows the purpose of E R by which I participates in R along with E N, which purpose is the necessary transformation of one species[65] into another so as to form V Y against V Z.

4. Since K L exist in R, and since they accord with the greatest minority and privation, it follows that I, in which K L do not exist, is concordant with majority and R with minority. Nevertheless, when I exists in V Z having V Y as its object, then as a result of ignorance, which accords with K L, R exists in majority and I in minority, which accords with blame. And since in one way I is greater than R and in another way lesser, there can therefore exist equality between I R.

5. In comparing I to R, the black triangle comes into play, for I affirms or denies by means of H, but since K L exist in R, doubt

[65] See Dist. 1, n. 13, for this use of "species."

arises and exists in R, because of which affirmation and negation are destroyed in I.

8/8. THE COMPARTMENT OF [N N]

1. A created M, which takes V Y Z as its object, loving V Y and hating V Z, which M is a work of the will, which is a creature; and since B F, C G, D H cannot carry out their acts without acquisition, therefore M, which can carry out its act without acquisition,[66] can exist with K L in N, in which N faith and belief are in accord, when they are creatures. But when M takes V Z as its object, hating Y and loving Z, then its act is contrary to a creature and concordant with privation.

2. The green triangle exists in N, since there is difference among K L M, with K forgetting, L not knowing, and M loving or hating. And there is concordance of the three powers in N, because without their concordance, it would be nothing. And K L M are contraries in said N against the compartment of [being privation];[67] because M, insofar as it can act, accords with being, whereas K L accord with privation. And thus M is impelled toward E I, whereas K L are impelled toward R.

3. M is the origin of K L, since M without acquisition can love or hate; but since B F, C G cannot have a second act[68] without acquisition, therefore M is the origin of K L when it acts suddenly and gives no thought to B F, C G. When, however, by the agency of M, K is transformed into B F and L into C G, then N is the intermediary by which this transformation is brought about. And the goal is for M, through K L, to have merit when it exists in Y and when it impels K toward B F and L toward C G; and above and beyond this purpose there is another, which is for M, through loving, to have A.

4. Majority accords with M, when, through loving, it has A V Y, and minority accords with it when, by hating, it has A V Y. Thus the compartment of [merit blame] accords with M, and is in disaccord with K L, by which disaccord this compartment accords

[66] In the sense of n. 64 above.

[67] Thus in A M; V B, instead of "against," have "when together they enter." From here to the end of Dist. II, M omits almost all of the boxes enclosing the compartments of Figure X. For "privation" as a synonym of "nonbeing," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 9.

[68] Cf. n. 49 above.

better with D H than with M. Equality between K and L is possible, but it is impossible between K L and M.

5. M, by means of K L and in the absence of B F, C G, affirms or denies like a blind man groping in the dark, except when there is faith, which accords with A V Y. Thus M sometimes affirms itself to be D, and K to be B, and L to be C; but when M is in the process of transforming itself into D, and K into B, as well as L into C, then it has some doubts, which doubts cease to exist when the transformation is completed, or when R, which is the means and subject of doubt, is destroyed.

8/9. THE COMPARTMENT OF [N R]

1. A created the relation and similarity between S and the four elements, so that together they might accord in serving A. For inasmuch as S contains four species, which are E I N R, which species are made up of the three principal powers of S, and inasmuch as the elements are four in number, which quaternity turns upon three principles that constitute elemented substance, that is, form, matter, and conjunction, therefore S and corporeal nature are concordant in quaternity and trinity, from which follow the square and triangle by which S and a body accord in a common supposite.[69] This being the case, R retains in itself the image of quaternity and N that of trinity, as a token—through N R—of the intellectual or sensual particular.

2. There is difference between N and R, since N is composed of K L M, whereas R is composed of E I N. As a result, N enters into an incorporeal and invisible mixture in R, which is composed of nonsensual and of invisible parts; and just as the four elements are concordant or contrary in a natural subject, so N R, in the acts of the powers of S, are concordant or contrary. For if R has within itself more of B C D than of M, then it contradicts N when M is against B C D; if however M constitutes in R a greater portion than E, it is concordant with R against that which R has from B C D.

[69] As Salzinger saw (*Revelatio, MOG* I, 281 = Int. vi, 29), this passage is important as linking Figure S with the Elemental Figure (cf. n. 57 above), each with their quaternity and trinity. He also saw (*Perspicilia, MOG* I, 227 = Int. v, 67) the importance of "the four elements turning on three principles," which are form, matter, and conjunction, which were to play such a basic role in Lullian correlative theory (cf. Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," pp. 247-8 and 251,) as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 40–4 and 194–9.

3. To the degree that N causes M to diminish and K L to multiply or increase, so it destroys affirmation and negation, and is the origin of R; which R, through doubt, is in turn the origin of affirmation and denial against doubt, by increasing the parts of E I present in itself. Thus N is the origin of R in one sense, and the reverse in another; and the intermediary between them lies in the parts of E I, as we have said before. The goal of N R, however, lies in E I, because E I are further from privation and minority than N R.

4. Since N does not contain as many different natures as R, and since privation simply has more to do with K L in N than in R, therefore R is greater than N. But since M has to do with greater strength and virtue in N than B C D, F G H in R, therefore N is greater than R. Equality between the two exists through the difference and contrariety of their parts, or through the difference and concordance, as a result of some parts of E I ascending and descending, and some parts of N descending and ascending.

5. According as in quantity or privation of activity N R are equal or unequal, doubt is either formed through N R, or it accords with R while affirmation or denial accord with N, since doubt always begins with and arises from R, and exists in R, in order, by contrast, to signify A and its compartments, in which neither composition nor doubt can exist. But since M is a fervent act of S, therefore it affirms or denies and does not doubt, even though M, through K L, might be very near doubt, which doubt, through K L, accords with privation.

8/10. THE COMPARTMENT OF [R R]

1. A has ordained that, in R, S should be a creature similar in operation to the Elemental Figure, for just as some elements enter others by means of the green, red, and yellow triangles, and form elemented bodies, similarly when these three triangles enter into the memorative, intellective, and volitional faculties, they form R, in which the following compartments are found: [being privation | perfection imperfection].[70]

[70] Another (see the previous note) formulation of the relationship between S and the Elemental Figure. Cf. Pring-Mill, "Potencias," p. 129, n. 121; Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 60; and Salzinger, *Revelatio, MOG* I, 303 = Int. vi, 51. Llull continues insisting on the theme in the rest of this compartment. Notice that the four concepts inside the boxes are precisely those from Figure X used in the tree of the *Principles of Medicine* (see Dist. I, n. 13 of that work).

2. The green triangle exists in R, for just as fire is different through simplicity and composition, and is different from air and earth with which it is concordant, and is contrary to water, so the green triangle exists in R, according to the acts of B C D, F G H, K L M. For when B draws away from majority and nearer to minority, then it accords with minority, in which minority the minority of C D also enters, and thus E falls into privation in disaccord with majority, and K L M are formed. And the same thing happens with F G H, by which consequent and antecedent R comes into being, having the green triangle in it through E I N.

3. In the Elemental Figure, simple fire, from its own entity, is the beginning of compound fire, and since the other elements are present in compound fire, therefore from these elements there results a body of another species that is neither simple nor compound fire, nor any of the other elements, even though it is composed of them. For in their composition, that is, association in a whole, there results a new species, just as from the parts of a house duly joined to one another there results a species which is a house, even though said species is not that of any part of the house. Now, this being the case, the absence of the greatness of E I N and the presence of their littleness are the origin of R, which is not E I N, even though it comes from E I N, they being between perfection and imperfection in R, which is the intermediary between the perfection and imperfection of E I N, by which intermediary is carried out the transformation of E into I and N, of I into E and N, and of N into E and I, which transformation is the purpose for which S is able to make use of all its species at different times.

4. The virtue of S issues from B C D in greater quantity than from F G H, and from F G H than from M, which is why R is greater through E than through I, and through I than through N. But when R is in a state of equality, then E descends to minority and M ascends to majority, and in the meeting of the descent of majority and the ascent of minority the equality of R is formed, which equality is unstable because the descent and ascent go on for so long that they finally destroy the equality, just as it is destroyed in the four elements through the vegetative power in which there exists the motive power of the four complexions.[71]

[71] For the vegetative and motive powers, see *Felix*, Bx. VIII, ch. 44, and for the complexions, ch. 47, n. 28.

5. The black triangle is more disordered in R than in E I N, because of the way E I N are mixed in R. It therefore appears that E I N do not belong to the respective entities of B C D, F G H, K L M, for if they did, S would be corruptible in R, and would be mortal like a body that is of the entity of the elements in their mixture, digestion, and composition. Since, however, S mixes, not its powers, but only their acts, which do not belong to its entity or to that of its powers, therefore S is not corruptible, even though E I N are corruptible in the black triangle.[72]

9. *The Compartment of* [S T][73]

1. Insofar as is appropriate, S exerts its powers through T, so that E can enjoy A in T as Creator, and so that it can use T as a creature, and S does this so that its works may be concordant with the works of A.

2. According to how S takes T as object, it diversifies the acts of its powers; for when by means of C it understands some noble object, then it differentiates D from H in the nobility of that object, with D loving it and H hating everything which is contrary to that object. And this is due to the concordance of E I in blue V; but they are against this concordance when they are concordant in red V; and the same is true for N R, and this for all of T, according to how it appears T can enter into S.

3. From the substance which is S, virtue issues through B C D, from which B C D there arises E, which is the act of B C D. Thus B C D are the intermediaries between said substance and E, and the substance itself is the origin of B C D, whereas E is the goal of B C D. Moreover, the substance is the goal of E, because it accords with majority; and the goal which is over and above the substance is A, since B C D exist in S, and E exists in B C D, so that E may rejoice in A.

4. According to how S apprehends its objects, the yellow triangle exists in its species, for B sometimes apprehends some object more strongly than C, or vice versa, and thus E is greater in B than in C, or vice versa, and the same follows for D. But when B C D accord in equality by apprehending some object equally,

[72] Thus in V B; A M (with M probably following A) have "in R and in the black triangle."

[73] We have now finished the compartments within S (cf. n. 50 above) and are once again dealing with those of the Demonstrative Figure.

then in such an equality E is far from N R, to which it draws nearer when majority accords with one or two of its individuals and minority with the rest.[74]

5. Before S makes an affirmation in the triangles of T, F G must survey the angles of each triangle, and S must reflect on its own species, that is, E I N R, in order to know with which of them it should affirm, with which deny, or with which to doubt, and this for all the compartments of figure T as well as for all the questions which are concordant with these compartments.

10. The Compartment of [S V]

1. S and blue V are creatures of A, so that S, with blue V, may serve its Creator in knowing His intrinsic and extrinsic work.

2. A has diversified operations with respect to S in V, according as S has diversity in its own powers; for through E, S is related to charity, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance; through I it is related to red V; and through N it is related to faith and hope. And there is concordance in the fact that the virtues are concordant with one another; and contrariety in the fact that the virtues are contrary to the vices, and conversely.

3. In E charity is the origin of all other virtues; in N, through supposition, faith is the origin of all virtues; through E I N hope is the origin of all other virtues; through R temperance is the intermediary between fortitude and justice; but through E I N R charity is the goal of all the other virtues. Now this being the case, just as we introduced the red triangle in S and blue V, it can similarly be introduced into S and red V, according to first and second intention.

4. S is greater in E than in N, and thus it is greater through charity than through faith, for if this were not the case, K L would be concordant with majority and B C with minority, which is impossible. But since M can rise higher than D, therefore an equality between E N is formed, and they are equal in E I N as if belonging to a single genus, for they come from the same common virtue of S. This, however, is not true of E I with reference to their acts, for E, as a result of its virtue, must always be greater

[74] Thus in V B; A has "and minority is in disaccord with it (or them)"; M has "and equality is in disaccord with them."

than I, since loving is nobler than hating. The same follows for I N R, insofar as one species accords more with majority than another, according to how, in keeping with the above indications, the yellow triangle enters S and red V, since one example can bring knowledge of others.

5. It should be affirmed that blue V is the path by which E I N R tend toward Y, just as red V is the path by which E I N R tend toward Z. And insofar as S finds some impediment in the path leading to Y Z by means of E I N R, blue V and red V draw nearer to doubt. And the more Y and Z are far from one another in E I N R, the more the negation of Z and the affirmation of Y are increased, and doubt is destroyed.

11. The Compartment of [S X]

1. Everything that in S is the result of predestination and free will is the creature and work of A, in which work lies the work of S, that is, the use which S makes of free will. Moreover, the very existence of S is a creature, and the privation of Y that S suffers in Z represents its inclination toward nonbeing, which accords with privation. The perfection that E has in A is its work; and the same follows for I, which is impelled toward the perfection of E, when I assigns H to Z. The merit that S has is a creature, with S making use of Y Z; but the blame of S lies in its own operation. The supposition that S makes with N is the operation that constitutes the beginning of the demonstration toward which F G are impelled. "Immediately" is the work that C does between one contrary and another; and "mediately" is when C, through an intermediary, takes another as an object. Reality exists in C in accordance with Y; and reason exists when Y Z are immediately contrary to one another.[75] Power is the very being of S, which

[75] In the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 396) Llull explains these two terms from Figure X by saying that "reality is the being (*esser*) of a thing which exists outside the intellect, like the very being of a stone, which does not exist in the intellect, or like that of silver, and so on"—"reason . . . is the likeness of reality which the intellect assumes when it understands something." See also the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 528 = Int. viii, 26, and the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis* (Lyon, 1635), p. 11. See also the *Liber de ente reali et rationis* (printed in *Opera parva* IV) entirely built around these two concepts. As for the previous adverbs "immediately" and "mediately" used nominally, see Dist. I, n. 30.

apprehends an object according to Y or to Z.[76] Now this being the case, therefore according to the disposition of the blue triangle in S X, the answer to a question can be given by means of said blue triangle.

2. C establishes the difference between reality and reason when it affirms predestination and denies free will, and this difference is according to the concordance and contrariety of power and object, mediately and immediately, and therefore in S, being accords with reality and privation with reason. And since perfection accords with C with respect to reality and imperfection accords with C with respect to reason, therefore C has blame and merit at differing times because of different objects being concordant or contrary one with another, and therefore E is transformed into R.

3. E originates in the compartment of [wisdom perfection] when it takes predestination as its object; but when N denies free will then H begins to assume the compartment of [justice perfection], with M subsequently loving the first compartment because of perfection and hating the second because of the imperfection M has in itself. And thus S has, with regard to itself, the first intention, which accords with final cause, and has, with regard to A, second intention, which accords with means. This being the case, the red triangle can therefore be introduced into S by means of X according to the disposition of the compartments of X itself, in the same way that we have already introduced two compartments into S.[77]

4. Predestination is greater in E than free will is in N according to object, reality, and reason, and because of this majority and minority N is more inclined to deny free will than is E to transform itself into N. And the same is true when E takes free will and N predestination as their objects, with S having Y through majority

[76] As Llull says in the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 395), "*Potència* can be understood in two ways: one sort of *potència* is that which apprehends the object, like the intellect which apprehends the truth, sight which apprehends color, or will loving; the other *potència* is that by means of which something which does not exist, can exist, like a live man's hand in which there can be worms." The first meaning can be translated in English as "power" or "faculty" (as, for instance, the "powers" of the soul), and the second as "power" or "potentiality."

[77] Thus in V B; A M have, "This being the case, according to the way, therefore, that we introduce the red triangle into S by means of the two above-mentioned compartments, in the same way it can be introduced according to the disposition that X has in its own compartments."

at one moment, and Z through minority at another. And since all of A cannot fit into S, E is transformed into N, and N into E by means of the black triangle and the compartment of [predestination free will]; moreover the equality of the yellow triangle consists in the very transformation of E into N and N into E, with S changing its objects which at one and the same moment cannot be included in the second acts of S itself, and which cannot enter or remain, in different ways, beneath a single species of S.

5. S introduces the black triangle into X to the degree that S takes X as object in one compartment and not in another, by means of one species and not another. That is to say, when E affirms with perfection the compartment of [wisdom justice], then Y is in E through the intermediary of that compartment; but when it denies free will, then it is transformed into R, or into N, and it doubts the existence of free will or predestination. And such doubt and negation are due to the imperfection of power in taking an object which is more intelligible and lovable than said power can accept; for if this were not the case, it would be impossible for E, after taking that object, to release it or to be transformed into N. Thus, just as we have given an example of the black triangle in the compartment of [predestination free will], in the same way, by means of S one can give an example in the other compartments of X.

12. The Compartment of [S Y]

1. The work of S in Y is, in one way, a creature in E, in another way in I, and in another in N; and to the degree that S disposes all the work towards a single end, it is the work of S; and this work and end are creatures, since the use S makes of creatures *is* its work.

2. Since there is difference between E I N R, therefore S has different ways of investigating Y and of having Y as an object, with E I N concordant against Z, or with the greater part of R contrary to Z. And what happens here with the green triangle in E I N R, is also true of their individuals,[78] just as is exemplified by the red triangle in the following paragraph.

[78] Thus in V B; A has, "And the same happens with the green triangle in B C D, in F G H, and in K L M." Perhaps because these are the "individuals" of E I N R, the Mainz editors combined the two texts, printing one after the other.

3. When S first investigates Y, it begins with N, supposing it possible for Y to be found by means of the black triangle; then, this supposition having been made, F G without H survey the compartments of this Art, in which S does not want to introduce H, so that between F G and M, which loves Y, there may be no contrariety. Now when, by means of this surveying, and E possessing Y is formed, then that E gives Z to H, so that I may be the means by which E has Y and H has Z, and that the end might follow from E Y.[79]

4. According to the disposition of E, Y is greater in C than in B D, and this is because of the nature of things between power and object; for C impels its understanding to Y, B impels its remembering to restore Y to C, and D loves Y the more Y is understood by C; and thus there is majority between C Y, whereas between B D Y there is minority, and equality exists in the virtue of S, in which virtue B C D are in a state of equality. But since I N are not so near to Y as E, therefore H is more readily against Y than D. And the same follows for M, because of the minority of I N and the majority of E.

5. To affirm Y by means of N is to bring doubt nearer to affirmation, and to deny Y by means of N is to bring doubt nearer to negation; but to affirm Y by means of E is to remove doubt from affirmation and negation, as well as H from Y. And this rule does not fail in any compartment of this Art, insofar as the black triangle can enter the compartment of [S Y].

13. The Compartment of [S Z]

1. S is the creature of A without Z, for if this were not the case, the work that S has in Z would be a creature, whereas the work it has in Y would not, which is impossible, since Y accords with being and being with creature, whereas Z accords with privation against creature.

2. There is difference between S Z, since S is a creature, whereas Z is the inclination that S, through the privation of Y in E I N, has toward nothingness, which accords with Z against being and against Y. Concordance between S Z exists when E I N are against

[79] Thus in V B; A is almost the same, but M has, "that there might follow the end, which is E Y." Note the discussion of F G as an investigative instrument; cf. n. 55 above.

Y. Contrariety between S Z, however, exists when E I N are against Z and when Z is against Y.

3. Z cannot take its origin from any entity of S; nevertheless, it can originate from a disordering of E I N. The means by which Z originates from E I N is when superior and inferior intentions in E I N are exchanged, with E attributing the First Intention to I and the Second to itself. Thus E causes the First and Second Intentions to be against reality; and the same follows for N.

4. Z can exist in greater quantity in E than in I, and in I than in N, and in N than in R, and this is because insofar as E is farther from minority than I, I farther from N, and N farther from R, with E greater than I, I greater than N, etc.,[80] so can Z be greater in a greater subject than in a lesser one, just as a surface can be greater on a larger body than on a smaller one. There exists equality between S Z when all of E takes Z and all of I takes Y as objects, and all of M, loving, takes Z as object, and when R, equally composed of Y Z, is formed from E I N.

5. When affirmation and nonbeing, negation and being, the impossible and affirmation, as well as the possible and negation are concordant, and this concordance runs counter to the concordance between affirmation, being, and possible, on the one hand, and that between negation, nonbeing, and impossible, on the other hand, then Z is in S through E I N, and from this Z doubt arises in N, through R, which R contains some parts of E I N, and it is through these that is formed the doubt which is in accord or disaccord with Z according to the nature of affirmation and negation that are produced by the corners of the black triangle.

14. The Compartment of [T T]

The present compartment exemplifies how certain triangles of T are used to survey others. This compartment is therefore divided into five parts, just as there are five triangles, with one triangle being introduced into another so as to provide a method for seeking the particular in the universal. We will therefore follow the proper order, first introducing the blue triangle in the other triangles, and then doing the same with the other triangles.

[80] The last seven words are missing in A M.

14/1. THE BLUE TRIANGLE[81]

1. With B remembering that in A there is eternal justice, which eternally does justice to the infinite understanding of wisdom and the infinite wanting of will, and with B remembering that in A there is no blame and that every creature has a beginning, C forms the idea of a difference between the justice and mercy of A, which idea is contrary to Y and to reality, and is concordant with Z and reason, since the justice and mercy of A are the same in essence, nature and unity, and this C, which accords with minority, cannot really diversify the essence of A. But just as a slanting mirror will reflect a vertical face with a slant it does not possess, so C reflects a diversity in A that it does not possess. Now this being the case, what has been said of divine justice and mercy is true for all the dignities of A, following the rule of the above example. And the same follows for contrariety, that is to say that C, since it understands justice to exist in A, understands that A does not love an S which has E in V Z, which S is loved by A when S has E in V Y; and thus C, in accordance with reason and against reality, takes as object in A a change in will in accordance with a change of work and time, which change is impossible in A. But when C understands A to be just, merciful, unchanging, eternal and to be without majority or minority, then it is concordant with its Creator, realizing that in itself there is minority and in A majority. Furthermore, a creature, through its work, has the green triangle within itself, as does the work of the elements, which is creature. Now these elements work in creature and diversify their work in each other; that is to say that the four elements are different, concordant, and contrary in relation to their work. They are different from their work[82] in that they are not the supposite they compose, for one creature is an elemented body and another is fire, etc.; they are concordant and contrary in said body in accordance with generation, corruption, and qualities, and in accordance with the red and yellow triangles.

2. None of the red triangle can be introduced into the entity of A, with the sole exception of the end that is the perfection of A;

[81] Once again (cf. n. 50 above), there begins a series of sections interior to a figure—in this case five sections each devoted to a triangle of Figure T. Note, however, that each section has only four paragraphs, since one cannot put a triangle into itself.

[82] "From their work" is missing in A M.

that is to say that, without a final intention, A cannot bonify, nor magnify, nor understand, nor want in itself, for unless this were the case its bonifying, magnifying, etc. would accord with minority. This, however, is not the case with creatures, or with their works, for the entire red triangle can be placed into them. This is due to the fact that the elements are creatures and can have a beginning, for they are begun by A, and their works begun by them, and all of their work is the means that extends from the beginning to the end, which is when the supposite is finished. And the same thing follows from the red triangle in the blue triangle in accordance with other things similar to these.

3. Majority and minority are not compatible with anything that is of the nature or entity of A, and thus in A there must necessarily exist equality of goodness, greatness, etc. in bonifying, eternalizing, understanding, willing, etc. Now this being the case, there is nothing of the red and yellow triangles in A, with the sole exception of the compartment of [end equality]. In the other corners of the blue triangle, however, all of the yellow triangle can be introduced, and of this there is no need to give an example, since it is self-evident.

4. The black triangle cannot enter A, since A is its own truth, immeasurably and eternally. But since creature and its work are in the red triangle, and since S works through E I N R, therefore the black triangle is compatible with S, as should be self-evident.

14/2. THE GREEN TRIANGLE

1. The blue triangle can enter the green one in the following way, namely, that A be the creator of every created difference, concordance, and contrariety, and thus A is in the green triangle in an active role, while the triangle receives it passively in a relationship of the working to the worked, with A differentiating some species from others and some individuals from others, and making these creatures concordant and contrary among themselves, insofar as accords with the extrinsic[83] work of A. And the same thing is true of the other angles of the blue triangle in the green triangle.

[83] "Intrinsic" in V B.

2. A natural beginning differentiates different things in the means by which its virtue is impelled towards its goal, like simple fire, which is the beginning of the heat existing in air, by means of which heat compound fire is impelled towards water for the purpose of destroying its cold, removing the matter from compound water and giving it to its heat so that there might exist a body of hot complexion. And the same thing is true of E existing in Y, which E is the origin of I having Z as its object; and this I is the means by which E has blue V as its object, which object is the purpose for which E impels I toward V Z. This being the case, according to the aforementioned principle, therefore the entire red triangle is shown to exist in the green one.

3. There is greater difference between different and contrary in one way, and greater between different and concordant in another, like the difference between Y and Z, which is greater in the compartment of [being and privation] than is the difference between V Y, with V Y in accord with being against V Z, which accord with privation, and which do not have so much difference or concordance as V Y. For if they did, it would follow that the natural beginning, which in the intermediate stage diversifies and contrasts, and which in the end makes equal and accords, would be against the work of nature,[84] which is impossible.

4. The black triangle enters the green triangle by affirming that diversity and concordance accord with being, perfection, affirmation, and majority, while diversity and contrariety accord with privation, imperfection, denial, and minority. One must therefore not doubt the generation of being from diversity and concordance and the corruption of being from diversity and contrariety.

14/3. THE RED TRIANGLE

1. Just as the *now*[85] is in the beginning, middle, and end, thus, and more so, is A in every beginning, middle, and end that are not in V Z and[86] are not V Z themselves, in which beginning, middle, and end A exists as creator as well as agent, and it exists essentially and presentially through goodness, greatness, etc. This,

[84] Thus in V B; A M have, "against itself in the work of nature."

[85] *Nunc*, even in the Catalan text, for which see F. de B. Moll, "Els llatinismes de la 'Logica nova,'" *ML*, p. 376 = *EF* 47 (1935), 60.

[86] "Are not in V Z and" is missing in A M.

however, is not the case with creatures, since some are the beginning of others, with some acting in others, and with some being born and issuing from others, by which birth and issue the red triangle is formed.

2. There is a difference between one beginning and another, just as in S, where E is a thing begun,[87] I another thing begun, N another, and R yet another, which things begun are made up of the three powers of S, which accord among themselves to be different beginnings. And the same is true of an elemented supposite in which the fire existing in the fourth degree of heat is a different beginning from the earth existing in the third degree of dryness. And the concordance of the two beginnings lies in the difference inherent in them without an intermediary, whereas contrariety lies in the fact that fire and water are different and contrary with respect to their end. This being the case, therefore just as the green triangle was put into "beginning" in the red triangle, it can similarly be put into "middle" and "end," as should be self-evident.

3. The greatest principle that exists or can exist is A, and after A, the greatest principle in man is the final created cause to with B C D move E for the sake of A, and after this principle comes the one that moves B C D to E. On the other hand, the equality that exists between one beginning and another, one means and another, one end and another, as well as between beginning, middle, and end, can be found according to the things exemplified regarding the red triangle with the aforementioned majority and minority.

4. Every created principle is affirmable, and not deniable, by means of E, and doubtful by means of N R, which accord with doubt; and the same is true of the "means" and the "end" of the red triangle. That, however, on account of which doubt accords with N R in the red triangle exists so that R might come to privation, and so that N might be transformed into E through the affirmation or negation that is in Y, or so that N might retain its form, having Y by affirming or denying without doubt so that N would in X accord with the compartment of [merit supposition] until N would be transformed into E by means of the compartment of [supposition demonstration].

[87] *Est unum principiatum* (Cat. *és un començat*); cf. *Gentile,* Bk. II, art. 2, sec. 1 (Goodness Eternity), par. 2.

14/4. THE YELLOW TRIANGLE

1. When C introduces the blue triangle into the yellow one, it then understands that A and majority accord with one another, as do creature and minority. And thus B remembers that goodness, greatness, eternity, etc. have greater concordance in majority than in minority; on account of which greater concordance C understands that in A there must necessarily exist equality of intrinsic work without any majority or minority, with the sole exception of the relation of the intrinsic work of A to the extrinsic work that is in creature.[88] And if this were not the case, C would understand that goodness, greatness, etc. could not accord without minority, which is impossible.

2. There is difference between majority and majority, between majority and minority, as well as between majority and equality, and the same is true between equality and equality, between equality and minority, as well as between minority and minority. And the concordance of majority and majority is greater than that of majority and equality or majority and minority; and the concordance of equality and equality is greater than that of equality and majority or equality and minority; and this is the case when equality is in greater things where no minority is present. Thus, according to what we have said about concordance in the yellow triangle, in the same way we can understand about contrariety in regard to its majority, equality, and minority.

3. The principles of majority that cannot exist without minority are quantity, quality, etc., and thus the subject of such principles underlies majority and minority, which subject is the means by which majority exists in the end, with minority existing in the beginning and middle. This being the case, A must be the beginning, middle, and end of all majority, which cannot exist without minority; and the same is true of all equality composed of majority and minority, with the majority descending to minority, and minority rising to majority. This, however, is not the case with the equality of A, for it must be without majority and minority, since if it were not, it would be impossible for it, by means of the red triangle, to be above majority and minority, as well as above equality composed of majority and minority.

[88] Thus in V B (except that B has, "that is E in creature"). In place of the last clause, A M have, "and with this majority being in relation to the extrinsic work in creature."

4. The greatest majority affirmation can have lies in the affirmability of A, and the greatest majority that denial can have lies in the deniability of A, and the same is true of equality; for the affirmability of A resides in the fact that C affirms in A that which is A, and is of its entity, nature, and work, whereas the deniability resides in the fact that C denies as being A that which is not A, and denies as being in A what is not in it nor is of its entity, nature, or work. Thus the greatest doubt that S can have is to have doubts about A through confused affirmation and negation. Now this being the case, S must therefore absolutely affirm in A every nobility and deny every baseness in it; and as a result, one must affirm the existence in A of equality of goodness and bonifying, of greatness and magnifying, and so on, as well as equality of goodness, greatness, etc. Moreover, with respect to the unity and essence of A, there must necessarily exist an equality that is affirmable. This being the case, the above rule therefore exemplifies the method by which the yellow triangle is introduced into the black triangle through creatures.

14/5. THE BLACK TRIANGLE

1. A and creature and operation are affirmable things,[89] therefore not deniable; for if they were deniable and not affirmable it would follow that a thing and affirmation would accord with privation, and that a nonthing and denial would accord with being, and this is impossible—which impossibility cannot be doubted.

2. There is difference, concordance, and contrariety in the black triangle: there is difference in said triangle[90] because a certain affirmation should be made according to E, another according to I, another according to N, and yet another according to R; and the same is true of negation. Doubt, however, does not occur in E I, but only in N R. This being the case, in accordance with what has been said about difference and the black triangle regarding E I N R, we have given the rule as to how, by this example, one can expound the doctrine concerning concordance and contrariety, which accord with the black triangle.

[89] *Entia* (Cat. *ens*); the same word translated as "being" in the description of this black triangle in Dist. 1, Figure T, par. 6.

[90] The six words after the colon are missing in A M.

3. In the beginning of the black triangle F G should survey the figures and compartments of this Art, with F remembering and G understanding by what principles and by what compartments it should affirm, doubt, or deny, and not until until E is in Y and H[91] is in Z should a solution be made. Moreover, the principles of this Art should always be preserved in accordance with its conditions. By this means, the principle surveys the black triangle until the end, which is the object of this Art, and in this rule lies all of this Art, which rule is contrary to R and doubt.

4. The greatest doubt that S can have concerns A, with S using N R to doubt whether A exists or does not exist, or whether in A there exists what is in it or what is not in it. Hence the greatest affirmation and negation that S can have is through E I, with D loving what A is, and H hating A's nonbeing, and there being in A what cannot be there. Therefore in A there must necessarily exist everything by means of which E can be greater in V Y and I in V Z; for if this were not the case, it would follow that the compartment [greatness and virtue] would be contrary to that of [creature and majority], which is impossible; and by this impossibility it is shown that the greatest equality that can exist in E is to affirm the existence of equality in A, with I denying the existence of inequality in A.

15. The Compartment of [T V][92]

1. It is impossible for the entire blue triangle to exist in V, since blue V is a creature and red V is vice; hence it must be outside of creature and in creature—outside of creature insofar as A, which includes the entire creature, cannot be limited within creature nor by the work of creature; and thus the work of A must exist immeasurably outside of creature. There must therefore exist immeasurable work in A, for if there were not, A would accord with majority and all its work with minority, which is impossible; by this impossibility it is demonstrated that red V exists outside A and its work, and it exists in the work of creature contrary to blue V, which is the work of A. And if this were not the case, it would

[91] Thus in V B; A has "B" and the printed sources have "I."

[92] We have now finished with the compartments interior to T (cf. n. 81 above) and are once again dealing with those of the Demonstrative Figure.

be impossible for A to exist outside the minority of creature, which in turn is impossible.

2. By means of T, G understands the green triangle, and by means of the green triangle which F remembers in V, G understands how it must investigate a particular in the compartment of [T V], which is a universal principle for the artificial investigation of the particular; that is to say, that because of the difference and concordance of faith, hope, etc. contrary to the difference and concordance of gluttony, lust, etc., G can understand the greater difference and contrariety between blue and red V, and F can remember the greater equality between one virtue and another, as well as between one vice and another; and by means of said majority and equality is signified the particular, which is the object of this Art.

3. T is made up of beginnings, and thus when F G begin to investigate virtues and vices one must have recourse to T so that, using those beginnings in T which are most appropriate for the investigation of the particular, F G investigate Y Z through V, so that V Y be made objects of E and V Z of I, and so that by this means one may achieve the goal, which is the compartment [E A].[93]

4. The yellow triangle exists in T, so that it can be introduced in V, with majority being concordant with blue V and minority with red V, and with there being equality between one virtue and another for the purpose of destroying the equality existing between one vice and another; for greater is the amount of virtue necessary for the destruction of the equality between one vice and another, than the majority and minority existing between one vice and another.[94]

5. In V affirmation accords with E and negation with I, and thus blue V accords with E, and red V with I; and doubt is in N R so that F G can survey V for a long time, until they can fashion and form said concordance, by having F G survey all the angles of T.

[93] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 72-74.

[94] The point here seems to be that it is harder to destroy two equally strong vices than one strong and one weak one.

16. The Compartment of [T X]

1. In T there exists the blue triangle with A in it, and thus, according to the compartment of [T X], one must investigate, by means of all the compartments of A and of X, in what way A is one, and is essence and dignities, in what way a creature is sensual, intellectual, and animal, and in what way an operation is intellectual, natural, and artificial.[95] And insofar as these principles and their conditions must be observed, and insofar as they are more suitable to one compartment of A and of X than to another, in this manner the particular being sought should be found; and this rule never fails in this Art.

2. The green triangle enters X, since there is difference between one compartment and another, as well as concordance between one compartment and another, and this mediately and immediately; and the same is true of contrariety. Thus, according to the Art, F G, along with the entire green triangle, must survey all the compartments of X, until they find the compartment that accords best with the solution, and, in accordance with that compartment, and respecting the triangle, Y must be disposed towards C[96] and Z toward H.

3. The red triangle enters X under the condition that the beginning, middle, and end of a question be investigated in all the compartments of X; and the same should be done with the solution, always keeping in mind the angles of the triangle; and the black triangle should be introduced into this triangle insofar as it can fittingly enter it along with the other triangles. This disposition and rule, moreover, will dispose Y towards C[97] and Z towards H, and it will make doubt accord with nonbeing and affirmation with being.

4. F G, along with the yellow triangle, must survey all the compartments of X, so that Y can be represented to E, and Z to I, with F remembering the other triangles, and G understanding the concordance of all the triangles which come together in this representation, by keeping the green triangle in X against R and doubt.

[95] Cf. Dist. I, Figure T, par. 2.
[96] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; the printed texts, however, have "E."
[97] Same remarks as the previous note.

5. Just as F G must use the black triangle to survey the compartments of X by mixing the other triangles in it, thus the black triangle must be mixed with the other triangles, so that, from this mixture Y can take form against Z and Z against Y, and so that E may receive Y and I receive Z. For just as a supposite sensed by the sensual senses is formed in nature through digestion carried out in a mixture, so is the representation of Y Z formed through the above-mentioned surveying, and this rule never fails in this Art. Moreover, all this Art operates by the method we have given for T X; and the exposition and experience of this rule can be found in the other compartments where examples are given concerning particulars for the purpose of providing a method for the practice of this Art, and to show how T enters the compartments of A S V X Y Z, by using its own compartments.

17. The Compartment of [T Y]

1. Insofar as the work of A and that of creature are concordant in the blue triangle, Y must be sought by means of this triangle together with the other triangles. And if Y takes form with respect to F, then in this way F should be transformed into B, G into C, and H into D, in order to form E Y and I Z. If, however, Z represents itself to G disguised as Y, then G must strengthen itself in F, with F remembering the concordance of work that there must be between A and creature, with A and its works according with majority, and creature and its works with minority, a concordance Z is always against when it presents itself in the form of Y.

2. When G introduces the green triangle into Y, the blue triangle having already been introduced into it, then F remembers Y more universally than when it only remembered it by means of the blue triangle, and in this greater universality of F, G is increased, by which increase H rises up against Z, and F is transformed into B, and G into C, and thus arises D, which loves Y. And this increase rises through the yellow and black triangles[98] according as Y is lovable in B C through D, and Z is detestable in F G through H.

3. In order to investigate Y by means of the red triangle, F must survey all the triangles of T, so that G understands the red triangle

[98] A M have, "the red, yellow, and black triangles."

of Y. For by means of the red[99] triangle G will understand where Y begins, and by what means it arises and moves towards its final cause; and by means of the green triangle it will understand the difference between one Y and another, it will learn which and what kind of Y it is seeking, and it will know how to make this Y accord with the black triangle by means of H Z, so that D and Y may be concordant against Z, insofar as Y, in the yellow triangle, accords with majority and Z with minority.

4. When G considers that Y accords with majority and Z with minority, F remembers Y in things past and present, for without past time F could not remember, and if F did not remember in present time, then G could not consider. Thus, when this disposition of F G is in majority, then Y is equally represented to F G, and minority is in H when it hates Y, since the task of H is always to hate Z.

5. The black triangle enters F G in order to investigate Y, in which investigation they experience doubt before affirmation or denial, using affirmation and denial as suppositions so that they can find Y and destroy doubt, which Y they find by destroying R, with F remembering in its investigation of the compartments of A S T V X. This they do so that G may, in some compartment or compartments, understand Y, in which Y, G is transformed into C, from which there stems D loving Y; and also so that F may remain, giving rise to G, from which there comes an H hating Z.

18. The Compartment of [T Z]

1. For an investigation of Z, H must not take part in the process, for if it did it would confuse F G when they surveyed the blue triangle in which H should not exist without Z, nor D without Y, especially since A and its work, as well as creature and its created work, are not lovable to Z, and since in fact the work of said creature is hateful when it is opposed to created work.[100]

[99] Thus in B; the other sources have "blue," which, in this context, must surely be an error.

[100] Thus in V B; from "especially since" on, A M have, "since A and its work is lovable, as well as creature and its created work, and since the work of creature is hateful when it is contrary to work which is a creature," which is substantially the same.

2. Z lies hidden in the green triangle in order that E will not have Y, for from E Y comes H having Z; and therefore Z and confusion of difference are concordant in R, which concordance destroys H, which is more contrary to Z in F than in O, in G than in P; and this is because H is moved by E, which E has Y contrary to Z. This being the case, according therefore to this rule, Z must be investigated by means of the green triangle with the help of the other triangles.

3. By means of the red triangle one must investigate Z, which has its beginning against the purpose of Y: for just as beginning, middle, and end are in accord in Y, so the beginning, middle, and end of Z are in accord against Y; and thus Z is contrary to the red triangle, and in this Z beginning, middle, and end are turned against Y, as a result of which turning Z presents itself to F G, which, with justice, assign Z to H.

4. The greater the majority Z has in E, the less E is in Y; and the less Z there is in I, the more it increases in E; and Z can be more equal in E I than in N R, since greater equality can be made out of E I than out of N R, for the reason that E I accord with majority and N R with minority.

5. Z appears in the black triangle when it loses its form and is contrary to the red triangle; and the black triangle loses its form when the beginning of affirmation is transformed into negation, and conversely; and the same is true of means and end. According to this rule we have stated, therefore, Z can be discovered and assigned to H, with F G making the above-mentioned triangles accord in Y, respecting their state and conditions in each case as they survey their compartments against Z.

19. The Compartment of [V V]

1. This compartment denotes the virtues and vices, along with the work of said virtues and vices, and it signifies that A is the creator and blue V is the creature and work of A, and this signification is represented in the other triangles, as appears in those that follow.

2. There is difference between V and V, that is, between virtue and virtue, between vice and vice, and between virtue and vice, according to the diversity of E I N R, and this appears in the figure

of V. Moreover, there is a difference between the virtue which is blue V in E and the virtue[101] issuing forth from S, which is a substance, into its powers; for the virtue that issues from substance is formed in B C D, F G H, and M, while the virtue that is blue V is formed in E I N; and since E I N are not of the entity of the powers of S, nor of that of S itself, therefore blue V belongs neither to the entity of S nor to its powers; but because S transmits its virtue into its powers, and E I N are their acts, in which blue V is formed, as a result there is accord between the virtue of S and the virtue that is blue V; and because blue V and red V are contrary to one another, therefore there is contrariety between the virtue of substance and red V.

3. The principal origin of blue V is A, and after that comes the virtue of S, which instills its virtue into its three powers, which themselves are the origin of E I N, and these E I N in turn are the origin of blue V, which is the means by which the virtue of S is set in motion through the various intermediaries mentioned above towards the goal that is A. The origin of red V, however, is in E I N, because E, which has free will, can have A V Y, and yet it takes up V Z, while I takes up A V Y and M hates A V Y; and the means of red V is the movement by which the powers work against the goal for which they exist, redirecting their acts towards a goal contrary to blue V.

4. Majority accords with blue V and minority with red V, and in one blue V there is majority and in another minority, and the same happens with red V. Moreover V is greater in E than in I, and in I than in N, insofar as majority and minority accord through E I N. And majority is greater through the concordance of one virtue with another than through the concordance of one vice with another; and the concordance is greater when the virtues accord as a result of their equality rather than when they accord against the vices. And insofar as the objects of E I N are concordant with majority or with minority, majority or minority increases or diminishes in E I N, by which increase or diminution is formed the equality of E in B C D, and I in F G H. And insofar as E I N are

[101] "In E" is lacking in M; the whole first part of this sentence is oddly truncated in A (cf. *ORL* XVI, 80, lines 1–4). Throughout this paragraph Llull makes use of the two meanings of "virtue," the ethical one as well as that of "power, capacity, efficacy," for which see *Gentile*, Bk. 2, n. 5.

in majority or minority, there is equality of V with E I N; and when one virtue is in act, then others are in habit,[102] in which they are equal, yet lesser than the virtue that is in act; and the same is true of red V.

5. The black triangle enters V according to the disposition of the other triangles, and thus one must affirm, deny, or doubt in V according to how V exists in E I N, for V exists in E I N in one way through faith, and in another through hope, because through faith V does not contain as much of E I as it does of N, while through hope it contains all of E I N, for it contains E insofar as it has A V Y, and I in that it has H against V Z, and thus S can hope through hope, justice, and mercy, and what it hopes for exists through N, in which S does not know what will happen in the future; and the same thing happens with the other virtues and vices. This being the case, therefore, insofar as V follows the disposition of E I N, the black triangle is formed following the rule of the other triangles.

20. The Compartment of [V X]

1. With the blue triangle in it, it is clear that this compartment contains creature, the work of A and the work of creature, for predestination does not contradict blue V, with which free will accords in the compartment of [perfection justice], without which blue V cannot exist; and without blue V this compartment could not be used in creature, nor could creature be subject to the compartment of [merit blame], without which compartment all of V would be, and would not be, in the compartment of [being privation], which is an impossibility and contradiction.

2. There is difference between V X, as is clear from their figures, and their concordance and contrariety reside in the disposition of E I N R and of V X. For in E predestination and free will are in accord when S has greater charity toward A than toward itself, and when I dislikes there being majority or minority in the compartment of [wisdom justice] and N likes equality in that compartment, and has hope on account of merit, while hating blame,

[102] For "act" and "habit" see text at n. 56 above.

and R steps aside[103] so that E I N may have perfection in the compartment of [reality and reason], and the same is true of the green triangle in the other compartments of V X, according to their qualities.

3. In the beginning, before answering a question that must be determined by V X, F G must survey V X and choose in V X those compartments that are fitting for the solution, using these compartments as starting point with F G surveying the other triangles of T; and the means should be one compartment or another according to the compartment of [mediately immediately], and majority should be preserved with respect to reality, and minority with respect to reason, by means of the compartment of [power object],[104] and the end should be that V retains its form, with N being concordant with supposition, E with demonstration, and I being against V Z.

4. When E has as its object the compartment of [predestination free will], with E being at one moment in act through one of the words of this compartment, and at another moment in habit through the other word, and when this is simultaneously true of the compartment of [supposition and demonstration], then E is concordant with majority and moves I towards majority by means of fortitude, by means of which it also assigns Z to H, while N is moved towards faith by loving the first compartment and hating its contrary, and because of this R is destroyed, which R is the source of doubt concerning predestination and free will, which doubt accords with minority and with privation of E I N. Now this being the case, insofar as E I N are equal more through majority than through minority, therefore blue V is greater through the [being perfection] of [predestination and free will].

5. Through the affirmation of [predestination and free will] blue V increases in virtue, and through the negation of this compartment it decreases. S has merit, therefore, through the affirmation of this compartment, and blame through its negation, because majority

[103] A M have "decomposes itself." For the "reality" and "reason" of the following compartment, see n. 75.

[104] For these two concepts of Figure X, see the first part of the definition in n. 76 above; for the second, see also the corresponding definition in the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 394): "Object is that which is apprehended by *potència*, as truth is apprehended by the intellect which understands it, and color which is apprehended by the sight when it sees it."

of virtue accords with [being perfection] and minority of virtue with [imperfection privation]; thus all doubt raised against [predestination and free will] accords with [privation blame] against [being merit], through which contrariety there is concordance between doubt and red V.

21. The Compartment of [V Y]

1. This compartment denotes how the blue triangle should be introduced into it, that is to say that A, for all of blue V, is the creator of Y, and that, for red V, Y is the work of S, which Y is not a creature and accords with Z. Moreover, this Y is contrary to the Y that is in blue V, which Y in blue V is the work of S using Y with respect to the final intention for which Y is creature in blue V.

2. There is difference between Y and Y throughout all of V. For since Y can exist throughout all of V, and V is in itself diverse and contrary, it therefore follows that the green triangle exists throughout V Y, with that Y which is a virtue in accord with blue V, and that Y which is a vice in accord with red V. Since it is true that red V exists in some men and because there are diverse virtues in blue V and diverse vices in red V, therefore Y is differentiated in blue V and in red V, which differentiation follows the disposition of concordance and contrariety according to how they are to be found in E I N R.

3. In blue V, one virtue is the origin of a Y in one manner, and another virtue is the origin of a different Y in another manner, like faith, which is the origin of Y through N and the compartment of [supposition reason], and like charity and prudence, which, through E, are the origin of Y, which exists through the compartment of [reality demonstration]. And the same is true for the other virtues and vices, according as the triangles enter V, and according to the means by which their origin and purpose accord, that is to say, when one virtue is the means by which another virtue can be concordant with Y, etc.

4. That Y which is in blue V accords with majority, while that Y which is in red V accords with minority; and therefore that Y which accords with majority is concordant with being, which accords with majority, and that Y which accords with minority is

concordant with privation, which accords with minority. There is therefore inequality between the Y that is against Z, and the Y that accords with Z; by which inequality every Y existing in red V can be destroyed by the Y that accords with blue V. Moreover, the Y that is in faith is there through inspiration, whereas that Y which is in prudence is there through acquisition;[105] and they are greater or lesser according as the use of A and S accords with majority or minority, and according as the yellow triangle is present in E I N R.

5. The more faith affirms A to be the creator of great Y, the greater is the Y in which faith exists; and the more S places its hope in A, the greater it is in Y; and the more E loves A through charity, the greater it is in Y; and the more I assigns H to Z through red V, denying the existence of said red V in A, the more I is in Y in which are F G H; and the greater Y is, the farther it is from doubt. Thus, according to this rule, it is demonstrated how the black triangle exists in V Y according to the disposition of the other triangles and of E I N.[106]

22. *The Compartment of* [V Z]

1. This compartment of V Z has a bad connotation, since Z means that V must be red; but when the blue triangle is introduced into this compartment, then it means that blue V is the creature of A, and that red V is not a creature, nor is Z really a creature insofar as it is contrary to Y,[107] which is the creature by means of which blue V works against red V and against Z.

2. Z, along with red V, differentiates the red triangle in blue V; for just as in wine, which is hot and dry, corruption brings about the transformation of heat into cold, thus giving vinegar, and the dryness is the subject remaining in the transformation of one contrary into the other, so red V and Z are contrary to blue V in E I N, which are subjects of the contrariety in which red V and Z are concordant, being contrary to blue V and to Y, transforming the final cause of V Y into the contrary purpose, that is, into V Z.

[105] Cf. n. 64 above.
[106] Thus in V B; A M have "E I N R."
[107] M, surely by mistake, has "V."

3. Sometimes Z begins against Y in faith, sometimes in hope, etc., and sometimes it is contrary to Y with one vice, sometimes with another; and Z is the means, E I N R are the beginnings, and red V is the end. This being the case, according to how the red triangle enters V Z against V Y, it can, in the same way, enter V Y against V Z.

4. To the degree that red V is concordant with Z, so is it concordant with majority or with minority, and thus there is equality between red V and Z. And to the degree that V Z are greater in E I N R, so are V Y lesser in them; but since V Y are concordant with the compartment of [being perfection], and V Z with that of [privation imperfection], and since the former compartment accords with majority and the latter with minority, it therefore follows that the greater are V Z, the better they accord with minority, and the greater are V Y, the greater their concordance with majority; and because of this, V Z can be entirely destroyed by V Y.

5. Affirmation, which comes from V Z, is contrary to V Y, and the same is true of negation; and doubt arises in R, which contains V Z Y.[108] in order to destroy doubt, therefore, V Y must be transformed into E and V Z into I, so that affirmation and negation can be made through V Y against V Z, with E I fortifying V Y and mortifying V Z.

23. The Compartment of [X X]

1. This compartment indicates the manner in which T should be introduced into it, combining one compartment of X with another, as is exemplified in the questions of X.[109] Since, however, we want this Art to be brief, and feel its brevity to be sufficient, therefore, in accordance with this sufficient brevity, we will explain how T enters said compartment, and first we will discuss the blue triangle, as follows: as F G survey X, they receive as object the compartments in which A appears as predestination and perfection, and in which it appears as creature and work; and the same occurs with the compartments that are not creatures, and this appearance results from the mixture of the other triangles with the blue triangle in said compartment.

[108] Thus in A M; V B, however, have "which is composed of V Z."
[109] The questions referred to are those of Dist. IV, part ii, Fig. X.

2. There is really difference between predestination and free will, and they are concordant through A in the compartment of [wisdom justice], as they are contrary in the compartment of [reality and reason]. There is difference between being and privation, which difference accords with contrariety and with concordance by means of the compartments of [mediately immediately] and of [perfection imperfection]; for, immediately, there is contrariety between being and privation, whereas mediately they are concordant, since through perfection, privation tends toward being, and through imperfection, being tends towards privation.[110] There is difference between perfection and imperfection, and this difference can be found in the compartment of [concordance and contrariety] by means of the compartment of [mediately immediately], since they are immediately contrary to one another, like fire and water; they are, however, also contrary to one another mediately, just as fire and water are contrary to one another mediately, that is to say, by means of the compartment of [air earth];[111] and the same is true of their concordance, as one can clearly see following the method of the Elemental Figure. Merit and blame contain the green triangle according to the compartment of [mediately immediately], as appears in the method we have already given, when the green triangle enters the compartment of [perfection imperfection]. What is true of the foregoing compartments is also true of subsequent compartments that are immediately contrary to one another.[112] Thus, the green triangle enters the compartment of [predestination merit], and just as this compartment is exemplified by the compartment [mediately immediately], in the same way one must understand the other compartments of X X to be exemplified, compartments that are immediately different or concordant, and mediately concordant or contrary. In this way predestination and merit are immediately different, for predestination is A, while the merit of the person predestined is a created thing, but A and the created thing are concordant through the mediation of predestination, so that, by means of that thing, what is predestined arrives

[110] This explains what was stated so briefly in Dist. I, the Second Figure of X, par. 2 above. See n. 113 below for an explanation of the first sentence above.

[111] See Dist. II, part i, comp. 3, 2 above (and 7, 2 for the reverse situation).

[112] Thus in V B. A M (with the latter probably following the former) have, "And the same thing happens with the green triangle in the other compartments of X, which follows [*sic*] from it in the above-mentioned compartments."

at something which A knows and judges. But their contrariety exists by means of R, through the compartments of [reality and reason | power and object], with N being of the opinion that in a predestined being there is no practice of justice, and that in the practice of justice there is no practice of perfect wisdom, which contrariety lies in the fact that the object is concordant with perfection, and the power of S with imperfection.[113]

3. Predestination is the origin of free will, since free will is its creature; and thus it is impossible for predestination to be against free will; and the means by which that which is predestined becomes that which it is predestined to be is free will, which is in E I N R against V Z; and the goal is the perfection of the compartment of [wisdom justice]. Created being is the thing begun, and A is its beginning, and the beginning of privation of created being is the inclination that created being has towards that from which it was created, that is, nothingness,[114] which accords with privation, in which was its state before it was created; and the intermediary between being and privation is the second act, for this act brings about a distance between being and privation in generation, and it brings about a closeness between being and privation through corruption; and their end is related to how the second act impels a being upward through generation, until it achieves its perfection, or impels it downward through corruption, until it lapses into privation. Predestination, moreover, is the origin of created being, and this being is the means upon which follows what is known to predestination. And the same is true of being and perfection, since in every created being, being originates before perfection, and perfection before imperfection; while the means of this being is that by which a thing tends towards its perfection, that is to say, to the final cause for which it was created. This being the case, according to the example given in preceding compartments as to how the red triangle is introduced into them, one can understand how it enters the other compartments of X.

[113] For the opening clause of this sentence, A M have, "And there is contrariety in R." Llull, in discussing predestination and free will (see n. 42 above), uses two components of Figure A (wisdom and justice) and ten from Figure X (predestination–free will, perfection–imperfection, immediately–mediately, reality–reason, power–object). In the first and last sentences of this paragraph, Llull means that (italicizing concepts from Figure X) human *reason*, using the *power* of its intellect, cannot properly apprehend the *reality* of the *object* of that *power*, i.e. God, in which these two apparent contraries are concordant.

[114] Thus (*nichilum*) in V B; A M have "nonbeing" (*non ens*).

4. Predestination is concordant with majority and free will with minority, since predestination is A and free will is creature; but since free will is concordant with A insofar as it is its creature, and is concordant with predestination insofar as E freely accepts A V Y as object, and is also concordant with justice, which is A, therefore there is equality between the influence of the predestination and the justice that the predestined man receives, and in these influences there exists that equality through which E exists freely among V Y Z; and the same is true of I N R. Furthermore, being and majority are concordant, as are privation and minority, and privation of evil and majority are concordant, as are privation of good and minority, and there is equality through an intermediary, that is, through the compartment of [merit and blame]. Moreover, predestination has greater concordance with majority than created being, and the equality between this majority and minority exists through an intermediary, that is, through duration; for the created being will last in glory as long as A. This being the case, in the same way that the yellow triangle was put into the above-mentioned compartments, so it can be put in the other compartments of X, and this mediately and immediately.

5. To affirm predestination is, in terms of reason, to deny free will, and by the same token, to affirm free will is to deny predestination; since, however, predestination must exist in terms of reality, and there must exist justice by means of which free will is really preserved, hence doubt is formed in N R, which doubt comes from the imperfection of N R in reason; and this doubt descends into privation when E immediately affirms the existence of the compartment of [wisdom justice] and when I denies the existence of contrariety in said compartment through the compartment of [predestination and free will]. To affirm the existence of the compartment of [merit and blame] is to affirm the compartment of [predestination being] as well as the compartment of [perfection justice], and this affirmation is in reality necessary. Doubt, on the other hand, exists for the reason that S, through N R, forgets, is ignorant of, and dislikes the necessity of the above-mentioned compartment. Thus, in accordance with the rule we have here given for the black triangle in the above-mentioned compartments, one can understand the rule by which the black triangle enters the other compartments of X.

24. *The Compartment of* [X Y]

1. The present compartment represents the way in which T enters the compartment, with F G surveying the angles of T and introducing them into the compartment for the purpose of investigation how Y is creature and work through the compartments of X, following the disposition of the triangles of T in order to make A and its compartments known to E.

2. The greater the difference between predestination and free will, the greater is the Y which is in that difference, since if this were not the case, it would follow that said difference would be in Z; and the greater the difference and concordance between predestination and free will, the greater is Y. Thus, the contrariety between predestination and free will must necessarily be in the reason of C, and their concordance in reality, in order for contrariety and Z to accord, as well as reality and Y. In the compartments of [being and privation], [perfection and imperfection], [merit and blame], etc., Y accords with being, perfection, merit, etc., while Z accords with privation, imperfection, blame, etc.; but since Y accords with X in greater quantity than does Z, therefore there is a greater difference and concordance between X Y than between X Z, and greater difference and contrariety between X Z than between X Y. Thus by this rule we have shown how the green triangle investigates the compartment of [X Y].

3. If predestination is against free will, it follows that being is the origin of privation, that perfection is the origin of imperfection and that merit is the origin of blame, since the perfection of free will as A, which is predestination, which in turn is one and the same with justice, which originated free will. But since it is impossible that anything be the origin of its contrary (for in that case, a single identical end would be the intermediary of many contraries), therefore we have shown how, by means of the red triangle, the compartment of [reality free will] is demonstrated. Moreover, supposition by means of Y N is the beginning of demonstration by means of E I, and thus supposition is the beginning and demonstration the end, while Y N E I are the means by which the Y of N is transformed into the Y of E I by means of the red triangle.

4. E is immediately greater in reality when B C D at one moment take the compartment of [predestination perfection] as object, and at another moment that of [perfection and free will], than when B C D mediately take as object the compartment of [predestination free will] through the mediation of that of [being privation]. And thus, in reason, minority is concordant with Z, and, in reality, majority is concordant with Y; moreover, the equality of being and reality exists in greater Y, while that of being and privation in lesser Y, on account of which lesser equality lesser Y is transformed into Z in the compartment of [privation reason], by means of which transformation is formed the compartment of [doubt minority] against the compartment of [affirmation majority], which the compartment of [predestination free will] demonstrates by means of the yellow triangle, as we have already explained.

5. Before Y can be affirmed or Z denied, F G must survey all the compartments of X, testing which compartment or compartments accord with affirmation or negation, with F G at the same time surveying the compartments of T, making affirmation accord with E and majority, and negation with I and minority, and doubt with N R, which accord with privation. Such being the case, this rule exemplifies the Art by which one uses the black triangle to find the Y in X.

25. The Compartment of [X Z]

1. In X there exists the compartment of [power object], which power apprehends an object with Z when the rational power works against the final intention for which A created it, or when the sensitive power, because of the influence of the rational power and the reception of the vegetative power, is disordered when it comes to apprehending an object with Y, as, for example, a sick man who thinks sweet things are bitter, which thought is in Z.

2. There is difference between the rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers, for the rational power is created with the other two powers, so as to have the compartments of [E A V Y | I V Z]; and the sensitive power is the created influence that proceeds from the rational into the vegetative power receiving this influence; and from action and passion comes the sensitive power, which is a species having five senses for the purpose of apprehending sensual

objects, to which the vegetative power is subject, which power in turn is the result of the composition of the elements, as is clear from the Elemental Figure; and the vegetative power, through the influence of the rational power, is, within the sensitive, impelled to receive objects, insofar as it is contained in the sensitive by way of generation, which generation arises from the sensitive in the reception of the vegetative. This being the case, according therefore to the concordance between the three above-mentioned powers, Y is against Z; but insofar as the red triangle exists in them in a disordered way, Z is dominant,[115] which Z is different according to the above-mentioned difference.

3. The rational power is the origin of the sensitive power, since the sensitive is created under its influence; and the rational power, when it influences the sensitive with its own force, makes for an influence of the sensitive in the vegetative, in which lies the root of the sensitive's reception, which reception exists through this generable root, the origin of which vegetative power lies in the other two powers, that is, the rational and sensitive, as long as there exists the participation of all three; and the sensitive power is the means in which is found the purpose of the five senses of the sensitive, wherein is formed Z, which is the absence of Y, when the vegetative power is disordered in its reception of the influence of the rational power, and when in the root of the sensitive power there exists imperfection; and by this disorder, the sensitive power loses some of the senses whereby Z is formed, just as through blindness, a cold, deafness or even derangement of taste, the sensitive power fails to apprehend those objects that accord with Y.

4. Majority accords with the rational power and minority with the vegetative power, while the intermediary between this majority and minority lies in the sensitive power; and thus Z is greater in one power than in another, since in that power where Y is most suitable, Z is greater when it is deprived of Y; and the equality of the power and object is suitable insofar as Z can be greater against a nobler object than against a less noble one, and this according as Z is more strongly against Y in the nobler power and object than in the less noble ones.

[115] Thus in V B, which seems preferable to the "Z exists" of A M.

5. The rational power affirms, denies, or doubts by means of E I N R, the sensitive power through the five senses, and the vegetative power through the four powers that come from its entity, that is to say, the appetitive, digestive, retentive, and expulsive; nevertheless, what we have said about the black triangle should be understood metaphorically in connection with the sensitive and vegetative powers.[116] Thus, according to how the black triangle exists in these three powers by means of the green, yellow and red triangles, Z exists in the objects which the three powers apprehend; and the same is true of Y in the compartment of [X Z].

In the preceding discussion we have given the rule and instruction as to how T enters the compartment of [power object], which instruction is the regulated principle as to how T should be introduced into the other compartments of X by means of the compartment of [X Z], and since this Art is compiled from universal principles and seeks to avoid prolixity, we have therefore explained the compartment of [X Z] by means of the above-mentioned compartment, in order to show how in this Art one principle proceeds from another and how one principle points to others.

26. The Compartment of [Y Y]

1. The present compartment exemplifies how F G, along with Y, survey the compartments of A S T V X, as well as those of the Elemental Figure and of the Principles of Theology, Philosophy, and Law, with F remembering and G understanding how in the compartment of [goodness goodness], which is represented in the Demonstrative Figure by the compartment of [A A], Y is A, which created Y, which is both creature and the work of creature, with goodness using bonification to bonify Y that is a creature, and with Y that is a creature bonified by a bonifying Y[117] which is the work of that creature, and the same is true of the other compartments of A and of S T V X, etc.

[116] For the four faculties of the vegetative power, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 49. Salzinger, in his *Revelatio*, *MOG* I, 304 = Int. vi, 52, quotes this paragraph a propos of the curious metaphorical use of the black triangle.

[117] Thus in V B; M has, "and in Y, which is a creature, with bonified goodness bonifying Y." For this correlative terminology, see the "Life," n. 128, and *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 47.

2. There is difference between Y and Y, for one Y is a created being, while another is the result of the work E carries out in an object it apprehends with Y; yet another Y is the result of I V Z, another is Y in that which exists through N, and another is that which exists through R. And the same follows for difference of number, for during the time when Y exists through E, it is not that Y which E had at another time, nor is it that Y which it had at another time as object. Therefore, just as we have given an example of Y in one angle of the green triangle, in the same way one can understand the concordance existing between one Y and another; and the contrariety of this triangle lies in the concordance that one Y has with another against Z.

3. The way Y exists in the green triangle exemplifies the way it exists in the red triangle, following the disposition of the yellow triangle. For that Y which accords with majority is the beginning of that Y which accords with minority, just as the Y in which E exists is the beginning of the Y in which I exists; and that Y which comes from the influence of power in object is the intermediary between power and object, by which mediation Y, which exists in the beginning, is set in motion and infuses its virtue so that the intermediate Y is transformed into the Y in which must exist the final cause; as is the case with F, which forms Y in remembering in order that Y remain in remembering long enough for B finally to have Y in the remembered, C in the understood, and D in the loved.

4. Just as Y exists in the red triangle, in like manner it exists in the yellow triangle; for just as the links of a chain are connected one to another, so are the triangles connected one to another. It is therefore clear that the Y existing in blue V accords with majority, while the Y existing simply in E, having blue V, accords with minority, and all the more so since blue V exists for its final intention, in comparison to Y that is in the simple act of B C D, which are the means by which Y travels from B C D to blue V. And the equality of one Y with another exists in B C D, in E and in blue V, etc., according as the red and black triangles accord through the green triangle.

5. Y is affirmable and Z is deniable, while doubt, which comes from them,[118] is supposable, and thus Y, by means of E I N R,

[118] *Facta de illis* is only in V B.

exists in the whole black triangle, according to the disposition of the other triangles. Concerning this there is no need to give an example, since in the participation of the triangles it is clear to all those who know how to use them by means of E I N R, following the rules of this Art and its principles.

27. *The Compartment of* [Y Z]

1. Since the blue triangle is composed of A, creature and operation, Y Z must be put into it according to the rule of the other triangles, in order to show that Y is a creature of A, and that Y is the work of A and of creature, and that Z is the absence of Y and an inclination of being towards nonbeing through the work of creature contrary to Y. There is, however, no need to exemplify this, since it is clear in the mixing of triangles and in the act of F G surveying the compartments or flowers[119] of this Art.

2. There is a difference between Y and Z, which difference is a thing existing in as much quantity as there is contrariety between Y Z. And since they are concordant in some things, such as in imperfection or in the red V that is in Y and Z in a man subject to sin; therefore that being which is in their concordance is less than the being which is in their contrariety.

3. By the red triangle, the compartment of [Y Z] exists more strongly in R than in E I N, and thus Y Z go through many intermediaries before they are simply in E I N; for in O there is an absence of B F through the presence of K, and because of this, the absence of B F and the presence of K are the origin of how E holds Y in privation and Z in act. And thus Z is the origin of the privation of Y in E I N,[120] and the same follows for P Q in E and in I N; whence it is shown that, in the contrary sense, Y is the origin of the absence of Z; and the means lies in the subject, which is R, in which is brought about the transformation of Y into Z and of Z into Y through E I N, just as happens with the elements through the individuals of the species. The purpose of this, however, is for Y to destroy Z[121] through E I N.

[119] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 1.
[120] A M omit "I N."
[121] A M add "and for Z to destroy Y."

4. Y accords with majority and Z with minority, because Y and being, which accord with majority, are concordant with one another, as are Z and privation, which accord with minority; and any equality of Y Z is due to their being in red V, it being true that red V is in some men who through said red V are in Z.

5. The Y that is contrary to Z, by revealing itself, reveals Z, and Z, by hiding itself, hides Y; and therefore affirmation is more strongly in accord with Y than negation, while with the work of said Z both affirmation and negation are in disaccord, which is why the result of its work is doubt, which in this Art is destroyed when Y is in E and Z in I, with both destroying R.

28. The Compartment of [Z Z]

1. This Art contains the general rule as to how to introduce T into each compartment of the Art so that Z be the object of I, and since in the process of investigation one Z exemplifies another, therefore the compartment of [Z Z] means that T must be introduced into it. Thus, following the proper order, we will first put the blue triangle in it, and then the other triangles. Now according to the blue triangle, it must be said that A is not the creator of Z which accords with red V against blue V; at the same time it must be said that a creature never produces any Z from its own entity or from its own nature, for if it did, Z would constitute some part of creature. Since, however, some creatures are against the disposition of A and of themselves through red V, therefore Z comes from the disordered work of such creatures.

2. There is a difference between Z and Z, since some Z is like a man's being a donkey, which being is Z, and such a Z accords with Y, whereas another Z is that which is habitually the object of E, when I has Y as object, which E I are thus in the compartment of [imperfection blame]. The concordance of Z Z lies in E I, and the same follows for the diversity of Z Z by red V, N R and other similar things in which Z Z are concordant, as we have already said, or in which they are contrary to one another, like the Z that accords with V Y, which is contrary to the Z that accords with red V.

3. The Z that is an object with respect to E is a beginning with respect to that Z which in turn is an object with respect to I; for

E moves I and B C D move E[122] by means of the compartment of [free will blame], and the Z that begins in N is the origin of that Z which is in E I, when E I are in Z as a consequence of that Z which is in N, like a man who believes in Z against A and who directs I against blue V. The intermediary between one Z and another is the object[123] by means of which Z moves from one species to another, that is to say, from E to I, from I to N, and from N to E, etc. And the purpose for which Z exists is to destroy Y and to give form to its own being, with which being Z is in disaccord, since Z accords with privation.

4. According as Z, by means of the green, red, and black triangles, enters the yellow triangle, one Z is greater than or equal to another, like the Z farther from Y, which is greater than the Z nearer to Y; and the greater the Z, the lesser the being and the greater the privation it contains. However, the equality that exists between Z and Z exists in E when B forms Z in E as strongly as do C or D, and conversely.

5. In R one Z is so close to another that the result is doubt against affirmation and negation; but when each component of E I N recovers its own parts from R, and R is in privation, then doubt is destroyed as a result of F G surveying the compartments of this Art with the intention of destroying R, in which destruction affirmation and negation are formed; with F G apprehending as object the difference existing between one Z and another, so that E may have Y and I be the contrary to Z.

Here ends the Second Distinction, in which are given the rules and conditions for the compartments of the Ninth Figure, and in it we have shown and exemplified the art and doctrine according to which one knows how to put T into the compartments of this Art, with F G surveying the compartments through which they move towards the object of this Art, which occupies the following Third Distinction, and which involves knowing and loving A.

[122] Thus in A V; B M lack the "E."
[123] Thus in V B; A M have "subject."

HERE BEGINS THE THIRD DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF INTENTION

SINCE THIS distinction concerns intention, we should first explain that there are two kinds of intention, first and second. First intention is final cause, and second intention is that which is directed towards the end, which second intention accords with beginning and middle, while the first accords with final cause. And thus first intention accords with majority and second with minority, through which majority and minority the beginning is impelled through the middle towards the end. This being the case, the object of this Art is therefore the end that is the first intention,[1] which end is to know and love A, while the second intention exists in the terms of this Art, insofar as it accords with them.

This distinction is divided into sixteen modes,[2] which can be moved by the two circles of the Ninth Figure to form the compartments of this distinction, similar to the way the compartments of the Second Distinction were formed.[3] These sixteen modes are: Remembering, Understanding, Willing, Believing, Contemplating, Discovering, Guiding, Preaching, Interpreting, Solving, Judging, Teaching, Disputing, Counseling, Accustoming, and Healing. It is these sixteen modes that are examined in this distinction, and many other modes can be found in this Art, modes which, by the example of those given here, can be understood according to the doctrine and rule of the Art.[4]

1. Remembering

1. In order to know how to remember according to the Art, F G must examine the compartments of the Art, and first of all that

[1] This little relative clause from V B is missing in the printed texts. For the doctrine of first and second intention, see Dist. 1, n. 11 above and the references there. For the precept about knowing and loving God, see "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 72-4.

[2] These *modi* (Cat. *mous*) could be translated as "applications," "methods of procedure"; they represent, as will become clear, the various uses to which the Art can be put.

[3] Llull is here suggesting yet another substitution in the two outer circles of the Demonstrative Figure; cf. Prologue, n. 2 above and the references there.

[4] For the "can be found" of V B, A M have "follow"; A M also omit "and rule."

of [water earth]; for B accords with dryness through concavity and with cold through restriction; and by means of these two qualities many particulars can be admitted into B, from which particulars is formed the universal in which C finds what D requests; and thus melancholy confers greater subtlety than any of the other complexions, and therefore it is a good thing to have B accord with its complexion, which concordance is signified in the ordering of the aforementioned compartment.[5]

2. The compartments [A S | S S] denote the rule by which one can know how to remember, since the first compartment signifies how S remembers the compartments of A, and the second compartment signifies which species S should use in remembering these compartments; for if B remembers this doctrine, it is through the influence of A, by which B is impelled to remember loftily. And the loftiness of B gives strength to C D, by which B ascends to remember A; and the second compartment signifies how B can come to rest in N R, for B can be destroyed as a result of too much remembering.

3. The compartment [S T] signifies that, before B remembers, F surveys T without H, so that the will might offer no impediment to F, and so that F may mix the triangles of T, in order for Y to be formed with respect to E, and Z with respect to H. If, however,

[5] In this and the following three "modes" a correspondence is established between:

Modes	*Powers*	*Compartments*	*Qualities*	*Humors*
1	Remembering	water earth	dryness, cold	melancholy
2	Understanding	fire earth	heat, dryness	choler
3	Willing	fire air	moisture, heat	blood
4	Believing	air water	cold, moisture	phlegm

Cf. Pring-Mill, "Potencias," pp. 127-8, and *Microcosmos*, p. 135, as well as Salzinger, *Revelatio*, *MOG* I, 279–80 = Int. vi, 27-8, for these correspondences; for those between qualities and humors, see the root of the tree in the *Principles of Medicine*. Pring-Mill suggests that the word "subtlety" refers to remembering, but see n. 10 below. "Concavity" and "restriction" are explained in a passage of the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae* (*MOG* III, 236 = Int. iv, 40) referred to in the Salzinger text cited above. There Llull says that "B is operative by means of dryness and cold, like a receptacle that is empty on the side facing earth and closed on the side facing water, which is due to the fact that earth is evacuable and water is restrictable," which he continues in words applicable to the following two chapters: "Similarly, C is operative by means of heat and dryness, for just as fire is divisive and evacuative, so C is similarly evacuative and divisive as it goes from species to species; as a result, C is more subtle in a hot and dry body than in one of any other complexion, which is why excessive application to study makes the body dry up. In a similar way, D is operative by means of moisture and heat, since heat makes it ardently desire repletion through moisture, because it is characteristic of air to fill things up."

this formation is impeded, F must be transformed into K, G into L, and H into M, in order that the memory not be corrupted and that its strength be conserved in N, where it exists potentially. For it often happens that B is destroyed when it cannot remember and when D wants it to remember what it is unable to remember; and as a result of this destruction, B loses its strength in N.

4. The compartments [S V | S X | S Y | S Z] signify how one knows how to remember, that is to say, that S knows how to remember through V when B remembers blue V, and F remembers red V, since in this remembering the red triangle accords with D H. But when D loves red V and H hates blue V, then the red triangle is inverted, by which inversion S is inverted in its remembering, and does not know how to remember.[6]

5. [S X] shows how S remembers the compartments of X, with D loving that which is in accord and H hating that which is in disaccord with them,[7] and F G examining the compartments of X along with the compartments of T, for by such an examination C will have greater subtlety, as a result of which B will be raised up to remember this subtlety of C.

6. By [S Y] and [S Z] it is clear that Y is the reason why B rises; and since Z represents the darkening of B, and H dislikes Z, therefore B H lifts S high up for the sake of remembering, and M loves that which B F are unable to remember, and by this love M wants K to transform itself into B, as a result of which desire the transformation of K into B is brought about, and then B raises E to the level on which N was. This being the case, B rises from one level to another in those people who know how to remember by the above-mentioned doctrine.

2. *Understanding*

1. In order to teach a person how to understand, one must form the following compartments: [fire earth | A S | S S | S T | S V | S X | S Y | S Z],[8] which G must survey, observing their conditions. For

[6] In this paragraph Llull discusses only the first of the four compartments mentioned at the beginning; the other three are discussed in the following two paragraphs.

[7] "With it" in A M.

[8] The last seven compartments, which are made up of combinations of S with each of the basic figures of the Art, and which are the subjects of pars. 2-8 below, are the same as those discussed in the previous Mode.

the first compartment signifies how C purifies its operation through heat and dryness, for through heat it separates one thing from another, and through dryness it empties its object,[9] drawing it to itself and filling itself along with B. And thus C is in the forehead,[10] where passion also is as a result of excess heat and dryness, in which B is destroyed, which B accords with C through dryness. This being the case, whoever wants to understand subtly, must know how to temper this compartment of [fire earth].

2. The compartment [A S] denotes how G, along with T, surveys the compartments of A, while M supposes what it loves so that E can have the compartments of A, by which C is influenced to rise; for when M in the beginning hates supposition, then C loses what means it has, and as a result cannot arrive at a demonstration, thus making it like fire which, without an intermediary, cannot cross over into water. And if in the conclusion the supposition is contrary to A and its compartments, M is then converted into H contrary to the supposition, and D loves the contrary of the supposition, so that C may have Y in the compartments of A.

3. The compartment [S S] signifies how S should sometimes understand by means of C, sometimes by means of G, and how sometimes it should be ignorant so as to form N R, where the intellect is kept and remains when B D F G fail it. And hence C should sometimes understand that it understands in what way E exists in act, and sometimes G should understand that it does not understand in what way N exists in act. And by this rule C is made subtle in its ability to understand; nevertheless one must guard against allowing the sensitive and imaginative powers to make C cruder and destroy it by understanding objects of their

[9] Thus in V B; "subject" in A M.

[10] Llull explains the locations of the various powers of the soul in the *Book of Contemplation,* ch. 214,20: "By means of the brain that is located in the back of the head, the soul is prepared to remember virtuous memory; by means of the brain that is located in the forehead, it is prepared to understand virtuous understanding; and by means of the heart, which is prepared to desire, the soul has virtuous will. And in this way, O Lord, a person becomes naturally subtle." Earlier in the same chapter (pars. 4-5) Llull discusses the relation between "subtlety" and heat and dryness, and hence with a choleric nature. Notice that the concept of "subtlety," which appears several times in this Mode of the *Ars demonstrativa*, is in Llull equivalent to "acuteness, perspicacity; cleverness, ingenuity." (In the above-mentioned chapter—as well as the four succeeding chapters—of the *Book of Contemplation, subtilea* is synonymous with *enginy*.)

nature more than intellectual objects, which C can understand more loftily than those which are not similar to it in nature.

4. The compartment [S T] denotes how S surveys the triangles of T, so that, taking them as object, it may know how to understand and become subtle in understanding. For by the blue triangle it can understand that everything which exists is either A, creature or operation; by the green triangle it can know how to recognize difference, concordance, and contrariety; by the red triangle it can know how to begin, and how to use the means, transforming itself from one to the other[11] so that it may arrive at its end; by the yellow triangle it can know how to know what and what kind of object is greater, lesser, or equal; and by the black triangle it can know how to affirm, deny, or doubt. And thus by all these things, S has the rule and art for understanding; for like a peasant who owns a horse but does not know how to ride it, so S without T has an intellect but does not know how to understand.

5. The compartment [S V] shows how S should understand, by assigning blue V as the object of D and red V as that of H. And according as V has its own compartments, S examines them so as to conserve blue V for D and red V for H. And since in this rule A is the helper of S, and S is on the path for which it was created, therefore C G rise to a higher level than they possibly could without this instruction.

6. By the compartment of [S X] C knows how to understand loftily in X when it understands the compartment of [predestination and free will], in which C understands that perfection exists, as well as understanding that it does not understand all the perfection of the compartment which N loves. And thus, by the unsurpassed understanding that S has in C, as well as by the supreme will that it has in N, it knows how to achieve very subtle understanding of the other compartments of X, by using T to survey them.

7. By the compartment of [S Y] one can learn how S seeks Y. Now when B remembers this compartment, and forms C in terms

[11] The Catalan version specifies "from one means to another." Carreras i Artau (Ca I, 545, n. 50) rightly associates this passage with the Lullian doctrine of transcendent points, by which the intellect transcends not only the data of sense experience, but even its own intelligibilia, to apprehend eternal truth. For this doctrine, in addition to the page of Ca I cited above, see Colomer, *Edad Media,* pp. 59ff.; Pla I, 270–1; and E.-W. Platzeck, "La combinatoria luliana," *Revista de Filosofia* 12 (Madrid, 1953), 597–600.

of it for the purpose of seeking Y, then that C which understands Y is of the greatest subtlety; when, however, C cannot understand, it has recourse to R and removes parts of it in order to increase E; if, however, by the destruction of R, C cannot find the Y it is seeking, E is transformed into N, which N does not believe that which E cannot understand, with C understanding that everything which cannot be understood by man is not deniable or unbelievable, for then it might be possible for C to be able to understand everything every time E wanted it to, which is clearly impossible.

8. The compartment of [S Z] denotes the doctrine of understanding, for this doctrine is taught by the mixing of triangles in this compartment. Hence, whoever wants to have a subtle understanding of Z should refer to this compartment and assign Z as an object to H, so that Y may act as object to D. Moreover, in order for said objects to be nearer to the powers of S, S should frequently put the objects in its species, just as the more frequently the elements enter one into the other, the more easily is digestion accomplished and the more easily is formed the supposite that they compose.

3. Willing[12]

1. Whosoever would like to be instructed as to how to will properly must follow what is denoted by the following compartments. [F G | fire air | A S T V X Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z]. For the first compartment signifies that F G examine it until the other compartments are found. By means of the compartment of [fire air], F can remember and G understand how one must want the heart to be subject to this compartment, since it accords with this compartment, the temperance of which must exist through tempered moisture and heat. By A is meant that B remembers and C understands the compartments of A so that D may be raised up for the sake of loving A and its compartments. S designates how E is in the second compartment, I in the third,

[12] For the various possible translations of *velle* (Cat. *voler*), see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12.

and M in the fourth, which M loves A V Y and hates V Z.[13] T signifies how F G examine it so as to be able to form the first, second, third, and fourth compartments. V, moreover, signifies that D loves blue V and H hates red V. X shows how D loves its compartments in accordance with justice, and H hates blame, privation, and imperfection. Y presents itself as the object of D, while Z does the same with respect to H. Thus, according to this rule, anyone may know the art permitting him to use his will, with F G surveying the first compartment, so that said will may, in the other compartments, have ordered desire. If, however, F G find some impediment to surveying the first compartment, they must have recourse to the compartments formed from the four elements and from A S T V X Y Z, and in accordance with their conditions, F G must survey the compartments of A, and then those of S T V X, until the will has a perfect act of loving.

4. Believing

1. The compartments of [air water | N A V Y] signify how one should believe, for the first compartment signifies that C cannot understand when it is occupied by many different objects almost equally loved by D, like phlegm, which is of such gross matter that, as a result of the cold which restricts it as well as the moisture which fills it, neither the green nor the red triangles can find place in it, which is why phlegmatic people are crude in character and lazy, and why they ignorantly take as object many species for a single species. As a result the second compartment is formed, which compartment signifies that N should believe what C cannot understand of A V Y, and that M should love A over and above what C cannot understand, and moreover that N should have universal will in V for the good that accords with blue V, and

[13] This numbering of compartments makes sense only if we count the first three as one, as in fact they are written in V, and as they appear (with variants of the members of the elemental figure) in Modes 12, 13, and 15 below. We have kept them separate in our text in deference to the other MSS, and also because of the sentence above referring to "the compartment of [fire air]." This macrocompartment, however, is only a greater formalization of the surveying role of F G mentioned in Dist. I, n. 9, and Dist. II, nn. 55, 79. For the next two compartments, see Dist. II, n. 33. The last compartment is explained in the text.

should hate the universal evil that accords with red V; and it should do the same with Y, namely, that it should love it over and above C G.

2. Whoever wants to strengthen belief against doubt or temptation must have recourse to the compartments of [A S | S S | S T | S V | S X | S Y | S Z] and understand in them everything he can, and thus perhaps he will transform his N into E, or otherwise strengthen his N in accordance with the rule of the above-mentioned compartment.

5. Contemplating[14]

1. In order for a person to contemplate A, F G must examine the compartment of [T T], so that, in accordance with the rule of the triangles, E may examine the compartment of [A A], H may examine the compartment of [V Z], M may surpass D in loving A, and R may be destroyed by the compartment of [S S] in order for the compartments of [X X] and [Y Y] not to be absent in contemplation.

2. As a result of the examination that F G conduct of the compartment [T T], B remembers the compartment of [A A], by which C understands that the compartment of [goodness goodness] exists for all the other compartments of A, and conversely. Hence C is very elevated in the contemplation of A and its compartments, through which elevation D is very exalted in its love of A, because of which exaltation H descends very strongly against [V Z]; and the influence which A has in E H is so great that M surpasses E H, for it so loves A that over and above what E understands of A, it loves A and hates V Z. And in accordance with the rule of [S S], the noble work of E I N is so great that R has neither the matter nor form that could accord with being in contemplation; for E I N apply all their force to this contemplation, by which force the compartment of [X X] is present in this contemplation along with that of [Y Y], that is to say, that just as predestination and free will exist in the highest degree when C can distinguish between A and creature, so in contemplation is the Y of E as well as that of I present in the loftiest work that can exist in contem-

[14] For Llull's writings on this subject, see the *Flowers of Love*, Introduction, n. 15.

plation according to the above-mentioned rule, as a result of which work sweet sighs rise from the depth of the heart and bring sweetness of tears to the eyes, and blue V and devotion abundantly fill the heart. It therefore comes to pass that infused knowledge is received by the grace of A, with F G surveying A T V X Y Z.[15]

6. *Discovering*[16]

1. The intention of this Art is the discovering of particulars in the universals of the Art, which particulars are to be found in the compartments of the Art, once T has been introduced into them, according to the rule and practice provided by A S T V X Y Z and the Elemental Figure. Therefore, for the finding of the particular in the universal there are three main rules. The first is to seek the particular in a compartment or compartments, using F G along with T to examine said compartment or compartments. If however one cannot find the particular one is seeking according to the method suggested by the examples given in the compartments discussed earlier in this work, then F G must have recourse to the second rule, that is, to the questions discussed in this Art, for in them there is a certain similitude by which the particular can be found in a compartment, according as to how the question is discussed in said compartment. If, however, the particular cannot be found in the question, then one must introduce T into the compartment or compartments with which the particular best accords, and this one must do according to the conditions and rules by which T is introduced into the compartments signifying particulars, examples of which, and practice in which, has been given in this Art; and this is the third rule.

[15] See the commentary on this last sentence (which is missing in A) in Salzinger, *Revelatio*, *MOG* I, 414 = Int. vi, 162, where he relates it with the supreme certitude of demonstration that resides in the gift of God's grace. See also L. Eijo Garay, "La luz divina en la gnoseología luliana," *EL* 15 (1971), 172.

[16] *Invenire* (Cat. *atrobar*), the usual scholastic translation of the Aristotelian *εὑρίσκειν*, meant both "to find, find out, discover" (cf. the titles and passages cited in "Llull's Thought," text at n. 59), and "to devise, invent." Llull used it in both meanings, the first in the sense of canvassing the various parts, or combination of parts, of the Art to "find" a solution to a problem; the second in the sense of "devising" various conclusions or arguments from some component or set of components of the Art. It was therefore a concept central to Llull's method. Cf. *Ars inventiva veritatis*, *MOG* v, 146ff., *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* v, 417 = Int. v, 59, and *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis*, *MOG* v, 314 = Int. iii, 14.

2. One must begin one's search for the particular by choosing that compartment or compartments which best accord with it, working under the assumption that it can be found in said compartments, for if such an assumption were not made, G would not have the strength to seek that particular, nor F to recall the compartments that constitute the principles for the finding of particulars. For just as the mason prepares his material before building a house, so must one seek the universal principles in which the particulars one is seeking are to be found, and these must be necessary principles, and one must assume that by means of them the particulars can be found.

3. If, therefore, the particular one is seeking has to do with the works of nature, then T should survey the Elemental Figure, form a compartment or compartments in the Ninth Figure, and then examine that compartment or compartments, and assign either affirmation or negation to the compartments of [concordance majority], of [being perfection], and of [reality power]. If, however, the particular one is seeking concerns A alone, it should be sought by using T in the compartment of [A A], and if it concerns [A creature], then the appropriate compartments of the Ninth Figure should be formed, that is to say, the compartments of [A S | A T], etc. And this same rule is applicable in seeking other particulars, observing, however, the conditions of the compartments of A, with majority, being, perfection, and Y being concordant, and always affirming that by which A is more intelligible and lovable; and the same should be done with S, blue V, and everything that accords with creature and its work, as long as no contradiction or inconsistency follows that would be against A V Y, E I N, and against the rules of this Art.

4. In order to seek and discover a particular, the following compartments are necessary: [E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z], which are the objects toward which the Art is directed, for by the compartments contrary to [E V Z | I A V Y | M A V Y Z][17] is this Art newly discovered. Thus, whoever would like to find a particular in this Art must not be rebellious, lazy, hesitant, or fearful, nor

[17] See Dist. II, n. 47, for the opposition between the first two compartments of each triad; because of the dual nature of M, the last compartment is its own opposite. For the following sentence, see Salzinger, *Revelatio, MOG* I, 384 = Int. vi, 132, and Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 161.

should he without necessary reason assent to the statements of philosophers who, imagining that they utter the truth on all subjects, err in so many, but he should strive to form those compartments that have good meaning against those with bad meaning, and he should deny all those particulars that prevent him from forming good compartments, and affirm all those which lead him to form those good compartments that in this Art are objects with respect to E, against those compartments that are objects with respect to H. For if A were contrary to the nobler and greater E H of this Art, it would be contrary to its own majority as well as that of its creature, which is clearly impossible; and it is through this impossibility that all the principles of the Art operate.

5. Thus whoever has become skilled in the use of the Art and follows its principles, according to the doctrine given above, will know how, with the help of A, to discover the secrets of nature, and he will have knowledge of A S T V X Y Z, as well as of how to devise and compile books. Moreover, he will know how to find out whether there is error in ancient sciences, and whether those who discovered them did so with true doctrine or devised them in accordance with natural sense; for this Art will give him rule and doctrine by which to know whether in some way they erred out of ignorance, and it will make their science more loved in those aspects in which their intellects did not deviate from the path of truth.

7. *Guiding*[18]

1. The intention of this Art is to guide those subject to error who lack art and doctrine by which they could be guided toward the path of truth; for this Art is common to all Gentiles, Jews, Christians, and Saracens alike, and to all people no matter to what religion or sect they belong. This is because the principles of the Art are completely general, and they can be used to judge clearly which people are on the true path and which are in error. Moreover

[18] Both the Latin *dirigere* and the Catalan *endreçar* mean literally "to put on the straight path," thus including the meanings of "to direct, guide, lead," along with those of "rectify, set right, correct, reform." It is, as will become clear from subsequent paragraphs, a word Llull usually uses in connection with his proselytism of unbelievers (cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 78 above). For further use of the term, see the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 53, and the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 51.

this Art provides instruction as to how a people on the true path can, with the help of God, lead to the truth a people whose errors have blinded them against that truth.[19]

2. You who are in Y, by which you go to A, and who want to guide those who are in Z, by which they go to the torments of the everlasting fires of Hell, you must learn various languages and teach your own language, and you must translate this Art into foreign languages[20] so as to teach it joyfully, with the aim of destroying Z, to those whom you wish to convert, and toward whom you must be friendly and not frightening, proud, thoughtless, or unjust;[21] nor should you use vile words among them, for such vices can often cause the compartment of [I V Y] to be formed.

3. In order to guide those in error, the following compartments are necessary: [E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y].[22] By the first of these is meant that E remembers, understands, and loves A V Y, and by A is meant that F G, along with T, survey the compartments of A, so that they can receive from them so much influence and grace that they will know how to recognize which people have E toward the compartments of A without any disaccord among these compartments, nor of E in V Y.

4. The second compartment means that I should have F G H against red V and against Z, which V Z accord with error, and this error is revealed in everything that exists against the first compartment. Thus if you, whoever you are, are on the true path, you must be able to form the first compartment and the second better than someone who is in error, which error is counter to the first compartment and the second. Therefore, you who are in Y must endeavor with all your might to form the first and second compartments for that person who is subject to error; if, however, you say that there is no possibility, then you are acting contrary

[19] Among the many commentaries on this paragraph, the most interesting are those of Salzinger, *Revelatio, MOG* I, 311–12 = Int. vi, 159–60; Galmés in *ORL* XVI, p. viii; and Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 39.

[20] The same recommendation as that in *Felix*, Bk. VIII, towards the end of ch. 89.

[21] After "frightening," A and the errata at the back of M add "nor avaricious"; in place of "thoughtless," M has "loving with wordly love"; in place of "unjust," A has "irate."

[22] A gives the last compartment as [M A V Y Z], which is not impossible in view of par. 4 of the previous mode, and of par. 5 below. Notice that this and the next two paragraphs constitute one of the few places where Llull actually *explains* compartments with more than two components.

to the compartment of [hope fortitude], and with K you are contradicting this Art through the compartment of [charity prudence], and you are interchanging E in the first compartment with I in the second, at the same time letting K forget the compartment of [mercy truth].

5. The third compartment means that it must be assumed by whoever is in Y, that Y has greater power than Z, and blue V greater than red V, and therefore M should love A, which accords with V Y and is in disaccord with V Z, as a result of which accord and disaccord there is the possibility of destroying every error by means of the first and second compartment, otherwise being, perfection, Y, and majority would not be in accord, nor would privation, imperfection, Z, and minority, which is impossible.

6. In order to guide those in error, F G must survey all the compartments of this Art, and the person who is in Y as well as the one who is in Z, must agree to follow the rule of this Art without worrying about death or hardships, and he must not be afraid to leave wife, children, wealth, and worldly pleasures,[23] since error against Y is worse than anything else in the world, and to remove doubt and demonstrate the truth is better than anything else beneath the heavens.

7. Just as we have in this chapter given an example as to how one should guide those subject to error, in the same way can be understood the doctrine of how to guide men from red V to blue V, from one virtue to another, and from ire to consolation, as well as from I to E and from N to E I, and also as to how E can be converted from V Z to V Y, and I from V Y to V Z, and similarly with other things, with F G surveying A S T V X Y Z as well as the Elemental Figure, until the following compartments are finally formed: [E V Y | I V Z].

[23] Galmés (*ORL* XVI, p. ix) points out the autobiographical nature of this clause (see § 9 of the "Life" above). He also (p. viii) quotes this and the next paragraph (along with Mode 6, par. 5) as examples of the hope Llull placed in his Art.

8. *Preaching*[24]

1. This Art provides instruction for preaching, as is indicated by the following compartments: [A S | A T | A V | A X | A Y | A Z | fire air]. The first of these means that E has as object the compartments of A, and this first compartment denotes the third, with E having blue V and I red V. The fourth compartment signifies how X affords material for the preacher, so that he may praise A, according as is indicated by the fifth and sixth compartments. The seventh compartment signifies how the preacher presents examples in accordance with the Elemental Figure, while the second compartment signifies how T exists in all these above-mentioned compartments for the purpose of giving knowledge and love of A.

2. In accordance with the above doctrine, the preacher must have F G survey these compartments, so that the compartments of [E A V Y | I V Z] may be formed in himself and in the people. For when C understands the intrinsic and extrinsic work of A, then B D accord in A V Y through C, and E impels I against V Z. When, however, C does not understand A V Y, then I does not have a perfect motor impelling it against V Z, and therefore the preacher has imperfect material for his sermon, and because of this lack of matter, the form is also deficient and there is imperfection in his sermon, as a result of which the people fail to grasp the usefulness of the sermon.

3. The compartment of [fire air] denotes how the preacher should dispose his intention in his sermon, for insofar as T is in the compartment, the preacher should reserve his first intention for A, and the second for himself and for the people to whom he is preaching; and he should therefore not have H against Y or against blue V. For just as fire receives its contrary along with the

[24] Llull wrote extensively on this subject during two periods toward the end of his life: the first was 1304–5 when he wrote the vast *Liber de praedicatione* as well as the *Liber de praedicatione contra Judaeos*; the second occupied the five months from October 1312 to February 1313, when he wrote eight works—all still unpublished—containing a total of 182 sermons, and including the *Art major de predicació* and the *Art abreujada de predicació* (nos. IV.60–7 in the Catalogue at the end of Vol. II here). He discusses the subject in the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (*MOG* v, 713 = Int. v, 355), the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 247, and the *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 98.

dryness it receives, and bestows its heat on its contrary along with the moisture of air, so a good preacher receives tribulation and perils through A, while scorning the vanities of this world, assigning Y against Z, and discussing the intrinsic and extrinsic work of A in his sermon, and therefore receives the influence and blessing of A in his sermon, from which stems his influence over the people to whom he is preaching.[25]

9. *Interpreting*[26]

This Art has been devised for the interpretation of the Scriptures of A, which texts can be interpreted according to the signification of the following compartments: [E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z]. The first of these indicates that the interpretation should be such that E has A V Y as object, for no Sacred Scripture contradicts the compartments of A, blue V or Y, nor is it against the E which is a creature so that it may have A V Y as object and impel I toward V Z, which are in disaccord with A V Y. If, however, the interpretation cannot be carried out according to the first compartment, it must be made according to the second, with H disliking everything that is against A V Y. And if it cannot be done by means of the second compartment, it must be done by means of the third, with M, through faith, hope, and charity, loving A V Y and hating V Z. According to this doctrine, therefore, F G must survey the compartments of A S T V X Y Z until they can finally form the first and second compartments in their interpretation, following the conditions of A S T V X Y Z. And what is true of the interpretation of theology is also true of the intrepertation appropriate to philosophy and law, since the principles of this Art are general to all fields of knowledge.

[25] For an even more extended parallel between preaching and elemental theory, see the chapter of the *Proverbs of Ramon* cited in the previous note.

[26] *Exponere* (Cat. *espondre*) in the sense of "interpreting, explaining, commenting upon," and almost always used by Llull with reference to sacred Scriptures. He elaborates on the theme in the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (*MOG* v, 716 = Int. v, 358). It is also one of the "principles" of theology, and as such is treated in the *Principles of Theology*, *MOG* I, 633 and 666 = Int. ix, 27 and 60, in the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 530 = Int. viii, 28, and here below Dist. IV, part ii, Questions of Theology, nos. 116–121.

10. Solving[27]

1. This Art was devised for the solution of problems or questions that must be solved according to the meanings of the Elemental Figure and the Ninth Figure,[28] as is briefly exemplified in the following compartments: [fire fire | A A | S S | T T | V V | X X | Y Y | Z Z]. The first compartment means that, if the question concerns fire and fire, fire and heat, heat and the lightness of fire, or some other similar thing, F G should examine the compartment of [fire fire] and answer according to the way in which T exists in that compartment; and the same is true if the question concerns fire and air, etc., that is to say, that one should have recourse to the compartment of [fire air], and so on for the rest. If, however, the question concerns A, that is to say [goodness goodness], [goodness greatness], or goodness and bonification, etc., then F G must examine the compartment of [A A] and the answer must be formulated according as T exists in said compartment; and if the question concerns A S or A T, etc., one must turn to those compartments which are formed in the Ninth Figure; and the same follows for S S, T T, etc.

2. There are six ways in which F G must investigate this Art, using first one, then another. The first way consists in using the table with the circular figures; the second in using the secondary figures in which the principles are combined with one another; the third in using the triangles of the Second Distinction; the fourth in using the compartments of the Fourth Distinction; the fifth in using Figure Nine,[29] and the sixth and last in using the imagination, that is to say, solving and seeking what is necessary through this Ninth Figure[30] by imagining the figures and compartments suitable for answering the questions. And it is to this sixth method that all the others are brought, since it constitutes their goal.

[27] Cf. *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 140, as well as "Llull's Thought," text at n. 80.

[28] For a commentary on this statement, see Pring-Mill, *Número,* p. 41, and "Grundzüge," p. 259. Note that the whole of Dist. IV below is concerned with the "solving" of questions.

[29] A adds "of brass"; cf. Dist. I, n. 42.

[30] Thus in V B M; after the comma, however, A has "without the book and the figure of brass," the last phrase of which—*figura del lautó*—is translated into Latin in the errata at the back of M as *figura authoris*! In the next part of the sentence, M has "by means of compartments" instead of the "and compartments" of all other sources.

3. For the technique of solving questions one should make use of metaphors, similes, and examples, so that between the person answering and the person asking there may be [charity justice]. Thus before answering a question, one should sometimes add a metaphor from the Elemental Figure which suits the conclusion, so that it be a principle common to both disputants.[31]

4. The above doctrine gives the method by which one may use the Art to answer and solve questions; and this same method also offers a technique by which one may know how to argue and formulate questions by means of this Art, by following the conditions of the above-mentioned compartments.

11. Judging[32]

1. This Art is very necessary for judging, as is indicated by the following compartments: [A S | A T | A V | A X | A Y | A Z | fire earth | E A V Y | I V Z]. By A we mean that every sentence pronounced on the basis of [merit blame] should be judged according to the four species of S and the compartments of A;[33] and T represents the compartment of [T T], which denotes that some triangles are introduced into others in order to investigate blue and red V for the sake of forming the eighth and ninth compartments, according to the meaning of X in the fourth compartment, Y in the fifth, Z in the sixth, and by fire and earth in the seventh.

2. A sentence based on the Art is surer than one not based on it, for by means of this Art a judge can carefully weigh whether he should punish on the basis of E, of I, or N or of R, or whether he should punish E more on account of B than of C, or more on account of D than of C, and conversely, and the same is true of the other individuals of I N R. A judge may also know by this Art if S is more contrary to a particular compartment of A than to another, and the same is true for V X; and he can also know whether S is more contrary to Y than to Z, or conversely.

[31] For commentaries on this important paragraph, see Pring-Mill, "Analogical," p. 323, and *Número*, p. 50, as well as J. Rubió in *EL* 3 (1959), 265. For more general references, see Dist. I, n. 39 above.

[32] Cf. *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem, MOG* v, 710 = Int. v, 352. For the legal applications of the Art, see Dist. IV, part ii, the Principles of Law, below.

[33] Thus in all sources except M, which has "and the species of the compartment of A."

3. There are more circumstances or cases that have to do with the compartment of [merit blame] than there are cases involving decrees, decretals, and laws; and since these circumstances can be investigated and discovered artificially through the compartments of this Art, therefore the Art is very necessary for every judge making judgments concerning temporal and spiritual possessions, and all the more so since the inner workings of S are so concealed by E I N R Y Z, which workings should be most carefully and subtly investigated.

12. Teaching[34]

1. This Art has been newly devised with the intention of demonstrating how in a short time one can get to know various sciences, since according to the meaning of the compartment of [F G fire A S T V X Y Z] the compartments of [E A V Y | I V Z] similarly denote how a teacher should teach and a pupil should learn by having F G survey the Elemental Figure and A S T V X Y Z in the Ninth Figure, in order for E to have A V Y as its object and for V Z to be objects with respect to I.

2. Through the teaching of this Art, E is uplifted in A V Y and I in V Z, and as a result of this uplifting of I E, knowledge is exhibited and taught in a short amount of time, and it is preserved by means of universal, necessary principles, in which are preserved and found many particulars which, without the instruction of a teacher, could not be found.

3. In order to teach this Art, one must follow the rules we have given in the compartments of A S T V X Y Z, in the Elemental Figure, and in the modes of B, C, and D.[35] First, however, one must learn the Alphabet that goes with the principles of the Art,[36] and one must become completely familiar with the figures of the Art. Then one must proceed according to the disposition of questions[37] in the Art, that is to say, show how the questions

[34] The verb *docere* (Cat. *mostrar*) is also used by Llull in the sense of "showing" and sometimes even "demonstrating." By the first sentence below, however, it is clear that he is here referring to the acquisition of other sciences discussed in "Llull's Thought," text at n. 81.

[35] I.e., Modes 1–3 above.

[36] On the importance of learning the Alphabet, see the *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 58 = Int. ii, 4, and Ca I, 400.

[37] Thus in V B M; A and the errata in the back of M have "distinctions."

should be determined by the compartments in which they are represented.

4. Just as the science of arithmetical calculation[38] requires frequent practice, so with this Ninth Figure, which is made of brass or some other metal and contains the other figures of this Art, one should have frequent practice in formulating and solving questions, and in reducing other fields of knowledge to the principles of this Art. And it is through such frequent practice that this science is easily learned and made familiar to those who have a natural disposition in C G, with D loving A V Y and hating V Z.

13. Disputing[39]

1. This Art provides instruction in disputing, as is shown by these compartments: [F G A S T V X Y Z | N R | E A V Y | I V Z]; for the first compartment means that F G survey the figures of the Art so as to be able to destroy the second compartment, and to form the third and fourth compartments, which accord with affirmation and negation against doubt, which in turn accords with the second compartment. Thus, at the beginning of the dispute, it must be agreed that the disputants will follow the rules of the Art, as are signified in the above-mentioned compartments.

2. In every disputation one must necessarily dispute by authorities according to N, and by reason according to E I; and since the authorities which, through N, are in Y cannot be contrary to E that is in Y nor to I that relates to Z, one must therefore correct the authorities and lead them back to E, so that they may be converted into E I, which conversion must be assumed at the beginning of the disputation; for if it were denied, an affirmation would follow, that is to say, an affirmation that K was stronger than B, L stronger than C, and M stronger than D, as well as that R would be nearer being and perfection than E I; but since this is impossible, therefore the above-mentioned assumption must form part of the

[38] *Scientia algorismi* refers specifically to the decimal system of Arabic numerals introduced into Christian Europe in the twelfth century.

[39] Disputation is a subject Llull treated extensively in the *Book of Contemplation,* chs. 187–8, 216–17, and 362, as well as in the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem, MOG* v, 716 = Int. v, 358, the *Proverbs of Ramon,* ch. 248, and the *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis, MOG* v, 339 = Int. iii, 39. See also "Llull's Thought," text at n. 78. Notice how the techniques proposed in this mode are essentially those of the *Book of the Gentile.*

disputation, so that K L M O P Q may be frequently overcome by B C D F G H, which accord with majority, being, and perfection.

3. In a disputation, blue V must, in every way, be against red V; moreover the subject of the disputation must be Y by means of E, and Z by means of H, and in the disputation examples must be introduced from the Elemental Figure or from A S T V X Y Z, so that the person in Z is compelled to concede that the metaphors and examples are in Y, thus being led by them to consistency or inconsistency through the possible or impossible.[40]

4. By the aforementioned rules and in many other ways a doctrine is taught in this Art by which the artist[41] may know how to dispute and destroy Z, by observing the principles of the Art and denying all accidents by which said principles might be destroyed.

14. Counseling[42]

1. This Art was devised with the intention of giving counsel to prelates, princes, and their subjects, as is indicated by the compartments of [N A V Y Z | R A V Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z], since the first and second compartments must be converted into the third and fourth, which conversion is taught by this Art, with F G surveying A S T V X Y Z, so that they destroy the first two compartments and form the last two, which should be objects for every prelate and prince, as well as for all their subjects, according to the disposition of the red, yellow, green and black triangles.

2. By this Art one can give counsel by following the disposition of the Elemental Figure, which indicates the way S should use E I N R; and by this Art one can have knowledge of future events

[40] See Pring-Mill, "Analogical," p. 323, and *Número*, p. 50, for a discussion of the analogical reasoning proposed in this paragraph.

[41] M has "the learned artist," whereas A just has "one." The usual medieval meaning of the word *artista* was that of a master in the Faculty of Arts, or of somebody skilled in or studying the liberal arts; Llull, however, almost always uses it in the more specific sense of a practitioner of *his* Art.

[42] On this subject, which was evidently important for him, Llull wrote three works: the *Liber de consilio* of 1304, the *Ars consilii* of 1315, and the poem *Del consili* of 1311. He devotes a whole chapter or section to the subject in *Doctrina pueril,* ch. 32; also *Blaquerna,* ch. 55; *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem, MOG* v, 714 = Int. v, 356; and the *Tree of Science, OE* 1, 666, 903; as well as treating the subject more aphoristically in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 47, and the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 45. For a definition, see *Ars brevis*, part x, "Hundred Forms," no. 63.

according to the circumstances that are the object of E I against N R. The Art also indicates which good is more lovable and which evil more detestable. This Art, moreover, confers necessity on chance counsels given without art, which necessity characterizes a counsel based on the Art following its principles and questions,[43] putting every counsel into the form of a question, one that must be determined in accordance with the Art and in accordance with the way questions are solved in the Art. Thus, since counseling is so very necessary to every prelate and prince, and indeed to everyone, this Art is therefore most desirable and attractive for every lord and his subjects capable of having it and knowing how to use it.

3. Every counsel must concern a particular or particulars, and therefore this Art is necessary for giving counsel to others and to oneself, seeking the particular or particulars in its universals, which universals are general principles in which one finds the particulars, according to the instruction imparted by the figures, compartments, and questions in many places in the Art.

15. Accustoming[44]

1. By means of this Art a person may know how to become accustomed to doing good, as is signified by these compartments [F G A S T V X Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z | E I N R]. For when F G examine the first compartment, a person becomes accustomed in the second and third compartments against the fourth; that is to say, that the more frequently and completely F G examine the first compartment, the more E I N recover their parts from R, and the more R is destroyed, the more E I N are increased, by which increase the second and third compartments are also increased, which compartments are in accord with good customs and perseverance.

2. If someone wants to become well accustomed according to the second and third compartments, his F should know how to remember A and its compartments, and should assign them as object to G, so that it might make S recognize[45] B C D in A and

[43] Thus in all sources except M, which has "conditions."

[44] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 75, and *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 99, as well as the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 194.

[45] Thus in V M; A B, however, have "accustom" for "recognize."

in its compartments, with F G examining T and giving blue V to E and red V to H, and this by the disposition of X, according as the powers of S accord in taking the object mediately or immediately, so that they accord with Y and are contrary to Z.

3. In accordance with the Elemental Figure, the elements in a gold ring are so accustomed to being one in the other, with their entering into and emerging from one another through diversity and concordance, and through least contrariety, that such a ring is more durable than the finger of the hand on which it is placed, in which finger the four elements are not so accustomed to entering into or emerging from one another as in the ring, since they have greater contrariety in the finger than in the ring. Such being the case, therefore, this metaphor denotes how, through this Art, a person can become accustomed to fortifying blue V and mortifying red V, if he knows how to make F G examine frequently the first of the above-mentioned compartments, so that the second and third compartments oppose R, which impedes good customs and is the occasion for all bad education.

16. Healing[46]

1. This Art provides instruction whereby a person can know how to heal physically and spiritually, as is indicated by the compartments of [fire water | R E I N | E V Z | I A V Y | M A V Y Z], which compartments signify bodily and spiritual illness, as a result of which signification health is signified by the contraries of these compartments. For the first of these compartments signifies that fire and water are contrary to one another, which contrariety causes physical illness without the intermediate tempering of air and earth, according to the disposition by which T enters the compartments of the Elemental Figure, which compartments denote the way in which a physical cure should be performed, following the prescriptions of the questions that are indicated in this Art.

2. The second compartment signifies illness of S; since R, in proportion to what it contains of E I N, represents the imperfec-

[46] Llull often uses this word in both the physical and spiritual senses; cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 49, as well as the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 132 and 293. In the *Proverbs of Ramon* he discusses it in the physical sense in ch. 150 and in the spiritual sense in ch. 50. For the former, see the *Principles of Medicine* here below and the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 589 and 607; for the latter, see the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 48.

tion of said E I N, as a result of which imperfection the remaining compartments are formed, for the sake of which S is in the compartment of [imperfection blame]. When, however, in this Art S surveys the compartments of [E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z], then it recovers its health through the compartment of [perfection merit], which it will be able to, and know how to attain by knowing this Art and by loving its principles and doctrine.

3. There are many methods and rules by which this Art teaches how a person can use it to heal himself and his neighbor. Since, however, the doctrine we have given should suffice, and since there are other subjects we want to discuss, we will therefore end this Third Distinction after this brief note, and begin the Fourth.

HERE BEGINS THE FOURTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF QUESTIONS

1. The Last distinction of this work is divided into two parts, the first of which consists of 38 questions, 10 of which are concerned with the compartments of the Elemental Figure, and 28 with those of the Ninth or Demonstrative Figure.[1] The second part contains as many questions as there are compartments in A S T V X and in the Principles of Theology, Philosophy, and Law, since one question is assigned to each compartment. There are therefore 1,080 questions, counting the preliminary question at the beginning of this distinction.[2]

2. The questions of this Art are of three sorts. The first is that of 38 questions; the compartments indicating the solutions of these are accompanied by an explanatory text, and thus are dealt with in a usual way. The second group is dealt with in a more subtle fashion, since the compartments indicating the solutions to the questions are not explained by any accompanying text, but are just given by themselves, so that the questions may be solved by their meaning alone. The third and last method, however, concerns external questions which do not appear in this volume, but which should only be settled by the Art, seeking their solution among the compartments of the above-mentioned 1,080 questions. And if the artist is skilled, he will solve them immediately by means of the compartments that best accord with them; or else he should make up other compartments himself, according to the method displayed in the compartments of this work. And this

[1] I.e., the compartments of the Second Elemental Figure and of the Second Demonstrative Figure. See Dist. I, nn. 37 and 44 for the numbers 10 and 28.

[2] The last phrase refers to the question at the end of this little introductory section. This one, plus the 38 in part i and the 1,041 in part ii, give us the total of 1,080. The number 1,041 is itself the sum of six second figures (those of A, S, X, Theology, Philosophy, and Law) of 136 compartments each, one (T) of 120, and another (V) of 105.

third method is subtler than the other two, as well as being the goal toward which the Art is directed, and the general goal of the entire Art, which is in C G.

3. It is the condition of the compartments by which questions are solved that every compartment following the first must be directed toward that first compartment through concordance or contrariety, and this rule holds for all the questions presented here.

Question: Whether this Art is demonstrative.

Solution: [E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | R A V Y Z].

F remembers that, with G surveying A S T V X Y Z, the first two compartments accord with the compartment of [majority end] whereas the last two accord with that of [minority doubt], and thus C understands that this Art is demonstrative. For if it were not, the first two compartments would not surpass the last two in dignity, which surpassing is self-evident in this Art, in which each universal is sufficient for the finding of many particulars in said universals by necessary reasons, as we have shown in many places in this Art.

HERE BEGIN THE QUESTIONS OF THE FIRST PART

Questions of the Elemental Figure

1. *Question*: Whether the simple elements enter into composition with essential or with integral parts.

Solution: [fire fire | fire water | T T | concordance majority | contrariety minority].[3]

The solution to the question posed is indicated by these compartments, and the following text is an exposition of said compartments. That is to say that the first compartment signifies essential parts, which are the matter and form of fire. The second compartment signifies integral parts, inasmuch as fire and water

[3] Notice how the first compartment of the solution corresponds to the first "compartment" of Dist. II above, as do the first compartments of subsequent solutions to the corresponding subsequent "compartments" of Dist. II. It is important to keep these correspondences in mind, because they provide much of the frame of reference for Llull's explanations here. This will perhaps become clearer in the extended analysis of this particular explanation provided in Appendix 1.

are different and contrary, and in them is produced an integral part with the other elements, which part is the elemented being having matter and form constituted by means of the generation of essential parts and divisible into integral parts. The third compartment signifies the fourth and fifth. The fourth compartment signifies that in elemented bodies there can be greater concordance through composition of essential parts than through that of integral parts, since continuous quantity accords with essential parts in a compound body, whereas discrete quantity accords with integral parts in different bodies. The fifth and last compartment signifies that the elements have less contrariety in composition by integral than by essential parts; and since majority of concordance and contrariety accords better with generation and corruption than minority, therefore G understands that the elements enter into composition by means of essential parts and that together they form a supposite which is part of all four elements and which is integrally composed of matter and form, and this is self-evident to the F examining the compartments in which this solution is indicated.

2. *Question:* Why is it that an elemented body is the product of the four elements, and yet is not those four elements?

Solution: [fire air | air water | water earth | earth fire].[4]

With F surveying the compartments, G finds the solution, in accordance with how T is regulated in these compartments; that is to say, that since the parts of the elements arise one from another and issue one from another, and since the accidents issue from substance and remain in it, therefore a body, which is a substance, is produced by the aforementioned transformation of elements brought about by generation and procession,[5] with the supposite being of another species that is neither an element nor elements, for if said body were in a species with an element or elements, then the aforementioned transformation, generation, or procession could not take place, and the work of nature would be destroyed.

[4] Note that this is the order of the circle of elements. See Table 5.

[5] This "generation and procession" refers to the previous "arise" and "issue." See the corresponding "compartments" in Dist. II, part i, above, and especially 9, 3 and 4, 2 where this question is discussed.

3. *Question:* Whether simple fire impels compound fire towards simple or compound water.

Solution: [fire water | air earth].

With F G examining the compartments, it is clear to G that simple fire has greater contrariety to simple water than to compound water, and especially since simple fire has greater virtue[6] than compound fire. And therefore simple fire directs its virtue through compound fire, impelled by simple fire against simple water, which impels compound water; now in this compound water, simple fire impels compound fire against the virtue of simple water, so that, in said compound water, compound fire, through the virtue of simple fire, is able to mortify the virtue of simple water, just as earth mortifies the virtue of simple air in the water it receives. And this is evident according to what, by means of the green, red, and yellow triangles, these compartments signify by the compartment of [mediately immediately].

4. *Question:* Whether simple fire exists essentially in compound fire, or whether what exists there is the virtue of simple fire and not its essence.

Solution: [fire earth | fire water].

In dealing with this question, F remembers the disposition of the compartments, so that G may understand the solution, which solution it understands as a result of F remembering that if simple fire did not exist essentially in compound fire, compound fire would be destroyed in water when air spread through compound fire, receiving heat from simple fire, and water without the essence of simple fire would destroy the compound fire existing in the earth into which water introduces the compound fire that air transferred to water; but by the presence[7] of the essence of simple fire preserving compound fire, this simple fire exists together with compound fire as a single essence, and thus water cannot destroy compound fire.

5. *Question:* In what way do accidents come from physical substance?

Solution: [air air | S S | fire water | water earth].

[6] Here, of course, in the sense of "power, capacity, efficacy"; cf. *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 5.
[7] The "principles" of M seems to be a mistake; it is in no other source consulted.

Once G has understood the question, it examines the compartments, as a result of which examination F remembers how the elements and S have certain similarities in their operation.[8] Hence G solves this question metaphorically, for from S there issues virtue in B C D, from which is formed E, which is composed of the accidents proceeding from substance by means of B C D, and therefore F remembers that from the generation which takes place in the first, third, and fourth compartments, there comes forth quantity, quality, relation, etc.,[9] since, through generation, substance is brought into existence, and this substance is the being and source of the accidents, which remain in it, it being a subject with respect to them.

6. *Question:* Whether air has greater concordance with water in earth or in fire.

Solution: [air water | fire earth].

N has doubts about solving this question, and it impels F to survey the compartments so that L may be transformed into G, and since F remembers the disposition according to which T enters the compartments, G understands that in fire the quality of air is passive, and in earth it is active, through the intermediary of water, whose quality in earth is active, for which reason air has greater concordance with water in earth than in fire.

7. *Question:* Whether there is as great a quantity of air in fire as in earth.

Solution: [air earth | fire water].

F has not forgotten to remember how there is a greater quantity of air in earth than in fire if fire does not renew it by infused generation, for air comes forth mortified from earth and passes into fire, where it is reduced in quantity as a result of said passage; but fire increases and renews it in intself through the influence of the heat instilled in moisture, as is clear from food and drink in animals and from the liquid[10] of fertile earth in growing plants.

8. *Question:* Whether accidents are of the essence of substance.

Solution: [water water | S V | Y Z | water earth | fire air].

[8] Cf. Dist. II, n. 57 and the references there.

[9] The "etc." implies the rest of the Aristotelian categories, the first of which is "substance"; cf. Dist. I, n. 19.

[10] The original has *licor*, which is akin to Chaucer's "swich licour."

With L not knowing how to solve the problem, R is formed; F, however, surveys the compartments so that G can understand their meaning and thereby understand the solution, which solution it understands as a result of F remembering that when E has V Y as objects, these V Y are not of the entity of S, for it would then be impossible for E to have V Z as objects; moreover F then remembers how S is farther from composition than the simple elements, and it remembers than an elemented body is of their entity, even though it is of another species which is not one of the elements, and it also remembers that water, in assigning its cold to earth, expands it, just as rain from its entity makes plants grow. Thus, while F remembers these things, it turns to remembering how, when quantity descends to minority in substance through corruption or through integral parts, substance is near privation and distant from being and majority.

9. *Question:* Whether natural appetite impels a power more strongly towards an extrinsic than towards an intrinsic object, or vice versa.

Solution: [water earth | S X | Y Z].[11]

L thinks that water, by allotting cold to earth, receiving moisture from air, and mortifying fire in itself, as well as in earth and in air, has the noblest object to which it can be impelled; but then F remembers that in this world S cannot attain perfection, which it seeks with E I N, in which perfection it would be with E continually, if such perfection existed in itself. Hence, as a result of these things that F remembers, G perceives the solution by understanding that S is in Z when it thinks it can find its perfection better within itself than outside itself, in which extrinsicality, so to speak, exists A and its compartments, in which A and compartments E is in Y, when it seeks the perfection of S therein.

10. *Question:* Whether the common form of an elemented body comes from the accidental forms or matters present in that body.

Solution: [earth earth | fire air | air water].

By means of these compartments F remembers how one form accords with simple earth, and another with compound earth, and

[11] The [S V Y Z] of M seems to be a mistake; all other sources consulted have [S X | Y Z].

therefore these forms must have different matters by which said forms may differ; and G understands the same thing in the other compartments by means of which F remembers that earth accidentally has one form in fire, another in air, and another in water. Now, when F has remembered this, G understands that just as the common matter of an elemented thing arises from the many matters existing in the compartments, so a common form issues from the forms that are differentiated by the compartments, with these compartments being in the elemented substance that is generated by the above-mentioned issue and generation and is corruptible by means of a contrary and altered issue and generation established against the common form and matter of said compound.

Here Begin the Questions of the Demonstrative Figure[12]

1. *Question:* Whether God exists.
Solution: [A A | being perfection | privation imperfection | S V | Y Z].
When F remembers this question, G examines the first compartment and then the others that follow it, and by their meaning it understands A to exist in this way, namely, that if A exists, the second and third compartments are contrary to one another, whereas if it does not exist, imperfection accords with all being, and all perfection accords with privation, which accords with all imperfection. This, however, is impossible, and therefore there exists some perfection and some being without privation and imperfection, and such perfection and being is A.

It is, moreover, evident from the fourth and fifth compartment that A exists, for otherwise it would follow that E could accord with V Z and I with V Y. Since, however, E accords with the second compartment and I with the third, this is impossible, for then majority would accord with the third compartment and with V Z,[13] and minority with the second compartment and with Y, which is clearly impossible.

[12] Medieval sources have *of the Second Part*, which, in view of the introduction to Dist. IV above, should be reserved as a title for the next section.

[13] Thus in V B M; A and the errata at the back of M omit the "V." For an extended analysis of Llull's explanation here, see Appendix 2.

2. *Question:* Whether a blessed soul in Glory could have knowledge of God, even if God had no intrinsic work in Himself.

Solution: [A S | greatness eternity | C D | being privation | I Y | merit blame].

The first compartment means that F G enter it with T in order to find out what the remaining compartments mean, namely, that the second compartment signifies the perfection of the third, if A has operation[14] by the second compartment, without which intrinsic, boundless, and eternal operation, M could love A, and D without C could not love it, nor could C have virtue in E A, and K L M would, in the fourth compartment, accord with being, whereas B C D would accord with privation. This, however, is contrary to A and its compartments and accords with the fifth compartment, which is in disaccord with A; and in that fifth compartment I would accord with blame, which would accord with being against merit, which in turn would accord with privation, if S would have knowledge of A, with A not having any intrinsic work in itself.

3. *Question:* Whether in God there is equality of goodness and bonifying, greatness and magnifying, eternity and eternalizing with His wisdom and understanding, will, and loving.

Solution: [A T | greatness perfection | goodness power | justice will | E A | I Y].

In T there are the green, red, and yellow triangles, indicating that if in A and its compartments there were any inequality, then all of the green and red triangles must exist in it, as well as majority and minority from the yellow triangle, but this is contrary to A and its compartments,[15] and by this contrariety E I would be concordant in the fifth and sixth compartments, which is impossible; by which impossibility the third and fourth compartments denote that in A there must be equality of all its compartments, with all of them existing in the second compartment, and conversely.

4. *Question:* Whether in God there must exist everything by which the virtues have greater concordance with being and the vices with privation.

[14] V and the uncorrected text of M have "perfection."

[15] See the corresponding Dist. II, part ii, comp. 3, for a discussion of which components of T are or are not compatible with A.

Solution: [A V | fire water | air earth | goodness greatness | greatness virtue | V V | Y Z].[16]

F remembers that insofar as they can, the simple elements adhere to one another in composition by means of the green triangle, so that each may be as far from his contrary as possible,[17] and therefore G understands the solution of this question in the other compartments, that is to say, that blue V accords with A, whereas red V is against it. Hence, in accordance with the fourth and fifth compartment, everything by which blue V is closer to greatness and red V to smallness must necessarily exist in A; for if everything by which blue V can be greater and red V lesser did not exist in A, then A's greatness would, by the fourth and fifth compartments, have minority in it, by which minority V Y could accord with I and V Z with E by said fourth and fifth compartments, which is impossible.

5. *Question:* Whether God is free to bestow His grace on a predestined man.

Solution: [A X | wisdom will | power justice | E A V Y | I V Z | R A V Y Z | being privation | merit free will].

With F entering the first compartment, G understands the remaining compartments, and specifically it understands that the third exists in equality by means of the second, in which it would exist in inequality if A could not bestow grace on a predestined man; for then the power of A would be greater in its wisdom and less in its justice and will, and the fourth and fifth compartments would accord with privation, while the sixth and seventh would accord with being; but this is impossible and contrary to the eighth compartment, which accords with [being reality].[18]

6. *Question:* Whether God can hate the truth.

Solution: [A Y | E Y | I Z | E Z | I Y | M Y Z].

By means of the first compartment, which F remembers, G, along with T, surveys the remaining compartments, and it therefore understands that in the second compartment Y is lovable, in

[16] Thus in all medieval sources; in M, however, the fourth and fifth compartments have [goodness goodness | greatness greatness].

[17] Cf. Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 50, n. 146.

[18] See Dist. II, part ii, comp. 23 above for a discussion of being, reality, merit, etc. in connection with free will.

the third Z is hateful, in the fourth and fifth compartments E I are hateful and contrary to A, while in the sixth Y is less loved than in the second, and Z less hated than in the third. Hence, if A hated or could hate Y, then A would be concordant with Z through all its compartments, while E I would be concordant with A in the third and fourth compartments mentioned above, which is impossible. As a result, C understands that A, through all its compartments, has Y, which is more lovable in its own compartments than through B C D in E, while E is more lovable in A itself than Z is hateful through F G H in I.

7. *Question:* Whether a man who believes in God in a false manner can be saved.

Solution: [A Z | faith hope | charity justice | merit blame | I A | M A].

In the second and third compartments there is difference and concordance, while in the remaining compartments there is difference and contrariety; and since salvation and damnation are contrary to one another, and since blame accords with Z, as does merit with salvation, being with Y, and privation with Z, it therefore follows that if a man believing in Z were to be saved, I would be able to hate A by means of the third compartment,[19] and one could make a concordance out of the second, third, fifth, and sixth compartments, which is impossible and contrary to the first compartment.

8. *Question:* Why are goodness, charity, justice, truth and humility not powers of the soul as are memory, intellect, and will?

Solution: [S S | A S | X X | E V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z].[20]

The first compartment signifies the solution to this question in the following compartments, and conversely, since S S signify B C D, which would always be in the second and fourth compartments, if goodness, charity, etc. were powers[21] S could work with in the normal course of nature, as it works with B C D, and thus it would be in privation, as well as being in blue V, which is a contradiction, from which it would follow that in the third com-

[19] A and the errata at the back of M add at this point, "and M [could do the same] by means of the second."

[20] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; in the third compartment, however, M has "X Y."

[21] M, again in opposition to all medieval sources, has "possible" instead of "powers."

partment free will, being, perfection, merit, blame, supposition, and demonstration would not exist, and the fifth and sixth compartments would also not exist, nor would A exercise justice in any compartment.

9. *Question:* Whether the soul should love God more because He does good than because He does no evil.

Solution: [S T | A A | X X | V V | Y Z].

In this question and its compartments, F remembers the solution of said question with G understanding by means of S the majority of E in A, as well as its majority[22] by means of T; and by means of A A it understands that S should love A more because it does no evil than because it does good, if it were true that A did not do good in itself understanding and loving itself; for the good that A does outside itself is not as great as the evil it does not want to do; but since that good which A does in itself is greater than the evil it does not want to do, therefore S has greater perfection and merit in blue V through Y, against V Z, loving A because it does good, than in loving it more because it does no evil.

10. *Question:* Whether sin is a creature.

Solution: [S V | A V | E A V Y | I V Z | E V Z | I A V Y].

When in the first compartment F remembers the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth compartments, then G understands that V Z are not creatures, for S is a creature, as are V Y in E I, which are creatures in the third and fourth compartments; they are, however, sometimes reversed by the red triangle, this reversal constituting V Z, which are the work and condition of E I.

11. *Question:* Whether one can simultaneously understand predestination and free will.

Solution: [S X | A T | E N].

The second compartment signifies that A and majority are concordant, as well as signifying the same for creature and minority, and by this meaning of A T is indicated the solution to this question in the first and third compartments; for S X means that A's work is greater in predestining and in judging by means of free will than E is capable of understanding, and therefore E cannot

[22] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; the two printed texts, undoubtedly made uncomfortable by the repetition, changed it to "minority."

understand simultaneously the entire compartment of [predestination free will]; but when E understands predestination, then N, through supposition, belief, and object, conserves free will until such time as E finally takes it as object, and abandons predestination, and the same happens with N and predestination.

12. *Question:* Whether, as a result of a remembered, understood, and loved truth, the powers of the soul become intermixed.

Solution: [S Y | E Y | I Z | M Y Z | R Y Z | fire fire | air water].

As is indicated by the question and its compartments, and as a result of F remembering them, G understands that the four elements are mixed together in a compound substance,[23] and therefore F remembers that Y is in diverse ways an object for E, as well as Z for I and Y Z for M R; and such diversity would not exist if the powers of S were mixed together and lost their forms, and they would not longer have nobler forms than the elements have, which elements, because of their mixing, are corruptible.

13. *Question:* Whether the soul, which is good, is subject to falsehood, which is evil.

Solution: [S Z | S Y | S V | fire earth | water earth].

With F remembering the fourth and fifth compartments, G understands that, just as dryness is the passive subject upon which is carried out the transformation of wine into vinegar as a result of the transformation of heat into cold, so E I N are the subjects in which is carried out the transformation of Y into Z contrary to the red triangle, there being a difference between S and B C D, as well as between B C D and E I N,[24] to which B C D are subject, beneath with B C D lies S.

14. *Question:* Whether man was created principally to know and love the intrinsic or the extrinsic work of A.

Solution: [T T | A A | S S | Y Z | V V].

The first compartment signifies how one triangle enters another, as a result of which it is understood that majority and the noblest red triangle indicate, in the second compartment, the solution of this question by means of all the other compartments; for C D

[23] For the elemental exemplarism here, in the next question and in Question 25, cf. Pring-Mill, *Número*, p. 50, n. 146.

[24] A and the errata of M add "which are in Z" here.

have a nobler and greater E in knowing and loving the intrinsic work of A, than the extrinsic, and, as a result, the red triangle is nobler in the green, yellow, and blue triangles against V Z; moreover, C D accord better with V Y if their goal is the intrinsic work of A, by which its extrinsic work is influenced; and this would not happen if man had been created to know and love himself, who is the work of A, and who would have in himself all of the red triangle, which is impossible; and consequently, etc.

15. *Question:* Whether the vices are subject to the virtues.
Solution: [T V | E V Y | I V Z | water earth | fire earth].

When F remembers how, by the red triangle and the fifth compartment, wine begins to form, and how, when it becomes verjuice,[25] it passes through the fourth compartment, which is the medium by which it can arrive at the fifth compartment, then G understands that just as dryness is the passive medium in which is performed the transformation of hot into cold, and cold into hot, so are V Z subject to the V Y of E I, according to what the first compartment signifies in the second and third.

16. *Question:* Whether a created being exists in and of itself, or through beginning, middle, and end.
Solution: [T X | A S | fire fire | E A V Y | mediately immediately].

By means of T, F remembers that being accords with majority in the end and with minority in the beginning and middle, and therefore G understands that S exists through A, which is its end, as is indicated in the fourth compartment. The fifth compartment denotes that S exists through beginning, which is A, and exists by itself, as is signified by V Y; and the same follows for the third compartment.

17. *Question:* Whether God can alter the end for which He has created a creature.
Solution: [T Y | A A | E A Y | I A Z].

At first F remembers the second compartment, and then the first, and G enters the third and fourth compartments, in which it understands the solution to this question; for by means of A A, F remembers Y in T, that is to say, how A has in itself goodness, wisdom, perfection, etc., and thus the end for which a creature

[25] The acidic juice from unripe grapes.

has been created is unalterable, in order for the third compartment to be able to accord with end, and not the fourth; for if the latter accorded with end, then the third would be in disaccord with the second, which is impossible.

18. *Question:* Whether the will can love and hate[26] simultaneously.

Solution: [T Z | immediately mediately | E I Y Z | power object].

With F understanding that E I have difference and concordance and no contrariety when E impels I against Z, which is contrary to the Y that E takes as object, then G understands the solution to this question, namely, that by means of the second and fourth compartments E I can be in the third compartment through the use of the green and red triangles, with E impelling I and remaining in habit[27] when I has Z, and conversely; and therefore D H mediately have an object according to the beginning and end of the red triangle, but not according to the middle, in which they have concordance and diversity.

19. *Question:* Whether each intellect is one with others.[28]

Solution: [V V | S S | A S | S T | Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z].

The first compartment signifies in the sixth and seventh that the green triangle—designated by the fourth and fifth compartments—is present in the second compartment, for otherwise it would follow that the third and fifth compartments would be destroyed, since A would then be without justice and there would be no diversity and contrariety in the fifth compartment, which is impossible, and therefore G understands this solution, as has been explained.

20. *Question:* What is the intermediary existing between power and object?

Solution: [V X | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air | air water | water earth].

The first compartment signifies the others, in which the solution to this question is made manifest; that is to say, that by the second

[26] See Prologue, n. 3 above for other possible translations of these two words.

[27] That is, in a state, as it were, of suspended animation.

[28] Llull is here discussing (and, in his answer, attempting to refute) the Averroist doctrine of monopsychism, which upheld the unity of the possible (or potential) intellect. This doctrine, which did away with personal immortality, was the central Averroist heresy of thirteenth-century Paris. See F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* (Louvain, 1970), pp. 203–5.

and third compartments E V Y are shown to be the intermediaries by which S takes A as its object, while I and red V are the intermediaries by which F G H take Z as their object. The other compartments signify the work existing between fire and fire, fire and air, etc., which work is the intermediary between the power of fire, etc. and the object, that is to say, the supposite toward which the elements are impelled.[29]

21. *Question:* Why is charity a more general virtue than faith?

Solution: [V Y | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | being privation].

E has greater being in the second compartment than M in the fourth, and I accords with majority in the third compartment, while M, which hates V Z, accords with minority in the fourth; and since majority is concordant with being and with V Y, and minority with V Z, therefore G understands the solution in accordance with the above-mentioned majority and minority.

22. *Question:* Whether the intellect is as contrary to the vices as is the will.

Solution: [V Z | S S | T T | fire water | air earth].

In the question and its compartments is signified the solution, for just as a mirror specifies the individual traits of different faces, so the question and its compartments, through representation, specify the solution, and this rule never fails in this Art. And this is the case with the above compartments and question, that is to say, that F G H are equally impelled against V Z by means of E, so that just as there is equal contrariety in the fourth and fifth compartments by means of the red triangle, so B C D exist equally in E against V Z be means of I and by means of the green and red triangles, otherwise the second compartment would be destroyed in the third.

23. *Question:* Whether God is a being infinite in essence and in dignities.

Solution: [X X | A A | being perfection].

Through the first compartment the third is represented in the second, in which G understands the solution of this question, with F remembering T in the second compartment. For, by means of

[29] For "power," "object" and their intermediary "work" see the following note (where the more usual "act" is substituted for "work").

blue T, it understands that the intrinsic work of A would be limited if A were finite in essence and in dignities; by means of the green triangle, it understands that there could be many A's if the third compartment fell into privation; by means of the red triangle it understands that if A were deprived of infinity, its intention, being finite, would be altered, and it would both hate and love the third compartment, which accords with infinity; by means of the yellow triangle it understands that if A were finite, its greatness would be the result of minority and not of infinity, against which minority we have the third compartment, which accords with A; but, by the black triangle, G understands that A would not exist if it were without infinity, for it would follow that the third compartment would then accord with minority against majority, and that being, contrary to its own self, would accord with privation, and perfection with imperfection, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

We have proved the existence of infinity in A and in its dignities, and this rule is general to all the Art, that is to say, that with each triangle a demonstration can be made and strengthened by having F G examine the compartments that accord with a solution.

24. *Question:* Whether a power produces its act by means of its own virtue or that of the object.

Solution: [X Y | A S | E A V Y | I A V Z].

X here represents the compartment of [immediately mediately] as well as the compartment implied in the question,[30] and Y means, in accordance with the red triangle, that the object existing in said triangle by means of Y must influence the power, on the condition that the latter possess that object in accordance with the second and third compartments; and thus G understands that from the power must come the virtue which impels its act to apprehend its object, otherwise there would be disorder in the second and third compartments and order in the fourth, which is impossible; and therefore the solution to this question is represented in the compartment of [immediately mediately], as we have already stated.

[30] I.e., [power object], for which see Dist. II, nn. 76 and 104. Note that with "act" as the middle term, or intermediary, between "power" and "object", we have a triad which later on was to become a fixed substructure of the Lullian system. See the *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 78 and the corresponding note.

25. *Question:* Whether a power apprehends an object inside or outside itself.

Solution: [X Z | fire earth | air water | E A V Y | I V Z].

The answer to this question is represented in the first compartment, with the second and third compartments metaphorically representing the fourth and fifth, and vice versa. For fire attracts to itself the dryness that it receives from earth and expels it from itself into the air it heats, which expulsion is done by fire, because water comes to said fire along with earth, insofar as it cools said earth; and thus the work is produced within and appears without, that is, in the elemented body. And the same is true of B C D in E, as well as F G H in I, for when E is in A V Y, then it exists within B C D by means of work, and exists outside by means of A V Y, which are not B C D, and the same is true of I in V Z; otherwise it would be impossible for Z to be in X on account of blame, imperfection, privation, and reason, and it would be possible for power, object, and work to exist neither within nor without, and hence mediately and immediately would be in privation.

26. *Question:* Whether sin, which is a nonthing, can be the occasion[31] for something.

Solution: [Y Y | S S | E A V Y | E V Z | fire fire].

The solution to this question is indicated by the above compartments; for the third compartment is the purpose of S, and not the fourth, which is contrary to its purpose; and on account of this the third compartment accords with being, and the fourth with nonbeing. But when S is subject to said fourth compartment, then sin is the occasion for something, even though it is itself a nonthing; or in other words, sin is the occasion for punishment and privation of the purpose of S; for just as simple fire is the occasion for compound fire, so sin, which is a nonthing, is the occasion for punishment and privation of good when it exists in a thing, that is to say, in an S that is in the fourth compartment. Hence, just as fire is the occasion for man, even though it is not man, thus the Y in the third compartment is the occasion for being, even though it is not the thing in which it is, and the Z that is in the fourth compartment is the occasion for sin and blame, even though it is neither sin nor blame.

[31] *Occasio* in both Latin and Catalan; cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 40.

27. *Question:* Which is more demonstrable, truth or falsehood?
Solution: [Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z | E V Z | I A V Y | X X].

Y accords with being and perfection, and Z with privation, and imperfection, while the first X of the last figure[32] signifies the first concordance in the second and third compartments, and the last X of said last figure the second concordance in the fourth and fifth compartments; this being the case, the question is therefore solved by means of the above-stated signification.

28. *Question:* Whether the will that hates falsehood is as near to truth as it is to falsehood.
Solution: [Z Z | E Y | I Z | X X].

The first X of the last compartment signifies power, whereas the last X signifies object, and the second compartment signifies that the H which hates Z is nearer to Y than to Z, for it is impelled by D; but since E must be in habit[33] when H hates Z, therefore H is immediately nearer to Z than to Y, whereas H is mediately nearer to Y than to Z, as we said above. And thus the question is raised as to whether, by means of the green triangle in the first compartment, E, which is in the second compartment, is as far from Z as is I because of E; and the solution to this question lies in the solution to the previous question, according to what has been said and indicated by the above compartments.

Here end the questions that are solved by a text explaining the figures and showing how the solution to a question should be sought by examining the compartments.

HERE BEGIN THE QUESTIONS [OF THE SECOND PART,] WHICH ARE SOLVED BY FIGURES ALONE

The Following questions are solved solely by figures made up of compartments, according as said compartments signify their solutions. And since every question precedes its solution, one will therefore find each question followed by the properly assigned

[32] "Compartment" in the Catalan text, which is missing the "of said last figure" of the next clause, giving a reading more in keeping with the usual Lullian terminology.
[33] Cf. n. 27 above.

compartments solving it. If, however, the reader does not understand the solution given by the compartments, he should go back over them, letting T examine them according to the rules given in the preceding questions; and by retaining and diligently following said rules, he will find everything he is seeking. And such a rule is general to the solutions of all questions dealing with A S T V X Y Z, as well as with the principles of theology, philosophy, and law. But first we must speak of A, as being the nobler subject, and then go on to discuss the others.

Questions Concerning A or God

1. *Question:* Whether God exists in Himself.

Solution: [goodness goodness | being perfection | privation imperfection | T T | S V | Y Z].

2. *Question:* Whether divine goodness and its bonifying are equal in greatness.

Solution: [goodness greatness | A A | A S | A T | power justice | eternity nobility].[34]

3. *Question:* Whether goodness has power eternally.

Solution: [goodness eternity | A T | S V | being perfection | majority end | justice generosity].

4. *Question:* Whether there are dignities in God.

Solution: [goodness power | A S | A T | V V | Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z].

5. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities exist one in the other without any differentiation of one from the other.

Solution: [goodness wisdom | greatness power | being perfection | generosity nobility | S V | A T].

6. *Question:* Whether the blessed who are in glory love God equally in His essence and in His works.

Solution: [goodness will | A A | charity justice | majority equality].

7. *Question:* Whether the work that God carries out intrinsically in Himself is essential or accidental.

Solution: [goodness virtue | greatness eternity | perfection justice | majority minority | being privation | E A | I A | difference contrariety].

8. *Question:* Whether substance is properly or improperly said to exist in God.

[34] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; M, however, has [S S] for the third compartment.

Solution: [goodness truth | A Y | A T | A X | essence dignities | act form].[35]

9. *Question:* Whether in God there is glory through bonification, which itself is glorification.[36]

Solution: [goodness glory | A T | life act | greatness will | justice nobility].

10. *Question:* Whether God is more demonstrable by means of similarity than by means of dissimilarity.

Solution: [goodness perfection | greatness nobility | E A V Y | I V Z | S T | S X].

11. *Question:* Whether relation can exist in God.

Solution: [goodness justice | power perfection | God operation | dignities act | E A].

12. *Question:* Whether, since God understands and loves Himself, the resulting good is as great as the understanding and loving itself.

Solution: [goodness generosity | greatness justice | power will | being perfection].

13. *Question:* Whether goodness and bonifying exist without composition.

Solution: [goodness simplicity | greatness eternity | being perfection | act relation].

14. *Question:* Whether God is more demonstrable by the acts of His dignities than by the dignities themselves.

Solution: [goodness nobility | A A | A T | A S | A X | A Y].

15. *Question:* Whether God's mercy is essence or power.

Solution: [goodness mercy | greatness eternity | essence act | immediately mediately | being privation].

16. *Question:* Whether God's dominion is eternal.

Solution: [goodness dominion | A T | A V | dignities relation | S T].

GREATNESS

17. *Question:* Whether possibility and impossibility are equally great in God.

[35] M is missing the second compartment and has "X X" in what is here the fourth. Note the use here—and in other solutions—of compartments from the Figure of the Principles of Theology, which see in Dist. 1 for definitions of the terms used.

[36] Cf. Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," p. 246 and n. 86 in connection with the verb forms used here to express the activity of the dignities.

Solution: [greatness greatness | A A | eternity perfection | justice generosity].

18. *Question:* Whether God's greatness is more immeasurable because of an eternity that eternifies an eternal specified good, than because of one that does so without any eternally specified good.

Solution: [greatness eternity | power justice | wisdom will | act relation].

19. *Question:* Whether God's greatness in understanding, willing, glorifying, and bonifying can be immeasurable in velocity.

Solution: [greatness power | eternity glory | will justice | being perfection].

20. *Question:* Whether God's wisdom can be as great in itself without specific intrinsic work as with such specific intrinsic work.[37]

Solution: [greatness wisdom | eternity virtue | power will | simplicity nobility].

21. *Question:* Whether the divine will wants to be in goodness, greatness, eternity, just as goodness, greatness, eternity want to be in it.

Solution: [greatness will | justice generosity | perfection nobility | glory simplicity].

22. *Question:* Whether Divine greatness has as much virtue in goodness, eternity, power, etc. as it has in wisdom and will.

Solution: [greatness virtue | power justice | glory perfection | will generosity | simplicity nobility].

23. *Question:* Whether in God there can exist any activity from which a contradiction does not follow, but which appears to be a contradiction to the human intellect.

Solution: [greatness truth | A S | being perfection | predestination free will].

24. *Question:* Whether God is more intelligible and lovable for His intrinsic than for His extrinsic activity.

Solution: [greatness glory | eternity perfection | goodness will | wisdom justice].

25. *Question:* Whether God can be the cause of imperfection.

Solution: [greatness perfection | power wisdom | will justice | simplicity nobility].

[37] Cf. ibid., n. 85 in connection with this characterization of the activity of the dignities.

26. *Question:* Whether one of God's dignities is limited by being in another.

Solution: [greatness justice | eternity power | will perfection | glory generosity | simplicity nobility | essence act | E A].

27. *Question:* Whether divine generosity can bestow a gift that is immeasurable and eternal.

Solution: [greatness generosity | A A | A T | dignities act | form relation].

28. *Question:* Whether divine simplicity can be as great without simplifying as with simplifying.

Solution: [greatness simplicity | goodness eternity | will glory | fire fire].

29. *Question:* What is God?

Solution: [greatness nobility | A A | essence act | dignities relation | being perfection | life form | E A].

30. *Question:* Whether great blame exists so that God may use great mercy.

Solution: [greatness mercy | A V | A Z | E A V Y | I A V Z | being perfection | privation imperfection | immediately mediately | act relation].[38]

31. *Question:* Whether, if vices and falsehood existed in God, they would be greater in Him than in another being.

Solution: [greatness dominion | S T | E V Z | I A V Y | M A V Y Z | R A V Y Z | fire water | fire earth].

ETERNITY

32. *Question:* Whether God and His eternity are one and the same thing.

Solution: [eternity eternity | A A | goodness greatness | power nobility | will justice | E A | being perfection].

33. *Question:* Whether God's power can, in eternity, empower works equal to itself and to eternity.

Solution: [eternity power | A T | A X | will justice | simplicity nobility].

34. *Question:* Whether God is eternally understandable and really understood.

Solution: [eternity wisdom | A Y | act relation | being perfection | justice nobility].[39]

[38] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; in the fifth compartment, however, M has "I A V Y," which in the errata is "corrected" to "I V Z."

[39] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; M, however, has "A V" in the second compartment.

35. *Question:* Whether God is more lovable for Himself than for His creatures.

Solution: [eternity will | goodness greatness | justice simplicity | A S].

36. *Question:* Whether divine virtue can be increased or diminished by being active or by not being active.

Solution: [eternity virtue | greatness power | majority equality | A A | dignities act | action relation | being privation | majority minority].

37. *Question:* Whether God's wisdom should have understanding in eternity as it has in itself.

Solution: [eternity truth | will justice | simplicity nobility].

38. *Question:* Whether eternifying and glorifying are as concordant in God as are eternity and glory.

Solution: [eternity glory | act relation | being perfection | greatness justice].

39. *Question:* Whether divine perfection was contrary to imperfection before the world existed.

Solution: [eternity perfection | A A | A X | E A V Y | I V Z].

40. *Question:* Why does divine justice perpetually preserve the damned, after mercy has not spared them?

Solution: [eternity justice | E A | I A | merit blame | nobility dominion].

41. *Question:* Whether God, since He is God, wants to be God.

Solution: [eternity generosity | dignities act | greatness will | A A].

42. *Question:* Whether in God there should be perfecting as there is willing in eternity.

Solution: [eternity simplicity | will perfection | act relation | justice nobility].

43. *Question:* Whether by the multiplication of an infinite number of dignities, God's nobility could be increased.

Solution: [eternity nobility | greatness generosity | will perfection | power wisdom | E A].

44. *Question:* Whether God's mercy is imperfect in greatness because the world is not eternal.

Solution: [eternity mercy | greatness perfection | A T | A X | dignities act].

45. *Question:* Whether God's dominion is boundless.

Solution: [eternity dominion | A T | greatness justice | simplicity nobility].

POWER

46. *Question:* Whether concordance and equality can exist in God's nature.

Solution: [power power | A A | goodness greatness | eternity perfection | being privation | simplicity nobility | E A | I A | Y Z].

47. *Question:* Whether divine wisdom has as much power in goodness, greatness, etc. as in understanding.

Solution: [power wisdom | will justice | goodness greatness | eternity nobility].

48. *Question:* Whether the divine will has the power to make things infinite, since the human will has the power to want things to be made infinite.

Solution: [power will | greatness eternity | dignities act | form relation | being perfection | E A].

49. *Question:* Whether divine power, which empowers in itself by understanding, loving, empowering, and magnifying, releases its virtue outside itself.

Solution: [power virture | A A | A T | greatness eternity | beginning end].

50. *Question:* Whether God is able to do something that He knows He will not do.

Solution: [power truth | greatness justice | act relation | concordance equality | E A | I A].

51. *Question:* Whether God's power can do something in itself by which it will have glory.

Solution: [power glory | goodness greatness | wisdom will | justice generosity | act relation | A S | A Z].

52. *Question:* Why do people wonder at God's miracles, if He is all powerful?

Solution: [power perfection | N A | R A | E V Z | I V Y | being privation | fire air].

53. *Question:* Whether God's power has as much perfection as His will would want.

Solution: [power justice | greatness eternity | simplicity nobility | act relation].

54. *Question:* Whether God's power can indulge in giving equal to His greatness.

Solution: [power generosity | greatness eternity | simplicity justice | goodness will].

55. *Question:* Whether all the acts of the Divine Dignities can be present in each dignity.

Solution: [power simplicity | greatness eternity | A A | E A | I A | majority minority].

56. *Question:* Whether God's power is as noble in empowering as His wisdom is in understanding and His will in loving.

Solution: [power nobility | goodness perfection | greatness eternity | will justice | E A].

57. *Question:* Whether God's power can do as much through mercy as it can through eternity and greatness.

Solution: [power mercy | A A | A T | A X | act relation].

58. *Question:* Whether God could be Lord if He were capable of sinning.

Solution: [power dominion | A A | will justice | being privation | E A | I A].[40]

WISDOM

59. *Question:* Whether in God there is wisdom so that He may understand, or whether He understands so that He may be wise.

Solution: [wisdom wisdom | A A | greatness eternity | T T | majority equality | God works | X X | act first intention].

60. *Question:* Whether the divine will loves everything that divine wisdom knows.

Solution: [wisdom will | greatness eternity | goodness justice | C G | D H].

61. *Question:* Whether God's wisdom can understand understanding and the understood without recourse to the virtue of species.

Solution: [wisdom virtue | goodness greatness | will glory | perfection justice | fire fire | fire air | fire water | fire earth | C Y | H Z].

62. *Question:* Whether one can legitimately say that the divine wisdom loves, and the divine will knows.

Solution: [wisdom truth | A Y | A Z | A A | act relation |E A Y | I Z].

63. *Question:* Whether God has knowledge of infinite number.

[40] Note the untranslated similarity of roots between the "Lord" (Lat. *dominus*, Cat. *senyor*) of the question, and the "dominion" (Lat. *dominium*, Cat. *senyoria*) of the solution.

Solution: [wisdom glory | A A | A S | A T | dignities act | power relation | E A | reality reason].

64. *Question:* Whether God's wisdom has greater perfection when it understands its own perfection, than when it understands that it understands more than any other being.

Solution: [wisdom perfection | goodness greatness | A T | God majority | A X | being privation].

65. *Question:* Whether God loves great activity of wisdom inasmuch as He loves greatness in wisdom.

Solution: [wisdom justice | greatness will | generosity simplicity | E A | M A | R A].

66. *Question:* Whether divine wisdom, in its understanding, is generous through goodness, greatness, eternity, power, will, etc.

Solution: [wisdom generosity | goodness greatness | eternity power | will virtue | A T | God majority].

67. *Question:* Why is composition farther from God than from an angel?

Solution: [wisdom simplicity | greatness eternity | act relation | A S].

68. *Question:* Whether in God there exists His intention.

Solution: [wisdom nobility | greatness power | will justice | dignities relation | form order | act action].

69. *Question:* Whether God's mercy can spare a person predestined to damnation.[41]

Solution: [wisdom mercy | A X | being perfection | reality reason | A T | God majority | creature minority | V V | hope charity | A A | greatness justice | generosity nobility].

70. *Question:* Whether God could be Lord even if there were no virtues or vices in man.

Solution: [wisdom dominion | A X | being privation | perfection imperfection | immediately mediately | act relation].

WILL

71. *Question:* Whether the divine will that loves and the divine will that hates are the same will.

Solution: [will will | A A | S S | E Y | I Z | justice mercy].

72. *Question:* Whether the divine will has greater virtue in willing than in not willing, and conversely.

[41] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 215 for the word *praescitus* (*presís*) used here, as well as the passage commented there (ch. 100) for another answer to this same problem.

Solution: [will virtue | greatness eternity | justice nobility | dignities relation | E Y | I Z | fire fire].

73. *Question:* Whether the divine will likes to have truth verify that which is loved by the will.

Solution: [will truth | goodness greatness | justice generosity | dignities act | form relation].

74. *Question:* Whether the divine will has specified goodness in its glory by reason of will, willing, and willed.

Solution: [will glory | greatness power | justice nobility | fire fire | E A].

75. *Question:* Whether in God there must exist everything by which a creature would be God.

Solution: [will perfection | greatness eternity | power glory | goodness justice | truth nobility].

76. *Question:* Whether everything that is in God, is God.

Solution: [will justice | power wisdom | form order | operation equality | greatness eternity | generosity nobility].

77. *Question:* Whether the divine will can give all of itself.

Solution: [will generosity | greatness power | wisdom justice | glory perfection | simplicity nobility].

78. *Question:* Whether the form of the act of God's will, which act consists in willing, is identical with the form of the will itself.

Solution: [will simplicity | greatness eternity | justice simplicity | E A | I A].

79. *Question:* Whether it pleases the divine will to have total nobility ascribed to it.

Solution: [will nobility | greatness eternity | power justice | E A | I A].

80. *Question:* Whether God has greater pleasure in forgiving than in punishing.

Solution: [will mercy | A A | S X | reality reason | Y Z].

81. *Question:* Whether God would have to be Lord if evil did not exist.

Solution: [will dominion | greatness nobility | justice generosity | commandments first intention | glory eviternity].

VIRTUE

82. *Question:* Whether God has greater understanding in understanding Himself than in understanding creature.

Solution: [virtue virtue | A T | act relation | first intention second intention].

83. *Question:* Whether it is just for divine virtue to be in truth.
Solution: [virtue truth | greatness eternity | will justice | E A | I A].
84. *Question:* What is the greatest virtue a creature can have in glory?
Solution [virtue glory | fire fire | fire air | fir earth | God creature | concordance majority | perfection immediately].
85. *Question:* Whether there is perfective virtue in divine perfection.
Solution: [virtue perfection | greatness eternity | will justice | power wisdom | generosity nobility | fire fire | E A | I Z].
86. *Question:* Whether divine virtue, justifying in justice, can be boundless and eternal.
Solution: [virtue justice | goodness greatness | power will | perfection generosity | wisdom simplicity | concordance equality].
87. *Question:* Whether God's virtue diminishes its greatness by being generous with its own essence through goodness, eternity, etc.
Solution: [virtue generosity | greatness eternity | power simplicity | being perfection | majority equality | fire fire].
88. *Question:* Whether God's virtue contradicts its own simplicity by having intrinsic activity.
Solution: [virtue simplicity | greatness nobility | goodness eternity | power will].
89. *Question:* Whether it is a noble or base thing for God's virtue to be active.
Solution: [virtue nobility | goodness greatness | power will | perfection justice | E A | I Z | being privation].
90. *Question:* Whether God's virtue existed without any act of mercy before the world existed, when there was no one to forgive.
Solution: [virtue mercy | A T | X X | greatness eternity | act relation | reality reason | being privation].
91. *Question:* Whether God's dominion would be lacking in virtue, if God neither understood nor judged.
Solution: [virtue dominion | A X | A S | E A V Y | I V Z]

TRUTH

92. *Question:* Whether for all of divine virtue,[42] which is boundless, there coexists created truth, which is limited.

[42] M has *veritatem* ("truth"), which is perhaps more expected; all medieval sources consulted, however, have *virtutem*.

Solution: [truth truth | A A | greatness wisdom | will justice | A T | God majority | creature minority | difference equality | A X | dignities act | form relation].

93. *Question:* Whether falsifying is against glorifying.

Solution: [truth glory | A Z | E A V Y | I V Z | E V Z | I V Y | merit blame | immediately mediately | being privation].

94. *Question:* Whether perfecting contradicts verifying.[43]

Solution: [truth perfection | greatness eternity | justice simplicity | being privation].

95. *Question:* Whether God's justice can better verify in itself, than a creature can falsify in itself through injustice.

Solution: [truth justice | greatness eternity | power will | A T].

96. *Question:* Whether divine generosity can be in such greatness of will as divine truth in wisdom.

Solution: [truth generosity | A A | goodness power | glory perfection | simplicity nobility].

97. *Question:* Whether divine truth, by verifying in goodness, greatness, eternity, contradicts the simplicity of each dignity.

Solution: [truth simplicity | A A | greatness nobility | S X | reality reason | Y Z].

98. *Question:* Whether divine truth is nobler verifying mercy than justice.

Solution: [truth nobility | justice mercy | greatness equality | A T].[44]

99. *Question:* Whether God's truth verifies through mercy, when God's justice punishes some sinner.

Solution: [truth mercy | greatness eternity | justice will | A X].

100. *Question:* Whether divine truth is the reason why dominion exists.

Solution: [truth dominion | A X | justice perfection | being privation | A S | E A | I Z].

GLORY

101. *Question:* Whether in God glory can be in glory without distinction of essence.

[43] Here and throughout this section, in the sense of the correlative of *veritas*, and hence literally "truthing"; cf. *Flowers of Love*, Part II, n. 6.

[44] This entire question and solution is missing from the three medieval sources consulted. Galmés's text is a translation (or, in this case, a mistranslation) from that of M.

Solution: [glory glory | greatness eternity | will justice | dignities relation | majority equality].

102. *Question:* Whether God's power can glorify and perfect in itself.

Solution: [glory perfection | A T | greatness eternity | act relation | majority equality | concordance end].

103. *Question:* Whether in God there is as much glory through bonifying, magnifying, eternalizing, glorifying, etc., as through understanding and loving.

Solution: [glory justice | concordance equality | simplicity nobility | A A].

104. *Question:* Whether God's generosity can be generous with glory on a scale equal to that of His greatness.

Solution: [glory generosity | greatness eternity | will simplicity | power justice].

105. *Question:* Whether, in God, glorifying contradicts simplicity.

Solution: [glory simplicity | will justice | perfection nobility | concordance equality].

106. *Question:* Whether God is more glorious through glorifying than through ennobling.

Solution: [glory nobility | A A | dignities act | form relation | being privation].

107. *Question:* Whether there is a difference between God's glory and His mercy.

Solution: [glory mercy | act relation | beginning end | majority minority].

108. *Question:* Whether God has greater glory because He is Lord, than He would have if He were not Lord.

Solution: [glory dominion | A T | A V | A X | act relation].

PERFECTION

109. *Question:* If God's works were extrinsic and not intrinsic, would the creation of a single point be enough for Him?

Solution: [perfection perfection | dignities relation | act form | being privation].

110. *Question:* Whether what is in God's perfection is there because of need.

Solution: [perfection justice | A A | greatness eternity | X X | being free will].[45]

111. *Question:* Whether there would be more imperfection than perfection if God did not exist.

Solution: [perfection generosity | A T | essence being | substance accident | majority negation | minority affirmation | T X | privation impossible].[46]

112. *Question:* Whether God must be everything which He works or does in Himself.

Solution: [perfection simplicity | greatness eternity | T T | unity essence | E A | I A | affirmation negation | substance accident].

113. *Question:* Whether God's power, which enables wisdom to understand and will to want, is identical with the power that is in God's perfection.

Solution: [perfection nobility | greatness eternity | will justice | glory simplicity].

114. *Question:* Whether divine mercy experiences suffering when justice punishes a sinner.

Solution: [perfection mercy | T T | end end | concordance equality | E Z | E A].

115. *Question:* Why must God be Lord if, within Himself, He has every perfection?

Solution: [perfection dominion | A T | nobility end | first intention second intention | A X | immediately mediately].

JUSTICE

116. *Question:* Whether divine justice is as great in goodness, greatness, etc. as it is in itself.

Solution: [justice justice | T T | essence essence | majority majority | equality equality].

117. *Question:* Whether divine justice makes power be generous on a scale equal to what greatness is capable of dispensing.

Solution: [justice generosity | goodness will | fire fire | being majority].

[45] Thus in V B and the uncorrected text of M; the errata of M has "being freedom" in the last compartment, which must be an error, since "freedom" (*libertas*) is not a component of any of the figures.

[46] The *essentia ens* of the third compartment could also be translated as "essence thing" (cf. Dist. II, n. 89 above). This and other concepts in these compartments ("substance," "accident," "impossible") belong to the secondary components of Figure T (see the description of that figure in Dist. I above).

118. *Question:* Whether justice would exist in God's simplicity when He simplifies outside His own nature, if He did not simplify within His intrinsic nature.

Solution: [justice simplicity | A A | wisdom will | composition minority].

119. *Question:* Whether divine justice can judge without ennobling that which it judges.

Solution: [justice nobility | goodness power | act relation | being privation].

120. *Question:* Whether there must be great merit and great blame for God to be able to use great justice and great mercy.

Solution: [justice mercy | A T | greatness majority | T V | majority charity | X X | being privation].

121. *Question:* Whether God is Lord in order to exercise justice.

Solution: [justice dominion | A A | greatness eternity | A T | eternity beginning | dignities relation].

GENEROSITY

122. *Question:* Whether in God generosity and the act of being generous are equal in greatness of goodness, power, eternity, wisdom, and will.

Solution: [generosity generosity | A A | simplicity nobility | form relation | T T | truth essence | substance accident].

123. *Question:* Whether divine generosity can be generous from the divine entity and nature.

Solution: [generosity simplicity | A A | power power | A T | unity essence | X X | being perfection].

124. *Question:* Whether it is a greater nobility for divine generosity to be generous from its own entity, or from that of creature.

Solution: [generosity nobility | A T | act majority | beginning end].

125. *Question:* Whether God, by being merciful, is being generous from His own self.

Solution: [generosity mercy | E A | A T | God creature | unity substance].

126. *Question:* Whether generosity and dominion in God are equal in relation and act.

Solution: [generosity dominion | A A | greatness eternity | T T | creature minority | X X | immediately mediately | being privation.].

SIMPLICITY

127. *Question:* Whether in God there must exist that simplicity which is farthest from composition.

Solution: [simplicity simplicity | greatness eternity | will justice | act relation | being privation].

128. *Question:* Whether, like a point that is simpler because of greater minority, God is simpler because of greater majority.

Solution: [simplicity nobility | A T | greatness being | minority non being | concordance equality | will justice].[47]

129. *Question:* Whether God's mercy is composed of relation.

Solution: [simplicity mercy | T T | unity essence | difference contrariety | act relation | reality reason].

130. *Question:* What is the greatest dominion that simplicity can have over composition?

Solution: [simplicity dominion | dignities act | greatness eternity | unity substance | God creature].

NOBILITY

131. *Question:* Whether all nobility, in which there is no imperfection or baseness, should be attributed to God.

Solution: [nobility nobility | will justice | power perfection | E A | I Z].

132. *Question:* Whether the noblest act a person can conceive of must exist in God.

Solution: [nobility mercy | greatness justice | goodness eternity | dignities relation | A T | God majority | C minority].[48]

133. *Question:* Whether man should be honored only for the sake of honoring God.

Solution: [nobility dominion | first intention second intention | immediately mediately].

MERCY

134. *Question:* Whether divine mercy bestows as much by rewarding as divine justice takes away by punishing.

Solution: [mercy mercy | A T | unity essence | greatness equality | T X | majority minority | reality reason | immediately mediately].

[47] The "being " and "non being" of the third and fourth compartments correspond to *ens* and *non ens* in the original, for which see the previous note.

[48] Thus in all medieval sources; M, followed by Galmés, has "creature minority" in the last compartment.

135. *Question:* Whether God's mercy and dominion exist in as much greatness as do His power, wisdom, and will.

Solution: [mercy dominion | greatness justice | eternity perfection | E A].[49]

DOMINION

136. *Question:* Whether God's dominion has greater nobility in the righteous than in sinners.

Solution: [dominion dominion | simplicity nobility | act relation | perfection justice].

Here Begin the Questions concerning the Soul

AND FIRST OF ALL, THOSE CONCERNING B

1. *Question:* Whether the soul exists.

Solution: [B B | A S | S T | S V | S X | S Y | S Z].

2. *Question:* Whether all souls belong to one soul that is general to all of them.[50]

Solution: [B C | S S | T V | V V | A S | X X].

3. *Question:* Whether there is a difference between the soul and its powers.

Solution: [B D | S T | fire fire | fire air | E I | N R].

4. *Question:* Whether there is a difference between memory and intellect.

Solution: [B E | K L | C D | B D | N R].[51]

5. *Question:* Whether the common act of memory, intellect, and will is composed of artificial or of natural parts.

Solution: [B F | E I | N R | fire fire | creature operation].

6. *Question:* Whether the memory impels the will to want to remember virtually or locally.[52]

Solution: [B G | S S | X X | V V | fire fire | fire earth].

7. *Question:* Whether memory impels the will itself or the act of the will.

[49] Thus in all sources, except M, which has "justice eternity" in the second compartment.

[50] Another reference to the monopsychism of the Averroists; cf. n. 28 above.

[51] Thus in all medieval sources; the "B C " that M has in the fourth compartment is surely a mistake.

[52] "Local memory," in the sense of using images of places (*loci*), was a basic technique of the classical art of memory; cf. F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London, 1966), the many references to the subject in the index.

Solution: [B H | S T | X X | act relation | first intention second intention].

8. *Question:* Whether the soul bears suffering in all of itself when the will hates that which it wants to love.

Solution: [B I | E N | fire fire | fire water | fire earth | fire air].

9. *Question:* Whether forgetting is a decrease of memory and remembering an increase of it.

Solution: [B K | A S | S T | S V | X X].

10. *Question:* Whether understanding increases through the multiplication of accidents, or of parts of them.

Solution: [B L | E N | I R | S T | power object].

11. *Question:* Whether the will can want without remembering.

Solution: [B M | E A | N A | majority minority | merit blame].

12. *Question:* Whether the memory forgets because of a cessation of remembering or because of a diminution of strength.

Solution: [B N | A A | perfection justice | X X | merit blame].

13. *Question:* Whether the memory can at the same time remember and forget.

Solution: [B O | R R | E I | K M | T X | difference object].

14. *Question:* Whether the three powers of the soul are at the same time active and passive.

Solution: [B P | E I | N R | X X | U U | fire fire | air earth].

15. *Question:* Whether the soul can have equal merit or equal blame as a result of remembering, understanding and loving.

Solution: [B Q | E A V Y | I A V Y | N A V Y | R A V Y].

16. *Question:* Whether the acts of the powers of the soul are united or divided by forms or by parts.

Solution: [B R | S T | X X | fire air | water earth].

C

17. *Question:* Whether the active and the possible[53] intellect are different in essence.

Solution: [C C | B F | D H | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

18. *Question:* Whether the intellect understands itself when it understands the will.

Solution: [C D | A S | K M | power object | concordance equality].

[53] Thus, *possibilis*, in all medieval sources; M has *passibilis* ("passive"), which is the usual scholastic opposite of *agens* when applied to the intellect (cf. Blaise, *Lexicon*, s.v. intellectus). See, however, n. 28 above.

19. *Question:* Whether the intellect understands itself before it understands the species it takes as object.

Solution: [C E | S S | D H | B F | C G | fire fire | form relation | X X].

20. *Question:* Whether the intellect is changeable as a result of the transformation of one object into another.

Solution: [C F | A A | fire fire | fire water].

21. *Question:* Whether charity can rise as much through understanding as faith can through will.

Solution: [C G | E A | N A | S S | S V].

22. *Question:* Whether the soul's virtue is diversified before it is in the powers.

Solution: [C H | S S | T T | end end | equality equality | first intention second intention].

23. *Question:* Whether the intellect begins to understand intellectual things before it does sensual things.

Solution: [C I | E A | fire fire | fire water | immediately mediately].

24. *Question:* Why is it more difficult to understand the entity of substance than its quality and nature?

Solution: [C K | L M | T T | operation majority | creature minority | E A].

25. *Question:* Whether not knowing is the privation of understanding or an act of ignorance.[54]

Solution: [C L | being privation | power act | majority action].

26. *Question:* Whether the rational soul is something made up of matter and form.

Solution: [C M | S S | A S | S V | X X | Y Z].

27. *Question:* Why the memory has more to do with passion than the intellect, and the intellect more than the will?

Solution: [C N | S S | M A | E A | X X | free will merit].

28. *Question:* Whether the powers of the soul come from the soul itself, or whether they are qualities that arise from its virtue.

Solution: [C O | S S | V V | fire fire | fire water | air earth | A X].

29. *Question:* Whether the acts of the powers of the soul originate in the essence of the soul.

Solution: [C P | S T | A S | fire fire | fire air | S X].

30. *Question:* Whether the intellect has action in the will or vice versa, and whether the memory is subject to said action.

[54] Similar roots in the original between *ignorare* ("not knowing") and *ignorantia* ("ignorance").

Solution: [C Q | S T | form matter | first intention second intention].

31. *Question:* Whether[55] the intellect grasps a sensual species more truly than does the imaginative faculty.

Solution: [C R | S T | A S | V X | Y Z | fire fire | fire earth].

D

32. *Question:* Whether the will and its wanting are of the same nature.

Solution: [D D | A S | V V | Y Z | being privation | merit blame].

33. *Question:* Whether in glory the act of will bears a causal relation to the acts of memory and intellect, and vice versa.

Solution: [D E | A S | S X | fire fire | fire air].

34. *Question:* Why does the memory, which remembers when the will hates, have more to do with suffering than that which remembers when the will loves?

Solution: [D F | beginning end | motion form | majority minority].

35. *Question:* Why does the soul repose when loving and suffer when hating?

Solution: [D G | A S | S S | X X | V V | Y Z | fire air | fire water].

36. *Question:* Why does free will better accord with the will when it is loving than when it is hating?

Solution: [D H | A S | V V | Y Z | X X | first intention second intention].

37. *Question:* Whether the soul is passive through its virtue and active through its powers.

Solution: [D I | S V | S T | form matter | S S | A A].

38. *Question:* Whether in the powers of the soul or in their acts there is action and passion.

Solution: [D K | M A V Y | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire earth].

39. *Question:* Whether in each power of the soul there is action and passion.

Solution: [D L | E I | M R | S S | V V | Y Z | A S | S X].

40. *Question:* Whether the will which loves that which the intellect understands is more lovable than the will which loves that which the intellect does not understand.

[55] A, followed surely by the corrector of M, has "why."

Solution: [D M | E A V Y | M A V Y | being privation | majority minority].

41. *Question:* Why, through great wanting, is doubt generated about that which is in truth remembered, understood, and loved?

Solution: [D N | S S | being privation | perfection imperfection | R R | B D | B C].

42. *Question:* Whether in the creation of the rational soul the sensitive power is also created, along with the influence that the vegetative power receives from it.

Solution: [D O | A S | S T | T X | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

43. *Question:* Whether the form that the soul has with respect to the body is different from the form that the soul has in itself.

Solution: [D P | S S | form matter | S V | S X | A S | fire air].

44. *Question:* From what and in what do the acts of the powers arise, and from what are they begotten?

Solution: [D Q | S S | V V | Y Z | X X | fire fire | fire water | fire air | fire earth].

45. *Question:* Whether rationality or reasoning passes through the powers, or whether the acts of the powers pass through the reason by reasoning.

Solution: [D R | E I N | fire fire | X X | V V | T T | S S].

E

46. *Question:* Whether willing can be increased as much by understanding as by remembering, and whether remembering can be increased as much by understanding as by willing.

Solution: [E E | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | S S].

47. *Question:* Whether doubt is closer to one power than to another.

Solution: [E F | G H I | K L M N | O P Q R | S S].

48. *Question:* Whether the intellect can understand different objects at the same time.

Solution: [E G | S S | T T | fire fire | fire earth | N R].

49. *Question:* Whether in the faculty of reason there is some intellectual sense common to memory, intellect, and will.

Solution: [E H | A S | E A V Y | I A V Y | X X | S S | beginning end | S T | fire fire].

50. *Question:* Whether in the imagination[56] there exists a sense common to the five individual senses of the sensitive power.

Solution: [E I | S S | beginning end | fire fire | fire water | X X].

51. *Question:* Whether the powers are immediately or mediately passive one with respect to the other.

Solution: [E K | X X | F F | fire fire | N R | fire earth | fire water].

52. *Question:* Whether, outside the body, the intellective power makes use of the imaginative and sensitive powers.

Solution: [E L | A S | X X | V V | fire fire | fire water].

53. *Question:* Which is more lovable, the soul, its powers, or the acts of those powers?

Solution: [E M | A S | A A | S S | T T | fire fire | fire air].

54. *Question:* Whether free will has greater greatness in willing through understanding than through ignorance.

Solution: [E N | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | X X].

55. *Question:* Whether some part of the acts of the powers can exist outside the powers.

Solution: [E O | S S | fire fire | air air | water water | earth earth].

56. *Question:* Whether remembering, understanding, and willing are as near to the soul as the five senses are to the sensitive power.

Solution: [E P | S S | A S | S T | S X | S Y | S Z | fire fire | fire earth].

57. *Question:* Whether the four powers of the vegetative power[57] are as near to the sensitive power as the five powers of the sensitive power are to the rational power.

Solution: [E Q | S S | relation action | form matter | fire fire].

58. *Question:* Whether the rational power instills its virtue into the vegetative power without any intermediary.

Solution: [E R | S S | fire fire | fire water | V V].

F

59. *Question:* Whether the virtue of the soul exists in the powers in continuous or discrete quantity.

Solution: [F F | E I | N R | A S | S S | S T | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

[56] The *phantasia* of all the sources is the Greek word which in the Middle Ages was usually translated as *imaginatio*. Llull, however (see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 31), sometimes distinguishes between the two, even though here he seems to mean simply "imagination." For the latter word, see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 5 and n. 9 there.

[57] Cf. Dist. II, part ii, comp. 25.5 above.

60. *Question:* Whether the virtue of the soul exists as a continuous or discrete quantity in the acts of the powers.

Solution: [F G | E I | N R | majority minority | V V | Y Z | X X].

61. *Question:* Whether memorative, intellective, and volitive virtue is diversified through imagination, opinion, and esteem.

Solution; [F H | B D | K M | X X | fire air | water earth].

62. *Question:* Whether the five powers of the body proceed and arise from the influence of the rational and sensitive powers.

Solution: [F I | E Y | I Z | fire fire | S S].

63. *Question:* Whether the sensitive powers influence the vegetative, and vice versa.

Solution: [F K | fire water | E I | X X].

64. *Question:* Whether there is motion in the influence that the intellective power exerts on the sensitive.

Solution: [F L | S S | E A V Y | fire fire | T T].

65. *Question:* Whether memory is closer to the soul than to the will.

Solution: [F M | S S | S T | fire fire | fire air].

66. *Question:* Whether memory is closer in nature to the intellect than to the acts of either, that is, to understanding and remembering.

Solution: [F N | S S | S V | S X | S A | S Y | S Z].

67. *Question:* Whether the memory is a thing existing by itself or through the soul, and whether remembering exists through the soul or through memory.

Solution: [F O | E N | I R | A S | S V | X X].

68. *Question:* Whether the soul's virtue is subject to the powers or to their acts.

Solution: [F P | X X | V V | fire fire | fire air].

69. *Question:* Whether the soul's virtue is passive in the acts of the powers, and whether the powers are active in said virtue.

Solution: [F Q | E I N R | T T | V V | X X].

70. *Question:* Whether the powers of the soul are active through form and passive through matter.

Solution: [F R | S S | A S | S X | S V | S Y | S Z].

G

71. *Question:* Whether the act of the intellect exists throughout all of the intellect.

Solution: [G G | majority minority | power habit | E I N R].

72. *Question:* Whether the act of the intellect exists throughout all of the soul.

Solution: [G H | E I N R | A A | majority equality | creature minority |difference concordance].

73. *Question:* Whether in Socrates' humanity the body and the soul are different substances.

Solution: [G I | A S | majority minority | act relation | fire fire | fire air].

74. *Question:* Whether the act of the intellect exists throughout all of the memory.

Solution: [G K | N R | M A V Y | fire earth | fire air | X X].

75. *Question:* How does the rational power reason?

Solution: [G L | E A V Y | I V Z | S S | fire fire | fire air | fire earth].

76. *Question:* Whether the imaginative power has motion when it imagines.

Solution: [G M | N E I R | S S | fire fire].

77. *Question:* How does the sensitive power sense?

Solution: [G N | S S | fire fire | T T | V V].

78. *Question:* How does the vegetative power vegetate?

Solution: [G O | R E | I N | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

79. *Question:* In whay way is there motion in the motive power?

Solution: [G P | fire fire | motion form | motion matter | E A | I Z].

80. *Question:* Whether there is alteration in the intellect as a result of understanding and being ignorant.

Solution: [G Q | P R | fire fire | S S | X X | Y Z | V V | A S].

81. *Question:* Whether there is as much difference between the powers of the soul as between their acts.

Solution: [G R | S S | fire fire | fire air | E I N R | E A | I A | T T | X X].

H

82. *Question:* Whether the will can be hated for itself, or whether it is its loving and hating that are hateful.

Solution: [H H | S S | E Z | I Y | E Y | I Z | X X].

83. *Question:* Whether God forms the acts of the powers while the soul uses them.

Solution: [H I | S T | S V | S X | fire fire | fire air].

84. *Question:* Whether the will, without imagination, can hate a physical thing.

Solution: [H K | E I N R | X X | fire fire | fire earth].

85. *Question:* Whether in the transformation that takes place in the will from hating to loving there is a transformation of new forms.

Solution: [H L | F G | B C | M D | fire fire | air earth | E I N].

86. *Question:* Whether after death there takes place a transformation of new forms in the acts of the powers.

Solution: [H M | A S | S T | S V | S X | fire air].

87. *Question:* Whether the transformation from a form loving into one hating, and vice versa, can be brought about without matter.

Solution: [H N | S S | E I N R | V V | fire fire | fire air].

88. *Question:* Whether the will, when it increases its act in loving or hating, leads it through an intermediary.

Solution: [H O | S S | E A V Y | fire fire | fire air | fire earth].

89. *Question:* Why does our imaginative power imagine the antipodes as falling upward?

Solution: [H P | fire earth | difference contrariety | C C].

90. *Question:* Whether the powers of the rational soul are mixed in virtue or in essence.

Solution: [H Q | S S | fire fire | fire water | E I N R | V V].

91. *Question:* Whether one power of the soul can be in another.

Solution: [H R | B C | D C | M K | S S | fire air | X X].

I

92. *Question:* Whether the powers, that is, the rational, sensitive, and vegetative, enter into mixture virtually or essentially.

Solution: [I I | E A V Y | M A V Y | fire fire | creature operation].

93. *Question:* Whether the powers appear in the soul as the eyes, eyelids, eyebrows, nose, and mouth appear in the human face.

Solution: [I K | form demonstration | power object | S S].

94. *Question:* Which is closer to the sensitive power, imagining or understanding?

Solution: [I L | being being | majority minority | immediately mediately | S S].

95. *Question:* Why are there different opinions concerning any one science?

Solution: [I M | E Y | N Y | R Y Z | difference end | S T | fire fire | fire air].

96. *Question:* Whether the soul and body are in man, or whether man is in the soul and body essentially or locally.

Solution: [I N | N I | E A V Y | F G | G F | fire fire | fire water | water fire].

97. *Question:* Whether it is through humanity or place that the soul is in the body, and conversely.

Solution: [I O | A A | S S | T T | fire air | fire earth].

98. *Question:* Whether the soul is in man's being without reference to place, like quality in quantity.

Solution: [I P | L C | D A | fire air | water earth | R R].

99. *Question:* Whether souls are differentiated one from another numerically or materially.

Solution: [I Q | E A V Y | E V Z | M A V Y Z | X X | fire air].

100. *Question:* Whether in a rational animal there is a single substantial form or several.

Solution: [I R | S S | A S | S T | X X | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

K

101. *Question:* Whether objects in the imagination[58] are representable to the powers of the soul distinctly, by means of their specific virtues, as they would be in a room by means of light and bodily sight.

Solution: [K K | A S | S S | V V | X X | fire fire].

102. *Question:* Whether forgetting and not knowing are different and concordant.

Solution: [K L | M A V Y | being privation | E being | N nonbeing | difference concordance].

103. *Question:* Why the soul wearies of remembering.

Solution: [K M | A S | S T | X X | beginning end | sensual intellectual | immediately mediately].

104. *Question:* Whether the rational soul grows.

Solution: [K N | S S | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y R | R E I N | fire fire].

105. *Question:* Whether everything that is done in the powers of the soul is done by means of the virtue being born and issuing from their activity, or whether it is done through the inflow of virtue into that activity.

[58] Cf. n. 56 above.

Solution: [K O | A S | E A V Y | I V A Y | fire fire | fire air].

106. *Question:* Whether the soul can love a thing it does not understand.

Solution; [K P | E A | E Z | M A | S S | S X | majority minority | being perfection | will justice | D H].

107. *Question:* How does the soul exert influence over the body?

Solution: [K Q | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | S X | fire air].

108. *Question:* How does the body exert influence over the soul?

Solution: [K R | E fire | I water | S X].

L

109. *Question:* Whether the accidental forms of the soul are only the second act of the rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers, or whether they have both a first and second act.[59]

Solution: [L L | A S | S S | fire fire | V V | X X].

110. *Question:* Whether the soul can understand as much in God by affirmation as by negation.

Solution: [L M | E A | I A | S S | S T].

111. *Question:* Why does the soul not have as much understanding of God as it has ignorance of Him, if it is similar to God through understanding and dissimilar to Him through ignorance?

Solution: [L N | A S | A T].

112. *Question:* Whether not knowing, forgetting, and disliking can result in the privation of something.

Solution: [L O | I E | N R | X X].

113. *Question:* Whether the rational power generates the imaginative power or its imagining, by drawing to itself the sensitive and vegetative powers.

Solution: [L P | S S | S T | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

114. *Question:* How does one soul understand another?

Solution: [L Q | S S | A S | S V | S X | T T | fire fire | fire water].

115. *Question:* Whether a soul existing in virtue and one existing in vice are different by their activity or by their nature.

Solution: [L R | S T | E A V Y | I A V Y | fire fire | fire water | X X]

M

116. *Question:* Whether the soul can love as much as it can hate.

Solution: [M M | S T | E majority | I minority | E A | I A | affirmation negation].

[59] Cf. Dist. II, n. 49 above.

117. *Question:* Whether the first act of the soul is life and the second to live.

Solution: [M N | S S | E A V Y | I A V Y | M A V Y Z | fire fire].

118. *Question:* How does one soul speak with another?

Solution: [M O | E E | E A | S T | S X | fire fire | fire water].

119. *Question:* Whether the imagination is necessary for one soul to understand another.

Solution: [M P | S S | A S | E E | creature operation | fire fire].

120. *Question:* Whether the soul suffers more through hating than through understanding and remembering.

Solution: [M Q | I A V Y | E A V Y | X X | fire air | fire water].

121. *Question:* Whether Socrates' loving will is intelligible because it is a will or because it is loving.

Solution: [M R | S S | A S | X X | fire fire | fire air].

N

122. *Question:* Why does the soul forget and not know, if it is immortal?

Solution: [N N | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | S T | fire fire | fire water].

123. *Question:* Whether the soul is in sin, or vice versa.

Solution: [N O | E A | A E | X X | V V | fire fire].

124. *Question:* Whether, without quantity, sin is increased in the soul.

Solution: [N P | E V Z | I A V Y | M A V Y | fire fire | fire earth].

125. *Question:* Whether the potential existence of willing by means of the will is a question of form or matter.

Solution: [N Q | S S | S X | fire fire | fire air].

126. *Question:* Whether in man the sensitive power has its own matter.

Solution: [N R | S S | S T | S V | X X | fire fire | fire earth].

O

127. *Question:* Whether the soul is made up of essential or integral parts.

Solution: [O O | S S | matter form | B C D | E I N R | fire air].

128. *Question:* Whether the soul can undergo greater suffering than the body.

Solution: [O P | I A V Z | M A V Y | fire fire | fire water].

129. *Question:* Whether the sinful soul, which is the form of the body, continues after death to exist in its first form—that which the soul has in itself—just as in its second form the soul without body is made to suffer in Hell.

Solution: [O Q | A S | E V Z | I A V Y | fire fire | fire earth | fire water].

130. *Question:* Why is it that the rational soul is immortal and does not grow old?

Solution: [O R | A S | S S | A T | S V | S X | fire water].

P

131. *Question:* How does the soul sin?

Solution: [P P | O O | Q Q | E I N R | E V Z | I A V Y | fire fire | fire air | fire water | fire earth | first intention second intention | X X].

132. *Question:* How does the soul fall into temptation?

Solution: [P Q | O R | M Y Z | beginning end | middle doubt | X X].

133. *Question:* Whether remembering, understanding and loving are forms out of which a single form can be composed.

Solution: [P R | E A V Y | fire earth | air water].

Q

134. *Question:* Whether the soul begins loving before hating, or vice versa.

Solution: [Q Q | E A | I A | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | E V Z].

135. *Question:* Whether the soul is complete in its powers or in its essence.

Solution: [Q R | S T | creature operation | E A V Y | beginning end].

R

136. *Question:* Whether the soul is satisfied with the quantity of the object loved, understood, and remembered, or with the quantity of its virtue, of its powers, or of their acts.

Solution: [R R | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air | fire earth | fire fire].

Here Begin the Questions concerning the Principles of This Art

AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNING GOD

1. *Question:* Whether there is one good God and another bad one.

Solution: [God God | goodness greatness | eternity power | A A | A S | fire fire].

2. *Question:* Whether the world is eternal.

Solution: [God creature | A T | A S | E A V Y | beginning end | V V].

3. *Question:* What is the best and noblest work that God can do?

Solution: [God operation | A A | being perfection | dignities act | form relation].

4. *Question:* Whether it is God's dignities or His essence that acts on created things.

Solution: [God difference | T T | A A | unity essence | act relation | E A].

5. *Question:* Whether contrariety can contradict the existence of concordance in God.

Solution: [God concordance | contrariety minority | creature operation | will justice].

6. *Question:* Whether God can sin.

Solution: [God contrariety | A A | greatness eternity | power justice | will virtue].

7. *Question:* Whether the noblest and greatest end that God can begin has already begun or is yet to begin.

Solution: [God beginning | A A | dignities act | A S | middle majority].

8. *Question:* Whether there can be an intermediary between God and creature.

Solution: [God middle | greatness power | will justice | end majority | E A V Y].

9. *Question:* Whether God, through His intrinsic or extrinsic activity, is the end of all ends.

Solution: [God end | A A | A T | fire fire | E A V Y | I A V Y].

10. *Question:* Whether the now that is infinite[60] because of minority signifies the now that is infinite because of majority.

Solution: [God majority | greatness eternity | dignities act | time motion].

11. *Question:* Whether God is farther from inequality through equality than without equality.

Solution: [God equality | dignities act | creature operation | being privation].

12. *Question:* Whether God can divide His entity into parts.

Solution: [God minority | greatness eternity | power justice | E A | I A].

[60] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; the "finite" of M is surely a mistake.

13. *Question:* Whether any imperfection can follow from an affirmation based on the assumption that all perfection exists in God.

Solution: [God affirmation | greatness perfection | power will | justice nobility].[61]

14. *Question:* Whether there can be any use in doubting God's existence.

Solution: [God doubt | being privation | greatness eternity | E V Z | I A V Y].

15. *Question:* Whether it is legitimate to deny everything by which there might be minority in God.

Solution: [God negation | greatness eternity | power justice | being majority | privation minority | concordance contrariety].

CREATURE

16. *Question:* Whether substance exists because there exist accidents in it.

Solution: [creature creature | operation difference | dignities act | E A V Y | fire fire].

17. *Question:* What is the noblest work a creature can perform?

Solution: [creature operation | E A | I V Z | E V Z | I A V Y | fire fire | fire air].

18. *Question:* Whether creature is as much of a thing as place, which is a thing because it contains things placed in it.

Solution: [creature difference | A T | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water].

19. *Question:* Whether species is a creature, or whether it is a common thing and the act of its individual parts, just as the common sense[62] is a thing and the act of the individual faculties of the sensitive power.

Solution: [creature concordance | being majority | E A V Y | fire fire].

20. *Question:* Whether there can be greater concordance between God and creature, than between creature and creature.

Solution: [creature contrariety | E V Z | I A V Y | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

[61] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; in the last three compartments M has, [greatness power | will justice | nobility perfection].

[62] "Common sense" should be taken here in its most literal meaning of the sense common to or which reunites the individual senses (cf. *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 6, n. 10).

21. *Question:* Whether the activity through which a person acquires merit is itself a creature.

Solution: [creature beginning | A T | S S | S V | middle end | fire fire | A S].

22. *Question:* Whether there are accidents that, by some means, can be both creatures and the works of creatures.

Solution: [creature middle | substance accident | dignities act | fire fire].[63]

23. *Question:* Whether man was created in accordance with[64] God's intrinsic or extrinsic work.

Solution: [creature end | first intention second intention | A A | majority minority].

24. *Question:* Whether God could have created the world earlier and in greater magnitude than He did.

Solution: [creature majority | being privation | operation end | fire fire | E A | A A | dignities act | power will | wisdom justice | reality reason].

25. *Question:* Whether God could create an infinite creature.

Solution: [creature equality | A A | dignities act | A T | E A | power justice | greatness eternity | act relation].

26. *Question:* Whether God could create a creature nobler than all other creatures.

Solution: [creature minority | I A | N A | E A | power will | wisdom justice | greatness nobility].

27. *Question:* Whether man can have greater knowledge through affirmation than through negation.

Solution: [creature affirmation | E A | I A | first intention second intention].

28. *Question:* Whether any creature can exist outside itself.

Solution: [creature doubt | N A | I A | E V Z | fire fire | fire air | operation end | A A | E A].

29. *Question:* Whether a false negative is a creature.

Solution: [creature negation | A A | will justice | E Y | first intention second intention].

OPERATION

30. *Question:* Whether accidents are in substance or vice versa.

Solution: [operation operation | creature end | A T | fire fire | fire water | E A V Y | I A V Y].

[63] Throughout this section (as, for instance, with the means-middle-intermediary here and in Question 8 above), the reader should keep in mind the various alternate translations of the concepts of the red triangle of Figure T discussed in Dist. 1, n. 16 above.

[64] A, followed surely by the corrector of M, has "was created in order to praise."

31. *Question:* Whether there is any difference between man and substance.

Solution: [operation difference | middle end | majority minority | fire fire].

32. *Question:* Whether man is the work resulting from the virtue of body and soul, or whether he is a mixture of body and soul.

Solution: [operation concordance | A S | S S | difference end | fire fire | E A V Y].

33. *Question:* Whether in the works of nature there can be generation without contrariety and composition.

Solution: [operation contrariety | A A | A T | E A | fire fire | fire water | motion firmament].

34. *Question:* Whether each element begins its activity from its own entity before it does from the entity of another element.

Solution: [operation beginning | middle end | fire fire | A A | E A].

35. *Question:* Whether the craftsman produces the artificial form as a result of his own work or as a result of the emergence of the virtue coming from natural matter and form.

Solution: [operation middle | difference end | E fire | creature majority | immediately mediately].

36. *Question:* Which work has the nobler end, that which is intrinsic or that which is extrinsic?

Solution: [operation end | A A | S S | E A | fire fire | fire air].

37. *Question:* Which is the greater work, to create or to raise from the dead?

Solution: [operation majority | beginning end | fire fire | fire water | A A | first intention second intention | E A V Y | I V Z | E A].

38. *Question:* Whether work that is completely uniform[65] can be corruptible.

Solution: [operation equality | A A | S S | E A | fire fire | fire air | fire earth].

39. *Question:* Whether the works of nature will ever come to an end.

Solution: [operation minority | A A | first intention second intention | E A].

40. *Question:* Whether the artisan can make any part that is essential, or integral, or accidental.

[65] *Aequalis* (Cat. *egual*) to go with the "equality" in the answer.

Solution: [operation affirmation | difference negation | majority minority | fire air | E V Y].

41. *Question:* Whether the accidents of substance are working parts proceeding from substance through the work of essential and integral parts.

Solution: [operation doubt | God creature | end majority | E A | I A].

42. *Question:* Whether sensual activity exists in sense before it does in intellect.[66]

Solution: [operation negation | middle end | motion minority | fire fire | fire water | power object | A A | E A | glory eviternity].

DIFFERENCE

43. *Question:* Whether, as a result of the diversity between substance and accidents, there is a difference between being and essence.[67]

Solution: [difference difference | creature operation | beginning end | fire fire].

44. *Question:* Whether the difference between being and essence is a result of the difference between substance and accidents.

Solution: [difference concordance | middle end | form matter | being privation].

45. *Question:* Whether there is contrariety between potential and actual form.

Solution: [difference contrariety | fire fire | fire water | water water].

46. *Question:* Whether work can be differentiated more through concordance than through contrariety.

Solution: [difference beginning | being privation | majority minority].

47. *Question:* Whether natural appetite is greater as a result of the elements being contrary or concordant with one another.

Solution: [difference middle | beginning end | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

48. *Question:* Whether the perfection of substance exists inside or outside said substance.

Solution: [difference end | E A | fire fire | A A | S S | S V | fire water].

[66] Thus in all medieval sources; M, however, has "exists in intellect before it does in sense."

[67] For the *esse-essentia* pair used here and in the next question, see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 2 with the corresponding note.

49. *Question:* Whether there is a greater difference between God and man than between God and a stone.

Solution: [difference majority | being privation | E A | fire fire | E Z | A A].

50. *Question:* Whether in any being there can exist a distinction between things equal in total nobility.

Solution: [difference equality | God operation | greatness power| will justice].

51. *Question:* Whether greater purpose and concordance can stem from greater difference.

Solution: [difference minority | fire fire | fire water | A A | E A | I A].

52. *Question:* Whether the elements can be one in the other without any diversity of essence.

Solution: [difference affirmation | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | A A | S S | E A V Y].

53. *Question:* Whether doubt is more strongly caused by diversity than by contrariety, or conversely.

Solution: [difference doubt | T X | being concordance | privation contrariety | majority minority].

54. *Question:* Whether the entity of substance is differentiated from the entity of accidents because they are different from the powers by which the virtue of substance is differentiated.

Solution: [difference negation | privation minority | being affirmation].

CONCORDANCE

55. *Question:* Whether there exist some things in which there is concordance without contrariety.

Solution: [concordance concordance | A A | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire].

56. *Question:* Whether it is more impossible for contrariety to exist in something in which there is concordance than conversely.

Solution: [concordance contrariety | A A | fire fire | S S | V V | being perfection].

57. *Question:* Whether it is just for there to be greater concordance in beginning than between beginning and begun.

Solution: [concordance beginning | A A | dignities act | form relation | fire fire | fire air | first intention second intention].

58. *Question:* Whether God can create creature in Himself as He can create accidents in substance.

Solution: [concordance middle | A T | S S | fire fire | form relation | E A].

59. *Question:* What is the greatest concordance God can make?

Solution: [concordance end | A A | A S | fire fire | dignities act | form relation].

60. *Question:* Whether there is greater concordance between middle and end than between beginning and end.

Solution: [concordance majority | A A | fire fire | fire water | middle majority | difference equality].

61. *Question:* Whether contrariety can exist in the concordance of equal things.

Solution: [concordance equality | A A | T T | fire fire | E A].

62. *Question:* Whether there is greater concordance between form and matter than between substance and its accidents.

Solution: [concordance minority | being privation | fire fire | first intention second intention].

63. *Question:* Whether man can have greater concordance with God through affirmation than through negation.

Solution: [concordance affirmation | A A | first intention second intention | E A | I A].

64. *Question:* Why does doubt have greater concordance with minority than with majority?

Solution: [concordance doubt | N A V Y | E A V Y | I V Z].

65. *Question:* Why does negation accord with privation and affirmation with being?

Solution: [concordance negation | A being | majority affirmation].

CONTRARIETY

66. *Question:* Whether substance is corruptible because of matter, and matter because of accidents.

Solution: [contrariety contrariety | T T | beginning accidents | end substance | being privation | X X].

67. *Question:* Whether God can give a beginning to something without contrariety.

Solution: [contrariety beginning | A A | T X | V V | fire fire].

68. *Question:* Whether contrariety and concordance can accord through some intermediary.

Solution: [contrariety middle | T T | fire fire | fire water | E I].

69. *Question:* Whether the elements desire to be the species that they compose.

Solution: [contrariety end | fire fire | fire water | beginning middle].

70. *Question:* Whether God consents to the existence of the greatest contrariety possible.

Solution: [contrariety majority | A A | God concordance | dignities act | form relation | difference affirmation].

71. *Question:* Whether concordance can exist in the contrariety of equal things.[68]

Solution: [contrariety equality | fire water | air earth].

72. *Question:* Why does minority accord with impossible and majority with possible?

Solution: [contrariety minority | A A | end equality | fire fire | dignities act | difference majority].

73. *Question:* In what case can affirmation and negation be most contrary to one another?

Solution: [contrariety affirmation | E A | I A | majority concordance].

74. *Question:* Whether doubt is more contrary to affirmation than to negation.

Solution: [contrariety doubt | T T | N A | E A | first intention second intention].

75. *Question:* Whether affirmation more strongly contradicts negation than vice versa.

Solution: [contrariety negation | T T | majority minority | E I].

BEGINNING

76. *Question:* Whether there is one beginning or many.

Solution: [beginning beginning | A A | S S | fire air | E A | I V Z].

77. *Question:* Whether nature begins with accidents before substance, so that they may be the instruments for making form and matter, from which substance is produced.

Solution: [beginning middle | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water].

78. *Question:* What does nature make accidents from, if not from the entity of substance?

Solution: [beginning end | middle minority | T T | being privation].[69]

[68] Note that this question is the reverse of Question 61 above.

[69] A, followed undoubtedly by the corrector in M, inserts between the first and second compartments [difference concordance | first intention second intention | fire fire].

79. *Question:* Whether substance is closer to its beginnings than to its accidents.

Solution: [beginning majority | middle end | difference minority | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water | form matter].

80. *Question:* Whether any beginning[70] can consist of equal things.

Solution: [beginning equality | A A | E A | fire fire | fire air | affirmation negation | difference concordance | contrariety end].

81. *Question:* Whether the world was begun with a view to its own end.

Solution: [beginning minority | A T | A A | A S | E A].

82. *Question:* Whether affirmation is the beginning of negation.

Solution: [beginning affirmation | E A V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention].

83. *Question:* Whether doubt begins inside or outside itself.

Solution: [beginning doubt | N V Z | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire].[71]

84. *Question:* Whether the origin of substance lies inside or outside the substance itself.

Solution: [beginning negation | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water | majority affirmation | difference concordance].

MIDDLE

85. *Question:* What is the noblest intermediary that can exist between God and man?

Solution: [middle middle | A A | greatness eternity | God creature |E A].[72]

86. *Question:* Whether there are any means by which a form can exist that is both active and passive.

Solution: [middle end | T T | fire fire | fire water | I V Z | E A V Y].

87. *Question:* Whether God can make an intermediary of infinite things.

Solution: [middle majority | greatness eternity | dignities act | end end | A A | T T].

88. *Question:* Whether man exists as an intermediary between body and soul.

[70] Thus in A, followed undoubtedly by the corrector of M. Given the context of a section on "beginning" with no "middle" appearing in the solution, the "middle" of V B M must surely be a mistake.

[71] A B have "N Y Z" in the second compartment.

[72] Thus in A B; in the last compartment V has "A A" and M has "A T."

Solution: [middle equality | concordance end | fire fire | fire earth].

89. *Question:* Whether God can make an intermediary that would exist between infinite and finite.

Solution: [middle minority | A T | A A | God creature | power will].

90. *Question:* By what means can affirmation and negation best accord against doubt?

Solution: [middle affirmation | A A | dignities act | A T | God creature | X X | supposition demonstration].

91. *Question:* By what means does doubt come from being and privation?

Solution: [middle doubt |N A V Y Z | R A V Y Z | fire air].

92. *Question:* Why is there justice in man when he denies that heat is not of the entity of fire?

Solution: [middle negation | difference end | beginning minority | fire fire | fire air | A A | concordance equality].

END

93. *Question:* Whether any end is perfect without work.

Solution: [end end | A A | dignities act | S S | E I N | fire fire].

94. *Question:* Which is the more perfect end, equality or majority?

Solution: [end majority | A A | greatness eternity | will justice | S S | E A | fire fire | fire air].

95. *Question:* Whether there is anything in which first and second acts can be equal.

Solution: [end equality | A A | dignities act | form relation | T T].

96. *Question:* Which act is greater, the first or the second?

Solution: [end minority | A A | equality concordance | E A | majority affirmation | difference negation | fire fire].

97. *Question:* Whether fire, if given sufficient wood, could burn throughout the fifth essence.[73]

Solution: [end affirmation | beginning middle | form matter | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water | contrariety minority].

98. *Question:* Whether the final cause for the existence of doubt is the supposition of true things.

Solution: [end doubt | supposition demonstration | N A V Y Z | E A V Y | I V Z].

[73] For the fifth essence, see *Felix*, Bk. IV, n. 16.

99. *Question:* Whether affirmation is the final cause of negation.
Solution: [end negation | E A V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention].

MAJORITY

100. *Question:* Whether majority can exist without minority.
Solution: [majority majority | A A | greatness nobility | concordance equality | creature minority | difference contrariety].

101. *Question:* Whether greater virtue can be infused by means of equality than by means of majority.
Solution: [majority equality | greatness eternity | beginning end].

102. *Question:* In what thing can there be the greatest concordance of majority and minority?
Solution: [majority minority | A S | E A | I V Z | fire fire | fire water | T T].[74]

103. *Question:* What is the greatest affirmation that can be made about God?
Solution: [majority affirmation | A A | E A | fire fire | fire earth | dignities act].

104. *Question:* About what things can there be the greatest doubt?
Solution: [majority doubt | A S | A A | N A | E A | I A].

105. *Question:* What is the greatest negation that can be made?
Solution: [majority negation | A A | A T | dignities act | form relation].

EQUALITY

106. *Question:* Whether equality and equalizing can exist without minority.
Solution: [equality equality | A A | dignities act | greatness eternity].

107. *Question:* Whether a point and sin are equal in minority.
Solution: [equality minority | fire fire | E V Z | I A V Y | contrariety end].

108. *Question:* Whether an unequal affirmation can be made from true things.
Solution: [equality affirmation | E Y | I Z | M Y Z | first intention second intention | A A].

109. *Question:* Whether all doubt involves blame.

[74] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; the "A T" which M has in the second compartment is undoubtedly an error.

Solution: [equality doubt | E I N R | first intention second intention | Y Z].

110. *Question:* Whether equality can exist as much through negation as through affirmation.

Solution: [equality negation | E I | majority minority | being privation].

MINORITY

111. *Question:* Whether an instant of time can, through minority, be distinct and indivisible.[75]

Solution: [minority minority | A A | majority majority].

112. *Question:* Whether a greater affirmation can be made as a result of sensual rather than intellectual things.

Solution: [minority affirmation | E A V Y | M A V Y | fire fire | fire water].

113. *Question:* Whether there should be less doubt about true than about false things.

Solution: [minority doubt | E A V Y | I V Z | majority minority].

114. *Question:* Why is negation less than affirmation?

Solution: [minority negation | E A V Y | I V Z | majority minority].

AFFIRMATION

115. *Question:* Which represents the truer affirmation, joy or sadness?

Solution: [affirmation affirmation | E A V Y | I V Z | R V Y Z].

116. *Question:* Whether affirmation and doubt can be equal and concordant.

Solution: [affirmation doubt | T T].

117. *Question:* Why does affirmation accord with loving and negation with hating?

Solution: [affirmation negation | E I | first intention second intention | Y Z].

DOUBT

118. *Question:* In what power of the soul does doubt first begin?

Solution: [doubt doubt | K H M | being privation | T T].

119. *Question:* Whether doubt accords better with affirmation than with negation.

[75] For *nunc* translated as "an instant of time," see Dist. II, n. 85 above. Instead of "distinct," A, followed undoubtedly by the corrector in M, have "destroyed."

Solution: [doubt negation | N R | E I | majority minority].

NEGATION

120. *Question:* Whether negation would exist if there were no such thing as sin.

Solution: [negation negation | E A Y | beginning end | being privation].

Here Begin the Questions concerning Virtues and Vices

AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNING FAITH

1. *Question:* Whether an increase of wisdom and charity is contrary to greatness of faith.

Solution: [faith faith | goodness greatness | will justice | habit act | N A | E A].

2. *Question:* Whether divine wisdom instills as much truth through faith as does divine justice through hope.

Solution: [faith hope | N A | E A | I Z | N Y | E Y | V V].

3. *Question:* Which is more desired by the divine will, faith or charity?

Solution: [faith charity | N A V Y | E A V Y | greatness justice | truth glory].

4. *Question:* Which is farther from privation, faith or justice?

Solution: [faith justice | N A V Y | E A V Y | I V Z | difference end].

5. *Question:* Whether God is more believable than understandable.

Solution: [faith prudence | N A | E A | greatness eternity | truth perfection | majority minority | first intention second intention].

6. *Question:* Whether fortitude is stronger through knowledge than through faith.

Solution: [faith fortitude | N A | E A | I Z | majority end].

7. *Question:* Whether faith is the result of acquisition or of infusion[76]

Solution: [faith temperance | K L | M A | wisdom truth | beginning end | A V].

8. *Question:* Which has the greatest objective existence in God, faith, justice, or prudence?

Solution: [faith gluttony | fire fire | earth earth | majority equality].

[76] See Dist. II, n. 64 above for the terms "acquisition" and "infusion."

9. *Question:* Whether the form of faith exists in matter.

Solution: [faith lust | fire fire | V V | immediately mediately | substance accident].

10. *Question:* Whether faith and avarice have greater contrariety in majority than in minority.

Solution: [faith avarice | water earth | being privation | N Z | I Z].[77]

11. *Question:* Whether faith is more contrary to pride in greatness than in smallness of humility.

Solution: [faith pride | being majority | privation minority | A A | A T | T X].

12. *Question:* Whether greater faith is more lovable than lesser faith.

Solution: [faith accidie | goodness greatness | will justice | wisdom truth | N A V Y].

13. *Question:* Whether knowledge increases through greatness or through smallness of faith.

Solution: [faith envy | supposition demonstration | end majority | power object].

14. *Question:* Whether faith can better be based on the intellect than on the imagination.

Solution: [faith ire | fire air | fire water | difference end | beginning middle].

HOPE

15. *Question:* Whether the hope that exists in greater faith can be greater than the hope that exists in lesser faith.

Solution: [hope hope | greatness justice | A A | E A V Y | I V Z].

16. *Question:* Whether greater despair can be contrary to greater charity, and conversely.

Solution: [hope charity | goodness greatness | justice nobility | being privation].

17. *Question:* Whether hope and justice have greater concordance through divine goodness and wisdom than through divine goodness and justice.

Solution: [hope justice | A A | N A V Y | E A V Y | I V Z].

18. *Question:* Whether the virtues mix with one another formally or materially.

[77] Thus in V M; A B have "V Z" in the fourth compartment.

Solution: [hope prudence | A A | S S | fire fire | difference concordance].

19. *Question:* Whether, when one virtue is active, the others are in potentiality or in habit.

Solution: [hope fortitude | air air | E I | first intention second intention].

20. *Question:* Whether one virtue can be in another.

Solution: [hope temperance | A A | water water | water earth | E A Y | I A Z | V V | X X].

21. *Question:* Why do virtues and vices exist?

Solution: [hope gluttony | God creature | concordance middle | justice mercy | E A V | I V Z | first intention second intention | V V | X X | intelligence immediately | S A].[78]

22. *Question:* Whether virtues and vices can draw near to one another, separate, and intermingle.

Solution: [hope lust | E I | N R | fire fire | fire water | fire earth | fire air | difference contrariety].

23. *Question:* Whether greatness of hope accords better with a rich man than a poor man.

Solution: [hope avarice | E A | I V Z | first intention second intention | middle end].

24. *Question:* Whether hope mortifies pride more with greater than will lesser humility.

Solution: [hope pride | majority being | minority privation | fire water].

25. *Question:* How are the virtues joined and interlaced one with another?

Solution: [hope accidie | E A V Z | I V Z | N A V Y Z | R V Y Z | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | first intention second intention | immediately mediately].[79]

26. *Question:* Whether each virtue exists for the others.

Solution: [hope envy | fire air | fire earth | mixture digestion | form matter].

27. *Question:* How are virtues and vices most contrary?

Solution: [hope ire | A A | A S | A T | A V | A Y | A Z | E A V Y | I A V Y | fire water].

[78] Thus in all sources, save M, which has "E A V Y" in the fifth compartment, and B, which has "V Z Y" in the sixth.

[79] The second compartment has "E A V Y" in the errata of M; the third has "V Z" in V and the uncorrected text of M; the fifth has "R A V Y Z" in M (and is omitted in B).

CHARITY

28. *Question:* Whether one has greater charity by knowing what God is than by knowing what God is not.

Solution: [charity charity | E A | I A | majority minority | first intention second intention].

29. *Question:* Whether man should love God in proportion to the prosperity He gives him in this world.

Solution: [charity justice | greatness eternity | goodness perfection | E A | I A | immediately mediately | first intention second intention].

30. *Question:* Whether charity can be greater through knowledge than through belief.

Solution: [charity prudence | faith accidie | E A V Y | N A V Y].

31. *Question:* Whether fortitude can increase itself in charity without increasing charity.

Solution: [charity fortitude | faith prudence | concordance majority].

32. *Question:* Whether imagination can be greater in temperance than in charity.

Solution: [charity temperance | E A | I A | V V | fire air | fire water].

33. *Question:* Whether the objects that the soul apprehends, or its virtues, constitute its fulfillment.

Solution: [charity gluttony | E A | E V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention].

34. *Question:* Whether lust first appears in the volitive, imaginative, or sensitive power.

Solution: [charity lust | end majority | S S | S V | E A | fire fire].

35. *Question:* Whether charity and generosity have greater concordance in greatness than have hate and avarice.

Solution: [charity avarice | A A | E A V Y | I V Z | earth earth].

36. *Question:* Whether charity and pride are formed in the same power of the soul.

Solution: [charity pride | S S | E V Y | I V Y | A A | justice mercy].

37. *Question:* Whether charity and accidie have greater contrariety in generosity than in pride.

Solution: [charity accidie | A A | will generosity | eternity justice].

38. *Question:* Whether charity contradicts envy with the infusion of virtue or with direct contact.[80]

Solution: [charity envy | E A V Y | I V Z | R V Y Z | fire air | air air].

[80] *Cum tactu* (Cat. *ab tocament*), literally "with touching."

39. *Question:* Whether lust can exist in the intellective power without the sensitive.

Solution: [charity ire | B D | fire water | S V].

JUSTICE

40. *Question:* Whether everything that is contrary to the greatness of uncreated and created justice is injustice.

Solution: [justice justice | goodness greatness | will generosity | avarice accidie].

41. *Question:* Whether justice can be greater through prudence than through faith.

Solution: [justice prudence | E A V Y | I V Z | N A V Y Z].[81]

42. *Question:* Whether justice has greater concordance with fortitude through charity than through hope.

Solution: [justice fortitude | A A | E A | first intention second intention].

43. *Question:* Whether between justice, which is in act, and temperance, which is in habit, there is influence or direct contact.[82]

Solution: [justice temperance | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire water].

44. *Question:* Whether justice can make the punishment equal to the blame with fasting and alms.

Solution: [justice gluttony | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire water].

45. *Question:* Whether justice punishes lust in form or in matter.

Solution: [justice lust | B C D E | F G H I | K L M N | O P Q R | fire water | fire fire].

46. *Question:* In which of B C D should justice most punish avarice?

Solution: [justice avarice | E N | free will blame | first intention second intention].

47. *Question:* Whether memory, intellect, and will can have greater concordance in justice than in pride.

Solution: [justice pride | E A | I A | air air | air water | water earth].

48. *Question:* Why are more men subject to vices than to virtues, when greatness can be greater in virtues than in vices?

Solution: [justice accidie | I A | E V Y | fire fire | dignities act].

49. *Question:* Whether the virtues are closer to the powers of the soul than to its substance.

[81] Thus in the medieval sources; M, however, has "M A V Y Z" in the last compartment.
[82] Cf. n. 80 above.

Solution: [justice envy | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air].

50. *Question:* Whether justice punishes wrongdoing in the acts of the powers, in the powers themselves, or in the substance.

Solution: [justice ire | I A V Y | E V Z | immediately mediately | greatness mercy].

PRUDENCE

51. *Question:* Whether prudence is of the entity of the acts of memory, intellect, and will.

Solution: [prudence prudence | E A V Y | E V Z | I N R | fire fire].

52. *Question:* Which virtue acts upon another, that which is in act or that which is in habit?

Solution: [prudence fortitude | V V | A T | act majority | form matter].

53. *Question:* Whether all the virtues can exist in one, as can general accidents in substance.

Solution: [prudence temperance | act habit | E I N | fire fire | gluttony ire].

54. *Question:* Whether prudence has a first and second act.

Solution: [prudence gluttony | act habit | E V Y | I V Z | fire air].

55. *Question:* Whether prudence can exist for the entire man.

Solution: [prudence lust | immediately mediately | S S | fire air].

56. *Question:* Whether virtues and vices can be in accord.

Solution: [prudence avarice | T T | fire water | air earth].

57. *Question:* Why can man have more charity than prudence?

Solution: [prudence pride | D M | C G L | majority minority].

58. *Question:* Whether faith and prudence can accord through supposition and demonstration.

Solution: [prudence accidie | V V | contrariety concordance | X X].

59. *Question:* Which can be greater, prudence or envy?

Solution: [prudence envy | E A | I A | fire fire | fire water].

60. *Question:* Whether prudence is as necessary with great ire as it is with great joy.

Solution: [prudence ire | charity fortitude | E I | first intention second intention].

FORTITUDE

61. *Question:* Whether virtues increase or decrease by continuous or discrete quantities.

Solution: [fortitude fortitude | V V | E V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire air].

62. *Question:* Whether virtues increase as a result of virtue arising and proceeding from substance into work.

Solution: [fortitude temperance | A S | E A | I V Z | fire fire | V V].

63. *Question:* Whether fortitude has greater concordance with justice per se or because it contradicts injustice.

Solution: [fortitude gluttony | act habit | appetite power | X X | fire fire | fire air].

64. *Question:* Whether lust is the first or second act of something descending to nothingness.

Solution: [fortitude lust | God creature | being privation | middle end].

65. *Question:* Whether avarice really has a first and second act.

Solution: [fortitude avarice | reality reason | immediately mediately | God creature | habit act | being privation].

66. *Question:* Whether sin begins in the soul before it does in the body, or vice versa.

Solution: [fortitude pride | E A V Y | beginning end | fire fire | fire water].

67. *Question:* Why does the destruction of one virtue entail that of the others?

Solution: [fortitude accidie | I A | E V Z | middle end].

68. *Question:* Whether fortitude can be greater through imagining dangers than through mortifying ire.

Solution: [fortitude envy | hope charity | E I N | fire fire].

69. *Question:* Why is fortitude associated with greatness more in majority than in minority of ire?

Solution: [fortitude ire | A S | merit blame | charity justice | fire water].

TEMPERANCE

70. *Question:* Whether the first and second act of temperance are different in essence.

Solution: [temperance temperance | B F | C G | D H | fire fire | fire air].

71. *Question:* Why should a person fast?

Solution: [temperance gluttony | E A V Y | I V Z | fire water].

72. *Question:* How does temperance subdue lust?

Solution: [temperance lust | E A V Y | I V Z | fire water | fire air].

73. *Question:* Whether temperance contradicts avarice more per se than by generosity.

Solution: [temperance avarice | habit act | immediately mediately | fire water | fire air].

74. *Question:* Whether God is a great with regard to temperance as He is with regard to pride, since temperance and majority accord with one another, as do pride and minority.

Solution: [temperance pride | A A | greatness eternity | T V | beginning end].

75. *Question:* Whether temperance contradicts accidie more with charity than with justice.

Solution: [temperance accidie | charity justice | first intention second intention].

76. *Question:* Whether envy entails greater blame in a rich man than in a poor man.

Solution: [temperance envy | majority second intention | middle end].

77. *Question:* Why does ire come on more suddenly than temperance?

Solution: [temperance ire | E A V Y | I V Z | E V Z | I A V Y | X X | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

GLUTTONY

78. *Question:* Whether sins mix with one another.

Solution: [gluttony gluttony | being privation | form matter | power act | habit act].

79. *Question;* How can the body sin?

Solution: [gluttony lust | fire fire | fire air | fire water | second intention end].

80. *Question:* Which is the greater sin, gluttony or avarice?

Solution: [gluttony avarice | fire earth | fire air | E V Z | I A V Y].

81. *Question:* Whether hypocrisy is as great a sin through gluttony as through pride.

Solution: [gluttony pride | E V Z | I A V Y | contrariety majority | air earth | air water].

82. *Question:* By what sin can a man be most frequently tempted?

Solution: [gluttony accidie | N R | water earth | air earth].

83. *Question:* Why does envy have greater concordance with pride than with gluttony?

Solution: [gluttony envy | I A V Y | fire earth | fire air].

84. *Question:* Why do gluttony and ire have greater concordance in a hungry man than in one who has eaten his fill?

Solution: [gluttony ire | fire air | air water].

LUST

85. *Question:* If we suppose that sin is nothing, then in what way does one sin differ from another?

Solution: [lust lust | E I | N R | creature operation | fire fire | fire air].

86. *Question:* Whether lust and avarice can, through generosity, be more contrary than concordant.

Solution: [lust avarice | first intention second intention | contrariety end].

87. *Question:* Why some vices are more concordant in the soul than others.

Solution: [lust pride | V V | S S | X X | fire earth | fire air | fire water].

88. *Question:* Whether the same matter can be subject to the form of lust and to that of accidie.

Solution: [lust accidie | E I N R | fire fire | air earth].

89. *Question:* Whether lust and envy can exist in the same work.

Solution: [lust envy | E V Z | I V Y | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

90. *Question:* Whether vices have any other object besides that of destroying virtue.

Solution: [lust ire | being privation | beginning end | E A V Y | I A V Y].

AVARICE

91. *Question:* Whether avarice simultaneously contradicts being and privation.

Solution: [avarice avarice | A A | V V | blame eviternity].

92. *Question:* Which more strongly contradicts its contrary, avarice or pride?

Solution: [avarice pride | A A | greatness eternity | beginning end].

93. *Question:* Which sin is more general, avarice or accidie?

Solution: [avarice accidie | goodness generosity | greatness eternity].

94. *Question:* Which more strongly contradicts hope, avarice or envy?

Solution: [avarice envy | justice generosity | hope charity].

95. *Question:* Whether avarice and ire have greater concordance in a rich man than in a poor man.

Solution: [avarice ire | difference contrariety | majority minority].

PRIDE

96. *Question:* Whether charity can contradict pride more than humility can.

Solution: [pride pride | goodness will | greatness eternity | mercy dominion].

97. *Question:* Whether accidie can contradict charity more than pride can humility.

Solution: [pride accidie | A A | S V | X X | Y Z].

98. *Question:* Why can one vice exist without another and one virtue without another?[83]

Solution: [pride envy | power act | habit act | being privation].

99. *Question:* Whether there can be as much merit through patience as through charity.

Solution: [pride ire | charity majority | patience minority | E I].

ACCIDIE

100. *Question:* Whether the subject of accidie is an existing thing.[84]

Solution: [accidie accidie | V V | I A | E Z | being privation | beginning end].

101. *Question:* Whether vice remains in the soul after the death of the sinner.

Solution: [accidie envy | pride ire | difference end].

102. *Question:* Whether accidie can exist without ire.

Solution: [accidie ire | I A | goodness greatness | justice nobility].

ENVY

103. *Question:* Which produces the greater punishment, justice or sin?

Solution: [envy envy | I A | God majority | creature minority].

104. *Question:* Whether the soul can sin in the next world.

Solution: [envy ire | beginning middle | difference end | blame eviternity | E V Z | I V Y].

IRE

105. *Question:* Whether an irate man can have as much patience as a joyful man.

[83] Thus in all sources except A and the errata at the back of M, which have, "and not one virtue without another."

[84] *Sit ens.* A and the corrector of M add *o no ens* (*vel non ens*), in which case one would have to translate the end of the question as "is something or nothing" or "is a being or a nonbeing."

Solution: [ire ire | E A | I V Z | V V | first intention second intention].

Here Begin the Questions concerning Predestination[85]

1. *Question:* Whether predestination accords better with divine wisdom than with divine justice and the other dignities of God.

Solution: [predestination predestination | A A | unity essence | concordance equality | greatness eternity].

2. *Question:* What is God?

Solution: [predestination being | wisdom generosity | concordance equality | greatness eternity | dignities act].

3. *Question:* Whether in God predestination can contradict justice, power, generosity, and will.

Solution: [predestination perfection | reality reason | Y Z | E I | N R | A A].

4. *Question:* Whether to suppose that free will exists is contrary to predestination.

Solution: [predestination merit | A A | wisdom justice | dignities act].

5. *Question:* Whether wisdom and justice have equal influence on what is predestined to salvation and to damnation.[86]

Solution: [predestination supposition | A A | being perfection | A V | fire fire].

6. *Question:* Whether the divine form can be observed in this world.

Solution: [predestination immediately | justice mediately | God operation | greatness eternity | dignities act].

7. *Question:* Whether power, which has to carry out that which wisdom knows, shows greatness of wisdom, and whether wisdom shows greatness of power in that it knows free will to exist.

Solution: [predestination reality | will justice | dignities relation].

8. *Question:* Whether the intellective power can understand as much by understanding free will as it can by understanding predestination.

Solution: [predestination power | first intention second intention | A A].

[85] For a discussion of many of the questions raised in this section, see Dist. II, part ii, comps. 5 and 23 above and the notes there.

[86] *In praedestinatum et praescitum* (Cat. *en lo predestinat e en lo precís*), for which (as in n. 41 above) see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 215.

9. *Question:* Whether predestination and free will really exist.

Solution: [predestination free will | wisdom justice | dignities act | concordance equality].

10. *Question:* Whether divine power is as far from constraint as wisdom is from ignorance.

Solution: [predestination privation | being perfection | A A | air air].

11. *Question:* Whether God is superior in greatness because of His essence or because of being the first cause of the world.

Solution: [predestination imperfection | A A | A T | fire fire | fire air].

12. *Question:* Whether a predestined man sins when he supposes that he can be damned.

Solution: [predestination blame | V Y | V Z | E A | justice merit].

13. *Question:* Whether predestination shows that that by which God seems to be constrained to do what wisdom knows is in reality nothing.

Solution: [predestination demonstration | being reality | reason privation].

14. *Question:* Whether a person who is predestined can be damned.[87]

Solution: [predestination mediately | power perfection | wisdom justice | X X].

15. *Question:* How are reality and reason different in predestination and free will?

Solution: [predestination reason | E A | N A | R A | fire fire | fire water].

16. *Question:* What is the most usual object by which one may have knowledge of God in this world?

Solution: [predestination object | dignities act | A A | A S | A T | A V | X X | Y Z].

BEING

17. *Question:* Whether in God predestination and free will are equal in entity and nature.

Solution: [being being | A A | greatness eternity | dignities relation].

18. *Question:* Whether that entity is divine in which wisdom knows that there is no constraint or limitation of nobility.[88]

[87] "Predestined" in the sense of "predestined to salvation"; see the references in the previous note.

[88] Instead of "wisdom," V and the uncorrected text of M have "it," presumably referring to "entity."

Solution: [being perfection | A A | fire fire | fire water | immediately reality].

19. *Question:* Whether predestination can be contrary to merit.

Solution: [being merit | predestination free will | wisdom justice | fire fire].

20. *Question:* Whether supposition has greater concordance with truth than with falsehood.

Solution: [being supposition | Y Z | end majority | demonstration reason].

21. *Question:* Whether God's power is as great in being able to do that which it will not do, as in being able to do what it will.

Solution: [being immediately | A A | greatness eternity | dignities act].

22. *Question:* Whether in a given species there is a difference between being and essence.

Solution: [being reality | B C D E | fire fire | dignities act].

23. *Question:* How can the intellective power best discover and judge being?

Solution: [being power | A A | A S | A T | A V | A X | A Y | A Z | fire fire | fire air].

24. *Question:* Whether God's being involves both freedom and necessity, from which follows that which wisdom knows.

Solution: [being free will | greatness eternity | act relation | fire fire].

25. *Question:* By what means can a thing be farthest from privation?

Solution: [being privation | A A | act relation | E A | fire fire].

26. *Question:* In what way can being and imperfection be most strongly contrary to one another?

Solution: [being imperfection | perfection privation | A A | fire fire].

27. *Question:* Whether sin lies within or without the powers and acts of the soul.

Solution: [being blame | I A V Y | E V Z | fire air | fire water].

28. *Question:* Whether one can make a greater demonstration of greater and nobler being than of lesser.

Solution: [being demonstration | E A Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

29. *Question:* Whether privation can contradict being as being can privation.

Solution: [being mediately | A A | E A V Y | E V Z | fire air | water earth].

30. *Question:* Whether anything has greater reality through having been given form than through its matter.

Solution: [being reason | A A | dignities relation | creature operation | fire fire].

31. *Question:* Why do women want to be men, and not vice versa?[89]

Solution: [being object | majority minority | privation imperfection | A A | fire fire].

PERFECTION

32. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities have such power and nobility that they can predominate over what appears to the intellective power to be a contradiction.

Solution: [perfection perfection | A A | dignities relation | power object | predestination free will | majority minority | reality reason].

33. *Question:* What is the greatest merit that can exist?

Solution: [perfection merit | E A | I A | fire fire | fire water].[90]

34. *Question:* Whether by the method of supposition divine perfection can be demonstrated.

Solution: [perfection supposition | N A | E A | A A | act relation | fire fire | fire water].

35. *Question:* Whether divine perfection can exist without any intermediary.

Solution: [perfection immediately | A A | greatness eternity | dignities act].

36. *Question:* Why is infinite number contrary to perfection, since perfection and infinity accord with one another?

Solution: [perfection reality | A A | E A | fire fire | fire water].

37. *Question:* Whether power loses its object because of imperfection in itself, in its act, or in the object.

Solution: [perfection power | immediately mediately | merit blame | beginning end].

38. *Question:* Whether predestination contradicts free will, or vice versa.

Solution: [perfection free will | predestination contrariety | A A | E A].

[89] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, the end of ch. 48.

[90] Thus in all medieval sources; for the second and third compartments M has [E I | I A], which is corrected in the errata to [E I | A A].

39. *Question:* Whether there would sooner be privation of imperfection as a result of perfection than conversely.

Solution: [perfection privation | A A | Y Z | fire fire | fire water | fire air | fire earth].

40. *Question:* Whether God has the power to create perfection without imperfection.

Solution: [perfection imperfection | being privation | first intention second intention | fire air | fire earth].

41. *Question:* Whether there is really a difference between sin and injustice.

Solution: [perfection blame | E V Y | I A V Z | M A V Y Z | fire air | fire water | V V].

42. *Question:* Whether God's perfection is completely demonstrable.

Solution: [perfection demonstration | A A | dignities relation | act form | fire fire | E A].

43. *Question:* Whether God's will is to blame for wanting power to do everything that wisdom knows it will do, and for not wanting power to do what it can, when wisdom knows it will not do it.

Solution: [perfection mediately | power wisdom | greatness eternity | form order].

44. *Question:* Whether reason has greater concordance with perfection than with imperfection.

Solution: [perfection reason | reality privation | fire fire | fire air | fire water | Y Z].

45. *Question:* What is the greatest and noblest object that man can have in God?

Solution: [perfection object | A A | dignities act | form order | greatness eternity | God operation].

MERIT

46. *Question:* Whether one should understand grace and freedom in terms of God's goodness, greatness, and eternity, just as one should understand predestination and necessity in terms of wisdom.

Solution: [merit merit | justice simplicity | wisdom perfection | A A].

47. *Question:* Whether there can exist as much merit through demonstration as through supposition.

Solution: [merit supposition | E A | N A | beginning end].

48. *Question:* Whether divine generosity bestows without any intermediary.

Solution: [merit immediately | A A | E A | I V Z | fire fire | fire water].

49. *Question:* Whether merit can be taken away.

Solution: [merit reality | predestination free will | wisdom justice].

50. *Question:* Whether the motive power is itself moved.

Solution: [merit power | A S | S V | X X | fire fire | fire air | beginning end].

51. *Question:* How does free will exist between the power and its act?

Solution: [merit free will | S S | E I N R | fire water | air earth | middle end].

52. *Question:* Whether merit is more lovable than punishment is hateful.

Solution: [merit privation | E A | I A | fire earth | fire air | middle end].

53. *Question:* Whether merit accords better with God's justice than with wisdom.

Solution: [merit imperfection | reality reason | A A | fire fire | fire water].[91]

54. *Question:* Whether merit and blame can oppose one another without any intermediary.

Solution: [merit blame | E I N R | V V | fire fire | fire water].

55. *Question:* Whether the greatness of divine generosity contradicts merit.

Solution: [merit demonstration | God creature | mercy dominion].

56. *Question:* Whether merit is the intermediary between the soul and its powers, or between the powers and their acts.

Solution: [merit middle | E A V Y | I A V Y | fire air | water earth].

57. *Question:* Whether reason, when it is against reality, can have merit.

Solution: [merit reason | N A V Y | beginning end | air water | air earth].

58. *Question:* Whether falsehood would have a subject if it had no object.

Solution: [merit object | immediately mediately | affirmation negation].

[91] Thus in all medieval sources; M, however, replaces the last two compartments with the following three: [fire water | fire air | air water].

SUPPOSITION

59. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities are more demonstratable than supposable.

Solution: [supposition supposition | A A | God majority | creature minority].

60. *Question:* Whether there is some intermediary between faith and knowledge.

Solution: [supposition immediately | V X | fire fire | fire water | N E].

61. *Question:* Why does supposition accord better with the intellective power than with the sensitive?

Solution: [supposition reality | E I N R | faith prudence | air air | air water].

62. *Question:* Whether the intellective power can, without supposition, be directed towards discovering and judging.[92]

Solution: [supposition power | N E I | Y Z | fire fire | fire air].

63. *Question:* Whether free will accords better with supposition than with demonstration.

Solution: [supposition free will | N Y Z | E Y | I Z | air air | air water].

64. *Question:* Why does supposition, which accords with ignorance, more strongly contradict privation than its contrary, which is being?

Solution: [supposition privation | beginning end | first intention second intention | Y Z].

65. *Question:* Whether through supposition there can follow more perfection than imperfection.

Solution: [supposition imperfection | A A | dignities relation | water earth].

66. *Question:* Whether one can demonstrate God's intrinsic work by supposing that God does and does not act necessarily in said intrinsic work.[93]

Solution: [supposition blame | A A | A S | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

67. *Question:* Whether supposition is the beginning of knowledge or of belief.

[92] After "directed" M adds "in knowledge." Note the similarity between this question and question 23 above, and note also that the "discovering" and "judging" of both correspond to Modes 6 and 11 of Distinction III (as does "directing" to Mode 7).

[93] A and the corrector of M have, "in His extrinsic work."

Solution: [supposition demonstration | N Y | E Y | I Z | faith prudence].[94]

68. *Question:* Whether supposition would be necessary if sin did not exist.

Solution: [supposition mediately | merit blame | E I | N R | A A | Y Z].

69. *Question:* Whether that which exists in reason through Z is a creature.

Solution: [supposition reason | beginning middle | end majority].

70. *Question:* Why is a person more frightened of being on top of a very high tower[95] than a low one?

Solution: [supposition object | N E | being privation | majority minority | fire air | fire water].

IMMEDIATELY

71. *Question:* Whether there is an intermediary between forgetting and not knowing.

Solution: [immediately immediately | B C | A A | fire fire].

72. *Question:* Whether eternity and mercy really exist without any intermediary.

Solution: [immediately reality | A A | A T | air water | air earth].

73. *Question:* Whether the sensitive power is active as a result of the form of the five sensual senses and passive as a result of matter.

Solution: [immediately power | S S | being privation | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

74. *Question:* What is the object without intermediary of free will?

Solution: [immediately free will | merit blame | middle end | first intention second intention].

75. *Question:* Why do people have a greater terror of a dead man than of a dead animal?

Solution: [immediately privation | being perfection | fire fire | fire air].[96]

76. *Question:* Whether between perfection and imperfection there can be an intermediary.

[94] In comps. 2–4, M has [V Y | E Y | I E], the first of which is corrected to "N Y" in the errata at the back.

[95] Thus *in sumitate turris altissime* in V B ; A has *prop de gran baus* ("on the edge of a great cliff"); M has *in siccitate terrae altissimae* ("in the dryness of a high land").

[96] For the "perfection" of V M, A B have "imperfection."

Solution: [immediately imperfection | privation being | God creature | A A | fire fire].

77. *Question:* Whether the damned in Hell will see God immediately.

Solution: [immediately blame | I A | E V Z | fire water | fire earth].[97]

78. *Question:* Whether a demonstration is more appropriate because of form or matter.

Solution: [immediately demonstration | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

79. *Question:* Whether divine goodness was bonifying in the just man before he was born, since divine wisdom already knew him and divine will loved him.

Solution: [immediately mediately | dignities relation | A A | simplicity nobility].

80. *Question:* Whether there is any intermediary between salvation and damnation.

Solution: [immediately reason | reality free will | V V | E I | N R].

81. *Question:* Which of the five senses of the sensitive power accords best with its object?

Solution: [immediately object | beginning middle | end majority | fire fire | fire air].

REALITY

82. *Question:* Whether God can do anything which, although not a contradiction, might seem to the intellective power to contain a contradiction.

Solution: [reality reality | reason minority | A A | act relation | fire fire | fire water].

83. *Question:* Whether the five senses have as much reality through the sensitive power as through the intellective.

Solution: [reality power | immediately mediately | majority minority | water water | water earth].

84. *Question:* Whether free will was created with the intention of salvation, and not of damnation.

Solution: [reality free will | A T | E A V Y | I V Z | air air | air water].

85. *Question:* Whether reality and privation can accord with one another.

[97] Thus in V and the uncorrected text of M; for the last compartment, A B and the errata of M have "air earth."

Solution: [reality privation | free will reason | Y Z | fire water].

86. *Question:* Whether imperfection has any substantial reality.

Solution: [reality imperfection | beginning middle | end perfection | fire fire | fire water].

87. *Question:* Whether blame exists in reason or in reality.

Solution: [reality blame | E V Z | I A V Y | reason object | being privation].

88. *Question:* Whether greater reality can result in a greater demonstration.

Solution: [reality demonstration | A A | dignities act | relation order].

89. *Question:* Whether the reality of a stone exists more nobly in the intellective power than in the stone itself.

Solution: [reality mediately | beginning end | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

90. *Question:* Whether that which God does really exists in the intellective power, and whether that which God can do but does not do exists only in the reason.

Solution: [reality reason | A A | being privation | perfection imperfection | beginning end].

91. *Question:* Whether there is less reality in the universal than in the particular.

Solution: [reality object | immediately mediately | beginning end | being privation | form matter | fire fire | fire water | air earth | E A V Y].

POWER

92. *Question:* Whether the second act of power is attracted by the form coming forth through matter.

Solution: [power power | A A | S S | fire fire | fire earth | fire air].

93. *Question:* Why is it only in terms of an object that a power can bring on carnal desire?

Solution: [power free will | E A V Y | I A V Z | merit blame | A A].

94. *Question:* Whether a power impels its acts toward an object by means of accidents, or whether the power itself is impelled by them.

Solution: [power privation | merit blame | fire fire | fire water | form matter].

95. *Question:* Whether accidents impel a power toward an object or vice versa.

Solution: [power imperfection | perfection free will | E A V Y | air air | air water].

96. *Question:* Which among B C D first apprehends an object?

Solution: [power blame | merit blame | difference beginning | middle end].

97. *Question:* Which object accords better with power, truth or falsehood?

Solution: [power demonstration | E A V Y | I V Z | Y Z | A A | fire fire | fire water].

98. *Question:* Whether the intellective power can ascend to intellectual objects without the imagination, since without the imagination, it cannot descend to sensible objects.

Solution: [power mediately | E A Y | I A Y | majority minority | fire fire].

99. *Question:* Whether an object can be brought as near to a power through reason as through reality.

Solution: [power reason | E I N R | immediately mediately | majority minority | fire earth | fire air | fire water | fire fire | A A].[98]

100. *Question:* Why, when it understands itself, is the intellective power more suited to understanding divine wisdom than glory and the other dignities of God?

Solution: [power object | A A | X X | fire fire | fire air].

FREE WILL

101. *Question:* Whether free will is an active or a passive power.

Solution: [free will free will | B C D | immediately mediately | F G H | fire fire].

102. *Question:* Whether free will exists equally through the act of being as through that of doing.

Solution: [free will privation | reality reason | C L | form order].

103. *Question:* Whether God can constrain free will.

Solution: [free will imperfection | goodness greatness | wisdom will | justice generosity | immediately mediately].

104. *Question:* Whether in man free will and reason are powers equal in virtue.

Solution: [free will blame | E A V Y | I V Z |wisdom justice | goodness generosity].

[98] Thus in all medieval sources; M, even in the errata, has a different order for the elemental compartments.

105. *Question:* Whether man's heart and brain, through influence of the root,[99] constitute specific places where free will exists.

Solution: [free will demonstration | power object | B C D | habit act].

106. *Question:* Why is free will closer to will than to memory and intellect?

Solution: [free will mediately | D H | V V | Y Z | immediately object].

107. *Question:* Whether the acts of memory, intellect, and will can take place without free will.

Solution: [free will reason | immediately mediately | E I N R | fire fire | fire earth].

108. *Question:* Whether free will remains in the soul after death.

Solution: [free will object | E A V Y | charity justice | I V Z].

PRIVATION

109. *Question:* Whether privation is a creature, and whether nothingness has a beginning.

Solution: [privation privation | immediately mediately | beginning end | fire fire | fire air | E A | I V Z | greatness eternity | God creature].

110. *Question:* Whether privation can contradict being without imperfection.

Solution: [privation imperfection | being mediately | perfection mediately].[100]

111. *Question:* Whether God can deprive as much as He can create, and whether He can make nothingness exist, without any being.

Solution: [privation blame | E A V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention | fire fire | beginning end].

112. *Question:* Whether truth can contradict falsehood as much as falsehood truth.

Solution: [privation demonstration | being perfection | E A V Y | I A V Y | Y Z | N A V Y Z].

[99] Thus in V B; A has "through (their) root and influence"; M has "through the influence of reason." Jordi Gayà suggested to me that the mysterious "root" might have to do with medieval physiological theories. He located the following passage from Averroes' *Colliget* (Bk. II, ch. 20): "Even though the compartments of the mind constitute the organs in which the operations of these [i.e., the imaginative, cogitative, etc.] faculties are carried out, nevertheless the *roots* of said faculties are found in the heart." To which he adds, several sentences later: "In [Aristotle's] *De anima* it is stated that the dwelling place and *root* of the common sense is in the heart." Dr. Gayà adds that the likely source of the idea for Llull (as well as Averroes) would be Avicenna.

[100] Thus in V M; B has "immediately" for both appearances of "mediately"; A has "immediately" for the first, "mediately" for the second.

113. *Question:* Whether every being would exist more in privation than in itself if God did not exist.

Solution: [privation mediately | beginning middle | second intention being | majority negation].

114. *Question:* Whether privation and being contradict one another through some intermediary, and whether nothingness has existed eternally.

Solution: [privation reason | being reality | perfection imperfection | fire fire | fire water].

115. *Question:* Whether any object can deprive the second act of the intellective power.

Solution: [privation object | A A | S S | V V | X X | fire fire | fire water].

IMPERFECTION

116. *Question:* Whether there can be any intermediary between perfection and imperfection.

Solution: [imperfection imperfection | beginning middle | end perfection | fire water].

117. *Question:* Whether imperfection would exist if sin did not exist.

Solution: [imperfection blame | goodness greatness | justice generosity | A A].

118. *Question:* Whether imperfection is perfection, since one is demonstrated by means of the other.

Solution: [imperfection demonstration | first intention second intention | middle end].

119. *Question:* Why does the volitional power desire cold, which is not of its nature?

Solution: [imperfection mediately | justice prudence | fire air | fire earth].

120. *Question:* Why does the sick man, who is cold, desire cold?[101]

Solution: [imperfection reason | being privation | D H | fire earth | air water].

[101] See *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 60, pars. 3–4 and the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. X, par. 1, where the same problem is discussed. See also *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 87 (which deals with precisely the same topic of perfection and imperfection as here), toward the end of which similar problems are also discussed.

121. *Question:* Whether fire is more rapidly impelled toward its object through destruction than through generation.

Solution: [imperfection object | being privation | E I | fire fire | fire water].

BLAME

122. *Question:* Whether it is more blameful to know God and dislike Him, than not to know God and dislike Him.

Solution: [blame blame | I A V Y | N A V Y | E A V Y | first intention second intention].

123. *Question:* Whether it is a sin to exhibit blame.[102]

Solution: [blame demonstration | E A Y | I V Z | beginning end].

124. *Question:* What is the intermediary between the end for which man exists and the blame there is in him?

Solution: [blame mediately | E I N R | fire air | water earth].

125. *Question:* Whether reason can be as effective against blame as demonstration.

Solution: [blame reason | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | fire air | fire water].

126. *Question:* Whether blame is increased in the sensitive and vegetative powers when it is increased in the volitional power.

Solution: [blame object | A S | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

DEMONSTRATION

127. *Question:* Which of the three kinds of demonstration[103] is the most powerful?

Solution: [demonstration demonstration | goodness greatness | concordance equality | majority minority | being privation | reality reason | act relation].

128. *Question:* Why can one not make such a clear demonstration about God as about creature?

Solution: [demonstration mediately | faith prudence | E A V Y | N A V Y | fire fire | form order | end majority].

129. *Question:* Whether demonstration can be as great in the intellect as reason in faith.

Solution: [demonstration reason | E A V Y | N A V Y | being privation].

[102] For the "exhibit" of the medieval sources, M has "hide."
[103] Cf. the Prologue, pars. 2–3 above.

130. *Question:* Whether the object of a demonstration has greater concordance with truth than with falsehood.

Solution: [demonstration object | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire water].

MEDIATELY

131. *Question:* Whether the accidents of substance can be of the entity of any intermediary existing between being and privation.

Solution: [mediately mediately | beginning end |E A | fire fire | Y Z].

132. *Question:* Whether the virtue of the intellective power exists throughout the space existing between itself and the understood object.

Solution: [mediately reason | difference end | E A V Y | fire fire | fire water].

133. *Question:* Why can the volitional power infuse its virtue in charity through one object more than through another?

Solution: [mediately object | reality free will | air air | air water].

REASON

134. *Question:* Whether reason is a power, or whether it is a collective act of the powers.

Solution: [reason reason | being reality | power object | mercy dominion].

135. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities differentiate reality and reason, or vice versa.

Solution: [reason object | God majority | creature minority | dignities relation].

OBJECT

136. *Question:* Whether universal objects are as necessary as particular ones.

Solution: [object object | first intention second intention | beginning end | fire fire].

Here Begin the Questions concerning the Principles of Theology

AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNING ESSENCE[104]

1. *Question:* Whether God's essence is essentially without any difference from Himself.

[104] For definitions of the various terms used in this chapter, the reader should refer back to Dist. 1, The Figure of the Principles of Theology, par. 2 above.

Solution: [essence essence | A A | greatness eternity | dignities act | power will | fire fire | E A | being privation].

2. *Question:* Whether there must be essentiation in essence, as there is living in life.

Solution: [essence life | unity essence | dignities relation | simplicity nobility | greatness eternity].

3. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities are in the essence,[105] and vice versa, with no difference between dignities and essence.

Solution: [essence dignities | greatness eternity | power justice | wisdom will | relation order].

4. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities work from the essence.

Solution: [essence act | A A | immediately reality | being perfection | greatness eternity | justice generosity | simplicity nobility | fire fire | E A].

5. *Question:* Whether in the essence there is an exemplary form for the acts of the dignities.

Solution: [essence form | A A | greatness simplicity | S S | V V | X X | fire fire].

6. *Question:* Whether in the essence there can exist concordance and equality without difference.[106]

Solution: [essence relation | greatness power | eternity perfection | justice generosity | fire fire].

7. *Question:* Whether in the essence there is essential order without any accident.

Solution: [essence order | A A | justice generosity | glory privation | being privation].[107]

8. *Question:* Whether there is passion in the essence as a result of the action of the dignities.

Solution: [essence action | goodness greatness | eternity nobility | greatness power | being perfection | fire fire | fire air].

9. *Question:* Whether such wonderful things should be believed about God, as are attributable to His essence.

Solution: [essence articles | N A | E A | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

10. *Question:* Whether man is more obliged to know God's dignities than His essence.

[105] Since this chapter concerns the principles of theology, it should be clear that "the essence" refers to the divine essence; see the reference in the previous note.

[106] Thus in the medieval sources, and not "*of* equality" as in the errata of M.

[107] In place of the first "privation," A and the errata at the back of M have "perfection."

Solution: [essence commandments | goodness greatness | will justice | fire fire | fire water].

11. *Question:* Whether interpretation is necessary between essence and essentiation.

Solution: [essence interpretation | dignities act | form relation | fire fire].

12. *Question:* Whether in God essence and being are identical.

Solution: [essence first intention | A A | greatness eternity | fire fire | being privation].

13. *Question:* Whether God and godliness are the same thing.

Solution: [essence second intention | concordance equality | power justice | E A].

14. *Question:* Whether essentiation is inappropriate in essence, if glorifying *is* appropriate in glory.

Solution: [essence glory | greatness nobility | act form | will justice].

15. *Question:* Whether those condemned to infernal punishment have knowledge of the divine essence.

Solution: [essence punishment | I A V Y | E V Z | fire water | blame eviternity].

16. *Question:* Whether eviternity is more appropriate to being the act of eternity than essence.

Solution: [essence eviternity | act relation | justice nobility | concordance equality].

LIFE[108]

17. *Question:* Whether living is inappropriate to God's life.

Solution: [life life | greatness eternity | essence will | dignities act | form order | fire fire].

18. *Question:* Whether the act of the Divine Dignities is to live in life.

Solution: [life dignities | greatness nobility | will justice | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

19. *Question:* Whether living is more appropriate to life than to wisdom and will.

Solution: [life act | essence dignities | simplicity nobility | E A].

20. *Question:* Whether there is form in God's life, and conversely.

[108] For "life" as applied to God, see the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 16, and the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 529 = Int. viii, 27, where Llull says that "the uncreated life produces its likeness in the created life."

Solution: [life form | greatness eternity | act relation | dignities order | fire fire].

21. *Question:* Whether God's life lives by means of some addition or necessity.

Solution: [life relation | dignities act | fire earth | fire air | fire water | God majority].

22. *Question:* Whether living in God can be the order[109] of life without distinction.

Solution: [life order | dignities act | form relation | fire fire].

23. *Question:* Whether God's living is without action and passion.[110]

Solution: [life action | greatness eternity | goodness perfection | justice generosity | power will | wisdom virtue].

24. *Question:* Whether God's life is an example for man as to how he should live.

Solution: [life articles | E A V Y | I V Z | N A V Y | fire fire | fire air].

25. *Question:* Whether the active life is by command and the contemplative life by counsel.

Solution: [life commandments | first intention second intention | merit blame | form matter].

26. *Question:* Whether living, understanding, etc. have to be differentiated in God.

Solution: [life interpretation | essence dignities | act relation | form order].

27. *Question:* Whether in God there is living on account of life, or vice versa.

Solution: [life first intention | A A | A X | greatness eternity | perfection immediately | being mediately].

28. *Question:* Why does man prefer to live than to die?

Solution: [life second intention | E A V Y | I V Z | immediately mediately | appetite alteration | difference end].

29. *Question:* Whether God's life is the glory of the life of the blessed.

Solution: [life glory | A S | E A | justice mercy | generosity dominion].

[109] For this peculiar use of "order"—which might here be better translated as "pattern" if there were not the need to recognize it as one of the principles of theology, and one that appears in the very answer to this question—see Dist. I, the Figure of the Principles of Theology above, Questions of Theology 82–91 below, as well as *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 82 and n. 138 there.

[110] A, followed by the corrector in M, has, "is action without passion."

30. *Question:* Whether not knowing, hating, doing evil, lessening, etc.[111] constitute punishment in God's life.

Solution: [life punishment | wisdom will | goodness greatness | dignities relation].

31. *Question:* Whether devils want to die.

Solution: [life eviternity | eternity privation | being perfection | fire fire | fire water].

DIGNITIES

32. *Question:* Whether any of the Divine Dignities can exist in themselves without relation.[112]

Solution: [dignities dignities | act form | relation order | being perfection | E A].

33. *Question:* Whether there is an extrinsic act for every one of the dignities.

Solution: [dignities act | A A | A T | goodness greatness | eternity justice | God majority].

34. *Question:* Whether any of God's dignities can exist without act.

Solution: [dignities form | act order | greatness nobility | fire water].

35. *Question:* Whether dignities and relation really exist in God, or whether it is a matter of reason.

Solution: [dignities relation | act form | greatness eternity | power wisdom | will justice | goodness generosity].

36. *Question:* Whether without relation the Divine Dignities could constitute a single essence.

Solution: [dignities order | justice simplicity | generosity nobility | act form].

37. *Question:* Whether in God there are more dignities than there are semblances of same in the just soul.

Solution: [dignities action | greatness eternity | justice nobility | God majority | creature minority].[113]

[111] *Ignorare, odire* (Cat. *desamar*), *malificare, minorificare* are the contraries of the acts of the dignities Wisdom, Love, Goodness, and Greatness; the "etc." therefore refers to similar opposites of the acts of the remaining dignities.

[112] For "relation," see the definition in Dist. 1, the Figure of the Principles of Theology, above.

[113] The first compartment is thus in A B ; V M have "act," which is a confusion with the principle of theology discussed in Question 33 above.

38. *Question:* Whether wonderful and lovable things should be believed and understood concerning the Divine Dignities.

Solution: [dignities articles | A A | greatness eternity | power justice | act relation].

39. *Question:* Whether God's doing good and bestowing grace and mercy constitute a precept or a counsel.

Solution: [dignities commandments | first intention second intention | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | merit blame].

40. *Question:* Whether the Divine Dignities can exist in a specific virtue without relation.

Solution: [dignities interpretation | R A V Y Z | I A | being imperfection | perfection privation].

41. *Question:* Whether essence is increased through the virtue[114] and acts of the dignities.

Solution: [dignities first intention | greatness eternity | form relation].

42. *Question:* Whether any of the Divine Dignities should be loved in accordance with second intention.

Solution: [dignities second intention | A A | goodness greatness | eternity simplicity].

43. *Question:* Whether the blessed will have equal glory in each of the Divine Dignities.

Solution: [dignities glory | form order | act relation | justice generosity | mercy dominion | simplicity nobility].

44. *Question:* Whether the damned will suffer punishment without relation of dignities.[115]

Solution: [dignities punishment | greatness power | wisdom justice | dignities act | form order | E V Z | I A V Y | fire fire | fire air].

45. *Question:* Whether something not having an end can be a creature.

Solution: [dignities eviternity | greatness eternity | act relation | beginning middle].

ACTS

46. *Question:* Whether there is any distinction among the acts of the divine dignities.

[114] For the "virtue" of V and the uncorrected text of M, A B have "unity," and the errata of M have "dignities."

[115] Thus in all medieval sources consulted; M has a different and more complicated question.

Solution: [act act | A A | essence dignities | E A | form relation].

47. *Question:* Whether in God form and act can be concordant and equal.

Solution: [act form | dignities relation | goodness greatness | eternity nobility | fire fire].

48. *Question:* Whether divine unity has any intrinsic act.

Solution: [act relation | essence dignities | form order | justice nobility].

49. *Question:* Whether God in glory manifests Himself to everything that exists and that does not exist.

Solution: [act order | truth glory | E A | I A Y Z | fire fire].[116]

50. *Question:* Whether in God act and action constitute the same relation.

Solution: [act action | A A | greatness eternity | power will | justice nobility].

51. *Question:* Whether the intellectual power is exalted in virtue if it understands the intrinsic act to exist in God throughout all the dignities.

Solution: [act articles | N A | faith charity | hope justice | E A | dignities relation | greatness virtue].

52. *Question:* Whether man has more obligation toward one dignity than toward another.

Solution: [act commandments | justice nobility | goodness greatness | wisdom will | E A].

53. *Question:* Whether every interpretation should be guided by how the acts of the dignities provide examples for the intellectual and volitional powers.

Solution: [act interpretation | God beginning | God middle | God end | A A | A T].

54. *Question:* Whether everything that is act in God exists through equality and concordance.

Solution: [act first intention | greatness eternity | dignities relation | A A | E I].

55. *Question:* Whether any act can exist without second intention.

Solution: [act second intention | A A | A T | fire fire | fire air | fire earth].

[116] V expands the second compartment to [truth justice | glory], which M completes by putting [truth justice | glory difference]. The fourth compartment is divided into two compartments of two terms each in A, and M precedes it by yet another "I A."

56. *Question:* Whether the blessed angels have greater glory in God's intrinsic or extrinsic act.

Solution: [act glory | goodness greatness | justice generosity | dignities relation].

57. *Question:* Whether the acts of the dignities bring punishment to devils immediately or mediately.

Solution: [act punishment | A V | A X | greatness glory | charity ire | being privation | I A | fire water].

58. *Question:* Whether God's power could diminish eviternity.

Solution: [act eviternity | power justice | merit blame | beginning end].

FORM

59. *Question:* Whether the fact that everything existing in God is form is a question of reality or of reason.

Solution: [form form | being privation | act relation | being perfection | E A].

60. *Question:* Whether in God goodness informs His bonifying and greatness His magnifying, etc.

Solution: [form relation | A A | S S | X X | fire fire | fire air | E A].

61. *Question:* Whether any form can exist without order.

Solution: [form order | form action | form relation | B C D E | fire fire | fire air].

62. *Question:* Whether an acting form exists intrinsically in God.

Solution: [form action | A A | greatness eternity | generosity nobility | dignities act | E A | fire fire].

63. *Question:* Whether divine form constitutes an example for the articles more through belief than through knowledge.

Solution: [form articles | K B | L C | M D | being privation | merit blame | glory punishment].

64. *Question:* Whether the commandments are better ordered through belief than through knowledge.

Solution: [form commandments | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z | being privation |merit blame].[117]

65. *Question:* Whether the divine form is an example for all interpretation.

Solution: [form interpretation | virtue truth | glory perfection | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire air].

[117] M has a different question and solution here.

66. *Question:* Whether in God there exists intention.

Solution: [form first intention | dignities act | relation order | E A].

67. *Question:* Why does form accord with first intention and matter with second?

Solution: [form second intention | form A | form action | form majority | form being | form act | fire fire].

68. *Question:* Whether God really loves and hates.

Solution: [form glory | reality reason | D H | act relation | greatness nobility].

69. *Question:* Whether in God form is an example for punishment.

Solution: [form punishment | dignities relation | I A | E V Z | fire fire | E A].

70. *Question:* How does eternity constitute an example for eviternity?

Solution: [form eviternity | goodness glory | justice dominion | merit blame].

RELATION

71. *Question:* Whether relation can really exist in God's immensity and eternity.

Solution: [relation relation | greatness power | greatness eternity | greatness justice | greatness perfection | fire fire].

72. *Question:* Whether relation and order are concordant and equal in the acts of the Divine Dignities.

Solution: [relation order | greatness eternity | justice nobility | will generosity | E A].

73. *Question:* Whether in God the relation between understanding and understood, as well as between wanting and wanted, exists in such greatness of essence as the understanding and the understood in the wanting and the wanted.[118]

Solution: [relation action | relation reality | relation greatness | relation eternity | concordance equality].

74. *Question:* Whether the relation of the acts of the dignities is believable and lovable.

[118] Thus in all sources consulted except V and the uncorrected text of M, which have, "in not wanting and not wanted." Throughout this section the reader should keep in mind the definition referring "relation" to the acts of the dignities (see n. 112 above).

Solution: [relation articles | justice commandments | E A V Y | I V Z | N A].

75. *Question:* Whether a person is obliged to make known those things that God's dignities signify in and of themselves.

Solution: [relation commandments | justice dominion | greatness nobility | merit blame].

76. *Question:* Which interpretation is more necessary, that which is appropriate in accordance with the relation of the divine dignities, or that which is appropriate in accordance with God's extrinsic work?

Solution: [relation interpretation | greatness truth | eternity nobility | God majority | fire fire | fire air].

77. *Question:* Whether relation and first intention can accord without second intention.

Solution: [relation first intention | greatness eternity | power perfection | generosity nobility | glory simplicity].

78. *Question:* Whether relation can exist in God without intention.

Solution: [relation second intention | form order | dignities act | fire fire].

79. *Question:* Whether in God it would be inappropriate to have relation of glory, glorifying, and glorified.

Solution: [relation glory | relation perfection | relation reality | E A | fire fire | dignities act].

80. *Question:* Whether God would suffer punishment if he could not infinitize.

Solution: [relation punishment | greatness eternity | power perfection | justice generosity | goodness simplicity].

81. *Question:* Whether eviternity, which is without end, can be without a beginning.

Solution: [relation eviternity | greatness power | will generosity | dignities act | justice nobility].

ORDER

82. *Question:* Whether any order can exist[119] without before and after.

[119] Thus *utrum aliquis ordo possit esse* in all sources (including B, *pace ORL* XVI, 243, n. 1) with the sole exception of M, which has *utrum in Deo ordo possit esse*, "whether order can exist in God."

Solution: [order order | A A | eternity wisdom | will justice | dignities relation].

83. *Question:* Whether order without passivity can exist in God.

Solution: [order action | greatness eternity | power perfection | justice generosity].

84. *Question:* Whether in God there must exist every perfection that exists in creatures, supposing that this would involve no disorder in God.

Solution: [order articles | being perfection | privation imperfection | greatness nobility | power justice].

85. *Question:* Whether usury is licit.

Solution: [order commandments | hope charity | accidie envy | fire fire | fire air].

86. *Question:* Whether interpretation has more greatness in supernatural order than in an order existing according to the course of nature.

Solution: [order interpretation | A A | dignities relation | act form | God majority | creature minority].

87. *Question:* To what end are all things ordered?

Solution: [order first intention | A A | God operation | E A | dignities relation].[120]

88. *Question:* Whether in eviternity there exists first and second intention.

Solution: [order second intention | E A | charity justice | E V | I A | accidie ire | glory punishment | majority minority].

89. *Question:* Whether the order that exists in God is the glory of angels.

Solution: [order glory | justice generosity | greatness nobility | being perfection].

90. *Question:* Whether there is order in infernal punishment.[121]

Solution: [order punishment | dignities act | form action | punishment eviternity | I A | fire water].

91. *Question:* Whether order can exist in eviternity without end.

Solution: [order eviternity | beginning end | middle end | glory punishment | fire fire].

[120] The compartment of "E A" is missing in V and the uncorrected text of M.
[121] A has "eternal" for "infernal."

ACTION

92. *Question:* Whether God has action in nothingness.

Solution: [action action | greatness power | will eternity | justice generosity].

93. *Question:* What is passive when man is active believing in and loving God?

Solution: [action articles | A A | dignities act | greatness eternity | fire fire | power object].

94. *Question:* Whether the action that exists in God is eternal.

Solution: [action commandments | A A | greatness eternity | act relation | God creature].

95. *Question:* Whether interpretation accords better with knowledge than with belief.

Solution: [action interpretation | E majority | N minority | being privation].[122]

96. *Question:* How are first intention active and second intention passive?

Solution: [action first intention | E A | I V Z | fire earth | fire fire | fire air].

97. *Question:* Whether second intention has action in the first.

Solution: [action second intention | fire water | immediately mediately | affirmation negation].

98. *Question:* Whether in glory one element will have action in another.

Solution: [action glory | glory justice | essence form | dignities act | concordance equality].

99. *Question:* Whether the devils in Hell have action one in another.

Solution: [action punishment | immediately mediately | fire water | majority minority].

100. *Question:* Whether merit and blame can be equal in greatness to eviternity.

Solution: [action eviternity | E A | I A | greatness eternity | goodness justice | beginning end | immediately mediately].

ARTICLES

101. *Question:* Whether without the Articles of Faith a person can be on the path to salvation.

[122] The third compartment is thus only in A; B M have "V minority"; V *seems* to agree with the latter two MSS, but its *n*s and *v*s are so similar as to make any judgment difficult.

Solution: [articles articles | E A V Y | I V Z | N A V Y Z | action commandments].

102. *Question:* Whether it is forbidden for the soul to conceive wondrous things concerning God's intrinsic work.

Solution: [articles commandments | E A | I V Z | merit blame | greatness minority | beginning end].

103. *Question:* Whether the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures is more in accord with the Articles than with Commandments.

Solution: [articles interpretation | first intention second intention | majority minority].

104. *Question:* Whether God has first intention towards any creature.

Solution: [articles first intention | A S | A T | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

105. *Question:* Whether the Articles are more in accord with the intellectual than with the volitional power.

Solution: [articles second intention | E A | E commandments | I commandments | N A | N commandments | concordance majority | being privation].

106. *Question:* Whether the Resurrection exists.[123]

Solution: [articles glory | A T | justice generosity | fire fire | air air | E A].

107. *Question:* Whether the articles are demonstrable.

Solution: [articles punishment | E A | I A | merit blame | justice generosity | greatness nobility | fire fire].

108. *Question:* Whether eternity is more demonstrable by means of eternalization, than eviternity by means of justice.

Solution: [articles eviternity | greatness eternity | justice nobility | beginning middle].

COMMANDMENTS

109. *Question:* Which of the three powers of the soul has most obligation to obey God's commands?

Solution: [commandments commandments | B C D | E A V Y Z | I V Z | fire fire | fire air | immediately mediately | concordance equality].

[123] The same question is answered with different compartments and with a long following explanation in *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 400 = Int. vi, 110.

110. *Question:* Whether the commandments should be interpreted more in accordance with intellectual than with sensual things.

Solution: [commandments interpretation | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air | water earth | first intention second intention].

111. *Question:* Whether those who are on the path of truth have been commanded to recover those who are on the path of error.

Solution: [commandments first intention | A V | justice nobility | faith charity | beginning end].

112. *Question:* Whether man has been commanded to honor God when he sees Him scorned.

Solution: [commandments second intention | E A V Y | I V Z | fire water].

113. *Question:* Whether it is prohibited for man to believe that in God there exists boundless swiftness in loving, understanding, bonifying, glorifying, etc.

Solution: [commandments glory | A A | greatness eternity | justice generosity | E A | fire fire].

114. *Question:* Whether the commandments deal more specifically with charity than fear.

Solution: [commandments punishment | E A V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention | fire air].

115. *Question:* Whether God has made any commandment that cannot be carried out by mankind.

Solution: [commandments eviternity | first intention second intention | fire fire | fire air | fire water | merit blame].

INTERPRETATION

116. *Question:* Whether in this Art one can solve questions as well by letters as by figures.

Solution: [interpretation interpretation | B C D | K L M | O P Q | immediately mediately | Y Z].

117. *Question:* Whether a spiritual interpretation is as specific as a literal one.

Solution: [interpretation first intention | A A | S V | fire air | Y Z | charity gluttony].

118. *Question:* Whether an interpretation has greater concordance with greatness and nobility if based on miracles rather than on the ordinary course of nature.

Solution: [interpretation second intention | A A | S S | fire fire | majority minority].

119. *Question:* Why is the glory of the next world not visible in this world?

Solution: [interpretation glory | perfection free will | merit blame | E I N | V V].

120. *Question:* How can this Art be used to interpret Scripture?[124]

Solution: [interpretation punishment | A A | S S | T T | V V | X X | Y Z | fire fire | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z].

121. *Question:* Whether the authority of the Holy Scriptures can be contrary to reason.

Solution: [interpretation eviternity | A A | N A | E A | Y Z | end end].

FIRST INTENTION

122. *Question:* Whether there can be concordance between two first intentions without any second intention.

Solution: [first intention first intention | concordance middle | beginning end | fire air | E I].

123. *Question:* Whether first intention can exist without second intention.

Solution: [first intention second intention | A A | creature operation | being privation | E A | I V Z | fire air].

124. *Question:* Whether first and second intention exist in glory.

Solution: [first intention glory | E A | I V Z | fire water].

125. *Question:* Whether any punishment can exist only through first intention.

Solution: [first intention punishment | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire water].

126. *Question:* Whether eternity creates eviternity through second or through first intention.

Solution: [first intention eviternity | God majority | creature minority | justice nobility].

SECOND INTENTION

127. *Question:* Whether greatness of second intention brings about any increase of first intention.

[124] This is the subject of Dist. III, Mode 9 above. Notice that the three compartments used there constitute the last three of the solution here.

Solution: [second intention second intention | concordance middle | beginning end | air water | E I].

128. *Question:* Whether in glory the soul has greater knowledge of itself through knowing itself than through knowing God, since it is more dissimilar than similar to God.

Solution: [second intention glory | A A | immediately mediately | being privation | dignities act | form relation].

129. *Question:* Whether glory or punishment constitutes the second intention for which man was created.

Solution: [second intention punishment | glory justice | will nobility | middle end | air water].

130. *Question:* Whether in this world second intention has as much concordance with greatness as with eviternity.[125]

Solution: [second intention eviternity | I V Z | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | E A | charity justice].

GLORY

131. *Question:* Whether in Paradise there is any real distinction of glory between the memorative, intellective, and volitional powers.

Solution: [glory glory | E A | difference concordance | essence form | justice greatness | being reality | perfection merit | dignities relation | form order].

132. *Question:* Whether all the five senses must exist in glory.

Solution: [glory punishment | V V | being privation | fire fire | fire air | end eviternity | form order | act relation].

133. *Question:* Whether in eviternity there is a distinction between reality and reason.

Solution: [glory eviternity | A T | fire fire | fire air | being perfection | merit blame].

PUNISHMENT

134. *Question:* Whether the damned are punished more by not seeing God than by understanding and hating eviternity.

Solution: [punishment punishment | A A | greatness eternity | beginning end | E A].

135. *Question:* Whether in eviternity the intellectual power will be punished in the memorative and volitional powers, and vice versa.

[125] Thus in V B and the uncorrected text of M; A and the errata of M have "in eviternity."

Solution: [punishment eviternity | first intention second intention | difference contrariety | beginning end | greatness justice].

EVITERNITY

136. *Question:* Whether time and quantity exist in eviternity.

Solution: [eviternity eviternity | dignities relation | form order | being privation | fire air].

Here Begin the Questions concerning the Principles of Philosophy[126]

AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNING FIRST CAUSE

1. *Question:* Whether eternity and infinity are more properly attributed to God than first cause.

Solution: [first cause first cause | dignities relation | essence form | A A | fire fire | fire air].

2. *Question:* Whether first cause impels everything without any intermediary.

Solution: [first cause motion | A A | greatness eternity | being free will | nature appetite | immediately mediately].

3. *Question:* Whether angels exist.

Solution: [first cause intelligence | justice generosity | being privation | concordance majority | fire fire | fire air | E A V Y | I V Z].[127]

4. *Question:* Whether one place is more suitable to God than another.

Solution: [first cause firmament | A A | glory punishment | immediately mediately | merit blame].[128]

[126] The subject matter discussed under this heading is best explained by realizing that "philosophy," as used here, corresponds roughly to Aristotle's *Physics* (and "theology" to his *Metaphysics*). Since nowhere in the *Ars demonstrativa* does Llull discuss or define these principles of philosophy, the reader seeking clarification will have to turn to the aphoristic treatment in the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam, MOG* III, 530–1 = Int. viii, 28–9. The excellent explanations in the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 242–4 = Int. iv, 46–8, unfortunately only deal with five of the sixteen principles. The discussions in the *Book of the Principles of Philosophy, MOG* I, 668–98 = Int. x, 2–32, and in the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 335–7 = Int. vi, 45–7, although complete, are not always of much help to the reader seeking information as to meaning.

[127] For "intelligence" (in the first compartment) as a synonym for "angel," see Dist. II, n. 17 above.

[128] For "firmament" (in the first compartment) as a translation of *orbis*, see n. 137 below.

5. *Question:* Whether God is the model for all forms.

Solution: [first cause form | fire fire | fire air | fire water | fire earth | E A V Y | I V Z | intelligence firmament].[129]

6. *Question:* Whether, in view of the fact that motion accords with perfection, the first cause is mobile.

Solution: [first cause matter | difference contrariety | greatness eternity].[130]

7. *Question:* Whether first cause can predominate more by its effect than the effect by itself.

Solution: [first cause nature | dignities relation | being privation | greatness eternity].

8. *Question:* Whether the first cause could so arrange things in its effect that no composition were produced from an aggregate of simples.

Solution: [first cause elements | A A | greatness power | justice generosity | eternity nobility | act relation | difference majority].[131]

9. *Question:* Whether the first cause communicates its essence to all creatures.

Solution: [first cause appetite | first intention second intention | difference end | being privation].

10. *Question:* Whether the world existed potentially in God before it was created.

Solution: [first cause power | A A | dignities relation | eternity power | act form | greatness perfection].

11. *Question:* Whether the first cause can exist outside its effect.

Solution: [first cause habit | A A | greatness eternity | act relation | dignities form | goodness perfection | beginning end | power will | free will privation].

12. *Question:* Whether the first cause is pure act.

Solution: [first cause act | dignities relation | form order | fire fire | fire air | beginning end | E A | A A].

13. *Question:* Whether the essence of the first cause is mixed with that of its effect, since it is everywhere.

[129] Here and in all subsequent appearances of the word "form" within the compartments, M alone of the sources consulted has "universal form."

[130] Similarly, here and in all subsequent appearances of the term "matter" within the compartments, M alone has "prime matter."

[131] Once again, here and in all subsequent appearances of the word "elements," M has "simple elements."

Solution: [first cause mixture | greatness eternity | perfection simplicity | justice nobility].

14. *Question:* Whether the first cause displays itself in its effect as the sun displays its light in a subject.

Solution: [first cause digestion | A A | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | E A].

15. *Question:* Whether there can exist an intermediary between first cause and its effect.

Solution: [first cause composition | A A | immediately mediately | being privation | power will | justice nobility | greatness simplicity | E V Z].[132]

16. *Question:* Whether the first cause exists in each of its effects.

Solution: [first cause alteration | greatness virtue | eternity wisdom | power will | A A].

MOTION

17. *Question:* Why is substantial motion within substance, and accidental motion outside it?

Solution: [motion motion | A A | A S | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | E A V Y | I V Z].

18. *Question:* How does an angel move from place to place, and how does it apprehend an object?

Solution: [motion intelligence | intelligence A | A A | fire fire | habit act].

19. *Question:* Whether the firmament, once set in motion, needs further impulse.

Solution: [motion firmament | intelligence A | form appetite | nature act | beginning end].

20. *Question:* Whether the universal form is movable.

Solution: [motion form | A A | first cause intelligence | intelligence firmament | firmament form | beginning end].

21. *Question:* Whether prime matter is set in motion in parts and conversely, and is in itself immovable.

Solution: [motion matter | A A | dignities relation | S S | B C D E | fire fire | fire air].

22. *Question:* Whether motion exists throughout the sphere of fire.

[132] In the second to last compartment, M alone has "perfection simplicity."

Solution: [motion nature | intelligence firmament | form appetite | habit mixture | digestion composition].

23. *Question:* Whether each element moves within the other.

Solution: [motion elements | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

24. *Question:* Whether natural appetite differs in number from natural motion.

Solution: [motion appetite | form matter | mixture digestion | power act | beginning end].

25. *Question:* Whether there is motion in form that exists in potentiality.

Solution: [motion power | mixture digestion | form matter | fire fire | fire air].

26. *Question:* Whether motion has a nobler appetite[133] than the stationary.

Solution: [motion habit | A Ā | greatness eternity | dignities relation | fire fire | fire air | beginning end | affirmation negation | difference concordance].

27. *Question:* Whether an act is more perfect being stationary than being in motion.

Solution: [motion act | A A | beginning end | fire air | fire earth | E A | E V Z].[134]

28. *Question:* Whether air and vapors differ in essence.

Solution: [motion mixture | digestion composition | air air | fire air | air water | air earth].

29. *Question:* Which is the surer cure for a sick person, that by similarity or that by contrariety?

Solution: [motion digestion | appetite composition | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

30. *Question:* Whether motion can exist without one surface touching another.

Solution: [motion composition | mixture digestion | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

31. *Question:* Whether motion can exist without place.

Solution: [motion alteration | fire air | fire earth | E A V Y | I V Z | A A].

[133] A alone of the sources consulted has "habit" for "appetite," which, in view of the answer, may be right.

[134] Thus in V M; A B and the errata of M have "E V Y" in the last compartment.

INTELLIGENCE[135]

32. *Question:* How do angels delight in God?

Solution: [intelligence intelligence | A A | A S | fire fire | form relation].

33. *Question:* Whether angels move the firmament with their intellective or volitional power.

Solution: [intelligence firmament | form matter | appetite habit | motion composition].

34. *Question:* Whether angels set in motion universal form within particular forms, and conversely.

Solution: [intelligence form | appetite habit | immediately mediately | nature power | digestion composition].

35. *Question:* Whether angels differentiate prime matter beneath the four universal simple forms.

Solution: [intelligence matter | appetite habit | nature elements | fire air | air water | water earth | fire earth].

36. *Question:* Do angels have foresight concerning the works of nature?

Solution: [intelligence nature | A A | motion firmament | act relation | fire fire | fire air].

37. *Question:* Whether angels impart motion to the elements virtually or substantially.

Solution: [intelligence elements | form matter | mixture digestion | power object].

38. *Question:* Whether angels perceive sensible things as clearly as does man.

Solution: [intelligence appetite | A A | form relation | dignities act | fire fire].

39. *Question:* Whether angels in essence have distinct powers.

Solution: [intelligence power | A A | act relation | glory punishment | B C D H].

40. *Question:* How do angels speak to one another?

Solution: [intelligence habit | A A | dignities act | form relation | charity justice | beginning end | concordance middle].

41. *Question:* Whether in the act of an angel there is such a thing as speed.

Solution: [intelligence act | A A | E A | fire air | charity justice | being perfection].

[135] See Dist. II, n. 17 above.

42. *Question:* Whether one angel can exist in another.
Solution: [intelligence mixture | A A | form order | fire fire | E A V Y].
43. *Question:* Whether angels have knowledge through acquisition.
Solution: [intelligence digestion | A A | form order | immediately mediately].
44. *Question:* Why can an angel more easily speak with a person who is asleep than with one who is awake?[136]
Solution: [intelligence composition | S S | fire water | concordance majority].
45. *Question:* Whether there can be any alteration in the qualities of angels.
Solution: [intelligence alteration | A A | B F | C G | D H | fire fire | fire air].

FIRMAMENT[137]

46. *Question:* Whether the firmament moves by itself.
Solution: [firmament firmament | immediately mediately | A intelligence | fire fire | fire air].
47. *Question:* Whether the firmament instills habit in universal form, with which particular forms are habituated.
Solution: [firmament form | A intelligence | motion mixture | digestion composition].
48. *Question:* Whether the heavenly bodies exert their influence in prime matter or in the elements.
Solution: [firmament matter | immediately mediately | fire fire | fire water].
49. *Question:* Whether the heavenly bodies can set the elements in motion without appetite.
Solution: [firmament nature | fire air | fire earth | fire water | mixture digestion].

[136] This is the way the question is phrased in all medieval sources; M, however, has a somewhat different text.
[137] Llull uses three different terms in this slot of the Figure of Philosophy: *orbis*, which is the most usual; *firmamentum* as in Question 33 under Figure T above, and in the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 243 = Int. iv, 47; and *primum mobile* as in the *Compendium seu Commentum Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 335 = Int. vi, 45. That they are synonyms, or at least the first two, is clear from the *Principles of Philosophy, MOG* I, 672–3 = Int. x, 6–7, where Llull explains how the "orb" or "firmament" contains the twelve signs of the zodiac and the seven planets (for which see *Felix*, Bk. III, ch. 18, n. 5). We have kept to "firmament" in our translation for the sake of consistency, and to avoid the peculiar-sounding and ambiguous English "orb."

50. *Question:* Whether the sun is simple fire.

Solution: [firmament elements | mixture digestion | nature appetite | air water | fire earth].

51. *Question:* Whether the firmament moves the entire sphere of water.

Solution: [firmament appetite | mixture digestion | composition alteration | fire earth].[138]

52. *Question:* Whether the composition of fire exists potentially in the influence of the sun.

Solution: [firmament power | A A | greatness eternity | appetite habit | fire earth | fire air].

53. *Question:* Whether the moon is made up of simple water, which water is called an element.

Solution: [firmament habit | water earth | mixture composition | appetite digestion | fire water].

54. *Question:* Whether the sun's influence comes from the essence of the sun.

Solution: [firmament act | power habit | digestion composition | mixture alteration].

55. *Question:* Whether a ray of sunlight is a body.

Solution: [firmament mixture | form matter | digestion composition | habit alteration | B C D E].

56. *Question:* Whether digestion could be accomplished if the moon did not retard the very great influence of the sun.

Solution: [firmament digestion | appetite act | motion alteration | fire fire | fire water].

57. *Question:* Whether the brightness that the moon receives from the sun constitutes a hindrance to the great influence of water.

Solution: [firmament composition | A A | fire fire | first cause intelligence | E A | majority end].

58. *Question:* Whether the shape of the earth is, by means of the sun, made to appear in the moon's darkness, just as happens with an image in two mirrors placed face to face.

Solution: [firmament alteration | appetite habit | power act | water earth | fire water].

[138] M alone of the sources consulted has "operation" instead of "composition."

FORM[139]

59. *Question:* Whether universal form exists.

Solution: [form form | A intelligence | firmament matter | appetite power | nature elements | habit act | concordance majority | beginning end].

60. *Question:* Whether there is a difference in essence and nature between universal form and idea.

Solution: [form matter | A A | A T | greatness eternity | God creature | dignities relation | fire fire | mixture composition].

61. *Question:* Whether particular forms are active and passive.

Solution: [form nature | A firmament | act mixture | fire air | fire earth | fire water | immediately mediately | matter nature].

62. *Question;* Whether one element can originate in and proceed from another.

Solution: [form elements | A A | S S | V V | T T | fire fire | fire air | fire earth].

63. *Question:* Whether a potentially existing form has an appetite.

Solution: [form appetite | motion firmament | mixture digestion | matter act | composition alteration | air water | N E I].

64. *Question:* Whether it is as a result of universal form that particular forms exist potentially in matter.

Solution: [form power | motion habit | appetite act | digestion composition].

65. *Question:* Whether all particular natural forms are habituated in universal form.

Solution: [form habit | first cause motion | intelligence firmament | matter nature | appetite act | middle end].

66. *Question:* Whether form has passion[140] in passive quality.

Solution: [form act | matter nature | mixture digestion | fire air | immediately mediately].

67. *Question:* Whether universal form and prime matter occupy space.[141]

Solution: [form mixture | motion composition | power act | fire fire | fire air].

[139] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk I, n. 36.
[140] "Passion" in the Aristotelian sense; cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 53.
[141] M alone has "whether universal form occupies space in prime matter."

68. *Question:* Whether fire gives as much in heat as it receives in dryness.

Solution: [form digestion | fire air | fire water | fire earth | motion alteration | appetite act].

69. *Question:* Whether in the beginning, when the world was created, universal form and prime matter constituted a body.

Solution: [form composition | being privation | elements appetite | habit act].[142]

70. *Question:* Whether universal form and prime matter constitute a single body, or whether they are of a bodily nature made up of the essence of many bodies.

Solution: [form alteration | motion firmament | mixture digestion | appetite composition | habit act | power habit | nature elements].

MATTER[143]

71. *Question:* Whether matter exists in reality or only according to reason.

Solution: [matter matter | motion firmament | appetite act | power habit | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water].[144]

72. *Question:* What accidents of substance belong to the nature of matter rather than to that of form?

Solution: [matter nature | form appetite | power act | fire air].

73. *Question:* Whether prime matter is a single thing in essence and distinct by parts.

Solution: [matter elements | fire air | water earth | appetite act | mixture digestion | composition alteration].

74. *Question:* Whether simple fire can exist outside its species.[145]

Solution: [matter appetite | power habit | fire fire | fire air | fire water | mixture composition | motion act].

75. *Question:* Whether prime matter can be passive through composition in secondary matter, since, on account of its own simplicity, it cannot be passive in itself.

Solution: [matter power | motion firmament | nature elements | mixture composition | fire air | fire earth].

76. *Question:* Whether passion is the perfection of prime matter.

[142] M alone has [privation elements | appetite power] in the two middle compartments.
[143] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 36.
[144] M alone has "intelligence firmament" in the second compartment.
[145] Thus in all medieval sources; M, followed by Galmés, has "outside its sphere."

Solution: [matter habit | motion firmament | appetite act | being privation | fire earth | fire water | I V Z].

77. *Question:* Whether passive quality is produced from the acts of prime matter.

Solution: [matter act | appetite habit | form digestion | fire earth | water earth].

78. *Question:* Whether matter can be in matter, and form in form.

Solution: [matter mixture | motion firmament | fire air | fire earth | fire water | difference concordance | nature appetite | being privation].

79. *Question:* Whether it is by means of form that accidents come from matter.

Solution: [matter digestion | B C D E | fire air | mixture composition].

80. *Question:* Whether prime matter exists as a continuous or discrete quantity.

Solution: [matter composition | motion form | firmament elements | mixture digestion | power act].

81. *Question:* Whether darkness is a mixture of elements in the absence of light.

Solution: [matter alteration | motion firmament | water water | mixture digestion].

NATURE[146]

82. *Question:* Whether nature is produced in the particulars of universal form and prime matter.

Solution: [nature nature | first cause motion | intelligence firmament | power habit | beginning middle | concordance end | fire air].

83. *Question:* When the simple forms of the elements make up an elemented substance, where are they, if not in that very elemented substance?

Solution: [nature elements | form matter | motion firmament | power act | appetite habit].

[146] *Natura* was the usual medieval translation of the Greek φύσις and hence the principal subject matter of a work such as Aristotle's *Physics* (cf. n. 126 above). Note that "natural philosophy" used to be the current English term for "physics." For Llull's use of the word, see his *Liber de natura* and Pring-Mill's commentary on it in "La estructura del 'Liber de natura' del beato Ramón Llull," *La Filosofia della natura nel medioevo. Atti del terzo Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia medioevale* (Milan, 1966), pp. 566–75.

84. *Question:* Why does the falling stone have greater motion the nearer it gets to its center?[147]

Solution: [nature appetite | A A | S S | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | being privation | immediately mediately].

85. *Question:* Whether the simple elements are that which cannot enter into composition.

Solution: [nature power | motion firmament | form matter | appetite act | fire air | fire earth].

86. *Question:* What causes the influx of the English Sea?[148]

Solution: [nature habit | motion firmament | power alteration | fire air | fire water | mixture digestion | form composition].

87. *Question:* For what reason is the sea salty?[149]

Solution: [nature act | motion firmament | fire earth | earth earth | fire fire | mixture alteration | R R].

88. *Question:* Whether the lightness of fire is greater than the heaviness of water.

Solution: [nature mixture | digestion composition | motion alteration | justice temperance | air earth].

89. *Question:* Whether fire would produce heat if it did not receive dryness from earth.

Solution: [nature digestion | A A | generosity simplicity | fire water | beginning end].

90. *Question:* Whether it is more fitting for nature to simplify than to compound.

Solution: [nature composition | form matter | motion firmament | appetite act | A A | S S | X X | fire fire | fire air | temperance gluttony].

91. *Question:* Whether it is necessary for the elements to be only four in number.

Solution: [nature alteration | form matter | appetite power | act habit | mixture digestion | motion composition].

ELEMENTS

92. *Question:* Whether the simple elements are divisible into essential or integral parts.

[147] "Center" in the sense of the point towards which a thing tends or is attracted; see *OED*, s.v., 6b, and *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 23, par. 1.

[148] For the Atlantic tides—which is what Llull means here—see *Felix*, Bk. IV, the end of ch. 28 and n. 42 there.

[149] See the same passage of *Felix* referred to in the previous note, where Llull gives the tides as the *cause* of the sea's saltiness.

Solution: [elements elements | motion firmament | form matter | mixture digestion | fire fire | S S].

93. *Question:* Whether the simple elements are bodies or are of a bodily nature.

Solution: [elements appetite | motion firmament | form matter | fire fire | water water | justice fortitude | habit act | mixture digestion].

94. *Question:* Whether any element has motion by itself.

Solution: [elements power | immediately mediately | firmament form | fire fire | fire earth | E I | nature alteration.].

95. *Question:* Whether, in habit, fire has another form besides the one that pertains to its quality.

Solution: [elements habit | first cause motion | intelligence firmament | form matter | fire air | fire earth | fire water | appetite act].

96. *Question:* Whether fire has greater concordance with the operation of air than with that of earth.

Solution: [elements act | appetite power | mixture digestion | mixture composition | nature alteration | firmament form].

97. *Question:* Whether one simple element can exist in another.

Solution: [elements mixture | digestion composition | nature alteration | motion firmament | form matter | appetite power | A A | E I | fire air | fire water].[150]

98. *Question:* Whether the heat and light of fire are the same power.

Solution: [elements digestion | fire air | fire earth | fire water | motion firmament | form matter | composition digestion | D H | B K | R R].[151]

99. *Question:* Whether fire could enter into composition if it were dry in and of itself.

Solution: [elements composition | firmament digestion | appetite act | fire fire | fire water | being privation].

100. *Question:* Whether darkness is caused by the privation of lighting and heating.

Solution: [elements alteration | motion firmament | fire air | fire water | fire earth | habit act | mixture digestion | D H].

[150] Thus in all sources save M, which, between the second and third compartments, adds one of "nature elements."

[151] M alone has "H R" in the second to last compartment.

APPETITE[152]

101. *Question:* Whether natural appetite is an active or passive power.

Solution: [appetite appetite | immediately mediately | intelligence firmament | motion habit | fire air | fire earth | B C D E | form matter].

102. *Question:* Whether it is without intermediary that appetite moves form from power to act.

Solution: [appetite power | fire fire | fire air | motion firmament | habit act | immediately mediately | beginning end].

103. *Question:* Whether appetite exists in the virtues God gave to words, stones, and plants.

Solution: [appetite habit | A A | act relation | E A V Y | motion form | fire fire].

104. *Question:* Why does magnetite oppose birth and jasper oppose the flow of blood?[153]

Solution: [appetite act | being privation | A A | fire fire | motion firmament | appetite composition].[154]

105. *Question:* Whether earth has greater weight in air than in fire.

Solution: [appetite mixture | fire earth | air earth | form matter | D H].

106. *Question:* Why does a mule not procreate?

Solution: [appetite digestion | A A | concordance equality | fire air | fire water | difference minority | motion alteration].

107. *Question:* Whether composition in substance has greater appetite than simplicity in accidents.

Solution: [appetite composition | A A | greatness simplicity | being privation].

108. *Question:* Whether substance is more corruptible by essential, integral, or accidental parts.

Solution: [appetite alteration | form matter | fire fire | fire air | habit act].

POWER[155]

109. *Question:* Whether, in an elemented substance, fire gives heat from its own entity.

[152] For "appetite" meaning "desire, inclination, disposition," see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 10.

[153] For the constrictive effects of magnetite on birth and of jasper on the flow of blood, see *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 170 = Int. iii, 154. The text translated here is that of V, which is substantially similar to that of the corrector of M.

[154] A and the corrector of M have "habit composition" in the last compartment.

[155] Cf. Dist. II, n. 76 above.

Solution: [power power | fire fire | A A | greatness generosity | being perfection | appetite act].

110. *Question:* Whether form that is in habit is also in potentiality.

Solution: [power habit | motion act | digestion alteration | being privation].[156]

111. *Question:* What is the intermediary through which health and sickness oppose one another?

Solution: [power act | habit mixture | digestion alteration | R R | fire air | fire water].

112. *Question:* Whether it is prime matter from which proceeds the form in which all matter is not included.

Solution: [power mixture | A A | fire fire | being perfection | being privation].

113. *Question:* Whether the simple elements that move and are moved to composition have any channel of action other than the sensitive and vegetative powers.

Solution: [power digestion | first cause motion | firmament nature | form matter | immediately mediately | affirmation negation].

114. *Question:* Whether the vegetative power is a body or is of a bodily nature.

Solution: [power composition | form matter | appetite act | nature habit].

115. *Question:* Whether that form which is impelled to act impels another form.

Solution: [power alteration | appetite habit | fire fire | N A | E A | act relation].

HABIT[157]

116. *Question:* Whether fire possesses dryness in habit because of the influence of its own sphere[158] or of that of earth.

Solution: [habit habit | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | E Y | I Z].

[156] M alone has "habit act" in the second compartment.

[157] *Habitus*, the usual Latin translation of the Aristotelian category ἕξις, is variously rendered in English as "habit, state, condition, disposition, possession, having." Cf. the definition in the *Taula d'esta Art*, *ORL* XVII, 393: "habit is that which clothes the thing which sustains it, as justice clothes the just man, knowledge the wise man, and a tunic or mantle a clothed man," which is an expanded version of the definition in *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 21. See also n. 159 below.

[158] Thus *orbis* (here clearly in the meaning of "sphere") in V and the uncorrected text of M; the remaining sources have "heat."

117. *Question:* Whether habit is nearer to act than to power.[159]

Solution: [habit act | beginning middle | appetite end | being privation | air earth].

118. *Question:* Whether a mixture can be made out of a multitude of habits.

Solution: [habit mixture | V V | form matter | appetite act | beginning end].

119. *Question:* Whether habit is produced by form, matter, and privation.

Solution: [habit digestion | E V Y | N V Y | fire air | fire water | appetite act | power composition].

120. *Question:* Whether habit is an intermediary composed of power and act.

Solution: [habit composition | motion appetite | power act | air water].

121. *Question:* Whether light and heat are in similar states in fire and air.

Solution: [habit alteration | fire fire | fire water | begin privation | E A V Y].

ACT

122. *Question:* Whether heat arises and proceeds from simple fire into compound fire by means of elemented substance.

Solution: [act act | form matter | appetite power | habit mixture | fire fire].

123. *Question:* Whether an element in its simple state enters a mixture.

Solution: [act mixture | nature elements | appetite power | habit digestion | virtue majority].

124. *Question:* Whether one light generates another from its own essence and nature, when one candle is lit from another.[160]

Solution: [act digestion | A A | E A V Y | I V Z | firmament form | motion matter | fire fire | fire air].

125. *Question:* How do elements enter into composition and how do they remain simple?

[159] Note that in the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam, MOG* III, 531 = Int. viii, 29, Llull says that "habit is the intermediary between power and act." See also Question 120 below.

[160] The problem of one candle being lit from another is also discussed in *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 20, and *Ars brevis*, Part XI, sec. 11.8.

Solution: [act composition | A A | B C D E | fire fire | fire air | form matter | motion firmament | nature elements | appetite power].

126. *Question:* Whether those forms that fall into privation, remain in habit in universal form and prime matter.

Solution: [act alteration | first cause intelligence | beginning end | motion firmament | power appetite | being perfection | E A | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

MIXTURE[161]

127. *Question:* Whether mixture exists as much in digestion as in composition.

Solution: [mixture mixture | appetite act | R N | E I | fire fire | fire air].

128. *Question:* Whether digestion brings about an emptying of mixture and filling of composition.

Solution: [mixture digestion | being privation | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | E A V Y | I V Z].

129. *Question:* Whether a multiplication of parts causes a multiplication of the universal.

Solution: [mixture composition | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | form matter | motion alteration | E A V Y].

130. *Question:* Whether the whole is the place of its parts.

Solution: [mixture alteration | form matter | fire air | fire fire | fire earth | fire water].

DIGESTION[162]

131. *Question:* Whether one place can be in another.

Solution: [digestion digestion | fire air | fire earth | fire water | E A V Y | I V Z | motion alteration | form matter].

132. *Question:* Whether fire heats the object of humidity or humidity itself.[163]

Solution: [digestion composition | beginning middle | form matter | appetite act].

133. *Question:* Why, in generation, is matter farther from being than form, and why, in corruption, is it nearer?

[161] Cf. Dist. I, n. 35 above, as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 43.

[162] In Llull "digestion" can refer to any kind of assimilation of nourishment. In the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam, MOG* III, 531 = Int. viii, 29, it is defined as "the transmutation of the virtue of essence into being, from being into powers, and from powers into acts." See also *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 34.

[163] A and the errata of M have "subject" instead of "object."

Solution: [digestion alteration | motion nature | appetite act | A A].

COMPOSITION[164]

134. *Question;* Whether an elemented substance is conserved through simple forms or through a common form.

Solution: [composition composition | form matter | fire fire | air air | water water | earth earth | appetite act].

135. *Question:* Whether the common form which, along with common matter, composes a body, has as specific a place in a body, as does the sense that is common to the five individual senses.

Solution: [composition alteration | fire fire | fire air | appetite power | habit act | motion intelligence | form matter].

ALTERATION[165]

136. *Question:* Whether alteration begins in form before it does in matter.

Solution: [alteration alteration | motion intelligence | form matter | fire fire | fire air | appetite act | being privation].

Here Begin the Questions concerning the Principles of Law

AND FIRST OF ALL THOSE CONCERNING FORMAL LAW[166]

1. *Question:* What constitutes form in law?

Solution: [form form | A A | S S | V V | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air | habit act].

2. *Question:* Whether form, matter, and privation are general principles of law.

[164] Cf. Dist. II, n. 2 and the references there.

[165] "Alteration is the changing of things, as when the unjust man changes to being good when he does good works, and like wine which is changed into vinegar"—*Taula d'esta Art, ORL* XVII, 390. "Alteration is the intermediary between being and privation"—*Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam, MOG* III, 531 = Int. viii, 29. See also the *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 68.

[166] Instead of "Formal Law," M—alone of all the sources—has "the Form of Law," which is in fact what Llull means by the former phrase. For this and the following principles of law, like those of philosophy, which Llull discusses or defines nowhere in the *Ars demonstrativa*, see the works cited in n. 126 above; their sections on law always immediately follow those on philosophy. See also Andreu de Palma de Mallorca, *Els sistemes jurídics i les idees jurídiques de Ramon Llull* (Mallorca, 1936), as well as *Ars brevis*, Part X, n. 51.

Solution: [form matter | D H | appetite alteration | being privation].

3. *Question:* Whether law has a greater dependence on form than on matter.

Solution: [form law | A S | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | power object].

4. *Question:* What does the form of common law consist of?

Solution: [form common | charity justice | A A | fire air | majority equality].[167]

5. *Question:* Whether the matter of common law is as necessary as the form of special law.`

Solution: [form special | concordance majority | appetite act].

6. *Question:* How does one kind of law accord with another?

Solution: [form natural | A S | S S | fire fire | common special | beginning end].

7. *Question:* Whether election is more necessary by natural than by positive law.

Solution: [form positive | A A | E I | Y Z | fire fire | substance accidents | first intention second intention].

8. *Question:* How do the Divine Dignities influence law?

Solution: [form canon | dignities act | B C D | F G H | V V | Y Z].

9. *Question:* Whether, in law, form accords better with justice than matter does with dominion.

Solution: [form civil | first intention second intention | appetite act | A A | fire fire].

10. *Question:* Whether an avaricious judge is more objectionable[168] than a proud one.

Solution: [form customary | A A | generosity simplicity | fire earth | fire air].

11. *Question:* How should a judgment be made?

Solution: [form theoretical | natural practical | E A V Y | I V Z | digestion composition | firmament elements].

12. *Question:* Whether law is more to be loved than feared.

Solution: [form practical | D H | E Y | I Z | first intention second intention].

13. *Question:* How are some laws mixed with others?

[167] Words such as "common" in the first compartment here, "special" in the first compartment of the following question, etc. are abbreviations for "common law," "special law," etc. For definitions of these terms, see the notes to the corresponding headings of the different sections below.

[168] Instead of "objectionable," A B have "acceptable."

Solution: [form nutritive | mixture digestion |V V | first intention second intention | fire earth | fire air | fire water].

14. *Question:* Whether the form of canon law is more natural than that of civil law.

Solution: [form comparative | A A | S S | fire fire | fire earth | middle end].

15. *Question:* Whether law can exist in greater greatness in one power of the soul than in another.

Solution: [form ancient | D H | C fire | B water | difference concordance | first intention second intention].

16. *Question:* In which of the three can the law exist in greatest greatness, the judge, the lawyer, or the defendant?

Solution: [form modern | D H | perfection free will | motion form | firmament matter | first intention second intention | charity fortitude].

MATERIAL LAW[169]

17. *Question:* What is the matter of law?

Solution: [matter matter | concordance middle | beginning end | air earth | fire water].

18. *Question:* Whether law originates in matter and emerges as form.[170]

Solution: [matter law | B C D E | fire fire | fire air | appetite act | power habit].

19. *Question:* What does the matter of common law consist of?

Solution: [matter common | special special | natural canon | concordance equality | motion mixture].

20. *Question:* How is law differentiated into many species?

Solution: [matter special | D H | V V | end end | first intention second intention].

21. *Question:* Whether the matter of natural law is more to be taken into account than the form of positive law.

Solution: [matter natural | N Y | E Y | I Z | theoretical practical | majority minority | being privation].

22. *Question:* Whether law begins in the intellective power before it does in the volitional power.

Solution: [matter positive | A A | act relation | will justice | M Y Z | C Y Z | D H | Y Z].

[169] As with the previous heading, instead of "Material Law," M has "the Matter of Law," which again is what Llull means.

[170] M, alone of all the sources, has "originates in matter and form."

23. *Question:* Whether law perishes in the volitional power before it does in the intellective power.

Solution: [matter canon | D free will | Y Z | C Y Z | merit blame].

24. *Question:* Whether the science of theology is more against simony than is the science of law.

Solution: [matter civil | form natural | fire earth | fire water | A A].

25. *Question:* Whether, in matters of custom, law follows matter more than form.

Solution: [matter customary | first intention second intention | natural positive].

26. *Question:* Whether a judge should first investigate the matter, rather than the form, of law.

Solution: [matter theoretical | difference end | fire air | fire water].

27. *Question:* Whether, by law, a sentence can be appealed whose form is correct but whose matter is corrupt.

Solution: [matter practical | nutritive comparative | difference concordance | power act | appetite habit].

28. *Question:* Whether law can be nourished by vices.

Solution: [matter nutritive | first intention canon | second intention civil].

29. *Question:* Which law is substantial and which accidental?

Solution: [matter comparative | E A | E V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention | fire air | fire water | fire fire].

30. *Question:* Whether justice and injustice are more contrary in the intellect and will than in the memory, and more in the intellect than in the memory and will.

Solution: [matter ancient | wisdom will | justice simplicity | greatness generosity].

31. *Question:* Whether the matter of ancient law is destroyed in the rise, advance, and preservation of modern law.

Solution: [matter modern | motion firmament | mixture digestion | fire fire | form alteration].

LAW[171]

32. *Question:* What is law?

Solution: [law law | E A V Y | I V Z | creature operation | appetite act].

33. *Question:* Why does law exist?

[171] By just plain "law" Llull simply means "the aggregate of the form and matter of law"; cf. *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 245 = Int. iv, 49, and *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam, MOG* III, 532 = Int. viii, 30.

Solution: [law common | A A | charity justice | E Y | Y Z | V V].

34. *Question:* How is law investigated?

Solution: [law special | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire earth | fire air | fire water | common natural].

35. *Question:* How is law devised?[172]

Solution: [law natural | charity charity | justice justice | fire fire | fire air].

36. *Question:* How is law preserved?

Solution: [law positive | common natural | canon civil | A A | fire fire | fire water].

37. *Question:* Whether civil law is more imaginable than canon law.

Solution: [law canon | A A | fire fire | hope charity | justice lust].

38. *Question:* Whether canon law is more intelligible than civil law.

Solution: [law civil | E A | E V Y | I A | I V Z | fire fire | fire theoretical].[173]

39. *Question:* Why does customary law accord better with civil law than with canon law?

Solution: [law customary | form matter | mixture alteration | being privation].

40. *Question:* Whether law is greater in theory than in practice.

Solution: [law theoretical | form matter | beginning end | charity justice].

41. *Question:* Whether positive law can be against natural law.

Solution: [law practical | N Y Z | E V Y | I V Z | nutritive comparative | A A | immediately mediately].[174]

42. *Question:* How is law nourished?[175]

Solution: [law nutritive | charity prudence | concordance equality | fire fire | beginning middle].

43. *Question:* Whether law is an act of the virtues or a power in and of itself.

Solution: [law comparative | ancient modern | E V Y | I V Z | habit act | digestion alteration].

44. *Question:* How should law be pleaded?

Solution: [law ancient | A A | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water | first intention second intention].

[172] For the various possible translations of *invenire* (Cat. *atrobar*), see Dist. III, n. 16 above.
[173] M alone has "theoretical practical" in the last compartment.
[174] The corrected text of M has "N V Y Z" in the second compartment.
[175] For the "nourishment" of law, see n. 188 below.

45. *Question:* How should law be constituted?
Solution: [law modern | form matter | A A | fire fire | E A V Y | I V Z].

COMMON LAW[176]

46. *Question:* What is common law?
Solution: [common common | special special | concordance equality | beginning end | fire fire | E E | I I | V V].

47. *Question:* In which is there greater charity, common law or special law?
Solution: [common special | common majority | special minority | prudence fortitude | A A].

48. *Question:* Whether necessity runs counter to law.
Solution: [common natural | first intention second intention | fire water | nutritive alteration | form matter | charity justice | fortitude temperance].

49. *Question:* Whether the poor man has a right to the possessions of the rich man.
Solution: [common positive | natural special | charity justice | prudence envy].

50. *Question:* Whether indoctrination is more necessary to an unbeliever than alms to a poor man.
Solution: [common canon | E A | I V Z | middle end | first intention second intention].

51. *Question:* Whether suspicion is sufficient reason to have someone handed over for questioning under torture.
Solution: [common civil | matter nutritive | N Y | E Y | I Z | immediately mediately].

52. *Question:* Whether it is permissible to kill an unbeliever without preaching and indoctrination.
Solution: [common customary | charity justice | faith hope | prudence fortitude].

53. *Question:* Whether a good intention can be condemned according to law, and conversely.
Solution: [common theoretical | N Z | faith chairty | R R | beginning end | immediately mediately | matter nutritive].

[176] By "common law" Llull does not mean what the modern reader might think, but rather that law which is "common" to the "special laws" of the following sections. Cf. the sources given in n. 171 above, where he sometimes uses "general" and "universal" as synonyms for "common." See also Andreu de Palma, op. cit. (n. 166), p. 26.

54. *Question:* Whether in this world there is more justice than injustice.

Solution: [common practical | being privation | E A V Y | I A V Z | fire air | fire water].

55. *Question:* Whether, according to natural law, special law can be better observed than common law.

Solution: [common nutritive | natural positive | immediately mediately | accidie envy].

56. *Question:* How is the law misused?

Solution: [common comparative | N E | I R | canon civil | first intention second intention | Y Z | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

57. *Question:* Whether law would exist if blame did not exist.

Solution: [common ancient | motion firmament | fire air | fire earth | E A Y | power object].

58. *Question:* Which kind of law is more dilatory, the modern or the ancient?

Solution: [common modern | nutritive comparative | form matter | N Y | E Y | appetite act | habit digestion].

SPECIAL LAW[177]

59. *Question:* What is special law?

Solution: [special special | common concordance | beginning end | fire fire].

60. *Question:* Whether faith and prudence have specific virtue in special and natural law.

Solution: [special natural | N Y | E Y | I Z | supposition demonstration].

61. *Question:* Whether, in the form of common law, the forms of special law are equal.

Solution: [special positive | first intention second intention | fire air | fire earth].

62. *Question:* In committing perjury, which of the three powers of the soul sins most?

Solution: [special canon | D first intention | B C second intention | H Y | motion firmament].

63. *Question:* Whether one should be more suspicious of the defendant than of the plaintiff.

[177] As Andreu de Palma, op. cit., p. 27 says, "Special law is that which remains beneath common law, like species beneath their genus." It is thus what nowadays we would call the various "branches" of "fields" of law.

Solution: [special civil | A A | D H | fire air |fire earth | form matter].

64. *Question:* Whether custom is more specifically related to special than to common law.

Solution: [special customary | form matter | nutritive modern | digestion alteration].

65. *Question:* How is law taught?

Solution: [special theoretical | A A | S S | V V | fire fire | E A V Y | I V Z].

66. *Question:* Whether the practice of natural law is more usual than that of positive law.

Solution: [special practical | N Y Z | E Y | I Z | fire air | fire water | fire earth].

67. *Question:* Whether, for a similar crime, a townsman should be more punished than a peasant.

Solution: [special nutritive | E I | N R | mixture digestion | being privation | majority minority].

68. *Question:* Whether the townsman should have greater privilege than the peasant.

Solution: [special comparative | fire fire | concordance majority | E A V Y | I V Z].

69. *Question:* How can particular laws be found within universal law?

Solution: [special ancient | A S | T V | X Y | R Z | fire air | fire water].

70. *Question:* Whether a poor man is more acceptable as a witness than a rich woman.

Solution: [special modern | substance accident | being privation | air air | air water].

NATURAL LAW[178]

71. *Question:* What is natural law?

Solution: [natural natural | A A | dignities relation | S S | E A V Y | I V Z | air air | air water | air earth].

72. *Question:* How is law present in the rational power?

Solution: [natural positive | S S | B C D E | F G H I | appetite act | power habit].

73. *Question:* How is law present in the memorative power?

[178] The *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae, MOG* III, 245 = Int. iv, 49, has a nice definition based on the terminology of the Art: "Natural law is based on E I, with E being in A V Y, and I in V Z."

Solution: [natural canon | power object | supposition reason | mixture digestion | reality demonstration | B A V Y | F V Z].

74. *Question:* How is law present in the intellective power?

Solution: [natural civil | difference concordance | contrariety end | habit act | form matter | C A V Y | G V Z].[179]

75. *Question:* How is law present in the volitional power?

Solution: [natural customary | motion firmament | merit free will | D A V Y | H V Z].

76. *Question:* What is the object of law?

Solution: [natural theoretical | E A V Y | I V Z | M A V Y Z].

77. *Question:* How can law be a matter of opinion?

Solution: [natural practical | A A | N R | E I | mixture digestion | middle end].

78. *Question:* How can law be a matter of doubt?[180]

Solution: [natural nutritive | matter form | middle contrariety | N R | fire water | mixture alteration].

79. *Question:* How can law be a matter of imagination?

Solution: [natural comparative | A A | S S | fire fire | fire air | fire water].

80. *Question:* How does law exist in the sense common to the five bodily senses?

Solution: [natural ancient | B C D E | fire air | fire water | firmament nature].

81. *Question:* How does law exist in the five bodily senses?

Solution: [natural modern | power object | form matter | habit act].

POSITIVE LAW[181]

82. *Question:* What is positive law?

Solution: [positive positive | will dominion | motion matter | fire air | fire water | supposition reason | N R].

83. *Question:* Whether canon law is more to be feared than civil law.

[179] Thus in V A for the last two compartments (and in B for the last), which must be right in view of the previous and following answers; M has in both (and B in the first), [E A V Y | I V Z].

[180] M made a terrible mess of Questions 77 and 78. It replaced the second with the first, and then replaced the first (along with its solution) by Question and Solution 125.

[181] "Positive" in the sense of "formal, explicit" as opposed to "natural." In the *Principles of Law*, *MOG* I, 735 = Int. xi, 3, Llull says positive law is that "instituted by pope and emperor in former times," which is equivalent to the quotation in *OED*, s.v. positive, A.I.1, "Positive public law, proclaimed and upheld by some public authority." It would therefore include the canon law and civil law of the next two sections.

Solution: [positive canon | E A V Y | I V Z | first intention second intention].

84. *Question:* Which sort of lawyer is more to be believed, one who cites natural law, or one who cites positive law?

Solution: [positive civil | first intention second intention | form matter | difference end | V V].

85. *Question:* Whether custom accords better with natural than with positive law.

Solution: [positive customary | form matter | middle end | being privation].

86. *Question:* Whether philosophy is as necessary in law as in medicine.

Solution: [positive theoretical | A A | S S | fire fire | first intention second intention | E A V Y | I V Z].

87. *Question:* Whether murder is more to be feared through natural than through positive law.

Solution: [positive practical | A A | charity justice | prudence fortitude | E I | N R].

88. *Question:* Whether according to natural law a woman should be more punished for lust than a man.

Solution: [positive nutritive | E I | N R | difference majority | V V | power free will | merit blame | being privation].

89. *Question:* Whether marriage should be governed more by natural than by positive law.

Solution: [positive comparative | A A | S S | fire fire | act relation | form order | V V].

90. *Question:* Whether the bonds of matrimony are as strong in practice as in theory.

Solution: [positive ancient | beginning end | form matter | positive nutritive | difference concordance].

91. *Question:* Whether a lawyer is as obliged to plead his case by means of testimony as a judge is obliged to judge.

Solution: [positive modern | form matter | first intention second intention | power free will].

CANON LAW[182]

92. *Question:* What is canon law?

Solution: [canon canon | mercy dominion | eviternity nutritive | fire fire | act relation].

[182] See the following note.

93. *Question:* How are canon and civil law differentiated by mercy and justice?

Solution: [canon civil | charity justice | justice fortitude | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

94. *Question:* Whether infamy is more punishable in canon than in civil law.

Solution: [canon customary | first intention second intention | E A V Y | I V Z].

95. *Question:* Whether a condemnation implies a greater loss for the defendant than for the lawyer.

Solution: [canon theoretical | charity fortitude | merit blame | firmament nature].

96. *Question:* Whether canon law is more provable than civil law.

Solution: [canon practical | A A | S S | fire fire | firmament form | first intention second intention | being privation | Y Z].

97. *Question:* Whether a bishop should be punished as much for wrongdoing as an abbot.

Solution: [canon nutritive | D H | V V | Y Z | form matter | difference majority].

98. *Question:* Whether canon law is more against simony than civil law is against avarice and lust.

Solution: [canon comparative | A A | E A V Y | I V Z | majority minority | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

99. *Question:* In which of the three powers of the soul does prelacy best exist in the prelate?

Solution: [canon ancient | C justice | act relation | theoretical nutritive].

100. *Question:* In which of the three powers of the soul does the monastic life best exist?

Solution: [canon modern | D M | hope charity | fire fire].

CIVIL LAW[183]

101. *Question:* What is civil law?

Solution: [civil civil | D justice | H V Z | second intention matter | water earth].

[183] See the comparisons between canon and civil law in the *Principles of Law*, *MOG* I, 735 = Int. xi, 3, and the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 245 = Int. iv, 49, where Llull says that the first has to do with the soul (as the form of the body) and the second with the body itself.

102. *Question:* Whether confession is as necessary in civil as in canon law.

Solution: [civil customary | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | air earth].

103. *Question:* Whether penitence is more necessary in canon law than punishment in civil law.

Solution: [civil theoretical | E V Y | I V Z | N R | mixture digestion].

104. *Question:* Whether law is predestined.

Solution: [civil practical | merit free will | immediately mediately | E I | Y Z | appetite act | A X].

105. *Question:* Whether, counter to canon law, a heretic should be punished.[184]

Solution: [civil nutritive | charity justice | faith hope | fire fire].

106. *Question:* Whether a priest can forgive sins.

Solution: [civil comparative | A A | greatness generosity | justice mercy | fire fire | faith hope].

107. *Question:* Whether ancient law is as necessary as modern law.

Solution: [civil ancient | B D | N R | fire water | motion firmament].

108. *Question:* Whether atonement and punishment can be better accomplished by canon than by civil law.

Solution: [civil modern | E I | N R | fire fire | fire water | motion firmament].

CUSTOMARY LAW

109. *Question:* What is customary law?

Solution: [customary customary | matter alteration | appetite form | difference concordance].

110. *Question:* Whether a judge can investigate the law as well by similar as by contrary metaphors.

Solution: [customary theoretical | A A | E E | I I | D H | fire fire | fire water | motion firmament].

111. *Question:* Whether, in law, affirmation and negation have equal dignity.

Solution: [customary practical | A A | S S | Y Y | fire fire | D H | being privation].

112. *Question:* What is more to be avoided in a procurator, ignorance or avarice?

[184] M, alone of the sources consulted, has, "whether a cleric should be punished more by civil than by canon law."

Solution: [customary nutritive | N R | I V Y | merit blame | glory eviternity | A A | being privation].

113. *Question:* Whether one custom can be misrepresented by means of another.

Solution: [customary comparative | E A V Y | I V Z | immediately mediately | fire fire].

114. *Question:* Whether ancient custom should be taken as much into account as modern custom.

Solution: [customary ancient | form matter | middle end | fire fire | fire water].

115. *Question:* Whether custom accords better with modern law than with ancient law.

Solution: [customary modern | beginning end | middle end | being privation | appetite alteration].

THEORETICAL LAW

116. *Question:* What is theoretical law?

Solution: [theoretical theoretical | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | A A].

117. *Question:* How does law arise from theory and pass over into practice?

Solution: [theoretical practical | supposition demonstration | E A V Y | I V Z | fire air | appetite act | intelligence firmament].

118. *Question:* Why is restitution a more serious matter than giving?

Solution: [theoretical nutritive | A A | greatness generosity | beginning end | avarice envy | being privation].[185]

119. *Question:* Why does the form of law accord with theory, and the matter with practice?

Solution: [theoretical comparative | A A | fire fire | fire water | fire air].

120. *Question:* What kind of witness is more to be believed, a cheerful or an angry one?

Solution: [theoretical ancient | A A | S S | fire fire | D H | affirmation negation].

121. *Question:* Whether a judge can find out the truth sooner by relation than by quality.

Solution: [theoretical modern | A A | act relation | firmament nature | being privation | fire fire | fire air].

[185] M alone has "E A" in the second compartment.

PRACTICAL LAW

122. *Question:* What is practical law?

Solution: [practical practical | E I | V Y Z | fire air | fire earth | beginning middle].

123. *Question:* Whether a testament can be impugned as much against the intention of the testator as against his will.[186]

Solution: [practical nutritive | form matter | being privation | C D].

124. *Question:* How is one law to be compared with another?

Solution: [practical comparative | A A | S S | V V | fire fire | first intention second intention].

125. *Question:* Whether philosophy should be cited in a trial.

Solution: [practical ancient | first cause form | power act | E I N R | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

126. *Question:* Whether practical law is, through its form, more suited to the judge, and, through its matter, more suited to the lawyer.[187]

Solution: [practical modern | fire fire | fire air | difference concordance | form matter].

NUTRITIVE LAW[188]

127. *Question:* What is nutritive law?

Solution: [nutritive nutritive | beginning middle | E A V Y | I V Z | fire fire | fire air | fire earth | fire water].

128. *Question:* Whether the law is nourished more by matter than by form.

Solution: [nutritive comparative | beginning middle | concordance end].

129. *Question:* Whether positive law nourishes natural law, or vice versa.

Solution: [nutritive ancient | power act | first intention second intention | fire fire | air water | fire earth].

[186] M alone has "intellect" for "intention." "Will" is meant here as a power of the soul, not as synonym for testament.

[187] Thus in A. The uncorrected text of M has "intellect" and "will" instead of "judge" and "lawyer." The errata of M has *both* solutions, given as alternates. V B have "judge" in the first slot and "will" in the second.

[188] What Llull means by "nutritive law" is not quite clear. Andreu de Palma, op. cit. (n. 166), p. 28, says it is that law which "serves to maintain and preserve the others," which accords with the statements in *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 533 = Int. viii, 31, that "law is nourished by the acts of virtues," and "whoever nourishes the law, nourishes the image of justice."

130. *Question:* Whether between law and injustice there is any intermediary.

Solution: [nutritive modern | customary ancient | appetite act | power habit | fire air].

COMPARATIVE LAW

131. *Question:* What is comparative law?

Solution: [comparative comparative | F G A S T V X Y Z | fire fire].

132. *Question:* Whether any law can nourish another law against itself.

Solution: [comparative ancient | form matter | nutritive modern | fire fire | composition alteration].

133. *Question:* Whether modern law should be compared to form rather than to matter.

Solution: [comparative modern | beginning end | ancient middle | being privation].

ANCIENT LAW[189]

134. *Question:* What is ancient law?

Solution: [ancient ancient | being perfection | habit act | concordance equality | form matter | beginning end | E A V Y | I V Z].

135. *Question:* Whether the transmutation of modern law is more a question of matter than of form.

Solution: [ancient modern | mixture digestion | act alteration | fire air | fire earth].

MODERN LAW

136. *Question:* What is modern law?

Solution: [modern modern | appetite act | digestion alteration | majority end].

HERE ENDS THE DEMONSTRATIVE ART, WHOSE PRESERVATION AND PROTECTION WE ENTRUST TO OUR LORD, WHO REIGNS AS TRUE GOD, WORLD WITHOUT END.

[189] In canon law, *jus antiquum* is that prior to Gratian (twelfth century), and *jus novum* is that from Gratian to the Council of Trent.

Appendixes

1. *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*, IV, i, ELEMENTS, QUESTION 1



but since

[generation corruption] [concordance majority | contrariety majority]

greater concordance

(cf. II, i, 1.2) than with "minority" in the corresponding slots,

therefore the elements enter into composition with essential parts, by which Llull means that in composition:

the form of fire combines with the form of air, with the form of water, etc. and the matter of fire combines with the matter of air, with the matter of water, etc.,

forming an individual substance (supposite) which is an integral part of (i.e., makes up each simple element within) the four compound elements, each of which is in turn essentially composed of compound form and compound matter. (For more about essential and integral parts, see the *Liber chaos*, *MOG* III, 254–6 = Int. v, 6–8, with the commentary on that passage in Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 61 and 64.)

2. *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*, IV, i, DEMONSTRATIVE FIGURE, QUESTION 1

F G [A A | being perfection | privation imperfection | S V | Y Z]

contrariety

if A exists [being perfection] [privation imperfection]

and if A does concordance

not exist [being] [imperfection]

concordance

[perfection] [privation]

concordance

[privation] [imperfection]

but since this is impossible, there must therefore exist some

[being perfection]

without [privation imperfection] .

Now breaking down the last two compartments of [S V] [Y Z]

into E I N R V^b V^r Y Z

concordance

if A does not exist E V^r Z

concordance

and I V^b Y

concordance

but since [being perfection] E

concordance

and [privation imperfection] I

The two previous concordances are therefore impossible, for then we would have

concordance

[privation imperfection] V^r Z [majority]

concordance

and [being perfection] Y [minority]

which is impossible.

ARS BREVIS

Introduction

THE *Ars brevis*, historically Llull's single most influential work, was the culmination of a long process of adaptation in response to criticisms concerning the complications and difficulties of works such as the *Ars demonstrativa*.

As the *Contemporary Life* implies, Llull's first teaching experience at the University of Paris in 1288–9 must have been disheartening.[1] One can easily imagine what today might be called the "culture shock" of his coming to this, the greatest center of Western learning in the Middle Ages. As in any structured academic or intellectual world, Paris had its fashions as to topics discussed, modes of discussing them, and the vocabularly used. All of these were far removed from the question Llull wanted to discuss: the conversion of infidels, by means of a method—the Art—which resembled nothing anybody had seen before, and employing a vocabulary that must often have seemed bizarre.[2]

Llull, however, was not easily discouraged. Converting the infidels was the task to which he had dedicated his life; the instrument for doing so, the Art, was for him God-given; and the vocabulary was essential to his purpose. So there was no question of abandoning them; all he could do was to try to persuade the Parisian schoolmen of the importance of his missionary aims,[3] in the process use the bizarre vocabulary more sparingly, and modify the Art itself so that it would not *look* so alarming. And, of course, what made it look alarming was the number and complication of the figures, as well as the letter symbolism.[4]

Towards the beginning of 1290 in Montpellier, therefore, Llull set about writing the *Ars inventiva veritatis*,[5] beginning a new phase of the Art that was to culminate in the twin works of the *Ars brevis*

[1] See the "Life," § 19.

[2] See the above-mentioned section of the "Life" and n. 111 there for the specific nature of these difficulties.

[3] Llull rightly felt that it was important for the achievement of his goals to get the backing of the French king and the University of Paris as representing the political and intellectual centers of Europe.

[4] Even the faithful disciple, le Myésier, complained to his master about "the confusion caused by the meanings of the alphabet of the *Ars demonstrativa* and its sixteen figures, which confound the mind"; cf. Hillg, p. 179.

[5] See again § 19 of the "Life," as well as Urvoy, *Islam*, p. 399.

of 1308 and the *Ars generalis ultima* of 1305–8.[6] In this process several important changes were made in the Art. First, the figures were reduced from twelve to four.[7] This simplification involved a jettisoning of principles that had been fundamental to the previous quaternary phase of the Art. For the reader who has become accustomed to the mechanism of the *Ars demonstrativa,* it may be hard to imagine the Art without Figures S, V,[8] Y, and Z, as well as without those of the Elements, Theology, Philosophy, and Law. The most startling losses are those of Figure S and of the Elemental Figure,[9] both so basic to the quaternary phase of the Art, the former as a touchstone for almost all its discourse, and the latter as a foundation for so much of its analogical method. In fact, the only figures left are A and T, along with the Demonstrative Figure, which resurfaces completely altered—its First Figure transformed into the Fourth of the new figures, and its Second Figure into the Third.

The next major change was a reduction of the Alphabet from twenty-three to nine letters.[10] At the same time, Figures A and T, since they were now represented directly in the Alphabet, were reduced to nine components each. This involved a loss of seven dignities of Figure A, and two of the triangles of Figure T.[11] Moreover, Llull now made explicit something only implied in the *Ars demonstrativa*:[12] that is, multiple significates for each letter. This would have been confusing had it not been for a concomitant change that probably did more than anything to defuse the complaints of Llull's critics. From now on the letters of the Alphabet

[6] For the ternary phase of the Art see "Lull's Thought," text at n. 17 above. For the date and place of composition, see the end of the *Ars brevis* and n. 2 there.

[7] Or sixteen to four, as some have claimed; see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 1, as well as n. 4 above. The four figures of the *Ars inventiva veritatis* at the beginning of the ternary phase are identical with those of the *Ars brevis* at the end of that phase.

[8] The components of Figure V returned later on in a different setting; cf. p. 574 below.

[9] The disappearance of elemental theory as a foundation of the Art was perhaps related to a new orientation away from the School of Medicine of Montpellier and towards the Arts Faculty of Paris.

[10] See the eleventh miniature of the *Breviculum* (Pl. VI and Hillg, pp. 179–80), where the two alphabets are compared.

[11] The first blue triangle (God–creature–operation) and the last black one (affirmation–doubt–denial), although the latter resurfaces as Question B of Part IV here. Notice that the remaining three triangles are those of the *Principles of Medicine*; cf. Dist. I, n. 12 of that work.

[12] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Prologue, n. 2, and Dist. I, nn. 4, 43.

were not to be used in the text itself; they were kept merely for convenience in the combinatorial manipulation of the figures[13] and for an occasional reference to a given Rule or Question. Gone, therefore, was the algebraic look of the Lullian discourse.

So far I have dwelt almost exclusively on losses; the gains came from unexpected quarters. The first was in the form of definitions (of the eighteen principles from Figures A and T, of the Virtues and Vices, of the Hundred Forms, etc.). The intensely structural and functional approach of the previous quaternary phase of the Art could have led one to develop a coherent and convincing theory as to why Llull had shunned definitions. Suddenly, however, they appear in the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, and they soon take on such importance that one scholar was able to characterize Llull as the "master of definitions."[14] In fact, however, Llull has abandoned none of his former approach; he has merely made his definitions purely functional, like modern mathematicians, who do not say what a thing is, but only what it does.[15]

The second gain was one that would probably bring Llull his greatest fame in succeeding centuries, and that would become known as the "Ars combinatoria." Initially it appears as a device to compensate for the loss of basic principles that formerly constituted the building blocks of the Art; but one soon sees that it is in fact the *replacement* of a vast sprawling structure, whose parts are loosely and often only implicitly (or analogically) interrelated, by a far more compact structure, whose parts are very tightly and much more explicitly and mechanically interrelated.

The building of this edifice, which only achieved its final form in the *Ars brevis* and its companion work, the *Ars generalis ultima*,[16] was, however, a slow process that occupied the entire Ternary Phase of the Art. Of the beginnings in the *Ars inventiva veritatis*,

[13] Llull himself says in the Prologue to the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (*MOG* v, 1), "In this Art we will necessarily have to use letters in place of terms in the figures, but not in the discourse [*non autem in processu*]; for otherwise no inquiry or invention could be carried out with the last two figures of this Art."

[14] The phrase was coined by Diego Ruíz; cf. Ca II, 417, and J. Rubió Balaguer in *EL* 5 (1961), 143.

[15] For this definitional doctrine, see Part III, n. 1 below and the references there.

[16] For the close relation between the two works—they correspond part for part—see the Invocation and Prologue below and the notes there.

the only portions to survive intact were the nine-letter alphabet,[17] the four figures, and the definitions of the eighteen principles, which were to form Parts IIII of the two definitive works. The Rules as well as the ternary combinations of Conditions in the *Ars inventiva veritatis*[18] are only rough preliminaries to the definitively formalized Rules and Table of the *Taula general* of 1293–4,[19] which later became Parts IV and V of the *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima*. This gave Llull his basic combinatorial material; what he added in subsequent works was, first, a systematization of its use and interpretation, which became the Evacuation of the Third Figure, the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure, and the Mixture of Principles and Rules, constituting Parts VIVIII of the *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima*.[20] Second, he added a systematization of the *scala naturae*, to which this mechanism could be applied; these constituted the Nine Subjects of Part IX of the same two works. Moreover, the last of these Nine Subjects (the Instrumentative), included a reintroduction of the Virtues and Vices of the earlier Figure V, now expanded to nine each so they could be included in the nine-letter alphabet. Third, he added a section on application, or how in actual practice to use the Art, which would become Part X of the same two works, and would include that curious Lullian conceptual dictionary called the Hundred Forms.

This brief introduction will perhaps give some idea of how much the Art has now become not only a structure in itself, but also one in which the relation of its own inner parts is structured, as well as its relation to subject (the user) and object (the world)—an extraordinary network of systems systematizing systems. This means, in fact, an almost total mechanization of the process of the Art, and hence of our process of thought and its application to the world about us. This first such attempt in Western thought, this idea of an *ars combinatoria* and the possibilities it seemed to

[17] Although of the concepts referred to by each letter, only the first two are the same in the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (*MOG* V, 13) as in the final form reached in the *Liber de praedicatione* of 1304 (*ROL* III, 35 and 143-4). The other section of the *Ars inventiva veritatis* that survived throughout the ternary phase was the "De habituatione" (*MOG* V, 204–6) which reappeared as Part XII of the *Ars brevis* and *Ars generalis ultima*.

[18] *MOG* V, 37ff. and 14ff., respectively.

[19] *ORL* XVI, 337ff. and 356ff., respectively. For more details concerning the Rules, see Part IV, n. 1 below.

[20] For the often complicated prehistory of these and subsequent parts of the *Ars brevis*, see the notes at the beginning of individual parts, as well as my "Notes," p. 86.

promise, intrigued succeeding generations down to Leibniz; it has earned Llull the title of discovering the germ, however remote and primitive, of modern computer science.[21]

This mechanization was accompanied by another major change: the abandonment of analogical methods. As a mode of reasoning, analogy was replaced by traditional logic, and as a way of relating the foundations of the Art to the rest of the intelligible world, it was replaced by inclusion. As to the first, the reader will not have gone far into the work before he finds himself immersed in propositions with their subject and predicate, in syllogisms, and in the problem of finding the middle term. Just five years before, Llull had written the *Logica nova*, in which he adapted the methods of traditional logic to his own philosophical frame of reference. In the *Ars brevis* he adapts it to the Art itself, in the sense of having the mechanism of the Art function through, or in terms of, the propositions and syllogisms so familiar to the schoolmen of his day.[22] Or to put it another way, the Art now became a method for "finding" all the possible propositions and syllogisms on any given subject and for verifying their truth or falsehood.[23]

As for the change from analogy to inclusion, the former reliance on "simile, example, and metaphor"[24] is replaced here by Lull's reassurances that "everything which exists is implicit in" such and

[21] See E. Colomer's balanced and penetrating article on this topic, "Ramón Llull, ¿precursor de la Informática?" *CITEMA* 81 (Madrid, 1979), 7–44, translated from Spanish into Catalan and slightly modified as "De Ramon Llull a la moderna informàtica," *EL* 23 (1979), 113–35. This article was written to fill a gap in I. M. Bocheński's *A History of Formal Logic*, of which Colomer complains that it "does not even mention the most original and promising aspect of Llull's method, the outline of a combinatory technique contained in the Fourth Figure. The same is true of the deeper significance of the Art as an ontological logic, in the line of Plato and Hegel." Cf. *CITEMA*, p. 12, and *EL*, pp. 115–16. Colomer's complaints might have been even louder had he used the English translation of Bocheński's work, whose section on Llull (pp. 272–3) is punctuated with howlers (*gula*, "gluttony" translated as "throat"; *circularis* translated as "cruciform"; and so on), which at least serve to make the English-speaking reader agree with Bocheński's comment that "this text is far from clear."

[22] The biggest changes in this direction would come in the post-Art phase; cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 18 above.

[23] It should be clearly understood that this involves no attempt on Llull's part to treat logic from the Aristotelian formalistic point of view, or even from the medieval linguistic point of view (with its *appellatio, suppositio*, etc.); it rather involves using the Art as a way of structuring, mechanizing, and "ontologizing" traditional logic.

[24] Cf. the text corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1, n. 39. *Felix*, nearly contemporary with the *Ars demonstrativa*, is composed almost entirely of examples; and "metaphor" occupies all of Dist. x of the earlier *Principles of Medicine*.

such a figure, that "whatever exists is reducible to the above-mentioned principles," how this Art is general and universal, and how by its use the reader or practitioner can make his thought general and universal.[25] Where before he offered a looser, more open-ended method of comparison, he is now giving a much tighter and more systematized method of invention, of "finding" the right place within the structure to locate the answer to a question.[26]

As a result of this last change, the Art is now more explicit, and hence, in spite of its extraordinary intricacy, more straightforward in its application. It is therefore easier to assimilate and use. The above-mentioned open-endedness of the earlier Art, where many aspects of its use were left up to the reader's initiative, where there was considerable fluidity in the application of similes, examples, and metaphors, and where even many of Llull's more fully explained answers were only a shorthand or outline of all the structures being referred to, is replaced by a technique where the reader is led much more carefully by the hand and told much more explicitly how and where to find his solutions. As a result, it *looks* easier, and *is* easier, to understand and apply.

Manuscripts, Editions, and Translations

All these new aspects probably played their part in the great success of the *Ars brevis* (as well as of its companion piece, the *Ars generalis ultima*). In the most immediate sense, it brought Llull the recognition he had sought so long: in February of 1310, during his fourth and last visit to Paris, forty masters and bachelors in arts and medicine signed a document attesting to the fact that they had heard and approved of his lectures on the *Ars brevis*.[27] The defeat of twenty years earlier was now clearly reversed. Not long after Llull's death, his disciple Thomas le Myésier included a slightly altered "anthologized" version of the work in the *Breviculum*, the

[25] See for example Part II below, every section of which contains some statement to this effect.

[26] This does not mean, of course, that earlier phases of the Art had *no* pretensions to generality, or that *all* use of analogy was banned from later formulations of the Art. The change was one of basis and emphasis. The universality of this version of the Art, however, was one of the things that most impressed Renaissance Lullists; see for example Agrippa von Nettesheim's remarks quoted in "Llull's Influence," n. 49 above.

[27] See the "Life," § 42 and n. 169 there.

only work of Llull's to appear in that magnificent manuscript destined for the queen of France.[28]

In subsequent centuries, no other work of Llull's was so often copied or commented. We possess, in fact, some seventy manuscripts of the *Ars brevis*.[29] During the Renaissance, it was Llull's most famous work; of the twenty-three or twenty-four editions in which it was printed, all but four appeared between 1481 and 1669.[30] Moreover, either the *Ars brevis* or the version of the Art represented by it together with the *Ars generalis ultima* was commented on by Agrippa von Nettesheim, Giordano Bruno, and Johann Heinrich Alsted.[31] It was these works and commentaries that made up the greater part of Zetzner's anthology. In fact, Zetzner began his anthology with the *Ars brevis*, so for many seventeenth-century readers it provided their first contact with Ramon Llull, as was certainly the case with the young Leibniz.[32]

After that, interest in the work—as in all of Llull's works—waned. Between 1669 and the present one finds only two editions of 1744,[33] a French translation published in 1901,[34] and a Catalan adaptation of 1934.[35]

Of modern studies of the work, three deserve mention. The first is the combined analysis of the *Ars brevis* and the *Ars generalis ultima* in Carreras y Artau's great work.[36] The second, which would be of special interest for the English-speaking reader, is the

[28] For the *Breviculum*, see "Lullism," text at n. 23 above. For the version of the *Ars brevis* it contains, see Hillg, pp. 447 and 239.

[29] See the concluding bibliographical section (pp. 325–75) of Artus, *Ars Brevis*, and the reprint of this section in *EL* 13 (1969), 153–81. He lists sixty-three MSS, which from the list in Madre's forthcoming edition (see below) can be expanded to seventy.

[30] Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 335–7, and *EL* 13 (1969), 161–3. Twenty-three if the first one he lists (Barcelona, 1484) is an error for one he does not list (Barcelona, 1481; cf. RD 3); twenty-four if they are different publications. For the four more recent editions, see below.

[31] For these people, see "Lullism" pp. 81–3 above. For lists of manuscript and printed commentaries on the *Ars brevis*, see Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 347ff., and *EL* 13 (1969), 173ff.

[32] For the Zetzner editions and Leibniz, see "Lullism," pp. 81–5 above.

[33] The first of these is *Opera Parva*, Vol. I, containing six works of Ramon Llull; the second is an offprint of the first (Palma, 1744; cf. RD 326), containing only the *Ars brevis*.

[34] Raymond Lulle, *Ars brevis* (Paris, 1901). It claims to be the first translation into French, but there was a seventeenth-century translation by a Seigneur de Vassy of which two MSS are still extant, and which was published in Paris in 1632: cf. RD 206, Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 334, 337, and *EL* 13 (1969), 160, 163, as well as Hillg, pp. 304–5.

[35] *Art breu. Versió catalana explicada i adaptada al lector modern per Mossèn Joan Avinyó* (Barcelona, 1934). This is a free translation from the Latin, intermingled with explanatory material; it bears no relation whatever to the two medieval Catalan MSS mentioned below.

[36] Ca I, 427–55.

unpublished doctoral disseration by Walter W. Artus mentioned above.[37] The third, also mentioned above, is Eusebio Colomer's excellent article relating this version of the Art to modern logic and computer science.[38]

In preparing this translation I have been most fortunate in being able to use a typescript of the monumental critical edition of the Latin text prepared by Alois Madre of the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut of Freiburg.[39] This I compared with printed editions I thought the modern reader might have occasion to consult.[40] As for translations, I have consulted the only two medieval Catalan manuscripts,[41] and both indeed seem to be translations from the Latin done by later followers of Llull, and thus of limited interest as sources of the text. The French version of 1901 was done by a translator with little knowledge of Llull, and was therefore not very useful; more useful was Avinyó's Catalan adaptation of 1934.

[37] Cf. n. 29 above.

[38] Cf. n. 21 above.

[39] For the loan of which it gives me great pleasure to thank Professor Madre and the Institut. Thanks to Madre's work, I have been able to base this translation on a text that is both authoritative and free from Renaissance accretions.

[40] This means the four Zetzner editions of 1598, 1609, 1617 and 1659 (cf. n. 32 above); the Palma, 1669, edition with commentaries by Francisco Marçal (RD 264), which was reprinted in Frankfurt (Minerva), 1970; and the two Palma, 1744, editions mentioned in n. 33 above.

[41] Both probably from the fifteenth century. The first is in Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, O. 87 sup., fols. 1–44, and the second in Palma, Franciscan Convent, cod. 11, fols. 1–13. The latter was formerly in the Jesuit College of Montesión, hence the confusion of a supposed third Catalan MS in Artus, *Ars Brevis*, p. 334, and *EL* 13 (1969), 160; cf. L. Pérez in *EL* 4 (1960), 206. The fourth MS listed by Artus as containing a Spanish translation of the *Ars brevis* (Palma, Bibl. Publ., MS 999), in fact contains a Latin abstract of the work, and a Spanish translation of the probably apocryphal *Art of Confession*; see García Pastor, Hillgarth, and Pérez Martínez, *Manuscritos lulianos de la Biblioteca Pública de Palma* (Barcelona-Palma, 1965), pp. 104–5.

GOD, WITH THE HELP of Your grace, wisdom, and love, here begins the *Ars brevis*, which is a replica of the General Art, that is, of the work beginning "God, with the help of Your supreme perfection, here begins the *Ars generalis ultima*."[1]

PROLOGUE

WE HAVE WRITTEN this *Ars brevis* so that the *Ars magna* may be more easily understood. For once the former is understood, the latter, along with the other Arts, can be easily understood and learned.

The subject of this Art is the answering of all questions, assuming that one can identify them by name.[2]

This book is divided into thirteen parts, just like the *Ars magna*.[3]

The first part concerns the Alphabet. The second, the Figures. The third, the Definitions. The fourth, the Rules. The fifth, the Table. The sixth, the Evacuation of the Third Figure. The seventh, the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure. The eighth, the Mixture of Principles and Rules. The ninth, the Nine Subjects. The tenth, Application. The eleventh, Questions. The twelfth, Habituation. The thirteenth, the way the Art should be taught.

And now we will begin by discussing the first part.

[1] The phrase inside quotation marks is, verbatim, the incipit of the *Ars generalis ultima*. For the *Ars brevis* as an abbreviation of and introduction to the *Ars generalis ultima*, see Ca I, 428, as well as n. 3 below.

[2] That is to say, assuming that one knows under which of the ten general questions (see Part IV below) any particular question should be classified. The point is more clearly made in the corresponding passage of the *Proemium* of the *Ars generalis ultima*. This is, of course, the point of an art that is *inventiva*; cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, n. 16.

[3] These "parts" correspond exactly, which greatly facilitates cross-consultation. Note that throughout the *Ars brevis* Llull almost always refers to the *Ars generalis ultima* as the *Ars magna*.

PART I, WHICH TREATS OF THE ALPHABET OF THIS ART

We have employed an alphabet in this Art so that it can be used to make figures, as well as to mix principles and rules for the purpose of investigating the truth. For, as a result of any one letter having many meanings, the intellect becomes more general in its reception of the things signified, as well as in acquiring knowledge. And this alphabet must be learned by heart, for otherwise the artist will not be able to make proper use of this Art.

THE ALPHABET[1]

B signifies goodness, difference, whether?, God, justice, and avarice.
C signifies greatness, concordance, what?, angel, prudence, and gluttony.
D signifies eternity or duration,[2] contrariety, of what?, heaven, fortitude, and lust.
E signifies power, beginning, why?, man, temperance, and pride.
F signifies wisdom, middle, how much?, imaginative, faith, and accidie.
G signifies will, end, of what kind?, sensitive, hope, and envy.
H signifies virtue, majority, when?, vegetative, charity, and ire.
I signifies truth, equality, where?, elementative, patience, and lying.
K signifies glory, minority, how and with what?, instrumentative, pity, and inconstancy.

[1] For the changes between this Alphabet and that of the *Ars demonstrativa*, see Introduction, text at nn. 10 and 11 above; for its development within the ternary phase of the Art, see above Introduction, n. 17.

[2] Some of the MSS and all of the printed sources consulted have just "duration." These two concepts are interchangeable in this slot of Figure A, which does not mean that they are synonymous, except as an attribute of God. Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 98.

TABLE 6. THE ALPHABET OF THE *ARS BREVIS*.

	Fig. A	*Fig. T*	*Questions and Rules†*	*Subjects*	*Virtues*	*Vices*
B	goodness	difference	whether?	God	justice	avarice
C	greatness	concordance	what?	angel	prudence	gluttony
D	eternity*	contrariety	of what?	heaven	fortitude	lust
E	power	beginning	why?	man	temperance	pride
F	wisdom	middle	how much?	imaginative	faith	accidie
G	will	end	of what kind?	sensitive	hope	envy
H	virtue	majority	when?	vegetative	charity	ire
I	truth	equality	where?	elementative	patience	lying
K	glory	minority	how? and with what?	instrumentative	pity	inconstancy

* or duration

† See Part IV, n. 1, for the original Latin terms and their relationship to the equivalent "rules."

PART II, WHICH TREATS OF THE FOUR FIGURES

1. THE FIRST FIGURE, DENOTED BY A

THIS PART is divided into four sections, one for each of the four figures. The First Figure is that of A, and it contains nine principles, to wit, goodness, greatness, etc.,[1] and nine letters, to wit, B, C, D, E, etc. This figure is circular to show that any subject can become a predicate and vice versa, as when one says, "goodness is great," "greatness is good," and so on.[2] In this figure, moreover, the artist seeks the natural conjunction between subject and predicate,[3] as well as their relative disposition and proportion, so that he can find the middle term and thus reach a conclusion.

Each principle, taken by itself, is completely general, as when one says "goodness" or "greatness." However, as soon as one principle is applied to[4] another, then it is subordinate, as when we say "great goodness." And when some principle is applied to a singular thing, then it is completely particular, as when we say "Peter's goodness is great." And thus the intellect has a ladder for ascending and descending; as, for instance, descending from a completely general principle to one neither completely general nor completely particular, and from a principle neither completely general nor completely particular to one that is completely par-

[1] I.e., the nine dignities listed in the previous Alphabet, which are those used throughout the ternary phase of the Art; cf. "Llull's Thought," n. 29 above. For a general discussion of Figure A and the dignities in this phase, see Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 121ff.

[2] Once again the convertibility of the dignities; see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 6, for references.

[3] Note how this phrase is identical with what is defined as the activity of a logician in Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 87 below, and how it is couched in terms identical with the new definition of "conjunctive middle" of Figure T, sec. 2 below. For the problem of finding the middle term mentioned towards the end of this sentence, see the Introduction above, and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 218–22.

[4] *Contrahitur* could also be translated as "joined or combined with"; cf. *Taula d'esta Art*, *ORL* XVII, 391, s.v. *contracció*. It is opposed to "abstraction" (cf. *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 66–9), and carries with it an idea of "contraction," as Llull points out in the *Ars generalis ultima* (Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 87 on Logic) when he says that abstract "goodness" by itself is completely general, but when it is "joined" to a predicate, as in the expression "goodness is great," it is less general, and less general still if the predicate itself is less general, as in "the goodness of (a) man." Cf. Pla I, 257–60, 305.


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Plate XVI. *Ars brevis,* The Second Figure.
From Escorial, Ms f-iv-12, fol. 4.



PLATE XVII. *Ars brevis,* The Third Figure.
From Escorial, Ms f-IV-12, fol. 6.



PLATE XVIII. *Ars brevis,* The Fourth Figure.
From Escorial, Ms f-IV-12, fol. 7.

ticular.[5] And in a similar fashion one can discuss the ascent of this ladder.

Everything that exists is implicit in the principles of this figure, for everything is either good or great, etc., as God and angels, which are good, great, etc. Therefore, whatever exists is reducible to the above-mentioned principles.[6]

2. THE SECOND FIGURE, DENOTED BY T

THE SECOND FIGURE goes under the name of T, and it contains three triangles,[7] each of which is general and all-embracing.

1. The first triangle consists of difference, concordance and contrariety, and it comprises everything which exists, according to its category. For everything which exists is either in difference, concordance or contrariety, and outside of these principles nothing can be found.

One must know, moreover, that each angle of this triangle has three species. For there is a difference between sensual and sensual, as for instance between a stone and a tree. There is also a difference between the sensual and the intellectual, as for instance between body and soul. And there is furthermore a difference between intellectual and intellectual, as between soul and God, between the soul and an angel,[8] between one angel and another, or between God and an angel. And the same can be said for concordance and contrariety, each in its own way. And this difference existing in each angle of this triangle is the ladder by which the intellect ascends and descends, so that it can find the natural middle term[9] between subject and predicate, with which middle term it can

[5] Many of the printed texts have truncated the part of the sentence following the semicolon to, "from a completely general principle to one not completely general, and from one not completely particular to one completely particular." For the subject of the ascent and descent of the intellect so important to Llull, see "Llull's Thought," n. 58.

[6] Cf. introduction, text preceding n. 25 above.

[7] As opposed to the five triangles of the *Ars demonstrativa;* cf. introduction, n. 11 above, as well as my "Cronologia," pp. 40–3. Here (as opposed to the *Ars generalis ultima*, to say nothing of the *Ars demonstrativa*) there is no mention of the different colors for each triangle. For general discussions of Figure T, see Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 173ff., and the references in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1, n. 15.

[8] "Between the soul and an angel" is missing in the printed sources consulted.

[9] Yet another translation of *medium* (Cat. *mijà*)—cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. 1, n. 16—this one related, as its context makes clear, to the passage commented in n. 3 above.

reach a conclusion. And the same is true for the ladder of concordance and contrariety, each in its own way.

2. The second triangle consists of beginning, middle, and end, and it comprises everything that exists. For everything that exists is either in beginning, middle, or end, and outside of these principles nothing can be found.

The word "cause" written in the angle of "beginning" stands for the efficient, material, formal, and final cause. The words "quantity" and "time" refer to the other nine predicaments, and to those things that can be reduced to them.[10]

The angle of "middle" contains three species of middle. First there is the conjunctive middle, which exists between subject and predicate, as when we say, "man is an animal."[11] For between man and animal there are middle terms, such as their life and body, without which man would not be an animal. Then there is the middle of mensuration, which refers to the act existing between the doer and the doable,[12] like loving between the lover and the lovable. And then there is the middle between extremes, like a line between two points. And this angle of "middle" acts as a general ladder with respect to the intellect.

The angle of "end" also contains three species. The first is the end of privation, which refers to a privative state[13] and to those things that are in the past.[14] The second species is the end of termination, which refers to the extremities, like the two points that terminate a line, or like the lover and beloved in relation to loving. The third species is the end of perfection, which refers to ultimate purpose, like man, who exists to multiply his species, and to understand, love, and remember God, and so forth. This angle also acts as a general ladder with respect to the intellect.

[10] The "predicaments" are, of course, the Aristotelian categories. Notice how this description is similar to the corresponding passage in the *Ars demonstrativa* (cf. Dist. I, n. 19), but more specific and explicit.

[11] Cf. n. 3 above. This intrusion of logic into Figure T is something quite new with the *Ars brevis* (it is not even present in the corresponding passage of the *Ars generalis ultima* that was probably written some years earlier). For a comparison of how the "conjunctive middle" was treated in earlier works of the Art, see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 20.

[12] *Inter agentem et agibile*. This relating of Figure T with the correlative doctrine, as in the second species of "end" below, is another innovation of the *Ars brevis*; cf. again *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 20.

[13] Thus *habitum privativum* in the MSS, and not *habitum privatum* as in most of the printed sources.

[14] The printed texts and a few of the MSS add, "like death which ends life."

3. The third triangle is made up of majority, equality, and minority, and it is general and all-embracing in its way. For whatever exists is either in majority, equality, or minority. Majority has three species. The first is when there exists majority between substance and substance, as, for instance, the substance of heaven, which is greater than the substance of fire. The second species is when there exists majority between substance and accident, like a substance that is greater than its quantity; for substance exists of itself, which is something no accident does. The third species is when there exists majority between accident and accident, like understanding, which is greater than seeing, and seeing than running.[15] And what we have said about majority applies equally to minority, since they are correlative to one another.

The angle of equality has three species. The first is when things are substantially equal, like Peter and Martin, who are equal in substance. The second species is when substance and accident are regarded as equal to one another, such as substance and its quantity. The third species is when there is equality between accident and accident, like understanding and loving, which are equal in their object. And this angle is a ladder by which the intellect can ascend and descend, as was said of the other triangles. And when the intellect ascends to general objects, then it itself becomes general; and when it descends to particulars, then it itself becomes particular.

The Figure T serves the First Figure, for through difference one can distinguish between goodness and goodness, between goodness and greatness,[16] etc. And by joining this figure to the first, the intellect acquires knowledge. And because this figure is general, therefore the intellect becomes general.

3. THE THIRD FIGURE

THE THIRD FIGURE is a composite of the first and second; for the letter B that appears in it stands for the B that is in both the first and second figures; and similarly for the other letters.

[15] Thus in the printed sources and some of the MSS; other MSS, instead of "running," have "believing."

[16] Thus in most sources; the Zetzner editions, however, have "greatness and greatness" for this pair.

This one consists of 36 compartments,[17] as can be seen in the illustration. Each compartment has many different meanings as a result of the two letters it contains. Thus the compartment of B C has many different meanings as a result of B C, and similarly the compartment of B D has many different meanings as a result of B D, and so on.[18] And this should be clear from the alphabet we gave above.

Each compartment contains two letters, and these represent subject and predicate, between which the artist seeks the middle term that will join them, like goodness and greatness that are joined through concordance, and similarly for other terms. With this middle term the artist tries to reach a conclusion and state a proposition.

This figure is meant to show that any principle can be attributed to any of the others: thus to B we can attribute C, D, etc., and to C we can attribute B, D, etc., as can be seen from the illustration. This is so that the intellect may know each principle in terms of all the others, and be enabled to deduce many arguments from a single proposition.

To give an example with "goodness," we make it into a subject and use the other principles as predicates, giving:

	goodness is different
goodness is great	goodness is concordant
goodness is enduring	goodness is contrary
goodness is powerful	goodness is beginning

[17] Combination without repetition of 9 elements taken two at a time, hence

$$\binom{9}{2} = \frac{9 \cdot 8}{1 \cdot 2} = 36.$$

In appearance it is like one of the second figures of the *Ars demonstrativa*; but in function it is quite different. It is no longer merely a second way of representing a first figure, but it is now a composite figure and hence much more general, as will become clear from the explanations that follow. Notice also how in the *Ars demonstrativa* we have combinations with, and here without, repetitions. For general considerations on the Third Figure, see: Ca I, 433–4; Pla I, 304–5; and Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 217ff. This figure remained unchanged throughout the ternary phase of the Art.

[18] In the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* v, 402 = Int. v, 44, Llull is more explicit: "Each compartment has six meanings, like the compartment of B C, which signifies Goodness, Greatness, Difference, Concordance, First and Second Rule, and like the compartment of B D, which signifies Goodness, Duration, Difference, Contrariety, First and Third Rule, and so on for the others," which is followed by a detailed interpretation of each compartment.

goodness is knowable	goodness is mediating
goodness is lovable	goodness is ending
goodness is virtuous	goodness is magnifying
goodness is true	goodness is equalizing
goodness is glorious	goodness is lessening

What we have said of goodness can be applied equally well to the other principles, each in its own way.

This figure is very general, and by using it the intellect is made very general in acquiring knowledge.

It is a condition of this figure that one compartment not be contrary to another, but that they be concordant in their conclusion. Thus the compartment of B C should not be contrary to that of B D, and so on for the others.[19] With such a condition, the intellect is conditioned to the acquisition of knowledge.

4. THE FOURTH FIGURE

THE FOURTH FIGURE has three circles, the outermost of which is fixed and the two inside ones of which are mobile, as appears in the illustration.[20] The middle circle revolves on top of the outer fixed circle, so that, for instance, C can be put opposite B. The innermost circle revolves on the middle circle, so that, for instance, D can be put opposite C. And in this way 9 compartments are formed at a time, one being B C D, another C D E, and so on. After that, E of the smaller circle can be put opposite C of the middle one, with which another 9 compartments are formed. When all the letters of the smallest circle have been brought opposite B on the largest circle and C on the middle circle, then C is the middle term between B and D, since B and D are related to one another through the meanings of C. And the same is true of the other compartments. And thus by means of these compartments, one may seek out necessary conclusions and find them.

[19] The Zetzner editions leave out "should not be contrary to that of B D," leaving a text one would have to translate as, "in their conclusion, like the compartment of B C, and so on for the others." This changes a prohibition between compartments to one between components *within* compartments.

[20] For this Fourth Figure, which is basically a very modified version of the First Demonstrative Figure of the *Ars demonstrativa*, see: Ca 1, 434–5; Pla 1, 308–11; and Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 227ff.

After that, we can bring all the letters opposite the B of the largest circle and D of the middle circle, and so on for all the letters of the middle and smallest circle, by rotating them, with the B of the largest circle remaining immobile, until we arrive at a position with B on the largest circle, I on the middle one, and K on the innermost; and this will make a total of 252 compartments.[21]

This figure is more general than the third, because in each compartment of this figure there are three letters, whereas in each compartment of the Third Figure there are only two. Thus the intellect is rendered more general as a result of the Fourth Figure than as a result of the Third.[22]

The condition of the Fourth Figure is that the intellect must apply to a proposition those letters that are most applicable to it. And once the compartment has been formed from three letters, it must grasp the meanings of the letters, keeping in mind the agreement between subject and predicate and avoiding disagreement. And with this condition, the intellect can acquire knowledge by means of the Fourth Figure, and can form many arguments toward a single conclusion.

So much for the four figures, which the artist must learn by heart, for without them he cannot use or practice this Art.

[21] Llull is saying that with the outer wheel remaining fixed, we can place opposite the B on that wheel all the possible 2-letter permutations of the remaining 8 letters of his alphabet, which gives

$$\binom{8}{2} = \frac{8 \cdot 7}{1 \cdot 2} = 28$$

usable positions of the two inner wheels (i.e., without repetitions of letters). Now since in any one position we can read off 9 compartments between the linked-up spokes, as it were, this gives us a total of $28 \times 9 = 252$ compartments. This does, however, involve repetitions; in fact, each compartment is repeated three times, since B C D = C D B (which appears when C K are lined up under B) = D B C (which appears when I K are lined up under B). For Llull's combinatorial purposes here, however, this is unimportant. In the table in Part v he has eliminated the superfluous combinations, giving $252 \div 3 = 84$ columns (see n. 3 there).

[22] Marçal (see introduction, n. 40 above) in his commentary on this passage quotes the statement from Llull's *Art amativa* (*ORL* XVII, 22) that "the entire Art is contained in this Fourth Figure."

PART III, WHICH TREATS OF DEFINITIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES

In this Art, the principles thereof are defined, so that they may be known by said definitions, and so that one may use them, affirming or denying in such a way that the definitions remain unimpaired. With such conditions, the intellect acquires knowledge, discovers middle terms, and dispels ignorance, which is its enemy.

1. Goodness is that thing by reason of which good does good.[1]

2. Greatness is that by reason of which goodness, duration, etc. are great.[2]

3. Eternity or duration[3] is that by reason of which goodness, etc. endure.

4. Power is that by reason of which goodness, etc. can exist and act.

5. Wisdom is that by reason of which the wise man understands.

6. Will is that by reason of which goodness, greatness, etc. are lovable or desirable.[4]

[1] The printed sources, along with two MSS, add, "and thus good is being and evil is nonbeing," for which see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 66 above. For the introduction of these definitions into the Art, see introduction, text at n. 14 above; and for the reasons for their being given in terms of functionality ("in terms of a power and its specific act") rather than in traditional Aristotelian terms of genus and species, see Part XI, ch. 6, Question 2, and ch. 2, Question 3 below, as well as "Llull's Thought," n. 46 above. Llull was aware of the opposition these definitions aroused; most of the equivalent Part III of the *Ars generalis ultima* is taken up with a defense of this doctrine, ending on an uncharacteristically angry note against those who with "a dog's fangs and a serpent's tongue scorn and slander our principles and their definitions." As for the definitions of these eighteen basic principles, they appear in every work of the Art of the ternary phase, and usually with almost identical wording; in seven works, moreover, they are accorded extensive commentaries. These are: the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (*MOG* V, 3–12), *Art amativa* (*ORL* XVII, 89–150); *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* (*ORL* XVII, 410–17); *Taula general* (*ORL* XVI, 312–36); *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (*MOG* V, 370–401 = Int. v, 12–43); *Tree of Science* (*OE* I, 557–62); and *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis* (*MOG* V, 303–7 = Int. iii, 3–7). See also Pla I, 129ff., and Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 245ff.

[2] The printed sources and one MS add, "and it encompasses all the farthest reaches of being."

[3] The printed sources and three MSS omit "eternity or" (cf. Part I, n. 2 above).

[4] The printed sources omit "lovable or."

7. Virtue is the origin of the union of goodness, greatness, and the other principles.[5]

8. Truth is that which is true concerning goodness, greatness, etc.

9. Glory is that bliss in which goodness, greatness, etc. come to rest.

10. Difference is that by reason of which goodness, etc. are clearly distinguishable from one another.

11. Concordance is that by reason of which goodness, etc. accord in one or in several things.

12. Contrariety is the mutual opposition of certain things as a result of different goals.

13. Beginning is that which is found in everything where there is any question of priority.

14. Middle is the subject through which end influences beginning, and beginning reinfluences end, and thus it participates in the nature of both.

15. End is that in which beginning comes to rest.

16. Majority is the image of the immensity of goodness, greatness, etc.

17. Equality is the subject in which the end of concordance, goodness, etc. comes to rest.

18. Minority is the thing close to nothingness.

So much for definitions of the principles, which must be learned by heart; for without knowing these definitions, the Art is unteachable.[6]

[5] For this linking of the concepts of "virtue" and "unity," see Pla I, 113, 183.
[6] Cf. Rossi, "Legacy," p. 198.

PART IV, WHICH TREATS OF RULES

THE RULES of this Art consist of ten general questions, to which all other possible questions can be reduced. They are the following

B. Whether a thing is.
C. What is it?
D. Of what is it?
E. Why is it?
F. How much is it?
G. Of what kind is it?
H. When is it?
I. Where is it?
K-1. How is it?
K-2. With what is it?[1]

Each of these questions is divisible into various species.

B. "Whether" has three species, to wit, dubitative, affirmative and negative, so that, from the outset, the intellect assumes either side to be possible, and does not bind itself to believing, which is not as natural to it as is understanding. And thus it must take that side with which it has the greatest understanding, which side must be that of truth.[2]

C. "What?" has four species:

[1] These ten Rules or Questions first appeared in the *Taula general* of 1293–4 (cf. introduction, text at n. 19 above), and they were reproduced almost verbatim in the *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* of the same year of 1294 (see Part IV of my "Notes" for the problem of the chronology of these two works, the second of which has usually been assigned a date four or five years earlier). From then on no work of the Art is without them. Those works which, in addition to the two already mentioned, contained more extended explanations of the Rules are: *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (*MOG* v, 360–7 ≡ Int. v, 2-9); *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744, pp. 11–18); *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis* (*MOG* v, 307–11 ≡ Int. iii, 7–11); and *Liber de praedicatione* (*ROL* III, 168–74)—to say nothing of the section corresponding to this in the *Ars generalis ultima*. As given, for example, in this last work, the list of rules with their corresponding questions is as follows: B. *possibilitas—utrum?*; C. *quidditas—quid?*; D. *materialitas—de quo?*; E. *formalitas—quare?*; F. *quantitas—quantum?*; G. *qualitas—qualis?*; H. *tempus—quando?*; I. *locus—ubi?*; K-1. *modalitas—quomodo?*; K-2. *instrumentalitas—cum quo?* Note that in order to accommodate ten rules to a nine-letter alphabet, Llull has had to put two rules in the last slot. For the complicated relation between these rules, the Aristotelian and scholastic topics, the Aristotelian categories, and earlier partial formulations on Llull's part, see Pla I, 261ff., and especially 275ff. It is curious to note that Giordano Bruno in his *De lampade combinatoria lulliana* (Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1617), p. 705, refers to these ten questions as the "syncategoremata" of the Art, in opposition to the "categoremata" of Figures A and T. Marçal in his edition of the *Ars brevis* (see introduction, n. 40 above) has an interesting *scholium* on the double nature of these questions (referring to the unknown or doubtful) and rules (referring to methods of argumentation or teaching).

[2] The three "species" of this question correspond to the lost black triangle of Figure T (cf. Introduction, n. 11 above).

1. The first is definitional, as when one asks, What is the intellect? To which one must reply that it is that power whose function it is to understand.
2. The second species is when one asks, What does the intellect have coessentially in itself?[3] To which one must reply that it has its correlatives, that is to say, intellective, intelligible, and understanding,[4] without which it could not exist, and would, moreover, be idle and lack nature, purpose, and repose.
3. The third species is when one asks, What is the intellect in something other than itself? To which one must reply that it is good when understanding in goodness, great when understanding in greatness, etc.; and grammatical in grammar, logical in logic, rhetorical in rhetoric, etc.
4. The fourth species is when one asks, What does a thing have in another thing? As when one asks, What does the intellect have in another thing? To which one must reply, In knowledge understanding and in faith belief.

D. The rule "Of what?" has three species:

1. The first is the original meaning, as when one says, Of what is the intellect? To which one must reply, Of itself, since it is not naturally derived from some other general thing.
2. The second species is when one inquires specifically, What is a thing composed of? As when one asks, What is the intellect composed of? To which one must reply that it is composed of its own specific matter and form, with which it achieves specific understanding.[5]
3. The third species is when one asks, Whose is a thing? As when one asks, Whose is the intellect? To which one must reply that it is man's, as a part belongs to the whole, and a horse to its master.

[3] The *Ars generalis ultima* has "essentially and naturally" instead of "coessentially."

[4] *Intellectivum, intelligibile et intelligere.* One of the few direct uses of the correlative doctrine in the *Ars brevis*. See T. Carreras i Artau, "El llenguatge filosòfic de Ramon Llull," *EUC* 21 (1936), 547, n. 8, where this passage is commented. Artus, *Ars Brevis*, p. 275, paraphrases: "the intellect as power, an intelligible nature ['object' would have closer to the normal Lullian terminology; cf. Part x, "Hundred Forms," no. 78 below], and the act of understanding which links the first two and completes the essence of the intellect."

[5] The different version of this last sentence in the *Ars generalis ultima* helps to explain Llull's meaning: "To which one must reply that it is composed of its own essential principles, that is to say, its intellective, intelligible and understanding. And similarly with man who is made up of his body and his soul, with a nail which is of iron, and so on."

E. The fourth rule[6] has two species, to wit, formal and final.

1. The formal aspect is when one asks, Why does a thing exist? As when one asks, Why does the intellect exist? To which one must reply that it is because of its specific matter and form, with which it has a specific understanding and with which it acts in accordance with its own species.
2. The second species is with respect to end, as when one asks, Why does the intellect exist? To which one must reply, So that objects may be intelligible, or, So that one may have knowledge of things.

F. The fifth rule asks about quantity, and has two species:[7]

1. The first is what one inquires about continuous quantity, as when one says, How much intellect is there? To which one must reply that there is as much as there can be through spiritual quantity, and this quantity has nothing to do with points or lines.
2. The second species is when one inquires about discrete quantity, as when one says, How much intellect is there? To which one must reply that there is as much as the amount of its correlatives, by which[8] it is diffused and sustained, that is to say, the intellective, intelligible, and understanding, with which it operates theoretically and practically, with respect to the general and the particular.

G. The sixth rule concerns quality, and it has two species:

1. The first is when one asks, What is the characteristic and primary quality of intellect? To which one must reply, The intelligibility with which it is clothed. Extrinsic understanding is a secondary and more distant property, with which the intellect understands a man, a lion, etc. It is of this that the intrinsic and substantial understanding of the intellect is clothed, and similarly for what is extrinsically intelligible.
2. The second species is when one inquires about appropriated quality, as[9] when one asks, What is an appropriated quality

[6] The printed sources add "of why?" The two species are further clarified in the *Taula general* (*ORL* XVI, 341), where Llull says they involve asking respectively "why things exist, and why they do what they do." In the corresponding section of the *Ars generalis ultima* he says one is *per existentiam* and the other *per agentiam*.

[7] Quantity reappears in Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 16.

[8] The printed sources and many MSS have "in which."

[9] "When one inquires about appropriated quality, as" is missing in the printed sources consulted.

of the intellect? To which one must reply, Believing, doubting, or supposing. For these acts are not those of the intellect proper, but of the understanding.

H. The seventh rule inquiries about time, and it has fifteen species signified by the rules of C, D, K, as is pointed out in the *Ars magna*.[10] But since this Art is brief, we must discuss this rule in few words, as when we ask, In what way does the intellect exist in time, if it is not made up of points and lines? To which one must reply that the intellect exists in time because it had a beginning and because it consists of temporal succession, by means of the motion of the body to which it is attached.[11]

I. The eighth rule inquires about place, and it has fifteen species signified by the rules of C, D, K, as is pointed out in the *Ars magna*.[12] Thus when one asks, Where is the intellect, one can answer briefly that it is in the subject in which it is, like a part in the whole, not however confined but rather diffused in it, for the essence of intellect has nothing to do with point, line, or surface.

K contains two rules, namely of modality and instrumentality.

K-1. The modal rule has four species, as when one asks (1) How does the intellect exist?[13] (2) How does one part exist in another?[14] (3) How do the parts exist in the whole, and the whole in its parts? and (4) How does it transmit its likeness outside itself? To which one must reply that subjectively it exists in the manner already determined through the above-mentioned species. Objectively,[15] it understands by finding the middle term existing between subject and predicate designated by the figures, and by multiplying alien

[10] See the corresponding section of the *Ars generalis ultima* as well as the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 15, where Llull explains that these species correspond to the 4 of the second rule (C), the 3 of the third (D), the 4 of the ninth (K-1) and the 4 of the tenth (K-2). For example, the questions based on C he formulates as, "When is the intellect?" "When does the intellect exist coessentially in itself?" etc.; those based on D as, "What is time composed of?" etc.; and so on for the other two rules. He admits, however, that "it is very difficult for the intellect to understand time" by means of these 15 species.

[11] This example is from the ninth rule [K-1]; cf. the corresponding part of the *Ars generalis ultima*.

[12] See the references under n. 10 above. The distribution is presumably the same here.

[13] *Quomodo est intellectus*? Literally, "How is the intellect?" The *Ars generalis ultima* phrases it as, "How does a thing exist in itself?" In the version of the *Ars brevis* appearing in the *Breviculum* (fol. 35r) and in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 17, it appears as, "How does a part exist as a part?"

[14] Literally, "How is a part in a part?"

[15] The "objectively" is missing in the printed sources and in many MSS.

species abstracted from sense and imagination, which are characterized and understood in its own intelligible faculty.

K-2. The second rule of K has four species, as when one asks, (1) With what does the intellect exist? (2) With what does one part exist in another? (3) With what do the parts exist in the whole, and the whole in its parts? and (4) With what does it transmit its likeness outside itself?[16] To which one must reply that it exists with its correlatives, without which it can neither exist nor understand. And it understands with alien species, from which it fashions an instrument for understanding.

So much for the rules with which the intellect solves questions, which it does by reducing them by means of rules; by keeping in mind what a rule and its species means subjectively;[17] by having the intellect discard whatever question is dubious as a result of applying the definitions of principles; by choosing and by understanding intelligibly the affirmative or negative side of the question; and this so that the intellect be removed from doubt.

[16] Note the exact parallelism between these four species and those of the first rule of K.

[17] After this the original adds another "by reducing a question by means of principles and rules," which seems redundant.

PART V, WHICH TREATS OF THE TABLE[1]

THIS TABLE is the subject in which the intellect becomes universal, because by said table it understands and abstracts many particulars on all matters, with the principles surveying the particulars objectively, and the rules subjectively.[2] And this it does by applying to each question twenty arguments to explain said question, one argument being extracted from each compartment of a given column.

The table, as one can see, has 7 columns, in which the 84 columns of the *Ars magna* are implicit. In this table T means that the letters which come before it belong to the First Figure, and those after it to the Second Figure.[3]

[1] The *tabula* (Cat. *taula*), which is derived directly from the Fourth Figure (cf. n. 3 below), first appeared in the *Taula general* of 1293–4. After that it appeared in its full form only in the *Ars compendiosa* (ed. Ottaviano, pp. 118–30) and in the *Ars generalis ultima*. It had a precursor in the ternary combinations of Conditions (cf. Introduction, text at n. 18 above), of the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (*MOG* v, 14–36), and the *Art amativa* (*MOG* VI, 64–90 = Int. ii, 58–96; I cite this edition because the equivalent passage in the Catalan edition, *ORL* XVII, 154ff. is lacking the combinatory letter notation which shows the relationship to the table).

[2] For the earlier *intelligit,* "understands," many MSS have *colligit,* "gathers, brings together." The phrase "and the rules subjectively" is missing in the Zetzner editions.

[3] As Llull says here, this table is an abbreviation or sample of the larger one in the *Ars generalis ultima*. The latter is engendered by the machinery of the Fourth Figure, but omitting the repetitions, which gives us

$$\binom{9}{3} = \frac{9 \cdot 8 \cdot 7}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3} = 84$$

compartments (cf. Part II, n. 21). For these compartments, see: Giordano Bruno, *De lulliano specierum scrutinio* (Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1617), pp. 670–1; and Agrippa von Nettesheim, *In Artem brevem* (ed. cit), pp. 841–9; as well as Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 285–7. Llull then takes each of these compartments and sets it at the head of a column containing further variations achieved by distinguishing the letters referring to Figure A from those referring to Figure T. If for a moment we do this by using upper case for the former and lower case for the latter, instead of putting the letter *T* between them as Llull does, it will become clear that the first column, for instance, consists of all the permutations of the six letters *B D C b c d* taken three at a time, or

$$\binom{6}{3} = \frac{6 \cdot 5 \cdot 4}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3} = 20,$$

giving us the number of triads in each column. We thus have a total of 1,680 compartments. Now for the *Ars brevis*, Llull just takes 7 of the 84 columns of the larger table. He chooses them by taking the first of the 28 starting with B, the first of the 21 starting with C, etc., ending with the one starting with H (cf. the passages cited from Bruno—the *Ars brevis* uses the first element of each "domus"—Agrippa, and Artus).

By means of this table the intellect is ascendant and descendant. It is ascendant when it ascends to things that are prior and more general, and descendant when it descends to things that are posterior and particular. And in addition it is connective, since it can connect columns, as, for instance, the column of B C D with that of C D E, and so on.

The Table

BCD	CDE	DEF	EFG	FGH	GHI	HIK
BCTB	CDTC	DETD	EFTE	FGTF	GHTG	HITH
BCTC	CDTD	DETE	EFTF	FGTG	GHTH	HITI
BCTD	CDTE	DETF	EFTG	FGTH	GHTI	HITK
BDTB	CETC	DFTD	EGTE	FHTF	GITG	HKTH
BDTC	CETD	DFTE	EGTF	FHTG	GITH	HKTI
BDTD	CETE	DFTF	EGTG	FHTH	GITI	HKTK
BTBC	CTCD	DTDE	ETEF	FTFG	GTGH	HTHI
BTBD	CTCE	DTDF	ETEG	FTFH	GTGI	HTHK
BTCD	CTDE	DTEF	ETFG	FTGH	GTHI	HTIK
CDTB	DETC	EFTD	FGTE	GHTF	HITG	IKTH
CDTC	DETD	EFTE	FGTF	GHTG	HITH	IKTI
CDTD	DETE	EFTF	FGTG	GHTH	HITI	IKTK
CTBC	DTCD	ETDE	FTEF	GTFG	HTGH	ITHI
CTBD	DTCE	ETDF	FTEG	GTFH	HTGI	ITHK
CTCD	DTDE	ETEF	FTFG	GTGH	HTHI	ITIK
DTBC	ETCD	FTDE	GTEF	HTFG	ITGH	KTHI
DTBD	ETCE	FTDF	GTEG	HTFH	ITGI	KTHK
DTCD	ETDE	FTEF	GTFG	HTGH	ITHI	KTIK
TBCD	TCDE	TDEF	TEFG	TFGH	TGHI	THIK

PART VI, WHICH TREATS OF THE EVACUATION OF THE THIRD FIGURE[1]

THE INTELLECT evacuates the compartments of the Third Figure by extracting from them as much as it can, taking from each compartment those things that the letters signify, so as to apply the things signified to the proposition, and it thus becomes applicative, investigative, and inventive. We will give an example of this in one compartment, and the others are to be dealt with in similar fashion.

From the compartment of B C the intellect draws forth 12 propositions by saying:

goodness is great	difference is good
goodness is different	difference is great
goodness is concordant	difference is concordant
greatness is good	concordance is good
greatness is different	concordance is great
greatness is concordant	concordance is different[2]

And having formed these 12 propositions by changing subject into predicate and conversely, the compartment is evacuated of these propositions.

Then it is evacuated of 12 middle terms. And they are called middle terms because they are placed between subject and predicate, with which they accord in genus or species. And with these middle terms, the intellect can become disputative and determinative. Thus, for instance, one can say, Everything which is mag-

[1] The techniques in this and the next part made their first hesitant appearance in the *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis* of 1304 (*MOG* v, 314, 338 = Int. iii, 14, 38). Here and in the *Ars generalis ultima* we have the first and only time they appear in their fully developed form. For more information on their functioning, see Ca I, 445–9, and Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 296–302.

[2] The compartment of B C implies those of B B, C C, and C B, and this for the two different meanings of each letter. We therefore have 4 concepts, each of which can be combined with 3 others, or 4 × 3 = 12. See Ca I, 445–6, for a tabulation of the results.

nified by greatness is great; goodness is magnified by greatness; therefore goodness is great, and so on for the others.[3]

After performing this evacuation, the intellect evacuates the same compartment by means of 24 questions, since two questions are implicit in each proposition. Thus one has:

goodness is great:
Whether goodness is great.
What is great goodness?
goodness is different:
Whether goodness is different.
What is different goodness?
goodness is concordant:
Whether goodness is concordant.
What is concordant goodness?
greatness is good:
Whether greatness is good.
What is good greatness?
greatness is different:
Whether greatness is different.
What is different greatness?
greatness is concordant:
Whether greatness is concordant.
What is concordant greatness?

difference is good:
Whether difference is good.
What is good difference?
difference is great:
Whether difference is great.
What is great difference?
difference is concordant:
Whether difference is concordant.
What is concordant difference?
concordance is good:
Whether concordance is good.
What is good concordance?
concordance is great:
Whether concordance is great.
What is great concordance?
concordance is different:
Whether concordance is different.
What is different concordance?

Once this evacuation of questions has been carried out, the intellect then evacuates the compartment with the definitions of goodness and greatness, and with the three species of difference and concordance that appear in the Second Figure. Then it evacuates the compartment with the three species of Rule B and with the four species of Rule C. Having carried out this evacuation,

[3] This last sentence is missing in the Zetzner editions.

the intellect solves the aforementioned questions in said evacuation, by observing the conditions of the compartment, affirming, or denying. And thus the intellect banishes doubts from the compartment, remaining in it calmly and positively. Moreover it now knows itself to be completely general and artful, and clothed in great knowledge.[4]

[4] The *Ars generalis ultima,* whose text—with the exception of the larger table—has up to this point been very similar to that of the *Ars brevis,* now continues with examples of questions and answers from each of the thirty-six compartments of Figure 3.

PART VII, WHICH TREATS OF THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE FOURTH FIGURE[1]

THE MULTIPLICATION of the Fourth Figure consists of the following, namely, that the first compartment B C D in the Fourth Figure or in the Table means that B has one condition with C and another with D; and C has one condition with B and another with D; and D has one condition with B and another with C.[2] And therefore in this compartment there are six conditions with which the intellect is conditioned and disposed to investigating, finding, arguing, proving, and determining.[3]

After these six conditions, the intellect acquires another six, by turning the smallest circle, putting its E where its D was, opposite the C on the middle circle. And then, since the compartment has been changed, so have its conditions. And thus the intellect now has twelve[4] conditions; and similarly for the other compartments, by multiplying columns and turning them.

The conditions that the intellect multiplies in this way are difficult to enumerate. For from each compartment the intellect can

[1] Cf. Part VI, n. 1.

[2] This curious use of the word "condition" is defined in the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 392) as being "the mixture of principles, with some being conditioned in others according to their definitions and properties, like goodness which is conditioned to being great by reason of greatness, and to being enduring by reason of eternity, and it is great and enduring in accordance with its own condition, that is to say, that its greatness and duration be good; and the same is true of 'condition' with respect to the other principles." Similar definition in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 579. See also Artus, *Ars Brevis*, p. 300.

[3] In the Zetzner editions this paragraph is followed by a figure exhibiting the six conditions:



in which one reads the relationships from left to right, with the figure right-side-up for 1, 2, and 4, and upside-down for 3, 5 and 6.

[4] The Zetzner editions have 15, but since we are adding the 6 conditions of B C E to the 6 of B C D, this is surely an error. The peculiar phrase at the end of the sentence would seem simply to indicate a continuation of the process of rotating the wheels and deriving the 6 conditions from each resultant compartment.

evacuate 30 propositions and 90 questions, just as from the compartment B C of the Third Figure we derived 12 propositions and 24 questions.[5] And as a result the intellect realizes it has become completely general and artful, over and above another intellect ignorant of this Art, who would reduce it to a multitude of inconsistencies and impossibilities. The sophist will thus not be able to stand up to such an intellect as that of the artist of this Art, who uses primary and natural conditions, as opposed to the sophist, who uses conditions that are secondary and unnatural, as is explained in the *Ars magna*.[6]

[5] Since each letter stands for 2 principles, in the compartment of B C D we therefore have 6 principles, any one of which can form propositions with the remaining 5, giving $6 \times 5 = 30$. And since to each of these 30 propositions we can apply 3 questions, we have $30 \times 3 = 90$. This is merely a ternary version of the binary mechanism of Part VI.

[6] The equivalent Part VII of the *Ars generalis ultima*, divided into five sections which correspond only roughly to the five dispositions of the intellect given at the end of the first paragraph, constitutes a small treatise on Lullian logic. After presenting (1) different ways of multiplying the Fourth Figure (along with the Table), he goes on to (2) use the ternary configurations to find the middle term between two concepts, leading him naturally into the syllogistic, with which (3) he investigates (*De modo probandi*) the three types of demonstration (see the *Ars demonstrativa*, Prologue, pars. 2–3); then he discusses (4) the fourteen fallacies of the *Logica nova*, and ends with (5) a section on how the Art can be used to acquire other sciences such as Theology, Philosophy, etc. Cf. Pla I, 447ff.

PART VIII, WHICH TREATS OF THE MIXTURE OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES[1]

IN THIS PART the intellect mixes one principle with another, examining each principle, with its definition, by means of the others, and examining each principle by means of all the species of the rules.[2] By means of such an examination the intellect becomes acquainted with each principle, and every time it mixes said principle differently, it will find out something new about it. Who in fact could enumerate all the means the intellect discovers for drawing conclusions, with the intellect evacuating this mixture as it did the compartment of B C discussed earlier?

This mixing is the center and foundation for the finding of all sorts of propositions, questions, middle terms,[3] conditions, solutions, and even objections. But we will desist from giving examples of this to the discerning mind, for the sake of brevity, and since this type of mixing is explained and exemplified in the *Ars magna*.[4]

Furthermore, this mixture is subject and refuge for the artist of this Art, so that he may find it in whatever he wants. For if he needs to find out something that has to do with goodness, he has only to examine said goodness by means of all the principles and

[1] This mixing of principles and rules first appears in its fully developed form in the *Liber de praedicatione* of 1304. In embryonic form, it first appears in the *Investigatio mixtionum generalium* of 1294 (see Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 93, for the work itself, and my "Notes," Part IV, for the date), and reappears in the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem* (*MOG* v, 705 = Int. v, 347), *Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis* (*MOG* v, 344–5 = Int. iv, 1–2), and *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis* (*MOG* v, 314, 337 = Int. iii, 14, 37).

[2] The middle part of this sentence is missing in the printed sources.

[3] In place of the *media* of all the other sources, the Zetzner editions have *materiae*, "matters."

[4] And this at great length, in two sections. The first has eighteen chapters, each devoted to one principle of the Art and its mixture with the other seventeen principles. The second section similarly has eighteen chapters, each devoted to one principle of the Art, but here each principle is mixed with all the species of the ten rules. In this second section of the *Ars generalis ultima*, under Rule C ("What?") each of these principles is defined again.

rules, and from it he will find whatever he wants to understand. And what we have said about goodness applies equally to the other principles.

This mixture is conditioned and disposed according as one thing is different from another. For if one examines divine goodness by means of the principles and rules, this examination requires other definitions and rules than does an examination of the goodness of an angel; and the examination of the goodness of angel, another than the goodness of man; and the goodness of man another than the examination of the goodness of a lion, and so on.

PART IX, WHICH TREATS OF THE NINE SUBJECTS

In this Art we have put nine subjects,[1] those indicated in the Alphabet. They include everything that exists, for outside of them there is nothing.

The first subject is God, denoted by the letter B.
The second subject is angel, denoted by the letter C.
The third subject is heaven, denoted by the letter D.
The fourth subject is man, denoted by the letter E.
The fifth subject is imagination, denoted by the letter F.
The sixth subject is the sensitive, denoted by the letter G.
The seventh subject is the vegetative, denoted by the letter H.
The eighth subject is the elementative, denoted by the letter I.
The ninth subject is instrumentality, denoted by the letter K.

Since in the *Ars magna* each subject is deduced by means of principles and rules, we will therefore not investigate them here, since we want to make this *Art* shorter than that one, and since said deduction is implicit in this *Art*. For this reason we will desist from presenting this matter to the discerning mind, which should be content with the example given in the Third Figure, where we apply all the principles to "goodness," as well as all the rules of this Art to "intellect."

In dealing with these subjects, we must keep in mind four conditions. By these the intellect will be conditioned to examine the aforementioned subjects in a conditioned way, by means of the principles and rules, according as each subject is conditioned by its nature and essence. For divine goodness has one condition in

[1] The idea of a *scala naturae* or a ladder of being is present in many works of Llull. It provides the framework for *Felix*, the *Tree of Science*, and the *Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect*. During the ternary phase of the Art, it is discussed in the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (*MOG* v, 47–61) under the heading of Transcendent Points. In the form of nine subjects, it appears fleetingly in the *Taula general* (*ORL* xvi, 380, 505–14), *Arbre de filosofia desiderat* (*ORL* xvii, 449), and the *Ars compendiosa* (ed. Ottaviano, pp. 155–61); but these subjects are not incorporated into the structure and Alphabet of the Art until the *Liber de praedicatione* (*ROL* iii, 144–53; cf. Soria's comments on p. 95). This part of the Art constitutes, as Carreras i Artau said (Ca i, 451), "a veritable treatise on ontology." For the use of the subjects here, see Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 303ff. In the *Ars generalis ultima* each is treated much more extensively and systematically.

God; angelical goodness another in an angel; and so on for the rest. And the same is true for the rules.[2]

The first condition is as follows, namely, that each subject must have a definition differentiating it from any other subject. And if any inquiry is to be made into said subject, the answer must be formulated in such a way, by affirming or denying, that the definitions of the principles accord with that of the subject; and the same is true for the rules, without any injury being done to either principles or rules.

The second condition is that in a judgment or in practice the difference between subjects be preserved. Thus divine goodness is different from the goodness of an angel by infinity and eternity, since such goodness is the reason why God does infinite and eternal good, whereas the goodness of an angel is finite and newly created.

The third condition is that the concordance between one subject and another not be destroyed, as for instance, the concordance existing between God and angel, for they are concordant in their spirituality. And the same could be said of the other subjects.

The fourth condition is that, insofar as one subject is nobler and loftier, one should assign it loftier and nobler principles and rules than to another, as in the case of God, who is a loftier and nobler subject than angel, and angel than man, and so on.

1. THE FIRST SUBJECT, WHICH IS GOD, EXAMINED BY MEANS OF THE PRINCIPLES

GOD CAN BE examined by means of the principles and rules, for God is good, great, etc. Many definitions can be given of Him, if one wanted to do things extensively. But we will only give one: God is that being who needs nothing outside Himself, because in Him exist all perfections. With this definition, God is different from any other being, for all other beings need something outside themselves.

In God there is no contrariety or minority, for they are principles having to do with privation and defect. Nevertheless, in God there

[2] This last sentence is missing from the printed texts.

is majority with respect to other beings; and there is equality, since He has equal principles, such as goodness, greatness, etc., as well as equal acts and relations.

In God there is difference of correlatives, without which said correlatives could not exist at all; nor without them could God exercise His infinite and eternal intrinsic action; moreover, without them his dignities[3] would be idle, which is completely impossible.

In God there is concordance, so that with it He may be infinitely and eternally far from contrariety, and so that His correlatives may accord infinitely and eternally in a single essence and nature. And this is what can be said about His dignities.

In God there is no quantity, no time, nor any accident. The reason is that His substance is separated from and stripped of all accident, because it is infinite and eternal. And with God being conditioned by the four above-mentioned conditions, the intellect understands that it is conditioned to understand God and those things which can be said about Him by means of the principles and rules appropriate to God, and it also knows and understands that if an angel has natural power in itself, and so on for the others, so much more should God, since He is a higher subject, as is clear through the relationship of lesser to greater.

2. THE SECOND SUBJECT WHICH IS ANGEL[4]

ANGEL CAN BE derived by means of principles and rules. Indeed, it has natural goodness, greatness, duration, etc. And it is defined thus: an angel is a spirit not joined to a body.

It has no natural contrariety, for it is incorruptible. In it there is the matter of -able, that is to say, of bonifiable, magnifiable, etc., as is indicated by the second species of D.[5]

In an angel there is majority, for it is more similar to God than is man, since it contains higher principles and rules than man. As a result, the intellect realizes that, if man cannot make use of his

[3] Here referred to as *rationes* (Cat. *rahons*); cf. "Llull's thought," text at n. 28 above. See Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 164, for a commentary on this paragraph.

[4] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. II and n. 1 there.

[5] That is, Rule D. 2 of Part IV. From now on, single letters are to be taken as referring to these Rules.

senses without the corresponding organs, it does not follow from this that an angel is similarly incapacitated, for an angel is of a superior nature. As a result, the intellect realizes that angels can talk to one another and act upon us without any organs, and they can travel from one place to another without any means of locomotion, and so on, as is clear to the intellect upon examining the rules.

In an angel there is difference, for its intellect, will, and memory are different from one another. There is equality of understanding, loving, and remembering in an angel, by reason of the supreme object, that is, God, who is equally intelligible, lovable, and memorable. In an angel there is minority, since it has been created from nothing.

3. THE THIRD SUBJECT, WHICH IS HEAVEN[6]

HEAVEN HAS natural goodness, greatness, duration, etc., and it is defined as follows: Heaven is the first mobile substance.

There is no contrariety in it, for it is not composed of contrary principles. It has natural instinct and natural appetite, and therefore movement, without which it could not possess a nature, instinct, and appetite.

Nevertheless, it has a beginning, for it acts as an efficient cause in things below it; moreover, this beginning is made up of its own specific form and matter, so that it may act in accordance with its species. Its movement constitutes its own end and resting place.

Heaven is in its place, like a body within its surface. Moreover, it exists in time, for it was created. It is also in time in the way that an efficient cause is related to its effect. And so on for its other accidents, each in its own way.

4. THE FOURTH SUBJECT WHICH IS MAN[7]

MAN IS COMPOSED of soul and body, and is therefore derivable by means of the principles and rules in two ways, that is to say,

[6] Llull usually discusses astronomy under this heading (cf. Yates, "Art," p. 118), for which subject see Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 83 below, and *Felix*, Bk. III, with the corresponding notes.

[7] Bk. VIII of *Felix* deals exclusively with man. See notes 1 and 9 there.

in a spiritual and a corporeal way. And he is defined thus: man is a manifying animal.[8] All the principles and rules exist twice in man, because of his double nature, that is, the spiritual and corporeal parts of which he is composed. And thus he is more general than any other created being, as a result of which one can say without doubt that man constitutes the largest portion of the world.

5. THE FIFTH SUBJECT, WHICH IS THE IMAGINATIVE FACULTY[9]

THERE ARE specific principles and rules in the imaginative faculty for the purpose of imagining imaginable things, just as there are in a lodestone for the purpose of attracting iron. And it is defined thus: the imaginative is that power whose function it is to imagine. And it is thus deduced by means of the principles and rules proper to the imaginative faculty. The intellect has great knowledge of it, as well as of those things that accord with it.

The imaginative faculty extracts species from the things sensed with the individual senses; and this it does with its correlatives, as indicated in the second species of Rule C. With goodness it makes these species good, and with greatness it magnifies them, as when it imagines a great mountain of gold. With minority it lessens them, as when it imagines an indivisible point. The imaginative faculty has instinct, just as the lower animals have the will to live, and a goat the instinct to avoid a wolf. The imaginative faculty has an appetite to imagine the imaginable, so that, by imagining it, it may come to rest.

When the individual senses apprehend sensible things, as when the eyes see something colored, they impede the imaginative fac-

[8] *Homo est animal* (*animal rationale* in the Zetzner editions) *homificans*. See Part XI, ch. 2, Question 3 for a defense of this definition.

[9] In the Aristotelian philosophical vocabulary of the Middle Ages, *imaginatio* had nothing to do with its modern connotations (as when we say that so-and-so has "imagination"), but, closer to its etymology, referred to the faculty of perceiving images when the objects of perception are no longer present to the senses. Note Llull's definition in the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 394): "The imaginative (faculty) is the power by which man imagines imaginable things, like a person who, with his imagination, imagines figures that he has seen, or lands where he has been, and so on." Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 56, as well as here below, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 31 and the note. For more information, see C. Aos Braco, "La imaginación en el sistema de Ramón Llull," *EL* 23 (1979), 155–83.

ulty, which then cannot carry out its act, since it cannot imagine any imaginable thing outside itself until the eyes are closed, at which point the imaginative faculty carries out its act, or can carry it out.

The person seeing apprehends the colored object better by seeing than by imagining, for something sensed is closer to the particular sense. The imaginative faculty, however, apprehends the imaginable object through the intermediary of sense. The imaginative faculty is thus not as general a power in sensed things as is the sensitive faculty, as can be seen from the sense of touch, with which a man holding a stone can, at one and the same time, feel several different things, such as the weight, coldness, roughness, and hardness of the stone; the imaginative faculty, however, cannot do this, except successively. And the same is true of other such things. And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough.

6. THE SIXTH SUBJECT, WHICH IS THE SENSITIVE FACULTY

THE PRINCIPLES and rules exist in the sensitive faculty in a specific way, for it has one power through sight, another through hearing, etc.; and this is especially so with the properties of instinct and appetite. And it is defined thus: the sensitive is that power whose function it is to sense. The sensitive faculty causes things to be sensed with its specific principles and rules. It is general through the common sense,[10] particular through the individual senses. Through the common sense it has common correlatives; through the individual senses it has individual correlatives.[11] The radical life of the sensitive faculty comes from vegetable life, with which it is connected, and in which it is planted, as is the vegetative in the elementative. The sensitive faculty uses all the senses to sense objects, as when it uses sight to sense something colored, and hearing to sense a voice, using the *affatus* to give it a name. For

[10] Not in our modern meaning; in the Middle Ages the "common sense" was, as the *OED* says, "an 'internal' sense which was regarded as the common bond or centre of the five senses, in which the various impressions received were reduced to the unity of a common consciousness."

[11] These individual and common correlatives are set out in the chart le Myésier included in the *Electorium*, fol. 96^{v} (reproduced in Hillg, p. 425) and in the *Breviculum*, fol. 14^{v} (reproduced in Pring-Mill, "Trinitarian," p. 253, and in his "Pontencias," p. 111).

without *affatus* the hearing cannot properly sense the voice, and therefore the intellect knows that the *affatus* is a sense.[12]

7. THE SEVENTH SUBJECT, WHICH IS THE VEGETATIVE[13]

IN THE VEGETATIVE there are specific principles and rules with which plants act according to the species they belong to. For a pepper, a rose, a lily, each acts according to its species. The principles of the vegetative are denser than those of the sensitive, just as the principles of the sensitive are denser than those of the imaginative. And it is defined thus: the vegetative is that power whose function is to vegetate. Indeed it vegetates elemented things just as the sensitive faculty senses either vegetated or elemented things. The vegetative transforms the elementative into its own species by way of generation; and from that it lives, grows, and is nourished. And the vegetative dies through lack of the elementative, just as the light in a lamp dies out through lack of oil.

8. THE EIGHTH SUBJECT, WHICH IS THE ELEMENTATIVE

IN THE ELEMENTATIVE there are specific principles and rules, with which it can have many species, such as gold, silver, and other similar things. And it is defined thus: the elementative is that power whose function it is to elementate. It has common correlatives, and what was said regarding the sensitive faculty can be applied here to its individual components, that is to say, to fire,

[12] This is a sixth sense Llull introduced in a treatise of the same name written in 1294. In the *Tree of Science* (*OE* I, 599) he defines it as "that sense by which the interior conception is made manifest in speech, like a man who says and speaks what he thinks, or like a bird, as for instance when a hen calls her chicks." See J. Dagenais, "Speech as the sixth sense—Ramon Llull's *affatus*," *Estudis de Llengua, Literatura i Cultura Catalanes. Actes del Primer Col·loqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amèrica. Urbana, 30 de març–1 d'abril de 1978* (Montserrat, 1979), pp. 157–69, as well as Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 64–7, 204–7.

[13] I have followed Llull in using an adjective in -ive as a noun. The usage is justified although rare in English (see *OED*, s.v. vegetative, B) as referring to the vegetative faculty or power. I have kept to this usage in the following two chapters, but not in the previous two, where it seemed more natural to speak of the imaginative and sensitive faculties. For information on the "vegetative" see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 44, and principally nn. 9 and 20, as well as ch. 49.

air, water, and earth, which have their own correlatives,[14] without which these elements could not exist, just as the correlatives could not exist without elements, which constitute the ultimate foundation of said elementative.

And through these correlatives, the elementative has points, lines and figures, length, width, depth and volume, qualities and complexions, hardness, roughness, lightness, and heaviness, etc. And as a result the intellect understands that the elements are actually present in elemented things, although in a loose way; for otherwise elemented things would not have anything out of which they would be made, nor would they be of the genus of substance, nor would they have form, matter, motion, instinct, length, width, volume or appetite, which is completely impossible and absurd to maintain.

9. THE NINTH SUBJECT, WHICH IS THE INSTRUMENTATIVE[15]

THIS SUBJECT deals with instrumentality, and it can be considered in two ways, that is, naturally, like the eyes, which are the instrument for seeing, and morally, like justice, which is the instrument for judging, and a hammer for making things.

One can acquire knowledge of a natural instrument by using the principles and rules of the Art to deduce it in a specific way; similarly one can use the same principles and rules to deduce a moral instrument in its own specific way.

Natural and moral instruments differ from one another. We will, however, spare the discerning reader such a deduction or investigation; and if the mind of the artist feels the need for such an investigation, he should turn to the *Ars magna*, in which we discuss moral questions at length. But since we mentioned moral concepts in the Alphabet, we therefore want to define our moral instruments, so that, by means of the definitions, along with the principles and rules, the artist can gain knowledge of morality.

[14] For charts of these correlatives (along with those of the senses), see the references in n. 11 above.

[15] Or "artifice" as he refers to it in some works, such as the *Liber de praedicatione*, *ROL* III, 153.

1. The instrumentative is the power with which a moral person acts morally.

2. Justice is the disposition[16] with which a just person acts justly.

3. Prudence is the disposition with which the prudent person operates prudently.

4. Fortitude is the disposition with which the strong in heart act with virility.

5. Temperance is the disposition that the temperate person uses in acting temperately.

6. Faith is the disposition with which a person believes to be true something he neither senses nor understands.

7. Hope is the disposition with which someone hopes for God's forgiveness and for glory, and places his trust in his good and powerful friend.

8. Charity is the virtue with which a person makes his private wealth available to others.

9. Patience is the disposition with which the patient person vanquishes and is not vanquished.

10. Pity is the disposition with which the kind person suffers for the suffering of his fellow man.[17]

11. Avarice is the disposition with which the rich man is poor and beggarly.

12. Gluttony is the disposition with which the glutton later finds himself imprisoned in sickness and poverty.

13. Lust is the disposition with which a man uses his powers wrongly and counter to the order of matrimony.

14. Pride is the disposition with which the proud man tries to make himself superior to other men, and it is contrary to humility.

15. Accidie is the disposition with which the accidious person grieves over another's good fortune and is joyful over his ills.

16. Envy is the disposition with which the envious person unjustly desires another's possessions.

[16] *Habitus* in the original, for which see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 157, as well as here below, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 21. For the virtues and vices which follow, and which of course made up Figure V of the *Ars demonstrativa*, see the various references among *Gentile*, Bk. I, nn. 19–35, as well as among *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 63–75.

[17] These last two virtues are new, with respect to the lists in the *Gentile* and the *Ars demonstrativa*, having been added, like the last two vices, so as to be able to accommodate them to the nine-letter alphabet.

17. Ire is the disposition with which the irate person shackles his thinking and his freedom.

18. Falsehood is the disposition with which the liar talks or gives testimony contrary to the truth of a thing.

19. Inconstancy is the disposition with which a fickle person is changeable in many ways.[18]

So much for the nine subjects, about which the artist can gain knowledge by examining them in the light of the principles and rules of this Art.[19]

[18] Cf. n. 17 above.
[19] Which is preciesely what is done in the corresponding section of the *Ars generalis ultima*.

PART X, WHICH TREATS OF APPLICATION

APPLICATION is divided into three parts. The first is when the implicit is applied to the explicit. The second is when the abstract is applied to the concrete. The third is when a question is applied to places in the Art. Let us first of all discuss the first part.

1. If the terms of the question are implicit, they should be applied to the explicit[1] terms of the Art, as when one asks whether God exists or whether angels exist. And the same is true for others applied to goodness, greatness, etc., such as: Whether it is a great, good, etc. thing that God exists and that angels exist.

2. The second part is as follows: if the terms of the question are abstract, they should be applied to concrete terms, such as goodness to good, greatness to great, color to colored, and so on. And in this way one should see how an abstract and a concrete term are related to one another, as one examines them by means of the principles and rules.

3. The third part deals with application to specific places, and it is divided into thirteen parts,[2] as follows: (1) First Figure, (2) Second Figure, (3) Third Figure, (4) Fourth Figure, (5) Definitions, (6) Rules, (7) Table, (8) Evacuation of the Third Figure, (9) Multiplication of the Fourth Figure, (10) Mixture of Principles and Rules, (11) The Nine Subjects, (12) The Hundred Forms, (13) Questions

The subject matter of the questions must be applied to these parts according as it is suitable to them. For if the subject matter of a question is relevant to the First Figure, then it must be applied to that figure, and the solution drawn from the text of that figure, by affirming or denying in such a way that the text is not violated. And what we have said about the first figure can be said about the others, each in its own way. Since we want to be brief, this

[1] Thus in the printed sources and some MSS; three other MSS have "explained"; the rest of the MSS have "applied," which seems hard to justify in the context. For the concepts of "implicit" and "explicit" see Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 139–40.

[2] After "specific places" the correcting hand in the Milan Catalan MS adds a helpful "of this Art." These thirteen parts, plus the previous two paragraphs, constitute the fifteen parts into which the corresponding section of the *Ars generalis ultima* is divided.

should be enough concerning application; if, however, the reader would like to know more about applying terms, he should turn to the *Ars magna*, where we discuss the matter at length.

12. THE HUNDRED FORMS[3]

IN THIS PART the reader will find a hundred forms with their definitions, so that a given subject can be made to reach the intellect. For by means of the definitions of the forms, the intellect will be conditioned to examining them by the principles and rules.[4] And through such an examination the intellect acquires knowledge of the forms discussed in the questions. Here now are the hundred forms with their definitions:

1. Entity is the cause by reason of which one thing causes another thing.[5]

2. Essence is the form abstracted from and sustained in being.[6]

3. Unity is the form whose function is to unite.

4. Plurality is the form that is an aggregate of many things differing in number.[7]

[3] The Hundred Forms make their first appearance in the *Tree of Science*, and, in somewhat different form, in nos. 101–200 of the *Proverbs of Ramon* of the same year. They reappear in the *Logica nova* (1303), *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis* (1306), *Ars generalis ultima* (1305–8), here (1308), and finally in the *Ars consilii* (1315). Cf. Pla I, 413–21. Note that all these lists are different, except for those here and in the *Ars generalis ultima*, which are identical.

[4] The corresponding definitions in the *Ars generalis ultima* usually point out *which* principles or rules are to be used for investigating each "form." So, in effect, the Hundred Forms constitute a method for integrating a series of special topics into the Art and of making them available to the "Artist" as ancillary tools.

[5] In the corresponding "form" of the *Ars generalis ultima*, Llull illustrates his point: "as goodness is the reason why some good does good," and "as greatness is the reason why goodness is great."

[6] In the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 393), Llull relates "essence" (*essentia*) and "being" (*esse*) in slightly different terms: "essence is that by which being exists, just as humanity is the essence by which man exists." That this definition ties them in with the previous pair is confirmed on the same pages of the *Taula d'esta Art* where Llull says that "entity (*entitas*) is the essence of a thing (*ens*), which constitutes its act," to which he adds, in the corresponding "form" of the *Ars generalis ultima*, "Since entity and essence are convertible, therefore so are being and thing. And what we said [above] about entity and thing, we can say [here] about essence and and being," after which he goes on to say that essence is the (superior) abstract, and being its (inferior) concrete. Cf. *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 69; Pla I, 140, 142; the same author's remarks in *EL* 2 (1958), 32; and W. W. Artus, "*Esse* and the Author of the *Liber contemplationis in Deum*," *EL* 21 (1977), 145–71, and especially p. 155 for the four terms discussed here.

[7] For "unity" and "plurality" see also *Gentile*, Bk, I, n. 36. Many of these Hundred Forms can be grouped in pairs or triplets. Llull is more explicit about this in the *Tree of Science*, where they are presented individually the first time around (*OE* I, 570–90) and in groups the second time (*OE* I, 600–8).

5. Nature is the form whose function is to naturize.[8]

6. Genus is something widely applicable and very indefinite, which is predicated of many things differing in species.[9]

7. Species is something that is predicated of many things differing in number.[10]

8. Individuality is the term farther from genus than any other thing.[11]

9. Property is the form with which the agent acts specifically.[12]

10. Simplicity is the form that is farther from composition than any other thing.

11. Composition is the form that is an aggregate of many essences.

12. Form is the essence with which the agent acts in matter.

13. Matter is simply passive essence.[13]

14. Substance is a thing existing by itself.[14]

15. Accident is a form not existing by itself, nor one related principally to its own end.

16. Quantity is the form by reason of which a subject is quantitative and with which it acts quantitatively.[15]

[8] For "nature" see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 146. In *OED*, "naturize" (*naturare*) is defined as "to invest with a specific nature."

[9] This, along with nos. 7, 9, and 15, represent four of the five predicables (the medieval descendants of the Aristotelian topics), or universals as Llull frequently calls them. The missing one, "difference," is not treated here since it has already appeared as a component of Figure T. The definition of "genus" in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 19, is identical with that here, but adds, "just as animal [is predicated] of man, lion, eel, etc."

[10] The *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 22, adds, "like Socrates, Plato, etc., which are contained in the human species, and like this lion and that lion, which are in the leonine species."

[11] In the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis,* Hundred Forms, no. 19, Llull adds, "like Peter, [which is predicated] of him alone." For the notion of *individuitas,* which could also be translated as "indivisibility," see B. S. Jørgensen, "Individuation und Individuationsprinzip im Schriftum Raymund Lulls," *EL* 21 (1977), 5–34, and especially p. 18 for a commentary on this passage. Note that some of the printed sources of the *Ars brevis* have "thing" instead of "term" here.

[12] ". . . just as pepper has the property of heating, rhubarb of attracting choler, a magnet of attracting iron, and a lion of begetting a lion," *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 578.

[13] For "form" and "matter," see *Gentile,* Bk. I, n. 36.

[14] We now begin with the Aristotelian categories or predicaments. For their division into substance and accident, which latter is in turn divided into the remaining nine categories (nos. 16–24 below), see *Ars demonstrativa,* Dist. I, n. 19. For "substance," see the extended discussion in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), pp. 36–40, as well as the following pages there for the remaining categories.

[15] . . . *est quantum* . . . *agit quantum*, where *quantum* means literally "how much." For "quantity" see Part IV, Rule F above, as well as *Gentile,* Bk. I, n. 4.

17. Quality is that by reason of which principles are of the sort they are.

18. Relation is a form existing with respect to many different things, without which it cannot exist.

19. Action is a form inherent in whatever is passive.

20. Passion is the thing underlying and inherent in action.[16]

21. Habit is the form with which a subject is clothed.[17]

22. Position is the disposition of parts, properly and duly arranged in a subject.[18]

23. Time is the entity within which created beings are begun and renewed. Or: Time is that thing made up of many nows with reference to before and after.

24. Place is the accident by which things are located. Or: Place is the surface immediately surrounding and containing the inner parts of a body.

25. Motion is the instrument with which the mover moves the thing moved. Or: Motion is that which knows the nature of beginning, middle, and end.

26. Immobility is that thing having no inclination to move.

27. Instinct is the figure and likeness of the intellect.

28. Appetite is the figure and likeness of the will.[19]

29. Attraction is the form with which the thing attracting attracts the thing attracted. Or: Attraction is a form having the instinct and appetite to attract something to a subject.

30. Reception is the form with which the thing receiving receives the thing received. Or: Reception is a form having the instinct and appetite to receive something in a subject.

31. Fantasy is a likeness extracted from things by means of the imagination.[20]

32. Fullness is the form far from emptiness.

[16] The printed editions have, "Passion is the thing [underlying action, and] sustaining it," with the Zetzner editions omitting the words in brackets. For "passion" see *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 53.

[17] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 157, for *habitus*.

[18] Besides "position," *situs* can also be translated as "situation" or "posture."

[19] For "instinct" and "appetite," and their relation to "intellect" and "will," see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 10. The second definitions added to both nos. 27 and 28 in the printed sources are doubtless later additions, since they appear in none of the medieval MSS.

[20] *Phantasía* was the Greek word whose usual scholastic translation was precisely the word *imaginatio*, also used here, for which latter see Part IX, n. 9 above.

33. Diffusion is the form with which the thing diffusing diffuses what is diffusible.

34. Digestion is the form by means of which the thing digesting digests what is digestible.[21]

35. Expulsion is the form with which nature expels those things which are not suitable to a subject.

36. Signification is the revelation of hidden things indicated by a sign.[22]

37. Beauty is a lovely form received by the sense of sight or of hearing, or by the imagination, thought, or sense of pleasure.

38. Newness is the form by reason of which a subject is clothed with new characteristics.

39. Idea, in God, is God; in creation, however, it is creature.[23]

40. Metaphysics is the form with which the human intellect strips substance of its accidents.[24]

41. Potential being is a form existing in a subject without motion, quantity, quality, and so on.[25]

42. Punctuality is the essence of the natural point, which is the smallest part of a body.[26]

43. A line is a length made up of many connected points and whose extremities consist of two points.

44. A triangle is a figure with three acute angles enclosed within three straight lines.

45. A square is a figure with four right angles.

46. A circle is a figure enclosed by a circular line.

47. A body is a substance consisting of points, lines, and angles.

[21] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 162.

[22] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 37.

[23] The *Ars generalis ultima* ties this concept in with the previous one: "Idea in eternity is God; in newness [thus, instead of 'creation', in many of the printed sources of the *Ars brevis* as well] it is creature, just as the shape of a box in a carpenter's thoughts can be old, but when it is brought from potentiality to act, then it is new." Cf. Form 57 below. Ca I, 482, comments on the clearly Platonic ancestry of this statement; see also Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 57.

[24] Many of the sources have "mathematics" instead of (and even sometimes alongside) "metaphysics," but from the definition here, and from the contrasting definitions of the two terms in the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis* (Lyon, 1635), p. 15, Llull must surely have meant "metaphysics" here.

[25] In the *Ars generalis ultima* Llull adds, "like the seed, in which the tree exists potentially."

[26] "Punctuality" in the literal senses, from *punctum*, "point." In the *Ars generalis ultima* Llull adds that it is indivisible and cannot be grasped by the senses or by the imagination. For Llull's use of this word in the setting of his time, see J. Gayà, "La concepción luliana de 'punctum' en su contexto medieval," *EL* 19 (1975), 41–51.

48. A figure is an accident made up of position and habit.[27]

49. The general directions are six, with the body at the center of diametrical lines.[28]

50. Monstrosity is the deviation of natural motion.

51. Derivation is the material foundation by which the particular descends from the universal.[29]

52. Shade is the state of privation of light.

53. A mirror is a transparent body arranged so as to receive all the figures presented to it.[30]

54. Color is a condition contained within a figure.[31]

55. Proportion is the form whose function is to proportion.

56. Disposition is the form whose function is to dispose.

57. Creation, in eternity, is idea; in time, however, it is creature.

58. Predestination, in God's wisdom, is idea; in creation, however, it is creature.[32]

59. Mercy, in eternity, is idea; in something predestined, however, it is creature.

60. Necessity is the form that cannot be otherwise; but the necessitated subject is the thing containing it.

61. Fortune is accident inherent in a subject; but the fortunate person is one disposed toward it.[33]

62. Order is the form whose function is to order; he who is ordered, on the other hand, is his own subject.

63. Counsel refers to a proposition open to doubt, and the person counseled is where it comes to rest.

[27] *Constitutum ex situ et habitu*; cf. Forms 21–2 for the last two terms. To this definition of "figure," the *Ars generalis ultima* adds, "With color a figure is a visual object, and with lines and angles, and without color, it is a tactile object; with all of these things it is an object of the imagination, which shows us that the imagination is a power superior to sense, and more general than sight."

[28] For these pre-Cartesian coordinates, see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 6.

[29] The printed sources have "general" for "material." The *Ars generalis ultima* adds, "like a stream from a spring, a line from points, a triangle from lines, a child from parents . . . , a conclusion from its premises, a consequence from an antecedent, and knowledge from things [*scientia a rebus*] by means of the mind."

[30] In the *Ars generalis ultima* Llull says that the transparency of a mirror differs from that of a pane of glass without lead, in that the latter is transparent on both sides, and he then goes on to explain the reflecting action of the lead.

[31] In the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis*, Hundred Forms, no. 62, Llull adds that "there are four general colors, to wit, lightness [*luciditas*], transparency, whiteness, blackness."

[32] Cf. n. 23 above.

[33] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 40.

64. Grace is a primary form, placed in the person receiving it without any merit on his part.

65. Perfection is the form whose function it is to perfect in a perfect subject.

66. Explanation is the form in which the intellect finds rest after making distinctions; the person enlightened is its subject, in whom the clarification is a condition.[34]

67. Transubstantiation is the act of nature in what is transubstantiated, which is stripped of its old form and clothed in a new one.

68. Alteration is the form born in the thing altered.

69. Infinity is that form having infinite activity and removed from anything finite.

70. Deception is the positive state of the deceiver, and it is the privative state of the person deceived.

71. Honor is an active state in the person honoring, but passive in the person being honored.

72. Capacity is the form with which something is capable of containing and receiving as much as is allotted to it.[35]

73. Existence is the form with which the thing existing is what it is. Agency is the form moving the thing existing to its terminal point.[36]

74. Comprehension is the semblance of the infinite, apprehension, of the finite.[37]

75. Discovery is the form with which the intellect discovers the thing discovered.[38]

[34] "Clarification" is *declaratio,* and "the person enlightened" is *declaratus* in the original.

[35] Llull uses this word both in its physical sense (see the *Liber de geometria nova*, ed. Millás, p. 94) and in the metaphorical sense. The latter is illustrated by the definition in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 73, which ties this concept with the next one defined: "Capacity is the habit with which possibility is clothed so that the doer and the doable [*agens et agibile*] have the proper proportion and disposition in relation to one another."

[36] Or as defined in the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis,* Hundred Forms, no. 51: "Existence is the essence of the thing [*entis*] which exists; agency is the being of the thing doing [*est esse agendi*], but doing [*agere*] is the act of existence, like heat heating or good doing good." For "existence," see also W. W. Artus, (n. 6 above), pp. 156–7.

[37] In scholastic terminology, "apprehension" was contrasted to the action of grasping something in its totality, which was "comprehension"; i.e., we can apprehend, not comprehend, God. See Blaise, *Lexicon,* s.v. *apprehensio.*

[38] For a discussion of the concept of *inventio* (Cat. *atrobament*), see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Mode 6 and the note there.

76. Semblance is the form with which the thing assimilating assimilates to itself the thing similar to it.[39]

77. The antecedent is the form giving rise to the consequent; the consequent is the form in which the antecedent comes to rest.

78. Power is the form with which the intellect apprehends the object. Object is the subject in which the intellect comes to rest. Act is the connection between power and object.[40]

79. Generation, in creatures, is the form with which the agent brings about new forms. Corruption is the form with which the thing corrupting undoes old forms. Privation, moreover, exists between them, in the middle.[41]

80. Theology is the science that speaks of God.

81. Philosophy is the subject by means of which the intellect concentrates on all the sciences.[42]

82. Geometry is an art devised for the measuring of lines, angles, and figures.[43]

83. Astronomy is the art by which the astronomer knows the influences and movements that the heavens effectively exercise over inferior things.[44]

[39] See *Felix,* Bk. VIII, ch. 85 and the note there for this concept so important to Llull. Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 46, quotes the corresponding definition from the *Ars generalis ultima*, as well as that from the *Tree of Science, OE* I, 581.

[40] This important trio, which we met fleetingly in the *Ars demonstrativa* (Dist. IV, n. 30), began its career as a fundamental paradigm for the correlatives in the *Tree of Science* of 1295–6 (*OE* I, 576–7 and 602; cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 109) and even more definitively in the *Liber de potentia, objecto et actu* of the same year of 1296 (cf. Gayà, *Correlativos,* pp. 121–4).

[41] For the Aristotelian "generation and corruption," see: *Gentile,* Bk. I, n. 36; *Felix,* Bk. IV, ch. 20; and the *Principles of Medicine,* Dist. VI. Once again, it was in the *Tree of Science* (*OE* I, 601) that Llull turned this pair into a triplet by adding "privation," for which see *Gentile,* Bk. I, n. 9.

[42] Forms 80–1 along with 91–2 formed the "four sciences" as Llull called them (see the following note for references), and on which earlier he had written the *Quattuor Libri Principiorum* (nos. II. A. 6–9 in the Catalogue of Works at the end of Vol. II here). In this definition, the Zetzner editions have "science" instead of this "subject." The corresponding definition of the *Ars generalis ultima* is quoted and commented in Johnston, *Semblance,* pp. 88–9.

[43] Forms 82–8 constituted the seven liberal arts, which, along with the four sciences of the previous note, Llull discusses in the following: *Doctrina pueril,* chs. 73–8; *Tree of Science, OE* I, 630–3, 935–8; *Brevis practica Tabulae generalis, MOG* V, 319–35 = Int. III, 19–35; and the *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis,* "Hundred Forms," nos. 84, 87–96, 98, as well as the last chapter of the work. For Llull on the seven liberal arts, see also Colomer, *Edad Media*, pp. 44–55. The corresponding form of the *Ars generalis ultima* constitutes a mini-treatise on geometry. Llull also wrote two works on this subject: the *Liber de geometria nova* and the *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli.*

[44] Some MSS have "astrology" for "astronomy." In the printed texts of the *Ars generalis*

84. Arithmetic is the art devised for the counting of many units.[45]

85. Music is the art devised to arrange many voices so they may be concordant in a single song.[46]

86. Rhetoric is the art with which the rhetorician adorns and colors his words.[47]

87. Logic is the art with which the logician finds the natural connection between subject and predicate.[48]

88. Grammar is the art of finding the correct way of speaking and writing.[49]

89. Morality is the disposition toward doing good or evil.

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ultima, this sentence begins, "Astronomy is the art with which astrologers . . ." It would be quite wrong to impose our modern separation of astrology and astronomy, as between superstition and science, on the Middle Ages, and even, for that matter, on the Renaissance. Most of the great minds, from Aquinas and Roger Bacon to Tycho Brahe and Kepler accepted the astrological world view inherited from classical times. On this subject Llull wrote a *Tractatus novus de astronomia*. For a discussion of his astronomical ideas, see M. Pereira, "Sulle opere scientifiche di Raimondo Lullo. I—La nuova astronomia," *Physis* 15 (1973), 40ff., and the same author's "Ricerche intorno al *Tractatus novus de astronomia* di Raimondo Lullo," *Medioevo* 2 (1976), 169–226, as well as the other references in Part IX, n. 6 above.

[45] The distinction between arithmetic as dealing with discrete numbers and geometry with the continuum was standard in the Middle Ages, and dated from the Greeks, who never quite recovered from the Pythagorean discovery that a real number such as $\sqrt{2}$ could be represented on a line (as the hypotenuse of a right triangle with unit legs) but could not be represented by a fraction (i.e., by a rational number).

[46] Possibly the *only* common medieval subject on which Llull wrote almost nothing was music; for the few passages where he does discuss it, see Caimari's note in the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 16–17.

[47] In addition to the works mentioned in n. 43 above, Llull discusses rhetoric in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 359, as well the *Rhetorica nova* of 1301. The latter work, previously analyzed by J. Rubió Balaguer in *EL* 3 (1959), 5–20, 263–74, and 5 (1961), 140, has now been edited and commented on at length in Johnston, *Semblance*.

[48] In the *Ars generalis ultima* Llull refers the reader back to his discussion of the middle term (cf. Part II, n. 3, and Part VII, n. 6 above) and to the five predicables (see n. 9 above) and the ten predicaments (see n. 14). He then compares logic to the Art, saying that the former deals with second intentions, the latter with first; the former is unstable and weak (*instabilis scientia sive labilis*) while the latter is enduring and firm (*permanens et illabilis*); the logician arrives at a conclusion by using two premisses, the artist by mixing principles and rules. He ends by saying how much easier is the latter; in fact, "the artist can learn more about this Art in one month than the logician about logic in a whole year." After the early versions of al-Ghazzali's logic (see p. 20 above), Llull wrote in 1303 the *Logica nova* and the *De modo appiicandi novam logicam ad scientiam juris et medicinam*. With the post-Art phase that begins in 1308 right after the writing of the *Ars brevis*, Llull's preoccupation with logic becomes much more intense (works such as *Liber de fallaciis novis, De conversione syllogismi opinativi in demonstrativum*, etc.). For a discussion of Llull's logic, see Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 208–33.

[49] The corresponding section of the *Ars generalis ultima* ties in the different "modes" of grammar (the parts of speech, cases, conjugation, declension, gender, etc.) with the different parts of the Art. Cf. Pla I, 385–8 and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 174–5.

90. Politics is the art with which townspeople work for the public good of the city.[50]

91. Law is the well-ordered act of a man possessing justice.[51]

92. Medicine is the method with which the doctor looks after the health of the patient.[52]

93. Government is the form with which a prince governs his people.[53]

94. Chivalry is the disposition with which the knight helps the prince maintain justice.[54]

95. Commerce is the disposition with which the merchant buys and sells.[55]

96. Navigation is the art by which sailors know how to navigate in the sea.[56]

97. Conscience is the form with which the intellect afflicts the soul for the wrongs it has committed.[57]

98. Preaching is the form with which the preacher instructs people so they will have good conduct and avoid bad conduct.[58]

[50] Note the urban setting of this definition, as opposed to the feudal one of "government" in Form 93 below.

[51] On the subject of law, Llull wrote the *Principles of Law* and the *Ars juris* during the quaternary phase of his production, the *De modo applicandi* (see n. 48 above) and the *Ars juris naturalis* (1304) during the ternary phase, and the *Ars brevis juris civilis* (1308) when that phase was ending and the last one beginning. For more references, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 166.

[52] For Llull's writings on this subject, see the introduction to the *Principles of Medicine* below.

[53] See *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 111 for a discussion of this topic.

[54] Llull often includes chivalry, along with the next two concepts, among the "mechanical arts," for which see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 252. In addition to the references there, he also discusses chivalry and commerce in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, chs. 275 and 280, as well as the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* v, 709, 711 = Int. v, 351, 353, and to the former topic he devoted the *Book of the Order of Chivalry*. For a more critical view of knighthood, see the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 112 (cf. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 60), and the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 903, (also p. 630).

[55] The *Ars generalis ultima* adds, "in order to increase his wealth." See the previous note for references.

[56] The equivalent section of the *Ars generalis ultima* constitutes a minitreatise on navigation, complete with a diagram (more elaborate in the Palma, 1645, edition; simplified in the Zetzner editions) and hypothetical problems with their solutions. See J. Sureda Blanes, *Ramon Llull i l'origen de la cartografia mallorquina* (Barcelona, 1969), pp. 32ff., for a good discussion of Llull's nautical knowledge in its medieval setting.

[57] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 102.

[58] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Mode 8.

99. Prayer is the form with which the person praying speaks to God in a holy way.[59]

100. Memory is that thing with which things can be recalled.[60]

[59] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 105.

[60] The peculiar repetition of "thing" (*ens*) is in the original. In the *Ars generalis ultima* memory is derived by means of the principles and rules, constituting another (five page) minitreatise, a treatment similar to that in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 617–19, and in the *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, *ORL* XVII, 449–54 (cf. the definition on p. 413). He also wrote a *Liber de memoria* in 1304, the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandum* in 1308 and the brief *Liber de memoria Dei* in 1314. Cf. F. A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London, 1966), ch. 8, and Rossi, "The Legacy," pp. 197ff.

PART XI, WHICH TREATS OF QUESTIONS

THIS PART is divided into twelve parts or headings, arranged and distributed according to the varying subject matter of the questions. For the solution to one question is indicated in one part or under one heading, and the solution to another under another. Because of this we will apply the questions in different ways to the aforesaid parts.

And this we will do in two ways, that is to say, we will solve some of the questions we propose and others not. These last we leave for the discerning artist, so that he may extract their solutions from those parts or headings to which we refer said questions, in which parts, or under which headings, he will find the solutions indicated.

For the sake of brevity we will here pose and solve few questions, for this Art is an extract from the *Ars magna*, treating it more briefly so that the intellect may grasp many things in few words. In this way the intellect is made more universal and, by means of the solutions to the questions posed and given here, is enabled to solve other questions, each in its own way.

The headings or parts to which we refer the questions are, as we said above, twelve.[1] They are, respectively: (1) the First Figure, (2) the Second Figure, (3) the Third Figure, (4) the Fourth Figure, (5) the Definitions, (6) the Rules, (7) the Table, (8) the Evacuation of the Third Figure, (9) the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure, (10) the Mixture of Principles and Rules, (11) the Nine Subjects, (12) the Hundred Forms.

And first we will discuss the first part or heading.

1. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FIRST FIGURE

1. *Question:* Whether there exists any being in which subject and predicate are converted into an identity of essence, nature, and

[1] Cf. Part x, par. 3 above. The corresponding part of the *Ars generalis ultima* only gives six, omitting the first six in the following list and starting directly with the Table. This seems to be the only place where the *Ars brevis* is in fact more complete.

number throughout the entire First Figure. The answer is yes, for otherwise the conversion of subject and predicate, as well as their equality, would be destroyed absolutely, and eternity would be superior through infinity of duration, while its goodness, greatness, power would be inferior through finiteness, which is impossible.

2. *Question:* What is that being in whom subject and predicate convert? To which one must answer: God is that being, for such a conversion cannot exist except in an infinite and eternal subject.[2]

3. *Question:* Whether divine goodness has in itself as great bonification as the divine intellect has intellection.

4. *Question:* Why is the agency God has in Himself as great as His existence?

5. *Question:* From what does God derive power equal to His being?[3]

6. *Question:* Why do man and animal not convert? To which one must reply: Because conversion cannot be carried out between greater and lesser, but only between equal things.

7. *Question:* Whether an angel's power, intellect, and will convert. To which one must reply: No, or otherwise it could have an act as infinite and eternal as God's.

2. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE SECOND FIGURE

QUESTIONS relating to the Second Figure can be formulated in three ways, like a man and a lion, who through difference differ in species, through concordance accord in genus, and through contrariety are contrary to each other, that is, through what is corruptible and incorruptible. And so on for the other questions, each in its own way.

1. *Question:* Whether difference is more general than concordance and contrariety. To which one must answer that it is, since whenever there is concordance and contrariety, there is difference; but the converse is not true in all things. For in many things one

[2] For the convertibility of the dignities as a definition of God, see Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 88.

[3] The answer in the *Ars generalis ultima*, Part IX, sect. 1, cap. 6, art. 2, is "from Himself in Himself."

can find difference and concordance, without their naturally containing any contariety, as with spiritual things.

2. *Question:* Which is the greater principle, concordance or contrariety? The answer is concordance, for from concordance positive principles are derived, whereas those that derive from contrariety are privative.

3. *Question:* Whether a definition such as, Man is a manifying animal, or, Man is that being whose function is to manify, is more ostensive than the following one: Man is a rational, mortal animal. And one must reply that it is. The reason for this is that manification is something only proper to man, whereas rationality and mortality are proper to many things.[4]

By means of the triangle of beginning, middle, and end one can formulate questions in three ways. The first is when one asks:

4. Why is there one first cause and not several? To which one must reply: For the reason that there must exist one end which is infinite.

The second way is when one asks:

5. Whether the middle existing between subject and predicate is of a continuous or discrete quantity. And one must reply that it is of a continuous quantity with respect to the middle between extremes, while it is discrete with respect to the middle of conjunction and that of measurement.

The third way is when one asks:

6. What is the final end in a subject? And one must answer that it is its own proper end, and not an appropriated one.

By means of the triangle of majority, equality, and minority one can formulate questions in three ways. By means of majority one can ask:

7. Why is God above angels, and angels above man? To which one must reply that God is above angels because divine goodness, greatness, etc., are far from quantity as a result of infinity, and far from time as a result of eternity, whereas an angel's goodness, greatness, etc. are not. But the latter are above man's goodness, greatness, etc., since the subject in which they exist is far from

[4] For this definition, see Part IX, subj. 4 above; the same definition is defended in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 10. For another defense of this definitional doctrine, see ch. 6, Question 2 below; see also Part III, n. 1 above. For the correlative and structural nature of these definitions, see Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 191, 218.

division and succession,[5] whereas the goodness, greatness, etc. of a man's body are not.

The second way is when one asks:

8. Why in the soul are the intellect, will, and memory essentially equal? To which one must answer: because the first cause, through the equality of its goodness, greatness, etc. is equally intelligible, memorable, and lovable. And as a result of this, the intellect realizes that a demonstration can be made in three ways: by cause, by effect, or by equivalence.[6]

The third way is when one asks:

9. Why is sin closer to nothingness than to anything else? And one must state that this is because it is most incompatible with the purpose of being.

10. *Question:* Whether the difference between sensual and sensual is greater than that between sensual and intellectual, and than that between intellectual and intellectual.

11. Furthermore, whether the difference between beginning and middle is greater than that between middle and end.

12. Similarly one can ask about the difference between substance and substance, etc. And one must reply by means of those things signified in the above-mentioned triangles, and this subjectively and objectively using the Rule of B.

3. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE THIRD FIGURE

IT WAS SAID in the Third Figure that each principle can be applied to the other. And thus one may ask:

1. Whether contrariety is as applicable to goodness, greatness, etc. as is concordance. To which one must reply that it is not, for contrariety is applied to them by depriving and opposing, whereas concordance is applied by affirming and according.

In the Third Figure it is stated that goodness is great. And therefore one can ask:

2. What is great goodness? And one must reply that great goodness is that goodness which, without contrariety and minority, accords with all the principles and their correlatives.

[5] Many of the sources, both manuscript and printed, have *susceptione* ("receiving, accepting"?) instead of *successione*.

[6] For these three methods of proof, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Prologue and nn. 6, 8 there.

3. *Question:* Where is goodness? Turn to the compartment of B I and extract its meanings.[7]

4. *Question:* What does goodness consist of?

5. *Question:* How is goodness? Turn to the compartments of B D and B K and extract their meanings. And so on for others.

6. *Another question:* When is the intellect universal, and when is it particular?

4. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FOURTH FIGURE

1. By the compartment of B C D one can ask: Whether any goodness is as infinitely great as eternity. To which one must answer yes; otherwise all the greatness of eternity would not be good.

2. By the compartment of B E F one can ask: Whether God is as powerful through His goodness as through His intellect. Turn to that compartment and take from it the things it signifies along with their correlatives and definitions.

3. *Question:* Whether an angel, since it is superior, begets an angel, just as man, who is inferior, begets man. One must answer that it does not, for an angel does not receive any addition to itself from the outside, since that would empty it of its essence; man, however, does, by reason of his body.

5. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE DEFINITIONS OF PRINCIPLES

1. *Question:* Whether God is a necessary being.

2. *Question:* Whether unity can be infinite without an infinite act.

3. *Question:* Whether there exists a single God.

4. *Question:* Whether God can be evil. Turn to the definitions of goodness, greatness, and eternity, and keep in mind what they

[7] As Marçal (see Introduction, n. 40 above) points out in his scholium on this passage, the compartment of B I referred to is explained in the *Ars generalis ultima*, Part VI, where Llull says that it exists in itself, in its own good and true concrete things. The compartments of B D and B K in Question 5 below should also be sought out in the same Part VI of the *Ars generalis ultima*.

signify. For if goodness is great and eternal, then it is necessary that goodness be the reason, with respect to what is good, great, and eternal, for producing something good, great, and eternal. And similarly for other questions that can be asked in relation to the definitions of principles.

6. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE RULES

1. *Question:* Whether believing precedes understanding.

2. *Question:* Which definition is better and clearer, the one given in terms of a power and its specific act, or the one given by genus and difference? To which one must reply, the one given in terms of a power and its specific act, for by means of such a definition a person can have cognition of the subject and its specific act; whereas by means of the other one cannot, but only of its parts.[8]

3. *Question:* Whether power acts outside its essence.[9]

4. *Question:* Whether the intellect is active in memory and passive in will.

5. Whether the intellect can apprehend an object without the senses.

6. Whether God's power can have infinite action.

7. Whether an act can exist without difference.

8. Whether the act belongs to the power or to the object, or to both.

9. Whether substance can exist by itself without its causes.

10. Whether the will has, in the intellect, the ability to believe, as well as the intellect to understand in the will.

11. Whether will and memory are equal in the soul.[10]

12. Whether the intellect without its correlatives can be either universal or particular.

13. Whether the intellect, when it acquires knowledge, does so by means of property and difference.

14. Whether the intellect disposes a person to love and remember, and conversely.

[8] Another defense of Llull's definitional doctrine; cf. n. 4 above.

[9] Almost all these questions are answered in Marçal's scholia. This one here is answered directly—negatively—in the *Liber correlativorum innatorum, ROL* VI, 133, line 127.

[10] Many of the MSS have "unequal" instead of "equal."

15. Whether the intellect can, at one and the same time, believe and understand.

16. Whether the intellect can acquire knowledge by itself.

17. *Question:* How does the intellect establish a species?

18. Whether the intellect, through its species, causes the will and memory to be objects with respect to that species.

And just as we have applied the questions having to do with the rules to the intellect, so can they be applied to the other powers, each in its own way.

7. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE TABLE[11]

1. *Question*: Whether the world is eternal. Go to the column B C D and maintain the negative. In the compartment of B C T B you will find that if it is eternal there are many eternities, differing in kind, and they are concordant by the compartment B C T C against the compartment B C T D, which is impossible. It therefore follows that one must maintain the negative answer to the question, and this is proved by the Rule of B.[12]

2. *Question:* Whether God can be as infinite by His greatness as by His eternity. Turn to the column of C D E and to the compartment of C D T C, maintaining the affirmative against the compartment of C D T D.

3. Whether God can do as much through His eternity as through His intellect. Turn to the column of D E F and to the compartment of D E T D.

4. Whether God is as powerful through His power as through His understanding and loving. Turn to the column of E F G and maintain the affirmative by means of the compartments of E F T E, E F T F, E F T G, etc. until the entire column is used up.

5. Whether, in God, His intellect and His will are greater than His virtue. Go to column F G H and maintain the negative

[11] Here the text of the *Ars generalis ultima* (see n. 1 above) reconnects with that of the *Ars brevis*. Notice that here we have one question for each of the seven columns of the Table.

[12] For a detailed explanation of the solution to this question, one making use of the same three compartments, see *Ars generalis ultima*, the "Quaestio unica" at the end of Part v. For the problem of the eternity of the world, see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 14.

throughout all the compartments of said column, extracting the meanings of those compartments.

6. Whether divine truth is as virtuous through equal correlatives as is divine will. Go to column G H I and maintain the affirmative throughout all the compartments of said column.

7. Whether, in God, His virtue, truth, and glory have the wherewithal to be equal, and to be remote from time, place, and minority. Go to column H I K and maintain the affirmative throughout all the compartments of said column.

8. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE EVACUATION OF THE THIRD FIGURE

In compartment B C it was said that goodness is great. Now we ask:

1. Whether goodness is great, and
2. What is its greatness? and
3. In what do goodness and greatness accord? and
4. Whether they can accord without any difference.

To all this one must reply, that goodness is great, as is clear from the definition of greatness, and its greatness resides in its possessing its correlatives, as is clear from the Second Species of Rule C. And they accord because goodness is great through greatness, and conversely. But it is impossible for them to accord without the difference of their correlatives.

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about the Evacuation of the Third Figure. For from what we have said about it, the artist can formulate and solve questions using the other compartments.

9. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MULTIPLICATION OF THE FOURTH FIGURE

1. *Question:* How can the intellect be conditioned to being general for the sake of general understanding? Turn to the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure and see how the intellect multiplies conditions, thereby multiplying objects as well as its own under-

standing, so that it will be general and clothed in many different ways for the sake of much and great scientific knowledge.

And this, in the interest of brevity, is enough about the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure.

10. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MIXTURE OF PRINCIPLES AND RULES

1. *Question:* Whether goodness can be investigated by means of greatness, duration, etc., and conversely. To which one must reply yes, by making the subject into predicate, as was shown by the Third Figure.

2. *Question:* What is goodness in greatness, duration, etc.? To which one must reply that in greatness it is great and in duration enduring.

3. *Question:* What does goodness have in greatness, duration, etc.? To which one must say that it has its correlatives which are great in greatness, and enduring in duration. And what we have said about goodness applies equally well to the other principles, each in its own way.

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about Mixture.

11. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE NINE SUBJECTS

11/1. Questions Relating to the First Subject, Which is God

1. *Question:* Whether God exists. The answer is yes, as was proved in the Questions relating to the First Figure.

2. *Question:* What is God? To which one must reply that God is that being whose intrinsic activity is as great as His existence.

3. By the Second Species of Rule C one asks, What does God possess coessentially in Himself? To which one must reply that He possesses His correlatives, without which He could not possess immeasurable and eternal dignities.[13]

[13] The printed sources have "essentially" for the "coessentially" in the question. For "dignities," the originals have *rationes* (Cat. *rahons*); cf. Part IX, n. 3 above.

4. By the Third Species one asks, What is God in something else? To which one must reply that He is creator, governor, and so on.

5. By the Fourth Species one asks, What does God have in another thing? To which one must say that in the world He has power and dominion, and in men judgment, as well as the acts of grace, mercy, humility, patience, and pity.[14]

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about God.

11/2. Questions Relating to the Second Subject, Which Is Angel

1. *Question:* Whether angels exist. The answer is yes, for if that which seems to be less similar to God exists, then all the more so will that which seems to be more similar to God exist.

Moreover, if something composed of body and intellect exists, all the more so will something composed of intellect and intellect exist.

Furthermore, if angels did not exist, the ladder of difference and concordance would be empty, and therefore the world too, which is impossible.

2. *Question:* What is an angel composed of, and whose is it? To which one must reply, by Rule D, that it is composed of itself, for its essence cannot be made up of points and lines. By the Second Species of the same rule, it is composed of its spiritual correlatives, that is to say, of its -tives, -ibles and infinitives.[15] By means of its -tives it is active, by its -ibles it is receptive, and the infinitive is the act existing between the -tives and -ibles. By the Third Species one must reply that an angel is God's.

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about angels.

11/3. Questions Relating to the Third Subject, Which Is Heaven

1. Whether heaven moves itself. The answer is yes, in order for its principles to have their own substantial correlatives by means of its constellations.

[14] The Zetzner editions have, "To which one must say that in another thing He has power and dominion, and in all things judgment as well as the act of grace, mercy, patience, and pity.

[15] *De suis -tivis et -bilibus et -are*; cf. Part IV, n. 4 above, and the "Life," n. 128.

2. Whether heaven moves in any direction. The answer is yes, in a circular direction in itself and with respect to the things beneath it, but not outside itself. The reason for this is that there is no action it has or can have outside itself.[16]

3. Whether an angel moves the heavens. The answer is no, because if it did then the -tives of its correlatives would be inferior and its -ibles superior, and thus it would not move the elements or elemented things by means of its form, but by means of its matter, which is impossible.

4. *Question:* Whether heaven has a motive soul. The answer is yes, for otherwise the sensitive and vegetative powers would not have motive souls, and the elements would have no motion.

5. One asks by the First Species of Rule E, Why does heaven exist? To which one must say, because it is made up of its own form and matter.

6. By the Second Species of Rule E one asks, Why does heaven exist? To which one must say, in order for things below it to have motion.

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about heaven.

11/4. Questions Relating to the Fourth Subject, Which Is Man

1. *Question:* Whether a man can have greater knowledge of God by affirming or denying. The answer is, by affirming, for God does not exist by means of those things without which He exists, but by means of those things without which He cannot exist.

2. *Question:* Why does man act by means of a specific form? Turn to the Second Species of Rule E, where the solution is implied.

3. Whether a man, by increasing his acts, increases his essence. To which one must reply that no man can act upon himself.

4. *Question:* When a man wants to remember and cannot, which is more deficient, his memory or intellect? The answer is his memory, for it naturally restores former species sooner to the intellect than to the will.

[16] As Marçal points out, Llull does not mean to deny the influence heaven exercises on things here below, but rather that it cannot send any part of itself outside its own sphere.

5. *Question:* In what way do body and soul constitute a man? The answer is that in man bodily and spiritual goodness make up a single goodness, and so on for the others.

6. *Question:* What is the life of man? To which one must reply that it is that form which is composed of the vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, and rational powers.

7. What is the death of man? The answer is the dissolution of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, and rational powers.

8. *Question:* Whether man is visible. The answer is no, for sight can only see colors and figures.[17]

9. *Question:* Whether in man intellect and memory are one and the same power. The answer is no, for if they were, the intellect would not be successive in its acquisition of species, nor would it be able to forget them. Also, it would be too strong against free will in an object.

And this is enough concerning man.

11/5. Questions Relating to the Fifth Subject, Which Is the Imaginative Faculty[18]

1. *Question:* Whether the imaginative faculty imagines imaginable things in the same way that the sensitive faculty senses sensible things.

2. *Question:* Why is it that the imaginative faculty abstracts species from sensible things?[19]

3. *Question:* What is the imaginative faculty?

4. Whether the imaginative faculty has correlatives.

5. Whether the imaginative faculty increases by increasing its activity.

6. Whether the imaginative is a higher power than the sensitive.

[17] The explanation of this seemingly mysterious question and answer can be found in the corresponding part of the *Ars generalis ultima*, where Llull says, "Whether man is sensible. The answer is no, for accidents are sensible, whereas the substance not at all—it is however intelligible."

[18] See the corresponding Subject 5 of Part IX above (as well as the section corresponding to *that* in the *Ars generalis ultima*) for answers to the questions of this section.

[19] Here Marçal quotes the *Ars generalis ultima*, Part IX, sect. 5, cap. 1: "if imagination did not exist, there would be no knowledge of past things, nor would animals know how to return to a spring, and so on."

7. Whether the imaginative has a specific instinct and appetite.

8. In what way does the sensitive impede the activity of the imaginative?

9. Why is the imaginative not as strong in sensed things as the sensitive? Turn to the subject of the imaginative faculty.

10. *Question:* Whether the sensitive senses the imaginative. To which one must answer that the inferior powers do not act on the superior ones.

11/6. Questions Relating to the Sixth Subject, Which Is the Sensitive Faculty

1. *Question:* Which of the following powers feels hunger and thirst—that of taste or touch? To which one must reply, the one most related to the object.

2. Whether taste uses instinct and appetite to perceive hunger or thirst, in the same way that sight uses color to perceive a colored object. Turn to the Second Species of Rule E.[20]

3. *Question:* With what does the sensitive faculty sense the things it senses? To this one must answer that each individual sense senses its sensible thing by means of its specific form, just as a colored subject which lies beneath a crystal colors that crystal.

4. Whether the sensitive power has quantity in terms of points and lines. To which one must answer that the sensitive power attains its object as readily from far as from near.

5. Whether the sensitive faculty, in the same way that it has a common sense, also has a common power, instinct, and appetite.

6. What is the sensitive faculty?

7. Through what things is the sensitive faculty common and particular?

8. From what does the sensitive faculty live and what nourishes it?

9. Whether the sensitive faculty is sensed. Look under the subject of the sensitive faculty.

[20] Some of the MSS and all the printed sources consulted have "Rule C," which is surely wrong. Cf. *Ars generalis ultima* (Palma, 1645), p. 248, par. 29; note that if it *were* Rule C, then it would have to be the third and not the second species (loc. cit., par. 23).

11/7. Questions Relating to the Seventh Subject, Which Is the Vegetative

1. Whether the vegetative acts by means of its own species.[21]
2. If there is any reason by which the vegetative is common and particular, like the sensitive faculty.
3. Whether the quantity of the vegetative is expressible in terms of points and lines.
4. *Question:* What is the vegetative and what does it possess in itself, according to the Second Species of Rule C?[22]
5. *Question:* From what does the vegetative live, gain its nourishment, and grow, and in what subject is it planted?
6. What constitutes the death of the vegetative? Turn to the subject of the vegetative, in which the solutions to the above questions are implied.

11/8. Questions Relating to the Eighth Subject, Which Is the Elementative

1. What is the elementative?
2. Whether the elementative, like the sensitive, has many species.
3. Whether the elementative has its correlatives.
4. Whether the candle's flame elementates the wick of the lamp when it lights it.[23]
5. Whether the candle's flame lights the wick by means of air just as sight sees a colored object by means of light.
6. Whether the elementative is the special cause of length, breadth, depth, and fullness.
7. Whether the elementative is the common species of the elements.

[21] Marçal adds, "The answer is yes," after Questions 1 and 3, which the two eighteenth-century Majorcan editions copied as if these replies were part of Llull's text.

[22] The "D" of the last three Zetzner editions is clearly a mistake.

[23] That is, impregnates the wick with an element (cf. *OED*, s.v. elementate), in this case, of course, fire. Marçal points out that both this and the next question should be answered in the affirmative. For similar questions concerning one candle lighting another, see the passages corresponding to *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 20, n. 14, and *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 160.

8. Whether the elementative can exist in a subject when the elements themselves are removed from it.

9. Whether the elementative can be the source of points, lines, and figures.[24]

10. Whether the elementative impels itself as naturally with its instinct and appetite, lightness, heaviness, heat and so on, as man does artificially with his feet.

11. Whether the elementative can have a nature without substantial correlatives.

12. Whether the elements exist in act in elemented things.

13. Whether the elementative is continuous in quantity everywhere in the sublunary world.

14. Whether there exist two heats, two drynesses, two whitenesses, and so on. Turn back to the Subject of Elementative, and extract from it the solutions,[25] with the intellect conditioned and fashioned by this Art.

15. Whether there exists a fifth element. The answer is no, for in elemented things four complexions suffice.

11/9. Questions Relating to the Ninth Subject, Which Is the Instrumentative

Since above we have already formulated questions concerning natural instrumentality, we will here formulate those concerning morality.

1. *Question:* What is morality?

2. *Question:* What is justice, prudence, etc.?

3. *Another question:* What is avarice, gluttony, etc.? Turn back to the Ninth Subject of Instrumentative, and do what that treatise indicates.

4. *Yet another question:* Whether justice is good. The answer is yes; for if it were not, injustice would not be evil.

5. *A further question:* Whether justice has correlatives. The answer is yes; for if not, there could exist no just condition, nor any things in which it could be sustained and situated.

[24] Instead of the *fons*, "source," of the printed sources and many MSS, many other MSS have *finis*, "end, purpose."

[25] With this plural, Llull is presumably referring not only to this question, but also to the previous thirteen of this section.

Following these examples, one can formulate questions relating to justice by means of all its principles and rules. And what we have said about justice can be applied to the other virtuous conditions.

6. Whether the vices are simply privative principles. The answer is yes, for they have no concordance with the virtues. In the virtues, for their part, the doer, the doable, and the instruments are in accord in the virtuous object.

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about moral matters, especially since in the *Ars magna* we have dealt with them at length.[26]

12. QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE HUNDRED FORMS

QUESTIONS relating to the Hundred Forms can be formulated in as many ways as each form is different in accordance with the Nine Subjects, like "entity," for instance, which is one form in God, another in angel, yet another in heaven, etc., as when one asks:

1. Whether God's entity is the origin of all other entities. The answer is yes, because His goodness is the origin of all goodnesses, His greatness of all greatnesses, His eternity of all durations, etc. The same, however, cannot be said of an angel's entity, that of heaven, etc. And thus a form, according to how it is different from others, must be examined by means of its own principles and rules.

2. *Question:* Whether essence and being are convertible. To which one must answer that in God they convert with one another, for in God nothing is superior or inferior. In angels, heaven, etc., however, they do not convert, since being exists in them through essence, and not conversely, and therefore in such things essence is superior and being inferior.

Questions can be formulated in one way concerning God's unity, and in another concerning an angel's unity, in another concerning the unity of heaven, etc., as when one asks:

[26] There Llull gives two sets of questions (*per principia* and *per regulas*) for each vice and each virtue.

3. Whether it is the function of God's unity to unite the infinite. The answer is yes, for if that unity did not unite the infinite, then it could not itself be infinite, because its power would be finite and constrained, and it would be idle in eternity, and the same could then be said of divine goodness, greatness, etc., which is impossible.

4. If, however, one asks about an angel's unity, whether its function is to unite, the answer must be in accordance with the conditions of its unity. That is to say that an angel can, in a moral, objective way of speaking, be united to another in a single loving, a single understanding, and a single bonifying.[27] I do not say, however, that an angel can become one with another angel, since it cannot, as has already been explained. Nor can heaven become one with another heaven. The unity of heaven, however, is the effective cause of inferior unities. But the unity of man is not like this, for one person can join another to produce a third. And similarly with other things, each in its own way.

5. Whether there is plurality in God. To which one should answer yes, with respect to His correlatives as exemplified in the Second Species of rule C, without which He could not have in Himself an infinite and eternal operation bonifying, magnifying, eternalizing, etc., as a result of which His dignities would be constrained and idle, which is impossible. The plurality of an angel, however, is not like this, for an angel is composed of -tive and -ible with respect to God's simplicity. And likewise heaven is more composite than an angel, and man more than heaven.

6. *Question;* Whether in God there is a nature. To which one must answer yes, so that He may have natural remembering, understanding, and loving, as well as natural goodness, greatness, etc.; also so that these very dignities may be natural to Him in order for him to produce infinite and eternal good for the purpose of naturizing. An angel's nature, however, is not like this, for it is finite and newly created. It does, however, have the function of naturizing, since it has innate and natural species with which it objectively and naturally objectifies. And thus one can also speak of the nature of heaven in its own way, as well as according to

[27] Instead of *bonificare*, the Zetzner editions have *homificare*, "manifying". The previous "moral . . . way of speaking" (*moraliter*) should probably be taken in the sense of "figurative," or even "spiritual" (vs. "physical").

its principles and its natural and specific rules, with which it naturally and specifically acts. And similarly one can discuss the other subjects, each in its own way.

From what we have said above, the artist can formulate questions concerning the Hundred Forms and solve them in accordance with how the questions are variously treated and derived by means of the Nine Subjects which differ from one another, by observing for each Form the definition of it we gave above. And thus the intellect learns in what way it can be most general in formulating many questions and solving them by the method indicated in the Evacuation of the Third Figure and in the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure. As a result, who could possibly enumerate all the questions and solutions that could be thus formulated?

And this, for the sake of brevity, is enough about questions relating to the Hundred Forms.

PART XII, WHICH TREATS OF HABITUATION[1]

THIS PART deals with habituation to the Art, and it is divided into three parts, the first of which is itself divided into thirteen parts corresponding to the thirteen divisions of the Art. And the artist of this Art should become familiar with them, so that he may know how to apply a question to that place or those places which are related to the question, in accordance with how analogous they are to the matter of the question.

The second part states that he should become familiar with the method and procedure of the text of this Art, keeping to the method of the text for proving and solving other questions, that is, using the method by which they are presented in the text, just as one example can be used to exemplify and explain another.

The third part states that he should become familiar with the method for multiplying questions and solutions towards one and the same conclusion, as is indicated in the Third and Fourth Figures and in the Table.

And this, for reasons of brevity, is enough about habituation.

[1] Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 113 and 309, translates this word as "(learning and) mastering the Art." I have kept the English homonym to tie it in with "habit" (Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 21), although I have sometimes used "become familiar with" in the text itself.

PART XIII, WHICH TREATS OF THE METHOD FOR TEACHING THIS ART

THIS PART is divided into four parts.

The first part states that the artist should know the Alphabet by heart, as well as the figures, definitions, and rules, along with the arrangement of the Table.

The second part states that he should explain the text well to his students, by rational means, and not bind himself by the authority of others. And the students should read through the text, and if they have any doubts, they should ask the artist or teacher about them.

The third part states that the teacher or artist should formulate questions in front of the students and solve them rationally, according to the method of the Art. For without reason the artist cannot make proper use of the Art. And it should be understood that the Art has three friends, which are subtlety of intellect, reason, and good intentions,[1] without which no one can learn this Art.

The fourth part states that the artist should put questions to the students, so they may answer them; and he should have them multiply their arguments toward one and the same conclusion. Moreover, they should find[2] the places by reason of which they will know how to answer and multiply. If, however, the students do not know how to answer, multiply reasons, or to find the right places, then the artist or teacher should teach them the above-mentioned things.

[1] Le Myésier quotes this phrase twice in the *Electorium* (see Hillg, p. 399, n. 6).
[2] For this use of *invenire* (Cat. *atrobar*) see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, n. 16.

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EPILOGUE

THE END OF THIS ART

To the honor and praise of God and for the public good Raymond finished this book in the monastery of Saint Dominic[1] of Pisa in the month of January of the year 1307 of the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ.[2] Amen.

[1] The oldest MSS of works written by Llull at Pisa in 1307–8 refer to the (Cistercian) monastery of San Donnino, for which "Saint Dominic" might well be an error (a *lectio facilior*) introduced by a few later scribes and copied by the rest. Cf. Hillg, p. 99 and n. 204; for a contrary opinion see M. Batllori in *OE* I, 52, n. 153.

[2] January 1308 by our reckoning.

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