

ANAKYRIE

A TREATISE ON POLITICAL THEORY

OTHER MAJOR TOPICS (UNORDERED): -

1. Pluralism and pluralisms: the old (and Marxist) fallacy of one form.
2. Authoritarian relations: Power, hierarchies, organisations.
3. Underlying metaphysics.
4. Constitutions, corporations, states and transnationals (not independent ~~things~~ *things*).
5. Styles of democracy, and improving democracy.
6. A major source of power: property. Land rights.

PREFACE

I wish ~~that I had been necessary~~
I had found it necessary to struggle with this
text, that someone else had written it, that I could
have spent more time in the ports and away from the
cities. But no one else had done it, in a way even
close to the way I wanted it said.

Let's sweep ^{out} the demons and puppets
who oversee ^{regulate} the present political system of privilege
and domination.

INTRODUCTION

Present political arrangements are hardly satisfactory, anywhere. They are not delivering adequate levels¹ of many of the things that such arrangements should at least assist in the production or attainment of, e.g. security, environment, welfare, livelihood, education, Thus if better ways to do these things can be found, they should be sought, and tried.

Perhaps surprisingly, there has been remarkably little effort expended upon surveying the range of political alternatives (as compared, e.g., with the effort put into defending the status quo), or to work out, so far as can or need be done, details of the more promising options. Indeed, as with so many other areas, where entrenched positions dominate, there has been considerable discouragement of such important investigation.

A significant range of alternatives, scarcely given a trial in the whole of modern history, are these arrangements which reduce domination and the exercise of power, and increase freedom. The present study concentrates on these sorts of arrangements, not in totalitarian or fascist or imperialist structures which have more than sufficient exemplification in recent times, despite their lack of justification and base in raw power and brute force.

1A. POLITICS WITHOUT DOMINATION: ANAKYRIE AND ANARCHISM

Anakyrie means without domination. That includes the whole range and variety of domination. For domination comes in many forms: of citizens by states, civilians by military, poor by rich, blacks by whites, thirdworlders by

Exploitation is a special case of domination.

Americans or Russians, women by men, ^{students by teachers} young by older, animals by humans, nature by men, ... Anarchy consists in social arrangements designed to avoid all ^{physical, political, economic, technological, etc.} such forms of domination. [There is nothing in the account so far ^{indicated} given which ^{however,} implies that it must take a given shape, ^{or} that it is uniquely determined.]

Anarchism is directly concerned with only one part of what anarchy is about: domination by people by states (whether their own or that of others), and removal of this domination by abolition of the state. But there are many other forms of domination not essentially bound up with this form, and abolition of the state is but one ~~rather drastic~~ way of removing state domination.

Anarchism has been extended, for instance to eco-anarchism (as feminism has been broadened to eco-feminism), in an effort to overcome a conspicuous part of the problem. ^{A main part of the problem was} that 19th C anarchism tended to accept the same domination of

nature by humans, and indeed the same sort of scientific reductionistic materialism, as its dominant rivals, capitalism and (marxist) socialism. But the broadening calls also for further ^{expansion} explanation, to include other types of domination. ^{it involves} And strictly such a reorientation as to involve a change in meaning,

in what was meant by 'anarchism'. In these circumstances, it is more straightforward and less misleading simply to introduce new terminology. ^{As it happens,} And there are ^{several} good reasons for seeking new terminology.

In more than a century of use, 'anarchy' and its derivatives have become thoroughly ^{encrusted} ~~converted~~ with undesirable and inappropriate associations, to such an extent that some of these, such as chaos and disorder, are now said to give part of the meaning of 'anarchy'. ¹

1. For example, R. in Barker Kellies equates anarchy with disorder several times on one page (p. 30).

Political theory (with A^x).

As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a political system. The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in society' (Kaplan p. 12). Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and therewith that system. The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further) inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by ~~the~~ expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'.

For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an organised system or structure.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY

4.

1. On the one hand, it is claimed that
'any acceptable form of social order ... must
rest on moral foundations' (Dworkin p. xiv).

'which are in principle ascertainable at any period, and
permanently valid' ¹.

On the other, and more common view, politics
scarcely transpires over morality when it suits it. However
that is a matter of mere morality, i.e. of a Christian
established form, being overwhelmed by another
Mafia-style morality — not the chance of a value
position. Any political theory rests on
a value theory. That is ~~the~~ the point.

2. There is the problem of evil, powerful
people, often

unintentionally evil people ^{such as} Reagan, Thatcher, ...
Hitler flourished most of ^{his} life; ^{he} ^{is} ^{an} active (etc.) life.

3. Anarchism does not require especially
good people. But political life would run much more
smoothly without a certain range of people. (Of
course, states think this, and totalitarian states
try to realise their aims.)

1. This involves a very dubious objectivity.

4 On Political Obligation.

There is ^{good grounds} no basis of political obligation.

All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state of people living in it (its territory) are wanting. (Arg for ^{this} these!)

Scepticism about political obligation does not imply scepticism ~~about~~ about obligation. So ~~a~~ moral scepticism is not implied. And on the contrary, moral requirements are of the first importance in ~~supply~~ outlining structures to the state.

Abolition is possible ^{not really (quidly) (as above) but in fact} longed for by us a great good future that a ~~time~~ vision present that eliminate all type A people. ^{it is possible}

Hobbes problem ^{was} that of political legitimacy —

'reason why we ought to obey the state'

(R., 6)

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Hobbes finds three

causes of disorder { competition — reflecting self-interest drives;
distrust;
enjoyment of power (glory) [self-interest is

To these he opposes

3 ^{causes} — from desire for security.

— argued for on ground
that fundamental motive
is self-preservation]

Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected end state, they say a great deal about the route - through the new state - to that end, and about the means to be used along that route.

By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.)

Engels' proposed route is through a

NEW SECTION ADDED

through 'new social order' where production and industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan. They

Main features ^{are} abolition of private property (vol 1, p. 88) and of private means (p. 92) ^{if consumption of social order is one}

Note that it is

Unclear whether this ^{is} immediate end state, but ^{these} features are common to both.

There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over-production) by (collective) planned economy without (small) private property. (p. 92)

None, division into antagonistic classes becomes superfluous. There are

New all-round people (p. 93), a disappearance of division of labour, for flexible labour. There is co-operation instead of competition. ^{and} Living towns & country (p. 94)

If According to Marx-Engels.

~~M.E.~~ (1, p. 183) ^{the reality is} through ^{the} central state. 'The workers must ^{not only} drive [against despots] for a single and indivisible republic, but also within this republic for the most determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority'. They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the despot's talk of freedom for the communities, of self-govt, etc. No communal property to remain: without centralisation! 'In central productive forces, means of transport, etc. in hands of state'. This ^{argument is} extremely top-down.

As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to ~~use~~ adopt any means, which is not. For Marx, ^{the} main means are by violent revolution. (Last page Purity of M.E.)
Revolution is ^{the} extreme of ^{the} contradiction of classes. By contrast

Engels ^{he} prefers peaceful means (in 1847), i.e. see Weeks vol. 1, p. 89); but doesn't rule out revolution.

But together Marx and Engels explain ^{means, and} violent, ^{or} occasional occurrences (2, p. 180).

Under the pretext that the petty bourgeois democrats will betray the workers the subversion/demolition of their government is planned (vol 2, address of CC to League, pp. 180-1)

~~M.E.~~ Julius Bakunin, Marx and Engels

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advocate fosterings
massacres etc (for what
else can this stuff mean?)
& a regime of terror. B
thinks that in a revolutionary
situation such things
may occur but should
be minimized (I can easily
check the reference in
Babuin is necessary) (p.180)

For the most part, Engels was much more
inclined to peaceful and established means to change
even to change by way of ballot box and universal ~~franchise~~
suffrage; the Revolution path to state transformation
(I, p.195, also I, p.202)

Note Engels introduction to
Class Struggles in France ~~18~~
written in 1895^(p.195) i.e. later than
the more bellicose texts he
is relying on — & as
the fruit of a richer
experience of politics.

He says
that by party action
universal suffrage is

'transformé de moyen de
dépense qu'il a été jusqu'ici
en instrument d'émancipation
et que la fortune montre
à la portée de la main

This suggests that it can
be used to gain control
of & subsequently transform
state apparatus.

In 1895 (pp 199-200) Engels suggests a

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(199-200), ~~revision~~ of tactics. New slow means,
propaganda etc. [Different from technical det!]
to win over ^{the} mass of people. No doubt

because of technological determination, there is
no need to be too specific about means; for it is
not as if activity is changing the course of things,
only speeding up the (incontestable) process.

→ "

Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels.

1. This would be to ~~try~~ try to see the future, which is reactionary (why? Because of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be wiser than us:

2. Standard explanation, suggested by Marx: 'science in socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utterances speculate about the socialist future: Marxists analyse the capitalist present' (Moore, p. 76). Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible.

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Principles of Individualism [?]

1. Govt based on individually-given consent of citizens -
'its authority or legitimacy deriving from the
consent' (Liber p. 11) (consent - answering back right)
2. Political representation as representing ~~social~~
individual interests, not classes, estates, etc.
3. That's all. Govt confined to enabling satisfaction of
individual interests. Hence ~~no~~ towards laissez-faire,
against paternalism, interference
or interfering individual wants, (79)

1. Anarchic based on individualism - abstract & otherwise.
(Often claimed anarchism based on extreme form of individualism e.g. Putnam p 134)
2. Promising, which further works to make us an evil practice.
OK. But it is a moral institution/practice. If people want to make political commitments, that's alright. But no moral general right, nor is any such promise inherently work, etc.
No political obligation, in this form, beyond moral obligation.
So I can claim that ^{persons} anarchists 'fail to deal adequately with the mutuality and reciprocity of social relations' (p 135) (just slander, if considers social anarchists)
- These criticisms are curious, because it is well known the road to social anarchism :- Thus the ^{persons} problem of 'political obligation' in the liberal democratic state constitutes an insoluble problem ... The problem of political obligation can be solved only through the development of the theory & practice of participatory & self-managed democracy' (p 1, italics added).
- [contemporary liberal democratic state]
3. 'But tendency to treat the state as if it were a natural fact about the world is characteristic of liberal democratic theory in general.' The liberal democratic state is taken for granted and is an ~~unexamined~~ ^{unexamined} premise of most Anglo-American political theory' (p. 6) Really a good many exceptions to that. Putnam a natural fact - world: it is conventional / ... future
4. Anarchism is re-presented as political scepticism. (P p 141, 137.)
If political theory involves a coercive state (which it does not), then it is political scepticism.
'Nor is it self-evident that the anarchist ideal does involve an absence of authority; not, that is, if anarchism is seen as a political theory and not merely as a variety of political scepticism' (p 137).
'Wolff's "anarchism" ... his argument forms no part of a political theory of anarchism; it is an extension of a purely philosophical scepticism, a scepticism which is inherent in abstractly individualist liberalism' (and so in anarchism in his sense) (p 137).
- X Another reason for watching from anarchy: Anarchists have individualism & beyond redemption. (So e.g. I think of modern anarchism through Wolff.)
But object is removal of hier. power structure - not the state - but ~~everywhere~~

5. Paterson's book, The Problem of Political Obligation,
 Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985 —
 is not worth troubling with. It contains no decent
 argument (indeed the argument requiring will claiming, etc.),
 and no decent conceptual analysis (even of political obligation).
 It is a good example of how not to proceed; consulting your
 commentaries of other authors.

genuine solution' since it combines both autonomy and authority; the difficulty is that it is empirically unrealistic.⁹ I shall return to Wolff's reasons for hesitating to accept his own philosophical anarchist conclusions in a moment. Godwin, in his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, was not so timid. Godwin's theory is extremely interesting for any discussion of political obligation because, like Hobbes' theory, it shows the full implications of one form of adherence to radical, abstract individualism.

Godwin's theory is a mirror image of Hobbes'. He ends where Hobbes begins, with a collection of individuals who each view the world through their own, subjective viewpoint. For Hobbes, the absolute freedom of individual private judgement leads to complete insecurity and arbitrariness; for Godwin, the 'unspeakably beautiful' practice of absolutely free exercise of individual private judgement is the only way to peace (p. 208).¹⁰ Hobbes creates an artificial social union held together by the Sword and reduces 'obligation' to enforced submission and obedience. Godwin relies on reified Reason that speaks identically to each individual and he completely eliminates 'obligation' along with all other social relationships. Social institutions and social relationships, Godwin argues, merely stand in the way of individual judgement by preventing individuals seeing things as they really are.¹¹ Unhindered by governments, and other social institutions such as promising, each individual will be able to decide for herself what ought to be done and individuals' judgements will coincide. Reason will speak to all in a single voice because, in the absence of social institutions, reality will stand revealed in all its transparency.

Godwin's objections to the practice of promising are similar to his objections to political institutions. Promising is 'absolutely considered, an evil' (p. 218). It may occasionally be necessary to make a promise in order not to mislead other people about one's intentions, but a defence of necessity in specific cases does not detract from the essential evil of the practice itself. The evils of promising are twofold: first, promising binds future conduct and thus rules out further individual judgement as information and circumstances change. Secondly, promising encourages individuals to act from 'a precarious and temporary motive' (p. 219). It distracts attention from the consequences of particular actions, and hence obscures their intrinsic merits. If the individual judges that an action ought to be performed (and Godwin saw this judgement as a utilitarian calculation) then a promise adds nothing; it merely clouds the moral worth, or otherwise, of the judgement itself. Political institutions function in the same way to prevent individuals seeing things as they really are. For example, they give an appearance of permanence to opinions that prevail at their inception and thus cause the stagnation of judgement. Laws, like obligations, bind future conduct and, being general in form, can take no account of the fact that each case is unique and should be judged, according to Reason, on its own merits. Moreover, political assemblies impose a 'factitious unanimity' on their members. Decisions have to be reached in which all the members must acquiesce, thus pretending that they are something more than a collection of individuals, each with their own opinions. Deliberation has to be cut short by a vote and everyone, if their efforts are not to be for nothing, has to see themselves as 'obliged' to carry out the decision: 'Nothing can

more directly contribute to the depravation of the human understanding and character' (p. 547).

Properly, according to Godwin, there are no obligations, only actions that ought to be performed, or refrained from; nor is there any political authority, only a coincidence of individual judgements that certain things ought to be done. Godwin's individuals, unlike those who enter a social contract, are 'bound to nothing'. If an individual joins in a 'common deliberation', he is, 'when the deliberation is over, ... as much disengaged as ever' (p. 234). This is not to say that he will never act with his fellows; they may independently have arrived at the same judgement as to the right course of action. Godwin also allows that individuals may sometimes defer to the judgements of an authority on a particular matter; this he calls 'authority' that depends 'upon the confidence of him with whom it prevails' (p. 242). This deference should, however, be rarely given, or it may tip over into a misplaced 'confidence' in alleged superiors who make judgements for others, and so inculcate those 'slavish feelings that shrink up the soul' (p. 232). This form of obedience is a greater source 'of degradation and depravity' than if the individual bows to political authority out of fear of the sanctions for disobedience. Here Godwin anticipates Wolff's 'denial' of the authority of the state. Wolff recognizes that there are many reasons for compliance, but these are irrelevant providing that the claims of the state are subjectively denied a 'binding moral force'.¹² Similarly, Godwin argued almost two hundred years ago that the individual who obeys solely to avoid punishment, 'may reserve, in its most essential sense, his independence. He may be informed in judgement, ... and suffer his understanding neither to be seduced nor confounded' (p. 141).

Godwin was confident that the philosophical anarchist 'denial' of authority and obligation could be put into practice. Through discussion and education, and the example of sincerity and frankness, individuals will become enlightened and develop an appreciation of the evils of social institutions and social cooperation. Godwin ruled out a sudden revolutionary change as this would not be based on the necessary development of individual understanding. As a transitional measure he advocated a system of 'juries', within small political communities or 'parishes', the juries dealing with individual offenders and disputes over property. He expected that disputes between parishes would be rare and that 'the obvious principles of convenience' would soon suggest a settlement (p. 546). A 'national assembly' might occasionally be necessary to adjudicate in such matters, but it would not be a permanent body. At first, all these institutions would exercise political 'authority' but, in time, Godwin expected that they would merely issue 'invitations' to individuals to cooperate in executing their verdicts, and, eventually, all political institutions and cooperation would wither away.

Abstract individualism rests on heroic assumptions. In Godwin's case he assumes that individual moral judgement can be exercised in complete absence of inter-subjective theoretical categories and communal relationships. The argument of the *Enquiry* implies that that which can be thought can be put into practice. Because it is possible to imagine an individual abstracted from social life, yet endowed with Reason and a capacity for moral judgement, Godwin also assumes that, given a

sufficient period of education and social and political change, those individuals could actually exist, with their social past 'stored', as it were, within the consciousness of each one. They would exist largely in isolation and yet, on occasions, emerge, inspect reality and make an individual judgement that would coincide with judgements and Reason of others.

Godwin's theory has some extremely charming aspects, but they cannot hide the philosophically and sociologically bizarre consequences of radical individualism taken to one of its extremes. Everything, except their own judgements, and actions that flow immediately and unhindered from them, is foreign to one of Godwin's individuals. Even the individual's own physical needs or freely created relationships appear as impediments. A solitary individual, Godwin writes, is prevented from executing his judgements 'in compliance with his necessities, or his frailties' (p. 758). The evils of social cooperation are much worse, but technological progress will enable individuals to do many things for themselves in the future that now require the help of others. Godwin expects that concerts and plays will cease to be performed; what enlightened individual would want to mouth the words or play the compositions of another? Eventually, the individual will come to see society as 'not a necessary of life, but a luxury, innocent and enviable, in which he joyfully indulges' (p. 761). At this point, however, there is no 'society' for them to indulge in. Godwin relies on a reified Reason to link his individuals together but this cannot take the place of the social relationships he has wished away.

Once again, the impossibility of distinguishing between institutions in various dimensions of social life from within an abstractly individualist perspective is demonstrated. Godwin treats promising as just as much a constraint and impediment, and just as mystifying, as the laws of the state. It is worth emphasizing that Godwin ends by depriving his individuals of the means of transcending their own subjectivity. They have no social means of acting on their judgements and thus must remain totally immersed in their own assessments of what 'ought' to be done. The creative moral and social capacities of individuals are meaningless treated in the abstract; they presuppose, and, in practice, can only be exercised and developed as a part of social relationships including relationships of obligation.

A tacit realization of the peculiar conclusion of philosophical anarchism seems to underlie Wolff's equivocations about the 'just state'. In the last part of *In Defence of Anarchism*, Wolff offers some 'deeper philosophical reasons' why he is unwilling to accept the 'negative results' of his argument; the social world, unlike the natural world, is not 'irreducibly other'. Wolff is thus implicitly arguing against Godwin when he says that the state is 'no more than the totality of the beliefs, expectations, habits, and interacting roles of its members and subjects. ... The state, ... cannot be ineradicably other'.¹³ In other words, instead of arguing that all authority is illegitimate, Wolff is now moving to the opposite theoretical extreme and putting forward a version of the conceptual argument; the state is no more than the association of its members and so necessary to them, so there is no problem about its authority. Wolff also suggests that there might be a practical solution to the problem of authority; political institutions must be decentralized and based on 'voluntary compliance' (although he may be arguing that a system based on 'voluntary

compliance' does not involve authority at all). Curiously, Wolff does not appear to see anything odd in an 'anarchism' that proclaims the necessity of the state. The central argument of anarchism is precisely that the state, including the liberal democratic state, is inherently 'other', and so its claim to authority can never be justified.

Anarchists, philosophical or otherwise, it will be objected at this point, make a much larger claim than this. Like Wolff, they argue that all political authority, not just that of the state, is illegitimate. It is true that anarchist writings are full of statements to this effect. Kropotkin, for example, writes that 'anarchism ... works to destroy authority in all its aspects'.¹⁴ Such statements are usually taken at face value. Flathman, for instance, criticizing Pitkin's comments on 'authority', argues that the state of nature in Hobbes' and Locke's theories provides an example of individuals living together without authority, and he asks 'what else have anarchists been putting forward as an ideal?'.¹⁵ But, as I have shown, any social relationships existing in Hobbes' radically individualist natural condition are likely to be based on force and power, not authority, and Locke's state of nature, with its father-rulers and capitalist economy, would certainly not find favour with anarchists. Nor is it self-evident that the anarchist ideal does involve an absence of authority; not, that is, if anarchism is seen as a political theory and not merely as a variety of philosophical scepticism.

The political theory of anarchism is not a theory of the chaos with which 'anarchy' is popularly equated, but a theory of a specific form of socio-political organization that is, as it must be, ordered and rule-governed. Anarchists have usually been political activists and popular pamphleteers and not concerned with precise conceptual distinctions. They have tended to treat 'authority' as a synonym for 'authoritarian', and so have identified 'authority' with hierarchical power structures, especially those of the state. Nevertheless, their practical proposals and some of their theoretical discussions present a different picture. Kropotkin calls anarchism the 'no-government system of socialism',¹⁶ but on one occasion he also distinguishes 'government' and the 'state'. He writes that 'it seems to me that in State and government we have two concepts of a different order'.¹⁷ Unfortunately, Kropotkin does not pursue this distinction, but it suggests that one anarchist, at least, did not totally reject political authority. This conclusion is also suggested by the social and political changes advocated by Kropotkin. He argued that abolition of the political institutions of the state would allow 'mutual aid' to become the ordering principle of socio-political life. His discussion of this principle presents similar difficulties to the recent philosophically sophisticated discussions of cooperation, reciprocity and obligation. In part, Kropotkin's claim can be seen as a version of the conceptual argument: 'the practice of mutual aid ... [has] created the very conditions of society ...'.¹⁸ He also used 'mutual aid' to refer to actual historical examples of cooperative institutions based on the voluntary agreement of the members, and it is the principle of free agreement that will govern an anarchist socio-political order. However, as I have argued, in political life self-assumed obligation and authority presuppose such 'free agreement'. Kropotkin's sketch of the internal organization of the communes that will replace the state is significant here. Kropotkin envisages

On ^{the} End State. According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a Marxist account is its pre-industrial character, also its romantic character, and ^{its} view of creative labour. These are as result in part of looking for utopia in the past, the sources of which according to Kamenka are

- i. a mistaken view of de ^{human} (social) storage
- ii. the abundance of industry
- iii. the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and self-regulatory character?)

This is confused. Sources ii and iii are the basis of the post-industrial character of the end state (where the machines are really working along)

The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life. The reason ^{is that} is

- iv. There is something drastically wrong with present arrangements, which not rectified by minor adjustments.

The end state, so far as it is described, is certainly a curious mixture of pre- and post-industrial elements.

The end state is not a static state, but a stable, dynamic state. The evolutionary analogy is again useful here. Capitalism is like a pioneering stage. Stable states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another. But it is rare why it is important to look in the past - for features of past stable states.

→ 3

ANAKYRIE . In Chapter 1

The Multiple and inconsistent areas of political theory:
pluralism, morality, ...

The differences ^{in theory} begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements are ~~about~~ ^{whom they are for, how they apply,} ~~for~~ what they are about. There are important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures' ~~their~~ activities and lives can be controlled and regulated. More authoritarian or totalitarian political arrangements impose much more in the way of regulations than more liberal arrangements which in the limit reduce regulation to mere minimums, to some ~~setting~~ framework or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives.

So far as political relations are concerned, the world (Terra) is a closed system. Political influence is not accreted from outside the system, nor to political influences of significance so far flow from Terra elsewhere. (All that way of course change, in which case the problem is not in terms of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some extraterrestrial gods are invoked.) With the advance of industrialization, communications and spill-over technology, few ~~communities~~ ^{communities} smaller than the world ~~communities~~ system are any longer ~~strictly~~ effectively closed.

1B. THE SEARCH FOR ANARCHISM - AND FOR AN APPROPRIATE NEW TITLE FOR IT.

The term 'anarchism' has acquired such an encrustation of unfortunate and undesirable associations that it is time for a clear new term to replace it. But that is not so easy, one reason being that it is not at all easy to say what the [new] position the term is to reflect is like, even in rough outline, or how that position (that nonstate state) might come about. [Replace B approach with A ^{here} approach.]

It is easier to be negative than positive, to say (as 'anarchism' itself does) what anarchism, or the replacement φ-ism (say) is not, rather than what it is.² What the position is not is, firstly, a state of chaos. A state of φ-y is not one of disorder; on the contrary, φ-istic arrangements - there will definitely be social and political arrangements - will be highly organised. A corollary - since (thermodynamically) an organised system or state requires energy for its production and maintenance - is that a φ-istic system is extremely unlikely to arise spontaneously. Directed organisational energy must be put into the attainment of a φ-istic endstate. Sought φ-istic systems will not simply emerge spontaneously, even when energy levels have been raised and states excited, as in vigorous demonstrations or in revolutionary activities.

Furthermore, φ-ism does not include ^{violence,} ~~any~~ ^Λ any more than anarchism need involve ^{it.} ~~violence~~. Nor need a φ-istic system emerge in a violent way. Even if it arises in a revolutionary way, there is no need for the route to include substantial, or even perhaps any, violence. The notion of a nonviolent revolution is not a contradictory one. Nor are rapid nonviolently induced changes beyond the bounds of real possibility in several parts of the world.^{2a}

An additional set of negative reasons for dispensing with the term 'anarchism' derives from the associations grafted on to it by marxists. Marx-Engels-Lenin mounted a pretty regular, and scurrilous, campaign against anarchism, as the publication Marx Engels Lenin. Anarchism and Anarcho-syndicalism³ reveals. A main reason for the Marxist rejection of anarchism was that it was assumed to involve immediate ^a ~~transition~~ ⁱ to stateless society. /i/a

What all anarchist trends have in common is a utopian vision of setting up a society without state and exploiting classes through a spontaneous rebellion by the masses and instant abolition of state power and all its institutions, instead of through political struggle by the working class, socialist revolution, and establishment of a proletarian dictatorship (p.9).

This last involves a false dichotomy. Similarly there is heavy criticism of '... anarchist dogmas about "abolishing the state" as the first step in the revolution' (p.17). The "opposing" idea was that of the state as affording 'a transition period'. But really there is no opposition: both are compatible with anarchism: there is ~~more~~ ^y than one way of dealing with a scoundrel. /more

The general shape of political transformation, both in "classical" Marxism and in anarchism, is a multi-stage transformation with

- 1) transition states, where the state is retained,
- 2) an end state, where the state is removed.

But the suggestion, especially in Lenin, is that even in the end state of communism, the state will survive!

Marxists were also highly critical of anarchist proposals for the destruction of authority of every kind, and the introduction of total decentralisation. The criticism is unfairly loaded, with its every kind and total decentralisations; but it nevertheless ~~makes~~ ^{marks} out two areas of substantial difference (which reflect deeper differences in world view). For example, leadership need not be excluded, where ~~the~~ ^{the} role to direct is freely granted and does /marks

not devolve into a fixed or imposed power relationship; and influence may be exercised from federal to local level as well as from local to federal. /;

There are a batch of lesser associations also removed by distancing the sort of theory to be outlined from anarchism. For instance, 19th century anarchism, like its dominant rival, accepted too much Enlightenment doctrine, /e.g. the essential goodness of man, the unalleged benignness of science, and worthwhileness of dominant economic goals. Not only was it too much a product of Enlightenment thinking: it shared with Marxism, ^{practitioners, Kropotkin} unecological assumptions about the elimination of scarcity, and with capitalism an assumption of individual reduction (at least in most of its ^{productiveness,} ~~productiveness~~ being an exception).

If we try to reach behind the contrasts, of 19th century political thought, both orthodox and alternatives⁵, what do we find? Not only reductionism, especially individual reductionism, ^{and} science and technology worship, and maximisation, but many other doctrines ^{drawn} from its ^{several} more orthodox, powerful and successful rivals, including domination, ^{forms of domination}. It is the removal ^{of these,} of a wide variety of forms of domination, of power structures, that anakyrie aims at (Martin's getting rid of): ^{constitutes} ~~that~~ ^{the} the negative side of anakyrie. Anarchy, with the removal of state, is only part of that; ^{for} it also concerns the ^{/for} removal of domination of nature (by humans), countryside (by cities), women (by men), blacks (by whites), etc.

As the removal of weeds makes way for new growth, so the removal of forms of domination makes way for new relations. The primitive side of anakyrie is concerned, among other things with such relations, especially with stable and self-regulating relations of this sort, and ways of achieving them. In these respects too anakyrie reaches far beyond what was normally encompassed by anarchism.

'Anakyrie' was selected in part however because of its phonetic and typographic resemblance to 'anarkie'. It is close enough to benefit by the resemblance, and yet far enough removed, hopefully, to shed the bad *encrustations*. It was not the first term arrived at, ^{in the quest} by any means, yet it means roughly the same as the first. In the search for new terms the first result was the term SANDOMINISM, i.e. sandomin (without master or authority) served for ϕ . But although domination is one of the main things to be removed in alternative arrangements, domination in a range of forms (environmental especially) is only part of the picture. With domination is assumed to go subjection and exploitation of what is dominated. With domination also tends to go expansion. Yet there are other things. [Expand, when look at domination later.] Another word looked at that has some currency is 'acephalous' meaning roughly 'stateless'. Literally it means 'without a head, headless'. It is not a particularly good term for present purposes.

The state operates with, ratifies, and legitimizes many forms of domination. Since both ~~An~~akyrie and anarchy aim to eliminate these, they travel the same road for a long part of the journey. And if the state is bound to ensure, and rely upon, forms of domination - as many critics, not really anarchists, have argued - then anakyrie includes anarchy. In any case for much of the initial argument, they ride together; and some assimilation, in the interests of brevity, will not be too misleading.

A great advantage of anakyrie, however - and one reason why the inclusion is proper - is this:- The removal of domination gives activists something immediate to work for, and in an effective way - again by contrast with anarchy, which may be a long-term project, or almost a do-nothing one in some advanced capitalist states.

FOOTNOTES

1. The problem is frequently not one of supply, but rather of distribution - still a matter of politico-economic arrangements.

2. Negativity remains a problem. It is considered below.

2a Perhaps recent events in the Philippines provide a partial example.

3. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972. Quotes which follow are from the 'Preface' by N.Y. Kelpinsky, to this work.

4. What could be argued is that the idea of immediate replacement of complex modern states is rather naive.

1a Authority is a little trickier than domination, especially freely conceded authority as in an adult education class. But in the admissible cases, the issue is like leadership or agencyship, not domination; it is non-coercive.

(e.g. I give you authority to...)

ANARCHISM : Headed NOTES

of political theory
 The multiple aims of political theory. Often an aim ^λ is taken to be a picture */m*
 (or ^{or} model) of the good society, or even more strongly (and less likely) of the ideal,
 or perfect, society. But, to put it in an old-fashioned way, there is no such
 thing as the good society, any more than there is such a thing as the good life.
 In principle at least, there are a variety of good societies, and even
 pluralistically there are different mixes (or pluralities) of good societies.

In this simple way
 Ritter's problem (p.135), of competing models of the good society (e.g.
 Rousseau, with equality, vs. Marx, with material ^{abun} ~~dece~~ ^{dance}, vs. Plato, with
 intellectual virtues), vanishes. They ^{se "models"} ^λ can be combined in a pluralistic framework of
 many ^{sorts of} good societies. Likewise the problem of conflicting values is ^λ much reduced,
 and indeed given sufficient tolerance of other arrangements largely vanishes. *A**

Equality. Ritter, p.137: 'The real diversity that marks anarchist society is
 supposed to be accompanied by equality of status'. But this is not required. Nor
 even is equality of power, but rather removal of social power. This leads Ritter
 on to the alleged conflict of community, which is 'repressive', and individuality.
 But some conflict is alright, as Ritter admits later (pp.138-9), where he gives
 the following pairs ^{as} ^λ generating conflict: diversity/equality, *censure/honesty* *[?]*,
 individuality/community.

imposes
gratuitously
Consistency requirements. Ritter ^λ ^{imposes} these everywhere; e.g. anarchists are
 required to demonstrate the consistency (also harmoniousness) of a state-less
 condition, p.138. But see also (p.1, p.9) ^{the} ^λ issue of ^{the} ^λ consistency of freedom with use
 of public censure. Ritter argues to consistency, and permissibility of some
 discord, from partial models, limited communities and arrangements of anarchistic
 types (primarily those given by Kropotkin).

A Under this head, deal also with account of political science in terms
 of power relations, which excludes anarchism.*

of anarchism.

Criticisms 1. 'Individualism gone wild' (Hyndman), 'socially destructive selfishness' (Rp.140). This confuses pluralistic/socialistic anarchism with right-leaning ^{forms}. And as R's model one has 'communal individuality'.

2. Social oppressiveness. Thus e.g. suffocating peer group pressures; 'adolescent gang' pictures. But, on ^{the} contrary, ^{pluralistic forms} permits very considerable individualism and choice.

3. Insufficient 'provision for privacy, for external self-expression and for meeting claims of distributive justice' (Rp.140). While these things may be problems in some anarchist communities, e.g. 'Godwin's conversational anarchy', they are not problems in pluralistic arrangements.

Ritter argues however that in the anarchistic society the needs for privacy vanishes - both as refuge from considerable intrusions and as a place of seclusion for inner growth or restoration. But these things depend on much ^{, what is not so likely,} improved other people. Of course nothing excludes ^{, or should exclude,} solitude.

3.2 The issue of the expression of emotions ties up with the rationalistic character of such older anarchism, the settling of disputes and controlling behaviour by reasoned argument. ^{Newer} ~~Non~~ anarchisms reject the reliance on reason, because reason has too often been used for evil ends, etc., and because emotional attributes are considered to be more central to the person. In rejecting more ^{emotional} ~~continually~~-oriented anarchism, Ritter draws on the ^{mistaken} reason/^{emo} ~~formation~~ dichotomy. But emotion does not exclude or block out reason ^{invariably} indefinitely. So too emotion does not ^{always} interfere with freedom: it is false that 'the extensive freedom of classical anarchy is simply unattainable without the limits on emotional self-expression that non-rational anarchists reject' (Rp.143).

3.3 The failure of anarchistic society to bestow benefits on those with special talents. This again comes from a one-track view, from pure communistic anarchism alone.

Ritter ^{here} argues that though some people will not receive ^{their} 'just desert', ^{viewed} in terms of what they put in, still 'bounteous', efficient production occurs without these [or usual ^{ward} ~~reasoned~~] incentives' (p.143). He argues from 'mutual understanding', 'desire to develop ... native talents', 'satisfaction in ... voluntary, varied work', 'polytechnical education' (of English character!), etc. It is better to argue that people not of this sort will choose different life-styles, in different communities.

4. The 'repudiation of active citizenship' which 'is a recurrent theme in political theory' (Rp.144). This has to do with anarchistic criticism of 'unanimous direct democracy'. Rousseau argued that there was a contradiction between individuality and citizenship (see Rp.145): dubious itself. But citizenship is correlative to a state, so ^{it is} not too surprising that it is damaged. Anarchism gives much greater scope for the do-nothing or do-it-when-you-feel-like-it life. No filling-in ^{of} the forms at this ^{demanded} time, registrations at those times, voting ^{on} those ^{required} ~~regional~~ days, etc. That is, it offers a range of freedoms the citizen does not get.

Presumably also then the Kantian idea of man as a self-governing citizen also gets ditched. But the alleged accompanying virtues - such as being self-directed, public spirited, controlling ^{one's own destiny} ~~even dictating~~ - are not lost, but enhanced. For communities replace the state as the place where they are manifested.

5. ^{The} Argument from the strange character of anarchist freedom and decision-making. ^{The} Problem arises because it permits bad decision-making, so R claims (p.148), provided ~~r~~ational procedural rules are met. This is very curious. But

the problem of rationality-justified freely-chosen exploitation ^{does} arises here. R appeals to constraints - which from a consistency viewpoint limits freedom. The constraints are internalisation, positional authority, censorial rebuke.

Anarchist arrangements are better than where we are. Since they are also superior to feasible alternatives, that is enough for movement in that direction. No requirement of best need be met.

5. Anarchism is ^{criticised as} a dangerous ideal, because it helps undermine the established social order. But it is pernicious because that ideal is unattainable.

6. Objection to anarchist methods. But aversion and fraud are said to have no place in them. According to R the main methods are 'free of argument and example' (p.152). But this ~~leaves~~ ^{initiates} out a range of ~~indicatives~~ ^{force} and strategies. ^{leaves}

Distinctively Marxist criticism of anarchism :-

1. The ~~reliance~~ ^{reliance} put on moral example
2. The failure to recognise class struggles, or to take advantage of it
3. The rejection of revolutionary action.
(This must be ~~intentionally~~ ^{intentionally} inaccurate.)

Early

The argument that ~~such~~ ankyria is
~~just~~ really possible, is not merely
logically possible (as it shows is), but is
realizable. I imagine that, by some
great good fortune, a virus spread
that painfully characterized all type A people.

2) ^{INADEQUACIES OF}
THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE STATE.

There are a variety of arguments ^{of} which will be assembled at first in a jumbled order. Other arguments are: from organisational demands, from law and order, from provision of public goods generally, from maximization (and prisoners' dilemma, etc.)

2) ^{One of the more}
A surprising Argument for the State is given by economists (e.g. in A. Atkinson and Stieglitz, Lectures in Public Economics). The state is required to regulate market(s) and ensure that theorems of welfare even apply. ^{really the} Is that ^{For} case? ^{on the} The market is invariably recommended ^{as} ground that it is self-regulating, and can dispense with government.

^{the} the argument for state ^{as} from overcoming deficiencies of ^{the (free-) is} market ^{really} appalling From that angle. For it means that the market is assumed (as ideal). ^{the} All argument shows is that market isn't means of regulations ^{however the} that should adopted, ^{especially if self-regulation is sought.} In a way it is a reductio of ^{the} market.

It may be claimed that it is analytically true that any society involves a state. This is false. Social arrangements without state powers are perfectly possible. ^{Not only are there plenty of examples - or rather, were there - plenty of examples; but further, it is easy to} construct small social models.

The argument that no society ^{or community} ~~commonly~~ is stateless - used by some anthropologists in defence of the claim that ~~no~~ primitive society is anarchic - depends on an A-conversion. ^{The} argument ^{goes as follows:-}

(a) every society has exhibits (some) internal order (otherwise it would not be a society)

(b) the basic proper/function of the ^{state} is to ensure internal order, i.e. ^{the} state ^{implies} (ought to) imply order.

∴ (c) ^{given} ~~given~~ there is internal order, there must be some sort of state.

The argument from realism is
an attempt to have us stay with what is, the
status quo, and consider only minor adjustments
to it. Applied in the real world, it would
exclude looking at modern states, and ~~for~~ striking
with feudal arrangements. Theory has never been
bound by ^{real} requirements of realism, nor should it be
(for several reasons, e.g. the look-out for and
transition to better things). Moreover, we should be
concerned not solely with the immediate present but
with future political arrangements. But then the
constraints of realism are broken.

THE CASE AGAINST GOVERNMENTS :
INADEQUACIES OF STATES.

against states

1. Most of the charges the libertarians make are true. States are very expensive. Governments are a heavy drag on economics. They are expert in imposing unnecessary charges, unnecessary licenses, etc. They are commonly soaked into excessive paternalism. They are masters of introducing bias in favour of ruling classes.

anti regulation of many states, anti-trust

3? ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATES AND THEIR POWERS

Nation-state arrangements, which are fairly recent phenomena, are based on assumptions of a certain ⁶⁹ amount of independence and isolation. *
The rise of technology, including communication, have put these assumptions in doubt, as has ^{contemporary} war.

'The presumption of the nation-state system, that sovereignty implied an ability to protect a nation's territory and population, is precisely the presumption denied by the nuclear capacities of both superpowers' (PL, 313). This was already put in doubt by other things: now also by pollution, ^{acid} ~~acid~~ rains, ^{nuclear dumping} etc.

Consider again also

Argument A. 1) Wars are the rights of states only.³

'x may [wage] war upon y only if x is a sovereign state; for otherwise x has legal means by which it may and must settle the claim against y' (Barnes, p.776). Thus Aquinas explains the condition of authority, that declaration of war requires 'just authority' to do so, thus: 'first the authority of a prince, at whose command the war is to be waged; for it does not belong to a private person to start a war since he can prosecute

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3. Naturally one has to worry about private armies and so forth, as well. But undoubtedly the overwhelming problem in the case of ~~type~~ LN wars ^{lies} ~~he's~~ with the superstate.

* Other assumptions as well, e.g. a certain cultural (racial?) uniformity for the nation-state.


his rights in the court of a superior' (Aquinas, quoted in Barnes, p.776).

In fact however an alternative factual premiss will serve as well:

(a) only (super)states are capable of waging ~~type~~ LN wars.

PATHS TO ANARCHISTIC END-STATE

Posture of stages (□) and transitions (□ → □)



A useful model for the process is that of punctuated equilibrium, drawn from recently reformulated evolutionary theory. Another useful model is Kuhn's picture of the growth of science, which is also one of punctuated equilibrium, the equilibrium states or stages being those where a scientific paradigm dominates, the transitions between stages being rapid and even revolutionary. There is presumably a general model of this type within the framework of systems theory, which brings models of this type together [verify *1].

The classical anarchist assumption is that no intermediate stages need be involved, we can transit directly (in a single revolutionary upheaval) into an anarchistic end-state - a pretty unplanned and unprepared for end-state. With the fast increasing size of the world's human population and complexity of modern organisation - both further locking things into statist frames - that assumption looks increasingly untenable. There are also, and always were, reasons for supposing that intermediate preparation and planning stages are necessary. For what have to be altered, in particular, are human attitudes,


expectations, etc. - malleable parts of human "nature" that can be altered by reeducation, reflection and immersion in alternative conditions.

What has to be changed? Much. The modern encouragement of greed - in such forms as maximum consumption, maximum production, etc. The entrenchment of gross economic inequality. The reversal is to be achieved in affluent countries, largely by bringing the tall ^{corporate} poppies down considerably and not ^{so much} the bottom up, and by redirecting military and industrial spending into social reorganising. What still has some appeal is the idea, suggested by Marx's work, of initial transition into a state governed from the bottom (certainly no longer workers) instead of from the top: but the intended good effects of this ^{up} ~~sp~~ending of states' structure could be rather quickly lost (like the effects of shallowly ^{based} cultural revolutions).

A critical question is what produces transition from one state to another? For if we can find out perhaps we can hasten the process - assuming the direction and so on are desirable. But some causes of ^{rapid} transition are decidedly undesirable, e.g. nuclear war. There are other ways as the models reveal, natural cataclysm, economic instability¹ accumulation of ^f anomalies.² The anarchistic route is a branch on the tree of future political options, which - blown over and assuming a single starting point (that of Australia say) - schematically looks like this:

¹E.g. the present loans and deficit situation, especially in third world countries.

²Including undermining of state economies by alternative economies (examples from places like Peru).



It is crucial to avoid many of the alternative ^{well} features possible from where we are, e.g. transitions to the increasing state-corporate control of life.

The Kingdom of God can ^{well} be compared with the marxist find state? The Kingdom of God is pacifist (state). Peace is fully realised, and justice ^{the} is foundation of it (yet there are tensions between them sometimes?)

Kingdom of God: see Psalm 37

PATHWAYS TO CHANGE / ROUTES TO ANARCHY

Dedication (from ...
Tennyson)

Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world.

Immediate action to set us on

the way includes:-

[1] REFERENDA : Alford devoing
leads to PARTITIONS.

[2] REMOVING COMPANY PROTECTION
Thames example.

Detail of roads to anarchy includes the
following points (not well covered).

1. The state has destroyed so much of community arrangements that the road to anarchy will have to make use of the state. It is like a weed such as lantana. It has suppressed growth of the new forest. But simply sorting it out will expose the ground to forces fertile to the new forest also (moisture stress, erosion, etc.). So the state must be pruned away, substituted for, and extirpated bit by bit.

2. There is now so much government - the government has infiltrated itself so effectively in so many areas of social life, breaking down and displacing communal structures - that simply, dispensing with government, an immediate return to communal arrangements, could not be accomplished without massive dislocation. Short of a massive disaster, disabling governmental structure, instant anarchy is not feasible. Since such a disaster is not improbable, instant anarchy should not however be excluded, but, like more evolutionary routes, allowed and planned for. Otherwise, the route is by replacement, patching up or substituting for the displaced community structures broken down by state activity.

Removal of government - not from where controls are required ^{until} actual replacements, e.g. ^{na}transitional penetration, big business, are developed - from exploitative areas, e.g. gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc. Set up instead nets to watch people/victims of these things.

• If the state in ^avoluntary arrangement, freely ^{contribu}unlimited to, then contributions to state coffers should also be voluntary, likewise involving free assent, not compulsory as they are.

But then free-rider problems, etc. ^{and?} No, only showing there wasn't consent, by ^{miss} many ^{ex} exodus from fragments. If there were only a few free-riders, these people who didn't have a state contribution and would get state ^{service} ~~carried~~, such as police - as simple as AA ~~cards~~ ^{or}. You buy state protection, whatever, just like state insurance.

(Thus ^{advant} Elster Sour Grapes p.97 bottom (also surrounding section). Democracy and other political systems ^{are} ^{vocant} advertised by various authors for their side effects - ^{however are} which obtainable better in other ways. ^{There is a} Case for anarchism here. Patemen ^{is a} good ^{example}.

On Transnationals

The sources of ~~domination~~ are power of one sort or another. Social arrangements without ~~domination~~ will be designed so far as possible to limit such power and prevent its accumulation.

This implies
Preventing global corp^{orate} arrangements; internationalism, *is perhaps* already over hill. *The Australian government* are twenty years out of date.

(Global Reach p.368), *The heart of* 'Rehunt the problem ... ~~passed~~ by the global corporation ... is excessive power, and the self-imposed limitation on power is not characteristic of human institutions', rearranged.

Remedies. 1. *an* Information and end to secrecy, as a way to social responses. *Freedom and openness of information.* *Company* books as public documents, etc., p.369.

and records Such documents are
2. Indispensable data for national program of national and international regulation, 370. *So also is*

Standardization of accounting *definitions* and practices.

5. *With transnationals comes the* (p.374) Breakdown of public/private distinction and *the* disappearance of free market. Global corporations built on social capital conspicuously.

9. (p.376) Alternation of tax laws to remove credits and advantages. *There is presently a major* Tax bias in favour of transnationals.

4. *Introduction of* counterriding power *balance* before strategies, This includes

"public directors", better "undetermination", *so* presidents running for office of companies *ie or* at least elections for candidates of regulatory commissions

then, seek to Generally, alter tax laws, remove subsidies *and advantages* which encourage the accumulation of private wealth, and power, using *however* public/social and biological capital. *An overriding aim* is to discern and remove private power.

1. *Observe the* State underpinning of multinationals. Multinationals would not have arisen to their present position of eminence without state assistance - and infrastructure, education, security, etc. *It is important to be able to cite* Need detailed evidence of this.

Then can argue that problem of multinationals can be resolved, more or less automatically, with problem of state?

PROBLEMS, SUPPOSED AND GENUINE

1. Problems of the absence of social regulation (and over reliance on market devices) : e.g. hard drugs, pornography, environmental damage (beach fronts), TV commerce,

There would be innumerable problems in the absence of social organisation, but ~~they~~ of course there will be social organisation. They are often hard problems, even with the full strength of authoritarian states, which may, however, make them worse, since they are mostly problems of corrupt and unwholesome life-styles.

Once market conditions are improved, there is an inverse relation between market freedom and room for regulation. Markets tend to exclude other forms of regulation in the interests of their ~~regulation~~ "freedom."

MARKETS AND PROFITS.

Though not entirely dependent, markets and profit systems are very commonly equated. Certainly many objections apply to both.

2. The profit system ^{was} never satisfactory, ^{and is} now extremely damaging. Compare ^{the} damage ^{done} to world's forests by destruction for ^{remote} profits - and look at the way these profits are spent. Profit system compare with (coupled?) sovereignty systems.

On the operation of
LAW in an anarchist ^{society and in the} theory.

^{Kamenka asserted that}
+ ~~Kamenka~~ Law is incompatible with anarchist utopianism. This is false.

Anarchism can retain a framework of rules. The key issue is how these rules are backed up, and enforced. What anarchism excludes is coercive backing where this involves violence. Opposition usually involves sliding on coercion, ^(cf pacifism issues) premise, etc. So it looks as if there are several different theses to consider, depending on how enforcement, rules, etc. are expanded.

^{enka} Kam argued that anarchism could not handle law on basis of i. to

i. ^{the} level of detail of law.

ii. ^{the} amount of procedural detail.

But there are no barriers at all. Complexity is no bar. The claims can be refuted by a countermodel. One such is the model Chomsky ^K appeals to, that of rules of language, which are complex and intricate enough, and not backed by force (Passmore wanted to suggest they were! But it is obvious that they need not be, whatever lapses occurred in the 16th century.)

As a matter of history, several anarchist thinkers were not opposed to operation of law, but included it in their framework. One example is Proudhon. Others?

Control of public life.

Need a public convention, like the
League and other war conventions, which
applies to public servants in place of
soldiers.

Such a convention would legitimize/require
whistle-blowing and the like.

It could also "force" the release of information.

On politicians; dirty tricks, dirty hands, and all that. Politicians are said to be characteristically dishonest — where they need to be (otherwise that is).

A long standing image is of politics as the theatre. The image was revisited by Rousseau, who however believed in the cure for the image. Under it, a politician is like an actor; the politician is a personator, a sophist, a dealer in rhetoric.

The upshot is that if the role can be abolished, if we can get away without it, so much the better.

MY ENGAGEMENT WITH SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY

Over the past decade¹ I have found myself increasingly concerned with social and political problems and more and more immersed in the theoretical issues raised thereby. In large part this has arisen from environmental involvement, especially on forestry and nuclear matters, and the realisation that the basic problems mostly lay with social and political arrangements.² It thus became important to try to determine what those really were, and how they might be changed, what the alternatives were.

But in part also my legitimate intellectual movement from logic and metaphysics³ to a wider perspective which includes social and political philosophy as major area of concern has come about as a result of reflection on the unsatisfactory and fragmented state of philosophy and its surrounds. It became increasingly hard (in particular for someone trained in analytic philosophy with a heavy Oxbridge orientation) to avoid noting, especially when confronted with wider philosophical and social issues, that one's philosophical education and

¹In 1972 I presented and circulated a paper, 'Is there a need for a new, and environmental ethic?' which played an influential part in the rapid growth of environmental philosophy in New Zealand and Australia (on the latter see D. Mannison and M. McRobbie in Environmental Philosophy). Such an excursion into ethics was not without precedent. My research work in fact began in ethical theory, with a thesis on moral scepticism, and I thought about and wrote on deontic problems in the sixties.

²The point is explained in detail in work cited in the accompanying curriculum vitae (where all otherwise unreferenced work is listed). In the case of forestry see for example 'Destructive forestry in Australia and Melanesia' and 'World rainforest destruction - the social factors'; as to nuclear see 'Nuclear power - some ethical and social dimensions' and 'The ethics of nuclear war, and political fall-out'; and for the general argument see 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems'.

³This does not mean that I have entirely abandoned these areas. Logic is, I believe (with Anderson, and so with the mainstream of Australia's most significant philosophical movement), the central part of philosophy, and many conceptual problems in applied philosophy will continue to require return to logical ground in order to find satisfactory solutions. A sound training in logical theory is essential for deeper solutions for some of these problems.

I should add that I never have been a very pure logician. I moved into logic in order to try to solve severe conceptual problems first in the philosophy of science and then in metaphysics. Now that these problems are largely solved (to my satisfaction at any rate) I can presumably move on to other things.

practice offered only a somewhat limited set of tools and techniques for tackling wider philosophical concerns and, worse, but few instruction as to how to apply these analytic techniques more widely. Nor had the inadequacy of such an education and the sort of philosophy to which it led gone unremarked.

It was charged that philosophy had abdicated several of its proper responsibilities - for example, to organise knowledge into some more coherent whole or world-view, to elaborate a social theory and influence social criticism, even to afford intellectual leadership - and had become excessively analytic and specialised, and therewith narrow and sterile (concerned, e.g., merely with linguistic niceties, conservative commonsense and/or scholastic logic-chopping). It was charged that academic philosophy not only had become excessively timid and accordingly lost intellectual excitement and appeal, but also had lost relevance to and touch with the important intellectual issues of the times and had failed in the business of addressing a larger audience with philosophical interests. These charges, which have a solid foundation, did not come from within academic philosophy but were most evocatively made by people outside philosophy (though with some knowledge of it) or by those in the margins of academic, professionalised, philosophy. Thus Durrant, an outsider, has powerfully expressed a part of the charges:

... philosophy itself, which had once summoned all sciences to its aid in making a coherent image of the world and an alluring picture of the good, found its task of inordination too stupendous for its usage, ran away from ... [the] battlefronts of truth, and hid itself in recondite and narrow lanes, timidly secure from the issues and responsibilities of life.¹

Philosophy began to change in the Seventies, some philosophers naturally changing with it. We aimed to address a wider range of socially relevant topics - and also sometimes a wider audience - for example, to get beyond the

¹W. Durrant, The Story of Philosophy, Second edition, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1926, p.v. Durrant though (or perhaps because) a leading populariser of philosophy in North America, is not usually at all well regarded by academic philosophers.

sterile examples of previous texts on moral philosophy to live issues, from minor cases of promising and truth-telling to abortion and euthanasia, genetic engineering and the treatment of animals, violence and nuclear war. But the analytical methods used for the most part did not change, the widening of horizons in applied philosophy proceeded from a narrow and inadequate logical (argumentative) and metaphysical base. The applied expansion went with theoretical stagnation: mainstream theoretical philosophy sat in the doldrums.¹

Nor has the applied transformation gone far enough. Significant issues have been left to theologians and journalists.² And there has been insufficient effort by philosophers (even those addressing relevant issues) to integrate their work with that of other (social) sciences that shed light on the issues, to overcome discipline fragmentation by synthesis. For it was not merely that philosophy itself was fragmented and often irrelevant, it had also become largely isolated from other disciplines and had ceased to be properly informed by them - or to inform them.

This unsplendid isolation is particularly conspicuous in the case of political philosophy, which often proceeds in much the way it did in the 17th century, with little of the import it should be receiving from recent advances in social psychology and ethology and (to the extent that it is well-founded) sociobiology. More generally, the way in which areas have been isolated from one another, and ceased communicating, to the disadvantage to all, is a matter for serious concern. It is not merely that philosophy, for example, can be enriched by taking due account of the social sciences. The

¹This description derives from Passmore.

²Philosophers and other academics should not be led in these areas, but do the leading. One of the roles of the academic community - a role in which philosophy in Australia (much degenerated by too long an incestuous history) mostly fails - is to address a wider public than part of itself. Philosophers may justly complain that there is little competent public discussion of these issues where applied philosophy matters and no reputable intellectual leadership in Australia at present, but they have by and large done little to rectify the matter.

social sciences also can be improved, and much rubbish removed, by taking account of philosophical criticism.¹ Each impacts on the others, in ways that should be taken into account. Moreover the interplay of different parts is fruitful.² There is a richness to be generated if the interaction works well. And such interaction is required to pull much material into a more coherent whole.

Such sentiments on integrating areas and rendering work more informed and holistic have been expressed before. It is one thing expressing them, and another putting them into effect. The tasks involved are difficult. And putting them into effect is not of course a task for just one person, but for several. A start can however be made with interdisciplinary people who willingly cross discipline boundaries, because they need to, and see the need to; by people who are able to adopt the often special methods and procedures of other disciplines and combine them with those of their own. But a start can not in general be satisfactorily initiated just by administrative fiat. A good deal of evidence has now accumulated to show that an administrator cannot simply pull together a successful interdisciplinary research group by hiring people skilled in the different disciplines concerned and putting them in a common setting. Such groups can evolve however by individuals with wide-ranging concerns interesting other researchers or like-inclined people from other disciplines in overlapping or joint problems. And in setting up the conditions for such collaborative research to evolve, administrative inputs are important. It is, for example, an astute move to have a position linking several different departments³ attached to none of them but to a section that sits so-to-speak above them; for in this way the researcher has access to all the departments concerned but is confined to none.

¹New philosophies of nature call for much more than this, indeed for major theoretical reorientation of some social sciences. The point is elaborated in the concluding part of 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics'.

²Nor will unified or coherent social sciences be arrived at without substantial philosophical imports.

³As the present post does. No doubt other political considerations have also influenced the move.

I think I can justifiably account myself an interdisciplinary person. Firstly, I have considerable experience in collaborative work, an advantage that philosophers, in contrast to experimental scientists, seldom enjoy. The claim is supported by my publication record. While that indicates the extent of my joint activity in research, it does not fully record cooperative activity in organising conferences and workshops, both in logic and in environmental philosophy, in helping found or reestablish organisations (the Australasian Association of Logic is the main example, but the local AAP is another), in establishing publications (e.g. the Environmental Philosophy Discussion Papers serve both Philosophy Departments) and so on.

More significantly, I can also fairly claim substantial experience in interdisciplinary work, as well as in other fields of philosophy. For example, I have worked not only in philosophy departments but in mathematics and in environmental studies programs.¹ Furthermore, my work in forestry, which is continuing, brought me into close touch with people from a broad spectrum of fields, not only forestry, but also economics, geography, demography, botany and zoology. The work, which is well-known locally and referred to in international textbooks, has for the most part been well received by people in those area, except forestry, and has been taken seriously by those who disagree with the often controversial positions developed. My more recent work on environmental problems has led me to communicate and interchange material with sociologists and political scientists in North American and England, and also with people in a variety of fields in Australian Colleges of Advanced Education. Naturally then, much of the resulting work reaches people in a range of fields. My work on environmental problems has also resulted in invitations to participate in conferences in a wide range of areas, on forestry (in several Australian

¹I declined invitations to work in interdisciplinary research groups in Washington and The Hague primarily because they would have kept me away from Australia too long and obliged me to endure northern winters.

states), on energy, on the environment (in New Guinea and USA). I have twice been invited to present papers at Australian Sociology conferences, but been unable to do so because of commitments abroad.

The basic forestry book The Fight for the Forests, and subsequent forestry and environmental papers, already included much that bears upon and is informed by social and political theory. A new book, tentatively entitled Forestry in Australia, now in preparation by a team of people drawn from a wide range of disciplines - which is intended to replace The Fight for the Forests, long out of print - will be even more closely involved with social and political theory. It includes much fuller analysis of social classes and power structures (and models of these) as well as, like earlier work, examination of elites, and types of inequality.

This should also begin to reveal how my work on apparently diverse areas is interrelated, and not a result of compartmentalisation. Most obviously, my work on forestry, which directly involves a range of environmental problems, in a very practical way, leads directly into areas of social and political theory. It is less obvious, but nonetheless a fact, that work on environmental problems, value theory and logic is not disconnected, but joined by several connecting ways. For example, relevant deontic logic has shown how the key moral matter of moral dilemmas and conflicts of value can be treated. The logic of obligation is important in rejecting arguments that there is a significant separate "morality" for nation states or for public representatives of these which exonerates them from normal responsibility. Differently, logic provides the basis of decision theory, which is important in structuring environmental problems. And so on, to look at some of the more straightforward connections.¹ There are larger connections. Social and political theory necessarily presupposes

¹Explanations of these connections are much expanded in "The logical basis of the social sciences".

a metaphysics, and this in turn a logical theory.¹ Philosophers of very different persuasions, for instance Hegel and Mill, have agreed about this.

Of course work in logic, such as that in probability theory and on statistical inference, sometimes speaks directly to other areas in the social sciences. My own work on universal semantics is of interest to linguists, and 'Universal semantics?' was abstracted in Sociological Abstracts, as have been several of my philosophical papers, on for example metaphysics, limits to knowledge and animal intentionality. Work on the recent history of logic and of philosophy of science in Australasia has led me into some sociological as well as historical investigations. Logical pursuits have also lead me into political science and economics. Because of my interest in applied logic I came to take over supervision of B. Embury's doctoral dissertation on voting theory, a thesis in the Department of Political Science. My interests also involved me in work with a post-doctoral fellow on preference and decision theory and social choice theory. Regretably no joint work issued from this enterprise, but I did publish some papers in the area, and emerged with further ideas for research jotted down: these ideas, mainly for further impossibility and limitative results in social theory, have yet to be followed through.

My present research in social and political theory has (like a conic section) double foci. One focus (F1) is a book tentatively entitled The Philosophic Reach of Environmental Problems and intended to supersede Environmental Philosophy in main respects, on the ethical, social and political dimensions of environmental problems.² The central problems yield a now rather familiar list: for instance, those of human and animal populations, disappearing species, vanishing rainforests and other habitats and ecosystems, treatment (and rights) of indigenous peoples, of animals and of plants, cities and

¹A substantial start in explaining these deeper connections is made in 'Social theories, self management and environment problems' and in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, chapter 9, §12.

²Here environmental is used in the wide sense, of which the ecological is only a quite proper part.

neighbourhoods, landscape transformation or destruction, mining, pollution, nuclear and energy issues, and so on. The underlying problems have significant features in common and common social and political sources. Before the integrative task is tackled in detail however, an analytical approximative approach is being followed. Discussion papers on several of the topics listed are being researched or written, and discussion papers on others will follow, before the whole thing is pulled together.

The other focus (F2) is a book on what might be called New Age Social Organisation, investigating alternatives to prevailing social, economical and political arrangements. Major alternatives considered in detail include left-leaning and right-leaning anarchisms, which will involve a careful examination of the extent to which social arrangements and political organisations can be self-managed and self-regulating.¹

While it is ambitiously hoped that the investigation will not only result (ideally) in a more philosophically-adequate left-leaning anarchist theory than has so far been produced, that is only part of its purpose. Another very important part of the enterprise is to give some better understanding of the range of alternatives to present (monopolistic capitalist and state socialist) arrangements that there are and that could be tried. A further part is, by considering alternatives, to shed light on the prevailing systems (their structures, institutions, etc.), in particular to bring out more clearly their underlying assumptions,² the extent of their necessity, to give a better idea

¹In several respects the term 'anarchism' is unsatisfactory and will have eventually to be replaced, perhaps by a neologism, since no available term delineates the types of socio-political arrangements envisaged.

It should perhaps be remarked, in case it is thought that I have no academic background in political theory, that my university education did include courses and seminars in the area. Furthermore I have more recently acquired a good working knowledge of the anarchist literature, and am well advanced in the process of obtaining a grasp of organisation theory and the necessary parts of social psychology.

²Some of these assumptions are rejected or varied in an assessment of alternatives. Thus, as a much better idea of euclidean geometry was obtained with the elaboration of hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry, and similarly of arithmetic with the formulation of nonstandard arithmetics, so also a much better appreciation of mainstream social theory should be achieved by investigating nonstandard social theories and assumptions. This method of variation of assumptions is a fruitful one as regards many scientific theories.

of the values they write in, of their desirability or undesirability, and so on. Although my enagement has two main foci, naturally there are also other and smaller endeavours under way: the attached curriculum vitae gives some indication of these - but only some. For example, the trilogy of papers on the meaning of life, nihilism, and the ultimate existence question is to be arranged into a book which will probably also address such related issues as the quality of life.

Richard Routley

TECHNOLOGICAL & ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

W. H. Shaw, Morx's Theory of History Hutchinsan Lib.

1978

A
D16.9
.J5

Impact (e.g. pollution) per unit of resource
Resource
Population
Environmental impact = Population x Resource
Policy (e.g. through pollution)

which helps a matter of simple mathematics.

The equation is important in separating out three components which should be considered when it comes to responsibility for current environmental and related social problems, namely:

1. Excessive population; the Malthusian component;
2. Excessive consumption;
3. Inappropriate technology (the component stressed by Commons).

It can be argued, for example, that habitat destruction in South Australia was not so serious as population or consumption, but to be excessive and in a different way, with a resulting loss of land, and the earlier settlement of South Australia. A contemporary would not have had such a problem. It doesn't in the population lives lightly on the land; but, as we know, the present Australian population does not. The impact of Australians on the land has not decreased. Cleared and degraded land proceeds with more rapidly than any (very limited) restoration. Impact remains heavy, with land/land consumption has increased.

On the one hand, per capita resource use, particularly by the large, industrialised nations, has increased in Australia in the last ten years (along with increases in per capita GNP). Though lagging the American pattern, consumption in general has much increased, as has the extent of unused and throwaway goods and the amount of waste. On the other hand, though technology has improved, it has become

MULTINATIONALS

On institutions and multinationals (over persons)
and what to do about them.

James J. Coleman Power and the Structure of Society
Newton NY 1974 (Kitt's copy).

RE ANARCH?

points p45 on technology selection
(over)

p48 2/3 down - diffs of abstraction

Green Politics (ed. Doherty)
from Carter article



An inquiry concerning ^{social} ~~political~~ organization:
a polemic on a tract on ~~anarchism~~ ^{anarchism}.

ANAKYRIE. In Chapter 1

The multiple and inconsistent axioms of political theory : pluralism, morality, ...

The differences in theory begin at the beginning, in what political arrangements are for, what they are about, whom they are for, how they apply. There are important differences in the extent to which peoples' and other creatures' activities and lives can be controlled and regulated. More authoritarian or paternalistic political arrangements impose much more in the way of regulations than more liberal arrangements which in the limit reduce regulation to some minimum, to some *framework* or setting for pursuit of satisfactory lives.

So far as political relations are concerned, the world (*Terra*) is a closed system. Political influence is not exercised from outside that system, nor *do* political influences of significance so far flow from *Terra* elsewhere. (All that may of course change, in which case the problem is reset in terms of some larger system, the Universe providing an upper limit - unless some extrasp~~a~~tial gods are invok~~e~~d.) With the advance of industrialisation, communications and spill-over technology, few communities smaller than the world system are any longer effectively closed.

Fill out
The general political problem is unsolvable. The argument for this theme is that the problem is only solvable for small relatively uniform communities (Taylor). But we no longer have such, given modern interference effects.

political
Defining the *problem*: The basic picture is of a network of goal-directed creatures and systems. The aim (political goal) is to ensure that these creatures are able to pursue goals so far as these are satisfactory. *paternal*

A major value judgment is inserted here : what of wiping out lives, of war, etc., those that interfere seriously with others? A liberal setting such as *Redman* sketched is operating in the background here.

Present political arrangements anachronistic : they were introduced at a time when much less interference was technically possible. They are no longer appropriate. The *actions* of empires now affects everyone's lives, so on democratic grounds all should have say (or vote). But they don't : democracy stops at national borders (even in those borders where it kind-of operates).

Present political arrangements, by increasing population, ~~racing~~ through resources etc. for what sort of consumption high can be obtained by present people are making things much worse. For the benefit of present power-holders, their maintenance of power and privilege, *Consider* the inadequacies of short-term ~~arrangements~~ - of present economics within political frameworks.

On the End State:

According to Kamenka a central deficiency of a ~~Marxist~~ account is its pre-industrial character, also its ~~romantic~~ character, and its view of creative labour. These are a result, in part, of looking for utopia in the past, the sources of which according to Kamenka are:

- (i) a mistaken view of the happy (noble) savage;
- (ii) the abundance of industry;
- (iii) the rationality of industry (presumably its increasingly automatic and self-regularity character?).

This is confused. Sources (ii) and (iii) are the basis of the past industrial character of the end state (where the machines are really whirring along).

The main source of the search in the past is quite different, namely the search for historical models, however partial, of the good or better life. The reason is that

- (iv) there is something drastically wrong with present arrangements, which ^{is} not rectified by minor adjustments.

The end state, so far as it is described, ^{in Marx and Marxists} is certainly a curious mixture of pre- and past-industrial elements. ^{λ?}

The end state is not a static state, but a stable, climax state. The ecological analogy is again useful here. Capitalism is like a ^(devastating) pioneering stage. Stable states may have been achieved in the past, to be disturbed in one way or another. That is one reason why it is important to look in the past - for features of past stable states.

Political theory (note A*)

As a result of the way 'political system' is commonly defined, anarchy is not a political system. The reason is that 'most authors consider the modern political system to be that system which controls the use of power or force in society' (Kaplan, p.22). Anarchy aims to remove use of power and force, and therewith that system. The exclusion could of course be taken to be a (further) inadequacy in the definition, a mere technicality almost, got around by expanding 'controls' disjunctively to 'controls or removes'.

For whether or not anarchy is a political system, it is certainly an organisational system or structure.

POLITICAL THEORY AND MORALITY

1. On the one hand, it is claimed that 'any acceptable form of social order...must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable at any period, and permanently valid'.¹ (Donegan, p.xiv)

On the other, and more common view, politics simply tramples over morality when it suits it. However that is a matter of one morality, e.g. of a Christian established form, being overwhelmed by another Mafia-style morality - not the absence of a value position. Any political theory rests on a value theory. That is the point.

2. There is the problem of evil, powerful people, often unintentionally evil people such as Reagan, Thatcher, ... Hitler flourished most of his life; he led an active (etc.) life ...

3. Anarchism does not require especially good people. But political life would run much more easily without a certain range of people. (Of course, states think this, and totalitarian states try to realise their aim).

4. On Political Obligation There is no good ground as basis of political obligation. All arguments designed to establish obligation to a state - of people living in it ('its territory') especially - are wanting. (Argument for this there). Scepticism about political obligation does not imply scepticism about obligation. So moral scepticism is not implied. And on the contrary, most requirements are of the first importance in outlining alternatives to the state.

Hobbes problem was that of political obligation - 'reasons why we ought to change the state' (R p.61).

Hobbes finds three causes of disorder (competition - reflecting self interest drives; distrust; enjoyment of power ('glory')) [Self-interest is argued for on ground that motive is self-preservation.] To these he opposes inter - from desire for security.

1. This involves a very dubious objectivity.

On Marx-Engels way

Although Marx and Engels say comparatively little about their projected end state, they say a great deal about the route through the new state - to that end, and about the means to be used along that route.

By contrast with means, they are far too restrictive about routes, ruling out many plausible roads to change (including peasant revolutions, etc.) Engels' proposed route is through 'a new social order' where production and industry run on behalf of society, according to a social plan. The main features are addition of private property (vol.1, p.88) and of private means of communication (p.92). Note that it is unclear whether this social order is an immediate or end state, but those features are common to both.

There is massive industrial and agricultural production (though not over-production) by (rationalised) planned economy without () private property (I,p.92).

Hence, division into antagonistic classes becomes superfluous. There are new all-round people (p.93), a disappearance of division of labour, for flexible labour. There is association instead of competition. Fusion of town and country (p.94).

According to Marx-Engels (I,p.183) the route is through the central state. 'The workers must not only strive [against democrats] for a single and indivisible...republic, but also within this republic for the most determined centralisation of power in the hands of the state authority. They must not allow themselves to be misguided by the democratic talk of freedom for the communities, of self-government, etc.' No communal property to remain : 'Concentrate productive means of etc... in of state'. This account is extremely top-down.

As to means, it looks as if Marx and Engels are prepared to adopt any means, likely or not. For Marx, the main means are by violent revolution (last page Poverty of Philosophy). Revolution is the outcome of the contradiction of classes. By contrast, Engels prefers peaceful means (in 1847 i.e. vol 1, p.89); but he won't at all rule out revolution.

But together Marx and Engels emphasise violent means, and encourage excuses on occasions (p.180).

Under the pretext that the petty bourgeois democrats will betray the workers, the subversion (destabilization) of their government is planned (Vol 1. address of CC to League, pp.180-1) Unlike Bak Marx and Engels advocate fostering massacres etc. (for what else can this stuff mean?), and a regime of terror. Bak thinks that in a revolutionary situation such things may occur but should be immunized (I can easily check the reference in Bak if necessary (p.180)).

For the most part, Engels was much more inclined to peaceful and established means to change, even to change by way of ballot box and universal suffrage; the Democratic route to state transformation (1, p.195, also 1, p.202).

Note Engels' introduction to Class Struggles in France written in 1895 (p.195), i.e. later than the more bellicose texts Lenin is relying on - and as the fruit of a riper experience of politics. He says that by party action universal suffrage 'transforme de mayer de dupere qu'il a ete jusqui' en instrument d'emarcqation' and this as footnote shows is a quote from Marx.

This suggests that it can be used to gain control of and subsequently transform state app

In 1895 (pp.199-200) Engels suggests a revision of . Now show means, propaganda etc., to win over the mass of people [different from technological determination.] No doubt because of technological determination, there is no need to be too specific about means; for it is not as if activity is shaping the course of things, only speeding up the (in) process.

Reasons for the lack of detailed description of the end state in Marx-Engels:

1. This would be to try to set the future, which is reactionary (Why? Because of historical determination?), and unnecessary, because future people will be wiser than us.

2. Standard explanation, suggested by Marx: 'scientific socialism cannot describe in any detail the society that will replace capitalism. Utopians speculate about the socialist future : Marxists analyse the capitalist present' (Moore, p.76). Moore argues the standard explanation is implausible.

Principles of Individualism [?]

1. Government based on individually-given consent of citizens - 'its authority or legitimacy deriving from that consent' (Lubes, p.11)

Consent-answering back requirement

2. Political representation as representing individual interests, not classes, estates, etc.

3. That's all. Government confined to enabling satisfaction of individual interests. Hence towards laissez-faire, against paternalism, influencing or interpreting individual wants. (79).