

00948

ANARKISM
EARLY
DRAFTS

+

FINISHED PAPERS

Features :-

- ordering of set of items concerned, $\{a: a \in \Omega\}$
(Now relative to Ω) by a relation R_c makes above choice for $c \in \Omega$, incl. that
 - $a R_c b$ does not imply $a = b$
 - $a R_c b$ & $b R_c a$ need not imply $a = b$
(generally won't)
 - i.e. ordering does not induce equality.
 - there is no sup (or inf)
 - i.e. no z such that for every a $z R_c a$
 - R_c "depends on" c ; other elements of Ω will preserve other ordering.

R_c is a weak ordering: primitive
asymmetric

not a partial order

R is a relative rank order.

Results: There is no class or "is only"
because there is order.

COUNTER CASE DISSOLVED;
critique of arguments to and for the State

Over the centuries that humans have been stuck with states, many different attempts to justify them, ~~namely~~ as in some way necessary or desirable (as were then an unfortunate accident of history), have been attempted. None of these arguments succeed (as such would perhaps be quite widely conceded).

There are various ways of showing that the arguments for. One powerful way deploys, indicates or develops, counterexamples; for instance modelling social arrangements without states. Another more pedestrian but essential way consists in direct examination of the arguments, not merely some of them or various classes of them, but, for completeness, each and every one of them. Ultimately that calls for, what is attempted first, ^{in a preliminary fashion} an exhaustive classification of the arguments.

1. A classification of arguments to and for

A preliminary classification of these arguments can take the following form:

1. Historic. ^{or quasi-historic} These arguments, ^{intention} divided into two ^{principal} classes:

1.1 Descriptive is ^{the falling of the states you in shorts} ~~But~~ without utterly questionable

connecting assumptions, such as that what is is necessary, (a moral fallacy) or that what is is right (a deontic fallacy), such arguments fail to offer justification.

A first group of arguments, in justification of the state, try to take advantage of the descriptive features that states are entrenched almost everywhere as the dominant feature of the political landscape. Helpful as it may be having states in avoiding hypotheticals, in injecting a heavy element of realism, nonetheless fact is not per se justification: what is often ought not to be. Bank robber and robber barons are justified by their mere existence. Such troubles, the evident gap between descriptive and normative, are among those that plague descriptive arguments.

This fallacy, heavily utilized by Hegel, is critically examined in NAK.

There are some important subtypes of descriptive (or quasi-descriptive) arguments, namely

- Pragmatic arguments. The state is not only established, it works. Immediate difficulties with such arguments are obvious. The Mafia too is well-established. It too works, often in opposition to the State (as a sort of negative opposite, like the Devil to God). ^{Still} ~~But~~ ^{are} pragmatic arguments enjoy considerable popularity, especially in North America. They will have to be considered in more detail (than they deserve).

(A) What sort of standards of adequacy is working well intended to meet? All sorts of ^{awful} political arrangements have "worked", at least in persisting for ~~some~~ as long as ~~stabil~~ arrangements: despotisms, dictatorships, tyrannies, ...

is selected thereby as best, and what is selected as best is no doubt right (by a pragmatic utilitarian deontic reduction). So rather evidently such arguments prove too much. Any form that in fact emerges, no matter how achieved, though what distasteful Machiavellian deeds, no matter how ^{and} awful, is thereby justified: empires, dictatorships of the worst sort, fascist and totalitarian states, ~~one~~ ^{and} all are justified, provided only they ~~they~~ ^N are established.

Even if ~~evolutionary~~ arguments are conceded some sort of force, presumably they enjoy this only for climax stages, where some sort of evolutionary plateaus have been achieved (~~otherwise~~ ^{otherwise} had means to select evolutionary ends may temporarily prevail). But where is the evidence that the state is not another transitional stage, like feudalism before it? As an evolutionary process

^{and practitioners}
N. That contemporary exponents of stakeholder are inclined to accept these sorts of considerations, and to recognize any regime that has gained (short-term) control over a territory and its administration, does nothing for the ~~argument~~ considerations, what it ~~shows~~ reveals rather is the moral sickness of contemporary real-politicians.

it is very recent, and fortunately not yet established in evolutionary time.

1.2 Non-descriptive. Difficulties with

descriptive arguments, including prescriptive fallacies (deriving prescriptive or evaluative conclusions from ^{purely} descriptive premises), are avoided idealization arguments, which include

- ideal history arguments. These are genetic in a justificatory character, relating the mythological "historical" development of the state from an imaginary pre-state situation. These arguments are not ~~of~~ sharply separated from

- imaginary transaction and ideal reconstruction arguments, for the transactions, such as an originating social contract, may be presented in a quasi-historic form. This important class of arguments is broader than contractual arrangements, including all the following sorts of imaginary transactions: negotiating, bargaining, experimenting, etc., in given (idealised) conditions, perhaps issuing in an arrangement, agreement, contract, etc. A preliminary classification of these arguments divides them into

{	natural	{ quasi-theological, legalistic invisible hand evolutionary
	artificial, consensual or equivalent.	

N

They include voluntary (as opposed to forced) relocation arguments, where a group ^(existing with its facts) relocates and forms a state (except of course those groups, when there was room for them, tended to aim for new societies, not states).

These arguments form a bridge between descriptive and normative. While voluntary contract arguments are descriptively implausible, voluntary relocation has ^{not had time} a little descriptive plausibility.

4.
The most notorious of these
reconstructions, ^{or political thought-experiments,} are the social contract theories (of Hobbes, Rousseau, recently Rawls, ...),
whereby individual members of a society fictitiously enter into an enforceable contract,
inescapable for themselves and all their descendants, setting up the state, primarily as a security
arrangement. In later versions, ^{which may involve other objectives, from these contracts, such as peace, trusts, etc.,} there is much negotiating and bargaining in contrived situations,
where humans lose many of their distinctive features and accoutrements (in a effort to ensure
some initial fairness).

A variant on contract theories, which justify some sort of state arrangements as if they
arose in an ideal way, is retrojustification of the state as naturally arising, as a sort of super-
insurance agency, from pre-state arrangements. For example, the minimal state evolves from a
competing set of state-like security agencies one of which somehow gains a monopoly, and is
retrojustified through insurance arguments (concerning risk and compensation). (B) (P) (D) on 4.0 (2) on 4.1

Now modern states did not arise in any such "natural" or contractual way. Often they
were imposed by conquest or through colonialisation, and with a few exceptions, using military
means ^{and heavy power plays,} rather than offering much sweetness and light and choice. (Q) Nor do the ideal constructions
or histories offer much justification for these resulting state power configurations. For the states
so delivered are very different from those most people presently toil under. (Q) on 7.0

In any case, the arguments involved do not succeed. They are extraordinarily gappy by
contemporary logical standards, and they depend upon some utterly implausible assumptions,
for example as to how vile conditions are in extra-state situations. ^{These charges are}

^{Notion /} easily illustrated, and will be. A small immediate ^{meanwhile} example. (B) (D) on 4.2

(D) No doubt some of the gaps ^{in the arguments}
could be plugged by further, further contestable, assumptions, but such analytic work remains


^{after two millions of such arguments,}
to be attempted and assessed. In fact it was ^{long ago} early realised that such arguments exhibit unlikely
and even paradoxical features. For example, in consenting to a state for security purposes,
participants to the state contract proceed to establish an institution which is far more dangerous
to them than the power of others taken distributively. It would seem that those smart enough to
enter into a social contract for a state would be smart enough to foresee the problems of hiring a
monster, and to avoid the steer and states along without it.

REF [31k.
In establishing a state, inhabitants, set up an institution ^{purpose and}
that is far more ^{dangerous} to them than the power of other
inhabitants, taken ^{only} as a group.

INTER This is to think that men are so foolish that they take
care to avoid what mischief may be done them by
Robbers, or foxes, but are content, nay think it safety, to be
devoured by Lions (Locke p. 372)

①

Such arguments are sometimes presented as replacing overall contractual arrangements (though ~~they~~ ^{minors, arrangements} and actually enter) with invisible hand mechanisms. Whereas contractual arguments take the general shape:



in invisible hand arguments the intermediate ~~steps~~ steps, en route to the state, consist in formation of organisations and their progressive amalgamation to ~~finally~~ provide finally a state. For example, in Norich these organisations are taken to comprise protective agencies (though that is only one statist function), and to ensure legitimacy for the final object, it is ~~contended~~ contended that each intermediate state derives from the proceeding in a morally permissible way, namely preserves ~~and~~ respects rights.

Such arguments fail for two main classes of reasons: inadequacies in the derivations of later and final stages from earlier ones, and overstatements over the initial state (in particular, what is assumed in it, such as proprietorial rights, and what is excluded, in the way of more satisfactory alternatives).

②

There are a notable discrepancies between ^{typical} justifications of the state (in what would be sweeteners and life, though it is far from a Pareto-optimal object) and ^{common} explanations of the role of the state (in what would be bitterness and -triggle).

In these forms the State arises through
 voluntary actions and transactions whereas anarchists and
 many socialists see anarchism as a post-state state,
 these transaction arguments ^{often} assume anarchism, in very early
 forms, as pre-state states. People voluntarily elect to
 escape these pre-state form, "making" into the jaws of the State.
 But there are, as well, non-voluntary versions, where
 the State ^{is} established through legislation or
 religious means. For example, the details of state
 organisation, as a regime or commandments. Hence, are
 received by as given to some powerful religious personage,
 who implement, the organisation under religious authority.
 The legalistic equivalent case about through implementation, act
 of religious dictates, but what may be very limited in
 practical effect and detail, natural law. Normally this law
 will be "seen", too, by some powerful personages, who are in
 a position to carry, and ^{have} put into effect, their
 illumination. With the decline of religion these sorts of
 arguments have lost much of their general appeal (they should
 never have enjoyed much credibility). ~~But many~~ But many
 relics of these shattered arguments remain, to be removed. A
 critical point is that such arguments should not gain
 independent standing. Most law is intra-state, state manufactured and
 state serving. What is independent of states has to answer to standards,
 moral standards especially, that are independently justified. Similarly for
 religious commandments. As a result, these arguments collapse back to other
 arguments for the state.

Underlying several of the imaginary transaction arguments to the state, are various choice arguments of a thought-experiment cast. Concretely

like those embedded in

little better than

like those embedded in Social contract arguments like that of Hobbes are con jobs. Such arguments ambitiously aim to show that

- the state is necessary, and that
- the state is superior to its absence, but ^{not} such arguments as are presented depend upon a false choice. For only two options are considered:

H, a horrible Hobbesian "state of nature" and

S, a well-ordered (contractually-read) Hobbesian state.

The argument, appealing to the vices of H and the virtues of S, has little trouble in concluding

- S is better than H (or similarly, rational agents would select S over H, etc.)

The choice conveniently leaves out other options, such as anarchist ones. Why should anarchists want to line up with S? They can agree with proposition ••. They might also want

to assert that anarchistic arrangements Z are superior to S. Whereupon it is evident that neither

- nor • follows. For necessity all accessible alternatives have to be considered (by the semantics of necessary). That has not been done. For superiority the superiority of S to Z and other alternatives has to be taken into account. That has not been done.

One alternative is Carter's *Society* which produces 'the kind of individuals who have strongly internalized values and can live cooperatively and freely without the threat of force ...' (p.25).⁵

5 16 "reversing" Hobbes' ^{argument} Bottom half: really a reranking.

The arguments, ^{like others to follow,} even if somehow repaired, would not establish an institution with anything approaching the power and complexity of the modern state. Arguments to the state typically establish ^{at best,} only a rather minimal state, with certain protective and regulatory powers. Such a minimal state would not deliver many of the goods economists, still less socialists, have come to expect of the state. The arguments certainly do not establish anything like the oppressive paternal state with a panoply of powers that many citizens are forceably subject to, powers states have accumulated by their own unjustified predatory activity. In this respect too, arguments to the state resemble arguments to God. Deistic arguments characteristically establish (insofar as they establish anything) only a quite minimal ^{some existent,} that which, a first cause, a most perfect object, a universal designer, "clockmaker" or the like. They do nothing to establish many of the powers or properties ascribed to God. (M)

The character of the arguments, and what they show (very considerably less than is usually claimed) matters for the kind of pluralistic anarchism here advanced. For, what will be contended, is that these and other arguments, when rectified and rectified show no more more than the merit of some organisations, for more complex communities.

There is yet another resemblance. A surplus of attributes are regularly ascribed to God; so much power, knowledge, and the like, that paradoxes of omnipotence, omniscience, and similar, are quickly engendered, paradoxes that a lesser God that merely satiated ^{on outward} (and could tolerate some production of evil) could surely escape.^N So too a surplus of power is ascribed to the state. The

state carries far more power than is required for collective organisation, a large "political surplus" which should be relinquished.

N. Lesser Gods encounter other difficulties: their plurality, the fact that they can be executed by other greater Gods, and their originating by ontological arguments.

2 (=1*). Systematic. These arguments divide again into two principal subclasses, namely

2.1 Analytic and

2.2 Non-analytic.

Further both subclasses may be subdivided in turn into individualistic and holistic subclasses, for instance 2.1 into

2.1.1 Individualistic and

2.1.2 Non-individualistic.

Most recent investigation has been ~~for~~ concentrated ~~upon~~ within subdivision 2.1.1, upon game-theoretic justifications of the State. Indeed, given prevailing methodological individualism, which ~~is~~ ^{is} almost invariably this analytic form, all justification reduces to ~~this~~ ^{an acceptable} subdivision. ^N But there is little good reason to

embrace individualism, methodological or other, because many ^{sorts of} wholes, beginning with cultural, do not ~~come~~ ^{come} down to individuals; it is ~~the~~ ^{poor} methodology to try to proceed as if they do. More on individualism elsewhere. See also JB...

ENOTE

Certainly other systematic ways of endeavouring to justify the state tends ~~to~~ ^{have} recently to have fallen by the wayside as has abandoned. ^{However} It is worth listing two further ~~of~~ forms, one of which remains significant:

- Holistic form considerations. The State is presented as the form, or even print, of Society, much as the mind is the form of the corresponding body. Insofar as there is an argument, it is analogical, from an increasingly dubious basis. Contemporary updating of the form ideas would no doubt have the State as the program, as the software, of a corresponding Society. - what is even less plausible -

- Moral considerations.

FEASIBLE ANARCHIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO
REGIONAL
GLOBAL, AND LOCAL PROBLEMS

Heavy criticisms of anarchism, deriving in
strongly from socialist and marxist quarters, include these:
that anarchism offers no workable practice for and
offers no useful contributions for coping with global problems,
meaning problems in present social and political
conditions (not usually problems concerning world environments).
Among the problems attached to, which it is alleged anarchism
does not and cannot address, are human poverty, human
malnutrition, inequitable distribution of resources, human
(over-)population, and ~~in~~ so on.

^{Granted,}
There are great many problems, many of them getting worse rapidly. Though anarchist arrangements played little ^{or no} part in producing these problems, many of them developing and getting out of ^{control} under free-enterprise capitalist and state-socialist arrangements, it is sometimes outrageously ^{claimed that anarchism should be able to deal successfully} with an array of these problems, ^{To add to the insult, it is said to} and fails ^{theory} as a... because it is unable to do so. Why on earth should anarchism be presumed to do this?

One critic endowed with this level of 'gall' (one A. Wertheimer) contends that anarchism is unable to successfully deal with four presently existing world social conditions. These are: 1) that "the population of the earth is (perhaps) too large, but increasing at a rapid rate with no prospect for a serious reduction"; 2) that "in much of the world, basic human needs are not being satisfied"; 3) that "the world's natural and human resources are not evenly distributed across the globe"; and finally 4) that "the present level of subsistence is based on a high level of social and economic interdependence among various regions of the world and within the regions themselves". In addition [5]... anarchism is unable to cope with conflicts between individual self-interest and social needs, particularly as relates to ... defense (Clark p.142).

The short response is So what? Firstly, insofar as these conditions constitute problems ("condition" 3) is more a fact than a "problem", no political theory is coping successfully, only ^a on all-conquering ideology would pretend to be able to cope. Democratic capitalism has had (important isolated pockets excepted) little impact in limiting India's gross population; Maoist socialism has done only a little better in China. Part of the problem in almost all such overpopulated regions lies in getting the problem recognised as a problem. Secondly, prospects of success for anarchism are primarily regional, ^{not global.} But a region can hardly be expected to handle, rather than make limited contributions towards, world problems. Suppose, for instance, Niue became (or reverted to) an anarchist society, a successful one locally. It would be no detraction from its local success that it made no impact upon demilitarizing the USA or ^(through standard US media practice) halting the world's resource drain to thereto, or that its success was scarcely known about there.

Anarchism is not really saddled with the global legacies of archist practice. A longer response begins thus:-

and making appropriate ^{adjustments;} ^{as with} ^{education and adjustment concerning} the hazards of pollution and smoking, this is largely because of remiss state practice. Part of the problem, the present overload, is furthermore ethically insoluble; for all present resolutions will have ethically inadmissible outcomes or by-products. Only for the future is there some glimmer of hope, but not under present archist arrangements.

2 Even so,

one way to solve is by building up from local and regional solutions. (impose rules, freedom, peace, etc.)

Population issues. As we have already noticed,

It is often asserted that anarchism cannot work in regions of large population, or with high population densities. That anarchy only has prospects of success in small, and perhaps technologically unsophisticated, communities is a widely espoused thesis.^N These kinds of assertion have already been criticised.

What does not work are stock control procedures, e.g. expanding an out-of-touch bureaucracy.

Polyarchic arrangements cannot handle high decisions. By contrast, dictatorship allows them to be taken (Buenos Aires), or As there is a

Range of lobbies (ethnics, etc.) in favour of population increase: hard for party systems to ignore these lobbies, because of voting system.

- Deliberate social reorganisation, which undercuts reasons for large families, namely old-age care, cheap labour inputs, etc., sons as insurance (technology level).^{NI}

This is important side implication of range of decisions: transport systems, restructuring urban systems, and even, as well as population and immigration policies.

NI. It is frequently claimed that we know more or less how to meet population problems. Only political obstacles and vested interests stand in way of doing so. But it is not quite that simple and easy.

^{Reas}
N, both synergistic and antagonistic counterforces; Taylor, Post Keynesian etc.

Scarcity. • Scarcity is relative to wants and presumed needs. Similarly abundance: it depends on extent to which materials, etc., prevail.

When wants are large, perhaps insatiable, there will always be scarcity. Wants ^{are} not a given; needs, though culturally dependent,

can be. When needs are set high (eg. to include domestic refrigerators), then too there will be scarcity for the foreseeable future. ^N

No doubt there is a ~~minimum~~ rough head of minimal sustenance and shelter requirements for keeping humans (by we are back to this) alive. Even if they could be met, satisfactory living would not result.

• (reduction of needs (More). Industrial revolution under capitalism aggravated conditions of scarcity and toil.

• Proskhins have a bad track record on scarcity. They have tended to assume abundance. A vast increase once the ~~the~~ subsidies of the state are removed.

Following Kropotkin's ^{prophecy} they have taken for granted enormous productivity from labour-intensive garden plots, a sort of anarchist green revolution, neglecting the extensive inputs required to make this feasible. ~~possible~~ (water, ^{energy}, manure, pesticides, etc.) [This eq. book p 148]

• There are some sharp limits on the extent of growth to cater for human populations and their "needs". An important limitation can be seen by tracking energy, which is limited, ~~etc~~ more abundant production of which encounters other limits (pollution, air & water pollution, etc.)

N Argument that wants/needs distinction cannot be drawn.

Distribution, redistribution of resources.

- Necessity, ^{is regularly} ~~is regularly~~ ^{this is done} often to enable capitalist nations to be able, access to foreign business provided etc.

- As regards more basic provisioning, material aid through free provision.

Example of Spanish collectives (Cebal ref 19 pp 1845)

- ^{The} Aid record of ^{present} liberal democratic states is dismal.

Argument that anarchist approach could succeed, from socio-psych. assumption:

'unless humans develop patterns of life and values based on mutual aid at level of small groups and local communities, one cannot expect them to go very far in the practice of mutual aid at any other level of social organization' (Cebal p 154).

But really needs the conscious; then have no developed, ~~will~~ can be expected to believe aid.

"Necessity" ^{forces} ~~is~~ part of imperialist exploitation. Contrast the equally ~~un~~ unsatisfactory

Merrill line: distribution is one with production ←

'... the central problem of "redistribution" is based on the questionable assumption of the possibility of achieving a return to the pre-war while continuing a technological system founded on dependency and disproportion in economic power' (Cebal p 154)

What is required is a change in technological systems and productive relations. Antisocial patterns of production result in ~~social~~ production.

Regional restructuring. Present arrangements for human living are not made on the basis of quality of life for the living, but all too often to suit the needs of industry, returns to capitalism, etc. The results are everywhere conspicuous, especially in contemporary cities ^{major} which characteristically dominate whole regions.

Many ^{major} local problems ^{derive from} include the environmental states and living conditions of cities. An anarchist resolution involves restructuring cities. This would include development of network cities and restructuring of community.

W

DONE WITH

ANARCHISM chapter 2

HOLD TO
THROW!

W1.

There is an important argument against the state based on its authoritarian character. This argument, ^{to be} found in Proudhon and in embryonic form in Rousseau, is developed and given a Kantian turn in Wolff. ^{N1} What Proudhon ~~presented~~ ^{portrayed} as a conflict between the authority of the state and freedom Wolff represents as 'the conflict between authority and autonomy' (p. 18). In this conflict where, the state represents authority, autonomy takes precedence; anarchism is consistent with the supreme virtue of autonomy, but anarchist doctrines supporting the state are not, because of the authoritarian character of the state. Because Wolff's argument has been subject to much criticism which an ~~improved~~ improved formulation would shed, because too Wolff's formulation leaves something to be desired (it is not sufficiently sharp or tight), the argument will be revamped. A crucial difference is this: whereas Wolff asserts that 'all authority is equally illegitimate', a judgement steadily rejected, it is now said that all closed authority is ~~illegitimate~~ ^{illegitimate}, meaning ^{morally} ~~morally~~ illegitimate, not 'having a binding moral force'. ^N

Nor is all closed authority equally objectionable. The unquestionable directives of a benevolent dictator (one whose ^{authoritarian} ~~authoritarian~~ directives and regulations prove inductively to be well directed) ~~will~~ can be seen as less objectionable than those of a malevolent dictator. Similarly for a dictatorial group, a junta, or a majority. ~~That~~ That the dictator said so, or that the majority said so, ~~does not~~ does not offer a reason rendering the state less than a closed authority.

N. Of course a state may legislate that its authority is legitimate, and ~~be~~ even have other states do the same. But that will not achieve moral, de jure, legitimacy. (A)

N1 As to Proudhon see Rittler p. 13, pp. 15-16. According to Rousseau the undesirable restrictions placed on not put in for all forms of government; they do not obtain for his ~~most~~ favoured arrangements, Wolff tries to repeat this out of point, and then successfully for anarchism direct democracy.

It is ironic when the state endeavours to enforce its authority; moral legitimacy is not easily obtained. Nevertheless these acts of petition go far towards explaining why people acknowledge, rarely questioning, clerical authorities like the state. There are other elements for which states take explaining this sheepishness, such as:

^{the} force of tradition,
this is the way things have always been done;

^{the} force of character of leaders;

^{their} occupation of official positions
which have ^{long} been ^{historically} holding.

A core theme, to be embodied and defended, is

W1. An autonomous person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate.

But

W2. The state is a closed authority, of a certain sort of course. Hence

WC1. An autonomous person does not recognise the state as legitimate.

The core theme depends ~~not~~ crucially on the notion of autonomy, on characterising features of the autonomous person. But before that task is addressed, observe that autonomy can be eliminated. First, the rational person, or a little less satisfactorily, the enlightened person, can carry the argument instead, using for instance

W3. A rational person is autonomous.

So results W1 with 'rational' displacing 'autonomous',

W1'. A rational person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate.

That premiss at once suggests a direct argument devoid of the circuit through persons. For what a rational, still more an enlightened, person does not recognise as legitimate ^{and certainly necessary} premissably is null. In any case,

W4. A closed authority is not legitimate.

Hence, by W2,

WC1. The state is not legitimate.

Since this conclusion is equivalent to

WC2. The concept of a legitimate state is null,

the result happens the ^{relative} conclusion Wolff reaches:

'Hence, the concept of a de jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous', to which he adds 'and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man' (p. 19),

(thereby presuming the links already made explicit,

As observed,

not too much long, upon the notion of moral legitimacy deployed, following Wolff's lead, throughout. Simple variations replace 'legitimate' by 'morally warranted', 'morally justified', 'justifiable', 'rightful' (the last, though a trifle old-fashioned, captures what is intended well),

These arguments permit of much other interesting variations. Wolff original argument, for instance, proceeds from authority as 'the defining mark of the state' with authority defectively explained as 'the right to rule' (p.18). Evidently then ~~the~~ ^{the middle term,} ~~even~~ authority, can drop out, and the argument can be formulated along the following lines ^{without question,}

V1. The state has the right to rule (its citizens, more or less as it pleases).

V2. An autonomous person rejects any (sweeping) right to rule.

Therefore

VC1. An autonomous person rejects the state.

Further variations may be obtained by amending the middle term, "right to rule" ^{without question} (which effectively replaced "exercise of direct authority") to reflect other features of the state, for instance right to coerce its citizens, rights to institute state monopolies, and so on. Under some ~~other~~ variations "autonomous person" ~~with~~ ^{from a right to command and control} should be correspondingly replaced. For instance, if V1 is specialised to the right to send citizens to war, then V2 may be adjusted to apply to the ~~unconscionable~~ person of conscience, of peace, or similar, that it can ^{simply} tell its citizens what to do, that it has a

As Wolff seeks a grander conclusion than VC1, which ^{he} might ^{be taken to} merely reveal that there are ^{but} few autonomous actors about, he invokes a further premiss

V3. Autonomy is a (even the) primary obligation.
From there, it is an analytic shuffle to the more ^{impressive} ~~impressive~~ conclusion VC2. The state ought to be rejected.

The arguments are as valuable as their premisses. What gets especially contested in the first argument is W1, concerning the ~~presence~~ of autonomous person. For all the surface reasonableness and ^{it brings into effect} open-door aspects of a ^{more} liberal state, W2 holds, 'as soon as the going gets tough'. As Dahl puts it, 'to obey the authority of the state ... means doing what the officials of the state tell you to do simply and solely because they tell you to do it' (p. 42).^N While there may be a little ~~some~~ scope for light and reason as regards more flexible minor officials, that scope is small; the wall of closed authority can be quickly encountered, particularly with judges and law enforcement officers. If W2 did not hold the state would risk sliding into a voluntary organisation, out of which citizens could opt. ⁹ The argument to W1 depends heavily on the meaning of autonomy. There is one way it can be prevented (following Dahl):

An autonomous person is self-determining, such a person is not under the direction or choices of another person. While the person may do what another tells her to do, she does not because she has been told to do it. Thus the autonomous person does not conform to closed authorities, and does not acknowledge them or assign them recognition (more than de facto recognition that is).

In the end citizens are expected to act in a variety of ways (fill in forms, take out licences, pay taxes, etc.) because the state tells them to, just because, or else face punitive action.

^N Dahl's reconstruction of Wolff effectively applies W2, using Wolff's definition of authority, to obtain W1. This produces a more complex, and defective, argument.

While autonomy is one thing, responsibility quite another, ^{still} a critical reason for aiming at autonomous responsibility.

INSET { ... so long as we recognize our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power to reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the contingent obligation to make ourselves authors of such conduct as we may obey ^{Wolff} (p.17), i.e. to make ourselves autonomous. A primary moral demand, central to the moral condition, is, according to Kant and Wolff, to 'acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy whenever and whenever possible' (p.17). Assuming responsibility in a life is by no means the only reason for striving for autonomy: achieving a certain personal freedom (within natural bounds) and operating a life rationally are other critical reasons. A main argument to VS indicated by Wolff does proceed from responsibility. It is simply that in order to take full responsibility (for one's actions, choices, etc.), which one should, one has to be autonomous. So one should be autonomous.

At least as important philosophically as the argument from W1 and W2 is that from W1' and W2'. While the arguments to W1' may proceed through authority it may short-circuit it, ~~giving rise to~~ ^{an epistemic} ~~the philosophical~~ argument for W1' is well-known, having been repeatedly from Socrates through to Russell: that a rational person does not accept anything for which there is not independent investigatable reasons and evidence. The pronouncements of a closed authority do not fall into this class.

quote?
from
med.

By rearranging the arguments ^{especially that} from autonomy as directed against closed authority, many objections to Wolff's arguments are fairly automatically voided. Firstly (contrary to Dahl p 47) the arguments are not (any longer, if they ever were) ~~not merely as Wolff~~ arguments against 'authority of any kind'. A rational person can of course acknowledge an open authority who can offer reason and evidence for pronouncements. For similar reasons, experts, ^{guides} and moderators, of open character, are not excluded. The argument does not cut "too broad a swath"; ^{while properly} it cuts out closed authorities like absolute rulers, states and similar, ~~but~~ it does not now down open authorities. In like fashion, much of Miller's criticism ~~is removed~~ of philosophical anarchism is voided. Things ^(in Miller's chapter 2) go astray from the very outset, from the ^{stark} formulation of "the principle of authority", which is classically formulated, 'no man can ever rightfully exercise political authority over another, that is have a right to issue directions which the other has an obligation to obey' (p.15), and then intended to apply to the relation of a state and its officials to its citizens. The formulation ^{both} has to be expanded to include persons and organisations as subjects of the relation, and ^{strongly} contracted to delimit the kinds of authority ~~properly closed~~ ^(closed) and rights concerned. For the explanatory clause offered reaches far beyond political authority; it would ~~not~~ wrongly rule out contractual relations such as those of freely arranged employment, parental relations, and so on.

as Dahl points out next page, the ^{typical} authority concerned is that of 'doing what someone tells you to do because he tells you to do it', i.e. a closed form.

It may be objected that it is unfair to treat Dell, Miller and others in the preceding fashion, which changes the dialectical playing field. They were attacking Wolff and his over-extended arguments, not a refinement of Wolff which singles out the philosophical nasty elements in authority, and accordingly ~~reverses~~ ^{destroys} their counter-examples which are rooted at the retinal open end of authority relations. But that was not all they were doing. They were using Wolff as a vehicle to draw quite general conclusions about the inevitability of principled anarchism (eg. Dell p. 50, Miller p. 29), and accordingly should have taken account of ~~single~~ ^{single} revampings of arguments like those of Wolff. Nor is this the only respect in which their practice is methodologically unsound. A principle, like that of absolute authority, that such authority is legitimate, does not stand because someone's attack ^(eg. Wolff) against it is unsuccessful. Yet this is Miller's methodological procedure against philosophical anarchism (p. 28, p. 29). This is ~~more than~~ Popperian ~~philosophical~~ falsificationism gone rampant. For Popper at least required ~~strong~~ sustained and strenuous testing and adequate variation; not a few select and easy examples. But of course a Popperian approach by anarchists is unsatisfactory; the crux of argument is the other way around. An anarchist has to establish that political authority, such as that the state ~~claims~~ claims and exercises, is right/ful.

That Wolff intended to work with something like closed authority should have emerged ^{but} from Wolff's ~~justification~~ ~~discussion~~ emphasis on the ^{place} ~~role~~ of 'grounds and reasons' in legitimate authority (p. 9), and his flirtation with unanimous direct democracy. What Wolff is exercised about is not compliance with a de facto authority or obedience where there are good ~~or~~ ^{not} independent reasons for it, but ~~obedience because that is what~~ to bind, or closed, obedience: doing what you are told because you are told to do it, (your not to reason why, yours but to do ...). While these points exonerate Wolff from some over zealous criticisms, they mislead him in others, namely ~~the~~ his attempt to combine ~~open~~ authority with autonomy under unanimous direct democracy. A major problem is that this combination, so far ~~as~~ as it is workable ^N (Wolff concludes it is not except under highly improbable conditions), ~~appears~~ ^{appears} not to the closed authority of the state, but to open autonomous arrangements which do not conform to requirements of the state (as Pahl remarks, the "authority" here is not the "authority" of his earlier definition' p. 48; and as Miller observes, 'it is ... arguable ~~that~~ whether this state of affairs (under unanimous direct democracy) involves the recognition of authority' p. 27)

In fact the conditions are more onerous than Wolff allows: humans who having consented do not change their minds, etc.

IN ANARCHISM

[11] PROBLEMS IN PRESENT WORLD
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

— o —

There are great many problems, many of them getting worse rapidly. Though anarchist arrangements played little part in producing these problems, many of them developing and getting out of control under free-enterprise^{-capitalist} and state-socialist arrangements, it is sometimes arrogantly claimed that anarchism should be able to deal successfully with an array of these problems, and fails^{as at least} because it is unable to do so. Why on earth should anarchism be ~~presumed~~^{presumed} to do this?

One critic, ^{andrews} with this level of ~~galt~~ (one A. Weatherman) ~~contains~~ ^{recounts} that anarchism is unable to deal with four presently existing world social conditions. There are: 1) that "the population of the earth is (perhaps) too large, but increasing at a rapid rate with no prospect for a serious reduction"; 2) that "in much of the world, basic human needs are not being satisfied"; 3) that "the world's natural and human resources are not evenly distributed across the globe"; and finally 4) that "the present level of subsistence is based on a high level of social and economic interdependence among various regions of the world and within the regions themselves". In addition^[5], anarchism is unable to cope with conflicts between individual self-interest and social needs, particularly as relates to ... defense (Black p. 112).

The short response is So what! ^{Firstly,} ~~insight~~ as these conditions constitute problems ("condition" 3) is more a fact than a "problem", no political theory is coping successfully, only an all-encompassing ideology would pretend to be able to cope. Democratic capitalism has had (important isolated pockets excepted) little impact in limiting India's gross population; Maoist socialism has done ^{only} a little better in China. Part of the problem is ~~at least~~ ^{dangerous} overpopulation requires this in

getting the problem reacquainted as a problem. Secondly, ~~even insofar as anarchism should come to~~
prospects of success for anarchism are primarily regional. But a
region can hardly be expected to ~~handle~~ ^{handle} ~~rather than contribute~~
its limited contributions towards, world problems. Suppose,
for instance, Nine become (or reverted to) an anarchist
society, a successful one locally. ^{it would be no deduction from its} ~~the~~ (real success ~~on~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ USA
that it had no impact upon ~~the~~ ^{the} world arising, as halting the
world's aware drain to thereto, or that its success was
secretly known about here.

2.1

[6] p30. As government is variously determinable,
so also is law. Under the main determinate, law is
incompatible with anarchism, but a ^{under} ~~not a~~ different
determinate, ~~in~~ there is no incompatibility.

Anarchism cannot traffic in law,
in the initial and proximate sense of law found in
the OED, namely 'a rule of conduct imposed by authority',
imposed by authority and characteristically backed up by
coercion, it may be added. To some extent counterbalancing
this pragmatism is a second sense of 'law' (the third comprises
'scientific and philosophical uses'); namely 'with out reference to
an external commanding authority'.

devisedly ^{forbidden}
Law, has a ~~bad~~ reputation in anarchism,
~~as an oppressive tool of states and empires.~~

Much of it is arcane, administered by an
oppressive priesthood. Too often it is a
oppressive tool of ^{the} state.

While anarchism is ~~incompatible~~ hostile to
such law, and incompatible with heavy
authoritarian law, it is in no way opposed to
rules, to regulations, to conventions, if freely
assented to by all, and so on.

[9] Community and smallness

It has become fashionable, since the concurrent anthropological findings concerning small ^{COMMUNITIES} communities and the collective action results concerning small ~~and~~ collectives, to doubt the assumption that anarchy was impossible, to concede that anarchy is possible but only ~~if~~ where there is a viable small community. This sort of socialisation-in-the-small has been forcefully urged by Tylor, who contends that 'anarchy is viable to the extent that the relations between people are those of which are characteristic of community', a small community (p. 186). It is, '... community is necessary - if people are to live without the state' (p. 3).

The argument to community that Tylor offers ~~is~~ ^{reduces} a modified Hobbesianism: social order can only be maintained, without the aid of the state in the small, if the relations between individuals are those of community (cf. p. 2). ~~It~~ In fact as it is detailed, it is a remarkably broken-down argument. As Tylor himself helps to show, 'the liberal justification of the state' ~~is~~ from the failure of individuals in a large public to voluntarily cooperate to provide desiderata without requisite collective goods - breaks down at every critical point, in its premises, in its argument, and in its concluding ^{inference} to the state as the only means of ensuring the supply of such goods (p. 59). If it is this point (around onto which Tylor latches. Granting the rest, 'all that can be inferred is that, if public goods are to be provided, some means must be found of getting people to do their part in providing them' (p. 59). Tylor There are,

ON DEFINING ANARCHISM AND THE TASKS OF ANARCHISM

[P] [Quote apart from wild definitions.]

Defective definition of anarchism abound, many supplied by high profile anarchists (hereafter they assume a certain ~~large~~ ^{with the considered, mostly} air of authority, a dogma etc). A few examples (drawn from a large list ~~included in~~ of similarly defective definitions included in Clark, p. 118ff., who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism through an essentialistic definition ~~and~~ ^{and} deploying one single idea is bound to fail, chrymally. (B) Kropotkin, for one, defines 'anarchism' in terms of 'society... without government'. Like most of the brief definitions to be cited, this is neither necessary nor sufficient. For 'government' has to be narrowed to its coercive and authoritarian determinate, and other archic arrangements also excluded. Mary, Runkle for one, mentions that anarchism 'opposes authority in all its forms'; but elsewhere Runkle tells that its essence is 'individual liberty'. Others, Goodman for one, suggest anarchism is defined in terms of decentralization, still others, Bakunin, ^{for one} in terms of 'organization from below upwards, by means of federation'. Again ~~but~~ this is neither necessary nor sufficient. (C)

There is a tendency (exemplified by Clark, ^{who} ^{also} ^{criticizes} ^{approvingly} ^{Woodcock}) to leap from the inadequate to the excessive. Anarchism is ~~first~~ ^{first} contracted to a rather elaborate doctrine, or political theory, thereby excluding practice. These requirements are, ^{sharply} ⁱⁿ ^{stated}:

For a political theory to be called "anarchism" it must contain: 1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, non-authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives (p. 127).

As Clark indicates, this ^{and better} ^{minimum} ^{a brief account} ^{of what} ^{Woodcock} ^{offers} ^{historically}, anarchism is a doctrine which gives a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to another' (cf. p. 120). There is nothing here about human nature, which anarchism need have no ~~no~~ ^{particular} views about, perhaps rejecting the notion altogether as part of archist propaganda or similar. (A) There is nothing about N. See later discussion

(B) on p3

12

or any commitment to one (A)
 the ideal society, & realistic anarchists ^{even} may come to
 appreciate ^{that there are} "no ideal societies, perhaps, just
 various less ^{and better justified} satisfactory societies than virtually all of the
 extraordinarily ^{narrow} range presently ^{exhibited or} on offer. However Clark's
 discussion of "the ideal" reveals that he does not
 really intend an ideal, ~~but~~ but only one or other of
 a plurality of societies meeting certain ~~by~~ adequacy
 conditions. He certainly does not intend a unique
 one, the ideal. Some adequacy conditions should
 substitute for ~~a~~ 'an (the) ideal', and the definition
 should be duly pluralised. (Clark is also sitting in
 a similar position as a practice, "anarchism without doctrine".)

Outside explanation of anarchism which
 answers back to ~~the~~ dictionary accounts, there
 are ~~various~~ high definitions (e.g. Clark) and some
 recent definitions. ~~Clark's~~ One such recent
 definition is that ^{proposed} ~~advanced~~ by Tyler, who -
 rightly enough contrasted anarchism with the
 presence of the state where there is a concentration of
 the means of producing force - defines a
pure anarchism as where 'force is perfectly dispersed,
 not concentrated at all' (p. 6). But Tyler advances, from
 pure anarchy, further than are as examples, to an illuminating
 discussion of the exercise of ^{concentrated} force in societies.

In recognisably anarchist writers there is
 but limited concentration of force (based on physical
 inequalities), which is ad hoc in use. There is no standing
 specialist group, or organisation or centralised system of
 groups.

[P]

One characterisation that is utterly appalling comes from a Russian Dictionary of Philosophy:

'Anarchism, a petty-bourgeois socio-political trend that is hostile to all authority and the state, and counterposes the interests of petty private ownership and small peasant economy to the progress of society based on large-scale production' (ed I. Frolov, 2nd revised edn, Moscow, Moscow, 1984).

Another ^{limited characterisation} comes from an American political scientist (Bjork).

[Q] It is not so easy to find an adequate characterisation of anarchism. I have found none, despite some working. That is one reason why a certain amount of work has gone into such books.

(Anarchism is not a philosophy)

One of the better brief characterisations is the following: 'a social philosophy that rejects authoritarian government and maintains that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural social tendencies' (Woodcock Eng. Phil. p.111). While the first negative conjunct might be regarded as passable, the second positive conjunct casts the whole account into doubt.

- No doubt a fair anarchist theory has to accomplish much of what ~~the inflated~~ excessive characterizations (like those of Woodcock and Clark) list, and more. Any reasonably full theory should include
- a critique of ^{most} present and past societies and their institutions
 - outline features of ~~alternatives~~ non-coercive non-authoritarian societies as alternatives to, and improvements upon ~~some~~ present dominant social arrangements, for some regions at least.
 - suggest strategies for attempting to change from ...

(B) Anarchy does not mean literally "without government" contrary to later p. 14. It does however imply without governments of present type which is what the immediately proceeds to: ~~the~~ 'and the latest & most dominant of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing forms of government are productive of war, internal violence, repression and misery' (p. 14). Right on!

The very short characterization of anarchism (and tradition of anarchos) as 'no government' * is defective ~~just~~ because of the elasticity, and slippiness of 'government'. For example, according to one dictionary (Oxford English) government means '... system of polity in a state; ruling rule by a governor...' in which case it is incompatible with anarchism; but it also means '... control; administration of public affairs' in which case it is certainly not incompatible. Granted there have been attempts to represent anarchism as if it entailed no organization or administration at all (title-of-office arguments regard only in this fallacy of ^{fallacy} substantivity), but it does not, and if it did there would be gap for a new idealist relative (anarchy) to fill.

* Run, by Foster, Whites(?)

(A) Authoritarian are not
seeking perfect societies; that is an
illusory, Enlightenment goal. It would be
quite enough to achieve satisfactory societies.^N

N Presently we are very far removed
from such societies, except for small communities
mainly in oil countries. States have done
extremely poorly in this regard. There is not one
satisfactory state in all of Africa or the Americas.

Even smaller European states that at least
have avoided ^{extreme} poverty, homelessness, and violence are in doubt because of

- virtually certain destruction of their natural environments
- reliance for wealth on importations Third World countries (by World)
- misdirection of energy of inhabitants.