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Selected Works of Ramon Llull

SELECTED WORKS OF
RAMON LLULL

(1232–1316)

Edited and Translated by

ANTHONY BONNER

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FELIX, OR THE BOOK OF WONDERS

Introduction

FOR THE PAST hundred years or so Llull has been known primarily as a literary figure and a mystic. This has meant that his reputation has been based chiefly on his two novels, *Blaquerna*[1] and *Felix*, parts of which have achieved even greater independent fame: the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* (part of *Blaquerna*) as Llull's greatest mystical work, and the *Book of the Beasts* (part of *Felix*) as Llull's best-known narrative work. This reputation, although presenting a limited vision of Llull's total endeavor, has had a very real justification in that these novels are among the first monuments of Catalan literature, and they may well constitute the first prose novels on contemporary themes in European literature. And since they are the only two such works Llull wrote, it is instructive to compare them.

They have, to be sure, many things in common. Both are, like Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, didactic and moral in purpose; plot, character, and so on, are present, if at all, merely as an outer decoration to make the inner message more appealing and more comprehensible. Both are directed, not to the Moslems and Jews for the purpose of conversion, but rather towards the Christian world itself; they are therefore not apologetic, but reforming works. The reform propounded in both, moreover, although spiritually grounded, is very strongly social. They also have a curious formal resemblance, in that they both contain works, as mentioned above, that seem extraneous to the main development of the novels, and which many critics believe to have been written separately—perhaps previously—and then inserted somewhat arbitrarily into the larger works.[2] Moreover, they were written fairly close to each other in time, both in what we have called the quaternary phase of Llull's development: *Blaquerna* in about 1283, and *Felix* some five years later.[3] Lastly, there is the curious linking

[1] For this spelling, see Bk. I ch. 7, n. 34 below.

[2] For a good recent refutation of these arguments where *Felix* and the *Book of the Beasts* are concerned, see nn. 9, and Bk. VII, n. 1 below.

[3] Cf. the "Life," nn. 104 and 110, as well as "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 15–16.

detail of a hermit named Blaquerna, who plays an important role in Felix.[4]

The differences between the two works, however, are notable. *Blaquerna* is a utopian novel, in which the main characters lead exemplary lives, create ideal institutions, or run them in ideal fashion. *Felix* is a novel of social criticism aimed at existing institutions, people in positions of responsibility, and contemporary attitudes. As a result, *Blaquerna* breathes an air of sweetness and light, while *Felix* breathes a somewhat harsher, countercultural air. There is also a structural difference: Blaquerna is a real protagonist, acting and being acted upon; Felix, going about "wondering at the wonders of the world" and seeking instruction, merely provides the thread on which a series of exemplary tales are strung.

Although both are works of instruction, the things taught in each are very different. The instruction of *Blaquerna* is institutional in the religious and ecclesiastical sense of the word, as one can see from the titles of its main sections: Matrimony, Monastic Life, Prelacy, Papacy and the Hermit's Life. The instruction of *Felix* is encyclopedic and includes the entire medieval universe, as is also clear from the titles of its inner divisions: God, Angels, the Heavens, the Elements, Plants, Minerals, Animals, Man, Paradise, and Hell.[5]

To concentrate now on *Felix*, one is immediately struck how the aforementioned succession of topics does not constitute a straightforward journey up or down the ladder of being, as we find for instance in the Nine Subjects of the *Ars brevis*. It is rather the order of creation: God, after creating the angels, created the elemental principles from which all the rest is derived, up to the end of the chain, which is man.[6] And since man is at the apex of

[4] He is Felix's teacher in the second half of Bk. I (chs. 7–12). Blaquerna plays a similar role in another work written at about the same time, the *Book of the Tartar and the Christian* (see my "Notes," Part III).

[5] Another curious comparison: *Blaquerna* was more popular in the Middle Ages in northern France (four medieval French MSS of *Blaquerna* vs. one of *Felix*), whereas *Felix* was more popular in the Mediterranean area (six medieval Catalan MSS, one in a Catalanized Provençal, six in Italian, and one in Spanish of *Felix* vs. one medieval Catalan MS of *Blaquerna* and one in Provençal).

[6] Cf. J. Gayà, "Sobre algunes estructures literàries del 'Libre de Meravelles,'" *Randa* 10 (Barcelona, 1980), 66, and "Algunos temas lulianos en los escritos de Charles de Bovelles," *EL* 24 (1980), 57–8.

creation, it is only right that Book VIII, on Man, should occupy almost three-fifths of the entire novel.

As opposed to Llull's other encyclopedic works, and as one would expect in a work of fiction, the treatment is not expository or demonstrative. Instead it is almost purely exemplarist. Indeed, the *exempla*, or *exemplis* as Llull calls them in Catalan, the little allegorical tales or explanations, are the very stuff out of which *Felix* is woven and by which the ladder of being is made intelligible.[7] They are the narrative equivalents of the metaphors of the artistic and scientific works.[8] It is not only through them that the instruction of *Felix* is imparted, and that Felix resolves his own inner struggle with doubt and achieves spiritual understanding,[9] but they themselves constitute part of the double message of the novel. For they are held up as models for instruction. In the Epilogue, these very *exempla* are treated as an open-ended body of lore that Felix can then use to go forth into the world to teach others what he has learned.

If this part of the message is methodological, or concerned with second intentions as Llull would have put it, the goal of that method, or the first intention of the book, is stated clearly in the opening paragraph of the Prologue: that God may "be known, loved, and served."[10] This is consistent with the creationist structure of the work, in that this theme, which runs like a litany throughout the novel, is given by Llull as the ultimate purpose of the Creation—that God in fact created man that He might be known and loved.[11] Since the basic purpose of *Felix* is the salvation of souls, it seeks to teach the reader to know and love God either directly (hence Book I) or through His works (hence the encyclopedic nature of the rest of the novel).

[7] This is, of course, Llull's analogical reasoning (see "Llull's Thought," n. 63 and the text there) operating in a literary framework. In addition to the references to Rubió in that same n. 63, see also M. Arbona Pizá, "Los 'exemplis' en el *Llibre de Evast e Blanquerna*," *EL* 20 (1976) 53–70, and J. Gayà in *EL* 23 (1979), 206–11.

[8] See the introduction to the *Ars demonstrativa* (text at nn. 6 and 7), and to the *Principles of Medicine* (text at nn. 15–22), as well as the references in "Llull's Thought," n. 63, mentioned above.

[9] Cf. J. Dagenais, "New Considerations on the Date and Composition of Llull's *Libre de bèsties*," *Actes del Segon Col·loqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amèrica, Yale, 1979*, (Montserrat, 1982), p. 139.

[10] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 72–74.

[11] See the text at Bk. I, n. 30, Bk. V, n. 1, and Bk. VIII, nn. 26, 79, and 262.

The reverse of the coin, man's failure to love and know God, is given as the cause of the world's being in the pitiable condition it is. This theme, which also runs through the entire novel, is the doorway through which Llull can introduce his social criticism. And this social criticism has two aspects worth observing: who is doing it and to whom it is directed.

To take the latter aspect first, it is soon evident that Llull repeatedly singles out those in power—princes, prelates, and wealthy burghers—as the ones who, by their example and position of leadership, bear the greatest weight of responsibility for the sorry state of the world, and who should most try to set it right. So in a sense one could call *Felix* a moral and spiritual manual for leaders.[12]

As to who is doing this teaching, one begins to notice after a while that it is hardly ever a member of the ecclesiastical, feudal, or mercantile establishment, but rather a succession of holy men or philosophers who mostly live apart from society as hermits or shepherds.[13] These teachers are consistently critical of the society they have left, of its misuse of power, of its opulence and wealth, of its self-indulgence, of its subversion of proper Christian values and spirituality.[14] *Felix* represents a very Franciscan form of *contemptus mundi*, mixed with a typically medieval admiration for solitary meditation. The novel is also a plea for a return to the purity of the pre-establishment Church, with the Apostles and Martyrs as models. The Prologue also stresses this theme of the work: "One no longer finds the fervor and devotion there was in the time of the Apostles and Martyrs, who were willing to languish and die for the sake of knowing and loving God."[15]

Another model, one not unconnected with that of the Apostles, is that of the *joculator Dei* or minstrel of God, a kind of pilgrim that Llull would have going from court to court entertaining his

[12] The *Book of the Beasts* is more specifically a manual for a king; see p. 654 below.

[13] Book IV on the Elements is an exception, in that it takes place in a court as a dialogue between a philosopher and the prince who is his pupil. Book VII—the *Book of the Beasts*, for which see below—is of course an exception in almost all ways.

[14] Book IV is again an exception. Criticisms of those in power sometimes seem to have required no little courage; see for instance the extraordinary story in Bk. VIII, at the end of ch. 91. One also finds considerable compassion for the poor in *Felix*, as well as severe condemnations of idle wealth and lack of charity.

[15] This explains Llull's interest and mention of the contemporary sect of the Apostolici, for which see Bk. VII, Prologue, nn. 1, 3, and Bk. VIII, ch. 56, n. 60.

hosts with morally and spiritually instructive stories, rather than with the wordly vanities propagated by the troubadours.[16] In fact, one could say that the work consists of Felix's preparation for the task entrusted first to him and then to his successor of becoming a *joculator Dei*, a kind of latter-day Apostle going through the world recounting the *exempla* that constitute the wonders of the *Book of Wonders*.[17]

To these general considerations, I must add a word about Book VII, the *Book of the Beasts*, which, in modern times at least, has become better known than the rest of *Felix*. First of all, its place within the general structure of *Felix* could hardly be more anomalous. Instead of the treatise on animals we might have expected after those on Elements, Plants, and Minerals, the *Book of the Beasts* consists of a series of animal fables, with no narrator or teacher as in the other books, and in which Felix himself disappears from view.[18] Moreover, it is the only work in which Llull used identifiable preexisting material to any notable degree. And the nature of this material is interesting: with the exception of the name and character of the main protagonist, taken from the French *Roman de Renart*,[19] it is all of oriental origin. There is one story from the *Seven Wise Masters* (also called the *Book of Sindbad* or *Sendebar*),[20] one from the *Thousand and One Nights*,[21] and no fewer than ten from the Arabic *Kalila and Dimna* which stems ultimately from the Indian *Panchatantra*.[22] Even the one autobiographical bit seems

[16] See Bk. VIII, text at nn. 86 and 153.

[17] Cf. Epilogue, n. 3 below. See n. 4 there for the extraordinary structural open-endedness of the novel as a collection of *exempla*.

[18] J. Dagenais (n. 9 above), pp. 131–9, has offered a very interesting explanation of this anomaly, in a possible relation of *Felix* with the *Rasa'il* (*Epistles*) of the Moslem Brethren of Purity. This was an encyclopedic work that included an appendix on the *Dispute between Man and the Animals*—curiously enough adapted into Catalan by the fourteenth-century Majorcan apostate Fra Anselm Turmeda as the *Disputa de l'ase*. According to Dagenais, the similarity is one of overall structure, not of content. The *Rasa'il* was apparently well known in Spain, and the Brethren of Purity held many ideas with which Llull would have sympathized, in addition to their having strongly influenced al-Ghazzali. For another possible reference to this sect, see *Gentile*, Bk. IV, n. 27.

[19] Cf. Bk. VII, n. 6.

[20] Ibid., n. 16.

[21] Ibid., n. 44.

[22] Ibid, nn. 15, 17, 20–3, 25, 28, 40, 45. See also nn. 18, 50 for other stories possibly stemming from this source. See the first of these notes (i.e., Bk. VII, n. 15) for more references.

to refer to Llull's unfortunate relations with the Moslem slave who taught him Arabic.[23]

Most extraordinary, perhaps, is the psychological and narrative unity Llull imposes on this material. The reader, accustomed to the loosely connected string of *exempla* of the first six books of *Felix*, begins the chain of animal fables of the *Book of the Beasts* in the same frame of mind. His surprise comes when he begins to see more and more pieces of the narrative fitting into place and realizes that he is experiencing a different literary world, one with a plot that builds and sweeps the reader along to a truly dramatic ending.

The modern reader's tendency to think of animal fables as a branch of children's literature or as elegant court *amusettes* leads to another surprise. As Dame Reynard's machinations become more and more appalling and her power greater and greater, the reader sees how penetrating and realistic are Llull's observations of the nastier side of palace politics; the surprise comes from confronting a kind of medieval predecessor to George Orwell's *Animal Farm*. The realization that this is indeed a political tract is confirmed by the Epilogue: "Here ends the *Book of the Beasts*, which Felix brought to a king so that he might learn, from the things done by the beasts, how a king should reign, and how to keep himself from evil counsel and from treacherous men."

All scholars have agreed, chiefly because of the place and date of composition of *Felix*, that the king in question must be Philip IV the Fair of France, who at that time was young (around twenty), still inexperienced (some three years of reign), and whom Llull perhaps felt he had a certain freedom to advise (since Philip was the nephew of Llull's patron, James II of Majorca). But no adequate historical counterpart to Dame Reynard has been suggested. All the more notorious "evil councilors" of Philip's reign, such as Pierre Flote, Guillaume de Nogaret, and Enguerran de Marigni, came into prominence some ten years later.[24]

[23] Ibid., n. 13.

[24] For Llull's relations with Philip the Fair, see the "Life," nn. 110, 140 above. For similar contemporary criticism of Philip's being led around by evil counselors, see Ch.-V. Langlois in *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution*, ed. E. Lavisse, III, 2 (Paris, 1911), 121–2. For other possible targets of Llull's criticism, see Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes* pp. 32–3.

There is surprising agreement among scholars as to the place and date of composition of *Felix*.[25] The opening sentence of the Prologue, "In a foreign land there was once a man who was sad and melancholy," coupled with the account in Book VIII, Chapter 89, of a man coming to Paris to ask King and University to support his missionary work based on the *Ars demonstrativa*,[26] has led most scholars to agree that the work was written in Paris during Llull's first stay there in 1288–9.[27]

Translations, Manuscripts, and Editions

As with the *Gentile*, the popularity of *Felix* is attested to by the number of manuscripts in which it is preserved, and by the fact that we possess medieval translations of it into French, Spanish, and Italian.

The medieval French translation, although not exceptionally good, is nonetheless of a far higher quality than that of the *Gentile*. It has been studied and partly edited by Gret Schib.[28]

The medieval Spanish translation is preserved in a single manuscript in the Escorial, which I have not been able to consult. I have, however, assumed, as have other scholars, that the eighteenth-century Spanish printed text does not derive from this source, but is rather a new translation from the two early Catalan manuscripts still in Palma. It was this latter text that was copied in Sapiencia 140–1 and reprinted in the *OL* edition of 1948.

I have also not been able to consult the medieval Italian translation preserved in six manuscripts. They, along with the Spanish

[25] The only subject of discussion—a possible earlier date for the *Book of the Beasts*—has been cleverly laid to rest by J. Dagenais in the article cited above (n. 9). See Bk. VII, n. 1 for details.

[26] See Bk. VIII, n. 168, where this passage is amply discussed.

[27] See the "Life," § 19 above, as well as my "Notes," Part III, for this Paris sojourn.

[28] In *La traduction française du "Libre de meravelles" de Ramon Llull* (Schaffhausen, Switzerland, 1969). This MS, which belonged to a counselor of the dukes of Burgundy, Louis de Bruges, Lord of Gruthuyse (1422–92), opens with a beautiful miniature reproduced in *OE* I, facing p. 320. (The other work contained in this MS is, curiously enough, the *Roman de sept sages*, on which Llull drew for the *Book of the Beasts*; see Bk. VII, n. 16 below.) For editions of the *Book of the Beasts* from this MS, see text at n. 32 below.

TABLE 7. MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITIONS OF *FELIX*

Century	*Catalan*	*Italian*	*French*	*Spanish*
14th	V = Vatican lat. 9443 A = Palma, Soc. Arq. Lul. 6	L = London, B.M. add. 16428		
15th	B = Palma, Soc. Arq. Lul, 7 Rome, Corsiniana 1362	S = Munich, Staatsbibl. 595 hisp. 51 Milan, Ambros. I 34 inf.	Venice, Marciana II 109 Oxford, Bodl., Can. it. 26 Modena, Est. it. 455	Paris, B.N. fr. 189	Escorial, X. III. 3
16th		Munich, CLM 10601		
17th	Munich, Staatsbibl. 612 hisp 69	Palma, S. Fran. 12 Montserrat 184 Palma, Sapiencia, F 70 Santander, Bibl. Men. Pelayo M 283	Modena, Est. it. 396	
18th				Palma, Sapiencia 140–1 Ed. in 2 vols, Palma, 1750 (RD 348)
19th–20th	Ed. Rosselló & Aguiló in *Biblioteca Catalana*, Barcelona, 1872–1904			
20th	*Obras* III, 1903 (Rosselló) *ENC*, 4 vols., 1931–4 (Galmés) *OE* I, 1957 Ed. M. Gustà & J. Molas, Barcelona, 1980			*OL*, 1948

TABLE 8. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF *THE BOOK OF THE BEASTS* (BK. VII OF *FELIX*)

Catalan	*Spanish*	*French*	*English*	*German*
Ein katalanisches Thierepos, ed. K. Hofmann, Munich, 1872				Catalan ed. (across) contains German tr. by Hofmann
Llibre de les bèsties, ed. M. Obrador, Barcelona, 1905				
			The Book of the Beasts, tr. Allison Peers, London, 1927	
	Obras filosóficas, Madrid, 1933 *Libro de las bestias*, tr. F. Sureda Blanes, Barcelona, 1936			
Llibre de les bèsties, Barcelona, 1947	*El león y su corte*, adapted by M. Manent, Barcelona, 1944			
				Die treulose Füchsin, tr. J. Solzbacher, Freiburg i. Br., 1953
Llibre de les bèsties, ed. P. Bohigas, Barcelona, 1965	*Antología* I, 1961	*Le livre des bêtes*, ed. A. Llinarès, Paris, 1964 *Livre des bestes*, ed. G. Sansone, Rome, 1964		
Llibre de les bèsties, ed. J. Mas, Barcelona, 1980				

manuscript, probably represent interesting textual traditions that would well repay investigation and perhaps publication.[29]

The original Catalan manuscripts fall quite neatly into two families, as shown in the two columns of Table 7.[30] I have consulted the five manuscripts represented by letter symbols on this table.

Rosselló's original text was based on A and B, which not only belong to the same family, but are even more closely related by the fact that many of the corrections in the first are undoubtedly based on the second. To this he added occasional touches from the two seventeenth-century manuscripts also in Palma as well as from his own imagination. Rosselló's text was reproduced in the *Obras* edition of 1903, and also, for some inexplicable reason, in the *OE* edition of 1957. Galmés's text in *Els Nostres Clàssics* had by then been out for almost a quarter of a century and is far superior. Its only drawback, in fact, was to be based on the same two manuscripts, A and B, available in Palma. I have therefore compared Galmés's with L and S of the second family, and also with V as a further control on the first family.[31] I have given in the notes whatever variants I felt the reader or scholar should have at his disposal.

Although there are no separate manuscripts of the *Book of the Beasts*, it has in the last hundred years been edited separately thirteen times in five different languages, all of which is shown in Table 8. The Hofmann Catalan text of 1872 is based on S with variants from the seventeenth-century manuscript also in Munich, and is followed by a German translation. The two French versions of 1964 are editions of the medieval French text, their simultaneous publication constituting one of those unfortunate reduplications of effort that occur from time to time in the scholarly world.[32]

[29] For these Italian MSS, see M. Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia (Ensayo de síntesis)," *Revista de Filosofía* 2 (Madrid, 1943), 300–3, as well as his, "Records de Llull i Vilanova a Itàlia," *AST* 10 (1934), 13–17; also R. Brummer, "Sobre una versió italiana del *Fèlix* de Ramon Llull. MSS de Venècia i de Munic," *Miscel•lània Aramon i Serra. Estudis de llengua i literatura catalanes oferts a R. Aramon i Serra en el seu setantè aniversari*, T. I (Barcelona, 1979), 127–33.

[30] See G. Schib (n. 28 above), pp. 103–39, for a comparison of all the Catalan MSS.

[31] V is an interesting MS, possibly the oldest extant text of *Felix*, and full of Provençalisms. Cf. J. Tarré, "Los códices lulianos de la Biblioteca Nacional de Paris," *AST* 14 (1941), 181, and above all the study by P. H. Coronedi, "Il Manoscritto Vatic. Lat. 9443 del 'Felix' di Raimondo Lullo," *Archivum Romanicum* 16 (1933), 411–32.

[32] I have found Llinarès's *Livre des bêtes* useful for its introduction, notes, and appendixes on the sources of the work.

GOD BY VIRTUE of your goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom and will, here begins this *Book of Wonders*,[1]

PROLOGUE

IN A FOREIGN LAND[2] there was once a man who was sad and melancholy. He wondered greatly at how little the people of this world knew and loved God, who created this world and with great nobility and goodness gave it to men so that He would be much loved and known by them.[3] This man wept and lamented that in this world God had so few lovers, servants, and worshipers. And in order that He be known, loved, and served, he wrote this *Book of Wonders*, which is divided into ten parts, namely: God, Angels, Heaven, Elements, Plants, Metals, Beasts, Man, Paradise, Hell.

This man had a son whom he loved very much and who was called Felix. He said to him: "Dear son, wisdom, charity and devotion are almost dead, and few are the men who live according to the purpose for which our Lord God created them. One no longer finds the fervor and devotion there was in the time of the Apostles and Martyrs, who were willing to languish and die for the sake of knowing and loving God. Where charity and devotion have gone is something you should wonder at. So travel through the world and wonder why men no longer love and know God. Let your whole life be one of loving and knowing God, and weep for the failings of those who are ignorant of, or do not love, God."

Felix obeyed his father, and took leave of him with God's grace and blessing. And with the teachings his father had given him, he went

[1] This is the title corresponding to Llull's original *Libre de meravelles*, but since from an early date it began, like *Blaquerna*, to be known also by the name of its protagonist, and since this is the name by which it has become familiar, we have decided not to do away with it. For a possible source of Llull's original title in the medieval pilgrims' guides to Rome called *De mirabilibus urbis Romae*, as well as an interesting coincidence with that of *Les merveilles du monde*, as Marco Polo's famous book was first called, see M. Batllori, "El lulismo en Italia (Ensayo de síntesis)," *Revista de Filosofía* 2 (Madrid, 1943), 300, as well as his introduction to *Felix* in *OE* I, 312. For interesting suggestions as to Llull's choice of the name "Felix," see Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 9, n. 5, as well as Riquer's suggestion outlined in the Epilogue, n. 5 below.

[2] Undoubtedly France; see p. 654 above.

[3] The opening sentence presents the two central themes of the book, the "wondering" (for which see the following note) and the precept about loving and knowing God (for which see introduction, text at nn. 10–11 above).

through woods, over hills and across plains, through deserts and towns, visiting princes and knights, in castles and cities; and he wondered at the wonders[4] of this world, inquiring about whatever he did not understand and recounting what he knew. And he underwent hardships and dangers in order that reverence and honor be done to God.

[4] I have translated the noun *meravella* and the verb *meravellar-se* by "wonder" rather than by the etymologically closer "marvel," because the former better conveys the combination of astonishment, admiration, and intellectual curiosity implied in Llull's use of the word, which as Colomer (*Edad Media*, p. 28) says is a prolongation of the Platonic θαυμάξειν. See also Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 102, n. 16.

BOOK ONE

1. WHETHER GOD EXISTS

After leaving his father, Felix entered a large wood where he walked for a long time, until he encountered a lovely shepherdess watching over a flock. "My friend," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at your being all alone in this wood where there are so many wild beasts who could harm you, and especially since you don't have the strength to defend your sheep from the wolves or other wild beasts."

The shepherdess replied, "Sir, God is the hope, companion and comfort of my heart, and in this wood I am beneath His protection and influence, for He helps all those who trust in Him; and since he has perfect power, wisdom and goodness, I have placed myself in His protection and company."[1]

Felix was most pleased with what the shepherdess said about our Lord God, and he was in wonder at how much hope and wisdom she had. So he continued on his journey, but he had gone only a short way when he heard the shepherdess shout and cry out very loudly. Then he saw her running after a wolf who was carrying off a lamb, and he was in wonder at her courage in chasing the wolf. While the shepherdess was chasing it, and Felix was running to help her, the wolf dropped the lamb and killed and devoured the shepherdess, and then went over to the sheep and killed many of the ewes and rams. As a result, Felix, in a state of great wonderment, began thinking about what he had seen, and he remembered what the shepherdess had said about God, in whom she had placed such trust.

While thinking about this and wondering about God, who had not helped the shepherdess, even though she had trusted in Him, Felix fell into great temptation, doubted God, and decided that God probably did not exist, for it seemed to him that if God did exist, He would have helped the shepherdess. This temptation and opinion remained with Felix throughout the day until nightfall,

[1] Riquer, *Història*, p. 294, points out that the setting and much of the vocabulary of this scene derives from the Provençal *pastorela*, a form with which Llull was undoubtedly familiar.

when he arrived at a hermitage inhabited by a holy man who had studied theology and philosophy for a long time, and who had come, with his books and wisdom, to this hermitage to contemplate and worship God. The hermit greeted Felix most pleasantly as he approached, but Felix was still so stunned that he was unable to reply; instead he threw himself at the hermit's feet and lay there a long time before he could speak. The hermit wondered at Felix's inability to speak, but by his appearance realized he had almost fainted. At the same time Felix's heart was full of wonder at the temptation into which he had fallen and how much it was tormenting him; and the more he was tempted, the more it seemed to him that God did not exist, for if He did exist, He would not have let him fall into such grievous temptation; and all the more so since he, for the love of God, had decided to travel through the world, in order to make people love Him, and know, honor, and serve Him.

"My dear friend," said the hermit, "what is the matter with you and why are you so speechless?"

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly that God abandoned me, letting me fall into such grievous temptation, and that He abandoned a shepherdess who was killed by a wolf." And then Felix told the holy man what had happened to make him doubt God's existence, and he begged the hermit to help him return to his former state of devotion and faith.

"Felix," said the hermit, "in a certain land there was a king who greatly loved justice, and over his throne he had placed a stone sculpture of a man's arm holding in its hand a sword, on the point of which was a heart made of red stone, all of which signified that the king's heart wanted to move the arm, which would move the sword, which symbolized justice. And it came to pass that, because of a large serpent, the palace was abandoned and nobody could live there. Then one day a holy man entered that palace, seeking a place to do penance and meditate upon God, and he saw the arm with the sword, and the heart which was on the sword. He wondered greatly what the arm, the sword, and the heart signified; he thought about this statue for so long, however, that he finally understood why it had been made.

"Sir," said Felix, "what is the meaning of this example[2] you have given me?"

"Fair friend," said the hermit, "you should realize that this world exists as the occasion[3] for good; for without occasion for good, the world would not be so beautiful a place as it is. And if God did not exist, the world would be the occasion for evil, for it would be more on the side of evil than on the side of good. And since good accords with being and evil with nonbeing, it is apparent that God is the reason the world is good, and if the world had greater evil than good the reason would be God's nonexistence; without whose existence everything there is would be in vain, and it would follow that good would exist for the sake of evil, and evil would exist by itself and be the final principle of good, and this is inconsistent; for which reason it is shown that God exists."

Felix gave a great deal of thought to what the good man told him and his soul began to gladden; with sighs and tears he said: "The shepherdess had virtue and strength of heart when she chased the wolf. If God existed, He would have helped this virtue of hers, and my soul's former virtue in loving God would not have failed me."

"Fair friend," said the hermit, "in God there is charity and justice, and since the shepherdess loved and served God and trusted in Him, He has taken her to His glory and He has given you a way to be strong against temptation and to believe in God, a thing you might not otherwise have been able to do; for a man who has taken on so lofty a task as you have must take heart. And this is why God allowed you to be tempted by the devil, so that you would become accustomed to being strong and stout of heart against temptation and vice."

After saying these words, the holy man took a stick and drew a circle around Felix; and then he asked him if he thought there more necesarily existed something outside the circle than inside. While Felix was wondering at the question which had been put

[2] For the various meanings of the word *semblança* of the original, see Bk. VIII, ch. 85 and n. 146 below. It is often used as a synonym for *exempli*, for which see Introduction, text at n. 7 above.

[3] For the concept of "occasion," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 40.

to him, the hermit said that greatness accorded better with being than smallness, and since that which was outside the circle was superior in greatness to that which was inside, therefore it is more necessary that there exist something larger outside the circle than inside. After giving this example, the holy man said that reason discerns and comprehends that outside the firmament there must be something, and that something is God, since that which is inside the firmament is not as large as the firmament itself, which contains everything within it. And if God were not outside the firmament, it would follow that nonbeing would be a greater thing than being, for outside the firmament there would be an infinite quantity of nonbeing, and what was inside the firmament would be finite and limited in quantity, and this is most inconsistent.

While the hermit was speaking, a large serpent passed near Felix, and Felix felt great fear and dread at the sight of it, and he wondered greatly at the hermit's lack of fear. "Dear son," said the hermit, "if God did not exist, there would be no resurrection, and the world would be eternal and would exist by itself alone, and after death mankind would be in privation and nonbeing. From which it would follow that the world existed so that people would be in nonbeing more than in being; for they would be in nonbeing without end, and in being only while living in this world. Thus, as you can see and realize yourself, if God were naught, your nature would not have been afraid of the serpent, for it would be natural to want to die, since would be the occasion for a person to enter that greater state for which he was made, that is to say, that he be forever in privation. But since your nature experienced fear of death, this shows that God exists, and that with Him just men will be in glory without end after the Resurrection."

"Sir," said Felix, "what you say makes me wonder at your not being afraid of the serpent, if by nature you prefer being to nonbeing."

"Fair friend," said the hermit, "it is so pleasant to think about and love God, that all those who understand how to love and know Him wish to see Him and bask in His glory, and they scorn the vanity of this world, which lasts so little. This is why, dear son, I have no fear of death, but rather look forward to dying and being with God. By which attitude you can see that God exists, for if God did not exist, I would have experienced the same fear

as you; which fear you experienced because you do not know how to love and understand God."

Felix was very pleased with the hermit's proof of God, and he praised and blessed God for having enlightened him with His knowledge. With contrition and tears because of his unworthiness, he submitted himself to God and confessed his sins to the holy man, praising and blessing God for having such a good meditator in this hermitage, and he hoped that many hermits had as much wisdom and love in knowing and loving our Lord God.

2. WHAT IS GOD?

"SIR HERMIT," said Felix, could you tell me what God is? For I want very much to know, since with this knowledge of what God is, my will would be uplifted to love God more than I now do, because it is only natural that through enlightened understanding the will is heightened in loving something about which the understanding has knowledge."

For a long time the hermit thought over the question Felix had asked him. While the hermit was thinking how he could make Felix understand what God was, Felix wondered why the hermit was taking so long to answer the question he had asked, and he said: "Sir, a man found a precious stone which was worth a thousand sous and which he sold for one denier[4] to a man who knew what kind of a stone it was and was able to get a thousand sous for it. Therefore, sir, if you know what God is, I beg you to tell me so that I can love and know Him according to His true value. And if you do not know what God is, I am in great wonder at how you can love Him so much without knowledge, nor how for His sake you can undergo such a harsh life in this hermitage. And it seems to me that if you do not know what God is, then at the slightest opportunity you would disdain Him, as the man disdained the precious stone, about which he knew nothing, selling it for one denier, which denier he knew about, and because of His knowledge of the denier and ignorance of the value of the stone, he preferred having the denier to the stone."

"Dear son," said the hermit, "in a certain land there was once a woman who heard a king praised for his wisdom, power, and

[4] One sou was worth 12 deniers.

good customs; and because of all the good things she had heard about the king, she decided to go to that land where the king ruled. When she came before the king and saw how well-ordered was his court, and saw his great power and his good administration, and when, in addition, she saw that the king was very handsome as a person, well-mannered and full of virtues, then she felt a much greater love for the king than before, when she had not yet seen the king.[5] And you, my fair son, have already remarked how the will loves more that which is known than that which is unknown; as for me, you should realize that I came to this hermitage in order to gain knowledge of what God is, since it is something I have long wanted to know. And in order to acquire this knowledge I have studied theology and philosophy for a long time, and in this hermitage I am doing everything I can to understand and comprehend the essence of our Lord God."

The hermit said to Felix, "A king once had a wife who was very beautiful and good, and whom the king loved very much. That queen loved the king very much, and on account of this great love she was jealous of the king and of a certain damsel of his, with whom he enjoyed conversing because of her pleasant manner of speaking. Every day this queen was in great sorrow, and no matter what the king did or said, he could not cheer her up, a fact which caused him great wonder. The king tried as hard as he could to make her content, and finally when he saw that he could not make her happy, he began to suspect the queen and to think she was perhaps doing something to dishonor him.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "when the king became jealous and suspicious of his wife, then he began to love the queen less, and because of the queen, to love the damsel less. The king went for a long time without speaking to the damsel, and the queen began to cheer up, which cheer caused the king great wonder; for when he had formerly done everything he could to please her, he could not cheer her up, and now when he had stopped trying to please her, the queen loved him more than before. The king was in great wonder at the queen's odd ways, but he fell in with them and let himself be loved by the queen, so that she would be happy and content in her love.

[5] Cf. the story of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba in 1 Kings 10.

"When men of this world take pleasure in temporal delights, and do not love them for the sake of the Creator who created them, so that with them and in them one learns to know and love Him, then God becomes estranged from such people, and because of this estrangement they can no longer have knowledge of Him, nor of the pleasure derived from this knowledge. But when a person ceases loving the delights of this world, through which delights and world a person can love God, then these delights and the world seek out that man, and give him a way in which he can love God and have knowledge of Him.[6] And in this, fair son," said the hermit, "you can, in this world, have knowledge of what God is: namely, that God is that on account of which the world will take you further from loving God if you love the world for itself; and God is that on account of which the world exemplifies God if you love the world for the sake of knowing and loving God.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "a person has knowledge of God by saying that in Him there is nothing which lacks nobility, nor perfection of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, and the other perfections existing in God; thus, when a person has acquired the knowledge that God is not something in which there is any defect, that person can have knowledge of God, who is the fulfillment of all goodness, of all greatness, all eternity, and similarly with power, wisdom, virtue, will, and the other dignities.[7]

"Fair son," said the hermit, "a merchant had a thousand bezants,[8] and he wanted to have another thousand; and when he had

[6] The "ceases loving" towards the beginning of the sentence is thus (*se lexa d'amar*) in all MSS except A, which Galmés followed, and which has *se lexa amar*, "lets himself love." The "seek out" later on in the sentence is also thus (*enqueren*) in all MSS except A, which has an illegible *en . . . en*, corrected by a later hand to *encerten*, which reading Galmés adopted, giving it a meaning in the glossary ("rectify, guide, put on the right path") not recorded in *DCVB*.

[7] The same list of dignities as in the invocation at the beginning of the work, which constitute the first seven of the list of the *Ars demonstrativa* (see Dist. I, fig. A there). Note that they differ from the seven of the *Gentile* (see Prologue, text at n. 21) in that there Llull has "perfection" instead of "virtue." The list is not entirely fixed in *Felix*; sometimes "virtue" is absent, and sometimes others (always from the list of the *Ars demonstrativa*) are added.

[8] Originally the Byzantine (hence the name) version of the Roman *solidus*, and for a long time one of the basic coins of Mediterranean commerce. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 66, cites the ensuing story as an example of the prosperous Catalan merchant of Llull's day on his way to becoming a nobleman.

two thousand, he immediately wanted more, and this way he amassed a hundred thousand bezants without feeling any satisfaction in his soul. The merchant wondered greatly at this fact, and he thought that perhaps the fulfillment of his desires lay not in money but rather in the owning of castles and estates and property, which he was determined to have and which he obtained, and yet he still felt no sense of fulfillment, for the more he bought and possessed, the more his desire to own estates and castles increased. When the merchant multiplied his wealth and saw that it still gave him no satisfaction, he thought that he would satisfy his soul by having a wife and children. He got himself wife and children and still he was not satisfied, and he wanted honors and many other things; and the more things he had, the more his soul wanted to have. The merchant was in great wonder as to how he could satisfy his soul with anything in this world, and he finally thought of having God in his soul. He then loved and served God with what He had given him, and he felt satisfied and fulfilled, and he desired nothing more. So you should know, fair son, that God is that which, in this world, gives satisfaction to the soul of the person who loves and serves Him with all his power.

"Through a forest where a hermit lived, a fully armed knight rode past on his horse, and he came upon the hermit picking the plants on which he subsisted in that hermitage. The knight asked the hermit what God was; and the hermit replied that God is that for which all existing things were created and ordered; and God is that which will cause the good and the wicked to rise from the dead, and will give everlasting glory to the good and punishment to the wicked; and God is that which causes it to rain, which makes plants flower and bear seed, and which gives life and sustenance to everything there is. When the hermit had satisfied the knight with regard to the question he had posed, the hermit asked the knight what a knight was. And the knight replied that a knight was a man chosen to ride on horseback[9] to carry out justice and to protect and safeguard the king and his people so that the king

[9] Llull's etymological reasoning is disguised here by the need in English to use three different roots where Catalan uses one: *cavaller és hom alet a cavalcar en cavall*. For knighthood and chivalry, see the definition in *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 94, and the references in n. 54 there.

could reign in such a manner that his subjects could love and know God."

"Sir," said Felix, "a knight asked a good woman, daughter of chastity,[10] to make physical love with him, and the woman asked him what love was. The knight replied that love was that which made separate wills unite toward a common end. The woman asked the knight if this love he asked of her would unite her with God in glory when she left the life of this world. The knight felt ashamed of what he had asked the woman, and he said the following: 'For a long time I have been subject to false love and in ignorance of true love.' And he said to the woman that he realized that true love united a person with God, and separated him from treachery, lust, cowardice, and all deceit and defect. Nevertheless, he still wanted to know what love was in itself, for one thing is what love does, and another is what love is; and he therefore asked the woman to give him knowledge of what love is, since she had already given him knowledge of foolish love, which he had loved without realizing what it was. The woman was very pleased by the knight's devoutness, and she praised God for having warmed him with the fire of true love, and to God she addressed the following words: 'O Lord, true and glorious God, since, through love, You have enamored this knight, I beg of You to give him knowledge of what love is, for by Your grace and virtue I have given him knowledge of what love does, but he wishes to rise higher in his understanding of love, so that he can love all the better, and he wishes to know what love is in itself.'"

After Felix had told the hermit about the words of love between the woman and the knight, he realized that Felix was not satisfied with the knowledge he had given him of God, whose being he had expressed through God's effect on His creatures, and that Felix wanted to know what God's being was in itself and in its actions. The hermit therefore said the following words to Felix:

"There was once a philosopher who had a son he loved very much and to whom he taught philosophy for many years. When his son was very knowledgeable in the science of philosophy, his father showed him a book he had written, and he asked whether his son knew that he was a man because of the fact that he had

[10] I.e., who had made a vow of chastity; cf. *DCVB*, s.v. *fill* 4, quoting this passage.

written the book or because of the fact that he was his father. The son replied that by the book he knew that he was a man, because to man belonged the ability to write; but even more he knew his father to be a man because he had engendered a man."

After this example,[11] the hermit told Felix that God is that to which belong actions which no one else can perform, save God alone, which actions God performs in creatures. But the way one can best know what God is in Himself, is in how God in Himself and from Himself engenders God, that is to say that God the Father engenders God who is the Son, and from the Father and the Son there issues God who is the Holy Ghost, and all three are in a single God; which God is that which is God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, and which is one God and not three gods. And God is that thing which is infinite, eternal, wise, volitional, virtuous, and who in Himself is the fulfillment of all goodness, all infinity, and of everything He is in Himself."

Felix was very pleased with the knowledge of God the hermit had given him, and he praised and blessed God, who had made Himself known to him; and in his soul he felt his love in loving God increase because he now understood Him better than before.

3. THE UNITY OF GOD[12]

FELIX SAID "In a certain land there was a king who was both very handsome and very virtuous in his habits. This king had great power in terms of men and wealth, and he was of strong constitution and noble in heart. One of his knights had a great desire for many other kings in the world to be like his king, so that there would be love and concord in the world between one king and another, and that all together they would make the world such that God would be known and loved by all people." After these words, Felix said, "Sir, I would like to know if there is only one God or if there are many; for it would be a source of great wonder to me if there were many gods, since I want to know and love one God who has every perfection, and thus, if there were many,

[11] *Exempli* in the original, for which see n. 2 above.

[12] Chs. 3–4 and 6–10 here below correspond loosely to the articles of faith of *Gentile*, Bk. III.

it would naturally follow that I should desire many gods and would want to know and love many."

The hermit said, "If there is only one God, He can have every perfection, and if there were more than one, then one god would be more perfect than the others if he had in himself all those virtues that each god had in himself and for himself. It is therefore proper that one God have all the nobility, goodness, greatness, and virtue which could be in all the gods, who together could not have as much greatness as the one alone. That is to say that one God can be infinite and sovereign in goodness and in power, but if there were many gods equal to one another, each one would have to be finite and bounded by the next one, and none of them would be all-powerful in all that was. And if there were one god, infinite, powerful, and sovereign over the other gods, then all the other gods would have to obey him; and therefore it would follow that in the end there would not be more than one god.

"A foolish king wanted to be king and lord of a realm belonging to another king who was very wise and of good habits, and who held his realm in peace and justice. This wise king wanted to be king of the foolish king's realm, for it seemed to him a bad thing to have it ruled by a king without wisdom, justice, and proper administration. It came to pass that the two kings fought each other, and the wise and just king was defeated; after which the foolish king became lord of the conquered king's realm. The foolish king held these two realms amid great tribulations, because he had no wisdom; and because of his ignorance and bad habits war and poverty spread among his people and from this followed much evil."

When the hermit had spoken these words, Felix was in great wonder, and said, "Sir, according to what you say there must be many gods; for almost the entire world is in a state of tribulation and war, and there are many men in the world who are enemies of virtue and lovers of vice; some men belong to one sect and some to another; and it would therefore seem, according to what you say, either that there are many gods or that there is one god defective in wisdom, justice, goodness, power and virtue; for if there were one god who was good, virtuous, just and powerful,

he would keep his people on the path of truth, and in peace and charity."[13]

"Fair son," said the hermit, "every person bears some resemblance to God, for every person is good insofar as he is a creature and insofar as he possesses understanding and will; and the goodness he has is similar to God's goodness, since goodness, which is God, has placed a likeness of itself in man's understanding and will. And since man has some likeness to God, it is only natural that he love and know his likeness, that is, God;[14] but since man neither knows how nor wants to use wisely his likeness to God, he acts against his own likeness and against the likeness of his God; which is why every man wants to be god when he acts against God. As a result, the confusion of those who do not love one god places the rest of the world in a state of tribulation, confusion, and error, and the God who is one has given them great liberty so they can love and know Him, in order that He may give them great glory if, freely and without constraint of will, they want to love and know Him. For God so loves His likeness in man, that He has given him the opportunity to increase this great glory by reason of the merit he might acquire in doing good works.

"A knight was out hunting, and he followed a wild boar so far that he became separated from his companions and had to spend the night in a wood. When darkness came on he was overcome with fear, and he wondered what could have caused his fear. While in this state of fear, the knight had the idea that the sun was God, because during the day he had felt no fear, which led him to think that his fear came from the absence of the sun. The next day, when the knight was returning at about midday, he met up with a squire whose father he had killed; at the sight of him the knight felt great fear, because he had offended the squire, and because he was unarmed and the squire was completely armed. The knight prayed to the sun to help him against the squire, whom he saw coming, but in spite of this prayer the knight did not lose his fear;

[13] In the part of the sentence following the last semicolon, "good" is missing in Galmés's text, but is present in most of the best MSS, and for "truth" the second family of MSS have "virtue."

[14] Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 42, quotes this passage as a good summary of Llull's exemplarist doctrine.

instead he grew more and more afraid as the other man drew nearer and threatened to attack him with his lance. When the squire was close enough to strike him in the chest with his lance, the knight begged for mercy and pleaded with the squire to listen to him before killing him, for he wanted to recount an experience he had had. The squire withheld his blow, and the knight recounted the fear he had felt in wood because of the absence of the sun and how he had gotten the idea that the sun was God. He added that he now knew that the sun was not God, because if it were, it would have helped him in his present fear, since it could see him. After saying this, the knight asked if he deserved death more because he had killed the squire's father, or because of his notion that the sun was God. The squire was in great wonder at the knight's question, and while he was thus wondering, trying to decide what to answer, the knight asked him another question, namely, whether he, the squire, was not guilty towards his God for hesitating to answer his question, which should be simple for a man who loved God more than his father. The squire thought for a long time about the two questions the knight had asked him, and finally he said that he should kill the knight for having killed his father; but for having not believed in God, imagining that the sun was God, he should not kill him, but rather indoctrinate and give him certitude in knowing and loving God. Then he admitted his own guilt for having taken so long to answer. After this reply, the knight said that for this guilt he needed pardoning, and furthermore since the squire had to indoctrinate him and give him knowledge of God, he should not kill him; and the knight then begged mercy for his guilt in the killing of the squire's father. They made peace with one another and agreed to love and know one God, and for a long time they were friends loving one God."

After saying these words, the hermit told Felix that the world was in tribulation and disorder because people were weak in knowledge and charity and because they held all sorts of varying opinions contrary to God. But if men agreed in knowing and loving one God, then the world would be in good condition and people would be in charity and love, and in accord over one God, like the squire and knight who were in agreement through one's pardoning the other, and through charity and knowledge.

4. THE TRINITY OF GOD

"Sir hermit," said Felix, "once, on a holy feast day called the Holy Trinity, I was present at a sermon on God's Trinity, and this sermon caused me great wonder, because the man who delivered it said that one should not try to prove that God exists in trinity; for it is preferable for people to believe in God's Trinity than for them to understand it by means of necessary reasons. I was in great wonder, sir, at these words, for if this good man was telling the truth, it follows that there is greater merit in believing in God's Trinity than in having knowledge of it, and that the will can love more through ignorance than through knowledge."[15]

The hermit said that there was once a city with many customs which were contrary to God, lawfulness, and princely government. "These customs were privileges the people of that city had acquired, on account of which privileges the king of that city could not carry out his justice. It came to pass one day that a man of that city committed murder, and the king wanted to punish that man. But because of certain privileges he was obliged to set him free, accept the payment of a fine, and pardon him. The king was most displeased that for the sake of money or privilege he had to forsake justice, and he said to the people of that city:

"'Two sinners were praying before an alter: one prayed for God to forgive him, because he feared Him; the other begged God to have mercy on him, because he loved Him. Now you, who fly in the face of justice with your bad customs, I want you to tell me which of these two men God should most want to pardon.' The people of that city took counsel over the king's question, and they decided to tell the king that God should forgive that man who loved Him in preference to the one who feared Him. When the king heard their answer and realized that it ran counter to their wicked customs, he said, 'I am very pleased with your answer, which makes it quite clear that I should love God more than I should fear you, because by loving God I could treat you with

[15] A succinct formulation of Llull's answer to those who claimed one should not try to prove the Trinity—an answer directly associated with the precept of loving *and* knowing God. See also n. 18 below. The *anar* ("go") of Galmés's edition instead of the *amar* ("love") towards the end of the sentence is surely a typographical error. All sources have the latter.

justice; but by fearing you, I would instead by the enemy of justice.'"

After hearing the hermit's words, Felix said he wondered greatly that love could exist without fear, or fear without love.

"Fair son," said the hermit, "those who like to believe in God's Trinity and do not want to understand it, love themselves more than God; for, with the idea that there is greater merit in believing that which they do not understand, they prefer to achieve great glory through faith rather than to perceive God by means of their understanding. And this is why, fair son, fear often exists without love;[16] that is to say, what people fear is to lose glory and to suffer punishment, and since they don't want to know and love God for His goodness and nobility, then their fear is without love."

"Sir," said Felix, "I have often wanted to ask those who are learned in our religion how God can be one in essence and yet be in trinity of persons; but for fear of not being able to understand I have hesitated to ask about the Holy Trinity, which I would like you to explain to me in words that I can understand."

The hermit said: "There was once a merchant in a certain city who had, after many years of hard work, earned a great deal of money. This merchant then became ill, both in spirit and in body. He was ill in spirit because he doubted the Holy Trinity of our Lord God, since he could not understand how God could be one in essence and yet in a trinity of persons; and since he neither understood nor knew how to believe this, he wavered in his faith, which wavering put him in a state of damnation. He was ill in body because of a fever he had, and because of the riches of this world, which he worried about and feared to lose. While the merchant was thus in great danger, he wished that he had labored as much in loving and knowing God as he had in amassing worldly wealth, which he knew could be of no help to him in this grievous trial and bodily illness. Because of how much the merchant wished that he had served God, God inspired his soul with the light of faith, by which he understood that he should not disbelieve whatever he did not understand about God's Holy Trinity; for God has given faith to man so that he may believe whatever he does

[16] Thus in the eighteenth-century Spanish translation. All other sources consulted have "love often exists without fear," which, in view of the rest of the sentence, must surely be a mistake.

not understand, since the Trinity is so lofty an object of knowledge that people who are merchants and businessmen dealing with worldly things cannot understand it."[17]

After this, the hermit said to Felix: "Fair son, even though you cannot understand God's Holy Trinity, it is only right that you should believe it; for if it were forbidden to believe everything one could not understand, it would follow that faith were a bad thing; when faith is in fact a most noble virtue, since by faith men are on the road to salvation, because of believing that which they cannot understand. And this is why, fair son, it is enough for you to believe in the Trinity, if you cannot understand it."

"Sir," said Felix, "if I don's understand your explanations of God's Holy Trinity, I am prepared to believe and have faith. But since I want to know God because he is good, and since it is because of His goodness, rather than to achieve glory or to avoid infernal punishment, that I want to love and know Him, I would therefore like to risk trying to find a way to know and love God. Hence I beg you, sir, to tell me what you know about God's Holy Trinity."

The hermit said: "A philosopher heard about a Christian holy man who was very knowledgeable in theology and philosophy. That man lived in a hermitage where he meditated on the work God performs in Himself. One day it happened that a Jew came to that holy man and had a discussion with him about God's Holy Trinity. On that same day the philosopher visited the holy man, arriving while the Jew was arguing with him; and the holy Christian proved to the Jew that the Trinity exists in God, but the Jew could not understand it. And the reason he could not understand the Christian's arguments concerning the Holy Trinity was because the Jew disliked the proof the Christian gave him; for it is so difficult to prove the Trinity that nobody can understand it if he does not presuppose that it can be proved by necessary reasons. The philosopher understood the arguments he heard the Christian giving the Jew, and as a result he had himself baptized and became a Christian. The Jew wondered greatly at the philosopher's becoming a Christian, since he had known him before his baptism,

[17] In this connection Llull wrote the *Liber per quem poterit cognosci quae lex sit melior, major et verior*, for which see *Gentile*, Introduction, n. 18.

and he said to the philosopher: 'Sir, I am in great wonder that you were so quickly converted to the Christian faith. Please tell me your reason for having been baptized, and for leaving the sect to which you used to belong.' The philosopher replied: 'For a long time now I have been trying, through philosophy, to reach a knowledge of God; and by this path I was able to arrive at a knowledge of God's work in creation, but when it came to God's work in Himself, I could find out nothing through philosophy alone. But by means of the theology the hermit used in his dispute with you, and through the philosophy I myself know and heard from him, I arrived at a knowledge of God's Trinity; which knowledge you could also attain if you presupposed the existence of Trinity, and if you were favorably disposed toward the existence of said Trinity in God, because there can be no proof of Trinity without some kind of presupposition, nor can one prove the Trinity to the obstinate understanding in a proud man's heart.'"[18]

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I well understand your words and your reason for having told me these exemplary stories. But do not hesitate to sow words of salutary benediction in me, for I am prepared to understand and to presuppose whatever you tell me about God's Holy Trinity. And I would be most pleased if I could understand it by necessary reasons, by which reasons I could eradicate forever that doubt and temptation which come to me or to others against the Trinity of our Lord God, whom I want to love, serve, honor, and know all the rest of my life."

After these words, the hermit made the sign of the cross before his face, and trusting in the help of God and the Trinity, said to Felix: "It is clear that our Lord God created everything there is for the purpose of giving people knowledge and love of Himself; and therefore, since He is one in essence and is in trinity of persons, He wanted the world to be one in essence and to be in three different things, which are sensuality, intellectuality, and animality.[19] Sensuality refers to sensual things, that is, things which are cor-

[18] An interesting formulation of the limitations of reason in proving the mystery of the Trinity, and of the relationship between faith and reason, for which see "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 22–3, and *Gentile*, Bk. I, Tree 2. See also n. 15 above.

[19] These are the three categories of "creature" in the blue triangle of Figure T; see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, Fig. T, par. 2, and *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 19.

poral or sensible;[20] by intellectuality we refer to what constitutes the soul of man, or that of angel; by animality we mean man, and what constitutes a union of corporal and spiritual things. These three things constitute the entire world, which is one, and yet is made up of the aforementioned things, without which the world would not have the unity it has, nor would the three things be what they are if each one were not in itself one thing and three things; that is to say, that every body is one, and yet is three things, which are matter, form and, the conjunction of matter and form in the existence of a body which is a union of matter and form.[21] The soul also is one in essence and is three different things which constitute the soul's being: they are memory, understanding, and will, without which three things the soul could not be a single substance. An animal likewise consists of three things, which are body, spirit, and the conjunction by which the body and spirit unite and constitute a single animal, such as a man, a lion, a bird, or any of the other things that constitute a union of body and soul. And in this number of one and three lies the whole world, and everything that is created in substantial being, in order to exemplify the fact that God's substance is one and yet is in three distinct persons, that is to say, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. If God did not exist in a unity of substance and in a trinity of persons, He would not have created everything there is in such a likeness of Himself, in order that He be known and loved by men; and there would have been a defect in God if men could not have known Him because of a defect in His likeness, or in the likeness of the world and of what the world contains in itself."

After the hermit had, by the example of creatures, shown God's unity and trinity to Felix, he wanted to rise even higher, and to reveal God's unity and trinity to Felix by means of God's dignities, saying: "Dear son, in God's nature there is goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, as well as many other dignities that are in God's essence, each one of which is God and none of which is idle. As a result, His goodness never ceases doing good,

[20] That is, capable of being perceived by the senses, i.e. the objects of perception (cf. the *Taula d'esta Art, ORL* XVII, 398).

[21] For form, matter, and conjunction, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 69. For a commentary on the Trinitarian exemplarism of this entire paragraph, see Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 42–3.

that is, producing good in itself and of itself; and by infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, it does good, which it begets from itself and from eternity, power, wisdom, will; which begotten good[22] is the person of the Son, while the begetter is the person of the Father, and from the Father and the Son issues the Holy Ghost. And the very same thing goodness does, is done by immensity, eternity, power, wisdom, and will; and together the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are one divine nature, one Godhead, one God. In God there is one person, the Father, source of all goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, for He who begets the Son and gives issue to the Holy Ghost is goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will; and the same is true of the Son and the Holy Ghost, each of whom is goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will. And that is why in this work God performs within Himself, one paternity, one filiation, and one procession are sufficient; and because there is infinity, eternity, there cannot be idleness, nor can there be inequality, majority or minority. If in God there were goodness which did no good, infinity which made nothing infinite, and so on for eternity, power, wisdom, and will, then in God there would be idleness of goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, and will, which idleness would be contrary to His goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, and will. Just as unity is sufficient in God, so, in this unity, one paternity, one filiation, and one spiration[23] are sufficient, because in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost there is goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will. And since the Father, with all of His goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, begets the Son, therefore the Son is all the goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will of the Father; and the same follows for the Holy Ghost, which is all the goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will of the Father and of the Son, since all of the Holy Ghost proceeds from all of the Father and from all of the Son infinitely and eternally for all of the Father and Son. It is only natural for there to exist love between a father and son, and it

[22] Instead of "it begets from itself . . . begotten good," from L S V, A (followed by Galmés) has only "[thing] begotten." A correcting hand supplied the missing line in the margin of A, which is the source of the different text of Rosselló (followed by *OE*).

[23] Literally "breathing" or "breathing forth"—the techincal theological term for the divine action that produced the Holy Ghost.

naturally follows that a person loves the virtue that proceeds from his remembering, understanding, and loving. Now, if a father loves a son who is begotten from his own body and from that of a woman, how much more natural for him to love even more a son begotten from himself alone, and moreover from all of himself and identical with himself! And if the soul loves the remembering, understanding, and loving that proceed from its virtue, how much more it would love them if its remembering, understanding, and loving were that virtue itself and the soul itself!"

"Fair son," said the hermit, "within your own nature you can understand and feel how you prefer being one man and not two or more men; and since you like your humanity, you like your being in three things, which are soul, body, and conjunction, without which three things you could not be one man. Now this being the case, according to that very nature by which you can feel and know what you like to be, in yourself you can understand and know what our Lord God is, He who created us to love and know Him.

"If God didn't understand or love Himself, He would not be God; and if God understands and loves Himself, then He must bonify, magnify, eternalize, and empower Himself;[24] for if He did not, then virtue, wisdom, and will would, in God, be nobler than goodness, infinity, and power, which is impossible, since in God everything is equal. As a result, goodness bonifies itself in itself and of itself: that is to say, goodness, which is the Father, begets the Son and gives issue to the Holy Ghost from itself, in itself and by itself; and the same follows for infinity, eternity and power.

"A wise man asked a philosopher which was nobler, the essence or the work of God. After thinking for a long time about the question the wise man had asked him, the philosopher said that God is as eternal as the world, and the world as eternal as God. And the reason the philosopher said that the world was eternal, was that he attributed eternal work to God. And this is why certain philosophers have held the opinion that the world was eternal, for it did not seem to them that God, who is so noble in goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, could nor should be idle. But if these philosophers had known of God's work within Him-

[24] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, nn. 16, 47.

self, that of the Father begetting the Son and the Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father and the Son, then they would not have held this false opinion, believing that the world had no beginning.[25]

"Two great wise men were before a great king, and the king wanted to know which of them was wiser; and he commanded that they be asked what was the noblest thing a person could ask of God. The first wise man said it was to possess God. The other wise man said that the greatest favor one could ask of God was that He make a person's will and power be one and the same thing, with no difference between the two; for if man's will were power, he could, if he wanted to, be God. Therefore, fair son," said the hermit, "you should know that, since God is one with His power and will, He can do whatever His will wants, and His will must want as much as His power can do, for if it did not, it would be less than His power and would not be one with His power. And since His power is infinite and eternal, it is itself able to do anything, and the will must want the power, which is the Father, to beget the Son and to give issue to the Holy Ghost for all its infinity and eternity; for without such a desire, the will would not be all infinity, eternity, for the sake of goodness, wisdom, eternity, and power.[26]

"A knight showed his son the great distance a squire had jumped. The son wondered greatly at the jump the squire had made; and the father wanted to know if his son had the discernment necessary to acquire wisdom, and he therefore asked his son why he was in such wonder at the squire's jump. 'Sir,' said the son, 'I wonder at the jump the squire made in terms of the strength of my own body, but I do not wonder, in terms of his body, which was sufficient for the jump he made.' The father was very pleased at his son's reply."

Felix told the hermit that he was satisfied with the knowledge he had gained about the Holy Trinity, in the light of God's goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and about God's work in Himself by means of all of His goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will. Felix then said to the hermit, "Sir, I

[25] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 14.
[26] The last "eternity" is missing in A and B, and hence in the printed sources.

greatly wonder at those philosophers who were gentiles and had great wisdom, and yet were in ignorance of the Trinity of God; but I can see that this is something about which Christian philosophers can have knowledge, and gentile philosophers not."

"Fair son," said the hermit, "the philosophers made no presuppositions based on faith in God, but only followed necessary reasons; and this is why their understanding could not rise high enough to attain God, as could that of Christian Catholic philosophers and theologians who, through faith, presupposed the existence of trinity in God from the outset. And because faith is the light of the understanding, this understanding can rise to greater heights than it could for the gentile philosophers."[27]

5. WHERE IS GOD?

FELIX ASKED the hermit where God was, for he wondered greatly that he did not see Him. The hermit replied that God is present in Himself and exists in Himself, and that in everything there is He exists essentially and presentially.[28] And because God is not a corporal thing, He is invisible to corporal eyes; but, because He is a spiritual thing, He is visible to spiritual eyes.

After saying this, the hermit recounted the following example: "A fool asked a wise man if God was in Hell, or in places which were unclean, full of putrefaction and stench, or if God was in stone, or in sinful men; and he asked many similar questions because it did not seem to him that God, who was so lofty in holiness and nobility, could be in places where there was vileness and filth. The wise man proved to the fool that God is infinite in greatness, goodness, and holiness. By this infinity He must be in every place and outside every place; by His goodness, holiness, and purity He is in every place without dirtying Himself. For if sunlight passing over manure is not soiled, and if a just man is not soiled in thinking about and disapproving of sin, and if man's understanding can understand a stone and hold within itself an image of the stone, without the nature of the understanding being like that of the stone, how much more can God, who is much nobler, greater,

[27] Cf. n. 18 above.

[28] The distinction in Spanish between *estar* and *ser* is similarly (but not identically) differentiated in Catalan *estar* and *esser*, translated here as "is present" and "exist," respectively.

more powerful and more just than man, be everywhere without dirtying Himself or limiting Himself!"

The hermit said that God is present in Himself wanting to be God, for, by wanting to be God, he begets God, and therefore God is present in God and is only one God, in whom God the Father is in God the Son and in God the Holy Ghost; and God the Son and God the Holy Ghost are in God the Father; and God the Son is in God the Holy Ghost, and God the Holy Ghost is in God the Son. And this existence is the result of generation and spiration. And the same follows with the existence of the dignities and virtues in God, for the goodness that is the Father is in itself begetting the Son and breathing forth the Holy Ghost from itself; and the goodness that is the Son and that is the Holy Ghost is present in itself; and the same follows for greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will.

"This existence, fair son," said the hermit, "cannot be seen with bodily eyes, but only with spiritual eyes. And this is why, fair friend, I wondered at you when you said you had not seen God; for, as you may remember, I proved to you that God existed, and I answered to your satisfaction the questions you asked me about God's existence and about His unity and trinity; which satisfaction you would not have experienced without your spiritual sight seeing God."

Felix said: "When I think about the error, vileness, and filth of the world and the little devotion, charity, and love people have toward God, then it seems to me that God is not in the world; for, by the sun being in the air, the air and the earth are lit up, and air, water, and earth are warmed; therefore, if the God of glory, who is brightness and splendor, purity of purities, who is charity and the flowing spring of life, is in the world, how can it be that the world is in such a troubled state?"

The hermit said: "A man was on a high mountain, and he was very cold because of the snow on that mountain. This man saw a fire on another mountain. Now if he had wondered why the fire he saw did not warm him, or why the snow he was in made him cold, his wonderment would have been foolish indeed. So that you, son, according to this example, can conceive how God is present in this world, and how He manifests Himself to people by many ways and examples, such as wars and plagues of hunger

or disease, which He gives in this world, so that people see Him through these things and draw near to Him through good works; and so that they flee from the warmth and ardor they feel toward the world and its vanities, and warm and purify themselves in having and loving God."

6. THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "when I consider that the world was created from nothing, it makes me wonder how anything can be created from nothing."

The hermit said: "A king sent a knight to the country of another king, to go to his court and do battle with a squire accused of treason. From that land there came a page who told the king who had sent the knight that this knight had fought and won the battle. The page gave this news in order to be well received by the king, but it was not true. Now if the king could be joyful about something that was in effect nothing, then how much more could God, who has sovereign power, create the world from nothing!"

Felix said: "A hermit who had spent a long time in a hermitage was passing through a city, and he saw a blacksmith making a knife, and a shoemaker making a shoe, and the hermit reflected that the blacksmith could not make the knife without iron, nor the shoemaker the shoe without leather. As he thought about this, it seemed to him that great would be the world's nobility if it were made from something, since the world exists so that God may be loved and known; for if the knife, which is made for the purpose of serving man, is made from something, how much more must the world be made from something, since the world exists for the purpose of serving God!"

The hermit said: "A clergyman once bought a serf,[29] and after buying him he asked him what he wanted to eat; the serf replied that he would eat whatever his master wanted to give him. And he said the same for drinking, dressing, thinking, desiring, and working; and the serf never tired of repeating that in all things he wanted whatever the clergyman wanted. At last the clergyman asked this servant of his if he had any will of his own. The serf

[29] "Servant" in A, followed by Galmés.

answered, saying that he had no will, for his master had bought him so that he would want whatever his master's will would want."

After this example, the hermit said to Felix that God wanted to create the world out of nothing in order that man be more subject to wanting whatever God wanted to do with man and with the world. For if the world were made and not created, then what the world was made from would be eternal, and man, who is made from the world, would not have such cause to be humble and submissive to God, as he has with the world having been created from nothing.

"Sir," said Felix, "what is the main reason why God created the world?"

The hermit replied: "The main reason why God created the world was so that He would be loved and known by man."[30]

Felix said, "It is clear that other things besides God are more loved and known by man; it therefore seems that the world was not created principally for the purpose of knowing and loving God; but rather that the main reason the world was created was so that man could know and love those things which he loves more than God, and which he knows better than God."

For a long time the hermit wondered about Felix's words. While the hermit was thus wondering he said to Felix:[31] "On a certain feast day, a holy man was preaching, and he said: 'The final purpose for which all things were devised has been almost changed into its contrary; and this is because people, by their sins, turn aside more and more from the purpose for which they were created, which is to know and love God. In spite of the fact, however, that sinful men turn aside from the reason they exist, God in His work does not turn aside from the reason He created man, for He pardons some and gives them glory, and He punishes others because they do not know and love Him. And thus, whether by mercy or justice, the reason for which God created man continues in force, which reason is to know and love God and His works.'"

[30] Cf. Introduction, text at nn. 10 and 11 above.

[31] All medieval sources have "Felix said." Galmés's suggestion that one of the earliest copyists omitted an *a* before *Felix dix*, which would have given "he said to Felix," seem eminently reasonable in the context.

"Sir," said Felix, "why did God not create the world in such a way that man could not sin or die, or suffer hunger, heat, cold, illness, poverty, ire, and other such things? For since God is good and not evil, I am in great wonder that God did not avoid evil, which is contrary to His goodness."

The hermit said: "An abbot was removed from a large abbey and given a small abbey. In the large abbey there were many dissolute monks who did not properly obey the rules of their order. In the small abbey the monks were of good habits, and they carefully followed the rules of their order. The abbot in question was very displeased and irate at having been removed from the large abbey, and he remained irate and unhappy for a long time, until he realized that the holiness of an order should not be judged by the number of its members, nor its wealth or its worldly rank, but rather by the holiness of its members, who lead ordered lives directed toward serving, loving, and knowing God. Therefore, my fair friend," said the hermit, "I answer your question in a similar way; for God did not intend, when He created the world with a multitude of people, that those who had not led a holy life should go to Heaven, which holy life they could not lead if people did not die or suffer hunger, thirst, travail, illness, or death; nor would this world suffice for the great glory for which man was created, that is, for experiencing in Paradise inestimable glory without end."

Felix said: "Sir, why did God not create the world earlier? And why did He not create it larger, more beautiful, and nobler, since God's goodness and power are in great greatness of virtue and plenitude?"

The hermit said: "There was once a queen married to a noble king who was very powerful in terms of his dominions and his wealth. The queen was unable to bear children, and she was afraid of dying without children. The queen was very sad because she could not have children who would reign after the king died. One day it happened that the king entered her room, and, upon finding her crying and bemoaning the fact that she could not have children, the king comforted her with the following words:

"'My queen,' said the king, 'in a noble city there was once a bishop with large rents and with great authority in that city and in many other places. Now it happened that an archdeacon, who

was a nephew of his, died, and this archdeacon was a man of very bad habits. The bishop was very annoyed at the death of the archdeacon, because he had wanted him to be bishop after he passed from this life. Do you think, my queen,' said the king, 'that the bishop should have been so annoyed at the death of his nephew?'

"'Sir,' replied the queen, 'insofar as the archdeacon was his nephew, it was only right for the bishop to be unhappy at his death, but not when it was a foolish question of wanting a sinner like his nephew to be bishop after his death.'

"The king was most pleased by the queen's answer, and he said to her: 'My queen, the reason I hold the office of king is not so that I may have a son who will be king, but rather so that I may rule like a king, and maintain justice and peace in my lands, in such a way that God may be loved and known. Therefore, if by chance I had a son who became king after my death, and he was of bad habits and did not rule as a king, then he would do much harm, which harm would be contrary to the reason for his being king. Hence may God, who is wise in all things, ordain that after my death there be a king worthy of being a king, and who will keep in mind the reasons a person holds the office of king.'

"The queen was most pleased by the king's words, which consoled and cheered her, and she put all her hope in the will and disposition of God. And on account of the queen's hope in God, God gave her a son who was a very wise king, and who reigned for a long time in the service and love of God."

After this the hermit said to Felix that the world did not exist so that it would be older, larger, or more beautiful, but rather so that God could be known, loved, and served. And the world was therefore created at a time when God wanted to be known and loved; and He created it in such a way and of such a magnitude as would befit the magnitude with which God wanted to be loved and known by His people.

7. THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD IN OUR LADY SAINT MARY

When Felix had been given sufficient certainty about God by the holy hermit's words, he took leave of him. The hermit made

the sign of the cross over him and blessed him, and commended him to God's care and benediction.

After this parting, Felix came down from the mountain on which the hermit lived. At the foot of that mountain there was a great forest in which Felix walked until midday. After he had said his nones,[32] he rested by a stream, thinking about the fact that, just as the water flowed down to the sea, so did the souls of unbelievers continuously flow toward everlasting fire; and that for these condemned souls there was no disposition—as there should be—to bring them to the path of salvation. Felix wondered greatly why God did not send emissaries to the unbelievers to teach them the truth about the holy Catholic faith, and why the Catholics did not have sufficient love of God to want to make unbelievers love and know Him.

While Felix was wondering about this, a courtesan[33] passed by near where he was resting. The woman was riding a palfrey and was very well dressed. She was going to see a prelate who, using a cleric of his as an emissary, had sent her the palfrey on which she was riding. As she drew near, Felix stood up and greeted her; but the palfrey, who had just entered the water, shied and the courtesan fell in the water, wetting all her clothes; and she would have drowned if Felix and the cleric accompanying her had not gone to her rescue and pulled her out of the water. Whereupon the courtesan wept and complained bitterly about her clothes having gotten wet, and she swore and cursed at Felix because by standing up he had caused her palfrey to shy and make her fall into the water. Felix wondered at why the woman was cursing him, since he had not stood up with the intention of making her fall into the water; and since he had saved her from dying, he wondered at her cursing him instead of being grateful. The clergyman in the meantime was in wonder at the patience of Felix, who blessed the woman while she cursed him.

While the courtesan was wringing out and drying her clothes, Felix asked the clergyman where she was going.

[32] A daily office—the "ninth" hour—which was usually said about 3 P.M.

[33] *Folla fembra*, literally "foolish woman," which in Llull is equivalent to "prostitute, courtesan," or more generally, "woman of easly virtue" (cf. medieval Latin *fatuae mulieres*, "courtesans"). The English adjective "foolish" lacks the moral sense once found in the noun ("She turn'd to folly, and she was a whore," Shakespeare, *Othello*, V, ii, 132). For a mention of this scene in its broader social context, see Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 76.

"Sir," said the cleric, "she is going to see a prelate, who sent me as a messenger, so he can sin with her."

"Good friend," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at you, that you could carry out such a mission, which involves the damnation of your soul; and I am in great wonder at the prelate who, when his task is to love and know God, can harbor in his bosom anything disagreeable to God."

"Sir," said the cleric, "this prelate who is the cause of your wonder is very rich and powerful, and he loves this courtesan very much, having sinned with her for a long time, and in order that he provide me with some benefice, I obey his orders."

"My friend," said Felix, "you cause me great wonder by your wanting, with the work of the devil, to gain a benefice, which is a thing that should not be given to a person who is an enemy of God; for that position was initiated for God to be known and loved."

When Felix understood the purpose of the courtesan's journey, he went over to her and said: "Oh, foolish woman, how greatly I wonder at you! For you are weeping because you fell from the palfrey into the water and wet your clothes, which are all adorned so that you can indulge in the filth of lust. Foolish woman, why don't you weep at having fallen from celestial glory, for which you were created? Moreover you yourself have flung yourself down the path toward the infernal abyss, and you have flung down and soiled in the stench of lust your remembering, understanding, and loving. Weep, foolish woman, because you have lost God, and because you have soiled your soul with such vile actions."

These and many other words Felix said to the courtesan; but the more Felix preached to her, the more she insulted him and the less she valued his words. Finally the courtesan got on her palfrey and continued on her way.

For a long time Felix thought about the prelate the courtesan was going off to see. Then he thought about the poverty in which Jesus Christ and the Apostles lived in this world. These thoughts led Felix to the opinion that this prelate did not believe in Jesus Christ nor in the Catholic faith; for if he did, it did not seem possible that, for the sake of the courtesan, he would be against God and His order. While thinking these things, Felix felt tempted by the idea that the coming of Jesus Christ was nought; and he

began to doubt his own faith, and as a result of this doubt he fell into a state of great anxiety.

While Felix was in this state of doubt, a woman came by weeping and moaning loudly, on her way to a holy man called Blaquerna.[34] This holy man was in a hermitage where he meditated on God. The woman had lost, through death, a son she loved very much; and because of her ire at the death of her son, she was going to Blaquerna, to have him speak words of devotion and consolation, so that she could accept her son's death with patience.[35]

Felix said to the woman, "Tell me, why are you crying?"

"Sir," said the woman, "I am crying over the death of my son, whom I loved more than anything in this world. And because of my pain, ire, and sadness over the death of my son, I cry and am so disconsolate that I am scarcely alive. And in order to find some remedy for my ire, I am going to see a holy hermit called Blaquerna, who is a very saintly man and one of great wisdom; for whenever people from this region feel disconsolate or suffer from some doubt, they go to him and ask him about the cause of their doubt; and the good man comforts the angry with words of God, and he counsels those in doubt about the things they do not understand."

Felix was very pleased with what the woman had told him; and together with her he went to see Blaquerna, so that he would give him knowledge about the Incarnation of the Son of God, about which he was having doubts.

[34] Cf. Introduction, text at n. 4 above. The form of the name without *n* is that which appears in the oldest MSS of the novel *Blaquerna* itself, of *Felix* (MS V), of the *Book of the Tartar and the Christian* (Venice, Bibl. Marciana, VI, 200, for the importance of which, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Introduction, n. 25) and the *Doctrina pueril*. In le Myésier's catalogue of 1311 (see the "Life," n. 175, and Hillg, p. 336) it appears as "Bracherne." This means that in *all* sources dating from Llull's lifetime or shortly thereafter in which the name appears, it is without the *n*. Only in the second third or half of the fourteenth century do scribes begin to prefer the more euphonic "Blanquerna," which has persisted to modern times. Perhaps too they were influenced by a supposed derivation from *blanc* ("white"), rather than from a famous palace of Constantinople (*Palatium Blachernarum*) and a statue of the virgin it contained, which was much venerated by pilgrims and crusaders, and which seems to have been the origin of the name. In any case, the evidence is so conclusive (Llull himself must have supervised the preparation of the Venetian MS), that it seems high time, as Morel-Fatio, Tarré, Platzeck, and Batllori have suggested, that we return to the original form. See J. Tarré, "Los códices lulianos de la Biblioteca Nacional de Paris," *AST* 14 (1941), 159, n. 9; A. Caimari's note in the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, pp. 6–9; and Platzeck, "Miscelánea," p. 397.

[35] For "patience" and "ire" see Bk. VIII, ch. 75 below.

While Felix was walking through the woods with the woman, he began to feel a strong temptation to sin with her. Felix was in great wonder at the temptation he felt, and within himself he said the following words to our Lord God:

"Glorious Lord God, who has every perfection, how and why have You forsaken Your servant, Felix, who intended to spend all his life knowing and loving You? Felix is now in sin and error, for he harbors doubts about Your Holy Incarnation, and he has fallen into a desire for carnal pleasure, wanting to corrupt his own virginity. How and why has Felix fallen into such a base condition? And where is the faith he used to have? And the virginity he once so loved, where has it gone?"

While Felix was talking thus to himself, and wondering at himself, the woman who was walking with him wept and moaned, saying to God: "Lord most high, who is just in all things, my will is contrary to justice in that I resent the death of my son, whom You have killed with justice, which justice is in everything willed by Your will. It is foolish of my will to resent what Your will has willed in the death of my son; my will is thus disobedient to Your justice. But since my will has been created to desire everything Your will desires, I am in great wonder at the impatience of my will against the works of Your will and Your justice."

Felix was in great wonder at the woman's words, for they were words of great devotion and wisdom; and he wondered how a woman uttering such words could feel impatience over the death of her son, and how he could feel a lustful desire to sin with a woman who uttered such holy and devout words about God.

While Felix was in the midst of these reflections, he and the woman arrived at the hermitage where the holy man Blaquerna lived. The holy man was sitting beneath a lovely tree, holding a book containing much science of theology and philosophy, with which he was meditating on the King of Glory. Felix and the woman greeted Blaquerna, and Blaquerna politely returned their greetings. The two of them sat down beside the holy man, and the woman spoke first, with the following words:

"My Lord Blaquerna, Love and Fear met on a high mountain; they greeted one another cheerfully and decided to keep each other company. Fear asked Love what he was seeking, and why he had come to that mountain. Love replied that the reason he had come

there was to build a handsome palace on that mountain, one in which he could spend the remaining days of his life. Fear was saddened by these words; Love wondered at Fear's sadness. Love asked Fear why he was sad, and Fear replied saying:

"'Greater is the fear in a soul that is afraid to offend God, than the love in a soul that loves worldly things. And since you love the pleasures of this world, and I fear God's justice, I am sad that you want to build and live on this mountain on which I too propose to build and live for the rest of my life.'"

The woman then told Blaquerna about her sadness and pain over the death of her son, and how she felt greater love for her son than fear of God. And this is why she had come to Blaquerna, so that he would comfort her over the death of her son in such a way that she could finally have more fear of God than grief over the death of her son.

Blaquerna was in great wonder at the beauty of the story the woman had told, considering the state she was in, and he wondered how the knowledge of her own error did not comfort her and cause her to be obedient to God's will, since it is only natural for knowledge to guide and order one along the path of salvation, and to make fear of God stronger than love for the world and its followers. After these thoughts, Blaquerna said to the woman:

"In a certain city there was a magistrate who was very lustful, proud, unjust, and full of evil ways. The king of that city was very wise, just, generous, humble, and full of good ways. A pilgrim once came to the city and stayed at an inn there. One evening he heard the innkeeper making the following speech to a knight who was complaining about the magistrate for having deceived his daughter and sinned with her:

"'Great is the king's justice when he lets a magistrate misuse his power, for by committing offense toward the king and toward the people, the magistrate increases the punishment he will suffer at the hands of the king; and the people, for their patience with the magistrate's evil ways, will be rewarded by the king, and the more the magistrate is against the people, the greater will be their reward.' When the innkeeper said this, the knight replied that the magistrate's wickedness was a reflection of the king's wickedness, and of the fact that his ways were similar to those of the magistrate. All that night the pilgrim thought about what he had heard, and

he found himself unable to decide which one of them, the knight or the innkeeper, had best characterized the king's condition."

After recounting this example, Blaquerna recounted another one: "There was once a very beautiful maiden who was much sought after for carnal pleasure. This maiden, however, preferred to remain a virgin, so that she might serve God and be contrary to the vanities of this world precisely in that area in which she was most sought after. It came to pass that a foolish man spoke ill of this maiden, accusing her of the sin of lust. The maiden was very angry with him, and her ill will toward him was such that she fell into ire, which is a mortal sin. While the maiden was in mortal sin, that is, in the sin of ire, she found herself wanting to sin with a knight who had loved her for a long time. Great was the maiden's wonder at her desire to sin with the knight and to destroy her virginity, which she had conserved so long. The maiden confessed to a holy monk, to whom she said:

"'Sir I am greatly tormented by the sin of lust, which I used to dislike intensely. I don't know why, but now I find myself desiring to sin with a knight who has loved me for a long time. I beg of you to tell me what is causing this and what has made me change from a good to a wicked state.' The holy man asked the maiden about the other mortal sins, so that through them he could discover why she had gotten the idea of sinning with the sin of lust. The maiden told the holy man that she was in sin of ire against the man who had defamed her, and the holy man realized that it was this sin of ire which had caused her to be forsaken by God and fall in with foolish desires. The holy man told the maiden to forgive this man, and in her heart to love him, in order to recover her patience and fortitude, and not take false pride in her virginity."

By the time Blaquerna had finished speaking, the woman had, thanks to his examples, understood his doctrine. Felix was in great wonder at Blaquerna's examples, since they had also permitted him to understand why he had fallen into temptation regarding faith and lust; and he praised and blessed God for the examples he had just heard, and he said to Blaquerna:

"Sir, in a certain land a Christian monk once had such a long dispute with a Saracen king that he was able to persuade him that the Saracen religion was false; and the king understood, by the

necessary reasons the monk had presented, that he was in a state of damnation. The king then asked the monk to prove to him by necessary reasons that the Christian faith was true, in which case he would convert to Christianity and be baptized, and he would place his country beneath the dominion of the Holy Church. The monk replied that he could not demonstrate it to be true by necessary reasons. The Saracen was most displeased with the monk's reply, saying that he had done a bad thing in taking him away from the Saracen faith, in which he had always believed, if he could not give him necessary reasons concerning the Roman faith. He added that giving up one's faith for another was a matter of grave concern; but to leave a bad faith for a true one, involving necessity of reason, that is to say, to leave believing for understanding, was quite acceptable. The king told the monk that if he could not give him understanding of the Christian faith, he would make him die a cruel death. The monk fled, and the king died in error, from which came great harm to him and to all his land."[36]

He recounted this example to Blaquerna so that Blaquerna would give him a proof of the Incarnation and so that he, Felix, would no longer fall into temptation with regard to his faith, for this is a most serious and dangerous temptation. After this example, Felix recounted another one so that he would never again fall into the sin of lust.

"Sir," said Felix, "a hermit spent forty years in a hermitage, where he led a very harsh life. One day when he was delousing his hair shirt he saw how very thin and badly afflicted he was as a result of his life of self-mortification. The hermit thought that perhaps God would give him great glory for the great penance he had undergone. The hermit realized, however, the temptation into which he had fallen; that of feeling vainglory over the penance he had undergone. The hermit thought over how he could so mortify in himself the temptation of vainglory that he would never again fall into a similar temptation. The good man put on his hair shirt and went to a city that was at the foot of the high mountain on which he had lived for the last forty years. The good man went through the city shouting whether there was anyone who wanted

[36] For this story, repeated in six other places in Llull's works, and for its importance as a criticism of Dominican methods, see *Gentile*, Introduction, n. 12.

to buy the merit he had earned in forty years of doing penance; and everyone who heard him wondered if he had gone out of his mind. The hermit asked a man if, in return for the glory he had earned in serving God for forty years, the man would give him the two loaves of bread he was carrying. The man replied that he would not even give him one loaf of bread for it. As a result of this, the hermit reproached himself so strongly for his temptation toward vainglory that he never again fell into that temptation, and he went back up the mountain to continue his former life of penance."

These were the words Felix spoke to Blaquerna, with the hope that Blaquerna would give him such severe penance that he would never again fall into the temptation of lust, as he had just done. And Felix told the hermit about the temptations he had just undergone regarding faith and lust.

Blaquerna was very pleased with the two examples Felix had recounted, and he said to Felix: "A philosopher and a shepherd were once seated beneath a lovely tree near a spring. The philosopher was discussing philosophy in terms the shepherd did not understand. While the shepherd was wondering about what the philosopher had said, wolves fell upon the shepherd's flock and devoured a great number of his sheep."

After this example, which Blaquerna recounted so that Felix would no longer feel temptation with regard to faith, he recounted another so that Felix would not feel the temptation toward lust: "A very rich man had two sins: one was that of avarice, and the other that of ire. One day he happened to hear in the Gospel how God commanded man to love his enemy. As a result he decided in his heart to love a certain man toward whom he felt ill will. As soon as he loved that man he had disliked, God enlightened him as to how to throw off his sin of avarice, for the mortification of one sin provides the opportunity for the destruction of another. Therefore, whoever dislikes lust," said Blaquerna, "dislikes all other sins, for one sin gives rise to another."

"Felix," said Blaquerna, "a Christian, a Jew, and a Saracen were debating, in the presence of a pagan, about the Incarnation of the Son of God. The Jew and the Saracen denied the Incarnation, and the Christian proved it with the following words:

"'It is evident that God created the world for Him to be known and loved. In God there is goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom and will. Through goodness He wanted the world to be good, and He wanted knowing and loving God to be a good thing; through greatness God wanted His goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will to be well known and loved; through eternity God wanted those who would know and love him to be everlasting in glory without end; through power God wanted all those things to be true by which He could be better known and loved; through wisdom God wanted those people who love and know Him to be wiser; through will God wanted those who have greater faith and greater merit to be on the true path, and He wanted the goodness and all the dignities of God to be more strongly exemplified, as well as the existence in God of great virtue and nobility, mercy and justice; and God's will wants those who feel most constrained to love God and the virtues, and to dislike the vices, to be on the true path.'

"The Christian said that the greatest good that God can perform for man is to make him God in the person[37] of the Son of God; and the greatest greatness that can exist in man is for him to be one with God, who is infinite greatness; and the greatest duration a creature can have is to endure without end in being God; and the greatest power a man can have is being able to be one person with the Son of God; and the greatest wisdom a creature can have is to know[38] himself to be one person with the Son of God, and to know that everything created is created so that he might be both man and God;[39] and the greatest love[40] a creature can have for God and for himself is to want to be one person with God; and the same follows with virtue, truth, perfection, and nobility. No man can be more disposed to knowing and loving God than one who is God and who died so that God could be known and

[37] Galmés followed A in writing "essence"; but all the other sources have "person."

[38] In Catalan, this and the following "know" (*sàpia*) have the same root as "wisdom" (*saviesa*); cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 8.

[39] Batllori (*OE* I, 509, n. 8) says this last clause adumbrates the Lullian and Scotist idea of the primacy of Christ in the economy of the Creation. See also A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 107.

[40] Galmés followed A in writing "firmness," but all the other sources have—and the sequence of divine attributes demands—"love." For the interchangeability of "love" and "will" in the list of Lullian Dignities, see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12.

loved, and so that God's people could be redeemed; nor can any people feel more obliged to know and love God than those who believe themselves to be redeemed and saved by the Incarnation and Passion of the God-man.

"After this explanation the Christian gave the pagan concerning the Incarnation of God, he said to him: 'A king sent a knight whom he loved very much to a Roman court. The knight carried out the king's mission in the Papal Court very well. On the return journey, thieves killed the knight and took everything he was carrying. This knight had a wife and children, and when she found out about her husband's death, she came before the king with all her children, weeping and lamenting the death of her husband, beseeching the king to help her with her basic needs, in consideration of her husband's merits. For a long time the king wept with the knight's wife and her children, and he felt himself most obligated to the wife and children, for love of the knight who had died as a result of transacting his business.'

"After this example, the Christian asked the pagan if he naturally felt more moved to love and to know God by what he had said about his own faith than by what the Jew and Saracen has said about their faiths and against that of the Christians; for if the pagan found himself more inflamed with love of God, and more enlightened as to the works of God, by his words than by those of the Jew and Saracen, then it must necessarily follow that his words were true; for if they were false, it would follow that goodness, greatness, and the other virtues of God would be contrary to themselves and to their works, which contrariety is impossible.

"For a long time the pagan thought about what the three wise men had said, and he realized that God participated with man and with all creatures in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and so on for all God's virtues, more in what the Christian had said, than in what the Jew and Saracen had said. And he became a Christian, and his wish was to die honoring and knowing God."[41]

Felix was very pleased with the beautiful example by which Blaquerna proved for him the Incarnation of the Son of God, and

[41] Thus in all sources except B, followed by Galmés, which has "his wish was to love and honor and know God."

he was confirmed in his former faith; and he praised God, who had given Blaquerna such wisdom that by examples he could answer and prove the questions people put to him, and by these examples could indoctrinate people in good habits, and in loving, honoring, and knowing God.

8. THE HOLY PASSION OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST

"Sir," said Felix, "I am very satisfied with your proof of the Holy Incarnation of the Son of God, which I have understood by the examples you have given. But it is a source of great wonder to me that divine nature allowed the humanity with which it was one to be crucified, tormented, and killed, since the Godhead must have loved that human nature above all other creatures, and love is of such a nature as to want to avoid suffering and death in the thing it loves."

Blaquerna replied, saying that divine nature put in Jesus Christ's holy humanity more goodness than in all other creatures, and the greatness of that human nature was greater by virtue of its duration, its power, its understanding, and its loving than any other virtue which God had created. And therefore it is only right that, just as God's goodness exalted the goodness of Jesus Christ's human nature above all other created goodness, so the goodness of Jesus Christ's human nature should have let itself undergo great suffering to honor divine goodness; which suffering had to be greater than any suffering that can be experienced.

"Fair son," said Blaquerna, "just as God exalted Jesus Christ's humanity with the greatest greatness possible, by making it be one person with Himself, so Christ's humanity wanted to humble itself to the greatest smallness to which it could humble itself. And this it did to honor the great greatness of the Son of God, the greater smallness consisting in Christ's wanting to become incarnate in a poor woman, in His wanting to be born and raised among poor people, and wanting to be befriended by only a few poor men, wanting to do little preaching, wanting to receive little honor, wanting to do few miracles in comparison with the many He could have done, wanting to remain poor, and wanting to live little; and in comparison with the honor that was His due, He had

less honor than any man in this world, and moreover He wanted to humble Himself in His death, which in itself is a thing concordant with smallness. And all these things He did in order to honor the greatness of the Son of God. For God wanted to be man, wanted all men present, past, and future to be everlasting without end, so that this humanity of Jesus Christ be honored in glory without end, and that it be loved and known by all the saints in glory, who glory in the glory of this divine and human nature of Christ. And through Christ's human nature, He wanted to suffer greatly in this world, so that in this world honor would be done to His eternal nature."

Blaquerna said: "A king was at war with a count, and he had taken all his land except for one fortified castle in which the count was living. The count was a very evil and proud man, and had done many wicked deeds and injuries to the King, who was his lord. One day it happened that the count heard Jesus Christ's Holy Passion mentioned, for a holy man was preaching on this subject. After the sermon, the count went to his palace, and on his way a greyhound of his he was very fond of chased a little dog, which lay down so that the greyhound would not hurt it. But the greyhound killed and tore the little dog to pieces in front of the count. The count was so angry at the greyhound that he had him killed, and he said to the knights, 'I have never seen or heard of an animal doing anything as cruel as this greyhound, killing the little dog, which was humbling itself so it would not be killed.'

"At the court of this count there was a wise knight, old in years and of saintly conduct, who said to him: 'Sir count, the noblest creature, and that with greater power than any other created thing, is Jesus Christ, son of our Lady Saint Mary; and the lowliest creature in the world is a man who sins. Jesus Christ, who has greater power than any other creature, humbled himself and delivered himself up to death in order to save the Jews and all the rest of us. Those Jews, however, were sinners, and had Jesus Christ crucified and killed, in the cruelest way they could.'

"The count thought a great deal about what the knight had told him, and by virtue of Jesus Christ's Holy Passion, he was filled with humility and contrition of heart. The count got on his horse, and, all alone, went to the king. He threw himself at the king's feet, and begged the king to be merciful and pardon him. The

count confessed all his wrongs to the king and his council, begging for mercy.

"Great was the king's wonder at the count's arrival and at what he recounted. The king then said to the count: 'A certain squire had offended a knight, who was his lord. The squire felt great contrition and repentance over the wrong he had done his lord. The knight sent men out to look for the squire, who had fled in fear of death. One day it happened that the knight, on his way back from hunting, passed before an inn where the squire was hiding. The squire came out of the inn and knelt down and humbled himself before the knight, whom he begged for mercy, saying:

"'"My lord, falsehood and deceit led me into the wrong which I did you. Fear of death made me flee; but now in my heart the good love I bore you for such a long time has returned. I do not ask for mercy so that I may live, for in fact I accuse myself of being worthy of death; but I ask for mercy so that you will forgive my soul, reserving for my body the death it deserves." The knight wondered with great wonder at the squire, for never had he seen anyone beg for mercy as well as the squire had. The knight dismounted and kissed the squire's eyes, which were crying, and his mouth, which was so sincerely begging for mercy.[42] The knight made the squire a knight, and he gave him great gifts and made him the most important member of his household.'

"When the king had finished, the count who was begging for mercy recounted the reason for his coming to his court to beg for mercy, and he told about the sermon on Christ's Passion, which he had heard, and about the deaths of the greyhound and the little dog, and he told him what the knight had said about Jesus Christ's Passion.

"After the count had recounted all these things, he said to the king and his court: 'Such has been the pride of my proud heart that I could never humble it to humility[43] until through the power of Jesus Christ's Holy Passion I humbled it in begging for mercy

[42] The printed sources, with only MSS A and B at their disposal, got this sentence wrong; the other three I have consulted make it clear that this remarkable direct expression of emotion is indeed what Llull had in mind.

[43] MSS A and B, and hence all the printed sources, omit the "to humility" of this curious phrase.

and in kneeling before you and your court; for if Christ, who was God and man, humbled Himself before death and before sinful men, being Himself without guilt or fault, then I am indeed worthy of offering myself to die, since, because of my proud and treacherous heart, which many times made me betray and deceive my faithful lord and his faithful council, I deserve to die.' The king and all his council were very pleased with count's words, and he pardoned him and returned his lands to him, and made him a member of his council. And the king and his court praised the power of God, who by His humility had conquered such a proud heart.

"One day this count happened to be passing by an illustrious monastery where many good men were doing penance. A good man who had put himself in service to these holy men as a gardner was taking manure to the garden. While passing by on the road, the count recalled Christ's Holy Passion, and he thought about the holy life these holy men were leading in the monastery; and, remembering how Jesus Christ had given Himself over to humility and had disdained the vanities of this world, he decided to abandon this world and give himself over to the basest occupation he could find. The count dismounted and told the gardener to give him his clothes and the basket in which he was carrying the manure, and to take his own horse and his clothes in exchange. The gardener said in reply: 'Sir count, do you remember a nephew of yours who has been missing a long time, one whom you made knight and wanted to adopt and make heir to everything you had?' The count replied, saying that he remembered the nephew in question, and that he had often asked people to look for him in different countries, but had never had any news of him. 'Sir,' said the gardner, 'I am that person you used to love so much.' Then the count recognized him as being his nephew; for, because of the long time he had not seen him and because he was so thin as a result of the great penance he had undergone, the count had not recognized him at first.

"The count was very pleased to have found his nephew, and he was in great wonder that he had taken on such a low occupation. While the count was wondering about this, he remembered how he himself had wanted to take over his nephew's occupation, and he wondered at himself for wondering at another with respect to

something he had himself desired. 'Beloved nephew,' said the count, 'I want you, from now on, to be count and lord of all my lands, and I want to be a gardner for the rest of my life.'

"The gardner replied, saying: 'Sir count, the same day you dubbed me knight, I heard a holy man preach, saying that it was better that a man's knowledge know humility and that he know himself to be working in the service of God, than to be king of France. And this is why, sir count, I do not want to banish such knowledge from my soul for the sake of your county or for whatever you could give me; for I love this basket and these poor clothes more than your horse and your clothes; for with my basket and poor clothes I am more pleasing to God's wisdom than I would be with your horse and with your clothes.'

"In a certain city there was once a noble burgher who had a wife and children and great wealth. The burgher wanted very much to serve God, and he wanted to have in his heart no other love but that for God. On account of his wife, children, honors, and wealth, however, he could not love God as he wished. The burgher therefore obtained a separation from his wife, giving her and his children everything he owned, with the exception of one house and vineyard, which he kept for his own needs. The burgher was then able to contemplate God much more than before; but the house and vineyard at times still kept him from meditating on God. So the burgher, for the love of God, gave away the house and vineyard he owned, and then he could meditate on God more than before. But his children and relatives were still sometimes an impediment, and the burgher could not yet fully satisfy his desire to love God until he left for foreign lands. Then he was so poor he possessed nothing; and then at last he possessed God to the limit of his desire, and nothing impeded him in his love of God."[44]

When Blaquerna had, by means of examples, revealed to Felix the reason why the Godhead wanted Christ's humanity to live in this world in poverty, suffering, dishonor, and death, Felix understood the point of Blaquerna's examples, and he praised and

[44] As Galmés points out in a note to this passage, it is undoubtedly autobiographical and constitutes a résumé of Llull's life from the time of his conversion to his departure from Majorca. See the *Libre de demostracions*, Bk. IV, ch. 37, where Llull makes the same connection between Christ's Passion and the drama of a man leaving his family to enter upon a life of contemplation.

blessed God, and in his heart decided to be poor for the rest of his life, and he was willing to die in order to give knowledge and love of the son of God, who, through the holy humanity He took on, wanted to be so known and loved.

9. ORIGINAL SIN

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "I have heard tell that as a result of the deadly sin our forefather Adam committed when he ate the fruit and disobeyed God, we must all undergo physical punishment and suffer hunger, thirst, cold, heat, sickness, and death. I have also heard tell that any man who is not baptized is doomed as a result of original sin. Now since the soul of any particular man is not Adam's soul, and since no one, according to my way of thinking, should be punished for a sin he did not commit, I am in great wonder as to why a person should be punished for Adam's sin."

Blaquerna replied, saying: "A king had wrongly taken a castle from a knight. The king died and left his son as heir. The knight who had lost the castle asked the king to return the castle taken by his father. The king replied, saying that he was not to blame for his father's sins, since the father had not taken the castle because of the son's wish, but because of his own. 'Sir,' said the knight, 'having inherited the kingship from your father, you must therefore fulfill all his obligations; and since you rule because of the rights your father had, you must carry out justice in all you have received from your father the king.'"

When Blaquerna had recounted this example, he applied it to the question at hand by saying: "All that is human nature was in Adam before he begat Cain and Abel, and the same was true of our mother Eve. In both of them human nature was exalted above that of beasts, birds, plants, fish, and other things; and as a result of what we received from our forefathers, Adam and Eve, we have that nobility which makes us superior to all other sensible[45] creatures. Therefore, just as we are honored by the good we have received from Adam and Eve, which honor does not come from ourselves, thus it is only fitting and just that we be tormented and abased more than any creature for the evil and sin which Adam

[45] In the sense of being capable of feeling or perceiving, and therefore not to be confused with the meaning give in n. 20 above.

and Eve committed against their creator; and this is why all of us should suffer physical punishment for the original sin.

"Fair friend," said Blaquerna, "if a man's soul did not suffer because of original sin, then if he were not baptized he would no longer be in a baser condition than an animal or other creature, man being what he is; and thus God could not make proper use of His great justice, which must necessarily be so great that, just as God's goodness could, through Grace, exalt man's nature above that of any physical creature, so God's justice was able to abase and punish human nature in general, and make all unbaptized persons of baser condition than any other creature, in which base condition any unbaptized person finds himself, for through lack of baptism he is condemned to damnation."

"Sir," said Felix, "how can Christ's Passion have such great virtue that it is sufficient to redeem the entire human race, when Christ's human nature is one man, and not many men?" Blaquerna replied that Christ's human nature by itself was not sufficient to redeem the entire human race; but since He was and is one with the Son of God, therefore, because of the nobility of the Son of God, his human nature was so exalted in terms of honor, virtue, and power, that not only could it suffice to re-create one world, but to re-create ten thousand worlds, or even more.[46]

"Sir," said Felix, "if Christ's Passion had such virtue in saving His people, how can it be that everyone in this world is not on the road to salvation? And why are there more unbelievers, who do not believe in His coming, than Christians? This would make it seem as if His coming were not enough to re-create the world."

Blaquerna replied that there was once a king who was a person of excellent habits and who had instilled good habits in his kingdom. That king had a son he loved very much, in whom he had instilled the same habits and whom he had brought up as well as he knew how. The king died and his son reigned a long time, and he was a wise king and of excellent habits, and he held his land in peace and in justice, because of the good habits his father had instilled in him. After the death of this king, there ruled a foolish king, who did not have good habits, and he wasted and dissipated almost all of his kingdom, because of his bad habits.

[46] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, Art. 6 and n. 33 there for this concept of re-creation.

Blaquerna then said that once a wise king with a great number of knights was riding through a city, and on one of the streets he met a priest who was carrying the body of Jesus Christ. The king dismounted and knelt down, kissing the ground out of reverence for the body of Jesus Christ. A foolish knight wondered at what the king was doing, and did not want to dismount and do reverence to the body of Jesus Christ. Great was the king's wonder at the knight's pride, and he had him banned from his court and his fief taken away, on account of the dishonor he had done Christ. After saying this, Blaquerna added that Christ's Passion was sufficient to give the king an example of charity, justice, devotion, and humility, and it was also sufficient for the knight who refused to dismount from his horse, but he did not want to take example or virtue from it. And this is why the world is in error; not through any defect in Christ's Passion, but rather because people do not want to take advantage of the good habits embodied in Christ, nor of those he bequeathed to the Apostles, Martyrs, and holy men.

10. OUR LADY SAINT MARY

WHILE STANDING there with Blaquerna, Felix's thoughts turned to our Lady, and he wondered how she could have remained a virgin after the birth of her son. He therefore said to Blaquerna: "Sir, I am in great wonder that our Lady could have her Son without corrupting her virginity."

Blaquerna replied that just as our Lady's son entered her without her virginity being corrupted, so must He have been born without its being corrupted; for if not, His birth would be contrary to the nature of His begetting, and our Lady would have been nobler at the beginning of the begetting of Christ than at the end, when her son was born, and our Lady's will, in choosing virginity, would not have been fulfilled in the birth of her son. Therefore, so that our Lady might not be corrupted, nor her will opposed when she gave birth, her son Himself wanted our Lady's virginity to be preserved, after His birth as well as before.

While Felix wondered at what he had said, Blaquerna went on to say that a student once asked his teacher how the sun's light could enter the light of a fire without corrupting it, and without

the sun's light being engulfed, for even when it is inside the light of the fire, it is not engulfed by it. The teacher was very wise in the science of philosophy, and he replied: "It is only natural that in every body composed of the four elements, one element enters another without the one corrupting the other, and that from all four elements comes the compound, that is the body that is composed of the four elements; just as the son of our Lady Saint Mary, who in her womb and with her remaining a virgin, was combined with her flesh, one element entering another, and came out of her womb with our Lady still remaining a virgin; similarly, the compound body engendered by the elements comes forth as something quite different from any of the individual elements, and yet, in that body, none of the elements is corrupted in its essence."

"Sir," said Felix, "when our Lady saw her son, who she so loved, be taken, bound, wounded, mocked, crucified, and killed, how could she endure it? And why did our Lady not die of grief when she saw her son dead on the cross?"

Blaquerna replied that once in a city there was a burgher who was exceedingly jealous of his wife, by whom he had a son. The wife of the burgher was a woman of very chaste and good conduct, and she loved her child more than anything else in the world. The burgher had a nephew he was very fond of, who had spoken ill of the burgher's good wife, hoping that the burgher would cease to love his child and that he, the nephew, would be made heir after his uncle's death. One day it came to pass that the nephew said to his uncle that he had seen a clergyman leave her bedroom, a clergyman he had already mentioned in his insinuations about the burgher's good wife. The burgher was very angry about what his nephew told him, and he said: "Fair nephew, if you love me and want to possess my wealth after my death, then you must do what I tell you. Go to my wife and, in front of her, put your hand in her son's belly and remove his heart, so that, as a result of her son's death, she will also die of sorrow and pain." That wicked man went to the good woman, and found her holding in her lap the child who was her consolation in face of her suffering at the hands of her jealous husband. He took her son, and in front of her, plunged a knife in the child's belly; and then he stuck in his hand, pulled out the child's heart, and threw it in the woman's lap. While the wicked man was killing the child, the child cried

and wept, and looked at his mother and begged her to help him against the wicked man who was killing him. The good woman was unable to help her son, and her sorrow was so great that she wondered how it was she did not die. For the good woman wanted only to die when she saw her child dying. But because she had great patience and thanked God for the suffering she underwent, God did not want the good woman to die then, but instead He made her live a long time in suffering and sorrow so that, through her fortitude, chastity, and sorrow, He could then crown her in glory, with a great crown of glory.

"Sir," said Felix, "how is it that the people of this world place such great hope in our Lady? For there are many men who place more hope in our Lady than in her son."

"Fair son," said Blaquerna, "the flesh that the Son of God took on from our Lady is worth incomparably more than all the angels and archangels, and more than all men present, past, and future; and it is worth more than everything God has created, nor could God create anything of such great worth as the flesh in which the Son of God clothed himself in our Lady's womb. And this is why it is fitting that our Lady be so lofty and excellent a creature, full of justice, charity, virtue, saintliness, and power; that she be sufficient unto the hope necessary for both the righteous and the sinner; and since everyone, whether sinner or righteous, needs our Lady's prayers, and since her son will give ear to our Lady's entreaties in preference to those of any saint or all the saints together, and also since our Lady is more assiduous in entreating her son for the righteous and for sinners than any other saint, He therefore wishes people to place great hope in our Lady."

After this, and in order to clarify what he had just said, Blaquerna recounted the following example to Felix: "In a certain land there was a very wise king, and in this land there were also many wicked men, and the king had to exercise great justice in order to punish people for their mortal misdeeds. Often the king was annoyed at having to exercise justice against so many people, and often he felt a desire to pardon people, but there was no one in his court who knew how to make the proper supplications that would permit the king to grant pardons; and everyone knew the king to be so just, that they felt their situation to be hopeless after committing some offense against him, and they did not beg for

mercy, but allowed the king to carry out his justice on them. And it came to pass that this king had a daughter who was very beautiful and of excellent conduct. One day he said to her: 'Fair daughter, I have a great desire to exercise my right to pardon, but my people do not know how to beseech my pardon. I will therefore display a great love for you, so that people who commit some wrong against me can trust in you, and so that I, by your entreaties, can sometimes allow them to be pardoned. And as for you, my daughter, you should make people love yourself and me, so that through your good conduct I shall be forced to listen to you, and so that people, because of your good upbringing and the hope they have in you, shall punish themselves for their wrongs; and you should also teach them how to beg for mercy.'"

11. THE PROPHETS

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "why is it that nowadays there are no prophets?" Blaquerna replied that once there was a very noble king who had a son he loved very much. The king sent official messengers throughout his kingdom announcing to one and all that a special court would be held to honor his son, on whom he wanted to confer knighthood, and whom he wanted to make heir to his kingdom. After the young king had been made knight and the court was over, the messengers, whom he had sent throughout his land so people would come to do honor to his son, resigned.[47]

"My Lord Blaquerna," said Felix, "why did this king you mention not hold his court earlier, since his son was worthy of knighthood earlier? And why did the messengers who announced the king's court die before the court which they had so long announced was held?" Blaquerna replied that the court was principally for the honor of the king holding it, and that much greater honor was due to the son than those who attended the court could give him;

[47] *OL*, p. 651, n. 3, says this word (*cessaren*) should be translated as "died" to accord with the following paragraph. However, *DCVB* not only does not give such a meaning, but cites this passage as an example of the meaning "to resign from a job." Moreover, the relationship is somewhat mysterious between this paragraph and the next one, in which is clearly presented the problem of the time-interval from the prophets' death to the thing they prophesied—Christ's coming. I.e., why here do the messengers resign (or die) *after* the announced event?

for this court was established according to the high honor befitting the two kings who at that time wanted to hold it.

Felix asked Blaquerna why the prophets had spoken so obscurely about the coming of Jesus Christ; for if they had spoken about it more clearly, many men would have believed it who, through ignorance of His coming, have gone to everlasting fire. Blaquerna said that both understanding and faith are God's creations, and the more obscurely the prophets spoke of the coming of Jesus Christ, the more the human understanding is induced to new heights of subtlety in inquiring into God's intrinsic and extrinsic works; about which works the intellect can have a better understanding the more secretly Christ's coming is announced. And the same is true with faith, that it can more greatly believe in Christ's coming the more subtly the prophets have spoken about it.[48]

Blaquerna said that the Holy Apostolic Father once gave a holy man a choice of two bishoprics, saying he could take whichever one he preferred. One of these bishoprics was in a city with many people, and the bishopric itself had large revenues, but its prelates and subordinates were many and of bad habits. The other bishopric had only small revenues, and the regular and lay clergy were few in number, but they were of good habits. And the holy man chose to be bishop of the lesser bishopric rather than the greater one, for he preferred lordship over few people of good habits than over many who were of evil disposition.

Felix said: "Sir, according to the example you have just recounted, God prefers to give glory to men of very virtuous and holy life than to many men who in this life have not displayed great holiness or virtue. And since God is all good, powerful, great, and is of perfect will, it is therefore a matter of great wonder that God has not ordained that in this world there be many more men of very great holiness than there actually are."

Blaquerna replied, saying that there was once an abbot who was a saintly and devout man, and beneath him were monks whose lives were not as upright or saintly as befitted their order, even though some of them led the life they should. This abbot did much

[48] This need for obscurity and its heuristic efficacy has received interesting commentaries in Riquer, *Història* I, 348, and Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 77–8. See Bk. II, n. 4 below, where the concept is applied to the Lullian *exempla*.

fasting and led a very holy and exemplary life, in order by example to exhort the bad monks to change their ways and the good ones to exert themselves in leading a life of the highest perfection, so that their great holiness and good conduct would be a reflection of the holiness of their creator.

"Sir," Felix said to Blaquerna, "why do the Jews not become Christians, since they have the Old Law which is the foundation of the New Law?[49] For it is a source of wonder that they have the principles of the New Law, and that with these principles they are still contrary to the purpose of those principles."

Blaquerna replied that in the time of the prophets the rule of faith was very strong, because people did not have as much knowledge as they now have;[50] and therefore the Jews, through their faith, believe that they have kept the Old Law; and they have made many commentaries antithetical to the text, and successive generations have followed their forefathers who falsely contradicted the New Law. And because they go against their own destiny, they are in captivity, as one wise Jew explained to another Jew, in the following words:

There was once a wise Jew who spent many years in the study of his religion, and was in great wonder at the Jewish captivity and how long it had lasted. For in the time of Christ they had already suffered two captivities for certain great wrongs they had committed; but these came to an end, with the first captivity having lasted four hundred years, and the second seventy; but this one in which they now find themselves has lasted more than twelve hundred years, without their knowing why.[51] And this Jew believed that the reason for their present captivity was the death of Christ; and he therefore wrote to another asking why they had been in captivity for such a long time, since he was afraid it was perhaps because the Jews had occasioned Christ's death.

"Sir," said Felix, "there was once a Christian who was a usurer, and he had a wife[52] and children. On the day he died, his confessor

[49] For the Old Law or Mosaic dispensation, see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 1; the New Law is, of course, the Gospel dispensation. The "principles" of the next sentence are to be understood in the sense of "beginnings."

[50] Cf. n. 63 below.

[51] Cf. the almost identical passage commented on in *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 24.

[52] Galmés's polygamous plural was surely a typographical error; all sources agree in giving the usurer only one wife.

told him that he could not be saved unless he returned everything he had earned through usury. The wicked usurer replied that he would rather be damned than have to return everything he had earned through usury and thus leave his wife and children in poverty. I am therefore in great wonder at the law which has been passed concerning Jews, that if they convert they have to part with all their possessions; for there are many Jews who would become Christians if it were not for that law."

Blaquerna replied: "There was once a king who ruled over a city in which there were many Jews from whom he received a large sum in tribute every year, which tribute money came from the usury the Jews practiced on Christians. And it came to pass that one very wealthy Jew became a Christian, along with his wife and children, and all of his belongings went to the king; and his wife, children, and he himself were so poor that they went from door to door begging, and were dying of hunger. The king's subjects wondered in great wonder at how he could accept money from usury and not give a man who had once been a Jew enough for him and his children to live on."

"Sir," said Felix, "a hermit who led a very holy life once entered a city in which there were many Jews. This hermit went all through the city so that he could feel joyful whenever he saw that God was loved and known, and so that for any contrary thing he could weep and beg God's mercy in order that God ordain that He be loved and known. One day it came to pass that this hermit entered the synagogue of the Jews, where he heard them cursing Jesus Christ, without giving the hermit a thought, since they assumed he was a Jew. This holy man felt great displeasure at the thought that the Christian king allowed people to remain in his city who were against the king's religion and dishonored that Lord who was the king's Lord. When this saintly hermit had left the synagogue of the Jews, he saw the provost carrying out a sentence on a Christian who had killed a Jew on Good Friday, because he remembered the dishonor the Jews had done Jesus Christ on the cross, where they had kept him dead and naked so that great dishonor be done him. The holy man wondered greatly how the king and Christians of that city could associate with such people, who are so adverse to the high honor befitting Jesus Christ, by virtue of whom those Christians believe themselves to be honored

for ever and ever in the glory of His Father, who so loves His own honor and all those who honor Him in this world, and who abhors all those who do Him dishonor."[53]

12. THE APOSTLES[54]

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "I wonder greatly how it is that the Apostles, who were few in number, could convert so many people, when now that we Christians are so many we cannot, among all of us, convert the unbelievers there are in the world."

Blaquerna said: "The disciple of a philosopher once lit a fire in front of the philosopher, and expressed wonder that a spark could start such a large fire. And he said to the philosopher: 'Sir, what is it that gives fire the virtue that, starting from a single spark, one can burn as much wood as one can throw into the fire?' The philosopher replied, saying: 'In the time of Christ there were a few holy men called Apostles, and they were all inflamed with holy grace and divine inspiration; and God gave them ways to multiply charity and devotion, while they, with all the power of their souls, struggled to make God loved and known.'"

"My Lord," Felix said to Blaquerna, "why are there now no men so burning with love of God, that through them God could enlighten all those who neither love nor know Him?"

Blaquerna replied: "Once there was a king, very powerful in terms of both wealth and number of subjects, who was very fond of hunting. One day he pursued a bear so far that he lost his companions. When evening came on, he went all alone to seek shelter in a peasant inn, saying he was a knight from the king's court and asking the peasant to put him up for love of the king. 'Sir,' replied the peasant, 'I am king, and that person you refer to as king is not a king.' The king was in great wonder at the peasant's words, and asked him to explain what he meant.

"'Sir,' said the peasant, 'it is a king's job to do all the good he can for his people, and to avoid all possible evil. But the king you mention has taken another job, namely, chasing after wild beasts, for whom he is no king, and he is always sad and troubled because he cannot have as many of them as he would like. But I, sir, am

[53] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 7.
[54] For the importance of the Apostles as models, see introduction, text at n. 15 above.

king of my own will, which is such that, if I had the power of a king, I would arrange things so that for the rest of my life and throughout my lands God would be loved and known.' The King said to the peasant: 'Kings and noblemen are, in this world, very often idle; and so as not to have evil thoughts or to do evil, they go hunting to put a stop to this evil.'[55] The peasant said: 'In that hunting, sir, there is no cessation of evil, but rather an increase of it, as can be understood from the words a certain clergyman said to his superior.'

"'My good friend,' the king said to the peasant, 'pray tell me what the clergyman said to his superior.'

"'Sir,' replied the peasant, 'a certain bishop found himself very put out at having to stay in his bishopric and carry out his bishop's duties. He therefore obtained permission from the pope to be absent from his bishopric, and rested and amused himself; now the clergyman who acted as his deputy was a man who led a dissolute life, and who did much harm. One day a cleric of his said to him: "My lord, I am in great wonder at why the bishop entrusts you with his bishopric, when you are capable of doing such harm, and that you haven't the slightest awareness of the harm you do." The deputy replied: "It's the bishop who has to give a reckoning of his flock, which, through me, he has lost." The cleric was in great wonder at this reply, and he went off to tell the bishop of what the deputy had told him.'[56]

"'My fair friend,' said the king, 'what is the meaning of what the deputy told the cleric about the bishop?'[57] 'Sir,' said the peasant, 'Will and Power met in a hermitage, and a great dispute arose between them, for Power said he was superior to Will, and Will said he was superior to Power. As judge they both chose the hermit living there, who said to them: "There was once a wise man living under a certain king. This wise man had great will to do good, and he wished he had as much power as the king, so that he could perform that good which was lost in the king's power to do good, because his will to do good did not correspond to his power."'"

[55] Similar complaints in the passage corresponding to Bk. VIII, ch. 102, n. 228; see also Bk. VIII, ch. 99, n. 213.

[56] "And he went off to tell the Bishop of what" is missing in A B and hence in the printed texts.

[57] The text of this sentence is very garbled in the sources, but this is surely what Llull meant.

After Blaquerna had recounted the above examples, Felix understood—by these very examples—why Christians were not as ardent as the Apostles in converting those in error and bringing them to the path of salvation; and he said to Blaquerna: "In a certain city it came to pass that a rich man died, leaving great wealth to his wife and children. And on the day of his death, after his wife and children returned from church, where they had sorely wept over the rich man's death, they were sitting in a large room, when a cat started playing with a feather in such a way that the wife, children, and others who were there to keep them company could not help laughing."

Blaquerna said that one day a holy pilgrim was before the cross, and he gazed at it with his bodily eyes, while with his spiritual eyes he recalled what Jesus Christ's Holy Passion signified. While in the midst of such thoughts, the pilgrim saw two priests enter the church, discussing temporal[58] matters, a discussion they seemed to enjoy and which went on for a long time. The pilgrim said to the two priests: "My lords, you know that after the death of Jesus Christ the Holy Church was placed in custody of Saint Peter, and from the death of Saint Peter until now there have been many popes[59] who have successively been pastors of the Holy Church. Now since the cross is a symbol of Jesus Christ's grievous suffering and of the dishonor done him in this world, I am therefore in great wonder at how any son of the Holy Church can be happy while Jesus Christ is debased, shamed, and scorned in this world by so many disbelievers, and by so many others who feel no gratitude for the high honor He did them in this world."

"Sir pilgrim," said one of the priests, "I once heard tell of a very rich and honored king who was playing chess. A wise man asked him why he was idle and did not do all the good he could in order to honor God, since God had created the world so that He would be honored. The king replied that he played chess to avoid doing or thinking evil, and in order to pass the time. The wise man said that God had not made him king so that he could avoid doing or thinking evil, nor so that he could be idle, but

[58] Thus in all sources consulted, except A (followed by Galmés), which has "corporal."

[59] Galmés, following the only two MSS available to him, has *apòstols* ("apostles") with a note saying the passage seems to require *apostolis* ("popes"), which is, in effect, the reading of L S.

rather so that he would do good as long as he lived. While the wise man was saying this to the king, another wise man thought in his heart about how much good was lost through the king's idleness and how much evil came from it, and he said to the king: 'My lord king, Power, Wisdom, and Will once met by a lovely spring. After spending a long while by that spring and speaking of many things, Power told of his great and many-sided capacity to do good and avoid evil. Wisdom wept because this capacity was lost and because Will did not induce Power to make use of this capacity. While Wisdom wept in this fashion, Will sang and was joyful, and Power was idle.'"

"My lord Blaquerna," said Felix, "how has it come to be and why is it that the Saracens possess and have possessed for such a long time the Holy Land beyond the seas where Jesus Christ was born, crucified, and buried? For I am in great wonder at Christians who have put up with this situation for such a long time."

Blaquerna said, "A Saracen who was sultan and lord of that land wrote a letter to the pope and to Christian kings in which he expressed his great wonder at how the Christians thought they could conquer that land by force of physical arms without using similar spiritual arms, by which the Apostles, preaching and risking death, had converted all the lands beyond the seas, and which the Christians then lost by force of physical arms, that is, using the methods of Mohammed, whose followers conquered those lands which by force of arms they now hold and possess against all the Christians of the world, and against the great honor due to Jesus Christ and His followers."[60]

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly how it has come to be or why it is that men of this world are so interested in being honored, when it is only God who should be honored; and if any man should

[60] Llull repeats this anecdote in *Blaquerna*, ch. 80, and in the *Ars notatoria*, ed. Gayà, pp. 34–7, where the sultan is said to be "de Babilònia," which was the usual Latin term for the sultan of Cairo, and hence Egypt. In the *Libre de Sancta Maria*, at the end of ch. 20, where the anecdote reappears, this personage is referred to as the "Galifa de Baldac," which is presumably the caliph of Baghdad. Since, however, that city had been destroyed by the Mongols in 1258 and now played a very subordinate role in the Mongol khanate of Persia, and since Llull was perfectly well informed on this Persian dynasty (see my "Notes," Parts II and III), this last reference is mysterious. For other passages where this concept is discussed, see the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 112,10–11, and n. 113 on this passage in *OE* II, 1263. Cf. Hillg, p. 24, n. 107, and A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 111, n. 135.

be honored, it should only be because through that honor God would be honored."

Blaquerna said that a very mighty and noble king once held a great court and gathered together many people, so that they would all do him honor there, and so that everyone would see the high honor befitting the king and his dominions. This king was very wise, and, in order to demonstrate his power, he wanted to honor a son of his, whom he therefore made king and equal to himself in power and honor; and he ordered everyone who had come to that court to honor his son as befitted a king. The others present at that court, however, were very envious of the honor accorded the king's son, and they wanted this honor for themselves, with no thought at all of reserving it for God.

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that emperors, kings, princes, counts and barons, and even prelates, are so honored in this world, yet after their death are so little honored, while the Apostles, who were poor and humiliated in this world, since their death have been, and still are, so honored, venerated, and revered?"

Blaquerna said that the Antichrist would come into the world with the intent of receiving the honor that is rightfully due to Jesus Christ; this Antichrist will want to be honored in opposition to Christ, and therefore after his death he will be very dishonored in this world and in the next.[61]

"Sir," said Felix, "a certain man, a great clergyman, told a great many people that the Antichrist had been born, and that he would soon come to reign in the world, and after his death would come the end of the world.[62] Now, if God created the world so that

[61] The last four words are missing in A and hence in Galmés's text. As for the figure of Antichrist, Llull gave a vivid description some eight years earlier in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 96, and a year or two after *Felix* he wrote the *Liber contra Antichristum*. For Llull's involvement with the Franciscan Spirituals and with the doctrines of Joachim da Fiore, characteristic of which was the idea of the coming of Antichrist, see Batllori, *Món*, pp. 23–5, and Hillg, pp. 53–6. For an analysis of this and related passages in this chapter, see A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 96–7.

[62] Batllori (*OL* p. 658, n. 25) suggests this might be a reference to Arnold of Vilanova (or Arnold of the Newe Toun, as Chaucer called him). He was Llull's contemporary (1238–1311), who combined a professional life as the most famous medical figure of his day—not only as a practitioner (he was doctor to kings and popes), but also as a theoretician (see the introduction to McVaugh, *Villanova*, for an appreciation of his importance in the history of medicine)—with a spiritual life as "visionary, reformer, and terrible polemicist in favor of his fantastic ideas" about the coming of Antichrist and the end of the world soon to come (see the article on him in Riquer, *Història* I, and especially p. 372). Given Llull's interest in medicine, and given the fact that Arnold of Vilanova taught in Montpellier

there would be more and more holy men leading exemplary lives, men who would be forever with God in glory, and since there have been so few holy men until now, I wonder greatly how God could want to end the world so soon, and why He would not make the world last until such time as there be many holy men martyred for love of Him."

Blaquerna said that a certain king was building a great palace. The king decreed that many men should work a long time on it. Large revenues were set aside for building the palace; and since it had to be of very great size and splendor, it was therefore necessary for the men building it to be many, and to be of great wisdom and nobility.

It came to pass that while all these people were working on the palace, many wicked men came, killing and overwhelming those building it. The king sent others to build, and once again the wicked men came, killing and overwhelming them, and laying waste to their possessions. The king was most indignant at these men who had killed those working on the palace, but he said that since his will wanted the palace to be finished, the task necessarily had to continue until completion, so that his will would be fulfilled in its desire to build the palace.

"Sir," said Felix, "in the time of the Apostles there occurred many miracles, and after their death there were many holy men who performed miracles, by which many people were converted to the Church of Rome. Nowadays, however, few miracles are performed, and few are the people converted to one faith, all of which is a source of great wonder to me." Blaquerna said: "In the days of the prophets it was proper to convert people on the strength of belief, because people believed more easily, and in the times of Christ and the Apostles miracles were quite fitting, since people did not have a solid base in scriptures, and therefore liked miracles, which are physically visible demonstrations of things. Now we have reached a time when people prefer necessary reasons, since they are well grounded in the great sciences of philosophy and theology; and therefore people who, through philosophy, have fallen into errors contrary to the Holy Roman

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between 1291 and 1299, it is unlikely that the two men did not meet before the encounter of 1308 (for which see the "Life," n. 167 above), but whether they met before the writing of *Felix* is much more problematical.

faith,[63] should be conquered by means of necessary reasons, and their false opinions refuted by means of necessary reasons, which reasons are based on philosophy and theology."

Felix was very satisfied with what Blaquerna had said, and he praised and blessed God for having enlightened him about the Incarnation of the Son of God, about which he had doubted when he had come to see Blaquerna. Felix then took leave of Blaquerna, and continued on his journey seeking wonders by which he could know and love God.

Here ends the first book and follows the second.[64]

[63] Batllori (*OE* I, 509, n. 13) suggests this might be a reference to the Parisian Averroists, for whom see the "Life," § 43 and n. 170 there. For other comments on this interesting passage with its clear statement of progress from a time of simple faith at the beginning of our era to one of greater rationalism in the thirteenth century, see Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 285, n. 32, and Hillg, p. 259, n. 373. For Llull's attitude towards miracles, see also Bk. VIII, ch. 115 (and n. 272) below.

[64] This last sentence is missing in the printed sources, even though it is in all the MSS.

HERE BEGINS THE SECOND BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF ANGELS

After leaving Blaquerna, Felix entered a large valley where he found a road along which he walked for a whole day, without finding anything to arouse his wonder. While walking through this valley he hoped to see some wonder, but because he did not, he decided in his heart to wonder about something he himself would think about. While Felix was in the midst of such thoughts, he came to a little church, where there was a hermit who was reading the *Book of Angels*,[1] in order to gain knowledge of them.

Felix went up to the door of the church, in which there was an altar to Saint Michael. Above the door of the church was a painting of a man with wings, holding a pair of scales, which represented Saint Michael weighing souls.[2] Felix was in great wonder at this representation, and after having made the proper reverence to the holy image of the cross, and having greeted the holy man, he said to the hermit: "Sir hermit, what is the meaning of the painting over the door of your church?" The hermit explained that it represented the angel Saint Michael weighing souls. Felix asked the hermit if angels existed, for this was something he very much wanted to know.

[1] An early work of Llull's, probably written 1275–7. He also treated the topic in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 37, 73, 152, 272, 275–6, 286, *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 98, and the *Tree of Science*, "Arbre angelical." Moreover, in the ternary stage of the Art, "Angel" became the second of the nine subjects (see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 2) and it is therefore systematically treated in many of the works of this period. See also *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 17, and Dist. IV, n. 127, for "angel" as a component of the Figure of Philosophy (and as synonymous with "intelligence"). In the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 85–90 = Int. iii, 69–74, some of the same questions raised in this Book of *Felix* are treated. Lastly, see Bk. VIII, ch. 116 below, where angels are treated again, this time as denizens of Paradise.

[2] For a reproduction of a beautiful Catalan romanesque painting depicting just such a scene, see Riquer, *Història* I, 299. As pointed out there, this was one of the traditional ways of representing Saint Michael.

13. WHETHER ANGELS DO OR DO NOT EXIST

When Felix had asked the hermit to tell him whether angels existed, the hermit explained the existence of angels in the following words: "Fair sir," said the hermit, "it is only natural for every creature to love its own likeness; and the more similar things are to one another, the more mutually lovable they are. And this is why it came to pass that a king, who had two sons, the older of whom resembled him much more than the younger, loved the older son more than the younger, precisely because of this greater resemblance. The younger son, on the other hand, resembled the queen, who therefore loved him more than the older son; and because the king loved the older son more than the younger, the queen was annoyed at the king, and wondered at how he could love the older son more than the younger. The queen therefore said to the king, 'My lord and king, I am in great wonder at you for loving one son more than the other, when both sons are equally yours.' This king was very wise, and he asked the queen why she loved the younger son more than the older. The queen replied, saying that she loved the younger son more than the older one because he resembled her more. 'My queen,' said the king, 'no creature resembles God as does an angel, for an angel has no body and is invisible, and has greater power to understand and love God than any other creature. And if it were the case that angels did not exist, it would follow that God would not love as much that which was more similar than that which was dissimilar to Him; and you, my queen, would have greater virtue and orderliness in loving your likeness than God in loving His, which is impossible.'"

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am very pleased with the example you have given me, by which you have shown me that angels exist. But all the same I wonder greatly why the queen could not recognize in the king that trait which made him love his own likeness more than something dissimilar, since she recognized it in herself."

"Fair son," said the hermit, "such is the great interrelation between will and understanding, that because of the queen's will,

which loved the younger son more than the elder, her understanding wanted to find the king's will similar to her own, while the queen's memory dwelt more often on her resemblance to the son more similar to her than on the son more similar to the king."

14. WHAT IS AN ANGEL?

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "what constitutes an angel's being?"

The hermit replied: "There was once a king who did not know what it was to be a king, nor what constituted a king's duty. He failed seriously in carrying out his duties as a king, on account of which failure much harm came to his own lands, and to many others. The king was very angry at his failure, which he was unable to set right, so great was the harm that had come from it. Great was the king's wonder at how much harm had come from his error, and he cursed the father who had begotten him and the mother who had conceived him for not having instructed him sufficiently in his youth as to what a king's duties were, and what a king was; and since they had given him a position whose nature he did not understand, he cursed his father and his mother."

Felix wondered greatly about this example the hermit had given him, for it did not seem to have anything to do with the question about what an angel was. The hermit, seeing Felix's wonderment, and realizing that he did not understand the example he had given, recounted another one: "In a large monastery there was once a holy monk who led a saintlier life than any of the other monks in that monastery. Because of the exalted life this holy man led, he alone of all the monks had been given the privilege of having a room to himself, where he ate and slept, and prayed to God as often as he wished. One day he began to wonder how it was that man had come to see, hear, smell, taste, and feel. While in the midst of these thoughts, a king came to see this holy man, because of the great fame his holiness had acquired. The king saw the holy monk poorly dressed, and he saw the simple bed in which the monk slept; and the abbot of that monastery praised the holy man for the harsh life he suffered in the manner of his eating, sleeping, and dressing, and in other ways in which the body could be afflicted. The holy man was in great wonder at the abbot's praising him, because, by doing so, he was accusing himself and his order

of not following the life of great penance established for his order by former saintly men, who were themselves men of great penance.

"And while the holy man was wondering about the abbot's praise, the king said to the abbot: 'It is in the nature of these bodily things that they enliven the bodily senses when a person makes use of them in the way of sensual pleasures; and this is why worldly men, for their sense of sight, make beautiful palaces and beautiful clothes, and why they want to see beautiful things—so their sight can have greater pleasure with the greater beauty of what it sees. And with the other bodily senses, worldly men act similarly; for their sense of hearing they want to hear words of praise, and for their sense of smell they want noble scents, and for their sense of taste they want to eat fine dishes and to drink noble wines, and for their sense of touch they want soft beds and clothes, and are moved to carnal pleasures.'

"From what the king said about the function of the sensitive,[3] the holy man understood the faculty by which people sense sensible things; that is to say that by nature the sensitive faculty likes to make use of things with which it has an affinity for its great delights and pleasures, for it is only natural for things to find pleasure in other things similar to themselves."

"Sir," said Felix to the saintly hermit, "I am in great wonder at your examples, for they don't seem to me to have anything to do with what I asked."

"Fair friend," said the hermit, "I consciously gave you these examples so that you would elevate your intellect in the effort to understand; for the more obscure the example, the greater is the understanding of the intellect which understands it."[4]

The hermit went on, saying to Felix: "Dear son, God (blessed may He be) is very memorable, intelligible, and lovable; and this is why He has made angels, who are composed of the three natures, that is, of recollection, intelligence, and will. With their recollection they remember God, with their intelligence they understand God, and with their will they love God. Thus, fair son,

[3] Llull here uses the word as a noun (as he does in the *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 6; cf. n. 13 there), as it was once used in English, meaning "the faculty of sensation" (cf. *OED*, s.v., B, 2).

[4] The doctrine of obscurity (cf. Bk. I, n. 48 above) applied to the Lullian *exempla*.

angels can contemplate God with all their being, remembering, understanding, and loving. And in order for that contemplation to be very great, God wanted angels to be spiritual things, without bodies, so that they would have nothing to impede them in their contemplation of God. Fair friend," said the hermit, "no creature can be more similar to God than memory, understanding, and will joined in a single being, which is an angel. These three natures of an angel represent the divine persons in God, and the unity of an angel represents God's unity, which is one person in three. Thus, fair son, in order that we may have knowledge of God and his works, and that through this knowledge we may love, praise, and honor Him, God created angels in His own likeness, so that in this likeness He may be known and loved."

When the hermit had explained to Felix what angels were, he went back to the above-mentioned examples, saying that wings on the figure of a man symbolize the fact that an angel is a spirit which moves wherever it wants, without place constituting any impediment to its movements; the scales symbolize the fact that the good angel takes the just souls to Paradise, and the wicked angel carries off the souls of those who have died in sin. The king's knowledge symbolizes the existence of a good angel who knows why he was created and who loves the purpose for which he was created;[5] the king's ignorance symbolizes the evil angel, who, through his malice, makes many men sin and err, just as a king's ignorance results in many evil things. The delights of the five bodily senses symbolize the fact that an angel is a thing which delights in remembering, knowing, and loving God; and a wicked angel is that which finds torment in remembering, knowing, and hating God.

15. THE MIND OF ANGELS[6]

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder how an angel can have knowledge of physical things, since it lacks physical eyes."

[5] Thus in L V S; A B, followed by the printed sources, have, "who loves what is created."

[6] This translation of *entenimentt* as "mind" is justified not only by the context, but also by the fact that Llull invariably renders the word in Latin by *intellectus*, which was the usual scholastic translation of the Aristotelian νους. See Bk. VIII, n. 53 below for more details.

The hermit replied: "On a certain road two men met a pilgrim on his way back from Jerusalem. One of the men was a philosopher and the other a jurist. The philosopher asked the pilgrim where he was coming from, to which the pilgrim replied that he was returning from Jerusalem. Then the philosopher asked him about Jerusalem and its surroundings, and the pilgrim described the city, according to what he had seen and what he imagined. The jurist told the philosopher that he was in great wonder at how the pilgrim was able to describe Jerusalem since he was not seeing it physically. The philosopher replied, saying that the imagination is capable of imagining whatever a man has seen yet no longer has before his eyes, and it is by this power of the imagination that the mind can understand physical things without seeing them physically."[7]

"Sir," said Felix, "the pilgrim, having seen Jerusalem, was able to imagine it, and by means of this imagination he was able to describe it to a mind capable of understanding it; but an angel has no physical eyes, hence cannot imagine what it has never seen, and therefore, by this defect of imagination, it cannot understand it."

The hermit said that a teacher was once reading a difficult lesson to his pupils. Among these pupils, there was one who was presumptuous, proud, and boastful, and did not understand the lesson, which the other pupils did understand. This pupil thought that the teacher did not understand what he was saying, and was pounding the opposite of the truth of the lesson. There was a great dispute between teacher and pupil, and the master explained to the pupil: "It is said that angels understand through will, and that the will wills through understanding; for by loving God, angels understand God; and by understanding God, they love God; and hence God has given them the virtue that when they love something they immediately understand it, and when they understand something, they immediately love it if it is lovable, and dislike it if it is hateful. For just as things are so disposed between imagination and physical sight that a person can imagine whatever he has seen physically, thus, and much more so, has God disposed things between an angels' understanding, which understands Him,

[7] See *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 5, n. 9 for this use of the word "imagination."

and the will, which loves Him; by which disposition an angel, in loving, understands whatever it loves or does not love."

After the teacher had spoken these words, the pupil realized that the reason he had not understood the teacher's lesson was because he disliked understanding through humility and liked to understand through pride and vanity. The pupil said to the teacher and to the other pupils: "There was once a dispute between a knight and a clergyman over a castle, for each thought the castle was his. The truth of the matter was that the castle belonged to the knight, who knew it was his. The clergyman believed that the castle was his, and thought he understood something that he did not understand. They both appeared before a judge, and the judge wanted to pass sentence. As he was about to pass sentence he realized that the clergyman wanted to have the castle more than the knight did, which caused him great wonder, for, according to natural reason, the person who understands what he loves should have greater will than the person who only believes what he loves. After wondering about the matter for a long while, the judge said: 'If the clergyman had the understanding of an angel, he would not want to have the castle, for a good angel understands in proportion to how much it loves, and loves in proportion to how much it understands.'"

16. THE SPEECH OF ANGELS

"SIR HERMIT," said Felix, "please tell me if angels have the power of speech. For it would be a source of great wonder to me if one angel could speak to another, since speech can only be properly produced by something having a mouth and tongue with which to move the air in which speech is formed."

The hermit said: "In the Gospel according to Saint John one reads that in the beginning was the Word, which Word is the person of the Son of God, which God is the Father, who begets the Word, which is the Son, without possessing mouth or tongue, since He is a spiritual thing; and, understanding Himself, He begets the Word, which is the Son. And in the same way God has given angels a natural power so that they resemble Him in being able to speak without mouth, tongue, or movement of air. Thus, just as God the Father, understanding Himself, begets the Word, so

angels, loving and understanding God and themselves, speak with God and praise God, and they speak with each other without mouths, tongues or movement of air."

The hermit said: "A saintly monk was praying when the devil came and tempted him with lust. For this saintly man remembered a very beautiful woman who had confessed to him that she had indulged in the sin of lust. The saintly man felt himself becoming aroused as he recalled the things the woman had told him. The monk's will took pleasure in what his memory recalled, until his intellect became conscious of this memory, and will, and arousal. Then through great consciousness of intellect, his will changed from liking to disliking, and his memory began to forget the pleasures of lust; and this saintly man therefore realized how the understanding speaks spiritually with the memory and with the will, even though neither intellect, memory, nor will have mouths or tongues, nor are capable of moving air."

The hermit told Felix that once there was a shepherd sleeping in the sun, and because of the heat of the sun, moisture suffered, for the dryness of the heat consumed it in the belly of the shepherd. And because of this lack of moisture the shepherd, while sleeping, dreamt that he came to a beautiful spring at which a lion was drinking, and he was very afraid. The shepherd imagined the beauty of the spring, and he was angry at the lion, who would not leave the spring; and thus the shepherd spoke spiritually within his soul.

"Sir," said Felix, "how does an angel speak to man?" The hermit said: "A knight was once bailiff in a city that belonged to a noble king. Now this king was very just and very wise, and when he first made the knight bailiff the knight was a just and loyal man, but then he became very unjust and avaricious in his position. One day it came to pass that the bailiff thought about the evil state into which he had fallen, and he wondered greatly at how he had strayed from the good state in which he used to be. While thinking about this, he felt sorrow and contrition in his soul, and as a result suffered greatly. For a long time he was in sorrow and pain for the wrongs he had committed against his position, and while he felt contrition he did no injustice nor did he misuse his position. Then one day it came to pass that a merchant brought him a lovely silver cup full of money so that he would not hang a son of the

merchant's, who deserved to die. When the merchant presented him with the cup, he felt his soul rejoice at the gift; but when the bailiff had taken the cup and had suggested not carrying out justice on the merchant's son, he felt his soul sadden because of its consciousness of the wrong he was doing. And in this way the bailiff had knowledge of how good and evil spirits spoke within his soul."

HERE BEGINS THE THIRD BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF THE HEAVENS

After speaking about angels for a long time with the hermit, Felix set out again in search of wonders by which he might learn to love and know God. While walking through a great wood, he found himself in the midst of lightning, thunder, and rain. Near the road he was on, there was a cave where a shepherd was keeping his flock. Felix went over to the cave because the rain and wind were making his walking unpleasant. He greeted the shepherd, who returned his greeting politely. Felix then sat down beside the shepherd and waited for him to say something. For a long time the two of them sat there without saying a word. Felix wondered greatly why the shepherd said nothing to him, and why he seemed so worried.

"Fair friend," said Felix, "why are you so worried? And what is it you are worried about?" The shepherd replied, saying: "Sir, I am the son of a wealthy burgher who is the owner of these sheep. He wants me to marry and to inherit his wealth; but I, who intend to leave the vanities of this world and who, in my heart, want to possess God in a state of virginity,[1] have come to live in these woods in order to love and know God."

Felix was in great wonder at the shepherd's noble resolution, and he said to him: "In a certain monastery there was a holy monk who was always very happy because he loved God and felt himself to be free from mortal sin. This man, by recalling as he did the grace that God had bestowed upon him, and because of his hope of achieving heavenly glory, was always happy and content. And therefore, fair friend," said Felix to the shepherd, "since you, in order to love and know God, have left behind wealth and worldly success, you should be very happy and content at the grace that God has bestowed upon you."

[1] Thus in A, followed by Galmés. V B, followed by Rosselló and *OE*, have "God and virginity." L S have just "virginity."

17. THE EMPYREAN HEAVEN

"SIR," SAID the shepherd, "the nature of the empyrean heaven is a source of wonder to me, as well as the manner in which the angels and the souls of holy men are there in the presence of Jesus Christ and our Lady. And since it seems to me that this heaven is excellently disposed for glorifying and being in a state of bliss, I therefore imagine it in the following way: Lord God," said the shepherd, "You are the light and source of life, and therefore that place in which You show Yourself to the saints in glory must be illumined by that light which appears in the stars of the firmament and in the planets;[2] and in that light, O Lord, will be the glorified bodies, who will be illumined by that light of the empyrean heaven, and these bodies will illumine that heaven, which is itself light."

"Fair friend," said Felix, "light signifies wisdom and wisdom signifies light; and light signifies glory, whereas darkness signifies suffering and ignorance." By what Felix said about light, the shepherd realized that Felix possessed wisdom; and he told Felix that there was once a noble king very enlightened by wisdom, and in his council there were men who were very wise, just, and honorable, and in whom there was much good. This king lived in a large palace with many windows, through which the sunlight entered, illuminating it all. Before the king were many honorable people who were enlightened by his good conduct; and those people who possessed the greatest wisdom and justice, charity and humility, were nearest the king. The king spoke to those about him of God's nobility and exaltedness, and of his action within Himself and in His creatures, and he spoke of the charity, justice, and wisdom that must exist between a king and his people. So good were the words spoken between the king and his people,

[2] In medieval Christian cosmology, the universe was represented as a series of concentric spheres. The outermost sphere was the Empyrean Heaven, the abode of God, angels, and the blessed. Just inside it was the firmament—see the next chapter—containing the fixed stars, and hence, of course, the constellations of the zodiac, or the twelve signs as Llull called them (see n. 5 below). Inside this were the spheres of the seven planets (see again n. 5 below). Inside them was the "sublunary" world of the four elements (see the spheres of the elements in Vol. I, Table 5). The whole structure is set out in the diagram in Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, p. 78. For Llull's treatment of light in a manner more metaphysical than physical, see Ca I, 488, where this passage is quoted, followed by an interesting analysis of Llull's *Liber de lumine*, relating it to Bonaventure's treatment of the subject.

and so great was the brilliance of the sun entering the palace, that the entire place was radiant with light and good teaching, and everybody present felt a great happiness.

Great was Felix's wonder at the lovely example the shepherd had given of the empyrean heaven, and of Jesus Christ and the saints in glory, and he spoke to the shepherd as follows.

18. THE FIRMAMENT

FELIX ASKED the shepherd how the firmament moved; that is to say, whether it moved by itself or was moved by some outside force. The shepherd replied that fire moves upward, since all of its parts are motile as form and movable as matter, being as it is of an elevatory form for all its form and matter.

Felix asked, "Why does the firmament have a circular motion?"

The shepherd replied, saying that fire moves upward in a straight line, since all of its parts are directly one above the other; and this is why fire does not have a circular motion; for if it did, its constituent parts would be circular like the firmament.

Felix asked, "Who holds up the firmament?"

The shepherd replied that the firmament is held up naturally by its own circular motion.

"Fair friend," said Felix, "in what way do the stars in the firmament and the planets influence the four elements and whatever is made up of the elements?"

The shepherd replied: "Because of the fact that the sun and fire resemble each other in their brightness, therefore fire heats itself and other things more strongly in summer than in winter, since the sun has greater brightness in those places where it is summer than in those where it is winter. Hence, by reason of the increased brightness of the fire,[3] and by the participation of the essence of celestial bodies in terrestrial bodies, comes the influence you asked about."

[3] Instead of *foch* ("fire"), two MSS have *loch* ("place"), which does little to clear up a paragraph whose wording is somewhat obscure (cf. *OL*, p. 671, n. 2). It is quoted in Yates, *Art*, p. 136.

Felix asked the shepherd if heat, moisture, cold, and dryness[4] were to be found in the twelve signs and in the seven planets.[5] The shepherd replied that astronomers have applied the above-mentioned four qualities to the twelve signs and to the seven planets, since they afford the opportunity to increase these four qualities more at some times than at others; and this is due to the influence of the celestial bodies on terrestrial bodies.

Felix asked the shepherd if fate or the stars were a thing involving necessity.[6] The shepherd replied that God has ordained that everything which exists should love and know Him, and God has made it possible for some creatures to have power over others, in such a way that He be known and loved.

From what the shepherd had said, Felix understood the meaning of the words "fate" and "stars," and he said: "A knight committed a wrong against a noble king, for which the king kept him prisoner a long time, with the intention of meting out justice to him. During this time the knight sent a letter to the king, saying: 'By virtue of the power God has given him, a king can condemn and he can pardon. This ability is similar to God's power, which can let the heavenly bodies use their influence on terrestrial bodies; and God's power can constrain that influence to act contrary to its nature, depending on whether He wants to condemn or pardon people, in whom nature is powerless against God's justice and power.'

"My friend," said Felix, "the stars traveling through the air—what are they?"

The shepherd replied, "It once happened, when I was a student of theology and philosophy, that the light from a lit candle traveled down the smoke of a snuffed-out candle, which light, burning the humidity, along with the cold and dryness, of the smoke moving next to it, traveled downwards and lit the candle."

[4] These are the primary qualities of the four elements: fire, air, water and earth, respectively. See Vol. I, Table 5.

[5] The "twelve signs" were those of the zodiac. The seven planets were the moon, Mercury, Venus, the sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn (in the geocentric Ptolemaic system, the earth did not count as a planet). See Pring-Mill's chart mentioned in n. 2 above. Llull goes into all these things in much greater detail in the *Tree of Science*, "Arbre celestial," (*OE* I, 711ff.) and in the *Tractatus novus de astronomia*.

[6] The eighteenth-century Spanish translation reproduced in *OL* has (p. 672) a very free but nonetheless helpful version of this sentence: "Felix asked the shepherd if there is such a thing as destiny, and if the influence of the stars obliges and forces things to happen necessarily according to their influence."

Felix was in great wonder at the shepherd's wisdom, and he said to him: "Fair friend, I am in great wonder at you for putting aside the sciences of theology and philosophy, and coming to live in this wood, where you are all alone and poorly dressed, and forced to watch over sheep."

"Sir," said the shepherd, "philosophers live in cities so that they can exercise their five bodily senses in observing all the different things done by the many people living there; because by these physical things that men see and hear, wisdom is increased in the soul of man. One day it happened that a philosopher, after finishing his studies, went to take a walk outside the city. There he watched an ox eating for a long time in a field of wheat. When the ox had had enough, he left the wheatfield and entered an untilled place, where he lay down next to a tree to ruminate and chew what he had eaten in the wheatfield. The philosopher returned home, and following the ox's example, he climbed a high mountain with all his books; and he remained on the mountain a long time, recalling what he had already learned, and learning new things, all the while watching over flocks so that he could discover things from the habits of animals in his care. He dressed humbly, so as to be humble and not let his learning make him vain. His bedding was poor, so he would not sleep too much; he ate and drank little, so as to live a long time; and he lived where the air was pure, so that he would be healthy and of discriminating mind, in order to be able to compose books on philosophy, which he was writing so as to better understand books on theology."

Felix was very pleased with the shepherd's life, and from what he said, Felix saw he was really a philosopher.

"Sir," said Felix, "why is the sun larger in the morning than at midday?"

The shepherd replied, saying that once a philosopher, after eating, went to take a walk in a lovely orchard, and he took pleasure in the beauty of the trees, and of their leaves and flowers, and of the singing of the birds in that orchard. The philosopher did this so that the food he had eaten would be better digested, and so as to refresh and cleanse his spirit, which had labored so much in his studies of the morning. While the philosopher was thus relaxing

in the orchard, a pupil of his came along with a difficult question,[7] which the philosopher answered as follows: "In the morning, when the night expires and day comes, vapors rise up from the earth, and these vapors are undigested and coarse due to lack of heat, which has not yet purified them. These vapors thicken the air, and in the morning the sun's shape is represented through this coarse thickness, seeming larger, due to its reception by and impression on coarse and disordered air, than at midday when sun and fire have purified and digested the air, when the sun appears smaller than in the morning since the impression of shade is less in light and purified air than in coarse and disordered air."

"Sir," Felix said to the shepherd, "why is the moon larger at some times than at others?"

The shepherd wondered at Felix's now addressing him as "sir" (which he had not done at first), since the shepherd was the same person now as he had been when they had first met. While wondering about this, the shepherd realized that honor is more in consonance with words of wisdom than with ragged clothes. With these thoughts, he said to Felix: "A certain woman used to adorn herself, and paint her face, so that men would find her more beautiful, and, on account of this beauty, desire her for carnal pleasures. The woman's husband prohibited her from painting her face, so that she would not be coveted for the sin of lust, and so that she would not be so proud. One day she complained to her friends about her husband, who in turn said to his wife's friends: 'it once happened that the sun had completely lit up the moon with its radiance, and when the moon was round and full like the sun, she began to think that the light the sun bestowed on her actually came from her own nature. As a result the moon became arrogant toward the sun, which took away its light by putting the earth between itself and the moon, so that the moon would not be arrogant as a result of borrowed light, and would lack both radiance and roundness.'"

"Sir," said Felix, "what does the shadow on the moon come from?"

[7] The Spanish version has "with the same question," which is surely what the context implies.

The shepherd replied: "One day a woman wondered what that shadow on the moon was. While she was wondering about this, she looked at herself in a lovely mirror she had, and saw her face. And while she was looking at herself in this way, it occurred to her that the shadow on the moon was a disposition of the earth, which was thus represented in the moon, as was her face in the mirror.

HERE BEGINS THE FOURTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF THE ELEMENTS[1]

When Felix had been with the shepherd a long time, and the shepherd had explained to him about the heavenly bodies, Felix took leave of the shepherd, who accompanied Felix for some distance through a great forest. In fact he accompanied him until they arrived at a road on which they found a maiden who was riding on her palfrey.

"Sir," Felix said to the shepherd, "do you know where this road leads?" The shepherd replied that the road led to a town which was quite near. "In that town there is a very noble and wise king with two sons who are students: the older son is studying natural science and the younger son is studying arms. The maiden you see is returning from a visit to the king's younger son, sent there by the queen, who loves this younger son more than the older one."

Felix wondered why the queen loved the younger son more than the older one. The shepherd said that the queen preferred knighthood to wisdom for a son of hers. Felix was in great wonder at such a preference, for by arms men are in danger of death, and by wisdom a person can avoid dangers and the risk of death.

"Sir," said Felix, "why does the king have the older son taught philosophy and the younger one arms?" The shepherd replied, saying that a king had greater need of knowledge about nature than about arms; for by natural science a king can have knowledge of God and of himself, and he can know how to reign, and how to govern himself and his people. And since a king needs men accustomed to feats of arms, the king had them taught to the

[1] The medieval French translation of this and the following two books (i.e., Bks. IV–VI in all) has been edited by Gret Schib (introduction, n. 28 above), pp. 53–99. In pp. 103–39 of the same work one can find transcriptions of this section along with ch. 19, "The Simplicity and Composition of the Elements," from all twelve Catalan MSS of *Felix*.

younger son, so that with arms he could guard the older son, who would be king after the death of their father. Felix was very pleased with the attitude of the king and his sons, and he wished that many kings would act similarly.

While Felix and the shepherd were talking, they saw the king returning from a visit to his two sons, whom he had found well informed in the subjects they were learning. Felix and the shepherd bowed, as was proper before a king, and the king greeted them both. Then the king said to Felix: "Fair friend, what is your reason for bowing and doing me honor? How do you know that I am worthy of your doing me honor?"

"My lord," said Felix, "in a certain city there was a king of very evil ways. Once when he passed through the main square of that city, a pilgrim also passing through the square did not bow down to him as others did. The king was very angry with the pilgrim for not having bowed as the others did. The pilgrim, however, said to the king: 'Two pilgrims were leaving Jerusalem on the same day I entered it. They were both weeping and lamenting the dishonor that the Saracens' possession of Jerusalem represents for all of Christianity, for these Saracens honor their prophet Mohammed, who said that Jesus Christ was not God. While the two pilgrims were thus weeping, one of them said to the other that in all the world there were six men who were Christians and who were kings capable of recovering the Holy Land for other Christians, if they wanted to; but they did not worry as much about honoring Jesus Christ as about honoring themselves, which is why they are not worthy of honor.[2] And you are one of these kings, which is why you are unworthy of being revered or honored.'" After saying this, Felix added that a king as such is worthy of honor, since God has honored him in order to honor His own honor. "And since you, my lord king, are teaching your sons to honor God, you are worthy of being honored."

[2] Even omitting James II of Majorca who, at the date *Felix* was written had been dispossessed of part of his reign, and Rudolph I of Habsburg whom Llull would have called "Emperor" and not "King," this leaves us with a surfeit of candidates: (1) Alfonso III of Aragon; (2) James I of Sicily, soon to become James II of Aragon; (3) Charles II of Naples; (4) Philip IV of France; (5) Edward I of England; (6) Sancho IV of Castille; (7) Dinis I of Portugal; (8) Henry II of Cyprus. Note that the advocating of the use of force is in strange contrast to the anecdote in the passage corresponding to Bk. I, n. 60 above; see in this connection, Hillg, p. 50, n. 15.

When Felix had left the king and the shepherd, he set out on the road and came to the town where the king's two sons were living. Felix went directly to the royal palace where the king's older son was being given a lesson in philosophy.

19. THE SIMPLICITY AND COMPOSITION OF THE ELEMENTS[3]

A PHILOSOPHER was sitting in a chair teaching philosophy to the young prince and to the sons of the other barons, saying: "Of the four elements, fire is a simple element to the degree that it has its own form and matter, which form and matter have an appetite[4] to be one in the other, without the admixture of any other element; and the same is true with respect to the simplicity of the other elements, that is to say, air, water, and earth. Since, however, all the elements are mixed and each is in the other, simple fire cannot be anywhere without the other elements, with which it enters into composition, giving its heat to the air, and receiving dryness from the earth, and heating the water so as to destroy it, for by heating air, fire heats water, since the air then gives its heated moisture to the water, which receives it, thereby mortifying[5] the coldness of the water; at the same time the water mortifies this heat, which heat passes on to the earth which receives cold from water, in which cold the earth receives the heat of the fire, which has entered the water through the air.[6] In receiving cold from water, earth

[3] For "simplicity" and "composition" see *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, nos. 10–11, and *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 2, as well as the definition in the *Taula d'esta Art* (*ORL* XVII, 397): "simplicity is a part of composition, so that from many simples a compound is made, just as from the four elements an elemented compound body is made." This Book of *Felix* provides an excellent introduction to Lullian elemental theory, which the reader will encounter in more developed form in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, the Elemental Figure; Dist. II, part i; Dist. IV, part i, Questions of the Elemental Figure; and above all in the *Principles of Medicine*. For a good modern exposition of the subject, see Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, pp. 59–70.

[4] I have translated *apetit* (Lat. *appetitus*) by the English homonym rather than by the more attractive possibilities of "desire," "inclination," "disposition," or "tendency" (cf. *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 10) to keep it recognizable as a component of the Figure of Philosophy (see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 152) and as a technical term Llull uses in connection with his elemental theory.

[5] The common word in early chemistry and medicine for destroying the vitality or altering the character of a quality, humor, or element.

[6] To understand this and the next sentence, the reader should consult the square of the elements with the circulation of their qualities given in Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*.

also receives moisture from the water, which moisture enters the water upon being received from the air; and this moisture counteracts the dryness in the earth, with which dryness the earth mortifies the moisture of the air. And fire, upon receiving dryness from the earth, receives the moisture of the air that passes into the water, and it receives the cold that passes into the earth, and it recovers the heat that it put into the air, and which the air put into the water, the water into the earth, and the earth into the fire, which heat is digested and mortified in passing through all the other elements."

Through the philosopher's explanation of fire and heat, the prince learned about the simplicity and composition of fire and of the other elements. And he repeated the lesson by giving an example, saying: "Fire wanted to engender a grain of pepper, so it combined three[7] points from itself with three points from the earth, and two points from itself with two from the air, and one point from itself with one from water. There were therefore four degrees[8] in the pepper, in which heat was in the fourth degree, dryness in the third degree, moisture in the second degree, and cold in the first degree. Thus pepper is compound fire in the fourth degree, compound earth in the third degree, compound air in the second degree, and compound water in the first degree. The essence of the fire, which is in the fourth, third, second, and first degrees, is simple fire; the essence of the earth, which is in the fourth,[9] third, second, and first degrees, is simple earth; the essence of the air, which is in all degrees, is simple air; and the essence of water, which is in all degrees, is simple water."

[7] Thus in all MSS except L B (followed by the printed sources), which have "four." For the context, which clearly demands "three," as well as a graphic presentation of this system of points, see the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. X, n. 14. For pepper as a model of compound fire, see the references in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 13.

[8] The standard medieval measurement of the intensity of the elemental qualities. See *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. I, n. 18, and all of Dist. V. Notice that a substance with the degrees of pepper corresponds to the species of simple medicine given the letter E in that work (see Dist. I).

[9] "Fourth" is missing in all printed texts, even though it is present in all MSS except B.

20. THE GENERATION AND CORRUPTION OF THE ELEMENTS[10]

THE PHILOSOPHER explained that the generation of an element takes place when it engenders itself in some elemented[11] thing, as when fire, in engendering a grain of pepper, engenders, under the complexion of its hot nature, the complexion of a dry, moist, and cold nature, corrupting the cold and moist complexion in the earth, the moist and cold[12] complexion in the air, and the moist and cold complexion in water.

After the philosopher had explained the generation and corruption of the elements in a grain of pepper, the prince repeated the lesson, giving the following example: "Justice wanted to engender charity in a sinner, in whom there existed injustice. Justice moved this man's memory to remember, his intellect to understand, and his will to love God's charity. Wisdom gave him the means to recognize the justice by which his memory was moved to remember, his intellect to understand, and his will to love. It came to pass, however, that injustice opposed justice, and ignorance opposed wisdom; but fortitude, by means of temperance, helped justice and wisdom,[13] by which help injustice, ignorance, weakness, and gluttony were overcome, and charity engendered, in which charity there was justice, wisdom, fortitude, and temperance."

Felix was in wonder at the prince's great knowledge, and he asked him how the elements, which lack discrimination, can engender and corrupt elemented bodies, and how they are able to give them their proper shape and color, for it would seem impossible to perform such a task without discrimination. The prince said that God in Himself loves His likeness, and on account of this love, God the Father engenders God the Son, which Son the Father engenders from His own wisdom. And this is why God has given elements the virtue that, through God's virtue, each has

[10] For "generation and corruption," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 36, and *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 79.

[11] For the word "elemented," see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 53.

[12] Thus in all MSS, in spite of which the printed sources all have "hot." For the word "complexion," see Bk. VIII, ch. 47, n. 28 below.

[13] Thus in all MSS except B (followed by the printed sources), which has "but fortitude helped justice, and temperance helped wisdom."

an appetite to engender its own likeness, which likeness in compound bodies accords with the disposition of each particular species.

"Sir," said Felix to the prince, "how is it that a lit candle can light another candle without any lessening of its own light?" The prince replied, saying that the form and matter of the fire want to possess the lit candle completely; and in another candle that is not lit, the form of the fire can engender from itself another form, and its matter can engender another matter in the lit candle; and this is why there is no lessening of the light which engenders that of the candle it lights.[14]

After the prince had said this, his teacher reprimanded him for not having answered Felix by means of an example, and therefore the prince said to Felix: "God has given man and woman, as well as plants, the ability to engender their own likeness without corrupting their specific being, for it is clear that a man and a woman can engender a child without either the father's or the mother's being corrupted[15] by this generation. And the same happens with the generation of trees, for each tree engenders a tree similar to itself without any corruption of its specific being. And all these engenderings are so ordained in order to show that there is no corruption in the Son of God."

21. THE MOVEMENT OF THE ELEMENTS

THE PHILOSOPHER continued lecturing, saying that God created four essences, to wit: igneity, aereity, aqueity, and terreity, as is explained in the book called *Chaos*.[16] These four essences were

[14] For similar questions about the lighting of candles, see the passages corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 160, and *Ars brevis*, Part XI, n. 23.

[15] The reader must be careful not to attach any of our modern moral connotations to the word "corruption." For definitions, see the references in n. 10 above.

[16] This is the *Liber Chaos* (cf. the "Life," n. 94), which discusses igneity, aereity, etc. at length. The idea of four essences that constitute the sublunary world was standard in the middle ages; the heavens with the planets and stars constituted the fifth essence or "quintessence" (cf. the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 711). One should perhaps apologize for the neologisms in the translation, but Llull himself has the essences in Latin (*ignitas*, *aeritas*, etc.) in the Catalan text.

created together, and together they formed a hyle,[17] which is called chaos. Each of these four essences exists as form and as matter; and the form is pure action, and the matter is pure passion, with the form moving through all of the matter, and all of the matter being moved by all of the form.[18]

Felix was in great wonder at these words, for it did not seem to him possible for movement to exist in the form and the matter of fire, since all of its matter is in its form, and its form in its matter. Felix asked the philosopher to explain his words, and the philosopher told the prince to inform Felix, by means of some example, concerning his doubts. The prince said that in God's essence there are three persons, as is explained in the *Book of the Gentile*[19] and in the *Book of Articles*.[20] These three persons are without any movement, with the Father begetting the Son from Himself, and the Holy Ghost issuing from the Father and the Son. And since God the Father begets the Son and gives issue to the Holy Ghost from all of Himself and in all of Himself, and this infinitely and eternally, there can therefore be no movement there. Thus, in order to show that God's work within Himself contains no movement, God wanted to create in the elements the property of movement, which exists within the elements both virtually and naturally, although their form is in their matter and their matter in their form; and this movement exists there intensely, since form and matter are different in essence, in dignity, majority, and minority.

Felix asked the prince how fire could descend here below, when it is natural for it to rise up, and when the sphere of the air and

[17] The Greek ὕλη, like the Latin *materia*, originally meant "timber, building material" (hence the Spanish *madera* and the Portuguese *madeira* meaning "wood"). With Plato, and even more definitively with Aristotle, the word began to be used in its general, philosophical sense. From there, among the scholastics, it developed an additional special meaning of "primordial matter," the first matter of the universe, and hence became synonymous with "chaos." Cf. the *Tree of Science, OE* I, 562.

[18] This sentence is merely a simplification of *Liber Chaos*, "De essentia chaos," pars. 2–3 (*MOG* III, 249 = Int. v, 1), where the "action" and "passion" (in the Aristotelian sense, of course) of the elements are tied in with the Lullian correlatives—with *-ivum* and *-bile*, respectively.

[19] Bk. III, arts. 2–4.

[20] This is the *Liber de quattuordecim articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae Fidei* mentioned in *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 3.

that of water are between it and the earth.[21] The prince answered, saying that in an elemented body the elements are mixed, and the elements are one within the other, just as in a goblet in which wine and water are mixed, each part of wine is in each part of water, and each part of water in each part of wine; the parts of fire descending and ascending through the compound body of the wine and water; which descent the simple fire carries out so that those parts of compound fire which are below the parts of air, water, and earth can in turn ascend.

22. LIGHTNING[22]

THE PHILOSOPHER said that lightning was the sudden burning of dry vapors, in which the form and matter of the fire are almost completely free of any admixture of other elements. Thus, when it happens that these vapors rise so high that the sun and the fire have nearly consumed their cold and moisture, then the great heat of the fire moves from that high place and descends suddenly, burning along the path where it encounters more dry vapors; and it burns them, in order that the form of the fire exist in the simple matter of the fire without the other elements.

After saying this and other things concerning lightning, the philosopher told the prince to repeat the lesson, giving some example.

"Master," said the prince, "it once happened that a philosopher went for a walk in a lovely plain with a great number of his students; and in this plain there were many cracks in the earth, produced by the heat of the sun, which had consumed the moisture and cold of the earth. The philosopher asked one of his students if the sun could have made these cracks suddenly, in a single moment,[23] if there were a great abundance of heat. The student replied that what a little fire would take an hour to burn, another fire could burn in a single moment, so great could be its amount of heat."

[21] For the spheres of the elements, and their resulting lightness and heaviness, see Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*.

[22] For the lightning of this chapter and the thunder of the next, see also the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 183.

[23] Thus, *moment*, in B V; L S and the French translation have *moviment*, "movement"; A has *movent*, "moving." The same variants apply to the reappearance of the word "moment" in the following sentence.

"Sir," Felix said to the prince, "what makes lightning move in a crooked line, and not come down in a straight line?" The prince replied, saying that once a teacher threw a wafer out of a window, and it dropped in a continual zigzag course until it hit the ground. The teacher asked one of his pupils what had made the wafer fall in an oblique rather than straight line. The pupil answered that since a wafer is thin and wide, it falls sideways through the air, cutting the air with its thin side and turning in the air on its broad side.

"Sir," Felix said to the prince, "that light engendered in the air and which looks like fire when lightning flashes, what is it?" The prince said that a pupil asked his teacher the same question, and the teacher took a handful of tow and wet half of it. He then lit the tow, which burnt rapidly until the fire reached the halfway point where it was moistened. The teacher gave this example to show the pupil how fire, which is in its own region, through excess of heat burns the hot and dry vapors in the clouds, but cannot burn those vapors having great moisture and cold.

23. THUNDER

DURING the course of his lesson, the philosopher said that thunder is the collision of hot and dry vapors in air made turbulent by the struggle of winds one against the other, which winds have been put in motion by the heaviness of the clouds that exert pressure on them, since water and earth have an appetite for their center.[24]

The prince repeated the lesson, giving the following example: "A king was besieging a castle, at which he was shooting with many engines of war; at the same time, from the castle, there was an engine shooting at the king's men. It happened that one night a stone coming down from the castle onto the king's men, and a stone from the king's engine hurtling up to the castle met in mid-air, and they collided with such force that both stones were broken, and such a great flash resulted that all the king's army was lit up. The blow of the two stones was so great that it awoke all the men sleeping in the king's army, and they were in great fear at the noise they heard and the light they saw, which was produced

[24] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 147.

by fire burning the hot and dry vapors produced in the air when the two stones collided."

24. CLOUDS

THE PHILOSOPHER continued lecturing, saying that clouds are engendered in the vapors given off by the sea and by the earth; and within these vapors the four elements are linked and intertwined one with another. Now because of the presence of fire and air, which are light,[25] these vapors rise; and the water and earth, as a result of being intertwined with fire and air, also rise up. And the fire and air that are in their own region draw toward themselves these vapors composed of water and earth, so as to extract from them the fire and air that are there mixed with water and earth. When these vapors have risen up on high, and fire and air have digested them, then water and earth combine with one another and adopt a broad, thin shape, taking on the shape of a cloud; which cloud is sustained in the air like a boat on water. And these clouds, because of the fire and air they contain, have an inclination[26] to rise, and their water and earth have an inclination to descend, which is why clouds are movable in and of themselves, and also by the winds, with which they are associated and which move them through the air, like a ship on the sea.

The prince repeated the lesson, saying: "There was once a shepherd on a mountain who, one morning, saw a cloud form below him and then rise above him. This cloud, and the way it rose up, caused the shepherd great wonder. And while he was in this state of wonder, he saw a great fire from which a large amount of smoke rose up and spread out in the air. The smoke rose up because the fire impelled it; and since the fire and air in the smoke had an inclination to rise up, the smoke could not convert itself into a cloud, since it already had too much hot and dry vapor from the fire out of which it had arisen."

Felix asked the prince, "Sir, why are clouds of different colors?" The prince said that there was once a stream which passed over

[25] See Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*.

[26] In this chapter I have translated *apetit* as "inclination," because what might be an acceptable archaism when dealing with the elements (cf. n. 4 above), becomes absurd when dealing with such things as clouds.

a place full of red stones, and then over another place with white stones, and the water took on different colors depending on the places it was passing over.

25. RAIN[27]

IN THE LESSON the philosopher was giving the prince, he took up the fact that rain was engendered high up in the air, from clouds which were transformed into their constituent elemental parts, that is to say, that in the clouds fire was purified by its hot and dry quality, air by its moist and hot quality, water by its cold and moist quality, and earth by its dry and cold quality. And for this reason, the parts of the elements that are mixed in the clouds separate from one another if they are different and contrary, and combine if they are different and concordant. Therefore, in the clouds, fire and air separate from water and earth, and rise up because of their lightness. And water and earth, because of their heaviness, fall, making for rain, which is a thing split up in the air into many parts of water and earth, in which there is more cold and dryness than heat and moisture.

Felix wondered at the teacher's saying that rain had more dryness than moisture, since rain was of a cold and moist complexion. While Felix was thus wondering, the prince repeated the lesson, saying: "Earth is dry by its own nature, and water is cold by its own nature, and up above where the clouds dissolve and rain is formed, water and earth are in closer association than they are in the space[28] through which the rain falls toward its center; for in the air in which they move, the moisture of the rain is increased. But through the downward movement of the water, and through the fact of the earth's nearing its center, the moisture cannot prevent the rain from falling."[29] Felix was in great wonder at the prince's wisdom in repeating the lesson in such a way that he was reassured about what he had doubted.

"Sir," Felix said to the prince, "what makes rain so beneficial to trees, plants, and other things on the earth?"

[27] The *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 182, also discusses rain.

[28] Thus in all MSS except B and the corrections in A, which have "sphere"—the reading followed by the printed texts.

[29] The Spanish translation adds, "and associating with the dryness of the earth even more than with the moisture of the air," which does make the passage a *bit* clearer.

The prince replied, saying that the fire and air that are down here on earth have an inclination to rise, which is why plants and animals grow upward; for their lighter parts move upward through their heat and humidity; but since fire is hot and dry, and earth here below dominates the air, its moisture and cold are consumed. And this is why rain falls, in order to increase moisture and cold in elemented bodies, there being concordance between air and water in the quality of moist and cold; for which quality of moist and cold elemented bodies grow in width and depth, so that they can be large and thick. And this is because air has a tendency to fill up, and water to contract, whatever is full; and earth, since it is evacuative, has the opposite effect to air; and fire, since it is expansive, has the opposite effect to water. And therefore, by the agency of fire and earth, plants and trees are straight, thin, and tall with respect to size and position.

26. SNOW AND ICE

THE PHILOSOPHER said that snow is produced in the air when rain falls through the air and is there converted into humidity[30] through the great abundance of cold, on account of which the water is filled with air, and the water confines this air to itself. And since air is of a moist complexion, and has a white light, therefore the water takes on the color of the air, which is why snow is white.

Felix asked the philosopher how ice was formed in water. The philosopher told the prince to reply, and the prince said, "The fire and air present in water have an inclination to rise; and when fire wants to rise with its own heat and the dryness it has from the earth, air and water are contrary to this rising of heat and dryness, and water so strongly confines the humidity that it engenders ice, which is a solid body, and which prevents the ascent of water vapor, in which vapor fire and earth have an inclination to rise on high."

Felix said to the philosopher, "What is it that makes bubbles rise up through the water of a spring?" The prince said that the inside of these bubbles is full of air, and their outer vestment is nothing but the water's constricting force, preventing the air from

[30] Thus in A B; L S and the French medieval translation have "in which dryness and humidity are converted."

escaping; and because of the lightness of air, the water coming from below the surface of the earth can rise up, a thing it could not do alone, without the help of the lightness of the air, which lightness it captures within itself in the act of confining the air within itself.

27. THE WINDS[31]

THE PHILOSOPHER continued lecturing, saying that wind is air moved by the pressure of clouds with an inclination for the center of the earth, which moving air flees from its position between clouds and earth, to another where there is no descent of clouds. These and many other things the philosopher said about the wind in his lesson, which lesson the prince repeated by giving the following example:

"A man once asked a wise man what wind was, yet he failed to understand the wise man's words of explanation. So the wise man had a wine-skin filled with air, and on it he put a large stone, whose weight caused the wine-skin to burst and the wind inside it to escape."

Felix asked the philosopher about the four principal winds, that is to say the east, west, south, and north winds.[32] The philosopher replied that the east wind is engendered by hot, dry vapors, the west wind by cold, moist vapors, the south wind by moist, hot vapors, and the north wind by dry, cold vapors.[33] And the reason the winds are thus engendered by different vapors is that in different regions the clouds differ as to their concordant and contrary qualities.

The prince said that from these four principal winds four others were engendered, namely, those from the southeast, northwest, northeast, and southwest. These four winds result from different mixtures of the qualities from which the principal winds are en-

[31] Llull also discusses winds (even using the same wine-skin simile in the second paragraph here below) in his *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, MOG IV, 158 = Int. iii, 142.

[32] English lacks the specific wind-names of Mediterranean countries. The Catalan names (with modern forms, where different, in parenthesis) used in this and the next paragraph are: tramuntana = N; grech (gregal) = NE; levant (llevant) = E; exaloch (xaloc) = SE; migjorn = S; lebeig (llebeig) = SW; ponent = W; mestre (mestral) = NW.

[33] For the correspondence between winds and the qualities of the vapors, see n. 35 below.

gendered. From these eight winds, eight others are engendered through the tempering of qualities, and there are yet other winds which are not governed by the positions of the sun,[34] but by those of land and mountains, and according to the accidents by which some clouds move against others.

28. THE SEASONS

IN THE LESSON the philosopher was giving, he spoke about the seasons, that is, the four seasons of the year: summer, winter, spring, and autumn. The summer season comes from hot and dry qualities; winter from cold and moist; spring comes from the tempering of moist and hot qualities; and autumn from that of cold and dry qualities.[35]

In the summer season there is concordance between fire and earth, for fire, which is hot and dry, rises up over earth and plants and consumes the cold in those plants, using its own heat along with the brightness of the sun, by which fire increases its heat and dryness. In the summer earth mortifies the moisture of the air in plants, because fire is concordant with earth, and is contrary to water and air. And this is why in summertime plants perform their digestion, their fruits ripen, seeds, along with the humors of animals, mature, and the wheat is gathered in.

In the autumn the earth contracts by reason of the water it receives; and by this contraction the vapors remain beneath the earth without being able to rise and escape; and this is when the seeds that have been planted begin to germinate.

In the winter season the seeds planted in the earth begin to sprout because of the moisture of the air that mixes with the cold of the water, through which passes the vapor from the earth, dried and

[34] Cf. n. 32 above; three of the four principal points of the compass—east, south, and west, which translate respectively as "rising," "midday," and "setting"—refer to successive positions of the sun.

[35] Note the correspondence between seasons, winds, elements and qualities:

summer	east	fire	hot and dry	(south)
winter	west	water	cold and moist	(north)
spring	south	air	moist and hot	(east)
autumn	north	earth	dry and cold	(west)

For the winds (the second column) this does not seem like the most logical solution. In this connection, it is interesting that a later hand in the margin of MS L corrects the qualities producing the winds, giving the results listed in parentheses in the last column.

heated in the autumn; and it is by means of this vapor that plants are born, and it because of their hot, dry, and moist complexion that they rise up and grow above the earth.[36]

In spring trees throw out buds, flowers, leaves, and branches, and produce fruit, owing to the fact that heat and moisture rise, while cold and dryness retain this moisture and heat in the lower regions, in which fruits ripen in summer by means of heat and dryness.

These things and many others the philosopher said about the seasons, adding that in addition to the four seasons the year was also divided into 12 months, into 52 weeks, and into 365 days and 6 hours,[37] which 6 hours make for a leap year with 366 days every fourth year, since there are 24 hours in a natural day.

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it colder at dawn than at midnight?" The prince answered this question, saying that since the sun, which is hot with fire, begins to rise at dawn, those vapors that are cold and moist flee from the sun, which is hot and dry by accident; and these vapors gather together in regions where men live at dawn. And this is why it is colder in those regions at dawn than at midnight, when these cold, moist vapors have not yet gathered in these regions, because the sun is farther from them at midnight than at dawn.

The philosopher asked the prince why it was colder on the mountains than in the plains, since in high places the ground is nearer fire[38] than in low places. "Master," said the prince, "in high places fire and air become more purified, rising above water and earth, which sink below them, than they do in low places, where fire and air do not have as much power as they have in high places. And therefore, the more fire and air are purified and separated[39]

[36] This is the botanical calendar of the Mediterranean countries, with the hot, rainless summers that kill vegetation, and the moist, frostless winters that favor growth.

[37] The figure is actually 5 hrs. 48′ 46″. It was this small difference of 11′ 14″ which by the time of the Gregorian reform of 1582 had put the Julian calendar ten days behind the solar year.

[38] "Fire" is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text and in that of *OE* (although in the latter it is restored in the errata at the back of Vol. II). The problem lay in their interpretation of the previous *sòl* ("ground") as *sol* ("sun"), which makes much more sense without the "fire," in that it gives, "since in high places the sun is nearer than in low places." The only really inadmissable solution is that of Rosselló and the corrected text of *OE*, which have, "since in high places the sun is nearer to fire than in low places."

[39] Thus in L V S. B, and possibly A (its text is somewhat ambiguous), followed by all the printed sources, have "pressed together," which must surely be wrong.

in high places than in low places, the more water and earth are united in high places than in low places; which greater union brings greater cold in the mountains than in the plains, as is clear from the snows and waters[40] of the mountains.

"Sir," Felix said to the prince, "why is the air thinner in the mountains than in the plains?" The prince answered that in the mountains the air is closer to its own sphere than lower down, its sphere being below that of fire and above that of water, which in turn is above that of earth. This being the case, it therefore follows that the air is purer and thinner the farther it is from any admixture with water and earth, with which it mixes more readily in vapors which are cold and thick than those which are hot and thin.

The philosopher asked the prince why the water in a well was warm in winter and cold in summer. The prince replied that in the summer the pores of the earth are open, and through them escapes the heat which the sun and fire draw towards themselves; and the more the vapor of the fire rises up, the more the cold that remains below is purified, and the greater[41] heat there is, the greater is the cold of this vapor. But in winter water causes the surface of the earth to contract so that the vapor of fire cannot escape, which is why the vapor of fire which is underground warms the water in wells and springs in wintertime, just as fire heats the water in a kettle.

The philosopher told the prince to explain how fire heats the water in a kettle. The prince replied that water had natural heat from the fire in composition with it. But since the fire with which the water is in composition does not have such power in the water in the pot before it is heated as has the water in itself, the water is more cold than hot; but because of the great heat in the fire beneath the pot, and because its heat passes into the water through the pot, therefore the fire increases the heat and subdues the cold of the water.

[40] The Spanish eighteenth-century translator put "waters of the springs," and the medieval French translator "frosts," either of which seems preferable to the original.

[41] Thus in L V S and undoubtedly in the original text of A. B and the corrected text of A (over an erasure), followed by the printed sources, have "less." B, however, is the least reliable of the five MSS consulted, and many of the corrections of A seem to stem from B; besides, "less" is definitely a *lectio facilior*. It seems to me that Llull means, "and the greater heat there is [in the sun and fire in the summer], the greater is the cold of this vapor." Notice that a similar problem is discussed in the passage corresponding to *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. III, n. 15.

The philosopher continued lecturing, explaining that the ocean is salty because it rises and falls. Its upward movement is caused by fire and the sun heating it and drawing upward its hot and dry vapors; and since water is by nature heavy, the cold and moist vapors move downward. And since water is round, it moves circularly and lengthwise, according to the obliquity of its roundness, which makes for the movement of waves toward land and for the movement of the English sea;[42] for this obliquity inclines one way some of the time and another way the rest of the time. And this occurs as a result of the movement which, with the help of the wind, moves the water, the wind itself, as we have already explained, originating in the pressure of the clouds. This being the case, and since through this movement, mixing and turbulence of winds and of qualities, heat and dryness are engendered, therefore seawater, which is naturally of a cold, moist complexion, accidentally finds itself with a hot, dry complexion, which complexion causes it to become salty.

29. THE BATTLE FOUGHT BEFORE THE KING'S TWO SONS

After the philosopher had finished his lesson, he went into a lovely orchard with the prince and other pupils, accompanied by Felix. While the philosopher and his pupils were walking through the orchard, looking at the trees, flowers, the flowing stream, and other things pleasing to the sight, along came the prince who was studying the martial arts, with his master of arms. And in order to amuse the prince who was studying philosophy, he and his master held a long fencing match before him in a lovely field. After the fencing match, the prince mounted a fine horse and with

[42] The "English sea" is the Atlantic, and its "movement" is its tides, a phenomenon almost absent from the Mediterranean. Llull goes into this question, as well as that of the sea's saltiness, in greater detail in the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 167–9 = Int. iii, 151–3. See also the questions corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, nn. 148–9, as well as M. Massutí Alzamora, "La teoria lul·liana de les marees," *LNT* 7 (1934), 304–15, and the same author's "Una teoría medieval sobre la marea," *Las Ciencias* (*Anales de la Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias*) 8 (Madrid, 1943), 259–67, both reprinted in his *Sus obras lulianas* (Palma, 1951), as well as M. Batllori, "Les idées géographiques de Ramon Llull (R. Lulle) et leur diffusion en Italie aux XIV^{e} et XV^{e} siècles," *Studi Colombiani* 3 (Genoa, 1951), 49–55.

many companions jousted, hurled spears at a mock turret,[43] and performed feats of arms, as his teacher had taught him to do.

For a long time the prince sported and displayed the martial arts before his brother; and while engaged in these combats and games, there arrived a great company of knights. Among them was one knight who was falsely, and against all truth, accusing a squire of treason. This knight was very proud and strong, and well practiced in the use of arms; whereas the squire was a man of little strength, nor did he have the knight's proud nature; but he was in the right, and in this he placed his trust. The king, father of both princes, had sent the knight and squire to fight in front of his son so that from the combat he would learn about fighting.

The knight and the squire entered the field, and at first the knight dealt heavy blows to the squire, but in the end the squire gained the upper hand and defeated and killed the knight. The prince studying arms was in great wonder at the knight's defeat, for, according to the way the fight had begun and the knight's greater size, and because the knight was more practiced at arms than the squire, he had expected the knight to defeat the squire.

The philosopher, realizing the source of his wonder, and wanting him to understand why the squire had won, said: "There was once a rooster in a tree with many hens. A fox came along and noticed them there. Now this fox went through such motions, running, jumping, and playing, beneath the tree that the rooster became weak from watching him and fell from the tree; and the wolf caught him and killed him." After the philosopher had told this story of the fox and the rooster, the prince studying philosophy explained what he had meant, by saying: "As it watched the fox, the rooster was overcome by fear, and the more he watched him the more the fear sapped his strength. And in this state of fear he watched the fox so long that his strength languished and weakened and he fell from the tree."

[43] The sorting out of the phrase *trasch al taulat* in the original is thanks to Professor R. S. Willis, who tells me that it was a sport which was associated with celebrations (weddings, coronations, knightings, etc.) and which seems to have consisted in hurling short spears (from horseback) at a mock turret mounted on a platform. Professor Willis has found references to it in Spanish (*Primera Crónica General*) and Catalan (Desclot, Muntaner) medieval literature, but none in French or English, which he suggests might indicate an Arabic origin.

"Dear brother," said the prince, "what does this have to do with the battle we just saw?" His brother answered, saying that the knight, thinking over the wrong he was doing the squire, lost his strength and ability, his conscience wounding and defeating him, while the more the squire thought about how he was right, the more loyalty and truth comforted him and increased his strength and ability.

Felix was in great wonder at the fact that the prince studying philosophy knew more about the reason why the knight was defeated and killed than his brother who was studying arms, and he praised and blessed knowledge above all other things. Felix did, however, ask why the rooster had fallen from the tree and not the hens. The philosopher told the prince studying arms to answer the question, but the young man was at a loss for words, and did not know how to answer. He therefore asked his master to answer the question, but his master said that he was a teacher of the art of moving one's body so as to give and sustain great blows, whereas the philosopher was a teacher who could instruct the brother, so that his intellect could understand lofty and subtle things.

When the master of arms had declined to answer the question, the prince who was studying philosophy solved the problem, saying: "A man and his wife were walking down a road when they came upon an enormous serpent. So enormous was it, in fact, and so great was the man's fear of its immense size, that he dropped dead in front of it. The wife was also very afraid of the serpent, and she too would have died of fright, but she trusted in her husband to help her against this creature. As soon as the man was dead, the serpent took hold of him, dragged him off the road and ate him. The woman fled in terror, and she too would have died of fright if the serpent had left her husband and chased her."

The philosopher asked his pupils to tell him the main reason combat between two people had been invented. The prince who was studying philosophy answered that the solution to this question was to be found in the story that had been told of the fox, the rooster, and the hens, or in other words, that conscience defeats and wounds all those who are in the wrong and fight against those

who are in the right; and truth and loyalty strengthen all those who fight on the side of justice.[44]

Felix said to the prince that it sometimes happens that men who are in the wrong win a combat against men who are in the right. The philosopher replied that there was once a man who was very lecherous; he had a son he loved very much, and God took away his son because of this sin of lust. In order to punish him for his lust and teach him patience over the death of the boy, God willed his son to die; which death taught the man chastity, patience, and charity.

[44] This was, of course, the idea behind the medieval institution of the judicial duel or trial by battle (see the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, s.v. duel). Cf. the passage corresponding to Bk. VII, n. 38 below, as well as A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 110.

HERE BEGINS THE FIFTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF PLANTS

FELIX left the court where the king's two sons were studying; and he praised and blessed God for having made such a wise man king and having given him such noble children. As Felix was walking through a great forest in search of wonders, he came upon a squire riding a handsome palfrey. The squire was weeping and moaning. "Dear friend," Felix said to the squire, "why are you weeping? What makes you so disconsolate?" The squire answered Felix with the following words:

"Sir, for a long time I served a wise master of philosophy, but now he has gone off to a place about a league away, where he intends to stay for the rest of his life, and he has left behind wealth, honor, and all the advantages he could have enjoyed in his remaining years on earth. He now intends to undergo poverty and discomfort, and wants to be alone in the forest. And because of my love for him and because he has sent me away, I am very angry and unhappy."

"Dear friend," said Felix, "do you know why he wants to be alone in the forest, and why he has left behind the wealth and advantages he had?"

"Sir," said the squire, "when we parted, I asked him why he had come to live in this forest, leaving all his friends and leaving a city so noble, of which he was such an honored citizen. When I had asked my master these and many other things, he replied that he had gone to live in the forest so that through the functioning of plants and trees he could contemplate, know, and love their creator; for honors, friends, and the advantages of the city had prevented him from perceiving how plants were a symbol of their creator."

Felix was very pleased with the philosopher's pious devotion, and he wished there could be many more like him in the world. "Dear friend," Felix said, "I am in great wonder at how you can weep over your master's doing good. Your tears mean that you

would be happy and full of laughter if your master did evil. One should only be sad at how little God is loved and known in the world, when the world was created for God to be loved and known. So do not weep, my friend, but rather be happy about your master, for you should count it a great good fortune to have so holy and wise a master, since thanks to his holiness you yourself may be more pleasing to God. Dear friend, I beg you to show me the way so that I may find your master." The squire gave Felix directions as to how to get to the place where the philosopher intended to live.

In a lovely meadow with many trees he found the philosopher, beside a lovely spring, reading from a book. Felix went up to him and greeted him humbly, and the philosopher politely returned his greeting. Felix sat down next to him and said:

"Sir philosopher, I am in great wonder at how you can live all alone in this forest, and why you left all the pleasures of this world. And what do you eat and drink here in the forest? And where do you sleep?"

The philosopher replied, saying: "One should wonder at men's failings; but nowadays there are so many that we begin to wonder at a man who does anything that might be pleasing or agreeable to God. The greatest pleasure a man can have in this world is to know and love God, since man was created to love and know God.[1] In this forest there is a hermit who does penance, and he has a servant who brings him some food, with which we both maintain our bodily needs. At night, if it is too cold or if it is raining I go to sleep in his cabin; in the daytime I wander through the forest, observing the work of nature in trees and herbs, so that through that work I may meditate on God, according to the art of philosophy and theology, which is written in a work entitled the *Book of Articles* and organized according to the order of the *Ars demonstrativa*."[2]

"Sir," said Felix, "in a certain city there was an honorable burgher with two sons who were clergymen well versed in the-

[1] The second half of this sentence is missing in the first family of MSS, and hence in the printed editions. Cf. the Introduction, text at nn. 10–11, as well as Bk. I, n. 30, for the thought expressed here.

[2] For the *Book of Articles*, see Bk. IV, n. 20 above. The medieval French translation has "the *Book of Articles*, which is the one I am holding." This passage is commented on in Yates, "Art," p. 137.

ology and philosophy. One of them chose to live as a hermit, meditating on God in accordance with the knowledge he had acquired; the other son remained in the city, lecturing, explaining and preaching so as to induce people to know and love God. There was much discussion as to which of these two wise men had chosen the better path."[3]

The philosopher answered Felix, saying: "In a certain city there was a philosopher who was a great master in that art. For a long time he lectured on the art of philosophy in that city. His students, however, did not learn as much from this science as he would have wanted; they were worldly men who placed little value on the science of philosophy. The teacher was very upset about the lessons he was giving and he was very angry because his students were not interested in learning. And because of how upset the teacher was, he decided to leave the city and go to a forest so as to refresh his soul and body there by meditating on God; and he preferred the company of wild beasts and trees to the company of evil sinners." After answering Felix by means of this example, the philosopher returned to the contemplation in which he had been engaged when Felix arrived.

30. THE GENERATION OF PLANTS

THE PHILOSOPHER was sitting beneath a lovely tree laden with leaves and flowers; a lovely spring watered this tree, in which many birds sweetly sang. And by the disposition of the tree, the spring, and the birds, the philosopher contemplated God's greatness and goodness, which the tree symbolized with respect to both creator and creature. After the philosopher had contemplated God for a long time, Felix said to him:

"Sir philosopher, I am in great wonder at the size of this tree. How is it that from a thing as small as the seed from which it was born can come forth a thing so large as this tree?"

"Dear friend," said the philosopher, "a shepherd once lit a fire before a wise man, master in the art of philosophy, and it was a large fire the shepherd made. When the fire had increased a great deal, the shepherd wondered how a spark could be so multiplied;

[3] The problem of the contemplative vs. the active life is discussed in much greater detail in Bk. VIII, ch. 62. See n. 82 there for more information.

and he asked the master how the fire could have so increased. The master replied that it was natural for fire to convert everything associating with it into its own likeness, since fire has greater virtue[4] than any of these other things; and because fire converts many things to itself, it increases through these many things."

After the philosopher had answered him by example, Felix said that, according to this very example he had given as a reply to his question, it must follow that Jesus Christ, while in this world—since he had greater virtue than all other men—should have converted all men with whom he associated. But since Jesus Christ converted few men to the path of salvation while he lived in this world, and since after his death many remained on the path to damnation, it would therefore seem that a tree has greater virtue in the matter of converting to its own likeness those things with which it associates than does Christ's nature.

The philosopher was very pleased with this question of Felix's, and he realized that Felix was a man of intelligence and wisdom, and he therefore made an effort to treat Felix with words and examples of great content and significance. "Dear friend," said the philosopher, "in a certain palace there was once a king dining with many knights. While the king was eating, there came to the palace a man who had made himself procurator of the unbelievers[5] so that they could find the path of salvation. This man told the king, knights, and clergymen eating in the palace that it had already been established how the unbelievers would be given knowledge about the holy Roman faith. The man cried out that there was a method to make known the truth to those who were in error, which method was to be found in the *Ars demonstrativa* and the *Book of Articles*. All those who heard him laughed at him and scorned what he said, making him weep, tear his clothes, and pull out his hair.

[4] "Virtue" in the sense of "power, capacity, efficacy." The same example of a spark lighting so great a fire appeared at the beginning of Bk. I, ch. 12, and in his speech following the philosopher's reply here, Felix recalls its former application to the role of the Apostles.

[5] This is a title, and an apt one, Llull gave himself in several places in his works: *Libre de demostracions*, Bk. IV, prologue, *Blaquerna*, chs. 61 and 90, and *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis*, *MOG* IV, 377 = Int. vi, 1, and the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 94, st. 9. But to go from there to asserting, as Galmés does, that this scene is essentially autobiographical and that the king in question is Philip IV of France, although not impossible, does seem farfetched. For a similar scene, see the passage corresponding to Bk. VII, ch. 41, n. 33 below.

"There were minstrels in the palace, singing and playing instruments, to give pleasure to the people eating there. After eating and drinking his fill, the king went outside, where a widow threw herself at his feet, begging him to free her son who had been condemned to a deserved death. A knight, whom the woman had paid to intercede on her behalf, also addressed the king, asking him to pardon her son. In that same square where the knight spoke to the king, there were many other people, and they all begged the king to forgive the woman's son. The king pardoned the young man who, by right, should have died. The man who was procurator of the salvation of the unbelievers shouted and wept, saying: 'By means of money the woman bent the knight's will to love the same things she did, and the knight likewise bent the will of the king and of those who helped him plead with the king. In this similarity of wills, therefore, there was avarice, injustice, and vainglory, in addition to surfeit of food and drink.' The fool[6] cried out and said, 'Is there nobody here similar to our Lady in her love for her son?'"

To which the philosopher added, "Our Lady's son, who created freedom in the will of man, has indebted[7] all men through His incarnation and death, and even through creation, so that they honor Him in this world, and so that they repay our Lady by honoring her son, who does not want to destroy freedom of will, which is itself a creation of His."

Felix was very pleased with how the philosopher had answered him by means of an example, and he praised and blessed God for giving man such wisdom.

31. ON THE CORRUPTION OF TREES

FOR A LONG time Felix and the philosopher discussed the generation of plants, and how it was a symbol of the existence of

[6] In *Blaquerna*—ch. 79, for example—Llull refers to himself as *Ramon lo foll*, and in the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* the "lover" is often referred to as "the fool"—hence the title of E. Allison Peers's later brief life of Llull, *Fool of Love* (London, 1946). Perhaps finding the title offensive, MSS L and B replaced it by "the said man," and the Spanish eighteenth-century translation (*OL* 698) left it out altogether. *Foll* might perhaps best be translated as "madman" (cf. English "folly"), but "fool" seems best in the context and in view of the tradition already established by Peers.

[7] Thus *obligats* in B and L (over an erasure), followed by the eighteenth-century Spanish translation, Rosselló, and *OE*. The normally more reliable V A (followed by Galmés) have *logat*, which means "rented, hired," or even sometimes "recompensed."

generation in God, with God the Father begetting God the Son without corruption, corruption[8] being symbolized in the corruption of trees. After discussing these matters for a long time, Felix and the philosopher went for a stroll through a field and a forest in which there were many different kinds of trees.

By a lovely stream there was a handsome tree laden with leaves and flowers, which a man was cutting down. Felix wondered why the man was cutting down a tree so tall and handsome. "Dear friend," Felix said to the man cutting down the tree, "why are you destroying such a handsome tree?"

The philosopher gave Felix the following example so that he could understand why the man was cutting down the tree: "In a certain city there was a money-changer who was very rich in worldly possessions, but very wanting in spiritual virtues. One day a poor man came up to the table on which the money-changer had many coins; the poor man begged the money-changer, for the love of God, to give him one denier[9] in alms, since God had given him so many. The money-changer did not want to give the poor man alms; instead he answered him in vile and abusive language. The poor man was patient in face of his poverty and in the face of the money-changer's insults. The poor man, however, thought in his heart what great harm was wrought by this money-changer's life, and what benefit his death would bring; for from the money-changer's great wealth great benefit would come after his death. Soon after, God killed the money-changer, who had hoarded so much money that benefited no one while he was alive; and after his death this wealth was scattered and did a great deal of good to many people."

"Sir," said Felix, "why do trees finally come to a state of corruption? And where will the essence of the tree the man is cutting down be when the tree is corrupted and burned?" The philosopher answered Felix's question by means of the following example: "A learned Christian was once disputing with a learned Saracen. The Saracen asked the Christian if when God the Father begets the Son anything is corrupted as a result of this generation; and the Chris-

[8] Thus in about half the sources (A V, the French medieval translation, and Galmés); the other half (B L S, the Spanish eighteenth-century translation, Rosselló, and *OE*) have "incorruption." For the word "corruption," see Bk. IV, nn. 10 and 15 above.

[9] The twelfth part of a sou (cf. Bk. I, n. 4 above) and equivalent to the English penny.

tian replied that God's begetting is nobler than that of trees, in which there can be no generation without corruption; for as soon as the tree is cut down, all its essence is turned toward corrupting that same tree; and from it nature engenders certain things while corrupting the tree, whose essence is restored in those things engendered from itself. But since God the Father begets the Son from Himself and from all of Himself, and since all the Father is infinite, eternal, and the fulfillment of all good, therefore the Father is sufficient for the begetting of the Son infinitely, eternally, and perfectly in all good, without corruption; and the Father and the Son remain forever a single essence and a single deity and virtue."

On the same bank where the man was cutting down the tree which had leaves and flowers but bore no fruit there was an apple tree so heavily laden with apples that many branches had broken under their weight.

"Sir," said Felix, "why does this apple tree bear so many apples that it breaks its own branches and rots even though it cannot consume its own apples?" The philosopher answered the question as follows: "In a certain city there was a bishop and a knight who were brothers. The bishop was handsome and well-educated. He was like the tree the man was cutting, and he took great pleasure in his knowledge, in his appearance, and in his position. But he had no care for the main purpose of his being bishop, and he bore no fruit. The knight was provost of the city, and in order to carry out justice he worked day and night, often going without sleep, so that his work weakened and corrupted his person. While the bishop was resting, enjoying himself, and doing all he could to live a long time, a fool asked the bishop: 'Sir, why do you, who are bishop, prefer to rest and live a long time, when you were made bishop to honor Jesus Christ and to be more like Him while you were in this world than your brother, who works harder than you to love and serve Jesus Christ; for Jesus Christ, in order to save His people, chose to work hard, to be poor, and to die, and He did not care to live long in this world?' The bishop answered the fool with many vile words; and a wise cleric answered the question in the following way:

"'There were once two apple trees in an orchard: one bore many leaves and flowers every year but did not bear as many apples as

the other tree which did not bear as many leaves and flowers. One day the owner of the orchard came and saw both apple trees, one with many apples and the other with many leaves and flowers. The owner had the apple tree that bore no apples cut down, and he ordered that the other apple tree be treated with great care. The man who cut down the apple tree asked the owner why he had the tree that bore no fruit cut down and the other that bore fruit treated with care. The owner replied that the peasant's question was a foolish one.' But more foolish was the bishop, who by resting thought he could live longer than his brother, the knight, whose life was dedicated to carrying out the main purpose for which the king had made him provost of that city; for there was greater virtue in the purpose for which the knight asked God to grant him a long life, than the bishop's virtue in eating and resting; just as the tree that bore fruit was more agreeable to its owner than the one that bore leaves and flowers but no fruit."

"Sir," said Felix to the philosopher, "why is there greater corruption in the body of a dead man than in a tree that is cut down?"

The philosopher answered the question by means of an example. "In a certain town there was a merchant with a beautiful wife, and she was having secret relations with a clergyman who was prior of the church of that town. The merchant, in turn, had a mistress with whom he was sinning. The prior excommunicated the merchant for not leaving the mistress with whom he sinned.[10] There was much discussion in that town as to which of the two, the prior or the merchant, had the more corrupted will, and which had acted more contrary to his position."

32. ON THE VIRTUE OF PLANTS

IN A LOVELY plain where the philosopher and Felix went for a stroll, there were many medicinal herbs of great virtue.[11] When Felix saw these herbs, he asked the philosopher for what purpose God had given virtue to herbs. The philosopher replied, saying it was so that they would symbolize God's virtue.

[10] This is the way the text of the preceding three sentences appears in three of the best MSS (A V S). In B there are some minor changes, and in A the text is substantially different, which has caused all sorts of variants and problems in the printed texts.

[11] The meaning given in n. 4 above should be kept in mind throughout this chapter.

"Sir," said Felix, "what virtue does saffron have as a symbol of God's virtue?"

The philosopher answered by means of the following example: "A burgher had a handsome son, well brought-up and of excellent habits. This young man brought great pleasure to his father every time he saw him, and whenever he thought about him he felt happy in his heart. Because of the burgher's great happiness in his son, he was happy in God, who had given him a son so well disposed and so well brought-up. While the burgher was in this happy state, God willed that the son should die. The burgher was very saddened over the death of the young man, and he lost his former happiness in God. So great was his grief over the death of his son, and so much did he cease being happy in God, that he became ill and was near death. A doctor who was treating the burgher made an electuary of gold, pearls, and precious stones, to which he added saffron, for saffron has the virtue of comforting and cheering the heart, and it improves the blood. The doctor made this electuary so that the burgher would be cheered both by the nature and virtue of the electuary;[12] but the burgher was so grief-stricken over the death of his son that neither by virtue of the saffron nor of its other ingredients could the electuary help him combat the illness his sorrow had brought on. Then one day the burgher thought about his son's death and of the joy he had once taken in him. While thinking about these things he remembered how he had taken joy in God because of his son, but not especially for God himself. As a result the burgher became persuaded that God had taken away his son precisely because he was the means by which he had loved God. The burgher felt very guilty toward God, for he had done a great wrong in loving God for his son rather than for Himself, whereas God is so good and noble that He is worthy of being loved for Himself alone. The burgher decided in his heart to do penance for the wrong he had committed against God and against patience, and he began to take joy in the beauty and goodness of God, and he forgot about the death of his son, and he gave thanks to God for showing him the light concerning the error in which he had been for so long. After

12 "An electuary, a pasty mixture of powdered drugs with honey or thick sugar syrup, is meant to be taken internally," McVaugh, *Villanova*, p. 247.

an hour of such thoughts, he felt healthy and cheerful, and he praised and blessed God's virtue for having cured him and rid him of his sadness."

"Sir," Felix said to the philosopher, "what virtue is it that makes man capable of living off the plants and fruits he eats?" The philosopher said that in nature's conversion of plants into blood and blood into flesh through their digestion in the stomach, the virtue of living is renewed, that is, the living of vegetative life. And so that Felix could better understand the virtue of plants that permits man to live from them, he gave the following example:

"In a certain city there was a merchant who was robbed of ten thousand bezants.[13] He fell into great sadness because of the money he had lost, and he thought so much about the harm he had suffered that he lost his reason and went mad. He had to be tied up and chained so that he would not kill himself or harm others. A wise doctor told friends of the merchant that he would cure him if he were well paid. The merchant's relatives agreed, and paid him ten thousand bezants. The doctor told the madman that this was the money he had lost; and then he had the merchant untied and unchained, and he poured the bezants over the merchant's head. After the merchant had handled the bezants for a long time, his imaginative power began to return; and as a result of seeing and feeling the coins, his imagination[14] increased in virtue, until finally, after a long time, the merchant imagined and became persuaded that these bezants were the ones he had lost. When the merchant had recovered his power of imagination, then his will began to cheer up because of what his imagination imagined, and his intellect was moved to understand, and his memory to remember. And thus, with the slow increase of virtue in the powers of the merchant's soul, he finally recovered his sanity."[15]

"Sir," said Felix, "by what virtue is rhubarb, which is hot and dry, good for the heat and dryness of the liver?" The philosopher replied, saying that the merchant who went mad because of the

[13] Cf. Bk. I, n. 8 above.

[14] "To return . . . his imagination" is missing in A and hence in Galmés's edition, but it is in all other sources. See *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 5, n. 9, for what Llull meant by "imagination," and especially p. 175 of the article by Aos Braco cited there for an analysis of its role in this specific example.

[15] For a structural analysis of this *exemplum*, see J. Gayà, "Sobre algunes estructures literàries del *Libre de Meravelles*," *Randa* 10 (Barcelona, 1980), 68–9.

bezants he had lost was cured by the bezants he felt and saw; for the heart sent its blood through all parts of the body as a result of the joy it felt in the merchant's feeling and seeing the bezants. And this joy sent its spirit into the heart, whose blood threw off its reasons for being sorrowful and mad. "Thus, when the liver, which is too heated and dry, feels the rhubarb, which is of like complexion, then it is joyful over the participation of the rhubarb and expels its inordinate heat and dryness, they being concordant with the rhubarb; and at that moment nature, which abhors rhubarb being digested because it would excessively increase the liver's heat, expels the rhubarb from the stomach, which rhubarb takes with it the heat and dryness of the liver, through an excess of which it had been sick."

While the philosopher was thus discussing the virtue of herbs with Felix, a dog came and in their presence ate an herb, which made it throw up the bile it had in its stomach. Felix was in great wonder at the dog's cleverness and at the property of that herb, and he also wondered how the dog knew how to distinguish that herb as being the right one to purge the humor which had caused his sickness. Felix, wondering about this, asked the philosopher how it was that the dog had the cleverness to eat that herb, since he had no understanding. The philosopher replied:

"In a certain city there was a heretic who inflicted great suffering on his body. He lived in that city, however, in such a way that no one knew he was a heretic. One day he met a canon on the street who was very nobly dressed and riding a handsome palfrey. The heretic thought a great deal about the harsh life he led, and the comfortable life the canon led. Such thoughts led the heretic to wonder greatly, and he said to himself: 'Miserable wretch! What is the use of fasting, living in poverty, praying to God, going badly dressed, sleeping in a hard bed, and being scorned by people, if this canon, amid vanity and pride, wealth and comfort, belongs to a church nobler and more honored than yours? It would seem as if he, by the virtue of his faith, were more exalted than you are by the virtue of yours; for if your faith were better than his, it would follow that the harsh life you lead would help to exalt and honor your church; and he with the vanities of the worldly life would dishonor and destroy his church. Become a Christian, you

fool! For there would appear to be greater virtue in the Christian faith than in yours.'"

Felix was in great wonder at the philosopher's example, for it did not seem to be an adequate answer to his question, so he asked the philosopher to explain his example. The philosopher said that the virtue of the good intention for which the heretic led a harsh life revealed to him the virtue of the canon's faith, in which virtue the heretic's intention accorded with the virtue of the holy Catholic faith, just as the property of the herb the dog ate accorded with his appetite to eat that herb which had the virtue to purge the bad humor the dog had in his body.

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at nature's virtue in medicinal plants, for, according to what I have heard tell, the virtue of a single herb can serve to cure various parts of the body, as is the case with rhubarb, which is good for an overheated liver, as well as being excellent for improving vision and cleansing the eyes."

"Dear friend," replied the philosopher, "in this tree on which you see leaves and flowers, the vegetative virtue is differentiated in various ways; for in as many leaves and flowers as the tree has, its vegetative virtue is differentiated in number, since one leaf is not another, nor one flower another. All the virtue is one and the same thing, but according to the different reception of this virtue, it is differentiated as it spreads throughout the tree. Dear son," said the philosopher, "this example I have given you is a symbol of the grace and virtue God sends down to men on earth, each of whom receives God's grace and virtue in a different way, according as each is different from the other in remembering, understanding, and loving, and according as each makes different use of worldly things. This difference in virtue which God spreads throughout the world, along with the infusion of His grace, represents the virtue that God has in Himself, which virtue is a single undifferentiated essence. But since the Father, who is virtue, begets the Son, who is virtue, and since the Holy Ghost issues from both, being the same virtue of the Father and the Son, and since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are different in personal properties, it therefore follows that this virtue, which is one and undifferentiated, is communicated and distributed differently to

the divine persons, since these divine persons are different one from the other, yet together constitute a single virtue in essence."

"Sir," said Felix, "by what virtue existing in plants did Jesus Christ want to be honored by plants on Palm Sunday? For people made a procession in his honor and adorned the streets with palm branches." The philosopher answered the question in the following words: "On that day in which Jesus Christ humbly rode on a donkey, it was a sign that God, through Christ's human nature, shared in the existence of all creatures; because Jesus Christ's body signified the participation of trees in the vegetative side of Christ's nature, since He wanted the vegetative aspect of trees to honor His body, which was of a similar nature. And the donkey was a sign that Christ's sensitive virtue was one in creation with that of the irrational animals. And the people doing Christ reverence and honor symbolized the fact that Christ was similar to them in human nature. And since Christ is a single person in which there are two natures, that is, God and man, therefore God wanted all creatures on that day to do reverence to Christ's deity and humanity."

HERE BEGINS THE SIXTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF MINERALS

AFTER TALKING for a long time with Felix about plants and how they were a sign of God's nobility, the philosopher turned to another subject, and told Felix that he wanted to talk about God and how minerals symbolized His nobility.

33. ON THE GENERATION OF MINERALS[1]

"WHEN GOD created the elements, it was ordained that the elements would symbolize the glorification of those bodies which, after Judgment Day, will be in everlasting glory. For the elements, in seeking their perfection, are compounded and dissolved in elemented bodies, and they seek their perfection in those bodies in[2] which they cannot find it. Dear friend," the philosopher said to Felix, "in eternal duration there can be no corruption; and this is why the elements have a natural inclination, in accordance with the purpose for which they were created, that is, that there be[3] certain compound bodies where they can be in accord without any corruption. And since the elements are better in accord in minerals than in any other elemented body, they are therefore compounded and joined in minerals, where there is less corruption than in any other elemented body."

The philosopher said that gold, silver, iron, stones, and other minerals[4] can sustain themselves better over the course of time

[1] The same subject is discussed in *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 180 = Int. iii, 164, and in the *Liber de ente reali et rationis*, *Opera parva* IV, 89–96.

[2] Thus in all sources save L S, which instead of "in," have "without."

[3] Thus in A B and the printed sources; the other MSS have an added "in," which would give a reading of, "created, to exist in certain compound bodies."

[4] From this passage it should be clear why I have translated *metalls* throughout Bk. VI as "minerals." Llull uses the word in the older Latin sense, where *metallum*, aside from meaning "mine," meant anything dug from the earth or "mined," hence "mineral." In the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 34, for example, he includes salt and precious stones under this heading; in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 199, he includes these and many other substances

than any other elemented body; for every other elemented body has greater need of external things than do minerals, which have such virtue within themselves that they do not have as great a need of external things as do other bodies, such as plants and animals, which have greater need of air, water, earth, and fire than do minerals.

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that there is greater concordance of elements in minerals than in plants or animals?" The philosopher replied as follows: "Dear friend," he said to Felix, "in the generation of minerals from the elements there is no intermediary, for the former are engendered directly from the latter, rather than one mineral engendering another. Since, however, with plants one plant engenders another, and with animals one animal engenders another, therefore generation is stronger in minerals than in plants or animals. And all this, dear friend, is in order to symbolize the eternal generation existing in God, which is from God the Father to God the Son, and where there exists no other thing except God."

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that gold is more durable than iron, even though iron is stronger than gold?" The philosopher said that a pupil once asked his teacher how the earth was held up, and his teacher replied that the earth was held up by the fact of one element's being interlaced with another, that is to say that fire enters air, air enters water, water enters earth, and earth enters fire; and because of the lightness and heaviness present in equal proportions among the elements, the earth holds itself at a midpoint of the firmament, which acts on it equally from all sides with the influence of its movement, so that the earth is firmly fixed in place. And when there happens to arise some impediment to this movement, because of some thick vapor that interferes with the pressure the firmament exerts on the earth, then an earthquake is produced in those places where the impediment appeared.

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that would nowadays be considered minerals and not metals; and in the *Liber de ente reali et rationis, Opera parva* IV, 91, he divides the genus *metallum* into two species, that of minerals such as gold, silver, iron, etc., and that of precious stones such as ruby, sapphire, jasper, etc.

34. ON THE DISPUTE THAT AROSE BETWEEN IRON AND SILVER

"Between Iron and Silver there arose a great dispute, for Iron said he was more necessary to people than Silver, and was stronger than Silver, and that on account of Silver people committed many sins and disobeyed God. Silver, on the other hand, argued against Iron, saying that he was handsomer, lighter, better sounding, and better loved by people than Iron; and he accused Iron of being the cause of many deaths, through wounds with knives, lances, swords, and bolts from crossbows."

"Sir," Felix said to the philosopher, "which do you think was right, Iron or Silver?" The philosopher replied, saying that two women once walked through a certain square filled with people: one of them was beautiful and the other ugly. The beautiful one was horrid and greedy, and full of envy; the ugly one was chaste, and had great charity and patience, for her husband scorned her on account of her ugliness, and loved the beautiful woman accompanying his wife. In that square there were many people who spoke ill of the beautiful woman and spoke well of the ugly woman. Both women were on their way to a church that was observing the vigil of a saint. In that church was a hand bell with a noble sound and a larger church bell, cracked and with a very disagreeable sound. The ugly woman said to the beautiful woman how nice it would be if the church bell had as nice a sound as the hand bell. The beautiful woman then thought about her own greatness in terms of beauty and wealth, and she thought about the other woman's ugliness and her goodness; and as a result of these thoughts she realized the wrong she was doing against her husband and against herself. She thought about these things so long, recognizing her wrong, that she conceived a desire to be good, like the ugly woman, as a result of which desire she then led a chaste and holy life. And she spoke the following words: "Iron in a plow is worth more than gold or silver in a chest; and a sword in a prince's hand is better than a sought-after treasure; and the chastity of ugliness is preferable to the lust of beauty; and a cock at dawn sings better than a wicked, lascivious, avaricious priest in church; and a magnet in a compass is worth more than

a sapphire in a gold ring; and the strength of a humble, pious man cannot be bettered by that of a proud man."

"Sir," said Felix, "why does iron exist in greater quantity than silver, gold, or precious stones?"

The philosopher replied, saying that God created a greater abundance of those things which are more necessary than of those things which are not so necessary, such as fire, air, water, earth, wheat, salt, iron, stones, and other similar things; for all these things are more useful to the life of man than pepper, gold, silver, and precious stones.

"Sir," said Felix, "if iron is more useful than silver or gold, why do people love gold and silver more than iron?"

The philosopher replied: "The noblest thing a person can understand and love is God, yet in this world silver and gold are more loved than God, whom man should love and understand more than silver or gold."

The philosopher said that a certain merchant had worked for a long time to make money; and when he had amassed a fortune, he wanted to be honored by the king and by the people of the city in which he lived. The king, seeing a chance to lay his hands on the money the merchant had amassed, made him bailiff of that city. The merchant was very pleased at being bailiff, and he lent the king a great deal of his money. The merchant had the chance to amass more money while he was bailiff, and he was unjust and did things counter to the office be held, for this merchant lacked moderation in the things he did, and loved money more than justice. The result, however, was that while he was bailiff he lost what he had earned as a merchant, for the king took everything he had on account of the injustices he had committed in this office. After the merchant had lost everything he had, he said to the king: "My Lord, in a certain city there was a blind man who, by means of a thousand bezants he did not possess, recovered a thousand bezants he had lost." The king asked the merchant to tell him how the blind man had recovered the thousand bezants he had lost, by means of a thousand bezants he did not possess. "My lord," said the merchant, "a blind man had a thousand bezants hidden beneath a stone, and every day, pretending he was going there to say a prayer, the blind man would come and take from the thousand bezants what he needed for that day. A neighbor of his thought

about the matter and realized that the stone was in his field and that the blind man had money beneath it, and he went to the stone, found the thousand bezants, and took them. The next day, when the blind man went there and did not find the thousand bezants, he suspected his neighbor might have taken them. 'Sir neighbor,' said the blind man, 'I would like to have your advice on a certain matter. I have a thousand bezants in one place and another thousand in another place. Do you think I should put the two thousand all together in one place, or do you think I should leave them where they are?' The neighbor, thinking the blind man would put another thousand bezants there beneath the stone, advised him to put all his two thousand bezants together in one place. So the neighbor took the thousand bezants he had stolen and put them back where they belonged, and the next day the blind man took the thousand bezants. And then he said to his neighbor that by means of a thousand bezants he did not possess he recovered a thousand bezants he had lost; and he said that he—the neighbor—was blinder on account of what he did not understand than the blind man on account of what he did not see."

Felix asked the philosopher to explain this example with reference to the question he had asked, and the philosopher said that the greatest blindness possible is for a person to prefer what he does not see or understand and[5] what is worthy of no honor, to loving God, who has knowledge of all things and who is worth more than all of creation. And since the merchant desired honors to which he was not entitled, and took an office about which he knew nothing, he lost what he knew and what he possessed, because of what he did not possess and because of what he did not know how to make proper use of. And the king deceived him with respect to his office, for the merchant did not see that it was through honor that one was entitled to the office of king; which honor he lost by loving money more than justice. Felix was in great wonder at the philosopher's example, for it had been too obscure; but he understood it in terms of the final purpose for which God had created all things, and he understood that a person,

[5] Thus in all medieval sources consulted, except for B, followed by all the printed texts, which in place of this "and," interpolates, "than what he does see or understand, and to love more."

by means of what he has,[6] can obtain that which he does not have, if he follows the purpose for which he was created; and if he turns aside from this purpose, he loses what he has along with what he does not have.

35. OF MAGNETITE AND IRON[7]

GOD PUT such simplicity of earth in magnetite that iron is attracted towards it. And therefore a magnet draws iron to itself through the great influence of the simplicity of earth, towards which iron is naturally drawn, since there is more simplicity of earth in iron than in any of the other minerals; and it is also because of this greater simplicity that iron is stronger than any of the other minerals.

Just as iron is attracted to magnetite, because in magnetite there is a greater simplicity of earth than in other minerals, so the magnet has a greater force of attraction for iron than for gold or silver, in which earth does not have as much simplicity as in iron. Now all these things are a symbol of the perfection naturally existing in God, on account of which perfection one should love God more than anything else. And when a person acts contrary to God's nature, God is more contrary to that person than the magnet would be towards iron if, with each maintaining its own nature, the magnet exercised more attraction on things with more simplicity of air than of earth.

"Sir," Felix said to the philosopher, "does the virtue of the magnet move the iron, or does that of the iron move the magnet?"

The philosopher said that in a certain city there was a church with a lovely cross with the figure of Jesus Christ on it, and this cross contained much gold and silver and many precious stones. One day it happened that two men were kneeling before the altar below the cross. One felt sorrow at Christ's Holy Passion, of which he was reminded by the figure on the cross, while the other coveted the gold, silver, and precious stones on the cross. The man who felt sorrow at Christ's Passion was on the proper path, since with him the greater virtue attracted the lesser one; the man

[6] Thus (*ha*) in B, followed by the printed sources; A and L have *no ha* ("does not have"), but with the negative crossed out; V S and the French MS have the negative unrepentantly.

[7] See *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 30, for references on this subject.

who coveted the gold, silver, and precious stones was on the wrong path, since with him the lesser virtue attracted the greater one.

"Felix," said the philosopher, "a magnet has a virtue by which it can make the compass needle point north and south. And magnetite is so strong in its dryness that it cannot be melted by the fire that melts iron. And since the magnet has in it greater virtue than iron, therefore the lesser virtue is naturally attracted to the greater virtue."

"Sir," said Felix, "how can fire melt iron?"

The philosopher said to Felix: "In a certain city there was a king who was very lustful. There was a woman in that city who would dress herself up and paint herself as best as she could, and would stand at her window every time the king passed down the street on which she lived. This woman showed herself to the king so that he would covet her for carnal pleasure. In the king's retinue there was a knight who imagined that the woman was in love with him, and he made her a dishonest proposal; but she would not consent to it with the knight, for she loved the king."

This example struck Felix as too obscure, and he asked the philosopher to explain it with reference to the question he had asked.

"Dear friend," said the philosopher, "fire is hot by its own nature and dry from earth; and since iron has greater simplicity of earth than of any other element, therefore when fire has heated iron a great deal, the iron melts in order to become so strongly joined to earth that it contains no air or water, which draw near to one another through their liquidity. And fire and earth take on a liquid form in the melted iron, so that the air and water can escape from it; which air and water can better escape from a molten, soft object than from one that is solid and hard. And since earth becomes a liquid, water imagines that it would prefer to associate with it rather than with fire, and therefore does not want to leave the earth. And the same happens with air, which imagines that fire prefers to associate with it rather than with earth, since it is transformed from solid to liquid."

"Sir," said Felix, "why does silver produce a better sound than iron?"

The philosopher told Felix that a woman once had her lungs so dry that she could scarcely speak or breathe. "A foolish doctor

who was treating this woman gave her cold and moist things to eat, because he thought the illness was caused by heat and dryness. For a long time the woman underwent this cure of the doctor's, and the more she ate the food the doctor prescribed, the worse she felt. Things reached the point where finally the doctor gave her hot and dry things to eat, thinking the illness was caused by coldness and humidity. But this cure was of no use to the woman, and in fact was as bad for her as the first. The doctor was in great wonder at the woman's illness, and he abandoned this cure as well. Instead he tried to cure the woman by having her fast, so that natural heat would consume the thick, undigested humors that the woman had from excess eating and drinking. For these humors had been ascending and descending in a raw state within the woman's lungs, where the humors were so thick that they prevented the air from having a digested movement whereby it could form a vocal sound, or from entering or leaving as it should."

"Sir," Felix said to the philosopher, "why is iron stronger than gold or silver?" The philosopher answered, saying that the elements are nobler by virtue of their form than by virtue of their matter; and this is why fire, even though it has more form than any other element and is therefore in itself nobler and stronger than the others, cannot destroy them; for its virulence[8] is checked by matter, which it has less of than the other elements. And this is why form cannot have as much virtue in its own matter when that matter is small in quantity as when it is large in quantity. And the same is true of air, which has less matter than water or earth, and has more form than water has in itself, or earth in itself. And the same is true of water, which has greater form and less matter than earth. And thus all the elements are generally ordered and proportioned to an equal temperament; but according as some are more dominant than others in elemented bodies, certain bodies have greater virtue than others, like iron, which is hard and strong through dryness and cold, and gold which is soft through heat and moisture, and silver through moisture and cold, there being more form in gold and silver and less matter than in iron. And since the form of iron is little and its matter great, the matter of

[8] Thus, *malicia* ("fury, ardor, malice") in all sources except A B, followed by Galmés, which have *malaltia* ("illness").

earth is less transformed[9] in iron than in gold or silver; on account of which lack of transformation iron is stronger and harder than gold or silver.

"Sir," said Felix, "if iron has more matter than gold, why is gold heavier than iron?" The philosopher replied that a sponge, which is a thing of great size, is lighter than gold, which is of lesser size; and the same is true of a reed, which is lighter than boxwood; for the solider the matter, the heavier it is, because of the pores into which neither fire nor air can enter or participate, they being the elements that rise because of their lightness; which fire and air partially lighten the nature of the iron, since they can enter more into iron than into gold, which has fewer pores than iron.

After this, the philosopher said that there was once a poor woman who, for the love of God, gave a beggar a half-penny she had, and the king, also for the love of God, gave the same beggar his royal vestments; and there was a discussion as to who had given the beggar more, the king or the poor woman. After hearing this example, Felix understood that there is more matter—with respect to the matter of earth—in iron than in gold; but with respect to matter in general, there is more matter in gold than in iron, since gold is denser and more compressed than iron, just as in the poor woman's will the charity was more intense than in the king's will.

36. ON ALCHEMY

FELIX ASKED the philosopher if alchemy was an art by means of which one metal could be transmuted into another. The philosopher answered, saying that in the transmutation of one element into another there must take place substantial and accidental transmutation, that is to say, form and matter, along with all their accidents, must be transmuted into a new substance, composed of new forms, materials, and accidents. "And such a task, my good friend," the philosopher said to Felix, "cannot be done ar-

[9] *Pus indigesta* in the original; see the definition of "digestion" in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 162.

tificially, for nature needs all her powers to do it.[10] Dear son," the philosopher continued, "in all natural beginning there is intention,[11] for when the elements join to engender metals, they must be mixed so well that one is within the other, just as in a goblet with wine and water all the parts of the wine and water are mixed substantially and accidentally, that is to say, that all of the form, matter, and accidents of the wine are mixed with the form, matter, and accidents of the water. And in this mixture there are various natural intentions, according to the gradation of some parts within others, and the amount of these various parts, as well as their proportions and positions,[12] are intangible, invisible, inestimable, and unimaginable.

"There was once a great debate between an alchemist and fire, for the alchemist said that the elements could be artificially simplified, with one purified and separated from the other, so that each element would be simple, by itself, of simple body, and composed only of simple form and matter, with simple accidents. The fire was in great wonder at the foolish notion of the alchemist, who thought he knew more about the existence of simple elements than he; and he said to the alchemist:

"'In minerals and in all elemented bodies the elements seek their own perfection, which perfection they cannot find, even though they have been seeking it since God created the world. This perfection consists in each element being by itself, simple, and without corruption; but since God mixed the qualities of the elements,

[10] For a more detailed treatment of the impossibilities of alchemy, see *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 181 = Int. iii, 165. There are briefer condemning references in the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. VI, ch. 20 (the passage corresponding to our n. 19), the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 839, and the *Ars generalis ultima*, Part IX, subj. 8, ch. 1, par. 8. In view of these specific condemnations, it is suprising that an alchemical legend should have become so persistently attached to Llull (see the section on this subject in "Llull's Influence" in Vol. I above). For an analysis of this chapter of *Felix*, see A. Llinarès, "L'idée de nature et la condemnation de l'alchimie d'après le 'Livre des merveilles' de Raymond Lulle," *La filosofia della natura nel medioevo. Atti del III Congreso Internazionale di Filosofia Medioevale* (Milan, 1966), pp. 536–41. For the considerable modern bibliography on the subject, see Bru, p. 70, and *OE* II, 1371; see also M. Pereira in *EL* 23 (1979), 29, n. 85.

[11] For Llull's use of this word in the sense of "purpose, intent," see Bk. VIII, ch. 107 and n. 242 below.

[12] *Assituacions* (the Catalan for the Aristotelian category, *situs*, for which see *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, n. 22), in all sources except A (followed by Galmés), which has the much rarer word *assiduacions*, the first (and only) example of which in *DCVB* is from the fifteenth century.

that is to say, heat, moisture, cold, and dryness, and since the subjects of these qualities are the forms and matter of the elements, mixed in a confusion[13] of simple matter and simple form that is the beginning common to all elemented bodies, therefore it is impossible for one element to exist without another. For if one element could exist without another, then air could be moist all by itself, with no admixture of heat, and it could exist incorruptibly, with its own form and matter, size and heat, in some compound body; but this is impossible and against natural principles, which are stronger in their own natural inclination than in the alchemist's artificial one.'

"The alchemist said to the fire that a painter can draw the figure of a man on a wall. And the fire said to the alchemist that the form of that figure was far from its matter, which was why that figure lacked the natural movement which belonged to human nature. The alchemist asked the fire to make gold out of silver for him. And the fire said the following to the alchemist: 'In a certain land it came to pass that a lion fought for a long time against a wild boar. The lion tried as hard as he could to kill the pig, because he wanted to eat him; and the boar defended himself because he did not want to lose his being, and he did not want his flesh transmuted into the flesh of the lion, for he preferred being in the species of pig to that of lion.'"

"Sir," Felix said to the philosopher, "according to what you say, it would seem you think it impossible to transmute one element into another or one metal into another by the art of alchemy. For you say that no metal wants to change its being into that of another being, since if it changed its being into that of another being, it would no longer be that being it prefers to be. Now that I have understood all your arguments and examples, one thing still causes me great wonder—how can people be so fond of the art of alchemy if it is not a true art?"

The philosopher replied in the following words: "In a certain land it happened that a man devised a scheme for amassing great

[13] Note the definition of this word in the *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 74: "Confusion is the principle by which the movement of generation and corruption is begun, and therefore said confusion is the subject and means of the movement of generation and corruption, and when the confusion has come to an end, then the generation or the corruption has been accomplished." Cf. *OED*, s.v., 7.

wealth. He sold all his belongings and went to the king of a far-away land, saying he was an alchemist. This king was very pleased at his arrival, and ordered that he be given lodging and whatever else he needed. This man had put a large amount of gold in three containers, in which there was a brew of herbs made to look like an electuary. In front of the king he placed one of these containers in a caldron in which he was melting the many pistoles[14] the king had given him so he would multiply them. The gold in the container weighed one thousand pistoles, and the king had put two thousand in the caldron, with the result that in the end the mass of gold weighed three thousand pistoles. The man did this three times, and the king thought he was a true alchemist. In the end, the man ran off with a large amount of the gold the king had given him to multiply, for the king thought that the mixture in the containers had the power to multiply gold when heated.[15]

"In a certain city there was an important and wealthy man whose wife could not bear him children, yet she wanted very much to have children. In that city there was a dishonest woman who devised a scheme for making a great deal of money, and she went to the wife and told her she would give her special things to eat that would make her pregnant. Such was this woman's desire to have children, that she believed everything the other woman told her. Finally, when the dishonest woman had gotten a great deal of money out of her, she fled and went to live in a land far away from that city."

[14] The *dobla* of the original was an Iberian gold (or silver) coin, whose usual English or French equivalent was the "pistole."

[15] A remarkably similar story of an alchemist pulling a confidence trick on a king, appears in Don Juan Manuel's *El Conde Lucanor*, Enxemple XX (*BAE* 51, 387), and yet another in *El libro del cavallero Zifar*, ed. Wagner (Ann Arbor, 1929), p. 446.

HERE BEGINS THE SEVENTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF BEASTS

When Felix had taken leave of the philosopher, he went off through a valley full of trees and springs. As he was leaving the valley, he met two men, poorly dressed, with long beards and long hair. Felix greeted them, and they greeted him.

"Dear sirs," Felix said, "where do you come from? To what order do you belong? For from your clothes, it would appear that you belong to some order."

"Sir," said the two men, "we come from far away lands, and have just passed through a plain near here. In that plain is a great gathering of wild beasts who are about to elect a king. We belong to the Order of the Apostles,[1] and our clothes and poverty are a reflection of the Apostles' condition while they lived in this world."

Felix was in great wonder at how these two men had

[1] The Apostolici or Apostolic Brethren was a sect founded about 1260 by a certain Gerard Segarelli of Parma. Their exalted Franciscanism tinged with the apocalyptic ideas of Joachim da Fiore brought them into conflict with the Church, which on 11 March 1286 ordered them to adhere to an already recognized rule. They refused and were branded as heretics. On 7 March 1290 a new bull was issued against them by Nicholas IV, and persecution began. Four followers were burned in 1294, and in 1300 Segarelli himself died at the stake. In 1307 the remainder of the sect was rounded up in the mountains near Vercelli, its new leader burned and its teaching more or less effectively stopped. See the article by C. Lohr in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1971 ed.), as well as L. Spätling, *De apostolicis, pseudoapostolicis, apostolinis*, Diss. Pontificii Athenaei Antoniani (Munich, 1947), pp. 111–79.

Llull refers admiringly to the Apostolici in *Blaquerna*, at the end of ch. 76, as well as here, and condemingly in Bk. VIII, ch. 56 (see n. 60) below, leading many scholars to accept the idea that *Blaquerna* and the *Book of the Beasts* were written before the condemnation of the sect in 1286, and that the rest of *Felix* was written afterwards. But as J. Dagenais has quite rightly pointed out (cf. introduction, nn. 9 and 18 above), this mention of the Apostolici does not appear among the animal fables of the *Book of the Beasts*, but in the prologue of that *Book*, with Felix still on the scene, and thus is part of the main fabric of the novel. Or as Dagenais puts it, "It would be difficult to sustain the argument that some time before Llull wrote the *Felix* he wrote an animal fable with a prologue which begins with a character named Felix who has just said good-by to a philosopher." So I think we can safely set aside this argument as evidence for prior composition of the *Book of the Beasts*. For a possible interpretation of these varying references to the Apostolici, see n. 3 below.

undertaken[2] so high an order[3] as that of the Apostles, and he said: "The Order of the Apostles is sovereign over all other orders. And whoever is in the Order of the Apostles should not fear death, and should go forth to show the path of salvation to unbelievers who are in error. And he should spread the doctrine of the holy life, by example and by preaching, to Christians who are in sin. Never should any man in the Order of the Apostles cease preaching[4] and doing good works to the best of his ability." These and many other things Felix told the two men who said they belonged to the Order of the Apostles.

"Sir," said the two men, "we are not worthy of leading so sublime a life as that of the Apostles; but we try to imitate their way of life, which we do through our clothes and our poverty, and through our wanderings through the world, from one land to another. We have hopes that God will send men of holy life who will belong to the Order of the Apostles and who will know sciences and languages in order to be able to preach and convert unbelievers with the help of God, and to set Christians a good example by their way of life and by their holy words. And so that God be moved to pity, and so that Christians shall desire the coming of such men, we try to imitate the Apostles."

Felix was very pleased with what the two men told him, and together with them he wept a long time, saying: "Ah, Lord God Jesus Christ! Where is the holy fervor and devotion there once was among the Apostles, who for the sake of loving and knowing You, never hesitated to suffer hardship or death? Fair Lord God, may it please You to bring about a time in which is realized the holy life symbolized by the life of these men."

[2] Thus, *emparat*, in all sources save A (followed by Galmés), which has *empetrat* ("obtained by entreaty").

[3] I suspect that here and in the following speech Llull is using the word "order" not with reference to this particular "Order" but more generally in the sense of "rank, position, state." He would therefore be praising not so much the Order of the Apostles itself, as the idea of anybody's trying to imitate the holy life of the Apostles (cf. introduction, text at n. 15 above). This interpretation has the advantage of making this passage no longer so totally dissonant with his condemnation of the sect in Bk. VIII, ch. 56 below. Llull would here be saying that their aim was laudable, and later branding them as hypocrites for not living up to this aim. See A. Oliver in *EL* 13 (1969), 59–60, for an interpretation that has some points in common with this one.

[4] MS A (followed by the printed sources) has *pregar* ("beseeching, praying"), but all the other MSS consulted have *preycar* ("preaching"), which, in the context, seems more apt.

After these words, Felix commended the holy men to God, and went to the place where the beasts were about to elect a king.

37. THE ELECTION OF THE KING

IN A LOVELY plain through which ran a lovely stream, many beasts were gathered together to elect a king. The majority agreed that the lion should be king; but the ox was very much opposed to this choice, and he said: "Gentlemen, a king's nobility must be accompanied by beauty of person; he must be at the same time large and humble, and he must do no harm to others. The lion is not a large beast, nor one that lives on grass, but rather one that eats other beasts.[5] The lion has a speech and voice that make us all tremble with fear when he roars. So if you take my advice, you will elect the horse as king; for the horse is a large beast, and handsome and humble; the horse is a nimble beast, not proud in his ways, and does not eat meat."

The red deer, the roe deer, the sheep, and all the other plant-eating animals were very pleased with what the ox had said, but Dame Reynard[6] stepped forward to speak before them all, saying: "Sirs, when God created the world, He did not do so with the intention that man should be known and loved, but rather that He Himself should be known and loved by man; and according to this intention, God willed that man should be served by beasts,

[5] M. Batllori (*OL*, p. 718, n. 1, and *OE* I, 510, n. 31) quotes a footnote of the eighteenth-century Spanish translator, Luís de Flandes, which, in spite of its ingenuousness and oversimplification, is not uninteresting: "In this treatise, the meat-eating animals represent the nobles, and those that eat grass, the common people. The lion represents the king, the leopard the man of honor, the lynx the flatterer, the fox the man of cunning, the snake the prudent man, and so on." To which he adds the surprising (in view of the fact that he had just finished translating the previous chapter on alchemy): "N.B. In addition to the above, this treatise includes everything concerning the transformation of metals, if one knows how to interpret it properly."

[6] *Na Renart* in the original—the only animal in Llull's fable given a proper name (and a title). The name comes from the Germanic Reginhard (from which, Reinhart) and was applied to the fox in a series of animal fables that arose in the Lotharingian area in the tenth and eleventh centuries. From there it spread out to Germany, the Low Countries, and mainly France, where the *Roman de Renart* became so famous that the proper name displaced the older French word (*goupil*) as a designation for the animal itself. Even in Catalan it came to be used for the fox, but apparently not till after Llull's time, for one of the fourteenth-century MSS of *Felix* (MS L) has the more usual *guineu* written above one of first appearances of the name *Na Renart* to explain what animal was being discussed. Note that here the fox is made feminine, perhaps influenced by the fact that the other Iberian names for the creature (Cat. *guineu, guilla, rabosa, volp*; Sp. *zorra, raposa, gulpeja*) are all feminine.

and man lives on meat and plants alike. You should therefore pay no attention to what the ox says, since he dislikes the lion for being meat-eating; instead you should follow the rules and dispositions God has given and placed over creatures."

The ox and his friends, however, argued against Dame Reynard's words, the ox saying that from the fact of his wanting the grass-eating horse to be king, it would seem that he and his friends had no ulterior motive in the matter of the election; for if they did, they would not want a creature like the horse, who eats the same grass they eat, to be king. Nor should they believe Dame Reynard with respect to the election of a king, for she is interested in having the lion be king more because she lives on the leftovers from what the lion hunts and leaves uneaten, than because of the lion's nobility.

There was so much discussion on one side and the other that the entire court was thrown into confusion, and the election held up. Then the bear, the leopard, and the lynx,[7] each of whom had hopes of being elected king, said that the court should be put off until it had been decided which animal was worthiest of being king.

Dame Reynard realized that the bear, the leopard, and the lynx were putting off the election because each had hopes of being king, and she said in everyone's presence:

"An election was once being held in a cathedral church, and in the chapter there was disagreement over the election of a bishop; for some canons wanted the sacristan of the church to be bishop, since he was a man of wisdom, culture, and virtue. The archdeacon, however, wanted to be elected bishop, and the same was true of the precentor,[8] both of whom opposed the election of the sacristan, and permitted the election of an ordinary canon who was handsome but ignorant, and moreover of weak character and very

[7] *Onça* in the original, which, like the French *once* (see Hatzfeld, Darmester, and Thomas, *Dictionnaire général de la langue française*, Paris, n.d.) and the English *ounce* (*OED*, s.v.), in the Middle Ages referred to the European lynx. I have avoided the homonym since nowadays in English (as in French) the word is only used to refer to the snow leopard of central Asia (hence, perhaps, the confusion of Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 55, n. 2).

[8] *Cabiscol* in Catalan, like the English "precentor," refers to the person who directs the singing of a church choir, and has nothing to do with the "dean" or head of a chapter of canons, which is what appears in the medieval French translation (causing, perhaps, another confusion in Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 57, n. 6). Riquer, *Història* I, 306, points out Llull's curious habit of having the animals occasionally give examples concerning human beings.

lascivious. The entire chapter was in great wonder at the attitude of the archdeacon and precentor. In the chapter there was a canon who then said: 'If the lion is king, and the bear, the lynx, and the leopard disagree with his election, there will forever be ill will toward the king; and if the horse is king, and the lion commits some wrong against the king, how will the horse get his revenge, if he is not as strong as the lion?'"[9]

After hearing Dame Reynard's example, the bear, the lynx, and the leopard were very afraid of the lion; so they consented to the election and desired him to be king. Because of the pressure brought by the bear and the other meat-eating animals, and in spite of the plant-eating beasts, the lion was elected king, whereupon he gave all meat-eating animals permission to eat and live off the grass-eating animals.

One day the king held a meeting to decide on the constitution of his court. The meeting between the king and the barons lasted all that day, almost until nightfall, with none of them having eaten or drunk a thing. When the meeting was over, the lion and his companions were hungry, and he asked the wolf and Dame Reynard what there was to eat. They replied that it was late to procure food, but nearby there was a calf, son of the ox, and a colt, son of the horse, on whom they could dine plentifully. The lion had the calf and the colt brought to him, and he and his friends dined on them. The ox was very angry over the death of his son, as was the horse. Together they went to man to place themselves at his service, so that he might revenge the wrong their lord had done them. When the ox and the horse presented themselves before man to serve him, the man mounted the horse and set the ox to plowing.

One day it came to pass that the horse and the ox met, and each asked the other about his situation. The horse said that he was very overworked in the service of his master, for every day he was ridden and made to gallop up hill and down hill, and was in harness day and night. The horse desired greatly to be free of this servitude to his master, and he would have willingly once again undergone submission to the lion. But because of the fact that the

[9] A remarkable instance of the characters in a story within a frame story referring to the characters in the frame story.

lion ate meat, and because the horse had received some votes in the election of king, he was afraid to return to the land where the lion reigned, and preferred to suffer beneath the dominion of man, who does not eat horseflesh, rather than be in the company of the lion, who does.

After the horse had told him about his situation, the ox replied that he too was very overworked, every day, from plowing, and that his master would not let him eat the wheat grown on the land he plowed, but instead, when he was finished with his plowing and exhausted from it, he was sent to graze on the grass the sheep and goats had been eating while he was out plowing. The ox complained bitterly about his master, and the horse consoled him as best he could.

While the ox and the horse were conversing in this way, a butcher came to see if the ox was fat, for the ox's master had offered him up for sale. The ox said to the horse that his master wanted to sell him to be killed and given to man to eat. The horse said this was a poor reward for the service he had rendered. For a long time the horse and the ox wept, and the horse advised the ox to flee and return to his native land; for it was better to be in danger of death, but in peace among one's own kind, than in danger of death[10] and suffering under an ungrateful master.

38. THE KING'S COUNCIL

WHEN THE LION had been elected king, he made a fine speech before all his people, saying: "Sirs, it is your will that I be king. Now you all must know that the position of king is a very dangerous one, and very difficult. It is dangerous because often, on account of a king's sins, God sends down hunger, sickness, death, and wars, just as He does for the sins of a people. And this is why it is dangerous for a king to rule, and why his reign is also dangerous for his people. And since it is very difficult for a king to govern himself and his subjects, I therefore beg all of you gathered here together to give me councilors to help and counsel me in such a way that both I and my people may be saved. And I pray that

[10] Thus in all sources save A (followed by Galmés), which lacks, "but in peace . . . of death."

the councilors you give me be wise, loyal, and such as are worthy of being councilors and in the company of a king."

All the barons and others of the assembly were pleased with what the king had said, and they all thought themselves fortunate with his election. It was agreed that the bear, the leopard, the lynx, the snake, and the wolf would be councilors of the king. All of them swore in presence of the court that they would give the king loyal counsel to the best of their abilities.

Dame Reynard, however, was unhappy at not having been elected king's councilor, and before the assembly she said the following words: "According to the Gospel, Jesus Christ, who is king of heaven and earth, preferred, in this world, the friendship and company of simple and humble men, which is why he chose the Apostles from among simple, poor people in order that He might exalt them through their virtue, thus increasing their humility. Subject to the approval of all present, it would seem to me that the king should have in his council simple, humble beasts, so that they should have pride neither of power nor of lineage, nor want to be equals of the king, but rather give an example of hope and humility to the simpler beasts who live off grass."

The elephant, the wild boar, the goat, the sheep, and the other animals who lived off grass agreed with what Dame Reynard had said. And they all advised the king to take Dame Reynard, who spoke well and had great wisdom, into his council. And Dame Reynard gave her advice, saying that it would be a good idea if the elephant, the wild boar, the goat, and the sheep also formed part of the king's council.

The bear, the leopard, and the lynx were quite worried when they heard that Dame Reynard was in the king's council, for they were very afraid that with her cleverness of speech and her craftiness she might cause them to incur the king's anger, and all the more so since Dame Reynard had been more in favor of the king's election than any other animal.

"My lord," said the leopard to the king, "in your court there is the rooster, who is handsome and who is wise, and who is lord over many hens; moreover at dawn he sings very clearly and beautifully; in short, it would seem to me much more advisable to have him in your council than Dame Reynard."

The elephant agreed that it would be a good idea to have the rooster on the king's council, to give him an example as to how to rule the queen and make her submissive to him, and to wake him at dawn so he could pray to God;[11] and he added that Dame Reynard would make a good king's councilor, because she was a wise beast and had knowledge of many things.

The leopard said that in a king's council there should not be two persons who by nature bear ill will toward each other, since such ill will could upset the king's council. Dame Reynard also spoke, saying that in a king's council the beasts should be handsome and large, like the elephant, the wild boar, the goat, the sheep, and the red deer, since beauty of person is fitting for those in the king's presence.

It was the king's wish that Dame Reynard and her companions be members of his court and his council, and thus it was done, but the leopard spoke secretly to the king as follows:

"My lord, there was once a count at war with a king; and since the count was not as powerful as the king, he had to exercise craft in his war with the king. What he did was to give large gifts in secret to the king's secretary, so that the latter would tell him of all the stratagems the king was going to employ against him. And thus the king's secretary prevented the royal power from bringing this war with the count to a successful conclusion."

After the leopard had finished speaking, and the lion had understood the example, he said that the rooster should belong to his court and Dame Reynard not, so that she would not tell the elephant and the other beasts who ate grass about the stratagems of the king and his companions who ate meat.[12]

39. OF THE TREASON DAME REYNARD ATTEMPTED AGAINST THE KING

DAME REYNARD and her companions were most displeased at not being on the king's council; and from that moment on Dame Reynard began to harbor treason in her heart, and to desire the death of the king. She therefore said to the elephant:

[11] Thus in L S; all other sources have, "and to wake him at dawn and (to) pray to God," giving the less likely situation of its being the rooster who prays to God.

[12] The last three words are lacking in A B, and hence in Galmés's edition.

"From now on there will be great enmity between the animals who eat meat and those who eat grass; for the king and his councilors eat meat, and you have no animal of your kind on his council to uphold your rights."

The elephant answered that he had hopes that the snake and the rooster would be able to defend their rights in the king's court, since they were animals who did not live on meat.

Dame Reynard answered, saying that in a certain land there was once a Christian who had a Saracen whom he trusted very much, and whom he did many favors; the Saracen however, being against him because of his religion, was unable to bear him any good will, but rather was continually thinking how he could kill him.[13] "And this is why you should realize, Sir Elephant," Dame Reynard said, "that the snake and the rooster are of a lineage so different from yours and that of your companions that, although they eat no meat, you should not trust them, but rather realize that they will consent to anything that will harm you and all your companions."

The elephant was very worried by what Dame Reynard had told him, and for a long time he considered the harm that could come to him and his companions from the choice they had made of king and councilors. While the elephant was thinking over these matters, Dame Reynard told him he should have no fear of the king and his friends, for if he wanted to be king she would see to it that he would be king. But the elephant worried that Dame Reynard might betray him, since she should by nature prefer animals who lived on meat to those who lived on grass. And he said to Dame Reynard:

"In a certain land it came to pass that a kite was carrying off a mouse,[14] and a hermit prayed to God that the mouse fall in his lap. As a result of the holy man's prayers, God caused the mouse to fall into the lap of the hermit, who then prayed God to turn it into a beautiful maiden. God heeded the hermit's prayers and turned the mouse into a beautiful maiden."

"Dear child," said the hermit, "do you want the sun as your husband?"

[13] Undoubtedly a reference to the slave from whom Llull learned Arabic (cf. the "Life," § 11–13 above).

[14] Old Catalan did not distinguish between "rat" and "mouse"; Peers uses the former, and I use the latter because the medieval French translation has *soriz* (mod. Fr. *souris*). The "kite" is, of course, the bird.

"No, sir, for clouds rob the sun of its brilliance."

The hermit then asked her if she wanted the moon as her husband, and she said the moon did not produce its own light, but rather received it from the sun.

"Dear child, do you want a cloud as your husband?"

She replied she did not, for the wind led the clouds wherever it desired. Yet she did not want the wind as her husband, because the mountains impeded its movement; nor did she want the mountains, because mice made tunnels in them; nor did she want a man for a husband, since men killed mice. So in the end the maiden begged the hermit to turn her back into a mouse, as she was before, and to give her a fine mouse for a husband.[15]

When Dame Reynard had heard this example, she realized that the elephant was suspicious of her, and was afraid he would denounce her. She would gladly have asked the wild boar to be king, just as she had asked the elephant, but in order that her scheming not be discovered, she wanted at all costs to have the elephant made king. She therefore said:

[15] This is the first of the fables of oriental origin in the *Book of the Beasts*, and it comes from a collection Llull drew on extensively in the *Book of the Beasts* and which began its history in India as the *Panchatantra* ("Five Cases of Wisdom"). From there it passed (being expanded along the way) through Persian into Arabic, where it was called *Kalila and Dimna*. It entered Europe by two routes: the first was through a Hebrew translation, which was translated into Latin in the thirteenth century by John of Capua as the *Directorium humanae vitae*; the second was by means of a Spanish translation ordered by Alfonso X, which in turn was translated into Latin at the beginning of the fourteenth century by Raymond of Béziers (who, curiously enough, was among the forty Masters and Bachelors of Arts and Medicine who approved Llull's lectures on the *Ars brevis* in Paris in 1310—cf. the "Life," n. 169 above, and *ROL* v, 139). See I. Montiel, *Historia y bibliografía del "Libro de Calila y Dimna"* (Madrid, 1975). We do not know which of these several versions Llull drew on. For identifying the specific fables used by Llull (most of which sources have been known since the pioneering *HLF*, pp. 355–60), the most convenient modern works are Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, which gives modern French translations of the original sources in appendix, and E. J. Neugaard, "The Sources of the Folk Tales in Ramon Llull's *Llibre de les bèsties*," *Journal of American Folklore* 84 (Philadelphia, 1971), 333–7, which cites the appropriate number in Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1955–7), or assigns his own number in accordance with the system of that work (in which case he precedes the Stith Thompson number with an asterisk, a system I have followed here).

For this particular tale, see Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 71, n. 2, and Appendix A, p. 165, as well as the Spanish version of *Calila e Dymna* printed in *BAE* 51, p. 52 (I use this edition because of the convenient fact that this volume of *BAE* contains almost all of the extant Spanish equivalents of the fables of the *Book of the Beasts*; preferable, however, is the modern edition by J. E. Keller and R. W. Lindsay entitled *El libro de Calila e Digna*, Clásicos Hispánicos, Madrid, 1967). Cf. Stith Thompson D315.2. As Llinarès points out, la Fontaine used this story in *Fables*, IX, 7.

"In a certain land it came to pass that a knight had a handsome son by his wife. But she died, and the knight took a second wife who disliked the boy whom her husband loved so much. When this boy was twenty years old, the woman thought up a way to have her husband banish his son from their house, by telling the husband that the son had proposed making love to her. The knight so loved his wife that he immediately believed everything she told him, and he drove his son from the house, commanding him nevermore to appear in his presence. The young man was very angry with his father for driving him from his house and withdrawing his favor for no reason at all."[16]

The elephant was partially consoled by Dame Reynard's example, and he had hopes that he would become king as she had said. He asked her how she would manage to have the king die and himself elected king, since the present king was physically so powerful and had such a wise council, and since Dame Reynard was such a small animal and so weak.

Dame Reynard replied with the following example: "In a certain land it came to pass that all the animals agreed to hand over one animal to the lion every day, so that he would not make them suffer with his hunting, and the lion accepted the bargain. Every day these animals drew lots, and the one to whom the lot fell went to the lion and was eaten by him. One day it happened that the lot fell to a hare, who put off going to the lion till midday, for she was afraid of dying. The lion was very angry over the hare's procrastination, for he was very hungry, so he asked the hare why she had taken such a long time. The hare excused herself, saying that nearby there was a lion who claimed to be king of the land and who had almost captured her. The lion was very angry, for

[16] This story comes from another collection of oriental origin called *The Seven Wise Masters*, the *Book of Sindbad* (or *Sindibad*), or just *Sendebar*, the early history of which is obscure. It entered Europe, however, in two forms: one as the French *Roman des sept sages de Rome* (contained, as we mentioned before, in the same MS containing the medieval French translation of *Felix*; cf. the introduction, n. 28 above), from which descends a version in Catalan verse, and several Spanish versions of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the second was the Spanish *Libro de los engaños* translated under the orders of Don Enrique, the brother of Alfonso X, in 1253. Again we do not know which version Llull used, but the tale told here is the frame story of *The Seven Wise Masters*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 73, n. 3, and Appendix B, p. 166. The story is also told in the *Libro de los enxemplos por a.b.c.*, no. 101 (*BAE* 51, p. 471); cf. Neugaard, "The Sources," pp. 335–6. Stith Thompson K2111.5.

he believed the hare's story, and told her to take him to this lion. The hare went first and the lion followed. They came to a large body of water that was part of a reservoir surrounded on all sides by a high wall. When the hare was over the water and her image and that of the lion appeared in the water, she said to the lion, 'Do you see, sir, the lion in the water who wants to eat a hare?' The lion thought his image was another lion, and he jumped in the water in order to fight with it. The lion drowned, and the hare, with her wits alone, succeeded in killing the lion."[17]

After hearing this example, the elephant answered Dame Reynard by means of another one: "A king had two pages who attended to his person. One day it happened that the king was sitting on his throne before a great throng of noble barons and knights. One of these pages was next to him, and saw a flea on the white samite robe the king was wearing. This page asked the king's permission to draw near and pick off the flea that was on his cloak; the page picked off the flea, which the king then wanted to see. The king showed it to all his knights, and said what a great wonder it was that so tiny a beast dared approach a king. He ordered that the page be given a hundred bezants. The other page was jealous of his companion, and the next day he put a louse on the king's cloak, and he spoke to the king as his companion had. The page gave the louse to the king, and the king drew back in horror, saying that the page deserved to die for not keeping his clothes free of lice; and he had him given a hundred lashes."[18]

Dame Reynard realized that the elephant was afraid of being king, and she was in great wonder at the amount of fear so great a creature could harbor. She said to the elephant: "It is said that the serpent, along with Dame Eve, who was one woman only, brought down God's anger on Adam and on all his descendants. So if the serpent along with Eve managed to do such harm, it may well happen that I, with my wisdom and cleverness, can manage to have the king incur the wrath of his people."

[17] This story is from *Kalila and Dimna*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 75, n. 4, and Appendix C, p. 167, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 25. According to Neugaard, "The Sources," pp. 335–6, it also appears in the *Libro de los enxemplos por a.b.c.*, but I have been unable to find it there. Stith Thompson K1715.1.

[18] Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 75, n. 5, says this story is undoubtedly an adaptation of the Fable of the Louse and the Flee from *Kalila and Dimna* (cf. his Appendix D, p. 167, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 27). But aside from the two parasites, the stories have little in common. Cf. Stith Thompson J2415.2.

From the moment Dame Reynard had recounted the example of Eve, the elephant began to think of betraying the king; and he told Dame Reynard that he would willingly be king once she had had the present king done away with. Dame Reynard told theelephant that she would see to it that the king died, and the elephant promised that he would give her great gifts and honors if she could arrange for him to become king.

40. HOW DAME REYNARD BECAME ROYAL DOORKEEPER

IN THE KINGS court it was ordained that the cat would be royal chamberlain and the dog would be doorkeeper. The cat was made chamberlain so he would eat the mice who were destroying hangings, and because of his similarity to the king. The dog was made doorkeeper so that, with his ability to hear things from afar, he could bark and let the king know when people were coming.

While the cat and the dog were carrying out their duties, Dame Reynard went off to find the ox and the horse, who had left the royal court. On her way she met the ox, who was returning to the king's court. It was in a lovely plain that Dame Reynard and the ox met. Each greeted the other in friendly fashion, and the ox told Dame Reynard about what had happened to him, how he had gone to man a free being, how man had held him for a long time in servitude, and how finally he had almost sold him to a butcher who wanted to kill him.

Dame Reynard on her side told the ox about the situation at court, as recounted above.

"Sir Ox," Dame Reynard said, "what do you intend to do?"

The ox replied that he was returning to the royal court, to flee from man, who had wanted to sell him for slaughter.

Dame Reynard then spoke to the ox in the following words: "In a certain kingdom there was a king of evil habits who was also badly counseled. As a result of the malice of king and council, the whole kingdom suffered hardships and incurred the wrath of God, for the harm the king and his council did to the people of that kingdom was inestimable. In fact, it lasted so long that the people of the country could stand it no longer; and because of the

evil life and bad example of the king and his council, the people came to desire the death of both king and council."

The ox understood, from what Dame Reynard said, that the king and his council were wicked, and he hesitated as to whether he should return and be subjected to an evil government. So he said to Dame Reynard:

"In a certain city there was once a bishop who did things very contrary to his office, and as a result of the bishop's wickedness and dishonesty and of the bad example he set his chapter and the people of that city much harm was done and much good lost, good that would have been done had the bishop been the person he should have been, according to the rule and doctrine Jesus Christ gave his Apostles and their followers. One day it came to pass that the bishop did a great wrong, and then went off to say mass. One canon was in such horror at the wrong the bishop had committed that he left the city and went to live with shepherds in the woods, saying that he preferred being with shepherds who guarded their flocks against wolves than with a shepherd who killed his sheep and gave them to the wolves."

After recounting this example, the ox said to Dame Reynard that he would leave the country altogether rather than put himself at the discretion of a king and council who governed so wickedly.

"Sir Ox," said Dame Reynard, "have you heard about the question the hermit put to the king?"

"No," said the ox, "What question was that?"

Dame Reynard said there was once a holy hermit living on a high mountain. This hermit led a saintly life, and every day he heard many complaints about the king of that land, who was a sinful man and one who ruled badly; and the people spoke very badly of him to the holy man. The hermit was very annoyed at the king's evil attitude, and he vowed that he would try to change it for the better. The good man came down from his hermitage and came to a beautiful city where the king was staying. "My lord." the good man said to the king, "which do you think is more pleasing to God in this world: the hermit's life or the life of a king who rules his people well?" The king thought about the question for a long time before he answered; then finally he said that the life of a king devoted to good works is grounds for greater good than a hermit's life. "My lord," said the hermit, "I am very

pleased with your answer, according to which it is clear that a wicked king does greater harm than the good a hermit can do in his hermitage. And this is why I came down from my hermitage to see you, and I intend to stay with you until you and your reign are in a better condition, and to speak words of God to you so that you will have knowledge and fear of God." The hermit stayed for a long time in the king's court speaking good words of God, by which the king changed his ways, and brought his entire kingdom under a good government.[19]

After recounting this example, Dame Reynard said to the ox: "Sir Ox, you are a beast similar to the hermit, and if you want, I will counsel you so that you may induce the king—my lord and yours—to take on a better attitude, from which action of yours there will follow much good."

The ox promised Dame Reynard that he would do all the good things he could to bring the king and his subjects into a better situation. Dame Reynard therefore advised the ox to go to a lovely meadow near where the king and his barons were staying, and to eat and rest, so that he would be handsome to look at and in strong voice for bellowing. "And as soon as you feel yourself well and strong again, Sir Ox, you must bellow as loud as you can, three times by day, and three times by night, and in the meantime I will have discussed your situation with the king."

The ox followed Dame Reynard's advice, while she returned to the royal court. When the ox had rested a great deal and was strong again, he began to bellow mightily. And when Dame Reynard heard him bellowing, she went before the king and stood there while the ox bellowed. So afraid was the king of the ox's bellowing that he could not contain himself nor keep himself from trembling. And he was ashamed in front of his barons, afraid that they would think he was a coward. While the lion was in this state of fear, and none of his barons had as yet noticed his fear, Dame Reynard drew near; and the rooster crowed and the dog barked when she drew near the king. The king was pleased to have Dame

[19] Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 83, n. 6, says this example is of unknown source, although in the personalities of the king and the hermit he finds a vague resemblance to the parables of *Barlaam et Josaphat*. Neugaard (n. 15 above) says there is a similar story in the *Libro de los enxemplos*, but his citation of J. E. Keller, *Motif-Index of Mediaeval Spanish Exempla* (Knoxville, Tenn., 1949), J151.1, refers one to no. 347 of that collection (*BAE* 51, p. 531), which has little in common with this story.

Reynard nearby, and he asked her if she knew what sort of an animal was producing that noise, because from the sound of it, it seemed to him that it must be a large and powerful beast.[20]

"Sir," said Dame Reynard, "in a certain valley there was a minstrel who had hung his tambourine on a tree, and the wind made it move and bump into the branches of the tree. And because of this bumping against the tree, such a sound issued from the tambourine that it made the whole valley resound. Now in that valley there was a monkey who heard the sound and went over to the tambourine; and he thought that because the sound was so great the tambourine must be full of butter or something of that sort that would be good to eat. So the monkey tore a hole in the tambourine, and found it was completely empty.[21] In the same way, my lord," Dame Reynard said to the lion, "you may be sure that the sound you hear comes from an animal that is empty inside, and doesn't have the strength one would imagine from the voice alone. So be strong and of good courage, for it is not seemly for a king to be afraid, and even less so to be afraid of something unknown."

While Dame Reynard was saying this to the king, the ox cried out and bellowed very loudly; so much so that he caused the king's entire surroundings to reverberate, and the lion and his friends to tremble. The king could not help showing his fear, and he said that if the animal's strength were in proportion to its voice, some evil would come to that place. The ox bellowed once again, and the lion and all the members of his council were afraid; but Dame Reynard showed no fear at all, maintaining instead her cheerfulness in front of the king and his council. The king and all the others were in great wonder at Dame Reynard's lack of fear, and the king said to her:

"Reynard," said the king, "how can it be that you are not afraid of so powerful and strange a voice? As you can see, I, who am so strong, and the bear, the leopard, and many other beasts stronger than you, are afraid of this voice."

[20] This story comes from *Kalila and Dimna*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 85, n. 7, and *BAE* 51, pp. 22–3. It is not cited by Neugaard.

[21] Even though the characters are different (no minstrel, and a fox instead of the monkey), the story is the same as one in *Kalila and Dimna*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 87, n. 9, and Appendix E, p. 168, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 22. Stith Thompson *J1812.6.

Dame Reynard answered the king, saying:

"A crow used to make its nest in a rock, and every year a large snake would come and eat the fledglings. The crow was very angry at the snake that ate its fledglings, but he did not dare fight it, since he was not strong enough to be able to defeat it by force of arms. The crow realized he would have to employ some ruse, since his strength was inadequate. It came to pass one day that a princess was playing with her companions in an orchard, and she had placed her diadem of gold, silver, and precious stones on the branch of a tree. The crow took the diadem and flew about with it for a long time until many men were following him to see where he would put down the diadem, which the princess especially loved, and over whose loss she was crying bitterly. The crow put it down near the snake, and when the men came to retrieve the diadem they saw the snake and killed it. Thus did the crow, through art and cunning, make use of others against the snake.[22] And in the same way, my lord," Dame Reynard said to the lion, "such is my art and cunning, that if it came to pass that I could not vanquish by force of arms this animal who has so loud and terrifying a voice, I would use art and cunning to make an end of him."

After Dame Reynard had recounted her example, the snake, who was one of the king's councilors, recounted this one:

"In a certain pond there was a heron who for a long time had been accustomed to fish there. The heron grew old, and on account of his age he often lost his prey, so he thought up a way to make use of art and cunning, which method turned out to be the cause of his death."

The lion told the snake to explain how the heron had caused his own death.

"My lord king," said the snake, "one day the heron stood sadly on the banks of the pond until nightfall, without even trying to fish. A crab wondered at the heron who wasn't fishing the way he usually did, and he asked the heron what was worrying him. The heron wept and said he felt very sorry for the fish in the pond with whom he had lived such a long time, and felt very unhappy

[22] This tale is from *Kalila and Dimna*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 89, n. 10, and Appendix F, p. 168, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 24. Stith Thompson K401.2.2.

over their death and misery; for two fishermen, now fishing in another pond, intended to come to this one when they had finished fishing there. 'These fishermen are masters in the art of fishing, and such is their cunning that no fish will be able to escape them, and they will catch all the fish in this pond.'

"When the crab heard these words, he was very afraid, and he told it to the fishes in the pond. All the fish got together and came before the heron, asking him to counsel them. 'There is only one piece of advice I can give you,' said the heron, 'and that is to let me carry you one by one to a pond about a league away from here, one so full of reeds and mud that the fishermen will not be able to harm you.' The fish agreed, and every day the heron took as many fish as he wanted, and pretended he was carrying them to another pond, when in fact he would land on a mountain and eat the fish he was carrying, and then go back for more. This the heron did for a long time, being able to live without the work of fishing.

"One day it came to pass that the crab asked the heron to take it to the other pond. The heron stuck out its neck and the crab grabbed onto it with both its claws. While the heron was flying with the crab hanging on to its neck, the crab was surprised not to see the pond to which the heron was taking it. When the heron drew near to the place where he normally ate the fish, the crab saw the bones of fish the heron had eaten, and he realized the trick the heron had been playing. The crab said to himself, 'While there's still time, you'd better get your revenge on this traitor who intends to eat you.' So the crab squeezed the heron's neck so tight that he broke it, and the heron fell to the ground dead. And the crab returned to his friends and told them about the treason the heron had been practicing on them, which treason was the cause of the heron's death."[23]

"Sir," said Dame Reynard, "when God drove Adam from Paradise, He cursed the serpent who had counseled Eve to eat the fruit that God had forbidden to Adam, and from then on all ser-

[23] Identical story in *Kalila and Dimna* (Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 91, n. 11, and Appendix G, p. 169, as well as *BAE* 51, pp. 24–5; cf. Stith Thompson K815.14), where it is also associated with the previous story about the crow and the snake. In the Spanish version the animals are the same, whereas in the French translation cited by Llinarès they are replaced by a cormorant and a crayfish.

pents have been horrible to look upon and poisonous; and from this serpent have come all the evils of the world. And this is why a wise man caused a snake to be driven from a king's council, although the king loved the snake dearly."

The lion asked Dame Reynard to recount this example.

"Sir," said Dame Reynard, "a certain king had heard talk about a holy man of very great wisdom, and he sent for him. The holy man came to the king, and the king begged him to stay with him to counsel him in the government of his kingdom and to reprove him for his vices, if he found him indulging in any. The holy man stayed with the king so that he could advise him how to do good works and to avoid evil.

"One day the king held a council concerning an important event that had happened in his kingdom. Near the king was a large serpent whose counsel the king valued above that of the others. When the holy man saw the serpent he asked what a king stood for in this world, and the king replied: 'Kings were established in this world in the image of God, that is to say, that a king must uphold justice on earth and govern the people God has put beneath his care.' 'Sir,' said the wise man, 'what animal was most contrary to God when He created the world?' And the king replied that it was the serpent. 'My lord king,' said the wise man, 'according to your answer, you should kill the serpent: and you commit a great sin by having it in your court. For if, as king, you represent the image of God, you should hate everything God hates, and more so that which God most hates.' Because of what the holy man said, the king killed the serpent, without the serpent's being able to use any art or ruse to prevent his own death."[24]

After Dame Reynard had recounted this example, the ox cried out and bellowed so loud that he made the entire place tremble, and the lion and all the others were terrified. So Dame Reynard said to the king that if he wanted, she would go to the beast from whom issued so strange a voice, and she would see if she could bring it to the king and have it become part of his court. The lion and all the others were glad that Dame Reynard was willing to go to the beast who was bellowing.

[24] Neugaard (n. 15 above) says this "example" appears in several Semitic and Indian collections; cf. Stith Thompson B123.1.

Dame Reynard then begged the king to promise that, if she was lucky and was able to bring this animal back to his court, it would be safe and sound there, and that no one would harm it nor commit any villany against it. And the lion, before his entire council, granted Dame Reynard everything she asked of him.

Dame Reynard went to the meadow where the ox was resting, and when the ox saw her he was very pleased at her arrival. They greeted each other warmly, and Dame Reynard told the ox everything that had happened since she had left him.

"My dear friend," said Dame Reynard, "go before the king, act humble, and make the gestures of somebody who is very wise. I will say that you have felt great contrition for having so long escaped the king's dominion, and then, in front of everybody, you must ask the king to pardon you for having gone to live with man and having put yourself beneath another's dominion. My dear friend," said Dame Reynard, "you must speak before the king and his court in such a way that the king and his entire council are pleased with your words and gestures. And tell the king about the affairs of men, and counsel the king to make friends with the king of men."

The ox and Dame Reynard went to the royal court. When the king and his barons saw the ox and Dame Reynard approaching, the king and everybody else recognized the ox, and they all felt very stupid at how afraid they had been of the ox; and the king was in great wonder as to how the ox could have so loud and terrifying a voice.

The ox went up to his lord and made the proper reverence for a king, and the king asked him about his present situation. The ox recounted everything that had happened to him while he was in the service of man. The king told the ox he was astonished at how his voice had changed, and the ox said he had cried out in fear and contrition, because he felt guilty towards the king and his court for having left them so long for another's dominion. And since fear and contrition made his heart tremble, this had altered his voice, as a sign of fear, terror, and dread, because it issued from a body containing a fearful and penitent heart.

The ox begged forgiveness of the king, and the king forgave him in front of his entire court. The king asked the ox about the affairs of the king of men, and the ox replied that the snake had

spoken the truth when he said that the most evil and false animal in the world is man. The lion asked the ox to tell him why the snake said that man is the most evil and false animal in the world.

"My lord king," said the ox, "it once happened that a bear, a crow, a man, and a snake fell into a deep pit. A holy man who was a hermit was passing by that place; he looked into the pit and he saw the four of them inside, unable to climb out. They all begged the holy man to help them out of the pit, and each promised him a good reward. He pulled the bear out of the pit, then the crow and the snake; but when he was about to pull out the man, the snake told him not to do it, because if he did he would receive an unpleasant reward for his services. The hermit refused to believe the snake's advice, and he pulled the man from the pit.

"The bear brought the holy man a beehive full of honeycombs. When the hermit had eaten his fill of honeycombs, he went off to the city to preach. As he entered the city, the crow brought him a lovely diadem belonging to a princess, from whose head he had taken it. The hermit took the diadem with great pleasure, for it was worth a great deal. Through that city went a man crying out and announcing that whoever had the diadem should return it to the princess, and he would be given a large reward; and if someone had the diadem hidden and was found out, he would be severely punished. The good hermit came to a street where there was the man he had helped out of the pit, who happened to be a silversmith. The holy man secretly entrusted the silversmith with the diadem, and the silversmith took it to court, with accusations against the holy man, who was then taken, beaten, and imprisoned.

"The snake whom the holy man had pulled out of the pit went to the princess while she was sleeping and bit her on the hand. The princess cried out and wept, and her hand became very swollen. The king was very upset at his daughter's illness, with her hand swollen and poisoned, and he had it announced throughout the city that he would give large gifts to whoever could cure his daughter. The snake came while the king was sleeping and whispered in his ear that in the prison of his court there was a captive who had an herb with which he could cure his daughter. The snake himself had given this herb to the good man and explained to him how he should put it on the princess's hand, and how he should

ask the king to bring the silversmith to justice since he had given him such an ill reward. Everything was done as the snake had arranged, and the holy man was released from prison, and the silversmith was brought to justice."[25]

The lion along with his entire council were very pleased with the example the ox had related against man, and he asked the ox if he thought he should be afraid of the king of men. And the ox replied that it was dangerous to be on bad terms with the king of men, because from a man who was evil, powerful, and clever no animal could defend itself.

The king thought over carefully what the ox had said, and Dame Reynard realized that the lion was afraid of the king of men, so she said to him:

"My lord, the proudest animal, and the one with greater avarice than any other, is man. And therefore, if you and your council approve of the idea, it might be wise to send messengers with gifts to the king of men, messengers who on your behalf would tell him of your good will toward him and give him your presents; and in his heart the king would conceive a love for you and your people."

The king and his council thought Dame Reynard's suggestion a good one, all except for the rooster, who was against it, saying:

"In a certain land Strength and Cunning were disputing before a king. Strength said that she had natural dominion over Cunning, and Cunning said it was the other way around. The king wanted to know which should have dominion over the other, and he arranged for them to fight, in which fight Cunning conquered and overcame Strength. And this is why, my lord king," said the rooster, "if you enter into friendship with the king of men, and send him messengers, and he sends you his messengers, those messengers will have knowledge with respect to your person and your barons, so that no stratagem or art will suffice to defend you against the king of men, who fights with art and stratagem, vanquishing all those who fight by strength alone, without art and cunning."

[25] Almost identical story in *Kalila and Dimna* (Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 99, n. 17, and Appendix H, p. 170, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 70) and in the *Libro de los enxemplos* (*BAE* 51, pp. 480–1), except that in the first the animals are a badger (or tiger), a monkey, and a snake, and in the second a lion and an eagle. Cf. Stith Thompson W154.8.

On the other hand, Dame Reynard maintained that God does what He does by power, with no art or cunning, and hence it is natural that those who fight with weapons similar to God's must be more powerful in battle than those who fight with weapons dissimilar to God's.[26]

The lion was very pleased with what Dame Reynard had said, and he wanted at all costs to send presents and messengers to the king of men. The king asked which messengers he should send to the king of men, and what sort of presents. Dame Reynard said that the ox should counsel him, since he knew about the ways of men, and what sort of things pleased them most. The king asked the ox to counsel him as to the messengers and presents he wanted to send to the king of men, whereupon the ox said:

"My lord king," said the ox, "it is normal for kings of men to send messengers from among their council and even from among the noblest members of their council. Now it would seem to me that the noblest councilors you have are the lynx and the leopard. On the other hand, the cat resembles you, and the king would be very pleased if you sent him the cat and the dog as presents: the cat because of his resemblance to you, and the dog for hunting, because men are very fond of hunting."

The lion did exactly as the ox had recommended, and he sent the lynx and the leopard as messengers, and the dog and cat as presents. And when the messengers had left the court, the king made the ox his chamberlain and Dame Reynard was given the post the dog had held.

41. CONCERNING THE MESSENGERS THE LION SENT TO THE KING OF MEN

THE LION instructed the leopard and the lynx as to how they should carry out their duties as messengers, saying: "The master's wisdom is reflected in messengers who are wise, speak well, give good counsel, and are good diplomats. And the master's nobility is reflected in messengers who spend money honorably, who are well dressed, and whose retinue is well-mannered and well-equipped; and the messengers and their retinue must be free of

[26] "Than those who . . . to God's" is missing in MS A, and hence in Galmés's edition.

avarice, as well as of gluttony,[27] lust, pride, ire, or any other vice. All these things and many others are required of a noble prince's messengers, so that his mission may find favor with the king and court to whom the messengers are being sent."

When the lion had instructed his messengers as to how they should address the king and how they should behave, the messengers left his court and traveled through many different lands. They journeyed on until finally they arrived at a city where the king was holding a great assembly. At the entrance to that city there were prostitutes who, in the presence of the messengers, were sinning with men. The messengers were astonished at what they saw, and the leopard said to his companion:

"A burgher was married to a woman he loved very much. This man rented lodgings near his own house to a prostitute. The burgher's wife often saw dissolute men visiting the prostitute, and she was overcome with a desire to indulge in the sin of lust. For a long time she lived in the sin of lust, until one day her husband found her sinning with a man. The burgher was furious at his wife's transgression, to which she replied:

"'It once came to pass that two wild goats[28] were fighting in a meadow, and as a result of the violent blows they gave one another, blood flowed from their foreheads. It fell on the thick grass where they were fighting, and a fox saw the blood and licked it up. Now the fox happened to be in the way of one of their charges, and he was wounded on both flanks. So great was the blow that the fox died of it; and before dying he admitted that he had been the occasion of his own death.'"

"Sir Leopard," said the dog, "it is a great wonder how men who believe in God can have so little conscience as to allow these prostitutes to sin in the presence of people entering and leaving the city. It would seem that the lord of this city as well as its

[27] Thus, *gula*, in V and the medieval French translation; A, followed by Galmés, has *nulla* ("none, no"); S and B (and hence Rosselló, followed by *OE*) omit the word.

[28] The two oldest MSS, V and A (followed by Galmés) have *bous* ("oxen, bulls"); but since all the other sources have *bochs* ("goats"), and since the story in *Kalila and Dimna* from which it is taken also has "goats" (see Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 107, n. 3, and Appendix J, p. 171, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 23), I have decided to keep the latter. Cf. Stith Thompson J624.1 for this story, and ★J1545.10 for the frame story about the aldulterous woman, which, according to Neugaard (n. 15 above), is also in *Kalila and Dimna*.

inhabitants were given to lust, and practice lust as shamelessly as dogs."[29]

With these words they entered the city and arrived at an inn; afterwards the leopard and the lynx went to the king with the presents they had brought. But they had to wait many days before they could speak to the king, for the king was accustomed to keep people waiting a long time, as a sign of his nobility, which was so dear to him. One day it happened that the messengers had waited all day at the king's door without being able to talk to him; and they were very angry with the king and irritated at having to be in his court. Then a man who had been wronged, and who had also been waiting at the court for a long time without being able to speak to the king, said in front of the messengers:

"God, who is king of heaven and earth and all that is, is humble; for whenever a person wants to see Him or speak to Him, he may do so and explain his needs. This king has no doorkeepers to whom one has to give money, nor councilors who for money will commit any villainy or fraud. He believes no one's flatteries, nor does He name provosts, judges, bailiffs, or attorneys who are proud, arrogant, avaricious, lustful, and iniquitous. Blessed be such a king, and blessed be all those who love, know, honor, and serve Him!"

By what this man said, the messengers realized that the king was an unjust man, and the lynx said to the leopard:

"Once there was a king who wanted to give his daughter in marriage to another king, and he secretly sent a knight to that king's country to find out what sort of person he was. This knight asked peasants and other people about the king, and everyone spoke badly of him. One day the knight happened to meet two minstrels[30] who had just come from the court where the king had

[29] As Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 107, n. 4, points out, this is a rather surprising remark to put in a dog's mouth. The scene of prostitutes at the entrance to a city appears also in *Blaquerna*, ch. 71.

[30] As Peers points out in his translation of *Blaquerna* (p. 175, n. 2), the most accurate translation of the Catalan *juglar* would be "jongleur," but that would be translating one foreign word into another. His solution of "jester" nowadays bears too many connotations of "joker" or "court jester." I have chosen "minstrel" as being closest to the Troubadour sense in which Llull usually meant it. As Peers points out (ibid.), however, it could also mean just about any kind of entertainer or performer (the English "juggler," for instance, comes from the same root), and he quotes the *Leges Palatinae* of King James II of Majorca, which says that "illorum officium tribuit laetitiam" ("their profession is to give amusement"). Cf. the interesting note by A. Caimari in the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 39–41. For a special Lullian use of the word, see the references in n. 33 below.

given them money and clothes. The knight asked the minstrels what the king was like, and they told him that the king was generous, that he liked to hunt, and that he loved the company of women; and they praised the king in many other ways. By these praises, and by the way the common people blamed the king, the knight understood that the king was evil and of base customs.[31] The knight told his lord what he had heard about the king, and the king no longer wanted to marry his daughter to that king, for his conscience would not allow him to marry his daughter to a man of such bad customs."

The two messengers entered into the king's presence and gave him the gifts the lion had sent, and they also gave him a letter from their lord, with the following message:

"In a certain province there was once a king with many honorable barons, who were men of great power. In order to make these barons fear him, and in order to have peace and justice in his land, the king tried to be on the best of terms with the emperor. This emperor loved the king very much, because of the favors he did him and because of his good ways; and the king's barons, for fear of the emperor,[32] did not dare disobey their lord in whatever he commanded them; and thus they were submissive and the king had peace in his land."

When the king heard the letter the lion had sent him and had accepted the presents, he gave the cat to a draper who was standing next to him, and he gave the dog to a knight who liked to hunt. The messengers were very displeased at the king's giving the cat to the draper, who was not a man of honor, considering that the lion had sent the cat because of his resemblance to himself.

When the messengers had returned to their inn after talking to the king for a long time about the mission on which they had been sent, the dog appeared and said he was very unhappy with the king's having given him to that knight, who intended to use him to hunt against the lion's humbler subjects; and his conscience troubled him at doing something against his former lord.

The king invited the two messengers to a great court he was holding that day. The king and queen, accompanied by many

[31] An interesting sociological reversal. Llull is in effect saying that anybody who conforms to the usual ideal of the troubadour patron must be a bad ruler. See the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 118, for a much more extended treatment of the subject.

[32] Thus in all sources except A and B (followed by Galmés), which omit "king's" and "for fear," leaving, "and the barons of the emperor"!

knights and ladies, dined in a beautiful hall, and the messengers dined in the king's presence. While the king and queen were dining, minstrels went up and down the hall singing and playing instruments, and the songs they sang were contrary to good manners. These minstrels praised what should have been blamed, and blamed what should have been praised. And the king, the queen and all the others laughed, and took pleasure in what the minstrels did.

While the king and all the others were enjoying what the minstrels did and said, a man, poorly dressed and with a long beard, entered the banquet hall, and, in the presence of the king, of the queen, and of everybody else, said:[33]

"Let neither the king nor queen forget, nor their barons, nor any others, great or small, who eat in this hall, that God created all the things which are on the king's table, and on those of the others; that He made them varied and delectable to eat; and He caused them to be brought from faraway lands so that they might be at the service of man, and so that man might serve God. Let neither the king nor the queen think that God will forget the improprieties committed in this hall, in which God is dishonored, for there is no one here to reprove what is reprovable, nor to praise what is praiseworthy, nor to thank God for the honor which, in this world, He has bestowed on the king, the queen, and all the others."

After the good man had said these words, a wise squire knelt before the king and begged him to give him the duty in his court of praising what was praiseworthy and blaming what was blameworthy. The king, however, would not grant the squire his request, for fear that the squire would blame him for the wrongs he was wont to commit, wrongs in which he took great pleasure and which he wanted to continue doing until the end of his days, when he intended to make due penance for his sins.

While the squire was asking the king to give him this duty and the king was saying no, the provost of the city entered into the king's presence, bringing with him a man who had very wrong-

[33] This new appearance of a Llull-like character in a palace banquet is very reminiscent of that corresponding to Bk. V, ch. 30, n. 5 above. Cf. Peers, *Ramon Lull*, p. 222. There is much about him too of the *joculator Dei*, for which see Bk. VIII, nn. 86 and 153.

fully killed a knight. The king ordered the man who had killed the knight to be hung, but the man said:

"My lord king, it is God's custom to pardon a person who begs Him for mercy; and of you, who are God's lieutenant on earth, I ask pardon, and you should grant it, since God Himself pardons."

And the king replied, saying: "God is just and merciful. He does justice if He pardons a man who has not knowingly committed a wrong—who has erred by accident or by chance and then repents and asks for pardon, in which case God's mercy pardons him. God's justice, however, would not accord with mercy, if mercy pardoned a person who intended to sin in the hope of subsequently asking for pardon. And since you intended to kill the knight, at the same time hoping I would pardon you, that is why you are not worthy of being pardoned."

The messengers realized that these words of the king went against what the squire had said, in that the king had not wanted to give him the duty he had requested.[34]

When the king and all the others had finished eating and had left the hall, the messengers returned to their inn, and one remarked to the other how great was the nobility of that court, and how great the king's power in terms of people and wealth—if only he were wise and God-fearing.

When they arrived at their lodgings, they found the innkeeper in tears, overcome with grief. "Sir innkeeper," they said, "why are you weeping? What is wrong?"

"Sir messengers," replied the innkeeper, "in this city the king has held a great parliament for which he had many people come from faraway lands. The king's expenses have been great, and as a result he has ordered a tax to be raised in the city, one that will cost me a thousand sous, which I will have to borrow from the Jews."

"Sir innkeeper," said the messengers, "has the king no treasury?"

[34] This confusing paragraph is partly clarified by the eighteenth-century Spanish translation, which has, "By these words, spoken by the king himself, the messengers realized that the king had acted against himself in having denied the squire the duty he had requested," to which the translator adds a tag of his own, "since by [these words] he was worthy of praise."

The innkeeper replied that the king did not have a treasury, but borrowed from his subjects, and raised taxes whenever he held courts, which was twice a year. He was thus ruining his subjects who were forced to spend great sums for these courts, and he was impoverishing his entire land as a result of the way he spent money.

"Dear friend," said the lynx, "what good comes from these courts the king holds every year?"

The innkeeper answered that no good at all came from them, but rather great harm, for they impoverished the people who then, as a result of their poverty, were deceitful and committed wrongs, causing the king to be angry with all his subjects. For he gave away and spent so much in these courts he held, that his income did not suffice, and he ended up taking from some and giving to others. And when people imagined that the king had some news to give, or some important matter to discuss, and he said nothing, then they all went away angry, and laughed at the king and spoke of him scornfully.

When the messengers had heard such words about the king, they felt scorn for him and all the people of his country, and the leopard said to the innkeeper: "Great harm has come to this country as a result of not having a ruler of good habits who maintains justice and peace."

"Sir," said the innkeeper, "no man can reckon the harm done by an evil sovereign: part of it comes from the evil he does, and the rest from the good he could do, but does not do. And thus an evil sovereign causes harm in two different ways, as I have just explained. This king to whom you have been sent is a person who places too much trust in his council, and this council is contemptible and evil, and made up of men of base extraction. And each member of this council thinks he could be a better king than the king himself, and between them they lay waste to his kingdom; and the king does not care, nor does he worry about anything but hunting, enjoying himself, living in lust, and indulging his vanities."[35]

The following morning the messengers returned to the palace, but they could not enter to speak to the king until they had bribed

[35] For parallels between Llull's criticism of this king, and those of his contemporaries towards Philip IV of France, see Hillg, p. 51, n. 17.

the doorkeepers. When the messengers were before the king, he honored the leopard more than the lynx, in that he looked at him more favorably and had him sit nearer to him. The lynx was jealous of this, and angry with the king; for the lynx felt he should be honored as much as or more so than the leopard.

While the king was with the messengers, there arrived eight notables sent by four cities, to complain about the royal officials in those cities, who were wicked and sinful men, and were ruining the land. The eight notables begged the king, in the name of all the inhabitants of the cities, to give them good officials; and the king sent them on to his council, which he said would take care of the matter. But when the eight notables went before the king's council and explained their case, the council reproved them sharply, for on that council sat friends of the officials in the four cities, on whose advice they did their evil work and who shared in their ill-gained profits. So these eight notables returned without having settled anything with the king.

"My lord king," said the leopard, "what message do you have for our king?" The king told the leopard to convey his greetings to the king, and to ask him to send him a handsome bear and a wolf, for he had a very powerful boar, which he wanted to pit against as powerful a bear as he could find, and he had a mastiff he wanted to pit against the fiercest wolf in the lion's court.

Both messengers took leave of the king, and went away discontented, for he had kept them a long time without giving them anything and without sending any presents to their lord and king, but instead giving them the impression of wanting to subjugate their lord the lion.

On the way back to their country, they ran into the eight notables who were returning very angry and dissatisfied with the king and his council. As the messengers traveled with the notables they commented on the king's words, those of his council, and of his attitude. All of them spoke ill of the king and his council, and the leopard asked the notables: "Sirs," said the leopard, "do you think the king is responsible for the harm resulting from his evil rule?"

One of the eight notables replied, saying: "In a certain city there was an honorable burgher who was very rich; and when he died he left everything he had to his son. This son was sought after by

many people. Some wanted to arrange a marriage for him, others begged him to enter a religious order. This young man, however, wanted to sell all his possessions and build a hospice and a bridge. The hospice was to provide lodging for pilgrims returning from the Holy Land,[36] and the bridge was for pilgrims to use so they would not risk drowning in the river, for that river was at the entrance to the city, and many people had drowned in it on their way to or from Jerusalem.[37] When the burgher's son had completed the hospice and the bridge, one night, when he was sleeping, he dreamed that for all the good ensuing from the hospice and the bridge he would find merit before God."

By these words, the leopard realized that the king would suffer punishments in Hell equal to the harm continually caused by the bad customs his wicked council spread throughout the land, and he said that the punishment awaiting king and council was beyond reckoning. And he then said to himself that he preferred being an irrational beast, even though he would not exist after death, to being a king of men who would bear the burden of guilt for the great harm done by bad government.

The messengers and notables parted company and said goodbye to one another in a friendly fashion. The leopard told the notables that they should trust in God to bring them soon a good ruler with a good council and good officials, and not to despair of God's help; for God does not allow wicked princes to live long, in order that they not work the evil they could if they did live a long time.

When at first the lion had sent off his messengers and presents to the king of men, Dame Reynard, who was doorkeeper, told him that the leopard's wife was the most beautiful animal in the whole world. So much did Dame Reynard praise the leopard's wife to the king, that he fell in love with her and took her as his wife, in spite of queen and council, which council was very afraid of Dame Reynard, when they saw how she had persuaded the king to com-

[36] As Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 121, n. 24, points out, in the Middle Ages a "hospital" (as Llull calls it) was an institution, usually charitable, for the reception of the poor, the sick and, above all, pilgrims and travelers—hence the Knights Hospitalers. Llull treats the same subject in *Blaquerna*, chs. 9, 10, and 15. See also the passages corresponding to Bk. VIII, ch. 72, n. 115 and Bk. X, ch. 121, n. 10 below.

[37] As pointed out in Peers's translation of the *Book of the Beasts* (London, 1927), p. 59, n. 1, there is an interesting discussion of safety measures for travelers in *Blaquerna*, ch. 95.

mit such a wrong against his own good wife and against the leopard, who was his loyal servant.

"My dear friend," the ox said to Dame Reynard, "I am very afraid that the leopard might kill you, when he finds out you have persuaded the king to violate his wife."

Dame Reynard replied: "It once happened that a lady-in-waiting did something treacherous against the queen she was serving; this lady-in-waiting, however, was very intimate with the king, because of which intimacy the queen was afraid of the lady-in-waiting, and for fear of the king she did not dare get her revenge on the lady-in-waiting."

When the messengers had returned and given an account of their mission, the leopard went to his house where he expected to find his wife, whom he loved very much. The weasel and all the other members of the leopard's household were very sad when they saw their master; and they told the leopard of the dishonor the king had done him when he had violated his wife. The leopard's anger against the king was alarming to see, and he asked the weasel if his wife had been angry or pleased with the king when he took her into his service.

"Sir," said the weasel, "your wife was very angry at the king's advances, and she cried for a long time, and bemoaned having to leave you, whom she loved above all else."

The leopard's anger grew even greater at the thought of his wife's being forced to enter the king's service; for if she had liked the idea, he would not have been so displeased. So while the leopard was in this state of anger he began thinking about how he could avenge himself upon the lion who had so betrayed him.

42. CONCERNING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE LEOPARD AND THE LYNX

THE LEOPARD arrived at the court of the king, and Dame Reynard, who saw him coming, said secretly to the king: "My lord, as a result of your affair with the leopard's wife, I have incurred the leopard's wrath. So, unless you honor me in front of the leopard, that is, do me the honor of letting me be closer to you than anyone else, I think the leopard will kill me." From that moment on, the lion made Dame Reynard a member of his council, and kept her

near him so the leopard would not dare to wound or kill her. And on Dame Reynard's advice, he gave the post of doorkeeper to the peacock, who had an excellent sense of smell.

All of the king's council and all of the barons there were displeased by the honor the king accorded Dame Reynard, and more than any of them, the leopard was displeased, because he had been informed that Dame Reynard was responsible for his wife's marriage to the king.

The leopard went up to the king, and in the presence of many other honored barons, he accused the king of treason, saying that he had treacherously taken his wife, and if there was any baron who wanted to exonerate the king of treason, he would do battle with him, and make him say that the king was a traitor. The leopard then confirmed his intention to do battle by giving the king his gage.

The king, upon being accused of treason before all his subjects, was very angry with the leopard, and he felt very ashamed at having been called a traitor in front of his subjects. The king therefore said to his barons: "Which of you wants to do battle with the leopard, who has accused me of treason?" All the barons were silent, until Dame Reynard spoke up, saying:

"Treason is a thing most disagreeable to God, and it is a great dishonor for all a king's subjects to have their lord accused of treason. Therefore, just as the leopard does his lord great dishonor, for the sake of which he is willing to risk death, so great honor will come to any baron who defends the king from this charge, and whoever does battle to save the king's honor will receive a large reward from the king."

Because of the king's great dishonor at being accused of treason, and because the lynx hated the leopard ever since the king of men had honored his fellow messenger more than himself, the lynx agreed to do battle and defend the king from the charge of treason. Yet his conscience bothered him, for he knew the king had done something wrong and deceitful against the leopard, who had served him loyally all his life.

The leopard and the lynx entered the lists, and everyone said, "Now we will see which will win, truth or falsehood." The rooster then asked the snake which he thought should win, and the snake said: "Trial by combat was instituted so that truth might

confound and destroy falsehood; and since God is truth, any person who upholds falsehood fights against both God and truth."[38]

These words, which the snake spoke secretly to the rooster, were overheard by the leopard and the lynx. The leopard found them very consoling, but they gave the lynx pangs of conscience and worry, and he became afraid that the king's sins would be the cause of his dishonor and death.

The battle between the leopard and the lynx lasted all day long till the hour of complin;[39] and the lynx defended himself stoutly against the leopard, whom he would have conquered and killed, had not his conscience constrained him; while for the leopard, truth and anger against the king gave him strength and revived him whenever he felt himself flagging. So strong, in fact, was the leopard, through the hope he placed in right being on his side, that he felt nothing could conquer him. At last he overcame the lynx and made him say, before the entire court, that the king was deceitful and traitorous. The king felt confounded and ashamed by the combat. The leopard killed the lynx, and everyone was ashamed of their lord's dishonor.

The king felt such shame and confusion in front of his subjects, and he was so angry with the leopard who had brought him such dishonor, that he could not contain himself, and in front of everybody he killed the leopard, who was so exhausted he could not defend himself. Everybody present in the square was angry at the crime the king had committed, and all desired to be beneath the dominion of another king, for it is a dangerous thing for a people to be subject to a king who is unjust, resentful, and traitorous.

All that night the king was very irate and angry. The next morning he called a meeting of his council, and asked them to advise him concerning the message from the king of men, in which he asked to be sent a bear and a wolf.

"My lord," said the serpent, who was the wisest councilor the king had, "there are many bears and wolves in your country—from whom you can easily choose whatever ones you think it would be best to send."

[38] Cf. Bk. IV, n. 44 above.

[39] The last of the canonical hours, either combined with vespers (at sunset) or said afterwards.

Dame Reynard, however, spoke up and said that the king of men was the noblest and most powerful king on earth. "And this is why, my lord, you must send the wisest and strongest bear and wolf you have, for if you don't, you might find yourself blamed and even in danger."

The king asked Dame Reynard which were the wisest and strongest bear and wolf in his kingdom, and Dame Reynard replied, saying that since there was a bear and a wolf on his council, it would seem only logical that each was wiser and stronger than any other bear or wolf in his kingdom.

The king approved of the idea of sending the bear and wolf who were members of his council, and neither the bear nor the wolf tried to get out of going, for both prided their honor and feared that, if they tried to get out of it, they might be accused of cowardice. Dame Reynard then said to the king that since he was sending the king of men the noblest personages in his whole country, it was only right that he also send the wisest messengers in his court to bring the bear and wolf as presents. The king also approved this idea, and told the snake to act as ambassador.

Before leaving the court on his mission, the snake said: "It once happened that, in a lovely meadow, a wolf came across some animal's entrails, in which a fisherman had hidden a hook in order to catch the wolf if he ate the entrails. The wolf, seeing these entrails, did not want to touch them, saying to himself, 'These entrails weren't put in this meadow without some intention of causing trouble and danger.'"

After sinning and killing the leopard, the lion no longer had the same subtlety or cleverness of mind as he had had before, and he did not understand what the snake's words signified; so he asked the snake to explain these words, since he did not understand them. The snake said that ever since the ox and Dame Reynard had been admitted to his court, it had not had a moment without trouble and suffering; and thus the honor the lion had done the ox and Dame Reynard had been the occasion of trouble and suffering to the king and his court.

When the ox heard the snake accuse him in front of the king, he apologized to the king, in the presence of his court, saying that he was not really guilty of anything, nor could he imagine ever doing anything bad against the king or his court, since the king

had seen fit to honor him. And since he was an animal that kings found good to eat, and the king did not want to eat him, he therefore felt especially obliged to keep and maintain all the king's honor. The ox apologized in all ways, and explained how Dame Reynard had advised him to bellow three times during the night and three times during the day, and then to come to court to do good work for the king.

The ox apologized to the king in such a manner that Dame Reynard was displeased, and in her heart conceived ill will toward the ox. One day it came to pass that it had snowed a great deal and been very cold, and the lion and the other members of the court had nothing to eat and were very hungry. The lion asked Dame Reynard if she could think of anything they could eat. Dame Reynard said she did not know, but she would go talk to the peacock and find out if he smelled any animal nearby that the king and his companions could eat.

When the peacock saw Dame Reynard coming a great dread came over him, for he was very afraid of her. She told him that if the king asked him if he smelled any edible animal nearby he should reply that he smelled no animal the king should eat, but he smelled that the ox's breath stank and that he was sure to die soon of illness. Because he feared Dame Reynard and because the ox ate the grain that the peacock was meant to eat, the peacock acquiesced in the matter of the ox's death, and told the lion what Dame Reynard had instructed him to say.

After the lion had asked the peacock what he could eat and the peacock had replied that he did not know, but that he was sure that according to what one could smell from the ox's foul, rotting breath, he did not have long to live, the lion was eager to eat the ox; but he felt pangs of conscience about killing him, since the king had promised him loyalty, and since the ox had served him for a long time and trusted him.

When Dame Reynard saw the king hesitating about eating the ox, she drew near the king and asked him why he did not eat the ox, since the ox would probably die soon from sickness, according to the peacock, and all the more so since it was God's will that a king satisfy his needs by means of his subjects whenever the occasion called for it.

The lion answered Dame Reynard, saying that for nothing in the world would he break the vow he had made the ox. "My lord," said Dame Reynard, "would you eat the ox if I got him to tell you to eat him and if he released you from the vow you made him?" And the lion told her that he would.

Dame Reynard then went to a crow who was very hungry and said to him: "The lion is very hungry, and I am trying to get him to kill the ox, who is very fat and who will provide food for all of them, considering how large he is. And if the lion says in front of you that he is hungry, you must offer yourself to him, and say that he should eat you. But he won't eat you, for I will make excuses to him, and he never departs from my advice, for he does everything I suggest. And if I offer myself for the king to eat me, you must say that I am not good to heat—that my flesh is unhealthy."

After indoctrinating the crow, Dame Reynard went to the ox and told him that the king wanted to eat him, since the peacock had said that the smell of his breath indicated that he was soon to die. The ox was very afraid and said that what the peasant said to the knight was true.

"And what was it that he said?" asked Dame Reynard; to which the ox replied:

"A rich peasant desired honor, and he married his daughter to a knight who coveted the peasant's wealth. Honor attracted wealth, yet wealth did not have enough power in the peasant to bring him honor; but the knight's honor attracted to itself the peasant's wealth, with the result that the peasant ended up poor and without honor, and the knight rich and honored. The peasant then said to the knight that in friendship between a peasant and a knight lay poverty and suffering for the peasant, and honor for the knight. And in the same way," added the ox, "in friendship between an ox and a lion, lies death for the ox and satiety for the lion."

Dame Reynard, however, reassured the ox that the lion had promised him fidelity and would not betray him; and she advised the ox to offer himself to the lion to eat if it were necessary. The lion would then be grateful to him, and because of his gratitude and indebtedness, he would not harm him. "And what's more, I

will help you and make sure that the lion does you no villainy or wrong."

When Dame Reynard had arranged all these things, she went to the lion with the ox and the crow, and the crow introduced himself to the lion, saying he had heard the lion was hungry, and offering himself to be eaten. Dame Reynard replied and made excuses for the crow, saying that his flesh was not fit for a king to eat. She then said that the king should eat her, since she had nothing else to offer him except her own body; but the crow told the lion that Dame Reynard's flesh was unhealthy to eat.

Then, with similar words, the ox offered himself, saying the lion should eat him, since he was large and fat, and had flesh that was good to eat. So the lion killed the ox, and the king, Dame Reynard, and the crow dined off the ox until they had had their fill.[40]

When the ox was dead, the lion asked the rooster who should be his chamberlain. The rooster wanted to speak first, but Dame Reynard gave him an angry look, which made him think it might be wiser to be quiet until she had spoken. Dame Reynard then spoke to the king saying that the rabbit was a humble beast of pleasant appearance, who would do well in the post once held by the cat and the ox. The lion asked the rooster if he agreed with Dame Reynard's suggestion,[41] and the rooster did not dare oppose Dame Reynard's counsel, since he was very afraid of her; he therefore gave the king the same advice she had given. So the lion made the rabbit chamberlain, and Dame Reynard had great power in the court, for the rooster, the peacock, and the rabbit feared her, and the lion believed everything she said.

One day it came to pass that the king had to attend to an important matter that had taken place in his kingdom, so he took counsel with the rooster and with Dame Reynard. The rooster said that he alone, without the help of others, did not feel up to counseling the king concerning such important affairs, and he advised the king to increase his council, for it did a king no honor

[40] This story is from *Kalila and Dimna* (cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 141, n. 20, and *BAE* 51, pp. 29–30; not cited in Neugaard), except that there it is the crow who sets up the treachery, with a wolf and chacal as companions, and a camel as the animal finally eaten.

[41] This last clause ("if he agreed . . .") is missing in A B, and therefore in Galmés's edition.

to reduce his council, which is what had happened with the disappearance of the snake, the leopard, the lynx, and the wolf. The king thought it a good idea to name more councilors, and indeed would have done so if Dame Reynard had not said:

"In a certain land there lived a man upon whom God had bestowed so much knowledge that he understood everything the beasts and birds said. But God had given this knowledge to this man on one condition—that he not tell a thing he heard and understood the beasts and birds saying to anyone, for the day he did, he would die.

"Now this man had a garden in which an ox drew water from a noria, and a donkey brought the manure needed for the garden. One evening it came to pass that the ox was exhausted,[42] and the donkey told him not to eat his oats that evening, so that the next day he would not be put to work turning the noria, and would be allowed to rest. The ox took the donkey's advice, and that evening did not eat his oats. The gardener thought the ox was ill and put the donkey in his place to turn the noria. All that day the donkey labored hard at the noria. When night came on he went to the stable where he found the ox lying down and resting. The donkey burst out crying in front of the ox and said: 'Our master has decided to sell you to a butcher, since he thinks you are ill; it might therefore be best for you to go back to your job and not look ill if you don't want him to kill you.'

"The donkey said this to the ox so that he himself would not be put back to turning the noria, which was harder work than his usual task of bringing manure. The ox was afraid of dying, and that night he ate his oats and made it appear as if he were cured.

"Now the master of the ox and the donkey understood what they had said to one another, and it caused him to laugh in front of his wife. The wife wanted to know what it was that made him laugh, but he refused to tell her, since he was afraid of dying as a result of explaining that he could understand the beasts and birds. The wife begged her husband over and over again to tell her what he had laughed at, but he still refused to tell her.[43] The wife then

[42] Thus, *hujat*, in some sources, followed by Rosselló and *OE*; others, followed by Galmés, have the less likely *anujat* ("annoyed").

[43] "Since he was afraid of dying . . . refused to tell her" is missing in A and hence in Galmés's edition, but it is in all other sources.

announced that she would not eat or drink, and would even allow herself to die, if he did not tell her. All that day and that night the wicked woman fasted, refusing to eat or drink. The husband, who loved her very much, finally said he would tell her, and he made out his will. After making out his will, he was about to tell her what had made him laugh, when he heard what the dog said to the rooster and what the rooster replied to the dog."

"And what was that?" the lion asked Dame Reynard.

Dame Reynard told the lion that while the man was making out his will, the rooster crowed and the dog reproved him for crowing, since his master was about to die. The rooster was in great wonder at the dog's reproof, but the dog told him how their master was about to die, and even wished to die, so that his wife might live. The rooster replied that it was just as well that he died, since he was a contemptible man who did not know how to control a woman. The rooster then called ten hens, brought them together in one place and did with them whatever he wanted, which he did to console the dog for the death of his master. So they consoled each other over the death of their master, and the rooster crowed and the dog was happy.

"My friend," the dog said to the rooster, "if you had as foolish a wife as my master and it came to pass that she brought you to death's door, as has happened in this case, what would you do?"

The rooster replied that if he was in his master's place, he would cut five rods from the pomegranate tree in his garden, and he would beat his wife until he had broken the rods and made her eat and drink; either that, or he would let her die of hunger and thirst.

After overhearing this conversation between the dog and the rooster, the man got out of bed and did what the rooster suggested; and the wife, after being beaten, ate and drank, and did everything her husband desired.[44]

After Dame Reynard recounted the above example, she said that the rooster was so wise that he could give counsel on any subject, and therefore the king didn't need to increase his council; all the more so since with many councilors there is too great a disparity

[44] This story is from the prologue of *The Thousand and One Nights*; cf. Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 145, n. 22, and Appendix K, p. 172. Stith Thompson T252.2.

of varying purposes, opinions, and desires, which often cause royal councils to be thrown into confusion.

When Dame Reynard had finished speaking, the rooster said; "There was once a parrot sitting in a tree next to a crow, and beneath the tree was a monkey who was putting kindling over a glowworm, thinking it was fire, and blowing on the kindling in the hope that it would burn so he could warm himself. The parrot called out to the monkey, telling him that it was not fire but a glowworm. The crow said he should not try to criticize or instruct someone unwilling to receive advice or correction. The parrot repeated many times to the monkey that what he thought was fire was in fact a glowworm and not fire; and each time the crow reproved him for trying to straighten out something that was naturally crooked. Finally the parrot came down from the tree and approached the monkey to try to make him understand what he was saying; and he came so near that the monkey grabbed him and killed him."[45]

When the rooster had recounted this example, the king got the idea that it was meant to refer to him, and he gave the rooster a savage look, full of ill will. Dame Reynard then took the rooster, killed him, and ate him before the king.

When Dame Reynard was left sole councilor of the king, and the rabbit was royal chamberlain and the peacock doorkeeper, she was completely happy, and did with the king whatever she wanted. And while she was in this happy state, she remembered the treason she had conceived against the king when she had told the elephant that she would see to it that the lion died and that he would be king. Dame Reynard would gladly have remained in her present situation, but she was afraid the elephant might betray her; and she therefore decided to look into the matter of bringing about the death of the king, so as to carry out her part of the bargain with the elephant.

[45] This story is from *Kalila and Dimna* (Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 147, n. 23, and Appendix L, p. 173, as well as *BAE* 51, p. 32; cf. Stith Thompson J1761.3). Llull used it earlier in *Blaquerna*, ch. 52, and later in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 813.

43. DAME REYNARD'S DEATH

IN NOT FORGETTING to look into the matter of the king's death, Dame Reynard did forget the honor the king had done her, setting her above all the other barons of his court. One day Dame Reynard told the elephant that the time had come for the king to die; and all the more so since everything was so well prepared by there being no other councilor in the court besides Dame Reynard herself. The elephant thought about the matter for a long time, and his conscience bothered him for agreeing to the death of the king. On the other hand he was afraid that if he disobeyed Dame Reynard she would denounce him and plot his own death.

At the end his conscience did not allow him to consent to the king's death, and the elephant decided not to go along with Dame Reynard. Furthermore he was afraid that if he became king, Dame Reynard would betray him as she was betraying the present king. So the elephant preferred to be in danger of death rather than betray his natural lord.

While thinking about this, the elephant said to himself that in the same way that Dame Reynard intended to use cunning to have the king killed, he would use cunning to have the king kill Dame Reynard. "For if in Dame Reynard's body there is enough room for treason, guile, and cunning, how much more room," said the elephant, "there must be in my body, which is so large, for loyalty, wisdom, and cunning."

"Sir Elephant," said Dame Reynard, "what are you thinking about? And why are you not anxious to become king before the snake, who is so wise and cunning, returns from his mission?"

It then occurred to the elephant to wait for the snake before doing anything against Dame Reynard, so the snake could help him get the king to kill her. But when Dame Reynard saw that the elephant seemed to be losing interest in her plans, she was afraid of the snake's return and of the elephant denouncing her; and she therefore told the elephant to hurry up, for if he did not,[46] she would take care of matters in ways he had never imagined.

The elephant was very afraid of Dame Reynard's cunning, and so he asked her what position she wanted to have if he became

[46] V and A, followed by the printed sources, omit the "not," making the rest of the sentence, I suppose, a promise instead of a threat.

king. Dame Reynard replied that she wanted to have the same position with respect to him as she had had with the present king, that is to say, sole councilor, with the rabbit as chamberlain and the peacock as doorkeeper. After Dame Reynard had stated the position she wanted to hold with the elephant, he asked her how the king's death would be arranged, and she told him her plan for killing the king, saying:

"Between the boar and the king there is ill will,[47] for the boar thinks himself the equal of the king in presence and in strength. And I will tell the boar to be on guard against the king, who wants to kill him; and I will tell the king to be on guard against the boar, who wants to be king. And when the boar is dead and the king exhausted from his fight with the boar, then you, Sir Elephant," said Dame Reynard, "will easily be able to kill the king and become king yourself."

Following her example, the elephant then decided to deceive Dame Reynard, and he said to her: "A promise without witnesses is worthless, and I therefore think," said the elephant, "that you, Dame Reynard, should have witnesses to the promise you want me to make you: namely, that you be my only councilor, that the rabbit be my chamberlain and the peacock be my doorkeeper. For without witnesses, if I went back on my promise, you could not prove it, and then maybe when I was king I would not feel so obliged to honor you as I do now when I am not king and you are the king's councilor."

Dame Reynard thought a long time about the elephant's suggestion, and she was afraid of the witnesses denouncing her for treason. When the elephant saw that Dame Reynard was worried, he told her that the best witnesses she could have were the rabbit and the peacock, for they were afraid of her and would be delighted to be his officials; and hence there was no cause for fearing that they might betray any of their secrets.

Dame Reynard accepted the elephant's advice, and in the presence of the rabbit and the peacock he made a solemn promise to

[47] Thus in L V S and the French medieval translation. The later correcting hand in A has, "Between the boar and the king I will create discord and ill will," the reading followed by Rosselló and *OE*. B has, "You should know that the boar is very proud." The uncorrected text of A omits the phrase altogether, which was the solution adopted by Galmés.

Dame Reynard, and the rabbit and the peacock promised secrecy to the elephant and Dame Reynard.

Afterwards, the elephant advised Dame Reynard first to tell the boar that the king wanted to kill him, and then to tell the king. Dame Reynard therefore went off to talk first to the boar, and while she was doing so, the elephant spoke to the king, telling him all that he and Dame Reynard had planned to do; and he asked the king to forgive him for the treason he had conceived against him, saying how much he repented, and how he preferred to be a loyal subject than a traitorous king.

"How can I be sure," said the lion, "that you are telling the truth?" The elephant said he could tell by the fact that Dame Reynard had arranged matters so that she was the only animal on his council, and that the rabbit, who feared her by nature, as well as the peacock, were made members of his household. "And I can, my lord king, give you another certain proof, in that Dame Reynard has gone off to the boar to tell him you want to kill him, and she will then come and tell you the same, that is, that the boar wants to kill you, and she will counsel you to treat the boar haughtily, so that the boar will believe what Dame Reynard told him is true."

The elephant then told the king that the rabbit and the peacock had agreed to his death. The king was in great wonder at how Dame Reynard, whom he had honored so much, could conceive such treachery and offense against him, and he said:

"I remember hearing my father tell how my grandfather, who was king of a great country, wanted to humiliate the barons to whom great honor was due, and to exalt the viler beasts, to whom honor was not befitting; and among these beasts was the monkey, to whom he did great honor. Now this monkey, because of his resemblance to man, began wanting to be king, and instead of honor, he planned treason against my grandfather."

"My lord," said the elephant, "not much wine can fit in a small goblet, nor can great honor or great loyalty be present in someone of vile origin; therefore it would be good if you slew Dame Reynard, and had a good council, and were free once again in your own domains, and that you not cause the nobility that God gave you, in your person and your office, to be subjected to a wicked person."

After this, the elephant went to the boar, with whom Dame Reynard had just spoken, saying that he knew what she had told him, and then the elephant proceeded to repeat exactly what she had said to him.[48] The boar wondered how it was the elephant knew it, and the elephant told him the whole story.

While these two were talking, Dame Reynard went to the lion and told him the boar wanted to kill him, and then the lion knew that Dame Reynard was trying to betray him. So he called for a great gathering of barons, among whom were the elephant, the boar,[49] Dame Reynard, along with the rabbit and the peacock. In front of everybody the lion asked the rabbit and the peacock to tell him the truth about the testimony they had promised to bring Dame Reynard after his death. The rabbit and the peacock were very afraid, but even greater was Dame Reynard's fear, and she said to the king:

"My lord king, in order to test your barons to see if they were good and loyal, I told the elephant what I told him, and I said the same to the boar. As for the rabbit and the peacock, I tell you that I never spoke to them about what the elephant said against me." And then Dame Reynard trusted that neither the rabbit nor the peacock, who were so afraid of her, would dare accuse her to the king nor reveal anything.

After Dame Reynard had spoken, the king gave the rabbit and the peacock a terrible look, and he let out a huge roar, so that the nature of his high dominion might have greater power in the conscience of the rabbit and the peacock than their fear of Dame Reynard. After letting out this great roar, he angrily told the rabbit and the peacock to tell him the truth; and they, no longer able to restrain themselves, told the king the truth, whereupon the king killed Dame Reynard with his own hand.[50]

After Dame Reynard was dead, the court returned to its former good estate. The king appointed the elephant, the boar, and other honored barons to his council, and he cast out the rabbit and the peacock.

[48] This last clause (from "and then the elephant . . .") is missing in A and hence in Galmés's edition, but it is in all other sources.

[49] "The boar" is missing in A and hence in Galmés's edition.

[50] Llinarès, *Livre des bêtes*, p. 157, n. 8, draws interesting parallels between the death of the fox here and that of Dimna in *Kalila and Dimna*.

Here ends the *Book of the Beasts*, which Felix brought to a king so that he might learn, from the things done by the beasts, how a king should reign, and how to keep himself from evil counsel and from treacherous men.[51]

[51] Scholars agree that the king in question must have been Philip the Fair of France.

HERE BEGINS THE EIGHTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF MAN[1]

PROLOGUE

FOR A LONG time Felix walked down a road without finding anything to wonder at, until he came to a field, with sheep in a sheepfold,[2] into which a wolf had entered and was killing and devouring the sheep. Near the sheepfold there was a shepherd lying in his hut, not wanting to get up because of the rainy and cold weather. Near where the shepherd was lying his dog was fighting with another wolf and barking loudly so the shepherd would wake up and help him against the wolf with which he was fighting as well as against the other wolf killing the sheep.

Felix was in great wonder at the shepherd's being so lazy and cowardly that he did not help the dog or offer any resistance to the other wolf killing the sheep in his care.[3] This wonder at the shepherd prompted Felix to say:

"God has placed the body under the care and safekeeping of the soul so that mortal sin will not kill it. And because it has been placed in its care, the soul incurs damnation if it does not defend the body. Christ entrusted the care of the world to the pope, the cardinals, and to the prelates of the holy Church. Christians who

[1] Book VIII constitutes an immense treatise on man. As I said in the introduction, since man is at the apex of creation, it is only right that this book should occupy almost three-fifths of the entire novel. It is also almost twice the length of Llull's one separate work on the subject, the *Libre de home*. Much of the same ground is covered in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 103–226, and in the *Doctrina pueril*, chs. 85–93. "Man" also constitutes one of the Nine Subjects of the ternary phase of the Art, for which see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 4. For more detailed references on the constituent parts of man, see ch. 44 below and the notes there.

[2] Thus in MSS A and V (here and at the beginning of the next sentence). The Catalan word *pàrrec* (related to English "park") is so rare (no medieval examples in *DCVB*) that scribes must have thought it was a mistake for *prat* ("meadow"), which is what appears in the other sources and in the printed texts, but which makes little sense in the context.

[3] The text of the MSS is corrupt here (one of the best MSS, V, even has Felix wondering why the shepherd did not help the wolf), but our text is surely what Llull meant.

are near infidels bark so that the pope and holy men may come running to destroy all errors against the holy Christian faith. I feel sorrow and pity for the sheep I see killed by the wolf, as well as for the dog fighting with no one to help him.[4] What a wonder it is that the dog, who lacks the use of reason, understands and carries out the task entrusted to him, whereas you, who are shepherd, do not carry out the task entrusted to you."

These and many other things Felix told the shepherd, who scorned everything Felix told him, and treated Felix like a madman, cursing him and menacing him so arrogantly that Felix feared for his own life.

Felix left very disgusted with the shepherd, and he wondered how it could come to pass that the shepherd had such confused intentions. As a result, Felix wanted to learn about the nature of man and of human existence, in order to be able to understand what causes man to fall into sin or to do good works.

While Felix was thus worrying and wanting to know about what man was, he came upon two men arguing. One of them was called Little-Do-I-Care and the other What-Will-People-Say.[5] Felix greeted Little-Do-I-Care and What-Will-People-Say, but because of how violently they were arguing they did not return his greeting. Felix listened to see if he could find something to wonder at in what they were saying. What-Will-People-Say said to Little-Do-I-Care:

"In the whole world there is nothing as pleasing as honor and a good reputation; for what people work for in this world is to acquire honor, and they enjoy the work they do for the sake of that honor, so that people will praise their acts and deeds. Thus, for the sake of acquiring honor, people have beautiful clothes

[4] As Riquer, *Història* I, 300, says, the image is clear; in addition to which, he says this might constitute an allusion to the Dominicans (the *Domini canes*, "the dogs of the Lord"), and he refers to a fresco (reproduced on the same page) by Andrea da Firenze in Santa Maria Novella in Florence depicting Saint Dominic and Saint Peter Martyr preaching to heretics, accompanied by black and white (the Dominican colors) dogs killing the wolves of heresy.

[5] These same names appear in *Blaquerna*, ch. 92, not as personifications, but as opposing concepts a town crier is asking people to consider. It must be kept in mind that the first has none of the blasé connotations we might attach to the phrase. In *Blaquerna*, in fact, it is defined as "the blame a person scorns because it is contrary to virtue and to the honor of God, as well as to contempt of this world," to which Llull adds that the second category has more people, but the first better.

made, and want to have a fine house, a fine palfrey, fine armor, lots of money, and many servants; and they want to do things on a large scale, and to be generous and hospitable; and for the sake of honor men risk their lives in battles, assaults, and similar things."

Little-Do-I-Care replied, saying: "Honor is befitting to God alone and to nothing else, for only God exists of Himself, and everything else came from nothing and would return to nothing if God did not sustain it. And if anybody has honor, it should be with the intention of honoring God, as with the prelate, prince, or other noblemen of this world, to whom honor is befitting since God has honored them above others, in order that those whom God has most honored should honor God more than do other men."

What-Will-People-Say said to Little-Do-I-Care: "In a certain city there was a very rich burgher who, for the sake of honor, kept a large house and did everything on a big scale. For a long time this burgher maintained great expenses until finally, as a result of them, he became poor and suffered great anguish and sorrow at not being able to keep up his former style of life. While the burgher was in this state of sorrow and grief, the king of that city found out about the burgher's poverty and gave him a castle which had a large income so that the burgher could maintain his former style of life. Everybody in the city was pleased at what the king had done, and praised him for it."

Little-Do-I-Care said to What-Will-People-Say: "In a certain city there was a wealthy burgher who liked to honor God. It came to pass that there was great scarcity and hunger, and the poor went about the streets dying of hunger and crying out for people to give them food for the love of God. This burgher gave everything he could to the poor, and he personally waited on them. The burgher's wife was an arrogant woman, afraid that her husband would be reduced to poverty on account of all the alms he gave; moreover she was ashamed at how her husband humiliated himself by serving the poor. This foolish woman scolded her husband for what he did, and said that if he were reduced to poverty people would scorn him and laugh at him. The distinguished burgher replied to his wife, saying that he did not care if people laughed at him, since God praised him for what he did; for the

true honor of a single man is worth more than the praise of a thousand men."

As they continued on their way, What-Will-People-Say and Little-Do-I-Care continued arguing, and Felix followed them to hear what they said. After a long time the three of them arrived at a city, at the entrance to which What-Will-People-Say put on some red stockings he had brought with him, and he then put on some colored shoes, which task took him a long time since they were very tight. In fact it took him so long that Little-Do-I-Care and Felix[6] grew tired of waiting, and Little-Do-I-Care said that in that city there was no one who knew What-Will-People-Say, and therefore there was no harm in his going without shoes. But What-Will-People-Say said that he was putting on these shoes so that people would not laugh at him. Little-Do-I-Care replied, saying that he did not care if people laughed at him, that it was good to suffer mockery, since one had to suffer it with humility. After putting on his shoes, What-Will-People-Say put on a beautiful tunic he had also brought, and then he went down the streets of that city with great pretense and ostentation.

Now the two sons of two honorable men of that city came upon What-Will-People-Say walking so proudly, and in an act of folly, and because of the ostentation they saw him displaying, they attacked him, insulted him, and took the tunic he was wearing, along with his stockings and shoes; and to Little-Do-I-Care and Felix who were walking modestly they neither did not said anything bad. What-Will-People-Say, however, was very insulted by the villainy the two young men had done him, and he said that if he did not get his revenge, people would gossip and accuse him of cowardice. So, with a knife he had on him, he killed one of the two men, and the other killed What-Will-People-Say. Little-Do-I-Care and Felix were unhappy over the death of What-Will-People-Say, and all the more so since he died through pride and vainglory.[7]

Felix and Little-Do-I-Care then went to stay at an inn run by a poor man, his wife, and three children. The man had once been

[6] Thus in all sources except V and B (followed by Galmès) which, instead of "Felix," have "What-Will-People-Say," and which clearly seems to be a mistake. The red stockings What-Will-People-Say was putting on were a sign of nobility.

[7] Cf. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 76.

very honored and rich, but now he was very poor, dying of hunger along with his wife and children; for he was ashamed of his poverty and did not want to beg for the love of God, and risk having people realize how poor he was.

When Little-Do-I-Care saw his host's conduct, he said: "In a certain city there were two knights who accompanied the prince of that city. In the course of a banquet the prince gave one of the knights a horse, and he gave the other clothes just like his own and invited him to eat at his table." Little-Do-I-Care recounted this example to his host so that he should remember how Jesus Christ chose to be poor in this world, and how he gathered around him all those who were poor for the love of Him, or were patient in their poverty.

The next morning Little-Do-I-Care went to a prelate who had many people beneath him, telling him that he should serve God with all his person and with all the power he had over those beneath him, for since his purpose as both man and prelate was to serve God, he was therefore obliged, as man and prelate, to make God known and served; and if he did not, he would be acting against the totality of his power, both of his humanity and of his prelateship. But the prelate answered foolishly, saying that people would laugh at him if he did what Little-Do-I-Care suggested. Little-Do-I-Care replied that it seemed as if What-Will-People-Say were still alive, and he did not care how much the prelate disdained him.

Felix was very pleased at how Little-Do-I-Care had taken on the task of going about the world praising and blessing God, and advising people to do good works in loving and knowing God, and at how he paid no attention when he was subjected to hunger, thirst, heat, cold, illness, hardship, poverty, or when people attacked or dishonored him. Felix asked Little-Do-I-Care how he could have such patience in undergoing the torment he suffered, and in belittling all the hardship and shame he suffered as a result of what others did and said.

Little-Do-I-Care said to Felix: "It is in the nature of matter,[8] that the more it suffers, the more it finds its fulfillment. And thus

[8] Thus, *natura és de matèria*, in L V S; A B (followed by the printed sources) have *manera* ("manner") for the last word, which would give a phrase translatable as "Nature is such," or "Nature is so constituted." A later hand in A (followed by Rosselló and *OE*), however, added two words, giving *natura humana és de aytal manera*, "Human nature is such," which is certainly a *lectio facilior*.

when a man's will becomes passive and desires God's will to be active over it, then human will finds its fulfillment, which fulfillment gives man greater happiness and satisfaction the more he suffers for the honor of God."

Felix recalled the foolhardy will of the shepherd in letting the wolf kill the sheep in his care, and he also recalled the foolish will of What-Will-People-Say. He therefore said to Little-Do-I-Care: "Sir, by nature of what, or by virtue of what, could you explain the shepherd's wrong in letting the wolf kill the sheep his master had entrusted to his care, paying him well to keep good watch over them? Or how could you explain the circumstances that made What-Will-People-Say so proud, vainglorious, and eager to be honored in this world? Or how could you explain the basis for your great boldness in praising God and in having such patience in the face of the hardships you suffer.?"

"My fine friend," Little-Do-I-Care said to Felix, "in the chapel of a hermitage on a high mountain near here there lives a holy man who went there to do penance and to meditate on the human condition. Now, when I first wanted to take on this task, I went to him so he could teach me about man's condition, that is to say, about why man was created, what he is, how he is constituted by nature, and how he makes use of virtues and vices. This holy hermit gives advice as to how to love and know God, and how to love oneself and one's neighbor; and he explains why man was created, and why he knows how to exercise virtue and counteract vice."

Felix was very pleased with what Little-Do-I-Care told him. He then took leave of him and went to the holy hermit so that he would explain to him about man's being and condition, what he is, the reason for his existence, and the purpose for which man was created.

Felix walked all that day until he finally arrived at the place where the holy hermit was meditating upon God. Felix greeted the holy man, who returned his greeting in a friendly fashion.

"Sir," said Felix, "for a long time now I have wanted to know what man is, how he is constituted by nature, and for what purpose God created him. For sinful man has so many failings that I would very much like to know why man was created, and about man's condition, so that I may know the sinner from the just man,

and so that, as a result of this knowledge, I may know myself, and above all, God, and also my fellow man."

The holy man was very pleased with Felix's good intentions, and said that he had studied and investigated human existence for a long time in order to know God and himself, and in order to know man. And first of all he decided to explain to Felix what man was.

44. WHAT IS MAN?

THE HOLY hermit then explained to Felix that man is a being which unites soul and body, a being in which there is vegetation, sensuality, imagination, reason, and movement.[9] Through vegetation man has position[10] and is composed of four elements, by which he has length, depth, and breadth, and has a head, eyes, a nose, arms, hands, and all his other members. Through the sensitive power man feels inclination and appetite; he feels heat, humidity, cold, and dryness; he wants to eat, drink, and dress; he is healthy or sick; he is fat or thin; and similarly for other such things.

[9] This fivefold division of Man is common to the pre-Art and quaternary phases of Llull's thought. See for instance the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 40–4 and 293.2 (in the *OE* edition note the erratum for p. 182); the *Principles of Philosophy*, *MOG* I, 694–5 = Int. x, 28–9; the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 85; and the index of the *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, *MOG* IV, 221–3 = Int. iii, 207–9. In the ternary phase of the Art, the "elementative," already implicit in the "vegetative" (see the following sentence and the second paragraph here), is given a separate status, and "movement" is dropped. We have:

Early Version	*Later Version*	
Vegetative	Elementative Vegetative	Body
Sensitive	Sensitive	
Imaginative	Imaginative	
Reason	Reason	Soul
Movement		

For this later version, see the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 616–17, along with Cruz Hernández's schematization in his *Pensamiento de Ramon Llull* (Madrid, 1977), p. 131, the *Libre de home*, the end of the Prologue, and the beginning of Part I, as well as the *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subjs. 4–8, and n. 11 there for references to le Myésier's charts of Man and the commentaries on same by Hillgarth and Pring-Mill. Most of this scheme was standard in scholastic philosophy, which taught that plants, in addition to being composed of elements, had a vegetative power or virtue (*virtus vegetativa*) or a vegetative soul (*anima vegetativa*); animals had this plus a sensitive power or soul; and humans have all of these plus an intellective or rational soul (see F. C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, London, 1972, p. 187, and *OED*, s. v. sensitive.

[10] The Aristotelian category; cf. *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 22.

"My dear friend," said the hermit, "insofar as man is vegetated, he is elemented,[11] with one element being present in another, entering and moving in that other element, like the fire that enters into the air, the air into water, water into the earth and earth into fire; as well as fire into water and earth,[12] air into earth and fire, water into fire and air, and earth into air and water. This circle,[13] fair son, is continually active in man's body, inside and outside it: outside appears the image of the entire body, and inside the body is the human form and human matter.

"The form of man is made up of the four forms of the elements, because man is one bodily form that is the multiplication of the four elemental forms. Beneath this form lies a common matter composed of the four matters of the elements, of which matter and of which form man's body is elemented.[14]

"The form and matter constitute a single body in which exists sensuality, by which man has five senses, which are sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. This sensuality is called the sensitive form, whose subject is the body that is vegetated, sensed, imagined, ratiocinated, and moved to be a human body.

"Through sight man sees colors and figures exterior to the substance of the body; through hearing man hears sound, noise, voice, and word; through smell man smells flowers, ambergris, and musk,[15] and he smells good and bad odors; through taste man perceives sweet and bitter, and he savors what he eats and drinks; through touch man perceives what is heavy and light, hard and soft, hot and cold, and he feels health and sickness, as well as the sense of touch itself and other similar things.[16]

"Through the imagination man imagines the objects of perception; and when a man is not in the presence of things perceived with the five bodily senses, the imagination retains them and rep-

[11] "Vegetated" is the Lullian term for something possessing vegetative power or virtue. For "elemented," see *Ars demonstrativa, Dist.* II, n. 53.

[12] MS A (followed by Galmés) adds "and [into] air."

[13] See the circle of elements in Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*.

[14] Note that under the first of the five divisions of man, Llull in fact discusses here man's elemental nature. For the vegetative power as such, see n. 20 below.

[15] The combination of "flowers, ambergris, and musk" was obviously a convention in discussing odors. Cf. the beginning of ch. 58 below, as well as *Gentile*, Bk. IV, Art. 12 under "Smell."

[16] The five senses are discussed individually in chs. 56–60 below. For the sixth sense Llull later added, see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 6.

resents them to him in that same disposition[17] in which he saw, heard, tasted, smelled, or felt them. By means of imagination man imagines the disposition of physical works, as in writing, painting, building castles, palaces, ships, and other things of that sort. This imagination is called the imaginative form or power, and it is the capacity to imagine. And just as the sensitive power has a single capacity in itself, and yet is diversified by the five bodily senses, similarly this imaginative power is a single essence that is diversified in the five bodily senses, retaining their disposition, its working having different influences depending on what the sensitive power has taken in sensually.

"Through reason man has a rational soul, one that is created anew when it is joined to the body; as opposed to the vegetative, sensitive, and imaginative powers, which are engendered by a man's father and mother. This reason consists of three things, namely, memory, understanding, and will, and all together they make a single soul, which is rational. By means of memory man recalls past events, by means of understanding man has knowledge, and by means of will man is inclined to like or dislike things.[18]

"By movement in man is meant the motive power, that is, the conjoint movement of vegetation, sensuality, imagination, and rationality.[19] Man's reason is a better and nobler form than all the others, and it dominates the movement of the others; and by its movement and capacity all the others are made to move. And this is why it is said that the soul is a form for the body, and dominates everything that is in man through vegetation, sensuality, and imagination. Reason moves the imagination to imagine, the sensitive power to feel, and the vegetative power to vegetate. And beneath reason, that is to say, the intellective soul, the sensitive moves the vegetative, and the imaginative the sensitive; and beneath reason the appetitive moves the digestive, the retentive, and

[17] MS A, followed by the printed sources, adds "of bodily activity." For Llull's concept of imagination, see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 5 and n. 9.

[18] For the rational soul and its three powers, see chs. 53–5 and n. 46 below.

[19] For "movement" or "motion," see *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 25, and *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 92.

the expulsive,[20] and the digestive does the same thing, as well as the others, that the appetitive does.

"Dear son, from all these things we have discussed, that is, from the forms and matters, which in man are many and diverse, there follows a single form called human form, which is the result of the composition and union of many forms, and a human matter, composed of many matters. And human form and human matter are the essence of man, and man is a being composed of the joining of human form and matter. And these things, fair son, which I have explained and revealed to you, constitute man."

Felix was very pleased with what he had learned about man's nature from the holy hermit's words, and for a long time he was lost in thought, without saying a thing.[21] "Fair friend," the holy hermit said to Felix, "why are you so thoughtful?"

"Sir," Said Felix, "I am in great wonder at how the shepherd, being a man, could be so negligent as not to help the sheep entrusted to his care against the wolf devouring them in his presence, if it is true that man has been created with so noble a nature; and I also wonder how the dog fighting the other wolf had a better understanding of his purpose as a dog than the shepherd, who is a man, had of his purpose as man and shepherd, since he did not want to get out of his hut for fear of the rain and cold."

When the holy man heard Felix talking this way, he understood what caused Felix's wonder, and why he was speaking this way, and he recalled things he had often recalled in the past. He then became sad of heart, and he wept copiously, saying: "Dear son, if in God there were anything bad (pride, ignorance, injustice, or any other defect) it would be greater than anything in the world, nor is the entire world as great in goodness or perfection as this would be in evil and imperfection. And because it is fitting that in God there be greater good and greater perfection of all things than in anything else, therefore all the lesser evil and imperfection existing in the world would, in Him, be greater evil and greater imperfection than in any other thing."

[20] Thus in all sources except A (followed by Galmés), which has "and the retentive [moves] the expulsive." Here are presented the four vegetative faculties (cf. ch. 49 below) that one would have expected to find in the section corresponding to n. 14 above.

[21] Thus (literally "without saying a word to the holy hermit") in L V; A B S, followed by the printed sources, have, "without the holy hermit saying a word to him."

Felix understood what the holy man meant, and he too wept copiously, saying to God: "Ah, Lord God! When will the time come that You will be loved and known by the whole world? And when will You have advocates[22] who with all their might make You known and loved by those who have no love for You, nor any knowledge of You?"

45. WHAT MAN IS MADE OF

After weeping for a long time, Felix asked the holy hermit what man was made of. And the holy hermit replied that man is made of all those things recounted in the previous chapter. "Son," said the holy man, "a philosopher was asked by a student of his what the sun was made of. The philosopher replied that the sun is a compound or combination of active and passive light, and the rays it pours forth, with which it illuminates the moon and the air, are the result of the action of active light on passive light.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "the grain of wheat that beneath the earth engenders other grains, gives its essence and being to the grains it engenders, giving them its form and matter, its quantity, quality, state, position, relation, action, and passion,[23] that is, its own likeness, and it does so in such a way that the grains it engenders come from the grain that dies in the earth, and they come from that which that grain converts into its own nature, taking from the earth and the other elements form and matter, along with quantity, quality, and all the other accidents. And everything it takes from them it converts into its own species and into its own nature, then giving it to the grains it engenders in such profusion on the stalk.

"Bread, wine, meat, and all the other things a man eats are converted in the stomach into blood, and from blood[24] into flesh, bones, marrow, sinew, hair, and all the other components of the human body. And this human body transmits its own likeness

[22] *Procuradors* in the original; cf. Bk. V, n. 5 above.

[23] "Form" and "matter" are the components of "substance," the first of the Aristotelian categories. For this and the remaining nine, or "accidents" (we have only seven here, because "time" and "place" do not apply in this case), see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 19, and *Ars brevis*, Part X, n. 14.

[24] The "from blood" is missing in A and hence in Galmés, thus leaving out a step in the chain of bodily processes.

when a man engenders another man. In this way the son takes form and matter, quantity, and the other accidents from the father's being; and he takes the same from his mother. The specific being of the father and mother, however, remains; and the son's being is engendered from what the father and mother convert into their species, likeness, and nature as a result of eating, drinking, smelling, and touching.

"Son, after God created the world, formed Adam out of the mud of the earth,[25] and made Eve from Adam's rib, Adam had children who came from his seed, and from what he ate and drank and converted into his own nature, transubstantiating what he ate and drank into his species; and from this matter and from and these accidents that were transformed into the bodily essence and being of Adam, he engendered children in Eve. And thus by descent and continuation, man is what he bodily converts into himself and then gives to another, engendering another man."

"Sir," said Felix, "what was our Lord Jesus Christ's humanity made of?" The hermit replied, saying that Christ's human, bodily nature came from the bodily, human nature of our Lady. For just as God formed Adam supernaturally from the mud of the earth, so God supernaturally formed and made Christ's body within our Lady, and from the flesh of our Lady, creating Christ's soul in it, so that Christ's human nature was at the same time of a bodily and spiritual nature."

Felix was very pleased to learn what man was made of, and he was even happier when he reflected that he was of the same human nature as Christ. But when he considered how Christ was not loved and known throughout the whole world, and indeed how there were many more people who did not love, know, or honor Him, even though they were of His same human nature, than there were who did know and love Him, then Felix became sad, and wondered what fault Christ had committed so that, having been man and having been crucified for man's sake, He should be so little loved, known, and honored by mankind.

For a long time Felix wept over this thought, and he bemoaned the fact that Christ, who had done man no wrong, should be so

[25] The Catalan *del lim de la terra* is a direct translation of the Vulgate "de limo terrae"; the King James version has "of the dust of the ground."

little prized by man. After weeping this way for a long time, Felix asked the hermit why man exists.

46. WHY MAN EXISTS

"Dear son," the holy hermit said to Felix, "God is memorable, intelligible, and lovable, as well as honorable and fearful, and there are many other qualities befitting his high honor and dominion. And in order to be remembered, known, loved, honored and feared, obeyed and served, He created man, who exists for the sake of recalling, understanding, and loving, as well as honoring and serving God.[26]

"Dear son, what I have just told you is the principal reason for man's existence. But beneath this one, there is another reason for man's existence, which is so that he may have glory in Paradise recalling, knowing, and loving God perpetually without end.

"Following this one, son," said the hermit, "there is yet another reason for man's existence, which is man's role in nature, that is to say, one man engendering another, as we have already explained."

"Sir," said Felix, "if the principal reason for man's existence is to remember, know, and love God, then why is it and how has it come to be that God is so little remembered, known, and loved in this world? And why are the vanities of this world better remembered, understood, and loved than God?"

"Dear son," said the hermit, "in a certain city there was an eminent burgher who was very rich and honored. This burgher was handsome of person and in all ways led an upright life; and he had a very beautiful wife whom he loved and honored. Now in this burgher's house a peasant came to work, and he was given the job of cleaning the manure out of the stable. The burgher's wife committed dishonest acts with this peasant, whom she loved more than her own husband.

"Ah, my son!" said the hermit, "what a grievous thing it is to transgress against and to turn aside from the purpose for which

[26] Both M. Obrador y Bennassar, *Doctrines sociològiques lulianes* (Palma, 1905), p. 11, and Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 136, emphasize the importance of this passage in Llull's doctrine of man. See also introduction, text at nn 10–11, as well as the passages corresponding to Bk. I, n. 30, and Bk. V, n. 1 above.

man exists! For this turning aside from the purpose for which man exists must needs be the occasion for everlasting pain and suffering, since it is contrary to God's infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and justice."

Felix was in great wonder at what the hermit said, and he did not understand the point of the anecdote until the hermit said: "Natural heat gives man the opportunity to live. Therefore, when a man dies, the unnatural heat must be greater than the natural, for if it were not, man would not die of sickness caused by unnatural heat."

Felix understood what the hermit meant by the above, but he wondered greatly how a simple misdeed could turn someone from the purpose for which he was created, since God was mightier in perfection than anything else in imperfection.

The hermit saw what caused Felix's wonder, and said that the just man continues in the purpose for which he was created, which is to remember, understand, and love God forever in glory; whereas the sinner turns away, through sin, from the purpose for which he was created. But his turning away does not cause God to lose His rights over him; rather, the purpose for which God created man continues, that is to say, in just men and in angels, and in the exercise of His justice, by making sinners suffer in Hell, God is remembered, understood, and loved through justice, or through mercy when He forgives sinners who repent and beg God's forgiveness in this world.

"Sir," said Felix, "why did God make man so that he could sin?" The hermit replied, saying that if God had made man in such a way that he could remember, understand, and love God, and could not forget, be ignorant of, or not love God, then man's purpose would be the result of God's goodness and not of His justice, and God's goodness and justice would be contrary in greatness, which contrariness is impossible. But since the just man can sin but does not wish to sin, goodness and justice accord in him, for he does good when he remembers, understands, and loves God, and does not wish to forget, be ignorant of and not love God. And when he does the contrary, he does wrong and acts against goodness, which is why justice punishes him; and this punishment is good, since the unjust man acts against justice and goodness.

"Sir," said Felix, "since one can neither see, hear, smell, nor feel God, why did he create eyes to see, ears to hear, or hands to touch, and similarly with the other sense organs? For it would be enough for God to create the soul, since it can remember, understand, and love."

"Dear son," said the hermit, "in God there is goodness, greatness, eternity, power, and many other virtues, and in order for the semblances of these virtues to be seen, heard and touched, He gave man eyes, nose, hands, ears, and mouth, and he made him able to perceive so that he could see how the world was good, large, enduring, with power and many other things bearing some similarity to God's virtues, in order to show His semblance, so that man may better remember, know and love Him, and so that a person may have virtues and avoid vices, and so that God may, by right, give him greater glory."

47. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF MAN'S LIFE?

"Sir," said Felix, "what is the purpose of man's life in this world?"

The hermit replied, saying, "Man lives in this world so that, by living, he may remember, understand and love God; and man lives in this world so that he may live in the next world in everlasting glory. Son," said the hermit, "the rational soul is one with a man's life, for what is rational soul, is life;[27] that is to say, that memory, understanding, and will are of the nature of spiritual life, and their life is a being that is the soul, similar to the sun's being, which is to shine with the form and matter of light.

"A man's physical life consists of the union of the elements composing his body, as you have already had explained; and this life is called the vegetative life, which is lived by virtue of the vegetative power. The body lives to eat, drink, breathe, feel heat and cold, and other similar things. For heat, in warming the body, consumes moisture, cold, and dryness; and cold does the same in consuming heat; and moisture and dryness act similarly. And this

[27] Cf. Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 119. For a comment on all of ch. 47, see p. 293 of the same work.

is why man wants to eat and drink—in order to achieve a temperament of humors, qualities, and complexions,[28] without which temperament a man could not live. This vegetative power lives by itself, and it also lives by the sensitive power, which has sensual life through sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch. Now a man can live without sight, hearing, or smell, but no man could live without feeling or taste.

"Both the body and the sensitive power live by virtue of the rational soul, for the soul is so potent in its effect upon life, that it gives life to everything vegetated or sensed in man. And by the power of the rational soul the food man eats and drinks is transformed in vegetating and sensing life, just as the bread, wine, and meat a man eats are transformed into blood and into living, vegetating, and sensing flesh.

"Dear son, man is a structure composed of physical and spiritual life, and the function of physical and spiritual life is living. And death is the contrary of life, that is to say, that man dies through the disordering of the structure, and by the separation of the soul from the body, which cannot exist without the soul to give it life."

"Sir," said Felix, "why do men want to live a long time in this world?"

The hermit replied that, in every realm, each being naturally loves itself, and hates nonbeing. And since living accords with being and dying with nonbeing, that is why men want to live a long time, and hate dying.

"Since the soul gives life to the body, and the body takes on life from the soul, therefore the soul wants to live in the body, and the body wants to live with the soul. This is why man dislikes dying and wants to be a living man. And when he is dead, he is no longer a man; there only remains the soul, which is only part of the man, and the body turns to dust; and he remains a nonman until the day of resurrection, when the soul will return to his body and together they will constitute the same man they were before.

[28] The "humors" were the four chief body fluids—blood, phlegm, choler, and melancholy. They corresponded to the four elemental "qualities" (cf. Bk. III, n. 4 above)—moisture, cold, heat, and dryness, respectively (for this correspondence, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, n. 4, and the root of the tree in the *Principles of Medicine*). The "complexions" were combinations of qualities (or humors) that gave a thing (or a person) its specific nature (or character).

"Man exists to remember, understand, and love God; and since God is worthy of being very much remembered, understood, and loved, by reason of being great in goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and perfection, therefore man by nature desires to live, so that he can very much remember, understand, and love God. But since through sin man has turned aside from the purpose for which he has created, therefore the sinner wants to live a long time, in order to have pleasures in this world and to put off infernal punishment; and the just man wants to live a long time so that he can greatly serve God and have great glory in Paradise.

"In a certain city there was a bishop who had been a man of upright life before becoming bishop; but upon being made bishop he became unprincipled and wanted only to live a long time. One day it happened that he presided over the service for a burgher of high position who had died in that city. When the bishop saw the burgher being buried, he suddenly had a feeling of horror at seeing the earth thrown over him. The bishop then gave a great deal of thought as to why a person felt greater horror at being near a dead man than at being near any other dead thing; and he thought about the matter so long that he finally understood the reason, which was that a person feels greater abhorrence at the failure of something similar to himself in kind than of anything else, independently of the greatness of the failure.

"When the bishop had thought this over for a long time, he remembered the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he resembled by his own nature, and he remembered that he was a sinner who had acted contrary to the position in which he had been placed for the purpose of honoring Jesus Christ. And he then understood that he was very displeasing to Jesus Christ, since the closer he was to Him in nature and in priestly position and yet sinned, the more hateful he was to Jesus Christ. The bishop thought this matter over so long that he recognized his own wrong, and he very much repented of his sins, and desired to live a long time in order to do penance."

48. WHY MAN WANTS CHILDREN

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "why does man want to have children, when the world has more men in a state of damnation than in a state of salvation?"

"Dear son," said the hermit, "everything naturally loves its own likeness, and this nature it gets from God, for God, loving Himself, loves His likeness, and this is why God the Father, loving Himself, engenders the Son, who resembles Him in being God, as well as in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will.

"Loving His own likeness, God gives this likeness to creatures;[29] or in other words, insofar as creatures are good, great, enduring, powerful, noble, they bear a certain likeness to the goodness, greatness, and virtues of God. Therefore, because of God's love of likeness, He created the world, to which He gave some likeness of Himself, and this is why man is the son of God by creation.

"Dear son, for the reason I am explaining, a man wants to have children, so that his likeness may be enduring; in which likeness may be represented God's goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom. But since the sinner is corrupted by sin, and since his desires run counter to the purpose for which he was created, he therefore wants to have children because of a nature dissimilar to God's, and he wants children for a cause contrary to that for which he should want to have them, and this is why he teaches his son how to adopt the vanities of this world.

"In a certain city a man had a son to whom, when he died, he left everything he had, and whom, while still living, he held in great honor. The day he died, when the son beheld his father dead before him, and was waiting for the priests and notables to go and bury his father, he waited to see if a certain woman he loved very much would come; and when he did not see her, he was more upset over that fact than over the death of his father. Moreover, he took pleasure in his father's death, for he inherited his wealth."

Felix was in great wonder at what the hermit had told him, and he asked him what could be the explanation of such things. The hermit replied with the following words:

"It once happened that a usurer made out his will, and not wanting to right his wrongs, he left everything he had to a son he loved very much, which son took great pleasure in his father's

[29] A B, followed by the printed sources, instead of "Loving His . . . to creatures," have just, "God loves His likeness in creatures."

death. The usurer's son lived a long time, and one day he happened to remember how his father had been a usurer and had left him everything he had, and how he had felt great pleasure at his father's death. This man thought the matter over for a long time, and he was in great wonder at his father for having preferred going to Hell rather than disinheriting his son; and he wondered at himself for having felt pleasure over the death of his father, who loved him so much.[30] He thought the matter over for so long that he finally realized that to the degree that his father loved him foolishly, God had punished him by making his son not love him, and value what he left him more than his father's life or salvation."

Felix felt satisfied with the hermit's reply to his question, and he understood that just as men want children for the wrong reasons, contrary to the intentions for which they should want them, so God punishes them in the love of their children, who love what they inherit from their father more than the salvation or the life of their father.

After thinking the matter over for a long time, Felix asked the hermit why it is that a mother prefers to have a son than a daughter, since a daughter bears more resemblance to her than a son.

"Son," said the hermit, "in the reason why a woman prefers to have a son rather than a daughter is reflected the reason why people want to have children: that is to say, since God likes to demonstrate and reflect His strength and His semblance more strongly in the nobler rather than in the less noble creature, thus He wants a woman naturally to prefer a son to a daughter, since a man is a nobler, stronger, and wiser creature than a woman. And insofar as a man is a nobler creature than a woman, so a woman should prefer to have a son than a daughter, so that from herself should come a son who would bear more resemblance to God than would a daughter."

49. WHY MAN IS HEALTHY AND SICK[31]

FELIX ASKED the hermit the reason for man's being healthy or sick. The hermit replied that the vegetative power has four faculties: appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive.[32]

[30] Galmés, with only two MSS at his disposal, had the equivalent of "whom he loved," thereby reversing the point of the story.

[31] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Mode 16 and n. 46.

[32] Cf. n. 20 above.

"As a result of the appetitive power, men have a desire to eat, drink, to warm themselves, cool themselves, to wake, or to sleep. Now when it happens that the appetitive faculty asks for things the body needs and avoids things the body does not need, and when it gets those things it asks for, then a person has bodily health, and eats and drinks, dresses, wakes, and sleeps temperately, moving in such a way while walking or working that there is no interference with natural movement. And if a man does the opposite, then he falls into bodily illness.

"The retentive power is given the task of retaining the food one takes in until the digestive faculty has had time to digest it and distribute it throughout the various members of the body. Afterwards the retentive must give full powers to the expulsive faculty to expel the gross matter not needed for the nutriment of the body. And if the expulsive faculty expells this excess, the body is healthy; and if the retentive faculty retains more than it should, then sickness is engendered in the body.

"When the digestive faculty digests the food a person eats in such a way that natural heat can counteract unnatural heat, then a person is in good health, and for this reason one should examine[33] the digestive power more carefully than any of the others. For if the appetitive faculty asks for more or less than the digestive faculty can assimilate, and if the retentive faculty retains more or less, and similarly with the expulsive, than the digestive faculty can deal with, then the body becomes sick.

"The way a person can know if his digestive faculty is in good condition is frequently to give thought to his own state: whether he feels light or heavy, sad or happy, or whether his expulsive faculty is working well, or which foods are easiest to digest. A person should likewise examine his own sleeping and dreaming,[34] and similarly with other things. All these things are therefore signs by which one can arrive at an understanding of the digestive faculty.

[33] Thus, *temptar* (cf. DCVB, s.v.), in most MSS. Only A (where it seems to be the result of a later correction) has *temprar* ("temper"), the solution followed by the printed sources.

[34] Thus in A B, followed by Galmés; the later hand correcting A, followed by the remainder of the printed texts, has "waking"; L V S have "eating." For the previous "examine," same remarks as in the preceding note; in view of the following sentence, "temper" would make little sense here.

"In the expulsive faculty there are many signs signifying health or sickness, that is, according to the form and color[35] of what is expelled by the expulsive faculty; for if the form is compact, this signifies good digestion, and if it is loose, this signifies indigestion; and the color is in accordance with the food a person has eaten. And the same is true of sweat or spittle, and secretions from the nose, eyes, and ears, and of other medical signs.

"By all these things, and many others, a man has knowledge of health and sickness; and health is the result of temperance, ordering and balance of the appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive faculties; and it is the result of similar qualities, foods, humors, and complexions, according as the body is of a hot, moist, cold, or dry complexion. And sickness is the result of the contrary of these things.

"There was once a prior of an important church who was a lustful man. This prior, while blessing the body of Jesus Christ, felt sadness enter his soul. And when he had finished saying Mass, he was sadder than before he had started it. The prior wondered what this sadness could refer to, for he did not know what occasioned it. One day it came to pass that after saying mass he felt particularly sad and annoyed with himself. While the prior was in this state of sadness, a doctor happened to come for confession, and specifically to confess the sin of lust, of which sin the doctor was very repentant. When the prior had confessed the doctor and had absolved him, he felt even sadder and angrier than before, and he was in great wonder at his own distress.

"The prior asked the doctor if he could tell him what was causing him to be in such sorrow after saying mass and confessing him. The doctor replied, saying: 'A king had two sons, one of which was always sad while the other was happy. The king was in great wonder at the different dispositions of his sons. A doctor appeared at the king's court, and the king asked him why it was that one of his sons was always happy and the other always sad. The doctor had both children eat in the presence of the king and himself, and he saw that the happy child ate and drank in a tempered fashion, and chewed well what he ate, and when he drank,

[35] Here and in the next appearance of "color" further on in the sentence, L and S, instead of *color*, have *calor* ("heat"). Both are possible, but the first is more likely; cf., for instance, the discussion of the color of urine in the *Principles of Medicine*, Dist. VIII.

did so little by little and slowly; whereas the other child, who was always sad, ate a great deal and did not chew his food properly, and he drank too fast and too much; and this was why he was sad, since his digestive faculty could not assimilate the food, making him feel sad and woeful.

"'After the doctor had explained to the king why his son was sad, two men accused of murder[36] were brought before the king; one of them, the guilty one, was ashamed, fearful, pale, and unable to speak before the king; the other one, who was not guilty, was cheerful and spoke out confidently and rationally before the king. By the behavior of the two men the king knew which of them was guilty and which innocent.'"

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am in great wonder how the prior, who was spiritually so sick, could cure the doctor who confessed to him."

The hermit replied: "The health the doctor received from the prior came from the power God gives a man of priestly condition; and this power is so great that the sickness the prior had through lust could not corrupt or destroy it." Felix was very pleased with what the hermit had told him; but he was saddened and amazed at how a man given such exalted Godlike power can be in sin of lust or in any other sin.

50. WHY MAN GROWS OLD

"SIR HERMIT," said Felix, "what is it that makes man grow old?" The hermit replied, saying that a student put the same question to his teacher, who showed the student a mill channel that had grown old and worn by the passage of water.

"Dear friend," said the hermit,[37] "man's body is a receptacle in which the elements constantly pass in and out of one another; and in man's body one thing is transformed into another, such as the bread, wine, water, and other food a man eats, which is transformed into the blood and flesh of man; and by the resistance of

[36] "Accused of murder" is missing in A B, and hence in Galmés's text, but it is in all other sources.

[37] Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, pp. 67–9, cites the passage that follows as the simplest and briefest of Llull's explanations as to the role of the elements in the composition of the human body and in its subsequent decay.

one thing to another is brought about the corruption by which man develops an inclination towards old age.

"Within man's body, fire enters air, and passing through the air, heats water, which water offers resistance to the fire and puts it in earth; and thus fire is mortified[38] in passing through air, water, and earth. And the same happens with the other elements passing through one another, mortifying each other; and it is by this mortification that man grows old, and becomes indolent, weak, and sluggish.

"The occasion for man's growing old is provided by the vegetative power, whose four faculties become tired through the movement of the motive power; for the appetitive faculty grows tired of asking and desiring; the retentive of retaining; the digestive of assimilating and decomposing; and the expulsive faculty grows tired of getting rid of what is not necessary for the nourishment of the body. And as a result of this tiredness comes old age, listlessness, and lack of strength in man, which is observable in his walking, standing, eating, drinking, working, speaking, begetting, and in other similar things."

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that some men grow old before others?" The hermit replied that there was once a muleteer who had two donkeys. On one he used to put large loads and on the other light ones; and he would make the one with the heavy load walk fast and the one with the light load walk slowly. And this was why the donkey carrying the heavy loads grew old quicker than the one who carried light ones.

"The reason why Christians age faster and die sooner than Saracens is because Saracens eat more sweet things, which are hot and moist, than do Christians; and with the water they drink they increase the moisture by which radical humidity[39] endures;

[38] Cf. Bk. IV, n. 5 above.

[39] Radical humidity, humor, or moisture was, in medieval philosophy, the vital humor to which was attributed the conservation of animal life. Cf. the *Liber Chaos, MOG* III, 290–2 = Int. v, 42–4, as well as M. Pereira in *EL* 23 (1979), 27. Concerning the dietary basis for Moslem longevity, A. Domínguez Ortiz, "Notas para una sociología de los moriscos españoles," *Miscelánea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicas* 11 (Granada, 1962), 50, says that whereas the Christian diet was based on the classic trilogy of wheat, meat, and wine, the Moorish diet was "rich in sweet fruits, vegetable fats and vitamins, as recommended by present-day medicine. And the very people [i.e. the Christians] who laughed at this poor fare, had to admit that many of them [the Moors] lived to eighty or even a hundred years of age, while Christians suffered attacks of gout, grew old and died prematurely, victims of their alimentary excesses."

whereas Christians, who drink wine, which is hot and dry, increase their heat and consume their moisture."

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that Saracens have more discernment the older they get, and Christians less?" The hermit said that wine, which is evaporative, along with the greater amount of food Christians eat, is the agency for the destruction[40] of the brain, which is the seat of understanding; whereas water, which is cold and moist, acts as a tempering of the brain, as well as of the ascending and descending[41] vapors, for by this moisture they rise up to the moisture of the brain, and by the cold they descend from it, since the moisture is light and the cold heavy, on account of the subject in which they are; and since the brain is cold and moist, it can be more tempered by similar than by dissimilar vapors.

"For conserving one's youth, a loose garment is better than a tight-fitting one, since in a loose garment the air can come into contact with the surface of the body, by which hot air the digestive faculty can get rid of the bodily vapors it wishes to expel, and by which cold air the pores are contracted and natural heat is kept within the body, thus making for better digestion, by which youth is better conserved in a young man, and age in an old man."[42]

While the hermit was saying these things to Felix, an old, thin donkey passed in front of them, his back badly chafed from the burden he was accustomed to carrying. This donkey brought the food on which the hermit lived, doing the journey once a week. When Felix saw the donkey, he reflected that he had lived for a long time in the service of man and had worked very hard; and Felix wept, and said amid sighs:

"Ah, blessed is he who places his long life at the service of God, and who labors greatly for the love of Him! Ah, death! Do not kill me, but instead let me labor long in knowing and loving my glorious God. Ah, glorious God, put in my heart, since you have created it for loving, a great burden, that I may forever carry it for love of You, and in order to spread Your glory and knowledge!" Felix's pious words made the hermit weep for a long time,

[40] The "distinction" of B, followed by Galmés, would seem to be a copyist's error.

[41] Thus in all sources except A B, followed by Galmés, which have *levament*. This would leave the translator with the choice of "the ascent and removal of vapors" or "the ascending and rising vapors," neither of which is satisfactory.

[42] Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 168–9, places this curious preference for Moslem dress in the wider picture of Christian adoption of Moslem customs in the thirteenth century.

and he praised and blessed God for having given Felix the gift of such great devotion.

51. WHY MAN DIES

THE[43] HERMIT told Felix that man dies in two ways. "One is bodily death and the other is spiritual death. Bodily death is when body and soul separate; spiritual death is when a person commits a mortal sin.

"In a ship there is a common form that is the sum of many forms and there is a matter that is the sum of many matters, and the ship is composed of a common form and a common matter. Now when the form and matter separate, then the ship is corrupted, that is, destroyed, and its common form is corrupted in the separation of the forms of which it is composed, and the same occurs with its matter."

From the hermit's example Felix understood why man's body is corrupted and comes to death: that is to say, that the four elements of which the body is composed separate one from the other, so that the form of the body is corrupted in the separation of one elemental form from another, and the same happens with matter.[44]

When Felix had perceived the way in which the body is brought to dissolution and death, he asked the hermit what caused the body to become corrupted and die.

"Son," said the hermit, "when the form of fire is not in accord with its own matter, in relation to its appetite for acting in matter, and when matter is not in accord with that form in relation to its desire to be acted on by that form—when they cannot attain the concordance they desire, because the other elements oppose them—then form and matter abhor that body and desire another in which they can be in better accord. And they corrupt that body, separating the form of fire from the form of the other elements; and matter does the same thing, separating from other matters—and this separation is the cause of death.

[43] The previous "Felix asked the hermit why man dies" is only in B, from which it has found its way into all the printed texts.

[44] Pring-Mill, *Microcosmos*, pp. 127–8, quotes these last two paragraphs in connection with Llull's doctrine on form and matter.

"A man once had a wife he loved very much, and she had a son from a previous husband, and he had a daughter from a previous wife. And the woman loved her stepdaughter so that her husband would love her all the more; and the husband similarly loved his stepson so that his wife would love him more."

The hermit recounted this example so that Felix would understand that however concordant the form of fire is with the matter of air and of earth, its own matter still desires it more, and however great is the appetite of the matter of fire for the form of air and of earth, the form of fire still has a greater appetite for its own matter. As a result, air and earth are the agency by which the form and matter of fire are in accord in the compound body.

"One day the woman's stepdaughter and the husband's stepson got into such a fight that neither husband nor wife could make peace or concord and the love husband and wife felt towards one another because of their respective stepchildren became corrupted, and as long as the stepchildren continued living in their house, they felt ill will towards one another. But when they were dead, husband and wife were again in accord and loved one another.

"Spiritual death, dear friend," said the hermit, "takes place when the soul turns aside from the purpose for which it was created, that is, when it forgets and no longer knows or loves God, or when it remembers, knows, and does not love God.[45]

"Once the form and matter of fire decided to beget a date palm; and when they had begotten it, and the date palm had grown up and was ready to make fruit, the form of fire conceived the notion of begetting an olive tree, and matter conceived the notion of begetting a fig tree; and as a result the date palm could not bear fruit, for form and matter turned aside from the purpose for which they had begun begetting a date palm."

Felix understood the hermit's example, and as a result he recognized what it was that caused sin and the spiritual death of the soul. And he asked the hermit why God had not created man in such a way that he would never die.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a noble king who had a son he loved very much, and this son was very devoted to the

[45] Note the various combinations of the acts of the powers of the soul (for which see the following note) and their correspondence with those of Figure S of the *Ars demonstrativa*, in this case with letters N and I of that work (see the alphabet in the Prologue there).

king and loved him a lot, since he was his son. One day the son, very nobly dressed and looking very handsome, happened to pass in front of his father. The king regarded his son and in his heart felt a great love towards him. The king thought a great deal about his love for his son, and he wanted his son to do something for love of him so that he could love him even more. He therefore made his son viceroy of a kingdom he had conquered by force of arms. The son was viceroy of this kingdom, and fought a war with a mighty and powerful king. The prince was occupied for a long time in this war, amid great hardships and dangers, and he carried it out with wisdom and courage. When the king had news of his son and heard how nobly he was carrying out his task, he then had great love for his son, partly for the fact of his being his son, and partly because he was a man of high principles; and as was fitting considering his son's merit, he made him heir to his kingdom."

From the hermit's example, Felix understood that this world is not enough for man, who is the son of God by creation, and who is the servant of God through virtues and good works. And this is why God wanted man to die in this world, and to suffer hardships in order to honor, love, and know Him, so that God could reward him with glory in the next world, which will be without end.

52. WHY MAN LOVES THE PLEASURES OF THIS WORLD

"SIR HERMIT," said Felix, "if man was created not for this world but rather for the next world, why does he so love the pleasures of this world?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "the question you have just asked is very difficult, even though it may not appear to be so. But, in accordance with the understanding God has given me, I would like to tell you my ideas about certain things. And first of all, I would like to tell you about the spiritual pleasure man has in this world, and then I will tell you of the bodily pleasure."

53. THE PLEASURE MAN HAS IN REMEMBERING[46]

THE HERMIT said to Felix that God wants to be remembered by man, which will to be remembered God has because He is worthy of being remembered. "By this will of God's to be remembered it follows that man takes pleasure in remembering God, and himself, and his fellow man, and other things having to do with the purpose for which pleasure in remembrance was given to man.

"Remembering and being are in accord, as are forgetting and nonbeing; and that is why, son, remembering brings happiness and forgetting unhappiness.

"Man remembers with memory and forgets with memory;[47] and remembering is the act and likeness of memory, just as forgetting is the act and lack of likeness of memory. Thus, in these words is revealed why man takes pleasure in remembering, or in other words, that the memory takes pleasure when it can engender its own likeness, that is, remembering;[48] and it would have even greater pleasure if its remembering could be converted into the being of memory, as is the case in the essence of God, in which God the Father takes pleasure in understanding, which is the semblance of wisdom; which understanding is the Son converted by generation into the being of wisdom, which is one with the Father.

"Son, memory wants to remember many things, and often, so that it can often engender its own likeness. And in order to en-

[46] The first of three chapters devoted to the three Augustinian powers of the soul (cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 24 above). Llull wrote an entire work on the subject—the *Libre de ànima racional*—as well as discussing it in: the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 161–5; *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 85; *Blaquerna*, chs. 37–9; the *Tree of Science, OE* I, 617–26; and many other places. For a more "artistic" treatment, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Modes 1–3. For an excellent modern discussion of the subject, see Pring-Mill, "Potencias." For their relationship to Figure S, see the previous note, as well as the discussion of that figure in the introduction and Bk. I of the *Ars demonstrativa*. For their relationship to the precept about loving and knowing God, see "Llull's Thought," n. 74. For their relationship to Llull's mysticism, see the *Flowers of Love*, introduction, text to n. 9 below. For the specific power of memory discussed in this chapter, see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 100 and the corresponding note.

[47] Quoted in Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 121, which see for another good discussion of the powers of the soul.

[48] Thus in all sources except A (followed by Galmés), which, instead of *membrar*, has *membrat*, "the thing remembered." This passage is also quoted in Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 121.

gender a great likeness it wants to remember many things of different kinds, and to remember them a great deal; and this it does so that its memory will be great, and to show that memory was created to remember many things and great ones, by which it can greatly remember God.

"A knight once sent a son of his to a foreign land. Before the son left his father and mother commissioned an artist to paint a portrait of him on the wall of their bedroom, so as to have their son's qualities and disposition represented in this image to be painted on the wall. Whenever the father and mother saw that image, they remembered their son who had gone off, and who for a long time remained fighting in a foreign land. Every time the father and mother looked at that painting they were happy, because it helped them remember their son."[49]

Felix was very pleased with this example, by which he understood that the world is the image in which is reflected God's goodness and nobility. And since memory was created to remember God, it should therefore naturally feel joy when it remembers the image of God, in which image are reflected the dignities of God, that is to say, that in the goodness of the creature is reflected the goodness of God, in the greatness of the creature is reflected the greatness of God, and so on with other similar things.[50]

After thinking these things over for a long time, and understanding the nature of, and principle behind, man's joy in remembering, Felix wondered greatly how any man could derive joy from remembering sin and not loving God, since such remembrance was against the ultimate purpose for which memory was created.

The more Felix thought about this, the more it made him wonder, and he asked the hermit why the sinner took pleasure in the things he remembered. "Son," said the hermit, "a student told his teacher that he greatly wondered how theriac could be an antidote for poison if it contained poison.[51] The teacher said to the

[49] Cf. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 57.

[50] This paragraph, which contains a particularly clear formulation of the exemplarist doctrine in connection with the dignities, is cited in: Ca I, 482–3; Hillg, p. 10, n. 45; Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 124; and Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 44. On this subject, see above, "Llull's Thought," text at nn. 34-36 and *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 37.

[51] A "theriac" (or "treacle" in its old meaning; both words had a common origin in the Greek [*antidotos*] *theriake*) was an antidote to poison, especially to that of a venomous snake, whose flesh was a necessary ingredient (cf. *OED* under either word).

student: 'In a certain land there was a merchant with a great love for worldly wealth. Now in that land where the merchant lived there was a drought, and the merchant bought a large amount of wheat at a very high price, for he thought there would be a great shortage of wheat in that land, and he hoped to make a large profit on the wheat.[52] After the merchant had bought a lot of wheat, it rained heavily and as a result there was a great abundance of wheat in the land. The merchant became so enraged at the abundance and profusion of wheat that his nature turned against itself; and because of this change, the merchant hated himself so much that he hanged himself and died.'"

54. THE PLEASURE MAN HAS IN UNDERSTANDING

IN ACCORDANCE with its nature, the greatest pleasure man's intellect can experience is to understand, and this is because understanding can be more similar to intellect[53] than anything else.

"Son," said the hermit, "the intellect takes greater pleasure in understanding than in remembering or wanting, because understanding is the activity of the intellect, and is more similar to the intellect than are remembering or wanting. And this is why the intellect has greater pleasure in understanding itself than in understanding memory or will. And since the intellect was created to understand God and God's work, therefore, according to natural laws, it should take even greater pleasure in understanding God and God's work than in understanding itself and its own work.

"Dear son, when the intellect takes greater pleasure in understanding God than any other thing, it then follows the path to everlasting blessedness; and when it does the opposite, it turns from the purpose for which it was created, and follows the path to infernal punishment, which is without end.

[52] The last clause is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text.

[53] As opposed to the "understanding" of *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 14, and the "mind" of *Felix*, Bk. II, n. 6, I here use "intellect" to translate *enteniment*, to distinguish it (i.e., the faculty; cf. n. 46 above) from the act, *entendre*, for which I reserve "understanding." Another possible translation of *enteniment* would be "intelligence" (*intelligentia* is a word Llull occasionally uses for this power of the soul).

"Dear son, a teacher once had many pupils, and among them was one who did not have the same willingness to learn as the others. The teacher asked this pupil why he did not want to learn. The pupil replied that, because he took no pleasure in the lesson the teacher was giving, he did not want to learn it. The teacher explained to the pupil that one pleasure was that of understanding, and another that of wanting, and this was why the pupil should convert and subjugate the pleasure of wanting to that of understanding.

"'Master,' said the pupil, 'the subject you are teaching concerns the will more than the understanding, insofar as it deals more with positive law[54] than with natural law; and this is why, in this subject, my intellect cannot take such pleasure in understanding as can my companions' will in wanting, since will prefers wanting to understanding.

"'Master,' asked the pupil, 'which is of greater value, intellect or will?' The teacher replied: 'Intellect is of greater value for understanding than will, and will is of greater value for wanting than understanding.'[55] The pupil was satisfied with the teacher's answer, and he asked the teacher if he would exchange his intellect for a kingdom, to which the teacher replied that he would not exchange it for the entire world. The pupil asked the teacher whether he would sell his intellect or exchange it if it were incapable of ever understanding anything, and the teacher replied that he would, for there would be little point in having intellect without understanding."

Felix was very pleased with these examples about the teacher and his pupil, yet he wondered how any man could take pleasure in his understanding when he understands something he should not understand, and which could even bring him harm if he understood it.

"Sir," said Felix, "why does the intellect take pleasure in understanding sin and falsehood, since they are things in which there is no likeness of God?"

[54] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 181.

[55] One would have expected *enteniment* ("intellect"; cf. n. 53 above), but all medieval sources have *entendre* ("understanding").

"Son," replied the hermit, "when the intellect is in an ordered state and is following the purpose for which it was created, then it takes pleasure in understanding sin and falsehood for three reasons, among others: the first is to perceive that in sin and falsehood there is no semblance, or work, of God; the second is that through understanding sin and falsehood the will is inclined to dislike sin and falsehood; the third is that when the intellect understands sin and falsehood, it engenders its own likesness, that is, understanding, in which likeness the intellect takes pleasure, even though it does not take pleasure in sin and falsehood themselves, since they contain no likeness of God, and since the will, through its understanding, is moved to dislike falsehood and sin."

"Sir," said Felix, "since the intellect takes pleasure in understanding God and His works, why does God not allow the intellect to understand so much, that its pleasure in understanding Him would be such that it would not turn to the pleasure of sin?"

"Dear son, God could reveal Himself to the human intellect in this world, as He does to the saints in glory, in such a way that no man would be inclined to sin; but then free will would be destroyed, by which destruction no man could win merit by having virtues and avoiding vices."

"Sir," said Felix, "if the intellect takes pleasure in understanding, then why does the sinner who understands the sin he is committing suffer when he understands it, which suffering comes from remorse of conscience?"

"Son," said the hermit, "it is because the will, by its nature, dislikes sin, and can only like it by accident, when it goes against its own nature; and because the intellect understands the sin committed against its nature when the will favors sin; and for this reason it is natural that the intellect suffer when it understands sin, which is desired by the will."

Felix was very pleased with what the hermit had said, and he added that because the intellect understands against understanding when it understands sin that the will likes, and because the will likes against the nature of will when it likes the sin that the intellect understands, therefore the understanding and the wanting make the intellect and the will suffer.

55. THE PLEASURE MAN HAS IN WILLING[56]

"Dear son," said the hermit, "in God there is a will that wants a will to exist in man in order to have that will love God; and since in God there is glory, God's will wants man's will to take pleasure in loving Him. And this pleasure is the primary and sovereign degree by which man's will naturally finds pleasure in willing.

"In God, the will that is God has everything it wants, and this is why human will wants to have what it wants; and when it has it, it takes pleasure in having it, and when it cannot have it, it is displeased. Thus, when it has what it wants, its pleasure reflects the pleasure God has in Himself, and when it cannot have it, its displeasure reflects, by dissimilarity, the great pleasure that God has in everything which has will, since God's power can have everything His will wants."

Felix thought about what the hermit said concerning divine will, which has everything it wants, and this in immensity of goodness, infinity, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and perfection. While Felix was thinking about this, he was in great wonder how it was that man's will wanted anything more than what God's will wanted. After thinking about this for a long time, Felix said to the hermit:

"In a certain city there died a young man who was the son of an honorable burgher. The father, mother, and relatives of the young man mourned greatly, which mourning caused me to wonder at how they could be displeased at the divine will wanting to kill the young man, since man's will was created to want everything the divine will wanted."

"Son," said the hermit, "it is only natural for the human will to love its own likeness, that is, its wanting, which is its activity; but it is more natural for it to love the divine will and God's willing, and this nature comes from the fact that man's will is made so that it will love the divine will, along with everything that will wants, above anything else. When, however, it happens

[56] *Voler* in the original, which could also be translated as "wanting" or "desiring." For its relation to *amor*, "love," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12.

that man's will turns to a purpose and nature contrary to that for which it was created, then its will runs counter to divine will, and it prefers its own wants to those of God, and it feels displeasure in what the divine will wants, and it feels pleasure in what the divine will does not want.

"In a certain city," said the hermit, "there was a usurer who had a son he loved more than God or anything else. The usurer loved his son so much that he did everything he could to make him contented, and he struggled hard to amass a fortune so his son would possess great wealth. It happened that the usurer's son died, and the day he died, a beggar came to the usurer's house and asked for alms for the love of God. The usurer's anger against the poor man begging for the love of God grew to such proportions that he could not contain himself, and he blasphemed against God, and cursed God and everything God had ever wanted, and he gave the beggar a beating and would have killed him if others had not intervened. After cursing God and beating the beggar the usurer cursed himself and all that he had amassed, and he cursed the father who had begotten him and the mother who had borne him. After cursing all these things, and because of his immense rage, the usurer's heart burst, and he died in the presence of a neighbor of his, who was a very wise man, one who very much loved and feared God. The wise man greatly wondered at the usurer, at his anger, and at his death, and he said:

"'Alas, how dangerous it is to love the pleasure of one's own will more than the pleasure of the divine will. Ah, Lord God, how great would have been Your pleasure if, when his son had died, the usurer had found joy in wanting and loving what Your will wanted in the death of his son, and if, for the love of You, he had made up for his wrongs by giving all his possessions to the poor man begging for love of You!'

"These words and many others were spoken by the wise man as he thought about the stroke of fortune the usurer had suffered. After thinking it over for a long time, the wise man went back to his house and decided to give everything he had to the beggar the usurer had beaten, and who had showed such patience amid the blows raining down on him; for while being maltreated, the beggar had praised God, calling out to Him and blessing Him, saying:

"'Lord God,' said the beggar, 'on account of the needs of bodily existence, I beg alms for love of You, and amid these blows I receive, I ask for patience, humility, charity, and fortitude. Lord God, just as it has pleased You that I be poor and beg alms for love of You, may it please You that I have the patience to praise and honor You amid all the hardships which befall me by Your will and for the sake of Your honor.'

"The wise man wanted to give the beggar all his possessions, because of the example of patience he had given him, and because of the good words he had spoken while the usurer was beating him. But the beggar refused his offer, saying he intended to remain poor all his life, and that he wanted to go through the world as a poor man, begging for the love of God, and he wanted to find joy in whatever he could get to know that was pleasing to God's will.

"The wise man was most pleased with the poor man's devotion and with the vocation he had adopted. So, for the love of God, this wise man gave up everything he had to other poor people, and joined up with this beggar in going through the world as a poor man, so that together they could observe everything that pleased God's will, and find pleasure in what God willed, and so they could feel displeasure in all they found men doing against God's will."

56. THE PLEASURE MAN HAS IN SEEING[57]

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "if God is invisible and cannot be seen by the bodily eyes, then why is it that men take such great pleasure in this world in seeing physical things? For they take much greater delight in this than in seeing, in the mind's eye, spiritual things, which are more similar to God than physical things."

The holy hermit was most pleased with Felix's question, and he replied: "There are two sorts of pleasure man has in seeing: one is by spiritual sight, the other by physical sight. By spiritual sight, that is, by the light of the intellect, God can be seen in Himself and in the holy work He executes in Himself; and by this same vision the human intellect can see the work God carries out

[57] Here and in the next four chapters we have the discussion of the five senses, mentioned in n. 16 above.

in His creatures. And since this intellectual sight is much nobler than sensual sight, therefore God has naturally placed pleasure in the seeing of physical things, so that the intellect may find pleasure in understanding them. But because sinners forget to remember God, pay no attention to Him, and prefer worldly things, therefore they remain with the pleasure of seeing physical things and lose the pleasure they should have in seeing spiritual things.

"Dear son, in a cathedral there was once a canon who led a very saintly life, while many of the other canons of that cathedral were very unprincipled men. Every time the canon saw his companions and their wicked sins he was displeased with himself and would remain sad and depressed most of the day. The habit of being in a state of sadness and distress at the wrongs he saw in that cathedral continued so long that he became ill and despondent; and he became so accustomed to this despondency that nothing good he saw could any longer bring him joy.

"The canon was in wonder at his own ire, and he was in wonder at his wicked companions who were happy at seeing one another and unhappy and sad whenever he saw them and rebuked them for their wrongs. But one day, while still in this state of wonder, the saintly canon went to church, where he found joy in seeing the holy image of the cross by which he contemplated Christ's Holy Passion, and was thereby made to see God's great love for His people and the great mercy in which the just and sinners can place their trust. Then while walking home from church in this happy and contented state, he saw a canon riding on a handsome palfrey and very nobly dressed. And his palfrey had a very fine saddle and bridle, and a brand-new poitrel.[58] He wore elegant boots and dazzling spurs. Leaning out of a window there was a prostitute[59] with whom the canon was discussing carnal delights. As soon as the holy man saw the foolish man and the foolish woman he was angry and distressed, and the pleasure he had felt

[58] The "poitrel" (Cat. *pitral*) was a breastplate or breastleather attached to the saddle to keep it from sliding back. Llull treats the ornamentation of these accoutrements as a symbol of ostentation and pride; cf. the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 88.18: "Just as you, O Lord, through humility did not want to ride on a donkey unless it was bareback, so the proud do not want to ride unless it be on painted saddles, with guilded and silvered bridles and poitrels."

[59] *Folla fembra* in the original; cf. Bk. I, n. 33 above.

upon seeing the cross and contemplating Christ's passion fled from his heart.

"The holy man was in great wonder at how he could have plunged so rapidly into sorrow, and in this state of distress he arrived at his house, where he found an old man at the door, begging alms for the love of God. He was humbly dressed, with a long beard, and his countenance was that of a man of piety and penance. As soon as the canon saw him he began to feel happy and to forget the ire into which he had been plunged by the foolish canon and the foolish woman, and he said that bodily sight takes greater and nobler pleasure in humble clothes and in poor men who lead saintly lives than in elegant costumes and in proud sinners.

"Dear son," said the hermit to Felix, "it is pleasant to see the sky, the sun, the moon, the stars, the sea, earth, fire, men, birds, beasts, plants, colors, money, clothes, and other things similar to these. And all these things are pleasant to see so that man can find pleasure in God, who created them in order that He should be loved and known. And the more numerous, the greater, and the more beautiful are the things man sees in the world, the more strongly should he, with spiritual eyes, see God and His works.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "it is a beautiful thing to see a physical thing which is beautiful; but it is an even more beautiful thing to see something spiritual, such as justice, charity, wisdom, temperance, and strength of heart. Yet those who are in sin take greater pleasure in seeing physical than spiritual things. It is therefore a great wonder that such people do not find greater pleasure in seeing ugly than in seeing beautiful things; for just as they are confused about seeing with spiritual sight, they should be confused about physical sight."

While the hermit and Felix were talking this way, they saw two men coming who claimed to belong to the Order of the Apostles. These two men were pleasant to see, because of their habit and because of their hair and beard, which was a symbol of the holy life the Apostles led, and the poverty in which they had lived. But when the hermit and Felix thought about the way of life of these men, who claimed to belong to the Order of the Apostles, and yet did not preach or do what the Apostles had done, then the hermit and Felix were displeased at seeing these two men, for their

works were not in consonance with their habit.[60] The hermit and Felix wept for a long time, saying to each other:

"Ah, hypocrisy! Why do you not die? Ah, beauty of habit and falsity of intent, why have you come together in any man? Ah God, send us men pleasant to see, both for their physical and spiritual habit, so that it be clear that there are many who are good advocates in the task of honoring and loving You, and valiant in singing Your praises."

57. WHY MAN TAKES PLEASURE IN HEARING

"HEARING is the operation of the auditive faculty, which works by hearing so that through hearing the soul can take pleasure in remembering, understanding, and loving that hearing. And since God is praiseworthy, He therefore wants to be praised by man, and He wants people to find pleasure in hearing words of praise directed toward God."

"Sir hermit," said Felix, "if what you say is true, I am in great wonder at how the people of this world take such pleasure in hearing vanities—idle praise, musical instruments, singing and other things of this sort, and delight in hearing things that are contrary to God—when all hearing should be directed toward praising God."

"Dear son, there was once a minstrel who, in the presence of a king, was praising a knight who was a wicked man and of evil ways. The minstrel praised the knight because the latter had given

[60] For the Apostolici and Llull's previous praising references to them, see Bk. VII, n. 1 above. In spite of what many scholars have said, it is not altogether clear to me that Llull is here criticizing the whole sect; he might rather be directing his anger against the hypocrites who *pretend* to be Apostolici but do not carry out their Apostolic role (cf. Bk. VII, n. 3 above). In this interpretation, Llull would be particularly angry at their not preaching. See in this connection the passage in *Blaquerna*, at the end of ch. 76, where another canon tells a group of Apostolici that if "they wanted to be of the Order of the Apostles, then through whatever cities, towns, or castles they passed, they should preach the word of God, and rebuke men of the sins they see them commit" (note the connection with the canon here and the sins he has witnessed). See also the indirect reference in ch. 81 (cf. n. 136) below. All these mentions, together with what Llull felt to be his God-ordained role and with his desire for a return to the "fervor and devotion there was in the time of the Apostles and Martyrs" (cf. the Prologue above), undoubtedly meant that he felt particularly close to the expressed aims of the Apostolici, and thus particularly deceived by their not carrying out those aims.

him a palfrey that he had taken from a monk. The king was very distressed at the minstrel's praising the knight, because he knew the minstrel was praising the knight falsely. The king asked the minstrel why God wanted speech to exist. The minstrel replied, saying that speech was to give knowledge about what the soul remembered, understood, and loved or did not love to those to whom one was talking. The king replied that this was correct, and then asked him to speak the truth to him, adding that if he did not, he would make him die a cruel death. The minstrel was afraid, and he promised to tell the king the truth about anything he asked him.

"'Minstrel,' said the king, 'have you been praising that knight so as to give me pleasure in hearing what you say about him, or have you been praising him because he is really praiseworthy?' The minstrel thought a long time before answering, but he was afraid of lying, so he finally said:

"'Sir, the knight is not worthy of praise, but I praised him because he had given me a palfrey, and I praise you so that you will give me some noble gift; for if he gave me a palfrey,[61] you should give me a horse or more, so that I may sing your praises to others.'

"'Minstrel,' said the king, 'you have told the truth; yet because you have incurred my displeasure by praising the knight, you should be punished, or in other words, you must return the palfrey to the knight, and tell him that I said he should return it to the monk from whom he took it, the monk being someone who gives true praise to God. And if the knight does not return the palfrey to the monk, tell him that I shall consider him my enemy, and have nothing more to do with him. And mark my words—his concern upon hearing these things will be greater than any pleasure he could have had from your praises.'

"The king thought for a long time about the vainglory men have in this world when it is a question of hearing themselves praised, and he was in great wonder that man, who came from and was created out of nothing, could be so eager for honor and praise in this world. While the king was thinking this over, a page

[61] A palfrey was a saddle horse for ordinary riding, as opposed to a war horse, which, since it had to carry an armored man, was built more like a modern workhorse or draught horse.

brought the king a book in which many figures and scenes were depicted. The page said to the king:

"'My lord king, a holy hermit who was doing penance on a high mountain near a castle of yours, has passed from this life. When he was dying my father visited the holy man, who told him to give this book to the most devout prince he knew. And this is why, my lord king, my lord and father sends you this book, since he considers you the wisest and most devout prince he knows of in the whole world.'

"'Do you know, page,' asked the king, 'what this book is about?' The page told the king that the book was about physical and spiritual pleasure. 'It deals with physical pleasure since there are many different illustrations which are very nobly executed, and they represent all the various ways a person can envisage creatures and the works of creatures. That is to say, in this book is depicted the empyrean heaven and the disposition of the heavenly throne and of the saints in glory. Then there is an illustration of the firmament, of the sun and the moon; and it contains the story of the Old Testament and of the New. In this book all the philosophers appear, as well as the works of nature, such as men, beasts, birds, fish, and plants; and of all these beasts, birds, fish, and plants there are illustrations and explanations; and the same is true of men, such as prelates, princes, clerks, knights, merchants, and of all the mechanical arts. Thus, all in order, each item is illustrated separately, along with an account of the way in which men, beasts, birds, and fish live and find their way in this world. In this book there are accounts of battles, of cities, sailing ships, and galleys;[62] and of all the other ancient things of former times this book gives remembrance through illustration. This book,' said the young man, 'was made by that holy hermit, who was a philosopher; and from all the books he could find, he took all the stories he could; and everything he saw men do, and everything concerning beasts, birds or trees, he put down in the form of illustrations.

[62] Thus in A; in the other MSS *galees* is followed by a mysterious *e deseers reys*, the second word of which could be that or *descers* in S, and either *descrets* or *deserets*, as Galmés has it, in B. Consultations with dictionaries and with Francesc de B. Moll have not provided any solution to this phrase, with or without its variants.

"'My lord king,' said the young man, 'after making this book, the philosopher went to live in a hermitage church, and he would look at this book every day, in order to have physical and spiritual pleasure. He derived physical pleasure from it because it was beautiful, well painted and illustrated, and filled with many figures,[63] and he derived spiritual pleasure from it because what he saw with his bodily eyes he was then brought to see with spiritual eyes, with which he saw God and His works in creatures; and he derived pleasure from thinking about past things, and about the works of creatures.'

"The king took this *Book of Pleasing Vision*[64] and gladly studied it. One day he happened to be examining an illustration in which was depicted a king sitting at table in a large palace eating with a great number of knights. One could also see minstrels playing different instruments; and before the figure of the king a lion and snake were fighting. A devil had his mouth to the king's ear, which signified that the snake, with praises and vanities, was fighting the lion, who represented the king. After thinking it over for a long time, the king understood what this scene signified, and he said: 'Ah, false, idle praises! Why do you exist in this world? And why are you more pleasing when heard by princes and prelates than by other men?'

"The king wept bitterly at this thought. After weeping a long time he decided, by the divine light of grace, to build a very large monastery, which he would enter along with many other holy monks who would sing the holy Mass, and who would know the holy science of theology, as well as philosophy, so that he could have the pleasure of hearing Mass every day, and of hearing their words, from which he would derive pleasure in their discussion of God and His works.

[63] Hillg, p. 215 and n. 78, cites this passage in connection with the importance of the figures as devices for memorizing and understanding the Art.

[64] For a long time now, critics have assumed this was a reference to a lost work by Llull himself. In my "Notes," Part I, I hope to have shown that this is most unlikely. To state the case briefly, before the end of the nineteenth century, there are only four references to this work, that here (the only reference from the Middle Ages), two from the sixteenth century, and that of Father Pasqual (*Vindiciae* I, 174–5), where the last three seem to refer to this passage of *Felix* rather than to any work they have seen with their own eyes. Moreover, the description of the work given here is suspiciously overemphatic, and it appears in none of the catalogues of Llull's works from le Myésier to Littré. My feeling is that it is an imaginary, ideal work, of a sort that would be most useful—says Llull—if it were ever written.

"And from the decision he passed to the act. The king bequeathed all his possessions to his sons, and he bestowed a large, perpetual income on the monastery. In this monastery the king lived with his holy men, and he made them explain what the scenes in the *Book of Vision* meant. Between hearing and seeing, and thinking, remembering, understanding, and wanting, the king found continual pleasure, and in this state he remained until he died. And on the day he died he ordered his son to lead the same life he had led."

58. WHY MAN TAKES PLEASURE IN SMELLING

"To SMELL flowers, fruits, musk, ambergris,[65] and other fine-smelling things gives pleasure; and to smell a privy, rotten flesh, mud, manure, and other things of that sort gives displeasure. This pleasure and displeasure that comes from smelling symbolizes the pleasure one should have in knowing and loving God, and the displeasure one should feel from everything that might be unpleasant or disagreeable to God; and it symbolizes the death to which man must come, as a result of which his body begins to stink and rot so much, and with such a smell that it is unpleasant and disagreeable to everyone; and this to such a degree that no one wants, or is able, to be near a dead man, no matter how close a friend he was."

"Sir," said Felix, "why has God given pleasure in smelling, when God is not smellable?"

"Dear son," replied the hermit, "God did not give pleasure in smelling because He was smellable, since He has no body, nor is He something that can be smelled. But since smelling is a pleasure of the will, He gave man the sense of smell so that he would find pleasure in it and, because of this pleasure, love God who gave him that pleasure in smelling.

"Son, God gave man a sense of smell so he could smell bad odors, and so that, because of his displeasure at these bad odors, he would fear the stench of Hell, with its sulphur and other foul-smelling things; for in Hell all men's bodies will rot and their

[65] Cf. n. 15 above.

breath will be rotten, and their members will rot in accordance with the sins they will have committed in this world with those members.

"A man once had a wife who painted and fixed up her face. This woman put paints on her face which stank, and her husband smelled them when he lay with her. The woman made herself up so she would appear beautiful to her husband and so he would take pleasure in her. Yet her husband, when he smelled the stench of the makeup on her face thought his wife was painting herself so that she would appear beautiful to some man with whom she was sinning. And thus the husband was jealous with regard to his wife, and he had displeasure from that stench in two ways; the first was from the smell of her face, and the second because he thought his wife was committing adultery. And thus because of his corporal displeasure, the husband received spiritual displeasure from his wife, that is, displeasure of will, which he had from jealousy.

"Dear son, if the human will, which is a spiritual creature, receives such great pleasure or displeasure from the sense of smell, which is a physical creature, how much more is the pleasure it can have in loving God, which is a spiritual thing! And how much greater would be the displeasure of the sinner's will in not loving God than in smelling the stench of Hell!

"Dear son, a certain woman, a burgher's wife, had a beautiful garden in back of her house, with many trees of different kinds, and these trees were in full leaf and flower. The woman often entered her garden to smell the blossoms and to get pleasure therefrom. One day it happened that while she was walking through the garden, enjoying the sight and smell of the blossoms, she felt a need to go to a privy situated in that orchard, where she smelled a great stench. While she was in this privy smelling the stench, she wondered how the things which came from her body could smell so badly, and how things which had nothing to do with her body, such as flowers, could smell so good.

"While the woman was in this state of wonder, her soul conceived the idea of chastity and purity, and she threw off the sin of lust in which she had long been, saying:

"'Ah, miserable woman, foolish sinner! How great a wonder it is that an apple, which is so lovely and good-smelling when one

eats it, turns in the body to something so ugly, rotten, dirty, and foul smelling! And when it is out of the body, stinking that way, who would put it back in his body?'

"After thinking this over for a long time, the woman said that it was a much greater wrong to put into one's heart, that is, into one's will, the carnal delight one feels through lust, which, to honest remembering, understanding, and will smells worse than any manure or privy. The woman wept copiously while she said these things, and was very repentant of the sins she had committed, and begged God's mercy to have her sins forgiven.

"Thus, through the circumstances of smelling, and by the grace of God, her life changed from wicked to good, and she developed the habit, whenever she smelled good or bad odors, of remembering, understanding, and hating[66] the sins she had committed through lust, and she trusted in God's mercy and begged His forgiveness.

59. WHY MAN TAKES PLEASURE IN TASTING

"SON," SAID the hermit, "man finds pleasure in tasting when eating and drinking. For tasting is one of the faculties of the sensitive power, and the subject in which the sense of taste develops is the vegetative power, which is composed of the four elements by means of a form that is a combination of the form of the four elements, and underlying it is the matter that is a combination of the matter of the four elements.

"Dear son, the pleasure that the sensitive[67] feels in itself, which it takes from the vegetative, it offers and gives to the will, which in turn takes pleasure when the sensitive perceives by means of taste. And this is a great wonder—that a sensual pleasure is transformed into a spiritual pleasure by affecting man's will, which is a spiritual creature.[68]

"Thus, son, just as the visual power takes color as object and offers it, by the imaginative, to the intellective power, which un-

[66] Once again (cf. n. 45 above) we have the combinations of letter I of Figure S.
[67] Cf. Bk. II, n. 3 above.
[68] "By affecting . . . creature" is missing in Galmés's text, surely through some oversight; it is in all sources consulted.

derstands color, so the sensitive, by the sense of taste, takes the sweetness or bitterness of whatever a man eats and drinks and gives it to the intellective power, which understands that quality of sweetness or bitterness; and it offers it likewise to memory, which remembers that quality. And thus, son, all three powers of the soul delight in the faculty of taste in accordance with how each power of the soul received it within itself.

"There was once a bishop who was a very fastidious man and who had lived for a long time amidst great pleasures. One day it happened that while he was eating and delighting in the taste of exquisite dishes, a squire who was serving him suddenly fell dead right in front of him and those eating with him at the table. The bishop and all the others were horrified at the death of the squire who, in an instant, had gone from what he had been when he was alive to being dead. After giving much thought to the matter of the squire's death, he wanted to go back to eating; but because of the horror he had felt at the squire's death he could not find the pleasure he usually found in the food he ate. So he gave up trying to eat, saying that a person should not eat when he no longer found pleasure or relish in his food; and yet he wondered at his not regaining his usual relish at the thought of eating.

"'Sir,' said a wise man eating at the bishop's table, 'one day it came to pass that a hermit who had been living for a long time on a high mountain where he contemplated God, conceived a desire to visit the city at the foot of the mountain. When he reached the city and was walking down one of its streets, he saw the bishop of that city riding on a horse, nobly dressed and with a large retinue. In front of the bishop were many squires dressed in particolored costumes[69] riding large palfreys. The hermit had great displeasure when he saw the bishop riding so ostentatiously, and he remembered Christ's poverty and that of the Apostles, and how they went about like poor, humble men. He returned to his hermitage, but because of the bishop's bad example he could no

[69] Or "motley." It was a costume of two contrasting colors on opposite parts of the body, as for instance with a gold left leg and right breast, and a red right leg and left breast. It was often associated with court jesters, who completed this costume by a cap with two cloth horns. This information, as well as the English translations, were provided by Professor Raymond Willis of Princeton.

longer contemplate God as well as he once had. Great was the hermit's wonder at having lost his former devotion.'[70]

"After recounting this example to the bishop, the wise man said that pleasure in tasting existed so that people would want to eat, and through eating could sustain the body, which body could then serve God. 'And since eating exists to sustain life, and living exists so people can serve God, and death is contrary to life, therefore you lost your sense of taste, for your nature experienced fear of death when you saw the squire die so suddenly. And the hermit lost his former pleasure in contemplating God when he saw the bishop riding with such ostentation, which bishop is of the same nature as the hermit in that they are both men, but is contrary to his way of living by reason of his vainglory.'

"The bishop gave much thought to the wise man's example, and he understood that a bishop exists to serve God and not to delight in eating or drinking. He also understood that the other bishop's bad example in acting contrary to his office by riding with such pomp had been the reason why the hermit, who was similar to him in terms of their human nature, then, because of this bad example, felt unable to contemplate God. From that moment on the bishop gave up his fastidious eating habits, and every time he was tempted to revert to them, he had poor people brought before him, people who ate with relish because of hunger; and the bishop was delighted with the pleasure these poor people found in eating, and especially when he considered that he was giving them the food for the love of God.

"The many monks gathered together for a general chapter were invited for dinner one day by a prince, who gave them a meal that was both dainty and plentiful. When they had finished eating, a monk asked the prince which sort of meal tasted better, that which was eaten because of hunger or that made up of many delicacies. Many answered the question, some on one side, some on the other; finally it was the monk who had asked the question who answered it, saying that the taste for food comes from bodily need, not from bodily delight or vainglory.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "an honorable burgher was once sitting at his table, eating a meal of delicacies. While he was eating

[70] This last sentence is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text.

and taking pleasure in the food a beggar came to the door seeking alms for the love of God. The burgher became angry at the beggar, for he seemed to prevent him from taking pleasure in the food he was eating. He therefore ordered a squire who was serving him to go out to the beggar who was seeking alms and to insult and beat him so that he would go away and not bother him. The squire went out and brought the beggar into the room where the burgher was eating, and said the following words:

"'Sir burgher,' he said, 'pleasure in wanting is worth more than pleasure in eating, and this is because a person can want God but cannot eat God. Therefore, by giving alms for the love of God, the will can have greater pleasure than in refusing alms for the pleasure of eating; and so that you may have pleasure in giving for the love of God, I have brought this beggar before you, so you can give him some of what you are eating, and especially some of what you find tastiest to eat, for the pleasure your will takes in loving God will increase in proportion to the pleasure you take in one food or another, if you give away that most preferred food.

"The burgher, for love of God, gave the beggar a roast capon he had before him, while he himself ate the less tasty dishes. As he ate, the burgher felt in his will and intellect the pleasure of charity, justice, wisdom, fortitude, and temperance; and this pleasure was so great, that never before had he experienced such pleasure eating any food as he now did in his will and intellect on account of the capon he had given the poor man."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder why it is that a beast or bird will stop eating or drinking when it has had enough, while man, who has the use of reason, goes on eating and drinking after he has had enough."

"Son," said the hermit, "a beast or bird, since it does not have the use of reason, follows the course of its sensitive nature, and therefore eats and drinks according to its feelings. But because man has will and understanding, and is disposed towards sensual pleasure in order to have intellectual pleasure, he loves sensual pleasure capable of giving intellectual pleasure, which intellectual pleasure can give him pleasure in God, who is the fulfillment of all pleasure, and thus has it been ordained by nature. But when it happens that a person is not interested in the pleasure of sensuality

for the purpose of experiencing it in intellectuality as a means of taking pleasure in God and in the virtues, then he is a dissolute man, worse than animals in his sense of taste, and eats and drinks more than is proper. And this is why men fall into the sin of gluttony, and become sick and die."

60. WHY MAN TAKES PLEASURE IN FEELING[71]

"DEAR SON," the hermit said to Felix, "the pleasure of physical feeling or touching exists so that there may be pleasure in spiritual feeling. But men of this world prefer physical to spiritual pleasure, and this is why they want to feel pleasure in touching things,[72] lying in soft beds, wearing clothing of delicate, soft material. And they want to feel the pleasure of warming themselves when they are cold, and of cooling themselves when they are hot, and they avoid hard work and movement, which are liable to give feelings of displeasure.

"With fire entering air, water, and earth,[73] and with one element entering another, the elements end up touching one another, and within man's body this engenders a feeling of heat or cold, of hunger or thirst, which feeling is formed by the sensitive power based on the vegetative power. And according to the disposition of this contact of one element within another a person experiences pleasure or displeasure of the senses."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder why it is that when a person is near death and is all cold, he wants to feel cold and does not want to feel heat, even though he is all cold from the natural heat he has lost."

"Son," said the hermit, "a dying person who feels cold has lost his natural feelings, and nature wants to recover what it has lost,

[71] *Sentir* in Catalan has the same ambiguity as the English "feeling," which can refer to emotion, sensation in general, or the sense of touch, in which last meaning it overlaps with the Catalan *tocar* (or *tocament* as Llull usually writes; cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 80) and the English "touching."

[72] MS A, followed by the printed sources, adds "things of pleasure." Note the similarities between this passage and that under "Touch" in *Gentile*, Bk. IV, art. 12.

[73] Thus in B S; L V A, followed by the printed sources, add, "with air entering fire, water, and earth," which seems to run counter to the normal direction of the circulation of the elements (see Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*), and might well have entered the text as a distracted copyist's misrepetition of the preceding phrase.

which is why the sick person wants to feel cold; but his nature does not really want cold, but rather wants the natural heat he has lost through unnatural heat."[74]

Felix asked the hermit, "Sir, I wonder why it is that a man who gets a fever and feels cold though he is hot, wants to feel heat."

"Son," said the hermit, "a fever with disordered cold brings about the destruction of natural heat, and this is why the sick person wants heat to counter his feeling of cold, while his nature wants natural heat to destroy his feeling of cold."

Felix gave much thought to what the hermit said, and he wondered greatly how a person could want to feel one thing and his nature another, like the sick person who is cold when he is near death and wants to feel cold while his nature wants to feel natural heat. After wondering about this a long time, Felix asked the hermit about it.

"Son," said the hermit, "a knight had a wife he loved very much and who loved him very much, but she was of such a nature that never, when her husband lay with her, was she satisfied. The woman wondered greatly what it was that made her feel unsatisfied and sad, since she loved her husband very much. The good woman thought for a long time about this, until finally she remembered how, long before her marriage, she had greatly loved virginity, but her father and mother had forced her to take a husband. Now, after thinking this over, she realized how her preference for virginity had brought about her dissatisfaction when she lay with her husband."

"Sir," said Felix, "why does a person feel pain and sickness?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a very saintly and devout nun who kept her vows very well. It came to pass that a false monk who was confessing her told her that lust was not a sin and with clever talk tricked her into lying with him. When the woman had been corrupted and had lost her virginity, she was very sad and disgusted, and she wondered how she could feel so disgusted if she had committed no sin."

Felix was very pleased with this example, and he realized that a person can feel pain and sickness through disordered humors,

[74] I.e., wants to recover its ability to feel cold, that is, the patient's sense of cold. See the *Principles of Medicine,* Dist. X, secs. 1–2, where this and the next problem are discussed.

just as the woman felt sad because she was in sin, even though she did not realize she was. When Felix had understood this, he felt happy, at the same time wondering greatly what it was that made him happy; but then when he thought about the fact that he was a virgin, he realized that this was the cause of his happiness, for his nature delighted in virginity.

"Sir," said Felix, "why does a person near a fire feel heat, or a person sitting on a stone feel cold?"

"Son," said the hermit, "because Jesus Christ loved men like Himself who, for the sake of loving and knowing God, underwent poverty, hunger, thirst, blows and contempt, He therefore wanted to be poor and suffer hardships and death."

Felix understood the example, and said that fire warms a person because it wants to change the person's warmth into a warmth like its own, and the same happens with the cold of a stone, for every creature wants to engender its own likeness.

When Felix had understood the example about Christ, and when he thought how few men are similar to Christ in being willing, for the love of Him, to suffer what He suffered to save His people, then he was in great wonder and wept, saying:

"Ah, true lovers! Where are you who find real love and pleasure in honoring Christ our Savior? Why do you not come forward? Why do you tarry so long?"

After saying this and many other things, he asked the hermit why it was that a bloodhound smelled the track of the deer it was chasing without smelling that of one it was not chasing, for such discernment caused him great wonder.

"Son," said the hermit, "a pilgrim in Jerusalem was praying when the memory of Christ's Passion made him feel in his heart great fervor and desire to die for the love of Him, since Christ had died for love of him. Near this pilgrim a Saracen was praying, but not with the fervor of the pilgrim."

Felix understood the example, and said that because the deer being chased had run harder than the one not being chased, he imprinted more of his own likeness in his tracks than did the other one; for more of its virtue was expressed through the movement it made than was the case with the other who did not move as much ,just like the pilgrim who, believing God had done so much for him, had greater devotion in honoring God than the Saracen,

who did not believe that God had done so much to save him, that is, that He had taken on human nature and had had that nature delivered over to death to save mankind.

"Sir," asked Felix, "why is it that a person feels heat in his mouth when he eats a hot thing and yet does not feel it in his stomach?" "Friend," said the hermit, "the hot food, when it is in the mouth, is nearer the throat, where lies the sense of taste, than when it is in the stomach."

After hearing the hermit's answer, Felix wept for a long time, finally saying: "Ah, feeling of sorrow! Blessed be you for entering a heart made devout by grace and love, a heart that meditates on its Lord and Savior, who gives sweet pleasure in tears, when a person is willing to die for his Lord Jesus Christ."[75]

61. WHY MAN IS GOOD OR EVIL[76]

"DEAR SON," said the hermit, "man is good insofar as God has given him some of His own likeness; and he is good insofar as he wants to make use of the likeness God gave him. Man is evil when he acts contrary to God and to God's likeness; and he is evil when he does not want to make use of God's goodness and likeness, or when he makes use of evil and of that which is contrary to God's likeness.

"God wants man to be good and to believe in, and know, the fourteen articles on which our holy Roman faith is based, which articles, my son, you can get to know in the *Book of the Gentile*, where you can also learn about the seven virtues, the love of which makes man good, and about the seven vices, the love of which brings man harm.[77] Man is, moreover, good when he upholds the Ten Commandments and the seven sacraments, and when he thanks God for the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, all of which

[75] Thus in all medieval sources except for B (followed by the printed sources), which has "wants to die for the sake of His love, dominion, goodness, and honor."

[76] We have now left the physical and psychological side of man to embark on the moral and social side of man, which takes up the rest of Book VIII. It occupies some 85% of this book, and almost half of *Felix*. Here begins a long series of forty chapters based on pairs of contrasting principles.

[77] For the fourteen articles, see *Gentile*, Bk. III (and n. 3 there). For the virtues and vices, see the trees of the *Gentile* and Figure V of the *Ars demonstrativa*.

are discussed in the book *Doctrina pueril*.[78] And when man acts contrary to these things, he is displeasing to God.

"Son, goodness in man consists in remembering, understanding, and loving God, and evil consists in the contrary. And great goodness in man consists in greatly remembering, understanding, and loving God.

"Now son, do you know why goodness in man involves remembering, understanding, and loving God? Because man was created and made so as to remember, understand, and love God; and since it is a good thing to remember, understand, and love God, that is why man is good when he does that for which he was created; and since it is a wicked thing not to do that for which one was created, therefore man is wicked when he remembers, understands, and does not love God, or when he neither remembers, nor understands, nor loves God.[79]

"Son, the firmament, the sun, moon, stars, elements, plants, birds, fish, beasts, and all physical things are good in man, for God created them all to serve man, and without man they would be worth nothing; and man is good in God, because he was created to serve God and carry out His will, and, without God, man would be worth nothing. This being the case, therefore, you will be able to understand, son, from what I tell you, what makes man good and what makes man wicked in this world and in the next."

"Sir," said Felix, "if man is good in God, can God be good in man?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "God the Father is good in Himself, in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost; and the same is true of the Son, who is good in Himself, in the Father, and in the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is good in itself, in the Father, and in the Son. And this is why God created man, so that man may be good in God and good in himself, and so that God may be good in man when He infuses him with His grace. But this goodness that God has in man neither grows nor improves; for God is so replete with

[78] The Ten Commandments are discussed in chs. 13–22 of the *Doctrina pueril*. The seven sacraments (baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, orders, matrimony, and extreme unction) are discussed in chs. 23–9 there. The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and fear) are discussed in chs. 30–6 of the same work.

[79] In this paragraph are three of the principal "species" of Figure S (see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 13), that is to say, E, I, and N (cf. nn. 45 and 66 above).

all good things that it would not be fitting for Him to find improvement in anything that had some defect."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder how it can be that, if God has created man to be good and not to be bad, there are more wicked than good men, and the wicked are more wicked than the good are good." The hermit thought hard about Felix's question and wept for a long time, finally saying amid sighs:

"It once came to pass that Goodness and Evil were arguing, and Goodness said she was greater than Evil, while Evil held the contrary. Goodness claimed that she was greater than Evil in that she was similar to God, and was the servant of God, following the purpose of which she was created. Evil claimed on the other hand that she was greater than Goodness, for she had more princes and great lords in her servitude than Goodness, and there were more evil men than good men. Goodness felt defeated, until she said that one small good is greater in goodness than are many great evils in wickedness. For since greatness accords with good and is in disaccord with evil, therefore the more evil increases in greatness, the more it is in disaccord with greatness of evil, and the more the good increases, the more it accords with greatness of good."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder as to why it is that men are more inclined to be wicked than good."

"Son," said the hermit, "a holy man living in a hermitage had many temptations, and the more virtuous he was, the greater were his temptations. The holy man was in great wonder at the temptations he was suffering, for it seemed to him that the more he tried to be good, the less temptations he should suffer. While he was wondering about this, God said to him in a vision that goodness and holiness in man consisted in resisting and overcoming evil, which overcoming and resistence could not exist without temptations; and the greater the temptations, the greater the good of the man who overcame them."

"Sir," said Felix, "does a wicked man have any good in him; is he good for anything?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a certain woman, the wife of a gentleman, lived for a long time in the sin of lust; and because of the great sins she had committed, she despaired of God, thinking that no matter how great her penance, God would not forgive

her. While she was in this state of despair, suddenly one day she found happiness within her soul, and she said:

"'Lord God, blessed be Your great justice! For, since I am not good enough to receive Your mercy, I am at least good enough to suffer Your justice, which will sentence me to infernal punishment. Then I will be good in that I will be justly punished; and I will be good in that in me Your justice will be made manifest.' God was so pleased by the good woman's words that the justice He should have used to punish the wickedness of her sin was converted into the use of mercy through the goodness of contrition."[80]

"Sir," said Felix, "what is the greatest good a man can do in the whole world?"

"Son," said the hermit, "this you can know by its opposite, that is to say, that the greatest evil that exists in the world is not knowing and not loving God, or knowing and not loving God."

By the hermit's answer Felix realized that a wicked Christian is in greater sin, when he is wicked, than a wicked unbeliever, since a person who knows and yet does not love God does greater evil than the unbeliever who neither knows nor loves God. Felix, however, wondered about this matter, and he asked the hermit:

"Sir, insofar as the intellect knows God, it is good, and is better than the intellect which does not know God; and this is why Christians who know and do not love God are not as wicked as unbelievers who neither know nor love God."

"Son," said the hermit, "God has given the will the power to divert the intellect from the purpose for which it was created and also to dispose it toward the purpose for which it was created; or, in other words, when the intellect understands God and the will does not love God, then the intellect does not have good understanding, since such understanding is bad in the bad will; and this is because the intellect becomes bad through bad will, just as it becomes good through good will. Yet the intellect cannot change the will, but it can increase or decrease it; for the more the intellect understands good or evil, the more it gives the will the opportunity to have great or small power of willing."

[80] Thus in L, S, and the corrections in A, followed by Rosselló and *OE*; B, V, the uncorrected text of A, the eighteenth-century Spanish translation, and Galmés have "mercy."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder why it is that, if the will can alter the intellect for good or for evil, the intellect cannot alter the will for good or for evil."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God has given man free will, which is more dependent on the will than on the intellect, and this is why the will has the property of controlling the intellect, and the intellect has the property of making good or evil manifest to the will so that the will loves good and hates evil, and so that it loves the one and hates the other intensely."

"Sir," said Felix, "which can give man greater pleasure—doing good or doing evil?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a good woman, known for her chastity, charity, patience, and fortitude, had a husband who was lustful, jealous, ill humored, and of very bad habits. This wicked man, because of his evil ways, did injuries and villanies to his wife, whose pleasure in being chaste and patient, and in having good ways, was greater than the pain she suffered from the blows her husband gave her when he beat her or from the vile things he said to her."[81]

62. THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE[82]

THE HERMIT said to Felix that the active life and the contemplative life were a part of the human condition: "Active life is out of necessity, and contemplative life is one of fulfillment. And that is why the monk in the monastery did not want to be abbot."

"And how was that, sir?" Felix asked.

"Son," said the hermit, "in a very renowned abbey there was once a monk who was elected abbot, but this monk did not want to be abbot, saying that an abbot is nearer to the active life than

[81] This last clause is missing in MS B and Galmés's text.

[82] The problem of the contemplative vs. the active life is one that Llull discussed in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 87, the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 251, and the *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 39. See also *Blaquerna*, the end of ch. 53 and towards the beginning of ch. 60, where the problem of a man being elected abbot (see par. 3 here below) and the model of Christ and the Apostles (see the end of this chapter) are also discussed. As A. Caimari points out in the *ENC* edition of that work (Vol. IV, p. 43), this problem is like that of Saint Francis as to whether he should lead the life of a hermit or of a preacher. For this chapter, see also A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 116.

is a cloistered monk, and that the contemplative life is nearer to a cloistered monk than the active life; and since the contemplative life is nearer God than the active life, the monk therefore declined the offer. He said that he would have remorse of conscience if he became distant from God after being so close to Him. The monks, however, claimed that they had elected him abbot and that he could not refuse when the entire monastery wanted him to be abbot; and all the more so since, if he were an abbot with a good active life, all the other cloistered monks could then better lead a contemplative life."

Felix gave a great deal of thought to the hermit's example, and he was in wonder at a certain canon's simony in becoming bishop. And the hermit asked Felix what had happened. "Sir," said Felix, "a certain cleric was no sooner made canon than he wanted to become bishop. All the time he was canon, he wanted the bishop who had made him canon to die, because he thought that after the death of the bishop he would be elected in his place. Until the bishop died, he kept trying to please the other canons, so they would like him and elect him bishop, and to this end he gave many gifts and underwent all sorts of expenses and unpleasantnesses. Now since a bishop is subject to the active life, whereas a canon is free to lead a contemplative life, I wonder why a man would prefer to be in servitude rather than in liberty."

"Son," said the hermit, "the case of this bishop is not like that of another who wanted to be bishop."

"And how was that, sir?" Felix inquired.

"Dear son," replied the hermit, "in a certain very honored church there was a wicked bishop who, as a result of his evil ways, felt he had to be continually on his guard against being poisoned. Finally an archdeacon poisoned this bishop and he died; and this archdeacon confessed his sin to a canon. It came to pass that this canon was elected bishop, but he was afraid of being poisoned himself if he became bishop, and he was unhappy at having to change his contemplative life for an active one. But he took the risk of becoming bishop so as to gain some merit for watching over the common good, and so he could be good where someone else might have been bad; and he enjoyed being bishop. And after being elected bishop, he said:

"'My friends, you have chosen me to be your shepherd, and as a result I, who was free, am now in servitude; but all the same I want to try as hard as I can to be a good shepherd; and if sheep are commended to a shepherd, the shepherd commends himself to the sheep by being a good shepherd.' That bishop," said the hermit, "led a good and saintly life, and he never worried about poisons, for he trusted in God and in the good works he did. He lived for a long time in his bishopric, and because of the anguish he suffered and the good works he did, there was no canon in that bishopric who won as much merit through a contemplative life as did that bishop through an active life.

"On a high mountain there once lived a hermit who led a deeply contemplative life. One day he happened to think about Jesus Christ's holy Passion and about the people who so little loved and honored Him in comparison with the great love Jesus Christ felt for them. As a result of these thoughts, he came down from his hermitage, wanting to lead an active life in order to persuade people to praise, love, and know Jesus Christ. When, however, he began leading an active life, experiencing the hardships sustained by those who only want to lead an active life, he then wanted to return to his hermitage and his former contemplative life, which had fewer hardships and pitfalls than an active life. But when the hermit thought about fortitude, patience, and charity, which are so necessary for an active life, his boldness and courage increased, as did his devotion in loving and praising God. And he went throughout the world, doing whatever good he could, in order to make God loved and known.

"One day the hermit asked an archbishop, who had a large income and who had amassed great wealth, to construct a monastery where monks could lead a contemplative life, and where they might pray God to grant him an active life, which he did not lead, since he took his wealth from poor Christians. The archbishop was very angry at what the holy hermit told him, and had him beaten and expelled from his court. And the hermit said that this beating was the pleasure and fruit of the active life, from which the fruit of the contemplative life was born and produced seed and leaf.

"A holy monk and prelate for a long time led an active life insofar as he was a prelate,[83] and a contemplative life insofar as he was a monk. In his active life he underwent hardships, for he worked physically and mentally for the common good. This work was physical and spiritual: physical[84] in that he had to go from place to place preaching, and he had to admonish the monks entrusted to his care; spiritual in that he was unhappy when a monk acted contrary to honesty, charity, humility, patience, and obedience. This monk would not have been able to undergo these hardships had he not found help in the pleasures of the contemplative life, which he experienced when he remembered, understood, and loved God, and despised the vanities of this world."

This is what the hermit told Felix so that he would have knowledge of the active and contemplative life. And when Felix had understood each of these lives, he said to the hermit:

"I am in great wonder that Christ and the Apostles took on an active life in this world and not a contemplative life, if the contemplative life is nobler than the active life."

"Sir," said the hermit, "Christ and the Apostles led an active life with reference to their bodies, and a contemplative life with reference to their souls; and this you should be able to understand from the above example of the holy monk and prelate I just gave you."

63. FAITH AND DISBELIEF[85]

"SON," SAID the hermit to Felix, "faith consists in believing in the fourteen articles; and faith is the light of human understanding, for faith assumes what the understanding does not understand, and the understanding, thanks to this assumption, rises up and understands things it could not understand without the assumption of faith. And disbelief, son, is the very contrary of faith.

[83] "Insofar as he was a prelate" is missing in B and in Galmés's text.
[84] The last three words are missing in B, the uncorrected text of A, and in Galmés.
[85] Here begins a series of thirteen chapters dedicated to the virtues and vices (cf. n. 77 above), each paired with its contrary. There are thirteen instead of the expected fourteen (seven of each) because in ch. 69 the last virtue (temperance) is paired with the first sin (gluttony). For *descreença*, "disbelief," "unbelief" in the sense of "lack of faith," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 15. For definitions of the virtues and vices, see *Ars brevis*, Part IX, subj. 9.

"Son, a layman wanted to leave off the vanities of the world, and dedicate himself to knowing and loving God. This man was quite unlettered and knew little, and so when he tried to understand the articles and the sacred scriptures, he could not, at which point disbelief almost induced and influenced him to disbelieve the Roman faith. But faith, by the power and grace of God, sustained him against disbelief, making him assume what he did not understand, and he considered and stated that the faith and Scriptures of Christians were the true path, even though he could not understand why, for there were many things he did not understand, and faith itself was one of them.

"Son, because of his using faith against disbelief, this man's intellect was raised up by the light of faith, and he understood many things about the articles and about other matters that he had not understood before; and such was the way he understood them, that disbelief could not defeat him, nor place temptation in the way of his faith.

"Dear son, faith is loving God in His Unity, Trinity, Incarnation, and in the other articles, which love is the work of the will, which does not understand what it loves, but which assumes it to be true. God gave this faith to men, so that they may believe what they cannot understand; and God placed this faith in the safekeeping of the Pope, cardinals, prelates, and other churchmen, to keep it and defend it against the disbelief of Jews, Saracens, heretics, and unbelievers, who are continually trying to destroy the Roman faith. Son, Christian laymen should guard and maintain the faith by force of arms, and churchmen should maintain it by force of reason and Scriptures, of prayers and of holy life."

After saying this and many other things, the hermit wept for a long time and then continued: "Ah, Lord God, in what a state of dishonor lies the holy Christian faith, for the defense and exaltation of which You willed to be man and to deliver that man unto death! And the Saracens, who are sons of disbelief, hold and possess that Holy Land beyond the sea where the faith was founded and given in charge to the holy Church! Ah, Lord God, when will the day come that combatants, lovers, and praisers will set out, using physical and spiritual arms, to bring honor to the faith and destroy the error by which faith is put to such shame in this world?

"Son, there was once a very powerful prince to whom God had done great honor in this world. One day the prince went out hunting, and was chasing a wild boar. While chasing the boar, he met up with Faith and Disbelief, who were quarreling. And Faith called out to the prince in a loud voice, saying:

"'Oh Prince, you who hunt wild beasts who are God's creatures, help me against Disbelief, who is the cause of my being so dishonored, scorned, and belittled among men. Leave these wild beasts you are hunting, and come and honor me, since it is through me that you are a Christian and it is to honor me that you were made prince, and since without me you cannot find salvation. While you are alive, give all of yourself and all of your land to the cause of honoring in me the God who created and honored you; and be as fervent in honoring God in my honor as you are in capturing wild animals; and arrange it so that after your death your descendants will always honor me.'

"This and many other things Faith said to the king who was hunting, but the king, paying little attention to her words, ran off once again after the boar. Faith wept, while Disbelief laughed at her and boasted, saying that she had more servants than Faith. Faith replied, saying that Disbelief gave ill reward to her servants."

Felix was in wonder at the hermit's words, and he said that he wondered greatly at how the Christian faith was not preached among the infidels by people praising and honoring it so nobly that they would not hesitate to honor it in spite of hardships, dangers, death, or anything else; since for the sake of great honor there should be little hesitation in such things.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "a man took up the profession of minstrel and went among princes and prelates begging them to help faith against disbelief. One day he happened to be eating in the court of a noble prelate with many other minstrels. After the meal, he asked the prelate if he wanted to honor the faith for which he had been made a prelate and for which he was honored. The prelate asked this man, minstrel of faith and minstrel of Christ,[86] how he could honor faith. The minstrel replied, saying

[86] The Franciscan idea of the *joculator Dei* or "minstrel of God" (cf. introduction, text at nn. 16–17 above) is best exemplified in the famous Minstrel of Valor in *Blaquerna*, ch. 48. See Caimari's note in the *ENC* edition of that work, Vol. IV, 39–41, with references to the interesting ch. 118 of the *Book of Contemplation*. There is naturally a strong auto-

that he should build a monastery where monks could learn Arabic and then go off to honor the faith in the Holy Land overseas, where disbelief holds it in such dishonor.[87] The prelate said that anyone who discussed such matters with Saracens would die; and it did not seem right for men to die fruitlessly. The minstrel replied, saying that the fruit consisted more in praising and honoring God than in saving and converting men, for praising and honoring God and the faith is nobler than converting men; and therefore, even though one might not be able to convert any Saracens, one should not desist from praising and honoring God, who for Himself alone is worthy of being praised, honored, and blessed; and the greatest honor one can do Him is to risk death and die for Him, thus honoring and praising Him with those means by which He can be most honored.

"What the minstrel said was of little use, for the prelate with whom he was talking was held in servitude by disbelief. This minstrel was dressed in black, with a long beard, and he went through different lands lameting that his Lord Jesus Christ was dishonored by the high position that disbelief held in this world. The minstrel wept and people laughed at his tears; he gave necessary reasons against disbelief; and those who should have supported him reproached him; as a result of which Faith was saddened and Disbelief gladdened.

"Son," said the hermit to Felix, "weep and lament the dishonor suffered by faith in this world, and observe how disbelief is so honored against faith; observe how much people love physical pleasures; observe how many unbelievers there are, and how few Catholics; and even among Catholics see how few there are who love to honor and exalt the faith that has been entrusted to their care. Son, open your eyes and see how, for the sake of temporal honors, which are worthless, people will not hesitate to suffer hardships, dangers, death, and other similar things. Let this be a source of wonder, my son, since you are observing wonders."

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biographical element in this figure (see the description of the "long beard" and mention of "necessary reasons" in the next paragraph; cf. Bk. VII, n. 33 above for similar passages). See in this connection Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 220, where Llull is compared to "a wandering mystical preacher of Islam."

[87] This, of course, was the ideal of Miramar, expressed more directly even at the end of ch. 89 below (cf. n. 168 there).

These and many other things the hermit told Felix, all amidst tears, great devotion, and fervor of heart. Felix wept, and he lamented the dishonor faith suffered in this world, and hated the honor given to disbelief, and was in great wonder at how few friends faith had.

64. HOPE AND DESPAIR[88]

"DEAR SON," said the hermit, "hope and despair are contraries. Hope is a virtue God created so that man would place his hope in the goodness, greatness, justice, and mercy of God, and in all His other dignities. And despair is the exact contrary of all this.

"Son, you should know that man was created and came from nothing, which is why man in himself is such a puny, insignificant thing and should place his trust in nothing he himself acquires but rather in the Lord God who is infinite in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and in the fulfillment of every perfection. Therefore man should trust in whatever is great, good, and powerful; yet despair can make a person act completely contrary to hope.

"Son, there was once a king who was both wealthy and powerful, and in person he was young and healthy. This king fought a prince who was an old man, and who was entering the fray with a smaller army than the young king. The old king trusted in God's power, justice, and mercy; and the young king, upon entering the fray, wanted to have hope in God, but he was tempted by false hope into thinking that he could defeat the old king without the help of God, merely by dint of having more troops and of being personally stronger. While the young king was thus being tempted by false hope, it occurred to him that God was stronger than his youth or power. And when this occurred to him, he realized the injustice he had done the old king, and he understood that, having wronged the old king, he could have no hope of God's helping him in battle. As a result, the young king made peace with the old king, and he redressed the wrong he had done him, saying he considered himself defeated in the battle, but that he in turn had defeated false hope and the temptation it gave him."

[88] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 29. See also M. A. Seguí Servols, "La esperanza, en el Bto. Ramón Llull," *EL* 10 (1966), 141–52, where passages from this chapter are analyzed.

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am in great wonder how it is that a sinner can have hope in God while being in mortal sin."

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a man who was very sinful, for he indulged in every one of the seven mortal sins. One day it came to pass that he gave thought to his sins and realized how sinful he was. These thoughts led him to despair of God's mercy, and he said to himself that he was so sinful that God's mercy neither could nor should forgive him. He was, however, in great wonder at himself for despairing of God's mercy, which was greater than his sin. While in this state of wonder he realized, by the divine grace of God, that his despair was caused by his loving his own sinfulness, since sin and a love of sin accord with one another. But as soon as he turned against sin, he became a child of hope and trusted in God's mercy. When this man had ceased being the servant of despair and had put himself beneath the protection of hope, he felt great joy in his heart, and he wondered how any man could be in sin and still believe he would find salvation. The man thought a long time about the subject of his wonderment, and he understood that those men who are in sin and think they will find salvation have no hope; for if they did have any hope it would follow that hope and sin would be in accord, which accord is impossible. And he said that this was not really hope, but rather false belief and false opinion, which they have because of their confused love of salvation and fear of damnation.

"Son, every time that man places his hope in God, he honors and praises God, for God wants to be honored and praised by man, so He can have the opportunity to do man great good. It once came to pass that God put a certain prince in a difficult situation in this world. The prince suffered great hardships and anguish for the love of our Lord, yet the more he was made to suffer, the more he trusted and had hope in God; and this hope of his sustained and consoled him, lightening the dangers and burdens he suffered for the sake of serving God. When the prince's situation was at its worst and everything seemed lost, despair came to him to make him despair of God; but at the same time hope told him that the more despair tormented and tempted him, the greater the hope he should have.

"For a long time the prince was tempted by despair, repeatedly defeating it with hope. One day he became annoyed at the struggle going on within him between hope and despair, and at the suffering he had undergone so long for the sake of serving God, and he begged God to kill him once and for all or to alleviate his suffering, for he felt he could stand it no longer. The prince fell asleep after finishing his prayer, and in a dream he thought he heard a voice telling him that God wanted men to suffer hardships, dangers, poverty, and many other misfortunes in this world, so that they can make use of hope against despair; and it is by this hope that God wants to be served, since He considers it a great honor when man, amidst perils, hardships, and tribulations, invokes Him and trusts in Him; and man thus gives God opportunity to help him and bestow great glory on him, when he places his hope and trust in Him.

"After having this vision, and subsequently waking up, the prince felt very consoled by the dream he had had, and asked only to spend the rest of his life amidst suffering and perils for the sake of honoring God, for the greater was his hope, the more he loved and honored God.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "any man who hopes to be saved through his merits does not have true hope, for true hope is more a matter of the grace of God than the merits of men. And that is why a certain holy man said on his deathbed that he was dying between hope and fear."

"And how was that, sir?" Felix asked.

"For a long time," said the hermit, "a certain man lived a sinful life in this world, and then became a just man who led a very holy life; and at his death he reflected that God sometimes forgives through mercy and sometimes punishes through justice. And when he thought about God's mercy he had hope; and when he thought about His justice he was afraid, which was why he said he was dying between hope and fear.

"Son," said the hermit, "it once happened that a Christian and a Saracen were traveling through an uninhabited area when they came upon a Jew carrying a large amount of money, and they killed him in order to take his money. A long time afterwards the Saracen was near death, and he despaired of God's mercy, considering himself a sinner for having killed the Jew. The Christian,

when he was about to die, confessed the sin he had committed in killing the Jew and then said that he was sure the Christian religion accorded better with greatness of hope than any other religion. Those present at his death bed were in great wonder at the Christian's words and begged him to explain them, so they could understand why he said the Christian faith offered greater hope than any other religion.

"Then the holy man who was dying told them about the death of the Jew, and about the Saracen who had died despairing of God's mercy, for he could not have such hope as could the Christian in God's mercy, in which a Christian can have greater hope than a person of any other religion. For since a Christian believes that God became incarnate for the love of man and died for man's sake, he therefore has greater hope in God than anyone else."

"Sir," said Felix, "it would seem to me that a Christian who despairs of God has greater despair than any Jew or Saracen; for just as he can have greater hope, so can he have greater despair."

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a discussion between a king and one of his squires. The king maintained that a king can more easily sin than a subject, and that the blame is not so great when he sins as when a subject does. The squire replied that according to what the king said it followed that a vassal had greater opportunities to do good and earn merit than a king, from which it would follow that if there were any more sin or imperfection in God it would not be greater than it would be in man."

65. CHARITY AND CRUELTY[89]

"CHARITY, SON, is the virtue which brings about friendship between God and man; and cruelty is the vice contrary to charity, which brings about enmity between God and man.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "charity associates with God those likenesses which man has to God's virtues, in such a way that God's goodness and man's goodness, God's greatness and man's greatness,[90] and so on, all constitute a single likeness and glori-

[89] For "charity," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 19. "Cruelty" is often given as its opposite; cf. the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 291, and the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 658.

[90] "God's greatness and man's greatness" is lacking in A B (although added by a later hand in the former), and hence in Galmés's text.

fication, like creator and creature, cause and effect, father by creation and son, lord and vassal, and glorifier and glorified.

"Son," said the hermit, "how could I possibly explain to you the nobility and utility[91] of charity, and especially when a man has a great abundance of it towards God, towards himself, and towards his neighbor? And as for its contrary, that is cruelty, no man can imagine the evils ensuing from those who are cruel and contrary to charity. For because of the great cruelty present in the world, charity is almost lost; and for every man who is on the path of salvation through charity, there are a thousand who are on the path of damnation through cruelty. And by this cruelty those likenesses that man has to God's virtues are turned into their contraries by the work of cruelty and enmity, making them contrary to God and His virtues; thus when man's goodness is without charity it is contrary to God's charity. The same follows from man's greatness, which is thus contrary to God's greatness, and the same holds true for the other virtues."

When Felix had understood the great nobility of charity, and its great usefulness, and the great harm that comes from cruelty, and when he had heard the hermit say that out of every thousand men only one was on the path to salvation and all the rest were on the path to damnation, then he was in great wonder as to why, if charity was a virtue so pleasing to God and cruelty a vice so displeasing to God, charity had so few people who loved it and cruelty had so many servants.

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a matter for great wonder how charity has thus been lost. And where has devotion gone? And why has cruelty increased so much?"

"Son," said the hermit, "charity has been lost in a reversal of intention, for charity can only exist when there is true and ordered intention, and for the purpose of which all existing things were created. But since men turn this intention for which they were created into an intention for which they were not created, therefore charity is being destroyed and cruelty increases."

Felix did not understand what the hermit had said, and he asked him to give him an example of what he meant, so he could understand it.

91 "Virtue" in A and all the printed sources. The reading of "utility," however, is confirmed by the beginning of the next paragraph.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a bishop who turned all the powers of his position towards the intention of having himself honored, feared, and praised. This was why he gave many banquets, led a life of ostentation, and indulged in other vanities—all with the intention of honoring himself and having people praise what he did. This intention of his, however, was contrary to the intention for which he was elected bishop, and against the calling of a bishop; and this was why, in what that bishop did, cruelty had such power and charity had almost nothing in which to take root."

After hearing this, Felix said: "Ah, so great is the wrong of those in whom charity dies and cruelty lives! And so great would be the merit of those who could help charity, and who could exalt it to the position of high honor it deserves!" Felix wept, as did the hermit, who then added:

"For lack of charity men prefer white bread, good wine, money, clothes, women, children, cities, castles, and honors, to God. Through excess of cruelty people are disinherited, women become widows, and poor people die of hunger, thirst and cold while begging for alms for the love of God; cruelty makes people forget pity, forgiveness, and mercy; cruelty has increased vileness over honor, and falsehood over truth; and cruelty makes virtues exist in small quantity and vices in great number."

"Sir," said Felix, "is there no step one could take, nor manner in which one could increase charity and lessen cruelty?" The hermit replied saying that whoever wanted to exalt charity would need people who were many and noble, as well as of great courage and virtue in loving and honoring God, who would not fear suffering shame and criticism, and would not fear dangers, poverty, hardships, or death. But almost all the men charity needs are against her, which is why almost the entire world is going to perdition.

"Son," said the hermit, "in a certain city there was a very avaricious bishop, and the prince of the city was a very wicked and cruel man, for in both of them charity was lacking and cruelty prevailed. The inhabitants of the city had a bad example to follow, and as a result charity decreased and cruelty increased. Now in that city there was a just man who led a holy life, a son of charity, a man who was poor in worldly goods but rich in those of the

spirit. One day the prince and the bishop happened to be riding together when they passed by the street where the holy man lived. Upon seeing them, the holy man cried out, saying that in them charity was dead and cruelty held them in its sway. The man was taken and beaten, and put in jail, where he remained a long time because of what he had said to the enemies of patience, humility and charity.

"Son," said the hermit, "open your bodily and mental eyes, and see how God has great charity towards His people, since He created them out of nothing; moreover, for the service of man he gave sky, sun, stars, sea, land, plants, beasts, birds, and everything that exists. And what is more, in order to save man, He made Himself man, which man He delivered unto death to save His people. All this God did out of His great charity. Now see how little charity His people have towards Him; see how many people are in error here among us, scorning and blaspheming God, not believing in Him, and dishonoring Him as much as they can; and see how few are those who try to have God loved, known, and honored in the world.

"A poor man was once walking through a noble town and he saw many men with gyrfalcons, which they had brought from one end of the world[92] and were now taking to the Tartars to make money. Afterward, he saw a bishop with a large retinue on his way to Rome to ask the pope to confirm him in his see. Then the poor man passed through a square where he saw stalls full of fine cloth, bankers' tables piled high with money, silversmiths' shops with many gilded silver cups, and he saw many other vanities. Later on, in other streets, he saw poor men who were naked, wasted, and famished, begging and asking alms for the love of God, and nobody showed them any charity but rather refused them cruelly and with vile words. The poor man was in wonder, and he said: 'Where is charity? And what is cruelty doing in this town?' The poor man wanted to cry out and blame the people who were children of cruelty; but he was afraid of people's crit-

[92] This picturesque phrase—*la ·i· cap del món* in the original—probably comes from the fact that gyrfalcons, the magnificent white hawks much prized in falconry, are circumpolar in distribution. Cf. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 76–7, where this scene is set in the context of town life of the period.

icism, and he realized he was not yet a true child of charity, for if he were, he would fear no criticism in praising God."

66. JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE[93]

"DEAR SON," said the hermit, "in God there is justice which loves its own likeness, in that it wants justice to be in man; but with injustice, which is contrary to justice, man makes his justice perish, and makes it, with the help of injustice, contradict God's justice.[94]

"Son, through justice man should love, honor, know, and serve God more than anything else, for God is nobler than anything else, nor is there anything existing as good or noble as God; and this is why it is only right that God be loved and known more than anything else in existence. It is thus a great injustice for man to love and serve something else more than God.

"Son, since there are more men who prefer other things to God than there are who prefer God to other things, there is therefore more injustice than justice in the world; and since the whole world is the creature of God and since in God there is not the slightest trace of injustice, it is therefore a source of great wonder how there can exist in the world more injustice than justice, which bears a likeness to God's justice."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am indeed in great wonder at how God, who is just, allows injustice in a world that is His, and does not do something so that men be more on the side of justice than injustice."

"Son," said the hermit, "God's justice has created free will in man, and He therefore cannot, should not, nor wants to inhibit this free will in man. And since men, given freedom, tend to love, know, honor, and serve one another more than they know, love, honor, and serve God, it therefore follows that injustice is greater than justice in the world.

"Son, God wants man to measure justly[95] the physical pleasures he receives seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, and the same is true of his spiritual pleasures, that is, remembering,

[93] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, nn. 28 and 34.

[94] Both Palma MSS, and hence all the printed sources, have the last part of this sentence wrong; L V S agree on the text translated.

[95] The remarks of the preceding note apply to the beginning of this sentence as well.

understanding, and loving; and God's justice wants man to give greater weight to spiritual pleasures than to physical pleasures; and if man does the contrary, then injustice overrides justice, and by this overriding men fall beneath the ire of God, whose justice punishes them with infinite sufferings.

"A judge once handed down a wrongful sentence in the presence of a shoemaker who was making him a pair of shoes. This shoemaker then made the judge one shoe too big and the other too small. When the shoemaker came to the judge to have him try on the shoes, the judge saw that one shoe was too big and the other too small, which made him wonder why the shoemaker had made such a mistake in the measurement of the shoes, which was a thing he usually did well, and he scolded the shoemaker. The latter replied that he was in great wonder as to how the judge recognized and wanted equal measurements for his feet, when in the sentence he had handed down he had wanted his measurements unequal and contrary to justice.

"Son," said the hermit, "a certain king was very wealthy and powerful, yet everything he had was used for gaining honor and for indulging in the delights of this world; and just as he had been chosen to love and maintain justice, so, when it came to choosing justice, he sided with injustice against justice. And this is why one of his peasants said he preferred driving oxen to being king. Which words caused the king great wonder, and he wanted to know why the peasant had spoken them.

"'Sir,' said the peasant, 'there was once a king who gave over his entire life and his whole kingdom to the vanities of this world; in the end, when he was near death, he repented of not having dedicated his life and kingdom to loving and knowing, honoring and serving God. And he thought that if he had done so, he could have destroyed all the Saracens in Barbary and given their lands to Christians.'[96] In this soul the king weighed God's great justice, and because of the injustice he had continually done God, his hope did not take account of the greatness of God's mercy, and because of the great sin he had committed against justice, he despaired of God.

[96] A B, followed by Galmés, have the king giving all the Saracens in Barbary to the Christians.

"Once, while praying, a sinner thought about the great injustice he had done God, and he said: 'O Justice of God, injustice is against you; and I, with injustice, have long opposed you, for nearly all of my life I have been against justice. And therefore you, Justice, have the right to sentence me to eternal fire; may your will be done.' Since this sinner passed judgment on himself for his own wrongs, and since he found pleasure in applying God's justice, therefore the application of justice and of mercy were in accord in the sinner, and brought him salvation.

"There was once a usurer who loved his son very much; when he was about to die he did not want to return the money he had unjustly earned, for he preferred his son to be wealthy rather than for himself to be saved. While the usurer was on his deathbed his confessor recounted the following example:

"'In a certain city there was a knight who was provost of that city and who had an only son he loved very much. It came to pass that this son of his killed a man, and the father had him hung, saying that justice among men was worth more than filial love which was contary to justice.' Such was the power of injustice within that usurer, however, that he paid no attention to his confessor's example.

"It once happened that a king sentenced a peasant to death for killing another peasant. A long time after the event the king was out hunting, and by chance came to lodge in the house of the son of the peasant he had condemned to death. When he was in the peasant's house and sleeping in his bed the peasant wanted to kill the king who had caused his father to be hung. While the peasant was thinking about this, he recalled the justice with which the king had punished his father, and he said that it was unjust for him to want to kill the king. As a result of these considerations, he said: 'Injustice, you have increased too much in this world, and justice is too belittled here. So that I may do honor to justice in at least one way, I want to be just with the king who is my lord and who justly hung my father. I do this to honor you, Justice, and the lessen injustice.'

"While the king was sleeping, he got the feeling that the peasant wanted to kill him, but that Justice was on his side; and in his sleep he promised Justice that if she helped him so that the peasant did not kill him, he would never do her any wrong or injury.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "think what a great injustice man does God when for any little thing he ceases to love, honor, and serve Him; for just as God is finer and nobler than anything else, so does man do Him great injustice in ceasing to love, honor, and serve Him. And because the injustice is so great, therefore God's justice punishes it with a punishment greater than one can envisage or imagine, and one that is without end.

"Dear son, it is because the contrariety between justice and injustice is so great that God wants people to undergo great hardships and dangers in this world, in order to destroy injustice and maintain justice; but since it is difficult to suffer these hardships and dangers, men who are weak of heart and have little love for exalting and honoring justice over injustice are easily vanquished, and prefer to be idle children of injustice rather than suffering children of justice; and this is why justice is forever perishing and injustice is exalted."

67. WISDOM AND FOLLY[97]

"SON, THE WISDOM of God the Father, understanding Himself, begets the Son who is wisdom; and since God the Father, with wisdom and love, begets His Son who is God, He therefore wanted man to have wisdom, to understand God, and therefore love God. But if man understands God and does not love Him, then that understanding gives folly, which is contrary to God, an opportunity to exist in man.

"Dear son, God's wisdom accords with great greatness of goodness, infinity, eternity, power, and will, which is why He wants man's wisdom to be great in goodness, quantity, duration, power and will;[98] for the greater is man's wisdom in all these things, the more it is similar to God's wisdom and the farther it is from, and the easier it can destroy, folly.

[97] Instead of the expected fifth virtue of "prudence" (see *Gentile*, Bk. I, Trees 2 and 4), Llull has "wisdom" here. But note that in the *Libre d'intenció*, ch. V, sec. 5, he says, "Dear son, prudence and wisdom are almost the same thing." See also *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 56, par. 4, and n. 219 below. As for "folly" (*follia*), it is the usual contrary of "wisdom" when the latter is used in a moral sense (cf. the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 651).

[98] Notice how in the step from God to man, "infinity" becomes "quantity," and "eternity" becomes "duration." cf. *Ars brevis*, Part I, n. 2.

"Son," said the hermit, "a king was once hunting in a great wood, chasing a wild boar. It came to pass that the king fell from his horse and broke his leg. He cried out for help, and he would have died in the middle of that wood if there had not been a hermit who heard his cries and who took him to his cell and cared for him till he was cured.

"While the hermit was caring for the king, he thought about the king's greatness, which manifested itself in many ways, such as his being tall and handsome in person, and having power in terms of people and wealth. As he thought about these things, the hermit fervently wished the king to have wisdom in all these great things, for if not, he would have great foolishness in all of them, as great, in fact, as was the need for greatness of wisdom.

"A poor, wise man was standing by the door of a church when a very rich burgher rode by on his palfrey. Now this burgher was a very worldly man, and he never made reverence before the church. The wise man thought about the burgher's folly, and he said to himself: 'What is this burgher's youth, health, or fortune worth if he has no wisdom, and if he only makes foolish use of everything he has, and does not know God, nor himself, nor the worldly goods God has entrusted to him, which he treats foolishly.' The wise man felt contempt for the burgher, as well as for the wealth and honors he had accumulated, saying he preferred to be poor and have wisdom than to be rich and foolish."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at the people of this world preferring honors and wealth to wisdom, since wisdom is closer to a man's true nature than honors or money, castles, estates, or cities, and since a man's wisdom is more pleasing to God than any physical or worldly thing."

"Son," said the hermit, "man's wisdom is born from understanding and loving God, and dies through forgetting and not loving God; by which death man's folly is born, a folly that he betrays in preferring honors, pleasures, wealth, and family to God. To remember, understand, and love virtues, and to remember, understand and hate vices is the basis of wisdom, and the contrary is the basis of folly. As a result of this, God turned down a king's prayers—not wanting to give him glory—and sentenced him to the punishments of Hell."

"And how was that?" Felix asked.

The hermit said: "There was once a king who was very powerful, and who had a great abundance of worldly possessions. For a long time the king lived in this world amidst great prosperity and honors, giving little thought to God's honor. When it came time for him to die, he beseeched God to grant him Paradise. A voice came to him in a vision, however, saying that the one who had made him remember, understand, and love the pleasures of this world more than God should be the one to grant him what he wanted.

"A fool encountered a wise man on the street one day. The fool in his folly said many nasty things to the wise man without the slightest reason. For a long time the wise man was patient with the nasty things the fool said to him, and the more patience he had, the more his wisdom grew. After a long time of the fool casting aspersions on his honor, the wise man felt his patience beginning to give way to impatience, and he was in great wonder how it could be that he was on the brink of impatience, when it seemed to him that the more wisdom he had the farther he should be from impatience. But when the wise man remembered, understood, and loved greatness of wisdom, then he understood that his wisdom would be great by means of the strength, abstinence, and patience which began to take hold of him when he felt himself tending towards ire and impatience. And he checked that inclination, combatting ire and impatience with strength of heart, loving great greatness of wisdom, humility, and patience. And he said to himself that the monk was a fool to leave wisdom for folly."

"And how was that, Sir?" Felix asked.

"In a certain city," the hermit replied, "there was a monk who was very wise, and had a great reputation for leading a holy life and being very wise. One day a fool heard about this monk, and he was annoyed at hearing him praised. And the fool said he could drive the monk out of his mind[99] if he wanted to. The men who were praising the monk said he could not. So the fool went to the monk and said horrid things to him, which made the monk very angry, and on account of this anger he said many foolish things.

[99] The *enfellonir* ("anger") of the printed texts comes from the unreliable MS B, since A is missing a folio here; but the other MSS have *enfollir*, which is much more in keeping with the subject of the chapter.

Those who had been praising the monk for his wisdom were in great wonder at how a fool could have made him err against wisdom, which he so long maintained against pride and folly."

"Sir," said Felix, "what is the wisest thing a man can do in this world?"

The hermit replied that the wisest thing a man can do in this world is to try to bring about the greatest good possible in the world, which is the common benefit of knowing and loving God. Felix understood the hermit's words,[100] and he was in great wonder at the great folly of men of high station who lack that great wisdom that surpasses all other wisdoms in greatness of perfection, justice, and goodness.

"In a lovely meadow, Wisdom and Folly once met beneath a lovely tree by a spring. Beneath this tree they found Charity and Devotion weeping bitterly because of how little the world esteemed them. Wisdom and Folly asked them why they were crying, and they replied that they were crying because they had lost their greatness in the world. Wisdom went to the greatness men have in this world through honors and wealth, and Folly did the same. Wisdom went to have their former greatness returned to Charity and Devotion, and Folly went there so they would conserve littleness of Charity and Devotion even longer.

"Wisdom and Folly called on a man who was very rich and honored. Wisdom told him to give all his honors and wealth to the cause of serving, loving, and knowing God, so that Charity and Devotion would be great. This man wanted to obey Wisdom, but Folly told him that if he did the pleasures of the world would lose greatness and be in littleness. Without hesitation, greatness was given to Folly, and Wisdom wept, saying:

"'Because of you, Folly, greatness of goodness, charity, devotion, prayer, alms, and contrition is lost, and because of you, greatness of celestial glory is lost and exchanged for greatness of infernal punishment. And the greater you are, Folly, the greater is your wickedness. Ah, when will the day come when you will

[100] The text here is that of Galmés and all the MSS, except for B (followed by the other printed sources) and a marginal note in L, which have, "Felix understood, by the hermit's words, that the greatest wisdom consists in trying to get the entire world beneath a single faith, believing what the Christians believe—that God took on human flesh in order to save man."

have little wickedness, and I great goodness?' This made Folly happy, and it made Wisdom weep.

"Folly wanted to prove that she was greater than Wisdom, and she said that a certain man lived like a miser so he could make an impressive will when his days ended; and he died in the ire of God so that people would praise him for having been a rich man. This miser lost God for the sake of praise after his death.

"She then said that a man once killed himself because of jealousy; another condemned himself by not wanting to confess a sin he had committed; another committed murder just because of something unpleasant a man said to him; and another preferred to praise himself than God. By saying these and many other things, Folly proved that in this world she was greater than Wisdom. Wisdom saw that what Folly said was true, and she felt great sorrow.

"In the court of a certain king there were two fools: one acted the fool to make money by saying foolish things that would make the king and his knights laugh so they would give him money and clothes; the other acted the fool so he could utter words of praise and love about God and have the king and the barons of his court listen to him, and as a result know and love God.[101] The one who pretended to be foolish just to make money always had a large audience, and there were many in that court who gave him big presents; and as for the good man who pretended to be foolish just to honor our Lord God and who wanted nothing from them, no one listened to him or valued what he said. Then this holy man said in front of the king and his barons, 'Ah, folly! Why do you exist in the king and his servants in greater quantity than wisdom?'"

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a source of wonder to me that men play the fool to make money, when it seems to me they could make a great deal more by acting wise rather than foolish."

"Son," said the hermit, "the grain of wheat which lies beneath the earth becomes confounded and annihilated, so that by this confusion[102] the earth and other elements which are also con-

[101] For the notion of the saintly fool, see Bk. V, n. 6 above, and for that of *joculator Dei*, n. 86 of this Bk. VIII. For minstrels who play the fool just to make money, see the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 118,14. For the Provençal troubadour, Peire Vidal, as a model for such people—a model that must have been familiar to someone of Llull's background—see my *Songs of the Troubadours* (New York and London, 1972), pp. 164-7.

[102] For Llull's use of the terms "confusion" and "confounding," see Bk. VI, n. 13 above.

founded mix with it so that it can grow into a new shoot; for if the grain did not itself become confounded and similar in confusion to the other elements, then it could convert no other element to itself."

Felix understood the example, and said that a man acts the fool to please fools, and to receive gifts as a result of their pleasure.

68. POWER AND WEAKNESS[103]

"GOD HAS DISPOSED power in man in many different ways, so that from all these ways he could make a single great power disposed toward serving, loving, and knowing God. But weakness, son," said the hermit, "has become greater in serving, loving, and knowing God, and the power to sin, dislike, forget, and dishonor God has increased in the world.

"Son," said the hermit, "in God there is one power which is God, and all of this power is distributed in three ways, that is, the power which is the Father, the power which is the Son, and the power which is the Holy Ghost; and these three ways remain one power which is one God, one kind of power. And that is why, son, there can be no weakness in God, for all this power has a task as great as He Himself, which is immense goodness, greatness, eternity, wisdom, and will.

"Son, man's soul has the power to remember, understand, and love, and the more it remembers and understands something, the greater power it has to love, or not to love, that thing; and the less it remembers and understands it, the greater its weakness in loving it. And that is why the wise man told the fool he did not know how to love God."

"And how was that?" asked Felix.

"There was once a fool who felt he could be excused for not loving God by saying that he wanted to love Him but could not. And that wise man to whom the fool gave this excuse for not loving God said that the reason he could not love God was that his remembering weakened his memory of how to do it, since he did not use the power of remembering he had; and the same was true of his understanding, which did not have the power to un-

[103] Note the use of "power" (*poder*) instead of the expected "fortitude." For "weakness" (*frevoltat*) see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 28.

derstand God, since his will did not make it understand. Thus through a lack of will his memory and understanding lost their power; and by the loss of their power, power was lost in the will, and all three increased in weakness.

"Son, man has five bodily powers, which are the five senses; and through the custom of using these powers, the soul becomes accustomed to the power to do good or evil. Now if it becomes accustomed through them to have the power to do good, its power to do evil is weakened; and the same happens to the contrary situation. And this is why the wise man told the fool that he was weakening himself."

"And how was that, sir?" Felix asked.

"A man who was a fool and a sinner," replied the hermit, "was gluttonous, lecherous, and full of vices. He was forever wanting to see beautiful women and to taste savory dishes, and did not want to be chaste, or temperate in his eating; therefore his will was weakened with respect to being chaste and temperate, while his power in sin increased with respect to tasting and seeing.

"Son," said the hermit, "all of God's power is working as much as it can in itself, for if it did not, power would be greater than its works. Now since all God's power is as great in its works as in itself, that is why God wants man, insofar as he has the power to do so, to work toward loving and serving God, in order to be similar to His power. Thus, when man does not use all his power in serving God, he acts against his power and that of God, allowing dissimilarity to weaken his power. And this was discernible in the dislike a man had for his wife.

"Son, a man had a wife whom he wanted to, but could not, love, for he was always recalling the offenses he had seen his wife commit against herself, at the same time that he recalled the things he had done for her pleasure. And because in his memory there was contrariety and dissimilarity between himself and his wife, this caused the weakening of his power to love his wife, whom he wanted to love but could not."

"Sir," said Felix, "how can man increase his power to love, understand, and remember God?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a very sinful man who repented of his sins and did penance. This man had many temptations of different kinds. He felt tempted when he did good,

and tempted when he avoided doing the wicked things he used to do. These temptations brought him such great suffering that he was on the verge of despairing of God and returning to his sinful life; and he wondered why God did not give him the power to resist these temptations so that he would be rid of them. While he was wondering about this, he heard a voice say that a person can love, remember, and understand God with greater fervor by resisting and overcoming temptations and then contemplating God than without temptations or dangers. And the reason for this is that there is greater power in man if he overcomes hardships, dangers, and temptations than if he does not overcome them for the sake of loving, understanding, and remembering God."

"Sir," said Felix, "why does God give man the power to sin? For I find it a source of great wonder that He does."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God created free will in man, which is something man would not have if he could not sin; and to be able to sin, to have power overcome itself in not sinning, and fulfill itself in hating sin, that is greatness of power, and contrary to weakness of same.

"Son, there was once a very powerful king who was a very sinful man, so sinful in fact that he turned all his power into sin. The more he sinned, the more his power to sin increased, and the more his ability to do good weakened, for the sake of which good God had given him the great power that he diverted toward sinning." Felix was in great wonder at the king's great guilt, in converting his power into so much evil, and giving his weakness so much power.

"Son, there was once a holy man who wanted to increase the greatness of his power, and wanted to avoid weakness. He therefore saw to it that his power did good works, and that these works were great in prayer, wisdom, charity, justice, humility, generosity, patience, and all the other virtues. The more the holy man's power increased in virtues, the more it increased in greatness and the farther it removed him from weakness. It once came to pass that this man committed a mortal sin, and he was in great wonder at his having done so, for he had thought that his power had so increased in good that it could do no wrong. He therefore said:

"'In this life, power cannot exist in such greatness that it is incapable of committing a sin; for if it were incapable of sinning,

it would not be in the same greatness of goodness as it is when it can sin and yet does not.' The holy man wept when he had sinned, and repented, and raised up his power to do good with contrition over his sin, by which his power increased in greatness of goodness. The holy man was in wonder at the fact that sin, which accords with weakness, had provided the occasion for his increasing his power in doing good works.

"There was once a sinner who thought he had the power to turn aside from sin whenever he wanted. One day it came to pass that a companion of his said that God had the power to judge and to punish all sinners, and he therefore wondered how any sinner could imagine he could turn aside from sin whenever he wanted to; for if he had the power to do so, it would follow that in God were weakness and not the power to judge whenever He wanted." Felix understood this explanation, and was in great wonder at how a sinner supposed he could leave sin whenever he wanted.

"Son," said the hermit to Felix, "Wisdom, Power, and Will lived together in a palace for a long time, and during this time Weakness was far from Power. Then Wisdom parted company with Power, while Will remained. In the absence of Wisdom, Power was weakened, and so was Will; then Wisdom returned and Will left,[104] and Power suffered a diminishing of greatness, as did Wisdom." Felix understood that wisdom and will are necessary to greatness of power, and he wondered how they could leave power.

"Sir," said Felix, "has God left sufficient power on earth for unbelievers to be made to love and know Him?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "Power and Wisdom have been married, and they have a daughter called Will, and this is why there is will in power and wisdom."

Felix understood these words, and he wept bitterly, saying: "Ah, power, wisdom, and will! When will the time come when you will accord to have man love and know God greatly?"[105]

[104] The last six words are missing in the two Palma MSS (A and B) and hence in all the printed texts.

[105] MS B, followed by the printed texts, has, "when you will accord in loving and knowing God greatly, and in making Him known to unbelievers," except that Galmés omits the last clause.

69. TEMPERANCE AND GLUTTONY[106]

"TEMPERANCE and gluttony are contraries; and since in God there exists an equality of persons, temperance opposes gluttony by a kind of tempering somewhat similar to divine equality; to which gluttony is dissimilar in the way of majority and minority, which in turn accord with gluttony and are contrary to temperance."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at how temperance can exist in such small quantity and gluttony in such great quantity, if God is great and not small and if through equality temperance has some semblance to God and gluttony has no semblance to God."

"Son," said the hermit, "God has created the world for His service, according to what a certain master in theology proved to a philosopher."

"And how was that?" asked Felix.

"Son, a philosopher once asked a master in theology why God punished man solely for the sins he committed, while he did not save a just man solely for the good he did. The master replied, saying that sin was against God's infinite justice, eternity and goodness, and therefore God's great justice should punish sin since it is against the greatness of justice; which punishment would have little justice if it were finite in Hell, or if God punished man for something that were not a wrong; and God's justice would be little if it granted the greatness of Paradise for nothing more than a man's littleness in doing good, which is little in comparison with Paradise; which littleness is increased in greatness by God's generosity and mercy."

Felix was very pleased with the hermit's words, but he did not understand how they answered the question he had asked, and he asked the hermit to explain how his example constituted an answer.

"Son," said the hermit, "greatness of gluttony accords with the application of great punishment, which in turn accords with the application of justice, as a token of the greatness which is in God; and smallness of temperance betokens the smallness of man's merit

[106] Cf. n. 85 above. In the Lullian systematization of concepts, these two are not usually opposites. The common opposite of "temperance" is "intemperance" (see *Gentile*, Bk. I, Tree 5, Temperance Ire), and that of "gluttony" is "abstinence."

in finding salvation solely through his own merit." Then Felix understood the answer, and he praised and blessed God for having given the hermit so much wisdom.

"Son, through temperance the soul becomes accustomed to being tempered in its remembering, understanding, and wanting, and the five senses are tempered in their operation, the same happening with the four elements. And from all this tempering comes equality and greatness in man and his works, which equality and greatness is pleasing to God, since it bears some resemblance to God's own equality and greatness. And since gluttony is contrary to the equality and greatness of man, it is therefore very displeasing to God.

"There was once a prelate who had a great amount of worldly possessions. He was, however, a man with very bad habits in his eating and drinking, eating and drinking so much that he was often very sick. One day when he had eaten and drunk a great deal someone asked him a minor question which he was unable to answer. The prelate was very confused and embarrassed in front of those present; and the man who had asked the question commented that temperance with poverty was worth more than gluttony with wealth, but that temperance had greater merit in wealth than in poverty, while gluttony was more wicked in wealth than in poverty.

"There was once a very gluttonous man who, after having eaten and drunk a great deal and finding himself quite full, felt completely weak because of his inability to digest the excessive food he had eaten, which inability prevented natural heat from giving the necessary sustenance to his bodily members. This man was in great wonder at being so weak, for he had eaten and drunk a great deal; so he started to eat and drink more, thinking he had perhaps not had enough. Yet the more he ate and drank, the weaker he felt and the greater was his wonder. While thus wondering, he told a doctor about his infirmity and what caused his wonder, to which the doctor replied:

"'There was once a monk who lived a very saintly life, continually meditating on our Lord. When this holy monk had meditated on God for a long time, he left the contemplative life and began leading an active life, in which he felt a diminishing of his former devotion, and he was in great wonder at this loss of de-

votion. After thinking about this for a long time he realized that God was not as often in his remembering, understanding, and loving as He had once been, and that temporal things occupied a greater place there than they once had.'

"There was once a prince who strongly desired temperance. Every time he sat at table this prince had placed around his goblet a golden ring on which was inscribed 'Temperance and Gluttony.' And when it came to pass that he was tempted against temperance, he read 'Temperance and Gluttony' on the goblet, and he would repeat to himself three times that temperance made men joyful when they arose from the table, and gluttony made them sad. One day it happened that, when this prince had eaten and drunk enough according to the standards of temperance, gluttony made him take another mouthful of meat because of a natural appetite for savory things. When the prince had the mouthful of food in his hand, he made a comparison, asking himself which was worth more in memory, understanding, and will: God, temperance, long life, and health; or gluttony, sickness, death, and the wrath of God. After making this comparison, the prince put down the mouthful of meat, praising and blessing God for giving him temperance, so that with it he might often and for a long time bless and serve Him."

70 GENEROSITY AND AVARICE[107]

"GENEROSITY, son, is in God, for God the Father gives all of Himself to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, begetting the Son and breathing forth[108] the Holy Ghost. And in giving Himself to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, the Father gives them being, in which being He gives immensity of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will, as well as all perfection and nobility. And because the Father is generosity, He gives generosity when He gives Himself as Father, and He gives all that He is, and the gift is the same to each of the divine persons. The Son does similarly when He gives all of Himself to the Holy Ghost, breathing it forth; and the Holy Ghost gives all of Itself, to be fruitful for the Father and Son.

[107] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, Tree 3, Eternity Avarice, and n. 29 there.
[108] Cf. Bk. I, n. 23 above.

"Son, God the Father sent God the Son to take on human flesh, and the Son gave all of Himself in becoming man, which man He gave over to great suffering and painful death to save mankind.

"God made man like Himself insofar as He gave him goodness, greatness, duration, power, wisdom, will, and other similar properties. Son, God gave man life as a human being, and put the whole world at his service. Thus man is obliged to be so generous toward God that he give Him all of himself in honoring, knowing, and loving Him.

"Avarice, son, is contrary to generosity, and he who is avaricious contradicts all the aforementioned generosity. Therefore, since there is so little generosity in men, and avarice is so prevalent in the world, weep, son, for the dishonor that the likeness of God receives in this world, and the exaltation accorded to what is dissimilar and contrary to God."

Felix thought a great deal about the hermit's words, and he was in greater wonder at the greatness of the generosity of God, who, being generosity, gives all of Himself and yet keeps all within Himself. After having marveled at God's generosity, he wondered at how God the Son could deliver His adopted humanity to such great suffering and such a grievous death to save mankind, when men are so avaricious toward God in giving so much more to themselves and to others than to God, who has given them Himself, and given them being and everything they have.

After wondering about these and many other things, Felix wept bitterly, saying: "Ah, Lord God! Blessed may You be, You who, in this world, have given to so much of mankind memory, understanding, will, sight, hearing, taste, smell, feeling, honors, estates, castles, wealth, and many other things, while there are so few men willing to give You remembering, understanding, and loving! Nor for the sake of loving, serving, knowing, or honoring You do they want to see, hear, come or go, or give their temporal goods to the poor who beg for the love of You." Felix wept, and so did the hermit, and together they cursed avarice, which had so many followers.

"Son," said the hermit, "in your body fire gives itself to air, and air gives all of itself to water, water gives all of itself to earth, and earth gives all of itself to fire, and through this giving the four elements enter into composition and mixture. The same thing hap-

pens in your soul with memory, which gives all of itself to understanding and to will, and with understanding and will, which give themselves to memory; and the will gives itself to understanding, and the understanding to the will; and this is why the soul is a being that is the union of memory, understanding, and will.

"There was once a very rich and powerful king who dedicated himself completely to honoring himself and experiencing the pleasures of this world. This king desired to live a long time, and wanted all the people of his kingdom to dedicate themselves to honoring and serving him. It came to pass that the king fell ill and was near death, and while he was sleeping he dreamt two women were standing before him: one was Generosity and the other Avarice. The king begged Generosity to give him health and long life. But Generosity replied that she would give nothing which was contrary to God nor in accord with Avarice.

"There was once a man who had a son he loved very much and to whom he left all his possessions when he died. When the son returned from the church where they had buried his father, he found many beggars at the door of his house asking him for alms for his father's soul. The son, however, did not want to give anything to the beggars, but instead entered his house, where he found one of his horses who should have been eating but had no grass to eat. He was very angry with his servants for not having given the horse grass, which he proceeded to do himself so that the horse would put on weight, and be profitable to him."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at why avarice is stronger in rich men than in poor men."

"Son," said the hermit, "generosity has greater power in wealth than in poverty; and when a rich man is miserly, avarice has greater power in wealth than in poverty, for if it did not, it would follow that wealth were not as powerful as poverty. And since in this world avarice is greater than generosity, therefore avarice has greater power in rich than in poor people.

"Son," said the hermit, "observe the power of avarice in the world. Notice how many people work to amass money, and observe the great dangers men will undergo for the sake of amassing wealth, to say nothing of the shame, hunger, thirst, heat, cold, beatings, and deaths that come from avarice. Open your mind's

eyes and observe how few are the people who work for generosity in this world, and how all the rest are avaricious with themselves and with their temporal possessions.

"There was once a very rich man who had five sons. One of his sons became a monk, giving himself over to loving, knowing, and serving God. The father and mother were very displeased with their son's taking the habit, and with the help of many others they attacked the monastery which their son had entered. Finally, however, when they saw they could not get him back, the father and mother suggested to the monks that they take a son of theirs who was lame and had only one eye and return the other one. The father and mother were furious at not being able to get the boy back, and they swore to God that those monks would never have any alms from their household. When the father and mother died, they left everything they had to the other children, and not a penny did they give to the one who had become a monk.

"There was once a knight full of vainglory who, because of his love of receiving honors in this world, gave as generously as he could. It came to pass that he gave so much that he was reduced to poverty, and when he had nothing more to give, he took from the peasants and gave to others. One day the knight took a mantle from one of his peasants and gave it to a minstrel who praised generosity and blamed avarice. The minstrel told the knight he was avaricious toward God, both with himself and with his possessions, for the honor he should have been giving to God he gave to himself, and therefore he was not generous, but beneath the sway of avarice.

"A pilgrim once came before a wealthy and powerful king and said that in view of the fact that God had given him so much in this world, why did he not try to have the Holy Land overseas returned to Christians and taken away from the Saracens who, to the shame of the Holy Church, now possessed it. The king told the pilgrim that he would like the Holy Land to belong to Christians; to which the pilgrim replied that perhaps his will wanted it, but it did not want to donate all the king's power, and that of his possessions, to carrying out that wish." Felix was about to wonder why, for the sake of carrying out his wish, the king's will did not offer all the power it could, when he understood that the king's will did not give all of itself to loving and knowing God,

and this was why it did not offer all the king's power to conquer the Holy Land overseas.

"A great quarrel arose between Generosity and Avarice, and they challenged one another to battle. Generosity gathered together his friends and Avarice his. Few people came to help Generosity and many gathered around Avarice. Generosity was in wonder at how few defenders he had and how many Avarice had. Generosity wept and Avarice laughed, but Generosity pointed out that his tears would turn to happiness in the next world, whereas Avarice's laughter would turn to tears.

"There was once a sick miser who owned many hens, yet did not want to eat any of them to strengthen himself. This sick man, however, when he heard one of his donkeys bray, ordered that it be fed oats, since it always brayed when it was out of oats. Finally this miser died through natural weakness, and he left everything he had to a son of his, whom he had brought up to be like him. It came to pass that the son traveled through the world as a merchant, coming to a fair where he lost half his capital, which loss plunged him into great grief for a long time. In the same hostal where he was staying there was a merchant who was both generous and rich. Now it happened that all the merchandise he had in that hostal burned and was lost, yet the merchant praised and blessed God, and was joyful in God. The miserly merchant was in great wonder at the generous merchant's ability to be joyful after losing everything he had, and he asked him why he was joyful and did not weep. The merchant replied that he was joyful because he gave his will and himself over to God and to patience."

71. CHASTITY AND LUST[109]

"CHASTITY and lust are in great contrariety; and the greater their contrast, the more different they become and the farther they grow from one another.

"It once came to pass that a very beautiful young virgin was given in marriage to a lecherous old man. She was very chaste and led a very saintly life, while her husband was lecherous with her and full of wicked ways. Those who knew them were in great

[109] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 27.

wonder because of the old man being lecherous and the young woman chaste. One day it came to pass that the devil tempted the good woman with lust and her husband with jealousy. The husband did not resist the devil, and he was jealous; while the good woman did resist the devil and was strong in her chastity, and was patient under the bad treatment she received at the hands of her husband, who beat her, dishonored her, and did[110] all sorts of villainous things to her.

"One day it came to pass that the husband had beaten his wife out of jealousy, and the devil tempted the good woman strongly with lust. The good woman would have been vanquished by the injustice her husband did her, combined with the devil's temptation, had it not been that she remembered God, who loves chastity and abhors lust, and who loves patience and abhors impatience. The good woman loved chastity and patience greatly, and praised and blessed God for having put her in a situation and condition in which she could exercise great chastity and patience. When the good woman had finished her prayer, she wondered how she could have any thought or inclination toward lust as a result of temptation by the devil or any villainous thing her husband had done to her. While the good woman was thus wondering about herself and to herself, she despised herself for having ever entertained a thought harmful to chastity. She realized that such a thought was a venial sin magnified by the devil's temptation and by the villainous way her husband treated her, and that she overcame it thanks to charity, justice, fortitude, abstinence, chastity, and patience. Then the woman was very cheered and consoled regarding her former thoughts and worries."

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I greatly wonder why it is that sight and hearing incline man's senses toward lust; for seeing beautiful features and hearing words of lust incline the sensitive toward carnal pleasures; and the same happens with the imaginative faculty."

"Son," said the hermit, "man has two kinds of contact: one is physical and the other spiritual. The physical is through sight and the other bodily senses; the spiritual is through memory, under-

[110] Instead of "beat her, dishonored her, and did," A B, followed by the printed sources, have just "said."

standing, and will. Now when it happens that through seeing, hearing, imagining, or physical contact man is tempted to lust, then in the soul there is contact of consent or opposition to lust, with the memory contacting the understanding and the will, and the understanding contacting the memory and the will; and the same happens to the will, which loves all the memory and understanding.[111] Thus, if this spiritual contact consents to lust, there follows physical contact; and if it opposes it, then physical contact is vanquished by spiritual contact, and a person wins great merit in loving chastity and abhoring lust.

"A lecherous bishop once loved a woman who greatly loved chastity. Many times the bishop begged her to do what he wanted, but the woman always told him to go away, saying he shouldn't throw to the wolves the sheep entrusted to his care. The bishop, however, put her in such a difficult situation that she was indignant, and secretly, she had the bishop come to her bedroom, where, in the presence of two ladies-in-waiting and a nephew of hers, she stripped down to her shift, which was filthy with a filth shameful to mention or touch.[112] After showing him her shift, she undressed further and showed herself completely naked, saying that if he had eyes he should look and see for whom it was he was losing chastity and God, and abasing the body of Jesus Christ when he sanctified it, and he should see for what it was he wanted to bring her beneath the wrath of God, as well as of her husband and friends, and have her blamed by others, and made an enemy of chastity and subject to lust. The bishop felt shame and contrition, and he wondered at his own great folly, as well as at the woman's great chastity and virtue; and from then on he led a just and saintly life."

"Sir," said Felix, "why is lust a sin?"

"Son," said the hermit, "God the Father begets God the Son beneath the order of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wis-

[111] The printed sources have followed a later correcting hand in the margin of A in changing "loves" to "contacting," and they have followed B in adding a little phrase at the end. The result is, "which, contacting all the memory and understanding, either consents or opposes," a solution that seems to be more consonant with the rest of the paragraph.

[112] The Spanish eighteenth-century translation has, "filthy with menstrual filth." Modern scholarship has more or less agreed (see Longpré, col. 1075, for a discussion of the problem with relevant bibliography) that this "example" is the basis for the legend concerning Llull's conversion, where what the lady revealed upon undressing was a breast devoured by cancer (see n. 50 to the "Life").

dom, justice, and will; and this is why He wants matrimony to be an order of goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, justice, and will; which order is maintained through chastity and corrupted through lust. And this is why, son, there is virtue in the sacrament of matrimony, which virtue accords with chastity.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a king who took the wife of a knight of his to indulge his lust with her. The king and the knight's wife acted against the justice of goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, and will. The knight was in great wonder at the king's having greater love for lust than for the greatness of goodness, power, virtue, wisdom and will, which bear some resemblance to the dignities of God."

"Sir, I am in great wonder about a story I once heard."

"What was that, son?" asked the hermit.

"Sir," said Felix, "a man had a wife to whom he did many villainous things, yet the woman was good and chaste and loyal to her husband. At the same time there was another man who was always trying to please his wife, yet she was lascivious and led a wicked life. And therefore, sir, I wonder at the fact that the good woman was chaste amidst the chagrin her husband inflicted upon her, while the loose woman was bad despite her husband's kindness to her."

The hermit replied in the following words: "Son," he said, "the goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and virtue of God bear a greater resemblance to the woman who loved chastity, than do the evil, greatness, power, and folly of a bad husband to lust; and this is why lust had no power against the good woman, nor chastity against the bad woman who preferred lust to her husband's kindness, which bore some likeness to chastity; to which likeness the loose woman opposed the likenesses of lust, which she loved and remembered more than the likenesses of chastity.

"No matter where Chastity went, she found Lust ever increasing and growing. One day Chastity discovered Lust in a monk and a nun. She went on further and found Lust between a brother and sister, as well as between a man and his wife. Chastity marveled at how great Lust had become. Chastity wept and Lust rejoiced. So many rich and honored followers did Lust have that

she wondered how Chastity could live with so little respect in this world.

"While Lust was wondering about this there appeared a man who had left his monastic order and who was now in the company of a woman of easy virtue whom he loved very much. He was badly dressed and poor, and was trembling because of how cold it was. When Chastity saw this lustful fool and the loose woman, she was in great wonder at why, for so filthy a sin as lust, this man had left his order, exchanging it for misfortune, filth, and baseness, which was the path to everlasting punishment."

72. DILIGENCE AND ACCIDIE[113]

"God created man so he would love and understand Him; and since God is worthy of being greatly loved and understood by man, therefore God wants man to love and understand Him greatly. And from this abundance of great loving and understanding, diligence arises, that is, that man be diligent in loving and knowing God, since God is worthy of being greatly loved and known.

"Son," said the hermit, "when man strays from the purpose for which he was created, then his action becomes contrary to that for which he was created. Thus, when it happens that man neither loves nor understands God, or understands God but does not love Him, then he is accidious, and has neither care nor diligence for what he was created for; and from this is born accidie and sloth, an accidious man being one who dislikes good and takes pleasure in evil.

"Son, the goodness of God, who is the Father, ceaselessly begets God the Son, for it is a good thing to beget a Son who is God infinite in goodness and in every perfection. And the same happens with greatness, which is the Father in God and ceaselessly begets God the Son, who is great in infinite goodness, and the same follows for all of God's dignities. This being the case, it is just and reasonable that in man there exists diligence in doing great and durable good, thus using his power to great good effect. And

[113] For "accidie," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 31. For "diligence," its usual opposite, see the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 135, as well as the somewhat surreal ch. 46 of *Blaquerna*, where Llull exemplifies the wordly misuse of diligence.

when man is negligent in doing good, then he is accidious and contrary to God's action in Himself and in creatures.

"Son, God truly loves good and great good, while He hates evil; and the greater the evil, the more God hates it. And this is why, son, man is obliged to hate evil, and great evil; by which obligation man is obliged to be diligent in hating evil and great evil. And if he does not, he is accidious and acts against God and his fellow man."

Felix understood the principles the hermit had given him concerning diligence and its contrary, that is, accidie, and he said he wondered greatly how accidie could be greater in this world than diligence, if the principles of diligence were so good and those of accidie so bad.

"Son," said the hermit, "Christ came into the world, where He was diligent in loving, praising, and serving God the Father, who sent Him to be man. And Christ was very diligent in saving mankind, so diligent in fact that He was willing to give Himself over to hardships, torments, and death. And He wanted the Apostles and Martyrs to follow His example and be diligent in carrying out the Gospel and going forth throughout the world to preach and to sustain hardships and death."

While the hermit was speaking, Felix wondered why it was that Christ's followers, who live in this world amidst great prosperity and honor, have so little diligence towards the great honor due to Christ in this world; for if they had great diligence in honoring Christ, who so honors them in this world, they would make Him known and honored throughout the world.

"Son," said the hermit, "accidie is contrary to both public and private good; and since public good is better than private, therefore accidie is more contrary to public than to private good. And because there is more accidie than diligence in this world, people have greater diligence in private than in public good; and thus diligence is present in this world in disorderly fashion, for it should be greater in common than in individual good.

"There was once a sinner whom God caused to suffer in this world on account of his sins. The man was impatient with the suffering he underwent as a result of illness, of losing his friends, and of losing his wealth, and this impatience brought him accidie. And when he heard that someone was prospering, he was dis-

pleased; and when someone lost everything he had or suffered some disaster, then he was pleased. One day it came to pass that he lost a hundred pounds in trade and he was very annoyed. While he was in this state of annoyance, he heard about a merchant who had lost a thousand pounds, and he was cheered up by this news; yet when he heard about another who had made a hundred pounds he was annoyed again. After giving the matter considerable thought, the merchant was in great wonder how he could feel displeasure at his own misfortune and pleasure at the misfortune of another, as well as feeling displeasure at another's prosperity. He thought about the matter until he realized that he was accidious because he was impatient with the suffering God gave him, and he also realized that God made him suffer because of his sins. He therefore became patient and left his sinful ways; as a result he had no accidie, but instead was diligent in loving God and his fellow man.

"In a certain city there was once a very rich and honorable burgher who lived on his private income, and did nothing but eat, drink, and anything else he wanted. Since he did nothing useful, he was diligent in nothing; in fact, he was forever idle, and therefore forever gloomy and irritable. And because of this gloom and ill humor he became accidious, and took pleasure in evil and displeasure in good; and his pleasure in evil turned to displeasure when it was not as bad as he had hoped; and his displeasure at the good brought him grief and sorrow when the good was great. So no matter what he did the burgher was subject to suffering and sorrow because of his idleness and accidie.

"A holy pilgrim went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land beyond the sea, and when he was in Jerusalem and saw that the Saracens held that holy place, he was in great wonder at the negligence of Christians, who through this negligence had allowed the Saracens to possess it. While wondering about this, the pilgrim entered a Saracen church where he saw people honoring Mohammed, who had told his followers that Christ was not God.[114] The holy pilgrim wondered at the negligence of Christians, and their lack of

[114] Pasqual (*Vindiciae* I, 133; see also his *Vida del Beato Raymundo Lulio* I, Palma, 1891, 268) took this passage as part of a chain of proofs for a supposed early voyage of Llull around the Mediterranean (see the "Life," text at n. 97 above). Subsequent commentators—Peers, Galmés, Batllori--cite this fact, but without much enthusiasm.

diligence in preaching and showing unbelievers the true way. The pilgrim went to Christian prelates and princes and told them they should be diligent in honoring Jesus Christ; and each one agreed that it would be a good idea, but none was willing to commit himself as much as the pilgrim would have wanted. The pilgrim wondered at this, saying that accidie lived and diligence was dying.

"Son," said the hermit, "accidie is a very secret sin, like that of gluttony; for a man can be gluttonous and accidious without thinking he is in the sin of gluttony or accidie. And that is why a certain canon asked the bishop along with his companions and certain town nobles where their accidie lay."

"And how was that?" asked Felix.

"In a certain city there was a hospice[115] brought to ruin by bad management; and as a result of the ruin of the hospice, many poor people lacked bed and board, and it often happened that they died of hunger or thirst in that city. The hospice was under the care of the bishop and his chapter; for a certain burgher had built it and then commended it to their care, under the condition that if the bishop and the chapter did not take proper care of the hospice and its property, the notables of that city should take care of it and defend it, at which point the bishop would no longer have any control over it. The canon was aware of the ruin of the hospice, and had pointed it out many times to the bishop, the chapter and to the notables of the city, but no one cared or felt any diligence; instead they were all negligent and each one made excuses. And that was why the canon asked about accidie, in which one or ones of them it lay, or whether it was without a subject."

73. HUMILITY AND PRIDE

"HUMILITY and pride are contraries, and they are more contrary in greatness than in smallness, and are therefore more contrary in some men than in others; for just as humility can be greater in one man than in another, so can pride be greater.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "insofar as God created man in His image and likeness, He is humble, since to man, who was created out of nothing, and who is a weak and insignificant thing

[115] Cf. Bk. VII, n. 36 above.

in comparison with God's great nobility, God was willing to give His image and likeness; and since God is humble, He wanted man to be humble so he would resemble Him in humility.

"Son, God's goodness is humble towards the goodness of man, and the same is true of God's greatness and all God's dignities; for God's greatness is humble towards man's greatness for it makes it similar to itself, and man's humility is good and great, and thus with all of them, when man humbles himself to honor, serve, obey, love, and praise God's goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will.

"Son, you have understood the root of God's humility, and the humility in man when he is born and begins to love and serve God. Now I want to tell you how humility arises, and what its place is in man, that is to say, how man should be humble toward his fellow man, humbling his own good, greatness, power, and other similar qualities before the good, greatness, and the power of his fellow man, so that there be charity and justice between them. That is how, son, humility between one person and another arises, and it dies when the contrary happens, that is, when one man's goodness has no concordance with another man's goodness, and the will of each is rebellious, wanting its own good to be greater than the other's good, and this against charity and justice.

"God humbled Himself toward man's nature when he took on such a nature in that glorious virgin, our Lady Saint Mary, for it was great humility to want a nature that was boundless in goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and perfection to unite with a nature that was limited in goodness, greatness, power, wisdom, will, and perfection.

"Dear son, of all the creatures there are, none is so noble as the humanity of our Lord Jesus Christ; and God took a humanity so noble, so excellent, and so good and humbled it to the greatest humility He could, that is to say, having His body sold, tormented, tortured, despised, and killed on the cross, and suffering vile men to torment and kill it.

"Son, a wise man was approached by a proud man who, because of his price, had done and said many villainous things to a neighbor of his, who was patient and humble amidst the injustice the proud man had done him. The proud man repented of the villainous way he had treated his neighbor, for the neighbor's patience opened

the eyes of his soul, making him recognize his pride and want to be humble; and he asked the wise man how he could be humble, for he wanted never to be proud again. The wise man replied, saying that he should often recall God's great humility in wanting to liken man to Himself, in wanting to be man, in wanting to humiliate that man in death, and in wanting our Lady and the Apostles to be humble in their poverty, hardships, dangers, and suffering. Moreover, God daily humbles Himself before sinners, waiting for them to repent, while they in return curse Him, dishonor Him, and do not believe in Him, who gave them their being and their worldly possessions.

"All this that the wise man told the proud man did not make him humble, until the wise man told him that God's humility had humbled His power before man's power in the seven sacraments,[116] in which man makes use of God's power; and that God had humbled both His honor and His power in that He had given man the power to honor or dishonor Him, and to love or reject Him in this world. When the proud man heard these words, he was in great wonder at how God's great humility was so great that He was willing to give man such power; and from that moment on the proud man decided to be humble for the rest of his life."

"Sir," said Felix, "I once found myself in a certain place with a great company of monks whom I greeted humbly. None of them got up for me nor did me any honor, but then afterwards a rich man appeared whom they got up for and honored. While I was wondering why they had honored the rich man and not me, it struck me that they were proud, but that I had been proud too, since I had been annoyed when they had not honored me as much or more than the rich man, since I am a servant of God and the rich man only an amasser of money."

"Son," said the hermit, "if you wanted to be honored by the monks so that through you they would be honoring God, then you could be exonerated of the sin of pride, as long as in your heart you do not mind having people scorn you for what you are in yourself; but if you wanted them to honor you for yourself,

[116] Cf. n. 78 above.

then you were right in thinking you were proud in being annoyed at the fact that they did not honor you."

"Sir," said Felix, "what grounds has man to feel proud, when he is a corruptible mortal, and when he carries so many vile things in his belly, and when so many worms are engendered in his body?"

"Son," said the hermit, "in God exist all nobility, perfection, and goodness, and therefore man naturally wants to be good and perfect in all perfection; but since man converts this nature to injustice, and with worthless deeds would like to be good and noble, then he becomes proud. But if he wants to be good, noble, and perfect with humility, submitting himself and his possessions to praising, loving, and serving God, then he would be humble, and he would also be good, noble, honorable, and perfect.

"There was once a peasant who had a wife who was beautiful and of noble lineage. This peasant loved his wife very much, and he dressed her well and kept her idle, and gave her better food than he himself ate. Now the peasant's wife, because she considered herself beautiful and of noble lineage, and saw that the peasant honored her more than himself, was proud and looked upon her husband with scorn, on account of which scorn she fell into the sin of lust. The peasant was in great wonder at how proud his wife was, and at how, the more he loved and honored her, the prouder she was.

"It once came to pass that Greatness and Smallness met and married, and had a daughter called Humility. This daughter was begotten through Greatness and Smallness giving of themselves, and Smallness being humbly obedient to Greatness, and always wanting Greatness to be greater than her.

"There was once a shoemaker who had a son he loved very much. Now this shoemaker was rich, and he was also avaricious in order to be able to give his son great wealth and an honorable wife. The shoemaker taught his son no craft, and dressed him very well. When the son was grown up, the shoemaker married him to the daughter of a poor burgher, who, on account of the shoemaker's great wealth, gave his daughter to the son. When the daughter-in-law found herself in the shoemaker's house, then she became proud, and her husband followed suit; and the shoemaker and his wife were so subjugated—so much had pride succeeded

in dominating their humility—that there grew great enmity between the shoemaker and his son, as well as between the shoemaker's wife and the son.

"A king once had a handsome son whose upbringing he entrusted to a wise knight. One day it came to pass that the prince went through the city very nobly dressed and riding a large horse. By the prince's manner, the knight who was bringing him up saw that the young man was proud of his youth, his good looks, and the dominion he expected to have over that city after his father's death. The knight decided to give the prince grounds for humility, and he therefore took him around to all the tradesman and craftsman of the city, telling him he was the subject of all of them, and that in the entire city there was nobody who would be in such servitude as he after the death of his father. The prince was in wonder at his master's words; and the master said:

"'In a certain town there were ten knights in a castle guarding a royal prisoner. These ten knights had a steward who bought and prepared their food, and who took care of all their other needs with the prisoner's money.'

"The young prince wondered about the example his master had recounted, for he did not understand it until his master explained that the royal prisoner symbolized the king's soul, which is prisoner of the obligation for which he was elected king; which king must listen to his subjects and keep them in peace, and that for this peace his people—symbolized by the ten knights—have a steward, that is, upright officials, who satisfy the knights so that the king can justify himself before God. When the prince had heard his master's words, he was very sad and said he was humbled by his great servitude in this world.

"A king once had in his household a devout man who, out of devotion and humility, always went humbly dressed, although by birth he was a man of honor and a knight. Two brothers of this knight were also in the king's household, and they were proud men who loved the vanities of this world. Since the king was proud, he was ashamed of being on friendly terms with the devout knight who was so humble in his dress, speech, and manner, while he was always friendly and having a good time with the knight's two brothers.

74. CONTINENCE AND ENVY

"CONTINENCE is the satisfaction of tempered desire,[117] and it is contrary to envy, which is a mortal sin wherein human desire has unjust desires that work against the perfection of continence.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "envy can be greater in a rich man than in a poor man, and the same is true of continence; for it is a greater vice for a rich man to be envious and not satisfied with what God has given him, than it is for a man poor in wordly possessions."

Felix was in great wonder at the fact that continence could be greater in a rich man than in a poor man, for it seemed to him that a poor man should be more praised if he is satisfied with little than a rich man with a great deal. The hermit realized that Felix was wondering about what he had told him, so he said:

"Son," said the hermit, "all the possessions or accomplishments that are or can exist in man come from God, and the greater, better, or nobler they are, the more similar they are to God's possessions and accomplishments. Now if there happens to be continence in a rich man, so that with all his wealth he is humble and serves God, he does and can do more good works than a man poor in temporal possessions. And if this were not the case, what the king told the hermit would be untrue."

"And how was that, sir?" Felix asked.

"A king with a large retinue of knights was traveling through a wilderness where a hermit dwelled. The hermit wanted to find out if the king was a just man and felt content with the wealth God had given him. The hermit asked the king if, with his great wealth, he could overcome envy; the king replied, saying that human desire is stronger overcoming envy when it is great than when it is small. From these words the hermit could see that the king was not envious, and that with all his wealth he overcame envy and was continent in loving, serving, and honoring God. The hermit was very pleased with the king's attitude, and he was in wonder that there were not more like him in the world."

[117] Thus in all MSS, except A (followed by Galmés), which has, "Continence is tempered satisfaction." Cf. the definition in the *Libre de Sancta Maria*, at the beginning of ch. 22: "Continence is the measured desire for those things with which a man is satisfied." It means, therefore, "self-restraint," and has no specific reference to matters sexual.

The hermit then told Felix about a poor peasant who had a vineyard next to a field owned by a knight who was very rich and powerful. "The peasant was envious of the knight's field, and the knight was envious of the peasant's vineyard. Both happened to go to confess to the same monk, to whom each confessed his sin. The monk gave the peasant greater penance to do than the knight, for the knight had offered greater resistance to his envy, in that he had not tried to use his power against the peasant, from whom he could have taken the vineyard if he had wanted to.

"Envy is contrary to hope, justice, charity, fortitude, temperance; and it accords with the contraries of all these virtues in being against continence, which accords with all the virtues and is contrary to the contraries of all the virtues. Thus, whenever envy increases, so do the contraries of the virtues; and when continence increases, so do the contraries of the vices."

Felix heard what the hermit said about the increase of envy and of continence, and he said to the hermit that he wondered how envy could be so increased in the world while continence existed in such small quantities; because the virtues, which bear some resemblance to God, should exist in greater quantity than the vices, which bear no resemblance to God.

It was a difficult question Felix asked the hermit. In fact, the hermit was in wonder at Felix's asking him such a difficult question, and he thought about it a long time before knowing what to answer. Finally, after thinking a long time, he said to Felix: "In a certain city there lived a king and a bishop. Both were men of wicked life, full of vice and envy. The people of that city were given a bad example by the wicked life of the king and the bishop; but they were given a worse example by the bishop than by the king, for insofar as the bishop, because of his position, was nearer the likeness of God than the king, this likeness of the bishop was more contrary to good than that of the king."

Felix understood the answer to the question, and he said that he wondered at the great amount of envy in an envious prelate, and why God suffered the existence of greater envy in a churchman than in a layman, a churchman being more expected to serve God than a layman.

"Son," said the hermit, "a certain knight had two squires. With one of them he took counsel and shared his secrets, and this was

the squire that looked after his person; and the other squire took care of the knight's horse. Both of these squires cheated and betrayed the knight, but the squire who had been more intimate with the knight underwent greater torment and a worse death than the other.[118]

"A bishop once had a nephew he loved very much. Now this bishop had in his bishopric a splendid castle, and he was envious of this castle, for he coveted it for his nephew. The ruler of that land also coveted the castle; and the question was, who had more envy, the bishop or the king.

"Envy and Continence once met. 'Envy,' said Continence, 'why do you persecute me? Don't you remember how little time lived the shepherd who coveted his master's sheep which had been entrusted to his care? For the shepherd killed the sheep's owner so that they would be his; but when he had killed his master he only had the sheep one day before he was accused of betrayal, and the following day sentenced to death and hung.'

"'Continence,' replied Envy, 'why do you oppose me when you see that I am more loved and honored in this world, and that I have more followers than you? Don't you remember how I was present in a very noble and powerful king who took away the very beautiful wife of a knight, and how you, Continence, who were in the knight, were powerless against me who was in the king?

"'Continence,' continued Envy, 'don't you remember how great I was that day a burgher coveted the widow's daughter a friend had entrusted to his care, and also coveted the orchard from which that widow and her children lived. And because of my greatness in that burgher, he defiled the widow's daughter and took her orchard.'

"'Envy,' replied Continence, 'well I know that you are great in this world, but you are also great in the wrath of God; and even though I am little in this world, I am great in God's blessing.'

"There was once a carter with wife and children who was continent, and who was satisfied with what God had given him. Now this carter had a donkey with which he earned his children's live-

[118] "When they were caught and punished," although unexpressed, is, as the Spanish eighteenth-century translator adds, what is implied.

lihood, yet one of his sons wanted to see his father dead, because he coveted his donkey. It was a question as to which was greater—the carter's continence or his son's envy."

75. PATIENCE AND IRE[119]

"PATIENCE and ire are contraries, for patience is the work of a strong heart, strengthened by fortitude, along with charity, justice, humility, and hope; and ire is weakness of heart, induced by vanity, pride, injustice, folly, and ill will.

"Son," said the hermit," God is patient in that He suffers man, who is His creature and who was created to honor, love, and serve Him, to dishonor and scorn Him in this world in favor of baser things and sin. And since God loves His likeness in man, and since God has patience, He therefore wants man to have patience, so that through this patience he be similar to God.

"God so loves patience that He wanted the human nature He adopted to have patience, and thus He allowed Jesus Christ to be sold, to be poor, scorned, tormented, forsaken, and killed. The Son of God wanted to have this patience in human nature so that man, in order to honor God, would have a likeness in patience and be similar to Christ in suffering poverty, torment, and death, for the honor and love of Jesus Christ.

"Son, Jesus Christ is very patient with many to whom He has given great wealth and honor in this world, and who could make Him honored, loved, and known in this world, but do not; and Christ suffers the dishonor done to Him in this world; but in the next world such men will fall beneath the ire of God, that is to say that God will curse them with eternal fire.

"Son, from patience comes consolation and pleasure, and from ire comes the contrary, for the patient are consoled when they have undergone some trial that ire gives to a strong heart not given to being vanquished by ire, whereas sorrow and unhappiness come to a heart that allows itself to be led and conquered by ire.

"Ire begins in the will, which suddenly springs into action with no deliberation of understanding or of memory; and this action of ill will is so rapid that it prevents the memory from remem-

[119] For "ire" see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 35.

bering and the intellect from understanding God and man's resemblances to God, and it makes man scorn God's commandments, as well as celestial glory and infernal punishment, and it renders him as if drunk and out of his mind. But when it happens that a person feels anger in his heart[120] and he resists it with patience and fortitude, then memory and understanding can take the time to deliberate, and thus remember God and His likenesses, and fear to offend God. And thus, in this way, a man can conquer ire, in which conquest he finds pleasure and happiness.

"A wise man once happened to be talking to a madman. The wise man spoke reasonably, and all his words were humble and well ordered. The madman's words were proud, vile, and totally unreasonable. While the wise man and the madman were thus arguing, the wise man began to experience an inclination toward ire in his heart, which gave him feelings of passion and brought disorder into the words he spoke. At this point the wise man was in great wonder at himself, since through the folly and ire of the madman he had been changed and brought close to ire. While the wise man was thus wondering at himself, his memory was able to take the time to remember, and his intellect to understand, patience, fortitude, charity, and the other virtues that assist patience against ire.

"The wise man was very pleased to remember and understand patience and the other virtues, and then he understood that he had been incited to the agitation of ire so that he would have the occasion to exercise patience, though which and by which he would be similar to God. With the help of fortitude, the wise man took patience into his heart, and he was patient and humble with the madman, and full of sweet and humble words, by means of which he converted the madman to words of truth and humility; and with contrite heart and tears in his eyes, he had him admit the truth, which he had formerly denied.

"There was once a king who had great love for the people of a certain city. Now it came to pass that the people of that city betrayed and cheated the king. Since the king had trusted them a great deal and had given them no grounds for betrayal, he was

[120] *Es irat en la pensa del cor* (literally, "is angry in his heart's thought") in all MSS except A, followed by the printed sources, which has *pena* ("pain, suffering, sorrow") for *pensa*.

very irate against these people. While in this state of ire, he began to suffer, for ire gives sorrow whenever it is present in a man. One day the king was thinking about the wrong these people had done him, and just as he began to remember and understand it he began to feel ire and anger in his heart, and his thoughts brought him anguish and suffering. For a long time the king was in this state of anguish and of subjection to ire, and he wished he had the power to destroy and kill all those people, who in the meanwhile had taken on another ruler. And the more the king thought about these things, the more his ire increased, and the more the sorrow it gave him grew.

"The king was in wonder at the sorrow his thoughts brought him, and he pondered the fact that God felt ire against all those who did Him treachery or villainy, or who through vanity did not love Him. While thinking about God and the wrongs men do to God, he remembered that he himself was in the sin of ire, and he cried out for God to have mercy on him and to be patient with him. When the king remembered patience and placed his hope in God, he felt that in his heart there was no longer the sorrow there had been when he had been thinking about the treachery of his subjects. And then the king said:

"'It is a great wonder that a man will ask forgiveness while he himself is unwilling to forgive, and will demand patience in another person while not wanting to exercise it in himself. And it is a wonder that people do not escape from the slavery and wicked dominion of ire, and from the sorrow ire brings, and forget their ire and the wrongs others have done them[121] by desiring patience in themselves and in God, in whom there is hope.'

"There was once a man with little power and few friend who was dealing with a business of great importance, that is, that God be loved, known, and served throughout the world. Now since this man was neither rich, honored, nor powerful, he alone could not carry out an affair of such magnitude, so he went to prelates, rulers, and great lords—men whom God had greatly honored in this world and to whom He had given great power—asking them to take a hand in this business. One day he happened to be talking

[121] In addition to other minor modifications in this sentence, Galmés, following MS A, has, "and the wrongs people have done God."

about this matter with a prelate who ridiculed him and laughed at his words, which he scorned and treated as worthless.[122] The man was in great wonder at the prelate who cared so little for God's honor, and in his heart he began to feel ire and sorrow. While in the midst of this ire and sorrow, he was in great wonder as to how he could feel ire if the business he had at hand was so noble and one that he so desired to see carried forward, and he thought that this ire must be a vice.

"The good man thought a long time about the source of his wonder, and he had recourse to patience to help him against the ire he was undergoing, but patience did not help him. The good man then remembered the patience of Christ and the Apostles, and his ire only increased; for the more he remembered Christ's patience, and that of the Apostles, the more he saw how unlike Christ and blameworthy was the prelate. The good man was in wonder at the fact that patience did not conquer his ire and expel the sorrow from his heart. For a long time he worried about this, until he realized that this ire was not a vice, for if it were, it would not be concordant with patience."

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a source of wonder to me how this man could still remain sorrowful after realizing that the ire he felt was not a vice, and that it accorded with patience."

"Son," replied the hermit, "that man felt sorrow because he loved Christ's honor, and saw that the prelate did not love it; for if he had felt no sorrow, then there would not have been patience or fortitude, and patience and fortitude are forever alive in man, causing him suffering when he desires that which must be fulfilled.

"In a certain city there was a wise and noble burgher who was wealthy and powerful. The ruler of that city was a wicked, ill-mannered person, so wicked in fact that he was ruining and destroying the city. Now since the burgher loved the city and since he was a just and wise man, he felt great ire at the ruler's wickedness and at the destruction of the city, and the burgher's ire was so great that he began to plot how he could arouse the people of

[122] This paragraph is surely built on personal experiences of Llull's; cf. his *Desconhort*, which is a moving poetic expansion of this complaint. The laughter too reminds one of the *Phantasticus* where, upon explaining his missionary program to the priest, the latter "burst into uproarious laughter, saying, 'I always thought you were *phantasticus*, Ramon, but now that I have heard your plans, I know you are not just *phantasticus*, but *phantasticissimus*!'"—p. 311 of the Müller edition.

the city and kill the ruler. The burgher was intent on carrying out his plot, until he remembered justice, loyalty, and charity, and he realized that he should have patience under the will of God, who had given them that ruler as their natural lord, and he repented of his foolish idea of killing his lord.

"The burgher wondered how it was that a mortal sin like ire, which he felt toward his lord, could take root in him, since his only aim was the good and well-being of the city. He realized, however, that the ire he felt at the ills of the city was not a vice, but rather that it bore some resemblance to the ire he felt when he wanted to kill his ruler, and for this reason he had lacked the fortitude to destroy the resemblance one ire bore to the other, which could be destroyed by patience.

76. HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS[123]

"In God there is goodness from which comes man's happiness, and the contrary of this happiness is unhappiness, which is unlike God's goodness. And this goodness shapes man's happiness unto its own likeness, by which, in heavenly glory, it finds the fulfillment of all its wishes.

"Dear son," the hermit said to Felix, "God's goodness is great, and that is why there exists in the world a great likeness of Himself in men, that is, great happiness; for it is a great blessing for man to come from nonbeing to being by an act of creation, and to have God give him dominion and lordship over all those things that are at the service of man. Moreover, God gave him memory, understanding and will, with which he might be able to remember, understand, and love God, himself, and all things that accord with blessedness. And, as if that were not enough, God gives man

[123] These two words, *benauyrança* and *malauyrança*, pose a problem for the translator. Etymologically (the adjective *benauyrat* comes from the Latin *bene auguratus*), they mean good and bad fortune; but since Llull not only uses them to refer to the resulting state, but also in connection with divine action or influence, one often has to steer away from "luck" or "fortune." "Happiness" has the advantage of both senses (since "hap" originally meant chance, fortune, luck). It does not, however, cover a third sense in which Llull uses the first of the pair, referring to supreme happiness (in Heaven), i.e., "bliss," "blessedness," or "beatitude" (cf. *les viii benevuyrances*, "the eight beatitudes" from the Sermon on the Mount, in *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 37), thereby forcing the translator to vary his rendition of the original according to the circumstances.

We have now finished the chapters of paired virtues and vices, and have entered on a series of twenty-five chapters dedicated to paired opposites of a more general nature.

blessedness when He calls upon him to be with Him in glory without end.

"Son, God has blessed man and given him the opportunity to use this blessedness; but when man tends toward evil, and through sin makes himself unlike God, then from happiness he tends toward unhappiness, and is contrary to blessedness, and he falls beneath the wrath of God who punishes him with misfortune; and it would be better for him never to have existed than to fall into misfortune and the wrath of God.

"Many are the ways in which God gives men good fortune, and many are the ways in which men fall into misfortune by acting against the good fortune God has given them, and not seeing it as something for which they should honor God and which they should use for their own good; and this, son, should be a source of great wonder in this world. For there is no one who, if he needs some temporal thing, and there is someone willing to give, lend, or sell it to him, will not willingly accept it, whether as a gift, as a loan, or as a purchase; but when it comes to the happiness God gives, one scarcely sees anyone willing to accept it for the honor of God or for his own benefit, or even just to avoid unhappiness.

"Dear son, the greatest blessing God ever gave or could give to man was when He blessed Christ's humanity by making it one person with the Son of God; for this is a blessedness that is nearer and has a greater likeness to the goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and all the dignities of God than any other blessedness or, in fact all other blessednesses. And from this blessedness, son, all other blessednesses have come and been created.

"Next after the blessedness of Jesus Christ comes the blessedness of our Lady, which is greater than any other blessedness. After the blessedness of our Lady, comes that of angels and apostles, of the prophets and martyrs. And the greatest blessedness God can give man in this world, is to give him the grace of being poor, suffering, scorned, tormented, and killed for the sake of praising, loving, knowing, honoring, and serving God, and of bringing to the path of salvation those who through ignorance or through sin are headed for eternal damnation."

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am in great wonder as to why it is that in this world God gives one man good fortune in terms of temporal things, and to another He gives neither wealth, health,

nor honor, but instead has them live their life in this world in poverty, suffering, and misfortune."

"Son," said the hermit, "a certain man had two sons. When he was on his deathbed, both sons asked him to give them his grace and blessing. The father asked the two sons which of them wanted to be left his wealth, and which wanted to be left his good habits. The elder son asked for the wealth, and the younger son for the virtues, which virtues brought the younger son greater happiness than did the wealth to the elder son."

"Sir," said Felix, "there were once two sinners. To one of them God gave the grace of leaving sin, and blessed him with virtues, honors, and wealth in this world; and He let the other one remain in sin, where he stayed until the day of his death. Therefore, since God is just, good, merciful, and powerful, I wonder why it is that if He pardoned and blessed one man, He did not pardon the other, but let him die in a state of damnation."

"Son," said the hermit, "in a certain country there was once an emperor who pardoned some people and punished others for doing injustice against him. Now in this country there was a king who pardoned everybody and punished no one, no matter what his crime. There was another king in that country who pardoned no one, but punished anybody who committed the slightest wrong. In the emperor's lands there were many inhabitants, for mercy and justice were in accord there; in the two kings' lands there were few inhabitants, since justice and mercy were not in accord there.

"There was once a king who gave a castle to one knight and a horse to another. The question was raised as to why the king had wanted to give one of the knights a castle and the other a horse, since both knights were equal in nobility, goodness, and wealth. In the king's court it was decided that the reason was that in order to demonstrate his free will, the king, of his own free will, wanted to bestow gifts according to the freedom of his will and power."

"Sir, if gentiles are people who are in error through ignorance, then why are they in the unfortunate state in which God causes them to be born, going as they will to perdition?"

"Son, man's misfortune through original sin is different from the misfortune of Christian sinners;[124] for that of unbelievers is through original sin, and that of bad Christians is from actual sin."

[124] Thus in all sources except A, followed by Galmés, which has "unfortunate sinners."

"Sir, it is a source of wonder to me that people can have good or bad fortune as a result of the constellations, or of the course of nature; for if this were the case, it would seem to me that good fortune would not be the work of God's goodness and justice."

"Son, a man had in his garden a wheel, which the water turned whenever he wanted it to do so; and when he did not want the water to turn that wheel, he put in a stick and locked the wheel in such a way that the water could not turn it."

"Sir," said Felix, "why does God give one man the good fortune of making him lord over another man, when all men are of one nature, that is, of the same species?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "many sheep were entrusted to a certain shepherd. This shepherd, however, along with a dog he had, was forever having difficulties guarding and defending the sheep from wolves."

Felix understood the example, and said that a sovereign's dominion constitutes a servitude, being as he is subjugated to the task of guarding and ruling his people, so that they may be pleasing to God. This made Felix wonder why sovereigns consider themselves fortunate, since they are subject to keeping watch over their people. Felix asked the hermit about this, and the hermit replied:

"Son, good fortune is nearer freedom than servitude, but when a foolish sovereign considers the honor and the dominion he has over his people, and does not consider his obligations as sovereign, then he thinks himself fortunate in that which will become unfortunate. But when a sovereign understands the honor and the dominion on account of which he is sovereign, and he feels the obligation to work, and does work to keep his people in peace and justice, then he is fortunate and he makes use of his good fortune."

Felix understood the hermit's words, and said he was in great wonder that there were so many sovereigns who were unfortunate while thinking themselves fortunate.

77. LOYALTY AND DISLOYALTY[125]

"LOYALTY is found in a true heart, strengthened by charity, fear, justice, and hope; and this strengthening comes from fortitude, which takes part in concordance with the virtues and in contrariety against the vices.

"Son," said the hermit, "God has given loyalty to men so that one man may trust another and share his secrets with him, ask his advice, or entrust him with the care of his children, his wife, his money, or other similar things; for loyalty is necessary for all these things.

"God has entrusted man with himself in this world, for every man, insofar as he is a creature, belongs to God, and God entrusts man with what there is in man so that he return himself to God through good works. And God entrusts man with his honor, memory, understanding, and love (all of which exist in man) or, in other words, God wants to be honored and served by being remembered, understood, and loved by man.

"Jesus Christ when He ascended to Heaven entrusted the Church to Saint Peter and to his followers; and to a shepherd he entrusted sheep so he would lead them to pasture and to a spring, neither of which they could find without him.

"Son, God has entrusted the five bodily senses to the soul, so that it may watch over them with its memory, understanding, and love."

The hermit told Felix about these and many other kinds of trust, so that Felix would be aware of and understand how loyalty is necessary for trust, and how disloyalty is dangerous to it.

Felix thought for a long time about the hermit's words, and he reflected on how the world was in a bad way; and he wondered at how loyalty was so little and disloyalty so great in quantity, and he said to the hermit:

"Sir, if the world were in a better state than it is, there would be more loyalty than disloyalty in the world; but since the world's state is more bad than good, in that there are more bad men than

[125] Loyalty is a subject Llull discusses in many works, such as: the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 203; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 93; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 34; *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 699 = Int. v, 341; *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 645-6; *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 90; and *Medicina de peccat*, Part III, ch. 31.

good, it therefore appears clear that disloyalty is greater and loyalty lesser in the world. Now, since loyalty is beloved by God, and disloyalty falls beneath the wrath of God, I wonder very much how a situation arose or developed in which disloyalty is greater than loyalty."

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a king who was a man of very saintly life, and who suffered greatly in ruling his people; for his subjects had very bad customs, and the king could not bear the suffering he underwent in ruling and governing these people. Once when the king happened to be in prayer, he begged God to give his people the grace of living according to good customs, or to take him from this life, for he could not bear the suffering he underwent in reigning and being in charge of his people. Upon uttering this prayer, the king thought he heard a voice which said to him: 'Through the greatness of your people's error, God wants to increase your good fortune, by converting it, through your suffering, into the path of salvation.'"

Felix understood the example, or in other words, that disloyalty is so great in order that loyalty may increase in destroying disloyalty; for the more disloyalty it destroys, the more it can increase. Felix then understood that God allows the evils, errors, and vices in the world to be great, so that man can increase and contribute greater good, greater virtue and greater order.

"Son," said the hermit, "a bitch gave birth to two puppies near a wolf's cave. One day it came to pass that the bitch was hungry and wanted to go and eat, but she was afraid that if she left her puppies, the wolf would eat them. So the bitch went to the wolf and entrusted the puppies to his care, for she had faith in his loyalty if she entrusted him with them. The bitch left the pups with the wolf, and went to eat at the house of the peasant to whom she belonged. When the wolf found himself face to face with the two fat, fine puppies, and thought that when they grew up they would be his enemies; when, moreover, he reflected that the bitch had entrusted him with her puppies not out of charity but out of fear; and when, finally, the wolf thought about how hungry he was, he killed the puppies and ate them. When he had finished, the bitch returned and discovered that he had eaten her puppies. She wondered greatly how the wolf could be so disloyal when she had trusted him; and the wolf wondered how the bitch could have

trusted him with her puppies, since she brought them up to oppose the wolf when he wanted to eat the sheep belonging to the peasant who was her master. The bitch accused the wolf of disloyalty, saying that from complete confidence and trust should follow loyalty, since loyalty exists so that trust and confidence may be preserved; but the wolf refused to discuss the matter and began to threaten the bitch.

"There was once a husband and wife who were very rich, but who were unable to have children. One day an attractive child came to their door begging for alms. The good man and the good woman took on this child as their son, and brought him up as well as they could, and decided that after their death he would be heir to all their possessions. When the worthy man and his wife were about to die, they kept a thousand sous for the care of their souls,[126] and left all the rest to him. Once they were dead, the wicked son did not want to spend any of the thousand sous for the care of their souls, but instead wondered that they should ever have trusted him and did not wonder at all at his own disloyalty towards them.

"In a certain land it came to pass that a baron, lord of a noble castle, wanted to go on a pilgrimage. This knight had a beautiful wife whom he loved very much. He entrusted his wife and his castle to a squire of his whom he had raised from childhood. When the knight was on his pilgrimage, the squire slept with his master's wife, and broke his faith concerning the castle, giving it over to a count who was an enemy of his master and had been at war with him for a long time. All the people of the castle and of the land wondered at the squire's having done such an act of disloyalty. Before he had done it, however, they had not wondered at the lord having entrusted him with wife and castle; they only wondered at the squire once the disloyalty had been done.

"When the count was in possession of the castle, he took the squire aside and asked him why he had betrayed his lord and master with respect to both his wife and castle. 'Sir,' said the squire, 'never for a moment have I loved my master with a loyal love; and since he entrusted me with something which shouldn't be entrusted when there is no true and loyal love, the little love I

[126] I.e., for the saying of masses.

bore my master for the good he did me was not enough to keep me loyal or to defend me from disloyalty.' The count reproached the squire, saying that even though the little love he bore his master had not been enough to keep him loyal, at least his master's love for and confidence in him, in entrusting him with all he had, should have been enough. Then the count ordered the squire to be put to a cruel death; and when the knight came back, he returned wife and castle to him, saying he had no wish to keep a thing that had been obtained by treachery and disloyalty. All the people of the land held the count as a loyal man, and the lord of the castle willingly became his liege man, and held the castle, and everything he possessed, from the count."

78. GOOD AND BAD MANNERS

"GOOD MANNERS consist in the ordered pleasure of physical sight and pleasant hearing. And this is why God wants people to have good manners in matters of greeting, inviting, offering, in speaking courteously, and in being pleasant to one another; for as a result of such external good manners a kind of pleasure enters man's soul, by which pleasure his memory, understanding, and will spread forth into charity, justice, humility, and other similar virtues.

"Good manners and courtesy make men dress, eat, drink, come and go, speak, etc. as they should; and bad manners do exactly the opposite. And therefore, son, it is a wonder that so many sovereigns and great barons, and so many men in general, are rude and ill-mannered in speaking, and do vile, filthy things, thus making themselves unpleasant to God and to other people.

"Son," said the hermit, "many a man is well-mannered and courteous in his speech and actions so that he be agreeable and pleasing to people by whom he wants to be loved, honored, praised, and served. One should wonder about such manners, however, for they are worthless, and even harmful, in that they make a man vainglorious; they are, in fact, only done for the sake of vainglory, and this despite whatever suffering and hardships they might cause others. On the other hand, the good manners and courtesy men try to show so as to have people praise, honor, and bless God for said good manners, should cause no wonder if

they are found in men, and especially in great lords, in whom God can be more loved and served than in other men, and in whom good manners and courtesy are more important than in other men.

"In a certain city there was a burgher who was lustful. His conscience often bothered him, however, about the sin he was committing, and he prayed to God to grant him the grace to give up his sin. One day the burgher happened to be in the town square with many other burghers and notables. While there, he got an urge to pass water, and he went home. When he had gone there and done what he had to do, he got an urge to visit a prostitute with whom he used to sin. So he went to the prostitute and sinned with her in the usual way. Afterwards he returned to the square, where once again he got an urge to piss,[127] at which point the burgher reflected on how he had secretly pissed and secretly done a discourtesy to God in sinning with the prostitute, and his conscience bothered him and he felt contrition in his heart. He wondered what it would take to make him piss in the main square in front of everybody, and he could not imagine doing it for anything in the world, so ashamed would he be. The burgher was in great wonder at being ashamed of pissing in public, when he had no shame before God in remembering, understanding, and loving sin; for it was certainly more ill-mannered to disobey God and besmirch one's soul with vile memory, understanding, and will, than to piss in public.

"Once there was a lady who was chaste but whose language was foul and ugly. She had a lady-in-waiting who was of loose character and subject to the sin of lust, but who would not have dreamt of uttering an ugly or rude word. One day this lady-in-waiting happened to sin with the clergyman who daily said mass for the lady. While the two women were at mass, the lady let out a rude and dirty word. Her lady-in-waiting was in great wonder at the rude word her mistress had uttered, and especially in so solemn a place as that in which they were hearing mass; yet she did not wonder at herself for sinning with the clergyman, nor at

[127] Thus, *pixar*, here and in the rest of the paragraph in one family of MSS; the other family continue to use the more euphemistic "pass water" (*escampar aygua*). This is the scene that Peers, p. 217, found "moral in principle, but, in detail, repulsive to a degree," and undoubtedly this scene was meant to shock Llull's contemporaries.

the clergyman for saying mass on the same day he sinned with her.

"A poor man, badly dressed, but who was saintly and led a good life, once sat down at the table of a great baron. The baron's steward rudely made the holy man get up from the table, for he did not think that a man as badly dressed as he should sit at the table of so noble a baron. A knight of that court was in great wonder at the steward's discourtesy toward the holy man, whom he knew to be saintly and upright, at the same time that he knew the baron to be a foul-mouthed and ill-mannered man.

"Son," said the hermit, "in a certain city there was a king who had very good manners and was very courteous with everybody. This king was a just man who led an upright life. One day there happened to pass through the city a lady, the wife of a noble count, who was on a pilgrimage to Santiago. In the hostel where she was staying there were two men quarreling over a game, saying rude and ugly things about Jesus Christ and our Lady. So rude were their words, in fact, that the countess was mortified when she heard them, and, in front of the innkeeper, she said she was in great wonder at the king of that city for tolerating such rude words about God and our Lady, and all the more so since according to what she had heard the king was himself so well-mannered.

"In a main square there was once a proud man saying vile and ill-mannered things about a good woman of that city. Also in that square there was a pleasant young man who was a relative of that woman, and who with courteous and humble words defended the woman against the alleged wrongdoings the proud man attributed to her, the latter, however, because of his pride and baseness, insulted and beat up the young man. Everybody wondered at the proud man and the injustice he had committed, as well as at how the young man had undergone with such patience the wicked man's vile attack."

79. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD[128]

"TRUTH AND falsehood are contraries, and their contrariety is greater in great things than in lesser things, since in great things there is greater power of opposition than in small things.

[128] These concepts correspond, of course, to letters (and figures) Y and Z of the *Ars demonstrativa*.

"Son," said the hermit, "God is truth, that is to say, God is truth itself; and the truth that exists in man and in other creatures bears a certain likeness to the truth of God, who created truth in His likeness; against which likeness is falsehood, which came to man through sin, so that created truth would be contrary to its likeness, that is, uncreated truth."

Felix heard and understood the hermit's words concerning truth and falsehood. Felix wondered at falsehood's being greater than truth in this world, since created truth opposes falsehood with the help of uncreated truth, which is greater than all the world. Because he was in wonder, Felix said to the hermit:

"Sir, I once heard it said in a sermon that for every man who is in truth and on the path to salvation, there are a thousand who are in error and on the path to damnation. As a result, I greatly wonder how God suffers the truth, which is His likeness, to exist in the world in so small a quantity, and falsehood in so great a quantity, and increasing so much."

"Son," said the hermit, "God the Father is truth, and from His very truth he begets the Son and He breathes forth the Holy Ghost, who are truth. Now, since the created truth bears some likeness to God's truth, God therefore wants that just as He, in Himself and from Himself—that is to say, He as God the Father—performs his begetting and breathing forth in greatness of truth, so those people who are in truth and on the path to salvation should spread, with their truth, the truth among unbelievers and wicked Christians who are on the path to damnation—which spreading they could not do so well if falsehood existed in small quantity."

Felix understood how the error and falsehood that exists in men in this world is great, in order that, from its great destruction, there should follow great truth. He was, however, in great wonder as to why those who are in truth do not take great pains to destroy falsehood and spread the truth, if in fact falsehood was great so that great truth could follow from it.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a holy man who traveled about the world speaking the truth so that people would love it and destroy falsehood. One day it came to pass that the holy man told a prelate the truth about the wrongs he did, accusing him of neither following the Gospel in matters of poverty, nor obeying them in their commands to go throughout the world

preaching the truth of God. The prelate was highly indignant at the holy man, who he had put in jail, where he remained a long time.

"The holy man was unhappy in jail because he could not travel through the world speaking the truth, and he wondered how it was that falsehood could have conquered truth. But then he reflected on how he could conquer falsehood with truth, and while in jail he exercised patience, faith, charity, humility, hope, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, with which he conquered and destroyed falsehood in his heart, by which destruction he increased truth in himself, which increase brought him consolation and well-being."

"Sir," said Felix, "truth has the power to make itself manifest, and falsehood has the power to signify that it is the truth and that truth is falsehood, which is why I am in great wonder that falsehood has such great power and truth does not have more; for it is a more difficult thing to signify that something which is, is not, and that something which is not, is, than to state that something which is, is, and something which is not, is not."

"Dear son, there were once three wise men disputing in front of a gentile: one was a Christian, the other a Saracen, and the third a Jew. In the dispute between the three of them it was decided in what manner truth and falsehood could be made evident to the gentile, so that he would choose truth and reject falsehood. The method was as follows: whichever religion had the greatest concordance with God's dignities and with the created virtues, and was most contrary to the vices, would be true, and the others contrary to it would be false. And the reason for this is that in God there is greatness of goodness, eternity, power, etc., and also because greatness of truth has greater concordance with greatness of virtues and is more contradictory towards vices than littleness of truth. By disputing according to this method, the Christian proved his religion to be true and all the others to be false, as is proven in the *Book of the Gentile* and as is contained in the *Ars demonstrativa*."[129]

[129] Notice how Llull is here categorical about something that he seemed to leave up in the air in the *Gentile* (see the Epilogue, n. 4 there)—namely, the Christian's winning his case. The *Ars demonstrativa* is mentioned here because by this time it had replaced the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (see n. 8 to the same Epilogue) as the fundamental work of the Art.

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in wonder at your words, for according to what you say, it should be easy, by means of this method, to destroy the error that exists in unbelievers and the falsehood they believe by the truth of the Christian faith. Now, if it is such an easy thing, I am in great wonder as to why falsehood is not destroyed, if it can in fact be destroyed by truth."

"Son," said the hermit, "truth without charity, faith, hope, prudence, justice, temperance, fortitude, chastity, humility, conscience, patience, contrition, diligence, and the other virtues does not have as much power as falsehood multiplied by gluttony, avarice, lust, pride, envy, ire, and the other vices. And therefore, son, truth alone is powerless against falsehood helped by many vices."

The hermit wept, and amidst his tears he said to Felix: "By means of the heavenly bodies, the planets, the beasts, birds, fish, and all the natural and spiritual activity of the world, God's virtues and the articles of faith are revealed to man; but no one dares say this to sons of falsehood for fear of suffering and death, and of losing vain temporal delights. Yet Jesus Christ, in order to mortify falsehood and vivify truth in man, gave man an example of how not to fear either falsehood or the suffering it brings as long as one can make manifest the truth by which God is loved, known, honored, and served. And this is why Christ wanted to deliver Himself, the Apostles, and those most loved in this world over to poverty, suffering, and death for the sake of revealing the truth. But all this is nowadays given almost no importance, and most people are ashamed to tell the truth and praise God, fearing more greatly the blame of others than the wrath of God."

Felix was in wonder, saying that what the hermit had said was true, and that What-Will-People-Say was still alive, according to what the hermit said.

"In a beautiful meadow a holy hermit came upon Truth weeping and crying out against princes, prelates, knights, burghers, and all the men of this world. The hermit wanted to console her, and he wondered at her crying out against all men.

"'Sir hermit,' said Truth, 'I shall remain disconsolate as long as falsehood is so loved and praised in the world, and has so many servants and maintainers; nor can I keep from crying out against those who love me, for not loving and serving me more; for I see

that Falsehood has servants that work much harder for her than mine do for me. So how can I be consoled, and what is there in which I might find joy, when people hardly dare to mention my name and love me?'

"'Lady Truth,' said the hermit, 'a poor man was asked to give false testimony against a certain prelate and was offered a thousand marks of silver,[130] but he said that he preferred to be poor and a son of truth than to be rich and a son of falsehood. So you can at least be happy for this man who loved you so much.'

"Upon hearing these words, Truth cried, wept, and lamented even more than before. Great was the holy man's wonder at his words causing Truth to multiply her tears, but Truth explained, saying, 'Although you, sir hermit, might know about this poor man who did not betray me for money, you also know of many who have done so, and who are enemies of mine and disobedient to me out of fear of Falsehood, who has them beneath her dominion.' The hermit then recalled and remembered how many servants Falsehood had, and he too wept for a long time.

"Dear son," said the hermit to Felix, "why don't you weep and lament the dishonor brought upon truth in this world? Remember that there are people who believe in idols, in the sun, and in other things of which they make strange gods. Observe how Saracens believe strange things about God, as do the Jews who live amongst us, and how they say vile words about Christ and our Lady, dishonoring them and falsely blaspheming them without our doing anything about it. See how great is the dominion of falsehood among Christians. If you remember, understand, and dislike this, then it would be a wonder if you did not weep." Felix wept because of what the hermit said, and because he hated falsehood and wanted truth to be honored.

"A clergyman once told a man that the truth about God's Holy Trinity and about His Incarnation could not be demonstrated to people in this world. The man was in wonder at these words, for it seemed to him that if what the clergyman said was true, it would follow that falsehood, which is contrary to truth, and which is more easily made manifest, would not be demonstrable, and one could believe in falsehood's, as one can in the truth's, being true,

[130] See n. 132 below for this coin.

which seemed to him most inconsistent. The man was also in wonder at what the clergyman said, because if it were true, it would follow that human understanding neither could nor should understand God (which it was created to understand) as well as it understands worldly things (which it was not principally created to understand); and the same would follow for memory and will as does for understanding."

80. MERIT AND BLAME[131]

"DEAR SON," said the hermit, "when, by merit, we mean good works, we say that it is contrary to blame, which comes from evil works; and their contrariety is great in proportion to the greatness of the works which are good or evil.

"Son, through great merit one earns great glory, and from great blame follows great punishment; and this is why greatness of virtues increases greatness of merit, and greatness of vices increases greatness of blame.

"In God there is greatness of generosity, of justice, and of mercy. Greatness of generosity gives man greatness of virtues, and justice, according to the greatness of these virtues, rewards men for their merit. But generosity gives a person more than he can obtain through merit, for he cannot have such great greatness of virtues as generosity can give him, and this is why generosity gives more than a man merits.

"Mercy forgives blame and gives on the basis of merit, and it forgives more than the forgiveness a person can ask for or the penance he can do; for mercy and generosity are, in God, one and the same thing. Justice, however, does not punish a person without his being blameworthy, and a person's blame must be as great as the punishment that justice metes out to the sinner; for if justice punished man and gave him a chastisement greater than his blame, then this justice would be lacking in greatness; and this is impossible, since justice and greatness are, in God, one and the same thing."

Felix was in great wonder at what the hermit told him about justice and blame, for it seemed to him that justice, when it sen-

[131] These two concepts are part of Figure X of the Art; cf. that figure in the *Ars demonstrativa*, in Dist. I.

tences a person to chastisement and suffering without end, punishes and gives a sentence greater than the sin committed, which had an end. The hermit realized that Felix was wondering about what he had said, and he spoke as follows:

"A bishop once had a newphew he loved more than God, for when he died he left this nephew a thousand marks of silver and to the poor he only left a thousand sous.[132] Now this bishop had been avaricious so that he could make his nephew rich, and he died in the sin of avarice. For he preferred finite things to infinite things, which is why the blame was finite; yet it went against infinite justice, which is God, and which infinity of justice was completely contrary to this blame; on account of which contrariety it was only right to sentence the bishop to punishment without end, for if it did not, there would be no greatness in justice, nor would justice be concordant with eternity.

"There was once a king who was in great wonder at God's justice, for he felt that he was in a position of greater danger than anybody in his kingdom, and it seemed to him that God had done him wrong in making it easier for him to sin than other men. The king gave this question a great deal of thought, until he understood how God's generosity[133] made it possible for him to have greater merit in doing good than any other person in his land; and this was the result of justice, which, just as it is great in punishing the king for greater blame, so it is great in rewarding the king for greater merit. The king was very pleased by the great concordance between God's justice and generosity, giving him greater merit for good works and greater blame for bad works."

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly how it is that a man can obtain merit by any good he does; for, according to what I have heard, all the good that is done in this world is done by God. If all the good is done by God, then how can man obtain merit by doing good?"

[132] A mark of silver was worth from 12 to 14 sous, depending on the region and time. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 108, cites this passage as an example of the wordly life, full of ostentation, led by many bishops of the period.

[133] A B, followed by the printed sources, have "greatness" instead of "generosity." More important, instead of the preceding "until he understood," all sources have "and he did not understand," which does not seem to make sense with what follows. The Spanish eighteenth-century translation solves the problem by leaving the negative here and beginning the last sentence of this paragraph with, "When the king was finally able to understand this, . . ."

"Son," said the hermit, "a certain king once condemned a man to death for committing murder. The king asked a provost of his to carry out the sentence, and the provost had the murderer hung. The king ordered justice to be done, and the provost carried it out, for which carrying out it was proper that the provost earn merit, for if not, carrying out the sentence would have been useless, and God's justice would be lacking in greatness, which lack is impossible."

"Sir," said Felix, "in what way does a man acquire merit, and in what way does a man deserve great blame?"

"Dear son," said the hermit, "there was once a king who was both powerful and wealthy. In accordance with the king's great power, he could have either great amounts of merit, or great amounts of blame; for if a king does good with all his power, his merit is as great as the good he does; and if he does not do good with all his power, he is doubly to blame: once for the good that is lost by his not doing it, and secondly for the evil he does. And the same thing happens when he does good, since he acquires merit for doing good, and at the same time for not doing evil, in proportion as the good is great and as the evil he could do, but chooses not to do, is great.

"A holy man was once praying. Now this holy man was the bishop of a large city, and while praying, he reflected on God's goodness, and he recognized all the good things God had given him, and attributed none to himself. While the bishop was thinking in this manner, it occurred to him that he should not acquire merit for any of the good he had done, for it had all come from God. These considerations led him to think that he likewise should not be blamed for any sin he committed, for it seemed to him that, if he acquired no merit for good, he should deserve no blame for evil. The bishop fell into grave temptation, and he prayed God to illuminate him and show him how a person acquires merit or blame; for it seemed to him that if he knew how this happened, he could vanquish the temptation in which he found himself, and which was afflicting and tormenting him so much. After praying to God for a long time, it seemed to the bishop as if he were falling asleep and in a vision seeing how man was created to love and know God in such a way that he would remember, understand, and love God, and so that he would be obedient to, and follow,

the purpose for which he was created. While in the midst of this vision, he seemed to be saying to two knights he loved very much: 'Go down this road and bring me water from a spring you'll find at the other end.' One knight obeyed the bishop and went straight down the path, and returned by the same path, bringing the water. The other knight disobeyed the bishop and did not want to go down that path; instead he took another path and found a spring that was poisoned. He brought the bishop some of that water; the bishop drank it and died because of the poison in the water."

"Sir," said Felix, "I once heard it said that no man who is in a state of mortal sin can gain merit through any good he does, and this is a source of great wonder to me."

"Son," said the hermit, "there were once two sinners: one was a layman and the other a clergyman. The layman gave alms so that God would free him from sin; the clergyman gave alms out of hypocrisy and vainglory. And therefore, son, the layman earned merit from the good he did, on account of his good intention; while the clergyman, on account of the bad intention behind the alms he gave, earned no merit, but rather blame."

"Sir," said Felix, "when a poor main gives a denier, why is merit as great as, or greater than, when a rich man gives a *morabatí*?"[134]

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a baker who had taken two loaves of bread from the oven; one he sold so that he could buy wine, and the other he kept to eat for lunch. When he had sold the first bread, a beggar came up to him and asked for alms for the love of God. The baker gave the beggar the denier he had made from selling the bread, and he ate without drinking any wine. In the city where this happened, there was a rich burgher who was holding a *morabatí* in his hand, which he gave to a beggar who came up and asked him for it for the love of God. He then went to his house, where he found his meal ready, and he ate bread and meat and he drank wine, as he usually did."

"Sir," said Felix, "according to the example you have just given, it would seem that the baker had greater merit than the burgher, since the baker could not drink wine as a result of giving the denier

[134] A gold coin which, in Catalonia or Majorca at that time, was worth 8 or 9 sous (cf. n. 132 above), or in other words about a 100 deniers (see Bk. V, n. 9 above).

to the beggar, whereas the burgher suffered not the slightest hardship as a result of giving the *morabatí*."

"Son," said the hermit, "God's justice is so great that no man can lose it through any good he does; and thus the burgher, insofar as spiritual and physical suffering are concerned, did not obtain as much merit for the *morabatí* as did the baker for the denier; but since the burgher had more obligations than the baker, and gave more, with the result that he might lack something to maintain his position or something else necessary to him, in this way he could acquire as much merit as the baker.

"There was once a man who was in sin, and did not want to leave it. He therefore consciously stopped remembering and understanding his sin, so his conscience would not bother him and his guilt would not be so great. Another man believed in the Roman faith, but did not want to understand it, so he would have greater merit through faith alone. The question was, Which of the two had greater merit, and which had greater blame?"

81. OBEDIENCE AND DISOBEDIENCE[135]

"OBEDIENCE and disobedience are contraries, and therefore, son," said the hermit, "because of this fact and because obedience is a virtue, disobedience must be a vice, since everything contrary to obedience must be a vice."

"Sir hermit," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at what you say, for if obedience is a virtue, how can it share a place with disobedience in so many men who are more disobedient than obedient?"

"Son," said the hermit, "obedience is present in man in many ways, and similarly disobedience is diversified in many ways; for there is sensual obedience and intellectual obedience. Sensual is when a person obeys physical things, such as the five physical senses; and intellectual is when a person obeys spiritual things, such as remembering, understanding, and loving. These obedi-

135 "Obedience is that virtue which makes the will, which is naturally free, be servant and subject to another will, one which is common to many people," *Tree of Science*, *OE*, I, 647. Llull also devotes separate chapters or sections to the subject in: *Blaquerna*, ch. 54; *Libre de Sancta Maria*, ch. 28; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 237; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 33, and *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 700 = Int. v, 342.

ences are mixed in man, for with sensual things, he obeys the spiritual, and with the spiritual, he obeys the physical. And the same happens with the five senses, that one obeys the other; similarly, one power of the soul obeys the other; and hence it follows that the soul obeys the body and the body the soul, according to how particular obediences are mixed in universal ones.

"Son, a man once heard it said, during the reading of the Gospel, that God commanded the Apostles to go forth throughout the world preaching the Gospels, and that they should go two by two. This man sought out a companion with whom he went forth preaching the Gospels, and he adopted the type of dress and the poverty that God ordered for those who went forth to preach the Gospels.[136] While carrying out this endeavor, one of them began to resent their harsh life, and greatly to fear death in a certain place where they were preaching, for an infidel king threatened to kill them. This companion obeyed the king and stopped preaching for fear of death; the other fellow wondered greatly at his companion for being more obedient to the king than to God, and to physical than to spiritual things.

"Son, there was once a rich man sitting at the dinner table who had already eaten and drunk a great deal, and yet continued to eat. He was holding a quarter of a chicken in his hand when he became aware of the fact that to eat it would be a vice and bad for his health. Just then he heard a poor man at his door begging for the love of God. The rich man decided to give the meat to the beggar; but when he was about to give it to him, he changed his mind and ate it himself. This man was disobedient, first of all towards temperance and fortitude, and second towards charity; and he was obedient to their contraries.

"There was once a very lustful man who wondered greatly why he was disobedient to chastity, and why he gave his obedience to lust. One day he happened to read a book containing the Ten Commandments, in one of which God commands man not to be lustful. He therefore resolved never to indulge in fornication again. Not long after putting the book down, he felt his flesh stirring, and he went off to commit the sin of lust, in spite of his conscience

[136] Note the similarity to the dress and aims of the Apostolici; cf. Bk. VII, nn. 1, 3, and this Bk. VIII, n. 60.

bothering him because of God's command and because of the resolution he had adopted in his heart. After committing the sin, the man repented very much and wondered why he had been disobedient to God and to his conscience, and why he had obeyed such vile stirrings of the flesh. While wondering about this, he understood that he had been disobedient to God because he neither loved nor feared Him greatly and because he had been greatly stirred by the flesh; which stirrings cannot be vanquished unless one has great love for God and fears Him greatly.

"A man was once before a king who was very powerful. This man recalled how in the Gospel God commanded that one should love Him with all one's heart, with all one's mind, and with all the strength of one's soul.[137] The man recalled how the king, who loved temporal delights, was disobedient to God; for if he loved God with all his might, he would take from the Saracens, who dishonorably hold the Holy Land overseas, the land they possess. While thinking about this, the holy man wondered greatly at the obedience commanded by God. 'If the king is disobedient to God alone or to his people, or both, or if all together are disobedient, it is a wonder that with them obedience, charity, fear, and justice can exist at all.'

"A holy monk was once singing mass. After performing the consecration and dividing the holy body of Jesus Christ into three parts, when he was about to receive it, he fell into the grave temptation of doubting that this was the body of Jesus Christ, and thinking that it was only what it appeared to his eyes, that is, bread. The holy man wondered that such a host could be flesh, or that a body like this could be divided. As a result of this wonderment he was on the verge of obeying his five bodily senses and denying that this host was Christ's body. Before denying it completely, however, he remembered God's power, and His words in the Gospel when He said that this body was His body. The holy man was in a quandry, not knowing whether to obey his bodily senses or his spiritual senses, until God sent him the light of grace, as a result of which he said that he would do better to obey things which are stronger, more noble, truer, and more nec-

[137] One MS (L) has, "with all one's strength and with all one's soul," which makes the passage an exact reproduction of the texts of Mark 12:30 and Luke 10:27. Cf. "Llull's Thought," n. 74 and text.

essary than those which were less strong, less noble, less true, and less useful. And from then on the holy man obeyed things spiritual and disobeyed things physical."

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly why God wants man to believe in the Sacrament of the Altar, which seems impossible according to the course of nature."

"Son," said the hermit, "God wants man to be more obedient to His power, wisdom, and will than to the workings of nature, and he therefore wants man to be obedient to that which seems impossible in nature, since in this manner the great workings of His power, wisdom, and will are made manifest.

"In a certain city there was a prior who led a sinful and wicked life. He had a large parish, and on every holiday he admonished everybody to lead a good life. In that same church there was a clergyman who was lustful, and he did not want to obey the prior, because he knew him to be as lustful as himself. Now it came to pass that the prior mended his ways and became a just man leading a holy life. One day he delivered a sermon to his parishioners in which he strongly condemned the sin of lust. The clergyman then became conscious of the sin of lust in which he was living, and he repented of his sin and obeyed the prior's words. Great was the clergyman's wonder at how he had suddenly become obedient to contrition and to the prior's words, after being disobedient so often and so long.

"There was once a big dispute between a Christian and a Jew. The Jew had no wish at all to believe what the Christian told him about his faith, for he did not understand the compelling arguments the Christian gave him. One day the Jew happened to understand one of the Christian's strong arguments in proof of the Trinity, and another day he understood others proving the Incarnation. Then the Jew was willing to heed the Christian's words, yet the Christian wondered at the fact that the Jew was willing to heed him when he understood him, and not to heed him when he did not understand him.

"There was once a monk who had been in his order for seventy years. He was so obedient that he did everything he was ordered to do, and he did not want to use his own mind, except to be obedient in doing what others ordered him to do. He then began to think of how long he had been obedient, and this made him

very proud of himself, for it seemed to him that God should reward him with great glory. While in the midst of these thoughts, he prayed God to show him in a vision the glory he would have in Paradise. He fell asleep and it seemed to him that he was in Paradise, where his will wore a lovely crown while his understanding wore another that was not so beautiful. Next to him there seemed to be a young monk whose understanding had a crown more beautiful than his, and whose will had one equal to that of his own will. This young monk had been obedient to both his understanding and his will while he lived in this world, and he had obeyed his superior with both his understanding and his will. The old monk was in great wonder why the young monk had a more beautiful crown on his understanding than he had."

"Sir," said Felix, "if obedience is a good thing insofar as it is a virtue and a bad thing insofar as it is a vice, I am in great wonder why it is that in the world, the flesh and the devil are more obeyed than God."

"Son," said the hermit, "God created man especially for the purpose of loving and knowing Him; but since most men love themselves more than God, and the rest are ignorant of God, they therefore are more obedient to what they more frequently remember, understand, and love than to God. And this is clear from what a woman once said to her husband."

"And what was that?" Felix asked.

"There was once a woman who loved a worthless man more than her husband, who was of very noble lineage, rich, and a man of good customs. This foolish woman committed fornication, in which act she was caught by her husband. He was very angry with her, for he loved her very much, and he asked her why she had done such a great wrong, and why, for the sake of such a worthless man and such an act, she had so dishonored him. The foolish woman answered her husband, saying that since she frequently remembered, understood, and loved her lover, and since she did not recognize the wrong she was doing, nor did she frequently remember, nor understand, nor love her husband, she had exchanged him for another."

Felix wept, and so did the hermit, and each said to the other: "Ah, what a wrong it is to forget, be ignorant of, and not love God, and to remember, understand, and love the world and the

flesh, and to obey the devil!" After they had wept for a long time, the hermit said to Felix:

"There was a wise and devout king who one day was in the refectory of a large monastery with many monks who had eaten with him that day. The king wanted very much to have all his men as obedient to him as all those monks were to their superior. Then he reflected on how many men there are in the world who are disobedient to God, and he wept at the dishonor done to God in this world through lack of obedience."

82. ORDER AND DISORDER[138]

"SON," SAID the hermit, "God wants there to be an order in all things, as a sign of the fact that God has an order within Himself and outside Himself. This ordering exists in Himself insofar as the Father, of Himself, begets the Son, and from the Father and the Son issues, in ordered fashion, the Holy Ghost.

"In God there is goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will; and all these dignities are ordered in being a single person, who is the Father, who, from his goodness, greatness, and so on, begets a Son and breathes forth the Holy Ghost, so that His goodness begets good, His greatness begets great, and so on for all of them; and the same follows from the Son in breathing forth the Holy Ghost. In this action, son, there is a most wonderful ordering, for in one person who is the Father, in another who is the Son, and in yet another who is the Holy Ghost, all the Divine Dignities are unceasing in their immensity and eternity, being all together, universally and commonly, a single essence, and being all one and the same thing in different persons."

Felix thought a long time about God's wonderful ordering within Himself, and it caused him considerable wonder that it could be so great.

[138] "Order" (*ordenació*, *orde*, or *ordenament*, as Llull variously calls it) is defined in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, The Figure of the Principles of Theology (cf. Dist. IV, n. 109), and in *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 62. See also: the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 38-59, 237, 298; *Principles of Theology*, *MOG* I, 632, 665 = Int. ix, 26, 59; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 579, 603 (where it is connected with the concept of *obra*); the *Logica nova*, Palma, 1744, p. 75 (where it is connected with the red triangle of Figure T); the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 42 (where it is connected with the correlatives); *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 44; and *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 529 = Int. viii, 27.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "from this great ordering God wanted there to follow usefulness for a creature directed to remembering, understanding, and loving; and this was why He created everything there is in an ordered fashion, so that the memorative, intellective, and volitional creature could, in an ordered fashion, remember, understand, and love the great ordering in God and in His works. This creation, my son, consists of angels and men, who can, in ordered fashion, remember, understand, and love God. The angels remember, understand, and love Him in ordered fashion with all their memory, understanding, and love, as part of God's ordering within Himself; and these are the good angels. The bad angels remember Him in disordered fashion, since they understand but do not love Him; for their will dislikes what their memory remembers and what their understanding understands of God.

"Son, men have five ordered physical senses they use in dealing with physical things, by which they can have order in remembering, understanding, and loving spiritual things, and have virtues and shun vices. In man's body there are compounds of the four elements which make that body a body; and the reason that body is begotten and grows is due to the action of the elements within it. This action is the vegetative power, which is the action of one element in another. And this power lives thanks to the sensitive power, and the sensitive and vegetative live thanks to the intellective power. And, son, man is ordered in many other ways, ways that are wonderful to remember and understand.

"Son, because God is very memorable, understandable, and lovable, God's greatness, along with all the other dignities of God, wants to be very much remembered, understood, and loved by man. And therefore, to itself and to all the dignities, it joined the human nature of Jesus Christ, with whom it became one person, so that human nature could more readily remember, understand, and love God. Beneath the ordering of this human nature all creatures are ordered, that is, angels and men, who are ordered to remember, understand, and love God.

"God has ordained religion and the path to everlasting life, and He has ordained how through doing good man attains glory, and how, if he does evil, he receives punishment, which glory and

punishment are everlasting. And in view of this great everlastingness, it is proper that the ordering be very great."

According to what the hermit indicated about great glory and punishment, Felix wondered why the order that would lead those in error to everlasting life was little and not great in this world; and he said there was little order and great disorder.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "God has ordained that in this world there be kings to uphold righteousness, and that there be prelates to preserve our faith; and beneath kings there are counts, dukes and marquises, knights, and burghers, merchants and peasants, and so on for other positions; and similarly beneath prelates he has put the different kinds of clergymen, who within their orders must maintain saintliness and truth in the world, for the purpose of praising, knowing, and loving God."[139]

Felix thought a great deal about what the hermit had told him about order, and he said to the hermit that he wondered greatly that there was such great disorder in the world; for there were more men disordered in understanding but not loving God than there were who were ordered in understanding and loving God.

"Son," said the hermit, "God took on human nature, and just as divine nature did human nature the greatest honor it could, so He wanted human nature to honor divine nature as best it could; and therefore human nature, by experiencing poverty, dishonor, hardship, and death in this world, honors divine nature."

From the hermit's example, Felix understood that God had ordered that man might greatly honor Him by dying for Him and suffering hardships and death for the sake of increasing order in the service of God and diminishing disorder where God is ill-served, which action is greater the greater the disorder to be overcome.

"Son," said the hermit, "God has ordained that there be sufficient power in the pope, as well as in cardinals, prelates, and monks, so that, either through the power of some or the wisdom of others, they can order things so that unbelievers come to the path of truth; and the same holds true for kings or princes, in whom God has ordained sufficient power for them to uphold

[139] For an interesting analysis of Llull's acceptance of and even desire to conserve the existing social order, *within* which he would like his reforms to be carried out, see A. Oliver in *EL* 11 (1967), 103-4.

righteousness on earth; but when will fails power and wisdom, then disorder increases and order diminishes."

The hermit wept upon uttering these words, and Felix was in wonder.

"There was once a monk who was idle in his order, in that he did not do all the good he could do. One day this monk asked a burgher, who also did not do the good he could do, why he was idle, for he was in wonder at the burgher's idleness. The burgher in turn was in wonder at the monk for having recognized idleness in another while not seeing it in himself; and he wondered about the origin of the disorder that permitted a person to recognize disorder in another person more readily than in himself. While the burgher was wondering about these things, he understood that the ordering of an upright life is done through a great deal of remembering, understanding, and loving of God."

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly how it is that an angel can know what a man is thinking to himself."

"Son," replied the hermit, "it has been ordained by divine order that just as a man can perceive what another man is thinking by his bodily actions, so can angels know what men are cogitating and thinking; for just as it is ordained that the scribe's hand fashions a letter which the intellect understands because the eyes see it, and the intellect in the imaginative faculty imagines it; so is it ordained that by whatever remembering, understanding, and loving a man does, or by his seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, or touching, or by his movements or by whatever state he is in, angels will perceive and see what a man is thinking and cogitating."[140]

Felix was in wonder at the great order the hermit described, and he said he wondered why plants and animals followed the course of nature in an ordered fashion, whereas man was disordered in not following the final purpose for which he was created.

"Son," said the hermit, "in man's body there is the ordered vegetative power, which converts the food to blood, and then converts the blood into flesh, marrow, and brain, spreading it throughout the members of the body. But when the vegetative power is disordered, this conversion of food cannot take place,

[140] In the margin next to this paragraph, MS L has, "pulcra demostracio."

and all the bodily members are disordered in the disordering of the vegetative power, and man's body dies."

Felix understood that the hermit's example signified that a disordering of the rational soul disorders the sensitive power of men, as well as their ability to remember, understand, and love.

83. WEALTH AND POVERTY[141]

"SPIRITUAL WEALTH is worth more than material wealth, for spiritual wealth is the fulfillment of the three powers of the soul, that is, memory, understanding, and will; and material wealth is the fulfillment of the five bodily senses, which are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling.

"The greater the wealth existing spiritually in the soul, the greater the soul's poverty in material wealth, which consists of money, vineyards, fields, castles, cities, and so on; for the more the soul remembers, understands, and loves God, His works, His virtues, and life in Heaven, the more it becomes separated from remembering, understanding, and loving material wealth; by which separation material poverty is rendered different and contrary to that spiritual poverty of sinners who have little memory, understanding or love of spiritual wealth."

"Sir," said Felix, "if spiritual wealth is nobler than material wealth, then why is material wealth more loved than spiritual wealth? For it is a great wonder that what is worth less is loved more than what is worth more."

"Son," said the hermit, "a man once found two coins, one of brass and one of silver. He thought the silver coin was made of lead, and the brass one of gold; and he preferred the brass coin to the silver one."

"Sir," said the hermit, "I am in great wonder at men rich in temporal wealth: why is it that the more they have, the more they

[141] Llull treats this subject, as he does here, from the point of view of the opposition between physical poverty and spiritual wealth on the one hand, and physical wealth and spiritual poverty on the other hand, in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 264; *Thousand Proverbs*, chs. 49-50; *Libre d'intenció*, ch. V, secs. 21-2; and the *Libre de Sancta Maria*, ch. 26. In the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 301, the opposition is not between the physical and spiritual, but between the sensual and intellectual; *Blaquerna*, ch. 69, deals with the subject only in terms of Christian social virtues (giving alms, etc.).

want to have? And why is it that the more they love this wealth, the poorer they in fact are?"

"Son, a man once had a great love of money. He had a thousand sous which he so loved that he wanted to increase them, to make them into two thousand; he went on this way until he had a hundred thousand. And since his love of increasing his money was so persistent, he thought only about increasing it and not about what his money might be used for; and because he refused to use any of the money, the more it increased, the greater was his poverty and the greater his need of money."

By this example, Felix understood how God the Father, understanding the Son and loving Him, gives Him an immensity of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will; and this is the spiritual wealth the divine essence has in the Father, in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost. When Felix had, by means of the example, understood this spiritual wealth, he also understood that divine nature so loves its work in creature, wanting so much to increase it in greatness of goodness, power, wisdom, will, and even of duration, that it wanted to join and unite man's nature to itself. He similarly understood about the nature of Jesus Christ, who, by the example of His life, wanted to increase the Apostles' wealth,[142] in that He wanted to make them live like Him in this world.

"Son," said the hermit, "God's wealth is His likeness in a just man; and the wealth of a just man consists in being as like God as he possibly can. And the poverty of God is a man expelling Him from his heart and not loving Him, and leaving Him for temporal things; and the poverty of sinners is their expelling God from their memory, understanding, and loving."

Felix was in wonder at God's having such poverty in this world, since for every man who remembers, understands, and loves God in this world, there are a thousand who do not remember, understand, or love Him. So great was Felix's wonder at God's poverty, that he cursed the poverty of those men who do not remember, understand, or love God, and he praised and blessed the

[142] Thus in L B, followed by Roselló, *OE*, and the Spanish eighteenth-century translator; the remaining sources—A V S, followed by Galmés—have "poverty." The first group, normally the less reliable sources, are surely right in that Llull is clearly discussing spiritual wealth in this paragraph.

wealth of just men in loving, understanding, and remembering God.

"Son," said the hermit, "in sinners God is rich through the operation of justice and mercy, forgiving some and punishing others; the sinners, however, have no wealth in God through justice, but rather, the greater is God's justice in punishing them, the poorer and needier they are in their perpetual suffering."

Felix was in wonder at the sinner's poverty in Hell, for there he would forever have penury in all of his five senses, and in all three powers of the soul, and for all the vegetative power.

"There was once a burgher rich in worldly possessions. This burgher was a man who lived very fastidiously, who was proud and easily angered, and who insisted on being constantly served by those beneath him. Now this burgher had such troubles in the possession of his wealth and in indulging in the pleasures he loved—trouble just because he could not increase both things as much as he would have wanted—that he felt a poverty and weakness of spirit in himself, from thinking about, understanding, and loving his riches and blessings too much, as well as hating himself for thinking about them. Worldly pleasure made this man feel poor, so he gave away his wealth for the love of God, and then he felt his spirit and his spiritual wealth strengthened, and he lived a long time in spiritual wealth and material poverty, and his life was a happy one.

"Dear son, there was once a king who had great hope, and this hope helped him get through many hardships and dangers, for any time he had any kind of physical hardship he placed his trust and hope in God. One day the king was in a battle, and so great was his fear of dying that he despaired of God's granting him life or victory from the battle. As a result of this despair he felt poor in virtue and strength, and wondered greatly what had happened to the hope he usually had and which had so often helped him. Now this king was in the battle unjustly, which was why the wealth he usually felt through hope had abandoned him, for without justice it cannot exist.

"There was once a king very rich in terms of subjects and kingdoms, but poor in understanding, for he did not understand who he was, where he had come from, why he was king, nor did he have any knowledge of God. It came to pass that he fell into doubt

regarding his faith, which doubt made him doubt that his was the true faith. The king was very troubled by the temptation into which he had fallen. Now this king had in his palace a man who was poor in temporal possessions, but had great wealth of spiritual possessions. The man followed the king's court so as to be able to explain doctrinal matters that would be useful to other members of the court. It came to pass that he was explaining an article of faith to a large group of knights, to whom he proved the truth of that particular article. One of the knights called the king so he could hear the good man's words. The king came over to listen to these words, by which he was comforted in his predicament, and he realized that that about which he had had doubts was clearly true, and in his heart he would have preferred to be in the poor man's position rather than his own, for the poor man had greater spiritual wealth from his understanding than he himself had from being king.

"There was once a poor man who placed his hopes on finding a precious stone that would be worth a thousand gold marks. Great was his desire to find the stone, and he imagined the many things he would do if he found it. While thinking about this, he felt his heart[143] to be poorer and needier than before he had started thinking about the stone, and he was in wonder at how he could suffer poverty because of something that did not exist."

84. FREEDOM AND SERVITUDE[144]

"FREEDOM exists in a man's heart so that his will may freely love God, as a symbol of the fact that man's will bears some similarity to God's will, which freely wills everything it wills.

"This will of God is free in goodness, infinity, power, wisdom, and all the other dignities; and all the dignities of God are free in God's will; and thus God has free will in everything good, great, eternal, etc. that His power can perform. And since it is of the nature of goodness, greatness, eternity, and so on, that power is

[143] Thus, *cor*, in L S and the corrected text of A; V B and A before the final *s* was erased (followed by the printed texts) have *cors*, "body". In the context the first seems preferable.

[144] Llull discusses freedom in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 297; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 669, 823; *Medicina de peccat*, ch. 29; and *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis*, Hundred Forms, no. 78.

freely transmitted to the will, and to the will in its entirety, therefore the entirely free will works for all goodness, greatness, eternity, etc.; from which unceasing, infinite, and eternal work there follows production *in divinis*.

"Dear son, according as God has within Himself freedom for all His dignities, He has given a likeness of this to man's will, so that it may be free, which freedom would exist for all of the understanding and memory, in order that the understanding be free and the remembering be free, each for itself, and that both together be free for all the soul and for all its activity, and that from this freedom, virtues follow freely, with no constraint, namely faith, hope, charity, justice, and so on."

"Sir," said Felix, "according to what you have demonstrated about the existence of freedom in man's soul, I am in great wonder how it is that men can fall into the servitude of vices and sins if they have so much freedom and if their freedom is similar to God's freedom."

"Son," said the hermit, "God's will is so free in all His essence and in all His dignities that its freedom and itself are one with all of His essence and all of His dignities; and this is why there follows the production of persons. And since all of the freedom of the human will should be converted and directed towards remembering, understanding, and loving God, when it does the contrary it falls into the servitude of sin, which is contrary to the likeness and character it has received from God, possessing as it does His likeness in freedom.

"Dear son, so noble a thing is freedom in a man's heart that nobody would give up the freedom of his will for all the treasure in the world. And this is why a saintly hermit was in wonder at a certain lustful man, whose love for freedom was such he often heard him say he would not exchange it for anything in the world; and yet even though his will was free, he allowed it to be captured in his love for a prostitute, whom he wanted not to love."

Felix was in great wonder at what the hermit said, and the latter continued: "The Holy Ghost issues completely free from the Father and the Son, and it exists in each of them and in itself freely, without any servitude; and the sinner's free will is free in itself as well as in the understanding and the memory, but this free will leaves him when he desires sin, in which sin the will is in servitude,

because it acts against the freedom of the Holy Ghost, and God's justice keeps it subject to sin so that in this submission it may punish him. But since man's will is very similar in freedom to God's will, through God's great mercy it has come to be that the sinner has the freedom to leave sin and the subjugation into which he has accidentally fallen.

"Son, free will is such a noble and lofty creation that no man can constrain another man to desire or to love by force; for nobody can remove from the soul its having been formed in the image and likeness of God. But since in man there should be charity, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance, therefore when a man does not make proper use of his freedom, he should constrain and submit his will to that servitude by which he attains virtues and avoids vices. In that servitude, however, the will is still free, which freedom nothing in the world can make it lose; but in the next life the will of the sinner will be in servitude, by wanting things which will be contrary to its freedom, that is to say, the sinner's will will want glory and hate punishment, against justice, hope, contrition, which it will also hate. In this hate the will will exercise its freedom to hate, and it will have servitude in loving glory and hating punishment, thus making its actual punishment greater."

Great was Felix's wonder at the extent of the punishment the soul will suffer in the next world, as the hermit had described it.

"A king was once sitting on his throne. Before this king were many knights and other people. Now this king's thoughts fell into vainglory, thinking that only he was free, and all those present were subject to him. While he was thus idly having these foolishg thoughts, a messenger arrived bearing a letter from a seneschal of his, telling him that a city had risen up against him. This letter was followed by another in which a knight of his asked him to carry out justice in a matter concerning another knight who had insulted him. The king gave much thought to the two letters that had been sent to him, and he felt obliged to answer them and take care of these matters, and he realized that he was in greater servitude than all the others in his presence."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at why it is that kings and great barons who are truly the most enslaved men in the whole world so love ruling, and want to have great lands and many

subjects; since the more they have, the greater is their servitude, for the more they have to work and govern."

"Son," said the hermit, "from the immensity and eternity of God the Father there issues freely the person who is the Son, and the person who is the Holy Ghost; and since it is natural for men to want to have similarities to God whenever possible, therefore kings and lords want to be kings in order to be free, and want many subjects, many lands, and great wealth, for their greater freedom; yet such a desire means that they will have great servitude when they make use of what they desire. But for the sake of their sins, in the case of those who desire wrongly, or do not know how to put their desires in order, they desire to have high dominion and do not recognize the great servitude involved.

"Son," said the hermit, "the soul by its nature should be free and master of the body, but through sin it is subject to the body in a sinful man, on account of which submission memory, understanding, and love are subject to the five bodily senses; and on account of this servitude spiritual things are scorned and earthly things prized. And so much are spiritual things scorned and earthly things prized by some men totally subjugated by sin that their soul is in submission to the body, and when they want to leave sin, they are unable to do so.

"There was once a town whose people loved liberty, and they were forever disputing with their lord so he would give them all sorts of privileges[145] that they lacked. One day there arose a great dispute between the lord and his people over a certain privilege that the people wanted to have at all costs. The lord said to his people:

"'In a certain city there was a burgher who had a privilege which stipulated that if a man who had committed murder took refuge in his house, the court could not go in and get him to bring him to justice. Now this burgher had a neighbor who was envious of this privilege, and he gave a large amount of money to the lord of the city to have a similar privilege. The burgher had a son and so did the neighbor; these sons got in a fight and the neighbor's son killed the burgher's son, for which act the court could not

[145] *Franqueses*, literally "franchises," in the sense of immunity or exemption from certain taxes, servitudes, legal burdens, etc.

bring him to justice. Every day the burgher would see the young man who had killed his son, but he could not get his revenge, and he died of grief.'"

85. SIMILARITY AND DISSIMILARITY[146]

"In God's essence there is wisdom that understands itself, and, understanding itself, loves its likeness, which likeness is God the Son, begotten by God the Father, who from Himself begets His likeness. And this is why it has come to be that all creatures love to beget their own likeness, just as a man's intellect begets his understanding, a man's will begets his desires, one man begets another man, one tree another tree, and so on for everything.

"God gives semblances of Himself to resemble the creatures he creates in man, that is to say, God gives man being, which being is good, great, durable, powerful; and the same is true of wisdom, will, and the other things present in man. God bestows these semblances so that He will be loved, and so that man, through these semblances, will love, know, praise, and serve God.

"For in God, one thing is the Father, another the Son, and yet another the Holy Ghost, as a result of which there exist similarities and dissimilarities in creatures. The similarities are there insofar as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are a single essence, a single nature, a single goodness, greatness, etc.; creatures are dissimilar because the Father is one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost yet another.

"Just as the divine persons are similar to one another, so their intrinsic activity is similar, and therefore God wants man's sim-

[146] Llull uses the word *semblança* in three different senses. One is that of "similitude, similarity, resemblance" (see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 76; note that *similitudo* is the usual Latin translation of *semblança*; another is "image, likeness, semblance" ("Semblance is the image of another [thing]"—*Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 156); and lastly that of "simile, example, metaphor, allegory" (cf. the passages corresponding to Bk. I, nn. 2, 11 above, and *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 39). The fact that this idea, or cluster of ideas, is at the core of Llull's exemplarist doctrine and his analogical reasoning (cf. Pring-Mill, "Analogical," passim, but especially pp. 321-3, and Yates, "Art," pp. 124-5 with an important quote from the *Tractatus novus de astronomia*) undoubtedly explains why he does not distinguish between meanings, purposely keeping all three paths or connections open. This, plus the fact that there is no single English word covering all three concepts, has forced me to use different words to translate the original *semblança*. For further Lullian bibliography on *semblança* and *dessemblança*, see the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 581-2, 604; *Proverbs of Ramon*, chs. 156-7 (very good); and *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, *ORL* XVII, 421-2. The most complete modern treatment of the subject is in Johnston, *Semblance*, ch. II.

ilarities to Him to be similar to one another in doing good, great, durable powerful works; and God wants this so that the similarities and their activities be similar to one another. But when it happens that the similarities man has received from God through creation are dissimilar in their activity, then these similarities are contrary to the similarities of God, which are in no way contrary to one another. And this is the way in which men are either righteous or sinful: they are righteous when their activities are similar to God's similarities; sinful when their activities and their created similarities are dissimilar.

"There was once a man who had a handsome son he loved very much, and who was a person of very good habits in every way. This man loved his son more because he was good than because he was his son, and this was because the son's love of God made the father love him. Now this love the man bore his son was both similar and dissimilar to the love God the Father bears God the Son; for the good man loved his son both more and less, as was explained above, whereas God the Father loves His Son equally in all ways."

These and many other words the hermit spoke to Felix to explain the similarity and dissimilarity which exists between God and creatures; and Felix was in great wonder at how the hermit had been able to explain so well and so succinctly how to recognize in what way things are similar or dissimilar to God.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a king who was handsome, tall, and powerful both in his person and politically. This king was full of vainglory about his good looks; and since he was great both in his person and in terms of power, he was very vain about his greatness and power. As a result the king's works were dissimilar to his image;[147] for by his handsomeness he should have wanted to do handsome works of justice, charity, humility, and so on for the other virtues, and by his greatness in beauty, in person, and in power, he should have performed great works of justice, charity, and humility. And since this king made his works dissimilar to his properties, he was therefore wicked, and a man whose works were vile, unjust, and dissimilar to those expected of a king.

[147] In the original the same root is used: *dessemblant a sa semblança*.

"It is natural that man should love man more than a beast or a stone, and that a dove should love another dove like itself rather than a horse or another bird. It is therefore a great wonder that man loves money, castles, horses, beautiful clothes, hunting, and resting more than upright remembering, understanding and loving, considering the fact that man's remembering, understanding, and loving are more similar to God than are money, castles, estates, the pleasures of the flesh, horses, and other things of this nature.

"There was once a king who went out hunting every day, often passing by a deserted place where a saintly hermit lived. The hermit wondered how the king could be so fond of hunting, and the king many times wondered how the hermit could lead such an isolated and harsh existence. One day it came to pass that the king caught a heron with a peregrine falcon near where the hermit lived. In the hermit's presence the king praised the falcon for the fine way it had caught the heron, and he expressed wonder at the falcon's flight, for it seemed to him that it flew much faster than any other falcon. While the king was expressing his wonder and talking about his hunting, the hermit, hearing the king's words, said to him:

"'My lord king, great is my wonder at your words and the life you lead; for it is much more seemly[148] for a people to praise a king for his justice, charity, wisdom, and good government, than for a king to praise his falcon for the way it flies.'

"'Hermit,' replied the king, 'the pleasure I derive from the falcon's flight comes from the fact that my will takes pleasure in it insofar as that flight gives rise to a pleasing desire similar to the will itself.'

"'King,' said the hermit, 'although desire is similar to the will, it is dissimilar when the desire is contrary to the ultimate purpose for which your will was created.'

"'Hermit,' said the king, 'I wonder at how you can lead such an isolated and harsh life.'

"'King,' replied the hermit, 'I in turn wonder at how you can be so isolated from a king's normal duties; for it is a king's duty to be with people, and to have his thoughts be with God, justice,

[148] *Semblant* in the original, giving yet another meaning for this root.

and good government; and you are a king, yet you do not perform the duties of a king, but instead surround yourself with things dissimilar to a king, such as wild beasts and vain thoughts, which are dissimilar to the duties of a king.'"

"For each thing loves its own likeness, which is why the world should have more similarity than dissimilarity; and since God has created man in His own image, it is a great wonder that man generally has more vices than virtues." This was what Felix said to the hermit. The hermit replied as follows:

"In a man's stomach the food he eats is converted into the likeness of man when man's nature turns the food into blood and flesh. One day it came to pass that a king was given poison to drink. That poison converted to its own likeness all the wine the king had drunk and all the food he had eaten; and since the king's nature could not convert the poison or the food he was eating to his own likeness, he therefore died for lack of his own likeness."

86. PRAISE AND BLAME[149]

"GOD BLESSED may He be, is worthy of being praised by His people; and this is why He created man, so that he would praise Him for what He does within Himself and outside Himself.

"There was once a painter who was painting the figure of a man on a wall. While he was painting this figure, many people who were watching praised the painter for his great mastery in painting the figure. At one point the painter asked one of those praising him if the praise applied to the imagination he had within himself in imagining the figure he was painting, or more to the actual figure he was painting. The man replied, saying to the painter:

"'"God the Father, understanding Himself, begets the Son, and, loving the Son, breathes forth the Holy Ghost; and with God the Father understanding His goodness, greatness, eternity, power, the Son and the Holy Ghost are goodness, greatness, eternity, power and so on for all the dignities. From an activity so great and wonderful it follows that God should be praised by men, and

[149] For "praise" see *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 69, and *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 66. "Blame" is here used to translate *blasme* in the sense of "censure, condemnation," and it should not be confused with the "blame" of ch. 80 above, which translates *colpa* in the sense of "guilt, fault" (i.e., that which causes one to be censured or condemned).

should be praised more for his activity within Himself than for that outside Himself.'"

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a source of great wonder to me that God is not more praised by men for His activity within Himself than for that which He carries out in creatures, since His activity within Himself is worthier than that which he carries out in creatures."

"Son," replied the hermit, "the work the painter did in forming the figure in his imagination was better than that which he did on the wall where he painted it; but since that interior work was invisible to physical eyes, whereas the painted image was visible to physical eyes, therefore people praised the work executed by the painter's hand, and did not praise the work of the imagination in imagining the figure.[150]

"Son, God is worthy of being praised by man, for all he does in this world; and since He has made man in His likeness, therefore men want to be praised by one another. But since man was not created to praise himself, but rather to praise God, therefore whoever loves praise of himself or of another commits a sin, unless this praise is indirectly attributed to God."

Great was Felix's wonder as to why men preferred to hear themselves praised rather than God, since praise does not appertain to man, only to God.

"Son," said the hermit "there was once a king who was very pleased when people praised him for the money he spent in maintaining a great following, in giving gifts, and in doing other similar things. Now this king's steward was a Jew, and the king loved the Jew's service more than Jesus Christ, who was blamed in the Jew's thoughts and will; and the king felt this way because he was more afraid of himself being blamed than Jesus Christ being blamed."[151]

By the hermit's words, Felix understood that since men love themselves more than God, they prefer to praise themselves rather than God; and he was in great wonder as to how God could permit this to be.

[150] This "example" is reproduced in X. de S(alas), "La 'Idea' en la pintura, según Raimundo Lulio," *Archivo Español de Arte* 39 (Madrid, 1966), 323-4, as the only explicit medieval Spanish formulation of the problem of the *Idea* and its realization in painting, as presented in E. Panofsky's, *Idea. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffgeschichte der älteren Kunsttheorie*, 1924.

[151] Cf. Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 209, as well as "Llull's Thought," text at n. 7.

"Son," said the hermit, "God wants to be praised for His patience, compassion, humility, and mercy, and this is why He permits people to scorn Him and not praise Him as they should."

Felix wept for a long time over the way God was scorned, He, who was so good, so noble, so powerful, so worthy of all praise and honor, and he wept over the world having so many men, with so few to praise Him, and so many to blame Him.

"A holy monk was kneeling before a prelate, humbly and devoutly begging him to give him permission to go among the Saracens and praise the name of Jesus Christ, who the Saracens claim is not God. The prelate replied that he did not want the monk going among Saracens to praise Christ, because he did not want to see him killed, and also because he did not feel the monk would accomplish anything useful in the land of the Saracens.

"'Sir,' said the monk, 'man was created mainly for the purpose of praising God, and therefore I cannot shrink from going to praise God out of fear of death, or because it might not bring something useful to man, for I am obliged to praise God and to defend God from the blame people heap on Him, thinking the sun or the moon is God, or believing in some idol they have made into God.'[152]

"After saying this the monk wept bitterly, saying that there was once a king who had a great desire to be praised in all lands. 'It came to pass that a merchant, a subject of that king, returned from India. The king asked if in India people spoke of him. The merchant replied that they did not. The king was very displeased at the idea that people in India did not praise him, and he sent messengers with large gifts to the king of India so that he would be praised and talked about in that land. These messengers, however, excused themselves before the king, saying they did not want to make the trip, because the distance was too great and they felt they would die there, and also because the praise the king wanted from that land would be of no use to him. The king threatened the messengers severely, telling them that in places of great danger and hardship one could praise more nobly and courageously than in other places; and since their task was to honor him, he wanted them at all costs to make the journey.'

[152] Galmés and Batllori suggest that this scene might be autobiographical. S. Trías Mercant comments on the monk's reply in "La ética luliana en el 'Félix de les Meravelles,'" *EL* 13 (1969), 115-16.

"A large number of minstrels were present before a certain king, praising those who gave them presents and blaming those who gave them nothing. Among them was one minstrel who was poorly dressed, and who praised those who praised God, and blamed those who blamed God. The king was in wonder at this minstrel's being so poorly dressed and he said to himself that he must be a bad minstrel. Each minstrel performed before the king, and none of them ever mentioned God or praised Him, but they praised the king and the barons of his court. The king and his barons gave the minstrels great and handsome gifts. At last it was the turn of the minstrel who was poorly dressed, and he blamed the king and the barons for having listened to vain praises of false love and of false praisers, and for having forgotten God and His praise. The minstrel was rudely reprimanded by the king, and the barons in the court beat him and injured him, but through him God was praised for humility and patience.[153]

"After being evicted from the king's palace, the minstrel entered a large monastery and went to the refectory where the monks were eating. Now this refectory was full of monks who were great theological scholars. The minstrel said in a loud voice they were to be blamed for the fact that they were so many while God had so few people to praise Him, considering that there were so many places where God is blamed, dishonored, ignored, and scorned by idolaters who prefer idols to God."

87. PERFECTION AND IMPERFECTION[154]

"PERFECTION and imperfection are contraries; and perfection contradicts imperfection through justice, while imperfection contradicts perfection through injustice.[155] And since God is perfection and justice, it is therefore a great wonder that in man, who is a

[153] Here again are the usual worldly minstrels (see Bk. VII, n. 31) compared to the *joculator Dei* (Bk. VII, n. 33 and Bk. VIII, n. 86).

[154] Two concepts from Figure X of the Art; see the corresponding section of *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, as well as *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 7. Llull also discusses the two terms in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 586, 606, and the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 527-8 = Int. viii, 25-6. For "perfection," see the *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 65, as well as the *Medicina de peccat*, Part IV, ch. 30.

[155] B, followed by Galmés, omits "contradicts perfection," leaving, "perfection contradicts imperfection through justice and imperfection through injustice."

creature of God and who was created for the purpose of loving and serving God, there is more imperfection than perfection.

"Being that God understands Himself to be perfection, then perfection must follow from Him; for if it did not, this would mean that perfection was greater in its goodness than in its own work of perfection, which is impossible in God.

"Son," said the hermit, "God the Father is perfection, which is infinite and eternal, and which from itself begets the Son, who is infinite and eternal God, since God begets Him from all of Himself; and since God begets Him from all of Himself,[156] therefore God the Son, who is perfection which is consequence of perfection, must be without beginning or end."

Great was Felix's wonder that God the Father infinitely and eternally gave perfection to God the Son, for he said that since the Son was complete and perfect, there was no reason for God the Father to give Him perfection, if He already possessed it.

"Son," said the hermit, "in the perfection which is God the Father, goodness, greatness, eternity, power and all the other dignities would be idle if God the Father ceased giving perfection; and so that they do not cease, God the Father incessantly gives perfection to the Son and to the Holy Ghost."

Great was Felix's wonder at the idea that infinite and eternal perfection could be given perfection, for it indeed seemed to him a source of wonder. He understood, however, that since God the Father infinitely and eternally gave Himself to the Son and the Holy Ghost, it necessarily followed that the Son and the Holy Ghost received this perfection, which the Son received from the Father in being the Son, and the Holy Ghost in being the Holy Ghost, each in essence and in nature being everything the Father is.

The hermit was very pleased with what Felix had understood concerning God's perfection, and he went on to tell him about the perfection of the soul, saying:

"Son, God has placed the image of His perfection in man's soul, which is created perfect,[157] that is to say, that the soul has perfect essence of recollection, intelligence, and willing, in which essence

[156] The preceding clause is missing in A B, and hence in the printed sources.

[157] *Complit*, "fulfilled, complete," as is clear from the discussion of the corresponding noun in *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 7, is frequently used by Llull as a synonym for "perfect."

there is perfect recollection for remembering and being remembered, intelligence for being understood and understanding, and willing for wanting and being wanted.

"Dear son, the soul wants to remember, understand, and love, and this is its perfection; and so that it can do a great deal of remembering, understanding, and loving, it remembers, understands, and loves now one thing, then another, so that it will not cease remembering, understanding, and loving, for the ceasing would be an imperfection."

"Sir," said Felix, "if perfection in the soul consists of remembering, understanding, and loving, then why, when the soul remembers, understands, and loves a thing, does it leave that thing and go on to remember, understand, and love another?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "God has put His likeness in man's soul. Now, just as the Father begets His likeness in begetting the Son, and this begetting must be immeasurable and eternal, in order that it never ceases to produce His likeness, so the soul, since it cannot increase its memory, understanding, and love immeasurably and eternally, remembers, understands, and loves different things, in order that its remembering, understanding, and loving may bear some likeness to immeasurable, eternal greatness."

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a source of great wonder to me why the soul, if it is in God's likeness, wants to remember, understand, and love anything but God alone, and all the more so since God is so complete that He suffices as an object for the soul to remember, understand, and love."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God suffices as an object for the soul to remember, understand, and love, and He wants the soul to have perfection by remembering, understanding, and loving Him; which perfection it could not have if it did not remember, understand, and love other things, in order that through them it might find fulfillment in understanding and loving God.

"Son, all the heating of air, water, and earth that fire does, it does with the intention of heating itself, for its heat has greater perfection heating itself than in heating air, water, and earth. And this illustrates the fact that God's perfection finds greater perfection in giving perfection to Himself than to things outside Himself, that is, to creatures; and this is why, son, everything the soul remembers, understands, and loves in something which is not

God, it does so that it may itself have perfection; and in itself it wants to have perfection in remembering, understanding, and loving so that it can be perfect in remembering, understanding, and loving God."

"Sir," said Felix, "God has bestowed perfection on the sun, moon, stars, elements, plants,[158] animals, and all things; but man is, in this world, imperfect, and almost all the world is in disorder and error because for every man who is perfect in the exercise of virtues, there are a hundred who are imperfect because of their vices. And for this reason I am in great wonder as to where man's imperfection comes from, and what is its origin."

"Son," said the hermit, "man's perfection is of two kinds: one is through his status as a creature, and this perfection is complete; the other is through his ability to have perfection in remembering, understanding, and loving. And because men turn away from this, and believe that their perfection is to be found in the temporal objects remembered, understood, and loved rather than in the act itself of remembering, understanding, and loving, which they should prefer, they are therefore imperfect.

"There was once a king who could not have children by his wife. He wanted very much to have a son by his wife, and he had the feeling that if he could have this son, his soul would find fulfillment. At last he did have a son, one that was handsome and healthy. The king loved his son so much that he felt more imperfection in his soul after having the son than before. The king wondered greatly how it could be that he did not feel in his soul the fulfillment he expected, since he now had the son he thought would satisfy his soul. He explained this wonder to a wise man in his court, and the wise man said he felt defective in his memory, understanding, and will, because he remembered, understood, and loved his son in an incorrect fashion.

"There was once a merchant who thought he could find fulfillment if he could gratify all his desires for wealth in money and possessions. He became rich, yet the greater his wealth, the more deficient was his remembering, understanding, and loving. The merchant was in great wonder at this deficiency he felt in his soul,

[158] B, S, and the uncorrected version of A (followed by Galmés) have "planets"; all other sources, including the later correcting hand in A, have "plants," which is more in keeping with the sequence of topics discussed in *Felix*.

for he was unable to satisfy himself with riches. He asked a philosopher about what was causing his wonder, and the philosopher said to him:

"'Fire was heating water, and the more it heated it, the more its own[159] heat increased and the more the water's coldness diminished; and the more heat the fire had, the more it wanted to have, for with all the heat it had, it still wanted to increase heat and destroy cold.'"

Felix was in wonder at the hermit's words, which were so instructive, and he said: "Ah, how great is the perfection of proper memory, understanding, and will directed towards loving and knowing God!"

88. NOBILITY AND BASENESS[160]

"NOBILITY exists in many forms; and since baseness is its contrary, baseness also exists in many forms; nobility and baseness are therefore contrary to one another in many different ways. And since in God there is nobility and no baseness, therefore nobility contradicts baseness in more ways than baseness contradicts nobility. And it is therefore a wonder that in this world man is more inclined to baseness than to nobility. In God's essence there is no baseness, for it is all nobility; in which nobility there would be some baseness, if it did not produce a nobility equal to itself."

Felix was in wonder, and he asked how it could be that nobility could produce the noble.

"Son," said the hermit, "there is nobility in human understanding. And do you know why? Because the understanding was created to understand God; and therefore, when it comes to pass that the understanding understands God, then its understanding is noble, which condition follows from the nobility of the understanding and from the nobility of the purpose for which the un-

[159] Without the possessive, as the text is found in A B, Rosselló, *OE*, and Galmés, one would have to translate, "the more it heated it, the more it increased the heat and diminished the cold of the water."

[160] For "nobility" and "baseness" (*vilea* or *viltat*), see *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 95, and *Liber super quaestiones Magistri Thomae Attrebatensis*, *Opera Parva* (Palma, 1746), Int. iv, 53. "Nobility," moreover, is one of the dignities of the *Ars demonstrativa*; see Dist. I, Figure A, as well as Dist. IV, part ii, Fig. A, questions 131-3. See also *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, *MOG* III, 522 = Int. viii, 20; *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 92; and *Medicina de peccat*, Part II, ch. 20.

derstanding was created. The greatest nobility conceivable must be conceived as existing in God; for if one could conceive of it in something else that was not God, then in God there would exist baseness and lack of nobility. And that is why, son," said the hermit, "we must consider that from God's nobility there follows something noble in all goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, etc.; for if it did not, it would follow that there existed greater nobility in man than in God, since from man there follows man, and from memory remembering and remembered, from intellect understanding and understood, and from will wanting and wanted."

Felix thought over carefully what the hermit had said, and he realized that, according to his explanation, within the divine essence from God the Father there followed God the Son and God the Holy Ghost,[161] and all was one God, one nobility, in such a way that nobility was present in it in greatness of unity, goodness, infinity, eternity, etc. Thinking these matters over, Felix was in great wonder at how divine nobility existed in such infinity of greatness, for all goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, and will.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "just as the greatest nobility that can possibly exist must be present in God, so the greatest nobility a creature can have it must have in God, and this it can do in either of two ways. The first is to be one with God's nature; the other is to remember, understand, and love God. For God in Himself has so much and such great nobility, that He could not have more; He therefore wanted to give to creature, that is, to Christ's human nature, so much and such great nobility that He in turn could not have more, and this by making His human nature one with divine nature.

"Son, when man's intellect understands a stone, the sun, or some other creature, it is nobler through this act of its understanding than is the object[162] it understands; and the reason for this is that the understanding is closer to it than the object it understands. But when the intellect understands God, it is nobler in

[161] Ms B, followed by all the printed sources, has, "from God the Father there followed God the Son, and from God the Father and God the Son there followed God the Holy Ghost."

[162] "Object" here and near the end of the sentence appears as "subject" in A B, and hence in all the printed sources.

God than it is in its own understanding, even though this understanding is closer to it than to God.

"There was once a very noble and powerful prince. The day he was knighted, the prince held a large court, and he gave many gifts and did many things as a sign of his nobility. Soon the prince began to conceive notions of vainglory about the court he maintained, and he wondered how there could be room for such a base thing as vainglory amidst the nobility of memory, understanding, and will. After being in this state of wonder for a long time, he finally realized, with God's help, that disordered memory, understanding, and will cause baseness to appear, and this was why he had become inclined to vainglory."

"Sir," said Felix, "if loving, understanding, and remembering God is such a noble thing, then it is a great wonder that man's soul can incline to sin or to any baseness."

"Son," said the hermit, "just as it is very noble to love, understand, and remember God, so it is very base to remember, understand, and not love God."

Felix wondered at what the hermit said, for it seemed to him that the nobility of remembering, understanding, and loving God was greater than the baseness of remembering, understanding, and not loving God. But the hermit explained that the baseness of the will that does not love God increases the baseness of the memory that remembers and of the intellect that understands God; and this happens as a result of how closely memory, intellect, and will are associated with one another in their activity.

"There was once a woman, wife of a count, who was very virtuous and beautiful. One day it came to pass that the king visited her and made her a dishonest proposal. Great was the countess's wonder that the king's contempt of her was such that he thought she would do such a thing with him; and she asked him what had made him have such a low opinion of her that he could ask to do such a base deed. The king replied that in view of the nobility of a king, which is greater than that of a count, he had hoped she would obey his will. To which the countess replied: 'There is much greater nobility in just, charitable, strong, and wise remembering, understanding and loving, than in counties, realms, or empires.'"

"Sir," said Felix, "how could Jesus Christ deliver Himself over to death, and at the hands of such base people, when death itself

is of such great baseness, and especially when one is killed without reason by such base men?"

"Son," said the hermit, "the baser the death of Christ's human nature, and the baser the men who tormented and killed it, the more His divine nature was honored by it."

"Sir, if the holy sacraments of the holy Church are such a noble thing, why does God suffer so many men to scorn them, men who are base and full of sin?"

"Son, God is humble, patient, just, and merciful, and wants to have nobility in greatness of judging, forgiving, punishing, humiliating, and suffering."

"Sir, how can it be that in this world there are so many people who are called noble on account of their wealth or family, but who by their deeds are so base and of such great wickedness? And why does God suffer things that are so base to be more loved than really noble things?"

"Son, God has given man freedom so that he is free to remember, understand, and love, for it would be a great baseness for the soul if it were forced and constrained to remember, understand, and love; for in its memory, understanding, and loving it could not have such nobility if it remembered, understood, and loved out of constraint rather than freely, and especially since God, by His great nobility, is worthy of being freely remembered, understood, and loved.

"Son, there was once a king who was very powerful but who had no wisdom. Now this king had in his court a wise man who was poor in temporal possessions because he did not care about them. It was decided in the king's court that the wise man was nobler than the king by his wisdom and his disdain of the pleasures of the world, but that the king was nobler than the wise man by his earthly power. Now it came to pass that the king committed a sin of pride,[163] while the wise man committed a sin through ignorance; and it was decided that the wise man was baser than the king because of his ignorance, and the king baser than the wise man because of his pride."

[163] Thus in all sources except A (followed by Galmés), which has either *cerquer* (Galmés's reading, which in the glossary he said meant "intentional, deliberate," and which would give "committed an intentional sin") or *cerguer* (which is what I believe it says, but since neither word is in *DCVB*, the point is not worth belaboring), crossed out and *certament* written over it (which would give "surely committed a sin").

89. GROWTH AND DIMINUTION[164]

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "it is a wonder to me how in the divine essence God the Father does not diminish when from Himself He begets the Son and breathes forth the Holy Ghost; and it is also a wonder that the Son is begotten and the Holy Ghost breathed forth without any growth occurring, since the Father produces them forever and eternally and infinitely."

"Son," said the hermit, "because the Father is eternal and infinite, and engenders the Son and breathes forth the Holy Ghost from all of Himself, and does this ceaselessly, it is therefore impossible that the Father diminish or that the Son or the Holy Ghost grow; for by virtue and property of the Father's eternity and infinity, and because all of it is bestowed on the Son and the Holy Ghost, therefore the Father does not diminish nor do the Son or the Holy Ghost grow, since they also are eternal and infinite; on account of which eternity and infinity it is impossible for them to grow."

"Sir," said Felix, "Jesus Christ is a single person in whom there are two natures, the divine and the human. Now when the divine nature joins the human nature to itself, it would seem that the divine nature has grown."

"Son," replied the hermit, "a man's body and soul are a single person, and yet neither the body, insofar as it is not the soul, nor the soul, insofar as it is not the body, grow as a result of being a single person."

"Sir," said Felix, "if man is so tiny in size when he is born and then grows, how is it possible that the soul does not grow, if man is a compound of soul and body?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "the color of wine, when mixed with water, does not grow as a color, but it does grow in the water, which it colors."

"Sir," said Felix, "when a person wants something, but not very much, and then wants it very much, what causes the desire of his will to grow?"

[164] Llull treats "growth" (*créixer*, *creiximent*, or *augmentació*) and "diminution" (*minvar*, *minvament*, or *consumació*) in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 577-8, 603, and *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 74.

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a man who lifted a hundredweight, and then lifted two hundredweight, and he wondered where the greater strength needed to lift the two hundredweight had come from; and a philosopher told him that potential power is not always translated into the act itself."

"Sir, how is it that the grain of wheat can be multiplied into so many grains? And why, if it is no more than a single grain, does it want to become many?"

"Son, God the Father is one, and He wants one Son, which He begets from Himself, and from Himself and the Son there follows one, that is, the Holy Ghost, and all three remain one essence and one nature. And since this essence and nature is eternal and infinite, and is one and the same in each person, therefore there is no multiplication of universal into particular or particular into universal. But since the grain of wheat multiplies from universal into particular, that is, from the four elements, which it receives beneath the soil, which universally associate with it, therefore it is only right that the grain should naturally multiply the number of grains it begets; for if it did not, it would follow that from the universal and from the particular there would not result greater growth than from the particular and the particular.[165]

"Son, the grain of wheat has a need[166] to conserve its species, beneath which there are many particulars, and as a result of this need it must naturally increase the number of grains; for by virtue of the grain's need to conserve its species, and by the universality that the elements communicate to the seed, this increase is brought about."

"Sir, why does man want to grow in honor, wealth, and worldly success?"

"Son, there was once a philosopher who continually sought to increase his wisdom, and to this end he increased his understanding in knowing one thing, and then another; for the more things he knew, the more his understanding and his wisdom increased."

[165] Thus in all sources except B and the later correcting hand in A (followed by Rosselló, *OE* and Galmés), which have, "from the particular *to* the particular."

[166] Here and in the rest of the paragraph I have translated *apetit* (cf. *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 28) as "need" (see in this connection, *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 10, and *Felix*, Bk. IV, nn. 4, 26 above).

"Sir, since the sun is not hot,[167] how can it increase the heat in a fire that is hot in and of itself?"

"Son, the intellect increases its own likeness when it understands a stone, a man, or anything else; for from the intellect, and the thing it understands, there follows understanding, which understanding is the likeness of the intellect. And since the sun and fire are alike in their brightness, therefore in its likeness to the sun, fire increases its heat.

"Son, the heat that exists in water comes completely from fire, and this heat is increased in fire the more fire diminishes the cold; for by this diminution of cold, fire draws considerably nearer its simplicity."

"Sir, how can I increase the good and holy life in myself and diminish sin and vices?"

"Son, there was once a man who wanted to be good, and he wanted his goodness to be great. This man remembered, understood, and loved the great goodness of God and that of those men who loved God; and because of the likeness of goodness and greatness existing between the goodness the man wanted to have and the goodness he remembered, understood, and loved in God, goodness in this man grew greater day by day.

"There was once a king who continually wanted to increase his honor, and he did everything he could to be honored; and the more he wanted to be honored, the more it represented anguish and exertion for his soul. The king wondered how honor, anguish, and exertion could be in accord, and a wise man in his court said:

"'It is only natural, according to divine ordinance, that everyone should love the honor befitting God in this world, and because God wants to be honored in this world, He wants people to suffer anguish and to exert themselves in honoring Him. And since you, my lord, make a god of yourself by wanting to be honored for yourself alone, therefore anguish and exertion are increased in you in proportion to how much you want to be honored.'"

[167] A surprising statement, explainable by the Aristotelian notion that, since generation and corruption are absent from the heavens, the elemental theory with its play of contrary pairs of qualitites must also play no role there (see the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 711-13). From ch. 45 above, which says that the sun is "a compound or combination of active and passive light," and from Bk. III, ch. 18 which says that "the sun and fire resemble each other in their brightness," it becomes clear that Llull considered the sun to be more luminous than hot.

"Sir," asked Felix, "how could one in this world cause the holy Church to grow and the error of those who oppose it to diminish?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a man who had long labored for the good of the Roman Church came to Paris and spoke to the king of France and to the University of Paris about establishing monasteries in Paris for teaching the languages of the unbelievers, and about translating the *Ars demonstrativa* into those languages and sending people with this *Ars demonstrativa* to the Tartars to preach to them and show them the Art; and also about bringing some of these people to Paris to teach them our alphabet and language and then sending them back to their country. All these things and many others he asked of the king and the University of Paris, trying at the same time to have them confirmed by the pope and established in perpetuity.[168]

"In this way, son, the Roman faith could be made to grow; for whoever converted the Tartars along with those of Liconia[169] and some other peoples would be able to vanquish the Saracens; and thus through the path of martyrdom and of greatness of charity, the whole world could be given over to Christianity."

When Felix understood how the faith could best be made to grow, he very much wanted to take up this way, and he was in wonder at all those who opposed this way of increasing the faith.

[168] All scholars agree that this passage is autobiographical, and refers to events of Llull's first visit to Paris; cf. the Introduction above, as well as §19 of the "Life." Hillg, pp. 49–50, is good on the background of this passage, and on its relationship to the three letters addressed at the time to the king, to an unnamed prelate, and to the University of Paris. One is perhaps surprised to see such an abstract work as the *Ars demonstrativa* being recommended for apologetic purposes, but see Dist. III, Mode 7 of that work, and especially the passage corresponding to n. 20 there. Notice once again (cf. n. 87 above) the desire to establish schools of oriental languages on the model of Miramar. Lastly, the specific mention of the Tartars (i.e., the Mongols) was not the result of chimerical ideas on Llull's part. There had for the last several years been considerable diplomatic activity between the European states and the Mongol khan of Persia, who was sympathetic to Christianity and interested in forming European alliances to drive the Moslems (the Mamelukes of Egypt) out of Syria and Palestine. See my "Notes," Part II, as well as R. Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem*, Vol. III, (Paris, 1936), 710ff. It was only natural that this activity would arouse Llull's interest; in fact, it was not long before *Felix* that he wrote his *Book of the Tartar and the Christian* (cf. the introduction to *Felix*, n. 4 above). Lastly, as Llinarès, *Raymond Lulle*, p. 102, n. 116, points out, "our alphabet and language" undoubtedly refers to Latin.

[169] The region around Iconium (modern Konya) in central Asia Minor. Llull is probably referring to the Seljuk Turks, at this time semi-independent under the protectorate of the Mongol khanate of Persia.

90. GAINING AND LOSING[170]

"THERE WAS ONCE a merchant who was happy whenever he lost money and sad whenever he made it. In the land where the merchant lived there were many people who knew about this idiosyncracy of his, and it caused them great wonder. One day it came to pass that the merchant lost a thousand pounds because of a ship that had sunk. On that very day the merchant gave a dinner party and was happy; and one of the merchant's guests asked him why he was happy when he lost money and sad when he made it.

"'Sir,' replied the merchant, 'the gaining of temporal possessions is an occasion for vainglory, pride, and idle temporal pleasures; and since one should greatly fear such things, I am afraid of acquiring them through an increase of wealth; but when I lose temporal possessions, I then gain poverty, patience, fortitude, justice, and temperance.'

"In gaining God, one gains infinite goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and one gains all the other dignities of God and all of God Himself; and when one loses God, one loses all the aforementioned things."

Felix was in wonder at the great gain and the great loss one could incur in God, and he said it was a wonder how little hesitation people have in losing God, and how little effort they make to gain God.

"Insofar as man is a creature, he is good, great, enduring, and powerful; and through goodness he can gain greatness, in that he can increase his goodness by gaining virtues. And man can do the same with greatness, duration, power, and wisdom; thus with each virtue and quality he can gain one by means of the other, or lose one by means of the other."

Felix was in great wonder at the great gain a person could make by increasing one virtue by means of another; for this is a much greater gain than gaining money, castles, towns, and cities. It is therefore a wonder why people labor more to gain money, castles, towns, and cities than to gain virtues; for the loss a person incurs

[170] *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 266, treats many of the concepts of this chapter in the form of aphorisms. The verb *guanyar*, like its Romance equivalents, Fr. *gagner*, Sp. *ganar*, and Ital. *guadagnare*, can mean "to earn, make [a profit]," "to win" (a race, a bet, etc.), or the more general "to gain." See also the following note.

when, in order to gain money and temporal things, he ceases gaining virtues, is greater than what he gains in earthly riches.

"There was once a merchant who wanted to make some money from a bale of cloth. Now this cloth had gotten wet, and the merchant could gain nothing unless he sold it fraudulently or by using some ruse. While thinking over what trick he could use with this cloth in order to make a profit from it, the merchant realized that if he profited from the cloth by false means, he would lose just remembering, understanding, and will. And since he had a greater love for just remembering, understanding, and will than for money, he therefore gave up the idea of practicing a deception."

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that people generally like winning and are afraid of losing?"

"Son," said the hermit, "winning accords with greatness and losing with littleness; and since in God there is greatness, which bears a similarity to winning and a dissimilarity to losing, there follows the reason you ask about."

Great was Felix's wonder that most people in this world preferred gaining things that are of little rather than of great virtue, usefulness, and nobility.

"Son," said the hermit, "man is capable of saving[171] or losing himself: he himself can save himself, or he himself can lose himself. A person saves himself when he fulfills the ultimate purpose for which he was created, that is, to love, know, and serve God, as a result of which he truly finds himself in finding everlasting glory. And when a person himself loses himself, then he loses the purpose for which he was created, and he loses God, becoming a slave to the infinite torments of Hell.[172]

"According to the course of nature, the intellect gains more in its understanding when it is just than it does in whatever money it understands to be justly gained; and when the intellect has unjust understanding, it loses more than when it understands that it has lost money, or castles, towns, and cities."

[171] Yet another meaning of *guanyar*; cf. *DCVB*, s.v., 1, c.

[172] Thus, *infinits torments infernals*, in one group of MSS followed by Rosselló and *OE*; the other group, followed by Galmés, has *infinits torments eternals*, "infinite, eternal torments."

Felix was in wonder at what the hermit said, for men generally think they have gained more when they gain money or some other worldly thing than when they gain justice in understanding; and they think they have lost more when they lose money than when they lose just understanding.

"There was once a man who lost a son he loved very much. The day his son died a great many people came to visit him, and among them was one person who offered his sympathies to the father, saying he felt very unhappy at the pain the son's death must have caused him. 'Sir,' replied the father, 'greater is my gain in having patience in the face of my son's death than is my unhappiness at his death.'

"There was once a man who wept and deplored the time he had lost, and he could not see or think of any way to regain it. While feeling thus sorrowful and lamenting the time he had wasted, he thought that perhaps he could recover the time by increasing greatness of justice, charity, hope, wisdom, fortitude, and temperance in his remembering, understanding, and loving. The holy man was then joyful over the time he had lost, since by the increase of virtues he could regain it.

"While he was thus feeling joyful, he came upon two men playing chess, one of whom was a prelate and the other a prince. The holy man asked them why they were playing chess; they answered that they did it to pass the time and not be bored. The holy man wept for the time they were wasting, and he said:

"'Ah, how much a person loses when he wastes time! And this time is lost by all those who do not fulfill the obligations of the office to which they have been elected, the duties of which involve making God loved and known, and which do not include playing chess or dice, or hunting, being idle, or any similar thing.' The holy man wept for a long time, and the prince and prelate were in wonder at his words and his tears; and the holy man was in wonder at them for not understanding the meaning of what he had said.

"There was once a knight whose son came to a sad end, dying in a state of sin. This knight was a just man who led a saintly life, and he bemoaned and lamented very much the death of his son, saying that he had been sorely hurt by the death of his son, who

had come from his own flesh and seed, and who would forever by under the curse of God and in everlasting fire.

"A holy monk once went with a large company of friars to a foreign land to live with unbelievers and try to convert them. It came to pass that he converted a man who died a noble death. The holy monk was overjoyed at having gained for God this soul that was lost. While in this happy state, the monk saw a woman he had converted who was worshiping God and leading a very holy life, and was saying to God:

"'Lord God, whom, through ignorance and original sin, I had lost, blessed may You be, You who have given me the grace to regain You and to regain myself through You; and blessed be he who has earned the great merit of regaining me.'"

91. BOLDNESS AND COWARDLINESS[173]

"BOLDNESS and cowardliness are contraries; and boldness, together with air, contrasts with cowardliness, while cowardliness, together with earth, contrasts with boldness."

Felix was in wonder at what the hermit said, so the hermit explained that boldness comes from the blood, which is moist and hot,[174] the heart pumping an abundance of blood to all the members of the body; by which abundance the bodily members and spirits are strengthened, and in this strengthening boldness is formed and nourished,[175] which boldness dies if the contrary takes place. This contrary is born from the dry and cold, thus constricting the heart and causing the blood to leave the members and return to it; on account of which departure the members and the

[173] *Ardiment e volpelatge*, literally "hardihood and foxiness." This "foxiness" has nothing to do with our idea of "craftiness": in medieval Catalonia and Occitania, in fact, the fox seems to have been known mainly as a coward. This is clear from the usual Lullian Latin translations of these two words: *audacia* (*audàcia* is a common Catalan synonym) and *pusillanimitas*. See the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 245; the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 137; and the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 702 = Int. v, 344, for further information.

[174] Moisture and heat are the qualities of air (see Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*), which explains the concordance with boldness in the first paragraph; they are also the qualities of blood as one of the four humors (cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, n. 5). Dryness and cold, mentioned in the next sentence, are the qualities of earth, which explains the concordance with cowardliness; they are also, it should be noted, the qualities of melancholy.

[175] Thus in all sources except B, followed by Galmés, which has "proper (or just) boldness is formed and inflamed."

body's spirits become deficient and impotent, thereby causing boldness to die and cowardliness to be born.

"Dear son, there is one virtue, called fortitude, which gives life to boldness, and this virtue called fortitude lies within a man's heart; and just as the heart strengthens the entire body with the blood it sends throughout its members, so this virtue called fortitude strengthens the other virtues when it associates with and gives itself over to faith, hope, charity, justice, and wisdom. And faith, hope, charity, justice, and wisdom do the same thing by strengthening fortitude, since they are all continually mixed with fortitude, by which mixture boldness lives and is present in man, and cowardliness and fear die."

Felix was in wonder at the hermit's words, and he said there were many people lacking faith, hope, charity, justice, and wisdom, and yet having boldness. The hermit replied that such people are bold through great remembering and great will, and through the abundance of blood in their members. Such boldness, however, is not true boldness, but rather a mere semblance of boldness; for not only are great remembering, understanding, and will, along with a great expansion of blood throughout the bodily members and spirits, necessary for true boldness, but also the use and practice of the virtues.

"A king was once fighting a battle with an emperor. The emperor had many men and the king had few. The emperor and all his men felt great audacity and boldness towards the king, since they outnumbered him; and the king was afraid when he saw the emperor with so many men in the field. While in the grips of this fear, the king experienced a desire to flee; but shame and justice, for he was in the right, helped him, and trusting in being right, he preferred to die than to disobey his strength of heart. Having made this decision, the king could feel his heart sending blood throughout his bodily members and spirits, and he began intensely to remember, understand, and love God and the virtues; and then the king was armed with boldness, thereby inciting all his men to boldness. The king fought with the emperor, and the emperor and his men were vanquished, since their boldness was not based on as solid a foundation as that of the king and his men. Great was the wonder throughout the land that the king, with so few

men, have vanquished the emperor, who had so many men in the battle.

"It came to pass that two knights were in combat; one of them was a Christian and the other a Saracen. The two knights were fighting because the Christian had said that Christ was God and the Saracen had denied it. Each knight was bold and strong of heart; but since the Christian believed that God, for the sake of saving manking, had become incarnate and had, when He was a man, died for mankind, he therefore had greater boldness than the Saracen, who did not believe in this incarnation and death; and for this reason the Saracen was vanquished and killed, because the Christian had greater faith, hope, charity, fortitude, and justice."

"Sir," said Felix, "in a certain province there was once a marquis and a count at war with one another. The marquis was a knight who was very knowledgeable in matters of war, and he gave much thought and planning to everything concerned with this war. But when he was in the thick of battle, his boldness was such[176] that he did none of the things he had intended to do; and to me it is a great wonder how such a thing can happen."

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a man who so loved his earthly lord that although when he was not in his presence he knew how to praise him and speak elegantly, when he was in his presence his praises[177] failed him through an excess of love and fear, and he could not speak in an ordered fashion to the prince, because he loved and feared him too much, and the heart infused all his members with so much blood and so exalted his will that the memory and understanding lacked sufficient deliberation to carry out their intention.

"On a Christian ship there were once two Christian captives, for two Saracen ships had captured this ship.[178] One of the Chris-

[176] Thus in all sources, except the later correcting hand in A, followed by Rosselló, *OE* and the eighteenth-century Spanish translation, which has, "he had such little boldness." In view of the first half of the following paragraph, this might be the correct reading; but the second half of that paragraph, about the blood infusing his members and exalting his will, would seem to require the reading printed here.

[177] A V, followed by Galmés, have, "his heart."

[178] Piracy was common in the Mediterranean in Llull's time (see the "Life," text at n. 25 above), as it was in the Renaissance (witness Cervantes's captivity) and remained until the early nineteenth century (when the United States Navy had its run-in with the "Barbary Pirates").

tians was a very unjust and sinful man, and he was the owner of the ship; the other was a just man full of virtue. The ship had been captured because of the owner's cowardice, for he feared death, since he was a sinner and afraid of going to infernal fire, and he hid below deck and fled from the battle. The just man defended himself well, for he was very brave; and thanks to his bravery, the ship was able to defend itself from the attackers for a long time. When at last it was captured, the captain of the two ships was in wonder at why the owner of the ship had been cowardly, while a man who owned no part of it had defended it better than the owner himself. The captain gave the two men the option of becoming Saracens or of being killed. The owner of the boat was so afraid of dying that he became a Saracen;[179] and the other, who was a just man, had such boldness in honoring his own faith that he was willing to die for it, and he was martyred."

"Sir," Felix asked, "I am in great wonder at why it is that men of this world are so ardent and hesitate so little in the face of death, while men of religion hesitate to die for the sake of honoring and serving God. For many are the men who die for the sake of winning honor and wealth, and few who go to their death for having praised, honored and served God."

"Son," replied the hermit, "when the memory very much remembers, the intellect very much understands, and the will very much loves a thing, then a person will suffer greater danger and hardship than he would for something he only remembers, understands, and loves a little bit.

"A Christian monk was once preaching the Christian faith in a town belonging to a Saracen king, who ordered the monk to leave town and stop preaching, for otherwise he would make him die a cruel death. The monk asked the king whether a knight should be bolder in battle under the command of his celestial or earthly lord, or because of having virtues or having vices. The monk did not stop preaching, and preferred to die being obedient to God and having virtues, then being disobedient to God and having vices."

[179] The problem of Christians converting to Islam worried Llull. See *Blaquerna*, ch. 85 (as well as A. Caimari's note in the *ENC* edition, Vol. IV, p. 62) and the *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, *MOG* IV, 476 = Int. vii, 46, where he says, "for every Saracen who becomes a Christian, ten or more Christians become Saracens."

"Sir," said Felix, "there was once a knight who, for the sake of justice, did combat with a squire; while the squire was fighting for the sake of money he had been promised if he won the battle. It came to pass that the squire won the battle, which victory causes me great wonder, since boldness should be greater for the sake of justice than for wealth in money."

"Son," replied the hermit, "each of these two men received the payment for which he was fighting, for the knight received justice in dying for justice, and his boldness was finer and greater than the squire's for he was better recompensed."[180]

"Sir, a knight once had a great desire to find a certain knight who was his enemy, for he believed that if they met and fought, he would win. The knight found him, but was afraid of him and fled, which causes me great wonder."

"Son," said the hermit, "when the bodily vision sees something that can bring harm to the body, then the heart constricts and the blood leaves the members, causing boldness to die and cowardliness to come to life; but when strength of spirit strengthens the heart and makes it send blood out to all the members, then bodily vision cannot engender cowardliness in the heart, nor can it eject boldness therefrom.

"In a large field two kings had drawn up their armies in preparation for battle. One of them was a very good man, just and generous, and who was much loved by his people; the other was the exact opposite. When they joined battle, the one who was loved by his people won, striking the first blow in the battle.

"There was once a man who went throughout the world reproving princes and prelates for not trying to bring unbelievers to the path of truth, so that God would be loved and known by them. One day he happened to be before a prelate who had a great following, and who, in terms of the world, was greatly honored; but in his soul there was disordered memory, understanding, and will, since he was a sinful man. While the holy man was in the prelate's presence, he wanted to reprove him, but his courage failed him and he was cowardly and unable to say what he had intended to say. The holy man had recourse to fortitude of heart and to

[180] B and a later hand in L add, "because he received great reward, that is to say, God," which is clearly what Llull is implying.

charity, justice, patience, and humility; and in front of everybody he undressed and beat himself violently with some leather straps he carried with him, and when he felt that his heart had regained strength and spirit, he reproved the prelate for his faults, which dishonored the Lord for whom he was so honored in this world. The prelate was in wonder at this man's reproving him, and had two squires beat him soundly in his presence and then throw him out of the palace. In that palace there was a wise man who was in wonder at the prelate for having so erred against truth, justice, patience, humility, charity, and wisdom."[181]

92. HONOR AND DISHONOR[182]

"To God is befitting all honor, and no dishonor, and in fact, everything that exists was created to honor God. And since honor is befitting to God, and since man was created in His image and likeness, therefore man by nature wants to be honored."

"Sir," said Felix, "according to what you say, man wants to be honored because he was created in the image of God, and because to God is befitting all honor; now if this is the case, please tell me why, in this world, man prefers honoring himself to honoring God. For this is a source of great wonder: if man wants honor because he is similar to God, and God deserves honor more than does man, why does man prefer honoring himself to honoring God?"

"Son," said the hermit, "honor and dishonor are contraries; and since man is inclined to sin, dishonor befits him, for when he submits to sin he dishonors his likeness to God; on account of which submission he falls into dishonor, which is the result of wanting to be honored more than God.

"In a certain city there lived a very rich and honorable burgher. The burgher was a humble man of good habits, who daily honored

[181] The "and wisdom" is missing in B and the uncorrected text of A, and hence in Galmés. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 174, assumed that this extrordinary story (which is like a much more developed version of that commented on in n. 153 above) was autobiographical.

[182] Honor, usually treated in terms of the contrast between that due to God and that which men want for themselves, is a recurrent theme in Llull: see, for instance, the *Libre d'intenció*, Part V, ch. 23; *Libre de Sancta Maria*, ch. 19; *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 668, 822, 916, 923; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 71. For a definition, see *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 71.

his soul with good remembering, understanding, and wanting; for to remember, understand, and want in proper fashion is an honor to the soul and to faith, hope, charity, justice, prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Now this burgher had a very beautiful wife, who, because of her beauty and because of her noble lineage, was proud and liked to be honored through the five bodily senses; for she wanted to dress in beautiful clothes so that people would honor her, and she wanted to be praised by people so that she could hear herself well spoken of. And since God is not corporeal nor has in Himself the five bodily senses, this woman preferred to be honored for these things dissimilar to God than for those that are similar to God. And her husband did just the opposite, which was why the woman dishonored God while her husband honored Him.

"There was once a prelate who was very powerful in terms of worldly possessions, but who led an unprincipled life. He was, moreover, proud, and wondered why people did not do him great honor. One day he happened to ask one of his clergymen why people did him so little honor.

"'Sir,' replied the clergyman, 'according to the laws of reason and nature, no man should be honored unless it be with the intention of honoring God; and this is why God wants prelates to be honored, so that, through their honor, people may love and honor God. But since you love honor simply for the sake of being honored yourself and not for the sake of God's being honored through you, therefore in you the nature and principle of why people should honor you is lost, which makes them dishonor you by remembering and understanding the fact that you are proud, avaricious, lustful, and worthy of dishonor.'

"In a certain city it came to pass that a man who was the son of a poor peasant was chosen bishop. As bishop he became very rich, and his bishopric was very honored. The bishop honored his father and mother, and all his relatives, as much as he could, but he gave them nothing, for it pleased him that they were poor. Everybody in the bishopric was in wonder at him, that he was not ashamed to honor such lowly people as his father and mother, and at why, if he insisted on honoring them, he did not give them money and make them rich. Now it came to pass that an archbishop, who did exactly the opposite, was a guest of the bishop's,

and he heard about the bishop's reputation for honoring his relatives and yet not enriching them. The archbishop reproved the bishop for not enriching his relatives and for allowing them to appear before him poorly dressed. The bishop answered the archbishop in the following terms:

"'Riches are dangerous to lowly people of base extraction, and the same is true of honors; and I honor my relatives by humiliating myself and displaying my humble extraction, for humility in the form of the poverty of my relatives is agreeable to me. And just as I honor my relatives through my own honor, so God honors me through His honor.'

"A certain prince loved honors, and he devoted all the income from his principality to honoring himself; and he never gave a single thought to the honor of God, for the sake of whose honor he had been made king. One day a rich Jew came before the king, and the king honored him and received him handsomely, so that the Jew would lend him some of his money. In the king's presence there was a Christian who loved God's honor, and who said:

"'Jesus Christ is dishonored in a Jew's soul, for he believes that Christ was not God, but rather a lowly, sinful, false, and deceitful man; and this is why he bears ill will towards Christ and all His followers.[183] Christ is dishonored in the soul of a prince who prefers his own honor to that of God. God is dishonored by the power of a prince who could make God honored in those lands where He is dishonored. God is dishonored there because the people of those lands claim that the sun, the hoopoe, or some idol is God.[184] And God is dishonored when people prefer money, children, white bread, good wine, and beautiful women to God.' These words and many others the holy man spoke in the presence of the prince and the Jew, who laughed at what he said.

[183] See the references in n. 151 above.

[184] I have not been able to clarify the reference to the hoopoe. In *Blaquerna*, ch. 88, there is another reference to the bird in a passage also dealing with idol worshipers. "There is another land near Bohemia [*Boèmia*; but another source has *Bocinia*] where a hoopoe enters a forest, and if anybody so much as cuts a branch in that forest, at once lightning and thunder come down from the sky and put any man who is in that forest in danger of death." This could also be an allusion to the fact that the Arabs held the bird in considerable reverence, claiming marvelous medicinal and other qualities for it, and making use of its head in charms (see the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed., New York, 1910, s.v. hoopoe). For similar complaints about idol worshipers, see the passage corresponding to nn. 227 and 235 below.

"The holy man wept and said he was in wonder at how dishonored God was by a wicked prince whom God has honored above all other people. God has honored man by giving him His likeness and by giving him so many creatures to serve him; and God has honored princes in making each of them lord and ruler of so many men. Man, however, has dishonored God by dishonoring the above-mentioned likeness, in making it contrary to Him by acts of sin; and in this world princes dishonor God by not obliging those who do Him villainy and dishonor to honor Him."

Felix thought a great deal about what the hermit had said, and he was in wonder at how patient God was in suffering the dishonor people do Him in this world.

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder greatly that honors are so loved in this world by princes, prelates, clerics, monks, knights, burghers, merchants, and all sorts of people; for many people abandon wife, children, temporal pleasures, and wealth, but I see hardly anyone willing to abandon honor, or who is not angry when someone does him a dishonor."

"Son," replied the hermit, "honor and dishonor are contraries, and their contrariety is greater when they are great than when they are small; and since to God befits honor, and in fact great honor, therefore God wants every man, whether prelate, prince, or whatever, to want to be honored in God, so that God can be honored in this honor. But most men do just the contrary, for they want honor for themselves[185] and not for God; and God causes such people to be dishonored in His justice, ire, malediction, and in vile thoughts and reflections.

"Dear son," said the hermit, "open you mind's eye, and see how much in the way of accoutrements, building, and other things is done in this world to honor man; while so few men go to any trouble to honor God."

Felix wept, and so did the hermit, and they agreed that dishonor had vanquished honor because of the shortcomings of wicked rulers.

[185] A B, followed by Galmés, have "itself."

93. BEAUTY AND UGLINESS[186]

"MAN NATURALLY loves beauty, for there is beauty in God. This beauty, however, is spiritual, and it is therefore a source of great wonder that men in this world prefer beauty in physical rather than in spiritual things, since God is not a body nor does He have physical beauty.

"Spiritual beauty consists in remembering, understanding, and loving God, faith, hope, charity, and all the other virtues; and spiritual beauty consists in remembering, understanding, and not loving gluttony, lust, and all the other vices. Spiritual ugliness consists in remembering, understanding, and not loving God and the virtues, and remembering, understanding, and loving the vices. This being the case, it is a wonder that ugliness is in such greatness, and beauty in such littleness.

"The greatest beauty imaginable is in the divine essence, in which God the Father, from His beauty, begets God the Son and breathes forth God the Holy Ghost; for God, delighting in His own goodness, infinity, eternity, and all His dignities, is beautiful in Himself, in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost; and the Son is beautiful in Himself and in the Father and in the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is beautiful in Itself, in the Father, and in the Son."

So that Felix would have a perfect understanding of divine beauty the hermit told him about a holy soul that was in contemplation and saw great beauty in its understanding and in its intellect, for the intellect understood that it could understand God, and in this power it understood great beauty; for there is great beauty in understanding God, and such an understanding greatly beautifies the intellect; and this holy soul saw the same thing in its memory and in its will. When this sould saw such great beauty of power in memory, understanding, and will, it desired to have this beauty within its power; and it therefore wanted to remember, understand, and love God, so that there would be beauty both in its essence and in its activity.

[186] For the contrast between spiritual and physical beauty (and ugliness), which is the way Llull usually discusses this topic, see the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 104; see also *Medicina de peccat*, Part IV, ch. 38, *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 34, and the definition in *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 37.

Felix understood the hermit's example, and he said that since God understood beauty of power to exist in His goodness, infinity, eternity, and other dignities, He wanted there to be beauty of production of the good, infinite, eternal, etc. in that goodness, in order that its essence be beautiful in goodness, infinity, etc. and that there be beauty in the beauty of activity for all of them, and with all of the dignities being a single essential beauty, and yet each being beautiful for its distinct activity in the divine persons.

While thinking about this, Felix wondered how any soul, seeing such great beauty in God, could feel inclined towards sin or towards any sort of ugliness.

"Divine beauty created beauty of soul in its likeness, and in the intellect it placed beauty of goodness, beauty of greatness, beauty of duration, beauty of power, and beauty of understanding; for it is a beautiful thing for the human intellect to be good, great, durable, powerful, and wise. And because God is intelligible, and the intellect can understand Him, God placed beauty of goodness, greatness, duration, power, beneath beauty of understanding; and this was very beautifully ordained, that is, that beauty of wisdom should be above, and that of goodness and the other likenesses should be below; for the soul can understand God, whereas it cannot make Him good, great, durable, or powerful."[187]

Felix was very pleased with what the hermit said, for his words were very subtle and of great beauty; and he said that what was true of the beauty of the intellect, was also true of the beauty of the will and the memory, since God was memorable and lovable.

When the hermit saw that Felix had understood him, he was very pleased, in which state there was beauty of pleasure, charity, justice, and wisdom;[188] and he said that God had beautified the human intellect with beauty of goodness, greatness, duration, power, wisdom, and He had given it more beauty of wisdom than

[187] Notice not only the exemplarist doctrine of this paragraph, but also its clear statement of the primacy of the intellect, a primacy indispensable to Llull's missionary method, to his "necessary reasons," and to the entire structure of the Art. This aspect of Llull's thought took on particular importance in the post-Art phase, when the dignity of "wisdom" was renamed "intellect" (cf. "Llull's Thought," n. 18), and where the intelligibility of God was used as a prime weapon to try to beat down the Averroist distinction between what we can know and what we believe.

[188] B, followed by Galmés, changes the word order, putting, "in which pleasure there was beauty of charity, justice, and wisdom."

of goodness, greatness, power, and duration, since God is intelligible but not bonifiable, magnifiable, eternalizable, or empowerable,[189] and this is why all these beauties are placed under the heading of beauty of intellect; and the same is true of beauty of memory and of will.

After saying these things about spiritual beauty, he spoke about physical beauty, saying that God had beautified man's body with qualities, that is to say, that its substance is beautified by accidents. And the hermit said this so that Felix would raise up his understanding as much as possible to understand the spiritual beauty present in the soul, which is beautified by the likenesses of God, which likenesses He created, and out of which He combined and composed the soul. And these likenesses, which are of goodness, greatness, eternity, and power, beautify the substantial likenesses, which are beauty of memory, understanding, and will, these being substantial in that the soul is composed of them, as is explained in the *Chaos*.[190]

By what the hermit said, Felix understood the essence of the soul, that is, memory, understanding, and will, which together form the soul's being, since God is memorable, intelligible, and lovable; and that the other likenesses are present in the soul as powers or qualities, since God is not bonifiable, magnifiable, eternalizable, or empowerable by the soul.

The more Felix understood this matter, the more he wondered how a soul created from such beautiful, such noble, and such great beauties could incline towards sin, which is so full of ugliness.

"Son," said the hermit, "physical sight derives pleasure from seeing beautiful colors, beautiful forms, beautiful clothes, trees, leaves, flowers, fruits, buildings, the sun, moon, and sea, beasts, birds, men, and other similar things. Now, all these beautiful things are nothing in comparison with the beauty of the soul and the virtues; and the beauty of the soul and its powers and virtues are nothing in comparison with the beauty of God, which He has

[189] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, nn. 16, 47.

[190] I can find nothing in the *Liber Chaos,* which deals almost exclusively with elemental theory, to which Llull might be referring here; in the *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae*, however, of which the *Liber Chaos* originally formed part (see the "Life," n. 94, and the bibliography of Lullian works at the end of this volume) there is a section (De Secundo Gradu S, *MOG* III, 212 = Int. iv, 8) that deals specifically with the substantiality of the rational soul and its powers.

in His essence, in His dignities and persons,[191] and in all His works. This being the case, it is a great wonder that physical beauty is more loved than spiritual beauty.

"Son, the greatest beauty God could put in a creature was to make it one person with Himself, and that in this creature the uncreated and created likenesses be so similar to one another that they become a single person."

Felix was in wonder at the great beauty existing in Christ, and he was in wonder at the beautiful life and teachings of Christ, our Lady, and the Apostles. And he was also in wonder at the ugliness of Christians who allow this great beauty of Christ to be scorned in this world by Jews and Saracens, and to remain unknown to Tartars and other unbelievers.

"A woman was once walking down a street full of people. This woman was magnificently dressed and was very beautiful; but she was living in the sins of lust and gluttony. A man watching her said to another man that he was in wonder at how beauty and ugliness had combined in that woman; the other man answered, saying:

"'A splendidly dressed priest was once at the altar saying mass; and while he was blessing the body of Jesus Christ, he realized what great beauty God had placed in that sacrament in which such a miraculous, wonderful, honored, and noble act was carried out, for God's power overcomes all the powers of nature as a demonstration of that beauty, which it possesses in goodness, greatness, eternity, wisdom, will, and in all the other dignities. While this prelate was meditating on the beauty that God's power possessed in all of God's dignities, and what this beauty represented in its overcoming of all the powers of nature in the holy sacrifice of the mass, he recalled a woman he had loved very much and with whom he had sinned for a long time, and this made him wonder greatly how, for the sake of such an ugly sin, he could have been an enemy of such great beauty as he realized was present in the holy sacrifice.'

"There was once a woman who was very beautiful, and who, because of this great beauty, was proud. One day, after looking at herself in the mirror and admiring her own beauty, she went

[191] "And persons" is missing in A and hence in Galmés's text.

off, still thinking about her beauty, to the toilet, where she saw all the ugliness that had come out of her body; then she wondered why she had ever been proud of her beauty, with such ugliness coming out of her body.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "it is a very ugly thing that the Saracens hold and possess the Holy Land where Jesus Christ was born and died. And this is why a knight once said to a prince that a prince's ugliness was greater than that of a simple knight, for a prince's ugliness drove out beauty."

Felix understood why the hermit gave this example, and he said that God is more dishonored by princes and prelates who are wicked men and tend to love base, ugly things, than by their subjects. In this way, Felix added, the greatest likenesses of beauty are, in this world, converted into the greatest likenesses of ugliness. With these words Felix wept bitterly, and he cursed ugliness, which had established itself in so many and such great men, in order to vanquish greatness of beauty in goodness, duration, power, wisdom, and will.

94. CONSOLATION AND DISCONSOLATION[192]

"In a certain city there lived a handsome young man, the son of an honorable burgher, who had been very well brought up by his father so that he would love, know, and serve God. The young man decided to travel throughout the world, praising and blessing God, and he wanted to take on the role of a poor pilgrim, begging alms from door to door. Unbeknown to his father or to any of his friends, he left the city and went on all the pilgrimages he could find on which one could praise and bless God. After going on all these pilgrimages, he took on the task of consoling people

[192] Of the many places in which Llull discussed the subject of consolation, the more important are: the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 349; *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 39; *Blaquerna*, chs. 23 and 49 (see A. Caimari's note in the *ENC* edition, Vol. IV, p. 29); *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 44; *Libre de Sancta Maria*, ch. 25; *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 701 = Int. v, 343; *Tree of the Philosophy of Love*, Part V, ch. 10; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 46; and the *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 32. In addition there are two curious works: the *Consolació d'ermità* written in Messina when Llull was eighty, and the *Consolatio Venetorum et totius gentis desolatae* written in 1298 to comfort the Venetians after their naval defeat at the hands of the Genoese (the defeat in which Marco Polo was probably captured, and in the captivity subsequent to which he dictated his famous *Travels*).

undergoing hardships in this world. This pilgrim, son," said the hermit to Felix, "led a saintly life and did much good in the world, consoling the disconsolate, as you will now hear:

"One day it came to pass that a man who had long led an upright life without committing any mortal sin was suddenly tempted to indulge in carnal pleasure, and so great was the temptation that he sinned with a woman of easy virtue. After sinning, he was very repentant of the sin he had committed, and night and day he was disconsolate, for it seemed to him impossible that God would forgive him, no matter how much penance he did. And when he thought that he had lost God and the glory of Paradise, he wept night and day, and he was unable to console his spirit no matter what he saw or did. While he was in this state of grief, the pilgrim arrived in the city and heard about this man who was so disconsolate. He went to him and said:

"'Sir,' said the pilgrim, 'according to what I have heard about your situation, you are disconsolate over something that happened to you. I am a person who goes through the world consoling the disconsolate. If you want to be consoled of your grievance, I am somebody who can console you whatever that grievance may be, as long as you tell me what it is that is making you disconsolate.'

"When the good man heard these words, he was in great wonder, and he said he doubted he could be consoled by anything the pilgrim said or did, and he refused to say what it was that was making him disconsolate. Instead, he wept bitterly and bemoaned the harm which had come to him, saying that he could never recover so great a loss.

"Great was the pilgrim's wonder at how disconsolate the good man was, and he said to himself that if he told enough consoling stories he could not but hit upon the problem which was making this man disconsolate, and he therefore said:

"'A merchant once lost everything he had in a ship that sank at sea. This merchant was very disconsolate over his loss, for he considered it most shameful to have other people consider him, his wife, and his children as being poor, when they had long lived amidst wealth and honors. While he was thus disconsolate, he remembered Jesus Christ, who, being God and man, wanted to live in this world as a poor man, without honors, and who wanted our Lady and the Apostles to live in this world amidst hardships

and poverty. These thoughts led him to realize that those who, in this world, are most like Christ and His followers, are those who are in the best situation.'

"The pilgrim saw that the good man was unconsoled by what he had said, and instead wept and moaned even more than before. He therefore changed the subject, saying:

"'There was once a burgher with a beautiful wife whom one day he discovered with a cleric in the sin of fornication. The burgher was very angry, for he loved his wife very much, and he considered the dishonor his wife had done him to be a great one. The burgher now repented of what he had done to his wife, for he had often sinned with a prostitute; and he therefore held back the great anger he felt towards his wife, and he wanted to exercise patience, and even found pleasure in being dishonored in this world. As a result of loving these things, the burgher was consoled about the wrong his wife had done him, and he was so happy in his newfound patience and justice that he forgot his anger.

"'This burgher had a son he loved very much who died; and as the burgher was becoming disconsolate over the death of his son, he remembered how God's will is just, and how everything He wants, He wants with justice. The burgher therefore said that whatever God's will had judged proper for his son counted for more than the son himself, or his own love for his son. And as a result he was consoled about his son, and he took pleasure in what God's will had willed.'

"These and many other words the pilgrim said to the good man, yet the more words he spoke and stories he told, the more the good man was disconsolate and sad, so that the pilgrim was in great wonder.

"The pilgrim then told about a cleric who was in wonder at how little he feared God, and how he had no great love for God's mercy. 'This cleric was an upright man who had never indulged in carnal sin, but was in fact a virgin. But then it came to pass that he was corrupted and sinned with a prostitute. Afterwards the cleric repented greatly of his sin, and he was very disconsolate at having lost the virginity he had so long conserved. While he was thus disconsolate, he felt in his soul a sensation of fear at God's justice, as well as one of trust in God's mercy. Then the cleric recalled the desire he used to have, that is, the desire to fear God

and to love His mercy; and since, as a result of the sin he had committed, he had been made to fear God and to have hope in His mercy, he was therefore consoled for the sin he had committed and for the virginity he had lost, and he took pleasure in repenting as a sinner, by trusting, and fearing, and doing penance.'

"The holy man gave great thought to the pilgrim's words, and he was consoled by them, to the point that he wondered how he could ever have despaired of God's mercy no matter how great the sin he had committed.

"After consoling the good man, the pilgrim came upon a knight whom another knight had defeated in battle. This knight was so disconsolate over having been defeated that he was languishing near death from mourning and sorrow, for to him it was a great dishonor to have been defeated. And the loss of the honor which he had always highly valued made him disconsolate, so that nobody could cheer him up.

"'Sir,' the pilgrim said to the knight, 'there was once a king who did everything he could to be honored. It came to pass, however, that this king's subjects chose another lord and left him. He was very angry and displeased at his subjects' having betrayed him and left him for another lord. This displeasure made him disconsolate and sad, for he had lost honor and come to a low estate. While in this condition, the king saw, by the grace of God, that it was better not to be king, to exercise patience and so to love humility that he would have no interest in being honored, but instead would prefer to be dishonored in the world and even by his own people, than to be king and to love honors against patience and humility.'

"The pilgrim then said that Jesus Christ, king of heaven and earth, suffered dishonor on the cross, where He died to honor the Godhead, wanting to dishonor Himself, so that He could give honor to God. When the knight heard these words, he was consoled about what was making him sad, and he desired dishonor in this world so as to honor God in his heart with patience and humility, and he said that he had gained more by being defeated than if he had won; for if he had won the battle, he would not have had so great an occasion to exercise patience and humility.

"In that city there was a rich merchant suffering from a fatal illness. This man was disconsolate because he saw he was dying

and would have to leave the wealth he labored so long to acquire, and he bemoaned the fact that it had not given him more personal happiness. He also bemoaned having to leave his wife, children, his friends and this worldy life he so loved. The pilgrim came to this merchant to console him on his deathbed and to speak good words of God to him.

"'Sir,' said the pilgrim, 'a miser, who had amassed a great fortune, was dying, and it occurred to him that God wanted him to die so that his wealth would not be idle, but instead would serve some poor people in need of worldly goods.[193] This thought made him think about God's justice and he was consoled about death, saying he deserved to die, since he had been hoarding wealth that poor people needed.' With this, the pilgrim added that the more of these temporal things he left when he died and the more he took pleasure in dying, the greater would be his reward for scorning them and for wanting to come cheerfully to God, and the greater would be his glory.

"The merchant was consoled, and he died cheerfully because of what the pilgrim had told him; and the pilgrim became famous throughout the land for his great ability to console people. And when they were disconsolate, they would send messengers for him to come and console them."

95. JOY AND SORROW[194]

"Joy is, in the soul, the likeness of the glory God possesses in His glorious essence; for since God created the soul in His likeness, and God is glory, therefore his glory imbues the soul with joy, because of this joy being a likeness of His glory.

"Son," said the hermit, "the Father is glory, and from His glory He begets the Son, who is glory, and He breathes forth the Holy Ghost, who is also glory, since both are begotten from glory; hence the soul's joy when it sees this begetting and procession on the part of the Father, and when it sees such great glory, all of which gives it inestimable joy."

[193] A. Caimari, in an interesting note on poverty and charity in Llull in the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna* (Vol. IV, pp. 12–13), cites this passage among many others concerning the obligation of the rich to give alms.

[194] For joy opposed to ire instead of to sorrow, see the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 588, 607.

Felix reflected on the great joy the soul would experience in glory, which it would receive with the likeness of glory, insofar as divine glory has created its likeness in the soul. Then Felix was in wonder at the great joy the soul should have in this world, since it was created in the likeness of God—a joy so great that no sorrow may cause it to be lost or expelled from the soul.

"There was once a man who reflected upon the fact that there had been a time when he did not exist; he then reflected that now he existed and was a man, who is such a good creature. Thereupon he felt great joy at his existence and at his humanity. While in this state of happiness, he felt a high fever come over him, giving him thoughts about death. He then fell into great sorrow, for dying and becoming nothing seemed to him a bad thing. Now this man was a gentile who did not believe in any other life but this one on earth; and he felt greater sorrow when he thought about death than when he thought about his present existence.[195] It came to pass that this gentile became a Christian, and once again he took sick; but this time he was happy and took joy in the thought of death, for he had the hope of achieving everlasting life.

"A good woman once gave birth to a son, and her joy over the child made her forget the pains she had suffered during the birth. While she was thus feeling happy, she thought about out Lady's great joy when she had our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom she gave birth without any trace of pain, and whom she knew to be God and man. Then she reflected on the great joy of the Father, who has a Son that is infinite, eternal, good, and perfect in all that is noble, which Son He has from Himself and in Himself. Then the good woman felt joy in the joy on which she had reflected, and she was in wonder at God's great joy, our Lady's, and her own.

"There were once two brothers who sold and gave away everything they had for the love of God, and then wandered through the world. One took up that task of finding joy in everything he saw or heard, and the other took up the task of being sorrowful over all the failings he found in men. It came to pass that both entered the court of a king who was eating in his palace amid a great gathering of knights. This king was a worldly man, as was

[195] Note the similarity to the protagonist's anguish in the prologue to the *Book of the Gentile*.

everyone else in his court. One of the brothers began to weep and feel sorrow in his heart when he saw the king behave like a dissolute man, along with everybody else in his court. The other brother found joy in God's justice, which would punish the king and his companions. The king and those with him were in wonder at the two brothers, at one of them being sad while the other was happy; and they asked them what was the cause of this strange behavior.

"'Sir,' said the sorrowful brother, 'my calling is that of feeling sorrow every time I find any man in the ire of God; and since you and your company are slaves of sin, as your vain actions proclaim, I therefore feel sorrow, for there should be great sadness in a person's heart when he sees any man who is on the path to damnation and is not a friend of God.' The other brother said he was happy and felt joy because the king and his company were creatures in whom God's justice would be made manifest in the next world where they would be given eternal suffering; for one should be happy and feel joy in everything God does in this world and in the next, since all His works are good and well-ordered."

"Sir," said Felix, "what does joy come from, what sustains it, and why does it arise? And why does sorrow arise?"

"Son," said the hermit, "in man's soul there is one likeness, among others, which is the image of glory, as you have already understood; and when the soul makes use of this likeness in something it loves, then it feels joy in its heart, just as does the will, when its desire, mixed with perfection, feels joy over something that is the fulfillment of its desire. And this is the path and root from which joy is born and lives. And when it comes to pass that this will finds no fulfillment and is deficient in what it loves, then it feels sorrowful, as a token of the suffering its likeness will have in eternal suffering."

Felix was in wonder at the hermit's words, and he said that many men feel joy in indulging in sin, and many also feel sorrow in practicing the virtues.

"Son," said the hermit, "those who feel ignoble joy make use of the likeness of glory, but in reverse, and they cause the entire likeness of glory to be contrary to God's glory, as a result of which contrariety their likeness to joy is turned around and converted into the likeness of sorrow."

When Felix had understood the hermit's explanation, and had reflected on the great sorrow of those in Hell, he was in great wonder at the immensity of that sorrow.

"There was once a merchant who had sent his son to a faraway land to do business. The son was away on his voyage for a long time, and he returned much later, having made a large profit. When the merchant saw his son returning with large profits, he felt great joy. The night of his return, however, their house caught on fire and burned to the ground, killing the son and destroying all the merchandise he had brought back. The merchant was very sad over the death of his son, his wife, and members of his household, as well as over what he had lost, and he was in wonder how such great joy could be changed to such great sorrow in so little time.

"There was once a woman who had a son she loved very much. When he reached the age of twenty this son died, and the woman was steeped in sorrow day and night over the death of her son. In a vision, however, she saw that if her son had lived two more years, he would have killed a man, been hung, and condemned to Hell; but since he had died earlier, his was a good death and he was saved. When the woman awoke, she felt great joy, and afterwards she no longer felt unhappy over the death of her son.

"A saintly person was sleeping, and in her sleep it seemed to her she was in glory with Jesus Christ, Saint Mary, the angels, and the saints of Paradise. Her joy was unimaginable, and she was very sad to wake up and find she was not in Paradise. She then reflected on the dishonor done to Christ and his heavenly court through works of sin in this world; and as a result her life became one of grief and sorrow."

96. CONCORDANCE AND CONTRARIETY[196]

"In God there is concordance without any contrariety, in that the Father from all of Himself begets the Son and the Holy Ghost;

[196] We now have three chapters with pairs of concepts from the three principal triangles of Figure T, the green, red, and yellow triangles of the *Ars demonstrativa*, which correspond to the three triangles of the *Principles of Medicine* (see Dist. I, n. 12 there) and the *Ars brevis* (see Part II, n. 7 there).

and since the Father is concordance, in the Son and the Holy Ghost, of goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and all the dignities, and since He is in Himself all the dignities, therefore God is concordance without contrariety; which contrariety cannot exist in Him, since the concordance is between all the dignities.

"Consider, son," said the hermit, "how great is the concordance existing in the divine essence, for all the dignities accord in being a single essence, a single nature, a single Godhead; and each has activity in itself, and each in the other, so that in the act of goodness are present the acts of greatness, eternity, power, and of all the others; and the same is true of greatness and all the others, in which is present the act of goodness; and so on for all the rest."[197]

Great was Felix's wonder at the great concordance existing in God, being a single essence without distinction, and having concordance in essence, nature, and dignities.

"Dear son, between God and man there is concordance and contrariety. There is concordance in that man has some likenesses to God, being created in the image of God. This concordance is made up of these likenesses, and when man makes use of the likenesses he has to those in God, and when this use is for the sake of praising, revering, and honoring God, then there is a concordance of operation between likeness and likeness, and therefore between God and man, which concordance is very great. But when it happens that the qualities a person has are contrary to God's dignities, then they are, by their works, dissimilar to God and His virtues, which makes for very great contrariety between God and man.

"In God, goodness, which is God, is similar to goodness in man, insomuch as he is a creature; and when it happens that man does good with the intention of loving and knowing God's goodness, then there is concordance between likeness and likeness, that is to say, between God and man; but when man does good with some intention unrelated to God, or does good more for himself or for another than for God, then there is contrariety between God and man. This is the case when man does some wrong against God's good or against his own, which results in contrariety between God and man, and between likeness and likeness."

[197] A good summary of the convertibility of the dignities in God, a concept inherent in the very structure of Figure A. See *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 6, for references.

Felix gave considerable thought to the concordance and contrariety the hermit had discussed, and he was in wonder at the greatness in which concordance and contrariety could exist, for it seemed to him that great was the concordance a man could have with God, and great the contrariety; and this was due to the greatness of man's likeness to God. As a result of this wonder, Felix said to the hermit:

"Sir hermit, I am in great wonder at how there can be such great similarity between God and man and at the same time such great contrariety; for, as one can clearly see, there are more people contrary to God than concordant with Him, whereas, according to reason, there should be more people concordant with God than contrary to Him, since He created them in His likeness."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God created men for the next life, not for this one, so that He could have greater concordance with them in the next world than in this one; and the more contrary men are to God in this world, the more God can, in the next world, punish them through justice or pardon them through mercy, which is why justice or mercy can be very concordant in them. Moreover, God suffers many men to be contrary to Him, and very much so, so that a few holy men can make such an effort to serve God that they can make them concordant with Him, and in this concordance these holy men will rise up to have great concordance with God.

"There is concordance between one man and another inasmuch as they belong to a single species; but the concordance is much greater when they are concordant through their works, with one man understanding what the other understands, and loving what the other loves; and just as in this way there can be greater concordance, so by the contrary there can be greater contrariety.

"Between soul and body there is concordance and contrariety: there is concordance because they are naturally concordant in constituting a single man; and there is contrariety because the body decays and dies and the soul cannot remain in it. There is, however, another contrariety which is even greater, that is to say: when a man is in sin, then the soul is against the final purpose of the body, and the body is against the final purpose of the soul; and thus they are concordant in what they were not made for, and contraries in what they were made for."

Felix gave considerable thought to the concordance and contrariety between body and soul, and he wondered why the soul and the body were more concordant in what they were not than in what they were created for. The hermit realized what Felix was wondering about, and he said there was once a king who more readily remembered, understood, and loved his own power and honor than the power and honor of God, which was why his remembering, understanding, and loving had greater concordance with defect than with perfection, and with nonbeing rather than with being.

"Between the intellect and understanding there exists concordance, since understanding is the work of the intellect; and the same is true of memory and remembering, of will and wanting. When, however, it comes to pass that the intellect understands and its understanding is contrary to God and to the purpose for which intellect and understanding were created, then there is contrariety between intellect and understanding."

Felix wondered at the great contrariety existing between intellect and understanding, for if the understanding was the work of the intellect, he did not see how such work could be converted into contrariety. And this was why the hermit, who saw that Felix was in wonder at how great was the contrariety between intellect and understanding, told him that there was once a king who was contrary to his subjects and his subjects were contrary to him; and this king had a son who was contrary to him, and a wife who was also contrary to him; thus his subjects, his wife, and his son were most contrary to him in those things the king most loved.

"Son," said the hermit, "any concordance or contrariety is in relation to purpose, for if one makes things concordant with the end for which they exist, then this concordance exists for that end; from which end it has taken its origin, according with that end by some means which is concordant with both its end and beginning.[198] But when it happens that things are contrary to their end, then they accord with nonbeing and are contrary to being. Since this is so, it is therefore a great wonder that a sinner, from a state of such great contrariety with being as he is in, can raise

[198] For "origin," "means," and "purpose" as alternate translations of *comencament*, *mijà*, and *fi* of the red triangle of Figure T (the first and last of which form the subject of the following chapter), see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 16.

up and bring himself to a state of concordance, which accords with being."

97. BEGINNING AND END[199]

"In God there is no beginning or end in the sense of something causing Him to be limited or finite. It is true, however, that God the Father is the beginning of God the Son, since He begets Him from Himself; and the end is one and the same thing in the Father and the Son, for the Father is a boundless, eternal end; and since from all Himself He begets the Son, the Son is therefore also a boundless, eternal end; and it is thus only fitting that the end be one, even though in the beginning the Father and the Son are different."

Great was Felix's wonder at how the Father and Son are one and the same end, and yet in the beginning are different persons. And the hermit told him that just as in the beginning they are different persons, with the Father being one person and the Son another,[200] so in the end they are also different persons, that is to say, that the end for which the Father is Father, is both Father and Son, and the same is true for the Son's end; and therefore in one way their ends are different and in another way they are the same. And this is also true of their beginning, in which the Father and Son are different, while at the same time being by essence and nature one and the same beginning, by reason of the fact that the Father begets the Son from Himself.

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am in great wonder how in God there can exist goodness and greatness without beginning; and I would say the same for eternity, power, and all the dignities, since goodness does good, greatness makes things great, and so on for all of them; and in this doing it seems to me there must be a beginning, and if there is a beginning, there must be an end."

"Son," said the hermit, "insofar as the Father is the beginning of the Son and the Holy Ghost, He is the beginning in goodness, greatness, eternity, and all the dignities of God; and being in good-

[199] Cf. nn. 196 and 198 above.

[200] Ms B (from where it made its way into Rosselló's text and *OE*) along with a later correcting hand in L add here, "and the Holy Ghost yet another," and later on in the sentence, after "for the Son's end," they add, "and for that of the Holy Ghost."

ness, greatness, etc., the Father is the beginning of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, from which it follows that in Him there is beginning. But begetting and proceeding have no beginning or end in time, for if they did, they would not possess goodness, greatness, infinity, eternity and the other dignities."

"Sir," asked Felix, "how can God be so great that his greatness has no limit, and how can He be so lasting that His being has no beginning or end?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a knight who was very light, and he could jump higher than any other man he could find. A squire wondered why this knight could jump so high, to which a philosopher replied that nature had ordained it this way by placing greater lightness in the knight than in the squire.

"Son," continued the hermit, "any beginning that is in greater concordance with its end is greater and nobler than any other beginning or end, and this comes from the fact that is has greater similarity to the beginning and end which are in God, where there is such a great concordance in greatness, that the beginning and the end are one and the same thing.

"In God there is goodness, and this goodness is great, eternal, and powerful; and His greatness is good, eternal, and powerful; and His eternity is good, great, and powerful; and the same is true of power. Therefore, since His greatness, eternity, and power are concordant with goodness, and since goodness is without beginning and without end, then even where there is no infinity of greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and so on, they are convertible with one another in such a way that there is no longer any limitation or end."[201]

"Sir, God is the beginning of this world, but if most past and present men have been more sinful than virtuous, I wonder how God, who is so good and so perfect in all good things, can be the beginning and end of such a vile world as this one in which we live, which has more evil than good, and more baseness than nobility."

[201] Cf. n. 197 above. The negative before "infinity" in the middle of the sentence seems not to make sense, but it is present in all medieval sources consulted (in L, however, it has a row of dots under it, which was the medieval sign for crossing out) and in all modern Catalan printed texts. The only reading that to me makes sense is that of the eighteenth-century Spanish translator, who has, "and since goodness is without beginning and end, it follows that all of them are infinite, and [they are convertible] . . . "

"Son," said the hermit, "the final purpose for which God created the world is so He may be known and loved; and for the knowing and loving of God it is proper that there be many different ways, and many dangers and hardships, so that loving and knowing be greater; and the more evil, base men there are in the world, the greater this knowing and loving can be.

"There was once a king who was lord of a great land. In that land there were many people of evil life and wicked customs. The king himself was a very good man of upright ways, and he did all he could so that he could rule his people in God's honor. The more the king labored and struggled to love and know God, the better he carried out the origin and purpose for which he was king. And God hopes there will be many such kings and many men consonant with such works.

"There was once a proud man who continually thought about his honor, and about his power and wealth, of which he had a great deal. One day it came to pass that, because of his pride, he did a villainous thing to a poor man, who told him he should remember his beginning and end; and the proud man asked him what he meant by beginning and end. The poor man replied that God had given him his beginning, and that his end was to love, honor, and know God; therefore, by reason of such a noble beginning and end, he should not dishonor him, for by doing so, he dishonored God."

"Sir," said Felix, "how can it be that a good end can come from a bad beginning, or a bad end from a good beginning, if end an beginning are concordant with one another?"

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a knight who was a bad Christian, for he doubted in matters of faith, in addition to being a lustful and avaricious man. This knight was at war with another knight, and he captured a cleric living in the other knight's lands; and in order to abase our faith, he made the cleric stand before him in chains, and every time he ate, he would make him eat on the ground. The cleric, however, whenever he was in the knight's presence, would speak to him good words of God and of our faith. So long did these speeches of his go on, that the knight converted to good, and he became a Catholic and a man of upright ways.

"There was once a squire who was the son of a very noble knight. This knight was seized with a devotion to serve God in the Order of the Knights Templars, and he submitted himself to the Temple, yet he did not want to become a knight, in order to be in a humbler position within the order. It came to pass, however, after he had been in the order a long time, that he felt jealous of the honor accorded the knights, which was greater than that accorded him. And as a result of this jealousy, he became a jealous, proud, irate person, and he died in sin.

"There was once a man who had the habit that every time he wanted to begin something, he would think about its end, whether it was a matter of speaking or of acting; and because of this great concordance between beginning and end, the man was wise in his speech and in all his actions; and everybody was in wonder at how he could have such wisdom even though he knew so little of the Scriptures.

"There was once a man who often wondered where sin came from, what was its origin, and what was its end. One day, while he was speaking with a large group of notables, a beggar passed through the square where they were gathered and asked him for alms for the love of God; and out of vainglory, so people would think him generous, he gave the beggar a denier. After giving him the denier, he thought over the beginning and end for which he had given it to him, and he realized that sin begins counter to a good end, which beginning it takes towards a bad end."

"Sir," Felix asked, "before the world existed, what did the beginning and end of the world consist of? And in fact, what is beginning and end in this world?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a wise man once asked a philosopher in what way God saw future things before they happened. The latter replied that within Himself God sees and understands everything; and since He is eternity that at the same time is wisdom, simplicity, immensity, and has the power of knowing everything created when it is created and even before it is created, He therefore sees within Himself, with Himself, and with His own nature; and before a thing exists, He sees it as well as when it already exists; for if He did not, greatness would be defective in goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and perfection, which defectiveness is impossible."

"Sir," Felix asked, "how can God know the beginning and end of contingent events before they take place?"

"Son, a man once had the freedom to take whichever of two paths he wanted. Even before he had chosen, God knew which path he would take, for God's wisdom preceded that man's choice of path. And all the more so since God has ordained everything there is towards a single end, which is to know and love Himself; and therefore, as part of this end, He knows all the ends and beginnings of contingent events."

98. GREATNESS AND SMALLNESS[202]

"SINCE IN GOD there is infinite greatness, and no smallness, and since this greatness is infinitely good and eternal, man therefore naturally loves greatness of goodness, and wants that greatness to be lasting. Because of man's sinfulness, however, the sinner comes to prefer greatness of baseness, which lasts only a short time, to greatness of nobility, which is of everlasting duration; and this is why men prefer this world to the next, even though this one is small and base and of short duration in comparison with the next.

"In God the Father there is greatness of goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, and so on for all the dignities; and since the Father is greatness, therefore greatness of goodness and of all the other dignities, must engender, in[203] His own greatness, the great, good, eternal, powerful, wise and so on; and in this generation there must exist the working of great goodness, eternity, and so on; for if this were not the case, it would follow that in God there existed smallness of goodness, eternity, and so on, which is impossible.

"So much does divine greatness want man's goodness, duration, power, wisdom, will, and even man's being, to be great, that He became man so that mankind would be great in goodness, eternity, and all God's dignities; and He also wanted man to be great in remembering, understanding, and loving God; and this was why He wanted to be man, and to die for man's salvation—so that man would be great in greatly honoring and serving God."

[202] Cf. n. 196 above, but note that instead of the more usual "majority" and "minority," Llull here uses "greatness" and "smallness." Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 17.

[203] Mss V B, followed by Galmés, have *e* ("and") instead of *en* ("in"), which would presumably give a translation of this part of the sentence of, "therefore greatness of goodness and of all the other dignities, along with His own greatness, must engender . . . "

When Felix had understood the great greatness of God and of the Incarnation, as well as that which man should have in goodness and in all the likenesses similar to God's dignities, then he was in great wonder how smallness could so effectively oppose greatness, or in other words, how men could prefer the smallness of worldly happiness to the greatness of the above-mentioned things.

"There was once a miser who wanted great wealth, and the more wealth he accumulated, the greater the wealth he still wanted, and as a result he could never be satisfied. Great was the miser's wonder at why he could not satisfy himself with worldly wealth. It came to pass, however, that, amid his wealth, he took a liking to greatness of charity, justice, and wisdom and then he was satisifed with his worldly wealth, and had no desire to accumulate more, but instead, from what he had already amassed, he gave away the greater part for the love of our Lord.

"There was once a king who wanted greatness of honor and of power, so that his subjects would fear him for his power and honor, since they did not want to love him for his goodness. But the king's subjects wanted greatness of privileges, liberties, and exemptions, for fear of the king, and did not want the king's greatness to be in terms of nobility, honor and power. Great was the king's wonder at his subjects' attitude, and he said to them:

"'God wants a prince to be good, so he can be loved by his subjects, and He wants him to be honored and powerful, so he may be cherished and feared; but you want just the opposite of me, and therefore, since I cannot be in the greatness of your will through love, I have to be there through fear. And since greatness of love is worth more than that of fear, you dishonor God as well as His lieutenant.'"

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a wonder that a man who loves this world should be more loved, feared, and honored than a man who loves God, since in this world there is smallness and baseness, whereas in God there is greatness and honor."

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a monk, steward of a monastery,[204] who did greater honor to the rich than to the poor, since he preferred the money of the rich to the goodness of the poor."

[204] Only B (followed by Roselló, *OE* and the Spanish translator) and the fifteenth-century corrector of L have, "of a monastery," but this seems to be what the sense requires. The *procurador* of a monastery was the person in charge of its finances.

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder as to why people generally prefer greatness of mercy in God to greatness of justice, when justice and greatness[205] are one and the same thing in God."

"Son," replied the hermit, "since men are in greatness of sins and defects they therefore prefer to have God be in greatness of mercy than of justice, which is why they are more interested in their own greatness than in that of God."

"Sir," asked Felix, "what is the nature of greatness that permits a person to increase greatness of good in himself and subdue greatness of evil?"

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a burgher who loved to be great in terms of honors, and he was continually telling people about his wealth and about the things he did for the sake of vainglory; and the more he spoke about these things, the less people liked and honored him. The burgher was in wonder at how people did not honor him, until he loved, understood, and remembered justice and the other virtues, and loved them in greatness, as a result of which he abandoned his desire for honors and tried to be honored for the sake of honoring God. And then the burgher had greatness of goodness and destroyed the greatness of evil he had in himself, and he was honored by people, who considered him a good man."

"Sir," asked Felix, "through what sort of actions can a person have the greatest greatness?"

"Son, in remembering, understanding, and loving."[206]

"Why?"

"Because in that way man is more similar to God than in any other way."

Felix was in wonder, and he said that when it came to remembering, understanding, and loving God, men have greater smallness than in remembering, understanding, and loving things that are not God.

"There was once a king who possessed greatness in terms of kingdoms, subjects, wealth, and amount of worldly honors, delights, and blessings; but he had smallness in goodness, justice,

[205] Thus in all MSS except B (followed by Galmés), which has the more expected "mercy." The eighteenth-century Spanish translator, followed by Rosselló and *OE*, combines the best of both with "mercy and greatness."

[206] The same sources as in n. 204 above add "God," which is surely what is meant.

and wisdom because he had smallness in remembering, understanding, and loving God."

"Sir," asked Felix, "why is there in this world greater greatness of folly than wisdom, of avarice than generosity, of pride than humility, of lust than chastity, and so on?"

"Son," said the hermit, "once it came to pass that Greatness-of-Good and Greatness-of-Evil joined in combat; Greatness-of-Good was beaten and went to live with a small number of men, who were good; and Greatness-of-Evil went to live with the greater number of men; and this is why there are more men in greatness of evil than of good.

"There was once a very rich man who had two sons. When he was sick and near death, he made out his will, and he asked his sons which sort of greatness was better, that of wisdom or that of wealth. One of the sons answered wisdom, and the other wealth; the father left his wealth to the one who had replied wisdom, since greatness of wealth is improper if unaccompanied by greatness of wisdom."

"Sir," asked Felix, "why is greatness of activity more fitting within substance than without?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "it is because God has more greatness of activity within Himself than without, and since any greatness is greater that is more similar to God than another, therefore it can be greater in that which is more similar to God than in that which is more dissimilar to Him."

Felix was in wonder at what the hermit said, because the greatness of a prince's lineage and wealth is more in disaccord with goodness when there is evil in the prince than it is in another man who is neither of noble lineage nor of ancient wealth and honor. And the hermit told him that since greatness[207] is converted into evil against the similarity it bears to God, it follows that in a wicked prince there is a greater amount of baseness than in a wicked subject.

Felix gave much thought to the situation of greatness and smallness, and he was in wonder at the greatness of ingratitude, which exists in the world, and which people have towards one another

[207] Thus in all sources except B (followed by Rosselló, *OE* and Galmés), which has "goodness."

and towards God who has so much greatness of good. And the same is true of the greatness of Christ's goodness, and the greatness of the suffering He suffered for His people. And Felix had similar thoughts about the greatness of glory and punishment in the next world. As a result of thinking about these things and of wondering at the vile state of the world and at the small amount of man's goodness in the world, which goodness God wants to be in greatness of faith, hope, charity and all the virtues, Felix wept bitterly, and he wanted to die, for it seemed to him that to be present and live in a world like this one was a great suffering.

"Son," said the hermit, "it was because of people's ingratitude and shortcomings that I came to live in this hermitage, so I would not have to see the ingratitude and wicked behavior of people, which is so great that it confounds a person's understanding and memory, and makes him ill-willed and confused. And that is why I am in this wilderness meditating on God, and thinking about how and why things were created, and as a result of this meditation and thought I feel contented and happy."

99. ACCUSTOMING AND DISACCUSTOMING[208]

"SPIRITUAL accustoming is the likeness of God's work within Himself, for God the Father ceaselessly begets the Son and breathes forth the Holy Ghost, and this is why He has made it so that the form of the soul ceaselessly desires to inform matter, and matter ceaselessly desires to be informed by form, and matter and form[209] ceaselessly desire to be a single soul that unceasingly remembers, understands and loves God.

"Through the soul's accustoming within itself, the memory, understanding, and will become accustomed to the objects that they apprehend, which should be apprehended having become accustomed to faith, hope, charity, justice, and all the virtues. What is to be wondered at, however, is that usually the soul does exactly the contrary, or in other words, that it becomes accus-

[208] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, Mode 15 and n. 44.

[209] This is the reading of the corrected text of A, followed by Rosselló, *OE*, and the eighteenth-century Spanish translator; all other versions truncated in varying degrees.

tomed to remembering, understanding, and loving sins and vices contrary to the accustoming of its likeness with God, where form and matter ceaselessly accustom themselves to being a single soul."

The hermit wanted to tell Felix about the wonders of physical accustoming, and he said that man becomes accustomed to apprehending physical objects with the five bodily senses, which accustoming accustoms the powers of the soul, that is to say, memory, intellect, and will. "And this is a great wonder—that the soul accustoms its remembering, understanding, and loving to seeing beautiful figures, beautiful clothes, beautiful palaces, and to listening to vain words of little use, and to tasting good bread and good wine, and so on with all physical things. For, according to the ordered course of nature, man should accustom himself to physical things so that the soul can become accustomed to remembering, understanding, and loving God, virtues, and good works.

"There was once a sinner who often felt contrition for the sins he committed, and he was in wonder how he could continue to sin if he felt contrition when he did. Once it came to pass that he had sinned through lust, and afterwards he greatly repented. He remembered that before committing the sin, he had felt contrition and displeasure when the desire had come over him, and he had done it almost as if compelled. Through the grace of God this man realized that he was ill-accustomed in remembering, understanding, and loving,[210] for there was no greatness of fortitude or justice in them. And the next time he felt like sinning, he tried to accustom himself to having great strength of contrition, and he thus disaccustomed himself to sinning, by accustoming himself to having great strength of contrition in remembering, understanding, and loving.[211]

"There was once a glutton who ate and drank too much. He knew that eating and drinking too much were bad for him, and he was even more aware of it after eating than before. This man accustomed his remembering, understanding, and loving to be aware of how bad it was for him before he ate and while he was

[210] Same remarks as in n. 206 above.

[211] L B (followed by Rosselló and *OE*) add, "God, virtues, and good works," just as in (or perhaps suspiciously like) the end of the previous paragraph.

eating, and in this way he became accustomed to being temperate in his eating.

"There was once a burgher who had a very beautiful wife whom he loved very much. In fact, he loved her so much that he became jealous, at the same time being in wonder at this jealousy, for he could find no way in which his wife had committed the slightest fault against him. While wondering at his own jealousy, which greatly distressed him, he thought about what could be making him jealous and making him worry that his wife was wronging him and worry about how she was managing to do it. But then the burgher accustomed himself to remembering that his wife's actions were undoubtedly good and not bad, and he thought about how and why her actions must be good and not bad; and as a result of such accustoming in the memory, intellect, and will, the burgher cured himself of his jealousy.

"There was once an abbot who greatly coveted an estate situated near the abbey. This estate belonged to a rich knight who did not want to sell it to the abbot. The abbot, however, every time he saw the estate, coveted it and wanted to have it, while at the same time realizing in his soul that he could not have it; and as a result, the abbot wondered why he desired something he knew he could not have. While wondering about this, the abbot, through the grace of God, understood what was making him want the estate, namely, that he often remembered, understood, and loved it, and as a result he had become accustomed to remembering, understanding, and loving it. And because he wanted to disaccustom himself of this and accustom himself to remembering, understanding and loving charity, justice, generosity, wisdom, and the rule of his order, he accustomed himself to forgetting and ignoring the estate, and he thus cured himself of his former covetousness.

"There was once a shoemaker who was forever mulling over a villainous thing that a furrier who lived next door had once done to him. This shoemaker had become so accustomed to remembering, understanding, and hating the villainous thing the furrier had done to him, that he was continually in ill humor and angry, and always thinking about how he could do some villainous thing to the furrier, which thing he continually thought about but never dared do. Great was the shoemaker's wonder at why he wanted and intended to do the furrier some villainy if he did not dare to

do it; and while wondering about this, he realized that it was the habit of fear—since he feared the resulting dangers—that made him lack courage and not dare to harm the furrier. Then the shoemaker forgot the dangers, and he went to get his revenge on the furrier, whom he beat up and insulted in the main square, in front of all those present.[212]

"There was once a king so accustomed to hunting that he was most displeased when people spoke to him about anything else.[213] The king had accustomed his will to hunting, as well as his memory and intellect, and when it came to governing his subjects, he had no interest in accustoming his soul to that. Everybody was in wonder at the king's attitude, but then the king changed his habits, forgetting about hunting and remembering why he was king, and as a result of this accustoming, he became a good and wise king.

"There was once a man who talked too much, and because of this he often told lies and said confusing things, and he was often very ashamed of himself. He wanted to be cured of this vice, and he was in wonder at not being able to do so. He thought about it, wanting to be cured, for such a long time, that he accustomed his remembering, understanding, loving, and wanting to justice and to prudence, wisdom, and temperance. And before speaking, he would think about justice and temperance: through justice he liked truth and disliked falsehood; through temperance he held himself in check until fortitude had conquered falsehood and injustice; and in this way he became accustomed to being truthful and methodical in his speech."

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a great wonder that the world has become so accustomed to base actions, falsehood, and vain pleasures, and that men have so many faults; for by those habits God, who is so good, is scorned, unloved, forgotten, and disobeyed, while base things are loved, remembered, and desired; and this is the greatest wonder possible."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God is worthy of being very much loved, remembered, understood, and obeyed; and because He is

[212] B (followed by Rosselló and *OE*) and the corrector of L add, "as a result of which he was then cruelly punished."

[213] See Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 62, where this situation is put in the general context of contemporary attitudes towards hunting. Compare the passages corresponding to Bk. I, n. 55 above, and n. 228 below.

little loved, honored, served, remembered, and understood, the world is full of bad customs; and God hopes that through the offices of people who are good, saintly, and devout, it will be converted into a world of good customs, for which conversion great saintliness, perfection, strength, charity, and devotion are necessary. But such greatness of saintliness and upright life has not yet appeared in men, even though God is forever awaiting it; in which awaiting lies a great wonder—namely, how God can wait so long, and how the devil can oppose Him so much."

100. PREDESTINATION AND FREE WILL[214]

"THE CONSEQUENCE which must follow from predestination is that what is known to God's wisdom, which is perfect in what it knows in itself, is carried out in man; and the consequence that follows from free will regards God's justice, which is perfect in itself and in everything it carries out in creatures. By means of this perfection man must have the freedom to be able to save himself, albeit by the grace of God, or to condemn himself; for if this freedom did not exist, God's justice could not be carried out justly in man, which is an impossibility."

Felix gave a great deal of thought to what the hermit had said about predestination and free will, and he was in great wonder at how a man predestined to salvation could go to perdition and how a man predestined to damnation could be saved,[215] and he therefore said to the hermit:

"Sir hermit, since God's wisdom is perfect, it follows that if this wisdom knows that a man should be saved, then that man

[214] Predestination and free will form part of Figure X of the *Ars demonstrativa*; see the description of that figure in Dist. I, as well as Dist. II, n. 42. They are also discussed in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 268, and in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 265–8, and above all in the *Liber de praedestinatione et libero arbitrio* recently edited in ROL X, 347–411; see pp. 349–50 there for further bibliography. For predestination, see also *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 58.

[215] *E meraveyllà's fortment que hom predestinat se pusca perdre, ne que hom precís se pusca salvar.* Note the same opposition of *predestinat* and *precís* mentioned in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 86. Llull uses *predestinat* in both the general sense of "predestined," and as here, in the more restricted sense of "predestined to eternal salvation" (see *DCVB*, s.v., citing this passage). *Precís* (from Latin *praescitus*, which normally gives *prescit* in Catalan, but which in Llull—see also *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 41—adopts a form apparently contaminated by *praecisus*; cf. F. de B. Moll in *EL* 1, 1957, p. 180), can also mean "predestined," but it usually has the more specific meaning of "predestined to eternal damnation" (*DCVB*, s.v., and Blaise, *Lexicon*, s.v. *praescitus*).

must necessarily come to salvation, for if he did not, said wisdom would not be perfect; and since God's justice is perfect, then that man must be able to go to perdition, for if not, said justice would not be perfect, because then he would be saved out of necessity, without free will. And I am therefore in great wonder at this activity, for it would seem to me that a man predestined to salvation must necessarily be saved; and at the same time it seems to me that according to justice everyone, even those predestined to salvation, must have the possibility of being doomed to perdition."

"Son," said the hermit, "a man was once in wonder at God's will, for it seemed to him that it was changeable, in view of the fact that God's will loved a person when he was just and disliked him when he sinned; and it therefore seemed to him that God's will changed as many times as a person changed from good to bad or from bad to good. By the grace of God, however, this man understood that God's will is not changeable, but only appears so to man; for if it were changeable the result would be that what was lesser would change what was greater, and that God's will was finite and contained accident, which is impossible."

By the hermit's example concerning predestination and free will, Felix understood that just as God's will does not change in itself, even though man might at one time be in a good state and at another in a bad one, so God's wisdom and justice are also unchanging, even though man might be predestined to salvation or to damnation, or might save or damn himself. And if a man predestined to salvation necessarily had to be saved, and similarly if one predestined to damnation necessarily had to be damned, it would follow that God's wisdom and justice would necessarily have to change according to the work of man; for the former would be contrary to the latter by their action in man, which contrariety is impossible.

"A teacher was once asked by a pupil of his why God, if He was capable of creating a thousand worlds, had created only one world, and whether He could have gone without creating the world at all. The master replied, saying that God's power, in an absolute sense, can do everything, since it is infinite; but since His wisdom knew that God would not create more than one world,

and it knew that it was what His will wanted[216] to create, therefore His power, which is one and the same thing with wisdom, could not create a thousand worlds, nor could it have gone without creating one world. And this lack of power exists with respect to wisdom and will, and not with respect to itself; and this is why one must believe and maintain that God *can* in terms of absolute power, and *cannot* in terms of power established in accordance with wisdom and will; and from this there follows no contradiction, for if there did, it would follow that either power or wisdom or will was deficient, which is impossible."

Felix thought for a long time about the example the hermit had given him, and he was in great wonder, saying: "Sir, never before have I heard words that could so make a person wonder as those you have just told me; for it would seem to me the human intellect is incapable of comprehending them. You are saying that God can do what He knows he will not do and His will does not want Him to do; at the same time you say He cannot do it, since wisdom knows that the will does not want to do it; and therefore God can and cannot, which is a source of great wonder."

"Son," said the hermit, "God wants man to concede that He can do what His wisdom knows He will not do, and what the will does not want Him to do; and such a thing is affirmable because God's power is greatness and goodness, and it is freedom; and if it had to do only what it does, without doing anything else, it would be constrained and limited to following what wisdom knew and what the will wanted; and wisdom and will would be in greater greatness than power, as well as in greater nobility and goodness, which majority is impossible. And if God could do what wisdom knew He would not do, and what the will wanted Him not to do, it would follow that the act (that is, the working) of power would have more capability and be in greater greatness than the act (that is, the working) of wisdom and will, and it would be nobler, better, and greater than wisdom or will, which is impossible. As a result of this impossibility, one must state and affirm that God can, insofar as power is concerned, and cannot, insofar as wisdom and will are concerned and with respect to what he

[216] For the similar roots of "power . . . can do," "wisdom knew," and "will wanted," see *Gentile*, Bk. I, nn. 8, 12.

will not do or has not done, and that from this there follows no inconsistency or contradiction."

After wondering greatly about this example, Felix raised his intellect as high as he could, so that it would understand, and he begged God to give him the grace to understand; and it was then that he understood that just as one must affirm that God can do what He will not do, and yet cannot do it if His wisdom knows that He will not do it, or His will does not want Him to do it, so is man predestined to salvation since wisdom knows it, and yet that same man can bring himself to damnation, since justice gave him free will to do so. And thus every man, whether predestined to salvation or to damnation, can save or condemn himself, without there following any contradiction.

"Son," said the hermit, "a man once said to an eminent prelate that God had given him greatness in power and wisdom, for this prelate was general[217] and he had beneath him many wise men, through whom this prelate had great power to do good. The man said to the prelate that God had infused the likeness of His greatness in his power and wisdom, so that he could use the power to do great good and so that his wisdom would know how to do so. He then said that in God there is greatness of will of which will He wanted the prelate to have a likeness, so that by greatness of will he would want to use greatness of power and wisdom. But since the prelate had a greater amount of power and wisdom than of will, his power and wisdom ceased functioning and were idle; and the prelate did injustice to power, wisdom, and will, inasmuch as in his will he did not want to receive greatness similar to that of God's will, which has as much greatness as His power and wisdom."

By this time Felix had become accustomed to hearing one example as an illustration of another, and he understood that just as greatness must be equally distributed among power, wisdom, and will, so must man have greatness by which wisdom can predestine him to salvation, if such is his lot, and by which justice can damn him if he is worthy of damnation. For if he could not be damned

[217] Contrary to what one might think, a "general" or "common" person is one whose responsibilities are "general" as opposed to "private" and who has to deal with the "commonweal," and therefore refers to a member of the upper ranks of the noble or ecclesiastical hierarchies. See the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 675–6, and nn. 47 and 61 there.

because of being predestined to salvation, and necessarily had to be saved, it would follow that in this man's actions God's wisdom operated on a greater scale than His justice, which is impossible. Therefore it must be granted that man can cause himself to be saved or damned.

"Son," said the hermit, "when one affirms that a man predestined to salvation must be saved, since God's wisdom knows it, then one affirms the truth, yet from this affirmation there follows a false negation, namely, that he cannot be doomed; and when one affirms that every man can save or damn himself this also is a true affirmation, since it is the result of God's justice, which is perfect, and which would not be perfect if man did not have free will. Yet from this affirmation there also follows a false negation, namely that if everyone has freedom to save or damn himself, it would seem that God's wisdom could not know who would be saved and who would be damned, which is impossible. By this impossibility it is demonstrated that the above-mentioned two affirmations are true, and the two negations that follow from them are false. This being the case, it is therefore clear that one should affirm that a predestined man can either save or damn himself.

"Son," said the hermit, "a man fell into great temptation with regard to predestination, for it seemed to him that he had greater power than God's justice; and this man then thought about the disposition of the world, from which he realized that man is in a position to have virtues or vices, to do good or evil, and to behave according to God's pattern in the world. And if free will did not exist, and if man were necessarily saved or doomed according to how he was predestined, then there would follow an inconsistency in relation to everything ordained in the world; for there would be no reason to do good or evil, nor would there be any reason for the existence of the sun or moon, or the sensual or intellectual works of nature, and the whole world would be disordered, which is impossible, as is quite apparent."

101. ABSTINENCE[218]

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder how it can be that abstinence is so little loved in this world, considering it is so noble a virtue and one so necessary to man."

"Son," replied the hermit, "the memory is naturally inclined towards its own likeness, which is to remember, and the same is true of the intellect and the will; and since each of these is inclined towards its own likeness (which they take on in relation to objectifiable physical or spiritual things), and in order for these likenesses to be adopted in an ordered fashion, God has created the virtue of abstinence in man, so that he can abstain sufficiently from wanting what he remembers and understands until justice, wisdom, strength,[219] temperance, and charity are present, and then, with the help of these virtues, memory, intellect, and will take on their own likenesses, so that in these likenesses there may exist the above-mentioned virtues.

"Whoever is familiar with the lofty, great, and perfect virtue of abstinence would have been in great wonder at the vile thing a certain king did one day to abstinence, in the presence of his entire court."

"And what was that, sir?" Felix asked.

"Son," replied the hermit, "on a great feast day a powerful and wealthy king was holding court. On that day the king, very nobly dressed, sat on his throne, before a great gathering of knights and other people. He spent the whole day in pleasures, in feasting, and in worldly vanities; abstinence and its contrary came into his presence, but that day he sinned with the seven mortal sins. Before committing these sins, abstinence appeared to his memory, his intellect, and his will so that the king would remember, under-

[218] We now leave the domain of contrasting pairs of concepts, and enter that of single concepts, beginning with six chapters on Christian virtues or precepts. This particular one of abstinence is discussed by Llull in many places in his works; the most important are *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 232; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 26; *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 645; and *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 696 = Int. v, 338. Note how these four works contain miscellaneous lists of virtues and precepts similar to the one we are now beginning here.

[219] For "wisdom" instead of "prudence" in the list of virtues, see n. 97 above. Instead of the expected "fortitude" of A, followed by the printed sources, all the other MSS have *força*, "force, strength," for which see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 27. For another substitution in this slot of the virtues, see n. 103 above.

stand, and love it and so he would remember, understand, and hate its contrary; but the king did exactly the opposite, hating abstinence and loving its contrary, for which reason he sinned that day with all the seven deadly sins.

"Abstinence came to the king so he would be abstinent in eating, drinking, and speaking, and not be proud of his power or of the honor done him. The king, however, did not love it in his remembering, understanding, and loving, but instead loved seeing, hearing, and everything pleasing to the body. While the king was doing these things, there came into his presence a poorly dressed man, who went from court to court observing the behavior of sovereigns and great barons, so that through them he could praise and bless God. For when he saw that they were on the way to salvation, he was joyful for God's sake, in His having such noble servants (for it is a good thing for a great lord to have noble and powerful servants); and when he saw that the princes were wicked, dissolute, vile, and of bad customs, then he grieved and wept at how God was not loved and served by them, and at the great harm which came of it. The poor man came before the king, and he realized there was no abstinence in the king's heart, so he said the following words to him:

"'My lord king, God created man's soul with memory, intellect, and will: from the memory comes remembering, from the intellect understanding, and from the will wanting. God wants this remembering, understanding, and wanting to be adorned with faith, hope, charity, justice, and all the other virtues. When it happens that the memory remembers and the intellect understands something, then, before the will is put in motion to like or dislike that thing, God wants abstinence to come and adorn this remembering, understanding, and loving.'

"One day it came to pass that a prelate chosen for a position in the upper hierarchies of the church saw before him a cleric who had once done him a vile deed. Without waiting for abstinence to come to his memory, intellect, or will,[220] he immediately, and in front of everyone, insulted and beat the cleric; all the people in his court were in great wonder at what he had done, and they agreed that the prelate had committed a great villainy.

[220] "Or will" is missing in A B and hence in the printed sources.

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a man who could not abstain from eating and drinking too much. One day when he had eaten and drunk a lot, he felt that what he had eaten and drunk was harming him. The man gave the problem a great deal of thought that day, and he wondered greatly why it was that he was incapable of abstinence in the face of excessive eating and drinking.

"While he was thinking about these things, he entered an orchard of his where his gardener was burning a tree. He considered how little time the fire took to consume the tree, and how long nature had taken to engender that tree. By thinking about the tree, he realized why it was that he did not know how to be abstinent, and he said that abstinence goes with long deliberation and its contrary with suddenness. For abstinence needs considered reflection to form itself in remembering, understanding, and loving, as a result of which justice, strength, and all the virtues may be present in the soul; whereas the contrary of abstinence suddenly takes form in the pleasure of the will. This man had been enlightened, and he then exercised abstinence, for every time he saw its contrary approaching, he abstained until the virtues entered his memory, intellect, and will and he preferred them to the contrary of abstinence.

"It came to pass that a certain knight decided to go to the Holy Land, and he left his wife in a castle, saying to her that if it came to pass that she felt a desire to indulge in the sin of lust, he begged her that before sinning she should think three times that if she did sin she would be doing a base, disloyal thing, and that she might some day repent of it. The knight said these things to his wife so that abstinence could come to her, along with charity, justice, wisdom, and strength; for it scarcely ever happens, if a person does not suddenly give in to a wish, that abstinence does not put in an appearance along with some virtue which proves useful.

"A philosopher was once asked by a pupil of his how he could have knowledge of abstinence, to which the philosopher replied with the following example: 'In the days when I was a student, I once asked my teacher about the disposition of matter and form, how they combine and make a compound, and he replied that form transforms[221] matter to the point where the two constitute

[221] Literally "digests," for which see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 162.

a single body. This transformation cannot take place suddenly, but must happen bit by bit; there being intense[222] forms within that individually transform the various matters, and then the common form finds the common matter and transforms it so that it joins it, becoming one individual substance[223] with it.'"

Felix understood what the hermit was saying, and he was in great wonder at his ingenuity, for he had framed his answer in a most ingenious way. He added that abstinence was a noble virtue, for from abstinence followed the purpose and fulfillment of ordered activity, and since abstinence was of such value, he was in great wonder that its value was not more appreciated in this world.

102. CONSCIENCE[224]

"CONSCIENCE is that intellective nature by which the soul feels that it is straying from the ultimate purpose for which it was created; and God created such a nature in man's soul so it would recognize when it was doing things in accordance with God, or against God.

"Once in a certain abbey, the abbot, the prior, the cellarer, and other officials of the monastery were gathered together in the chapter house. Each boasted about how he had increased the earnings of the monastery. A cloistered monk who was present at the gathering said: 'My lords, it is a wonder that your conscience does not bother you as many times a day and so many days as you have neglected to meditate on and contemplate God in His Unity, Trinity, Incarnation, and in the other articles, for all you seem to think about and seek is vainglory in increasing the income of the monastery; but prayers, contemplations, tears, and weeping

[222] Note the Lullian definitions of intensity: "Intensity is the purity of a thing, like goodness which is the purity of good, and heat of hot," *Taula d'esta Art*, *ORL* XVII, 394; "intensity is that which reveals itself, for it is far from, and in fact the opposite of, confusion," *Logica nova* (Palma, 1744), p. 71; and, "intensity is that which is nearer to simplicity than to composition, like simple fire," *Introductorium magnae artis generalis*, Hundred Forms, no. 14. Its usual opposite is, of course, extension; cf. the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 572, 602, and the *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, *ORL* XVII, 421.

[223] *Subpòsit* in the original, for which see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 34.

[224] Aside from the definition in *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 97, conscience is treated in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 207–13, as one of the "spiritual senses" (cf. ch. 43.3 there). It is also treated in the four works mentioned in n. 218 above: *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 241; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 21; *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 646; and *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 697 = Int. v, 339.

represent a greater and nobler gain than money, castles, towns, and cities; and it is more fitting for a monk to contemplate and weep than to buy and sell.'"

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a wonder how bishops and prelates, for the sake of maintaining the Catholic faith, have such revenues and benefits, and yet their conscience seems untroubled by how many people slander and dishonor the holy Church, without these prelates or those beneath them doing anything whatever to help."

"Son," replied the hermit, "just as plants and animals are fashioned in such a way that they are begettable and corruptible, so spiritually are conscience, abstinence, and the other virtues or spiritual properties fashioned so that they are spiritually begettable and corruptible. Now when it happens that conscience comes to a man, without the other virtues also coming as they should, then that conscience has nothing in which to take strength and put down roots, just as the grain of wheat that falls among thorns[225] cannot find the necessary humor in which to take root.

"There was once a bishop who for forty years had a rich bishopric, and at the end of his days his conscience troubled him regarding income from the bishopric that had not been used for the service of God as it should have. The virtues appropriate to these pangs of conscience were justice and contrition, hope, atonement, and others similar to these. Before he took sick, the bishop's conscience had sometimes bothered him with respect to the wrongs he had committed, but along with this conscience he did not apply the above-mentioned virtues, and therefore his conscience was worthless. So long, in fact, had the bishop accustomed his conscience to existing alone, without the other virtues, that when death approached, he had only his conscience, unaccompanied by other suitable virtues; and this bishop died without having satisfied his conscience, as would have been appropriate.

"Son," the hermit continued, "there was once a lawyer who in his profession had, by means of treachery and injustice, brought about the ruin of many people, and the harm he had done them through false allegations and arguments was much greater than whatever profit he had made from it all. Now this lawyer became

225 "Stones" in Ms B (followed by Rosselló, *OE* and Galmés) and the later correcting hand in L. The Spanish eighteenth-century translator has both "stones and thorns," with perhaps unnecessary malevolence towards the grain of wheat.

fatally ill and he confessed to a bishop,[226] telling him about the harm he had done to people. The bishop said he should give whatever compensation he could. The lawyer said that if he did, his conscience would bother him for leaving his wife and children in poverty as a result. The bishop replied, saying his conscience should by nature be more concerned with his salvation than with the honor and wealth of his children. The lawyer died in mortal sin, because he did not use his conscience with justice, greatness, wisdom, and strength.

"After the lawyer had died, the bishop thought about how he had died such an unfortunate death as a result of not having greatness of justice, strength, and wisdom in his conscience, and he realized that in his own conscience there was a lack of greatness of justice, wisdom, strength, and charity, and therefore in his conscience he increased greatness of virtues, by which he gained true knowledge of the wealth he had through the holy Church, which wealth he distributed among the poor and lived a long and holy life.

"In the presence of a prelate and a prince, a poor man raised the following question, that is to say, he said that conscience was not legitimate without power, wisdom, and will; for whoever can do, and knows, but does not want, the good, should feel pangs of conscience for not wanting the good he can do and knows about; and if he cannot do the good he knows about, then he must feel troubled in his conscience about not doing it if he had the power to do it. The prelate and the prince were in great wonder at the poor man's words, as were all the others present. While they were in this state of wonder, he said that a holy man once went to the Tartars and to the many other idolatrous people living with them. This man observed them, reflected on the things they did, and was in wonder at seeing them do so much dishonor to God; that is to say, he saw some of them make gods out of idols of gold and silver, while others worshiped the sun, others the moon, and yet others beasts and birds, and so on with many kinds

[226] Galmés suggested that, in view of the following paragraph, this would make more sense if it read "to the bishop," referring to the one mentioned before.

of strange gods.[227] After thinking the matter over for a long time, the holy man said that he wondered why princes, prelates, monks, and other Christians feel no pangs of conscience about the dishonor to God resulting from these unbelievers who do not know Him and who worship strange gods, and who feel no gratitude to Him for having created them and kept them alive. As a result of these reflections the holy man said that the conscience of Christians in this matter consisted of smallness of faith, hope, charity and so on; and so that greatness not be lacking, God took onto Himself great dishonor on account of those in error. And because of the greatness in God, the hermit wondered why Christians did not, in their consciences, prefer semblance of this greatness to the semblance of smallness."

"Sir," Felix inquired, "why does it sometimes happen that people have a conscience where they should not have one, and have none where they should have one?"

"Son," said the hermit, "there was once a prince who felt pangs of conscience about certain foolish thoughts that came to him when he was idle; and so as not to be idle, he hunted every day, in order to get rid of these thoughts of his.[228] This man delegated his authority to men who ruled his kingdom badly. The king, whose conscience was bothered by his bad thoughts when he was idle, should have converted his bad thoughts into good thoughts, so as not to be idle; instead, these bad thoughts incited him to do the contrary of good, and thus constituted a mortal sin. And by making foolish use of his time—by hunting and abandoning his duties as king—he increased his mortal sin; for any king, insofar as he has the power to do good, should have an uneasy conscience when he does not do the good he could; and thus when he makes foolish use of his conscience, he has a conscience where he should not have one, and has none where he should.

[227] Another passage that Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I,133, took to be autobiographical, but about which Peers, p. 147, was justifiably skeptical. The second half of the sentence, about idol-worshipers and animists, is very similar to a passage in *Blaquerna*, ch. 84, in which Llull is describing the people of Ghana, who provided the end link in the trans-Sahara gold trade so important to Majorca (the "Life," text at n. 21 above).

[228] Note the similarity to the passage commented upon in Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 55 above; cf. also n. 213 above.

"Son, conscience is sometimes too fine and sometimes too coarse. When it is too fine, it comes from excess of love or fear; when it is too coarse, it comes from lack of greatness in the one or the other. And all this has been thus ordained so that conscience cannot exist in man without justice, which wants to be on an equal footing with conscience, so that the memory, understanding, and will may be justly adorned with a conscience that is neither too coarse nor too fine."

103. CONFESSION[229]

"CONFESSION is the admission of the wrongs one has committed against God, and it should be accompanied by repentance for the wrongs committed, and by atonement, according to the advice of one's confessor, who must advise one as to how to have virtues and avoid vices, and how to make amends to God and to one's fellow man for the wrongs one has committed.

"There was once a clergyman who had a large parish. He had studied law so as to be able to advise those who confessed to him; but he had learned nothing about philosophy or theology, which was why he was unable to advise people as to how they could vivify virtues and mortify vices in their soul, but was able to advise them regarding worldly goods and how to make amends with them. It once came to pass that a man confessed to the sin of lust, and he asked the clergyman how he could, in accordance with nature, strengthen chastity and mortify lust in his soul; he then asked to be enlightened in matters of faith, for he had often had doubts. The clergyman, however, was unable to give him any necessary reasons concerning these things. This man wondered why the task of confession was entrusted to such a man."

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "it is a wonder how men confess without any desire to abandon sin; for a confession without contrition and atonement is practically worthless."

[229] In addition to the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 239, *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 23, and *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 712 = Int. v, 354, "confession" is also discussed in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 351; *Libre d'intenció*, Part V, ch. 16; *Medicina de peccat*, Part II; and the *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, *MOG* IV, 475 = Int. vii, 45. Note that this last work contains a list of precepts somewhat similar to those found in the four works listed in n. 218.

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a priest who in his house kept a woman of easy virtue with whom he was wont to sin. This priest said mass every day and confessed his sin without contrition or atonement, which made his confession worthless. Yet when he confessed, he was nearer confession than he would have been had he not confessed; and because of this proximity, which bears a certain resemblance to true confession, it sometimes happens that contrition and atonement follow."

"Sir," Felix said, "it is a wonder that a person confesses to a clergyman he knows to be in mortal sin; and it was for this reason that a sinner once did not want to confess to his parish priest, whom he knew to be in mortal sin."

"Son," said the hermit, "there is greatness in God's goodness, as well as in His mercy and justice; and this greatness makes great the office of the priest. A priest's littleness cannot destroy this greatness of office, in which is imprinted the likeness of the greatness God possesses in goodness, justice, mercy, and in all His properties.

"There was once a man who had committed an ugly sin, and when he confessed he would omit that sin but confess all the others. He wondered why he did not confess this sin, and why he was more ashamed before the priest to whom he was confessing than before God who knew about the sin he had committed. For a long time he reflected on what could be the circumstances making him unable to confess this sin, and he was in great wonder over the matter. One day, while he was thinking about his situation, how he lived and what sort of customs he had, he remembered that he loved the honor of this world, and was more afraid to be blamed by other people, who judge according to worldly standards, than he was of incurring God's anger. Then he understood that he was more ashamed before other people than before God, since he feared them more than God, and this was why he could not confess the ugly sin he had committed.

"There was once a saintly monk, very knowledgeable in theology and philosophy, who was confessor to a noble king. One day it came to pass that the king confessed a sin he had committed against a count, from whom he had very wrongly taken a castle. The king confessed this sin and others, and the saintly monk gave a great deal of thought to the sins the king had committed. After

thinking about it for a long time, he, because of his great wisdom, understood the origin of the sin, in which power of the soul it had originated, and how it had come to be committed. As a result, the holy priest knew how to confess the king, giving him convincing natural reasons as to the origin of his sin and how he should make atonement for it. And he explained the working of the sin so well that the king was very pleased; and every time he felt a temptation to sin he was able to recognize its origin and the method and manner necessary to destroy and mortify that sin.

"In a large monastery there was a lay brother who was in wonder at the brothers whom he often saw going to confession, but whom he never saw committing a sin. This brother was a simple man, and he thought sin could not exist in the soul without its appearing in the actions of the body.

"A pilgrim from overseas went up to an emperor and asked him if he had confessed his sin in allowing the Saracens to hold the Holy Land. The emperor replied that his conscience had never disturbed him about this matter, and this was why he had not confessed it, to which the pilgrim responded:

"'There was once a great prelate who had very great power, but this power was great in idleness and small in usefulness. A clergyman of his asked the prelate if a person was more obliged to confess his wrongs against the honor and dignity of God than those against his neighbor. The prelate judged rightly, saying that since more honor is due to God than to man, a person can sin more against God than against man.

"'The clergyman was in wonder at the prelate's words, which contradicted his actions, and he said: "If a person sins against God and confesses it, it is a wonder that he does not make amends for it, since when he commits a sin against his neighbor, he makes amends in terms of temporal possessions; for in confession, atonement in terms of honoring, praising, knowing, and loving God is more important than atonement in terms of vineyards, fields, money, or other similar things."'

"A poor knight went to confession with a bishop, and he confessed to having taken a thousand sous from a peasant of his. The bishop told the knight to return the thousand sous, for otherwise he would not absolve him of his sin. The knight replied that he no longer had the thousand sous, nor did he have any way of

getting them. The bishop said that on the condition of his at least wanting to return the thousand sous if he had them, he would absolve him. The knight, however, replied that he had no desire to return them, whether he had them or not, to which the bishop said that if he did not even have the desire to return them, then he could not absolve him. Great was the knight's wonder at the bishop's words, and he said:

"'My lord bishop, please tell me who does the greater wrong, I who wish to have neither the will to return, nor contrition regarding, the thousand sous, or you who could give a thousand sous for the love of God yet do not wish to, nor wish to do the good you could with the wealth you have amassed.' The bishop did not wish to reply, and the knight was in wonder at the bishop who recognized sin in the knight and not in himself, since the sin the bishop committed was closer to the bishop's own understanding than the sin the knight had committed."

"Sir," said Felix, "a holy man one day listened to many women who confessed to him the sin of lust. As a result this holy man was sorely tempted by carnal delight, and he was in wonder how, from confession, which is a good thing, there can follow evil, that is, the temptation of lust."

"Son," said the hermit, "in God there exists greatness of goodness; and since confession is a good thing, God wanted there to exist in the holy man greatness of fortitude against lust, which greatness of fortitude is good, and which was, by the resistance the good man put up, contrary to carnal delight."

104. PENANCE[230]

"PENANCE is what people do for the sins they have committed, and of which they repent with justice, charity, hope, wisdom, strength, and temperance; but when people think they can do penance without these virtues, then they are acting contrary to penance, which cannot properly exist without the above-mentioned virtues.

[230] Llull discusses penance in many works, principally in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 86; *Blaquerna*, ch. 52; and *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 22. It is also one of the seven sacraments (cf. n. 78 above), and as such is discussed in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 26; *Tree of Science*, OE I, 683, 947; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 223; and *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, *MOG* IV, 469 = Int. vii, 39, among other works.

"You should wonder," the hermit said to Felix, "about anyone who thinks he can do penance without justice; for justice wants him to repent of the sin he has committed in proportion to the degree that he has offended God. And it is on account of justice that a person should, in doing penance, make amends to God and to his neighbor against whom he has sinned; and this he should do so that he may have greatness in justice, charity, hope, wisdom, and temperance. But when it comes to pass that greatness starts to come to the virtues and people experience the hardship that comes from penance, then they cast off greatness from the virtues and put littleness in its place. And thus most men do little penance, since they neither can nor want to sustain greatness of virtues.

"There was once a knight who was not only evil and lustful, but also a thief and a murderer, and who had committed many other sins. This knight entered a religious order to do penance for his sins. When he was in the order, he underwent a certain amount of physical suffering, but in his soul he felt no pain or suffering, but instead felt less anxiety and tribulation than he had in the outside world. This knight was in great wonder that the penance he was doing could atone for the great sins he had committed, and he begged the abbot of the monastery to give him instruction and method by which he could have a greatness in doing penance equal to that which he had had in committing sin. The abbot paid no attention to what the knight said, but instead, seeing that he was intelligent and industrious, make him cellarer. The knight could not do complete penance in this job he was given, since perfect penance requires much weeping, meditation, and repentance, both day and night, and especially for a person who has committed great sins. The knight wondered greatly at the abbot for not giving him the opportunity to do penance."

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in great wonder at many people I see doing penance by dressing in vile rags, fasting, and sleeping on hard beds, so that they make their bodies, which have sinned less than their soul, sustain greater punishment than their soul."

The hermit replied: "There was once a holy man who lived as a hermit and did physical and spiritual penance: physical, in that he tormented his body with fasts, tears, hard beds,[231] undergoing

[231] Instead of the *mal jaer*, literally "bad lying," of all the other sources, B (followed by Galmés) has *mal plaser*, "bad pleasure"!

heat, cold, loneliness, and many other things that made his body suffer; and in his soul he also did penance, for every day he made it hate sin and love God, and inasmuch as he could he made an effort to love God greatly, and to be very repentant of his sins. And he continually kept his will servant of, and beneath the control of, his intellect, which understood that the soul should be given great affliction in its will, since it was through the will that it sinned so much."

Felix said: "It is a great wonder how many men one sees in the world who do penance and yet like honors; for if one does something base or unjust to them they are annoyed."

The hermit replied: "Honor befits God, and since in God there is greatness of goodness, nobility, and of every perfection, it is therefore fitting that in this honor there be greatness, which God likes to have in the way He is honored by those who do penance. But the devil makes some men who do penance want temporal honors, so that their penance may lack greatness of patience, humility, and justice."

Felix said, "It is a wonder how some members of religious orders do penance and yet want to be bishops, who cannot do as much penance as members of religious orders."

The hermit replied: "A very devout member of a religious order who led a holy life was elected bishop. He declined the position, not wanting to leave his order for the sake of becoming bishop. He gave many reasons for not wanting the position, but the chapter told him that he could do more good in being bishop than in being a simple member of a religious order, whereupon he said to the chapter that had elected him bishop:

"'It once came to pass that a monk was elected bishop. This monk accepted the bishopric, thinking he could do a lot of good in this position; and this was why—since he had the intention of doing great good—he consented to becoming bishop. Once in the position, however, he became a man of very bad habits, leading an overly refined life, and he kept the bishopric obstructed for a long time, not doing the good he should have, but rather using the income of the bishopric to do a great deal of harm.'

"Someone who had been listening to these words said he was in wonder at why there were so few members of religious orders like him in the world.

"There was once a man who confessed often, yet seemed not to want to do any of the penance he was given, for within a few days of having confessed, he would break off doing penance. One day it came to pass that this man wondered why it was that he could not go through with any penance imposed on him, and he asked his confessor the reason for this. His confessor replied that penance without suffering was worthless, and since he avoided suffering, there was therefore no virtue by which he could be made to be penitent."

Felix said: "In order to do great penance, a person must mortify the five bodily senses in all those areas in which they take pleasure, which is why I am in wonder at so many people who say they do penance and yet take pleasure in seeing beautiful things, in hearing pleasing words, in eating white bread, and in drinking good wines."

The hermit said: "There was once a man with great strength of heart, whom nothing he saw, heard, ate, or drank could corrupt or incline to mortal sin. This man went among people, and whenever he saw beautiful things, heard pleasant words, or ate, drank, or slept[232] well, he was always able to turn it towards God, and he praised God for giving His subjects so many good things, and in his heart there was sorrow, and he often wept and bemoaned the fact that people did not give God great thanks for the good things He did for them."

105. PRAYER[233]

"PRAYER is the means by which God's virtues instill their likenesses into man's virtues that is to say, when a person devoutly and with

[232] Instead of the *jahia*, literally "lay," (cf. the previous note) of L V S, B has *oyrà*, "will hear," and A had *hoyia*, "heard" (the solution adopted by Galmés). Rosselló and *OE* followed the corrector of A in omitting the word.

[233] As is to be expected with Ramon Llull, the subject of prayer occupies an important place in his writings. In the *Book of Contemplation* of the pre-Art phase it occupies all of Dist. XL (chs. 315–65) as well as chs. 92, 200, and 296. In the quaternary phase, within the cycle of the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, he discusses it in the brief *Oracions e contemplacions del enteniment*, as well as in the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 84, the *Libre d'intenció*, Part V, ch. 15, and *Blaquerna*, ch. 40. He also discusses it in three works written around 1300; they are the *Oracions de Ramon*, along with Part V of the *Medicine de peccat*, and Part III of the *Libre de home*. As for the works cited in the notes to the preceding four chapters, prayer is discussed in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 234; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 30; *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 712 = Int. v, 354; and *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar saraceni*, *MOG* IV, 474 = Int. vii, 44. For a definition, see *Ars brevis*, Part X, Hundred Forms, no. 99.

sincere intention meditates on God, then God's goodness instills its own likeness in that person's goodness, insofar as that person is good through the prayer he formulates in meditating on God. And when the prayer is great, then God's greatness instills its likeness therein inasmuch as it makes that prayer great in goodness, duration, power, and so on. And eternity does the same thing, making the prayer last by instilling its likeness into it; and the same can be said of power, wisdom, will, and all of God's virtues.

"Son," said the hermit, "when one grain of seed engenders another grain, or when a man's intellect engenders his understanding, then this generation is accomplished by the instilling of likeness into likeness,[234] and the instilling likeness is the engendering one, and the instilled likeness is the one engendered, and this is how generation of likeness to likeness is brought about. And this is why, son, it is a great wonder that people do not make a greater effort to worship and meditate on God; for in such a prayer there is a union of uncreated and created likeness, and at that moment man receives the benefit and grace of his creator.

"Son, in God's essence, the goodness that is Father is like the goodness that is Son, and this likeness is relative to personal goodness; and this likeness is so great that normally it is a single essence and nature, which is Father and Son; and the likeness is personal and relative in terms of the distinction between one person and another. I tell you this so you can be in wonder at how, in prayer, God wants to represent the work He has within Himself through the likeness of persons. For in prayer God's will is similar to man's will, since man loves God and God loves him; and God's will and man's are alike in goodness, greatness, and so on for all God's virtues and for all of the properties given to man enabling him to receive the influence of God's virtues."

Felix thought a long time about the hermit's words, and he realized that, according to them, prayer was very pleasing to God. Yet Felix was in wonder at how little the people of this world adore and meditate on God, in proportion to how much they should do so, and he said to the hermit:

"Sir hermit, there was once a miser who, every time he was in church, wondered why it was that he was unable to pray devoutly and steadfastly, but instead, whenever he started to pray to God,

[234] The last two words are missing in A B, and hence in the printed sources.

would immediately begin to yawn, and feel sad, tired, and uneasy. But when he abandoned the attempt and began to discuss his wealth and the things of this world, then he felt happy, satisfied, and at ease. This miser remained in this state for a long time, until one day he asked a friend about what was causing his wonder, to which the friend replied:

"'There was once a ruler who liked to have his people do him honor, providing that through honoring him they wanted to honor God. This king wanted to be honored so that God would be honored, and he wanted to be a likeness of honor, so that honor would be done to the other likeness. If, however, the king had been a miser, he would have wanted to be rich for the sake of the honor it would bring him, and he would not have wanted to be honored so that through his honor God would be honored; and as a result of having such a desire in his will, God would not have been able to instill the likeness of His honor.'"

The hermit was very pleased with Felix's comparison concerning the miser and why he could not pray to God, that is to say, because his will was inverted and turned away from the purpose for which it was created, and he said to Felix:

"Son, prayer and intention are two things that should accord in greatness of goodness, power, wisdom, will, justice, and perfection; but greatness of sincere intention is lacking in the world, and exists only in smallness, while hypocritical intention has turned into greatness of evil and imperfection. This is why prayer exists in smallness of intention, on account of which smallness people, while they imagine they are worshiping and praying to God, are in fact blaspheming and cursing Him, in that they are praying to Him for unjust and useless things, which are contrary to goodness, perfection, and greatness.

"There was once a very rich draper who had a son he loved very much. So much did he love him that, in order to make him a rich man, the draper became a usurer and a miser, doing unjust and treacherous things to many people for the sake of amassing money. The draper prayed to God to preserve his son; and when he prayed he thought more about his son than about God; and for this reason he dwelt more, in his prayers, on the likeness of his son than on that of God, on account of which preference he in fact blasphemed and scorned God.

"There was once a child who entered a monastery and who lived there a long time wearing the habit of the order. When he was an old man, he thought that God would surely give him great glory, because of the many years he had spent in the monastery. One night, while sleeping, he dreamed that he had been condemned to Hell and that he was in the midst of flames surrounded by devils, and he wondered why he had been condemned to Hell, since it seemed to him that, according to God's justice, he should have been saved. While he was thus wondering, one of the devils said to him that he had been condemned to Hell because each time he prayed to God, he prayed to be sent to Paradise and not to Hell, and not once did he worship God uniquely for the love of God, or because God is worthy of being loved for Himself alone."

After the hermit had said these things, Felix thought about them for a long time, finally weeping and lamenting bitterly; and the hermit asked him why he was weeping.

"Sir," Felix replied, "I weep because of how many men are in a bad state through worshiping God falsely and contrary to sincere intention; for most men who pray to God do so more out of fear than love, and are more interested in themselves or other things than in God."

Felix continued: "When I think about God's exalted nobility, which has infinite greatness of goodness, eternity, power, and wisdom, and when I think that there are more idolaters who worship the sun, idols, or beasts as God than there are people who truly worship God, then I am in wonder at how so many monks and holy men belonging to the holy Catholic faith can put up with and not feel great pain at the villainy and injustice done to God by worshiping Him in the guise of an idol or a beast or something else."[235]

The hermit said: "Son, in a certain city there was once a recluse who lived from what was given to him by people passing by in the street. It was his custom to spend his time looking through a window at the people passing by all day long,[236] and he judged

[235] Notice the similar complaints about nobody going out to proselytize among idolaters in the passages corresponding to nn. 184 and 227 above.

[236] Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 77, implies that such "religious recluses, walled up in small cells beside the street, living on alms given by passers-by," were not uncommon in medieval Spanish cities.

that some were passing by for the sake of good works and others for the sake of evil ones; and for every man that seemed to pass by on the street for the sake of good works in the service of God, it seemed to him there were a hundred who passed by for the sake of bad works in the disservice of God. The recluse had indulged in this custom of his for a long time, and he was in wonder at how God could put up with it, and many times he prayed to God to give the world the grace to have more good men than bad ones. After thinking this over a long time, he wondered how it could be that God did not heed Christ's human nature, which prayed to the divine nature on behalf of His people, nor heed Saint Mary and the many angels, archangels, martyrs, and confessors[237] existing in Paradise, all of whom pray for the world to be good and in a good state. While thinking about these things and wondering why God paid so little heed to the saints in glory, he fell asleep and saw in a vision how great are the wrongs mankind commits against God, on account of which great wrongs it is no wonder that God allows men of this world to continue in their wickedness."

106. ALMS[238]

"IN A CERTAIN CITY there was once an eminent burgher who was very rich in worldly possessions, and who had lived for a long time amidst great prosperity and honor. One day it came to pass that the burgher was sitting in the doorway of his house, which was on the main square of the city, when a poorly dressed pilgrim passed by and asked him for alms. The burgher said to the pilgrim, 'May God help you,' to which the pilgrim replied that God wished to help him with the burgher's alms, since the burgher and his possessions belonged to God. The burgher was in wonder at the pilgrim's words, and for a long time he thought about them in the following way:

"He thought about why God has established alms, and God illuminated his soul, and caused him to reflect on and understand

[237] MS B, followed by the printed sources, adds "and virgins."

[238] Llull discusses alms in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 84; *Libre de Sancta Maria*, ch. 27; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 270; and *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, MOG IV, 474 = Int. vii, 44.

the following things, that is to say, that God established alms so that people would give to God; and in order that they be able to do so, God wants some people to give to others for the love of God. Then, as a result of these thoughts, the burgher gave the pilgrim a penny, whereupon the pilgrim blessed him because of the penny he had given him, thanked God for it and prayed to God to grant the burgher Paradise and to forgive him his sins.

"The burgher said that the penny he had given was worth more than the many other pennies he had in his purse, for only this penny had been the occasion for the pilgrim's blessing and thanking God and having prayed to God on the burgher's behalf, and none of the other pennies had so benefited him or done so much honor to God as this single one he had given.

"After thinking about these things, the burgher remembered how many times he had said no to the many poor people who had begged alms from him for the love of God, and he remembered how God had given him so many worldly possessions. By virtue of this remembering the burgher's understanding was illuminated and his will enamored, and he sold everything he had, and penny by penny, gave everything he had to the poor. And when he had nothing left to give away, he went from door to door begging alms for the love of God.

"One day it came to pass that the burgher had been begging for bread for the love of God, without yet finding anyone willing to give him some. He fasted and was hungry, for it was already past three in the afternoon, and he was in wonder at God for not having done him the grace of letting him find someone that day to give him alms. While he was thus wondering, he saw the bishop of the city approaching accompanied by a large retinue, and he reflected as to whom God had blessed with greater gifts, him or the bishop. The burgher understood that God had blessed him with greater gifts than the bishop, who was avaricious and unprincipled. The burgher was consoled, and he understood that the more hardships he suffered for God's sake, the more he was giving[239] God and the more God was giving him.

"Son," said the hermit, "when a poor man is before a rich man and begs alms for the love of God, then he is a representative and

[239] The "honoring" of the printed sources comes from Ms A.

a mirror in which the following ideas can be considered: In the poor man's begging alms from the rich man for the love of God is signified the fact that the rich man should remember, understand, and love God, who created him, gave him wealth, and kept him from being poor. The rich man should consider that he could have been poor, or that a time could come when he might be poor. He should also consider the fact that giving is a very noble thing, and taking a very base thing; and in giving he will be similar to the Father who gives Himself to the Holy Ghost, and similar to the nobility of the Father who gives.[240] And if the rich man does not give to the poor man, he is dissimilar to these things and to many others. Thus the person who gives, gives a penny so that he may be similar to God in giving and in nobility; and when he does not give the penny, he sells this similarity for a penny, and shows he prefers the penny to being similar to God."

After hearing these words, Felix was in great wonder why rich men said no to poor men begging for alms for the love of God, when by the act of giving alms they could resemble God, which resemblance is the best thing a person can have in this world or in the next.

"In a certain city there was a bishop who loved giving alms above all else. This bishop gave away half of the income from his bishopric for the love of God; and through his good example in giving alms, the whole city took him as a model and more alms were given there than in any other city. One day it came to pass that the bishop died, and all the poor people of the city and in all the land were in great mourning over his death, for they loved him greatly; and they wondered why God had not prolonged his life, for they were very afraid that the next bishop would not be so fond of giving alms as the one who had just died.

"A poor man once begged alms from a rich man for the love of God and of Saint Mary; and the rich man gave him one penny

[240] The printed sources, following MSS A B, have a sentence which is (as M. Batllori rightly points out in his note to the *OE* edition) grammatically very confusing. The only aspect of the version of L V S—that reproduced here—which could still be considered confusing is the parallelism between "similar to the Father who gives Himself" and "similar to the nobility of the Father." This anomaly, however, is explained two sentences later, where Llull talks about a person's being "similar to God in giving (i.e. in generosity) and in nobility."

for the love of God and another for the love of Saint Mary. The poor man wondered why God had not created many such men to honor Saint Mary."

Felix said that he was in wonder at rich men, since most of them ate white bread and gave alms of black bread.

"Son," replied the hermit, "a certain man had a son and a stepson living in his house; to the son he gave wheat bread to eat, and to the stepson he gave barley bread, which he did because he loved his own son more than his stepson.

"There was once a bishop who was a master[241] in canon law, and who told a fellow citizen that everything prelates kept, saved, and stored away in their treasury, aside from what they needed for their everyday life, was robbed, stolen, and taken from the poor in Christ. This bishop, however, gave no alms, but put in his treasury everything he could. He died, and the wealth he had accumulated went to the bishop who succeeded him. Now the dead bishop had accumulated that wealth by being a thief and a robber, and the above-mentioned citizen asked for this money on behalf of the poor in Christ; but he was not allowed to have it, for the new bishop refused to discuss the matter, which refusal caused the citizen, who had heard what the dead bishop had said, to wonder.

"It once came to pass that, for the love of God, a knight gave a halfpenny to a poor man, but then did not want to give anything to another poor man who begged him for alms. The poor man who had received the halfpenny bought some bread with it, and half of that bread he gave to the poor man who had received nothing. The knight was in great wonder at this poor man for having more charity with one halfpenny than he with everything he had; to which the poor man said he should not wonder, since he, in his poverty, was more similar to Christ than the knight with his wealth. The knight then decided to surpass the poor man in charity, and he therefore gave away all his wealth for the love of God, wanting to be poor and to beg for His sake; and whatever people gave him for the love of God, he, for the love of God, gave away to the poor."

241 "Doctor" in A, followed by the printed sources.

107. INTENTION[242]

"GOD CREATED the world with the intention of being loved and known by man; and in God's intention in creating the world there existed greatness, so that there would be greatness in this knowing and loving of God. But in men's knowledge and love of God there is smallness, and it makes one wonder why in fact there is no greatness there, since greatness is more concordant with God's intention in creating man than smallness.

"In accordance with the course and nature of God's intention in creating man, He created the heavens and the sun, moon, stars, elements, plants,[243] animals, and minerals in the service of man; and all these things follow the intention and purpose for which they were created. Most men, however, do not follow the purpose for which they were created, but rather act as if they were created for some other purpose; or in other words, they think they were created to be loved and known, honored, and served. Now this being the case, what is a great wonder is that creatures who lack the use of reason follow the intention for which they were created, while man, who has the use of reason, does not follow it.

"In ordaining the intention for which man was created, God ordained many different intentions, from which follows the intention for which man was created. That is to say, God ordained that there should exist many grades of intention, such as prince, prelate, and all those who are below them, such as knights, burghers, merchants, shoemakers and plowmen, and also pope, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, canons, monks and so on. God created these grades with the intention of being loved and known, honored, served, and praised, and so that there be greatness in each of the grades; but since in all these grades there is smallness and a lack of greatness, this is a source of great wonder.

[242] As Sala-Molins, *Choix*, p. 398 points out, Llull often uses this word to mean "purpose" or "moral purpose"; cf. the definitions in *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis*, "Hundred Forms," no. 12; *Logica nova*, "Hundred Forms," no. 30 (Palma, 1744), p. 70; and *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, *ORL* XVII, 413. The subject is treated at greater length in some of the same works mentioned in previous notes: *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 579, 603; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 96; *Thousand Proverbs*, ch. 52. For the specific doctrine of first and second intention, see n. 244 below.

[243] MSS B (followed by Galmés) and L have "planets"; all other sources have "plants," which in view of its placements in the sequence, must be the correct word.

"There was once a bishop who had a large income as well as castles, towns, and one very large city. This bishop was a miserly, proud, accidious, and lustful man. Behind the greatness of the city, of the castles and towns, and of his revenus lay the intention that, through it, God should be loved, known, and served; yet it was not present in the intention the bishop had in knowing, loving, and serving God. For the bishop's intention with respect to God was little, and he turned the greatness of his bishopric and its income toward himself, and there, as well as toward worldly pleasures, his intention was great; for which reason he destroyed the intention for which he was bishop.

"There was once a prince with an abundance of great lands, people, and wealth. This prince preferred the glory of this world to that of the next, and all the power of his kingdom he converted and turned to his own intention, that is to say, to have himself known, praised, loved, and feared by people; and to this same purpose was converted the entire intention of his provosts, bailiffs, judges, and officials; and as a result of this conversion and turning of intention, the entire kingdom was being ruined and made contrary to God's intention and contrary to that for which it had been created.

"Son," the hermit continued, "there are two grades of intention, first and second, which is why one refers to the first and second intention. The second intention is so that the first may exist, like evil, which exists so that good may exist; and soul and body, which exist so that man may exist; and intellect, which exists for the sake of understanding; and trees so that there may be fruit; and the heavens, elements, trees, and beasts, for the sake of man; this world exists for the sake of the next world, and the next world exists so that God may be known and loved. In all these and similar things there exist first and second intention;[244] and the first is in

[244] As is clear from this and previous definitions of first and second intention (see the passages corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, nn. 11, 48, and Dist. III, n. 1), Llull uses these terms in a sense different from the more epistemological usage current in scholastic circles (cf. W. & M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, Oxford, 1975, pp. 229–30, and the excellent résumé in *OED*, s.v. intention, sec. 11). Llull dedicated the entire *Libre d'intenció* to the subject, as well as the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 45; *Logica del Gatzel*, st. 43; *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 92, pars. 4–9; and *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, Dist. II, Mode 1, in addition to discussing it in some of the passages mentioned in n. 242 above and in many other places in his work.

accordance with greatness of goodness, nobility, perfection, and virtue; and the second is in concordance with smallness of nobility, goodness, fulfillment, and virtue. And since people convert the first intention into the second, and the second into the first, preferring themselves to God, they therefore destroy intention as much as they can; on account of which destruction most of the world is full of wrong and error.

"This was why a holy man wondered how it could be that all the people in the world were created with the intention of God's being loved, known, honored, and served, when almost nobody does that for which he was created. So great was his wonder that he traveled throughout the world crying out to people regarding the cause of his wonder, and saying that true intention was waning and false intention waxing.

"In the beginning, when hermits first went out to lead a harsh life in the wilderness, it was ordained that they should gather together and live in monasteries, the better to do penance, to instruct one another, and to serve God. One day not long ago, it came to pass that a man entered into the room of a Black Monk[245] who was the abbot of a large abbey. This abbot had in his room a large bed with a lovely silk bedspread embroidered with his coat of arms, and he had many silver goblets and many other handsome possessions. The other man wondered about the intention for which the abbey had been founded, and what it had now come to."

"Sir," said Felix, "it sometimes happens that a person does good when he has the intention of doing something bad, or that he does something bad when he has the intention of doing something good; and this is why I wonder why God judges people more by their intention than by their works."

"Son," replied the hermit, "intentions are the work of the soul, whereas what comes from them in the way of exterior actions are works of the body; and since the works of the soul are greater than the works of the body, God judges the works of the soul more harshly than those of the body.

[245] A Benedictine, as opposed to a Cistercian or White Monk. The way Llull tells this anecdote, with the phrase "not long ago," has made commentators believe he might be recounting a real event.

"There was once an abbot who did not permit his monks to study the Holy Scriptures, so that they would not know more than he, and so that he could better use them to administer his worldly possessions. One day it came to pass that a monk from that monastery said that he was in great wonder at God, for he had often seen God make those people suffer who were of good intention towards Him, and do good to those who had bad intentions when it came to serving Him. The abbot answered the monk that a man's good consists in good remembering, good understanding, and good loving; and to those whose intention is good, God does the above-mentioned good; and to those whose intention is bad, He grants good that is less valuable, such as wealth, health, honors and long life. The monk was in wonder at what the abbot said, for his words were very contrary to his intention in not allowing the monks to study theology."

108. TEMPTATION[246]

FOR A LONG TIME the hermit and Felix discussed intention, and they were in great wonder at how true intention had perished in this world, which was itself created through true intention. As Felix thought about his good intentions in loving and serving God, he fell into temptation, thinking that God should give him a great reward for his good intentions. But he recognized the temptation into which he had slipped, and he wondered greatly at how, in such a short period of time, he had fallen from a good to an evil state; and he said to the hermit:

"Sir hermit, it is a great wonder that God will allow a man who is in a good state suddenly to be tempted by the devil, which temptation makes him displeasing to God."

"Son," said the hermit, "temptation and fortitude are in accord in increasing faith, hope, charity, justice, and wisdom, for the greater is a person's perfection in loving and serving God, the more faith, hope, and the other virtues are increased when he is tempted to the contrary yet maintains the strength of heart to

[246] The most important of the many places where Llull discusses this subject are the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 190; *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 90; *Blaquerna*, ch. 51; *Libre d'intenció*, Part V; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 294; and *Liber de praedicatione*, *ROL* III, 278–81.

conquer that temptation, which increase in virtue is pleasing and agreeable to God."

"Sir," Felix asked, "in what way is temptation midway between two opposites?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a pupil once asked his teacher in what way free will was present in the soul. The teacher replied that the soul is composed of three things: memory, intellect, and will. The memory has two aspects: one is the capacity for remembering, and the other the capacity to undergo that remembering. The first capacity is active and the other passive, and in each one there is freedom to the degree that it is active or passive. The same follows for intellect and will, and thus from all three there follows a freedom made up and composed of active and passive properties, so that man can freely remember, understand, and love."

Felix was in great wonder at the hermit's words, and he said that he did not see how there could be freedom in a passive thing.

"Son," said the hermit, "in God there is greatness of justice; and since God's greatness and justice instill their likenesses in man's soul, they therefore want greatness of freedom to exist in man."

So that Felix would understand these words, the hermit gave the following example: "It is only natural, in every element,[247] that the form, inasmuch as it is active, has the freedom to act, and the matter, inasmuch as it is passive, has the freedom to want to undergo." And this was why he said that form freely informs matter, and matter freely lends itself to form to exist beneath it, so that the conjunction of the two may be stronger and more united.

From what the hermit said, Felix understood that if the soul were not free with respect to passivity,[248] it could not receive such a great likeness of God's justice and greatness; for then only the active form would be worthy of praise or blame, and not the passive form, that is, matter.

While thinking about these things, Felix understood that temptation existed in man's soul in relation to the disposition of free will. He then said that he was in great wonder how temptation

[247] Instead of *element*, two MSS, B and V, have *elementat*, "elemented thing," "thing made up of elements" (cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 53).

[248] *Passió* in the original, for which see *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 53.

could cause any man to suffer,[249] before he had any inclination to do good or evil.

"In a certain monastery there was once a monk who was a man of holy life; and in the same monastery there were many monks of evil ways and wicked lives. Their evil conversation was the source of many temptations for the good monk; which caused him to wonder why temptation could so distress him when he had no desire to imitate the habits of the other monks. While he was thus wondering, he understood, by the light of God's grace, that the reason temptation distressed him was so that he might have the opportunity to increase virtues against vices; and since he did not do this, he felt constrained by the influence of God, who felt it necessary that he receive this increase of virtues."

"Sir," said Felix, "I once heard tell of a bad man who had lived for a long time in mortal sin. It came to pass that he repented of his sins, did penance, and became a man of upright life. While doing penance and leading an upright life, he received many temptations with respect to his faith; for it often seemed to him that God did not exist, and sometimes he was tempted to think that God did not exist in Trinity, that He had not become incarnate, that the Resurrection did not exist, and similarly for the other articles, about which he had often doubted when this temptation came upon him. The saintly man wondered greatly how it could be that when he was leading a wicked life of mortal sin, he had not suffered these temptations, whereas now that he was leading a good life without, as far as he knew, mortal sin, he often suffered them."

"Son," said the hermit, "God created man to love and know Him, and he wants man to love and know Him in that activity which man can best imagine and contemplate; which activity is that within Himself, that which follows from the articles of faith, from the sacraments, and from other similar things, and which a man in a state of sin is unworthy of contemplating or thinking of. And people who are on the path to salvation are often tempted in these matters so that they can the more strongly raise up their memory to remember, their intellect to understand, and their will to love God and His works.

[249] *Donar a nuyll hom passió*, with *passió* in its other meaning.

"On a high mountain there once lived a hermit who led a very holy life, yet who was beset by grievous temptations every time he prayed or was idle. He was in great wonder at being unable to fight off these temptations, and he often prayed God not to have them, for they distressed him greatly and made him very unhappy. While the hermit was thus wondering about the temptations he experienced, he went to a spring he often visited, where he found a man sleeping. The hermit suddenly felt tempted to kill the man with a little knife he was carrying. After experiencing this temptation, he thought hard about it and wondered how he could possibly have been tempted to do a thing he would never really do for anything in the world. While in this state of wonder, he understood that he had experienced this temptation so that he might know the malice of the devil, and the weakness and paltriness of man, who can so easily slip into error and wrong. After having these thoughts, he remembered that at the moment the temptation had come to him, he had not been thinking about God or anything else, and since he was thus idle, he fell into temptation. The hermit reflected that just as, in order to wake up a sleeping man, one had to touch him or call out, so a man who is tempted must remember, understand, and love God, as well as the virtues, and hate the vices; for temptation comes to a person so that he may be awakened to such things."

Felix said: "Sir, I once heard tell of a canon who was very proud; after a time he was made archdeacon, and finally bishop. Many times while he was canon, archdeacon, and bishop he attempted to be humble, and he had greater difficulties in being humble as archdeacon than as canon, and greater yet as bishop than as archdeacon. Great was his wonder in connection with something he felt to be true: namely, that pride was more contrary to the position of bishop than to that of archdeacon, and more so to the position of archdeacon than to that of canon."

"Son," said the hermit, "according to natural reason, the more distinguished a man is, the more vitrue is in accord with him, and the more vice is in disaccord with him; and thus temptation, whether for good or for evil, can increase more in man, the higher his position and the more distinguished he is."

Felix said: "A man was once tempted to indulge in carnal sin, when fortitude, accompanied by justice and charity, came along

and conquered that temptation, and this man exercised abstinence and did not commit the sin. Now it came to pass that after a brief period of time, the temptation returned, and this time the man rushed ahead, without the slightest deliberation, and committed the sin. Great was his wonder at the sin he had committed, that is to say, he wondered why, if he had been able to abstain the first time, he had not been able to do so the second time."

The hermit replied that the reason he had abstained the first time was because there had been a concordance between fortitude, justice, charity, and abstinence. "The second time temptation came, there was no deliberation by which the virtues could accord and take shape, for the time was short, and as a result the man sinned without his will offering the slightest resistance.

"Son," the hermit continued, "temptation usually brings suffering, and this is because there is a holding back, from not immediately following the dictates of one's will; on account of which suffering one needs fortitude in order to be able to overcome the temptation. This is like the wise man who had living in his house a man of evil ways whom he was educating the best he could; and when the man who had been so badly brought up did something wrong, the wise man was tempted to throw him out of his house. But then fortitude, hope, and charity came to his aid, and held him back, so that he could give him a good education; and through this the wise man gained a great deal, for he overcame temptation with strength of heart."

109. VAINGLORY[250]

"VAINGLORY is against the glory of the next world. Now since man was created for the glory of the next world, and in this world there are few men who dislike vainglory, it is therefore a great wonder why vainglory is so loved.

"Vainglory consists of the pleasure taken in remembering, understanding, and willing, when this pleasure is against charity, justice, and wisdom, like the bishop who was full of vainglory about his large revenues and the many clergymen he had beneath him. When this bishop remembered, understood, and loved the

[250] Vainglory is also discussed in the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 140; *Doctrina Pueril*, ch. 89; *Blaquerna*, chs. 18, 57; and *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 295.

fact that he was bishop and that his bishopric had greatness of revenues and people, then his pleasure was very great; but since this pleasure was not based on the final purpose for which he had been made bishop, but rather on injustice and lack of charity and wisdom,[251] his pleasure was converted into vainglory. As a result of his vainglory, he did all he could to be honored. Now it came to pass that this bishop became very ill, and was beset by a great fear of death, and was very saddened by the thought that he would have to leave the bishopric and the pleasures of this world. He fell asleep, and it seemed to him that he died and that a devil took his soul off to everlasting fire. The bishop was in great wonder that a good angel he saw there did not help him, and he begged him to help him against the devil. The angel replied, saying that he, who had loved the glory of the world and not loved the glory of paradise, should not wonder at his not helping him.

"There was once a cleric who sang very well, and who was full of vainglory about how well he sang. It came to pass that this cleric went to a sermon given by a monk, who was full of vainglory about the sermon he was giving, for he was an excellent preacher. The cleric was in wonder at the monk who gave himself praise for something for which he should have praised God, since every good thing is God's work; yet he was not in wonder at himself and his own vainglory about his singing. Which makes one wonder how it is that men recognize vice in others, while remaining unable to recognize it in themselves.

"Two knights once came to the court of a noble king. One of them was very nobly dressed, and the other was poorly dressed. The knight who was richly dressed was well received by the king and all the members of his court; and the knight was full of vainglory about the fine reception everybody gave him. The poorly dressed knight, on the other hand, was not given any sort of honorable treatment, which caused a certain wise man in the court to wonder; for this wise man knew that the well-dressed knight was lustful, proud, and vainglorious, and that the badly dressed knight was chaste, humble, and of good customs. As a result, the wise man wondered why a person was more honored and better re-

[251] "Of charity and wisdom" is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text.

ceived on account of his clothes (which have nothing to do with his being) than on account of the virtues, which are what make a man virtuous and in the grace of God.

"A holy hermit once came to lodge in a large monastery. The abbot of that monastery had great pleasure when the hermit appeared, for he had not seen him for a long time. The abbot showed the hermit the monastery, which was very beautiful and well-furnished with everything necessary for a monastery. The abbot boasted about all the tools and workshops as he showed them; yet he was not saddened by the thought of his monks, who did not lead the kind of life they should have. The hermit, who knew about the wicked life the abbot and his monks led in the monastery, wondered why the abbot was so full of vainglory about the walls, trees, and fields of the monastery, and was not saddened by the dishonest life he and his monks led.

"The hermit left the monastery and entered a beautiful city. While walking through the city, he came across a poor man who was lamenting and weeping because he had nothing to eat and was very hungry, and because he was naked and very cold and ashamed in front of other people. The hermit consoled the poor man, saying he should have self-esteem because he was a man, and not despise himself for lacking those things with which a man lives, which are not as noble as man himself. While he was thus cheering up the poor man, a rich burgher, very nobly dressed and riding a handsome palfrey, passed by. The burgher was full of vainglory over his lovely clothes and his palfrey, and as a result the hermit said to the poor man: 'Son, see what a wonder it is that the burgher esteems himself more for being well-dressed and riding a palfrey, than for being a man and being created in God's image. And thus you, son, should find consolation in your poverty, since you are a man who was created in God's likeness; and what is more, insofar as you are poor, you are similar to Jesus Christ and the Apostles.'

"After listening to these words, the poor man was consoled by what the hermit told him; and the hermit led him through the town, and showed him a shopkeeper's stall full of things people needed. Then he showed him a draper's shop and a butcher shop, and the place where bread was sold, and other places engaged in

the mechanical arts.[252] 'Son,' said the hermit to the poor man, 'all these things are necessary to man, and since men need so many things to live, it is therefore a great wonder that any man can give himself vainglory; for the more things he needs to live, the more shortcomings he has.'"

The hermit said to Felix that there was once a very beautiful woman who gloried in her own beauty. "One day it came to pass that while she was admiring herself and feeling vainglorious about her beauty, she sneezed, and from her nose and mouth there issued large amounts of phlegm,[253] which stank and was horrible to see. The woman wondered how she could be so full of vainglory if from inside her head, and through her nose and mouth there could come something as ugly as that phlegm.

"There was once a knight with a handsome son who had recently been made knight. This knight and his son went to fight against the castle of a knight with whom they were at war. The knight saw his son on horseback, handsomely decked out, and he felt vainglory over his son, for he was good at arms and very handsome on his horse. While he was thus feeling vainglory over his son, from the castle came a bolt, which killed his son, so that he suddenly fell dead at the feet of his horse. The knight was in wonder at how he could have felt vainglory over something that had died so suddenly.

"There was once a knight who had a strong, well-appointed castle, which was perched on a cliff. This castle was so handsome and noble that every time the knight saw it, recalled it, or heard it mentioned, he was filled with vainglory. One day the knight happened to go hunting in a great forest near his castle, when he came across a knight who bore him ill will and who wounded

[252] A "mechanical art" was, as Llull says in his *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis*, "Hundred Forms," no. 83, "a manual way of earning a living," and was opposed to the "liberal arts." In the *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 79, he lists those who engage in such arts as farmers (literally "plowmen"), ironsmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, drapers, merchants "and other professions similar to these." In the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 629ff., shoemakers and drapers are replaced by tailors, sailors, and knights (cf. *Ars brevis*, Part X, n. 54). The lists in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 112–22, and the *Libre d'intenció*, Part V, chs. 29–30, are again different. See Colomer, *Edad Media*, p. 48, for the use of this concept in Llull's predecessors, Hugh of St. Victor and Vincent of Beauvais.

[253] The word *posterma* (*postema, postrema* in other MSS, all from the Latin *apostema*), here and in the next sentence, means either "abscess" or what comes out of an abscess, that is, "pus," but both seem excessive in this case.

him and took away his horse. The lord of the castle remained in one place, wounded, all day long, without being able to get up, and experiencing great thirst because he had lost blood. While he was in this state, a shepherd passed by carrying a barrel of wine. The knight begged the shepherd to give him something to drink, and the shepherd asked him which he preferred, his castle or a goblet of water or wine. The knight replied that he preferred a goblet of water or of wine to his castle. To which the shepherd said that he wondered how he could have had such vainglory over the lordship of the castle, if he was willing to sell it for a goblet of water or wine."

110. BUILDING[254]

"SIR," FELIX SAID to the hermit. "I am in wonder at why people build fine palaces, castles, and houses, when they are destined to live such a short time in this world, and when a person cannot be sure he will be alive from one day to the next."

"Son," said the hermit, "external works are a sign of internal works; without external works, internal works would not exist, and thus, as a representation of internal works, men have external works, as you will understand from the following example:

"In a noble city there was once a bishop who was building a large church and a large palace. This bishop imagined the church and his palace in greatness, beauty, and strength, as well as in the other qualities pertaining to the nobility of building. So intensely did he imagine these physical things, that he forgot about spiritual building, that is to say, about a person's building virtues in his soul, and loving them in greatness of beauty, strength, and goodness. And this is the love and charity with which the holy Church is built; and the heart, intellect and memory are the palace in which the holy Church should dwell. This was why the bishop naturally had a temporal inclination, so that he would then be moved to

[254] *Edificar* is here used in the sense of constructing something either to house people or to contain spiritual-moral qualities. In the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 41, and the *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 39, it is used more in the sense of building something doctrinal or spiritual. Llull also uses the word (*Blaquerna*, ch. 1; cf. *ENC* I, 25, and the corresponding note) in the sense of edifying or giving a good example. That these figurative meanings were not uncommon in the Middle Ages is clear from O. von Simpson, *The Gothic Cathedral* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 128–31, 140.

spiritual building; but he remained with the temporal building and forgot about the celestial one."[255]

"Sir," said Felix, "when one thinks about it, one wonders why people have tombs made before they die, for they can never be sure they will die in the town where they have been made."

"Son," replied the hermit, "according to what I have explained and shown you before, you can understand that one begins with the external signs so as to convert them into internal actions, like a man who thinks he will die in a certain place, and therefore has a tomb built, so that after his death he can have a fixed, assigned place; and he makes the tomb good, beautiful, and large because he wants greatness of beauty and goodness in that place. And all this means that a person builds in this present life, because he wants to have an assigned place in Paradise, one that will be good, beautiful, and of great glory, through being near Jesus Christ. But since people are blinded by worldly delights and vainglories, they perform the external works but forget about the internal ones.

"Son," said the hermit, "you may well wonder at the story I will tell you about a certain king who knew how to build outside his soul, but not within it. There was once a king who had great wealth, and who, for the sake of vainglory and worldly delights, built a castle—one that was very large, very beautiful, and very strong, with many rooms and towers, with a strong wall and a large moat; and nothing pertaining to a castle's nobility, beauty, strength, and goodness was lacking there. The king worked for a long time on that palace, and he put all his wealth into it; his soul, however, was never able to build a palace where God could be contemplated, nor a castle where virtues would be strong against vices. When the king had finished the castle and was about to live in it, he died; and because of his vices, he was damned. This king had not wanted to build a castle in the next world, where one lives forever, but instead he built it in this world, where life is short. And thus, son, it is a great wonder why such men, for the sake of something that has so little worth and permanence, are willing to lose that glory which is everlasting and commit themselves to a building of fire that never ceases to burn those who are damned.

[255] "The spiritual one" in MS B, followed by all the printed texts.

"In a wilderness there was once a very strong castle perched on a high rock. This castle belonged to a knight who was a thief, a murderer and, in general, full of wickedness. One day this knight happened to capture a merchant who was carrying a large amount of money, and he locked him up in his castle in a well-fortified room, which was the prison where the knight put the people he captured. In this prison there was a cleric the knight had held captive for a long time. The merchant asked the priest if there was any way to break out of that prison and escape during the night. The priest said no, that the prison was very strong, and the castle had a large wall and moat, and guards were on duty every night, all of which made it impossible to escape or get away. The merchant was in wonder at the knight's having built such a strong castle out of stone, lime, wood, and earth, while in his soul having a building so weak in virtues, and so strong in vices.

"In a certain city there was a merchant who had worked for a long time to amass a great deal of money, and then he built himself a handsome and large house in that city. The merchant lived in the house with few other people, since he was avaricious and not accustomed to spending much money; and because of the few people living there, many of the rooms and apartments of that house were empty, thus serving no purpose, not even for storing things. It came to pass that the king of that city entered the house to see it, since he had heard it spoken of so admiringly. When the king saw the size and beauty of the house, and the few people living there, he wondered why the merchant, for the sake of so few and such undistinguished people had built such a large house; and he took the house away from the merchant, and kept it for his own needs. The merchant told the king that he was in wonder at his taking the house without any justification. The king replied, saying that it was not right that any building should remain unused."

111. GOVERNMENT[256]

"SON," THE HERMIT SAID to Felix, "you who have been searching for wonders, go through the world and see how princes, prelates

[256] See *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 93, for a definition of *regiment*. This chapter is built on a series of related words all originating from the Latin *rex*: *rei* ("king"), *regnar* ("to reign"), and *regir* or *règer* ("to govern").

and many others govern the world, and wonder at why there are so many who govern badly, and so few who govern well,[257] especially in view of the fact that greatness in the amount of good government is similar to God's greatness, and greatness in the amount of bad government is dissimilar to it.

"Government exists in order to conserve the final purpose for which man was created, and this government originates in the soul, and then passes to the body, and from the body returns to the soul. And this, son, you will be able to understand from the following example.

"There was once a wise king who, after reigning for a long time and governing his subjects very wisely, had grown very weary of the difficulties of the task and felt a desire to rest. Now he had a son whom he had taught how to govern his memory to remember, his intellect to understand, and his will to love, for through such a government a person is able to rule and govern his eyes to see, his ears to hear, his nose to smell, his sense of taste to taste, and his sense of touch to feel. And by means of spiritual and corporal governing a ruler can properly rule both himself and his people. After bringing up the son so carefully to rule, he made him king, while he himself entered a monastery, where he spent the rest of his days meditating on God and His works.

"In the king's lands there was a count who was an evil person who ruled his own land wickedly. This count was in wonder at the king for having abandoned the world during his lifetime and made his son king; and, thinking the king had done it for some personal advantage, he did likewise, entering a monastery and leaving his county to a son whom he had brought up badly. And thus, because of the bad government the count had accustomed himself to in the world, he governed himself badly in the monastery, as did his son in the county.

"The king who was in the monastery thought about God's goodness and about the goodness he received from God's goodness. And inasmuch as he could, he governed the greatness which that goodness had in power, wisdom, will, and the other virtues,

[257] M. Arbona in a note to the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 111, 5 (in *OE* II, 1263, n. 111) cites this passage of *Felix*, along with another of the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 304, one of the *Libre d'intenció*, Part V, ch. 28, and the Imperial Tree of the *Tree of Science* as examples of the great liberties Llull took in criticizing the conduct of those in power.

all of which he had in likeness of God. By the way the king governed the virtues and goodness he had, he was able to use this goodness to do great good in remembering, understanding, and loving God and His works; and as a result of the good he did, he inspired his son to do good works, and similarly with everybody in his kingdom. Everybody in the land was in wonder at the good government the king maintained in his monastery, as well as that of his son in his kingdom.

"While the king was thus governing well, it came to pass that a bailiff of his, who for a long time had also been accustomed to governing well, had become corrupted by money, and he governed his office wickedly, without the king's knowing anything about it. Everybody in the bailiff's city wondered why the king, who himself was so upright, could have such a wicked man in his service. When the king found out about the bailiff's wicked behavior, he was very angry with him, and he had him tortured and killed, and he returned everything he had taken from the people. As a result of what the king did to the bailiff, all the other bailiffs were encouraged to govern well.

"To the court of that same king there came a holy hermit who was wandering throughout the world choosing to live among laymen, for the great merit he could acquire by leading an upright life among them. Great was this hermit's wonder at the good government the king maintained in his person, in his household and in his kingdom, and he asked him what was the main reason for his being able to govern himself and his people so well. The king replied that, after the grace of God, the next most important reason was his good upbringing and the example his father had given him in governing the works of the soul, which, insofar as possible, are similar to God's works."

"Sir," Felix said to the hermit, "I am in great wonder how it is that God entrusts one man alone with the task of governing a people, when the average man is busy enough governing himself, his wife, and his children."

"Son," replied the hermit, "between a king and the people there once arose a great dispute. The people wanted to be free of many things, and they took away the king's power and honor; and the king, who was a wise man and led a saintly life, said to his people:

"'It is absurd for a prince's government to be without power or honor, for only through power and honor can he govern his people properly; and the more power and honor he has, the more he can be feared and loved.' And if the contrary were the case, it would be absurd for a single man to be entrusted with the government of many people; and what is to be wondered at is a people who want to live in peace and freedom, and yet want a lord who is powerless and honorless."

After giving Felix this example concerning a king and his people, he gave him another, about a grain of wheat which engenders many grains, saying that it was able to do so because it gave them its own likeness, and because it converted many things into its likeness, namely those things beneath the surface of the earth that were converted into a grain of wheat.

By the example the hermit gave, Felix understood that a king can govern many men because he sets an example with his likeness, and he causes this likeness of his good customs to exist in his bailiffs, judges, provosts, and magistrates, and because he receives the likeness of God's virtues, and causes them to exist in himself. Felix was very pleased with the example the hermit had given him, and he was in wonder at the great subtlety of his mind.

"There was once an emperor who was a simple, well-meaning person and he did not know how to govern his empire. This emperor heard about a king who was very wise and knew how to govern his kingdom well. The emperor went to see the king and begged to be shown how to govern his empire, for great was his desire to do so; and the king said to him:

"'There was once a sovereign who acted in such a way that everyone, even before knowing him, assumed he was a wicked man; but this he did on purpose, because he saw that the world was more in a bad than in a good way. Since he assumed that every person was bad, he would tempt him first, before putting any trust in him; and if that person turned out to be bad, he would make himself feared; and if that person turned out to be good, he would make himself loved. And he thus made it so that the people with whom he came in contact could not fool him, for he was clever enough to be able to persuade people to do his will, and this was why he knew how to reign and rule his land.'

"The emperor was very pleased with the example the king had told him, and he realized that he did not know how to rule because in dealing with bad people, he assumed that they were good rather than bad, and thus, through his good intentions, allowed himself to be fooled, before he recognized that they were bad. Then the emperor was in wonder at the state of the world, which was so altered; for according to reason, one should assume the good rather than the bad. But malice has so increased in the world that there are more bad people than good, and therefore, in times like these, with a person one does not know, one should more readily assume he is bad than good."

After the hermit had said this about the emperor and the king, Felix wept for a long time, saying that he was in wonder at the wicked government that existed in the world, for nowhere does the soul govern the body as it should. Just as in plants the form governs the matter in an ordered way, so should the soul inform the body and its actions in such a way that good government results.

112. ELECTION[258]

FELIX TOLD the hermit that he was in wonder at a certain prince's custom, which seemed to him peculiar; for this prince was the sort who gave willingly, but who refused to make restitution for any wrong he committed.

"Son," said the hermit, "God instills the likeness of his virtues in mankind, and sometimes it happens that a person chooses some of these virtues and abandons others, as was the case with this prince, who chose the likeness of God in giving, for he wanted to give in order to be similar to God in giving;[259] but he made no restitution to those from whom he had taken, and hence did not choose the likeness of justice; and because of this abandonment, the likeness of the giving he had adopted was turned into a vice, and the result was that he took so as to be able to give.

[258] *Elecció* in the two senses of "choosing": one when carried out by a process of voting, for which Llull proposed curious schemes in the *Ars electionis* and *Blaquerna*, ch. 24; the other when carried out directly by fewer people (an individual, God, etc.), as exemplified in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 55, and *Hundred Names of God*, ch. 53.

[259] This last clause is missing in V A, and hence in Galmés's text.

"In a certain monastery there were two monks who had elected an abbot for different reasons: one had elected the abbot so that he would love, understand, and serve God, whereas the other had elected him so that the abbot would love and honor him over and above the other monks. This abbot was a man of good and holy life, and the monk who had elected him selfishly (and who never did anything for the love of God), was a wicked and dishonest man, whom the abbot treated badly, dishonored, and put in prison; and the other monk, who had elected him for the proper reasons, was honored and loved by the abbot. Almost all the monks in the monastery wondered why the abbot honored one of the monks and dishonored and constrained the other monk, when both had elected him abbot.

"To a certain king there came two men, each asking to be made bailiff in one of the king's cities. One of them was a good and upright man who asked the king to make him bailiff so that he could serve God and carry out justice in that city. The other was a miserly and proud man, who wanted to be bailiff so people would honor him and so he could amass a lot of money. Since the king himself was a miserly, proud, and unjust man, he chose the likeness of the wicked man to love, and did not want the good man, who bore no likeness to him, to be bailiff; and the unprincipled man was made bailiff. Many people in that city were in wonder at the king for making the wicked man bailiff and not the good man."

"Sir," said Felix, "why do people choose temporal in preference to spiritual pleasures, when the spiritual ones are nobler than the temporal ones?"

"Son," replied the hermit, "a bishop once had a nephew he loved very much, and because of this great love, he wanted him to be bishop after his death. The bishop preferred physical to spiritual likeness, and God therefore punished him in the choice he made of his likeness."

Felix was in wonder at how this bishop preferred to have his physical rather than spiritual likeness in charge of the bishopric.

"In a certain very important church there was strong opposition in an election, for the canons, who were of noble lineage, wanted the archdeacon, who in addition to being also of noble lineage was handsome, knowledgeable in law, and very generous with his

money, to be bishop; whereas the sacristan wanted a poor cleric who served a poor chapel to be bishop. This cleric was a wise man who knew a great deal about theology and led a holy life. The archdeacon was elected bishop by a majority of canons; and the sacristan was in great wonder at that election, in which pride had vanquished humility, sensuality had vanquished spirituality, and law had vanquished theology.

"There were once two clerks, one of whom chose to love beautiful things, such as beautiful houses, beautiful clothes and trappings, etc., while the other one chose to hear beautiful words that were true and beautifully ordered. The one who chose beauty in visible figures chose the beauty that God reveals of Himself through visible things; and the one who chose beauty of words chose the beauty that God reveals of Himself in audible things. It came to pass that the one who loved visible beauty was elected bishop, whereas the one who loved beauty in audible things was rejected. And it was a source of great wonder that for the position of bishop beauty of sight was preferred to that of word, considering that God is invisible yet nameable.

"In a certain abbey there was an abbot who was a miser, and who thought more about increasing the abbey's revenues than about increasing the knowledge or good life of the monks. In another abbey, which was superior to this one, the abbot died. In that abbey there was a monk who was a man of holy and good life. But the members of that abbey elected as abbot the abbot who was a miser, and chose not to elect the monk who was wise and upright.

"Two clerics came before a bishop asking for a church position which was vacant. One of the clerics had served the bishop for a long time as his squire; the other was simply a good clerk who led an upright life. The bishop gave the church to the one who had served him, who knew no Latin and was unprincipled, and refused to give it to the other who was very devout and literate.[260] It is a great wonder how a bishop can give any cleric a benefice through simony.

[260] For the surprisingly low level of literacy among the clergy of the time, see Hillgarth, *Kingdoms* I, 114, as well as the pages immediately preceding and following for a discussion of clerical morals.

"Once there was a cathedral canon who began thinking about how he could become bishop. He studied law and acted humble and honest, so he would be elected bishop when the reigning bishop died. Finally the bishop did die and the canon was elected in his place. When he was bishop, however, he was proud, miserly, and lustful, and misused the law he had learned. The people of that city wondered why he was not deposed, since he had developed traits contrary to those he had had before becoming bishop."

The hermit told Felix to wonder, and to weep and lament the evil and disorder that comes from a bad election; for if there were a good and honest election, much good would exist which does not, and much evil that does exist would not. Felix thought about the good that came from a good election, and the evil that came from a bad election, and the good that was thereby lost, and since he saw that the bad far outweighed the good, he wept and lamented greatly the good that was lost and the evil that came from a bad election.

"Son," said the hermit, "in a certain city there lived a very wealthy burgher who chose temporal delights for the pleasure of the soul, and he tried to find the fulfillment that the five bodily senses demanded in every one of these delights. Since these temporal delights, however, could not satisfy his soul, he found that, no matter what he said or did, he could not find fulfillment of pleasure in any of his five bodily senses. Great was the burgher's wonder as to why he could not find fulfillment in eating, dressing, hunting, riding, and other similar things. While wondering at this, he decided to choose pleasure and fulfillment of his soul in spiritual things, and he therefore thought about God, about goodness and greatness, and about God's virtues; after this, he thought about man's virtues, and then he felt that his soul was satisfied and fulfilled by these thoughts. When the burgher realized that fulfillment of pleasure could be found in spiritual and not sensual things, he felt great joy and sold everything he had, giving the proceeds to the poor in Christ. For the rest of his life he lived with a holy hermit, meditating on God and thinking about spiritual things. Often the burgher would wonder at how many people in religious orders and how many clergyman in this world chose sensual plea-

sure, in which there is no fulfillment, and neglected spiritual pleasure, which is the source of fulfillment."

113. SIN[261]

"SIR," SAID FELIX, "I have often heard it said that sin is a nonthing, and it therefore causes me wonder that a person should be punished for something which is nothing."

"Son," replied the hermit, "God created everything that exists for Him to be loved and known; therefore the ultimate purpose of man's existence is to love and know God above all other things. Hence when a person loves other things more than God, he is straying from the ultimate purpose for which he was created.[262] It is this straying that brings guilt, and the guilt brings punishment; and this straying is called sin. Now this straying is not something created, but rather is a straying from everything that has been created; and this is why it is said that sin is nothing.

"There was once a king who loved the delights of this world, and scorned the glory of the next one. This king had been established in his position so as to maintain justice on earth, but he had the idea that he had been made king so that he would have a great abundance of money, honors, and pleasures in hunting, sporting, eating, drinking, dressing, and in carnal delights. All these things the king did without giving justice a thought; and thus his kingdom was going to ruin, as a result of having nobody ruling it. This king sinned by changing the purpose for which he was king into its contrary."

"Sir," said Felix, "it is a wonder to me that man's body can sin, since the soul controls the body, giving it life and movement, and since the body, without the soul, would be unable to do anything."

"Son," replied the hermit, "the soul and the body between them make the man, and it is the man who sins;[263] the soul alone could

[261] Llull discusses sin in the same general way he does here (as opposed to discussing the seven deadly sins or original sin) in the *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 281, and the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 64 and 191.

[262] Note the similar definition in *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 92, 9: "Sin exists when a person loves the things he should love through first intention less than the things he should love through second intention." Cf. also introduction, text at nn. 10–11 above.

[263] I have followed A, S, and the uncorrected text of V in omitting a repeated, "and since it is the man who sins."

not make a man sin, since it must be joined with the body to form man, which is why it is the body that is to blame.

"A shepherd was once sitting next to a spring with a small loaf of bread and he was very hungry. It came to pass that while the shepherd was eating this bread, he thought to himself that if somebody came along begging for bread for the love of God , he might give him some. The shepherd felt charity within himself, and he decided that if this situation did come up, he would definitely give away some of his bread. As he was thinking this, he saw a poor man coming who was very hungry and who begged him for bread. He gave him half of his bread and ate the other half; however, the shepherd was very hungry all that day and night, for the bread he had eaten had not been enough."

After saying this, the hermit asked Felix whether, supposing the shepherd had died before giving the poor man the bread, but when he had already decided to do so, he would have gained as much merit as if he had died after giving the poor man the bread.

Felix thought a long time about the hermit's question, and as a result of this question, he understood that, since the body suffered more through an increase in charity, which was greater when he gave the bread than it would have been if he had not given any, even though he intended to do so, therefore it was fitting for the body to have merit, and to have blame for the contrary.

Felix told the hermit that he wondered how sin could increase or decrease if it was nothing.

The hermit replied that a bishop once committed the sin of lust with a prostitute; the sin was greater for the bishop than for the prostitute since the bishop had strayed farther from his purpose than the prostitute.

"Sir," Felix asked, "when a sinner commits a sin, how can it be that the sin is nothing? For if it were nothing, one would think that he could not have committed it."

"Son," replied the hermit, "to that question one can give the same answer as before, namely that sin is alteration of purpose and straying from what man was created for; and since man can stray in this way, he can sin, without sin's being anything with regard to creation and final purpose."

Felix said he wondered how a man could pardon sin, since in committing sin, a person offends God more than man.

The hermit replied that an accident is nothing in itself, but it does exist in something else. From this Felix understood that man can pardon sin through the power he has on God's behalf, but not through his own power.

"Sir," Felix asked, "how does sin begin, what is its condition, how does it increase, and how does it end?"

The hermit replied that insofar as the beginning, condition, increase or decrease, and end of sin are concerned, it is all the result of a straying from the final purpose for which things exist, that is to say, when people cause them to deviate from their goal. And so that Felix would understand this better, the hermit said:

"There was once a vegetable garden watered by a noria, whose wheel was turned by a donkey. It came to pass that the gardener made the wheel turn in the wrong direction, and the donkey worked in vain while the wheel itself began to break down, and the plants in that garden went without water and died. The more the donkey worked, the more the wheel broke down and the plants died. The gardener came along and repented of the foolish thing he had done, and he turned the wheel around the other way, making the donkey go the way it should, bringing up water so the plants could live."

"Sir," Felix asked, "how, if it is nothing, can sin exist on such a scale? For one hardly finds anyone who really and truly does that for which he was created. And since virtue is contrary to sin, and virtue is something, how can it be that in the world sin has more people beneath its sway than virtue?"

The hermit replied that sin is greater in privation of good than virtue in the existence of good, since when people sin they are more contrary to infinite than to finite good, on account of which contrariety they are punished by great privation of good.

Felix said that he wondered how the many people whom God had so favored in this world could be inclined towards sin, which is something both so contrary to God and so vile in itself; for usually those who in this world are most honored, richest, most powerful, and most handsome are those who commit more sins than others.

The hermit replied that there was once a bishop who was miserly with a thousand marks he had, and an archdeacon who was miserly with a thousand sous;[264] and since the bishop turned aside

[264] Cf. n. 132 above.

greater purpose with his thousand marks than the archdeacon with his thousand sous, the bishop's inclination to avarice was therefore greater than the archdeacon's.

"Sir," said Felix, "why is it that man is more easily inclined to commit sin than to do good? It makes me wonder very much, especially if by committing sin a man is acting against the reason for which he was created, and in doing good he is in accord with the final purpose for which he was created."

The hermit replied that in order to do good, a virtue called fortitude must be present, that is, strength of heart, which brings suffering to the will and to the body, in order that a person may gain spiritual and physical merit. When, however, people feel this spiritual and physical suffering, then it is only with difficulty that they are induced to do good; but when they do wickedness and sin, then no spiritual or physical difficulty is necessarily present, which is why they do not suffer when they do something evil, and thus would rather do something evil than good.

114. RESURRECTION[265]

FELIX GAVE a good deal of thought to the Resurrection, and he wondered how a person could rise up from the dead in that same being he had when he died, if the body is corruptible and turns to dust beneath the earth. The hermit reassured Felix about what was causing his wonder with the following words:

"The main reason why God created man is so that He be known and loved by him. And since man is constituted and composed of soul and body, and since he could not exist as a soul without a body, he must therefore rise up from the dead. For if he did not, the purpose for which man was created would be lost, which loss is impossible, in view of that fact that God is so powerful,[266] so

[265] Since resurrection is one of the articles of faith (the seventh) it is discussed in the works listed in *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 3, and of course specifically under art. 7 of that same Bk. III, under the frequent Lullian synonym of "glorification." At the same time it is an article of faith common to the three religions, and as such it was discussed in the last five "flowers" of Bk. I, Tree 1 of the same work. See also the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 16, 197, and the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 614ff. = Int. v, 256ff.

[266] The following "and so good" of all the printed texts is found only in MS B.

just, so wise and willing, that everything He has seen fit to ordain must be fulfilled.

"God has given His image and likeness to man so that man, through this image and likeness, will love and know Him. God is good, and his goodness is great and eternal and complete with every virtue; and since man is like God insofar as he is good and his goodness is great, God has given him the likeness of Himself in goodness and greatness; that is, the goodness man has from the likeness of God's goodness, and the greatness he has from the likeness of God's greatness. Thus, if it happened that man did not rise up from the dead, it would follow that God's eternity would not have given its likeness to man in duration, and thus God's goodness and greatness would instill more of their likeness in man than would eternity, from which it would follow that, from lack of eternity, man could not love and know God forever, which is impossible; by which impossibility the Resurrection is demonstrable."

"Sir," said Felix, "how will a man, whom beasts, birds, or fish have eaten, be able to rise up from the dead? For the flesh of that man will be converted into the flesh of those beasts that have eaten him, and these beasts or fish or birds will be eaten by other creatures, and thus the flesh of one creature will be converted into that of another successively during the hundred, two hundred, or more years that man will have been dead."

"Son," said the hermit, "a Christian and a Jew were once arguing, and the Jew denied the Incarnation, for it seemed to him it could not be, since it was contrary to the course of nature; and the Christian replied that when God created the world from nothing, and when He formed Adam from the mud of the earth,[267] and when He created the first tree, the first horse, and so on, he did it over and above the course of nature."

The hermit said that God is just, and man is that which does good when he sustains the virtues and does evil when he indulges in the vices. "Since God's justice is great, man must rise up from the dead, for if he did not, it would follow that man would earn

[267] Cf. n. 25 above.

merit or blame,[268] and yet would not be rewarded for good or punished for evil, and that justice would not have great, but rather little, application, since it should, but would not, judge man; which little application is impossible.

"It is only natural that man should prefer to be man than to be only a soul; and if the just man likes to be man, and yet would never again be man after his death, and if a man is a greater thing than just a soul alone, it would follow that, if the Resurrection did not exist, the likeness that God's will, which is great, instills in man would be contrary to the greatness of the just man's will, which contrariety is impossible."

The hermit told Felix that a silkworm is a symbol of resurrection, for this worm dies, and when it is dead there arises from it a moth, which begets a worm similar in species to the worm from which came the live moth. "Now, if nature has the virtue and property of producing from a dead worm a live moth that begets a worm similar to the one that has died, how much more can God, from the dust that was once a man's body, resuscitate that body; and he can join one speck of dust to the next, no matter how far apart they have been, since God's power and wisdom exist throughout the world!"

The hermit said that a certain gentile, who did not believe in the afterlife, but only in the life of this world, did not think he would be anything after his death. Every time he thought that after his death he would be nothing, he was sorrowful. It came to pass that the gentile became a Jew, and he had faith that after his death his soul would subsist for all time; and he was very happy when he thought that he would be a soul after his death.[269] And in accordance with his belief in the Jewish faith, he loved God, whom he had not loved when he had been a gentile. After a time it came to pass that the gentile abandoned the Jewish faith and became a Christian, and then he believed in the Resurrection, and he loved God more than he had when he had been a Jew; which

[268] Thus in V S and the uncorrected texts of A L; B and the later correcting hands in A L (who might very well have been following the lead of B in a *lectio facilior*), followed by the printed texts have a negative before "earn," giving a passage one would have to translate as "that man would not earn merit or blame, and that he would not be rewarded . . ." Instead of the following "justice," B and the correcting hand in L (followed by Rosselló and *OE*) have, helpfully, "God's justice."

[269] See *Gentile*, Bk. II, art. 5, under the "third opinion."

greater love towards God he felt because, now that he believed in the Resurrection, he saw God's work in creatures as being nobler, and he felt that God better demonstrated there the greatness of His power, will, justice, goodness, and unity.[270] When he had reflected on all these things, he realized that the Resurrection must necessarily exist, since through it he could better understand and love God; for if the Resurrection did not exist, it would follow that what best permitted man to understand and love God would be in accord with nonbeing, and what did not permit man to love and understand God as much would be in accord with being, which is inconsistent.

By these and many other arguments the hermit proved the Resurrection so clearly to Felix that he felt completely certain about it, and from then on never wondered about it again. He did, however, wonder how people who believed in the Resurrection, which is so noble and good for good people, and so bad for bad people, could sin, or refrain from doing all the good they could.

Felix said[271] that a king had once done a great injustice to a knight of his. It came to pass that this king fell sick and was on the verge of death. While the king was sick, the knight came before him and begged to be given satisfaction for the grievance he had done him, and said he would pray God that the king, on the day of Resurrection, be allowed to keep his own body and his five bodily senses, and that he remain in God's glory for all time. In spite of all the knight's prayers the king died without ever satisfying the grievance. The knight, along with everyone else who had heard what he had asked, was in wonder at the king for his harshness with the knight and with his request.

[270] The *unitat* of all MSS could in A be read as *veritat* ("truth"), as Galmés read it.

[271] Thus in all MSS except B (the least reliable), followed by all the printed sources, which has the more expected "The hermit said . . ."

115. MIRACLES[272]

"Sir," said Felix, "I am in wonder at those men who wonder about miracles and about God's supernatural activity in the world; for since God created nature and has power over it, nobody should wonder about anything God does that transcends the course of nature."

"Son," said the hermit, "what you say is true, and if men reflected and thought about God and His power, which is great, they would not wonder at any miracle or any action that was supernatural. But instead of remembering and understanding God's power, when they see or hear of some action which might transcend the course of nature, they wonder at that action, because they are accustomed to seeing natural actions every day."

The hermit said that a wonder is something strange to see and understand, to hear and remember, and it is this strangeness that causes a man to wonder at something; and when he has become accustomed to remembering, understanding, hearing, and seeing it, he no longer wonders at it. "And this is why unbelievers wonder at how Christians can believe in the Trinity, the Incarnation, or in the sacraments; for such things seem very strange and miraculous to men who are not accustomed to remembering, understanding, and loving them."

The hermit said that a Christian was once disputing with a Saracen about the Holy Trinity of God, and he said the God the Father begat God the Son. When the Saracen heard the Christian say that in God there was a begetting, he imagined that, just as there is an interval of time between a father and son, there must also be one between God the Father and God the Son, and he wondered very much how the Christian could believe that in God there existed passage of time. Similarly, the Saracen wondered at the Christian for believing that there existed plurality in God, for it seemed to him that if there was plurality in God, there would also be com-

[272] Since miracles rely more on faith in tradition and "authorities" than on the rational, dialectical mechanism of something like the Art (cf. the *Liber de praedicatione*, *ROL* IV,11), it is a subject one could almost say Llull avoided. See for instance what he has to say on miracles in the passage corresponding to Bk. I, ch. 12, n. 63 above. Here it was clearly suggested by passages such as par. 5 of the previous chapter. The only other places in Llull's work I have been able to find where the subject is discussed are in two late works: *Liber de efficiente et effectu* (*ROL* VII, 288) and the *Liber de potestate pura* (*ROL* I, 430–5).

position. The Saracen also wondered at how Christians could believe that God had become incarnate, for it seemed to him that if God had become incarnate, He would have been changed in His essence. As for the Sacrament of the Altar, he was in great wonder, for it did not seem to him that beneath the accidents of bread there could lie the substance of flesh.[273] About these and many other things the Saracen wondered, but after the Christian had gone over these things many times he no longer experienced any wonder, for these explanations had accustomed his ears to hearing, his mind to understanding, and his will to loving them.

The hermit went on to say that the Christian who was disputing with the Saracen stated that in God there is goodness, which from itself begets the Son, who is goodness, the Father being goodness which begets goodness, so that His goodness would not be idle. He said that the same was true of greatness, eternity, power, and all the dignities; for the Father, being all the dignities, begets the Son, so that no dignity may be idle in God, and so that each by itself and all together (being one and the same Father) may eternally and infinitely have no idleness of activity within the substance of God. And since in God there is simplicity, therefore from all of itself it begets the Son; this is why there can be no composition in God, even though there is plurality of persons; for if there were, it would follow that the simplicity which is Father would not have begotten the Son, who is simplicity, in which simplicity the Father and Son are a single essence. The Christian went on to say that in God there can be no change, since He is infinite and eternal, and He can become incarnate because of the fact that His power and His will are one and the same thing; for what the will wants, the power can do; for if the will wanted it and the power could not do it, then God's power and will would not be one and the same thing. As for the Sacrament of the Altar, the Christian said that if by virtue of nature blood is present potentially in bread, and flesh is present potentially in blood, how much more by virtue of God, that is, by virtue of the divine power and will, can the act by which beneath the accidents of bread there lies the substance of flesh exist above the power of nature. After the Christian had

[273] An excellent résumé of the principal objections of Moslems and Jews to Christianity which Llull felt he had to combat; cf. Yates, "Art," p. 152.

said all these and many other things, the Saracen had himself baptized and became a Christian, and he no longer wondered at the things he had wondered at before.

"Son," the hermit said to Felix, "everything a person can feel with the five bodily senses is a wonder, but because he is continually experiencing these bodily feelings, they no longer constitute a source of wonder. The same thing happens with all the spiritual things he can remember and understand.

"It once came to pass that a Saracen who was very well versed in philosophy was captured by Christians, and he was taken to Christian lands where he was a captive for a long time. To the Saracen, the Christians behaved strangely in the way they ate, dressed, spoke, and lived, and he was in great wonder at their behavior, and he wrote to a friend of his that he was seeing people he was unaccustomed to seeing, hearing words he was unaccustomed to hearing, remembering unaccustomed things and doing things he did not usually do, which was why he was in wonder at everything he saw or heard. All these things were wonders, son," said the hermit, "for the Saracen, but not for the Christians among whom he was living."

"Sir," Felix said, "I wonder why people in this world don't wonder more at the wrongs they do than at supernatural things; for it is a greater wonder to sin, or to see that almost everyone has a tendency to prefer worldly vanities to knowing and loving God than it is to bring the dead back to life, to cure paralytics, or any other supernatural thing."

"Son," said the hermit, "a philosopher once went up to live on a high mountain. One night he happened to wonder at a great brightness he saw in the sky.[274] Then afterwards he wondered why he had been in such wonder at the brightness he had seen, for, when he thought about it, he realized that this brightness had come about in the course of nature; and he therefore wondered at himself for being in wonder at a work of nature, and why the situation had arisen. While wondering about this, the philosopher realized that people wonder at things they perceive suddenly, in such a way that the intellect has no time to deliberate or understand; but when it has had time to deliberate, it understands what

[274] Galmés suggested this might be a reference to an aurora borealis.

the person was previously wondering at, and he will wonder no more at it, since he has understood or understands it."

Felix gave considerable thought to the example the hermit had given, and he was in wonder at it, for it seemed to him that the question he had asked had been very subtle and difficult to understand. While wondering at this, Felix's intellect had time to deliberate and take on strength and force, and he understood what he had previously wondered at, or in other words, he said that worldly people and sinners love sins, and they do not wonder at what they love. But when something comes up that they do not love, and this thing takes place without the intellect grasping it, and without its having the way or time with which to grasp it, then they are in wonder at that thing.[275]

[275] The subject of miracles has made this last chapter of Bk. VIII on man into a little essay on the main theme of the entire work—i.e. wondering.

HERE BEGINS THE NINTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF PARADISE,[1]

116. AND FIRST OF ALL OF THE GLORY OF ANGELS[2]

THE HERMIT told Felix that the glory angels experience in Paradise is so great that whoever in this world could comprehend it, would be in a state of wonder beyond imagining; for God has given such likeness of His greatness to the glory which angels experience in Paradise, that it is a wonderful thing to remember and understand. So that Felix would be in wonder at the glory of angels, the hermit said:

"In Paradise God assimilates the qualities of angels to His dignities, insofar as angels can, in their qualities, receive the likenesses of them, for God's goodness assimilates the goodness of angels to itself; and the same thing is done by God's greatness, eternity, power, and so on. God's goodness makes the goodness of angels similar to itself in its greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, and so on. The same thing happens with God's greatness, which makes the greatness of angels similar to itself in God's goodness, eternity, power, wisdom, and so on for all of God's dignities; for each of them by itself and in itself, and each in the others, assimilates and gives form to the qualities of angels, so that they may be a spiritual vessel in which to receive the glory of God.

"The reason God wants the glory of angels to be very great in goodness, greatness, duration, power, wisdom, will, and all the

[1] Llull discusses Paradise in the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 57, 82, 159, 311, 343, 355; the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 730–9; and the *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*, *MOG* V, 631–51 = Int. v, 273–93. In the *Disputatio Raymundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, *MOG* IV, 475 = Int. vii, 45, Christian and Moslem ideas on the subject are contrasted. See also *Gentile*, Bk. II, art. 7, and Bk. IV, art. 12.

[2] Cf. Bk. II, n. 1 above. We now begin a series of chapters (in this Book, and the next one on Hell) with parallels in Llull's *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*; this chapter, for instance, corresponds to Question 46, "How the Benign Angels Delight in God," *MOG* IV, 87–8 = Int. iii, 71–2.

other angelical qualities, is so that angels may contemplate God in His essence, in His dignities, in His trinity and in His unity; for the more God imprints the likeness of His dignities on the qualities of angels, and the likeness of His essence on the essence of angels, the better the angels can contemplate and rejoice in Him.

"In God's essence, the goodness which is the Father, from all of itself, begets the Son, who is goodness; because that goodness which is the Father and that which is the Son are one and the same essence, while at the same time there exists the distinction between the person of the Father and the person of the Son; and the same is true with the Holy Ghost, and with all God's dignities. This being the nature of God's intrinsic activity, in angels all their qualities are joined in order to receive knowledge and love of the divine activity; and through their contemplation of this activity, there arises in them such a great feeling of glory, as it is written, that no heart can imagine it, nor mouth describe it, nor ears hear it."[3]

Felix thought a great deal about the glory of the angels, which the hermit had described in God's essence, in His dignities, and in His persons; and because of how great he understood that glory to be, he was in wonder for a long time before he could say to the hermit:

"Sir, I am in great wonder at why it is, if angels experience such glory, that people of this world don't do them more reverence and honor; for sinners neither believe nor obey them, but rather do or say vile, sinful things before them, which are displeasing and disagreeable to angels."

"Son," said the hermit, "fire and water are opposites, and this is why one acts against the other."

Felix understood by this example that sinners make contrary use of the likenesses they have, insofar as they are creatures, contrary to the likenesses angels have to God; or in other words, sinners have created qualities similar to those of angels, and use these qualities in a fashion contrary to that for which they were created. The hermit was very pleased with Felix for having understood the example he had given him, and was in wonder at how easily he had understood it.

[3] 1 Cor. 2:9

"Son," said the hermit, "in Paradise, where the angels are in glory, this glory of theirs is of many different kinds, and these different kinds are so many and so vast, that I could not name or describe them to you. But perhaps I can give you some small idea of their nature with the following explanation: in an angel, its goodness loves its own likeness in the greatness, the duration, the power, the wisdom, and in all the other qualities the angel possesses; and since its goodness loves its own likeness in all of them, therefore this goodness is present in each of the dignities[4] in such a way that all of these qualities are good, and this goodness possesses within itself the likenesses of the other qualities; and this is why goodness is great, durable, powerful, and so forth. What I have told you, son, about goodness loving its own likeness in all of them, is also true of greatness, which also loves its own likeness in all of them, and for each of the angelical qualities, which loves its own likeness in the others. And this is why, son, since the angelical qualities fulfill all possible desires, an angel's glory is such that it would be a wonder to consider and recount.

"Son, I have described the glory of angels in Paradise as existing on two levels; the first is the glory they have in God, and the second is the glory they have in themselves. Now I want to tell you about the glory they have in people who love God; and you should understand this glory in the following way:

"Angels love God so much, that they love anything God loves, and all those who love God; and since God created man in His image and likeness, angels love people precisely because they are the image and likeness of God. And when a person wants to contemplate God through his image and likeness, then the angels feel a very great glory, for they experience pleasure at man's carrying out the purpose for which God created him in His image and likeness."

When Felix had understood the three levels on which angels experience glory, he was very pleased, for it seemed to him that the glory of angels was wonderful and great. However, he said it seemed to him that if angels experienced glory as a result of the good works done by good men, then they should also suffer as a result of the evil works done by evil men, since angels must feel

[4] B, followed by all the printed texts, has "qualities."

angry whenever anyone does something counter to God's goodness.

"Son," said the hermit, "angels experience greater glory at the works of God than those of men; and therefore the work God performs in Himself, in angels, and in men keeps angels from suffering over the evil works done by evil men, and instead brings them glory when God's justice punishes them or God's mercy forgives them."

"Sir," said Felix, "if angels experience such great glory in God and in themselves, I am in great wonder how they can experience glory at anything men do, whether it be good or bad."

"Son," replied the hermit, "from the beginning follows the end, and from the end the beginning."

From what the hermit said, Felix understood that it was proper and reasonable that angels experience glory in God as a result of the good God performs in men and of the love men feel toward Him; and thus justice will have it, for angels love everything God loves and all those who love God.[5]

117. OF THE GLORY A MAN'S SOUL HAS IN PARADISE[6]

FELIX TOLD the hermit that he wondered how the soul could have glory in Paradise without the body, loving it as it did, but being without it in Paradise until the day of Resurrection.

"Son," said the hermit, "since God is memorable, intelligible, and lovable, He has created man's soul so that it will remember, understand and love Him. And since God created sensual things in order to demonstrate the greatness of His dignities, He created man's body so that it could see and hear how great are the physical[7] things God has created; and this is why the soul can have glory, since it thereby achieves the purpose for which it was created, that

[5] Only V and the eighteenth-century Spanish translation have this reading; all other sources have, "all those God loves," which, in view of the previous part of the sentence and the paragraph above beginning, "Angels love God . . . ," surely misses the point.

[6] Cf. *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Question 33, *MOG* IV, 72–4 = Int. iii, 56–8. For this and the next chapter, see also *Gentile*, Bk. III, art. 7, and especially the question and solution at the end.

[7] Thus, *corporals*, in all MSS except A, followed by the printed texts, which have *temporals*. The previous "man's" is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text.

is to say, remembering, understanding, and loving God, in which lies all its glory; and after the Day of Judgment it will have glory together with the body as a man, whereas now it enjoys it as the glory of a soul.

"Son, you cannot imagine how great is the glory of the soul in Paradise; for God, in all His essence, in all His dignities, in all His three persons, and in all the glory He has in Himself, *is* the glory of the soul. And you can therefore see that if the soul glories in all of God, its glory must be very great and wonderful."

Great was Felix's wonder at the hermit's words, for it did not seem to him that the soul, which is a small, finite thing, could have glory in all God's essence, dignities, and persons.

The hermit, however, said, "God is a whole without part or parts, for He is a thing which cannot be divided into part or parts; and all of God is worthy of being remembered, understood, and loved in His totality by the soul; and therefore it is only fitting that the soul have glory in all of God; for if it did not, God would be divided, which is impossible."

Felix understood what the hermit said, and he was in wonder at the great glory the soul has in Paradise; for if in this world a person has great pleasure when he remembers, understands, and loves some friend of his, even though he does not remember and understand him completely, how much more glory will a person have in Paradise when he remembers, understands, and loves God! After saying this, Felix asked the hermit to tell him the way in which the soul has glory in all God's essence, dignities, and persons.

The hermit replied, saying that the soul of a just man remembers, understands, and loves in Paradise; that the essence of God is goodness, greatness, eternity, power, and so on; and each dignity by itself and in itself and in the others is all of God's essence, without any differentiation of essence or of nature. "Moreover the soul remembers, understands, and loves how all the Father, who is all the essence and all the dignities, from all of Himself begets the Son and breathes forth the Holy Ghost; and the Son, who is all the essence and all the dignities, from all of Himself breathes forth the Holy Ghost. In Paradise, moreover, the soul remembers, understands, and loves how the Holy Ghost, who is all the essence and all the dignities, in all of Itself rejoices in Itself,

in the Father, and in the Son. And since the soul remembers, understands, and loves all of this for all of God, it therefore experiences glory in all of God, and in all its remembering, understanding, and loving."[8]

Felix understood what the hermit said, but he wondered how the soul could have glory in all of God, while not understanding as much of God as God understands of Himself; and he begged the hermit to explain to him what was causing his wonder.

The hermit replied: "Man's soul cannot understand as much as God's wisdom; but since God is a whole in Himself and *is* all Himself, without there being any division, and since He has given His likeness to the soul in all its totality, according as He has been given it in goodness, in greatness, in duration, in wisdom, and similarly for the other dignities, therefore the soul understands all of God, remembers all of God, and loves all of God in Paradise; for if it did not, God's totality would not have made the soul so like itself as was the case for its goodness, greatness, etc., and the similarity would be less, and the similarity of goodness, etc., greater, which is impossible. But since the goodness and the other qualities of God are greater than the goodness and the other qualities of the soul, so God's totality is greater in God's understanding than in the soul's understanding; and this is why God understands all of Himself better than does the soul, even though the soul understands all of God."

Felix was very pleased with what the hermit had explained to him about God and His totality; for he was in great wonder at the fact that the soul was able to understand all of God, yet did not understand it as well as God understands Himself. Thus, after a certain time spent in taking pleasure at what the hermit had said, Felix said, "Sir, just as you have shown me how the soul experiences glory in remembering, understanding, and loving God, so I beg you to show and demonstrate to me how the whole soul has glory; for it is only fitting that, if the soul has glory in all of God, it should also have glory in all of itself."

"Son," said the hermit, "since all of God is worthy of being remembered, understood, and loved, therefore God's totality has

[8] For a commentary on this and other themes of this chapter, see Sala-Molins, *Amour*, pp. 131, 140, 146, 225.

infused its likeness in the memory, understanding, and will of the soul, or in other words, God wants all the essence of remembering, understanding, and loving that is in the soul to rejoice in God; and this remembering, understanding and loving are the essence of the soul, insofar as they are substantial essences, and the soul is the joining of these essences as a kind of form, and it is the remembering, understanding, and loving agent, and God is the thing remembered, understood, and loved. And thus all of the soul finds glory in God, so that all of God may infuse and instill in all of the soul the likeness of all its glory.

"Son," continued the hermit, "you who want to wonder and who are seeking wonders, you should try to understand how great is the glory of the soul in Paradise; and to help you do so, I will give the following example. In the essence of a fire that is burning wood, form and matter are more important than heat or light, for the form and matter are the essence of the fire, and the heat and light are mere qualities of the fire. This heat and light, however, exist throughout the fire, and in the essence of the fire the heat never ceases to heat nor the light to illuminate."

Felix was very pleased with the example the hermit had given him, for it enabled him to understand that the entire essence of the soul rejoices in God essentially, and therefore its entire essence experiences glory throughout for all its substance. Then he understood that the soul, through and by all its qualities, has glory with them rejoicing in the work God has in creatures; and thus, in consideration of greatness of glory, Felix was in wonder at the great glory a soul has in Paradise.

The hermit said, "Son, you should wonder at, and understand, the great glory the soul of a just man has in Paradise, for the memory remembers that the will has all the glory it wants to have; and the intellect understands that the will has the glory it wants to have, which glory it has through greatness of willing, understanding, and remembering, according to how much God's greatness instills its likeness in the will and the willing, in the memory and the remembering, and in the intellect and the understanding; and this according to the greatness of the likeness of goodness, and similarly for all the dignities of God."

Felix thought over for a long time what the hermit had said about the greatness of glory; and when he had understood what

the hermit had said, he wondered very much how the greatness of glory could be so great, and how a master in divinity, who was a bishop,[9] could prefer the glory of this world to that of the next.

118. OF THE GLORY A MAN'S BODY WILL HAVE IN PARADISE[10]

"Sir" said Felix "according to what I have heard, a person will neither eat, drink, smell, nor experience carnal pleasures in Paradise, and I therefore wonder how, without these things, the body can experience perfect glory."

"Son," replied the hermit, "in Paradise the bodies of saints will be glorified, and their glory, in this glorification, will be corporeal;[11] for just as iron in a furnace becomes incandescent and full of fire inside and outside, so the body, in the glory the soul will find through seeing the essence and the dignities and the divine persons, will be fully glorified, that is to say, that the body will have every fulfillment the will shall want in greatness of goodness, duration, power, and wisdom. And the same will follow with all the soul's likenesses to God.

"The intellect will understand greatness of corporeal glory, the memory will remember it and the will will want it, and the body's nature will obey whatever greatness the memory will be[12] able to remember, the intellect to understand, or the will to want. And since in Paradise the soul can remember, understand, and love much more than in this world, since it sees God in His essence, dignities, and persons, you can therefore understand, my son," said the hermit, "how great will be the glory experienced by the bodies of the blessed in Paradise."

Felix gave considerable thought to the hermit's words, and according to these words he understood that the glory of the body would be very great and wonderful; and because of the greatness

[9] This little clause is missing in A and hence in Galmés's text.

[10] Cf. *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Question 35, *MOG* IV, 76–7 = Int. iii, 60–1, and the same section of the *Gentile* mentioned in n. 6 above.

[11] "And their glory . . . corporeal" is missing in A B, and hence in the printed texts.

[12] A B, followed by the printed texts, have, "will not be able"; L has the *no* crossed out; in its place, V S have the partitive *ne* (literally "of it"), which must surely be what the original had, and what some early copyist mistook for a negative.

he realized pertained to the glory of the body, he said:[13] "In this world a person wants to eat, drink, dress and experience pleasures because the body has needs that one wants to gratify. But if the body were as perfect in virtues as the will could want, the intellect could understand and the memory could remember, and if this perfection could reach the body by the influence with which God infuses His likeness in the soul that is in Paradise, then nobody would want to eat, drink, dress, or experience any temporal pleasures."

According to what the hermit had said, Felix understood that if the soul wants the body to move through the air, then it will do so; and if it wants that movement to be so great that in a moment it goes from the western to the eastern horizon, then it will do so; and nothing will be able to prevent it if the will wants it, for if something could, the will would not be perfect. He said the same of the radiance of the body, of its immortality, and of the great feeling of glory it would experience, and so on for other things. Thus, when Felix had said these things, he thought about what he had said, and he was in wonder at the great glory the body could experience forever in Paradise.

The hermit said that in Paradise the soul sees all of God, as you have already heard, and through this vision, a likeness of vision will be instilled in the body, giving corporeal vision, by which one will physically see Jesus Christ and our Lady Saint Mary, along with all the men and women who will be in Paradise; and one will see them all shining and radiant, more so than the sun, in fact incomparably more so.

The hermit continued saying that through this vision which the soul will have of God, hearing will also be instilled in the body, so that the body will hear Jesus Christ speaking, as well as our Lady and the saints in glory. This hearing will be a great part of the body's glory according to the greatness of the instilling the soul will instill into the body through the vision of God's essence.

[13] Galmés in his variants, disturbed by having Felix and not the hermit deliver the following speech, suggested corrections that are too numerous to be plausible. Indeed, the need to have the hermit deliver the following speech would seem to be reinforced by the "According to what the hermit had said . . . " of the paragraph after that. But if one imagines this last sentence as referring to the hermit's previous words, and the paragraph in between as being Felix's elaboration of what he took the hermit's words to mean, then the problem may turn out to be more apparent than real.

Now, this being the case, who can possibly conceive the greatness of the glory a person will experience in his body as a result of his power of hearing?

"Son," said the hermit, "to the degree that a person takes pleasure in this world in seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, to this degree he takes pleasure in his senses; and you can therefore imagine how great and wonderful will be the glory the body will feel through seeing and hearing in Paradise; for according as the vision the soul has in Paradise will be great, and according as the vision and the hearing the body will experience from seeing and hearing Christ and the saints will be great, so will the glory of the body be great in its senses."

Felix gave considerable thought to what the hermit said, and he understood that just as the soul and the body join to make one man, so the glory of the soul is joined to that of the body. And as a result, Felix understood how great was the glory of the body, which greatness[14] made him wonder for a long time; and finally he said: "Ah, Lord God, You who are the perfection of all perfections! What a great wonder it is that people of this world can so love the vainglory of this world, and so little love and desire the glory of the next world, when the glory of this world is so small a thing, and that of the next one so great!

"Sir," said Felix, "in man's body there are some elements contrary to others, such as fire and water, which are contrary though heat and cold, and air and earth through moisture and dryness; and as a result I wonder how it is that in Paradise the body can have perfect glory."

"Son," replied the hermit, "there was once a man who harbored very ill feeling towards his wife, and she towards him; but they had a son they loved very much, and because of the great love each bore the son, they came to an agreement and made peace with one another."

Felix understood the hermit, and said that since in Paradise the body did what the will wanted, what the intellect understood, and what the memory remembered of it, it followed that the elements should be in accord with one another and in no way contrary to one another; and this concordance is the fulfillment and ultimate

[14] "Glory" in MSS A and B, and the printed sources.

purpose for which the elements are in constant movement in this world, begetting and corrupting.

When Felix had understood this, he understood how great would be the body's glory in Paradise; for if in this world the body has the ability to feel so many pleasures even though the elements in it are contrary to one another, and the body is unable to follow or fulfill what the will wants in the way of pleasures, how much greater will be the glory of the body in glory, when the elements are no longer opposed to one another, nor the body in any way opposed to anything the will wants!

"Sir," said Felix, "if the glory the body will experience in Paradise is so great, I wonder why the body naturally tries to avoid dying."

"Son," replied the hermit, "in this world the body has its being in its human essence, as long as this is alive in the soul, and when it dies, it loses that being, and it remains deprived of this being until it is resuscitated; and since deprivation of such a noble being is something to be avoided, therefore the body naturally tries to avoid dying; but if it were resuscitated immediately upon dying, the situation would be different."

HERE BEGINS THE TENTH BOOK, WHICH TREATS OF HELL,[1]

119. AND FIRST OF ALL OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEVILS[2]

"Sir" said Felix "I wonder greatly how it is that devils, who have no body, can be tormented by material fire."

"Son," replied the hermit, "you have heard how in Paradise the body, although it has weight, will follow the will, as a result of which it will be in Heaven, and able to move through the air, and nothing will hinder or destroy it. Now, by what you have heard about the body and about the will of those saints who will be in glory, you can see that the nature of devils will follow divine justice by being punished if the divine will chooses to torment them with fire. But over and above this torment of fire, there will be another incomparably worse. And if you want to wonder at so great a torment, listen to the following words:

"Devils, insofar as they are creatures, have qualities that are similar to the properties of God, or in other words, a devil has goodness as well as greatness, duration, power, knowledge, and will; for God created him with these qualities so that the devil might take pleasure in God's properties, that is to say, goodness, greatness, etc. But since the devil's actions are contrary to each of these qualities, he therefore has the greatest punishment that can exist, just as the goodness of the devil, which is good when created, is converted into evil by the evil use the devil makes of it.

[1] Llull discusses Hell in some of the same passages cited in n. 1 to the previous Bk. IX, such as the *Book of Contemplation*, ch. 159, and the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 730–9. See also *Doctrina pueril*, ch. 99.

[2] For more on devils, see the *Book of Contemplation*, chs. 73, 152. For the subject of this chapter, see *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Questions, 38–9, *MOG* IV, 80–2 = Int. iii, 64–6. The preceding noun, *pena*, like the original Latin *poena* and the rest of its romance derivatives, can mean either "punishment" or "suffering," and in connection with this particular chapter, its English derivative, "pain," once meant specifically "the punishment or sufferings of hell" (cf. *OED*, s.v., 2, b).

"There was once a good man with a son who greatly resembled him, and because of this resemblance, the father loved him very much. One day it came to pass that the son dishonored his father, striking him while the father was punishing him for a foolish thing he had done. The good man was very angry at the villainous thing his son had done to him, and in fact it would have been impossible for him to be as angry with anybody else as he was with his son."

Felix understood that by these words the hermit was explaining that the punishment of devils is very great and wonderful, or in other words, that the goodness and actions of a devil should by nature accord with a common goal, that is to say, towards God's goodness and the good works God's goodness has in itself in the Father begetting the Son and breathing forth the Holy Ghost. But since the devil's goodness is converted, through his actions, into wickedness contrary to God's goodness and actions, therefore this conversion and contrariety are the grounds for the devil enduring the greatest punishment that could possibly exist; and this punishment is multiplied through all the other qualities present in the devil.

After saying[3] this, Felix thought for a long time about the punishment of devils, wondering how it could be so great; for it is so great, that just as the intellect does not suffice for understanding the great glory angels experience in Paradise, so it does not suffice for understanding the great suffering devils must undergo in Hell.

"Son," said the hermit, "the essence of the devil lies in three things: recollection, intelligence and volition; and all of his essence was created so that he could delight in God. But the devil, by reason of his wickedness and injustice, converts himself with his entire essence to being contrary to God; and therefore his entire essence is converted into suffering, for just as it would have been converted into glory if he had served God, so, since he does disservice to God, it is converted into suffering."

Upon hearing these words, Felix understood how very great would have been devils' glory if they had not lost what they had, and he wondered how anything could have made them lose such great glory.

[3] Of all the medieval sources, only the later correcting hand in A (followed by all the printed texts) has the more expected "understanding."

The hermit said that in the beginning when God created all the angels, the angels who are now devils wanted to be like God, that is to say, that each wanted to be good by himself, great by himself, and so on for all their qualities; and each wanted to have his end and fulfillment in himself. And since each wanted to be like God, it was only just that each be punished, and lose the glory for which he was created.

"Son," said the hermit, "devils suffer in knowing God and His works, and in knowing themselves and their own works. The same is true with their knowing all creatures and their works; and this is because the devil's intellect, and his will and memory, are contrary to one another in greatness; or in other words, the more the devil understands and remembers, the more his will hates what the intellect understands it should not hate, and loves what the intellect understands it should not love. And this is why this contrariety is so great that it could not be greater, for the memory remembers and the intellect understands that it will be thus for ever and ever. This is why, son, the devil's suffering is immeasurable."

The hermit said that there was greater concordance between the form of fire and its matter than between the form of fire and the matter of air. Now if this were changed so that there existed contrariety between the form and matter of fire, then this contrariety would be greater than that between fire and water; and this would be because the form and matter of fire are closer to constituting a single substance[4] than water and fire, or than the form of fire and the matter of air.

From what the hermit said about form and matter, Felix understood how great was the punishment of devils; for they have greater contrariety between memory, intellect, and will than would exist between the form and matter of fire; and this is because devils are much more in accord with simplicity than the form and matter of fire.

Felix wondered greatly at the great suffering devils undergo both substantially and accidentally, and he said that he wondered how devils could last through such great suffering, since suffering corrupts and destroys being.

[4] The crucial words *una substància* are missing in A and hence in Galmés's text. The point, of course, is that the devil suffers so much because he has contrariety *within* himself.

"Son," said the hermit, "the suffering of devils is so great that they could not bear it, whatever their nature; but God's justice, which follows God's power and will, sustains them so they can undergo this punishment."

"Sir," said Felix, "if devils undergo greater suffering the more they remember, understand, and want, I wonder why it is that they so want to remember, to understand, or to love or hate so much, or why they want to do people harm, when it will only increase their punishment."

"Son, the devil has been completely converted to contrary works through the wrong he did when he fell from Heaven, that is to say, when he became a devil; and this is why he does what he should not do, and does not want to do what he should do, like a woman of easy virtue, who, the more her husband beats her, the more foolish things she does, or like the miser who, the richer he grows, the more avaricious he becomes."

120. THE PUNISHMENT SOULS UNDERGO IN HELL[5]

THE HERMIT said to Felix that souls in Hell are punished substantially and accidentally, and that the substantial punishment is much worse than the accidental punishment.

"Substantial punishment is when the soul is punished in its very essence, that is, in that of which it is composed, that is to say, recollection, intelligence, and volition. Recollection suffers in remembering whatever it remembers, and it suffers in being remembered, understood, and unloved. The same happens with the intellect, which suffers in everything it understands, as well as in being understood, remembered, and unloved. The same follows with volition or the will, which suffers in everything it wants and that is wanted, and when it dislikes and is disliked, as well as when it is remembered and understood.

"Son," said the hermit, "if you want to wonder, then wonder at the great punishment the soul undergoes; for its punishment is as great as the soul itself in its very being. For all of this being is

[5] Cf. *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Question 34, *MOG* IV, 74–6 = Int. iii, 58–60.

being punished, since the more it understands, the more it is punished; and the same is true of the memory and the will. And with all three, each is against the other, each is against itself and each suffers from the others' suffering; for the memory, remembering itself, makes the intellect and the will suffer along with itself; for the memory suffers by the suffering of the intellect and the will, and the same is true of the intellect and the will."

So that Felix would better understand the great suffering the soul will undergo in Hell, the hermit recounted the following example: "Simple fire enters into composition in a compound body, and entering into composition, it causes air, water, and earth to enter into composition in that body; and the other elements do likewise. In this composition, however, there is both concordance and contrariety, whereas in the soul there will be no concordance whatsoever between memory, intellect, and will, but rather contrariety in all their working."

Felix was in great wonder at the suffering the soul undergoes in Hell, for according to what the hermit had said, he understood that the will wants the memory to remember and the intellect to understand that it has something it desires and the will dislikes.[6] For the memory remembers and the intellect understands that it will never have what it desires, but instead will forever have what it dislikes, and will forever dislike what it will have forever, and it will forever love what it will never have; and this is why the will dislikes the memory's remembering and the intellect's understanding. And for this reason the will has immeasurable suffering, equal to the great suffering of the memory and the intellect.

"Son," said the hermit, "the intellective soul suffers through the sensitive and vegetative, since in everything the sensitive feels and the vegetative vegetates, with the intellective in a state of sin,[7] the intellective will suffer; for in it is the form and mover of the sensitive and vegetative. And this is why you, son, who go seeking wonders, can wonder at such a great wonder, that is to say, at the great suffering the soul undergoes in Hell.

[6] Llull is obviously comparing what the soul would like to have with (in the next sentence) what it will never have, but the specific wording of the text as we have it here (there are no important variants) is mysterious indeed.

[7] The preceding part of this sentence is truncated in A and hence in Galmés's text.

"The intellect will always understand that God is good, just, and perfect in every way, yet it will understand God in such a way as if He were not good, had no justice, or was imperfect, and from this understanding will come suffering so great that one cannot envisage or imagine it. And an equal and similar suffering will be in the memory and in the will."

Felix was in wonder at a suffering as great as that described by the hermit, and the hermit added that there was another sort of suffering the soul would undergo, one he then described. He said that after the Day of Judgment, the soul will recover the body, and this will involve suffering, for in this union of soul and body which will constitute a man, physical suffering will be joined to spiritual suffering, by which union the suffering of the soul will be increased, as well as that of the body, in that the soul will suffer as a result of the physical suffering, and the body will suffer as a result of the spiritual suffering.

"There was once a husband and wife who loved each other very much, and they had a son they loved very much. This son was sick and was near death, and in fact already paralyzed. The son's suffering at his approaching death made the father and the mother suffer; and since the husband loved his wife, he suffered because of his wife's suffering, and similarly his suffering made her suffer; and the husband therefore suffered for himself, for his son, and for his wife, and the same was true of his wife."

This speech made it clear to Felix that in Hell the soul will suffer in itself as well as in the body, and it will suffer in everything it will love in itself and in everything it will love in the body; and similarly the soul will suffer in everything it will dislike in itself and in everything it will dislike in the body. Now, this being the case, who could possibly imagine the great suffering the soul will undergo in Hell?

"Consider, son, how much the soul will suffer in Hell when it realizes that for the short time the body lives in this world, and for the little bit of pleasure it has here, it has lost celestial glory, which is so great and everlasting, and that it will remain in Hell, where there is such suffering forever and ever.

"There was once a king with a very great kingdom. The emperor, however, because of a lie the king had told him, took his kingdom away from him and put him in prison, where he lan-

guished until he died. Every time the king thought and remembered how for so small a motive he had lost his kingdom and was imprisoned, he was in wonder at how, for such a small thing, he could have lost so much good, and received so much evil."

The hermit continued: "You should look and wonder, son, at the great suffering the soul will experience in Hell from the thought of the glory it has lost; for the soul will remember that if it had been saved, all God's will would have loved it, and all of God's good would have done it good, and all of God's glory would have glorified it; and all of God's greatness would have magnified it. But since it is damned, it has lost all these things; and now, on the contrary, all of God's will hates it, and all His goodness condemns it to suffering punishment, and all of God's greatness magnifies the punishment the soul suffers."

Great was Felix's wonder at the punishment the soul suffers, and he said it was a great wonder that any man should be inclined to sin, if the soul, for this sin, will be so severely punished. While Felix was thus wondering, the hermit told him about an old archdeacon who, through simony, managed to get himself chosen bishop. After a month, and while still in the sin of simony, he died.

Felix wept upon hearing these words, and he wondered how the people of this world could so little love the glory of Paradise and so little fear the punishments of Hell.

121. THE PUNISHMENT A MAN'S BODY WILL UNDERGO IN HELL[8]

THE HERMIT said that one day a certain king was thinking about the great power he had in this world; and he imagined this power in the following way, namely, that all the power of each of his subjects was joined and brought together generally, and then specifically inclined to be subject to the king's personal power. The hermit gave Felix this example so it would make him wonder at the great suffering a person's body will undergo in Hell.

[8] Cf. *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*, Question 36, *MOG* IV, 78–9 = Int. iii, 62–3.

In accordance with this example of the hermit's, and in accordance with what Felix remembered of the glory a person's body will have in Paradise, Felix understood the great suffering a person's body will undergo in Hell. And in accordance with what he understood about this suffering, he said:

"Just as the power of the king and his subjects is combined to form a single power which is at the service of God, so in Hell the suffering of the rational soul, the suffering of the sensitive power, and that of the vegetative power are combined to constitute a single, increased suffering in man, which suffering will involve all of the rational, sensitive, and vegetative powers, as well as the imaginative power; and the greatness of this suffering will be a cause of wonder."

After saying these words, by which he had explained the hermit's example, Felix said that he wondered very much at any king who used his power for the vainglory of this world, diverting it from the service of God; as a result of which diversion he would receive the great punishment discussed and explained above.

"Son," said the hermit, "in the goblet with watered wine the parts of wine are all mixed with those of water, in such a way that each of these parts is in the others, so that all together they form a single body which has only the color of wine."

Felix had been with the hermit such a long time and learned so much from him that he immediately understood the examples the hermit gave, and was able to explain them, and in this case he explained the example as follows:[9] "In the human body all four elements are present one in the other, and together they form a single body; and this is why all the heat of fire is both in the fire itself and in all the other elements, as well as in their qualities. Or in other words, heat is in the form and in the matter of each element, and it is in the moisture of the air, in the cold of the water and in the dryness of the earth. And the same is true of the other elements and their qualities. This is why in Hell heat will torment the body throughout all its forms and matters, and in all its qualities; and the moisture of the air will do likewise, as will the cold of the water and the dryness of earth. And all these pun-

[9] "Them, and . . . the example" is missing in A B, and hence in Galmés's text. Note that one reason Felix might now understand better, is that this particular example was already used in Bk. IV, at the end of ch. 21.

ishments will be a single punishment in diversity, in unity, and in contrariety, with no concordance."

Great was Felix's wonder at the magnitude of the punishment the body would suffer in Hell, and he said that great would be the punishment suffered by Mohammed, who has been the cause of so many people's going to Hell; for in the suffering of each of them, his own would be multiplied.

After being in wonder for a long time over Mohammed's great punishment, Felix then wondered at Christians for worrying so little about converting unbelievers, and he was of the opinion that as a result of how little they worried about this, they would suffer from the suffering of unbelievers in Hell.

While thinking about the above, Felix remembered Saint Benedict, Saint Augustine, Saint Bernard, Saint Francis, Saint Dominic, and many other saints who, by the grace of God, provided the occasion for so many people's being saved and avoiding Hell; and as a result, he wondered why there weren't many more men to take up new projects that would prove forever useful and by which their glory would be increased.

"Son," said the hermit, "in a certain city there was a hospice that was going to ruin through the bad administration of its rector.[10] This hospice was under the control of the bishop, who scarcely gave it a thought, and who was more afraid of the punishment the body underwent in this world than of the punishment it would suffer in Hell."

In connection with this example, Felix said that if the bishop was sent to Hell, he would be punished for all the bad results of his actions and for all the good that was no longer done in that hospice. And he was therefore in wonder at the bishop's negligence in repairing the hospice. And he said[11] that a certain priest was once lying in his bed, which was very handsome and had fine, soft sheets. While he was lying in his bed, fire broke out in his house. He hastily got out of bed and quickly went to put out the fire. When he had put out the fire, he went back to sleep in his bed. Just as he was about to fall asleep, a messenger came asking

[10] Identical example in Bk. VIII, ch. 72, the passage corresponding to n. 115.

[11] Galmés, followed by Batllori in *OE* (see n. 54 there), assume it must be the hermit talking again. But in view of Felix's new-found ability to understand and explain the hermit's examples, this assumption seems unnecessary.

him to go confess and administer the sacrements to a parishioner of his who was at death's door. Because of the priest's laziness in going quickly to the sick person, and because he went back to sleep for a little while after receiving the message, it came to pass that when he got there, the sick man had already passed from this life without confessing and without having received the sacraments. The priest was accused of the wrong he had committed, and the bishop was in wonder at the great wrong he had done, and he punished the priest accordingly. The priest, however, said to the bishop that he wondered why he, the bishop, did not punish himself for what he had done wrong with the hospice, which beneath his administration was going to ruin."

Felix asked the hermit how the body in Hell could withstand so great a punishment as that which it receives from fire, from the other elements, and through the five bodily senses.

"Son," replied the hermit, "the body is so weak that in this world it takes only a little hunger, thirst, anger, or fever to torment it; even the itch mite,[12] which is such a tiny thing, can torment it. Because of its weakness, therefore, the body would not be able to endlessly suffer the punishment of Hell, which is the worst a person can imagine or conceive, and which lasts longest; but since God's justice is great, eternal, and strong, it makes man's body endure forever in Hell, so that the body can be punished for all time."

The hermit said that a certain priest had in his parish a very beautiful woman. This priest had a great love of chastity, yet he felt the temptation of lust every time he saw that woman or she came to church and confessed to him. Because of the great temptation he felt, he imagined the torments of Hell to try and get rid of this temptation, and imagined how the bodies of men will be all white like pillars of fire, and how they will forever be piled one on top of the other, in heaps higher than Mount Canigó;[13] and how they will all be in sulphur, boiling water, and flames of fire; for all the elements will join to torment the bodies in Hell, which is in the middle of the earth. In this and in many other ways the priest imagined Hell's torments (which are in fact many, as is

[12] *Briant* in the original; the acarid that causes itch or scabies.

[13] The mountain on the border between Roussillon and Catalonia, spelled *Canigou* in French. This passage is quoted in Peers, p. 213.

recounted in the book *Doctrina pueril*),[14] yet his imaginings did not completely do away with his temptation. The priest wondered very much how he could be tempted by lust, when he imagined and feared such great infernal punishments. One day the woman happened to confess to the priest, and told him that she had sinned against chastity with a man. At that moment the priest was strongly tempted, and right away he imagined how in Hell some men are swimming in burning, molten gold and silver like fish in the sea. But the priest could not overcome his temptation, until it occurred to him that since he could not overcome it through fear he would see if he could overcome it through love; and then he began to love God and His works with all his might, and then finally he was freed from the temptation which had so long had him in its grips.

Felix wondered why the priest had overcome his temptation through love when he had not overcome it through fear, and he said that in this world there are more who avoid doing evil out of fear than out of love.

"Son" said the hermit, "every person who is in a good moral state must be so because God instills His grace in him, and God does not instill it in any man who fears Him more than he loves Him, for love is a better thing than fear; and those men who in this world stop doing bad things more out of fear than love, have neither love nor fear in the order and perfection they should have according to divine ordinance."[15]

The hermit continued: "There was once a usurer who was mortally ill. He was very thirsty and asked his doctor to give him a goblet of water. The doctor, however, out of fear of his fever's rising, did not want to give him water. While he was asking for this water there was a monk present to whom he had confessed without wanting to make amends for the wrongs he had committed. The monk asked the sick man if he would give everything he possessed to whoever would give him a drink, rather than always suffering the thirst he felt, and the sick man said yes, he would. The monk then said: 'You, who know you will suffer everlasting thirst in the fires of Hell if you don't make amends for

[14] Ch. 99.
[15] "Love nor fear . . . according to" is missing in A, and hence in Galmés's text.

your wrongs, why don't you make amends to the people you have wronged, if in this world you would give everything you possess to satisfy this thirst you have?' The sick man, however, did not give in to the monk's words, and died in sin; and everybody was in wonder at the words they had heard—those the monk had spoken, and the way the sick man had scorned them."

"Sir," said Felix, "I wonder how it is that the fires of Hell can last forever, since they must consume the thing that is actually burning and as a result find themselves in a state of privation."

"Son," replied the hermit, "Hell is in the center of the earth, which is hollow, and in this cavity there are so many elements enclosed, that with the bodies of those sent there, the entire cavity will be filled and its openings blocked up in such a way that none of those elements will be able to escape in the form of vapor or in any other way. In that place, all the fire will burn all the other elements, which will not be able to be consumed, for each will be as active in the fire as the fire in them; and therefore no element will be able to be converted into another or consumed; and altogether they will form a single burning, moistening, cooling, and drying body. And thus they themselves will be instilled into the human bodies by admixture, that is to say, that the substantial parts of the bodies will be mixed with the qualities of the bodies in such a way that there will be suffering without the consumption of substances and qualities, and without any temperance or concordance to alleviate it; instead all their substantial and accidental equality will exist in diversity and contrariety, so that God's greatness may instill in them greatness of punishment and justice, and similarly for His eternity; for such instilling befits God's greatness and eternity."

THE END OF THE BOOK[1]

IN THE MANNER that has been recounted, the hermit taught Felix how to wonder and gave him many examples by which he might possess acquired knowledge;[2] for by these examples the soul is uplifted to remember, understand, and will. Now when Felix was well indoctrinated, he took leave of the hermit in very friendly fashion, and set out on his way.

All that day Felix walked through a great forest seeking some chance event at which he could wonder. While walking in this way he came to a very large abbey, where he was very kindly received by the abbot and all the monks. The abbot asked Felix about his situation and Felix told him how his father had given him the task of going throughout the world seeking wonders, and then recounting these wonders in the courts of princes and prelates, in towns, castles, cities, wastelands, monasteries, and all the other places where people live.[3] "Of these wonders, sir abbot," Felix said, "I have seen many, and if it pleases you, I will stay in this monastery of yours as long as it takes me to recount them to you and the monks, for they could be most useful to this monastery in matters of science and devotion, contrition and atonement."

The abbot and all the monks were very pleased with Felix's offer. Every day he would recount examples and wonders to the abbot and the monks; and the abbot delighted in his recounting, as did the monks, for they were very pleasant words to hear, and contained a large amount of wisdom and doctrine, and from them one could learn a great deal about the condition of this world and the next.

The abbot and all the monks very much wanted Felix to become a monk in that monastery; but Felix declined the offer, saying that he felt obliged to go throughout the world recounting the wonders

[1] The medieval French version of this Epilogue is printed in Gret Schib, *La traduction française du "Libre de meravelles" de Ramon Llull* (Schaffhausen, Switzerland, 1969), pp. 100–2.

[2] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 64.

[3] Note the similarity between Felix's duties, now that he has "acquired" his knowledge, and those of a *joculator Dei* (cf. Bk. VIII, nn. 86, 101, 153), as well as between them and the duties imposed by Blaquerna on the jongleur in the Epilogue of *that* work.

he had seen and heard, for thus he had promised his father. The abbot and all the monks begged Felix to adopt their habit, and in this habit of theirs to go throughout the world recounting the *Book of Wonders*.

Felix gave in to their prayers and was made a monk and charged with the task of going throughout the world at the expense of that monastery to recount the *Book of Wonders* to one and all, and to add to the book as he added to his stock of wonders during his wanderings.

When all these things had been arranged, and Felix was ready to leave the monastery, he fell sick. And for a long time he was ill in the monastery, until he finally died of the illness.

While Felix was on his deathbed, he said: "Ah, glorious Lord God! If it were not that You are just and that I am unworthy of living a long time in Your service, I would wonder why You do not prolong my life, giving me time to accomplish my purpose and to carry out my promise, going throughout the world wondering at people who neither know nor love You and wondering why those who do serve and love You do not serve, know, and love You more. Lord God, since I am unable to carry out this task, may it please You to confer this task upon somebody worthier than I, and to let him carry out what I, through lack of merit and the shortening of my life, am unable to accomplish."

Felix died, and he was much lamented by the abbot and all the monks; and he was buried in front of the altar, amid great solemnity.

THE SECOND FELIX

When Felix had been very honorably buried and the abbot had preached a sermon recounting Felix's life, one of the monks, who was a holy man and of upright life, and who had retained Felix's wish in his heart, as well as having retained in his memory and intellect the examples and wonders that Felix had recounted, wondered why people, on the day they die, worry about the honor they want done them when they are buried.

The monk realized that this was a wonder that Felix had not recounted in his book, and he said that it would be a good thing to add it to the book. He then begged the abbot to grant him a

favor; and kneeling down before him and all the monks, with tears in his eyes and with great devotion, he asked to be given Felix's task, and to be allowed to go throughout the world as Felix had been allowed to do. The abbot and all the monks agreed to the monk's request, and they gave him the name of Second Felix.

The abbot gave him his blessing, and Felix went throughout the world recounting the *Book of Wonders* and adding to it, according to the wonders he encountered.[4] And the abbot and all the monks decided that in that monastery there should always be a monk with this task, and that he would be called Felix.[5]

Here ends the *Book of Wonders*, to the glory and praise of God.[6]

[4] Notice that what Llull wants to have propagated is not a finished work of art—a novel called *Felix*—but rather a collection to be added to by the minstrel of God as he encounters more wonders in his travels. In other words, it is a work that is intentionally open-ended, one to be continually remodeled and reshaped through use.

[5] Riquer, *Història* I, 302, suggests that this closing passage could explain the protagonist's name, as deriving from the mythological Phoenix, which arises from its own ashes. The Catalan form *Fènix* would then have been Christianized to *Fèlix*, "blessed."

[6] As is often the case, this explicit varies from one MS to the next. In some cases it is more a scribe's note about having finished the job of copying (MS L even gives a name, Joan Tholrra, and a year, 1386) than the author's note upon finishing the work.

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE

Introduction

To situate Llull's medical works—and his scientific works in general—in the context of both the science of his day and his own system is not easy. Traditionally, historians of science have examined these works and found them not only wanting but unpleasantly mixed with metaphysics and even theology.[1] Llull himself seems to cloud the picture by giving, for example, an apparently mathematical work like the *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli* the subtitle of *De principiis theologiae*. But to understand what Llull was attempting, one must understand some of the intellectual atmosphere of his time, as well as his own special outlook.

In the thirteenth century there was no clear demarcation between philosophy and the theoretical side of medicine. Within the Islamic world, from which the Latin Middle Ages absorbed so much of its philosophical thought and almost all of its medicine, the interconnection between the two disciplines was so close that any lists of the principle medieval Islamic philosophers would be nearly identical to lists of the chief figures in medieval Islamic medicine. Such lists would include al-Kindi (d. 873), Rhazes (al-Razi; ca. 865–923/32), al-Farabi (870?–950), Avicenna (980–1037), al-Ghazzali (1058–1111), and Averroes (1126–98), to which one could add the Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135-1204), who wrote many of his works in Arabic.[2] This juncture of philosophy and medicine was an Islamic inheritance from Greek science as represented principally by Aristotle (with his many works on natural history) and Galen (who wrote more philosophical works than is generally known, and whom the Arabs translated almost as avidly as they did Aristotle). Avicenna said that "medicine as a

[1] I am thinking particularly of J. E. Hofmann, *Ramon Lulls Kreisquadratur*, Cusanus-Studien 7 (Heidelberg, 1942), and J. M. Millás Vallicrosa, *El libro de la "Nova geometria" de Ramon Lull* (Barcelona, 1953). Both contain partial editions, the first of the *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli* and the second of the *Liber de geometria nova*, editions that omit all the "unscientific" parts. See Pring-Mill's criticism of the second of these two editions in *EL* 2 (1958), 341–2, as well as in his *Número*, p. 17.

[2] The only name perhaps less familiar to students of philosophy is Rhazes. But as the article on him in the 1971 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* says, "The philosophical writings of Rhazes were completely neglected for centuries; not until the 20th century did their importance come to be appreciated again." The Western thinker who most notably carried on this tradtion was Llull's contemporary, Roger Bacon. Cf. G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* I (Baltimore, 1927), 609f.

whole, as a result of its anthropological nature, takes on an essential importance for all the other sciences, even for metaphysics, which (last) precedes all the others, as a *philosophia prima*."[3]

Another reason for the blurring of the distinctions between disciplines lay in the fact that the Greek theory of the four elements, with their opposing pairs of qualities, hot-cold, dry-moist, was broad enough to act as a basis for all of what today would be put under the headings of biology and chemistry, as well as much of what would be put under the heading of physics. And the fact that it was precisely in the field of medicine that the elements and their qualities were most actively investigated and discussed contributed greatly to its privileged position.

Given such a situation, given Ramon Llull's dedication to converting the Muslims, and given his unspoken assumption that he would have to do so by addressing the more learned members of their society whom the rest would follow, what could be more natural than to use the basic science of medicine as a prime weapon in his apologetic arsenal? One could see clearly in the *Ars demonstrativa* how he bracketed his attack between arguments from the summit of theology and base of elemental theory.[4]

Another factor that must have contributed to this outlook was Llull's close and frequent contacts with Montpellier, which was the seat of the most famous medical school in thirteenth-century Europe.[5] As I have already pointed out,[6] Montpellier was, along with Palma and Perpignan, one of the capitals of the strangely and perilously disseminated Kingdom of Majorca. In his youthful travels in the courts of king and prince he must have visited it frequently, he might have studied in the Cistercian college there, and in later years—principally during the period of 1285–98 when his friend and patron, James II, had been evicted from the island part of his Kingdom of Majorca—he seems to have used it as his prin-

[3] Cf. H. Schipperges, "La medicina en el medioevo árabe," in Laín Entralgo's *Historia universal de la medicina* III (Barcelona, 1972), 67.

[4] An emphasis more or less constant throughout the quaternary phase of the Art, but which changed considerably in the later ternary phase, where elemental theory was relegated to a relatively lower rung in the hierarchy of arguments. For science as a basis for Llull's apologetics, see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 12 above, and Pereira, "Le opere," p. 21.

[5] Salerno *had* been the most famous, but by Llull's time it had declined in relative importance.

[6] See the "Life," text at n. 98, as well as the explanations on the back of the map near the beginning of Vol. I here.

cipal base of operations.[7] It was surely in Montpellier that Llull learned his medicine and came into contact with the classic authors he mentions in Distinction V, Chapter 14—Avicenna, Platearius, and Constantine the African.[8]

It was there too that he undoubtedly became acquainted with the principal problems of thirteenth-century medicine. First among these was to find some sort of theoretical basis according to which the vast number of disconnected traditional and empirical observations that constituted the specific properties of medicines and the symptoms of diseases might be ordered. Most writers agreed that this could be done only in terms of the classic theory of elements, qualities, humors, and degrees. Another problem was that of compound medicines, and the role played in them by the specific properties or qualities of the simples of which they were composed. At the root of these was the even more basic problem of how to express such things as qualities, humors, and degrees—and even properties and symptoms—in quantitative terms useful to a physician trying to measure out a medicine or gauge the seriousness of a sickness.[9]

These were the problems to which Llull, like other medical writers of his time, addressed himself. The solution that Llull offered, however, was unusual, and yet wholly consistent with his aims and with the system he had divised to further them. His idea was to mount, as it were, a two-pronged attack on the subject. The first side consisted in showing how the Art, being a system capable of providing a foundation for all fields of knowledge, was applicable to medicine; the other was to use the resultant medical theory as a paradigm for his analogical reasoning in philosophy and theology.

The first part of this program was carried out in Distinctions I-IX of the *Principles of Medicine*. Of the Art he uses the structures

[7] See the "Life," text at nn. 103–4. For an extended discussion of Montpellier in Llull's life, see A. Soria Flores in *ROL* III, 5–20.

[8] For the Montpellier school of medicine in relation with Llull, see J. Gayà, "El ambiente científico de Montpellier en los siglos XIII y XIV," *EL* 21 (1977), 59–67, as well as M. Pereira, "Le opere," pp. 26–8. For the curriculum there, see H. Schipperges, "La medicina en la edad media latina" in the same *Historia* of Laín Entralgo (cf. n. 3 above), p. 228.

[9] For the thirteenth-century background to Lullian medicine, see McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, the same author's *Villanova* (particularly valuable for its long introductory essay, pp. 1–136, on "The Development of Medieval Pharmaceutical Theory"), and Pereira, "Le opere."

implicit in the Elemental Figure (qualities, degrees, lightness, and heaviness, etc.), along with Figure T and, to a lesser extent, Figure X.[10] After presenting these components in Distinction I, he goes on to apply them to the problem of qualities and degrees in compound medicines. This he does in Distinctions II-IV, with one distinction devoted to each of the three triangles of Figure T.[11] He then applies the techniques thus acquired to the relationship of degrees with other medicinal problems (Distinction V); to generation and corruption in compounds, animals and minerals (Distinction VI); to fevers (Distinction VII); urine (Distinction VIII); and pulse (Distinction IX).

As should be clear, Llull's interest in medicine was not that of a practicing physician,[12] nor did he see his job as that of writing a new systematic herbal or medical manual. His intention was to provide a new theoretical framework—that of the Art—within which the various aspects of medical practice (pharmacology, diagnosis, etc.) could be worked out.[13] Or as he put it in his *Ars compendiosa medicinae*: "Science deals with universals, from which one can descend to particulars. And since the particulars causing sickness along with all the things which a doctor needs for inducing health are almost infinite, therefore this Art has been invented so that the doctor may know how, from universal principles, to find particulars artifically, and from the particulars rise to universals, constructing universals from said particulars."[14]

[10] Technically the figures referred to are those of the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, but they are substantially the same as those printed at the front of the *Ars demonstrativa* and described in Dist. I of that work.

[11] See Dist. I, n. 12 below, for the number of three as opposed to the usual five at this stage.

[12] Although it seems to be the scientific field in which Llull had the greatest technical knowledge; cf. Pereira, "Le opere," p. 8.

[13] Llull also hoped that this putting of medicine on a rational basis would help poor students by cutting down on the time needed for study; see the passage corresponding to Dist. I, n. 25 below.

[14] *Opera medica*, Int. ii, p. 2. How successful—or meaningful for contemporary medical practice—this theoretical paradigm was, is another matter. McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, pp. 70, 250, maintains that it was far too speculative to be relevant to contemporary medicine. On p. 72, however, after noting that "a trained physician . . . could never have carried unapplied theory so far," he adds, "Yet Lull's work is not entirely unrelated to late-thirteenth-century medicine. In his belief in the strictly regular interaction of certain basic properties in the formation of compound medicines, and in his ambition to describe that regularity numerically, Lull is perfectly characteristic of the new trend in pharmacological thought." Pereira, "Le opere," p. 20, says that "far from being fantastical speculations, Llull's various elaborations of the theory of degrees seem to fit perfectly on the level of the most advanced medico-philosophical discussion of his time."

The second part of Llull's program is carried out in the tenth and last distinction of the *Principles of Medicine*. Here he uses medical theory analogically, telling, for instance, how one such theory can "signify" another, how nonmedical things like the appearance of flowers in spring or the water boiling in a pot can "signify" medical things, or how a medical theory can "signify" the Incarnation, the Trinity, and so on.[15] To quote Llull himself: "From degree to degree, from example to example, and from one principle to another, I could go on at great length discussing metaphor with you," for "the greatest virtue of this Art . . . lies in its metaphorical nature."[16] The character of some of these "metaphors" might still cause surprise or amusement, but after Frances Yates's pioneering study of 1954, no one can doubt the importance or interest of this elemental exemplarism as a prime component of Llull's analogical methods in this stage of the Art.[17] The only surprise can perhaps still come from finding it treated *in extenso* in a work that the modern reader would have expected to be purely scientific.[18]

To understand more adequately the relationship between the general Art and the specific fields to which it applied and of which it made exemplarist use, as well as how this relationship works in the specific case of the *Principles of Medicine*, one must understand its connection with other works written in the same period. For it is part of a group of six works so closely interrelated as to form practically a single work. The foundation stone of this group is the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*,[19] on which Llull wrote a commentary called the *Ars universalis*,[20] followed by four works on individual fields; the *Principles of Medicine*, *Theology*, *Philosophy*, and *Law*.[21] These last four works correspond to the Figures of the

[15] For this doctrine of "signification," see *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 37.

[16] The end of Dist. I below.

[17] See "Llull's Thought," n. 63, for references on his elemental exemplarism.

[18] See n. 1 above for other examples of this technique and how uncomfortable it has made historians of science. For those two works, Johnston, *Semblance*, p. 248, has suggested the apt term of "symbolic geometry."

[19] To which Llull makes repeated references in the *Principles of Medicine*.

[20] This is the work he refers to in Dist. VI, ch. 19, as the *Great Commentary on the Brief Art of Finding Truth*.

[21] See the very end of the *Principles of Medicine*, where the other three works are mentioned. Note that Salzinger, who understood the unity of these six works, edited them together in Vol. 1 of the Mainz edition.

Elements, Theology, Philosophy, and Law in the later *Ars demonstrativa*,[22] which in fact constituted an attempt to amalgamate all the material of the six earlier works into a single unit.

These six earlier works are, of course, the principal works of the cycle of the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, of which Llull simultaneously developed two "branches." The first was dedicated to apologetics, in the *Book of the Gentile*, and the second investigated methods of proof for said task, in the *Libre de Demostracions*.[23] It was an enormously ambitious project, and one that was the direct fruit of the fervor generated by Llull's vision on Mount Randa. Since most scholars agree in dating that vision to 1274,[24] we can say that this group of works was written within the next several years, but there is no way of being more specific.

The *Principles of Medicine* was not the only work Llull wrote on the subject. Some five or ten years later, and within the cycle of the *Ars demonstrativa*, he wrote the *Ars compendiosa medicinae*. This work involves a somewhat different structuring of the elemental-artistic foundations, and these are in turn applied to a detailed answering of ten fairly general questions. In 1294, already within the ternary phase of the Art, he wrote the *Liber de levitate et ponderositate elementorum* "at the request of the doctors of the city of Naples," as he says in the Prologue.[25] In this work he undertakes a detailed quantification of the lightness and heaviness of the elements, using the Elemental Figure of the *Ars demonstrativa* as his basis, and then proceeds to answer thirty very miscellaneous questions. In 1303 he wrote the *Liber de regionibus sanitatis et infirmitatis*, which is more generally descriptive and astrological in nature, as well as the *De modo applicandi novam logicam ad scientiam juris et medicinae*.[26] To enumerate all the works in which Llull discusses medicine and related fields would be too long a task,[27] but mention must be made of two important works devoted exclusively to

[22] Cf. the introduction to the *Ars demonstrativa*, text at n. 6.

[23] For the relationship of the *Gentile* to these six works, see the Introduction to that work, text at n. 26. As for the *Book of Demonstrations*, Llull himself refers to it as "a branch of the *Art of Finding Truth*" (*ORL* XV, 3).

[24] See n. 86 to the "Life."

[25] *Opera medica*, Int. iv, p. 1. For an interesting analysis of the mechanism presented in this and in the previous work, see McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, Appendix B, pp. 245–50.

[26] For editions of these works, see "Manuscripts, Translations, and Editions" below.

[27] A good bibliography is in the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 18–19.

elemental theory and which do much to elucidate Llull's ideas on this subject: they are the *Liber chaos* and the *Liber exponens figuram elementalem Artis demonstrativae*.[28]

Among Llull's followers, the medical side of his doctrines aroused less interest than other aspects of his system. All the same, a century after Llull's death, Antoni Ricart, physician to the kings of Aragon from 1395 to his death in 1422, was conversant with Llull's medical theories.[29] In the latter part of the fifteenth century a Venetian doctor, Nicola Pol or Poli, collected and copied many Lullian works, including medical works.[30] At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Bernard de Lavinheta, who was so instrumental in the dissemination of the Lullian Art in Paris, included a section on Lullian medicine in his famous *Explanatio compendiosaque applicatio artis Raymundi Lulli*.[31] Paracelsus was a declared enemy of Lullian medicine, but Giordano Bruno, who himself wrote a *De medicina luliana*, accused him of having borrowed more from Llull than he admitted.[32] In the seventeenth century, that curious figure Jean d'Aubry—missionary, surgeon, expelled monk, and part charlatan, who ended his life as a secular cleric—spread the doctrine of Lullian medicine in a work that went through five editions

[28] Which are part of the cycle of the *Ars demonstrativa*; see the introduction to that work, n. 24. There is also the exposition of elemental theory in the *Ars demonstrativa* itself, Dist. II, part i, and in *Felix*, Bk. IV, as well as the interesting presentation in the *Liber de geometria nova* analyzed in Pring-Mill, *Número*, pp. 17–24. Other works which, as pointed out in Yates, "Art," pp. 167–8, should be studied in this connection are the *Tractatus novus de astronomia* and the *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli*.

[29] Cf. J.-M. Dureau-Lapeyssonnie, "L'oeuvre d'Antoine Ricart, médecin catalan du XVe siècle," in G. Beaujouan, Y. Poulle-Drieux, J.-M. Dureau-Lapeyssonnie, *Médecine humaine et vétérinaire à la fin du moyen âge* (Paris, 1966), pp. 171–364, quoted in Pereira, "Le opere," p. 20, n. 50, and in McVaugh, *Villanova*, pp. 123, n. 1, 128–30.

[30] For this personnage, see J. Rubió Balaguer, "Los códices lulianos de la biblioteca de Innichen (Tirol)," *Revista de Filología Española* 4 (1917), 303–40, and above all, M. H. Fisch, *Nicolaus Pol Doctor 1494* (New York, 1947). His library, which he seems to have begun forming in 1494, was bequeathed to the church of the village of San Candido (as Innichen is called nowadays) sometime in the beginning of the sixteenth century. MS VIII.b.14 (see Table 9 below) contains all Llull's medical works except the little *De modo applicandi*. According to Pereira, "Le opere," p. 20, MS VIII.c.14 contains a work or works of Antoni Ricart.

[31] Cf. "Llull's Influence," text at n. 46 above.

[32] For Paracelsus and Llull, see Walter Pagel, *Paracelsus* (Basel and New York, 1958), pp. 241–7, as well as Yates, "Art," pp. 130–1, and Ca II, 223–4. One must add, as Yates points out, that by the sixteenth century Llull as a medical writer had, in many circles, become embroiled with the pseudo-Llull who was an alchemist. For Giordano Bruno, see also Pereira, "Le opere," p. 7 and n. 8.

and was translated into as many languages.[33] In 1660 Lullian medicine was solemnly approved by the University and School of Medicine of Aix-en-Provence, when Louis XIII granted a privilege on its behalf.[34] In this and the next century, Lullian medicine was taught in Majorca, and in 1742 there was a noisy dispute on the subject, one of the participants in which (for the defense) was Andrés Oliver, who in 1752 edited the *Opera medica*.[35]

Manuscripts, Translations, and Editions

Of the medical works of Llull enumerated above, those that seem to have been best known among his followers were the *Principles of Medicine* and the *Ars compendiosa medicinae*, both of which are preserved in seventeen manuscripts. For a list of these manuscripts in connection with the former work, see Table 9.

The *Principles of Medicine* and the brief *De modo applicandi novam logicam ad scientiam juris et medicinae* are the only ones among these medical works extant in a Catalan version. All except the *De modo applicandi* have appeared in print: the *Principles of Medicine* in *MOG* (reprinted in *Quattuor*), and the other three in *Opera medica*.[36]

For this edition I have consulted the four manuscripts represented by letter symbols on Table 9. The translation was done from the Catalan text of D, which seems to offer the best text.[37] I compared it with A, which is very close to it, but not quite so reliable.[38] Whenever these sources offered difficulties or discrep-

[33] The work's inflated title was *Le triomphe de l'archée et la merveille du monde ou la médecine universelle et véritable pour toutes sortes de maladies*, first published in Paris, 1660 (cf. RD 240–1). Salzinger in his article on Aubry (*MOG* I, 204 = Int. iv, 44) claims that one of the translations was into English, but I have not been able to find any other reference to it. For Aubry in general, see Ca II, 293–4. Here, as might be expected with such a personnage, pseudo-Lullian medicine played a considerable role.

[34] See the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 19.

[35] See Pereira, "Le opere," p. 6, n. 6, and Ca II, 376–7.

[36] That is the *Ars compendiosa medicinae*, *Liber de regionibus sanitatis et infirmitatis*, and *Liber de levitate et ponderositate elementorum*. The fourth work in this volume is a treatise on the physical and symbolic properties of light entitled *Liber de lumine*. Until it was recently reprinted, this little anthology was so rare outside Majorca that, as pointed out in Yates, "Art," p. 167, there was no copy in the British Library, the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, or the Vatican Library.

[37] Jordi Gayà has very kindly lent me photographs of this MS, which he is using in preparing his edition for the Catalan works.

[38] Through the kindness of the Franciscan monks of Palma, and especially of their librarian, Father Amengual, I have been able to use Galmés's transcription of this MS (cf. L. Pérez Martínez in *EL* 5, 1961, p. 189, no. 1102).

TABLE 9. MANUSCRIPTS AND PRINTED EDITIONS OF THE *PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE*

Century	*Catalan*	*Latin*
14th	D = Dhún Mhuire, B 95	Fermo, Bibl. Comm., 19
14th–15th		Vatican, Ottob. lat., 1250 (frag.)
15th		Dhún Mhuire, B 100 (first ½ of work, minus Dist. I)
	A = Milan, Ambros. I 117 sup.	Dhún Mhuire, B 84 (second ½ of work)
		P = Palma, Bibl. Publ. 1029 (lacks the beginning; see Dist. I, n. 26 below)
		Milan, Ambros. N 101 sup
		San Candido, VIII. b.14
		G = St. Gallen, Vad. 393
		Oxford, Bodl. 465 (frag.)
		Oxford, Bodl. Digby 85
		Oxford, Corpus Christi College 247
17th		Rome, San Patricio, I 108
		Munich, CLM 10593
18th		Palma, Archivo Diocesano, Causa Pia 3
		Cremona, Bibl. Publ. 99
		M = *MOG* I, Int. xii, 1721 (reprinted in *Quattuor*)

NOTE: The portions of Dhún Mhuire B 100 and B 84 containing the *Principles of Medicine* follow one another perfectly (with the break coming in the *middle* of Dist. V, ch. 13) and may thus have originally constituted parts of a single MS. For descriptions of these Irish MSS, see J. N. Hillgarth in *EL* 10 (1966), 73-9. No manuscripts or editions of *The Principles of Medicine* were produced in the sixteenth century.

ancies, I compared them with the Latin versions of P, G, and *MOG*.[39] This last seems in this case at least, to be the least reliable of the sources, full of amplifications, "corrections," and minor alterations.[40]

[39] For G, the photographs I have used are unfortunately so blurred as to be unintelligible in many places.

[40] A comparison with the other Latin MSS, and especially the one in Munich, would reveal how many of these changes were due to Salzinger and how many to the source (or sources) he consulted.

Since my translation is therefore based on a text as yet unedited, I will point out whenever it differs in any substantial way from the only printed text available, that of *MOG*. Matters of detail will be treated in the Catalan text presently being prepared by Jordi Gayà.

GOD, YOU WHO ARE the supreme virtue from which all other virtues receive their origin and perfection, with Your grace and help, and with the intent of honoring and serving You, here begins the *Art of the Principles and Degrees of Medicine*, by which the human understanding, following the method of the *Brief Art of Finding Truth*,[1] is raised up to understanding the secrets of medicine and nature.

PROLOGUE

SINCE each art has its principles, we therefore begin this book with[2] the principles of medicine, by means of which we will also acquire knowledge of other principles. This book is divided into ten distinctions: the first concerns the disposition of the entire book; the second concerns the red triangle; the third the green triangle; the fourth the yellow triangle;[3] the fifth deals with the investigation of degrees; the sixth deals with generation and corruption; the seventh with fevers; the eighth with urines; the ninth with pulses; the tenth with metaphor.

[1] The *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*; see the similar reference in the Prologue to the *Ars demonstrativa*.

[2] Thus (*en*) in the Catalan texts. The Latin sources have "of," making a phrase one could, as did M, take as a title: "this *Book of the Principles of Medicine*."

[3] The three principal triangles of Figure T—cf. Dist. I, n. 12 below.

THE FIRST DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE ART

Chapter 1. THE DISPOSITION OF THE TREE

IT IS ONLY natural for the intellect to understand better by means of a visual and auditory demonstration than by one that is purely auditory.[1] Therefore, at the beginning of this book, we have set out a tree in such a way that its flowers exhibit to the human intellect the truth of what we are investigating, which tree is called the Tree of the Principles of Medicine.

The root of the tree is a wheel composed of letters representing the four humors, and it is therefore divided into four parts: the first is that of choler, the second of blood, the third of phlegm, and the fourth of melancholy.[2] In each quadrangle is shown the operation of that particular humor, of the fever rising from it, of the greater access of said fever, and of other things contained in the conditions of the tree.

Thus, in order to set up and formulate the demonstration suitable to this Art, we suppose:

A to be heat,
B dryness,
C moisture,
D cold,[3]

[1] By "auditory" Llull is referring to the written text, which in the Middle Ages was still so often intended to be read aloud rather than silently. For this role of the figures, see "Llull's Thought," text to n. 53.

[2] See *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 28, for the four humors.

[3] Notice how the four first letters of the alphabet refer to the qualities and not to the elements, which are scarcely mentioned in the Prologue. McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, p. 40, remarks that "The natural tendency for physicians from the twelfth century on is to pass over the elements for the primary qualities, despite the danger of seeming to attribute substantial reality to what are actually merely accidental forms of the elements." In this



PLATE XIX. The Tree of the Principles of Medicine.
Adapted from Palma, Bibl. Publ. MS 1029, fol. 23^{v}.

TABLE 10. THE CHART OF DEGREES FOR THE *PRINCIPLES OF MEDICINE*

	Heat *A*	*Dryness* *B*	*Moisture* *C*	*Cold* *D*
E	4	3	2	1
F	3	2	1	. . .
G	2	1	. . .	. .
H	1	. . .	. .	.
K	2	4	1	3
L	1	3	. . .	2
M	. . .	2	. .	1
N	. .	1	.	. . .
O	3	1	4	2
P	2	. . .	3	1
Q	1	. .	2	. . .
R	. . .	.	1	. .
S	1	2	3	4
T	. . .	1	2	3
V	. .	. . .	1	2
Y	.	. .	. . .	1

NOTE: For the similarity between this array and the Elemental Figure of the *Ars demonstrativa*, see Dist. I, nn. 10–11, below. For the dots or fractional degrees, see Dist. V, n. 3.

which letters we use to make up the quadrangles of the wheel,[4] according as the humors are mixed, and according as they are active and passive with relation to one another, all of which is demonstrated to you in the root of the above-mentioned tree.

From this root two branches arise.

The first branch deals with the principles of medicine as recounted by the ancients who preceded us, which branch is divided into three parts, the first of which is of natural things, the second nonnatural, and the third of things contrary to nature.[5] The natural one is divided into seven flowers, which are: elements, complexions, humors, members, virtues, operations, spirit. And on the same branch there are four additional flowers, which are: age, color, difference between masculine and feminine, and form. The nonnatural one has six flowers, which are: air, exercise and rest, eating and drinking, waking and sleeping, filling and emptying, and accidents of the soul such as joy and sadness. The third part has three flowers: disease, cause, and accident.[6]

The second branch, which is newly invented for the purpose of explaining the first artificially and metaphorically,[7] is divided into two parts. The first part is divided into A B C D; the second is divided into the three triangles, which are among the principles of the *Brief Art of Finding Truth* and one square of the Figure of Predestination also contained in said Art.[8]

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respect the *Principles of Medicine* is different from Llull's other medical and astronomical works, where the same letters stand respectively for air, fire, earth, and water (cf. Yates, "Art," p. 120, and McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, p. 245), which does not even correspond to the order of the qualities here.

[4] By "quadrangles" Llull is here referring to the quadrants of the circle, each of which when extracted (as in the beginning of Dist. VII below) forms a rectangle with its corresponding eight letters.

[5] Llull also mentions these three categories in the *Principles of Philosophy* (*MOG* I, 714 = Int. x, 48). This division, which first appeared in the ninth century in Johannitius' *Isagoge*, composed as an introduction to Galen's *Ars parva*, became the foundation for medical education in the West since the time of Constantine the African; cf. McVaugh, *Villanova*, p. 115.

[6] The Latin sources have, "disease, the cause of disease, and the accident of disease," which is surely what is meant by the briefer Catalan text.

[7] I.e., by means of the Art and analogy. For a commentary on this passage, see Pereira, "Le opere," p. 13.

[8] For more details on these figures, see the end of this chapter. In the Mainz edition there follow two sentences of superflous explanation, which are in none of the medieval sources consulted.

A is divided into four degrees represented by the Arabic numeral 4, 3, 2, 1,[9] and the same is true of B C D. Thus to illustrate said degrees, we must choose sixteen characteristic herbs, so that each may be a representative of other herbs having that same complexion. Each of these sixteen herbs must be given its own prescribed letter, so as to facilitate and abbreviate demonstrations. We will not, however, use the letter I because of its resemblance to the first Arabic numeral, nor X, which could be confused with the Roman numeral X.

The denomination of the various herbs and letters is as follows:

Let us suppose and say that E is a species of simple medicine, and that it has A in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st.

F is another species, which has A in the 3rd degree, B in the 2nd, and C in the 1st.

G is another species, which has A in the 2nd degree and B in the 1st.

H is another species, which has A in the 1st degree.

K is another species, which has B in the 4th degree, D in the 3rd, A in the 2nd, and C in the 1st.

L is another species, which has B in the 3rd degree, D in the 2nd, and A in the 1st.

M is another species, which has B in the 2nd degree and D in the 1st.

N is another species, which has B in the 1st degree.

O is another species, which has C in the 4th degree, A in the 3rd, D in the 2nd, and B in the 1st.

P is another species, which has C in the 3rd degree, A in the 2nd, and D in the 1st.

Q is another species, which has C in the 2nd degree, and A in the 1st.

R is another species, which has C in the 1st degree.

S is another species, which has D in the 4th degree, C in the 3rd, B in the 2nd, and A in the 1st.

T is another species, which has D in the 3rd degree, C in the 2nd, and B in the 1st.

[9] Llull consistently reserves Arabic numerals for degrees, using Roman numerals for all other quantifications in this work.

V is another species, which has D in the 2nd and C in the 1st.
Y is another species, which has D in the 1st degree.[10]

These letters form the basis of the Art, and whoever does not know them cannot understand the Art.

Each letter should be a flower on the tree, and each letter and its degrees should have its own color, so that the letters and degrees accord in the setting up of a demonstration. We therefore assign red to A E F G H, as well as to the degrees indicating heat. We assign black to B K L M N, as well as to the degrees indicating dryness. We assign blue to C O P Q R, as well as to the degrees indicating moisture. We assign green to D S T V Y, as well as to the degrees indicating cold.[11]

The red triangle has three flowers, which are "beginning," "middle," and "end."

The green triangle has three other flowers, which are "difference," "concordance," and "contrariety."

The yellow triangle is divided into another three flowers, which are "majority," "equality," and "minority."[12]

The square is divided into four flowers, which are "being," "privation," "perfection," "defect";[13] "being" is written in red, "perfection" in blue, "privation" in black, and "defect" in green.

Whoever wants to understand or know this Art should learn the above alphabet, and should transfer the flowers of the tree onto other movable and inscribed flowers so that he can, for purposes of demonstration, mix, give form to, equalize, increase, or diminish one with the other.

[10] For the similarity between this array of characteristic herbs and the Elemental Figure of the Art, one has only to read the almost identical description of the latter in the *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* III, 348 = Int. vi, 58. See also the following note.

[11] These colors are symbolically and functionally identical with those of the Elemental Figure (cf. *Ars universalis*, *MOG* I, 488 = Int. viii, 6, as well as the passage of the *Compendium* cited in the previous note). E-H, K-N, O-R, and S-Y correspond to the top lines of each of the individual figures of the Elemental Figure.

[12] These are respectively the third, second, and fourth triangles of Figure T of the quaternary phase of the Art. The first and fifth triangles are omitted presumably as irrelevant to medical theory, an omission that was to become general in the later ternary phase of the Art (cf. *Ars brevis*, Part II, n. 7).

[13] These four concepts constitute one of the principal subsets of Figure X; in addition to the description of the figure in the *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, see also Dist. II, n. 70, of that work, as well as the *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 9.

Chapter 2. THE CONDITIONS OF THE TREE

THERE ARE six conditions to this tree. The first is that if E has A in the 4th degree, then it must have B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st degree, and this is in accordance with the course of nature.[14] For fire is hot in itself and dry from earth, air is moist in itself and hot from fire, water is cold in itself and moist from air, and earth is dry in itself and cold from water.[15] Now this being the case, and since in every elemented body one complexion is greater and dominant over the others,[16] therefore anyone who tried to deny the above condition would be denying natural principles, as a result of which denial he would not be worthy of affirming the principles of medicine. Thus by the example given in A E of the natural principles in relation to the degrees, you can understand how the degrees work with the other complexions and with the other letters.[17]

The second condition concerns the intelligible and insensible degrees,[18] like H where the degree of B C D is not sensible until H is combined with F, by which combination the 3rd degree of F is converted into the 4th, and the 1st of H into the 2nd.

The third condition concerns the square, which has two conditions. The first is that being and perfection accord with majority, while privation and defect accord with minority. The second is

[14] There follows in the Mainz edition a sentence about each element having a quality from itself and another from another element, which is merely a generalization of the following sentence and is in none of the medieval sources consulted.

[15] Cf. the square of elements on Table 5.

[16] In the Mainz edition there follows another clause about the intention of each element, which although possibly by Llull (it is quoted by Pereira, "Le opere," pp. 18–19, n. 44), is in none of the medieval sources consulted.

[17] What Llull means here is that, according to the example at the beginning of the paragraph, the reader can understand that a substance having x degrees of a given quality will have the one immediately preceding it (counterclockwise to it on the circle of elements) in x-1 degrees, the one immediately following it (clockwise to it), in x-2 degrees, and the one opposite it (i.e., its contrary) in x-3 degrees. It should be remarked that this sentence is greatly expanded in the Mainz edition.

[18] The previously discussed four degrees were the standard "sensual" measurement of a quality, in that when it was in the fourth degree it presented a maximum of that quality to the senses, and when in the first the minimum. Thus any measurement of intensity below one sensual degree must necessarily be in terms of "intelligible and insensible degrees," which can be understood by the mind but not perceived by the senses.

that being and lesser imperfection accord with one another, as do privation and greater imperfection.

The fourth condition is that the degrees and the triangles follow the square, and that all of them together follow the disposition of the root of the tree, to which disposition the first branch and its flowers must be subject.

The fifth condition is that every one of the ten distinctions of this book be guided by the disposition of the tree and by the above conditions.

The sixth condition is that you be acquainted with first and second intention,[19] so that you may understand how each element has its first intention towards itself and the second towards another. This first intention has to do with final cause, whereas the second has to do with matter and other similar things. As an example, one can take A in E, whose first intention is to destroy D, and therefore, through its second intention, it gives itself to C, so that D, in receiving C, will receive A, which mortifies the subject of D. And the same is true of the other elements. So if you understand that, you will understand how the 4th degree exists by first intention, and the 3rd by second, while the 3rd exists by first intention with respect to the 2nd, and the 2nd exists by first intention with respect to the 1st.

Chapter 3. THE REASON WHY THE DEGREES AND TRIANGLES ARE IN THIS ART

SINCE THE INTENTION of medicine is to preserve health and destroy sickness, and since herbs and medicines possess degrees according to the disposition of the triangles, therefore the doctor must know how to mix herbs so as to increase, diminish, and equalize[20] the degrees one with the other, and he must also know how to initiate and recognize the beginning, middle, and end of the degrees, as well as how to differentiate, accord, and oppose

[19] For Llull's use of the concepts of first and second intention, see *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 244, and the references there.

[20] This is, of course, a reference to the "majority," "minority," and "equality" of the yellow triangle of Figure T (see above); the rest of the sentence refers to the other two triangles.

degrees in such a way that the artificial and natural work are in accord towards the preservation of health and the destruction of sickness.

Just as hammer and tongs are instruments of the blacksmith's art, so the degrees and triangles are instruments in the art of medicine.[21] Moreover, just as the sick person's body is the subject of the art of medicine, so the degrees of A B C D are the subjects and matter of the Art of the triangles, which triangles artificially impel the degrees towards their final cause, in the same way that nature[22] naturally impels forms from power into act towards their final cause. It is therefore important in this Art to use the triangles for investigating the degrees in medicines, so as to remove doubt and the contradictions of previous authors, and it is also important to make the degrees obedient to the triangles.[23]

Chapter 4. THE REASON WHY THE SQUARE, THE ROOTS OF THE TREE, AND GENERATION AND CORRUPTION ARE IN THIS ART

THE INTENTION of the doctor is to strengthen being with perfection. Since privation and defect are contrary to his intention, and since being and perfection accord with generation, while privation and defect accord with corruption, therefore the square is included in this Art—so that the degrees and triangles can be tempered[24] in it, according to the disposition of the root of the tree.

The root of the tree is made up of A B C D, to show how in a sickness the humors are mixed according to their action and

[21] Note the similarity between this sentence and that corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 23.

[22] Thus in the medieval sources consulted; the Mainz edition, however, has "matter" instead of "nature." See Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 50 and n. 190, for the various versions of this passage.

[23] The "and conversely" tacked onto the end of this sentence in M seems to be an addition of the editors. The "authors" earlier in the sentence is thus, *actors*, in the Catalan sources; G has "doctors" and M has "actions."

[24] Thus, *temprar*, in A and G (although the photograph of the latter is very fuzzy here); D has *temptar*, which in this case would mean "tested, investigated," similar to the "investigated and discovered" of M.

passion. Indeed they function in one way in the humoral mixture which has an excess of choler, in another in the mixture with an excess of blood, in another in the mixture of phlegm and another in the mixture of melancholy. Thus in the quadrangles of the root, with the help of the square and the degrees, you can understand how the humors are mixed, as well as on what day the access of the disease will be strongest, what is the intention of the humors, in what way a particular nature and the disease are contrary to one another, and how the humors give way to corruption or rise up to generation.

Chapter 5. THE REASON WHY IN THIS ART WE DEAL WITH FEVER, URINE, PULSE, AND METAPHOR

SINCE FEVER is the most universal of sicknesses, and since this Art is brief so that in a brief amount of time we can solve the difficulties of poor students who on account of their poverty have difficulty in continuing their studies of medicine,[25] and since universal principles constitute demonstrations of, as well as the principles behind, particular principles, we therefore, in general, will deal only with fevers, and avoid other sicknesses, so as not to make this Art too long and so that the reader can, by means of this Art, descend from the universal to the particular and from one set of principles to another.

Since it is through accidents that one can recognize the occasion[26] of a sickness, and it is through the occasion that the doctor can recognize the sickness itself, we will therefore deal with urines, pulse, and metaphor;[27] and in accordance with said accidents and occasions one must shift the triangles and degrees so as to irradicate the disease by the differing virtues[28] and operations

[25] The problem, it would seem, is not new. See Pereira, "Le opere," p. 15 and n. 31, for comments on this passage.

[26] See *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 40, for the word "occasion." The previous sentence is where the Palma MS (P), which is lacking the first folio or folios, actually begins.

[27] P M have "metaphor, pulse, and urine, which are the signs and accidents declaring the cause of the disease."

[28] For this word, meaning "efficacy," "strength," or "*virtual* power," see *Gentile*, Bk. II, n. 5 (where it also appears in conjunction with "operation"). It was a standard technical term of medieval medicine, and will appear again and again in this work. See Dist. III, n. 13 below for an even more specific use of the word.

of herbs and medicines contrary to the occasion for the disease. Thus, just as urine, pulse, and metaphor constitute the accidents by which that occasion is made manifest, so the triangles, degrees, and virtues of herbs constitute the accidents by which the occasion for health is made manifest, if one follows the dispositions of the degrees and triangles, and if one observes the conditions of the tree.

In this Art we deal with metaphor as a method for uplifting the intellect in this as well as in other arts, for metaphor gives the intellect the power to understand, since at one and the same time it turns on several different species.[29] And the reason why, in this Art, the first branch is understood metaphorically by means of the second, is so that students of medicine and of the other arts, by means of this second branch, may retain in their memory and intellect what they have heard and learned from medical authors concerning the first branch.

Since metaphor is what binds together the operation of the three powers of the soul when they are directed towards a single end in remembering, understanding, and willing, and this as a result of the great power the intellect takes on when a person saying[30] one thing understands another, therefore we have put metaphor in this Art, so that, in accordance with what is said about degrees and triangles and in the other distinctions, the reader can understand other things that have to do with the sciences of theology, law, and nature, as well as with the other sciences by which the intellect is uplifted to understand.[31] And so that you may have a better idea of what we mean, we will give you an example from the science of medicine.

You see a magnet attract iron, but do you know why it does so? Because in a magnet earth is closer to its simplicity than in

[29] Salzinger made much of this passage, quoting it in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 342–3 = Int. vi, 90–1, and using it to buttress his alchemical arguments in his *Perspicilia Lulliana philosophica*, *MOG* I, 269, 300 = Int. v, 57, 88 (as he did with many passages concerning the "metaphorical" side of the *Principles of Medicine*). That it *is* important, however, is clear; see n. 31 below, as well as the introduction, text at nn. 16–18 above, for further discussion of this topic.

[30] Thus in all medieval sources consulted and not "hearing" as in M.

[31] This important passage has been commented on by Frances Yates in "Art," p. 130, as well as by Pring-Mill in: *Quattuor*, p. xxvi; "Trinitarian," p. 237; *Número*, pp. 38, 46; and "Analogical," p. 318. P and M have *philosophia naturalis* for the "[science of] nature" of the other sources.

any other species, and iron contains more earth than any other element, and this is why the earth in the iron is impelled towards its simple nature in the magnet.[32] Now this has been explained to you so that you may uplift your understanding metaphorically to understand how scammony,[33] which is composed of A B, purges choler. For the choler existing in your body in excessive quantity is impelled towards the scammony which you have drunk, and the scammony is impelled towards the choler. And this is done to find the simple point that we will discuss in the Fifth and Sixth Distinctions. And since the choler is separated from the vegetative power and the scammony has not entered into composition with your body's vegetative power, therefore nature cannot withstand the simplicity of the two simple points that are reunited in A B, and together it purges both the choler and scammony. Now if by means of iron and the magnet you can understand this simile, then you know how to lift up your understanding by means of metaphor.

Turpeth[34] purges its contrary, but do you know why? Because the A B of the turpeth attract the A B that are in composition with phlegm, and therefore the phlegm decomposes and dissolves, drawing nearer to its own simplicity as it drives A B from itself. But since nature abhors the dissolution of tempered humors, it therefore does not want to sustain in itself the discordance of dissolved humors, and it expels the phlegm, retaining what it can of A B to strengthen that which D C were destroying before you drank the turpeth.

Now as a result of what you understand in medicine, you can, by the use of metaphor, understand that in theology virtue accords with the midpoint between two extremes, and vice with the extremes.

The larger a number and the more it is composed of different factors, the harder it is for you to comprehend. Now this metaphor shows you that, in the science of medicine, the greater the mixture

[32] For other references to magnetism, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 30.

[33] This word refers to the eastern Mediterranean plant *Convolvulus scammonia*, as well as the strong purgative obtained from its tuberous roots.

[34] Turpeth (or turbith) similarly refers to a plant and to the purgative obtained from its root. In this case the plant is *Ipomoea* (or *Operculina*) *turpethum* of tropical Asia and Australia, of the same family (*convolvulaceae*) as the previous species.

of simple medicines in a drink you make, the less[35] the assurance with which you can work. Now this medicinal metaphor denotes another in the science of law, for the more different laws and cases you want to make accord towards a single end, the more difficult it is to attain that end. Now this metaphor from the science of law denotes another from natural science, that is, that the more A B C D are diversified in different species in revealing the colors they have engendered, the more they conceal and deny the existence of color in the simple elements.

From degree to degree, from example to example, and from one principle to another, I could go on at great length discussing metaphor with you, but we will reserve this for the distinction on that subject. The greatest virtue of this Art, however, lies in its metaphorical nature, and this is due to the fact that the elements and the universal sciences conceal and reveal their secrets and their operations to the intellect in very subtle ways. Because of this obscurity, the intellect must be uplifted to understand metaphorically so that these secrets be revealed to it, and so that a person, through this uplifted understanding, may know how to pose and solve questions.[36]

[35] Instead of the *minus* of the other sources, M has *magis* ("more, greater").
[36] See introduction, text at n. 16 above.

HERE BEGINS THE SECOND DISTINCTION[1]

Chapter 6. BEGINNING AND E

A IN E, is the origin of B C,[2] in the way of operation, by receiving from B and giving to C; and B C, in E, are the origin of D in the way of operation and support: operation insofar as C gives itself to D and B receives from D; support insofar as B C help it against A. And since A accords with majority in E, in that it is present in the 4th degree, it therefore must be the origin of B, which is in the 3rd degree, and of C which is in the 2nd, whereas it cannot be the origin of D, which is its contrary, of which D, however, B C are the origin. And if D, in E, were the origin of B, then a greater thing would be taking its origin from a lesser, in the greater, that is to say A, which is contrary to the lesser, that is to say D; and this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the tree.

E F

When one mixes E and F, then the 4th degree of E is the origin of the 3rd of F, the 3rd of E of the 2nd of F, the 2nd of E of the 1st of F, and the 1st of E is, intellectually, the origin of some part of D in F. Since, however, the D of F is not enough to constitute a degree, therefore, sensually speaking, it has nothing from which it can take its origin. But if you want to make the intellectual into a sensual origin, join H onto E F, so that F H can be made equal to E, an E in which D has a sensual origin.[3]

[1] M adds, "concerning the Mixture of Degrees according to the Red Triangle"; G adds, "and First we will Discuss the Red Triangle, which is made up of Beginning, Middle, and End." Llull now devotes one chapter to each of the three angles of this triangle of Figure T. The concepts of this triangle must not be confused with the standard medieval *subdivisions* of a degree into "beginning," "middle," and "end" (see McVaugh, *Villanova*, pp. 95, 233, and *The Mediaeval Theory*, p. 20), which Llull, as far as I know, never uses.

[2] In P and M this opening is preceded by a short introductory paragraph that adds little and might well be the work of a copyist or translator. *Començament* (Lat. *principium*) is here used in a causal sense (cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 19), which is why I have translated it as "origin" (ibid., n. 16). For an explanation of how this causal mechanism works, see Dist. VI, ch. 17 below on "Generation and Corruption."

[3] For sensual and intellectual degrees, see Dist. I, n. 18 above.

E G

In a mixture of E G, the A of E is the origin of the A B of G,[4] while the C of A cannot be the sensual origin of the C of G unless you add F or H to it. And if you add F H to E G, then, in accordance with the conditions of the square, the A of E must be the origin of the A of F G H, since the greater virtue should be the origin of the lesser.

E H

With H joined to E, the A of E is the origin of the A of H, which A of H is so small in quantity that it cannot be the origin of another degree, without entering into composition with another herb of the same quality.[5]

E K

In a mixture of E K, the 4th degree of E is the origin of the 2nd of K, the 4th of K of the 3rd of E, the 2nd of E of the 1st of K, and the 3rd of K of the 1st of E, all of which must be the case according to the conditions of the tree. And this is because each degree, insofar as it is greater, converts the degree similar to it in quality or humor to the species in which it is greater, and by means of this property, each of the complexions and qualities is converted into the other.

E L

In the same way the question of origin was explained for E K, you can understand its existing between E L, E M, and E N. And since the above rule is sufficient, being as it is the origin of knowledge of other origins, and since we have composed and exemplified this Art as briefly as possible, we therefore do not want to deal any further with the question of origin between E K[6] in this chapter.

[4] Thus in D P M; A G, however, have "of the A of G," which seems to make more sense, especially in view of the following clause.

[5] M has, "with another herb or medicine of the same quality and complexion," of which P omits the "herb or" and "quality and."

[6] Thus in the medieval sources; M, however, has "E L."

E O

With O united and mixed with E, the result is that the 4th degree of E is the origin of the 3rd of O, the 4th of O of the 2nd of E, the 3rd of E of the 1st of O, and the 2nd of O of the 1st of E, and hence each origin converts to itself the quality of its cause, which is why they put their virtues and operations together, one in another, as is fitting, and, in corrupting one species, they engender another in which they are once again in accord.

It is the nature, rule, disposition, and condition of this brief Art that one principle should be the origin of many other principles,[7] and therefore the example of origin we have given under E O can be applied as a demonstration of the origin befitting E P Q R in accordance with the art of origins explained above.

E S

In the union of E S, the 4th degree of E is the origin of the 1st of S, the 4th of S of the 1st of E, the 3rd of E of the 2nd of S and the 3rd of S of the 2nd of E. Now since A D are contraries, therefore the origin of E in S and that of S in E are contraries. As a result of this contrariety, the origin of B C A in S and that of B C D in E are contraries, since each origin that is in the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degree is in better accord with a species in the 4th degree. And since all these origins are contrary to one another according to first and second intention, there is a greater contrariety of origins in the union of E S than in any other natural origin, and this is why a subject composed of such origins is less durable than another.

In accordance with the above, you can also have knowledge about the union of E T V Y by applying to them what we have said about the union of E S. And by the examples we have given of the origin of E in K O S, you can understand about the origin of K in O S and of O in S,[8] and conversely, for all these origins follow the art and rule of those discussed above.

[7] *Que un comensament sia comensament a moltz altres comensamens* in the Catalan MSS (*quod unum principium sit principium ad multa alia principia* in G); cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, nn. 19, 37.

[8] Thus in A G; D P M have *P*'s for all the *S*'s in this sentence, which seems unlikely in view of the fact that there is no separate discussion of E P in this chapter.

We have discussed the question of origin in the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degrees, and by what we have said you will know how to deal with the question of origin in all the triangles, in the square, and in the flowers of the second tree, following, of course, the conditions of said tree.

Chapter 7. MIDDLE AND E

ACCORDING to the course of nature in E, the simple matter of fire and the simple matter of earth constitute the means with respect to the proportion of A B in E,[9] and therefore when fiery matter is mixed with earthy matter, the fire becomes hot and dry in quality. In this quality neither C D nor their matter constitute a means, since A D are contraries, as are C B, and if C D were intermediaries in the joining of A B it would follow that a thing would be the cause and origin of its own contrary, which is impossible, against the course of nature and contrary to the conditions of the square and the triangles.

That which constitutes the proportion and means for the union of A C in E is the fiery and airy matter that are in accord because of the accord of A C. As a result of this the quality of C becomes moist and hot, and what is contrary to these means are the proportion and means existing between B D.

The means by which there exists proportion between C D in E is the simple airy and watery matter that are mixed thanks to the concordance of C D, as a result of which D takes on a cold and moist complexion, to which complexion the concordance of A B is contrary.

The intermediaries of D B in E are the watery and earthy matter of D B that are mixed thanks to the concordance of D B, as a result of which B takes on a dry and cold complexion.

As a result of the means we discovered above, we have revealed the secret of primordial matter, which is a power that must be subject to the above-mentioned means. This primordial matter is compoundly subject to the means that are reunited in it and which

[9] Llull also refers to this concept of simple matter constituting the intermediary or means (both of which terms, of course, correspond to the "middle" of the chapter heading) in the formation of complexions in the passage corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 12.

differ by their qualities, that is, by their means and complexions that are concordant and contrary; and all this goes to make up E, in which the above-mentioned means and qualities are combined.

Primordial matter is a power with reference to the matter of A, B, C, and D, and it is diverse insofar as it is general and universal while the subjects of A B C D are particular and special. Moreover they constitute universal and general particulars with reference to individuals of the natural species conserved in their engenderable and corruptible individuals, all of which shows you how the four elements are the intermediaries between primordial matter and the individuals of the species.

E F

When E F are mixed together in some decoction or electuary,[10] the matter subject to the A of E and the matter subject to the A of F unite and mix before the other means, and this is because 4, 3 are greater in quantity in that decoction than 2, 1, and because the form of A B takes precedence and has greater matter in E F than the form of C D. This is why, beneath the greater form, the lesser form is passive and its quality is united to the greater form, which is closer to the agent and to the final cause than the lesser form, while the lesser form is closer to nonbeing[11] and defect than the greater form.

In accordance with the above principle, you can acquire knowledge about intermediaries in the origins of E G H. Furthermore, by the knowledge you have gained of the intermediaries in the species of A you can get to know the natural operation for which the medicinal operation is an instrument, on the condition that you know how to follow the conditions of the tree.

E K

When one makes a decoction of E K, the matter subject to the 4 of E and 2 of K constitutes the means and subject, since, in E K, A B accord with greater; and the same happens with the matter subject to the 4th degree of K and the 3rd of E, which is why A

[10] See *Felix*, Bk. V, n. 12, for a definition of an electuary.
[11] A synonym for the "privation" of Figure X; see the references in Dist. I, n. 13 above.

B enter more readily into composition in E K than do A C, C, D or D B. And beneath the form of A B lie the forms mentioned above, that is to say, of A C, C D, and D B.

This example we have given you of intermediaries in E K can be used to exemplify the intermediaries of E L M N, and by the intermediaries you now know between A B you can know about a disease and its cure, or incurability, following the conditions of the tree. For if you work against the conditions of the tree, the entire Art will be contrary to you, as a result of which you will be contrary to the art of medicine and to nature, whose offspring is medicine.

E O

In the red triangle there are three species of "middle,"[12] as is explained in the *Art of Finding Truth*; in this Art, however, we will mostly take "middle" as being the conjunction between two different things. Thus, just as we have given an example of how prime matter is the intermediary with respect to the qualities that are in accord when an herb is judged to be of two qualities, so the concordance of the qualities is the intermediary by which matters different from one another in simplicity unite to form a single compound matter through the concordance of their qualities. This you can understand in E O P Q R in a manner similar to the way you understand it in E F G H K.[13]

E S

If you unite and mix E S, the degrees that are contrary in 4 are kept equal in contrariety, and the 3 of E accords with the 2 of S, the 3 of S with the 2 of E, the 4 of E with the 1 of S, and the 4 of S with the 1 of E. And the same follows for the contrariety existing between the B of E and the C of S,[14] which is why an intermediary is created, one that accords better with temperament and with being in the middle between two contrary extremes and

[12] M adds, "that is to say of conjunction, mensuration, and extremities"; cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 20.

[13] Thus in P M; D omits the "H," and A G omit the "K."

[14] "The B D E and the C D S" of M is a mistake doubtless due to having read a đ as a letter of the Lullian alphabet rather than as the usual scribal abbreviation for *de* ("of").

between two that are concordant than is the case for A B, D B, A C, or C D,[15] and the same happens with K O. Therefore this species of middle is similar to temperament and to a point equidistant from two extremes, as well as to virtue, which is midway between two vices. This being the case, therefore, and following the conditions of the tree, you can arrive at an understanding of "middle" in the above-mentioned species; you can also preserve health in that species, as well as destroy sickness, if you know how to transform the above-mentioned middle from power to act.[16]

If you mix E T, E V, or E Y, then A will better constitute a middle between one extreme and another than when it is the middle between one extreme and the other in the mixture of E S. The reason for this is that A will have greater fieriness and greater B than when S is mixed with E; and the same is true for the mixture of K O. Now this kind of "middle" is the third species[17] contained in the *Art of Finding Truth*, the one that accords with linearity and with the continuation of fever or other disease. You can therefore increase or decrease this kind of middle if you know how to join and separate the flowers of the tree in accordance with the conditions.

Just as this kind of middle that occupies the entire space enclosed between one extreme and another accords with the decoction and the disease, thus the virtue and the substance of the decoction are in accord when they pass over into the disease and to the place where the sickness is located, in the same way that the air occupying the space between the eyes and the object is lit up so that the eyes can see the object. Thus if you know this Art well, you will be able, in accordance with the proportions of the flowers of the tree, to prescribe the "middle" so well that the virtue and the matter of the decoction will be able to pass to the places where

[15] Llull has perhaps not expressed himself very clearly here. The intermediaries in question are A D (with contrasting 4s and 1s in E and S) and B C (with contrasting 3s and 2s in E and S), either of which is preferable to the other four mentioned. The same two would also act as intermediaries for the following K O.

[16] For *potència* in the sense of "power, potentiality," see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 76; for its specific interpretation in connection with the role played by the constituents in a medicinal compound, see McVaugh, *Villanova*, pp. 23, 64.

[17] Cf. n. 12 above. The beginning of the next paragraph will confirm the fact that Llull is referring to the middle between extremes.

the sickness is greatest, and this is explained to you during the course of this book.

Chapter 8. END AND E

As is explained in the *Art of Finding Truth*, there are three species of end: one has to do with final cause, another with termination, and another with privation.[18] In this particular Art, we will deal mainly with final cause, which is why we say that the 4th degree is present in E in accordance with final cause, while the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st are present in E in accordance with matter. And by comparing the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degrees we can see that the B in E has to do with form, while C D have to do with matter, all of which is in accordance with some degrees being greater and nobler than others in a given species.

The fact that in E fire contributes more towards final cause than the other elements reveals to the human understanding the natural agent, that is to say, the "simple point" we will discuss in the Fifth and Sixth Distinctions, and which, in E, impels the form from power into act through generation, and from act into privation through corruption.[19] Now this natural agent is fire, with a natural appetite for its simple matter and simple form to have a simple conjunction,[20] and a simple body without admixture of the other elements. And since fire is closer to that towards which it is impelled in E than in F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, therefore it exists more readily under the species of E than under the other species designated by the above letters. This is also why B C D are impelled by A towards the final cause that fire seeks, while fire is impelled by the heavenly bodies, in accordance with the final purpose desired by universal matter and universal form, which are the exemplars for the particular forms and matters in order to preserve the species in their individuals, as is proved in the principles of nature.[21]

[18] Cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 21.

[19] For the "simple point," see Dist. VI, n. 3. For generation, corruption and privation, see the same Dist. VI, as well as *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 79.

[20] For "form," "matter," and "conjunction" in connection with elemental theory, see the references in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 69.

[21] This could either be a general reference to the principles of natural philosophy, or, as the Mainz editors assumed, a specific reference to Llull's *Principles of Philosophy*.

By natural reason we can understand that fire in its simple sphere is not active, which is why it descends to other spheres, seeking its perfection; and since its simplicity accords better with B than with C D, it therefore more readily receives B from earth than C from air, as well as more readily being against D. This is why, in E, it retains the 3rd degree of earth, as well as the 2nd of C and the 1st of D; and A, in E, by force of its dominance there, converts B C D to its intention. This example therefore shows that A, as intention in E, has priority over B C D, and that it exists more readily in its own simple point than in E, and that it takes B before C, and C before D, which is why, in E, it retains more of itself than of B C D, and more of B than of C, and more of C than of D.

The above should make clear to the doctor the intention and final purpose of A B C D, thereby permitting him, upon preparing a decoction containing E, to consider the final purpose to which the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degrees are directed in E, and by this intention the doctor can direct his intention towards the cure in accordance with the disposition of the disease and of the decoction in which he puts E.

E F G H

If one makes a mixture of E F G H then, according to the natural course of things, the A existing in E will constitute the final intention, and the same will be true if one combines only E F, E G, or E H. And if one makes a decoction of F G H without E, the final intention will be the A in F, as it will also be in a mixture of F H. Therefore, by this explanation, the doctor can recognize the intention towards which the species present in a decoction are directed in accordance with their degrees.

E K

In a mixture of E K there are two principal final intentions, for the degrees that have the greatest concordance with A accord in increasing A, while the degrees that have the greatest concordance with B increase B. Thus if the disease is principally composed of C D, the sick person should be given an electuary of the com-

plexion of A B, so that A C unite, as well as B D, in order for the sickness to diminish by dividing itself among more species in which nature will be more deliberate in its conservation of health than it is in only one or two species. And according to whether the sickness seems more inclined towards the fulfillment of A C or of B D through the help of the medicinal preparation, the doctor should help the other part to increase its quality to mortify the sickness in those parts where it is most abundant.

This example will permit you to understand the role of final intention in the mixing of E L M N, L M N, or M N, for any one principle can be used as doctrine and demonstration of another.

E O

Once you have learned and understood the above arguments regarding the mixing of E K, you will understand the role of final intention between E O, when some decoction of them is prepared, which is why there is no need to give another example; for the same demonstration given in connection with E K is applicable here, except that A is related in one way to B, and in another to C.

E S

Since E S are contraries, a decoction containing a mixture of them has two final intentions contrary to one another. So if you want to know whether a sickness is due to A or D, make a preparation of E S alone, or take from the species that are beneath E S, and then you will know with which the sickness accords—with E or S. If you cannot find out anything by means of E S, make a preparation of E L or S F, and so on for the rest, and since their intentions are contrary, the sickness must accord with one intention and health and nature with the other.

E O S

If you mix E O S, O will convert the final intention of E S to its own form, and will thus have E S beneath it, just as a complexion which is in the 4th degree has 3, 2, and 1 beneath it. The

reason for this is that E S are contraries, while O accords with E S, by which concordance it has greater efficacy and strength in the decoction than E S.

So much for "end" and the other angles of the red triangle. And from what we have said many other important and valuable principles can be understood, as well as many good and noteworthy things, as will be exemplified in the following paragraphs.

Natural reason tells us that fire exists more readily in itself than in something else, and the same is true for the other elements. This is why fire begins to have intention with respect to itself before it does towards something else, and why in the beginning of the composition of E, fire has one simple point; then it draws near to earth from which it receives B, and thus has two points which make a line; afterwards it draws near to air, to which it gives A, and thus it is a line having breadth, or in other words, a surface; and when it descends to water, mortifying D in the B that fire receives and in the A that it gives to the air, which in turn gives C to water, then the body of E is formed and the single simple point we will discuss in the Fifth and Sixth Distinctions is divided into seven points in E.[22] Such being the case, this principle can give you knowledge of other principles that accord with it.

One cannot go from beginning to end without middle, and therefore A cannot pass over to destroy its contrary without intermediaries, which are B C, by which is signified that you who are beginning to learn this Art will find yourself unable to destroy your ignorance of it without some intermediary, which intermediary is constituted by the conditions of the tree, through which your understanding must pass if you want to arrive at the goal of understanding this Art.[23]

[22] Cf. Dist VI, nn. 3–4. Notice the important similarity between this formulation of dimensionality in connection with the elements and that in connection with the dignities formulated in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 562, a passage commented on in J. Gayà, "La concepción luliana de 'punctum' en su contexto medieval," *EL* 19 (1975), 41–51. See also the passage very similar to this one in the *Principles of Philosophy*, *MOG* I, 689 = Int. x, 23.

[23] P M add, "which Art is the mirror of medicine." Notice, as in the *Gentile* (cf. Prologue, n. 17), the importance given to the conditions. Cf. Salzinger's comments on this passage in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 292 = Int. vi, 40.

Just as A is present in a higher degree in E than in F, in F than in G, and in G than in H, so choler is greater in a choleric man than in another choleric thing. Thus if you naturally have choler in the 3rd degree, and want to reduce it to the 2nd or 1st degree, you are acting against the principle of quality as well as against the final intention of the A of your quality. And since nature accords better with the principle and final intention than with the means by which you want to descend from the 3rd natural degree to the 2nd accidental degree, you are therefore acting against your health and against the conditions of the tree. Hence what this Art does is to direct and advise you so that, when you have found your natural quality in its proper degree, you may make the medicinal means proportional to it, so as to preserve that toward which the final cause is directed.

If you undergo hunger or thirst, nature more readily begins to destroy its contrary than its likeness, so if you want to be healthy you should occasionally allow yourself to go hungry and thirsty, so that nature can have the time and opportunity to destroy its contrary engendered by excess of eating and drinking. Therefore if you are sick because of a surfeit of food and drink, before arriving at the goal of health you should pass by the means, which are abstinence and temperance.

The beginnings of A B C D in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y vary according to the seasons; and you should therefore give to the red triangle in each season of the year whatever accords with the beginning, middle, and end of the above letters. And in summer you should eat more hot and dry things, and you should undergo what heat is necessary to fortify A. The same is true for the other letters and for the seasons to which they correspond.[24]

I could tell you about many other principles and important, noteworthy things as revealed by this Art through the triangle composed of "beginning," "middle," and "end," but since there are other matters to discuss, we will put an end to this distinction and begin the Third.

[24] For a more detailed discussion of the relationship of medicine to the seasons, see Dist. X, secs. 26–7 below.

HERE BEGINS THE THIRD DISTINCTION[1]

Chapter 9. DIFFERENCE AND E

SINCE[2] IN E there are four letters, to wit, A B C D, and since A is in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st, and since the matter subject to A is different from that subject to B C, the matter of C different from that of A D, the matter of D different from that of C B, and the matter of B different from that of A D, this demonstrates the difference there is in E, by which demonstration you, the doctor, can acquire knowledge of the operations of A B C D in E, which knowledge will permit you to make E accord with the conditions of the tree.

E F

If you, the doctor, mix E F in some preparation, you should know in what way the virtues of E F differ from one another, and you should make their virtues concordant with the differences between their degrees. As a result of this difference and of the majority of E, the A of E impels the A of F towards the virtue and property of E, which is why the A of E is different from the A of F with respect to action and passion, as well as matter and final cause, which matter is related to the A of F, while final cause is related to the A of E; and the same follows for B D.

By the above aphorism[3] and natural medicinal principle you can acquire knowledge of difference in relation to E G H, and similarly

[1] M adds "concerning the Mixture of Degrees according to the Green Triangle"; G adds "concerning the Green Triangle, which is Made Up of Difference, Concordance, and Contrariety."

[2] P and M again (see Dist. II, n. 2 above) precede this with an introductory paragraph that looks spurious.

[3] In the sense of "definition or concise statement of principle in any science" (cf. *OED*, s.v.). Don Juan Manuel, only one generation after Llull, says in his *Libro del caballero et del escudero, BAE* 51, 240b, that what grammarians call rules, logicians call maxims, and physicians aphorisms. In this sense the word came directly from the title of Hippocrates' *Aphorismos*. It is curious, however, that the medieval sources of this work of Llull's consistently spell it with an extra nasal consonant: *anforisme* in Catalan and *amphorismus* in Latin. The latter is also the spelling in the medieval sources of Arnold of Vilanova (cf. McVaugh, *Villanova*, p. 82, nn. 36, 38, and pp. 139, 145–6). Don Juan Manuel spells it *anphorismas*, and *amphorisme* seems to be the medieval French spelling (cf. O. Bloch and W. von Wartburg, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue française*, Paris 1950, s.v. *aphorisme*).

in relation to F G H. So if F existed in an amount too great to increase the virtue and property of E, then in place of F you should put G, or even H; and if F was not enough to be of use to E, then you should add to it G or H; and if by using E F you differentiated the remedy too much in terms of the quality by which you wanted to cure the sickness, then in place of E you should put F, and in place of F you should put G or H.

E K

You know the difference there is between the A B C D in E and the B D A C in K, for beneath the A of E are B C D, and beneath the B of K are D A C. Therefore if you make up some medicine of only E K, then E will be related to one treatment and K to another; but since the treatment should only be in terms of a single end, you should assist E or K with another herb which accords more with E or K, so that E should have K beneath it, or E be beneath K, according to the end desired. For just as the disease is in relation to a single end, so should the treatment be related to the single final purpose contrary to that of the disease.

In accordance with the way we have exemplified difference in E K, you can become familiar with the difference entailed in the union of E L M N, or in that of K F G H. Now if you know how to recognize the above-mentioned difference, and if you follow the conditions of the tree, you can turn the operation of E F G H K L M N to whatever final purpose you want, just as you can turn a horse you are riding in whatever direction you want.

E O

By the example of E K you can learn the difference existing between E O. And you should realize that E is related to K in one way and to O in another, since K O are contraries, as a result of which contrariety E is related to one final purpose if you mix it with K, and to another if you mix it with O. Thus, if you want to mix E K O, you must add F to E so that, by its great strength, it may be able to turn and convert K O to its purpose; either that, or you should mortify O with L, or K with P.

E S

E S are different and contrary: they are contrary through A D and different through B C. For insofar as E is related in one way to B and in another to C, and D is related to B C in a manner opposite to that of A, E S are contrary and different: contrary in the way of heating and cooling; different in the way of giving and receiving. For this reason E, insofar as it is different from S, directs its intention towards an end different from that of S, and insofar as E S are contraries, the end of one is contrary to that of the other. So if you mix only E S, you will give rise to an opposition of two final purposes that are different and contrary, with one acting as an impediment to the other by the tempered quantity of E S. Thus if you want E S to be directed towards a single end, you must give F to E or T to S, so that one operation may be like that of action and the other of passion.

By the above example you can know how E differs from T V Y, as well as how S differs from F G H, since certain principles serve as a demonstration of others. Thus, just as, by means of E, we have shown the difference existing in K O S, so, by means of K, you can show it in E O S, or by means of O in E K S, or by means of S in E K O.

A does not heat D, but rather the prime matter of D in the water in the pot on the fire. And this shows you the difference between D and the matter subject to it, which matter is a power capable of receiving the form of A and of holding D potentially in itself; and the same follows for B C. And by knowledge such as this you can discover the secrets of nature, beneath which prime matter is hidden from the human intellect and the power of the senses. And by the above-mentioned secrets you can get to know the difference between substantial and accidental form, the former being D in its own matter, and the latter being A in the matter proper to D, with B C acting as intermediaries. You can thereby in turn get to know about difference without or with an intermediary: without is that between D and its matter; with is when the matter of D is accidentally subject to A. This knowledge of the difference between the presence or the lack of an intermediary, in turn, shows you the difference between primary and secondary matter, as well as between primary and secondary form. For pri-

mary matter is what is subject to D with no intermediary, while the subject and D itself are the primary and simple form of water, and the secondary matter and form are the subject of D, which compositely receives the form of A, to which form it is subject. And the same is true of B, C, and D, and of their subjects.[4]

There is a difference between the conjunction of A with its simple matter to which A is impelled, and the conjunction with which A B C D all move together. For the first simple conjunction involves the union of prime simple matter with simple quality so as to constitute a simple body with no composition; the composition, however, impelling A B C D is the union of secondary and compound form and matter, in which the four elements are combined. Such a body is elemented, begotten, and corruptible, and in it the four elements move sensually in the same way that the intellect moves intellectually over the species whose particulars it takes as objects.

What we have said above explains prime matter—that it is a power and subject with respect to the matter of A B C D, and that it is a general subject and matter from which, through the difference and concordance of A B C D, special parts are formed—that is, the four elements—and from them are made the parts constituting the individuals of the species, all of which is pointed out in Chapter 7 and in the Distinction of Metaphor.[5]

If you want to be a good natural philosopher or a good doctor, then, in accordance with what we have said above, you should learn about difference, and having done so, and this difference necessarily existing, you must survey the flowers of the tree, by which surveillance you will get to know about many principles by means of which difference will be revealed to you artificially, according as it is revealed by the above-mentioned Art. I could tell you many principles about this revelation if I were not so busy seeking the secrets of other principles.

[4] Notice this association of "form" with the qualities of the elements, and "matter" with the elements themselves, here presented as that which is subject to these qualities, in a reversal of emphasis already commented upon in Dist. I, n. 3 above. The primary form and matter are those proper to an element, the secondary form and matter are those received from its clockwise neighbor ("clockwise" in the circle of elements in Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*). Cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 52, as well as n. 13 below.

[5] Cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 51–2 and n. 194.

Chapter 10. CONCORDANCE AND E

IN E THERE IS a natural concordance between A B, between A C, between C D, and between D B, and therefore in E there is concordance of 4 3 2 1. For in the simple matter of A, B is directed towards drying the hot matter, and thus A B are so concordant that fire takes on a hot and dry complexion. A, in turn, is directed towards heating the simple matter of C, as a result of which air takes on a moist and hot complexion. C, moreover, is directed towards giving humidity to the simple matter of water, as a result of which water takes on a cold and moist complexion. Lastly, D is directed towards cooling the simple matter of earth, as a result of which earth takes on a dry and cold complexion. This being the case, therefore, and according as one letter is more closely related to the matter of another, there is greater concordance between some letters than between others, as well as between some matters than others, and thus you, the doctor, can learn by which greater or lesser concordance the sickness is curable. You can also learn how in A matter exists in two ways: one is simple matter that accords essentially with the letter, the other is the matter that accords accidentally with the letter in receiving its quality from it. This being the case, you can therefore use this Art to acquire knowledge of primary and secondary matter.

E F

If you prepare a mixture of E F, the 4th degree of E accords with the 3rd of F, the 3rd of E with the 2nd of F, the 2nd of E with the 1st of F, and the 1st of E with some part of D existing in F, which part is not enough to make up a degree of F. This can give you knowledge about two species of concordance, and how one takes precedence over the other; for the 4, 3 of A in E F accord more readily in E F than do the 4 of A and the 2 of B, and the same follows for the other degrees, by which is demonstrated the existence of two species of concordance, one of which takes precedence over the other. Thus, by this knowledge of the two species of concordance, you can know which virtue is more readily contrary to the sickness and which accords more readily with nature and with health.

By the example we have given of concordance in E F, you can learn about concordance between E G H, between F G H, or between G H. And if you prepare a mixture of E F G H, you will understand that E F accord more readily than E G H, and F G more readily than G H, because of the fact that greater concordance accords more readily with being than lesser, and lesser concordance accords more readily with privation than greater.

E K

If you make a mixture of E K, then what E contains of K will accord with what K contains of itself, and what K contains of E will accord with what E contains of itself. This concordance, moreover, will take place together and simultaneously, and afterwards you can accord what there is of C D in E K. And by these two species of concordance, two purposes and two different treatments are formed, for E will be disposed towards one cure and K towards another. Therefore, since you have to use one treatment before another, you should accord some other species with E or with K, so that E may impel K to its own disposition, or K impel E, which impulse E imparts to K if you give it F, or which K imparts to E if you give it L.

By the above example you can also acquire knowledge about the concordance that is formed among E L M N or among K F G H.

E O

According to the example we have given of the concordance existing between E K, you can learn about the concordance existing between E O, as well as about the difference between the concordance of E K and that of E O. For E accords with K in the way of passion, and K with E in the way of action; O, however, accords with E in the way of passion and E with O in the way of action. Hence, through this concordance you can know about concordance existing between K S and between S O, which accord in a way similar to that explained between E K and between E O.

E S

It is clear that E S are contraries, yet there must necessarily be some area in which they are concordant. For if they were not, it would be impossible for D to exist in E, or A in S; since, however, D must exist in E and A in S, therefore it is clear that E S are concordant in some area, which area is the intermediary between A D (for if they were concordant without any intermediary, it would be impossible for A D to be contraries). Now this intermediary is B C, for insofar as the matter of A is directed towards receiving B, the matter of B is directed towards receiving D, the matter of C is directed towards receiving A, and the matter of D is directed towards receiving C, B C are formed as intermediaries of the concordance existing between E S. Now this concordance is matter with respect to the contrariety existing between E S, which contrariety has to do with form and with first intention, while said concordance has to do with matter and with second intention. And the same follows for K O, for E T V Y, and for S F G H.

Do you know why E S accord in a decoction that you prepare? It is so that they can be contrary to one another. Thus they first accord so that E can expel A from its subjection to S, and so that S can expel D from its subjection to E; and when E has recovered A from S, and S has recovered D from E, then E and S are contraries. This therefore shows how a treatment is effected by concordant and contrary things, with concordant things being related to matter and contrary things to form.

By the above principles concerning concordance, which we have demonstrated by the method of the Art, you can understand many important good things and many good demonstrations having to do with concordance, some examples of which we will give in the following paragraphs.

It is true that a continual fever[6] is generated by phlegm which is cold and moist, so if you wanted to cure by contrariety without concordance, you would give the patient E K against D C. But, because of the accident of the foreign heat which is unnatural and

[6] See Dist. VII, n. 3 below for the different kinds of fever, and ch. 27 specifically for continual (or continent) fever.

contrary to nature, you should not give E K against a continual fever, so as not to increase the foreign heat; you should instead give the patient food similar to C D so that it may act as a means through which C D could naturally accord in the natural heat. By this accord the accident and the natural heat can be destroyed, passing the cold and moist food through the means of the foreign heat, that is, the fever which unnaturally heats and dries, and which originated out of cold and moisture through the disorder of C D. This being the case, by this example therefore you can know about a sickness which is curable by qualities similar to that of its origin.

In accordance with the simple spheres of the elements, it is agreed that the sphere of air comes after that of fire, and the sphere of water is between that of air and that of earth, which is why fire is the highest element and earth the lowest.[7] In elemented bodies, however, this is not the case, for A B associate against the above-mentioned ordering of spheres, while A C associate in the elemented body following the ordering and disposition of the spheres, and mainly of the sphere of air which is beneath that of fire. This is why, in an elemented body, there is a mixing of places and spheres through natural concordance, with A descending to B and B ascending to A, with A descending to C and C ascending to A, with C descending to D and D ascending to C, and with D descending to B and B ascending to D.[8] Since A is descendant in B C and B is ascendant in A D, A B are concordant; moreover, since A is the highest element and B the lowest, and since C D are in between, therefore, as a result of this concordance, A descends to D and D ascends to A, and C descends to B and B ascends to C, for otherwise they could neither be concordant nor contrary, nor could they mix in an elemented body. This having been made clear in accordance with the degrees of A B C D in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, you the doctor can therefore accord medicines for the mortifying of fumosities,[9] as well as of gross and subtle humors, by making them ascend and descend; this is

[7] See Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa* for these spheres of elements.

[8] Because the qualities corresponding to the spheres in Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa* are, in descending order, A C D B. This is the order in which each element bestows its quality on its neighbor (see the circle of elements in the same Table 5).

[9] Vaporous humors rising into the head from the stomach.

if you know how to accord A B C D in the above-mentioned letters that go from E to Y, and if you can understand the ordering of the association of A B C D in this Art in accordance with the mixing of the four elements in an elemented body.

Through the concordance of A B C D in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, which we have explained to you, you can fight against the disease by according the flowers of the first tree, which are Natural, Nonnatural, and Contrary to Nature, with the square and with the flowers of the second tree, knowing as you do how to accord the conditions befitting the flowers of said square and of the two trees;[10] and if you remain ignorant of this your practice will be without any basis in theory.

A C represents the conservation of life, because fire engenders A in air, and air engenders C in water. But since water engenders D in earth contrary to A, and earth engenders B in A contrary to C, therefore B D are contrary to life. Hence you can accord the upper flowers of the square with A C in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, at the same time according, in these same letters, the lower flowers of the square with B D.[11]

You should understand how concordance is differentiated in itself, according to the different decoctions of E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y. And this difference is exemplified by the different purgations engendered by the combining of the above letters, which different purgations can be of various kinds, depending on whether they are due to decoctions, urine, bloodletting, sweating, vomiting, abscess, vapors, fever, the consumption of bad humors brought about by the digestion of natural heat, or by flatulence, or by other similar types of purgation.

Chapter 11. CONTRARIETY AND E

As is explained in the *Art of Finding Truth*, in the Figure of Predestination, contrariety sometimes exists without and sometimes with an intermediary.[12] Contrariety without intermediary

[10] The Latin sources refer more correctly to "the first branch of the tree . . . the second branch of the tree . . . the two branches of the tree."

[11] The upper flowers of the square being "perfection" and "being"; the lower "defect" and "privation."

[12] The passage referred to concerning Figure X can be found in *MOG* I, 476 = Int. vii, 44.

is when A D are simply contrary in E, with A heating the simple matter of D, and D mortifying A in the simple matter of A. Contrariety with intermediary is when A, by heating the matter of C and mortifying B in the cold that the matter of earth receives from D, is contrary to D. And D is contrary to A insofar as it mortifies A in the matter of C, with the matter of D receiving C and D giving itself to B in order to destroy B in A. Thus, if it were not for the intermediary existing between A D, such would be their contrariety that there would be no tempering possible between the matter of A and that of D, which, thanks to the intermediary of B C, constitute a single matter subject to the form of E.

By the above-mentioned principle you can get to know how to cure a sickness by its contrary, for in one way A D are contraries by means of C, in another way by means of B, and in yet another by themselves. And therefore when it is a question of tertian fever engendered by A B, you should give the patient C D; moreover, since A is greater than B in tertian, you should give greater D against A than C against B.

E F

If you prepare a mixture of E F, the A of E F is contrary to the D of E F, and conversely; and the same is true of B C. And since in E F there is a greater quantity of A than D, hence in their mixture A is active and D is passive, and the same follows for the mixtures you make of E G H or of F G H.

E K

In Chapter 10, in the paragraph of E K, you were given an explanation of the concordance between E K, by which concordance you can find out about the contrariety between E K; and the same follows for E L or K F.

E K O

If you mix E K O, E is the intermediary between the contrariety existing between K O, and since A is in O in the 3rd degree and B is in E also in the 3rd degree, and since action accords with greater nobility and passion with lesser, therefore A is inclined to

oppose K and to help O against K, which is why an electuary made up of E K O is inclined to generate A C and to destroy B D.

E O K S

In the preparation you make from E O K S, E O are contrary to K S and K S are contrary to E O, which fact is made clear by the concordance existing between being and E O, as well as between nonbeing and K S, with A C sustaining life and K S engendering death. Thus if this contrariety did not exist in said preparation, it would be impossible for life to accord with A C, or death with B D.

E K S

If you mix E K S, the result is the contrary of what happens with the mixture of E K O, and therefore there is no need to give any example, except to say that you should take the contrary of what was said in the paragraph of E K O.

E O

In the mixture of E O there is contrariety of A B C D, which contrariety is indicated in the paragraph of E K, since some paragraphs act as demonstrations of others, and some as the origins of others, in accordance with this Art.

E S

The contrariety existing between E S if you mix them is explained in the paragraph of E S of Chapter 10. For in accordance with the way E S are in accord with one another, you can understand how they are contrary to one another.

In accordance with the explanation we have given of contrariety in E K O S, you can understand about the contrariety existing between K O S, following the rules of the Art and the conditions of the tree, and accepting the meanings of the above-mentioned paragraphs.

If you have understood what has been explained in the above-mentioned paragraphs concerning the natural contrariety of some elements towards others, you will understand the contrariety exposed in the following observations.

You should know that A B C D are contrary to one another in terms of virtue, color, heaviness, lightness, thinness of matter, thickness of matter, taste, smell, and condition, as well as many other qualities. Thus if you become very familiar with this Art, as with the Art from which it has sprung, you will be able to undestand how A B C D are contrary to one another in the above-mentioned qualities, and of this we want to give you an example with the chickpea and quicksilver.

The chickpea and quicksilver are considered to be of the nature of C, which C is greater in quicksilver than in the chickpea, while there is also a greater weight of B D in quicksilver than in the chickpea. And since C B are simple contraries, and D is mediately contrary to C because of its concordance with B, and C is contrary to D insofar as C accords with A, therefore in quicksilver there is produced a greater contrariety between virtue and matter than in the chickpea. In quicksilver, matter, with its weight and thickness, is more strongly opposed to virtue than in the chickpea, and therefore C must be in a higher degree of virtue in quicksilver than in the chickpea; for if it were not, it could not oppose the great weight of water and earth existing in quicksilver. Such an example, therefore, shows you how primordial matter is subject to form, and it reveals to you the natural secret existing between matter and virtue, which secret is revealed to you so that it can act as a basic principle for investigating other natural principles which you can learn by means of this one.

A rose is considered to be of a cold nature, and the chickpea humid. There is, however, more weight in the chickpea than in a rose, because of the fact that in the chickpea earth is present with more matter and less B than in a rose, and air possesses greater virtue in the chickpea than in a rose, but greater matter in a rose than in the chickpea.[13] This should make clear to you the con-

[13] Notice the association of virtue (cf. Dist. I, n. 28 above) with the quality of an element (and hence with its form; cf. n. 4 above).

trariety of C B in the chickpea and in a rose, which contrariety should in turn instruct you regarding the simple and compound elements, with virtue according with the simple element and being contrary to the compound element. And, if this were not the case, it would, according to the course of nature, be impossible for there to exist more moisture and weight in the chickpea than in a rose.

If you, the doctor, understand the above paragraphs that explain virtue, and lightness, and heaviness in the medicinal herbs you should use in treating a sickness, you will know how to arrive at the correct proportions in syrups, electuaries, decoctions, and plasters, according to the proper quantity of virtue and weight.[14] And if you do not know about the above-mentioned contrariety, then your practice will be based upon chance.

Do you know why water is cold in summer and hot in winter? It is because fire has greater power against water in summer than in winter, whereas water has greater power against fire in winter than in summer. For this reason, fire recovers its parts more readily in the water of summer than of winter, as a result of which recovery, water is nearer its simplicity in summer than in winter, and, the nearer water is to its simplicity, the colder it is, and the farther it is, the warmer it is.[15] Now this being the case, the foregoing example shows you about the contrariety resulting from diversity of place and time; it also reveals to you the secret of the simple element of fire whose place is on high, as well as the secret of the simple element of water whose place is below. Since water is warmer in winter than in summer, it expels heat from itself and places it on its outer parts where it comes into contact with air; that is to say, in winter you feel the surface of the water as being warm, because A recedes to low places where D has greater virtue and strength, that is, inside the body of water, and D pushes A upwards, so that it may accord with C, which accords with A.

The above example shows you how a continual fever, which is generated by cold, in fact constitutes unnatural heat, similar to

[14] Llull is here offering his own solution to the classic problem of thirteenth-century medicine: how to express qualities, degrees, complexions, and humors quantitatively; cf. introduction, text at n. 9 above, and mainly McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, pp. 57ff.

[15] For an explanation of the phenomenon that is basically similar but in simpler terms, see the paragraph in *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 28, corresponding to n. 41.

the heat of water in winter; and this cold uses an intermediary, that is, continual fever, to rid itself of A. There are many examples and noteworthy things we could say about natural contrariety, but since we have to go on to other subjects, we therefore think it best to begin the Fourth Distinction.

THE FOURTH DISTINCTION[1]

Chapter 12. GREATER, LESSER, AND EQUAL IN E

SINCE THIS ART is presented in a very brief form, and since a knowledge of "greater" can lead to knowledge of "lesser" and "equal," and vice versa, we therefore intend to explain "greater," "lesser," and "equal" all together in E, and similarly in F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y.

It is clear that in E we have A in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st, and this demonstrates the existence of "greater" and "lesser" in E.[2]

E F

If you mix E F, you must grant majority to E and minority to F, since in F we have A in the 3rd degree, B in the 2nd, and C in the 1st; which is why in F you are, sensually speaking, lacking the 1 of D, which you must intellectually consider as being one point less than D of E. This, too, should show you the difference between the sensual degree in E and the intellectual point of D in F.

E G

A is 2 degrees greater in E than in G, B is 2 degrees greater in E than in G, and C has 2 points less in G than in E; and since G has two points less of C, its intellectual degree must be less than any sensual degree.

E H

A is 3 degrees greater in E than in H; and the B of H has 3 points less than the B of E, the C of H has 3 points less than that

[1] M adds, "concerning the Mixture of Degrees according to the Yellow Triangle"; G adds only, "concerning the Yellow Triangle."

[2] For the additional text of P M here, see the following note.

of E, and the D of H has 3 points less than that of E, which is why A constitutes a sensual degree in H, while B C D constitute intellectual degrees, which intellectual degrees are greater or lesser in accordance with the above numbers.

A is greater than B by one point in H, and B is greater than C by another point, and C greater than D by yet another. Now, this being the case, you can, by this majority and minority, understand what is greater or lesser among F G H, as well as how D has 3 points less than A in H.

The equality, however, involves the 3 points that earth gives from itself to fire, which receives 3 points from B, which are equaled by 3 points from A, as are the 2 points from A with 2 from C, and the 1 from A with the 1 from D.[3]

E K

If you mix E K in some electuary, then E will be greater than K in that electuary by 1 degree of C, and K will be greater than E by 2 degrees of D. This is demonstrated to you by the fact that E contains A in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st; while K has B in the 4th degree, D in the 3rd, A in the 2nd and C in the 1st; and since in this electuary E has 4 degrees of A while K has 2, therefore E is greater than K in 2 degrees of A; and since K has 3 degrees of D while E has only 1, therefore the 2 degrees of D in K destroy the 2 degrees of A in E,[4] and K remains greater than E in 1 degree of B. Since, however, E has 1 degree of D in itself, it therefore becomes equal to K in D; and since E contains 3 degrees of B and K contains 4, therefore K is greater than E by 1 degree of B. But since E contains 2 degrees of C and K only contains 1, therefore 1 degree of C in E is consumed by the degree of B, in which K was greater than E. All of which should indicate to you the equality existing between E K.

[3] In P M this paragraph on equality has been removed from here, expanded, and tacked on to the opening section on E (see the previous note). For the system of points presented here, see the passage corresponding to Dist. VI, n. 3, as well as the chart in Dist. X, n. 14 (reading the arrows there as bidirectional).

[4] Llull must here mean "the 2 *extra* degrees of D in K destroy the 2 *extra* degrees of A in E." How this works should be clear if the text is read in conjunction with Table 10.

E L

In E there are 10 degrees and in L there are 6, which is why E is greater than L by 4 degrees. Thus, if you want to make L equal to E, combine L with N, and then the 3rd degree of L is converted into the 4th, the 2nd into the 3rd, the 1st into the 2nd, and C would come into being in 1 degree.[5]

E M

E is greater than M by 7 sensual degrees, since M has only 3 sensual degrees while E has 10. Thus if you want to make E M equal, combine E M with N Y, and N will convert the 3 of M into 6, and Y will mortify the 4th degree of E, converting it into the 3rd, by which conversion E will only have 6 degrees. This domination and increase in fact takes place in both the sensual and intellectual degrees when one makes a mixture of E M N Y.

E N

Since E has 10 sensual degrees and N only has 1, if you mix them and want N to be equal to E, assist N with L, and they will be equal, as we explained above in the paragraph on E L.

The examples we have given you of "greater," "lesser," and "equal" in E L M N Y should show you how to find them in K F G H R; for in accordance with the Art, the same order that exists among E L M N Y also exists among F L M N and L G H.[6]

E O

Following the example we gave of "greater," "lesser," and "equal" under the heading of E K you can deal with them in E O, and the same follows for E P Q R and O F G H, as well as for F P, G Q, and H R.

[5] The point is that since, as was proved in the previous section, E = K, the only way to make L equal to E is to make it equal to K, which is done by adding N. Or, in other words, L + N = K = E. This addition, however, is not a matter of total points (which would give 6 + 1 = 10; see again Table 10), but rather hinges on the fact that N raises *each* quality of L one point, making the latter equal to K.

[6] Thus in D A P; instead of "L G H," G has "K L G H," and M has "L F G H."

E S

If you mix E S, F T, G V, or H Y, or if you mix E T, S F, or any of the other letters that are beneath A D, the same thing would happen in "greater," "lesser," and "equal" that happens with A B in E F G H K L M N. But since A D are contrary and A B are different, there is therefore greater contrariety between "greater," "lesser," and "equal" in E S than in E K, in E T than in E L, and so on for the other letters. And this greater contrariety shows you the greater concordance existing between A B in E K than between A B in E S.

K O

What is true of E S with respect to "greater," "lesser," and "equal" is also true of K O, and just as E is related to K, so is K related to S, and O to S with respect to "greater," "lesser," and "equal." There is therefore no need to give another example, for it is understandable by the aforementioned principles.

If you have understood the foregoing, you will understand that from greater things one can make greater temperance and intemperance. For one can do more with A B C D in the 4th degree than in the 3rd, 2nd, or 1st, and more with the 3rd degree than with the 2nd, or 1st, and more with the 2nd degree than with the 1st, which metaphorically reveals to you that in mankind there is greater temperance through generation and greater intemperance through corruption, which fact in turn is revealed to you so that you may understand that the human body is nobler than another body by reason of the soul, and less noble by reason of guilt and sin.

If you, the doctor, want to understand the revelation of the Holy Trinity of our Lord God, then you must realize that, if that which constitutes a greater contrariety between E S than between E K were concordance, then there would be greater difference, concordance, equality between E S than between E K. And do you know why? Because E S are more different and contrary than E K; and since in God there must exist greater concordance and equality than in creature, therefore this concordance and equality must exist in greater diversity of persons without any contrariety.

When you, the doctor, want to find "greater" and "lesser," and you want to make the greater and the lesser equal, then lower the

greater towards the lesser and raise the lesser towards the greater until you have achieved quality. If, however, you want to destroy equality, adjust the degrees one to the other in accordance with the Art explained to you in previous paragraphs.

Action accords with greater, and passion with lesser, and since, in E, A receives 3 degrees from B and gives 2 to C, an equality is brought about, as well as temperament of action and passion between the 3rd and 2nd degrees. In this way the entire yellow triangle is exemplified, by which example you should increase the degrees of passive quality over and above the degrees of active quality so that between agent and matter there may exist a tempering of greater and lesser operation.

If you want to increase B, you should eat a great deal and drink little. And do you know why? Because C is engendered through drinking and B through eating. And the same follows for A B and for C D, for A B accord better with eating than with drinking, and C D with drinking than with eating. Thus if you want to consume "greater" with fire and with natural heat, you should know how to make use of the above principle.

In E, A is in the 4th degree, and the action of B is in the 3rd degree and that of C in the 2nd. And since, in E, A is 1 degree over and above what it receives or gives, therefore fire is greater in itself by 1 degree than in what it receives from earth, and it is 2 degrees greater in itself than in what it gives to air, and it is 3 degrees greater in itself than in what it opposes to water. For this reason, the above-mentioned "greater" is the simplicity of fire, in which it governs and sustains itself and from which issues forth the superfluity of A in receiving and giving action and passion as we have explained above. Now what has been indicated to you about "greater" in the simplicity of fire you can apply to the simplicity of earth, of air, and of water in a similar way in K O S. Thus, by this principle, you can know in what way the elements love forms in species, yet safeguarding their simplicity. And when species are not in proper proportion for being subject to the simple elements, then each element aspires to another form in other matter, where its simplicity can be governed and conserved, and where one element can be in concordant and contrary operation with another; and this is why the elements engender some forms and corrupt others.

HERE BEGINS THE FIFTH DISTINCTION, IN WHICH IT IS SHOWN HOW THE DEGREES SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED

Chapter 13. IN WHICH THE EXISTENCE OF FOUR DEGREES IS PROVED BY NECESSARY REASONS[1]

In the First Distinction we assumed the existence of four degrees in medicines, and now we must prove the existence of the four degrees by necessary reasons, after which we will explain the method that should be used to investigate the degrees in things medicinal and in the human species.

First of all we must accept the following principles, namely that there are four elements; that fire is hot in itself and dry from the earth, that earth is dry in itself and cold from water, that air is moist in itself and hot from fire, and that water is cold in itself and moist from air.[2]

By experience and by means of the bodily senses we know that some herbs are of a hotter complexion than others, that some have more heat than cold, while others have more cold than heat, and the same follows for dryness and humidity.

These are the principles we will take as a starting point for proving the existence of the four degrees. Now because E shows itself to possess a greater quantity of A than B, there must necessarily be some measurement, which could fittingly be called "degree," to show that A is above and B below in said mixture. For if A B were equal in E, then C D would necessarily have to be equal in

[1] Thus in G; M has "concerning the Method of Investigating the Number of Degrees"; D A P have nothing.

[2] This passage is identical to that commented on in Dist. I, n. 15 above.

it too, since A accords with C and B with D. And since fire accords better with its own heat than with dryness, and since B C are contraries, as are A D, it is therefore necessarily true that if E is of a hot and dry complexion, then A is above and B below. Now the quantity by which one is above the other should be treated as a degree, related in one way to A and in another to B, which is why, in E, A must be present in a certain degree and B in another.

Since A C accord with one another in E, as do B D, therefore C must be present in E in a certain degree and D in another. And since A is present in E in a greater degree than B, therefore C must be present in it in a greater degree than D; for if this were not the case, C D would, in E, be contrary to the above-mentioned principles, and this is impossible according to the course of nature; by which impossibility is necessarily demonstrated that the four degrees under investigation are present in E.

If you say that it might be possible for B to be present in E in the 4th degree, you are affirming that it would be possible for D to be present in E in the 3rd degree, in which case A would be present in the 2nd degree and E would therefore be judged to be a complexion that was dry and cold, and contrary to hot and humid which would run counter to experience and to the bodily senses.

If you say that, in E, A is present in the 5th degree, then such an affirmation would imply that there were 5 elements in E, which is contrary to the principles established above. If, on the other hand, you say that, in E, A is present in the 3rd degree, this implies that D would not be present to the senses in any degree; but since D is present in E in a degree one can sense, therefore A must be in E in the 4th degree, which 4 implies the presence of the 3, 2, and 1.

It is obvious to your physical senses that there is more A B in some herbs than in others, as in E, which has more A B than F, F which has more than G, and G than H. This should make it clear to you that A is present in E in a certain degree, in F in another, in G in another, and in H in yet another, and this is why you have four degrees of A.

And if you say that A is in the 5th degree in some herb where there is more A than there is in E, then you would be affirming that in H, B was present to a degree perceptible to the senses; but

since it is not, it should therefore be clear that A does not exceed 4 degrees, nor does it go below the first degree perceptible to the senses. And to the extent that B C D are present in H, it is in intellectual degrees, whose quantity is so small that they cannot become sensual degrees. As for these intellectual degrees, B is in 3, C in 2 and D in 1, in accordance with the ordering of the larger sensual degrees in E F G.[3]

Since earth, air and water are elements existing by themselves, and since some herbs are felt to have more of the quality of B than of A C D, more C than A B D, or more D than A B C, therefore you can see by the example we have given you concerning the degrees of E that B C D can each go from the 1st to the 4th degree, which 1 2 3 4 are something each element has in itself, according to the aforementioned principles.

Chapter 14. HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE QUALITIES OF HERBS ACCORDING TO THE WRITINGS OF OTHER AUTHORS AND ACCORDING TO NATURAL PRINCIPLES

Authors can be contrary to one another in their writings, but natural principles cannot be contrary to nature. Now, since the ancients held differing opinions about the qualities and complexions of herbs, we must therefore enquire as to which of them accord in their writings with natural principles, and which of them are contrary to same, and then we must, according to the conditions of this Art, affirm that which accords with natural principles.

Avicenna says that the chaste tree has A in the 1st degree and B in the 2nd, whereas Platearius puts it as being in the 3rd of A B.[4] According to natural principles Avicenna is wrong. For since

[3] Cf. Dist. I, n. 18 above. These "intellectual" or fractional degrees—represented as dots in Table 10—form the basis of the later *Liber de levitate et ponderositate elementorum*.

[4] These are, respectively, the famous Persian philosopher and physician, ibn Sīnā (980–1037), whose medical work, the *Qānūn* (or *Canon* as it was known in the West) was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) and in the following century became the most widely used pharmacological text in Europe, and the standard work on the subject

A is in a higher degree than B in an herb of a hot and dry complexion, because fire is of a hot and dry complexion and earth of a dry and cold complexion, therefore, if the chaste tree is of a hot and dry complexion, A must be in it to a higher degree than B; for if it were not, then the herb would have to be contrary to natural principles, which is impossible. Platearius, in turn, is wrong in what he said about the two qualities of the plant being in the same degree, since A B cannot be in the same degree, as we have explained above. Now since Avicenna and Platearius are in accord in defining the plant as being of a hot and dry complexion, and since it seems only right that as a result of experience it should be considered hot and dry, we should therefore investigate its degree of heat as well as of dryness. For if it is in 1 of B, then it must be in 2 of A; if it is in 2 of B, then it must be in 3 of A; and if it is in 3 of B, then it must be in 4 of A. Now this investigation can be done by trying to pair off one letter with another in the alphabet of E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, doing so according to the art of mixture found in Chapter 12. For if the chaste tree is in 1 of B and in 2 of A and you mix G with it, a tempering will result; and if it is in 2 of B and in 3 of A, or in 3 of B and in 4 of A, a greater or lesser efficacy will result.

Avicenna said that quicksilver is in the 2nd or 3rd degree of C D, whereas Platearius puts it as being in 4 of C, and other doctors put it in 4 of C D.[5] Since Avicenna is wrong when he puts C D in 2 or 3, and since Platearius puts it in 4 of C and others in 4 of C D in accordance with its appearance and with their experience of it, it would seem that quicksilver is in 4 of either C or D. Now,

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at the school of medicine at Montpellier (see McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, pp. 32ff.). The second is Matthew Platearius (d. ca. 1165) of the school of Salerno, who wrote a gloss on the earlier *Antidotarium Nicholai*, and to whom is attributed a pharmacological catalogue entitled—or beginning—*Circa instans* (see McVaugh, p. 26). The chaste tree, *Vitex agnus-castus* (or just *agnus castus* as it was called in Llull's time), is a tall Mediterranean shrub which seems to have achieved its reputation as a subduer of the "inclination natural" through a confusion of the original Greek name for the shrub, ἄγνος (*agnos*), with the word ἁγνός (*hagnos*), "pure, chaste; holy, sacred." For the text of Avicenna about the degrees in this plant, see Pereira, "Le opere," pp. 22–3 n. 55.

[5] See Pereira, loc. cit., for the passage of Avicenna cited here. Salzinger gave this passage considerable importance, referring to it in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 404–5 = Int. vi, 152–3, a well as in his *Perspicilia Lulliana philosophica*, *MOG* I, 284, 294 = Int. v, 72, 82, where he uses it to buttress his alchemical arguments, relating it to the passage in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 839, which begins, "Mercury said to the alchemist that quicksilver was born from earth."

in order to determine whether it is in 4 of C or of D, one must mix E K with quicksilver, and if the latter inclines more towards A than B, it is clear that its quality is in the 4th degree of C and in the 3rd of D, and if it inclines more towards B than towards A, then it is clear that its quality is in 4 of D and 3 of C.

Avicenna said that birthwort is in 3 of A and in 2 of B, while Platearius says it is in 2 of A;[6] and since Avicenna followed nature in putting A in a higher degree than B in the complexion of A B, and since Platearius does not follow nature, we should agree more with what Avicenna said about the above herb than with what Platearius said.

Since Avicenna and Platearius are in accord about balsam's being in 2 of A B,[7] we should therefore consider it as being of a hot and dry quality, and we should try to find out whether in balsam B is in the 1st or 2nd degree; and if it is in 1 of B, then it must be in 2 of A, and if it is in 2 of B, then it must be in 3 of A. The way we can find out is to add and mix S with balsam and then watch for a greater or lesser contrast; for if balsam is in 2 of A, it will not be as contrary to S as if it were in 3 of A. Therefore, according to the greater or lesser contrariety, you can know the degree of B in balsam, as well as the degree of A.

Avicenna says that fumitory is in 1 of D and in 2 of B, Constantine says it is cold and dry, and Platearius puts it at 1 of A and 2 of B.[8] Now since Avicenna follows the meaning of the words,[9] whereas Constantine does not specify the degrees between A B,

[6] See Pereira, loc. cit., for the passages of Avicenna and Platearius cited here. The plant in question is *Aristolochia clematis* (*aristologia* to the medievals), originally a native of Southeast Europe, but since naturalized in much of the continent, and which was used medicinally since the time of Theophrastus as an aid in childbirth (hence its English name, birthwort).

[7] See Pereira, loc. cit., for the passages of Avicenna and Platearius. Llull is here doubtless referring to Mecca balsam or balm of Gilead, an oleoresin exuded from *Commiphora opobalsamum*, a tree growing in Arabia and Ethiopia, and formerly much esteemed as an antiseptic and vulnerary.

[8] Constantine the African was a Tunisian forced to flee from North Africa in about 1070, who went first to Salerno and finally to the monastery of Monte Cassino, where he died in 1087. In addition to translating many Arabic medical works, he also wrote the *Liber graduum*, which is undoubtedly the work to which Llull is referring (see McVaugh, *The Mediaeval Theory*, pp. 12ff.). For the actual quotations from the three authors, see Pereira, loc. cit. The plant in question is the *Fumaria officinalis*, known in the Middle Ages as *fumus terrae*, "smoke of the earth."

[9] Instead of the *vocabula* of the Latin sources, the Catalan MSS have *notables* here (as opposed to later on in the sentence where all have *vocables*); but surely both passages refer to properties based on the name, "smoke of the earth," with "smoke" being taken in the sense of "vapors."

and Platearius does not follow the meaning of the words, therefore it would seem fitting to affirm that fumitory is of the quality[10] that Avicenna gives it.

In accordance with the examples we have given from various authors concerning certain herbs, and how one should investigate degrees in medicines, you can know how to investigate the nature of herbs as exemplified by the above-mentioned principles.

Chapter 15. CONCERNING THE COMMON NATURAL PRINCIPLES TO BE USED IN INVESTIGATING DEGREES IN MEDICINES

THERE ARE MANY natural principles by which one can study and apprehend the qualities of herbs. Among these natural principles are the following: virtue, matter, color, taste, smell, place, heaviness, lightness, time, thinness, thickness, condition, smoothness, roughness, heat, cold, dryness, humidity, quantity, and many others, which it would take too long to recount. We will briefly give examples of a few of them, even though in Chapter 11 you were given demonstrations of some in the course of our demonstration of "contrariety," by which contrariety you can become acquainted with the qualities of herbs.

Virtue and Matter

A peppercorn is smaller in quantity than a root of ginger; yet since A is more penetrating and sharper in pepper than in ginger, this shows that A accords better with quality of virtue than quantity of matter;[11] for if it accorded as well with matter as with virtue, ginger would exist in a higher degree of heat than pepper. Since, however, A exists in a higher degree in pepper than in ginger, while the matter of ginger is greater than that of pepper, this shows you, in a contrary sense, that D accords better with

[10] Note how here (and elsewhere) Llull uses "quality" in the sense of "complexion" (which is what M has here), as a constitutent part for the whole.

[11] For virtue and matter, quality and quantity, see Dist. III, nn. 13–14 above, which will also lead the reader to the demonstration of contrariety mentioned in the previous paragraph. For the complexion of pepper, see *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 13, and *Felix*, Bk. IV, ch. 19, nn. 7–8.

greater matter by comparison with A, which has greater virtue.[12] This is why the matter of D is present in greater quantity in a squash than in opium, because opium is dry and cold, whereas a squash is cold and moist. Now if D accorded better with virtue than matter, it would be greater in a squash than in opium, which is not the case, since D is present in squash in the 2nd degree and in opium in the 3rd. All of which shows you that by comparison with water alone, D accords better with virtue than with matter, because of being present in opium in the 3rd degree and in squash in the 2nd, even though it has greater matter in a squash than in opium.

What is stated above reveals the nature of air and earth, since air accords with water, and earth with fire. You can therefore understand that C is present in a higher degree in a body of moist and hot complexion, even if that body exists in a lesser quantity, than one of the complexion of D C. Moreover, B is present in a higher degree in a body of hot and dry quality, that is to say, E, than in one of a dry and cold quality, that is to say, M,[13] even though the body that is of a dry and cold quality might exist materially in greater quantity than the one that is of a hot and dry quality.

If you have understood this principle, you can understand the demonstration of "full" and "empty." That is to say, that "full" accords better with the matter of air and water, and "empty" better with the matter of fire and earth, which is why, in lesser matter and lesser body, there can be greater virtue of A B than of C D, and therefore thinner matter accords with A B and denser with C D. When, however, A C have greater virtue than D B in some species, then they have greater matter than D B, as in a man of melancholy complexion, and this is due to the fact that, from water and earth, denser and fuller matter is formed in a lesser body than from fire and air, where matter is thinner and exists in a larger body.[14] This shows that the virtue which air has in itself is thinner

[12] M expands the latter portion of this sentence with considerations about water being cold by itself and moist by accident, which are in none of the medieval sources consulted.

[13] Thus in all medieval sources, even though the "K" of the Mainz edition seems a bit more reasonable.

[14] For these concepts of *ple* ("full"), *buit* ("empty"), *gross* ("thick, dense"), and *subtil* or *prim* ("thin, subtle"), see the *Tree of Science*, "Hundred Forms," nos. 16–19 (*OE* I, 573, 601–2).

than that which it has when it is joined to water, as is that which fire has by itself as opposed to when it is in earth or air.

Place and Weight

If you have understood the above principles, you will have learned what is most consonant with "empty" and "full." Since fire and earth accord better with emptiness than fullness, this means that fire and earth constitute a receptacle for air and water, and that fire is the highest element and earth the lowest; it also means that plants growing in low, humid places are heavier than those growing in high, dry places. This shows you that A B accord with lightness in plants growing in places that are hot and dry, whereas C D accord with heaviness in plants growing in places that are humid and cold.

This principle illustrates how fire, in receiving B from earth, consumes water, thereby turning earth into an empty vessel so that it may be filled with A C D.[15] And since fire does not have as much power in a plant of cold and moist complexion as does water, therefore water so fills said plant with D C that A cannot expel the dense matter of C B D; as a result of which that body is heavier than a body of a hot and dry quality, or of a hot and moist quality.

Just as in an iron chain or coat of mail the links are intertwined, so in a demonstrative science some principles lead to others, and some exemplify others. Thus the above-mentioned principles should be enough to reveal other principles by which you may investigate and acquire knowledge of the qualities and degrees of plants.[16]

Chapter 16. HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE FOUR DEGREES IN HUMAN BEINGS

THERE ARE MANY paths that can be followed in the study of how the degrees are disposed in human beings, and we will present a

[15] This reading, which is that of M, would seem to be the logical one; the four medieval sources consulted, however, have "A C B."

[16] This paragraph is quoted by Salzinger in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 293 = Int. vi, 41, who says the subject is amply discussed in Bk. IV of the *Book of Contemplation*. He is presumably referring to the doctrine of signification presented in Dist. 35 (= chs. 234–7) of that book, for which see Johnston, *Semblance*, pp. 101ff.

few of them in subsequent paragraphs, following nature and the flowers of the tree.

By means of the flowers of the square, we can raise up our understanding to reflect on the great and unsurpassed perfection and temperament that God gave to the human body over and above all other elemented bodies, which body is related to that of all creatures, so that its soul may be the form of a nobler matter. This means that, with respect to form and matter, all the degrees of A B C D must exist actually and potentially in man;[17] for if they did not, E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y would together be more concordant with being and perfection than would the human body, which is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the flowers. Since among all the above-mentioned letters there are none of such noble form nor directed towards so noble an end as the human body, and since being and perfection are more in accord in a nobler form and matter than in a lesser, this shows that each of A B C D is present individually in the human body in the 4th, 3rd, 2nd and 1st degree in accordance with act and power.

Greater difference can produce greater concordance against greater contrariety so as to engender greater equality and temperament. Now if all the degrees of A B C D were not present in the human body, it would not have such great difference or concordance against intemperance; and if it did not, it would not reflect so well the holy distinct plurality of the divine persons that are concordant and equal without any contrariety. And since that by which they are better intelligible and represented to the human understanding must be affirmed, therefore all the degrees of A B C D are shown to exist in the human species, in which they have greater temperance than in any other species, for they are present in the four degrees in act and power, in accordance with the complexion of the man.

It is clear that being accords with greater in E and with lesser in H; and being likewise accords with greater in the union of E K O than in that of E S. Now since the Son of God took on human nature, if in said human nature all the degrees of A B C

[17] For an interesting commentary on this statement, as well as on the following paragraph, see Pereira, "Le opere," p. 14.

D are present, then the human nature the Son of God took on accords better with being, whereas it would accord better with nonbeing if all the degrees of A B C D were not present in the humanity He took on. And since being and perfection accord, as do nonbeing and defect, this shows that all four degrees of the four elements are present in the human body. And this demonstration reveals the secret of the time Jesus Christ spent in the wilderness, where he fasted for forty days, as a sign of the 40 subdivisions of degrees in each complexion having 10 points multiplied by 4 3 2 1 in the human body,[18] which fasting is presented to you as a means of mortifying the excess of the above-mentioned 40 points.

It is true that in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y there is no change or alteration from one species of 4 3 2 or 1 into another; for in E we always have A in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st. In a body with a rational soul, however, we can have A in the 4th degree, B in the 3rd, C in the 2nd, and D in the 1st, or we can have the opposite, which is why some people are choleric, some sanguine, some phlegmatic, and others melancholic. Now if these complexions could not exist in human beings, it would be impossible for one complexion to be changed into another in any human body; but since this can and does happen, it is therefore demonstrated that, in the human body, when one complexion is actually present in the 4th degree, the others are present potentially in the same 4th degree; for if they were not, it would be impossible for them to become act. And since it has been made clear to you from the above that if one complexion is in act in the 4th degree, the other three are there potentially, therefore this shows you that the degrees which are present potentially and are intelligible beneath the degrees present actually are of a nobler disposition than the intelligible degrees present in

[18] Thus in the medieval texts consulted. "Multiplied" often means just "increased," but here Llull seems, in a clumsy way, to be asking us to multiply the 10 points by *each* of the 4 degrees. M (quoted in Pring-Mill, *Número* p. 31) has, however, "as a sign of the 40 subdivisions of degrees, with each of the 4 complexions having, in the human body, 10 points, produced by the addition of 4, 3, 2, 1." Was this an interpretive change of the editor's? *HLF*, pp. 89–90, cited this metaphor as one they found particularly absurd; but if Frances Yates ("Art," p. 154) could still say almost seventy years later that "the details of the working of this metaphor are, of course, at present unintelligible," perhaps Littré and Hauréau would have done well to follow the advice of some of the quotations at the beginning of this anthology.

F G H L M N T V Y,[19] which are not present potentially and able to come into being actually in sensible degrees. This shows you that the matter underlying human form is nobler than the matter underlying the forms of bodies without souls.

A C accord in generating the natural heat by which life is preserved, while B D accord in generating the sickness that is contrary to life. Now when A C are in the 4th degree, they are more contrary to death than when they are in the 3rd, 2nd, or 1st; and B D are more contrary to life when they are in the 4th degree, than when in the 3rd, 2nd, or 1st. As a result, it follows that if in human beings A B C D can be present in 4, 3, 2, and 1 in different ways according to diversity of act, power and time, then God's justice, which because of original sin makes a greater contrariety between life and death in the course of nature, is better revealed than it would be if 4 3 2 1 could not in human beings be present in each complexion.

If the 4th degree were not present potentially in a person, then when he ate food which was in the 4th degree it would be so contrary or concordant that, beneath the 4, those complexions which were in 3 2 1 and contrary to 4 would be destroyed. But since each complexion is present potentially in the human body in the 4th degree beneath the dominant complexion, whose 4 is present actually, therefore when a person eats or drinks a species that is in the 4th degree, nature rushes to the excess with the 4th degree, which goes from potentiality into act against the virtue and matter that is actually in the 4th degree, contrary to the vital and natural spirit.

The nobler an inferior thing, the nobler is that which is above it. Thus, if A in the 4th degree dominates B C D, with B C D potentially having 4 degrees, then the nobler and more dominant is the 4 of A. And the nobler is that which is in act and potentiality, the greater is man's disposition towards free will. And so that one may affirm that by which free will better exists in man, it is therefore revealed that 4 3 2 1 of A B C D exist in man.

[19] No two sources the same. Thus in A; D has the "N" replaced by "R"; M adds "P Q R" after the "N" (since this is the most logical solution, it is the most suspect); G has "E" through "R," and P has "F" through "Y," both inclusively in terms of the alphabet of Dist. I, either of which seems completely wrong.

Beneath understanding is imagining, beneath imagining is feeling, and beneath feeling is vegetation,[20] which shows you that all the above-mentioned operations are noble in the nobility of understanding, which is their purpose; and nobility of understanding is greater in the intellect than in the powers that are beneath it. Thus, if in your sanguine body C is actually in the 4th degree, beneath which A is actually in the 3rd degree, D in the 2nd, and B in the 1st, and if beneath this actuality we find 4 of A D B, 2 and 1 of A, 3 and 1 of D, 3 2 of B and 3 2 1 of C potentially present, it is clear that potentiality and actuality accord better with being. Moreover, this being is revealed by its position above[21] vegetation, sensuality, and imagination; and this demonstrates the fact that the human body has greater temperance through act and potentiality than any other elemented body. Thus, considering this relation, as well as the conditions of the flowers, this shows you that the degrees are present in man, as we have explained above.

Just as in F we do not have A in the 4th degree, so in some choleric men we have A in the 3rd,[22] and so on for B C D; nevertheless, in man A is potentially in the 4th degree, which is not the case for F; and the same follows for the other complexions.

There are many other things I could tell you about the degrees we have investigated, discovered, and demonstrated to you. And it is very necessary for you to know the disposition of the degrees in the human body so as to know how to treat it, which disposition we have explained to you above.[23]

[20] Cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, n. 9.

[21] Thus in all medieval sources; M, however, has "beneath."

[22] Thus in D A G; M has "in the 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degree."

[23] This paragraph is expanded in P M, part of the expansion consisting of the words "since we want to avoid prolixity . . ."

HERE BEGINS THE SIXTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF GENERATION AND CORRUPTION[1]

WE MUST investigate generation and corruption in four ways, that is, in E, in the mixture of E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y, in animals, and in minerals. These four things hold the secrets of generation and corruption that lie hidden from human understanding, to which, however, they will be revealed by this Art in brief words and following the conditions of the tree.

Chapter 17. GENERATION AND CORRUPTION IN E

TO INVESTIGATE generation and corruption you should turn back to the Second Distinction, and keep in mind the disposition of the degrees in E, that is to say, that A has in E one degree more than B, 2 more than C, and 3 more than D. This is why, in E, A is divided into four parts: the first, sovereign part is in the 4th degree; the second is equal in quantity to B, which, in the 3rd degree, dries the matter subject to A; the third is equal in quantity to C, with fire heating to the 2nd degree the subject of C; and the fourth part is equal in quantity to D, with fire heating the matter subject to D in E.[2]

The first part of A is simple and active, and not passive; for if it were passive, that in which the operation took place would have to be in the 4th degree of action and passion, which is a contradiction. Therefore this 4th degree constitutes the simple invisible matter that has a natural appetite to conserve the species of E; and in this 4th degree lies the universal natural and incorporeal form,

[1] See *Ars brevis*, Part X, "Hundred Forms," no. 79, and the corresponding note.

[2] See Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 51, fig. a, for a schematization of this sentence. Each "part" here corresponds to one of the bundles of solid lines on the chart in Dist. X, n. 14 below.

which is the model for the particular engenderable and corruptible forms.

In the beginning of the generation of E, the 4th degree of A engendered one simple point, which descended to earth to receive one point from B, as a result of which reception the point engendered was divided into six parts. Of these, three became subject to B, as a result of which B was divided into 3 degrees; two of these parts were given by the 4th degree of A to the matter of C, as a result of which C was present in that matter in 2 degrees; and the sixth part was given by the 4th degree to the matter underlying D, as a result of which D is present in E in only the 1st degree. This, therefore, reveals to you the 7th point, that is, the 4th degree, like a powerful lord and ruler who, along with the influence of the seven planets, impels the other degrees in E initially towards generation, and in the end towards corruption.[3]

Initially, as we said before, there is generation in E of one point of A; then comes one of B, which engenders a line of two points; then another point is engendered, this time from C, thereby producing a line of 3 points, that is, a surface; lastly, a fourth point is engendered from D, thereby producing a body having length, width, and depth, in which this generation takes place all at once.[4] Notice, however, that the choice of the natural appetite of the 4th degree of A in E, with the resulting better concordance with one degree than another, has been purely a matter of convention.

What we have said above about generation can also be applied to corruption. For just as, in its natural appetite, fire accords better with one point than with another, so in corruption, what first begins to be corrupted is the point of that element with which it least accords. Thus, just as seeing needs an instrument, i.e., physical eyes, air, and an illuminated object, so the above-mentioned generation and corruption must have an instrument made up of time, place and beginning, i.e. the seed, the influence of celestial bodies and the natural desire to preserve the species of E and to seek the simple conjunction of prime matter and its simple form,

[3] For the dominant quality of a compound, expressed as the simple point which becomes the 7th point, and which we have already met in the passage corresponding to *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 20, see Pereira, "Le opere," p. 19. For a diagram of the distribution of the other 6 points, see Dist. X, n. 14 below, as well as Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 51, fig. b.

[4] See Dist. II, n. 22 above for the use of points in terms of dimensionality. See Gayà, loc. cit, fig. c, for a schematization of this paragraph.

by which search potential forms, through generation, are moved to act, while actual forms are inclined towards corruption, according to how the 4th degree of A in E accords with the above-mentioned instruments.

In accordance with the example we have given of generation and corruption in E, you can acquire knowledge of generation and corruption of other species which are beneath the vegetative power, that is to say, the species denoted by the letters of the alphabet in this Art.

Chapter 18. GENERATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE MIXING OF E F G ETC.

By divine ordinance it has come to pass that seeds, herbs, and plants have different virtues. Thus if you mix E F, E K, or any other species, then in accordance with the degrees and virtues of A B C D in that mixture, and in accordance with the proportion of virtues according to the three triangles and the square of this Art, a given humor or virtue is engendered or destroyed in the patient to whom you administer the decoction you have prepared from the herbs you mixed; and this should be familiar to you from the examples given in the red triangle of the Second Distinction.

Just as in E we find A directed toward a single end, so in the mixture of E F or E K the different virtues and degrees are directed towards a single end, with each corrupting that to which it is directed by its individual end, and with all joining together towards another end engendered by the community of different ends.

When earth engenders B in the matter of A, it corrupts the proportion that A C had attained by means of fire engendering A in the matter of C; when fire receives in itself the generation of B, it corrupts the proportion of earth and water; and when fire engenders A in the matter of C, it is contrary to the proportion of C D in the matter of water and air; and the same follows for the other elements, as is explained in Chapter 11 on contrariety.

If you mix E K O S, you can see from the above example that a single end is composed and engendered from the 4th degree of

E K O S, while the particular end of each letter taken individually is corrupted. Thus, when it happens that with the passage of time or with the help of celestial bodies some letter becomes dominant over the others, then it compels the others to adopt its own end and it corrupts their common end, as it returns to the particular end bestowed on it by nature. And if the matter cannot be subject to all the letters, then one letter expels the other, and as a result corruption takes hold of the actual and potential forms present in the corrupted matter underlying the species, and this you can understand from the triangles and the square.

If you mix E S then a tempering is brought about of all the degrees that are beneath the 4th degree, and this temperament tends toward a single goal. The 4th degree, however, of the simple E S which are over and above this temperament, that is to say, the 7th point which is lord and master and was discussed in section E of Chapter 17,[5] recovers its parts by corrupting the temperament engendered by the 6 points which are beneath the 7th, and therefore, in the 4th degree, that is to say, in the 7th point, E is directed towards engendering A, and S towards engendering D.

If you mix F L, F P, or F T, just as the 4th degree is above the 6 compound points, so the 3 of F is above the 2 it has from itself, which are joined to the 2 it has from earth, as it is also above the 1 it has from itself, which is joined to the 1 it has from air.[6] And the same follows from the other letters mixed with F, which is why 3 of F, L, P, or T are above[7] the points that are subject to the tempering and which provide matter for generation, as well as constituting the four 3s which lie beneath the four 4s (that is, those acting on and having a causal relation to the ones beneath them), and each of which has an appetite for its own simple nature, whereas in matter they have a joint appetite for an end composed of compound points. The same follows if you mix G M Q V, or H N R Y, for all such mixtures follow the disposition of E K O S; and by this disposition you can understand how, in human beings, the simple actual point dominating the other compound points can exist in the 3rd or 2nd degree of A B C D, with the

[5] Cf. n. 3 above.

[6] For the system of points in a species whose hightest degree is 3, see *Liber chaos, MOG* III, 265 = Int. v, 17, par. 6.

[7] Thus in the medieval sources, and not "different from" as in the Mainz edition.

4th degrees existing potentially. This explains why complexions in human beings sometimes accord with greater and sometimes with lesser.

If you have a good understanding of the above-mentioned degrees and their mixture, you will understand how certain simple elements leave their sphere and mix with others, how they are simple each in the other's spheres, how they become compound, and how they carry out that operation by which they are active so as to accord better with being. Since being and operation are far from privation, whereas being and nonoperation are near privation, and since composition is near privation, therefore the simple elements have an appetite for simple operation, which is far from privation. And they enter one in the other, because by themselves they cannot have simple operation. Now if you understand this, you will understand the principles of generation and corruption, as well as the natural appetite of the four simple elements, and you will understand their mixture, motion, and composition.

Chapter 19. GENERATION AND CORRUPTION IN ANIMALS

THE DISCUSSION of the 4th degree in the Fifth Distinction in connection with animals reveals the secret of generation and corruption in animals. For just as the 4th degree of K O S is beneath the 4th degree of A in E, and in a choleric person the 4th degree of A exists actually while the 4th degrees of B C D exist potentially, so in the union of male and female there are two 4th degrees, which are in act, and six that exist potentially. And since those that exist potentially desire actuality so as to accord better with being and to be farther from nonbeing, therefore from the sperm that issues from the man and which the woman receives, there comes forth and is born an actual degree having beneath it two potential degrees; and through the influence of both male and female, and through the great appetite for being on the part of the potential degrees, a new 4th degree is engendered with an appetite to preserve the human species and which has beneath it other potential degrees with the same appetite. And from all this appetite there is formed a supposite similar in species to the male and female.

You know that the visible fire of the burning candle is actual fire, while the other elements are invisible and beneath the form of the visible fire; and from the fire you see, from the other elements you do not see, as well as from the potential fire that, in the candle, is subject to the burning fire, there comes forth and is born another supposite, that is, smoke; which smoke is the fire that is impelled from generation to corruption, because it cannot find place in the light together with the fire rising from power into act. Now if you understand this explanation, you will understand how from male and female the body of a child, which exists potentially in their matter, becomes actual. And since it cannot find place together with the matter of the father and mother, and since the above-mentioned degrees have an appetite to exist and remove themselves from nonbeing, and since this generation is assisted by the influence of the heavenly bodies, therefore, with the help of divine power, another supposite is engendered and preserved, one containing the natural motion by which potential forms are impelled to act. Thus, according to the disposition of the degrees in the father and mother, according to the food they eat, or according to the proportion and movement of the celestial bodies and the four elements, the child receives a complexion of the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, or 1st degree.

If you have understood the foregoing, you will understand the reason why male and female experience pleasure while engendering a child, which reason is to be found in the 4th degree, which is potential in the matter of the female and the male and which comes into act; as a result of this actuality pleasure is felt by female and male, as a metaphorical expression of the fact that being is desirable and nonbeing hateful. Since this is the case, you can therefore see that generation accords with concupiscence and corruption with irascibility.

What you have understood about generation holds for corruption. For as long as the moisture lasts that is subject to the operation of A, as long as the A lasts that is subject to the operation of B, as long as the D lasts that is subject to the operation of C, and as long as the B lasts that is subject to the operation of D, so long will generation be preserved and increased in a given supposite. When, however, there is a lack of matter for the above-mentioned operations, then corruption sets in, making the above-

mentioned operations reach a state of privation, depriving form and then changing to another form by means of generation; all of which was illustrated for you in the above-mentioned triangles.

Just as generation is brought about by addition, so is corruption brought about by subtraction; therefore, just as generation is brought about by eating, drinking, etc., so is corruption brought about by hunger, thirst, etc. And just as generation comes from the conjunction of the elements, so does corruption come from their disjunction. And just as generation is preserved by the appetitive, digestive, receptive, and expulsive faculties, so does corruption come from privation of said faculties.

Since in human beings the 4th degrees of A B C D go from power to act and from act to power according to people's differing complexions, this shows you that there is greater generation of temperance and intemperance in the human body than in any other body; and by the greater temperance it is the noblest of creatures, whereas by the greater intemperance it is the least noble. This intemperance, moreover, reveals to you the presence of original sin, and the intemperance itself is revealed to you upon the death of the human body, from which no more activity can come, as is the case with other bodies useful to man.

There are many kinds of generation in animals, as there are in objects, as is explained in the *Great Commentary on the Brief Art of Finding Truth*;[8] and there is similar generation with respect to the five senses and with respect to the bodily members, as is explained in the *Book of Animals*.[9] But since it does not form part of the subject matter of this book, and since it is a lengthy subject, we will not deal with it here.

[8] This would be the *Ars universalis*, whose subtitle, *Lectura Artis compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*, translates into English as the "Commentary on the Brief Art of Finding Truth." I have, however, been unable to find a passage corresponding to the one referred to here. This plus the fact that the *Ars universalis* is not cited in any of the other works of this group of six (see the Introduction, text to nn. 19–22 above) makes it possible that it was written last, and Llull is here citing a passage he was intending, but never got around to writing in that work.

[9] Salzinger (no. 167 in his catalogue of works in *MOG* I, 63–4, 72 = Int. ii, 17–18, 26) thought this referred to a lost work of Llull's. Pasqual (*Vindiciae* I, 91) wondered whether it was a work Llull has thought of writing, or whether it was "by some philosopher." Platzeck (Pla, II, 6★, n. 11) says it is a "Rückverweis auf Dist. V," which is surely the oddest of the three opinions. To add yet a fourth, why could it not refer to one of Aristotle's zoological works, such as the *Historia animalium* also mentioned in the *Doctrina pueril* (see the "Life," text at n. 68 above), or such as *On the Generation of Animals*, where precisely such subjects are discussed?

From what you have understood about the above-mentioned natural generation in a rational animal, you can understand generation in irrational animals, as well as the generation that comes from corruption in the case of fleas, lice, flies, worms, eels, and other similar things, which generation is brought about through the influence of the heavenly bodies as well as through the influence of animated matter inclined to corruption.[10] For animality is so near and closely connected to said matter that, by the great appetite which animal forms have in becoming act, and because animated matter is potentiality with respect to these forms, the above-mentioned animals are engendered.

What you understand about generation in the above-mentioned irrational animals can also be applied to vegetables. For since the elements are mixed parts derived from seeds, which in turn are divided into atoms, which atoms move and mix with one another in the air,[11] therefore these seeds are engendered from similar parts; and this is due to the great influence of celestial bodies, to the mixed parts that are concordant in species, and to the natural appetite that is present in the general form and which constitutes an exemplar in the 7th simple point, as was explained in the Fifth Distinction.

Chapter 20. GENERATION AND CORRUPTION IN METALS

IT IS CLEAR that there are three kinds of prime movement, circular, upwards and downwards,[12] and by these three movements the elements are impelled towards elemented bodies of three species—vegetable, animal and mineral; in which three species the elements move and are moved, engendering and corruption the forms of the individuals of the species, in which species the elements are something different from what they are in themselves outside of said species.

[10] In this latter category Llull is referring to spontaneous generation, a doctrine upheld from Aristotle's time (see *On the Generation of Animals*, I, 1) until well into the seventeenth century.

[11] A rare reference in Llull to the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, taken up later by Aristotle's Greek commentators and by Averroes.

[12] This statement makes sense only if we realize that Llull is here talking about movement in terms of the spheres of elements (see Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*).

Circular movement is that of the firmament, of the seven planets, of days, hours, and points;[13] while the upward and downward movement is that of the heaviness and lightness of the elements and of their natural appetite, which movement is of two kinds: natural and unnatural. The natural kind is like that of fire which is impelled upwards; the unnatural is like that of a stone which is impelled upwards. Now this being the case, by the above movements you can therefore see how the elements move and are moved in vegetables, in animals, and in the surface of the earth, where digestion is carried out by roots, plants, seeds, and semen, so that species may be preserved. And the digestion and generation of metals is carried out in the heart[14] of the earth in accordance with the disposition of the above movements, and with each kind of metal having its own planet.[15] Thus, just as the human body receives sustenance by means of the outside things it absorbs within itself when it eats and drinks, so metals are engendered in the body[16] of the earth by means of what descends there from the surface through heaviness and through an unnatural movement of the lightness of fire and air.

Just as a fish cannot live out of water, so metals, when they are on the surface of the earth, are impelled towards corruption through rust; and, by generation, they turn into another species, just like the elements in animals. Therefore, just as a man's body inclines towards nonbeing through fever, abscess, paralysis, or other diseases leading to death, so do metals incline towards corruption through rust. And the reason you see rust on iron and not on gold is because iron is more corruptible than gold, whose rust you can only see when it is purified by fire.

The reason why you cannot convert one metal into another species of metal is because the generation of metal is carried out naturally by digestion in the heart[17] of the earth, just as in your

[13] Here in the sense of the fourth or fifth part of an hour (see *OED*, s.v., 10, and Blaise, *Lexicon*, s.v. *punctus*).

[14] Thus, *cor*, in the Catalan MSS; P M have "body," which in Old Catalan would have been *cors*.

[15] Llull discusses the correspondence between planets and metals (Saturn–lead, Jupiter–tin, Mars–iron, etc.) in the *Tree of Science*, *OE* I, 715; *Proverbs of Ramon*, ch. 199; *Liber de praedicatione*, *ROL* III, 147–8; and above all the *Tractatus novus de astronomia* (section I, 1, b in the edition being prepared by Jordi Gayà).

[16] Here all sources have "body."

[17] Variants here as in n. 14 above.

body flesh is naturally engendered by the digestion of blood, and blood is engendered by the digestion of food and drink.[18] And if you can sometimes give a metal the form of another, this is like the painter who artificially engenders the form of a man on the matter of wood, which form and matter are in disaccord with one another; and this disaccord shows you why the foreign form that the alchemist gives to the matter is soon corrupted.[19]

Since there seems to be a greater appetite on the part of nature to conserve the human species than to conserve other species, because the degrees of A B C D are present more nobly in it, therefore nature submits the other species to the service of the human species; and since minerals are necessary to mankind, therefore nature, by divine ordinance, engenders only those minerals necessary to mankind, which reveals to you the nobility of the human race.

The reason corruption takes longer in metals than in vegetables or animals is because generation is slower and of a longer beginning in metals than in vegetables or animals. Thus, if you understand this, and grasp what it means metaphorically, then you will understand that the generation that God the Father carries out in God the Son is incorruptible, since it has no beginning, even though the Son is engenderable.

Insofar as possible, we have briefly discussed generation and corruption in terms of the above principles, by means of which you can understand many other principles of generation and corruption.

[18] Thus in G. The other sources have, 'just as in your [M: in an animal's] body flesh is naturally produced by the digestion of blood, and the digestion of blood [M: and blood is produced] by the digestion of bread, water and the other food you eat [M: of the food and drink taken in by the body].'

[19] Llull's point here is that metals cannot be artificially changed one into the other, even though, as he says in the previous paragraph, this can happen naturally inside the earth. This passage should be read in conjunction with his condemnation of alchemy in *Felix*, Bk. VI, ch. 36 (see n. 10 there for further references). Salzinger, who was a "believer," used up a fair amount of ink interpreting this chapter; see his *Perspicilia Lulliana philosophica*, *MOG* I, 279–80, 283, 293, 297–8, 300–1 = Int. v, 67–8, 71, 81, 85–6, 88–9. See the interesting remarks on this passage and on the subject in general in Yates, "Art," p. 132.

HERE BEGINS THE SEVENTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF FEVERS

Chapter 21. FEVERS IN GENERAL

In order to deal with fevers, we should recall the root of the tree, which is divided into four parts, namely choler, blood, phlegm, and melancholy.[1] This number is arrived at in accordance with the simplicity of the elements, and it comes in the form of the following figure.

A	C
C	D
D	B
B	A

Since, however, the elements are mixed in compound bodies in a different way, therefore in accordance with the way they are mixed in compound bodies we will mix the letters in the circular figure which designates the various fevers. By this figure you can acquire knowledge of the termination of a fever or of death, and in accordance with the termination you can make a prognosis for the patient.

If the circular figure that forms the root of the tree had its letters arranged as in the above quadrangular figure,[2] it would follow that fire would mix more readily with water than with earth, because the sphere of water lies between fire and earth; and since fire is of a hot and dry quality, therefore the elements must necessarily be mixed in a compound body according to the mixture of the letters of the circular figure; and by this mixing you can learn about the mixing of fevers.

Since the kinds of fever are many and diverse, and since we want to deal briefly with the subject in this Art, we will therefore only discuss seven kinds of fever, namely simple quartan, double quartan, simple tertian, double tertian, quotidian, continual, and

[1] The chart in the following paragraph corresponds to "blood" on the root of the tree.
[2] Cf. Dist. I, n. 4.

acute.[3] Thus, insofar as this Art can help you acquire knowledge about the above-mentioned seven kinds of fever, you can then go on the acquire knowledge about the other kinds of fever.

In order to understand the occasions under which fever arises, you should consult the red, green and yellow triangles and you should be familiar with the actual, active, and formal simple 4th degree, which we discussed in Chapter 17. This knowledge will show you how the 4th degree, which is normally active by appetite and form, is destroyed and corrupted by fever and does not have the other degrees arranged beneath it towards a common end. Thus each degree of A B C D desires the end it finds most suitable, and one is neither ruled nor ordered by the other; moreover, natural form is destroyed and A B C D mix together with no order, which mixture and disorder shows you the occasion for the fever, which is brought about by the destruction of the noblest 4th actual degree beneath which the other 4th degrees existed potentially so that the operation of the degrees which were in 3 2 1 would be directed toward the goal of the nobler and more formal actual 4th degree.

Since B D provide the occasion for death and A C for life, since fever and death are in accord, and since melancholy is of B D,[4] we will therefore first deal with the fever that accords with melancholy.

Chapter 22. SIMPLE QUARTAN FEVER

QUARTAN FEVER begins in the compartment of B D, which in the circular figure lies in the quadrangle of melancholy, and ends in the other compartments lying in that same quadrangle, and this is why it occurs every fourth day,[5] for nature is more resistant in

3. Quartan was a fever characterized by the occurrence of a paroxysm every fourth (in modern reckoning, every third) day; double quartan was one with two sets of paroxysms, each recurring at that interval. Tertian was one occurring every third (in modern reckoning, every other) day; quotidian was a fever recurring daily. These were the main kinds of intermittent fevers, which were opposed to the continual (or continent) fever and to the acute or short-lasting fever. For the last two categories, P M have "slow continual and acute continual."

4 For this correspondence between melancholy and B D, see the root of the Tree and *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. III, n. 5. Salzinger comments on this passage, connecting it with the terms of Figure X, in his *Revelatio secretorum Artis*, *MOG* I, 295 = Int. vi, 43.

5 Counting inclusively; see n. 3 above.

the three compartments below the top one. But melancholy resists nature in the upper compartment, which resistance is sensed by experience; this is why the operation of melancholy takes place sensually in the upper compartment, which represents the fourth day, while the operation of nature is formed in the other three compartments, which represent health.

In the compartment of B D the simple and natural 4th degree of B is disordered through the excess influence of the 3 points each of B and D that are mixed in the matter underlying B D, which excess influence cannot be included in the above-mentioned 6 points, thereby destroying the 2 points of A and the 1 point of C. Now by this destruction of A C—which are thus deprived of their natural operation—their matter is corrupted, with the result that each of the 4 degrees are disjoined and desire another form to be present in the matter that they corrupt through dissolution and division, which is why the quartan fever is formed and engendered on that day.

In the compartment of B A nature, as well as it can, makes the 3 points of A concordant so that the 3 points of B can receive the matter underlying A in a well-ordered way. In the compartment of A C nature determines how the matter of C temperately receives the 2 points of A; and in the compartment of C D it determines how the matter of D should be subject to receiving 1 point of C. Now if nature finds itself unable to arrange things in this way,[6] then the influence of B D returns on the fourth day and destroys what nature had ordained to counteract the influence of B D. This being the case, and in accordance with what you can see from the Sixth Distinction, you can know why it is that quartan fever comes every fourth day.

From what has been said above you can acquire knowledge of the density and thinness of elemental matter. For the denser the matter, the longer it takes for the quartan fever to return. And do you know why? It is because nature has greater space and time in the compartments of B A, A C, and C D, where matters take longer to interpenetrate. This shows you that if fire existed in its sphere as a simple body, detached from the other elements, it could not pass through water, with water existing as a simple body in

[6] M adds, "before the fourth day."

its own sphere, nor could fire associate with earth, nor would it have anything with which to receive B, nor would earth have its operation in fire; and the same would follow for C D.

Just as the week runs its course in seven days, so quartan fever runs its course through the four compartments of the quadrangle of melancholy. And just as the first and eighth days are the beginning of a week, so B D are the beginning of quartan fever; and just as the first day preceded the eighth, so B precedes D in the beginning of quartan, which is owing to the fact that B is in 4 and D in 3 in accordance with it formation in K. This being the case, you can get to know how quartan begins with B D, on the fourth day arrives at the compartment of C D, on the seventh day changes to that of A C, on the tenth is in that of B A, and on the thirteenth day returns to the compartment of B D[7] and on that day it is stronger because of the compartment's being composed of B D. And the same follows if one continues with the numeration.

If you know how to make use of what we have said above, and if you remember the paragraph of E K that is found in Chapter 8, then you can understand how sickness and nature coincide on one day and at one point in one being more contrary to the other, and this will permit you to know the days of the cure, or of death. For just as on its strongest days the sickness has the greatest inclination towards nonbeing, so nature on that day should have a greater inclination towards being than on any other day. Now if nature is not overpowered in the greater onslaught of the disease, if the entire disease does all in its power, and if the power of nature is greater than the power of the disease, then one entirely overcomes another, and conversely. But when nature does not exert all of its power against the disease, then the disease cannot conquer all of nature, and do you know why? Because nature does not have in act all the power it conserves potentially; and the same follows for nature's overcoming of the disease.

[7] Thus in the Latin sources; the Catalan MSS have the fourth, eighth, eleventh, and fourteenth days, respectively. But from the following list, it seems to me the Latin sources must be right (the boldface days are the ones mentioned in the text):

B	D	**1**	5	9	**13**
B	A	2	6	**10**	
A	C	3	**7**	11	
C	D	**4**	8	12	

As a result of understanding the above explanations, you can elevate your intellect to understand how the sickness and nature survey the compartments of the figure until they finally pit all their power one against the other so strongly that all their power is in act and none is left over in potentiality. And when one actual power is overcome by its contrary, then the disease has run its course or the patient is dead.

If you, the doctor, want to cure a sickness, you should work at having your mind examine the triangles until you know how to conserve the powers that nature holds in potentiality, so that the disease will place all its power in act before nature does, and so that nature may then have as much or more power in act than the disease, with some remaining in potentiality, which potential power is the root and support of the actual power.

Chapter 23. DOUBLE QUARTAN FEVER

DOUBLE quartan fever begins in the compartment of B D, changes over to that of A C, from which it returns to B D, for which reason it is worse in B D than in A C. Now if you have understood the foregoing, then you can understand how a disease has greater power actually and potentially in B D than in A C, while nature has greater power actually in A B and greater power potentially in A C. For the more the disease leads its power against nature from potentiality into act, the more nature tries to bring even greater power from potentiality into act, conserving power in actuality. But since the fever is double, nature is so often troubled by the disease that, if it continues for long, its subject is corrupted and cannot arrive at the previously mentioned ordering against the disease.

Simple and double quartan are different in that the means are more mixed and better prepared in double than in simple quartan for some humors to pass over to others. And because nature does not have as much of a time interval in which to recuperate or order its powers against the disease, therefore the double is stronger than the simple; and the stronger it is, the more power nature must put into act and the less in potentiality, which is why nature is more disposed to being overpowered by the disease in its double than in its simple form.

Nature conserves the means by which A B are in accord, and the same follows with the means of A C, of C D, and of D B, as was shown in Chapter 7. And the sickness does the exact contrary of what nature does; thus, in the destruction of the subject of the qualities, the disease is increased, which is why in the double form the humors are more intermingled and divided up than in the simple form: they are more intermingled so that they can be more contrary, and more divided up, insofar as their matter is corrupted by not being subject to form. This being the case, you can infer the cure for double quartan from what we have said about simple quartan.

Chapter 24. SIMPLE TERTIAN FEVER

TERTIAN FEVER begins in the compartment of A B in the quadrangle of choler, and on the third day it changes to the compartment of C D, and on the fifth day it returns to the compartment of A B, which is why it is worse on the fifth than on the third day, on the ninth than on the seventh day, and on the thirteenth than on the eleventh, and the same follows if one continues counting, as was explained in the chapter on simple quartan fever, which provides the principle according to which you may know, with simple tertian, the day of the cure or of death.

Since choler is hot and dry, and since tertian fever is beneath the form of choler, you can therefore apply what you have learned about quartan to tertian. This shows you that fire is a lighter, quicker, thinner, and more operative element than water, in that it more often works with earth to engender and bring back simple tertian fever than water with earth in engendering simple quartan; and the same is true of double quartan and double tertian. Nature, therefore, has less time to order the compartments against the disease in the quadrangle of choler than it has in that of melancholy. You can therefore see that tertian accords with triangularity through the quickness and thinness of its matter, while quartan accords with quadrangularity through the slowness and density of its matter.

So strongly and frequently is A joined to its simple matter that it impedes B from carrying out its operation, which is that of drying the matter of A, and because of this impediment D cannot

pass over to cool the matter of A. As a result, natural operation comes into privation and there takes shape another foreign operation by which choler and tertian are increased. You should therefore give the patient matter which is thin and of the complexion of D C so that the matter of A B may be eliminated.

The reason why in tertian fever the matter subject to B is too dried out is that D cannot travel or pass over to the matter of A, nor can it fill the matter of B with the matter of water, which receives the matter of air subject to C. Thus, if you want to help the matter of B, you should give the patient enough C D so that the matter of C D is enabled to travel over and pass through B and through A. And if you have understood the triangles and the conditions of the tree, you will be able to help B as we have explained above.

Chapter 25. DOUBLE TERTIAN FEVER

DOUBLE TERTIAN begins with A B, changes over to the compartment of A C, on the third day changes to the compartment of C D, then changes to the compartment of D B, and returns to the first compartment of A B on the fifth day, in which it is stronger than on other days; and the same is true of the ninth day, which is stronger than the seventh, and so on, by which reckoning we know the times of greatest activity.

The double form runs its course between day and night, using some of the compartments and leaving aside others, according to the hours and points.[8] Now in the compartments that the fever leaves behind, nature sets to work and disposes how it can act against the fever in the compartments through which it travels, while C D rest so as to recover their strength. Since, however, nature does not have as long a time or interval to act against the disease in the compartments when the fever is double as when the fever is simple, and since A B do not have to rest as much as they do in the simple form, therefore one can see that the double form accords more with greater and with nonbeing, than does the simple form. This knowledge, in turn, shows you that the matter of A B is nearer to another form and farther from the form of the

[8] Cf. Dist. VI, n. 13 above.

patient in double than in simple tertian; while the matter is thinner and quicker in the double than in the simple form. And if this were not the case, A B would not have as much operation nor frequent action by greater as by lesser, which is impossible and contrary to natural principles.

The above impossibility shows you that, in urine, A B dissolve more of the matter of C D in double than in simple tertian, and that urine is therefore redder and thicker in the double than in simple tertian. This is why, beneath the color of blood and water, the color of fire, i.e., brightness, and the color of earth, i.e., blackness, lie more hidden to your bodily eyes in the double than in the simple form of the disease. Now if you understand this, your understanding of this principle will permit you to understand the weakness of the individual sensual senses, and the superiority of the intellect, which raises itself up to understanding over and above the bodily senses.

There are many things I could tell you about double tertian, disclosing many of its principles; but from what we explained before about simple tertian and from the principles given above, you can guide yourself to an understanding of double tertian.

Do you know why tertian does not last as long as quotidian fever? Because it always strikes in two compartments of the wheel, as we have explained, while quotidian fever strikes in all of them, and because nature is stronger in all of the compartments than in just some of them. And this is why quotidian fever lasts longer than tertian.[9]

Chapter 26. QUOTIDIAN FEVER

QUOTIDIAN is a daily fever, and it differs from double tertian in that it can belong to the quadrangle of phlegm, to which double tertian cannot belong.[10] Moreover, it takes more from the compartments than does double tertian, and beneath the perceived color of urine it conceals more intellectual color than double tertian, and it is a stronger dissolvent of matter, as well as being

[9] P M interchange the order of these last two paragraphs.

[10] The point being that since tertian occurred every other day and double tertian had alternating onsets (see n. 3 above), the latter therefore had daily recurrences and could only be differentiated qualitively from quotidian.

contrary to nature for a longer time. Thus, in accordance with the pulse and urine, and in accordance with the division of day and night into four parts[11] so that A, as well as B C D, may have their proper times, you can find out to which quadrangle of the figure a quotidian fever belongs.

Chapter 27. CONTINUAL AND ACUTE FEVERS[12]

CONTINUAL fever is one that uses all the compartments of the quadrangles, yet it differs from acute fever in that the latter is equally dominant over natural operation in every compartment, while continual is greater in some compartments than in others. As a result, acute fever is worse than continual.

Nature is so strongly and frequently disturbed and overcome in the compartments of the figure that the soul cannot act as form to the body and the body constitute the instrument of the powers of the soul; and this is why people suffering from continual and acute fevers speak foolishly and without discernment. However, since people suffering from tertian or quotidian also speak foolishly, this shows you that continual and acute have their roots in tertian or quotidian,[13] so as to be more vigorously contrary to nature. And the same thing is revealed to you in tertian fever where no purge is carried out, since it becomes like continual where no purge is done until the end of the disease, because nature is powerless there.[14]

We have dealt very briefly with quotidian, continual, and acute fevers, since we dealt at length with quartan and tertian, and you can use the principles of quartan and tertian as a guide to understanding and curing the other fevers, providing you follow the conditions of the tree and providing you are favored with the permission and aid of divine power.

[11] For this division of day and night into four parts—morning, midday, sunset, midnight—see Llull's *De regionibus sanitatis et infirmitatis, Opera medica*, Int. iii, p. 3.

[12] P M have "Slow Continual and Acute Continual Fevers"; cf. n. 3 above.

[13] In P replacing (in M in addition to) the last clause, we have, "and this is a sign of the transmutation of tertian itself or quotidian into continual."

[14] P M have, "because nature is powerless to effect a purge there, until the disease has been completely subdued.".

HERE BEGINS THE EIGHTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF URINE

IN GENERAL there are four kinds of urine by which the four general colors of the elements are revealed. Thus, just as, in A, E has B C D beneath it, so one color has the others beneath it. As a result of the disease, however, and the dissolution of humors, many special colors are formed as a sign of particular diseases. And since from universals one can descend to particulars, we will therefore deal universally with the four kinds of urine associated with choler, blood, phlegm, and melancholy.

Chapter 28. CHOLERIC URINE

JUST AS BY feeling the pulse you can recognize the two humors denoted by the two different beats that the pulse makes on your fingers, so, in simple tertian fever, fire and earth exhibit their respective colors; for insofar as the urine is light and red, it denotes fire, which *is* light. And this light is revealed in the blackness of earth, as you can see when you shake fire from flint in the darkness, in which darkness the fire's light is better seen. Thus the secret of fire and earth is revealed to you, namely, that fire is related to light and earth to blackness.

A red color present in urine is an indication of blood, which accords with air, which air is revealed in the color of blood, while water is revealed in its matter, as is the case with wine containing a great deal of water, which great quantity causes the color and matter of the wine to incline toward a white color. Now if you understand this, you will understand that just as the four elements are revealed in their operations through A B C D, so they reveal their operations through the above-mentioned colors in urine.

Thus the redder the color of urine, the less is its lightness, and this is due to the fact that the subject of B is more filled with

matter, leaving the fire little in which it can manifest its light, nor earth the blackness that it manifests in the light of fire. Hence thick, red urine is a sign of more corrupted matter than is light, red urine.

Just as you cannot, in this world, have a demonstration of God except through His works, so you cannot have knowledge of the elements except through their operation. This is why you must remember the green triangle in which their operations are diversified, accorded, or contrasted, and in which they are diversely manifested in accordance with the diversity of your individual senses. For just as A in E is revealed through knowledge,[1] so in urine it is revealed by color. Thus, if you understand this principle, you can use it to elevate your intellect to the understanding of many other principles by which the secrets of the elements will be made clear to you in their operations.

Chapter 29. SANGUINE URINE

THE URINE that is of C A is of a red color and thick, and since C is contrary to B, B cannot be a subject for representing the brightness of A, nor can A manifest the blackness of B; therefore in this redness C is revealed in both color and matter, while A is revealed only in matter. Now if you have understood that, you will understand that C has A beneath it, insofar as in the urine C is demonstrable by both color and matter, and A is demonstrated by means of the matter without the color; and this is why you can visually perceive both color and matter.

In the urine that is of C A, A is made manifest in both virtue and matter, while D[2] in the matter alone, which matter is thick and subject to C, thus explaining why the urine is red and thick. Now if you understand this, you can understand how the elements are differentiated in virtue and in matter. Thus, the redder and thicker the urine, the more matter it contains of each of the four elements. Since, however, C A are present in it in greater virtue

[1] Thus, *per saber*, in the two Catalan MSS; P M have *per saporem*, "by taste"; the photograph of G is difficult to read here, but it looks like *per calorem*, "by heat." As for the Catalan, even though the verb *saber* can (as in Spanish) mean "to taste," the corresponding noun (in both languages) is always *sabor*. J. Gayà, whom I consulted on this point, says the first is the most likely reading, in the sense of something theoretically intelligible. He definitely discards "taste," and says the "heat" is probably a later interpolation.

[2] Thus in D P M; A G have "C."

than B D, you should therefore cure the patient with thin matter and with increased virtue of B D.

In the privation of the operation of C A their virtue is destroyed, and in the destruction of their virtue, their matter is corrupted. And by this you can understand that the thicker the matter, the greater the impediment to the movement of the heart and to the operative virtue of C A. This is why you should alleviate the matter by bloodletting, so that there will be no cessation of the operative virtue of C A, by which virtue the operative virtue of B D is renewed.

Chapter 30. PHLEGMATIC URINE

URINE that is of D C conceals within itself the color of A B if it is white and thick, and contains a certain red color like that of water in which raw meat has been washed. If, however, it is white and thick with no admixture of another color, this indicates that D is greater; and if it is white and thick with a tendency towards blackness, then D accords with B in matter and is in disaccord with C in virtue, in that it more clearly reveals that which follows from its action than that which follows from its passion.

By a color composed of a lot of white and a little red, or one composed of a lot of white and a little black, one can recognize how D sides with C or with B against A, the reason being that C B accord with A, as a result of which D is against B when it shows red and against C when it shows black. Now if you understand this, you can understand how, by means of B C, something can be favorable to A against D, coloring the urine with red and no white, or with light yellow and no black. Now if in turn you have understood this, you will know whether to do the cure by similarity or by contrariety: by similarity insofar as A accords with B C and B C with D; by contrariety insofar as A can, through in intermediary, oppose D, being concordant with B C so as to destroy the concordance of D C B. And if you do not understand this, turn back to the degrees, triangles, and the conditions of the tree, and then you will understand it.

Chapter 31. MELANCHOLIC URINE

THE URINE of melancholy is white and clear: white through D, and clear because water is retained by the earth, which acts as a

dry recipient for it, so as to mortify C in the water. Now if you understand this, you will understand how earth retains water against C, and as a result of this understanding, you will be able to break the recipient with C A, if you know how to allow your mind to investigate the degrees and the triangles.

Just as the sun lighting up the air makes the day, so the concordance of B D in matter make the night, which is of a black, thick color, and this is why urine appears to you in a similar color, which is black and thick, its blackness being projected by a quantity of earthy and watery matter. Thus if you understand this and want to cure the patient, you should increase the virtue of A C by some thin matter of A C, so that its virtue may enter the thick matter of B D.

It often happens that, through some accident, the urine does not reveal the truth about the disease, and you must therefore have recourse to the patient's pulse, to the color of his face and eyes as well as that of his body, so as not to be deceived by the urine concealing the disease beneath its visible color.

HERE BEGINS THE NINTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF PULSE

THERE ARE, in general, four kinds of pulse corresponding to the operation of A B C D, which operation begins with the heart sending A B C D to all parts of the body, giving them A and drawing D to itself, so as to strengthen natural heat, and so that too much A does not destroy the heart.

Chapter 32. CHOLERIC PULSE

SINCE CHOLER is composed of A B, they make two beats against your finger, one from A and the other from B. One beat precedes the other, and one is greater than the other, and they do not occur in the same place. The beat of A is greater and prior to that of B, and they occur near one another. In addition, they are sharper, more frequent, and take place in emptier blood vessels than the beats of other complexions.[1]

As a result of the movement of the heart, A strikes a blow to C so that it passes over to D, C strikes a blow to D so that A can pass over into it,[2] D strikes a blow to B so that is passes over to A, and B strikes a blow to A so that it may put D in it. Now of all these beats only two are felt, that is to say, those of A and B, since in choler they are greater than the other beats.

The more the heart needs D to cool off A, the more it speeds up the aforementioned beats. Thus, by the frequency of the beats and by the triangles you can acquire knowledge of the pulse. And when the urine reveals the strong action of choler and the pulse is weak, this signifies that the body has lost its virtue and strength and A B have destroyed the subject of C D.

[1] This paragraph is considerably expanded in P M.
[2] I.e., "into D," as stated in M; the "into B" of G is surely an error.

When a person has tertian fever, C D pass so often through A B that A corrupts the matter of D and D corrupts the matter of A, while C corrupts the matter of B and B corrupts the matter of C. And as a result of the corruption of this matter, the form is also corrupted, and the 7th point of A desires another form in that matter, so that it may have the other points beneath it in an orderly, unopposed way. If, however, this point has power against the sickness, then one letter strikes against the other so often that finally each recovers its virtue, with each letter strengthening its matter by its own beat, and by that of the other.

Chapter 33. SANGUINE PULSE

A SANGUINE pulse is thick, full, and soft, and it has two beats, one of C and the other of A. Because of the thickness of the matter involved, the beats cannot be as frequent[3] nor as close to one another as they are in a choleric pulse. As a result, a disease of a sanguine nature is not as rapidly curable as is one of a choleric nature, nor does it destroy its subject as rapidly as does choler. Moreover, the beat of C is stronger than that of A, yet that of A, is sharper and more penetrating than that of C.

Chapter 34. PHLEGMATIC PULSE

PHLEGM is stronger through D than through C, since D is present in it in the 4th degree, and C in the 3rd, and therefore D makes a stronger, fuller, and harder beat than C. Moreover, the beats of D C are not as frequent as those of C A, because the matter is heavier and thicker in a phlegmatic than in a sanguine pulse.

Chapter 35. MELANCHOLIC PULSE

MELANCHOLY makes two perceptible beats, the stronger one of B and the weaker of D. The beat of B is sharper, harder, and prior to the beat of D. Moreover, the beats are more frequent than those of C A in the sanguine pulse, while they are more sluggish and farther apart than those of choler.

According to the rule and disposition of what we have said about pulse under choler, you can understand about other kinds of pulse, each according to its quality.

[3] Thus in D A G; P M have "rapid."

HERE BEGINS THE TENTH DISTINCTION, WHICH TREATS OF METAPHOR

1. METAPHOR is one thing signifying another,[1] like the sick person who is near death and is cold, yet desires cold and searches around the bed to see if he can find it. This signifies that the feeling of cold is destroyed by large amounts of heat, and therefore nature, in the sick person's desire to find cold, indicates that it would like to recover the feeling it has lost, that is, the cold the sick person is suffering from and yet does not feel.[2]

2. When fever comes with cold and the sick person wants heat and is hot from the fever, then metaphorically the sick person wants heat to counteract cold, even though he already has more A than D. Thus his desire signifies that the natural heat is corrupted and that D enters A corrupting said natural heat, which is why the sick person feels D and does not feel A, and why he desires A to counteract D.

According to the foregoing, the sick person desires food that is either contrary to, or concordant with, health. For just as he desires cold even though he is hot, so does the 7th simple point that we discussed in the Distinction of *Generation and Corruption*[3] cause him to desire food which is contrary to health or to sickness, depending on whether that point tries to oppose the disease or whether it desires that matter to have some other form.

[1] Note the definition of this term (for which see "Llull's Thought," text at n. 63), as well as previous references to this concept in connection with medicine in Dist. I, nn. 7, 29, 31, 36. For general commentaries on this distinction, see introduction, text at nn. 15–18 above; Pereira, "Le opere," pp. 21–2 (and above all n. 51 there); and the Salzinger passages cited in Dist. I, n. 29 above.

[2] In the Mainz edition, each of the sections that follow is given a title; but since there is none in any of the medieval sources consulted, we have omitted them. Note that the problems of these first two sections were discussed in *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 60, the text at n. 74.

[3] Dist. VI above.

3. The seven days of the week and the seven planets[4] symbolize the 7 points in which is divided that A which is in the 4th degree, while the 7 points of A, plus the 3 of B, the 2 of C, and the 1 of D in E symbolize the twelve Apostles and Jesus Christ, who was their leader; just as the simple seventh point determines the form for the other 12 points in E, in K, in O, or in S.[5] And the simple 7th point, which does not enter into composition with the other points, symbolizes the seventh day on which God rested, which determines the form for the other six days of the week, just as the 7th simple point determines the form for the 6 points which are mixed with B C D.[6]

4. The above-mentioned noble simple point, which determines the form of the other points in an elemented body, metaphorically reveals to you that the Son of God became incarnate so that the humanity he took on might constitute the goal and fulfillment of all creatures and so that the Son of God might be the fulfillment of that humanity, and so that all of the divine essence might constitute the fulfillment of creatures because of that humanity. And the contrariety of the points that are contrary to the 7th point, which contrariety makes them come to corruption and defect, symbolizes for you the fact that all men who are contrary to the humanity that the Son of God assumed are in great error.

5. In every place and in every elemented body the 7th simple point desires a simple body having diversity of matter, form, and conjunction[7] without corruption and contrariety, and in its search for such a body it moves ceaselessly day and night, as well as causing the other points it has beneath its sway and whose form it constitutes to move towards the same end. And this metaphor reveals to you the unity and trinity of our Lord God, who exists as a simple form without matter, who has in Himself distinction

[4] For the correspondences between the seven days of the week and the seven planets, see the same references as those given in Dist. VI, n. 15 above. The Latin and Romance (not to mention English) names for the days of the week are of course *etymologically* connected with the planets.

[5] This, insofar as I can make out from the photographs, is the reading of G; A P M have "in E, or [in] K and O"; D has just "in E or in K, etc."

[6] Cf. Dist. VI, n. 3.

[7] Cf. Dist. II, n. 20, and the text corresponding to that note, where this topic is presented in somewhat more detailed fashion. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 53, rightly points out the considerable importance of this paragraph

of persons without distinction of essence, and who is the fulfillment of all fulfillments, as well as the simplicity and concordance of all perfections.

6. By the above-mentioned simple point, nature conserves its species and leads forms from power to act; and by means of said point health is preserved and the Resurrection is revealed; without which that noble point could not have nor attain what it desired. Moreover this point reveals to you the simple elements along with their spheres and operations, as well as the compound elements existing in the points beneath it. Lastly, it denotes health and sickness; and many other things that it would take too long to recount are revealed metaphorically by the above-mentioned noble point. Thus, if you love science, you must be sure to have knowledge of it.

7. The degrees, triangles and conditions of the tree reveal to you how one virtue is joined to another, and one vice with another, as well as how the virtues and vices are contrary to one another.[8] And by the examples given you in this book you can acquire knowledge of the sciences of theology, law, nature,[9] and medicine; for just as the 7th point is the fulfillment of health, so the mixture of the degrees and the flowers of the tree and their conditions constitute a metaphorical demonstration of the above-mentioned sciences.

Thus, just as a tree loaded with fruit metaphorically signifies that you should do good works, just as the bird flying through the air represents Jesus Christ's cross, and just as the leper and the donkey signify that insofar as you would not want to be a leper or a donkey you should avoid sin, for the love of God, who could turn you into a leper or a donkey, in the same way the second branch of the tree metaphorically signifies the first branch. For by the examples we have given concerning the second branch, the secrets of the first are revealed to you, and this is why the final intention of this Art is for the understanding to be able, by means of one principle, to attain artificially the understanding of another.

[8] See Yates, "Art," p. 153, for a commentary on this sentence.

[9] M adds, in parenthesis, "natural philosophy"; Llull is indeed here referring to the four books of Principles (cf. introduction above).

For in any other way contrary to this one, there would be no Art for understanding one principle by means of another.

8. The firmament moves around the earth, and man constitutes the finest elemented body because the operation of the elements is noblest in him. Metaphorically, this shows you how the active noble 7th point, in the extremities of a body, moves the points for which it provides the form, while in the heart it is refined and clarified as much as it can so as to remain simple.

9. The 7th point demonstrates and signifies to you that on one day of the week you should fast, eating and drinking little, so that said 7th point can in this way rectify and order the other points which, through an excess of food, have become disordered in their material being, for which the 7th point constitutes the form. And the same follows for the temperance you should exercise if you care about health and want the 7th simple point to provide the form for the other points.

10. The fact that the 4th degree of A B C D is impelled from potentiality to act and from act to potentiality only in human beings metaphorically reveals to you the greater temperament in the human body than in any other body, with the 4th actual degree keeping the other fourth degrees analogously potential, and providing the form for the other acting degrees, which the 4th degree makes similar to itself. And this metaphor about similarity of natural operation reveals to you the divine secret existing in the Holy Trinity of our Lord God; for just as it is natural for every creature to try to make something similar to itself insofar as it can, so in the Divine Essence it is proper that there exist diverse operations, among which must be that which makes something similar to itself in infinite virtue, power, wisdom, love, and essence. And if this were not so, creature, with its operation and appetite, would accord with being, majority, and perfection, whereas God would accord with minority, imperfection, and privation. This, however, is impossible and contrary to the square and to the conditions of the tree, which impossibility reveals to you the secret of the Incarnation of the Son of God, who became incarnate so as to make a creature almost similar to Himself, that is to say, the humanity He took on, which was a likeness of Him insofar as it was

better, more powerful, wiser, more lovable, and possessed of more virtue and justice than all other creatures.

11. The mixture and conjunction of the matter underlying A B C D in E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y metaphorically reveal to you the primordial matter[10] that is power and subject, as well as the universal matter common to the particular and special matters of A B C D, which particular and special matters are revealed to you metaphorically by the particular and special matters of E F G H K L M N O P Q R S T V Y. Now these four matters are general, universal, and common, and constitute a power with respect to the matter underlying the forms of the individuals of the natural species, which individuals are sensual so that they may metaphorically represent prime matter and its parts which underlie the elemental, insensible, intelligible forms from which are begotten the sensual individuals to which they return through corruption, as is signified to you in the conditions of the tree, and in the mixing of the degrees and triangles, as well as in the potential forms of A B C D. For when A heats the matter of D, then D exists potentially in its matter, and conversely; and the same follows for B C, B A, A C, C D, and D B, which shows you that the matters in which the above letters are present potentially are themselves particulars,[11] which in turn reveals the elements, and at the same time the primordial matter underlying the particular matters in which A B C D exist potentially and actually.

12.[12] In the spring, when you see flowers, buds, and leaves appear on trees, and you know that it does them good to be pruned and plowed, this reveals to you metaphorically that you should bleed and bathe yourself frequently, and that you should eat and drink little so that there be no hindrance to the passing over of one matter into another among A B C D, nor to their mixing; and there should be instruments in the form of adequate places for this passing over and mixing, so that all year long there might

[10] M adds, helpfully, "of which we spoke in the Third Distinction, ch. 9, The Mixture of E S, in the corresponding paragraph," which would seem to be the one preceding n. 5 there.

[11] And not "are *in* particulars," as in M.

[12] § 12 of the Mainz edition appears as § 25 of the medieval Catalan sources that I have followed. The number, therefore, of each of the following §§ 12–21 is one *more* in the Mainz edition than here. For other changes of order, see nn. 20, 24, 27, 29, 32, 34 below.

be ordered fruit for the preservation of health, which fruit is signified to you metaphorically in the fruits and seeds of the tree. This, therefore, being the case, divine and natural disposition and ordinance reveal to you metaphorically how you should fast and eat little in Lent, and how Lent comes in the most fitting season of the year, with the exception of foods contrary to health.

13. When you see that a man or a horse, as a result of running too much, is quickly tired, and the master taking care of him too quickly does not do things as well as he would if he did them slowly, this shows you metaphorically why it is that nature cannot sustain a long life in a man who eats and drinks too much, lies too much with women, and does other things in which nature has to overexert itself to carry them out, as a result of which overexertion nature does not have as noble an order nor as long an operation as it would have with a man tempered in his actions.[13]

14. If you are sick and have an appetite to eat or drink something of the complexion of E or of S, and if it is beneficial for you to eat or drink it, then nature is metaphorically making its demands by means of natural appetite; but if the above thing is harmful to you, then nature is revealing, by means of natural appetite, that it has lost the virtue and operation by which the thing desired would be beneficial. And the same applies for touch and feeling, if you make ointments or plasters from the things you desire and put them in the places where you are suffering from pain or from some other infirmity.

15. In E the 4th degree is divided into 7 points, the 3rd into 7, the 2nd into 6, and the 1st into 4, and thus E is divided into 24 points,[14] which symbolize the 24 hours of the day and night, sig-

[13] P M add, "which metaphor signifies that the patient should diet while sick, so as to evacuate the places through which A B C D must travel."

[14] The apparent contradiction between this passage and that corresponding to Dist. VI, n. 3, is best explained by the following diagram based on the circle of elements in Table 5 in the *Ars demonstrativa*, and in which the numbers in parentheses represent degrees, the solid lines represent the points in the above-mentioned passage of Dist. VI, and the solid *plus* the broken lines represent the parts described in the *Liber exponens Figuram elementalem Artis demonstrativae*, *MOG* IV, 2.



nifying that each point has its appointed hour according to its natural appetite,[15] and the same is true for K O S. And by said letters you can understand about the letters that are beneath them, namely F G H L M N P Q R T V Y; moreover, you can understand the division into the above-mentioned points in accordance with the operations of the elements and with the triangles. And the reason why in E the 7th point of A is greater than the 7th point of B is because the latter exists potentially in the 4th degree in K or in another species, while the former exists actually. And the 7th point of A and of B, the 6th of C, and the 4th of D are conceived in this division as simple points, of which the only one actually operative is the 7th of A, while the rest are potential. This reveals to you how primordial matter is the potential for generation and corruption, with those points which are potential able to become actual.

16. In E it is A which receives the 3rd degree and which gives the 2nd,[16] and A is not differentiated in itself in the differentiation of the operation of the 3rd and 2nd; for if it were, it would follow that there would be four A's in E: one in the 4th, one in the 3rd, one in the 2nd, and one in the 1st degree, which is impossible, contrary to the course of nature and against the conditions of the tree. Now if you have understood this metaphor, it will have revealed to you the fact that in God there is no difference of divine essence between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, even

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which gives the following figures:

degrees:	4th	3rd	2nd	1st	
points:	6	3	2	1	solid lines
or:	7	4	3	2	including the extra simple point in each case.
plus					
parts:	6	6	5	3	solid plus broken lines
or:	7	7	6	4	including the extra simple points.

The justification for the last row of figures, which gives the required 24 points, can be found in the same *Liber exponens, MOG* IV, 5, where the apparently confusing statement that the 7th point of simple earth (that is the column of the 3rd degree above) "is equivalent to the 4th point of earth which was discussed in the *Liber Chaos*, in the chapter on the Four Degrees of the Elements" (i.e., *MOG* III, 264–5 = Int. v, 16–17, where the figures in the third line above are given), is explainable in terms of this chart.

[15] For a more systematic relation between the elements and the twenty-four hours of the day, see the *Ars compendiosa medicina, Opera medica,* Int. ii, 20ff.

[16] Thus in D A G (insofar as I can make out from the photographs of the latter); P M, however, have, "Moreover in E, that which A receives is in the 3rd degree and that which it gives to C is only in the 2nd, " with the phrase "to C" lacking in P.

though one person is different from the other. For just as A exists throughout E in the 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st degrees without difference within itself, so and incomparably more so does the divine essence constitute, throughout the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, a single divine essence with no difference within itself, even though the persons are different.

17. When you see that the fire which is beneath the pot moves the water boiling inside it without causing any motion in the pot itself, this metaphorically shows you how, just as A B C D are set in motion in the body of the pot from the fire burning the wood, so as to reach the boiling water, similarly, as a result of what reaches the human body from its tasting, smelling, and touching, A B C D are set in motion in the body without destroying the matter that is subject to the human form, which matter and form it will have after resurrection and which is neither reduced by a diminution of size nor augmented by increase of thickness.

18. When you see water nourishing vegetables and making them grow, this metaphorically shows you that in a similar way blood nourishes animals' bodies. Moreover, just as rain is engendered from vapors coming from the earth, which are compounded and broken up in the air, so is blood engendered from exterior things entering your body, and just as rainwater comes from the air, so it is demonstrated that natural heat comes from the blood as it flows throughout the body in order to pass on and nourish natural heat, with A B C D engaged in their respective operations.

19. The fact that men who have been more blessed with gifts of nature[17] or virtues are more predisposed to being vainglorious than other men signifies that, according to the conditions of the triangles and of the square, neither a natural gift nor one of virtue is in itself of any advantage to man without the grace of the Most High. Thu the greater the good that man has within himself, the less appropriate it is by its very greatness, and as a result man is belittled in proportion to the greatness of the gift. Therefore the most gifted men are those most tempted by vainglory; yet as a

[17] Instead of "gifts of nature," M has "temporal prosperity."

result of this temptation, they are better prepared to gain merit through humility and fortitude.[18]

20. If A could destroy all the matter subject to B, the latter would have nothing in which to exist and would be in privation, and therefore A would be God, since it would be able to destroy that which cannot be destroyed except by divine power alone. Now if you have understood this metaphor, you can therefore understand that if you had the power to create a creature, it would follow that you would be God and not a creature. And do you know why? Because you would have the power that pertains to God alone. Thus, if you have understood this metaphor, it should signify to you another, which is, that if you could be God as a result of creating a creature, how much more there must exist in God that which, by engendering infinite power, is God. If this were not the case, and if you, as a result of creating a creature, were God, it would follow that creating a creature were a greater thing than creating infinite power, but this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the triangles and the square, which impossibility and contrariety metaphorically demonstrates the existence of the Trinity in God.

21. If your will accords with being, perfection and majority against non-being, defect, and minority, and if you had the power to be better and nobler than all other creatures, then your will would *want* you to be better than all other creatures, and by this will and power you would make yourself better and nobler than all other creatures. Now if you have understood this, your understanding will reveal to you how the divine power and will want one creature to be nobler and better than all other creatures, for if it did not do so, your will would be more concordant with being, perfection, and majority and against nonbeing, defect, and minority than the will of God; but this is impossible and contrary to the conditions of the triangles and the square, as a result of which impossibility and contrariety the Incarnation of the Son of God is revealed to you, as well as the nobility and superiority of Jesus Christ's human nature over all other creatures. And this revelation in turn reveals to you metaphorically the procession of the

[18] M adds here two sentences that are in none of the medieval sources consulted.

person of the Holy Ghost existing in the divine nature. For if God wants Christ's human nature, which is joined to the person of the Son of God, to be better and nobler than all other creatures, how much more does He, and should He, want that person who is nobler and better than all creatures to issue from the person who is Father and the person who is Son. For if this were not the case, it would follow that God's will were more concordant with being, perfection, and majority in exalting one creature over and above all other creatures than in exalting His own nature above all other natures,[19] which is impossible and contrary to the above-mentioned conditions.

22. The Night Sphere.[20] If out of brass or some other metal, or out of paper, you make a wheel of the above name, which is an instrument for ascertaining the hours of the night—one like the accompanying figure—you will metaphorically be able to perceive from that figure in what hour of the night A B C D are dominant in relation to each other. For, in accordance with the motion of the firmament, each letter has greater power in one quadrangle of the night than in another. And if you know about this, you will be able to judge the proper hour for giving a medicine depending on how it accords with the quality represented by the letters, and with the hours. And if you are studying or traveling, this sphere will tell you what time of night it is.

Through the hole in the middle of the smaller wheel look at the Pole Star, closing one eye so as to be able to see it better, and in accordance with the twenty-four hours written on the sphere look at the larger Guard, which is a star revolving around the Pole

[19] Thus in the Latin sources; the Catalan MSS have, "above all creatures."

[20] In G M this section is placed at the end of the work. Moreover, the Mainz editors gave it the title of "The Nocturnal Astrolabe," whereas the medieval sources consulted have only "La espera de la nit" or "Sphera noctis," which, combined with the description, agrees much more with the simple instrument that in English was called a "nocturnal" (see the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., 1910–11, Vol. 19, p. 285, for a description and diagram) than with the much more elaborate instrument described a hundred years later in Chaucer's well-known treatise. Llull gave a far more detailed and clearer description of the same instrument in his *Liber de geometria nova* (ed. Millás, pp. 78–9), where he just calls it an "instrument for ascertaining the hours of the night." See also J. Sureda Blanes, *Ramon Llull i l'origen de la cartografia mallorquina*, Episodis de la Història (Barcelona, 1969), pp. 34–5, as well as Salzinger's curious *Glossa Discipuli* at the end of *MOG* I. According to the Catalan historian of science Julio Samsó, in the unpublished "Notas sobre la astronomía y la astrología de Llull," this is the earliest known description of such an instrument.



PLATE XX. The Night Sphere.

Star,[21] and don't move your head or your hands in which you are holding the sphere. Now in accordance with the straight line along which you have sighted the Guard, you will be able to know what time of night it is, and how long it will be till daybreak, provided that you know the course and order of the star denoted in the wheel. That is to say that the star which is called the Guard appears at sundown in the middle of June in the compartment in which "June" is written, and it disappears in the morning at sunrise in the compartment of October, since the night only has nine hours. After June it shifts over and appears in the compartment of July, where the night has ten hours, and it disappears in November. After July it shifts over and appears in August, and so on for all the remaining numbers until it returns to the compartment of June[22] at the end of a year.

And you must understand that the cross made up of holes in the smaller wheel should be straight up against your face, and you should hold the sphere at such an angle that your eyes should be equidistant from the larger circle and the middle one.

23. In K, B is contrary to C while D is contrary to A, and since B is in the 4th degree, and D in the 3rd, A C accord with one another against B D; and C is curable, because of the fact that A does not consume it as effectively as it does in O. This metaphorically shows you that the choleric person accidentally lasts longer than the sanguine as a result of the concordance of A C against B D. And this in turn metaphorically demonstrates to you that insofar as C is sufficient to act as subject to the operation of A, the vital spirit will last in the human body, and that A does not consume C so strongly in K as in O, since in O it is in the 3rd and in K in the 2nd degree.

If you consider the fact that God lets the devil tempt you with some sin God knows you will not commit, then you will see that the merit lies in the operation of a power, that is to say, in its act. For through power alone, without act, you would not be against

[21] The Two Guards or Pointers are in the shoulder of Ursa Minor (the Little Bear or Little Dipper), of which the Pole Star is the tip of the tail. The larger Guard (or Big Brother as Llull calls it) is undoubtedly the beta star Kochab, which is the brighter of the two. For an explanation of how it functions, see J. Vernet, *Estudios sobre la historia de la ciencia medieval* (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 421–3.

[22] The "July" of P M is surely a slip.

the devil's temptation, which is why your merit accords with being and perfection in the act of the power. Hence, if you understand this, you will see that through temptation you give glory to God.[23]

24.[24] For use against repletion, the following secret is metaphorically revealed to you—a secret you must not tell the patient lest he look down on the treatment—which treatment you can carry out in accordance with the following instructions. For a person suffering from repletion, in whom natural fire has been suffocated by an excess of food, divide what he usually eats during the day and night into seven parts by weight, and do the same with what he drinks; then put him on a seven-day diet, each day taking away one, two, or more units of weight of what he eats and drinks, at the same time adding a powder of simple qualities, one that is neither medicinal, pungent, nor constraining to nature. If the patient feels better, go on to the eighth day, and similarly from day to day until he feels too weak,[25] and then start giving him food again, one or two units of weight a day, until he has returned to his former state. Then you can gauge how the "middle" of the red triangle is related to A B C D in accordance with the yellow and green triangles and with the square. Then take this "middle" and give him the weight of food that accords with said "middle" in accordance with the conditions of the square, and each day add to it that powder whose ingredients are unknown to the patient and which this Art does not constrain you to make out of one thing more than out of another; only that you must, by means of color or some other thing, make it unrecognizable to the patient. And by such a treatment you can cure the sickness, and this treatment is safe and beneficial as well as a means of preserving health; so let this treatment be dearer to you than any other, because it accords better with the 7th point to which God has granted dominion over compound nature. And you should prescribe the weight of the powder to be one ounce, or to be in accordance with the weight of the food, which in turn accords with the above-mentioned "middle."[26]

[23] This second paragraph is lacking in M.

[24] § 28 in the Mainz edition.

[25] M has, "If on the seventh day the patient does *not yet* feel better, go on to . . . until he feels *less* weak" (the italics are mine).

[26] For the additional remaining part of this section in P M, see n. 34 below.

25.[27] There are some species of animals and plants in which poison is engendered, which poison is the result of an element drawing very near to its simplicity, and therefore when it enters the human body it is contrary to nature and to the compound elements, because it attracts to itself its likeness, while destroying what is not like it. And since a theriac[28] mortifies the poison, with the theriac itself being made up of the poison, this signifies to you metaphorically that laxative herbs are nearer to the simplicity of the elements than other herbs and farther from composition, which is why nature cannot tolerate them or put them into the vegetable power, and therefore expels them. This signifies that poison can be treated with laxative medicines, because nature expels the poison by having the laxative herbs accord with the poison and expelling the laxative herbs. This treatment is therefore given through the disposition of the green triangle and the square in accordance with one's experience of how laxative medicines combine in the stomach with the bad humors that detest composition in the stomach, where they are located.

26.[29] A pear which has the quality of B D metaphorically signifies that in the summer season you should mortify A with B D, for by increasing B you increase D, and by increasing D you mortify A as a result of A receiving B, and in doing so receiving D; and because B receives D, it mortifies the operation of A in C, where D is all the greater. And the same thing is signified to you about the other seasons of the year. For in winter you should mortify D with C A, for by increasing C you increase A, since air is of the quality of C A. And the same is signified regarding the autumn season, where you should mortify B with D C, for the greater the degree of D, so is C increased, by which increase you mortify B in itself and in its operation in A. And if in spring you want to mortify C, you should increase A B, for in the process of increasing A, B is increased, and the increase of B mortifies C in itself and in the operation it has over D. This being the case, you can see how to vivify the above-mentioned qualities, and how

[27] § 12 in M (see n. 12 above).
[28] See *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 53 n. 51 for this term.
[29] § 26–9 are number two *less* in the Mainz edition. The second word is thus, "pear," in M; D has *pera*, which in Old Catalan could mean either "pear" or "stone"; A G decided unequivocally for "stone"; P cut (or retied) the Gordian knot by writing *papaver*, "poppy."

the four seasons are like different species of simple medicine in which the four degrees are seen to be ascending and descending through the mixture and dissolution of A B C D in the said four seasons.

27. In the summer season B is greater than in winter as a result of the increase of A; it does not follow, however, that D is greater in summer than in winter, even though D is greater the more B is increased; for if this were the case, D would be greater in summer than in winter, which is not true in that D is beneath A in that species which is summer, just as in the species of E the 1st degree of D is beneath the 4th degree of A. This metaphorically signifies the difference between one treatment and another, and between one increase and another. For a treatment can be applied temperately by ascending and descending from one degree to another, as from the 4th to the 3rd, the 3rd to the 2nd, or the 2nd to the 1st, whereas another treatment can have A that is in the 4th degree descend to the 2nd, or from the 3rd to the 1st; which metaphorically signifies that with great D you can mortify a great A, and conversely. This is why in the summer there are cucumbers and squashes and the other simple medicines that have a great quantity of D C for the purpose of mortifying A B in said summer season, and the same follows for the other seasons and other treatments. This treatment, however, is not as reliable as the first one,[30] because it involves greater contrariety and difference, since the subject suffers more there, and since concordance accords better with minority and privation because of the fact that each element is more contrary to the other in its action and passion. If, therefore, you as doctor greatly esteem the art of medicine, these two metaphors should be very pleasing and memorable to you.

28. The root of the tree of the degrees metaphorically signifies that at the beginning of the sickness, during the time it takes A to enter C, C to enter D, and B to enter A, you should give preference to bloodletting over vomiting, and to vomiting over syrups or decoctions, and this so that nature can help itself more rapidly.

[30] The Mainz edition adds a helpful "contained in the previous chapter, which begins 'A pear which has the quality of B D.'"

29. Because, according to the course of nature, a person who drinks water eats more than one who drinks wine, this metaphor signifies that for a person without appetite who is thin and suffering from A B or from B D you should have him drink water at the beginning of his meal so that he can increase the D C in it.[31]

30.[32] Since the salamander lives in fire, this metaphorically signifies the way that its C receives A temperately when it breathes fire, in the same way that a person breathes air, which breathing[33] blocks the entry of the fire, just as a closed window blocks the entry into the room of the wind, which would enter with the window open. Now if you understand this metaphor you will understand how, in a sick person, to prevent some qualities from receiving too much from others.

31.[34] Just as in the science of medicine and even in that of nature, the 7th point is dominant over the other points, so in the science of law one should seek justice that holds to the common, noble good over any special good, judging the special to be subject to the general and wanting the special to be patient and humble while the general is dominant and perfect, so that the various species of justice may be conserved beneath it.

We could recount many other principles in accordance with this metaphorical Art,[35] but since we have to speak of the Principles of Theology, Law, and Nature, we must therefore bring these Principles of Medicine to an end, which work was finished with the help and blessing of our Lord God. Amen.

[31] The following portion of the corresponding § 27 in M is in none of the medieval sources and has the kind of very general advice (in this case about electuaries) that might well be spurious.

[32] § 29 in M.

[33] P M add "of the salamander" here, as well as changing the end of the sentence to "which enters when a window is open in another part of the room." The belief that salamanders could live in fire was widely held; cf., for instance, Aristotle *Historia Animalium*, 552b15.

[34] This section corresponds to the last part of § 28 in P M; cf. n. 26 above.

[35] Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 53, comments that in this "metaphorical Art lies the justification for all [Llull's] exemplarist literature."

FLOWERS OF LOVE AND FLOWERS OF INTELLI-GENCE

Introduction

LLULL'S MYSTICISM is a remarkable blend of three very disparate elements: Muslim, secular, and Christian. The first came to him from the Islamic mystics, the Sufis, to whom he openly acknowledged his debt in the prologue to the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, saying that they had "words of love and brief examples[1] that gave people great devotion" which he intended to use as a model. He used not only the outward form of this model, but also some of the key elements of its inner terminology, such as the conceptualization of the mystic relation between man and God as that between "lover" and "beloved,"[2] as well as the characteristic masculinity of both terms.[3]

Other parts of his terminology and imagery, however, seem to have come from his secular source—the troubadours—with whom we can be sure he was familiar before his conversion. From them he took the idea of unrequited love, with its consequent languishments, suffering, and so on, as well as some of the forms he used, such as the poetic dialogue.[4]

These more exotic and literary sources, however, must not make us forget his considerable debt to previous Christian mys-

[1] D. Urvoy in "Les emprunts mystiques entre Islam et Christianisme et la véritable portée du *Libre d'Amic*," *EL* 23 (1979), 39, suggests that these *paraules d'amor e exemplis abreujats* might well be a translation of the Sufi term *shaṭaḥat*, "ecstatic words." Llull's contact with Sufism could well have come from al-Ghazzali, with whose work we know him to have been familiar, and who was the greatest thinker to try to bridge the gap between this form of mysticism—to which he devoted his later years—and the more standard Islamic theology and philosophy. Another possible source—although there is no direct evidence—might have been one of the most renowned of all Sufis, the Spanish-born Ibn 'Arabi (1165–1240).

[2] Burton in his translation of the *Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*, Vol. V (London, 1885), 289, n. 2 says, "In Sufistical parlance, the creature is the lover and the Creator the Beloved." In the *Tree of the Philosophy of Love* (*ORL* XVIII, 72, and *OE* II, 26) Llull defines them as "beloved, whom we call God; lover, the man who loves God; and love, charity."

[3] For the masculinity of *amic* and *amat* (the corresponding feminines, *amiga* and *amada*, are never used by Llull) see the interesting remarks of R. Pring-Mill in "Entorn de la unitat del *Libre d'amich e amat*," *ER* 10 (1962), 57–8. The point was, of course, to put the relation on a more spiritual and, in a traditional Moslem sense, nobler plane.

[4] For the debt of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* to the troubadours, see M. de Montoliu, "Ramon Llull, trobador," *Homenatge a Antoni Rubió i Lluch* 1 = *EUC* 21 (1936), 363–98, along with the important modifications of his thesis suggested by D. Reichardt, "Ramon Llull, trovador: a propósito de un estudio de Montoliu," *EL* 7 (1963), 75–8. For the dialogues, see the third example below, so similar in form to some of the poems of the troubadour Guiraut de Bornelh.

ticism, and especially to that of the Franciscans, to whom he was spiritually so close.[5]

These were the three spiritual paths at the crossroads of which Llull lived. His achievement was not only to be intensely aware of their separate qualities, but even more, by the force of his personal vision and literary gift, to be able to join them into a single path of extraordinary beauty and strength.

Love lit up the cloud that came between the lover and the beloved, and he made it as bright and shining as the moon by night, and the morning star at dawn, and the sun by day, and the understanding in the will. And it is through this cloud so bright that the lover and the beloved speak to one another.[6]

The birds were singing at dawn, and the lover, who is the dawn, awoke; and the birds finished their song, and the lover died for the beloved at dawn.[7]

Then too there was an obsessional quality that Llull knew how to use with such force.

They asked the lover from what sort of a family he came, and he answered, "From love." "What are you made of?" "Of love." "Who engendered you?" "Love." "Where were you born?" "In love." "Who raised you?" "Love." "How do you live?" "By love." "What is your name?" "Love." "Where are you coming from?" "From love." "Where are you going?" "To love." "Where are you?" "In love." "Have you anything besides love?" He answered, "Faults and wrongs against my beloved." "Is there forgiveness in your beloved?" The lover answered that in his beloved there was mercy and justice, and therefore his own lodgings were midway between fear and hope.[8]

For Llull, however, to have reached such heights was not enough. If his system was really to be all-inclusive, if the structure

[5] See G. M. Bertini, "Aspectos ascético-místicos del Blanquerna (El 'Libre d'amic i amat' y los 'Fioretti' de S. Francisco)," *EL* 5 (1961), 145–62, and W. Schleicher, *Ramon Lulls Libre de Evast e Blanquerna, Eine Untersuchung über den Einfluss der franziskanisch-dominikanischen Predigt auf die Prosawerke des katalanischen Dichters*, Kölner romanistische Arbeiten, Neue Folge, 12 (Geneva and Paris, 1958). Others have mentioned Llull's debt to the *Song of Songs*, but it does not seem to me to go beyond the *general* debt of Western and Islamic mysticism to that poem. For a detailed discussion and balanced judgment on this point, see B. Seelemann, "Presencia del 'Cantar de los cantares' en el 'Llibre d'Amic e Amat' del Bto. Ramón Llull," *EL* 6 (1962), 283–97.

[6] *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, v. 123.

[7] Ibid., v. 26.

[8] Ibid., v. 97.

of his Art was really to embrace every *modus essendi et intelligendi*, then he had to find a place in it for the mystic experience. This he did first of all by relating it to the three Augustinian powers of the soul—memory, intellect, and will—which were so fundamental to his system.[9]

The beloved came to dwell in the house of his love, and his lover made him a bed of thoughts, and served him sighs and tears. And the beloved paid for his lodgings with remembrances.[10]

Usually it is on the latter two of these powers that Llull concentrates, putting them under the headings of *sciència* and *amància*.[11] The mystic experience, of course, falls under the latter heading, but this does not at all imply a separation between the two. In fact, as Llull himself says, "*amància* is defective without *sciència*, as is *sciència* without *amància*."[12] After the passage quoted at the beginning of this Introduction about the Sufis and their "words of love," Llull adds, "and these words need interpretation, by which interpretation the intellect is raised up, by which raising up the will is increased and raised up in devotion." Even more revealing is another passage from the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*:

> The lover asked the intellect and the will which of them was closer to his beloved. Both ran up to him, but the intellect reached his beloved first.[13]

The second way that Llull found to integrate mysticism into his system was more direct: it consisted in utilizing the fact that these two powers of the soul existed as dignities of God, thus permitting him to introduce them into the combinatorial mechanism of the Art, *sciència* coming under Wisdom with the letter F, and *amància* under Will with the letter G.[14] This possibility, however, does

[9] Cf. "Llull's Thought," text at n. 24 and *Felix*, Bk. VIII, chs. 53–5 with n. 46 there.

[10] *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, v. 231. For the use of the powers of the soul in that work, see the Pring-Mill article cited in n. 3 above; see also the remarks in Longpré, col. 1130.

[11] In the *Taula d'esta Art* (ORL XVII, 389), Llull says, "*Amància* refers to the will which loves, just as *sciència* refers to the intellect which understands." See also the *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 4. One should also note the parallel terms of "infused knowledge" and "acquired knowledge" discussed in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. II, n. 64.

[12] *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 4. See also Hillgarth's remark about the "great emphasis on the use of reason in contemplation" in Hillg, p. 38, with many references in n. 192 there.

[13] V. 19, quoted in Longpré, col. 1132. Charles Lohr has suggested to me that this might also constitute an allusion to the race of Peter and John to Christ's tomb (cf. *John* 20:4–8).

[14] See the Alphabet in "The Flowers of Love" below.

not seem to have occurred to him until relatively late in his development. During the quaternary phase of the Art he wrote only one mystical work, the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*.[15] It was only with the beginning of the ternary phase that he hit upon the idea of writing one group of works under the heading of *sciència*, comprising one "Art," the *Ars inventiva veritatis*, and one "tree," the *Tree of Science*, along with another group of works under the heading of *amància*, similarly comprising one "Art," the *Art amativa*, and one "tree," the *Tree of Philosophy of Love*,[16] all of which (with the exception of the *Tree of Science*) make use of the combinatory mechanism of this phase of the Art.

Now in the midst of this dichotomy, Llull wrote one little work to try to bridge the gap between *sciència* and *amància*: this was the *Flowers of Love and Flowers of Intelligence*, translated here. He did this purely artifically and combinatorially, by taking the mechanism that in the *Ars inventiva veritatis* and the *Art amativa* had articulated sections called "Conditions," as well as subsequent "Questions" based on said conditions,[17] and by extracting from this clear precursor of the "Table"[18] all the ternary combinations containing G for the first section of the *Flowers of Love*, and then all the ternary combinations containing F for the *Flowers of Intelligence*, and then repeating the process for the questions based on

[15] I am not counting in this category the very closely related works on contemplation and prayer (see the classification of Carreras i Artau in *OE* I, 66). For those on prayer, see *Felix*, ch. 105, n. 233. Those on contemplation are principally (1) the *Book of Contemplation*, which Carreras i Artau, loc. cit., calls the "obra troncal de la mística lul·liana," as it is for much of the rest of Llull's thought; (2) *Libre de oracions e contemplacions del enteniment*, more or less contemporary with the *Book of the Gentile*; (3) the *Art of Contemplation*, which forms the last section of *Blaquerna*, that immediately following the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*; (4) the *Contemplatio Raymundi*, which includes the *Quomodo contemplatio transeat in raptu*, probably written in 1297 in Paris; and (5) the *Oracions de Ramon* written in 1300; and (6) the *Contemplatio compendiosa* of 1313. The most complete survey of Llull's mystical writings is that in Ca I, 548–609. See also Longpré, cols. 1128–32, corresponding to the list of works in cols. 1103–4.

[16] See *Art amativa*, *ORL* XVII, 4, where this project is clearly formulated, at least for the two "Arts."

[17] In the *Ars inventiva veritatis* they occupy respectively Dists. II and IV, ii (*MOG* V, 13–36 and 185–203), and in the *Art amativa* Parts IV and V, i (*ORL* XVII, 154–235 and 238–303, but the structural mechanism is easier to see in Salzinger's Latin translation in *MOG* VI, 64–96 and 97–121 = Int. ii, 58–90 and 91–115, which is printed with the combinatorial letters).

[18] See Part I, nn. 4 and 7 below for references and explanations.

each of these two sections.[19] The two sides, of course, join in the ternary combinations containing both F and G.

F G T C. Wisdom and Love were so in accord in loving and understanding that the lover could not bear it, and he gave them both to his loving and retained memory for himself, which made him go about like a madman among people, remembering his beloved.[20]

The result is not so much a purely mystic work, as a curious and in some ways very characteristic little collection of aphorisms or proverbs, a form of which Llull was so fond during a certain period of his production.[21] These are mixed on the one hand with parables or "examples" involving the lover and the beloved, and on the other hand with headlong dashes into the correlative theory.[22] This discrepancy, however, is not as great as it would appear, since the "examples" are, for Llull, the ideal instrument for making the lover love, as is the correlative theory the ideal instrument for making the lover understand, the beloved.[23]

This work is among the several that Llull, during his year's stay in Naples in 1294, addressed to that tragic figure Pope Celestine V.[24] This was the unlettered hermit Peter of Morrone, who had

[19] This is the same combinatory mechanism that Llull uses in the *Tree of Philosophy of Love*; see the same Part I, n. 7 below.

[20] Part I, Flower 63 below.

[21] A period that covers roughly the ternary phase of the Art. It goes in fact from the end of the quaternary phase with the *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*, all of whose Dist. IV is a vast collection of proverbs, to the beginning of the post-Art phase with the *Proverbis d'ensenyament* of 1309, and includes not only the *Proverbs of Ramon* of 1296 and the *Thousand Proverbs* of 1302, but also the proverbs contained in the "Arbre exemplifical" of the *Tree of Science* as well as the proverblike sentences of the *Hundred Names of God*. Cf. J. Rubió Balaguer in *EL* 3 (1959), 266–8; *EL* 5 (1961), 143; and *OE* I, 105, all of which are very interesting on the relationship between the proverbs on the one hand, and the "examples" and definitions on the other; cf. also S. Garcías Palou's introduction to his Spanish translation of the *Proverbis de Ramon* (Madrid, 1978), which is particularly informative on the contemporary background to Llull's proverbs.

[22] The equivalent parables of the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved* are referred to by Llull as "metàfores morals." For the correlatives, see the "Life", § 26 and n. 128.

[23] The reader may wonder why this curious, hybrid, although not uninteresting little work was chosen for this anthology instead of one of Llull's better-known purely mystical works. In the case of the justly famous *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, it was the result of a general decision to avoid excerpts from larger works, and to avoid works already translated into English (see the Bibliography of Llull's Works at the back for its place in *Blaquerna* and for the *two* published translations by Allison Peers). In the case of the *Art amativa* and the *Tree of Philosophy of Love*, reasons of space dictated their exclusion, as well as the fact that Allison Peers had also done a translation of part of the second.

[24] For the works dedicated to him, as well as details of Llull's (as well as the Pope's) itinerary in 1294, see the "Life," n. 134.

been dragged from his retreat in the Abruzzi as a "manageable" candidate to end a two-year deadlock in the College of Cardinals, and who was crowned pope on 5 July 1294. He quickly fell beneath the sway of King Charles II the Lame, and moved to his capital city of Naples, where he lived completely out of place in a world of court intrigue and politics, until he resigned on 13 December of the same year. Llull's attraction to him—with the resultant stay in Naples—was doubtless due to a belief similar to that current among the Franciscan Spirituals that this was the *papa angelicus* who would lead a return to the poor and humble way of life of the Apostles, which of course would have made him an ideal champion of Llull's ideals and projects.[25] Nor was Llull timid in prodding him concerning what he felt was this pope's missionary duties.[26]

This little work, edited in *ORL* XVIII (Palma, 1935), is preserved in a single Catalan manuscript which might date from Llull's life-time.[27] The Latin text of *MOG* VI, 225–38 = Int. iv, seems to be a translation done by the editors from the text of this manuscript which was in their possession.[28] Our translation was done entirely from Galmés's text.

[25] For Llull's interest in the Apostolic way of life as a model, see *Felix*, introduction, text at n. 15, and Prologue. The other connection between this pope and Llull is the extraordinary coincidence between his resignation—the only one in history—and that of the hero of *Blaquerna* in Bk. V, ch. 96 of that work, who also does so to return to the ascetic life of a hermit. This has generated considerable discussion as to whether part or all of that novel might have been written after 1294. See the *ENC* edition of that work, Vol. IV, 67–73, for an extended discussion of the problem, although I agree more with the conclusions of Platzeck, "Miscelánea," pp. 397–9, that the whole novel was written earlier, some time around 1283 (see my "Cronologia," p. 45 and n. 64).

[26] Cf. Part I, Flower 71 below; the references of Part III, Flowers 70, 71, and 72 are more veiled.

[27] Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, MS 604 Hisp. 60. It contains the *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*, the *Book of the Five Wise Men*, the *Petition to Celestine V*, the *Flowers of Love and Flowers of Intelligence*, and the *Affatus*, which, as I hope to have shown in my "Notes," were all written in 1294. For the date of the MS, see *ORL* XVII, p. xx.

[28] Galmés (see n. 1 above) says there is a possibility, albeit slim, that the Mainz editors also consulted a Latin MS now lost.

PART I. FLOWERS OF LOVE

GOD, BY YOUR VIRTUE we shall pick these flowers of love.

IN ORDER to know these flowers of love we shall pick, we must set out the principles of the *Art amativa*[1] and know their definitions. These principles are: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth, and glory; difference, concordance, contrariety, beginning, middle and end, majority, equality and minority.[2] Moreover, these principles should be put in the following alphabet, which must be learned by heart; that is to say, that

goodness and difference are denoted by B
greatness and concordance by C
eternity and contrariety by D
power and beginning by E
wisdom and middle by F
will and end by G
virtue and majority by H
truth and equality by I
glory and minority by K.[3]

One must also know that the letter T indicates that those letters written before it represent the first principles and those after it the last ones, as for instance, B placed before T, which denotes goodness, while after T it denotes difference, and so on for the others.[4]

The mixture of these principles we have presented, and which we apply to love, gives rise to these flowers, by which the lover can know, love, and contemplate his beloved, who is God, and by which he can constrain his will to love.

[1] Written in 1290, immediately after the *Ars inventiva veritatis*; see introduction, text to n. 16 above, as well as the "Life," n. 113.

[2] For definitions of these eighteen principles of the ternary phase of the Art, see the *Ars brevis*, Part III. The definitions of the *Art amativa* to which Llull refers (*ORL* XVII, 89–150) are merely a much expanded version of those of the *Ars brevis* (cf. Part III, n. 1 there).

[3] These are, in effect, the first two columns of the Alphabet of the *Ars brevis*, Part I (see Table 6 there, which the reader should keep at hand to follow the combinatorial mechanism of this work).

[4] This is the same mechanism of the Table described in the *Ars brevis*, Part V. For its slightly difference structurization, see n. 7 below.

These flowers an unworthy Ramon Llull sends to the holy pope, Celestine V, and to his honorable and distinguished College, so that his *Petition*[5] for making God known and loved throughout the world may meet with diligence and remembrance through the loves from which the flowers are born.

GOODNESS WILL[6]

1. B C G.[7] Goodness, Greatness, and Love awoke the lover who was sleeping in the orchard of little good. The sleeping lover awoke and cried out: Love, love, love!

2. B D G. Because the lover, through goodness, made his loving endure, his love was good and enduring.

3. B E G. The power of love is so good that it makes the lover a captive of his loving.

4. B F G. Love cried out against Wisdom for doing so little to proclaim and present to people the goodness of his beloved.

5. B G H. Virtue of good loving is more lovable than virtue of good feeling.

6. B G I. Goodness, Will, and Truth wept in the presence of the lover and the beloved: Goodness wept because it was so little loved and held in truth by the lover; Will wept because the lover loved his beloved so little; and Truth wept because falsehood was so abundant in the world—and this was why the lover was afraid of his beloved.

7. B G K. Goodness and Will bound and seized the lover, and imprisoned him in the glory of his beloved.

[5] For Celestine V, see introduction above. For the *Petition to Celestine V* to which Llull refers here, and which appears as an epilogue to the *Book of the Five Wise Men*, see the "Life," n. 134.

[6] The *volentat* of the Catalan text appears throughout as *amor*, "love," in the Mainz edition; for the relationship between these two terms in Llull, however, see *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12.

[7] Even though this work was written after the *Taula general*, which presented the definitive version of the Table (see *Ars brevis*, Part V, n. 1), its combinatorial mechanism is taken from the earlier version of the Table presented in the *Ars inventive veritatis* and the *Art amativa* (see the references in the same note of the *Ars brevis*, as well as n. 17 of the introduction above). What Llull does here is to go systematically through that table extracting from it all the combinations containing the letter G denoting "will" or "love"; see the previous note). This is the same method Llull uses in the later *Tree of Philosophy of Love* (*ORL* XVIII, 95ff.; *OE* II, 33ff.; *MOG* VI, 170ff. = Int. iii, 12ff.), where the reader can find interesting parallels with Part I of this work.

8. B G T B. Difference entered, along with goodness, into the will of the lover so that it might be full of good and concrete things, such as loveful, lovable, and loving.[8]

9. B G T C. The concordance of goodness and love lies in the concordance of lover and beloved.

10. B G T D. No good thing is contrary to good lovableness.

11. B G T E. Goodness and Will began good loving with which the lover might love his beloved.

12. B G T F. So that the lover would not escape from the beloved, Goodness and Love bound the lover to his beloved with loving.

13. B G T G. The lover sought the end of his loving in the seas of Goodness and Love, and he would have perished if that end had not been his beloved.

14. B G T H. The lover complained to Goodness and Greatness about Love, which so tormented him through loving, whereupon Goodness and Greatness doubled the lover's loving.

15. B G T I. The lover rejoiced because goodness and love were equal in his beloved through bonifying and loving.

16. B G T K. The lover's loving was in minority of goodness and love, and as a result there was discord between the lover and the beloved.

GREATNESS WILL

17. C D G. The lover and Love were talking about the greatness and the eternity of the beloved, and Love said that if Eternity were not as great through eternalizing as through being, Eternity would not suffice for great loving.

[8] *Amatiu, amable e amar*. See *Ars brevis*, Part IV, n. 4, for a parallel use of the correlatives; here, however, there is no possibility in English of putting a -tive suffix on the root "love," forcing us to make do with "loveful," rather than changing roots to "amative." The curious use of the words "full" and "concrete" is best explained in the *Tree of Science*, where Llull says (*OE* I, 602; the italics are mine), "just as goodness is *full* of bonificative, bonificable and bonifying, so is the sensual tree *full* of the elementative, vegetative, and sensitive essence," and where he also says (*OE* I, 572), "the elementary tree contains primary *concrete* things . . . just as in goodness there is bonificative, bonifiable, and bonifying, which constitute its *essential* parts, and similarly in greatness, in which the *essential concrete* things are magnificative magnifiable, and magnifying." The concrete things or essential parts are therefore the correlatives, which Llull (*OE* I, 572, 601) opposes to the abstractions such as goodness, greatness, etc., with the latter being "full" of the former. Cf. Gayà, *Correlativos*, p. 108 for a résumé of this question.

18. C E G. Greatness and Power entered Love, so that its power would be as great through loving as through being what it was.

19. C F G. The lover said to those who loved that, because Wisdom and Will are equal in his beloved, his beloved loves Greatness as much in loving as in knowing.

20. C G H. The lover loved greatness of virtue, so that he could love his beloved with great and virtuous loving.

21. C G I. Greatness and Love begged Truth to verify their presence in the lover's loving, so that the lover might love his beloved with a true love.

22. C G K. The lover reprimanded the lovers of this world for not loving, with greatness, the glory of his beloved.

23. C G T B. Difference came between Greatness and Will, so that the one could bestow its semblance on the other.

24. C G T C. Greatness and Love rejoiced because the beloved and the lover were in concordance.

25. C G T D. Greatness, with Contrariety, wanted to enter the lover's loving, but it was unable to do so because the loving[9] was clothed in great concordance.

26. C G T E. The lover begins his loving with Greatness and Love.

27. C G T F. Love nourished its loving by means of Greatness, so that it would be great.

28. C G T G. The beloved created the lover for the purpose of Greatness and Love, so he would never cease loving.

29. C G T H. The lover placed his loving in the greatest amount of love he could find.

30. C G T I. Equality of Greatness and Love nourished the lover's loving, so that there might be an equality of loving between the lover and the beloved.

31. C G T K. Since minority accords with smallness, which is the contrary of greatness, Greatness and Love banished Minority from the lover's loving.

DURATION AND WILL

32. D E G. Lovability and the beloved were, in eternity, sufficient for love's loving.

[9] Thus in the Latin version, where the neuter *erat vestitum* could only refer to the "loving"; the feminine *era vestida* of the Catalan would seemingly have to refer to "greatness."

33. D F G. So that understanding might have the wherewithal with which to endure in love, lovefulness, lovability, and loving[10] endured in love, and understanding endured with them.

34. D G H. If loving consisted of duration and virtue, then the lover would never fail the beloved.

35. D G I. Eternity and Truth complained to the beloved about Love, because things that were false and transitory were loved more than those that were true and enduring.

36. D G K. The sleeping lover awoke and said to those gathered around him that with the glory of this world, which is of brief duration, they should buy the eternal glory of his beloved.

37. D G T B. Will begged Duration to make the difference between the lover and the beloved endure, for without difference there could be no loving.

38. D G T C. The lover said to Duration and Concordance that his beloved bestowed great grace on him by making him love him.

39. D G T D. Duration and Will bound Contrariety and took him captive, so that he would not come between lover and beloved.

40. D G T E. The beloved began fashioning the lover's love out of enduring and beginning, so that the lover would never cease loving.

41. D G T F. Duration and Will measured[11] the lover's love, so that they might know how much he had loved his beloved.

42. D G T G. The lover rejoiced because his beloved's goal was to make things eternal.

43. D G T H. "Beloved," said the lover, "the longer you make me sustain sufferings and adversities for love's sake, the more you make me love love itself."

44. D G T I. In the equality of lover and beloved are nourished duration and love, loving and enduring.

45. D G T K. Minority endured in loving so that the lover would lose his beloved.

[10] *Amativitat amabilitat e amar*; cf. n. 8 above.

[11] Because of the "F" after the "T," Llull is here referring to the middle of mensuration; cf. *Ars brevis*, Part II, § 2,2.

POWER AND WILL

46. E F G. Love complained to the power of the beloved about Wisdom, which so little understood the beloved, for by this littleness the lover was losing his beloved.

47. E G H. The lover loved his beloved with virtue, so as to be virtuous in his loving.

48. E G I. Before the beloved, Power accused the lover's will of not loving the truth as much as it could.

49. E G K. Since the power of the beloved was as glorious in glory as it was loving in love, the lover could find rest in loving his beloved.

50. E G T B. Difference entered Will so that Power could be present amoung Will's loveful, lovable, and loving.[12]

51. E G T C. Concordance entered Love so that the power of love could make the lover and the beloved concordant.

52. E G T D. The lover's will had two contrary powers: with one he could love his beloved, and with the other he could hate him. And this was why the lover wept—because he had the freedom to hate his beloved.

53. E G T E. Power and Beginning transmitted their likenesses to the will, so that the lover would have freedom in loving his beloved.

54. E G T F. The power and the will of the beloved measured[13] the power and the will of the lover, and they ordered them to have him go throughout the world giving praise to his beloved.

55. E G T G. With endless power and will, the lover promised that he would forever go everywhere to praise, preach, and honor his beloved.

56. E G T H. Those who love greater power of love, and despise themselves,[14] take up the Cross, with which they follow their beloved.

[12] Cf. n. 8 above.

[13] Cf. n. 11 above. See Galmés's introduction, *ORL* XVIII, xxvii—xxviii, for a brief commentary on Flowers 52, 54, and 55.

[14] "And despise themselves" is the reading of the Mainz edition, which is probably a (justifiable) correction of the "both despise themselves and" of the Catalan MS.

57. E G T I. Because there is equality of power and will in loving, the lover, in the beloved, loves empowering[15] as much as loving.

58. E G T K. The will and power of the beloved lay ill in the minority of the lover.

WISDOM AND WILL

59. F G H. The more the lover understands his beloved, the greater the virtue of his will in loving.[16]

60. F G I. Wisdom and Will begged Truth to tell the lover how to answer with necessary reasons those who asked about his beloved.

61. F G K. Wisdom, Will, and Glory told the lover to understand and love his beloved with all his might.

62. F G T B. The lover was singing a song about his beloved, and he said he made no distinction between the wisdom and will of his beloved; and he therefore wanted to understand the beloved as much as to love him.[17]

63. F G T C. Wisdom and Love were so in accord in loving and understanding that the lover could not bear it, and he gave them both to his loving and retained memory for himself, which made him go about like a madman among people, remembering his beloved.[18]

64. F G T D. Contrariety came between Will and Wisdom, so that the lover would neither understand nor love his beloved.

65. F G T E. The beloved said to the lover, "Whoever understands and loves my beginnings, loves and obeys my commandments."

66. F G T F. Wisdom told Will to tell the lover that if he was not with his beloved, he must be against his beloved.

[15] Cf. *Gentile*, Bk. III, n. 16.

[16] For a commentary on this "flower" from the existential standpoint, see E. de Antón Cuadrado in *EL* 7 (1963), 151.

[17] For a commentary on this "flower," see Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 228, as well as in *EL* 7 (1963), 72.

[18] For this "flower," as well as for this whole chapter where F and G appear simultaneously, see introduction, text at nn. 19–20 above. See also Sala-Molins, *Amour*, p. 133, even though he mistranslated the end of this "flower" as "among people who remembered his beloved."

67. F G T G. Will said, "Wisdom, if the lover loves himself more than his beloved, he loses his own self since he is acting contrary to the end for which he was created."

68. F G T H. Will said to Wisdom, "Tell those engaged in loving that no lover can love his beloved more than one who dies to honor him."

69. F G T I. Equality begged Wisdom and Will to send him understanding and love.

70. F G T K. The lover was singing a song of love, and he said to Wisdom that those who loved with a lesser love knew little about love.

WILL AND VIRTUE

71. G H I. Truth complained to Will and to Virtue about the Vicar of Christ for not sending holy people throughout the world to teach everyone the truth of God in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and to baptize those who, for lack of this baptism, would go to everlasting fire.

72. G H K. Will, Glory, and Virtue told Obedience that since the lover was engaged in loving, he should make him obedient to the commands of his beloved.

73. G H T B. Will and Virtue begged Difference to come and stand between lover and beloved, for without it the lover could not love his beloved.

74. G H T C. The more the lover clothed his loving with virtue, the more he accorded with his beloved in loving.

75. G H T D. Will and Virtue disciplined the lover with the adversities of this world so that they would vindicate the beloved.

76. G H T E. Because the lover had a virtuous beloved, the virtuous love of Will and Virtue was begun.

77. G H T F. The lover placed his loving in the midst of virtue, so that it would be farther from vice.

78. G H T G. As soon as the lover lost the purpose of love, he grew tired of loving and became wicked.

79. G H T H. The lover loved his beloved with greater virtue of loving, so that lesser virtue could not keep him from loving that which he wanted to love.

80. G H T I. Will and Virtue begged the beloved and the lover to be equal in loving.

81. G H T K. The lover lay sick beneath a tree, because he had less virtue in loving.

WILL AND TRUTH

82. G I K. Will loved Truth so that through it the lover might attain the glory of his beloved.

83. G I T B. Will loved Difference in Truth, so that the difference between loveful, lovable, and loving[19] might be clothed in truth.

84. G I T C. From the concordance existing in Will and Truth stems the concordance between lover and beloved.

85. G I T D. Contrariety entered Will, so that falsehood might be loved contrary to the truth and nature of loving.

86. G I T E. Beginning, in someone who has begun to love and verify, makes for a true lover.[20]

87. G I T F. Will and Truth joined and mixed verifying and loving, so as to bring together the lover and the beloved.

88. G I T G. The lover and the beloved are clothed in the purpose of Will and of Truth.

89. G I T H. Evil is the will that wants greater loving to be without truth.

90. G I T I. Will and Truth are filled with Equality, so that there may be equality in verifying and loving.

91. G I T K. Will sold[21] Minority to a false lover and false beloved so it would not exist in any true lover and beloved.

WILL AND GLORY

92. G K T B. It is through Difference that glorificative, glorifiable and glorifying are lovable in Glory; and through Difference that loveful, lovable, and loving are glorifiable in Love.

[19] Cf. n. 8 above. The Mainz edition has, "so that it might differ from a tendency to hate (literally "differ from hativeness") and hatefulness, and so that loving."

[20] For the "verify" here and the "verifying" of the next flower, see Part II, n. 6 below.

[21] The Mainz editors apparently interpreted *vené* as being the preterite of *venir*, and therefore translated the opening of this sentence as, "Will and minority came to a false lover."

93. G K T C. Without Concordance, Will cannot love glorificative, glorifiable, and glorifying in Glory; nor can Glory without Concordance glorify loveful, lovable, and loving in Will.

94. G K T D. If not for the little concordance existing between the lover and the beloved, Will and Glory would have abandoned this world, because there is so much contrariety in it.

95. G K T E. Without Beginning, glorifying and loving could not exist.

96. G K T F. Glorifying is the intermediary between glorificative and glorifiable, so that the will may greatly love glory.

97. G K T G. Since the end is as great in glorifying as in loving, therefore the will can come to rest in glory.

98. G K T H. It is not a good lover who wants to have greater glory than his beloved.

99. G K T I. Without equality of glorificative and glorifying, Glory could not make its loving perfect.

100. G K T K. Small is the loving of that will which, in glory, loves a lesser beloved.

PART II. FLOWERS OF INTELLIGENCE

GOD, BY VIRTUE of Your wisdom, we shall pick these flowers of intelligence.[1]

BY MEANS of the flowers of intelligence that we pick, it is possible to answer questions and prevail over the infidels who are against the Roman faith. An unworthy Ramon Llull therefore sends these *Flowers* with their corresponding questions to the Holy Apostolic Father Celestine V and to the honorable cardinals, so that they may see how one can refute the errors of the infidels and prove to them the truth of the Roman faith.

These *Flowers* and their corresponding questions follow the manner of the *Flowers of Love*, and they are based on the same principles and use the same Alphabet.

GOODNESS AND WISDOM

1. B C F.[2] If greatness were not as great in goodness as in wisdom, it would be small in goodness and great in wisdom.

2. B D F. Without bonifying and enduring there is no understanding.

3. B E F. Everything possible in goodness is possible, through power, in wisdom.

4. B F G. If goodness were not as lovable as wisdom, then all of wisdom would not be lovable.

5. B F H. If virtue were not as bonifiable as it was intelligible, there would exist some intelligibility without virtue.

6. B F I. The reason truth exists in goodness and in wisdom is for the sake of the truly bonificative, intellective, for the sake of the truly bonifiable, intelligible, and for the sake of the truly bonifying and understanding.

[1] Llull has a new invocation here, as if this were a separate work. Parts III and IV, however, clearly make it all one work.

[2] The mechanism here is identical with that in Part I (see n. 7 there), except that now Llull chooses every combination containing the letter F denoting "wisdom."

7. B F K. Since glory is as bonifiable as it is intelligible, the saints in glory are glorified as much through bonifying as through understanding.

8. B F T B. Because of the difference existing between goodness and wisdom, goodness is accidentally intelligible, as is wisdom bonifiable.

9. B F T C. Without concordance, goodness and wisdom could not be in accord.[3]

10. B F T D. If goodness and wisdom could be contrary to each other, then so could evil and ignorance.

11. B F T E. If goodness were a more universal principle than wisdom, more things would be bonifiable than intelligible.

12. B F T F. Just as it is good for wisdom that understanding be midway between intellective and intelligible, so it is good for goodness that bonifying be midway between bonificative and bonifiable.

13. B F T G. If the goal of goodness were greater than that of wisdom,[4] all of the goal of wisdom would not be good.

14. B F T H. If wisdom were greater through understanding than goodness through bonifying, then goodness would not suffice for understanding.

15. B F T I. It is impossible for goodness and wisdom, without equality, to be without majority and minority.

16. B F T K. Goodness, through bonifying, is as far from evil as wisdom, through understanding, is from ignorance.

GREATNESS AND WISDOM

17. C D F. Greatness of eternity consists in the fact that in it the essential eternificative, eternifiable, and eternifying are understood; and greatness of wisdom consists of the fact that in it the essential intellective, intelligible, and understanding are eternal.[5]

[3] See n. 7 below for an explanation of why this *sens concordansa no·s purien concordar* is not *quite* as tautological as it appears.

[4] The Mainz edition has it reversed: "If the goal of wisdom were greater than that of goodness."

[5] For this last correlative series, see *Ars brevis*, Part IV, n. 4. For the concept of "essential," see Part I, n. 8 above. For the convertibility of the Dignities, see the references in *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. I, n. 6.

18. C E F. Greatness of power means that in wisdom–through power—can be found essential intellective, intelligible, and understanding.

19. C F G. The reason why wisdom is great is that it contains essential intellective, essential intelligible, and essential understanding, and it is also great because all three are lovable. And the same is true of the will, which is great because it contains essential loveful, lovable, and loving, as well as because all three are intelligible.

20. C F H. The reason why wisdom has great virtue is because it is a greatly virtuous being that clothes itself in the intellective, intelligible, and understanding.

21. C F I. The reason why truth is great in wisdom is because it verifies in it the intellective, intelligible, and understanding; it is also great in wisdom because in it wisdom understands the essential verificative, verifiable, and verifying.[6]

22. C F K. Wisdom achieves great glory in glorifying the intellective, intelligible, and understanding, as it also does in understanding the glorificative, glorifiable, and glorifying in glory.

23. C F T B. In greatness, wisdom and difference have differentiating and understanding; for through differentiating, magnificative, magnifiable, and magnifying are distinct one from the other, and through understanding they are intelligible.

24. C F T C. In concordance, greatness and wisdom have concording, in which concording they have concordance.[7]

25. C F T D. Contrariety, in wisdom and greatness, is that which impedes their concordance.

26. C F T E. What greatness and beginning have in wisdom is great intelligibility and great commencibility of understanding.

27. C F T F. In greatness the intermediary is magnifying, and in wisdom it is understanding, while the intermediary between greatness and wisdom is the compound act of magnifying and understanding.

28. C F T G. Greatness and wisdom have, in their end, an abundance of concrete essentials, like greatness that in the end of

[6] The previous "verifies" and the closing "verificative, verifiable, and verifying" represent the correlative series on *veritat*, "truth," represented by the "I" of the combinatory letters; cf. *Ars demonstrativa*, Dist. IV, n. 43.

[7] Llull is here contrasting the infinitive, *concordar*, with the abstract noun, *concordansa*, in terms of his correlative theory.

magnificative has the end of magnifiable, in the end of magnifiable has the end of magnificative, and in the end of both, the end of magnifying; and the same is true for the essential correlatives of wisdom.[8]

29. C F T H. The reason why wisdom has greater greatness is to be found in understanding, which is the magnification of magnificative and magnifiable.

30. C F T I. The reason why wisdom has great equality is because it has in itself the essential, equal correlatives of intellective, intelligible, and understanding.

31. C F T K. Magnifying and understanding are those things on account of which greatness and wisdom are far from minority.

ETERNITY AND WISDOM

32. D E F. Power is related to eternity in enduring and to wisdom in understanding.

33. D F G. Wisdom and will partake of eternity, so that eternity may be eternally understood and loved.

34. D F H. Eternity partakes of wisdom and virtue, so that virtuous understanding may endure in wisdom.

35. D F I. Wisdom and truth partake of eternity, so that, in eternity, verifying and understanding may partake of eternifying.

36. D F K. Insofar as wisdom, eternity, and glory are one and the same thing, eternalizing, understanding, and glorifying partake of each other.

37. D F T B. Just as wisdom, without difference, would not understand, so eternity, without difference, would not eternalize.

38. D F T C. Concordance is composed of the concrete things of which wisdom and eternity are full.[9]

39. D F T D. In eternity and in wisdom there can exist no contrariety of eternalizing and understanding.

40. D F T E. The eternal intellect in the eternal intellective begins the eternal intelligible from eternity and wisdom.[10]

[8] For the "concrete essentials" and "essential correlatives," see Part I, n. 8 above.

[9] Cf. Part I, n. 8, for the terms "concrete" and "full."

[10] Thus in the Mainz edition; the Catalan MS has, "In the intellective, the eternal begins from eternity, and eternal wisdom is intelligible," the last clause of which the scribe had corrected (?) to "and eternal, understood, intelligible wisdom." Cf. *ORL* XVIII, 288, n. 2.

41. D F T F. Eternity and wisdom have their own kinds of measurement.

42. D F T G. Every created end partakes of eternal understanding.

43. D F T H. No wisdom is greater than eternity.

44. D F T I. It is just as fitting for equality to be in eternity composed of eternificative, eternifiable, and eternalizing, as in wisdom composed of intellective, intelligible, and understanding.

45. D F T K. No minority can possibly stem from eternal wisdom.

POWER AND WISDOM

46. E F G. It is thanks to power that possibility[11] exists in wisdom and will.

47. E F H. No power can be virtuous through ignorance.

48. E F I. By means of power and truth, the understanding is clothed in verifiability and possibility.

49. E F K. Since in God power, wisdom, and glory are one and the same thing, power can[12] glorify and understand.

50. E F T B. It is through difference that empowering can exist in power, and understanding in wisdom.

51. E F T C. It is through concordance that wisdom and power can accord, through power that wisdom and concordance can empower, and through wisdom that power and concordance can understand.

52. E F T D. Through the unity of wisdom and power wisdom cannot harbor ignorance nor power impossibility.

53. E F T E. The power of wisdom prevents ignorance from beginning.

54. E F T F. If empowering did not exist for understanding, understanding would not exist for empowering.

55. E F T G. There is a certain evil power by which wisdom can act contrary to the goal of its understanding.

56. E F T H. No power is greater through majority than that which is one with wisdom.

[11] *Poder* (Lat. *potestas*) and *possibilitat* (Lat *possibilitas*) all ultimately derive from Lat. *posse*, "to be able."

[12] See the previous note, as well as *Gentile*, Bk. I, n. 12.

57. E F T I. Equality is in power so that it may be present in wisdom, and equality is in wisdom so that it may be present in power.

58. E F T K. Because power and wisdom are not identical in man, man can empower and understand with minority.

WISDOM AND WILL

59. F G H. Insofar[13] as wisdom and will are virtuous through virtue, they have quantity through virtue.

60. F G I. Truth has as much intelligibility through wisdom as it has lovability through will.

61. F G K. Loving would no longer be glorious if understanding did not exist.

62. F G T B. In the difference of understanding and loving wisdom and will constitute essential principles.

63. F G T C. In the concordance of wisdom and will lies the habit of knowledge and that of love.

64. F G T D. Contrariety, with its contradicting, is contrary to understanding and loving.

65. F G T E. Without loving or hating, wisdom cannot begin to understand.

66. F G T F. So that wisdom and will may associate, wisdom understands loving and will loves understanding.

67. F G T G. Insofar as the will is intelligible and wisdom lovable, they constitute the goal of loving and understanding.

68. F G T H. Greater loving leads to greater understanding, and greater understanding leads to greater loving.

69. F G T I. Because God is equally memorable, intelligible, and lovable, He created equality of memory, intellect, and will.

70. F G T K. Because the intellect has freedom in understanding, and the will in loving, there can exist minority in understanding and loving.

WISDOM AND VIRTUE

71. F H I. Wisdom clothed its understanding in truth and virtue, so that with them it might understand truth and virtue.

[13] *En quant*, which goes with the "quantity" at the end of the sentence.

72. F H K. It is with virtuous understanding that the wise go to the glory of God, and with wicked understanding that fools go to infernal punishment.

73. F H T B. Without the virtue of difference, wisdom cannot understand.

74. F H T C. It is with virtue that the wise place concordance in the intellective, intelligible, and understanding.

75. F H T D. In the time of Jesus Christ and the Apostles, wisdom and virtue overcame contrariety with concordance.

76. F H T E. At the same time that wisdom began to understand, virtue and vice began their presence in its understanding.

77. F H T F. In the midst of virtue, wisdom takes on the habit of understanding.

78. F H T G. In accordance with its purpose, virtue is no greater in wisdom than in itself.

79. F H T H. That virtue is greater which makes for greater understanding.

80. F H T I. Equality of the intellective, intelligible, and understanding is not wicked.

81. F H T K. Through lesser virtue, wisdom has lesser understanding.

WISDOM AND TRUTH

82. F I K. Wisdom finally comes to rest when it places its understanding in truth, and truth comes to rest when it verifies understanding.

83. F I T B. Without difference, no truth is intelligible.

84. F I T C. Without concordance of wisdom and truth there is no true understanding.

85. F I T D. Without contrariety there is no false understanding.

86. F I T E. In the truth in which wisdom begins to understand, no false understanding can be initiated.

87. F I T F. According to the nature of the means, wisdom can place its understanding in verifying.

88. F I T G. By the nature of the end, there can be verifying[14] in understanding.

[14] The Mainz edition has "wisdom can verify."

89. F I T H. With greater verifying, wisdom has greater understanding.

90. F I T I. With equality, wisdom and truth find rest in verifying and understanding.

91. F I T K. Wisdom, with lesser truth, cannot have greater understanding.

WISDOM AND GLORY

92. F K T B. Wisdom could not understand glory without the difference between glorificative, glorifiable, and glorifying.

93. F K T C. Wisdom could not find rest in glory without concordance of glorificative, glorifiable, and glorifying.

94. F K T D. By means of the contrary of glory, wisdom can understand glory.

95. F K T E. All created wisdom was begun for the attainment of glory.

96. F K T F. Wisdom cannot find rest in any glorifying that is not the intermediary between glorificative and glorifiable.

97. F K T G. If there were no purpose in glorifying, there would be none in understanding.

98. F K T H. Without the essential glorifiable and the essential glorifying, which are of the essence of glory, wisdom could not understand greater glorificative.

99. F K T I. Equality of intellective, intelligible, and understanding finds rest in equality of glorificative, glorifiable, and glorifying.

100. F K T K. Greater understanding cannot find rest in lesser glorifying.

PART III. QUESTIONS CONCERNING LOVE

THESE QUESTIONS can be solved by the flowers of love, with each question having its corresponding flower denoted by number and letters.

GOODNESS AND WILL

1. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "why is your goodness, which is so great, so little loved in this world?" *Solution:* B C G.

2. *Question:* Love asked the lover what sustained his loving. *Solution:* B D G.

3. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "why do you not make me love you more?" *Solution:* B E G.

4. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "why do most men love you more through fear than through love, if love is nobler in loving than in fearing?" *Solution:* B F G.

5. *Question:* Goodness asked Love why it did not make him increase more in loving than in feeling, since feeling was not of the essence of love. *Solution*: B G H.

6. *Question:* The lover was asked why he was sad before his beloved, when the presence of the beloved should be a reason for great joy. *Solution*: B G I.

7. *Question:* "Will," said the lover, "if you are free, then who has taken away my loving?" *Solution*: B G K.

8. *Question:* Goodness and Difference asked the lover of what it was that his will was full. *Solution*: B G T B.

9. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover who it was who had placed discord between goodness and will.[1] *Solution*: B G T C.

10. *Question:* Goodness asked Love why the lover found opposition in loving his beloved. *Solution*: B G T D.

[1] In this work the plural "(other) lovers" is always used to translate *amadors*, while the singular "lover" always translates *amic* (in this work, at least, Llull never uses the former in the singular or the latter in the plural). The "discord" is a correction in the Catalan MS, written over a crossed-out "difference." Undoubtedly influenced by the letter "C" of the solution, the Mainz editors put "concordance." That letter could, however, also suggest its opposite, "discord"; cf. the similar situation in Question 24 below.

11. *Question:* "Lover," said the beloved, "who began your loving, for he could have begun it in such a way that I would not have allowed myself to be loved by you?" *Solution*: B G T E.

12. *Question:* Goodness asked Love if anything could separate the lover from his beloved. *Solution*: B G T F.

13. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover[2] why he put himself in danger of death for the sake of loving. *Solution*: B G T G.

14. *Question:* Goodness asked the lover why he complained about love; and love asked the lover why he complained about goodness. *Solution*: B G T H.

15. *Question:* "Lover," said love, "how can there be equality between goodness and myself in your beloved, if in your beloved goodness and myself are one and the same thing?" *Solution*: B G T I.

16. *Question:* The lover asked who it was who had put discord between him and his lover, when his lover was so lovable. *Solution*: B G T K.

GREATNESS AND WILL

17. *Question:* Greatness asked Love whether the lover loved his beloved as much for his works as for his being. *Solution*: C D G.

18. *Question:* "Love," said the lover, "since my beloved is so lovable, could you grant me loving as great as his lovability?" *Solution*: C E G.

19. *Question:* "Love," said the lover, "is my beloved as great through loving as through understanding?" *Solution*: C F G.

20. *Question:* A great vice came to the lover and asked him why he did not let him enter his loving. *Solution*: C G H.

21. *Question:* Greatness and Truth asked Love in what his loving was clothed. *Solution*: C G I.

22. *Question:* "Will," said the lover, "since you are so great, why do you love such small loving?" *Solution*: C G K.

23. *Question:* Lovers asked Love if it could be great without difference between lover and beloved. *Solution*: C G T B.

24. *Question:* Greatness asked Love what made the beloved and the lover be far from discord. *Solution*: C G T C.

[2] See the previous note. The reader should remember in connection with this question, that Llull had just returned from his first unsuccessful trip to North Africa.

25. *Question:* Greatness asked Love if contrariety was part of its essence. *Solution*: C G T D.

26. *Question:* Lover, said love, what is greatness in loving? *Solution*: C G T E.

27. *Question:* Ladies of love[3] asked the lover why he had such great loving. *Solution*: C G T F.

28. *Question:* Greatness asked the Goal of Love why the lover did not weary of loving. *Solution*: C G T G.

29. *Question:* Greatness asked the lover if he wanted to put her in his loving. *Solution*: C G T H.

30. *Question:* Greatness asked Truth if it was true that the lover loved himself as much as his beloved. *Solution*: C G T I.

31. *Question:* The lover asked Greatness and Will who it was who had cured him of his sickness. *Solution*: C G T K.

DURATION AND WILL

32. *Question:* Duration and Power asked the lover what made love suffice for its loving. *Solution*: D E G.

33. *Question:* Will asked Wisdom what made its understanding endure, and Wisdom asked Will what made its loving endure. *Solution*: D F G.

34. *Question:* The lover asked Love what made greater loving endure. *Solution*: D G H.

35. *Question:* "Love," said Truth, "why does false loving exist in you?" *Solution*: D G I.

36. *Question:* Lovers asked the lover if he wanted to sell his loving. *Solution*: D G K.

37. *Question:* "Difference," said the lover, "why do you come between me and my beloved?" *Solution*: D G T B.

38. *Question:* Love asked the lover what his loving was made of. *Solution*: D G T C.

39. *Question:* Concordance asked Will to whom the lover belonged when he opposed his beloved. *Solution*: D G T D.

40. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover what was a greater punishment, dying or not loving. *Solution*: D G T E.

[3] In the *Tree of the Philosophy of Love* (*ORL* XVIII, 72–3, and *OE* II, 26) Llull defines *dones d'amor* as the roots of the Tree of Love, which roots are in fact the eighteen principles given in the Alphabet at the beginning of Part I above.

41. *Question:* "Lover," said Eternity, "was there ever a time when you did not love your beloved?" *Solution:* D G T F.

42. *Question:* Eternity and Will asked the lover why he spoke only of his beloved. *Solution*: D G T G.

43. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "why do you allow good men to associate with wicked men?" *Solution*: D G T H.

44. *Question:* The lover found himself in danger in the seas of love through excess love. Other lovers asked him why he did not perish from so much love. *Solution*: D G T I.

45. *Question:* "Love," said the lover, "why is my loving sick?" *Solution*: D G T K.

POWER AND WILL

46. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "why does Love torment me more, the more you make me understand you?" *Solution*: E F G.

47. *Question:* The Power-of-Virtue and Love asked the lover[4] what it was with which false lovers indulged in wicked loving. *Solution*: E G H.

48. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover why, if he cared so much about love, he hesitated to tell the truth about his beloved. *Solution*: E G I.

49. *Question:* The lover asked Glory if its glorifying was as powerful as Love's loving. *Solution*: E G K.

50. *Question:* "Difference," said Love, "why do you come between my loveful, lovable, and loving?" *Solution*: E G T B.

51. *Question:* Contrariety asked Power if it could enter love, for it wanted to place discord between the lover and the beloved. *Solution*: E G T C.

52. *Question:* Contrariety and Concordance asked the lover if he had greater power to hate than to love. *Solution*: E G T D.

53. *Question:* "Love," said the lover, "why am I so constituted that I find it easier to love another than my sovereign beloved?" *Solution*: E G T E.

54. *Question:* The lover was asked why he had left country and friends and traveled through distant lands undergoing hardships

[4] This is Galmés's interpretation; the Mainz editors interpreted this phrase as "The lover asked the power of virtue and love."

and dangers in places where he was scorned and ridiculed by people.[5] *Solution*: E G T F.

55. *Question:* The Goal-of-Love asked the lover why he did not carry out his promise to his beloved, since he was able to carry it out. *Solution*: E G T G.

56. *Question:* "Will," said Power, "through what[6] can the lover have greater loving?" *Solution*: E G T H.

57. *Question:* Other lovers asked Equality-of-Power and Love why the lover was afraid of dying or of suffering adversities for the sake of honoring his beloved. *Solution*: E G T I.

58. *Question:* The lover ate less power and drank less love, and he was asked why he was ill. *Solution*: E G T K.

WISDOM AND WILL

59. *Question:* The lover asked Wisdom if vice could exist in those who greatly understood and loved his beloved. *Solution*: F G H.

60. *Question:* The lover was asked if he felt more obliged toward his beloved through loving than through understanding.[7] *Solution*: F G I.

61. *Question:* Obedience asked the lover if he were ever disobedient toward the beloved, who had made him so honored in the world, and who had made him such a public figure.[8] *Solution*: F G K.

62. *Question:* Wise lovers asked the lover if the beloved had created him more to love than to understand. *Solution*: F G T B.

63. *Question:* Wisdom, Concordance, and Will asked the lover why he had no moderation in loving. *Solution*: F G T C.

64. *Question:* The lover was asked if ignorance had as great concordance with loving as did understanding.[9] *Solution*: F G T D.

[5] Cf. n. 2 above.

[6] Thus in the Mainz edition, which, in view of the antecedent Part I, Flower 56, would refer to the taking up of the cross. The Catalan MS, however, has *qui*, which would mean "whom," and would in this case refer to the beloved.

[7] The Mainz edition has, "more obliged to love than to understand his lover."

[8] *Persona comuna*; cf. *Felix*, Bk. VIII, ch. 100, n. 217.

[9] Thus in the Catalan MS; the Mainz editors and Galmés emended it to "as with understanding," the reason for which I fail to understand. From the combinatory letters "T D," the answer clearly involves the "contrariety" between "ignorance" and "understanding," and the former's lesser "concordance" with "loving."

65. *Question:* The lover asked Beginning if it existed in his loving before it existed in his understanding. *Solution*: F G T E.

66. *Question:* Wisdom and Will asked the lover if there was any intermediary between him and his beloved. *Solution*: F G T F.

67. *Question:* The lover asked the beloved why he had said that those who love their souls lose them. *Solution*: F G T G.

68. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover whether the lord who dies for his vassal has greater love than the vassal who dies for his lord. *Solution*: F G T H.

69. *Question:* The lover asked Wisdom and Will if they could be full of equality without loving and understanding. *Solution*: F G T I.

70. *Question:* The lover asked his beloved why, if he would rather have sinners be converted and live than die, he did not send preachers to convert them. *Solution*: F G T K.

WILL AND VIRTUE

71. *Question:* The lover asked those around him if they felt the same devotion that existed in the time of Christ and the Apostles, and if they knew where that devotion had gone and why it was taking so long to reappear, for among Christians public service was becoming a thing of the past. *Solution*: G H I.

72. *Question:* Virtue asked Glory and Will, why, if the beloved had commanded his lover to lead his sheep to pasture, the lover, through love, did not do so. *Solution*: G H K.

73. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover if he loved the difference existing between himself and his beloved. *Solution*: G H T B.

74. *Question:* "Love," said the lover, "who has stripped my loving of virtue and concordance?" *Solution*: G H T C.

75. *Question:* "Will," said Virtue, "why do we torment the lover with contrariety, when we are already tormenting him with concordance?"[10] *Solution*: G H T D.

76. *Question:* "Lover," said Love, "for whom do you feel virtuous loving?" *Solution*: G H T E.

[10] The Mainz edition has, "Virtue said to Love, why does the lover begin with contrariety after we began with concordance?"

77. *Question:* The beloved asked the lover if a person's loving was wicked when he did not love as much as he could. *Solution*: G H T F.

78. *Question:* The beloved bestowed the purpose of love on a man of little virtue, and lovers asked that man if his loving had increased. *Solution*: G H T G.

79. *Question:* The lover was asked why he did not flee from love, since it tormented him so much. *Solution*: G H T H.

80. *Question:* Lovers asked if, in will, there was equality of lover and beloved. *Solution*: G H T I.

81. *Question:* "Will," said Virtue, "who put the lover beneath the wrath of the beloved?" *Solution*: G H T K.

WILL AND TRUTH

82. *Question:* "Truth," said Glory, "do you know why I am so little loved?" *Solution*: G I K.

83. *Question:* Difference asked Will if it loved him as much in Truth as in himself. *Solution*: G I T B.

84. *Question:* Truth asked the concordance of lover and beloved where it came from. *Solution*: G I T C.

85. *Question:* "Will," said Truth. "if Falsehood is detestable, then why is it loved?" *Solution*: G I T D.

86. *Question:* The lover asked Truth why false loving was allowed to begin. *Solution*: G I T E.

87. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover and the beloved who had brought them together. *Solution*: G I T F.

88. *Question:* The beloved asked the lover if he wanted to give away or sell the loving that had united them in the orchard of love. *Solution*: G I T G.

89. *Question:* "Will," said Truth, "why do you love falsehood with greater loving?" *Solution*: G I T H.

90. *Question:* Truth asked Will if in the will of the sovereign beloved there was equality of loveful, lovable, and loving. *Solution*: G I T I.

91. *Question:* Will wounded Truth,[11] and lovers asked why Truth was lying sick. *Solution*: G I T K.

[11] *Veritat naffrà volentat*, which would seem to mean "truth wounded will," but since this sort of word order is free in Catalan (i.e., has no binding syntactic significance) and since the sense requires the reverse, I have taken the liberty of turning it around. The Mainz edition has "falsehood wounded will."

WILL AND GLORY

92. *Question:* The lover asked the beloved if Difference was as lovable in glory as in will. *Solution*: G K T B.

93. *Question:* Will asked Concordance if it existed in the glory that the lover had so loved. *Solution*: G K T C.

94. *Question:* Other lovers asked the lover why he passed through places where contrariety held such sway. *Solution*: G K T D.

95. *Question:* The lover asked his beloved if there was as much glorifiability in glory as there was commenceability in beginning. *Solution*: G K T E.

96. *Question:* "Beloved," said the lover, "in Glory, will my loving be able to find rest without substantial glorifying?" *Solution*: G K T F.

97. *Question:* "Lover," said the beloved, "of what is your glory full?" *Solution*: G K T G.

98. *Question:* "Lover," said Will, "why do you love yourself with greater loving, and your beloved with lesser?" *Solution*: G K T H.

99. *Question:* Other lovers tempted the lover and asked him if he loved equality as much in the glory of his beloved as in his will. *Solution*: G K T I.

100. *Question:* "Will," said Glory, "why in me do you love minority as opposed to greater loving?" *Solution*: G K T K.

PART IV. QUESTIONS CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE

THESE QUESTIONS are solved by the Flowers of Intelligence, and in the same way as these questions are solved by said flowers, other alien questions can similarly be solved, since the flowers constitute universal maxims, while the questions concern particulars.

GOODNESS AND WISDOM

1. *Question:* Whether God's goodness is as great as His wisdom. *Solution*: B C F.

2. *Question:* Whether in God goodness, eternity, and wisdom constitute a single entity. *Solution*: B D F.

3. *Question:* Whether the good man can do as much, through goodness, as the wise man through wisdom. *Solution*: B E F.

4. *Question:* Whether goodness is as lovable as wisdom. *Solution*: B F G.

5. *Question:* Whether virtue is as bonifiable as intelligible. *Solution*: B F H.

6. *Question:* Whether there is as much truth in goodness as in wisdom. *Solution*: B F I.

7. *Question:* Whether the blessed who are in Paradise have as much glory through bonifying as through understanding. *Solution*: B F K.

8. *Question:* Whether there is any difference between God's goodness and His wisdom. *Solution*: B F T B.

9. *Question:* Whether goodness and wisdom, without concordance, can be far from contrariety. *Solution*: B F T C.

10. *Question:* Whether goodness and wisdom can be contraries. *Solution*: B F T D.

11. *Question:* Whether wisdom is as universal a principle as goodness. *Solution*: B F T E.

12. *Question:* Whether middle accords as well with goodness as with wisdom. *Solution*: B F T F.

13. *Question:* Whether the goal of goodness is as good as the goal of wisdom. *Solution*: B F T G.

14. *Question:* Whether wisdom is greater through understanding than goodness through bonifying. *Solution*: B F T H.

15. *Question:* Whether there is equality in the goodness and in the wisdom of God. *Solution*: B F T I.

16. *Question:* Whether goodness is as far from minority through bonifying as is wisdom through understanding. *Solution*: B F T K.

GREATNESS AND WISDOM

17. *Question:* What constitutes greatness of eternity and of wisdom? *Solution*: C D F.

18. *Question:* What constitutes greatness of power in wisdom? *Solution*: C E F.

19. *Question:* What are those things that cause wisdom and will to be great? *Solution*: C F G.

20. *Question:* What is it that causes wisdom to have great virtue? *Solution*: C F H.

21. *Question:* What is it that causes truth to be great in wisdom? *Solution*: C F I.

22. *Question:* What is great glory of wisdom? *Solution*: C F K.

23. *Question:* What do wisdom and difference have in greatness? *Solution*: C F T B.

24. *Question:* What do greatness and wisdom have in concordance? *Solution*: C F T C.

25. *Question:* What constitutes contrariety in greatness and in wisdom? *Solution*: C F T D.

26. *Question:* What do greatness and beginning have in wisdom? *Solution*: C F T E.

27. *Question:* What constitutes means in greatness and in wisdom? *Solution*: C F T F.

28. *Question:* What do wisdom and greatness have in their end? *Solution*: C F T G.

29. *Question:* What is it that causes wisdom to have greater greatness? *Solution*: C F T H.

30. *Question:* What is it that causes wisdom to have great equality? *Solution*: C F T I.

31. *Question:* What is it that causes greatness and wisdom to be far from minority? *Solution*: C F T K.

ETERNITY AND WISDOM

32. *Question:* Of what is eternity abundantly composed so as to empower and understand? *Solution*: D E F.

33. *Question:* Wisdom asked Will if it partook of eternity. *Solution*: D F G.

34. *Question:* Wisdom and Virtue asked Eternity whose it had been, whose it was, and whose it would be.[1] *Solution*: D F H.

35. *Question:* Eternity asked Wisdom and Truth to whom verifying and understanding belonged. *Solution*: D F I.

36. *Question:* Wise men asked Unity of wisdom, glory, and eternity what it consisted of.[2] *Solution*: D F K.

37. *Question:* "Difference," said Wisdom, "to whom do you belong and what do you consist of?"[3] *Solution*: D F T B.

38. *Question:* Wisdom and Will asked Concordance what it had been, what it was, and what it would be. *Solution*: D F T C.

39. *Question:* Eternity and Wisdom asked Contrariety what being contrary consisted of. *Solution*: D F T D.

40. *Question:* Beginning asked Wisdom if it knew what it was composed of both in eternity and in itself. *Solution*: D F T E.

41. *Question:* Eternity asked Wisdom if it knew what eternifying was composed of; and Wisdom asked Eternity if it knew what understanding was composed of. *Solution*: D F T F.

42. *Question:* Wise men asked the world if its end was composed of any of its parts. *Solution*: D F T G.

43. *Question:* Eternity asked Wisdom what greater understanding consisted of, and to whom it belonged. *Solution*: D F T H.

44. *Question:* Wisdom asked Eternity what its equality consisted of, and Eternity asked Wisdom what equality and understanding consisted of. *Solution*: D F T I.

[1] *De qui era, e de qui és, e de qui serà*, which could also be translated as "to whom it had belonged, to whom it belonged, and to whom it would belong." Since the dignities are here personified, so are the pronouns referring to them. There is, however, a certain fluctuation between *de qui era* and *de que era* ("what it consisted of"), and sometimes—as in Questions 37 and 43 below—opposition within the same sentence.

[2] The Mainz edition has, "Glory and Eternity asked Unity of wisdom what a wise man was composed of."

[3] The Mainz edition has, "what are you and what do you consist of?"

45. *Question:* "Wisdom," said Eternity, "from what does lesser understanding come?" *Solution*: D F T K.

POWER AND WISDOM

46. *Question:* Will asked Power why it was intelligible and lovable. *Solution*: E F G.

47. *Question:* Power asked Wisdom and Virtue if they could exist and work by themselves. *Solution*: E F H.

48. *Question:* Wise men asked Understanding why it was clothed in possibility and verifiability. *Solution*: E F I.

49. *Question:* Wise men asked a philosopher why, in creatures, power, wisdom, and glory do not constitute a single entity. *Solution*: E F K.

50. *Question:* Power and Wisdom asked why difference exists. *Solution*: E F T B.

51. *Question:* Wise men asked Concordance if it exists as much through wisdom as through power. *Solution*: E F T C.

52. *Question:* A philosopher asked Power why it was greater in concordance than in contrariety. *Solution*: E F T D.

53. *Question:* Wisdom asked Power why Power could[4] begin to be ignorant. *Solution*: E F T E.

54. *Question:* Power was asked why empowering existed in it. *Solution*: E F T F.

55. *Question:* Wise men asked Power why wisdom has power against its own understanding. *Solution*: E F T G.

56. *Question:* Power was asked why some wisdom has greater power in another than in itself. *Solution*: E F T H.

57. *Question:* Equality was asked why it exists in power and wisdom. *Solution*: E F T I.

58. *Question:* If wisdom consists of intellective, intelligible, and understanding, why does power maintain that it is capable of not knowing. *Solution*: E F T K.

WISDOM AND WILL

59. *Question:* How many essential concrete things are there in wisdom, will, and virtue? *Solution*: F G H.

[4] *Poder podia*; see the references in Part II, n. 12 above.

60. *Question:* Will and Wisdom asked Truth how many measures it uses to measure true objects. *Solution*: F G I.

61. *Question:* A teacher asked his pupils why God was so little loved, known,[5] honored, and served in the world. *Solution*: F G K.

62. *Question:* A wise man asked Will and Wisdom whether quantity was as intelligible and lovable in Difference as in themselves. *Solution*: F G T B.

63. *Question:* Wise men asked Concordance if it was through her that the habit of knowledge and that of love were quantified. *Solution*: F G T C.

64. *Question:* Contrariety asked Wisdom and Will what it was whose quantity it increased against understanding and loving. *Solution*: F G T D.

65. *Question*: Wisdom asked Will what beginning began its loving. *Solution*: F G T E.

66. *Question:* Will asked Wisdom if understanding and loving can exist without simple and compound quantity. *Solution*: F G T F.

67. *Question:* Wisdom asked Will why it did not love the purpose of its loving as much as wisdom could understand it. *Solution*: F G T G.

68. *Question:* Wisdom asked Will why it did not love greater understanding. *Solution*: F G T H.

69. *Question:* Wise men asked Wisdom and Will whether they were equal in both their being and in their action. *Solution*: F G T I.

70. *Question:* "Will," said Wisdom, "what do you do to increase lesser loving?" "Wisdom," said Will, "what do you do to increase lesser understanding?" *Solution*: F G T K.

WISDOM AND VIRTUE

71. *Question:* "Wisdom," said Virtue and Truth, "why do you understand with wicked and false understanding?" *Solution*: F H I.

72. *Question:* Virtue asked Wisdom if a person can understand God with wicked understanding. *Solution*: F H K.

[5] The "known" is missing in the Mainz edition.

73. *Question:* Virtue and Difference asked Wisdom if differentiating and virtuifying could inhabit his understanding. *Solution*: F H T B.

74. *Question:* Concordance and Virtue[6] asked Wisdom when it was that understanding was virtuous and concordant. *Solution*: F H T C.

75. *Question:* Virtue asked Wisdom when it was the Contrariety had least power in the world. *Solution*: F H T D.

76. *Question:* Beginning asked Wisdom and Virtue if it could begin something that was neither in virtue nor in vice. *Solution*: F H T E.

77. *Question:* Wisdom asked Virtue if at its extremities there was virtuous understanding. *Solution*: F H T F.

78. *Question:* Virtue asked End if virtuifying could be greater in Wisdom than in Virtue. *Solution*: F H T G.

79. *Question:* "Wisdom," said Virtue, "do you know what is the greatest understanding God has created?" *Solution*: F H T H.

80. *Question:* Wisdom asked Equality[7] if it was as great as Wisdom's capability for understanding it. *Solution*: F H T I.

81. *Question:* A teacher asked his pupils if they knew why lesser understanding existed. *Solution*: F H T K.

WISDOM AND TRUTH

82. *Question:* Glory asked Truth and Wisdom if there existed spiritual places where verifying, glorifying, and understanding could be placed and intermixed. *Solution*: F I K.

83. *Question:* Pupils asked their teacher how wisdom and truth existed in difference, and how difference existed in them. *Solution*: F I T B.

84. *Question:* Concordance asked Wisdom what false understanding was like. *Solution*: F I T C.

85. *Question:* Contrariety asked Wisdom if it could place false understanding in truth. *Solution*: F I T D.

86. *Question:* Two wise men asked Truth how false understanding can ever begin in it. *Solution*: F I T E.

[6] And not "truth" as in the Mainz edition.
[7] The Mainz edition has "Will."

87. *Question:* Verifying asked Wisdom how it can understand Truth. *Solution*: F I T F.

88. *Question:* Wise men asked Truth whether, with a purpose, she was the mistress of intelligence, or whether intelligence, with a purpose, was her mistress. *Solution*: F I T G.

89. *Question:* "Wisdom," said Truth, "with what do you hold me in your understanding?" *Solution*: F I T H.

90. *Question:* Truth asked Wisdom whether, without equality, its understanding could find rest. *Solution:* F I T I.

91. *Question:* Truth asked Wisdom if with lesser truth it could attain greater understanding. *Solution*: F I T K.

WISDOM AND GLORY

92. *Question:* Glory asked Wisdom what it could use to understand it. *Solution*: F K T B.

93. *Question:* Wise men asked Wisdom what its understanding could use to attain glory. *Solution*: F K T C.

94. *Question:* Glory asked Wisdom how it could understand glory by means of the contrary of glory.[8] *Solution*: F K T D.

95. *Question:* A condemned soul asked Wisdom why it was suffering punishment, since it had been begun for the purpose of attaining glory. *Solution*: F K T E.

96. *Question:* Wisdom asked Glory if by the nature of Middle, which is glorifying, that is to say, the intermediary between glorificative and glorifiable, a soul that has been saved can understand God without having recourse to the imaginative faculty. *Solution*: F K T F.

97. *Question:* Wise men asked Purpose if it can be present in glorifying that is not of the substance of glorificative and glorifiable. *Solution*: F K T G.

98. *Question:* Glorificative, Glorifiable, and Glorifying asked Wisdom what it could use to have greater understanding. *Solution*: F K T H.

99. *Question:* Equality asked Wisdom whether without her it could be filled with glory. *Solution*: F K T I.

[8] Thus in the Mainz edition; the Catalan has, "Glory asked Wisdom how it could understand it by means of its contrary," which probably means the same thing, although the last "its" might refer to "Wisdom."

100. *Question:* "Wisdom," said Minority, "do you want to find rest with me in glory?" *Solution*: F K T K.

Here end the *Flowers of Love* and their *Questions*, as well as the *Flowers of Intelligence* and their *Questions*, finished in the city of Naples in the year 1294, for the glory and praise of our Lord God. Amen.

A Chronological Catalogue of Ramon Llull's Works

THIS CATALOGUE represents a basic reworking of Platzeck's catalogue (see the abbreviations below), which has been a fundamental tool of scholarship for the past twenty years. I have organized mine in terms of the periods or "phases" outlined in Volume I, "Lull's Thought," above. This has the advantage that at a glance one can see that a work preceded by the Roman numeral II belongs to the quaternary phase, by III to the ternary phase, and so on. Within each period, the chronological succession of works has been carefully revised, as has been the title, date,[1] and place of composition of each individual work—all this based, whenever possible, on original sources or recent research.

The second item in each entry consists of the numbers of the more important previous Lullian catalogues, whose abbreviations and references are as follows:

E = the catalogue on fols. 88^{va}-89^{ra} of the *Electorium*, reproduced in Hillg, 335–45, and *ROL* VIII, 304–9.[2]
Sa = Salzinger's catalogue in *MOG* I, 47–74 = Int. ii, 1–28.
HLF = the catalogue in *HLF*.
Go = G. Golubovich, "B. Raimundo Lullo di Majorica," in *Biblioteca Bio-Bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell'Oriente Francescano*, I (Quaracchi, 1906), 361–92, and especially the catalogue on pp. 373ff.
Lo = Longpré, the catalogue in cols. 1090–1110.
Gl = P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, II (Paris, 1934), 146–91.
Av. = Avinyó[3]

[1] Many dates—and especially those that seem too specific—refer only to the completion of a work, not the entire period of composition. As for titles, I have included the commoner English titles used in Peers, Hillgarth, and in this anthology.

[2] For works in le Myésier's second catalogue of 1314 (?), I use Hillgarth's numeration. To find the equivalent number in the note in *ROL* VIII, p. 309, subtract 124 from the Hillgarth number.

[3] For this and other abbreviations not explained here, see the general list at the beginning of Vol. I.

Ca = the catalogue in Ca I, 285–334.
Pla = the catalogue in Pla II, 3★–84★.
Ar = the catalogue in Artus, *Ars Brevis*, pp. 339–46, reprinted in *EL* XIII (1969), 164–72.
ROL = the numbers assigned to works by the editors of *ROL*.
Per = the catalogue of Catalan works in J. Perarnau, *Els manuscrits lul·lians medievals de la "Bayerische Staatsbibliothek" de Munic*, I (Barcelona, 1982), 181–204.

I have included E because of its historical importance, its testimony as to authenticity of works, and because it is now available in such reliable and accessible forms. Sa is important as the first modern catalogue based on a large number of manuscript sources, for its repertoire of incipits and explicits, as well as for being the first to list Llull's citations of his own works, so important for establishing chronology. I have included the partial catalogues of Go, Ar, and Per because they offer a large amount of information not readily available elsewhere. I have omitted the catalogues of Ottaviano (Bru 393) and Díaz (Bru 387) since they add little to previous catalogues, in addition to containing a larger share of inaccuracies than is usual (and perhaps inevitable) in Lullian catalogues.[4]

The third item in each entry gives the number of manuscripts and then lists the editions in which a given work has appeared, all this broken down by languages.[5] It is here perhaps that the largest amount of information necessary for Llull scholarship but not easily available elsewhere has been reunited. I have tried, moreover, to arrange it in such a way that the reader consulting it can find at a glance the information he wants.

Following the main work, I list, when occasion demands, those portions of it which have with time acquired a certain biblio-

[4] The Perarnau catalogue is a borderline case: it must be used with considerable caution (see my review in *EL* 25, 1981–3, 169–71), but it does present a lot of material not readily available elsewhere.

[5] In these lists I have followed the form (as well as making use of much of the information offered) in Stegmüller's bibliographical introductions to the reprint of *MOG*. It should be emphasized that the figures given for number of MSS are, except for those works where I have been able to rely on information from the Freiburg files, purely tentative, and rely largely on whatever information I have been able to glean from published sources. In enumerating editions, I have counted different *printings* as a single *edition*, such as, for instance, those in RD 24–5, 210–12, 246 & 249, etc.

graphical autonomy. With each fragment, however, I list *only* those catalogues, manuscripts, or editions in which it appears *separately*; it is to be understood that it can *also* be found in the catalogues, manuscripts, and editions listed under the main entry.

For Llull's poetry, I have abbreviated references to frequently repeated anthologies as follows:

Rosselló, 1859 = *Obras rimadas de Ramón Lull*, ed. G. Rosselló, Palma, 1859 (RD 412).

Alòs, 1928 = Ramon Llull, *Poesies*, ed. R. d'Alòs-Moner, *ENC* 3, Barcelona, 1925, ^{II} 1928 (Bru 66).

Alòs, 1932 = *Pàgines escollides de Ramon Llull*, ed. R. d'Alòs-Moner, Col·lecció Popular Barcino 88, Barcelona, 1932 (Bru 73).

Mele, 1935 = *Poesie e versetti di Ramon Lull*, ed. E. Mele, Testi Romanzi 4, Rome, 1935 (Bru 67).

Riquer, 1936 = *Antologia general de la poesia catalana*, ed. M. de Riquer, J. M. Miquel, & J. Teixidor, Barcelona, 1936.

Tasis, 1949 = *Antologia de la poesia catalana*, ed. R. Tasis, Biblioteca Selecta 58, Barcelona, 1949.

Triadú, 1953 = *Anthology of Catalan Lyric Poetry*, ed. J. Triadú, Oxford (J. Gili), 1953.

Castellet, 1979 = *Antologia general de la poesia catalana*, ed. J. M. Castellet & J. Molas, Barcelona, 1979.

For more bibliographical details regarding Llull's verse, see *OE* I (1957), 1277–86.[6]

Lost works will be found listed at the end of each period. Rejected works will only appear in an expanded version of this catalogue to be published later with the cooperation of the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut of Freiburg. We have also made the notes as brief as possible here; further clarifications and justifications will likewise appear in the expanded version.

Lastly, I have been able to make use of and include in this catalogue, which was prepared in the summer of 1982, works such

[6] When I give the number of MSS in which a poem appears, I *include* the two or three poetry MSS that have disappeared from Palma since the turn of the century—one of which belonged to Jeroni Rosselló, and one or two to the Prohens family. I give them because, in contrast to others MSS, such as those that perished in the fires of the Turin library of 1904 or of the Barcelona Seminary of 1936, there is still a chance of their reappearing, as other private Palma MSS have resurfaced, for instance, in Copenhagen.

as Perarnau's catalogue, *Obra escogida*, etc., which appeared long after the main body of this anthology was completed.

I. Pre-Art Phase, ca. 1272–ca. 1274.[7]

I.1a. *Compendium logicae Algazelis.* 1271–2 (?)—Montpellier.

I.1b. *Lògica del Gatzel.*[8] 1271–2 (?)—Montpellier.

E 26 (?), Sa 47, HLF 137, Lo vi/1, Gl e, Av 43, Ca 229, Pla 33 & 43, Per 23.

Latin prose version (1a). 3 MSS. Ed. Lohr, Dr. diss., Freiburg i. Br., 1967. ***Catalan*** verse version (1b). 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Rubió Balaguer, *AIEC* 5 (1913–14), 311–54; (2) *ORL* XIX (1936), 1–62.

I.2. *Libre de contemplació en Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber contemplationis magnus*; (Eng.) *Book of Contemplation.* 1273–4 (?).

E 3–4, Sa 55–7, HLF 48, Lo i/1, Gl d, Av 3, Ca 1, Pla 2, Per 1.

Catalan. 16 MSS.[9] 2 eds.: (1) *ORL* II–VIII (1906–14); (2) *OE* II (1960), 85–1269. ***Latin.*** 12 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) partial ed. Lefèvre d'Étaples, Paris, 1505 (RD 35); (2) *MOG* IX–X (1740–2); (3) Palma, 17 vols., 1746–9 (RD 338 & 341). ***French.*** Extracts in Sala-Molins, *Choix* (1967), pp. 136–92. ***Spanish.*** Extracts in *Antología* II (1961), 7–75.

II. Quaternary Phase, ca. 1274–1289.

A. CYCLE OF THE *ARS COMPENDIOSA INVENIENDI VERITATEM*, CA. 1274–CA. 1283[10]

II.A.1. *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem*; (Cat.) *Art abreujada d'atrobar veritat.* ca. 1274—Majorca.

E 5–7, Sa 19, HLF 1, Lo iii/1, Gl a, Av 1, Ca 13, Pla 3, Ar 1.

Latin. 21 MSS. Ed. *MOG* I (1721), 433–81 = Int. vii.[11]

[7] For this pre-Art phase, see my "Cronologia," pp. 43–4, and above all n. 48 there.

[8] For more details, as well as the relationship between the two versions of this work, see Vol. I, "Life," text at n. 78 above. For the identification of the *Logica brevis* of the *Electorium* catalogue with this work, see Ch. Lohr in *EL* 16 (1972), 10.

[9] Of which only two (fortunately the earliest and best) are reasonably complete. Of the 12 Lat. MSS mentioned further on in this paragraph, none are complete.

[10] For this cycle, see my "Cronologia," pp. 44–5. The dates of works within this cycle are all conjectural, as is the order of nos. 2–9, which form a complicated web of mutual citations.

[11] In spite of what some bibliographies state, no Catalan text of this work has been preserved. One should not confuse this work with the *Ars inventiva veritatis* (III.1) written more than fifteen years later. Note that the *Definitiones principiorum* with which this work closes (*MOG* I, 477–81 = Int. vii. 45–9) and which are sometimes given separate status (cf. Pla 3a), might well be spurious (see my "Cronologia," p. 58, n. 91).

II.A.2. *Ars notatoria*. 1274–6 (?).
E 86, HLF p. 345, Gl je & kh, Pla 4.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. Gayà, Madrid, 1978.

II.A.3. *Ars universalis* (= *Lectura Artis compendiosae inveniendi veritatem*. 1274–8 (?).
Sa 31, HLF 2 & 132, Lo iii/4, Gl t, Av 2, Ca 14, Pla 5, Ar 2.
Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. *MOG* I (1721), 482–606 = Int. viii.

II.A.4. *Libre del gentil e dels tres savis*; (Lat.) *Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus*; (Eng.) *Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men*. 1274–6 (?).
E 1–2, Sa 109, HLF 7, Go 6, Lo iv/4, Gl q, Av 4, Ca 71, Pla 6, Per 2.
For MSS and eds., see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work in Vol. I here.

II.A.5. *Libre de demostracions*; (Lat.) *Liber mirandarum demostrationum*. 1274–8 (?).
Sa 68, HLF 10, Lo iv/2, Gl p, Av 5, Ca 73, Pla 7, Per 5.
Catalan. 4 MSS. Ed. *ORL* XV (1930). ***Latin.*** No MSS known. Trans. Salzinger in *MOG* II (1722), 177–420 = Int. v.

II.A.6. *Liber principiorum theologiae*; (Eng.) *Principles of Theology*. 1274–8 (?).
E 39, Sa 169, HLF 3, Lo iv/1, Gl j, Av 6, Ca 72, Pla 8.
Latin. 10 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* I (1721), 607–66 = Int. ix; (2) repr. in *Quattuor* (1969).

II.A.7. *Liber principiorum philosophiae*; (Eng.) *Principles of Philosophy*.[12] 1274–8 (?).
E 40, Sa 168, HLF 4, Lo iii/2, Gl i, Av 7, Ca 15, Pla 9.
Latin. 14 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* I (1721), 667–732 = Int. x; (2) repr. in *Quattuor* (1969).

II.A.8. *Liber principiorum juris*; (Eng.) *Principles of Law*. 1274–8 (?).
E 24 or 47, Sa 166, HLF 5, Lo iii/3, Gl k, Av 8, Ca 16, Pla 10.
Latin. 8 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* I (1721), 733–66 = Int. xi; (2) repr. in *Quattuor* (1969).

II.A.9. *Liber principiorum medicinae*; (Cat.) *Començaments de medicina*; (Eng.) *Principles of Medicine*. 1274–8 (?).
E 24 (?), Sa 167, HLF 6, Lo viii/1, Gl 1, Av 9, Ca 4, Pla 11, Per 6.
For MSS and eds., see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work here above.

[12] Not to be confused with the later *Principles of Philosophy* (III.43).

II.A.10. *Artificium electionis personarum.*[13] 1274–83 (?).
E 87 (?), Pla 12.
Latin. One MS; unpubl.

II.A.11. *Liber de Sancto Spiritu.* 1274–83 (?).
Sa 192, HLF 8, Go 7, Lo iv/3, Gl o, Av 10, Ca 74, Pla 13.
Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *MOG* II (1722), 115–24 = Int. iii.

II.A.12. *Oracions e contemplacions de l'enteniment.* 1274–83 (?).
Sa 151, HLF 147, Lo v/1, Gl h, Av 11, Ca 198, Pla 16, Per 7.
Catalan. 2 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Bonllabi, Valencia, 1521 (RD 76); (2) *ORL* XVIII (1935), 231–68.

II.A.13. *Libre dels àngels*; (Lat.) *Liber de angelis*; (Eng.) *Book of the Angels.* 1274–83 (?).
E 18, Sa 7, HLF 240, Lo iv/5, Gl r, Av 12, Ca 75, Pla 18, Per 8.
Catalan. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) fragm. in Probst, *Caractère* (1912), pp. 329–32; (2) *ORL* XXI (1950), 305–75. ***Latin.*** 4 MSS; unpubl.

II.A.14. *Libre de l'Orde de Cavalleria*; (Eng.) *Book of the Order of Chivalry.* 1279–83 (?).
E 56, HLF 171 & 258, Lo ix/1, Gl c & il, Av 15, Ca 210, Pla 37, Per 14.
Catalan. 7 MSS. 6 eds.: (1) ed. Aguiló, Barcelona, 1879 (Bru 48); (2) ed. Luanco, Barcelona, 1901 (Bru 49); (3) *ORL* I (1906), 201–47; (4) *OE* I (1957), 513–45; (5) ed. Allegra, Rome, 1972 (Bru 50); (6) ed. M. Gustà, Barcelona, 1980. ***French.*** 13 MSS. 6 eds.: (1) Paris, 1504; (2) Paris, 1505; (3) Lyon, 1510; (4) Lyon, 1859, (5) *ORL* I (1906; cf. Cat. 3 above), 249–91; (6) ed. Minervini, Bari, 1972 (Bru 115). ***English.*** Trans. Wm. Caxton, 3 eds.: (1) ed. Caxton, London, 1484 (?); (2) ed. Wm. Morris, Hammersmith, 1892; (3) ed. Byles, London, 1926;[14] ***Scottish.*** 5 MSS. Ed. in Eng. 3. ***Spanish.*** 18th-cent. trans. A. Pasqual. 2 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) in Cat. 2 above (cf. Bru 89); (2) *OL* (1948), pp. 95–141; (3) ed. de Cuenca in *Floresta española de varia caballería*, Madrid, 1975; other trans.: (4) Sureda Blanes, Buenos Aires, 1949 (Bru 90); (5) *Antología* II (1961), 309–74. ***Italian.*** Ed. in Cat. 5 above (cf. Bru 130).

II.A.15. *Lo peccat d'Adam.* 1279–83 (?).
HLF 95, Lo vi/4, Gl u, Av 30, Ca 232, Pla 41, Per 20.

[13] Not to be confused with the *Ars electionis* of 1299 (III.38). Cf. Pérez Martínez in *EL* III (1959), 275–8, and the same author's *Los fondos lulianos existentes en las bibliotecas de Roma*, Rome, 1961, p. 39.

[14] The excellent bibliographical introduction of this edition, done for the Early English Text Society, should be consulted for further details on all these MSS and early editions.

Catalan. 14 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) ed. Moll in *Anuari de l'Oficina Romànica* 5 (1932), 297–310; (3) *ORL* XIX (1936), 63–73.

II.A.16. *Doctrina pueril.* 1282–3.

E 14, Sa 85, HLF 215, Lo ix/2, Gl b, Av 14, Ca 211, Pla 42, Per 21.

Catalan. 6 MSS. 5 eds.: (1) Palma, 1736 (RD 311); (2) *ORL* I (1906), 1–199; (3) ed. Obrador, Barcelona, 1907 (Bru 53); (4) fragm. ed. Alòs in *Franciscalia*, Barcelona, 1928, pp. 1–13 (Bru 54 & 401); (5) ed. Schib, *ENC*, 1972 (Bru 55). ***French.*** One MS. 2 eds.: (1) Paris, 1482;[15] (2) ed. Llinarès, Paris, 1969 (Bru 118). ***Provençal.*** 4 MSS. 4 eds. of extracts: (1) in Cat. 2 above; (2) by de Bartholomaeis in *Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei*, Series V-a, Vol. 11 (Rome, 1902), 448–63; (3) by Zorzi in *Aevum* 28 (Milan, 1954), 345–9; (4) by Dando in *Romania* 85 (1964), 17–48. ***Spanish.*** One MS. Ed. Salamanca, 1742 (RD 322). ***Latin.*** 4 MSS. Extract ed. in Cat. 2 above.

II.A.17. *Blaquerna* (full title: *Libre d'Evast e d'Aloma e de Blaquerna*).[16] 1283—Montpellier.

E 15, Sa 41, HLF 76, Lo ii/1, Gl ak, Av 31, Ca 226, Pla 44, Per 25.

Catalan. 2 MSS. 5 eds.: (1) ed. Bonllabi, Valencia, 1521 (RD 76); (2) *ORL* IX (1914); (3) ed. Galmés, *ENC*, 4 vols., 1935–54 (Bru 41); (4) *OE* I (1957), 111–307; (5) ed. Gallofré & Badia, Barcelona, 1982. ***Provençal.*** One MS;[17] unpubl. ***French.*** 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Llinarès, Paris, 1970 (Bru 104); (2) fragm. in Sala-Molins. *Choix* (1967), pp. 83–95.[18] ***Latin.*** 3 MSS; unpubl. ***Spanish.*** 5 eds. of 18th-cent. trans.: (1) Palma, 1749 (RD 342); (2) ed. Menéndez Pelayo, Madrid, 2 vols., 1881–2 (Bru 81); (3) ed. Ovejero, Madrid, 2 vols., 1929 (Bru 82); (4) ed. Riber, Madrid, 1944 (Bru 83); (5) *OL* (1948), pp. 143–596; modern trans. of fragm. in (6) *Antología* I (1961), 85–154. ***English.*** Trans. Allison Peers, London, 1926 (Bru 139).

II.A.17a. *Libre de Ave Maria.* Constitutes chs. 61–6 of Bk. II of *Blaquerna.*

Pla 44d.

Catalan. Ed. Olivar, *ENC*, 1927 (Bru 43). ***French.*** Trans. Guiter, Montpellier, 1943 (Bru 105 & 631). ***German.*** Trans. Solzbacher, Paderborn, 1954 (Bru 133).

[15] Cf. G. Schib in *Romania* 93 (1972), 113–23.

[16] For this spelling as opposed to *Blanquerna*, see *Felix*, Bk. I, n. 34 above.

[17] For the fact of this MS (Paris, Bibl. Nat., esp. 478) constituting a Provençal translation, and not merely a slightly Provençalized version of the Catalan text, see M. Metzeltin, *Die Sprache der ältesten Fassungen des Libre de Amich e Amat*, Frankfurt/M., 1974, p. 3 and p. 174, n. 2.

[18] The first is an edition of the medieval French MSS; the second a modern translation from the Catalan.

II.A.17b. *A vós, dona verge santa Maria.* Poem in ch. 76 of Bk. III of *Blaquerna.*

Lo vi/6, Gl ae^{I}, Ca 234, Pla 44e.

Catalan. 10 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) Milá y Fontanals, *De los trovadores en España*, Barcelona, 1889, p. 497; (3) O. Denk, *Einführung in die Geschichte der altcatalanischen Litteratur*, Munich, 1893, p. 202; (4) A. Bulbena, *Crestomatia de la llengua catalana* II (Barcelona, 1907), 32–3; (5) Alòs, 1928; (6) Alòs, 1932; (7) Mele, 1935; (8) Riquer, 1936; (9) Tasis, 1949; (10) Triadú, 1953. ***Spanish.*** Rosselló, 1859. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS; unpubl. ***German.*** Trans. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964.

II.A.17c. *Libre d'amic e amat*; (Lat.) *Liber de amico et amato*; (Eng.) *Book of the Lover and the Beloved.* Constitutes Bk. VI of *Blaquerna.*

E 20, Sa 6, Lo v/2, Gl g, Ca 199, Pla 44g.

Catalan. 2 MSS. 8 eds.: (1) partial ed. in *La Veu de Montserrat* 4 (Barcelona, 1881); (2) partial ed. Rosselló, Palma, 1886; (3) ed. Obrador, Palma, 1904 (Bru 42); (4) partial ed. in *Ca-Nostra* 6 (Inca, 1925); (5) ed. Olivar, *ENC*, 1927 (Bru 43); (6) ed. Aramon, Barcelona, 1935, ^{II}1966 (Bru 44); (7) ed. de Riquer, Barcelona, 1950 (Bru 45); (8) ed. Peix, Barcelona, 1982. ***Latin.*** 11 MSS. 4 eds.: (1) ed. Lefèvre d'Étaples, Paris, 1505 (RD 35); (2) ed. N. de Pax (?), Alcalá de Henares, 1517 (RD add. 4); (3) Paris, 1585 (RD 132); (4) ed. du Mans, Rouen, 1632 (RD 205). ***Spanish.*** One MS. 9 eds.: (1) Madrid, 1749 (RD 343); (2) ed. Ana María del Santíssimo Sacramento, Madrid, 1760 (RD 375); (3) ed. Mir & Obrador, Madrid, 1903 (Bru 84); (4) Madrid, 1940 (Bru 85); (5) in Cat. 7 above (cf. Bru 86); (6) ed. Bertini, Turin, 1950 (Bru 87); (7) Madrid, 1956 (Bru 88); (8) *Antología* II (1961), 77–149; (9) Madrid, 1965. ***English.*** Trans. Allison Peers, London, 1923, ^{II}1946 (Bru 140).[19] ***French.*** 2 MSS. 12 eds.: (1) trans. G. Chappuys, Paris, 1586 (RD 133); (2) Paris, 1632 (RD 204); (3) trans. J. d'Aubry, Paris, 1645 (RD 221), (4) Geneva, 1890 (Bru 106); (5) trans. M. André, Brussels, 1899 (Bru 107); (6) partial trans. A. de Barreau & Max Jacob, Paris, 1919 (Bru 108); (7) partial trans. G. Etchegoyen in *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Ecole Française de Rome* 38 (Paris, 1920), 197–211 (Bru 109); (8) trans. M. André, Paris, 1921 (Bru 110); (9) trans. E. Clop, Lyon, 1924 (Bru 111); (10) trans. G. Etchegoyen in *Etudes Franciscaines* 45 (Paris, 1933), 587–99, ibid., 46 (1934), 54–69, 172–93, 289–310 (Bru 112); (11) trans. G. Lévis Mano & J. Palau, Paris, 1953 (Bru 113); (12) trans. Sala-Molins in *Choix* (1967), pp. 347–

[19] Different from and inferior to that contained in his later translation of the complete *Blaquerna*. See Vol. I, "Bibliographical Note," above.

96. ***Italian.*** 3 eds.: (1) trans. E. Mele, Lanciano, 1932 (Bru 128); (2) Genoa, 1932 (Bru 129); (3) trans. V. P. Pignoni, Città Armoniosa, 1978. ***German.*** 2 eds.: (1) trans. L. Klaiber, Olten, 1948 (Bru 134); (2) trans. M. Aubry, Zurich, n.d. (Bru 135).[20]

II.A.17d. *Art de contemplació*; (Lat.) *Ars contemplationis*; (Eng.) *Art of Contemplation*. Constitutes Bk. VII of *Blaquerna*.

Sa 21, HLF 212, Lo v/4, Gl af, Ca 200, Pla 44h.

No separate MSS known. ***Catalan.*** 3 eds.: (1) ed. le Jau Frost, Dr. diss., Baltimore, 1903 (Bru 46); (2) partial ed. in Probst, *Caractère* (1912)[21]; (3) complete ed. Probst, Münster, 1914 (Bru 47 & 863). ***English.*** Trans. Allison Peers, London, 1925 (Bru 141). ***French.*** Partial trans. in Sala-Molins, *Choix* (1967), pp. 192–202.

II.A.17e. *Sènyer ver Déus, rey gloriós*. Closing poem of *Blaquerna*.

Lo vi/7, Gl ae^{II}, Ca 235, Pla 44f.

Catalan. 5 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) Milá y Fontanals, *De los trovadores en España*, Barcelona, 1889, pp. 497–9; (3) Alòs, 1928; (4) Mele, 1935; (5) Riquer, 1936. ***Spanish.*** Trans. Pasqual in *Vida del B. Raymundo Lulio* I (Majorca, 1890), 225–7. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS; unpubl. ***German.*** Trans. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964.

II.A.18. *Libre d'intenció*; (Lat.) *Liber de prima et secunda intentione*. 1283 (?).

E 25, Sa 115, HLF 46, Lo v/3, Gl ad, Av 32, Ca 78, Pla 45, Per 26.

Catalan. 12 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) *Obras* I (1901); (2) partial ed. Barnils in *BRABLB* 5 (1909–10), 128–34, 202–6, 320–5; (3) *ORL* XVIII (1935), 1–66. ***Latin.*** 15 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* VI (1737), 537–60 = Int. ix. ***French.*** One MS; unpubl.

Lost Works

II.A.L1. *Libre de definicions e de començaments e de qüestions*.[22] 1274–83 (?).
Cited in *Doctrina pueril* (II.A.16), chs. 73.3 and 91.19.

II.A.L2. *Doctrina de príncep*. 1279–83 (?).
Lo xi, Gl ah, Ca lost works 3, Pla 36.
Cited in *Blaquerna* (II.A.17), ch. 115.

[20] For further details on MSS and eds. of both *Blaquerna* and the *Book of the Lover and the Beloved*, see the *ENC* edition of *Blaquerna*, Vol. IV, 106–24.

[21] For the le Jau Frost ed., see the remarks in Vol. I, "Bibliographical Note," above. Probst, *Caractère*, also contains (pp. 306–13) an ed. of the brief Bk. V (*De vida ermitana*) from *Blaquerna*.

[22] Not to be confused with the later *Libre de definicions* (III.75b). See my "Cronologia," pp. 47–8, for the separation of these two works.

B. CYCLE OF THE *ARS DEMONSTRATIVA*, CA. 1283–9[23]

II.B.1. *Ars demonstrativa*; (Cat.) *Art demostrativa*. ca. 1283—Montpellier.
E 9, Sa 22, HLF 13, Lo iii/5, Gl f, Av 18, Ca 17, Pla 21, Ar 3, Per 9.
For MSS and eds., see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work in Vol. I here.

II.B.2. *Liber de quattuordecim articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae Fidei*.[24] 1283–5 (?).
E 79 or 82, Sa 33, HLF 11, Lo iv/7, Gl n, Av 27, Ca 77, Pla 24.
Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. *MOG* II (1722), 421–610 = Int. vi.

II.B.3. *Introductoria Artis demonstrativae*. 1283–5 (?).
Sa 116, HLF 12, Lo iii/7, Gl v, Av 20, Ca 19, Pla 27, Ar 21.
Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *MOG* III (1722), 55–92 = Int. ii.

II.B.4a. *Regles introductòries a la pràctica de la Art demostrativa*. 1283–5 (?).
II.B.4b. *Regulae introductoriae in practicam Artis demonstrativae*. 1283–5 (?).
E 144, Sa 182, HLF 20, Lo vi/5, Gl ac, Av 19, Ca 233, Pla 22–3, Ar 4, Per 10.
Catalan. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* IV (1729), 11–14 = Int. ii, 1–4;[25] (2) *ORL* XVI (1932), 289–94. ***Latin.*** 6 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* IV (1729), 14–16 = Int. ii, 4–6. ***French.*** One MS; unpubl.

II.B.5. *Ars inveniendi particularia in universalibus*; (Eng.) *Art of Finding Particulars in Universals*. 1283–7 (?).
Sa 26, HLF 17, Lo iii/10, Gl z, Av 22, Ca 22, Pla 25, Ar 5.
Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* III (1722), 453–502 = Int. vii.

II.B.6. *Liber propositionum secundum Artem demonstrativam*. 1283–7 (?).
E 10, Sa 172, HLF 18, Lo iii/11, Gl aa, Av 23, Ca 23, Pla 26, Ar 6.
Latin. 15 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* III (1722), 503–63 = Int. viii.

II.B.7. *Liber de quaestionibus per quem modus Artis demonstrativae patefit*. 1283–7 (?).
HLF 138, Lo iii/49, Gl w, Av 26, Ca 28, Pla 35.
Latin. 2 MSS; unpubl.

[23] For this cycle, see my "Cronologia," pp. 45–8. I have somewhat changed the order of works within this cycle (especially nos. 2–11) with respect to the order suggested in my article as a result of a closer study of mutual citations, as well as being able to follow the development of the correlative doctrine more closely as a result of Gayà, *Correlativos*, pp. 57–81.

[24] Not to be confused with the *Liber de articulis fidei*, which is part of the *Liber Apostrophe* (III.24).

[25] In *MOG* the Catalan verse version (i.e., 4a) is accompanied by a facing literal Latin translation by Salzinger, which must not be confused with the free Latin prose version (4b) presumably done by Llull himself, which follows it.

II.B.8. *Ars juris.*[26] 1285–7 (?).
E 47–8, Sa 28, HLF 73, Lo iii/50, Gl du, Av 28, Ca 25, Pla 28.
Latin. 25 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Rome, 1516 (RD 63); (2) Majorca, 1745 (RD 331).

II.B.9. *Ars compendiosa medicinae.* 1285–7 (?).
E 45–6, Sa 20, HLF 84, Lo viii/2, Gl al & jr, Av 29, Ca 5, Pla 29.
Latin. 17 MSS. Ed. in *Opera medica* (1752).

II.B.10. *Lectura super figuras Artis demonstrativae.* 1285–7 (?)—Montpellier.
E 23 (?), Sa 125, HLF 14, Lo iii/8, Gl x, Av 21, Ca 20, Pla 30, Ar 9.
Latin. 15 MSS. Ed. *MOG* III (1722), 205–47 = Int. iv.

II.B.10a. *Liber chaos.* Part of II.B.10.[27]
E 71, Sa 43, HLF 15, Lo iii/6, Gl s, Av 13, Ca 18, Pla 21a.
Latin. 24 MSS. Ed. *MOG* III (1722), 249–92 = Int. v.

II.B.11. *Liber exponens figuram elementalem Artis demonstrativae.* 1285–7 (?).
Sa 102, HLF 19, Lo iii/12, Gl ab, Av 25, Ca 24, Pla 31, Ar 7.
Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *MOG* IV (1729), 1–10 = Int. i.

II.B.12. *Cent noms de Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber de centum nominibus Dei*; (Eng.) *Hundred Names of God.* 1288—Rome.[28]
E 134, Sa 146, HLF 96, Lo vi/8, Gl an, Av 33, Ca 236, Pla 52, Per 29.
Catalan. 10 MSS. 5 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) partial ed. Alòs, 1928; (3) partial ed. Riquer, 1936; (4) *ORL* XIX (1936), 75–170; (5) partial ed. *OE* I (1957), 1287–9. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS; unpubl.

II.B.13. *Liber Tartari et Christiani* (= *Liber super Psalmum "Quicunque vult"*); (Eng.) *Book of the Tartar and the Christian.* 1288—Rome.[29]
E 30, Sa 180, HLF 23, Go 8, Lo iv/8, Gl am, Av 34, Ca 79, Pla 46.
Latin. 14 MSS. Ed. *MOG* IV (1729), 347–76 = Int. v.

[26] To be confused neither with the *Ars juris naturalis* of 1304 (III.61) nor with the *Ars brevis juris civilis* of 1308 (III.78).

[27] Cf. Stöhr in *EL* I (1957), 51. Even Salzinger seems to have been aware of this situation, since the page of the *Lectura* where the *Liber chaos* should have been inserted is numbered "23 usque 31" (*MOG* III, 227 = Int. iv, p. cit.), a numbering that could be perplexing indeed for the uninitiated reader. This situation is confirmed by the wording of §16 of the "Life," for which see my "Cronologia," p. 46 and n. 67.

[28] For the date of this work, see Platzeck, "Miscelánea," pp. 402–3. Platzeck's arguments, combined with the new chronology proposed in my "Notes," p. 78, would place this work in the spring of 1288, when Llull could have presented it to the recently elected (Feb 1288) Nicholas IV, the first Franciscan to become pope.

[29] For the chronology of this and the next five works (nos. 13–18), see my "Notes," pp. 77–80.

II.B.14. *Compendium seu commentum Artis demonstrativae.* 1288–9—Paris.
Sa 46, HLF 16, Lo iii/9, Gl y, Av 24, Ca 21, Pla 32, Ar 8.
Latin. 32 MSS. Ed. *MOG* III (1722), 293–452 = Int. vi.

II.B.15. *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis.* 1288–9—Paris.
E 137, Sa 83, HLF 24, Go 10, Lo iv/9, Gl aq, Av 35, Ca 80, Pla 49.
Latin. 14 MSS. Ed. *MOG* IV (1729), 377–429 = Int. vi.

II.B.15a. *De sacramentis Ecclesiae.*[30] Constitutes Part V of the *Disputatio.*
E 80 (?), Pla 49a.
Latin. 3 MSS.

II.B.15b. *De praedestinatione et libero arbitrio.*[31] Constitutes Part VIII of the *Disputatio.*
Pla 49b.
Latin. 3 MSS.

II.B.16. *Libre de meravelles*; (Eng.) *Felix* or the *Book of Wonders.* 1288–9—Paris.
E 16, Sa 101, HLF 257, Lo ii/2, Gl ap, Av 36, Ca 227, Pla 51, Per 28.
For MSS and eds., see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work above.

II.B.16a. *Libre de les bèsties*; (Eng.) *Book of the Beasts.* Constitutes Bk. VII of *Felix.*
Pla 51a.
No separate MSS. For separate eds., see the introduction to *Felix.*

II.B.17. *Three Letters.* 1288–9—Paris.
II.B.17a. *Epistola Raymundi ad regem Franciae.*
II.B.17b. *Epistola Raymundi ad quendam amicum.*
II.B.17c. *Epistola Raymundi ad Universitatem parisiensem.*
HLF 90, Go 5, Lo x/1, Gl at, Av 79, Ca 219, Pla 171–3.
Latin. No extant MS. All three ed. Martène & Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* I (Paris, 1717), cols, 1315–19. Last (17c) also ed. in (1) Denifle & Châtelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* II (Paris, 1891), 83–4; (2) L. Thorndike, *University Records and Life in the Middle Ages*, New York, 1944, pp. 125–7.

II.B.18. *Epistola dedicatoria ad ducem Venetorum*; (Eng.) *Dedicatory Letter to the Doge of Venice.* 1289—Paris (?).
Gl bx^{II}, Pla 54.
Latin. One MS. Ed. Obrador in BSAL 8 (1899–1900), 303.

[30] Not to be confused with the *Liber de septem sacramentis Ecclesiae* of 1312 (IV.61). Cf. Stöhr in *EL* I (1957), 47–8.
[31] Not to be confused with the similarly entitled work of 1304 (III.68).

Lost Works

II.B.L1. *Tractatus de retentiva*. 1283–7 (?).
Gl jm, Pla 20.
Cited in *Ars compendiosa medicina* (II.B.9), Part II, Question 5.

III. Ternary Phase, 1290–1308.[32]

III.1. *Ars inventiva veritatis*.[33] 1290—Montpellier.
E 8, Sa 27, HLF 34, Go 1, Lo iii/13, Gl as, Av 38, Ca 26, Pla 55, Ar 10.
Latin. 20 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1515 (RD 53); (2) *MOG* V (1729), 1–211 = Int. i.

III.1a. *De punctis transcendentibus*. Constitutes Dist. III, Rule 8 of the *Ars inventiva veritatis*.
Pla 55a.
Latin. 2 MSS; no separate eds.[34]

III.2. *Art amativa*; (Lat.) *Ars amativa boni*. Aug. 1290.
E 21, Sa 15, HLF 39 & 249, Lo v/5, Gl ax, Av 40, Ca 201, Pla 58, Per 30.
Catalan. 3 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* XVII (1933), 1–398. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS. Ed. (in new trans. by editors) in *MOG* VI (1737), 7–154 = Int. ii, 1–148. ***Spanish.*** Fragmentary trans. in *Antología* II (1961), 485–94.

III.3. *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles*. 1290–1 (?).
E 72 (?), Sa 178, HLF 21, Lo iii/14, Gl ar, Av 39, Ca 27, Pla 57, Ar 11.
Latin. 17 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* IV (1729), 17–224 = Int. iii.

III.4. *Libre d'Anticrist*; (Lat.) *Liber contra Antichristum*. 1290–2 (?).
E 19, Sa 9, HLF 239, Lo iv/10, Gl av, Av 50, Ca 83, Pla 61, Per 33.
Catalan. 2 MSS; unpubl. ***Latin.*** 5 MSS; unpubl.

III.5. *De adventu Messiae*. 1290–2 (?).
HLF p. 345, Gl ie, Av 236, Ca 138, Pla 62.
Latin. 2 MSS. 2 fragms. ed. by (1) Ottaviano in *EUC* 14 (1929), 4; (2) Longpré in *ML* (1935), pp. 382–4 (= *EF* 47, 66–8).

III.6. *Quaestiones quas quaesivit quidam frater minor*. 1290–2 (?).

[32] For the chronology of the first twenty-three works of this phase, see my "Notes," pp. 80–6.
[33] Not to be confused with the earlier *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (II.A.1).
[34] Cf. Stöhr in *EL* I (1957), 50.

E 150, Sa 176, HLF 223, Lo iv/11, Gl aw, Av 48, Ca 84, Pla 63.
Latin. 4 MSS; unpubl.

III.7. *Libre de sancta Maria*; (Lat.) *De laudibus B. Virginis Mariae*. 1290–2 (?).

E 17, Sa 123, HLF 81, Lo v/7, Gl az, Av 42, Ca 203, Pla 60, Per 32.
Catalan. 2 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Pijoan, Vilanova i Geltrú, 1905; (2) *ORL* X (1915), 1–228; (3) *OE* I (1957), 1143–1242. ***Latin.*** 4 MSS. Ed. Lefèvre d'Étaples, Paris, 1499 (RD 24–5). ***Spanish.*** One MS. 2 eds.: (1) Majorca, 1755 (RD 371); (2) fragm. in *Antología* II (1961), 151–95.[35]

III.8a. *Hores de nostra Dona sancta Maria* (in verse). 1290–3 (?).[36]
III.8b. *Hores de sancta Maria* (prose version of 8a). 1290–3 (?).

E 125, HLF 94, Lo vi/3, Gl aj, Av 17, Ca 231, Pla 38–9, Per 17–18.
Verse version (8a). ***Catalan.*** 8 MSS. 4 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) *ORL* XIX (1936), 171–98; (3) *OL* (1948), pp. 1032–69; (4) fragm. in *OE* I (1957), 1289–91. ***Spanish.*** Trans. in Cat. 3 above.
Prose version (8b)—***Catalan.*** 3 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* X (1915), 229–88.

III.9. *Plant de nostra Dona sancta Maria* (= *Plant de la Verge*). 1290–3.[37]

HLF 92, Lo vi/2, Gl ai, Av 16, Ca 230, Pla 40, Per 19.
Catalan. 7 MSS. 7 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) Alòs, 1928; (3) Riquer, 1936; (4) *ORL* XIX (1936), 199–216; (5) *OL* (1948), pp. 1070–93; (6) fragm. in Triadú, 1953; (7) *OE* I (1957), 1292–1301.

III.10. *Libre de passatge*.[38] 1292—Rome.
In two parts:
III.10a. *Quomodo Terra Sancta recuperari potest* (= *Epistola summo pontifici Nicholau IV*); (Eng.) *Petition to Nicholas IV*.
III.10b. *Tractatus de modo convertendi infideles*.

Lo xi, Gl bb, Av 49, Ca 216 & lost works 4, Pla 65–6.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. Rambaud-Buhot in *Opera Latina* III, Majorca, 1954, 93–112. ***French.*** Trans. of 10b in Sugranyes, *Docteur*, pp. 131–43.

[35] A Latin edition of 1494 (RD 22) must be ruled out; cf. *OE* I, 1153, n. 53.
[36] In the dating of these two works I have followed Galmés's suggestions (cf. *ORL* XIX, xxxvi). His thesis is confirmed by the fact that the virtues and vices (sts. 22–35) are listed in the post-1290 order (see my "Cronologia," pp. 42–3). My only discrepancies with Galmés concern his attempt to relate these two works chronologically with the *Hundred Names of God* (II.B.12; cf. n. 28 there) and to pin the work down to a specific year (1292).
[37] Cf. Galmés in *ORL* XIX, xxxvii–viii for the date, which he gives as 1295, *after* the *Desconhort* (III.22), for reasons more literary and psychological than strictly historical. Rather than giving it such a precise date, I have preferred to place it more generally with the other Marian works from the beginning of the ternary phase.
[38] For the identity of the *Libre de passatge* mentioned in the *Desconhort* (III.22), see Garcías Palou in *EL* 16 (1972), 216–30. For its referring to *both* 10a and 10b, the first of which merely constitutes a letter of presentation or introduction to the second, see p. 228 of the same article.

III.11. *Taula general*; (Lat.) *Tabula generalis*. Sept 1293 in Tunis to Jan 1294 in Naples.[39]

E 11, Sa 195, HLF 35, Lo iii/15, Gl bc, Av 51, Ca 29, Pla 67, Ar 12, Per 36.

Catalan. 3 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* XVI (1932), 295–522. ***Latin.*** 33 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1515 (RD 53); (2) *MOG* V (1729), 221–300 = Int. ii.

III.11a. *Taula d'esta Art* (= *Taula de paraules*).[40]

Pla 58a, Per 30B.

Catalan. 7 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* XVII (1933), 389–98. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS. Ed. (in new trans. by editors) in *MOG* VI (1737), 155–7 = Int. ii, 149–51.

III.12. *Lo sisèn seyn, lo qual apelam efatus* (= *Libre de affatus*); (Lat.) *Liber de sexto sensu* (= *Liber de affatu*). 17 April 1294—Naples.

E 73, Sa 4, HLF 148, Lo iii/17, Gl bf, Av 54, Ca 31, Pla 70, Per 37.

Catalan. 2 MSS. Partial ed. in Probst, *Caractère*, pp. 332–4. ***Latin.*** 5 MSS; unpubl.

III.13. *Flors d'amor e flors d'intel·ligència*; (Lat.) *Flores amoris et intelligentiae*; (Eng.) *Flowers of Love and Flowers of Intelligence*. 1294—Naples.

Sa 106, HLF 41, Lo v/8, Gl bg, Av 57, Ca 204, Pla 71, Per 38.

For MSS and editions, see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work above.

III.14. *Disputació de cinq savis*; (Lat.) *Liber de quinque sapientibus*; (Eng.) *Book of the Five Wise Men*. 1294—Naples.

E 84, Sa 78, HLF 9, Go 2, Lo iv/13, Gl bi, Av 55, Ca 86, Pla 72, Per 39.

Latin. 15 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1510 (RD 42); (2) *MOG* II (1722), 125–74 = Int. iv. ***Catalan.*** One MS; unpubl.

III.15. *Petició a Celestí V;* (Lat.) *Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium ad Coelestinum V papam*; (Eng.) *Petition to Celestine V*. 1294—Naples.[41]

HLF 9, Go 3, Lo x/2, Gl bh, Av 56, Ca 217, Pla 73, Per 40.

[39] For the dates, see n. 132 to the "Life" in Vol. I above.

[40] This important little Lullian dictionary has, as Pring-Mill pointed out to me, become known as an appendix to the *Art amativa* because of its situation in a single Munich MS from which the Mainz editors prepared their translation, and on which Galmés based his edition. In three other MSS, however, including one at Harvard recently brought to light, it is associated with the *Taula general*.

[41] This *Petition* has traditionally been listed as an appendix to the preceding work, solely on the basis of the one Catalan MS in which both are preserved, and from which Salzinger made his translation. The evidence, however, of the fifteen Latin MSS in which the *Disputació* is preserved (without the *Petition*), as well as the fact that the text of this *Petition* is almost identical with that of the later *Petition to Boniface VIII*, make its independence seem beyond doubt.

Catalan. One MS. Ed. in Perarnau, *Arxiu de Textos Catalans Antics* 1, Barcelona, 1982, pp. 9–46. ***Latin.*** Trans. Salzinger, 3 eds.: (1) *MOG* II (1722), 174–5 = Int. iv, 50–1; (2) Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I (1778), 207–8; (3) Go 3 (1906). ***French.*** Partial trans. in HLF, pp. 104–7.

III.16. *Arbre de filosofia desiderat*; (Lat.) *Arbor philosophiae desideratae.* 1294—Naples, Barcelona, Majorca.[42]

E 41, Sa 13, HLF 42, Lo v/6, Gl ay, Av 44, Ca 202, Pla 59, Per 31.

Catalan. 2 MSS. Ed. *ORL* XVII (1933), 399–507. ***Latin.*** 19 MSS. Ed. *MOG* VI (1737), 241–81 = Int. v.

III.17. *Investigatio mixtionum generalium.* 1294—Naples.

E 135, Sa 118, HLF 152, Gl au, Av 45, Ca 81, Pla 64.

Latin. 4 MSS; unpubl.

III.18 *De levitate et ponderositate elementorum*; (Eng.) *On the Lightness and Heaviness of the Elements.* 1294—Naples.

E 136, Sa 128, HLF 86, Lo viii/3, Gl bj, Av 58, Ca 6, Pla 69.

Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. in *Opera medica* (1752).

III.19. *Lectura super Artem inventivam et Tabulam generalem*; (Cat.) *Art de fer e solre qüestions.* 1294 in Naples to 1295 in Rome.

E 156, Sa 127, HLF 38, Lo iii/18, Gl be, Av 53, Ca 32, Pla 74, Ar 14, Per 41.

Latin. 7 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1515 (RD 53); (2) *MOG* V (1729), 359–716 = Int. v. ***Catalan.*** 2 MSS; unpubl.

III.20. *Lectura compendiosa Tabulae generalis.* 1295—Rome.

E 147 (?), Sa 126, HLF 37, Lo iii/16, Gl bd, Av 52, Ca 30, Pla 68, Ar 13.

Latin. 5 MSS. Ed. *MOG* V (1729), 344–58 = Int. iv.

III.21. *Petitio Raymundi pro conversione infidelium ad Bonifacium VIII papam*; (Eng.) *Petition to Boniface VIII.*[43] 1295—Rome/Anagni.

E 143, Sa 155, HLF 253, Go 4, Lo x/3, Gl bm, Av 114, Ca 218, Pla 75.

Latin. 5 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Longpré in *La France Franciscaine* 18 (1935), 145–9; (2) ed. Wieruszowski in *ML* (1935), pp. 416–19 (= *EF* 47, 1935, 100–3).

III.22. *Desconhort.* 1295—Rome.[44]

[42] See my "Notes," pp. 81–2, for the date and circumstances of composition of this work.

[43] Cf. n. 41 above.

[44] For the much discussed date of this poem, see my "Notes," pp. 82–3 and n. 50, with the relevant bibliography.

Sa 75, HLF 97, Lo vi/9, Gl bl & on, Av 59, Ca 237, Pla 76, Per 42.

Catalan. 13 MSS. 13 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) Alòs, 1928; (3) Riquer, 1936; (4) *ORL* XIX (1936), 217–54; (5) ed. A. Pagès in *Annales du Midi* 50 (Toulouse, 1938), 113–56, 225–67 (Bru 69, 597); (6) *OL* (1948), pp. 1094–1147; (7) fragm. in Tasis, 1949; (8) ed. Riquer, Barcelona, 1950 (Bru 45, 70); (9) Triadú, 1953; (10) ed. M. Ruffini, Florence, 1953 (Bru 71); (11) *OE* I (1957), 1308–28; (12) fragm. in Castellet, 1979; (13) *Obra escogida*, Madrid, 1981, pp. 453–507. ***Spanish.*** Trans. N. de Pax. 2 MSS. 9 eds.: (1) Majorca, 1540 (RD 90); (2) Majorca, 1606 (RD 158); (3) Palma, 1852 (RD 407); (4) in Cat. 1 above; (5) in Cat. 6 above; (6) *Antología* I (1961), 229–67; (7) Palma, 1973 (Bru 93); other trans. by (8) Riquer in Cat. 8 (Bru 92); (9) Gimferrer in Cat. 13. ***French.*** 5 eds.: (1) trans. J. M. Guàrdia in *Revue de l'Instruction Publique* 22 (Paris, 1862–3), 520–38; (2) repr. in *Revue Germanique* (Paris, Jan 1862), 219ff.; (3) partial repr. in HLF, pp. 23–9; (4) partial trans. M. Beaufreton in *Anthologie franciscaine*, Paris, ^{II}1929, pp. 255–65; (5) trans. A. Pagès in Cat. 5 (Bru 117). ***Italian.*** Trans. M. Ruffini in Cat. 10 (RD 131).

III.23. *Arbre de sciència*; (Lat.) *Arbor scientiae*; (Eng.) *Tree of Science*. 29 Sept 1295 to 1 Apr 1296—Rome.

E 145, Sa 14, HLF 72, Lo i/2, Gl bk, Av 60, Ca 2, Pla 77, Per 43.

Catalan. 2 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *ORL* XIXIII (1917–26); (2) *OE* I (1957), 547–1046. ***Latin.*** 10 MSS. 4 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1482 (RD 5); (2) Barcelona, 1505 (RD 34); (3) ed. J. Bade, Lyon, 1515 (RD 55); (4) repr. Lyon, 1635 & 1637 (RD 210–212). ***Spanish.*** Trans. A. de Zepeda, 3 eds.: (1) Brussels, 1663 & 1664 (RD 246 & 249); (2) Buenos Aires, ca. 1940 (Bru 78); (3) fragm. in *Antología* II (1961), 495–532.[45] ***French.*** Fragm. in Sala-Molins, *Choix* (1967), pp. 130–5.

III.23a. *Arbre imperial*; (Lat.) *Arbor imperialis*. Constitutes Part VII of the *Tree of Science*.

Pla 77a.

Latin. Ed. Majorca, 1745 (RD 331). ***Spanish.*** Ed. in *Antología* II (1961), 532–71.

III.23b. *Arbre exemplifical*. Constitutes Part XV of the *Tree of Science*.

Catalan. Ed. Moll, Palma, 1971 (Bru 38). ***Spanish.*** 3 eds.: (1) *BAE* 65 (1953);[46] (2) fragm. in *Obras filosóficas*, Madrid, 1933; (3) *Obra escogida*, Madrid, 1981, pp. 517–617.

III.24. *Liber Apostrophe*. 23 June 1296—Rome.

In two parts:

[45] Containing the Prologue and the *Arbre imaginal*—this in addition to the *Arbre imperial* listed under III.23a.

[46] This edition also contains (pp. 133–9) a fragment of Part VI, the *Arbre moral*.

III.24a. *Apostrophe ad summum pontificem.*[47]
III.24b. *Libre dels articles de la fe*; (Lat.) *Liber de articulis fidei.*[48]

E 79 or 82, Sa 10 & 34, HLF 27, Lo iv/14, Gl bo, Av 61, Ca 87, Pla 78, Per 44.

Catalan. 5 MSS; unpubl. ***Latin.*** 25 MSS. 8 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1504 (RD 32); (2) Cologne, 1509 (RD 40); (3) Paris, 1578 (RD 122); (4–7) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609, 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (8) Majorca, 1688 (RD 274); (9) fragm. ed. A. Riera, Majorca, 1689 (RD 275); (10) *MOG* IV (1729), 533–61 = Int. ix, 29–57.[49]

III.25. *Libre de ànima racional*; (Lat.) *Liber de anima rationali.* 1296 (?)[50]—Rome.

E 36, Sa 8, HLF 44, Lo iii/19, Gl bn, Av 62, Ca 33, Pla 79, Per 45.

Catalan. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) fragm. in Probst, *Caractère* (1912), 326–9; (2) *ORL* XXI (1950), 161–304. ***Latin.*** 28 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Alcalà, 1519 (RD 73); (2) *MOG* VI (1737), 415–74 = Int. vii.

III.26. *Liber de potentia, objecto et actu.* 1296 (?)—Rome.

E 68, Av 108, Ca 179, Pla 80.

Latin. 3 MSS; unpubl.[51]

III.27. *Proverbis de Ramon*; (Lat.) *Liber proverbiorum*; (Eng.) *Proverbs of Ramon.*[52] 1296 (?)—Rome.

E 43, Sa 171, HLF 43, Lo ix/3, Gl ce, Av 63, Ca 212, Pla 81, Per 46.

Catalan. 2 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* XIV (1928), 1–324. ***Latin.*** 29 MSS. 6 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1493 (RD 20); (2) Venice, 1507 (RD 37); (3) ed. Lefèvre

[47] This short introductory poem, which for some reason has given the entire work its name (and this even in the earliest MSS), and which according to some critics might not even be genuine, appears only in the Latin MSS and eds.

[48] Not to be confused with the *Liber de quattuordecim articulis sacrosanctae Romanae Catholicae Fidei* (II.B.2).

[49] *MOG* IV, Int. ix, contains a confusing array of material: (1) pp. 505–30 = Int. ix, 1–26: a literal Lat. trans. by Salzinger of the Cat. version of III.24b; (2) pp. 531–3 = Int. ix, 27–9: excerpts from the *Liber in quo declaratur quod fides sancta catholica est magis probabilis quam improbabilis* (IV.30; cf. n. 101 below) and all of the *De ostentione per quam fides catholica est probabilis atque demonstrabilis* (IV.107; cf. n. 123 below); (3) p. 533 = Int. ix, 29: the poem, *Apostrophe*; (4) pp. 534–61 = Int. ix, 30–57: the standard Latin text of III.24b, which is a free translation dating from Llull's time. Note that the excerpts in (2) were printed thus as part of the work ever since the Cologne ed. of 1509 (Lat. 2); cf. nn. 101 and 123 referred to above.

[50] The date given in the MSS is 1294 and 1293 (see Stegmüller's introduction to the reprint of *MOG* VI and Hillg, p. 122, n. 313), but since the work cites both the *Tree of Science* (III.23) and the *Liber Apostrophe* (III.24), it cannot have been written before the summer of 1296.

[51] For the date and MSS, see Hillg, p. 228, n. 187, and p. 354.

[52] Not to be confused with the *Thousand Proverbs* of 1302 (III.53) nor with the *Proverbis d'ensenyament* of 1309 (IV.7). For the date, see *ORL* XIV, p. viii, n. 1.

d'Etaples, Paris, 1516 (RD 62); (4) Barcelona, 1524;[53] (5) Palma, Part I, 1735 (RD 309) and Part II, 1738 (RD 313); (6) *MOG* VI (1737), 283-413 = Int. vi. ***Spanish.*** One MS. Trans. Garcías Palou, Madrid, 1978.

III.28. *Contemplatio Raymundi.* Aug 1297—Paris. In three parts:[54]
III.28a. *Quomodo possumus Deum contemplari (= De decem modis contemplandi Deum).*
Sa 58 & 140, HLF 213, Lo v/9, Gl bp, Av 64, Ca 205, Pla 82.
III.28b. *Quomodo contemplatio transit in raptum (= De raptu).*
Sa 59, HLF 214, Lo v/10, Gl bq, Av (64), Ca 206, Pla 83. Which in turn includes:
III.28c. *De declaratione conscientiae (= De gradibus conscientiae).*
E 157, Sa 111, HLF 162, Lo iv/15, Gl br & jj, Av 75, Ca 88, Pla 84.
Latin. 9 MSS. Ed. in *ORL* XVIII (1935), 393–435.

III.29. *Tractatus novus de astronomia*; (Cat.) *Tractat d'astronomia.* Oct 1297—Paris.
E 53, Sa 37, HLF 169, Lo viii/4, Gl bs, Av 65, Ca 7, Pla 85, Per 47.
Latin. 27 MSS. Ed. in M. Pereira, *La filosofia naturale di R. Lullo nell'inedito "Tractatus novus de Astronomia," nelle opere mediche e nella critica*, Dr. diss., Florence, 1971. ***Catalan.*** One MS. Ed. Gayà & Badia in *Textos y estudios sobre astronomía española en el siglo XIII*, Barcelona, 1981.

III.30. *Declaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita.* Feb 1298—Paris.
E 54, Sa 67, HLF 235, Lo vii/1, Gl bu, Av 67, Ca 180, Pla 86.
Latin. 16 MSS. Ed. in Keicher, *Stellung* (1909), pp. 89–221.

III.31. *Disputatio eremitae et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quaestionibus Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi.* Aug 1298—Paris.
E 57, Sa 82, HLF 22, Lo iv/16, Gl bv, Av 68, Ca 89, Pla 87.
Latin. 20 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Lyon, 1491 (RD 18); (2) Venice, 1507 (RD 38; see also RD 39); (3) *MOG* IV (1729), 225–346 = Int. iv.

III.32. *Arbre de filosofia d'amor:*, (Lat.) *Arbor philosophiae amoris*; (Eng.) *Tree of the Philosophy of Love.* Oct 1298—Paris.
E 22, Sa 12, HLF 40, Lo v/11, Gl bw, Av 69, Ca 207, Pla 88, Per 48.
Catalan. 7 MSS. 4 eds.: (1) *Obras* II (1901); (2) *ORL* XVIII (1935), 67–227; (3) *OE* II (1960), 9–84; (4) ed. G. Schib, *ENC* (1980). ***Latin.*** 6 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Lefèvre d'Etaples, Paris, 1516, (RD 62); (2) *MOG* VI (1737), 159–224 = Int. iii. ***Spanish.*** 2 MSS. 2 fragm. eds.: (1) Madrid, 1940 (Bru 91); (2) *Antología* II (1961), 197–261. ***French.*** Trans. in Sala-Molins,

[53] Cited in Stegmüller's introduction to the reprint of *MOG* VI.
[54] See *ORL* XVIII, xxxvi–vii for the grouping of these works.

Choix (1967), pp. 203–346. ***English.*** Partial trans. Allison Peers, *The Tree of Love*, London, 1926.

III.33. *Consolatio Venetorum et totius gentis desolatae.* Dec. 1298—Paris.

Go pp. 389–91, Gl bx[1], Av 66, Ca 228, Pla 89.

Latin. 2 MSS. 2 eds. of extracts by: (1) B. Hauréau in *Notices et extraits de quelques Mss. latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, Vol. IV (Paris, 1892), 290–4; (2) Golubovich (see above).

III.34. *Cant de Ramon.* 1299—Paris.

Sa 42, HLF 98, Lo vi/10, Gl ca, Av 76, Ca 238, Pla 90, Per 49.

Catalan. 18 MSS. 15 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) ed. K. Bartsch in "Zur catalanischen Litteratur," *Jahrbuch für rom. u. englische Litteratur* 11 (1870), 61–3; (3) partial ed. in HLF, pp. 31–2; (4) ed. O. Denk in *Einführung in die Geschichte der altcatalanischen Litteratur*, Munich, 1893, pp. 208–9; (5) ed. Capdevila in *Les cent millors poesies líriques de la llengua catalana*, Barcelona, 1925; (6) Alòs, 1928; (7) Alòs, 1932; (8) Mele, 1935; (9) *ORL* XIX (1936), 255–60; (10) Riquer, 1936; (11) Tasis, 1949; (12) Triadú, 1953; (13) *OE* I (1957), 1301–2; (14) Castellet, 1979; (15) *Obra escogida*, Madrid, 1981, pp. 509–15. ***Spanish.*** Trans. P. Gimferrer in previous Cat. 15. ***French.*** 2 eds.: (1) partial trans. M. Beaufreton, Paris, 1929 (Bru 125); (2) trans. Sugranyes in *Docteur*, pp. 143–5. ***German.*** Trans. E.-W. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964.

III.35. *Liber* (or *Quaestio*) *de congruo adducto ad necessariam probationem.* 1299—Paris (?).

Sa 175, HLF 227, Lo iv/17, Gl by, Av 74, Ca 90, Pla 91.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. E.-W. Platzeck in *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 8 (1957), 13–32.

III.36. *Ars compendiosa (= Brevis practica tabulae generalis).*[55] Jan 1299—Paris.

E 146, HLF 134, Lo iii/21, Gl bt, Av 70, Ca 34, Pla 92, Ar 15.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. C. Ottaviano in *Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale*, 12 (Paris, 1930). ***English.*** One 16th-cent. MS in Oxford.

III.37. *De quadratura e triangulatura de cercle*; (Lat.) *De quadratura et triangulatura circuli.* June 1299—Paris.

E 140, Sa 173, HLF 160, Lo iii/20, Gl bz, Av 73, Ca 35, Pla 95, Per 50.

Catalan. 6 MSS; unpubl. ***Latin.*** 5 MSS. Partial ed. J. E. Hofmann, *Ramon Lulls Kreisquadratur*, Heidelberg, 1942, pp. 21–38 (Bru 31 & 1025).

[55] This work should not be confused because of its first title with the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (II.A.1) nor because of its second with the *Lectura Artis quae intitulatur Brevis practica Tabulae generalis* (III.54).

III.38. *Ars electionis*.[56] 1 July 1299—Paris.

E 88 (?), Gl jg, Pla 93.

Latin. One MS. Ed. in M. Honecker, "Lullus-Handschriften aus dem Besitz des Kardinals Nikolaus von Cues," *Spanischer Forschungen der Görresgesellschaft* 6 (Münster, 1937), 304–9.

III.39. *Liber de geometria nova et compendiosa*. July 1299—Paris.

E 141, Sa 110, HLF 170, Lo viii/5, Gl cd, Av 71, Ca 8, Pla 94.

Latin. 7 MSS. Partial ed. J. M. Millás Vallicrosa, Barcelona, 1953.

III.40. *Quaestiones Attrebatenses* (= *Liber super quaestiones Magistri Thomae Attrebatensis*). July 1299—Paris.

E 151, Sa 177, HLF 71, Lo iii/22, Gl cc, Av 72, Ca 36, Pla 96.

Latin. 11 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Lyon, 1491 (RD 18); (2) Venice, 1507 (RD 38); (3) *Opera parva* V (1746), Int. iv.

III.41a. *Dictat de Ramon*; (Lat.) *Tractatus compendiosus de articulis Fidei catholicae*.[57] 1299—Barcelona.

III.41b. *Coment del dictat*; (Lat.) *Commentum de dictamine*. 1299—Barcelona.

E 154, Sa 32, HLF 99, Lo vi/11, Gl cf, Av 77–8, Ca 239, Pla 97, 98, 102, Per 51–2.

(a) ***Catalan.*** 8 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) *ORL* XIX (1936), 261–74. ***Latin.*** 2 MSS; unpubl.

(b) ***Catalan.*** 2 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) fragm. ed. J. Rubió in *EUC* IV (1910), 126–8; (2) *ORL* XIX (1936), 275–324. ***Latin.*** One MS; unpubl. ***Spanish.*** One MS; unpubl.[58]

III.42. *Oracions de Ramon* (= *Libre de oracions*); (Lat.) *De tredecim orationibus*. 1299—Barcelona.

Sa 150, HLF 230, Lo v/12, Gl ch, Av 80, Ca 208, Pla 99, Per 53.

Catalan. 6 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *Obras* II (1901); (2) *ORL* XVIII (1935), 313–92. ***Latin.*** One MS; unpubl.

[56] Not to be confused with the *Artificium electionis personarum* (II.A.10); see n. 13 above.

[57] The *Tractatus* is a Latin translation done by Llull in July 1300 in Palma. Whether it is a translation, however, of this work or of the *Coment* is difficult to ascertain from published sources, but Riedlinger in *ROL* V, 234, says it is a translation of the *Dictat*, moreover its incipit, etc., is clearly different from the *Commentum de dictamine* in Rome, Vat. Ottob. lat. 375 (see Pérez Martínez, *Los fondos lulianos existentes en las bibliotecas de Roma*, p. 51). Note that this *De articulis Fidei catholicae* should not be confused with the similarly entitled works of II.B.2 and III.24b.

[58] The existence of this medieval Spanish translation following the *Book of the Gentile* in London, Brit. Libr., add. 14040, fols. 86–110, has till now passed unnoticed. It should be added that all MSS and eds. containing the *Coment* also contain (at least most of) the *Dictat* itself.

III.43. *Començaments de filosofia*; (Lat.) *Principia philosophiae complexa*; (Eng.) *Principles of Philosophy*.[59] 1299—Paris, to 1300—Majorca.

E 42 (?), Sa 170, HLF 130, Lo i/3, Gl ci, Av 81, Ca 3, Pla 100, Per 54.

Catalan. 2 MSS; unpubl. ***Latin.*** 13 MSS; unpubl.

III.44. *Medicina de peccat*. July 1300—Majorca.

E 29, HLF 101, Lo vi/12, Gl cj, Av 82, Ca 240, Pla 101, Per 55.

Catalan. 9 MSS. 10 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) fragm. Alòs, 1928; (3) fragm. Alòs, 1932; (4) fragm. Mele, 1935; (5) fragm. Riquer, 1936; (6) *ORL* XX (1938), 1–205; (7) fragm. Tasis, 1949; (8) fragm. Triadú, 1953; (9) fragm. *OE* I (1957), 1303–8; (10) fragm. Castellet, 1979. ***Latin.*** Partial 18th-cent. trans. in one MS.

III.44a. *Dictat de Trinitat*; (Lat.) *Dictatum de Trinitate*. Constitutes Part IV, sect. iii of the *Medicina de peccat*.[60]

Sa 76, Gl ik^{I}, Av 46, Ca 82, Pla 47.

Catalan. 2 MSS. ***Latin.*** One MS.

III.45. *Libre de l'és de Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber de est Dei*.[61] Sept 1300—Majorca.

E 149, Sa 96, HLF 174, Lo iv/18, Gl ck, Av 85, Ca 91, Pla 103, Per 56.

Catalan. 3 MSS. Ed. in *Obras* II (1901), 437–80. ***Latin.*** 5 MSS; unpubl.

III.46. *Libre de coneixença de Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber de cognitione Dei*. Oct 1300—Majorca.

E 83, Sa 45, HLF 175, Lo iv/19, Gl cl, Av 84, Ca 92, Pla 104, Per 57.

Catalan. 3 MSS. Ed. in *Obras* II (1901), 373–435. ***Latin.*** 3 MSS; unpubl.

III.47. *Libre de home*; (Lat.) *Liber de homine*. Nov 1300—Majorca.

E 28, Sa 112, HLF 45, Lo iii/23, Gl cm, Av 86, Ca 37, Pla 105, Per 58.

Catalan. 4 MSS. Ed. *ORL* XXI (1950), 1–159. ***Latin.*** 13 MSS. Ed. *MOG* VI (1737), 475–536 = Int. viii.

III.48. *Libre de Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber de Deo et Jesu Christo*. Dec 1300—Majorca.

E 89, Sa 71, HLF 47 & 176, Lo iv/20, Gl cn, Av 83, Ca 93, Pla 106, Per 59.

Catalan. 5 MSS. Ed. *Obras* II (1901), 269–371. ***Latin.*** 14 MSS. Ed. *MOG* VI (1737), 561–98 = Int. x.

[59] Not to be confused with the earlier *Principles of Philosophy* (II.A.7).
[60] Corresponding to *ORL* XX, 76–88; cf. Stöhr in *EL* I (1957), 51.
[61] Note that this "Book of the *Is* of God" should not be confused with the later *Liber de esse Dei* (IV.15), which deals with the "*Being* of God."

III.49. *Aplicació de l'Art general*. March 1301—Majorca.

Sa 11, HLF 100, Lo vi/13, Gl co, Av 87, Ca 241, Pla 107, Ar 16, Per 61.

Catalan. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) *ORL* XX (1938), 207–51.

III.50. *Rhetorica nova*. Sept 1301—Cyprus.[62]

E 81, Sa 184, HLF 74, Lo iii/24, Gl cp, Av 88, Ca 38, Pla 108.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. in Johnston, *Semblance* (1978), pp. 290–372.

III.51. *Liber de natura*. Dec 1301—Cyprus.

E 74, Sa 144, HLF 68, Lo viii/6, Gl cq, Av 89, Ca 9, Pla 109.

Latin. 22 MSS. Ed. *Opera parva* II (1744; repr. 1971–2).

III.52. *Libre què deu hom creure de Déu*; (Lat.) *Liber quid debet homo de Deo credere*. Jan 1302—Ayas in Cilicia (Lesser Armenia).[63]

E 60, Sa 66, HLF 177, Lo iv/21, Gl cr, Av 90, Ca 94, Pla 110, Per 63.

Catalan. 4 MSS; unpubl. ***Latin***. 2 MSS; unpubl.

III.53. *Mil proverbis*; (Eng.) *Thousand Proverbs*. 1302—on shipboard returning from the Near East.[64]

E 44 (?), HLF 259, Lo ix/4, Gl cs, Av 91, Ca 213, Pla 111, Per 64.

Catalan. 8 MSS.[65] 5 eds.: (1) Palma, 1746 (RD 335); (2) *Obras* I (1901); (3) *ORL* XIV (1928), 325–72; (4) ed. de Saint-Germain in *Homenaje a Millàs-Vallicrosa* I (Barcelona, 1954), 551–86; (5) *OE* I (1957), 1243–69. ***Latin***. Trans. in Cat. 1 above. ***Spanish***. 2 eds.: trans. in (1) Cat. 2 above; (2) *Obras filosóficas*, Madrid, 1933.

III.54. *Lectura Artis quae intitulatur Brevis practica Tabulae generalis*. 1 Feb 1303—Genoa.[66]

E 147 (?), Sa 124, HLF 36 & 134, Lo iii/30, Gl cb & de, Av 95, Ca 43 (see also 34), Pla 123, Ar 18.

Latin. 22 MSS. Ed. *MOG* V (1729), 301–43 = Int. iii.

[62] This is the date and place of composition of the lost Catalan original version. The extant Latin version stems from the translation done in 1303 in Genoa.

[63] See Vol. I, n. 152 to the "Life."

[64] See Vol. I, n. 153 to the "Life." This work should not be confused with the earlier *Proverbs of Ramon* (III.27) nor with the later *Proverbis d'ensenyament* (IV.7).

[65] One of them—Milan, Ambrosiana, I 153 inf.—contains in fact a curious Catalan-Latin hybrid.

[66] Not to be confused with the *Ars compendiosa* (III.36) with its similar second title (see the remarks in HLF 134). For the date of this work, see the following note.

III.55. *Liber ad probandum aliquos articulos fidei catholicae per syllogisticas rationes* (= *Liber de syllogismis*). Feb 1303—Genoa.[67]

Sa 35, HLF 218, Go 12, Lo iv/23, Gl df, Av 96, Ca 96, Pla 124.

Latin. 11 MSS; unpubl.

III.56. *Logica nova*. May 1303—Genoa.[68]

E 27, Sa 132, HLF 56, Lo iii/25, Gl ct, Av 92, Ca 45, Pla 112, Per 65.

Latin. 26 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1512 (RD 48); (2) *Opera parva* II (1744; repr. 1971–2). ***Catalan.*** 2 MSS; unpubl.

III.57. *Liber de modo applicandi novam logicam ad scientiam juris et medicinae*. 1303 (?).

Sa 141, HLF 167, Lo iii/26, Gl cu, Av 93, Ca 47, Pla 113, Per 66.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. Ottaviano, *EUC* 14 (1929), 5–14. ***Catalan.*** One MS; unpubl.

III.58. *Disputatio fidei et intellectus*. Oct 1303—Montpellier.

E 31, Sa 84, HLF 26, Go 11, Lo iv/22, Gl cx, Av 97, Ca 95, Pla 117.

Latin. 12 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1512 (RD 47); (2) *MOG* IV (1729), 479–504 = Int. viii.

III.59. *Liber de lumine*. Nov 1303—Montpellier.

E 50, Sa 133, HLF 87, Lo viii/7, Gl cy, Av 98, Ca 10, Pla 118.

Latin. 17 MSS. Ed. in *Opera medica* (1752; repr. 1981).

III.60. *Liber de regionibus sanitatis et infirmitatis*. Dec 1303—Montpellier.

E 46 (?), Sa 181, HLF 85, Lo viii/8, Gl cz, Av 99, Ca 11, Pla 119.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. in *Opera medica* (1752; repr. 1981).

[67] In the MSS, this and the previous work are dated February 1304, in Genoa, which requires us to believe that Llull wrote three works in January in Montpellier (III.61–3), dashed off to Genoa where he finished these two works (the first of which is a complex commentary on the Art) in the middle of a cycle of three works (III.62–4) on the powers of the soul, only to rush back to Montpellier to write two other works in what remained of the month of February. Rather than postulate such an otherwise undocumented visit to Genoa, it seems safer to assume that the date given in the MSS is mistaken (it would not be the first such case), and that Llull wrote these two works a year earlier, when we know he was in Genoa, and when they fit more naturally into a far less crowded schedule. This dating also accords with the fact of a *Liber de syllogismis* cited twice in the *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* (III.58) of October 1303, twice in the *Liber de praedicatione* (III.69) of 1304 and once in the *Liber de fine* (III.72) of 1305, and of a *Liber de sex syllogismis* cited in Llull's will (IV.71) of 1313. If we accept the suggestions of Delisle, followed by Alòs (cf. Av 96), of Soria (*ROL* III, 81, and IV, 219) and of Madre (*ROI* IX, 237 & 259) that these citations refer to our *Liber ad probandum*. . . , then it must precede the *Disputatio fidei et intellectus* of October 1303. For further arguments in this direction, see the forthcoming expanded version of this catalogue.

[68] This is the date of the original Latin version; Llull translated it into Catalan in July of 1304 in Montpellier.

III.61. *Ars juris naturalis.*[69] Jan 1304—Montpellier.
Lo iii/32, Gl da, Av 100, Ca 39, Pla 121.
Latin. 6 MSS; unpubl.

III.62. *Liber de intellectu.*[70] Jan 1304—Montpellier.
E 32–3, Sa 113, HLF 140, Lo iii/27, Gl db, Av 103, Ca 40, Pla 120, Artus 17.
Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. A. Llinarès in *Archives d'Histoire doctrinal et littéraire du moyen âge* 38 (Paris, 1971), 193–270 (Bru 27). ***French.*** 17th-cent. trans. ed. ibid.

III.63. *Liber de voluntate.* Jan 1304—Montpellier.
E 34, HLF 141, Lo iii/28, Gl dc, Av 104, Ca 41, Pla 122.
Latin. 6 MSS; unpubl.

III.64. *Liber de memoria.*[71] Feb 1304—Montpellier.
E 35, HLF 142, Lo iii/29, Gl dd, Av 105, Ca 42, Pla 125.
Latin. 5 MSS; unpubl.

III.65. *Liber de significatione.* Feb 1304—Montpellier.
E 49, HLF 228, Lo iii/31, Gl dh & jk, Av 102, Ca 44, Pla 126, ROL 114.
Latin. 11 MSS. Ed. *ROL* X (1982), 1–100.

III.66. *Liber de consilio.*[72] March 1304—Montpellier.
E 51, Sa 53, HLF 220, Lo ix/5, Gl dg, Av 106, Ca 214, Pla 128, ROL 115.
Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* X (1982), 101–235.

III.67. *De investigatione actuum divinarum rationum.*[73] April 1304—Montpellier.
E 85 (?), Sa 119, HLF (206), Lo (iv/24), Gl (di), Av (129), Ca (99), Pla 129, ROL 116.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. *ROL* X (1982), 237–346.

III.68. *Liber de praedestinatione et libero arbitrio.*[74] April 1304—Montpellier.

[69] To be confused neither with the earlier *Ars juris* (II.B.8) nor with the later *Ars brevis juris civilis* (III.78).
[70] This work and the next two form a group dealing with the three powers of the soul.
[71] Not to be confused with the *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam* of 1307–8 (III.76), nor with the *Liber de memoria Dei* of 1314 (IV.104), nor with the apocryphal *Ars memorativa.*
[72] To be confused neither with the *Del consili* of 1311 (IV.48) nor with the *Ars consilii* of 1315 (IV.109).
[73] Not to be confused, as did HLF, Lo, Gl, Av, and Ca (hence the parentheses around the catalogue nos.) with the *De investigatione vestigiorum productionum divinarum personarum* of 1308 (IV.3). Cf. Stöhr in *EL* I (1957), 56–7, and *ROL* X, 239–40.
[74] Not to be confused with the similarly entitled II.B.15b above.

E 58, Sa 162, HLF 224, Lo iv/28, Gl dn, Av 111, Ca 100, Pla 130, ROL 117.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. *ROL* X (1982), 347–411.

III.69. *Liber de praedicatione* (= *Ars magna praedicationis*). Dec 1304—Montpellier.

E 55, Sa 29, HLF 246, Lo iv/25, Gl dj, Av 107, Ca 97, Pla 131, ROL 118.

Latin. 17 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) fragms. ed Samuel d'Algaida in *EF* 42 (1930), 493–6, and *Studia* 4 (Palma, 1932), 279–81 (Bru 33–4); (2) *ROL* III IV (1961–3).

III.70. *Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus*; (Eng.) *Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect.* March 1305—Montpellier.

E 38, Sa 36, HLF 62, Lo iii/33, Gl dk, Av 109, Ca 48, Pla 132, ROL 120.

Latin. 27 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1512 (RD 48); (2) *Opera parva* III (1744; repr. 1973); (3) *ROL* IX (1981), 1–199. ***Spanish.*** 2 eds. of 18th-cent. trans.: (1) Palma, 1753 (RD 364); (2) ed. Ovejero, Madrid, 1928, (Bru 80). ***Catalan.*** Trans. F. Salvà, Barcelona, 1953 (Bru 40).

III.71. *Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam.* March 1305—Montpellier.

E 69, Sa 69, HLF 30, Lo iv/27, Gl dl, Av 110, Ca 98, Pla 133, ROL 121.

Latin. 31 MSS. 4 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1510 (RD 42); (2) *MOG* IV (1729), 577–82 = Int. xii; (3) *Opera parva* I (1744; repr. 1971); (4) *ROL* IX (1981), 201–31.

III.72. *Liber de fine.* April 1305—Montpellier.

E 77, Sa 103, HLF 242, Go 14, Lo x/4, Gl do, Av 112, Ca 220, Pla 134, ROL 122.

Latin. 8 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Palma, 1665 (RD 252); (2) partial in Gottron, *Kreuzzug*, pp. 65–93; (3) *ROL* IX (1981), 233–91.

III.73. *Liber praedicationis contra judaeos* (= *Liber de erroribus judaeorum*, or *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione*).[75] Aug 1305—Barcelona.

E 66, Sa 92, HLF 256, Lo xi, Gl ih, Av 113, Ca 102, Pla 136.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. Millás Vallicrosa, Madrid-Barcelona, 1957 (Bru 30).

III.74. *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione.*[76] Sept 1305—Barcelona.

E 61, Pla 137.

[75] This last title should be confused neither with that of the next work, nor with the second title of *De secretis sacratissimae Trinitatis et Incarnationis* (IV.59).

[76] See the previous note.

Latin. 2 MSS; unpubl.

III.75a. *Introductorium magnae Artis generalis* (= *Liber de universalibus*). 8 March 1306.

Sa 117, HLF 131, Gl eb, Av 115, Ca 49, Pla 139, Ar 19.

Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Lyon, 1515 (RD 54); (2) Lyon, 1635 & 1637 (RD 210–12). ***Spanish.*** Trans. A. de Zepeda, 2 eds.: (1) Brussels, 1663 & 1664 (RD 246 & 249); (2) *BAE* 65 (1953). ***French.*** Trans. de Vassy, Paris, 1634 (RD 209).

III.75b. *Libre de definicions*; (Lat.) *Liber de sensuale et intellectuale* (= *Rubrica de differentia, concordantia et contrarietate*).[77]

Lo iv/6, Gl m, Ca 76, Pla 34, Per 12.

Catalan. One MS; unpubl. ***Latin.*** 7 MSS; unpubl.

III.76. *Liber ad memoriam confirmandam.*[78] 1307–8—Pisa.

Sa 135, HLF 143, Lo iii/36, Gl dr, Av 122, Ca 52, Pla 143.

Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. P. Rossi in *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* 13 (Florence, 1958), 272–9 (Bru 28 & 1213); (2) Rossi, *Clavis* (1960), 261–70.

III.77. *Ars brevis*; (Cat.) *Art breu*. Jan 1308—Pisa.

E 13, Sa 18, HLF 50, Lo iii/38, Gl dq, Av 121, Ca 53, Pla 142, Per 68.

For MSS and eds. see the corresponding section of the introduction to the work here above.

III.78. *Ars brevis juris civilis* (= *Ars brevis quae est de inventione mediorum juris civilis*).[79] Jan 1308—Montpellier.

E 48 (?), Sa 16, HLF 168, Lo iii/34, Gl dv, Av 101, Ca 50, Pla 144.

Latin. 12 MSS. Ed. Wohlhaupter in *ML* (1935), 36–55, 477–566 (= *EF* 46, 1934, 196–215 and 47, 1935, 161–250).

III.79. *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi.*[80] Feb 1308—Montpellier.

[77] For these titles and this work's relation to the lost *Libre de definicions e de començaments e de qüestions* (II.A.L1), see my "Cronologia," p. 48. Its relationship to the *Introductorium* has only come to light recently, as a result of Lola Badia's as yet unpublished transcription of the *Libre de definicions*, which she has kindly allowed me to consult, and which clearly presents a version of the *Introductorium*, without the Hundred Forms, and with several other minor changes. Further research should clear up questions of other possible versions, as well as what MSS contain which versions.

[78] Not to be confused with the *Liber de memoria* of 1304 (III.64), nor with the *Liber de memoria Dei* of 1314 (IV.104), nor with the apocryphal *Ars memorativa*. For the date, see Rossi, *Clavis*, p. 261.

[79] Not to be confused with two earlier works, the *Ars juris* (II.B.8) or the *Ars juris naturalis* (III.61).

[80] Not to be confused with the *Liber de venatione Trinitatis per substantiam et accidentem* of 1313 (IV.75).

E 75, Sa 199, HLF 139, Lo iii/35, Gl dw, Av 132, Ca 51, Pla 145.

Latin. 13 MSS; unpubl. exc. for Dist. VII, which was long thought to be a separate work entitled:

III.79a. *De venatione medii inter subjectum et praedicatum.*[81]

HLF 65, Gl ip, Av 152, Ca apocr. 30, Pla 160.

Latin. No separate MSS. 7 eds.: (1) Paris, 1516 (RD 60); (2) repr. Paris, 1518 (RD 68); (3–6) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609, 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (7) *Opera parva* I (1744; repr. 1971). ***French.*** Trans. de Vassy, ed. Paris, 1632 (RD 206).

III.80. *Ars generalis ultima.* Nov 1305 in Lyon to March 1308 in Pisa.

E 12, Sa 25, HLF 51, Lo iii/37, Gl dp, Av 120, Ca 54, Pla 146, Ar 20.

Latin. 31 MSS. 9 eds.: (1) Venice, 1480 (RD 1); (2) Barcelona, 1501 (RD 30); (3) ed. Lavinheta, Lyon, 1517 (RD 65); (4) Frankfurt, 1596 (RD 142); (5–8) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609. 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (9) ed. Marçal, Palma, 1645 (RD 219; repr. Frankfurt, 1970). ***French.*** Trans. de Vassy, ed. Paris, 1634 (RD 209).

III.81. *Disputatio Raymundi christiani et Hamar saraceni* (= *De fide catholica contra sarracenos*).[82] Apr 1308—Pisa.

E 59, Sa 79, HLF 25, Go 15 & p. 389, Lo iv/29 & 61.1, Gl ds & hs, Av 123, Ca 103 & 175, Pla 147.

Latin. 16 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1510 (RD 42); (2) *MOG* IV (1729), 431–77 = Int. vii.

III.82. *Liber de centum signis Dei.* May 1308—Pisa.

E 63, Sa 191, HLF 180, Lo iv/31, Gl dz, Av 124, Ca 105, Pla 149.

Latin. 6 MSS; unpubl.

III.83. *Liber clericorum*; (Cat.) *Libre de clerecia.* May 1308—Pisa.

E 65, Sa 44, HLF 78, Lo iv/30, Gl dy & if (?), Av 126, Ca 104, Pla 150.[83]

[81] By many considered to be of doubtful authenticity, and even sometimes attributed to B. de Lavinheta (cf. Hillg, pp. 290–3 and 305; *ROL* V, 158–9; Platzeck, "Miscelánea," p. 410; and Johnston, "Semblance," pp. 271–2). The arguments put forward by J. Vennebusch in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 14 (Louvain, 1972), 87–9, however, seem convincing. This work should not be confused with *De conversione subjecti et praedicati et medii* of 1310 (IV.28).

[82] Spellings of the Muslim's name in MSS and early printed editions vary from *Hamar* to *Homeri*, with every possible intermediary (*Homar, Hameri*, etc.). For the earlier Arabic version of this work, its loss and recomposition, see nn. 163–5 to the "Life" in Vol. I. The second title comes from Munich CLM 10497, which was long thought to be a different work, hence the double numeration in many catalogues.

[83] Platzeck separates a *Petitio Raymundi ad Universitatem parisiensem* (Pla 150a) at the end of this work (corresponding to *ORL* I, 385–6).

Latin. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Lefèvre d'Etaples, Paris, 1499 (RD 24–5); (2) *ORL* I (1906), 293–386. ***French.*** 17th-cent. trans.: One MS. Ed. in Lat. 2 above.

III.84. *Ars Dei* (= *Ars divina*). May 1308—Montpellier.
E 67, Sa 23, HLF 181, Lo iv/32, Gl ea, Av 125, Ca 106, Pla 151.
Latin. 8 MSS; unpubl.

Lost Works

III.L1. *Tractatus de anima.* 1289–90 (?).
Pla 56.
Cited in *Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles* (III.3), *MOG* IV, 192 = Int. iii, 176.

III.L2. *Petition to Clement V.* Nov 1305–Feb 1306—Lyon.
Pla 138.
Cited in the *Contemporary Life*, §35 (see n. 156 there in Vol. I above).

III.L3. *De multiplicatione.*[84] 1308 (?).
Gl jn, Pla 148.
Cited in the *Ars Dei* (III.84).

IV. Post-Art Phase, Oct 1308–Dec 1315.

IV.1. *Liber de novis fallaciis.*[85] Oct 1308—Montpellier.
Sa 99, HLF 151, Lo iii/39, Gl ec, Av 127, Ca 56, Pla 152, ROL 135.
Latin. 14 MSS. Ed. *ROL* XI (1983), 1–136.

IV.2. *De aequalitate potentiarum animae in beatitudine.* Nov 1308—Montpellier.
E 93, Lo iv/33, Gl dt, Av 128, Ca 107, Pla 153, ROL 136.
Latin. 6 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) Xiberta in *ML* (1935), 160–5 (= *EF* 46, 1934, 320–5); (2) *ROL* XI (1983), 137–53.

IV.3. *De investigatione vestigiorum productionum divinarum personarum.*[86] Nov 1308—Montpellier.
E 95, HLF (206), Lo (iv/24), Gl (di), Av (129), Ca (99), Pla 154, ROL 137.
Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* XI. (1983), 155–68.

[84] Not to be confused with the *Liber de multiplicatione quae fit . . .* of 1314 (IV.105).
[85] Not to be confused with the *De fallaciis quas non credunt facere . . .* of 1310 (IV.32).
[86] Not to be confused with the *De investigatione actuum divinarum rationum* of 1304 (III.67); cf. n. 73 above.

IV.4. *Liber de experientia realitatis Artis generalis*. Nov 1308—Montpellier.

E 91, Sa 98, HLF 135, Lo iii/40, Gl ed, Av 130, Ca 57, Pla 155, Ar 22, ROL 138.

Latin. 16 MSS. Ed. *ROL* XI (1983), 169–222.

Contains:

IV.4a. *Epistola Raymundi ad christianum*.

E 139 (?), Gl ed^{I}, Pla 156.

Latin. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. S. Bové in *Al margen de un discurso*, Seo de Urgel, 1912, pp. 26–8; (2) ed. Avinyó in Av 130.

IV.5. *De refugio intellectus*. Dec 1308—Montpellier.[87]

E 37, Pla 158, ROL 139.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *ROL* XI (1983), 223–320.

Contains:

IV.5a. *De conversione syllogismi opinativi in demonstrativum cum fallacia vicesima*.

E 138, Pla 159, ROL 140.

Latin. 2 MSS. Ed *ROL* XI (1983), 321–9.

IV.6. *Excusatio Raymundi*. Dec 1308–Feb 1309—Montpellier (?).[88]

E 76, Gl ec^{I}, Av 131, Ca 108, Pla 157, ROL 141.

Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. *ROL* XI (1983), 331–75.

IV.7. *Proverbis d'ensenyament*. 1309.[89]

HLF 93, Lo vi/15^{I}, Gl cg & ef, Av 143, Ca 242, Pla 161, Per 70.

Catalan. 3 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Morel-Fatio in *Romania* 11 (1882), 188–202; (2) partial ed. Obrador in *AIEC* 2 (1908), 606–7; (3) *ORL* XIV (1928), 373–89. ***Spanish.*** Trans. in *Obras filosóficas*, Madrid, 1933.

IV.8. *Epistola Raymundi ad Regem Aragoniae*; (Eng.) *Letter to the King of Aragon*.[90] 19 Feb 1309—Montpellier.

Gl eg, Pla 162.

Latin. One MS. 7 eds.: (1) ed. Bofarull in *Revista Histórica* 4 (Barcelona, 1877), 37; (2) ed. Morel-Fatio in *Romania* 11 (1882), 189; (3) HLF, pp. 368–9; (4) ed. Obrador in *BSAL* 8 (1900), 321–4; (5) idem in *BSAL* 11 (1905), 98–9; (6) ed. Finke in *Acta Aragonensia* II (1908), 879; (7) ed. Rubió

[87] For the date, as well as the relationship between the main work and the *De conversione syllogismi opinativi* see Stöhr in *EL* 1 (1957), 61–2. See also Hillg, p. 380.

[88] For the date, see Av 131. For other bibliographical information, see Stöhr in *EL* 1 (1957), 60.

[89] These verse proverbs should not be confused with the two earlier sets of prose proverbs, the *Proverbs of Ramon* (III.27) and the *Thousand Proverbs* (III.53). For the date, see Pla II, 54*, n. 151.

[90] Not to be confused with the two lost letters of 1314 and 1315 (IV.L6 and L20). For the date, see Hillg, p. 69, n. 70.

y Lluch in *Documents per l'historia de la cultura catalana mig-eval* I (Barcelona, 1908), 41. ***German.*** Trans. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964.

IV.9. *De majori agentia Dei.* March 1309—Montpellier.
E 64, Lo iv/34, Gl ei, Av 136, Ca 109, Pla 163.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. Xiberta in *ML* (1935), pp. 147–60 (= *EF* 46, 1934, 307–20).

IV.10. *Liber de convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto.* March 1309[91]—Montpellier.
E 92, Sa 61, HLF 29, Go 13, Lo iv/35, Gl ej, Av 133, Ca 110, Pla 164.
Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. in *MOG* IV (1729), 571–5 = Int. xi.

IV.11. *Liber de duodecim syllogismis concludentibus duos actus finales.* March 1309[92]—Montpellier.
Gl dx, Av 135, Ca 55, Pla 166.
Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 221–2.

IV.12. *Liber de acquisitione Terrae Sanctae.* March 1309[93]—Montpellier.
E 78, Sa 1, HLF 254, Go 16, Lo x/5, Gl eh, Av 141, Ca 221, Pla 165.
Latin. 3 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Longpré in *Criterion* 3 (Barcelona, 1927), 265–78; (2) ed. E. Kamar in *R. Lulle, son projet "De acquisitione Terre Sancte,"* Dr. diss. Paris, 1956; (3) idem in *Studia Orientalia Christiana*, Collectanea 6 (Cairo, 1961), 103–131.

IV.13. *Liber de exemplo unissimae unitatis et volissimae voluntatis.* Apr 1309—Montpellier.[94]

[91] Some MSS have March 1308 while others have March 1304. In our system of counting from Jan 1 (instead from March 25 in the so-called Florentine system Llull used), this would give 1309 and 1305, respectively.
[92] For the date, see Hillg, p. 99, n. 209.
[93] The MSS have March 1309 in Montpellier, which would normally mean (see n. 91 above) March 1310 by our reckoning. But since by March 1310 Llull was firmly installed in Paris, this must mean that he finished this work between 25 and 30 March 1309. Cf. Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 274–5.
[94] This work and IV.15, *Liber de esse Dei*, have traditionally been placed at the end of Llull's production (Tunis, 1315) for no better reason, apparently, than their absence from the *Electorium* catalogue, which in principle takes us to 1314 (see *ROL* II, 381 and 389). Since that catalogue (in both of its parts) enumerates only 157 works, such reasoning would leave us with some 110 works in the last year of Llull's life! Much better evidence lies in the Vatican MS Ottob. lat. 832, which gives in almost perfect order and with only a few omissions, the first 18 works of the quaternary phase (i.e., IV.1–18), right up to Llull's departure for his fourth and last stay in Paris. The omissions (using the catalogue nos. here) are nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, and the only change of order involves nos. 1 and 4. From 9 to 18 the order is perfect and includes these two works (13 and 15). For further partial confirmation of this situation from other MSS, see the comparative chart on *ROL* I, 62.

Gl if, Av 233, Ca 69, Pla 272, ROL 279.

Latin. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 222–3; (2) *ROL* II (1960), 379–86.

IV.14. *Liber de propriis et communibus actibus divinarum rationum.* Apr 1309—Montpellier.

E 94, Sa 3, HLF 207, Lo iv/36, Gl ek, Av 134, Ca 111, Pla 167.

Latin. 7 MSS; unpubl.

IV.15. *Liber de esse Dei.* Apr 1309—Montpellier.[95]

Gl ig, Av 234, Ca 70, Pla 273, ROL 280.

Latin. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 292–4; (2) *ROL* II (1960), 387–96.

IV.16. *Liber de potestate divinarum rationum.* Apr 1309—Montpellier.

E 96, Gl el, Av 138, Ca 112, Pla 168.

Latin. One MS. Ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 223–4.

IV.17. *Liber de Trinitate in unitate permansive in essentia Dei* (= *De nominibus personarum divinarum*). Apr 1309—Montpellier.[96]

E 97, Sa 196, HLF 208, Lo iv/26, Gl dm & em, Av 137 & 139, Ca 101 & 113. Pla 169 & 169a.

Latin. 12 MSS. Ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 289–90.

IV.18. *Liber de probatione quod in Deo sunt tres personae.* Apr 1309—Montpellier.

E 98, Gl en, Av 140, Ca 114, Pla 170.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 290–2.

IV.19. *Ars mystica theologiae et philosophiae.*[97] Nov 1309—Paris.

E 99, Sa 30, HLF 172, Lo vii/2, Gl eo, Av 144, Ca 182, Pla 174, ROL 154.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. *ROL* V (1967), 259–466.

IV.20. *Liber de perversione entis removenda.* Dec 1309—Paris.

E 100, Sa 157, HLF 158, Lo iii/41, Gl ep, Av 145, Ca 58, Pla 175, ROL 155.

[95] See the previous note. This work, moreover, should not be confused with the *Liber de est Dei* of 1300 (III.45), nor with the *Liber de essentia et esse Dei* of 1313 (IV.91).

[96] For this work, which was often treated as two, see Stöhr in *EL* 1 (1957), 52–3. As for the date, see the very convincing arguments in *ROL* V, 156–7, corroborated, it would seem, by the evidence of Ottob. lat. 832 discussed in n. 94 above.

[97] And not *Ars mixtiva* or *mistiva* as in all catalogues since Salzinger.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. *ROL* V (1967), 467–506.

IV.21. *Metaphysica nova et compendiosa.* Jan 1310—Paris.

E 101, Sa 137, HLF 61, Lo iii/42, Gl es, Av 146, Ca 59, Pla 177, ROL 156.

Latin. 7 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1512 (RD 46); (2) Paris, 1516 (RD 59); (3) *ROL* VI (1978), 1–51. ***French.*** trans. in one MS.

IV.22. *Liber novus physicorum et compendiosus.* Feb 1310—Paris.

E 102, Sa 158, HLF 60, Lo viii/9, Gl et, Av 147, Ca 12, Pla 178, ROL 157.

Latin. 14 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) Barcelona, 1512 (RD 46); (2) *Opera parva* IV (1745; repr. 1972); (3) *ROL* VI (1978), 53–83. ***French.*** 2 MSS. Ed. Llinarès in *EL* 11 (1967), 41–66, 219.

IV.23. *Liber de ente infinito.* Feb 1310—Paris.

E 107, Sa 88, HLF 199, Lo iv/38, Gl eu, Av 148, Ca 115, Pla 179, ROL 158.

Latin. 5 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VI (1978), 85–115.

IV.24. *Liber correlativorum innatorum.* Mar 1310—Paris.[98]

E 103, Sa 64, HLF 63, Lo iv/40, Gl fc, Av 160, Ca 118, Pla 190, ROL 159.

Latin. 19 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1512 (RD 48); (2) *Opera parva* I (1744; repr. 1971); (3) *ROL* VI (1978), 117–52.

IV.25. *Liber de praedestinatione et praescientia.* Apr 1310—Paris.

E 153, Sa 163, HLF 225, Lo iv/39, Gl ev, Av 149, Ca 117, Pla 180, ROL 160.

Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VI (1978), 153–75.

IV.26. *Liber de modo naturali intelligendi.* May 1310—Paris.

E 104, Sa 139, HLF 145, Lo vii/3, Gl ex, Av 150, Ca 183, Pla 181, ROL 161.

Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VI (1978), 177–223.

IV.27. *Supplicatio Raimundi venerabilibus et sublimis sacratissimae theologiae professoribus ac baccalariis studii Parisiensis.* June 1310—Paris.[99]

E 105, Sa 193, HLF 28, Go 17, Lo iv/37, Gl er, Av 199, Ca 116, Pla 140. ROL 162.

Latin. 5 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* IV (1729), 563–70 = Int. x; (2) *ROL* VI (1978), 225–50.

[98] For the date, see *ROL* VI, 120–1.
[99] For the date, see *ROL* VI, 229–30, as well as *ROL* V, 154.

IV.28. *De conversione subjecti et praedicati et medii.*[100] July 1310—Paris.

E 106, Sa 63, HLF 64, Lo iii/51, Gl ic, Av 151, Ca 60, Pla 182, ROL 163.

Latin. 2 MSS. 8 eds.: (1) Paris, 1516 (RD 60); (2) repr. Paris, 1518 (RD 68); (3–6) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609, 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (7) *Opera parva* I (1744; repr. 1971); (8) *ROL* VI (1978), 251–75. ***French.*** Trans. de Vassy, ed. Paris, 1632 (RD 206).

IV.29. *Liber reprobationis aliquorum errorum Averrois.* July 1310—Paris.

E 109, Sa 183, HLF 165, Lo vii/4, Gl ey, Av 153, Ca 184, Pla 183, ROL 164.

Latin. 9 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Chielowska in *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 13 (1973), 3–34; (2) *ROL* VI (1978), 277–318.

IV.30. *Liber in quo declaratur quod fides sancta catholica est magis probabilis quam improbabilis.* Aug 1310—Paris.

HLF 79, Lo vii/17, Gl fp, Av (61), Ca 196, Pla 184, ROL 165.

Latin. One MS. Ed. in *ROL* VI (1978), 319–73.[101]

IV.31. *Liber de possibili et impossibili.* Oct 1310—Paris.

E 108, Sa 159, HLF 157, Lo vii/5, Gl ez, Av 154, Ca 185, Pla 185, ROL 166.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VI (1978), 375–466.

IV.32. *De fallaciis quas non credunt facere aliqui, qui credunt esse philosophantes, contra purissimum actum Dei verissimum et perfectissimum.* Nov (?) 1310—Paris.[102]

E 110, Sa 100, HLF 150, Lo vii/6, Gl ee, Av 155, Ca 181, Pla 176, ROL 167.

Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VI (1978), 467–88.

IV.33. *Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae.* Dec (?) 1310—Paris.[103]

Sa 81, HLF 166, Lo vii/7, Gl fb, Ca 188, Pla 186, ROL 168.

Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VII (1975), 1–17.

IV.34. *Liber natalis pueri parvuli Christi Jesu.* Jan 1311—Paris.

[100] Not to be confused with *De venatione medii inter subjectum et praedicatum* (III.79a).

[101] That is, only one MS and one ed. of the complete work. A fragment—the first part of the Prologue—was used to make up part of an introduction to the *Liber Apostrophe* (III.24), and was reprinted in every edition of that work from Cologne, 1509, on, in addition to appearing thus in one 18th-century MS. This work should not be confused with the *De ostentione per quam fides* . . . of 1313–14 (IV.107) also used to make up part of the above-mentioned introduction (see n. 123 below).

[102] For the date and place, see *ROL* VI, 470–1, as well as *ROL* V, 154.

[103] The title should not be confused with the alternate title of *Liber de efficiente et effectu* (IV.40) below. For the date, see *ROL* VII, 3–4, as well as *ROL* V, 154–5.

E 113, Sa 143, HLF 53, Go 18, Lo x/6, Gl fa, Av 157, Ca 222, Pla 187, ROL 169.

Latin. 7 MSS. 3 eds. (1) ed. Lefèvre d'Etaples, Paris, 1499 (RD 24–5); (2) partial repr. by M. Müller in *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 3 (1936), 139–46, 230–6, 298–305; ibid. 4 (1937), 69–71, 145–6, 292; (3) *ROL* VII (1975), 19–73. ***Catalan.*** trans. L. Riber in *OE* II (1960), 1271–95. ***German.*** partial trans. M. Müller in Lat. 2 above.

IV.35. *Liber lamentationis Philosophiae* (= *Duodecim principia Philosophiae*). Feb 1311—Paris.

E 114, Sa 122, HLF 55, Lo vii/8, Gl fd, Av 161, Ca 189, Pla 191, ROL 170.

Latin. 11 MSS. 8 eds.: (1) Paris, 1516 (RD 58); (2) repr. Paris, 1518 (RD 67); (3–6) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609, 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (7) *Opera parva* IV (1745; repr. 1972); (8) *ROL* VII (1975), 75–126.

IV.36. *Liber contradictionis* (= *Liber de centum syllogismis*). Feb 1311—Paris.

E 111, Sa 60, HLF 70, Lo vii/9, Gl fe, Av 159, Ca 186, Pla 188, ROL 171.

Latin. 5 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *Opera parva* V (1746; repr. 1973); (2) *ROL* VII (1975), 127–58.

IV.37. *Liber de syllogismis contradictoriis.*[104] Feb 1311—Paris.

E 112, Sa 194, HLF 149, Lo vii/10, Gl ff, Av 158, Ca 187, Pla 189, ROL 172.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VII (1975), 159–98.

IV.38. *Liber de divina unitate et pluralitate.* Feb 1311—Paris.

E 115, Sa 204, HLF 183, Lo iv/41, Gl fg, Av 162, Ca 119, Pla 192, ROL 173.

Latin. 11 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VII (1975), 199–236.

IV.39. *Sermones contra errores Averrois.* Apr 1311—Paris.

E 116, Sa 190, HLF 164, Lo vii/11, Gl fi, Av 163, Ca 190, Pla 193, ROL 174.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VII (1975), 237–62.

IV.40. *Liber de efficiente et effectu* (= *Disputatio inter Raymundum et Averroistam*).[105] May 1311—Paris.

E 117, Sa 87, HLF 67, Lo vii/12, Gl ew, Av 156, Ca 191, Pla 194, ROL 175.

[104] Not to be confused with the previous work, nor with III.55.
[105] Not to be confused with the *Disputatio Raimundi et Averroistae* (IV.33) above.

Latin. 9 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *Opera parva* IV (1745; repr. 1972); (2) *ROL* VII (1975), 263–91.

IV.41. *Liber facilis scientiae.* June 1311—Paris.

E 118, Sa 187, HLF 31, Lo iv/42, Gl fj, Av 116, Ca 120, Pla 196, ROL 176.

Latin. 20 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) *MOG* IV (1729), 583–93 = Int. xiii; (2) *Opera parva* V (1746); (3) *ROL* VII (1975), 293–341.

Followed by:

IV.41a. *Quaestiones factae supra Librum facilis scientiae.*

E 119, Sa 179, HLF 32, Lo iv/43, Gl fk, Av 117, Ca 121, Pla 196a, ROL 177.

Latin. No separate MSS or eds.

IV.42. *Liber de Deo ignoto et de mundo ignoto.* June 1311—Paris.

E 120, Sa 74, HLF 184, Lo vii/13, Gl fl, Av 164, Ca 192, Pla 195, ROL 178.

Latin. 8 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VIII (1980), 1–32.

IV.43. *Liber de forma Dei.* July 1311—Paris.

E 121, Sa 108, HLF 182, Lo vii/14, Gl fm, Av 165, Ca 193, Pla 197, ROL 179.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VIII (1980), 33–101.

IV.44. *Liber de existentia et agentia Dei.* Aug 1311—Paris.

E 122, Sa 97, HLF 185, Lo vii/15, Gl fn, Av 166, Ca 194, Pla 198, ROL 180.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VIII (1980), 103–37.

IV.45. *Liber de quaestione valde alta et profunda.* Aug 1311—Paris.

E 123, Sa 174, HLF 217, Lo vii/16, Gl fo, Av 167, Ca 195, Pla 199, ROL 181.

Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VIII (1980), 139–74.

IV.46. *Liber de ente quod simpliciter est per se et propter se existens et agens* (= *De perseitate et finalitate Dei*).[106] Sept 1311—Paris.

E 124, Sa 91, HLF 200, Lo vii/18, Gl fq, Av 169, Ca 197, Pla 207, ROL 188.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *ROL* VIII (1980), 179–245.

Contains:

IV.46a. *Petitio Raymundi in Concilio generali ad adquiriendam Terram Sanctam* (constitutes Dist. VI of the *Liber de ente*).

E 142, Sa 156, HLF 252, Go 20, Lo x/8, Gl ft, Av 171, Ca 224, Pla 207a.

[106] Not to be confused with the *Liber de perseitate Dei* of 1314 (IV.106).

Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Longpré in *La France Franciscaine* 18 (1935), 145–54; (2) ed. Wieruszowski in *ML* (1935), 419–25 (= *EF* 47, 1935, 103–9).

IV.47. *Vita coetanea*; (Cat.) *Vida coetània*; (Eng.) *Contemporary Life*. Sept (?) 1311—Paris.

Sa 62, Pla 208, ROL 189, Per 72.

Latin. 11 MSS. 9 eds.: (1) ed. Custurer in *Disertaciones historicas*, Palma, 1700 (RD 283); (2) ed. Sollier in *Acta B. Raymundi Lulli*, Antwerp, 1708 (RD 291); (3) idem in *Acta sanctorum, junii*, T. V, Antwerp, 1709 (RD 292; repr. Venice, 1744—RD 324, and Paris, 1867); (4) ed. Salzinger in *MOG* I, 35–46 = Int. i; (5) ed. Allison Peers in *A Life of Ramón Lull*, London, 1927, pp. 47–86; (6) ed. de Gaiffier in *Analecta Bollandiana* 48 (1930), 146–75; (7) ed. Batllori in *OL* (1948), pp. 46–77; (8) ed. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964, pp. 145–79; (9) *ROL* VIII (1980), 259–309. ***Catalan.*** 2 MSS. 6 eds.: (1) ed. S. Bové in *BRABLB* 8 (1915), 89–101; (2) idem in *BSAL* 15 (1915), 349–57; (3) ed. Avinyó in *Història del Lulisme*, Barcelona, 1925, pp. 3–30; (4) ed. Moll, Palma, 1933 (Bru 147); (5) ed. Batllori in Lat. 7 above; (6) idem in *OE* I (1957), 31–54. ***Spanish.*** 2 eds.: (1) trans. de Saavedra in *Antología* I (1961), 51–84 (= *Introducción a Ramón Llull*, Madrid, 1960, pp. 49–82); (2) trans. P. Gimferrer in *Obra escogida*, Madrid, 1981, pp. 1–22. ***French.*** 4 eds.: (1) trans. Hauréau in *HLF*, pp. 4–46; (2) trans. Beaufreton in *Anthologie franciscaine du moyen âge*, Paris, 1921, pp. 228–54; (3) trans. Sugranyes in *Docteur* (1954), pp. 25–49; (4) trans. Sala-Molins in *Choix* (1967), 18–44. ***English.*** Trans. Allison Peers in Lat. 5 above, pp. 1–45. ***German.*** Trans. Platzeck in Lat. 8 above, pp. 33–59.[107]

IV.48. *Del consili.*[108] Oct 1311—Paris to Vienne.

Sa 52, HLF 102, Lo vi/14, Gl fs, Av 168, Ca 243, Pla 209, Per 73.

Catalan. 9 MSS. 10 eds.: (1) Rosselló, 1859; (2) Alòs, 1928; (3) fragm. in Alòs, 1932; (4) fragm. in Riquer, 1936; (5) *ORL* XX (1938), 253–88; (6) fragm. in Tasis, 1949; (7) fragm. in Triadú, 1953; (8) *OE* I (1957), 1328–44; (9) fragm. ed. Rodríguez Alpera, Palma, 1973; (10) fragm. in Castellet, 1979.

IV.49. *Disputatio Petri clerici et Raymundi phantastici* (= *Phantasticus*). Oct 1311—Paris to Vienne.

Sa 80, HLF 54, Go 19, Lo x/7, Gl fr, Av 170, Ca 223, Pla 210.

[107] For further discussion of some of these versions and translations, see Vol. I, "Life,", and especially nn. 42–4 there.

[108] This crusading poem should not be confused with the *Liber de consilio* of 1304 (III.66), nor with the *Ars consilii* of 1315 (IV.109).

Latin. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Lefèvre d'Etaples, Paris, 1499 (RD 24–5); (2) ed. Müller in *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 2 (1935), 311–24 (Bru 24).
French. One MS of 17th-cent. trans.[109]

IV.50. *Liber de ente reali et rationis.* Dec 1311—Vienne.[110]
Sa 89, HLF 69, Lo iii/43, Gl fu, Av 173, Ca 61, Pla 211.
Latin. 13 MSS. Ed. *Opera parva* IV (1745; repr. 1972).

IV.51. *Liber de divina habentia.* Jan 1312—Vienne.
Latin. One MS; unpubl.[111]

IV.52. *Liber de ente simpliciter absoluto.*[112] Mar 1312—Vienne.
Sa 90, HLF 201, Lo iv/45, Gl fv, Av 174, Ca 123, Pla 212.
Latin. 7 MSS; unpubl.

IV.53. *Liber de locutione angelorum.* May 1312—Montpellier.
Sa 131, HLF 241, Lo iv/46, Gl fw, Av 175, Ca 124, Pla 213.
Latin. 2 MSS; unpubl.

IV.54. *Liber de participatione christianorum et sarracenorum.* July 1312—Majorca.
Sa 152, Go 21, HLF 255, Lo x/9, Gl fy, Av 176, Ca 225, Pla 214.
Latin. 5 MSS. Fragm. ed. Wieruszowski in *ML* (1935), pp. 425–6 (= *EF* 47, 109–10).

IV.55. *Liber de differentia correlativorum divinarum dignitatum.* July 1312—Majorca.
Sa 77, HLF 209, Lo iv/47, Gl fx, Av 177, Ca 125, Pla 215.
Latin. 6 MSS; unpubl.

IV.56. *Liber de quinque principiis quae sunt in omni eo quod est.* Aug 1312—Majorca.
Sa 165, HLF 161, Lo iii/44, Gl fz, Av 178, Ca 62, Pla 216.
Latin. One MS; unpubl.

IV.57. *Liber de novo modo demonstrandi.* Sept 1312—Majorca.
E 126, Sa 138, HLF 33, Lo iv/49, Gl gb, Av 179, Ca 127, Pla 217.
Latin. 7 MSS; 2 eds.: (1) *MOG* IV (1729), 595–610 = Int. xiv; (2) *Opera parva* V (1746).

[109] Supposed Catalan and Spanish texts of this work existing in Palma and mentioned in many bibliographies are nonexistent. The errors seem to have arisen from a MS in the Causa Pia Luliana of the Diocesan Archive containing a *Libre de la disputa de el seglar y de el jacobita*, which is an alternate title for the apocryphal *Libre de concepció virginal*; cf. L. Pérez in *EL* 2 (1958), 218.
[110] Thus in the oldest MSS, and not Avignon as in many modern bibliographies.
[111] See H. Riedlinger in *EL* 7 (1963), 181–7, as well as in *ROL* V (1967), 176.
[112] Not to be confused with the *Liber de ente absoluto* of 1313 (IV.76).

IV.58. *Ars confessionis* (= *Liber qui continet confessionem*).[113] Sept 1312—Majorca.
Sa 51, HLF 245, Lo iv/50, Gl gc, Av 188, Ca 128, Pla 218.
Latin. 4 MSS; unpubl.

IV.59. *De secretis sacratissimae Trinitatis et Incarnationis* (= *Liber de Trinitate et Incarnatione*). Sept 1312—Majorca.
Sa 197, HLF 205, Go 9, Lo iv/48, Gl ga, Av 189, Ca 126, Pla 219.
Latin. 5 MSS; unpubl.

IV.60. *Sermones de decem praeceptis*. Oct 1312—Majorca.
Sa 189, HLF 229, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{III}, Av 182, Ca 132, Pla 221.
Latin. One MS; unpubl.

IV.61. *Liber de septem sacramentis Ecclesiae*.[114] Oct 1312—Majorca.
Sa 185, HLF 231, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{II}, Av 183, Ca 133, Pla 220.
Latin. 3 MSS; unpubl.

IV.62. *Expositio super Pater noster* (= *Sermones de Pater noster*). Oct 1312—Majorca.
Sa 153, HLF 233, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{V}, Av 185, Ca 135, Pla 222.
Latin. 4 MSS; unpubl.

IV.63. *Expositio super Ave Maria* (= *Sermones de Ave Maria*). Oct 1312—Majorca.
Sa 39, HLF 234, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{VI}, Av 186, Ca 136, Pla 223.
Latin. 3 MSS; unpubl.

IV.64. *Liber de septem donis Spiritus sancti*. Oct 1312[115]—Majorca.
Sa 86, HLF 232, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{IV}, Av 184, Ca 134, Pla 227.
Latin. One MS; unpubl.

IV.65. *Liber de virtutibus et peccatis* (= *Liber de vitiis et virtutibus*); (Cat.) *Art major de predicació*.[116] Jan 1313—Majorca.

[113] Not to be confused with the apocryphal *Art de confessió* printed in *ORL* I (1905).
[114] Not to be confused with II.B.15a above.
[115] This is the date given in *ROL* III, 23. Platzeck gives Feb 1313. Other authors (Pasqual, *Vindiciae* I, 318 and 373, as well as Carreras y Artau in his catalogue) have just said it must have been written during this stay in Majorca. In the only MS, Munich, CLM 10495, preserving all these collections of sermons (IV.60–7), and whose order I have followed (with the sole exception of the following *Liber de virtutibus et peccatis* which, as the major work by far of the series, appears at the head of the MS), this work comes between IV.63 and IV.66, which could justify either date. For the relationship between all these works, see *ROL* III, 23–4.
[116] This Catalan title, which also appears in Latin listings as *Ars major praedicationis*, should not lead to a confusion with the alternate title (*Ars magna praedicationis*) of the *Liber de praedicatione* (III.69).

Sa 202, HLF 247, Lo iv/51 & 51^{I}, Gl gd & gd^{I}, Av 180, Ca 130, Pla 225, Per 77.

Latin. 7 MSS; unpubl. ***Catalan.*** One MS; unpubl.

IV.66. *Liber de operibus misericordiae* (= *Sermones de operibus misericordiae*). Feb 1313—Majorca.

Sa 148, HLF 226, Lo iv/51^{II}, Gl gd^{VII}, Av 187, Ca 137, Pla 228.

Latin. 3 MSS; unpubl.

IV.67. *Ars brevis praedicationis*; (Cat.) *Art abreujada de predicació*. Feb 1313—Majorca.

Sa 17, HLF 248, Lo iv/53, Gl gf, Av 181, Ca 131, Pla 226, Per 78.

Latin. 22 MSS; unpubl. ***Catalan.*** 4 MSS. Ed. C. Wittlin, Sant Boi de Llobregat, 1982.

IV.68. *Liber per quem poterit cognosci quae lex sit magis bona, magis magna et etiam magis vera*. Feb 1313—Majorca.

Sa 129, HLF 219, Lo iv/52, Gl ge, Av 190, Ca 139, Pla 229.

Latin. 9 MSS; unpubl.

IV.69. *Ars infusa* (= *Ars sive scientia generalis ad habendum certam cognitionem Dei et rerum omnium creaturarum*). 1312–13—Majorca.

HLF 173, Lo xi, Gl ii, Av 192, Ca 129, Pla 224, Ar 23.

Latin. 3 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Galmés in *EUC* 17 (1932), 291–301; (2) repr. in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 51–64; (3) repr. in *Miscelánea Luliana*, Palma, 1955, pp. 41–54.

IV.70. *De virtute veniali et vitali, insuper de peccato veniali et mortali*. Apr 1313—Majorca.

Sa 203, HLF 250, Lo iv/54, Gl gg, Av 191, Ca 140, Pla 230.

Latin. 2 MSS; unpubl.

IV.71. *Testamentum Raymundi*; (Eng.) *Llull's Will*. 26 Apr 1313—Majorca.

Gl gh, Pla 231.

Latin. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Bofarull in *MRABLB* 5 (1896), 435–79; (2) ed. Avinyó in *El terciari francescà beat Ramon Llull*, Igualada, 1912, pp. 523–5. ***Spanish.*** Trans. in Lat. 1 above. ***German.*** Trans. Platzeck in *Das Leben des seligen Raimund Lull*, Düsseldorf, 1964, pp. 127–32.

IV.72. *Liber de compendiosa contemplatione*. May 1313—Messina.[117]

Lo iv/55, Gl gi, Av 193, Ca 209, Pla 232, ROL 213.

Latin. 6 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *ORL* XVIII (1935), 437–50; (2) *ROL* I (1959), 69–86.

[117] This work was begun on the sea journey from Majorca to Sicily, and finished in Messina in May.

IV.73. *Libre de consolació d'ermità*; (Lat.) *Liber de consolatione eremitae*. Aug 1313—Messina.[118]

Sa 54, HLF 260, Lo iv/56, Gl gj, Av 194, Ca 141, Pla 233, ROL 214, Per 79.

Catalan. 11 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Barnils in *BRABLB* 6 (1911–12), 184–95; (2) ed. Sponer in *ML* (1935), pp. 341–72 (= *EF* 47, 25–56). ***Latin.*** 2 versions: (A) An incomplete literal trans. One MS. Ed. in *ROL* I (1959), 94–106. (B) A complete free trans. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Alòs in *Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia en Roma* 2 (Madrid, 1914), 115–27; (2) *ROL* I (1959), 107–20.

IV.74. *Liber de definitionibus Dei*. Sept 1313—Messina.

Lo iv/57, Gl gk, Av 195, Ca 142, Pla 234, ROL 215.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. in *ROL* I (1959), 121–32.

IV.75. *Liber de accidente et substantia* (= *Liber de venatione Trinitatis per substantiam et accidentem*).[119] Oct 1313—Messina.

E 128, Sa 200, HLF 66, Lo iv/58, Gl gl, Av 200, Ca 143, Pla 235, ROL 216.

Latin. 18 MSS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Proaza, Valencia, 1510 (RD 42); (2) *Opera parva* I (1744; repr. 1971); (3) *ROL* I (1959), 133–47.

IV.76. *Liber de ente absoluto*.[120] Oct 1313—Messina.

HLF 202, Lo iv/59.1, Gl gm, Av 197, Ca 144, Pla 236, ROL 217.

Latin. 10 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 149–59.

IV.77. *Liber de actu majori*. Oct 1313—Messina.

E 131, Sa 2, HLF 238, Lo iv/59.2, Gl gn, Av 198, Ca 145, Pla 237, ROL 218.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 161–71.

IV.78. *Liber de divinis dignitatibus infinitis et benedictis*. Oct 1313—Messina.

Lo iv/59.3, Gl go, Av 196, Ca 146, Pla 238, ROL 219.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 173–84.

IV.79. *Liber propter bene intelligere, diligere et possificare*. Oct 1313—Messina.

Lo iv/59.4, Gl gp, Av 201, Ca 147, Pla 239, ROL 220.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 185–99.

IV.80. *Liber de medio naturali*. Oct 1313—Messina.

[118] This is the date of composition of the original Catalan version. The free Latin version—apparently done by Llull himself—was completed in November of the same year.

[119] Not to be confused with the *Liber de venatione substantiae, accidentis et compositi* (III.79). The danger of confusion is increased by the fact that this work is often referred to as the *Liber de substantia et accidente*.

[120] Not to be confused with the *Liber de ente simpliciter absoluto* of 1312 (IV.52).

Sa 134, HLF 155, Lo iii/45, Gl gq, Av 199, Ca 63, Pla 240, ROL 221.
Latin. 5 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 201–17.

IV.81. *Liber de scientia perfecta.* Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 188, HLF 159, Lo iv/59.5, Gl gr, Av 207, Ca 148, Pla 241, ROL 222.
Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 219–32.

IV.82. *Liber de infinita et ordinata potestate* (= *Liber de potestate Dei absoluta et ordinata*). Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 161, HLF 188, Lo iv/59.6, Gl gt, Av 210, Ca 149, Pla 242, ROL 223.
Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 233–62.

IV.83. *Liber de minori loco ad majorem.* Nov 1313—Messina.
E 130, Sa 130, HLF 156, Lo iv/56.7, Gl gu, Av 209, Ca 150, Pla 243, ROL 224.
Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 263–75.

IV.84. *Liber de infinito esse.* Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 93, HLF 204, Lo iv/59.8, Gl gv, Av 203, Ca 151, Pla 244, ROL 225.
Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Bender in *SMR* 9–10 (1953–4), 51–8 (= *Opera Latina* II, Majorca, 1953–4, 57–62); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 277–86.

IV.85. *Liber de Trinitate trinitissima.* Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 198, HLF 210, Lo iv/59.9, Gl gw, Av 202, Ca 152, Pla 245, ROL 226.
Latin. 9 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Gálszécs in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 31–4 (= *Opera Latina* I, Majorca, 1952, 21–4); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 287–95.

IV.86. *Liber de sanctitate Dei.* Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 186, HLF 187, Lo iv/59.10, Gl gx, Av 204, Ca 153, Pla 246, ROL 227.
Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 297–308.

IV.87. *Liber de divina unitate* (= *De unitate Dei in gradu superlativo*). Nov 1313—Messina.
Lo iv/59.11, Gl gy, Av 206, Ca 154, Pla 247, ROL 228.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 309–17.

IV.88. *Liber de inventione Dei.* Nov 1313—Messina.
Sa 120, HLF 186, Lo iv/59.12, Gl gs, Av 205, Ca 155, Pla 248, ROL 229.
Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Stegmüller in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 21–5 (= *Opera Latina* I, Majorca, 1952, 11–15); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 319–27.

IV.89. *Liber de quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis.* Dec 1313—Messina.

E 129, Sa 164, HLF 59, Lo iii/47, Gl hd, Av 215, Ca 65, Pla 249, ROL 230.

Latin. 12 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) *Opera parva* II (1744; repr. 1971–2); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 329–45.

IV.90. *Liber de divina natura* (= *De natura Dei*). Dec 1313—Messina.

Sa 145, HLF 190, Lo iv/59.13, Gl ha, Av 212, Ca 156, Pla 250, ROL 231.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 347–56.

IV.91. *Liber de essentia et esse Dei.*[121] Dec 1313—Messina.

Sa 95, HLF 189, Lo iv/59.14, Gl gz, Av 211, Ca 157, Pla 251, ROL 232.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 357–75.

IV.92. *Liber de creatione.* Dec 1313—Messina.

Sa 65, HLF 222, Lo iii/46, Gl hc, Av 214, Ca 64, Pla 252, ROL 233.

Latin. 5 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 377–87.

IV.93. *Liber de concordantia et contrarietate.* Dec 1313—Messina.

E 132, Sa 49, HLF 221, Lo iv/59.15, Gl hb, Av 213, Ca 158, Pla 253, ROL 234.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 389–401.

IV.94. *Liber de potestate pura.* Jan 1314—Messina.

Sa 160, HLF 198, Lo iv/59.17, Gl hf, Av 216, Ca 160, Pla 255, ROL 235.

Latin. 4 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Schneider in *SMR* 9–10 (1953–4), 59–86 (= *Opera Latina* II, Majorca, 1953–4, 63–90); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 403–35.

IV.95. *Liber de intelligere Dei.* Jan 1314—Messina.

Sa 114, HLF 191, Lo iv/59.18, Gl hg, Av 217, Ca 161, Pla 256, ROL 236.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 437–51.

IV.96. *Liber de divina voluntate infinita et ordinata.* Jan 1314—Messina.

E 133, Sa 205, HLF 193, Lo iv/59.19, Gl hi, Av 219, Ca 162, Pla 258, ROL 238.

Latin. 7 MSS. Ed. *ROL* I (1959), 457–83.

IV.97. *Liber de Deo majore et Deo minore.* Jan 1314—Messina.

[121] To be confused neither with the *Liber de esse Dei* of 1309 (IV.15), nor with the *Liber de est Dei* of 1300 (III.45).

Sa 73, HLF 192, Lo iv/59.16, Gl he, Av 218, Ca 159, Pla 259, ROL 239.

Latin. 3 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Giers in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 35–50 (= *Opera Latina* I, Majorca, 1952, 25–40); (2) *ROL* I (1959), 485–503.

IV.98. *Liber de affirmatione et negatione.* Feb 1314—Messina.

Sa 5, HLF 153, Lo iii/48, Gl hl, Av 220, Ca 66, Pla 260, ROL 240.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 17–40.

IV.99. *Liber de justitia Dei* (= *De divina justitia*). Feb 1314—Messina.

Sa 121, HLF 194, Lo iv/59.20, Gl hh, Av 222, Ca 163, Pla 261, ROL 241.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 41–58.

IV.100. *Liber de fine et majoritate* (= *Liber de majori fine*). Feb 1314—Messina.

E 127, Sa 104, HLF 243, Lo iv/59.21, Gl hk, Av 221, Ca 164, Pla 262, ROL 242.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 59–69.

IV.101. *Liber de vita divina.* Feb 1314—Messina.

Sa 70, HLF 178, Lo iv/59.22, Gl hj, Av 223, Ca 165, Pla 263, ROL 243.

Latin. 7 MSS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Gálszécs in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 27–30 (= *Opera Latina* I, Majorca, 1952, 17–20); (2) *ROL* II (1960), 71–9.

IV.102. *Liber de perfecto esse.* Mar 1314—Messina.

Sa 94, HLF 203, Lo iv/59.23, Gl ho, Av 224, Ca 166, Pla 264, ROL 244.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 81–95.

IV.103. *Liber de objecto finito et infinito.* Mar 1314—Messina.

Sa 147, HLF 154, Lo iv/59.24, Gl hm, Av 225, Ca 167, Pla 265, ROL 245.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 97–116.

IV.104. *Liber de memoria Dei* (= *De divina memoria*). Mar 1314—Messina.

Sa 136, HLF 195, Lo iv/59.25, Gl hn, Av 226, Ca 168, Pla 266, ROL 246.

Latin. 6 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 117–30.

IV.105. *Liber de multiplicatione quae fit in essentia Dei per divinam Trinitatem.* Apr 1314—Messina.

Sa 142, HLF 211, Lo iv/59.26, Gl hq, Av 228, Ca 169, Pla 267, ROL 247.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 131–46.

IV.106. *Liber de perseitate Dei.*[122] Apr 1314—Messina.

Sa 154, HLF 179, Lo iv/59.27, Gl hp, Av 227, Ca 170, Pla 268, ROL 248.

Latin. 3 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 147–60.

IV.107. *De ostentione per quam fides catholica est probabilis atque demonstrabilis.* 1313–14—Messina.[123]

E 148, HLF 216, Lo iv/44, Gl eq, Av 208, Ca 122, Pla 254, ROL 249.

Latin. 2 MSS. 9 eds.: (1) Cologne, 1509 (RD 40); (2) Paris, 1578 (RD 122); (3–6) ed. Zetzner, Strasbourg, 1598, 1609, 1617, 1651 (RD 144, 162, 180, 233); (7) *MOG* IV (1729), 532 = Int. ix, 28; (8) ed. Stegmüller in *SMR* 7–8 (1952), 19–20 (= *Opera Latina* I, Majorca, 1952, 9–10); (9) *ROL* II (1960), 161–7.

IV.108. *Liber de civitate mundi* (= *De consilio divinarum dignitatum*).[124] May 1314—Messina.

HLF 163, Lo iv/59.28, Gl hr, Av 229, Ca 171, Pla 269, ROL 250.

Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 169–201.

IV.109. *Ars consilii.*[125] July 1315—Tunis.

Lo ix/6, Gl ht, Av 230, Ca 215, Pla 285, ROL 253.

Latin. 1 MS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Rius in *ML* (1935), 257–98 (= *EF* 46, 1934, 417–58); (2) *ROL* II (1960), 213–69.

IV.110. *Liber de Deo et suis propriis qualitatibus infinitis.* July 1315—Tunis.

Lo iv/61.4, Gl id, Av 231, Ca 178, Pla 286, ROL 254.

Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 271–88.

IV.111. *Liber de inventione majore.*[126] Sept 1315—Tunis.

Gl hv, Av 232, Ca 67, Pla 288, ROL 270.

Latin. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 219–20; (2) *ROL* II (1960), 297–302.

[122] Not to be confused with the alternate title (*De perseitate et finalitate Dei*) of IV.46.

[123] Not to be confused with the *Liber in quo declaratur quod fides sancta catholica est magis probabilis quam improbabilis* of 1310 (IV.30) into which this work was inserted (cf. n. 101 above) to make up a new introduction to the *Liber apostrophe* (III.24; cf. n. 49 above), as part of which it was edited so many times. For the date, see *ROL* II, 163, and Pla II, 77★, n. 234.

[124] This second title, under which the work appears in some catalogues, is in fact that of Part II of the work (*ROL* II, 182–94).

[125] Not to be confused with the *Liber de consilio* of 1304 (III.66), nor with the poem *Del consili*, of 1311 (IV.48). Llull originally wrote this work in Arabic (in July, 1315) and then (probably in the same month) translated it into Catalan. The Latin translation—the only version preserved—was done by Fra Simó de Puigcerdà towards the end of the year.

[126] Not to be confused with the *Liber de inventione Dei* of 1313 (IV.88). Note that in some early catalogues this title was given as *De intentione majori* (cf. *ROL* II, 300, n. 1).

IV.112. *Liber de agentia majore.*[127] Sept 1315—Tunis.
Gl hu, Av 235, Ca 172, Pla 289, ROL 271.
Latin. One MS. 3 eds.: (1) ed. Ottaviano in *EUC* 14 (1929), 3; (2) repr. in Av, loc. cit.; (3) *ROL* II (1960), 303–7.

IV.113. *Liber de bono et malo.* Dec 1315—Tunis.
Gl hw, Av 237, Ca 68, Pla 290, ROL 272.
Latin. One MS. 2 eds.: (1) ed. Ottaviano in *Rivista di Cultura* 16 (Rome, 1929), 216–19; (2) *ROL* II (1960), 309–17.

IV.114. *Liber de majori fine intellectus, amoris et honoris.* Dec 1315—Tunis.
Sa 105, HLF 146, Lo iv/61, Gl hy, Av 239, Ca 174, Pla 291, ROL 277.
Latin. 4 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 323–35.

IV.115. *Liber de Deo et de mundo.* Dec 1315—Tunis.
Sa 72, HLF 196, Lo iv/60, Gl hx, Av 238, Ca 173, Pla 292, ROL 278.
Latin. 2 MSS. Ed. *ROL* II (1960), 337–77.

Lost Works

IV.L1. *Ars navigandi.*[128]
E 52, Gl jf, Pla 202, ROL 183.
Cited in catalogue at end of *Vita coetanea* (IV.47).

IV.L2. *Liber de proprietatibus Dei.*
E 62, Pla 203, ROL 184.
Cited in catalogue at end of *Vita coetanea* (IV.47).

IV.L3. *Liber de beatitudine.*
E 70, Pla 204, ROL 185.
Cited in catalogue at end of *Vita coetanea* (IV.47).

IV.L4. *Liber de divina et individua majestate.*
E 90, Pla 206, ROL 187.
Cited in catalogue at end of *Vita coetanea* (IV.47).

IV.L5. *Liber de sapientia Dei absoluta et ordinata.* 1313–14—Messina (?).
Pla 257, ROL 237.
Existed in 2 MSS now lost.[129]

IV.L6. *Epistola Raymundi ad Regem Aragoniae*; (Eng.) *Letter to the King of Aragon.* Oct (?) 1314—Tunis.

[127] Not to be confused with *De majori agentia Dei* of 1309 (IV.9).
[128] For this and the next three works, see *ROL* V, 155–6, and VIII, 177.
[129] See *ROL* I, 455, for details, as well as for reasons for dating this work during Llull's stay in Messina.

Pla 271, ROL 252.
Known from the king's reply of 5 Nov 1314.[130]

IV.L7–15. A group of lost works, mentioned in letters written by the king of Aragon.[131] Nov 1314–July 1315—Tunis.
Pla 274–80, ROL 255–68.

IV.L16. *Liber de unitate majori.* Nov 1314–July 1315—Tunis.
Pla 281, ROL 273.
Cited in early catalogues.[132]

IV.L17. *Liber de essentia majori.* Nov 1314–July 1315—Tunis.
Pla 282, ROL 274.
Cited in early catalogues.

IV.L18. *Liber de pertinentia majori.* Nov 1314–July 1315—Tunis.
Pla 283, ROL 275.
Cited in early catalogues.

IV.L19. *Liber de objectatione majori.* Nov 1314–July 1315—Tunis.
Pla 284, ROL 276.
Cited in early catalogues.

IV.L20. *Epistola Raymundi ad Regem Aragoniae*; (Eng.) *Letter to the King of Aragon.* July (?) 1315—Tunis.
Pla 287, ROL 269.
Cited in two letters written by the king of Aragon.[133]

[130] Cf. *ROL* II, 211 and 401. Not to be confused with the letter written the following year (IV.L20 below), nor with that of 1309 (IV.8).

[131] In a letter of 5 Aug 1315 the king mentions works that Llull has written, and in another of 29 Oct he talks about fifteen works Llull has written. Notice how this fits in with a fourteen-month gap in Llull's production between May 1314 and July 1315, i.e. between IV.108 and IV.109 above. I have followed Platzeck (Pla II, 82*, n. 233) in including among these fifteen four lost works whose titles we know (IV.L16–19 below) plus the *Ars consilii* and the *Liber de Deo et suis propriis qualitatibus infinitis* (IV.109–110 above) written prior to the first of the king's two letters, which gives us the figure of nine. Such a figure, however, is highly conjectural. One could also include, for instance, the *Liber de inventione majore* and the *Liber de agentia majore* (IV.111–112) written prior to the king's second letter, thus reducing the figure to seven. See *ROL* II, 291–2, for more details. The only works, it seems to me, one must definitely exclude are the *Liber de exemplo unissimae unitatis et volissimae voluntatis* and the *Liber de esse Dei* (IV.13 & 15); cf. n. 94 above.

[132] For this and the next three works, see *ROL* II, 319–22. For their possible inclusion among the works mentioned by the king of Aragon, see the previous note.

[133] The same two letters mentioned in n. 131 above (they are printed in *ROL* II, 402–5); cf. *ROL* II, 295, for more details. Not to be confused with Ramon's letter of the year before (IV.L6) nor with that of 1309 (IV.8).

Additional Remarks on the Catalogue of Works

As a result of research at the Raimundus-Lullus-Institut for the expanded version of this catalogue (as well as the result of a recently published article on the *Cant de Ramon* by Josep Romeu i Figueras), discoveries made too late to be included in the text of this catalogue require the following changes:

III.4 should become II.A.19 and be dated 1274–83 (?)
III.5 should become II.A.20 and be dated 1274–83
III.17 should become III.30.bis and be dated 1298—Paris
III.34 should become III.43.bis and be dated 1300—Majorca

Moreover a new work should be added:

III.20.bis. *Lectura super tertiam figuram Tabulae generalis.*
1294–6 (?).
E 23, Pla 74a.
Latin. 2 MSS; unpubl.

Detailed justification for these changes will appear in a forthcoming article in *EL*, as well as in the expanded version of this catalogue.

Index of Ramon Llull's Works

Works are listed alphabetically, discounting initial words such as "Book," "Libre," "Liber," "Tractatus"; any adjectives modifying these, such as "novus," "compendiosus"; following (or initial) prepositions, such as "of," "de," "super"; and articles. Thus, for instance, "Book of the Angels" is listed under "Angels," "Liber contra Antichristum" is listed under "Antichristum," and the "Tractatus novus de astronomia" is listed under "Astronomia." This has been done to avoid the cumbersome mechanism of having to cross-reference "De ascensu et descensu intellectus," the "Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus," and the "Book of the Ascent and Descent of the Intellect," and to be able to join them all under the first significant word, which in this case is "Ascent."

Immediately after the title, I give the number in the preceding Catalogue of Works, where the reader will find alternate titles and pertinent bibliographical references.

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