

1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: on the contrary, there are all too many, though none are legitimate. The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence-sitting position. Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly based anarchism, which can both fault arguments for the State and produce a case against the State.

A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin,¹ is that of State and Church. This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly on organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil.

Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. And it can be succeeded, by alternative social arrangements.

2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest-destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).

The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argument, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve).

But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case form, considering each function in turn.² In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio), most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally

held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals.

As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus - is detached.

State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. They do not. Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of the State's propping up of gross ^{inequalities} ~~inequities~~.³ A community which seriously limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes gross ^{ali} ~~inequities~~ in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distribution. ¶ This then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical

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and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion.

3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where individuals will not agree or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can furnish.⁴ In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others' contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed.

A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.⁵ Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. But if both confess they would each receive 4 years. The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:-

Strategies	Prisoner 1	
	S(ilence)	C(onfess)
Prisoner 2	S	-1, -1
	C	0, -8
		-8, 0
		-4, -4

The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.

4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.⁶ Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.⁷

A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would undoubtedly be much higher.⁸ The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and devious, ^{many} State arrangements involved in providing public goods, ~~such as taxation,~~ would not succeed either). That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first, suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on.

The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count

is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence. And ^{having} sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.⁹

5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED. What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also damaging if unresolved, ^{and that they are resolvable} ~~but resolved~~ by State intervention, and only so (optimally) resolved, ^{it has to be shown} ~~and finally~~ that in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situations than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ. The selection of Dilemmas ^{itself} provides an example: ^{of such} after all there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of ~~violence or feuds~~ family feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention.

There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests.¹⁰ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required.

Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate.¹¹ Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering^{to agreements}, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives is known (should they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is used even by the State, e.g. gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. But at no stage is the State required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons.

In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.¹² But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).

g ✓ Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations has very extensive effects,¹³ many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma³ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as ^{in the case of} ~~with~~ the working ^{the prisoners} example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). These points lead also to further arguments against the State.

8 " to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimization). But institutional checks which operate only insofar as a "system" acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those "checked", are not really checks at all.

5 / n The problem of controlling the power of the State, usurping and preventing the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.

8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. A person is responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent. Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each ^{such} occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside, ~~but~~ determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. It implies, that is, moral autonomy. Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because another so directs. In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free.

x ~ A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on ^{if the argument is sound,} personhood implies ¹⁸ anarchism.

It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism. On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation.

9. THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. The replacement argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted.

There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,¹⁹ and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic arrangements within the State structure.²⁰

10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism—according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrangements will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation—is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society which these theoretical arguments ^{delineate} will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic ^{and} power. A community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all.

While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer no detailed blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.

11. STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETY : THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL OF REPLACEMENT BY AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE. The main strategy, emerging from the First Way, is that of replacement : transition to a new anarchist social order proceeds by replacement or adoption of the more satisfactory State organisations and structures by organisations and structures of a more anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements.

Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change and succession as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such a model is in turn very suggestive. To make the model more definite, and to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a sub-tropical rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism replaces a Statist society. There is certainly a marked change in structure, typically from a tall forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact closed forest with more layers of vegetation, much more local diversity and a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms. A forest is not merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence, not merely on one another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects, seed-carrying birds and animals, and so on; and the changes in structure include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus and bacterial content.

The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced evolution, or by catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is clearfelled and artificially succeeded by planted rainforest. (Strictly, there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between evolutionary and revolutionary, and various different revolutionary strategies; and the standard evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.)

Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be very slow by human time scales, may require some (management) practices, else evolution towards rainforest will not begin or continue. For example, seeds for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining areas have been stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion, in which case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas, methods, arrangements, etc.). And rainforest evolution may not be able to

12. APPLYING THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL. How to apply the model is not difficult to see in broad outline, and many of the further details have been filled out by work that can be described as indicating how allegiance can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social arrangements and life-styles built on self-management and mutual aid.²²

The seeds of anarchism should be broadcast or planted, anarchist (nonStatist) arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts made to replace or *modify* vulnerable Statist arrangements. Some of the practices are familiar : anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist) cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc. Others are slightly less familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond State reach such as costless (or alternative currency) interchanges of goods and services, action directed at removing decision-making from State departments, such as forest services, and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to decentralized local communities. In this sort of way worthwhile State arrangements can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from the State, and returned to the community and to people more directly involved.

(e.g. by democratization of present institutions and development of nonstatist and noncapitalist alternatives.)

FOOTNOTES

1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, especially p. 139. Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. Replacement is not of course uniquely determined. Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary. For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism ~~(also reprint of Nomos XIX)~~, New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
4. Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' (M. Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are not merely ecogistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum" quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,

unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980.

5. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation into smaller communities. The figures given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation.
7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social Theories, Self Management, and Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980.
8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-Managing Environment, Allison & ^KBar~~B~~sbys, London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.

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('In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.)

9. Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.

10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modern economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition) ^{in Taylor. For a further} see Routley, op. cit., p. 250 ff. criticism of such false dichotomies,
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining regions.
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State', 'upon which' Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' (p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p. (209).
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. Wolff's argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.

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THE IRREFUTABILITY OF ANARCHISM

1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: on the contrary, there are all too many, though none are legitimate. The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence-sitting position. Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly based anarchism; ~~which can both fault~~ ^{it} arguments for the State ^{showing none are viable,} and ~~produce~~ ^{incisive} ~~develops an~~ case against the State.

A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin,¹ is that of State and Church. (1) This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly on organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; ^{and thence to its officers} how it is of the same category as business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil. (2)

Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. And it can be succeeded, by alternative social arrangements. (3)

2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest-destructive pine planting and woodchip projects).

The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argument, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve).

But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case form, considering each function in turn.² In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio), most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally

held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals.

As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus - is detached.

State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. They do not. Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of the State's propping up of gross inequities.³ A community which seriously limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes gross inequities^{ali} in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distribution. ¶ This then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical

as paragraph

and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion. (4)

3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where individuals will not agree (5) or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can furnish.⁴ In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others' contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. (6)

A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.⁵ Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. But if both confess they would each receive 4 years. The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:-

Strategies		Prisoner 1	
		S(ilence)	C(onfess)
Prisoner 2	S	-1, -1	-8, 0
	C	0, -8	-4, -4

The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent.

4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.⁶ Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.⁷

A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would undoubtedly be much higher.⁸ The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and devious, ^{many} State arrangements involved in providing public goods, ~~such as taxation~~, would not succeed either). That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first, suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on.

The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count

is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence. And ^{having} sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State.⁹

5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED. What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also damaging if unresolved, ^{and that they are resolvable} but resolved by State intervention, and only so (optimally) resolved, ^{it has to be shown} and finally ^{itself} that in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situation than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ. The selection of Dilemmas ^{of such} provides an example: after all there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of ^{violence or} family feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention.

There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests.¹⁰ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required.

Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate.¹¹ Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering ^{to agreements}, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives is known (should they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is used even by the State, e.g. gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. But at no stage is the State required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons.

In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.¹² But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs).

Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations has very extensive effects, many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma ¹³ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as with the working ^{in the case of the} example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State ^{prisoners} may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). These points lead also to further arguments against the State.

6. THE SECOND WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM PROBLEM RECURRENCE^{and aggravation}. The solution by the State to problems of social organisation repeats or generates in more dangerous form the very problems introduction of the State was designed to solve, including new Dilemmas. Suppose, for instance, the secular State really were introduced in order to solve Prisoners' Dilemmas - introduced as opposed to inherited from the religious State and the Church, and maintained to prop up privilege and foster objectives that are not in its communities' interests - then the array of States generates new Prisoners' Dilemmas, which there is no Super-State to resolve by coercion. Suppose, as the myth has it, the State really were introduced in the interest of order and stability and to curb violence; then the arrays of States resulting more than negates these advantages, with instability, disorder and violence on a grander scale than before the emergence of modern secular States.¹⁴

7. THE THIRD WAY : THE OVERSHOOT ARGUMENT, FROM THE INADEQUACY OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON STATE POWER. Having ceded a monopoly on power to the State, in order to resolve some dilemmas, some of them arising from an inequitable distribution of power, what controls or balances the power of the State? A Super-State. And its power? There is a vicious infinite regress if the reply to the question "What controls the controller?" is "a further controller".¹⁵ The only promising way of avoiding this problem - other routes lead (even more) directly to totalitarianism - is by having the first of these controllers, the State, answer back to those in whose interests it is allegedly established, those of the society or group of communities it controls. This implies democratic methods of some kind. Others go further: 'democracy [is] the only known means to achieve this control, the only known device by which we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power'.¹⁶ In this event, control has mostly failed. Democracy is extremely attenuated, even in those states that claim to practice it. The exercise of power in modern "democratic" states - much increased power reaching deep into peoples' lives, power which has passed to certain political elites and is directed at the attainment of such objectives as economic growth and material "progress" - is often channelled through 'non-elected authority' and 'is not democratic in the traditional meaning of the term'.¹⁷ In any case, indirect democratic and other institutional checks are tenuous in as much as they depend ultimately on the toleration of those who have direct control of the forces of the State. Experience seems to show that such toleration will only be shown so long as democratic procedures deliver results that are not too disagreeable, that are broadly in accord with what those who control the coercive power are prepared

Locke

to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation). But institutional checks which operate only insofar as a ^{§?} "system" acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those "checked", are not really checks at all.

The problem of ~~controlling~~ ^{§?} the power of the State, ~~usurping~~ ^{§?} and preventing the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation.

8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. A person is responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent. Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each ^{such} occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside, ^{but} determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. It implies, that is, moral autonomy. Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because another so directs. In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free.

A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on personhood implies ^{if the argument is sound,} anarchism. 18

It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism. On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation.

9. THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. The replacement argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted.

There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives,¹⁹ and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic arrangements within the State structure.²⁰

10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism—according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrangements will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation—is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society which these theoretical arguments ^{delineate} will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic and power. A community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all.

Connecting
arguments
to types

FOOTNOTES

1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, especially p. 139. Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin.
2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. Replacement is not of course uniquely determined. Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913.
3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary. For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism *(reprint of Nomos, XIX)*, New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4.
4. Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' (M. Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are not merely *egoistic* (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum" quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons,

unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980.

5. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation into smaller communities. The figures given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5.
6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation.
7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social Theories, Self Management, and Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980.
8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self-Managing Environment, Allison & Bartsby, London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations.

('In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308.)

9. Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93.

10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5.
11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries".
12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modern economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition) in Taylor. For a further criticism of such false dichotomies, see Routley, op.cit., pp.250 ff
13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity.
14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining regions. X
15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument.
16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State', 'upon which' Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' (p. 129).
17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p. 211.
18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. Wolff's argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff.

While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer no detailed blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives.

19. Documented in The Anarchist Collectives (edited S. Dolgoff), Free Life Editions, New York, 1974.
20. As B. Martin boldly asserts, 'The advantages of self-management and alternative lifestyles are many and significant. And these alternatives are entirely feasible: there is plenty of evidence and experience to support their superiority over the present way society operates. The obstacles to self-management and alternative life styles are powerful vested interests and institutional resistance to change', Changing the Cogs, Friends of the Earth, Canberra, 1979, p. 6.
21. As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley, p. 284 ff.