


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
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NUMBER 5
WAR AND PEACE. I

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT

RICHARD ROUTLEY



INTRODUCTION.

Virtually all the philosophical literature on either a superpower (predominantly American) or other European (usually British, British or French) viewpoint. This article, after commenting on initial reactions with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different philosophical stance. Such regional perspectives, while they should not affect the morality of the matter, are highly politically relevant.

Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the USA, also fails the test of morality. It is concerned only or primarily with what is good or bad for the world, or for the American state, or for the world independent of place, race, nationality and the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously. It concludes, among other things, that the American and European states have no moral obligation to the world, and that the world has no present moral arrangements.

WAR AND PEACE. I

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12. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations to become entirely subordinated in the context of war. The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based unless morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits on expediency: superpower and superpower. National, regional and expediency distinguished. Limits of state expediency.

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Deterrence. The first argument is the morality of deterrence. Then the plausibility of probability. Further arguments through domestic connecting principles: the probability linkage, relating the counterargument from the success of deterrence. The key the story of

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INTRODUCTION.

Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German, British or French) viewpoint. This article, after connecting in initial sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean stance. Such regional perspectives, while they should not affect the morality of the matter, are highly politically relevant.

Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the USA, also fails the test of morality. It is concerned only or primarily with what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American state, to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously. It concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear arrangements involve.

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Although nuclear war was, then, far from a completely unexplored area of non-existent objects, nuclear war proper had several distinctive properties (extrapolated from a very limited nuclear experience) and some in general variation. In particular, contrast of limited nuclear war, of which tactical or strategic war subsisted, contrast with large-scale nuclear war (LSN war).

Although nuclear war was, then, far from a completely unexplored area of non-existent objects, nuclear war proper had several distinctive properties (extrapolated from a very limited nuclear experience) and some in general variation. In particular, contrast of limited nuclear war, of which tactical or strategic war subsisted, contrast with large-scale nuclear war (LSN war).

1. The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forcefully: 'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are not moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We would destroy God's work' (PL, p. 111). While the independent analysis offered in this volume has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position, it differs significantly in assessing the religious backing and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backing and its associated unity-of-view, then, consider what happens in two examples from PL, p. 111:— Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it; religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there is implied: 'Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishop tries to give it. ... racial discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography and sexual violence is not. It is a serious mistake to try to lump so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms of violence) as we do in if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war.

Note that referencing, which not through an author's name, is by way of an acronym exploited in the references at the end.

2. The isolated, and considerably, looking of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear war proper will be very different and very much more horrifying. Nuclear war proper, though, even if it is not as horrifying as nuclear war, could therefore be the worst of all possible worlds, enough of their features as to be appreciable without their being brought to actuality.

ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT

Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated, either at all or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.¹ This is at bottom because of their projected effects, which are often said to so differ from those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a difference in kind of war. Certainly massive exchanges such as nuclear wars involve, and threatened exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of just wars. Much new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will serve as initial ethical base.

Although nuclear wars are, thus far, only a decidedly menacing class of nonexistent objects, nuclear wars proper have several distinctive properties (extrapolated from a very limited nuclear experience²) and come in several varieties. In particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with large-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)

1. The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forcefully: 'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position, it differs significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it: religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there implied. Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to give it, e.g. sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography can operate without it, etc. It is a serious mistake to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war.

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2. The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds, ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.

which need not however be unlimited³. A large-scale nuclear war involves the explosion of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region; it is a function of two main parameters: quantity (megatonnage of explosive) and distribution. Such a war differs markedly from a limited (tactical or strategic) nuclear war which is limited, by assumption, to much smaller quantities of explosives, and where the targets are characteristically circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a given region. Though the focus in what follows is upon LSN wars and their prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no means a separate issue, since a nuclear arsenal is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions of follow-up or second strike, etc.).⁴ Because of these connections, much of the case made against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.

§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars: wars and states and the resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war. A model of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic thinking, is the two party (or several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or tribe battle⁵. A picture of war thus emerged, especially as a result of reflection on requirements for legitimate and just wars, which technological advances have now rendered inappropriate and sometimes inapplicable. The traditional theory of war, hardly surprisingly, made no allowance for such

3. Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially the type of strike involved. Though the sequence is important for the moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.
4. 'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no limits' (PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars: that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and present communication arrangements, the idea of a highly circumscribed purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European "theatre", is really a myth.
5. There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of prowess) in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given, etc., they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a much deeper way.

phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as occurred with Dresden and Tokyo. And nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass bombing, adds further new dimensions.

Yet it is important for the argument to retain historical linkages and anchors, to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter⁶), and of when, and why, wars and military actions were accounted unjust or wrong. Firstly, war is essentially a matter of states and their control: to elaborate the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state' for control of the state⁷; other senses of the noun 'war' are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.⁸ States are the protagonists, antagonists or players; forces comprising armed soldiers are the means of contention or combat; and combat or forceful and typically violent exchange is the actual experience. Thus wars are external or internal (civil), but always a function of states or their rule. Thus too wars have grown in quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have transformed, and nuclear war has emerged 'with nuclear states. An obvious theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states: in short, wars are

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6. There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term 'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had in living use any word properly meaning 'war': Oxford English Dictionary (OED) on war.
 7. But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between clans, gangs, multinational firms, even against Nature, and still more metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of nation-states.
 8. Into this category (since Nature is no nation) falls the ubiquitous and unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed, someone - it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature. James proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a war against Nature (see Wasserstrom, p.12). What it boiled down to, however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil, especially discipline, but also service, devotion, physical fitness, constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through war games and other games of competitive cast. Again specious arguments enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.

an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are removed by altering the structure. War can thus be seen as a structural problem of state arrangements, to be removed along with these (otherwise defective) arrangements. Wars arise from political organisation of states; they are a situational fix, a structural malformation. This semantically based picture of war helps explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence devolves into an argument against the (self-legitimised) war-declarers and war-makers, against states. In fact on the traditional theory, wars were restricted to external wars, which were construed as the right of states or their rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes; the argument was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts⁹, while states did not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts). But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate place of wars; the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for example to end wars, injustice, etc.

Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention to a basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes) of states, two-player external wars. It was assumed firstly that wars, like competitive games, could be won. That assumption still held good (though in attenuated form for some "victors") for massive armed exchanges such as the World Wars. With LSN wars it no longer holds; there may well be no winning strategy. An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan agglomerations in the Northern hemisphere and the laying waste of huge surrounding areas of countryside. Thus, secondly, the point of war as traditionally seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed: nothing is settled with main protagonists substantially obliterated¹⁰, and all main players very substantially worse off than at the outset of the "play". Hence another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that are most elaborately prepared for (exercised for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;

9. Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes, p.776, top). The argument presupposes rather a lot, including a neat public/private distinction. Put Aquinas's way, it looks as if it could be readily transferred into an argument for international government, or at least effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be one state!

hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence. Certainly, deterrence, bluff, and the other elements of gamesmanship had a role in earlier wars, but it was not pure deterrence. Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in principle¹¹ to military targets and military exchanges. This feature is fundamental as regards just wars; for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross ways to uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality. The special effects of nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear wars cannot be legitimately confined. These special effects (presented in horrifying detail in popular sources such as Schell) include radioactivity, ozone destruction, shockwaves, electromagnetic pulses, fireball or firestorm devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ... etc., etc. As a result of these compounded effects and the rapid speed of exchange, LSN wars will resemble gigantic fumigations more than they resemble older-style wars.

§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations to become entirely submerged in the context of war. It is particularly important in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient distinction between morality and expediency. What is done in war, especially for local or national advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the

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10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while not being entirely annihilated oneself: the side that somehow "survives" sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical evidence concerning nuclear destruction.

Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention ... (PL, p.313).

Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons developed in the text.

Unfortunately as documented in Scheer, significant officials who are responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world - think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"! They rely, among other things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".

11. In practice they often were not, they drained limited economies, they layed waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.

latter is determined using the codes and conventions of war, or otherwise¹². Much that ought not to be done in war is done, for one (alleged) advantage or another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like. Militarily we live in a rather barbarous age: the horrors of the twentieth century will not go unremarked, if the history gets written (accurately) that is. Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range of morally excluded actions, such as wiping out rural populations, become real possibilities, included in consequentialist calculations. The reason is that strategic planning is characteristically based on expediency. Each side in a military encounter determines its "strategy" by considering only its own advantages and disadvantages, its own gains and losses as a result of alternative possible moves: it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as well. In this way strategic planning displaces morality.

Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted this way, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of force, etc.). Such is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewitz, oft repeated. And Clausewitz tries to argue, through an incremental escalation argument (but really the classical "bald man" fallacy¹³), that there can be no limit. The assumption is that any merely selected limit (as distinct from an externally enforced limit) will be broken by each player in turn for advantage. Thus too an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed. It would follow from the argument that the idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in terms. But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the confusion of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable. Nuclear

12. For as Nagel contends (early on), there are moral restrictions on the conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness. These themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewitz - a theory outlined in Walzer.

13. As one less hair does not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a hirsute man, there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. The fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.

wars thus appear decidedly Clausewitzian. Still the argument is inconclusive; for the players can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate, and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.¹⁴

A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by constraints of morality: it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they may well encounter, especially from the other side. So each group potentially engaged in war faces the question not only as to what it ought to do in morally permissible situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in the morally flawed situations it finds itself. But the last question does not, in that case, reduce to one of expediency.

There is no question, then, of morality giving or having to give way to expediency, even under extreme circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war involves. For it is not as if shaky considerations of morality are bound to give way to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations. But the crucial theoretical fact is that both morality and expediency fall within the same, equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value theory. Expediency does not miraculously deliver us from the value to fact, but simply takes narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable. It assumes, or even urges, that local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of remote or foreign considerations. By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its proper characterisation, a much more universal distribution of value and, therefore, universalizable principles. And morality thereby imposes, through resultant intersubstitutivity principles, certain requirements of general fairness, equitability and justice. Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently placed¹⁵. The deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic thinking, also derives from this failure of interreplacement, from the same evaluations and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under

14. As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.

expediency assessments¹⁶. For expediency does not elude deontic presentation: it can be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right", or given tight formal characterisation. The characterisation will normally resemble that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or are biased in favour of, certain individuals. However, theories of utility do not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined. Thus utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency; it can meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality; it does not, unlike the methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the individual utility of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.

There are however significant differences, between utilitarians and deontologists especially, which serve to further complicate the moral picture regarding war¹⁷. In particular, utilitarian approaches have seemed to render morally permissible, or to justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit. But this is already to effect some partisanship, since utilitarians would reject the description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly'; whereas an aim in what follows is to avoid meta-ethical partisanship, to achieve meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not moral neutrality. And morally there is a large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which argument can begin. Virtually all positions agree that the obliteration of several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous. If there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to feel no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian ones, simply increase the costs involved, up to loss of whole nations if

15. The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues", nationalism and patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment. The point of, and reasons for, intersubstitutivity as a requirement of morality, is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to strategic decision-theory). Nationalism, along with fanaticism, is the main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.

16. The case against expediency was developed in detail by Plato; see especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.

17. Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare on the other, in Cohen et al.

necessary, until moral repugnance is encountered; then try to work down again. The fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially out of perspective, morally. Strategic thinking, in particular, has tended to abandon or suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).

Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does not mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be to no one's advantage. Consider the rising southern (hemisphere) strongman, SS, who has visions of world empire. While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can hardly be realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid southern waters of US submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try to encourage an all-out nuclear exchange in the North. There would be a point then in securing institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much power, especially given the apparent instability of crucial world arrangements. But that is to anticipate: the present point is that (the fact of) moral consensus has its limitations, and is an inadequate constraint without accompanying structural adjustments.

For, typically, national interest is taken to override morality, or differently to impose irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary ethical considerations (such as those concerning holding civilian populations nuclear hostages or even killing millions in the national interest¹⁸). And, unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian regimes, such as those of Eastern Europe. But morally national interest can do neither of those things. The first, the overriding of morality, is simply the substitution of expediency for morality, which entirely lacks moral justification; the second, the alleged moral dominance of national interests, fails in important classes of cases, including, so the argument will go, the case of LSN war.

18. As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendants in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather than based on national interests.

States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis, but let it not be pretended that it is a moral basis as distinct from one of expediency (namely, that of "group egoism"). There is no special moral dispensation for governments. Morality works in the same way for groups as for individuals: there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or analysis of obligation. For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds; and it makes no difference whether X is an individual or individual system, group or organisation. States such as Israel (in its recent invasion of Lebanon) are, extenuating reasons aside, behaving just as immorally as brigands or mass killers: there is no moral difference.

Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents have claimed, or been conceded, special moral dispensations; but the excuses offered are no more than that and do not stand up to criticism. A satisfactory moral theory cannot furnish two (incompatible) moralities, a state or public one and a private or individual citizen one - state expediency and individual morality - because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.¹⁹ For instance, a state operative X could use state cover to damage citizen Y in morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g. by state interests) when X and Y are permuted. A group or organisation or person can be bound of course by special derivative considerations in virtue of role, but these are derivative principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some (at least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency. In particular, a state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even for its own survival. Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear deterrence require, as will emerge.

19. There are also other arguments against two (or multiple) morality lines: see Routley and Plumwood.

§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars. Arguments for pacifism yield arguments to the immorality of war. But such arguments are controversial in an area where there is no good reason to be controversial. Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of LSN wars follows.

All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime. Not all wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior ways of settling political issues between states. Among more or less admissible wars are the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors who volunteer as soldiers and whose action does not spill over onto noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants were killed in war. Since the establishment of such induction practices as conscription, press-gangs and recruitment of the near-destitute, wars have largely ceased to take these less offensive forms; modern massive wars are far removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious). Most sorts of wars are immoral, because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such an extent as LSN wars.

The first argument to the immorality of LSN wars and of sufficiently large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:

- | | | |
|---|---|------|
| P1. The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong. | } | (KA) |
| P2. LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants. | | |
| P3. What involves what is wrong is wrong. | | |
| ∴ LSN wars are wrong. | | |

The particular argument given is just one representative of a set of arguments of this type. Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen. But the focus can be taken off killing: the destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans alike that an LSN war will bring is quite sufficiently evil. Thus a first variation on (KA) replaces 'killing in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or not directly involved creatures'. Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including

that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).

The argument is valid, but may be attacked (and has in effect been attacked) on the basis of each of its premisses. Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are, in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, which purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. For instance, assisting an injured robbed person is said to "involve" that person's being robbed; but, since the robbing is wrong, providing assistance is also wrong. But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.²⁰

As against P2, it may be argued that nuclear wars can be encounters legitimately directed against military targets. But given the character of nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets. There is not merely the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings. For example, the radioactive fallout down-wind from military targets will affect large concentrations of people, especially in the case of US and European targets, and may affect uninvolved countries such as Canada.

There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side effect)²¹. If missiles were characteristically reliably on target, and one

20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are diagnosed.

21. According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are responsible only for the intended effects or consequences of our freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended consequences. Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is pernicious, allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities!

Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.

which was intended only to destroy an unmanned underground missile silo unfortunately went off course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under the double effect principle. Such claims should be rejected: the action would be wrong, and the wrongness not lessened by the given intention. Nonetheless the circumstances could make a difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had deliberately aimed at the city. The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.

As against P1, and as regards the middle term of P1 and P2, it may be argued that there is an important equivocation. The equivocation is induced by the bracketed term, 'deliberate'. While it will be conceded that deliberate killing of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made. It will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable, are by no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort, whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of goods or services used by the military, e.g. farmers or bootmakers or entertainers. Secondly, it will be contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those properly excluded as innocent. The second point concerns a much narrower - and less defensible - version of premiss P2. Because P2 so amended is less defensible, and for other reasons, it is best to leave out the "modifier" 'deliberate'. What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is done, not a mixture of that with the motives of the perpetrators. So 'deliberate' gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does P1. For P1 does not require the qualification 'deliberate' or 'intentional' or the like.²² Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and there is no serious problem in marking out a class of clear noncombatants, people who are not directly involved in the command and action chains. There is, moreover, no need to adopt the practice, deriving from catholicism, of stating an initial version of P1 in terms of innocents - at least as problematic

22. Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158). The suggestion depends upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.

a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then endeavouring to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.

Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met, there are arguments for the premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss P1 they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort and will tend to vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory. For example, one argument for P1, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one, that (to seriously understate the point) doing so fails to treat them with the minimal respect owed to them as persons²³.

§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important argument from convergence, and environmental arguments. The conclusion that LSN wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified - is not merely something dreamed up by contemporary opponents of America or of the "free-enterprise" capitalist state (and communist inspired, etc). The same conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval times, for just wars. One of the requirements gives but a variant on the first argument (KA).²⁴ For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound to be killed (cf. Barnes, p.775).

A just war requires just means, that the war should be fought by morally legitimate means, which implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. The implied principle was encapsulated in a principle of discrimination (between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, p.312)²⁵. LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate this requirement²⁶.

23. Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants. One favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man: there is no clear line between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g. in carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of their harmfulness, the threat they offer. See also PL, p.312, where a simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.

24. Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common usage, of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally wrong.

Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of proportionality, the proportion being that of net evil to net good: 'the damage to be inflicted and costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms' (PL, p.312).²⁷ It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this requirement: the damage and costs, which are not nationally confined, are disproportionate to moral goods achieved in that way. Entangled with the proportionality requirement is the doctrine of "ameliorative" war and the criterion of "improvement" through war. According to the first, 'X wages war justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less bad, than the overall consequences of abstaining from war' (Barnes, p.782). Similarly improvement "puts wrongs to rights": 'a nation wages war justly only if the conditions for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). LSN wars can in no way satisfy these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such wars reveal.

Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also infringed by LSN wars, for example that of reasonable expectation of success. It seems that there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever the very limited prospects of success for some small state elite, or differently, whatever the prospects of success in strictly limited nuclear exchanges. What is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right intention. For

25. The principle can be argued to in various ways. One (by no means conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that, 'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).

26. The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "indirectly", would be different. Such wars are not however excused by the pernicious doctrine of double effect. For such wars remain unjust on several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. on life systems, etc. As Zuckermann says, 'It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions of civilians would be killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith, p.14, where the italics are added).

27. This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.

this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are seen as basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can be ideologically justified. While the mainstream position of medieval theory was opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf. Barnes, p.778). There is little merit, however, in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements, when so many are decisive against LSN wars (and when matters underlying the sensitive issues will arise again subsequently). Finally, these arguments from historical requirements do not commit any prescriptive fallacy; for the arguments are not simply arguments from historical authority to moral conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed, and sometimes applied, were justified. As they are.

In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the moral rightness or justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on until contemporary times. Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and involve violence²⁸. This is the beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars: that such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once expediency is duly removed (and even, very frequently, when it is not). They are morally wrong however you look at it morally. The argument is not the same as the weaker consensus argument; it proceeds from similar results from the full sweep of genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.

The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case one, from each type of moral theory. Fortunately details can be shortcut. For deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements for just war

28. These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear. For the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it. The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction between the alternatives. In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may be condemned - 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims' (PL, p.311). Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only legitimate basis for war; Roman law was only slightly more generous, in allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).

which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate. In fact conditions for just war were sometimes arrived at or defended through principles of such moral theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative work has already been done. The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is adopted, however utility maximisation is finally accomplished, LSN wars are excluded on utilitarian grounds.²⁹ The reason for such convergence is not far to seek; LSN wars involve such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure, that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in utilitarian fashion. Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better³⁰.

The arguments so far outlined against LSN wars do not exhaust the overwhelming moral case against such wars. For there are other significant moral principles which the waging of an LSN war would violate (again these principles are derivable from some of the theories just considered). These principles include environmental ones, such as: the obligation to maintain the earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems: the responsibility to future generations, to whom we are accountable, to "pass the world on" not in substantially worse condition than we "received it". Such conservative principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are bound to be violated in the event of an LSN war.

§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality. Those who support nuclear arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars, by pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars. What is being done is, it is claimed, quite different from engagement in LSN war: indeed deterrence is most important precisely in preventing such wars from ever occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values. Indeed, it is continued, deterrence is the only practical way of obtaining both desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. Similar arguments are

29. For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM. But compare Hardin.

30. An argument of this sort is developed in more detail, though not in complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.

advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented in: mutually assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.³¹

Such claims as to the roles and objectives of deterrence are decidedly dubious, for several reasons. A first reason is that there is much evidence, despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only - military goal. If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. In fact there has been a quest for more than this, and sometimes even a renewed drive for superiority. Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Western military strategy³². Nor has deterrence set in motion the process of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate for deterrence. On the contrary, under "its" impulse there has been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).

Another major reason for serious doubt about what is being marketed and sold under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor: deterrence has

31. It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes "flexible response", since the likely further development is massive retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes and to electromagnetic pulses. In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.

It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nuclear power. It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.

32. As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular intervention in other nations; there have been repeated US threats to use nuclear weapons, especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war; and in official military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons: on these and other related points see further Lackey MM, p.191ff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front, which plays only a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among further evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff.

increased the probability of LSN war. More precisely, deterrence of the arms-race type that is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and has to that extent at least enhanced its prospects of occurring. For other reasons also, connected with pure deterrence and with the "cold war" (its original setting), the probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in the last 30 years. The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to maintain credibility with a population whose real interests are being overridden or "sacrificed" for military objectives; the dangerous and risky state of military readiness; etc. The situation has now been reached where many sober analysts think there is a high probability of an LSN war this century, i.e. before 2000. There are several routes to such a probability assignment.³³ It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and 2000. Full alerts, on the American side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance of nuclear exchange. We have been lucky already. In the years ahead it appears likely that the number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will increase markedly. For the danger zones separating the superstates are increasing in size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and as the plight of supplicant nations worsens and the extent of easily extractable crucial resources declines. The danger is enhanced by the continuation of the arms race, and the connected increasing chance of nuclear accident and human or technical error, none of them negligible factors as past experience copiously reveals (cf. Cox). Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a lot. Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are

33. Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' assessments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in recent years.

American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).

contentious (though not always for good reasons). For better or worse, there seems no way to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight; and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.

It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it is highly probable that an LSN war will occur this century. For then it follows (by distribution principles) that it is decidedly plausible that it is highly probable that a grossly immoral sequence of events will be perpetrated this century. And that is enough to morally warrant evasive action. We ought morally to take action to avert the outcome. That in turn implies taking steps, on moral grounds, to change deterrence as presently practised. Thus present deterrence policy is immoral. That is but the first of several ways we shall arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.

The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of LSN war has of course been disputed. The main counterargument runs as follows:

- Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying. The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with horrifying outcomes, are improbable. Unfortunately however much available evidence counters this assumption. More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges and horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper).

What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the evidence certainly seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an LSN war. Thereby, through deterrence, we have already got into an immoral situation, since deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for LSN war, thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense of raising the probability. The more detailed underlying arguments, then, to the immorality of nuclear deterrence proceed by way of principles mapping moral arguments against LSN war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war. Such principles might appropriately be called deontic connecting principles. The first of these principles takes the following preliminary form:

C1. If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only is it wrong that it should be probable that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly

increase the probability that X occur.

Thus, for example, since it is wrong to kill a large noncombatant population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out, both of which nuclear deterrence does. For similar reasons a superstate is not morally entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those of third party nonaligned states.

Like most substantive principles in ethics, C1 runs into dilemma situations. Unless moral dilemmas are duly allowed for, C1 appears liable to defeat by counterexamples, and accordingly, to require complication. For example, the second part of C1 encounters apparent trouble where clash of principles occurs. Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the probability that X occurs to avoid a greater evil. Consider for example the pilot who increases the probability that the passenger plane he is flying crashes, in order to make sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city apartment buildings³⁴. Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of nuclear deterrence, where (though there is a clash of principles, as §6 explains) wrongness of a practice is not offset or removed by its role in avoiding greater evil.

It can be argued that it is: such is part of the point of the popular argument from the previous success of deterrence. However this inductive argument deserves little more credence than the racing driver's argument, perhaps from a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet (despite some close calls), he won't. As Barnett argues, 'the happy accident that the world has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war in the coming era, ...'

34. This dilemma example was supplied by D. Johnston. There are more difficult putative counterexamples. For example, in inciting people to civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased. Thus, to take C. Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj. But surely Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi did not directly increase the probability of violence. But spelling out what 'directly' means - in terms of short causal chains over which responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to other connecting principles.

(p.100). He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power relations, the increase in Russian strength, the rise of other nuclear powers, etc. (cf. similarly Cox).

There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that

D1. Deterrence will not continue to work,

and, more important for the present argument, that

D2. Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.

The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together: but the focus is on the (in some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor. An initial reason concerns proliferation, the emergence of lesser nuclear powers. As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect of it.³⁵ Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial use of nuclear weapons by a lesser state. Moreover the opportunities for confrontation to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political instability, relating to third world economic decline, growing resource costs and scarcity of cheaper supplies, etc. A second group of reasons concerns the nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to. With so many more weapons and weapon systems, more widely distributed, the probability of war through accident or error is increased. Arms races, and interwoven balance of power or terror situations, have an exceedingly bad historical track record. There is substantial inductive evidence that escalating arms races, such as present deterrence involves³⁶, lead eventually to war, with probability increasing as the race proceeds. Next, deterrence depends on a certain balance of power being maintained: if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail.

A related reason for supposing that deterrence practice increases the

35. It can be theoretically argued that the fewer the nations armed with nuclear weapons, the less the chance of nuclear war: cf. Lackey, MM, p.230n.

36. The standard argument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the probability of war, would be decidedly better if the arms race were abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for deterrence. Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of several things required if deterrence is to be justified.

probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy, especially the renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being overwhelmed, the USA to take advantage of the superiority achieved.³⁷ Recent dangerous shifts in US policy towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as hostages), and thereby also weakens the case against resort to nuclear war. Finally, deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet important) level of mutual understanding, shared principles, soundness of judgement among leaders, and even some cooperation and transmission of information between nuclear super-states. It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for instance, follow through on delusions of one sort or another. It is also that deterrence depends upon judgements regarding the other side, which may be seriously mistaken: 'each is at the mercy of the other's perception of what strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how "convincing" one side's threat is to the other' (PL, p.313). There is a grain of truth in the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other side thinks, not what we think'.³⁸ But about what the other side thinks there can be a considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of error. Not only is there evidence, that one side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) perception of what is rational, as regards limited nuclear war, with the possible result of a first strike countered by massive retaliation; but there must now be severe doubts as to whether rational principles are operating effectively. As to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous

37. The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies: we don't see, with alarm, their incoherence and irrationality.

38. Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the West face, it is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'. This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.

idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.

The supporter of deterrence has not only to defeat arguments through connecting principles such as C1, but, more difficult, to field a convincing rival case. For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly practice of deterrence is justified. But far from the fairly decisive case that is required (to contrast with the argument through C1), only a feeble case through the questionable obverse of C1,

C1†. If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X, appears open. For it has to be shown that

- deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war, and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with C1†) that
- deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.

The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued. So, for reasons already given, does the probability claim. When nuclear deterrence sets up the very conditions for an LSN war, it can hardly have reduced the probability of such a war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago when such an LSN war was not technically possible.

More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is not enough to refute the theme that deterrence is wrong. It is not enough to make out that deterrence is permissible, or alright. For there certainly seem to be alternative permissible courses of action without the costs or problems of deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory. To surpass these options, a uniqueness condition has to be established; nuclear deterrence has to be shown to be not merely alright, but right. But establishing such a claim, to acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.³⁹

Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by fear or threats including fright (cf. OED)⁴⁰. For most people, vivid scenarios portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough to deter them from LSN wars, without all the enormous expense, trouble and wastage of

39. An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances. Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures, the answer has to be, No.

preparing to engage in them. And deterrence by such means (which military deterrence in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral. (Schell was not immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New York.) But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where this object, a LSN war, itself is not permissible. The argument for this is through the principle

C2. If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong. Hence since LSN wars are wrong and nuclear deterrence implies complete preparation, nuclear deterrence of LSN wars is wrong. It is not however being claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X: Y and Z may both be wrong and Z (much) worse than Y. What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil⁴¹.

In 1945 there would have been little doubt that complete preparation for LSN war was wrong. Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunals (which tried the major war criminals at Nuremburg) were

Crimes against peace: namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in Kuper, p.21; italics added).

But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the wrongness implied in C2 has become increasingly liable to question. However the doubts mainly come from

40. Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity, deception, misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally undesirable traits.

41. Nor are degrees of wrongness required: wrongs can simply be partially ordered as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring because it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both wrong, categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or equally evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:

there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil as the second. This is because both are held to be absolutely forbidden.

Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden" to "So Y is as totally evil as Z" and to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ morally" are both entirely without validity. Compare: 2 is a number, and 3 is a number; so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numerically from 3!

assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.

Complete preparation for something, such as LSN war, already writes in several other features. In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pretence. Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence. Military intelligence is now too sophisticated for bluff alone to succeed: there has to be serious preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in deterrence. But, on the other hand, complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for will be attempted other than conditionally: complete preparation for X does not imply attempted X. It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed with what is prepared for under certain conditions. Complete preparation, whether for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a (proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can be taken for granted.

Principle C2 is part way down the line in a series of connecting principles. A principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that connecting X with attempted X: if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong (though perhaps not as bad), whether X succeeds or not. But the series ends; it cuts off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to the claims of various religious positions. For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong then the contemplation of X is wrong or that mere non-action-oriented consideration of carrying out X is wrong. The point applies equally to sexual fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares. In particular, there is nothing wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable, and in some senses are all too thinkable.

Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each commonly involves decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome it connects with. Accompanying the increased probability are certain sets of reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves; these are not those of mere passive contemplation⁴². However all the connecting

principles invoked except C1 hold, where they do, even when the probability of wrongdoing eventuating is not increased. One reason for this is that the means chosen to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do someone harm using witchcraft. The increased probability of an evil outcome simply makes things worse.

Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but announcement of this accompanied by threats and a threatening posture. For some party, the potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved, if deterrence is to succeed: the threat must be recognised as such and be credible. This aspect of nuclear deterrence yields a further connecting principle:

C3. If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also wrong; or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.

The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form

CG. If X is wrong so is a conditional intension to do X - a form which requires some further explanation. A conditional intension is a judgement of the form, $\psi(X \text{ if } C)$, where ψ is some intensional functor, e.g. 'the credible threatening of'.⁴³ Apart from intentions themselves, the most discussed conditional intensions are conditional obligations where ψ is the functor: an obligation to (or in propositional rather than event style: it is obligatory that). To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the conditions C involved are not impossible or even remote or improbable: the conditions typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential enemy. The fundamental claim in what follows is that there are intensional functors (specifically those involving certain sorts of threatening, intending, and commitment) for which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate the immorality of nuclear deterrence. Naturally again there are many

42. There is plenty of scope for further elaboration here. Passive spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to make a difference is quite another thing, from contemplation of other worlds where evil occurs.

43. The conditional intension, $\psi(X \text{ if } C)$, which is an intension, should not be confused with the provisional form, if C then ψX , which is not. The Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they strike: it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten them with retaliatory action. Such confusion has arisen because of the problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective theories of conditionality.

non-action-oriented functors for which versions of GC fail, e.g. those of contemplation, thinking, dreaming, etc. There is also an interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping (for), expecting, awaiting and the like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.

Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X is wrong then threatening X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay: 'What is wrong to do ... is wrong to threaten...'⁴⁴ The reason is that if putting something into practice (e.g. committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to put that into practice. The point can alternatively be argued semantically, beginning as follows: if worlds where X happens are excluded then so are adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.

The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons. Firstly, nuclear war is only conditionally threatened, i.e. should certain conditions obtain. However the required conditional form can be derived from the simple form, through the following argument:- substitute for X in the simple form, which is perfectly general, X if C. Observe, furthermore that if something X is wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions; if it weren't it wouldn't have been wrong in the first place. (The converse route fails of course.) In particular, by earlier arguments (of §§3-4) LSN war is wrong whether the opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it has. Hence, where X is wrong, so also is threatening X if C. More generally, to establish CG it is

44. Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer, p.272. It is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move. For in virtue of simplified C3 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten and also, in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral non-combatant populations. It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, would be inconsistent.

Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops: see PL, p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.

However simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to assess the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is open to all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality mentioned below.

enough to establish the simpler

CG'. If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.

The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to a serious threat, causes more trouble. Some modification appears required, because it is often contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where what is threatened is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse.⁴⁵ And in fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention at all to proceed to action on the basis of threats. Insofar as this is plausible it removes support for simplified C3. Hence the shift to serious threats. A serious threat then, in the slightly technical sense intended, is one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible. Principle C3 is not open to the same challenges as simplified and unqualified C3. For the challenge which says in effect that it is perfectly morally permissible to issue serious threats to undertake grossly immoral conduct under certain not improbable conditions, is unconvincing, and calls for moral double-think. To bring this out consider a case where the circumstances result from an intricate accident. Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow - it is not. Either way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the threat ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral nor more "practical" grounds. Furthermore, while states and their representatives may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot: it would run counter to their moral natures, to the kinds of morally principled agents they are or take themselves to be (as Benn explains). For such agents, who may comprise a not insignificant proportion of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such as C3 are not in doubt.

The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the

45. For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is immoral, can be left open.

threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not. If it is not serious then it is inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained. But if it is serious then by C3 deterrence is wrong. The sub-argument that nuclear deterrence depends on serious threats is a practical one: namely, that if the threats were not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through, then the opposition would find out, in one way or another. A policy of bluff could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political system, for example, without gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition. Even in closed non-democratic systems there would be major difficulties in maintaining such a policy down the chains of command involved with nuclear weapons, especially during times of change in governing elites, and the information would likely escape through opposition intelligence. But then, since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded. There are as well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious. One is that nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about the rationality of carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility essential to its effectiveness. To be effective then it must be serious (cf. Benn).

Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of CG, one centred on intention, one on commitment. Principle C3 is intimately linked with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle C4. If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is also wrong.

The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to some dictionaries, 'a declaration of intent to inflict punishment, loss, injury, etc.'. It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of some paradoxes of deterrence, which turn on the problem of credibly threatening war without intending to go to war. Principle C4 is justified through the simplified principle, that intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's position prevail. Simplified principle C4 is an extremely widely assumed moral thesis,⁴⁶ perhaps for the excellent reason that it holds analytically. Its elaboration C4 can be used to

argue against nuclear deterrence, as follows: since proceeding to LSN war when the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war when the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong. Nuclear deterrence involves such an intention, all the available evidence shows. Hence nuclear deterrence is wrong.

But like virtually every deontic principle, except those flowing from utilitarian principles themselves, principles C3 and C4 can be challenged on utilitarian grounds. For it is not difficult to outline strategic situations where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence. But on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon principles C3 and C4. For it is likewise not difficult to outline situations where the hanging of innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by pursuit of maximum expected utility. Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism, not by scrapping the doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around with qualifications, which, they hope, will enable them to evade the worst trouble spots with utilitarianism. So it is with Kavka, whose work nicely illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its moral favour depends upon utilitarian assumptions.

Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of ethics must have substantial utilitarian elements' (PD, p.287). Even if this astonishing observation were correct - it is not, depending for one thing upon conflating consequential elements with utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable systems must include the particular assumption Kavka thereupon tries to infiltrate, an 'assumption that produces the paradoxes of deterrence'. The normative assumption involved is that the act with maximum expected utility '(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility

46. Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD, p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham, Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson. Kavka also gives reasons as to why the principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral' (cf. Kavka p.291).

It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the maximisation principle of p.287) that directly generates Kavka's first paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes": see PD.

is at stake' (p.287). This assumption is open to essentially the same batch of objections as utilitarianism itself: it is mainly a matter of increasing or varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample. Kavka tries the usual strategy of weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising utility can morally enjoin.

But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies in what is supposed to follow from the normative assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means that ... other moral assumptions are overridden by utilitarian assumptions' (p.287).⁴⁷ Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what the fudged assumption and C4 produce, when combined in situations such as special deterrent situations, are moral dilemmas. These are not cases where one deontic principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it is right to intend to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4). Nuclear deterrence remains wrong: that judgement is not overridden. Nor does it in any way follow that C4 is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption, p.290). However, what is also the case is that in these special situations, there are countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives. For in these special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what is wrong. However it is hardly news, but a standing objection, that utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.

Special deterrent situations, where deterrence under utilitarian sponsorship may appear to get a foot in the moral door, are very special. As characterised by Kavka, they are such that the deterrence is very likely to

47. Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian considerations predominate where stakes are large enough: see his argument for the approach in MM p.192.

What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles, but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts with that of another principle with less significant consequences, and in the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle with important consequence prevails.

succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e. deterrence is lodged in a deep probability-well. This is very far removed from the real world situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the probability of LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as likely to succeed as deterrence. Even if it were mistakenly supposed that deontic principles subject to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working deontic principles such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.

Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires, by way of the following principle:

C5. If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong. The reason is that the commitment is a commitment to act wrongly in certain circumstances; and that commitment is itself wrong. Nuclear deterrence is however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions. And as with conditional intention, so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt that superstates and their controlling representatives have the relevant commitment and intention to use nuclear weapons. The dangerous strategy of launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a response to attacks that did not occur) is enough to establish the point, for which there is otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.

Now the connecting principles are applied: one sound principle would suffice logically, but when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a weighty case. By detachment from the principles nuclear deterrence, for instance by complete preparation for and conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong. Deterrence of this type is wrong. This also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so bizarre and has appeared paradoxical: it left out the connections between nuclear war and nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that nuclear war itself should not be engaged in (unless its direction can be drastically changed, e.g. at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,

to purely military targets).

The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different sorts of arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence. There are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the commonplace observation that

- All the ethical arguments in favour of nuclear deterrence are broadly utilitarian.

In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many of those that have infiltrated the ethical literature, are those of expediency - generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the advantage of one player, the USA. Utilitarianism, though still looking basically at advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take a less partisan position, and consider other nationalities as well, on pain of forfeiting its claim to morality otherwise. The commonplace observation is supported by the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains, derives from utilitarianism.⁴⁸

There are two directions on to a general claim against deterrence, either by way of the pro-utilitarian theme

- Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,
- Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.

Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory moral arguments in favour of deterrence. Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second direction: after all it is widely thought that utilitarianism is a false,

48. Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier. Showing that cogent defences of nuclear deterrence have to take a utilitarian route would be a much tougher enterprise. Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the enterprise could be carried through, much would depend on what was accounted cogent. For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes to deterrence.

And, despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions can be made to speak against deterrence and its continuation. A deontological case against deterrence, primarily the way of deontic connecting principles, has been argued in some detail. In the light of these principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical positions would go. After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of stances, e.g. contractual, natural law, utilitarian even.

seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position. It hardly does then for a political system which depends in some measure upon consensus, to rely on utilitarian arguments for its policies. Yet with nuclear deterrence just that appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.

For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on: how it is applied; with which maximisation recipes; along with what other restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well); and on how generous are utility assignments for such things as preservation of national sovereignty, national security, etc. With different (and arguably superior) assumptions, or upon varying the guestimation methods, very different results emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.⁴⁹ The basic reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4). It is that LSN war has an extremely large negative utility. Any policy such as nuclear deterrence which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose out to other feasible alternatives, whatever initially plausible decision recipes of a consequentialist type are applied (e.g. Minimax, Dominance, Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).

The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism of utilitarianism, beginning for instance with its well-known justification of localised injustices,⁵⁰ or else by addressing some of the inadequacies of utilitarianism when applied to issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence. One obvious deficiency is this: on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the improbability of other options working. If the deterrence probability-well is deep, utilitarianism morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.⁵¹ But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are probable.

49. The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the discussion involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin, continued in Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically opposed conclusions are reached. (Hardin's approach tends however to expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)

50. Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-known to repeat. Some of the main defects are considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism'. The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to stand comes from L. Mirlin.

Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is independent of whether it is likely to work or not. If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter. Moral principles are not determined through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how bad some outcome is may be. Worse, since the expected utilities in the case of deterrence are decidedly uncertain, and the results utilitarianism delivers depend essentially upon these uncertainty measures, utilitarianism offers nowhere firm to stand. In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle, utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.

The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism. The act form shows at most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights under very special conditions (the probability-well is deep, nation-state interests, such as security of state, have high utilities, and special estimation rules are pulled in). It does not yield a deterrence policy; indeed it hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself). These and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a sequence of acts.⁵² But the method lacks stability; different prescriptions will result depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left out (as also associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal recipe is delivered. To see this, suppose the sequence is selected to include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and war breaks out. In this event it can hardly be argued that deterrence is the policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.

Along with the arguments, there are other concomitant reasons for deep dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence. Firstly, the peace it has provided is only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there is no shortage of smaller-scale conventional wars. And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at any stage by a range of

51. Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the simplification. In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate (referred to in footnote 49).

52. Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism because the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.

factors, including error, both human and technical. It does not offer genuine peace, of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile "peace of a sort" (PL, p.316). Secondly, there is enormous cost, the moral opportunity cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent moral priorities. The US Bishops put this familiar point, in a surprisingly Marxist way, in terms of 'the contradiction between what is spent for destructive capacity and what is needed for constructive development' (PL, p.316).

§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas. While there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also counter-arguments, that have proved remarkably persuasive (especially to Americans), to the moral justifiability of nuclear war preparation in the present circumstances.

The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift, of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit as dubious as that argument from local dangers. It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been told, guards against the double danger: first of all atomic blackmail and foreign domination; and second of nuclear destruction. The two go together, since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy of appeasement or surrender and so avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273). In fact nuclear preparation is supposed to guard against more than these; there is a crucial third element, namely, loss of basic rights (freedom, equality, etc.) and fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and ways of life integrated with these. This further set of elements is linked to the danger of foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of blackmail. Though foreign domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various national objectives; conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as is commonplace in the

"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through the increased security and control a nuclear state demands, etc. But what nuclear preparation increasingly risks, extensive nuclear destruction, also involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction of the material base of the cherished life-style.⁵³ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut means of guaranteeing basic values.⁵⁴

In other respects too the argument from loss of basic values and rights lacks cogency and rings hollow. It is hard to avoid the feeling that the oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like pious citation of religious values at political ceremonies; that the argument is a clean cover for economic consideration of one sort and another, many arising from demands of the military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign domination of other lesser states, and many of them having to do with the concentration of private wealth and power. However an argument isn't, or oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury associations. And the rights and values appealed to are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice. But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into this category: in particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment of "communism" or of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of capitalism. What has happened here of course is that (the ideal of) communism has been confused with (the reality of) state socialist totalitarianism, which does remove certain more basic values, namely certain freedoms (of opinion, association, information, etc., etc.), and so does derivatively threaten basic values.

One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear preparation for LSN war, and indeed for nuclear holocaust, is a good or effective or even rational way of preserving those fundamental values, which we have left.

53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.

54. The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.

Similar questions arise as regards the arguments from danger of foreign domination and blackmail. Justification of the methods of extensive nuclear preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile nation states, a structure which is itself open to serious question, and is subsequently questioned (in §8), both from the point of view of basic values, such as freedom, and otherwise.

But whether ultimately justified or not, these arguments from national dangers are those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear preparation, and have been accepted by policy makers as affording moral justification. They have in fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form part of many people's moral outlook. Within such a conventional Northern framework the moral justification holds good. It is within such a framework, in particular, that extensive nuclear preparation engenders a moral fix. For others, however, the arguments do not establish the morality of extensive nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. Such people also face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is not a specifically moral one. And for many others again, who are not so impressed by or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life, and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. For such people who live beyond the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.

This is the genesis of the argument from isolated people. Consider some people who live in a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet) under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nuclear deterrence (as under principle C1). For such isolated people, who may have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no genuine nuclear dilemma, and nuclear deterrence is wrong. People in less fortunate locations may have problems as to national dangers, but in meeting these problems they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated people. In doing so through nuclear deterrence, superstates are proceeding immorally; and for similar reasons the conventional Northern framework is

impugned. The same conclusion can be alternatively reached by a substitution argument: put a reflective American or Russian in the position of such an isolated person, and check the resulting assessment of nuclear deterrence. Since it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally transfixed, the conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.

The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then, very different depending on whether the arguments are applied as regards a superstate or not. The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,

SST. Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.

Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something in the order of the nuclear armoury that it has. Or, weakening the theme to meet objections concerning excess, "overkill" capacity, it ought [morally] to retain at least a solid core of the nuclear devices it has. For subsequent argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for instance because of the character of the Northern values supposedly being protected, or only (as argued above) one of prudential reason⁵⁵. On similar grounds to those supporting the SS theme it can be argued that unilateral disarmament against a dangerous nuclear opponent would be prudentially irrational.

It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is a suboptimal strategy, like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma situations and of certain related competitive games. So it should be admitted that a superior strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the like could be achieved, would be cooperative arrangements. Cooperation and agreement would be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a range of other respects. For such arrangements would be much less risky, expensive, draining of resources, destructive of the environment, and so on; the details are well-enough known. However for the present and the foreseeable future the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state

55. It can still, and presumably does, amount to more than mere local expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.

representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make their policies true - unfortunately rather remote: the only sure insurance is extensive nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.

At least this is so where one is a superstate: nuclear preparation must proceed, largely unabated. Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a nuclear arsenal, one's insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly through some superstate's nuclear preparation, one huddles under another's nuclear umbrella. But here a level of trust and cooperation is called for, by dependent states, which is far from foolproof, and which contrasts strangely with the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere. Does a "dependent" state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally, have that much ground for confidence in its super-ally rather than its ally's opponent? Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or stage a nuclear exchange on its territory? Given the proclivity of states, especially large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of superstates and their leaders, too much faith would be misplaced.

Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate theme, it does not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs from SST and ends as follows:

DST. Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.

In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and the same goes for more obvious variants upon it). Nor do the arguments offered for SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments for DST.⁵⁶ This is more strikingly illustrated by the case of more remote nuclear dependent states. Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in jeopardy through, the actions or plans of the Soviet Union. Nor are they threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical

56. As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g. economic considerations such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.

capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but 'clearly lack[ing] any motive to do so', so far.⁵⁷ Clearly the argument from basic values does not look convincing. For similar reasons the argument from foreign domination carries little weight. In fact, with a little care, the present level of economic and political domination could be much reduced. In this way too, the force of the argument from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified. For there is only such danger because of superstate facilities and the questionable superstate nuclear umbrella, danger that would be removed with non-aligned practices.⁵⁸ With less remote dependent European states these sorts of arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may be defeated along analogous lines.

The differences in the situations of states, and of differently situated peoples, break the theme of a monolithic West. This is a theme especially favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West, and its freedom, as threatened by Soviet domination. In this the West is a single undifferentiated unit. But this idea, designed in part to align lesser dependent states with leading NATO powers, and to justify putting them at nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West. The West is not so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it (including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.

Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is now coming under attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the underlying retaliatory model that

- Safety lies in weapons,
- More weapons imply more security⁵⁹.

Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits from nuclear submarines). Europeans are arguing in a similar way, that the present system is more of a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.

57. For the quoted claim, and some of the argument for it, see Threats to Australia's Security, p.94.

58. The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.

59. See, for example, the last article in Thompson.

Thompson, p.251); and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be the envisaged theatre for a limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US (but not Soviet) strategists.

Once the weapons assumptions are questioned, other assumptions of the retaliatory model and its variants come up for examination, namely

- Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
- Whether the proper response is through nuclear armament, as opposed, say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or, taking off from the previous point,
- Whether military approaches and procedures (through armaments, etc.) are proper methods, or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resolution at the international level.

It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no ordinary level do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and never really warranted, frontier ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary⁶⁰ emphasis and explanation it deserves, but one that already anticipates subsequent questioning of the framework of nation-states. While the state system is intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected and are likely inevitable. For 'force has [a] ... permanent place in the nation-state system': thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.

§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states and their supporters.

Assembling the themes so far developed yields the deontic dilemma, often referred to as the nuclear fix:- States both ought not to engage in war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5) it is immoral, and also ought to engage in war-deterrence, at least for prudential reasons (as argued using

60. Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in China by the Mohists. For contemporary work on alternative systems, see especially the survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature on non-violent and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on transarmament, i.e. conversion to such arrangements.

SST and DST). This dilemma is no idle construction (concocted to demonstrate the virtues of paraconsistent logic), but a serious real-life dilemma, the outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on nuclear war and its aspects⁶¹, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.

The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense version of the deontic dilemma produced by war itself⁶², or at least war which spreads beyond purely military targets, as larger wars inevitably do (since military arrangements, e.g. rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones). The main dilemma arises from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of war. War is required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold); but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences. The doctrine of "just war" can also be seen as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that under certain circumstances these really evil consequences are morally justified. Thus 'some justifications of war aim to show that actions deemed normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible when performed under the aegis of war' (Walls, p.260). But this is no better or more morally acceptable than fallacious asymptotic arguments for utilitarianism as being correct when the stakes are large.

War and preparedness for war also generate subsidiary dilemmas - for

61. Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ... the best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms' (p.xii). Green also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy, even while asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets down): '... though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.

Similarly the US Catholic Bishops present the situation in terms of a moral dilemma; they speak of 'the political paradox of deterrence ... the dilemma of how to prevent the use of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313). In Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn too the nuclear situation is presented in terms of moral dilemmas.

The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers. But it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.

62. Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.

instance, a severe tension between freedom and authority: 'one of the most difficult problems of war involves defending a free society without destroying the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL, p.324). The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.

The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced by the contemporary sovereign state⁶³, in particular the deep tensions between national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such as individual liberty, popular control of institutions, etc). It also accentuates other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for example the extent of one's (political) obligations to a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear armaments processor or researcher (the question of political obligations and their evasion is considered further in Appendix 2).

At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there are several questions to be disentangled - questions different from the key issue 'What should my state be doing and do?', on which one may exert little influence, depending on who one is. There is not only the question 'What should I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending on where one lives, and in what sort of state, where one works, what one controls or influences, i.e. on who one is and one's roles - but also the questions 'What sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'.⁶⁴ Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to action-oriented questions. Each of those questions can, in given situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas.

The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the negation of A are wrong (or differently, obligatory), for some suitable A, such as pursuing a nuclear defence policy. The place and essential role of deontic and

63. The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas. Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and security arrangements, also contribute. But a conflict of freedom and authority is already an outcome of the large central state.

64. For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate than they are.

moral dilemmas are not widely or well understood, particularly in ethical literature⁶⁵. This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which gives rise to them - but then such positions do not really offer reportive accounts of wrong and obligation anyway. Contrary to utilitarian perceptions a dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better and worse ways out. By contrast with such ethical theories, preanalytical assessments, which form the basis of sensitive theories, do recognise moral dilemmas and reflect their features.

Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas emerge from the nuclear fix. There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to grasp as a temporary crutch. Thus, for example, the Bishop of London contends that the possession of nuclear weapons 'while never "morally good", can be "morally acceptable" as a way of exercising our moral responsibility in a fallen world'⁶⁶, that is in a morally-strapped world. A similar shift to a "second best" ethical functor (as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic Bishops who speak of the 'strictly conditional' 'moral acceptability' of deterrence while we try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. from the moral fix. Deterrence has a strictly temporary role and strictly conditional acceptability, but the object must be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out of the nuclear fix. And deterrence is certainly one option as to what to do in awkward circumstances. Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion that war deterrence, though wrong, is nevertheless the policy to pursue in the circumstances (p.274).⁶⁷ However as more than an immediate stepping stone to a

65. There are exceptions of course, e.g. in the Catholic educated such as Sartre; and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.

66. Reported in The Economist; reprinted in The Australian, February 12-13 1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.

67. As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable' have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.

superior policy, it is a decidedly poor option, for reasons already assembled (in §5-§6), reasons of the sort that are decisive for those, sufficiently outside the conventional Northern framework, who find no genuine nuclear dilemma.

To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore, a fix of nuclear states' own making. It is not something they blundered into, by accident. The initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the USA, and the escalation has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by the USA and the USSR in interaction. In these respects the situation is like that of people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible relationships, and build up conflicting obligations thereby. It is a myth, though one with some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response to Soviet nuclear build-up. The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has frequently led escalation, and apparently still does. The recent (1980)

programme is to be in addition to existing United States' strategic resources (which are generally agreed to be already in excess of Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).

The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome of state policy, especially by advanced capitalist nations, USA and its NATO allies, and not merely a response to the Soviets (or state socialism). Naturally the route taken would not have been feasible without complementing USSR policies. And independent evidence, such as Soviet-Sino confrontation, indicates that there is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist nations.

There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements through nation-states and the nuclear fix. On the one hand, these political arrangements are an evident source of the dilemma with the result that the nuclear situation is increasingly seen as indicating the inadequacy of the present world political structure. Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but is widely promulgated that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state arrangements: it is '... a world of sovereign states ... which brought the

world to the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313). On the other hand, the nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into the statist form, into statist arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast. The espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the peace (!), to provide security, and to defend national interests, but underneath there are other reasons such as perpetuating the system of sovereign states and politically advantageous state confrontation, and the framework of favoured military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and inequality it supports.

The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the statist arrangements and interrelations (economic rivalries, conflicting ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock the world into the present arrangements of sovereign states and zones of interest. The argument to this theme is a piecemeal practical one. Consider first, the matter from the Soviet side where the pattern of national control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.

The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimization for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders. In the West we have ... carefully controlled ... and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).

"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also have, in forms increasingly integrated with state apparatus, the military-industrial complex, which is a major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.⁶⁸

Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements, as shown by such things as the SALT negotiations; there are fixed superpowers and a (growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a flimsy negotiated set of rules, partly held in place by deterrence. Connected with this, there are cases revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. The Soviet invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the US is not overduly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was

68. The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would freely concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.

different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats concerning, were adjacent Western oil supplies: these lay within the US zone of interest (cf. the discussion in Schell, p.212).

§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the ethical results. Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limitations on the powers of states. Limitations on national sovereignty are thus inevitable. The limitations may be reached by agreement and negotiation, and more or less voluntarily agreed to⁶⁹, or they may be imposed, or possibly worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.

As with other fixes produced by the structural arrangements of states, there are suggested ways out which do not interfere with these arrangements, interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure and power relations of states (and, in the limit, remove them altogether), extrastate approaches. All the familiar, allegedly "practical" and "realistic", attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations, etc., are interstate; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the sovereign state. The same goes for less "realistic" proposals, such as (graduated) unilateral disarmament. But in fact there is nothing very sacred about the nation-state; it is not a particularly well justified political form; it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement; nor, as a matter or empirical fact, is it particularly a stable one. We are certainly free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as to its demise and its replacement by alternative arrangements. And nuclear dilemmas should have encouraged such reflection.

69. In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers, lawyers, or etc. In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like these. Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration between city-states, not seeing its social, structurally-emergent, character.

Extrastate approaches take one of two routes, the way up, to genuine international power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation⁷⁰ of states. The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; but they are not necessarily incompatible. Some of the important machinery, for a way up to world government, is already there in the international law-courts. Were the courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal action, that medieval theorists saw to all intrastate disputes, could in principle be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S and T superseded by the just case of S versus T. But if the law courts were given sufficient power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at least initially) upon war deterrence, though perhaps not by military means. Law courts, as usually conceived, are not effective without police and jails or their equivalent back-up for economic and other penalties; and the super-statist equivalent of either will involve the capacity to inflict quite substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will typically be organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other uninvolved parties. In short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to repeat it.

The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying to get to grips with the nuclear problem, and accordingly is often mentioned, though mostly in passing to be dismissed⁷¹, in orthodox strategic texts on

70. Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR) is a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present. By contrast, there are significant separation movements, some deserving aid and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR, UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite empire together; and the one recent attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.

Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be fostered elsewhere. The same applies to state empire expansion, as illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important, the reunification of Germany should be resisted; instead a more rational regional deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border region, and so on.

71. Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical, etc. Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.

thermonuclear war. By contrast, the Way Down, though like the Way Up by no means new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; but it is making an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions, and is sometimes combined with the Way Up (in "world order" models: cf. Galtung). The Way Up, unlike the Way Down, is however beginning to be much more sympathetically considered by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. There is a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching 'towards a morally integrated international system'; and 'the missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).

A main argument for the Way Up is just a repetition of that which is commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners' Dilemma, such as the Tragedy of the Commons. It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the state - are required to ensure best solutions to problems of organisation, especially, traditionally, as regards public order and, more recently, as to ecological order. So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are not herdsmen but nation-states, and one of the prospects is destruction of a good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now said to be some sort of superstate. Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some of their order-imposing role, and political obligation to states will be correspondingly weakened. But all this is to assume that these "tragedy" arguments are good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.⁷²

There are, then, many problems with the Way Up, both theoretical and practical. A further theoretical hitch is that the Way Up merely repeats statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate arrangements. It is only through a contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated a level up

72. See further Routley and Routley and material referred to therein, and especially Griffin.

The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.

again. The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.

In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century ago, In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we have moved further away from a world government than we were before World War II. The disintegration of empires has multiplied sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui, pp.2-3).

The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline. For the foreseeable nuclear future ideological differences between states, including especially differences as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of an operative world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear hostilities. In some ways, this is just as well. World government would be extremely monolithic, would foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism. It would certainly, whatever its (gray?) political colour, impose on the world an exploitative economic system which would do immense damage to many remaining natural systems.⁷³

The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely and, in some crucial respects, undesirable level of political and economic unity. Moreover, given the ideological, indeed paradigmatic, separation of main Northern cultures, requisite unity cannot be expected within nuclear deadlines. When not even nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is it that much more sweeping agreements, involving genuine limitations of state sovereignty, could be negotiated? There is an almost endless series of blockages and deadlocks in the way of such state reconciliation. The same applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use of the Way Up (e.g. negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged through the United Nations).⁷⁴

73. For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world government, see Galtung. Naturally the objections to world government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf. Mazrui). Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can be genuinely synthesized with the Way Down.

There is regrettably also much evidence that international treaties, arrangements and conventions are frequently not observed (especially those concerning war and human rights⁷⁵), and are not worth a great deal: lofty sentiments slide smoothly into despicable deeds. Even agreements states have signed are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or openly violated. It does not bode well for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement ever be reached. Indeed there already appears to be at least one international convention in force, to which all the major nuclear states are signatories, which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide. Genocide includes any of the following acts committed, in time of peace or war, with intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethnic, racial or religious group as such: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part. Beside genocide the following associated acts are also punishable: conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, complicity in genocide. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts mentioned shall be punished, whether they are responsible rulers, private individuals or public officials.⁷⁶ It is not difficult to argue that a larger nuclear strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what it does to some minority groups. But then, by virtue of connecting principles like C5, nuclear deterrence stands indicted as involving acts associated with genocide, in particular conspiracy and incitement. Some well-known political and military representatives of the nuclear states would thus appear to be liable to indictment and punishment under international law.

74. Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms control attempts and lost opportunities, is by no means confident that suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp. 210-13). Reasons include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American drive for strategic superiority.

75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports. Most of the points in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.

76. The account of genocide given is taken directly from the text of the Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.

The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the apparent impotence of interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation and nearer to the nuclear "brink" - is now taken to indicate (from a new contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political arrangements, and has given new impetus to consideration of other extrastate resolutions. The thesis that the nuclear problem indicates the radical unsatisfactoriness of national sovereignty and the present system of nation states has even reached the best-seller book stands, namely in Schell's The Fate of the Earth. According to Schell the nuclear situation should lead to a 'full-scale reexamination of the foundations of political thought' required to make 'the world's political institutions ... consonant with the global reality in which they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ... can reorganise its political life' (p.219). However Schell himself tries to avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by history, constitute the political work of our age'⁷⁷. So, not feeling the pressures of history or else overimpressed by the realities of (unstable) nation-states, do most political theorists. But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.

There is little doubt but that we live (too many of us willingly, even unthinkingly) with an antiquated system of political arrangements which the nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question. The features of even the best present state arrangements, representative (allegedly democratic) government, were largely fashioned in the 17th century when technology, and communications especially, were in a very different and more primitive condition; the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state were discerned, and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier. In the briefs presented

77. A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general (see Cox, p.225).

Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g. 'Thus the peril of extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival" but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original state were an undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.

for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size and complexity of modern states was not envisaged. But such systems continue to operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases have been undermined. Nuclear problems have emphasized several other deficiencies in present representative political arrangements. In particular, they have revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles in some European countries. Now that modern communications and information-processing make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major issues, the 19th century case for representative procedures is dissolved. It is past time for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once elected (in a way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost free hand on every issue, but are required to answer back at least on major policy issues. The excessive power of governments would, to that extent at least, be reduced. But the route down through issue-regulated government and reduced governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made possible even in large and complex modern states by recent technological developments, imposes other requirements. What are called for are smaller groupings, information flow, communication and education. Firstly, democratic procedures, like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with much smaller initial grouping than giant states, and progressive upward integration of groups by principles of federation. Secondly, democracy, insofar as it is to approximate a satisfactory political procedure, depends upon informed citizens of goodwill. As nuclear problems have again made patent, there are serious deficiencies in the control, release and distribution of information in present nation-states, even the most liberal of them (and related deficiencies as regards education). Again, especially with new and less expensive information systems, there is little excuse for this. But there are evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited availability and flow of information, from distortion of data in major communication channels, and so forth. These restrictive features have helped in making publicly acceptable the present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state

confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's dilemma type situation the nuclear superstates are often seen to be locked into (on which see, e.g., Hardin).

A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for questioning current political arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at least), takes the following shape:-

- Political arrangements should answer back to certain requirements and are justified in terms of doing so.⁷⁸ These requirements include such things as enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those who operate under the arrangements, at least where (as certainly in much of the West) the basic material conditions for such lives are met.

- Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have ceased to meet these requirements. For nation-states, at least in the North, can no longer guarantee the prospect of good and meaningful lives to those under their arrangements. A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before its prime in a nuclear disaster; yet there is a non-negligible probability that many such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way. Furthermore a person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged to acquiesce in or support a state engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn).

Therefore, nation-state arrangements have forfeited their justification, and should be amended. Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though not all) nation-states: it is not only because of the nuclear fix that some nation-states have forfeited their mandate. Political obligations to such states are correspondingly dissolved.

There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control states have lost sight of, or worse don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of what justifies or is supposed to justify their states. This applies both to

78. How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the underlying political theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contractual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way: 'since the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and their interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).

more powerful states and to lesser states, both where the brokers have some claim to popular mandate and where, as more often, they act without it or against the will of the people. The situation has been reached where 'nuclear powers put a higher value on national sovereignty than they do on human survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210; for copious evidence see Kuper). This is already illustrated by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear military situations: the principles of just warfare have been blatantly violated repeatedly, as have many other principles. Such states have forfeited much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience; so, on other grounds, have many other states.

It could just be, of course, as is often insinuated, that there are no alternatives, or no possibly better alternatives. But alternatives there are, that have been glimpsed, though but little effort has been expended on researching the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the option of world government). As to whether all such alternatives can be dismissed, for instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic; alternatives have been given very little opportunity to work, and we know very little about how humans operate under substantially different arrangements. But, once again, nuclear deadlines do not appear to give sufficient time to proceed very far on organising and trying out alternative arrangements, even those of the more accessible Way Down. There may be time to proceed a little way however, in working towards the weakening and breakdown of the larger nuclear states, especially the superunions, which are the immediate problem. Thus it would be invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and social arrangements, while theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.

But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma to the exclusion of all others: quite the contrary. We can not only afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other) constraints; indeed, given the urgency, the direness of the situation, we

should be fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such as bogged down (and very undemocratic and certainly unrepresentative) negotiations on arms limitations between main nuclear states. But even such methods should be perservered with, and attempts made to wring further significant concessions from the superstates, e.g. a jointly signed No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc. The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially new. The political means of the Way Out are what they have been on virtually every larger liberal or humanitarian issue that has mattered: from outside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or without upon it, and by furnishing self-organising alternatives which bypass it, characteristically Bottom-Up methods and practically never Top-Down. Such familiar considerations are but part of the more general, and very effective, case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to supply, but which can almost invariably be obtained, where required, more effectively and for that matter less expensively without them (and their monopolies).

In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions, that have imposed, or acquiesced in, military solutions involving nuclear installations and nuclear weapons. The opposition to the escalating nuclear fix has come frequently from local and neighbourhood groups, some of them now federated across nations (so the direction is not really interstate). These groups have been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the time being, some nuclear-free neighbourhoods. The patchwork grass-roots movement against nuclear equipment is strongest in Europe, which is - as the movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching American shores. It is extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American nuclear installations in Europe will make it a safer place: on the contrary it seems probable that Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements succeed in having these installations removed and Europe rendered nuclear-free. The chances of grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.

What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and other? Except in the case of Europe, where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication. Does anyone seriously expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada or Brasil say? And even in Western Europe the spectre is much exaggerated, a failing giant partly fashioned and largely propped up by the NATO powers' military-industrial alliance. Since the last World War, Western Europe has been increasingly dominated financially and economically and, in some measure, politically and ideologically, by the USA. Indeed much of the "free" world is dominated ideologically, and some of it dominated economically, by the USA. That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is⁷⁹), and in any case is not adequately countered by military means. The basic mode of domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant is military. But insofar as military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by the Soviets is a problem, there are several ways other than reliance on predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it. These should include not only local defence arrangements - whether top-down state-supplied methods, or alternative social methods - but also some social restructuring, such as decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of power to dispersed local organisations, and much more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and Eastern Europe.

Part of the point of restructuring is to make any military takeover, whether external or internal, so much more difficult and pointless, and the restoration of local control easier.⁸⁰ Part of the point of cooperation and interchange, especially at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary situations, is to break down hostility and distrust and to sabotage the state-contrived conditions of West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove

79. For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative. It is fortunate, then, that we need be saddled with neither: there are superior options.

other motives for, and popular support for, military adventures and expenditures.⁸¹ Western Europe, for long much too partial to military adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American nuclear umbrella for its defence. Moreover it ought to be, at the very least, uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging extensive parts of the world in the interests of its own security. Nor should other "nuclear dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European imposition. There is no enormous virtue in sacrificing other parts of the world, what LSN war risks, for Western Europe, which has long exported military-based domination to other parts of the world. There are better options than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.

80. Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups from following suit or following further directions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section would hold only limited information about the federated units it integrated. The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc. The net effect (as C. Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.

One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62). Yet the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially untrained and unorganised for locally-based defence. With such a defence restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.

81. In particular, with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separate, are removed. So too a main model supporting deterrence policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would be further corroded.

In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g. in grain and gas, to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gift projects. If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice versa). Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g. as part of the strategy of the "cold war".

What the anti-nuclear movements must press for is accordingly clear in broad outline: in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction and disarmament (and, on the more perceptive outer edges of the movements, transarmament, i.e. conversion to alternative social defence arrangements). But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go, namely all the way through graduated unilateral disarmament⁸² to total nuclear disarmament, certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's surface, including especially Europe. For once the state is demoted, its importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance on its decision-making diminished in favour of more localised control and decision-making - once all that is duly allowed for (it does not need to happen), one major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty. Maintenance of that sovereignty has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers. What is important and worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the state. The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying features such as misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.

Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments from national dangers also disintegrate. In their place are arguments concerning individual and group rights and freedoms, civil liberties in particular. None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None of the rights and freedoms that matter are necessarily or exclusively guaranteed by the nation-state. The nation-state is neither sufficient for them, since in increasingly many states these liberties are disappearing, nor necessary for them, as smaller community arrangements can ensure them. But arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not? To be sure, risks to individuals and groups remain: that has always been so,⁸³ and is not

82. The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than a fraction of present nuclear arsenals. The steps to disarmament are well-known, e.g. the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as Europe, etc.

being changed but only worsened in this age of nuclear nation-states. People mostly want to be sure that their lives will continue to run their course, ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be controlled by Americans or Russians or other outsiders. Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives are not a rational route to these ends.

In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way out of such deontic dilemmas as the nuclear fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of those things the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare and autonomy; but those things are better ensured by the removal of nuclear weapons. The main reasons are familiar: in particular, nuclear circumstances threaten the loss of basic values, such as welfare and autonomy, for many creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in a nuclear-free situation (even should another ideological party remain armed with nuclear weapons). There are also well-known supplementary reasons; for example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local welfare (because of the opportunity costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the accompanying security measures).

Thus the nuclear fix is resolved, theoretically at any rate, by appropriately limiting sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear devices and weapons it can deploy, and how), and by allowing for the considerable reduction of state sovereignty. But, although that is a reasonable Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be strongly resisted in practice, since those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the auspices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act against the state.

Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since the reduction in sovereignty need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. Indeed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated

83. It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements. Until human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.

agreement (at the top levels of state). However to get this far with the superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further: for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation. Rather it is tied into both military systems and (civil) industrial production of the states concerned. So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being solidly resisted by superstates.

Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states and especially against the superstates, after all the states causing the most serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further. Once again it will take a variety of organised forms. These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear war preparation, either directly or indirectly. The forms of action range widely, from such steps as the blockading of shipments of uranium, and the refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines, to the withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes. They include as well the whole range of nonviolent protest methods against nuclear installations and facilities (methods which do not exclude incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new model resistance and defence organisations).⁸⁴

It is important to realise that petitioning of state representatives and power holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored, and the results discouraging. This is one reason why popular action should be based on a more comprehensive political strategy, which also involves withdrawing support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in alternative arrangements, especially alternative defence forms.⁸⁵ Sufficient details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.

84. For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.

85. For much more on all these points, see e.g. Martin. As to what to do, see further Appendix 2.

APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,

according to Schell, and to Anders.

A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of human extinction.¹ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts with the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the slightest of the "prophets", Schell's The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of media-philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle their work. In particular, Schell's little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects.

Some of it is simply garbage: to select one example, consider the claim that

'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] species nothing else that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ... (p.173, rearranged).

This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues: they don't cease to be so when compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor species, unlikely to be exterminated under presently arranged nuclear holocausts.

1. The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination.

A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.

But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even.

The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:

S1. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and

S2. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).

It is applications of S2 which give Anders' and Schell's work² some of its apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on S1. For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!

Granted the factual assumption S1 is by no means ruled out as a real possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct;³ granted the prospect of nuclear war does threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so S1 appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). Schell's argument to S1 is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schell's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.⁴

Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly

2. For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2, see Foley JS.

3. Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box.

Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.

4. However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, the immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned. In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous differences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p.56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing them.

that the notion no longer made sense. But what they seem to want to suggest with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. Certainly such views have been floated⁵. But they are not tenable. There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.

Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments". Even if this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". Again they have latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects such as fireballs or firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war, and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character.

The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders' version of S2 being just one striking illustration (cf. AA p.252ff.). It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged implications of extinction; but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings - past or future or merely potential humans are not enough, persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as it is, we are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human time, ...'. The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies that: there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and future ...' (p.140)⁶. Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides time into past, present and future': so annihilation cannot 'come to pass' (p.143). But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings.

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5. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military has a weapon it will use it.
 6. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future (etc.) is repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173.

Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist: 'for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There would still remain many sorts of difference; for one, the history recorded in many other organisms would be different. Temporal themes do not lack 'legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone'; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.

Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting the first. In fact there is no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims. The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing there must be life', human life (p.171). These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere.⁷

Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song ...'. For there are, and may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs, Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile.⁸

Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions S1 and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both. 'The death of mankind', under S1, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and S1 remaining life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166) and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base.

From S1, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that 'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly 'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64; S p.150). This theme falls with S1. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being

7. See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.

8. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the argument from perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.

rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; as explained, the position is different in different countries and places.

Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme, which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to which

S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear situation (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.⁹ But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo theme¹⁰ runs as follows: '... the world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies' (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere: '... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)' (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points: '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' (p.152). And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done less. Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among

9. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry, and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control.

10. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: 'The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the (USA) nation, and against socialism. In the course of this argument yet another fallacious assumption is rolled out: 'The means to the end are not limited, for the end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).

many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is discussed in Appendix 2).

When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. As observed (in §8), Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up.

Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simplistic way, from the Top Down; those who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations (such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).¹¹ Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life.

But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.¹² The roots of the nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination.¹³ Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy.¹⁴

In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, the nation-state; it is also important to alter key components of the state, and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything

11. See p.225ff. and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.

12. In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly, in Martin. The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.

needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states.

In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between "raison d'état" and the Socratic-Christian ethics. The teaching that 'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort' (p.134). So 'states may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'. Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under S1) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends-means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is

13. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference-satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of the virtues.

Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience. There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative theorems).

14. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral science.

There have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix. It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out-of-control machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not.

Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.

claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.¹⁵ An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.

As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185).

Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end' (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from earlier conventional wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewitz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic.

Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,

15. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.

reasonable, rational. However this represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision (as presented, e.g., in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.¹⁶ In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very generously, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the policy or strategy of'. In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail:¹⁷ yet the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. pp.201-2): but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,¹⁸ along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.

16. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of deterrence' is based on eye-for-eye and tooth-for-tooth assumptions.
17. Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g. it has been wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix from the radioactive ashes.

There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology.

18. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles.

Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction; although involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily is another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.

APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies

What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be. So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations. In present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their policies. There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all responsibility ends: these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states, and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for themselves, some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities, responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of certain social arrangements.

Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out. They can neglect their moral responsibilities; but they are not justified in doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential argument takes the following lines:

1. The (ordinary) individual, or group, has no possibility of making a difference to what happens. Therefore
2. Such individuals, or groups, have no obligation to try to make a difference. Hence
3. Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when things go wrong.

There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be resisted: firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can" theme¹, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference. While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many other individuals do. In highly competitive communities, full of hopeful free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in manner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly. Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in ways that do make a difference. An individual is not exonerated from responsibility by the argument.

While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows, political disobedience. An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards defence or various parts thereof (e.g. nuclear weapons production and deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace funds. Evidently, however, all these more individualistic forms of political activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities, since the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or punitive action by state authorities.

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1. Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due seriousness is bound to reject this theme. There are also independent grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme: see Routley and Plumwood.

There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities, etc., and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the state is likely to take in return. (Any state seriously practising deterrence is bound to take some action against effective protest, or risk losing credibility; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individual need bear.)

One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear weapons to, for example, providing facilities for them - proceeds from the wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the weapons for such war. The argument here applies connecting principles (like those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through defence taxes². The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be: Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destruction of human populations? Or with making credible a threat to do so, or the like? What follows applies primarily to people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.

Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothings on the spot insofar as they contribute to national objectives; they also raise questions, perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take action, even limited action such as redirection of taxes³. For are there not political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the national defence effort? It is usually assumed that there are. However, no dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be regulated in some fashion by moral obligations; for in this case moral obligations override political obligations. In fact political obligations are already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does not so much bring out new limits on political obligation, as emphasize the respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.

An obligation to try⁴ to dissociate oneself from preparation for nuclear war or from nuclear-deterrence, for instance by not spending part of one's working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than this: to an obligation, for example, to work for an alternative national defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g. to nonviolence, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g. schemes that leave

2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthausen of Seattle in support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3. This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give the state interest on gross earnings, but obviously very effective in removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring power from individuals to the state.
4. Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to contribute to other deserving causes. For example, it may be virtually impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.

"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact, and deeper (ecological) schemes that change that.

The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper set of changes in the superstates. For those whose very limited political influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow goals may look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better control. The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war, while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others). There is accordingly some obligation - an obligation little considered and not grasped by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps towards self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.

What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once the goals are glimpsed. Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance, which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;⁵ closure of American bases and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear-carrying equipment to ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve). That much is easy, in principle; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to the American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation; it is premised primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been argued (in §5ff.), lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint Australian-US facilities and to US military operations in the region is explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of deterrence'.⁶

More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone not worth targeting militarily: the region must also have a sustainable life of its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand's economic independence.⁷ For a larger region which included Australia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the

5. See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1. How slight the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA. Of course, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated: from a European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe (and elsewhere), are very much more important.

A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy and alternatives, will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.

whole region towards a multi-cultural consumer society and perhaps even diverting "defence" spending to connected self-management and social defence goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great in the setting of a consumer-satellite society. In any case, where life and culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.

In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with Northern nuclear powers⁶, and should be preparing now, socially and economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war. However there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield political power. But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised in the false dichotomy: "either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway; so why bother". One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (S1 of Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic. A more important reason is that most people, and most of their political representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to befall them. These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to other (remote) people, not them.

It is not that LSN war is unthinkable: rather it is that it seems unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear war. Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in

6. See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on consequences of nuclear war, *Canberra Times*, Saturday July 23, 1983. The point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture, as Hawke notes. The point is softened by representing the facilities as also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms control and reduction feasible': the known role of the facilities in war fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is not in any doubt: 'successive Australian governments ... have taken the view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence; quoted in *Threats to Australia's Security*, p.17).

Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities put Australia at nuclear risk. 'However it is the judgement of this Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf. Ball, pp.130-8), the potential risks given that an LSN war has a non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits. Since Australia has only a regional strategic role, the global strategic considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put Australia, its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk for immediate and American interests. A worthwhile representative government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is that short-sighted expediency decision making: it seems virtually certain that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term commercial considerations.

7. As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.
8. Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.

achieving requisite social and political adjustment. Even those who believe that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life) do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessment.⁹

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9. Again, for some of what to do, for some ways to reorganise, see e.g. Martin. There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.

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