

WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPLIED ETHICS

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There is much that is wrong with and in applied ethics. Specifically, there are three comprehensive counts where things are wrong with the commodity concerned, applied ethics, that is with applied ethics so economically viewed.¹ Namely on the following three counts:

- *extraneous*, with the supply, delivery, consumption, and the like of applied ethics, AE. The category prominently includes the *delivery* of applied ethics: what is done, taught and learnt, by whom, and how qualified (e.g. whether taught by professionals, professional ethicists or philosophers in particular). That has tended to presume that the commodity itself is more or less in order, though the presumption lacks good pedigree, delivery of defective goods being almost as ubiquitous as business enterprise.

The present focus is not however upon the delivery, or other features of the production and consumption, packaging and marketing of the goods, but on features of the commodity itself, applied ethics itself. Thus

- *intraneous* counts, concerning the commodity itself, where a further two things are wrong:
 - the applied idea, and
 - what the application is presumed to be made to, established - or, should it be, establishment - ethics.

Because an implicit premiss in organising the *Philosophy and Applied Ethics Re-examined*² Conference seems to have been that the issues to be addressed are predominantly extraneous, and because most of the papers actually relevant to the Conference topic appear to focus on extraneous issues, the present exercise, by contrast, concentrates upon intraneous problems, especially the third: radical deficiencies in what is supposed to be applied, prevailing ethics, and some extensive repairs thereto.

1. The applied count

To begin with, there is something decidedly³ odd, not to say radically unsatisfactory, about the very idea of *applied ethics*. To bring out the oddness, the conceptual inadequacy, it helps to consider the dictionary senses and established usage of *applied*. The term in the only relevant sense (the other obsolete sense is that of *folded*) means: 'put to practical use; practical as distinguished from *abstract* or *theoretical*' (*OED*, similarly *Concise English*). Relevant examples cited are: 'the applied sciences' (from Babbage 1832), 'applied logic (as distinguished from pure)' (from Thomson 1806).⁴

It may appear then, that "applied ethics" amounts to pleonasm, a popular tautology (and "pure ethics" correspondingly to an oxymoron), because ethics itself is already practical, for instance much or all of it being concerned with practical action and its qualities (such is MacIver's assumption: 'moral philosophy is practical - in a way in which other branches of philosophy are not', p.206). In this respect "applied ethics", even more "applied morals", is rather like "applied motoring", "applied nursing" or "applied housekeeping". Conceptual confusion would be considerably reduced by removing the modifier 'applied'.⁵ Such a charge of confusion can however be mitigated by properly

distinguishing ethics, which includes philosophy and theory of morality, from morals, thereby revealing, perhaps, elements of some theory apt for application. No doubt something like this is the presupposition of those who preach or profit from practical ethics (similarly practical economics, but doubtfully practical housekeeping): that standing in contrast is a suitably established theoretical ethics (could it perchance be utilitarianism?) which can rather uncontroversially be used to guide practice. But is there such a theory, apt for application, for translation into practice? *ly*

To appreciate what *is* required for adequacy, consider successful applied subjects. Let us compare "applied ethics" with long established applied discipline, namely applied mathematics, which often boasts a separate department in universities (a discipline I was obliged to study as an undergraduate in order to proceed further in pure mathematics). In the first place, applied mathematics contrasts with pure mathematics, applied logic with pure. Where, a naive outsider may ask, is pure ethics that similarly stands in contrast with applied ethics? Could there decently be separate departments of pure and of applied ethics? */a*

For the most part, applied mathematics applies to practice, in some wide sense, a body of pure mathematics that is more or less *correct*, at least within the assumption framework and contextual settings where it is applied. (The qualified formulation is given for pluralistic reasons; given the dominant paradigm, the pure mathematics that is applied is correct without further qualification, correct period.) A body of substantially correct theory ready for application is then the first of several pertinent features of that relational object, applied mathematics, the first of several dubiously matchable by "applied ethics". The proviso 'for the most part' (introducing the paragraph) signals another discrepancy. There is a, presumably derivative, part of applied mathematics that investigates, in essentially the manner of pure mathematics, theories, algebras, spaces and similar, selected through postulates, principles or equational sets drawn from standard applied mathematics (thus e.g. Newtonian theories where classical force laws are satisfied, Hilbert and phase spaces, and so on).⁶ Such derivative applied mathematics need not compromise at all normal methodological requirements (such as they are) of pure mathematics, for rigour, exactness, and similar.

Ordinary applied mathematics, in its quest, even haste, for practical results, *does* compromise, or violate, pure mathematical methodology. For example, shortcuts are taken, simplifications made, information shed, figures rounded, approximations adopted, and so. Science veers towards art. From a pure perspective, dreadful things are often done to data or mathematical transformations of data. Skilled practitioners tend to appreciate what they can get away with in this sort of regard. Again, none of this, neither the body of information nor the kinds of skills, is really matched in ethics, in putting ethical theory to practical work.

Next, the mathematics that is applied, a body of pure mathematics, is not thoroughly contested. Ethics however is. There is nothing in ethics like arithmetic or elementary mechanics; the nearest thing ethics can offer is some controversial development along axiomatic geometric lines. Mathematics has its critics, both inside (e.g. intuitionists) and out (e.g., cultural relativists), but none (hard core sceptics excepted) suggest changing all of it or tampering with most of what is applied. By contrast, in ethics, there continues to be an array of competing theories, none of which has managed to win broad allegiance. What pure theory is there to apply, to do dreadful things to? It might be said in response: whichever of them is adopted!

Even that, a hollow compromise will not stand up for long. For deeper environmental ethics challenge a broad range of pure theory that is alleged to be applied! What challenges a whole subject, that would change it, can hardly be an application of it. The rise of such environmental ethics is *one* reason why the modifier *applied* is a misnomer. For deeper environmental ethics is not any sort of

application of ethics; it instead challenges prevailing ethics. Nor is it, like stock "applied ethics", an adaptation of ethics within an environmental context.

The label *applied* is substantially, if not entirely, a misnomer. Adjectives in modifier or attributive roles, in the combination adjective-noun phrase, often enough do not signify application. The assumption that all modification is application invokes a dubious, presumably false, theory of adjectival attribution. Consider a few examples involving a relevant adjective, 'medical'. Combinations such as 'medical student', 'medical book', 'medical trial' do not signify applications. A *medical s* is not normally an application of *s* to medical matters (of books or students in this fashion); normally it is a *type* (an *m* type) of *s*.⁷ There are occasional exceptions, in which case compounds are liable to be recorded in dictionaries, as with *medical jurisprudence* which is not a type of jurisprudence, but 'the legal knowledge required of a doctor'. There is good reason to think that *ethics* induces no exception, that medical ethics, and similarly business ethics, follow the normal pattern. Thus business ethics is a type of ethics, namely ethics within a specifically business setting, and accordingly adapted thereto. Observe that such a preliminary account incorporates automatically (what gives the applied presumption some problems; see Appendix 1) allowance for variations in standards, that business corporations for example should not be expected to measure up to standards set up for ordinary persons (any more than they should ~~not~~ be expected to pay the same levels of taxes)!

Given the manifold inadequacies of the label *applied*, amendment of terminology appears warranted. Amendment, not abandonment. After all, what 'applied ethics' is supposed to comprehend, such as medical ethics, business ethics, even environmental ethics, are not themselves in court, but presently taken as viable fields. A superior label is *field*, for field-defined or field-restricted; another is *type*, for type-delimited, another *domain*. Where others speak of "applied ethics", let us discourse about *field* ethics. Investment ethics, for instance, is a field ethic, with field investment. An "institute for applied ethics concentrating upon applications to business" is an institute for field ethics with main field business. The "applied ethics" movement becomes effectively a field ethics movement.

Observe that professional ethics are field ethics, with the field in each case the profession concerned. But professional ethics in sum form a quite proper subclass of field ethics; bio-ethics and ecological ethics are plainly not professional ethics. Less obviously, more importantly, field ethics differs from practical ethics (as usually poorly defined), with which "applied ethics" is regularly conflated. For, on the one side, ordinary living and daily life, central to practical ethics, are not fields. On the other, field ethics are not confined to practice, but may involve considerable theoretical material, particularly from the fields concerned.

2. The ethics count

Not only is the *applied* operation in trouble, *ethics* also is in deep trouble. Indeed, in a way, the main problem lies here. There is not a fit, properly satisfactory subject, for some significant applications. For some "applications" have to change and develop the subject! But, the problems do not vanish when the amendment to field ethics is made. Satisfactory fieldwork, satisfactory outcomes in field ethics are seriously hampered by long-standing troubles in ethics. For as field ethics involve ethics, whatever is wrong with ethics affects field ethics.

To glimpse these troubles, consider recent ambivalence towards ethics. Is ethics even a good good? There is a most *curious* contrast in later 20th century attitudes towards ethics. On the one side, there are great expectations, for instance for what ethics can contribute, to social and professional life

especially; but on the other there is serious disquiet, occasionally verging upon despair and into nihilism, as to ethics, and its role. Virtually the whole spectrum from great expectations through no expectations to substantial forebodings is selectively represented. A few examples:

- Great expectations for ethics, beginning to re-emerge these days, tend to come from outside professional philosophical ranks, from scientists and social scientists.⁸ Ethics is seen as taking up again its grand legitimization and critical roles. It can indeed be *used* in this respect as regards to a wide variety of practices, such as in business, economics, government, scientific experimentation, and so on. Of course it cannot always succeed, because one ethics can be pitted against another, and each and all challenged.

These expectations, a bit surprising after the drab days of analytic moral philosophy (where philosophy could express no interesting moral opinions), contrast sharply with

- heavy disquiet or worse as to present ethics. A recent example is afforded by MacIntyre's disturbing introduction to *After Virtue*: that 'we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality' (p.2). Some, like MacIntyre, promise a happy, even a great, outcome, should we return to proper paths, to a virtue ethic in the tradition of Aristotle. Others are not so sanguine; there is
- no hope for ethics. There are divergent routes here. Either it can play no relevant role any longer, or it can play only a negative or damaging role (thus e.g. Hinckfuss). Though both these routes lead badly astray, present (merely classificatory) objectives do not include showing as much.⁹

There is, furthermore, reason for at least serious disquiet. Should we care to look closely at, and try to assess, the *total ethical heritage*, then what we find is not very promising.

- What is on offer is mostly extremely sketchy and very piecemeal, much of it a hotchpotch. There are extraordinarily few well-worked out and detailed ethics. Spinoza's *Ethics* is perhaps one rare example.
- Most of what is on offer is seriously biased or prejudiced, indeed from a deep environmental perspective even unethical. Prime examples include
 - religious bias, heavily constraining or distorting creatures' lives, and putting them to work to serve imagined religious objectives.
 - spiritualistic distortion. Even where an explicit religion does not feature, as in Platonism and neo-Platonism and in edified Buddhism, the whole of life may be distorted through promise of an after-life or successor life or extra-material life, where furthermore some system of rewards or punishments may be dished out for previous performance. No doubt such biases help in conferring upon ethics authority, unwarranted authority (fulfil duties or be damned, etc.).
 - humanistic distortion, summed up as human chauvinism. It is upon this prejudice, critical for environmental ethics, that we concentrate.

A main matter that is wrong with ethics, and *ipso facto* its practice and its belated appearance in many professional settings (when it should have been in evidence long ago), is its anthropic bias, its considerable prejudice in favour of (present) humans.¹⁰ The matter is highly material in several fields, most obviously in environmental ethics, but also in medical ethics, bio-ethics, agricultural and veterinarian ethics, and similar.

It is widely assumed, however, that ethics is inevitably human biased, that it has to be anthropocentric. That is not so. Ethics can be repaired. So much is the substance of *ethics without humans*. Both morals and ethics can be characterised, in substantially reportive ways, so as to free

them of anthropocentrism and the like.¹¹ Furthermore, the whole superstructural theory can be developed in a fashion that makes no essential reference to humans or any other biological species.¹²

These repairs represent, however, only the beginning of adjustment and change - of many changes if a satisfactory deep-green ethics is to be reached. When repairing goods, there often comes a stage, increasingly rapidly encountered those days, when it becomes a more attractive proposition to acquire new items than to persist with repairs. So it may be, it is now suggested, with ethics. So increasingly it has been suggested this century, with demands for new ethics, new moral philosophies. Those making such proposals include Schweitzer, MacIver, Leopold, along with many others.¹³

Suppose we should arrive, through addressing different or new fields, at what amounts to a new ethics, as many think we do (thus MacIver, p.179 and many ecocentric philosophers). Then what emerges is no "application" of a standard ethics, but something different, not an applied standard ethics at all. Now something similar may appear to occur for normal applied subjects. A newly encountered group of physical phenomena, for instance, leads not to the elevation of some dusty mathematical theory buried in archives, what is mostly the case, but to elaboration of a new mathematical theory. Normally in this event, the main body of pure mathematics would remain untouched; a new annex or suburb would simply be added to it.¹⁴ With ethics, however, things are different. There are grounds for contending that the green (environmental) revolution has shaken ethics to its (dubious) foundations and core, and, as coupled with associated non domination themes (as emphasised especially in ecofeminism), has left comparatively little untouched. The standard city of ethics is not left alone, unscathed.

Much the same sort of points can be presented in the form of a dilemma, for standard ethics and a proposed field, such as environmental issues. *Either* standard ethics will not cover the field (or cannot be extended to do so because it (or its extension) does not apply, or through being forced upon the field it twists or damages the data, for instance leaves an indelible anthropic bias. A homely carpentry analogy may help: there is some cabinet work where delicate hammering would be appropriate, but the only tool we have is a sledgehammer.¹⁵ Likewise, a standard chauvinistic ethic is the wrong tool to try to use or extend for deeper environmental work.

Unremarkably, the three options emerging, namely (inappropriate) application, extension or adjustment, and fashioning of something new or different, correspond more or less to the now familiar threefold division of environmental positions, into shallow, intermediate and deep.¹⁶ As before, deep ethics are not "applications", but *near* ethics.

3. Extraneous issues

Among the *many* extraneous issues concerning field ethics, those that have come to exercise philosophers do look distinctly partisan:¹⁷ namely, the role of philosophers, especially professionals; the place of philosophy in field ethics; and the poor practice of these ethics, particularly from a professional philosophical perspective. Here the main thesis to be advanced inclines towards these professionally unsympathetic lines: insofar as these matters, philosophical extraneousities, are of negative impact for philosophy, philosophers have largely themselves to blame, for they are largely of their own making (or, to sheet some of the responsibility more accurately, of the controlling power elite of the profession).¹⁸ Let us investigate *some* of the extraneous issues seriatim.

Because a field ethics concerns the field as well as (relevant parts of) ethics, its investigation, practice and teaching, requires an intersection of capacities and skills, drawn from *both* ethics and the field.

This simple observation enables an immediate response to such questions as: if not philosophers, then *who* is to investigate, and teach, field ethics? That response is: those from one area *or* the other who have acquired requisite knowledge and technique in the other, or less promising, those from outside (but with some appropriate informational background) who acquire these prerequisites in both. In medical ethics, where there is perhaps a larger pool of information concerning the field than there is regarding ethics, a moral philosopher untrained in medicine may have more to learn than a medical doctor unversed in ethics and lacking philosophical skills. (Really, *neither* should be let loose on students before they are *duly* prepared in the intersection.) It is evident, then, that philosophy enjoys no natural monopoly in field ethics. The place of philosophy is less exalted, and certainly is not dominant - still less given recent proposed (but hardly well justified) decoupling of ethics from philosophy.¹⁹

There are corollaries regarding the roles of philosophers on committees relating to field ethics, in decision-making and so on on these topics. Philosophers do not have an automatic place. Unless they are well-informed as to ethics (many philosophers are not) *and* as to the field, they do not deserve a place at all (of course they still may gain a role for want of any better placed). Ousting of under-informed or unenergetic philosophers is not always such a bad thing.

While the informational situation is now *significantly* better than in 1945 when MacIver was agonising over the predicament of moral philosophy, it is still true that 'academic moral philosophers' are not using 'every opportunity to make themselves acquainted, so far as possible, with the real difficulties of those [not merely present humans] who need the help of moral philosophy most ... I ... confess that I myself lack the factual knowledge which would be required to do this work well. I suspect that many ethic philosophers are in the same position ...'²⁰ One of the reasons why philosophy has lost prestige in recent years is that it has not kept pace' (pp.204-205). One example MacIver incisively develops concerns 'discoveries associated with the name of Freud. The behaviour of philosophers in this connection is particularly hard to excuse. At first they flatly denied the reality of the alleged discoveries - maintained that the notion of "unconscious mind" was self contradictory, and so forth. But all this has now been given up. ... Philosophers no longer dispute ... details of the Freudian system - but disregard them. If they mention them at all, they talk as if they somehow concerned none but medical men - as if the same propositions could be ^{true} done in medicine and false outside it. In the light of the recognition of unconscious motives the whole traditional theory of moral responsibility needs overhauling, but no moral philosopher undertakes this' (p.205). The reason why the corresponding philosophical debate (about whether unconscious desires are sometimes evil, whether relevant moral predicates are restricted to conscious motives, and so forth) had not ^{been} by 1945, after 40 years of exposure to Freudian issues, MacIver attributed to the mass of psychological literature which philosophers have not read and would have to read, reading that is obligatory if moral philosophy is to be made 'the subject which it ought to be' (p.206). true

There has been disappointment among some professional philosophers, those with expansionist ^{inclinations} ~~instincts~~, that field ethics has not turned out to be quite the bonanza anticipated, that the expected boom in new opportunities and positions began to dissipate as field practitioners started to supply their own "field ethicists".²¹ None of this should have been surprising, for broad inductive reasons. Philosophy had long shed subjects and fields of overlap; and those professionals who have hung in have become something different (economists instead of social philosophers, computer scientists instead of logicians²²) Nor have philosophers, especially those who have not changed or reskilled, all the virtues assumed by professionals; e.g. they have little or no theory, they are too fuzzy, they are indecisive, or vacillate, etc. (remember the sophists; these provide some of the reasons too why philosophers are often not welcome on committees). inclination

Some outside inputs into ethics, such as field studies or field workers may supply, would not go astray. For there is theoretically little that is new or interesting on the standard ethics scene. Much of it is 19th century revival, refinement of utilitarianism or Kantianism, and ornate additions (with bells and whistles). One of the few "new" offerings is the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics! Nothing, however, stops outside inputs. Anyone is free to attempt philosophy. Professionals have no exclusive rights over philosophy, still less over ethics; nor should they. There is a case for widening practice of philosophy, and encouraging paraphilosophers. For critical problems emerging are not so much those of philosophy itself (which could be very different from the way it is practised and professionalised), but of philosophy as professionalised and as conducted. The immediate future does not bode well for change in the latter, for several reasons; the prevailing materialistic technological ethos (which devolves pure intellectual activity), the consequent marginalisation of subjects like philosophy and continuing narrowness of dominant philosophical activity. *ca. n*

Nor, moreover, have philosophers proceeded well, particularly in the Antipodes, in training and *equi* applying students who can readily adapt to become field ethicists. Philosophy has never been strongly employment-market driven (but has tended to rely on a version of Say's flawed law); indeed there are features intrinsic to philosophy, such as its contemplative character, that renders it antithetical to the very idea of responding to markets at all. There are other regional features that compound this sort of problem: the conservative, and class, bias of philosophy (inherited from similar British arrangements), which has meant that Australian philosophy has not been innovative in adapting its topics and emphases to changing circumstances;²³ and the heavy concentration, as in British empiricism (still dominant in Australia), upon epistemology, with ethics and what went into moral sciences and social philosophy still regarded as second class arenas and not what philosophy was really about or what first class chaps would mainly concern themselves. These are major reasons why philosophy lost out, and deserved to lose. */ equi*

It is for those latter sorts of reasons in particular, that environmental ethics and environmental philosophy have been unable to gain more than occasional marginal status in philosophy curricula in Australian universities. Fuller accounts of the predicament of environmental philosophy have been given elsewhere.²⁴ Its predicament tends to illustrate a general problem for field ethics, with bioethics (with its own institutional settings) the only partial exception.

Now that field ethics is being lost to the fields in many cases, there are complaints about the calibre of what is done and taught, the quality of the investigators and teachers, and so on. No doubt much of this criticism is warranted; some similar criticism of ethics within philosophy would also be warranted. Among the justified criticisms are these:

- that field ethics as done from the field is divorced from ethical theory (from what theory has so far been developed). Too much comprises mere case studies, as with business MBAs.
- that the field practitioners are not trained in ethical theory, and are often ill-informed ethically and lacking in analytic and critical skills crucial for satisfactory philosophy.

A *different* complaint, of importance, concerns the poor ethical practice, even the unethical practice in some of the fields, despite the development of field ethics. Such a problem is particularly conspicuous in the field of business.²⁵ But this has been a long-standing problem for ethics itself; how to get people to behave as they ought? Teaching agents ethics can certainly enable, and encourage, them to be moral: but it cannot make them moral. Nor would it be proper for it to do so.

The field ethics movement, successor to the late AE movement, is both important and timely, especially as regards getting ethics and *axi*ology back into many fields that *had* tried, erroneously it now appears, to eliminate them. The movement will have to be carefully orchestrated however to *x*

avoid capture by the very power structures and disciplinary paradigms that it should transform. These are certainly grounds for some cynicism about such movements: that they are easy targets for co-option, that they can be used to cover up abuses by power structures, and to authorise dubious procedures, or worse, ^{consequentialism} with a rubber stamp of ethical approval from appropriate ethics' committees and inquiries. Such grounds for cynicism can be ^{reasoned} removed, however, and new hope inaugurated, given more adequate formulation and development of relevant field ethics (exercises including considerable theoretical work), along with independent and impartial administration of emerging codes and decision methods, and with appropriate openness of the formerly abused procedures they are intended to regulate fairly.

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NOTES

1. For such a treatment of items like ethics, as economic goods, see further *Greening of Ethics*.
2. The Conference, organised by the University of Newcastle in August 1993, where this paper was presented.
3. Ethical theory has tended to borrow classifications from elsewhere, from apparently more successful enterprises. Thus, for instance, the (normative) ethics/meta-ethics distinction lifted, none too adeptly,

from logical theory. Thus too the present pure/applied distinction, also purloined. By no means everything that intelligent agents dream up and promote is entirely in order. Rather uncontroversially colourless green ideas is one such combination, more controversially human nature, deep ecology and post-modernism are such. Applied ethics appears to belong to this not-in-satisfactory-order or out-of-order bunch.

4. 'Applied. Practical, put to practical use. Applied science. Science of which the abstract principles are put to practical use in the arts' (*Concise English*).

'2. Put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical' (*OED*). Though we persevere with these dictionary explications, there are grounds for complaint; there are neglected nuances. For example, the practical/theoretical contrast (just one of the muddy contrasts with practical) differs from an applied/pure contrast. A theory can in principle be applied (a plying to, i.e., a mapping) in a non practical, or impractical, field. Different again is that concrete/abstract contrast. And what exactly is practical?

5. The advance notices for the Conference (which look pretty confused, even mumbo jumbo), well they add insult to injury by invoking talk of a theory of applied ethics. There is said to 'appear to be a significant gap between the theory of applied ethics and its practice'; this is said to be why 'disillusionment has set in' now. While there may be a theory of applications, talk of a "theory of applied ethics" heaps confusion ('theory of') upon confusion ('applied ethics'). As for gaps (really, between the theory and practice of ethics), there are two, as we shall see; there is an ambiguity in 'gap'.

As for mumbo jumbo, try the following sentence:

'The teaching and practice of applied ethics has grown rapidly and in an unruly manner across many disciplines, with many practitioners now not possessing any depth of philosophical knowledge and expertise and, because of difficulties experienced with the theory and practice given, in some cases deciding that same is relevant.' Its sequel is easily unscrambled:

'We wish to hold a conference to explore this issue for the Australian community and its practical consequences.'

6. Thus, too, there is a two way process. Application feeds back to inform theory and to enrich the pure subject. With ethics, as we shall see, something similar or more dramatic happens. Field developments not merely may inform and enlarge the ethical theory; some may alter it irrevocably.

7. Of course not all adjectives function in this way, ~~but for instance without types of responded s.~~ Thus, e.g. possible, probable, alleged, putative, etc. 80

8. Examples include Wilson in *Biodiversity*, ^{and} Engel.

9. We try to ~~do~~ show as much elsewhere; ^{e.g. Sylvan 93} Routley and HTII. (e.g. Sylvan 93)

10. This is by no means all that is wrong with standard ethics. Another, important for field ethics, is the lack of an adequate theory of ethical dilemmas, confronting which is a main engine of progress in ethics.

11. See *Greening of Ethics*; also 'Ethics without humans. Philosophy without humans'. Observe that ^{such} repairs are not unique. in Sylvan 93

12. As to how this is accomplished, see the annular theory, reiterated in *Greening*. ethics

13. MacIver suggests 'that all the old codes are out of date and a satisfactory new one has still to be discovered. A lost moral code cannot be recovered, and a new one obtained, simply for the asking' (p.201).

14. Nothing, no paradigm shift ^{or} ~~as~~ revolution has effected the whole citadel of mathematics; none is likely to (even dialethism, more threatening than much else, because central areas can be protected by due qualification) / or rev

15. A different example: an isolated person has an extensive weeding tool in a weed invaded forest, with the only techniques available a broad-acre chemical defoliant.

16. For a classification of environmental positions along the lines of the three options, see Callicott *Introduction*, where attention is also drawn to shortcomings in the applied idea.

17. On extraneous issues in ethics, including especially field ethics such as environmental ethics, see for a detailed treatment *Greening of Ethics*, part III. II

18. Among other things, philosophers did not act, did not respond to incipient demand, fast enough in organising appropriate structures for delivery of field ethics.

19. See esp. Edwards, ~~*Ethics without Philosophy*~~ (1)

20. MacIver continues 'and for this reason this conception of the task of moral philosophy is unlikely to be popular in the profession.' There are two troubles with the tack: firstly, field ethics do not - should not - exhaust ethics; secondly, field ethics are enjoying some popularity.

21. The proposition, from the circulated Conference announcement, that field ethics might rejuvenate a flagging philosophy, that they *had* 'given philosophy a rebirth' can hardly be taken seriously (for all that they may have given jaded philosophy departments a fillip). Concrete working examples and dilemmas might stimulate ethical investigation, but would only exceptionally impact ~~an~~ ethical theory; and moreover ethics itself has but rarely been a source of growth and development in philosophy. /

Field practitioners, who often have their own expansionist and imperialist ambitions and programs, are unlikely to let a service subject be supplied from elsewhere unless they cannot yet manage the subject themselves and then only so long as times are good so they do not need the jobs and can avoid chores involved.

22. Interestingly there has been no similar fuss from professionals regarding the attrition of logicians within philosophy (for which some of them have responsibility), or the on-going loss of logic to computing science and mathematics.

23. It is for this sort of reason that philosophy in Australia, unlike that in parts of USA, missed the field van. 17

24. See Sylvan 1986, ~~*The Greening of Ethics*~~, ^{Sylvan 91} *From Wisdom to Wowserism*.

25. A problem in fact exacerbated under prominent ethical positions, e.g., crude utilitarian^{ism} fostering "greed is good" notions, ~~most~~ ^{and} social Darwinism encouraging cut-throat competition.