

There are no deep green political arrangements.
All prevailing arrangements and all standard political theory are environmentally shallow. That includes most green and ecopolitical theory.

Being green involves ^{serious} commitment to action on environmental problems. Depth has two ^{elements} parts: avoidance of shallowness, by acknowledgement that intrinsic value is distributed through nonhuman nature, value that does not accrue back to ~~the~~ humans; and second, recognition, rejection of a greater value assumption that human values always exceed ~~all~~ others.

Indeed it is ~~even~~ contended that this is inevitably so. Some of the defective arguments appear to show as much as still arguments can manage.

0. New introduction

not about ~~that~~ get in w/ to institutions.

lead in to discussing with several for change ①

explain green and deep

types of opposites within deep green

and of

type-down
bottom-up

short term
long term

② at end: type p.3. are moving past transitional realities.

green environment.

use in abstract

green — commitment to environmental problem

deep — intrinsic value is to itself
throughout active life to act
around back to know.

regiment of justice who arranged

all preceding political concepts are checked,
as is not deep reason.

next political theory, in building

Widened popular disconnection with present arrangements

Movements for change including some change

lead by some by

— politicians all about —
regime

but bent, mixed — rights not grasped

— economic

single religious institution, in spirit ways.

Nothing includes more actual working.

black movement.

Prevailing political values

usually with historical

Power to thinking as

any of changing them with
actual social adjustment

some lines
upward
inwardly
26

aid: 'dramatic resemblance
as in collard, celoid, rhomboid

NOTES

Organization is of essence — as against superficial anarchism

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches if environmental
regulation is prove adequate.

DEMOCRACY

Social to certain helps in
needed more from

interest based to welfare based arrangements.

Several connected changes: individualist → collective.

What forms work will depend
critically on the energy, character and
dispositions of the active political agents
within, and even those outside such
community. Certainly it will also depend on the
structures within which they operate. Neither is in general
sufficient; serious action, energy is a superior
framework any but not survive, a ~~few~~
promising structure with ill-disposed actors, or
structure can otherwise achieve bad results.

... a new democratic public sphere of empowered,
decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of
national and regional state structures to facilitate
legal, economic, educational and cultural values and
practices, to support those local citizens lacking in
material and cultural resources, and to settle the many
disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of
any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local,
direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures
at the national level will make life for traditional
political parties very difficult if not impossible. This
development is to be applauded because too many citizens
in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of
the possibilities of democratic participation and often
equate democracy with voting rituals⁸². *Frankel pp 290-7 The Post Industrial*

AFTER P2.

RE MIX &
LEVEL

goodish

Clayton Blackwell 1987.

Where there are other
requirements than democratic
convergence (as there would normally be)
then these are ensured in other ways
than democratic procedures,
e.g. by constraints such as
constitutional arrangements which are
much more difficult to change.

In short, power is limited, by division and
checking, so groups cannot acquire
unopposed power by democratic means.

MIXING. There is no reason why there should not be a mix of
methods and procedures, e.g. participatory democracy operating at
some between level places, voting on some issues etc.

cf

Barber.

public policies is involved in one or other project. Artterton's
study shows the promise of some ways of using technology to
stimulate and enhance the impact and quality of citizen
participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the
local level⁶⁷. Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of
a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to
revitalise local participation and local political power in his
vision of 'strong democracy'. As one of a range of far-
reaching reforms, including the establishment of 'neighborhood
assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications
cooperative to regulate and oversee the civic use of new
communications technology and to supervise debate and
discussion of referendum issues'⁶⁸.

B. Barber Strong Democracy, 11 Calif Press Berkeley 1984
FC Artterton Teledemocracy Sage, Beverly Hills, 1984.

ANARK

DALEMMMA

A FUNDAMENTAL ~~PROBLEM~~ FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES

There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according ~~for example~~ to Saward. ^{for one} For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed.

This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which ^{the theory} typically ^{sponsors} supports, is put in a sharp form as follows:¹

Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will yield a way of protecting environments?

However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect.² It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcome ^{occur} happens, for instance as in what has been called a "paradox of democracy" where a constituency elects an antidemocratic tyrant.³

A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a ^{destructive} strong version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he ^{darkly} calls 'dark green'). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green theory. In clearest form, the version ^{turns} as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication:

The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the 'intrinsic value' of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which

¹ Goodin condensing Saward p.168.

² (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.)

³ Such *paradoxes of democracy*, and *varieants* thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in UTD.

INTO
TEXT

make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or 'direct democracy' in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents.⁴

As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideration^{um}, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is "implied" and what supersedes consistency. As more than a century of Hegelian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes. ^{um} / ^e

A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like ^a absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected) ^{, e.g. as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy} is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.⁵ Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. ^a / ^m

^{um.} A first illustration is directed against Porritt:

A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like 'local production for local need', 'low consumption', 'labour-intensive production', and 'voluntary simplicity' (other items from Porritt's list).⁶ ^m / ^a

Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convert ^{since it is} (an up-grading by high redefinition), ^{cp} to twist goals, programs, and principles—through 'imperative goals' and the like—into 'imperatives', 'prescribed outcomes', undeniable principles, ^u ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. ^u / ^u

A second example looks at an alleged

contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. 'Grassroots democracy' is one of the four 'basic principles' of the party's 'global conception'. Another is the 'ecological': 'Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature'. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.⁷

⁴ Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5.

⁵ Cf. p.12 essay.

⁶ [Reference]

⁷ [Reference]

The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that 'certain outcomes are proscribed'. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however splendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a micro^{scon}-ception too ^{about} what principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ^{not} '...principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] 'laws of nature', against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board'. ^{we} Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.).

To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for ^{so} information of a newspaper ^{or} repeat to other newspapers).

Frankel accuses Bahro of an 'anti-democratic' vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of 'givens'. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives'⁸

In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological "given", stand, they remain 'desirable in an ultimate sense', but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no 'anti-democratic vision', but rather an unecological ^aprox, which principled greens will work to change.

The route is accordingly barred to Sayward's important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.⁹

What Sayward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions.

⁸ [Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward's case is being presented. The last part of Saward's essay contains much ~~fill~~ and a good deal of garbage.

⁹ [ref].

... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.¹⁰

Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no ⁿinteral or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^wself-disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any "will" of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole ^uworld obtain. It should not be required that there are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. ^IIt is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no guarantees), ^aenabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on.

In the end, Saward too recognises the ^{or}popul^es power of attitudinal change, thereby removing ^{himself}, his previous loading of authoritⁱarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspective [^{and} others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that 'political change will only occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking'. By ^abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.¹¹

But he overstates the attitudinal point, with 'only...the case'. People can be politically led (^aretardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under ^{iss}permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. ^{we're still, his}And ^athe ^{al}find ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may including ^acoming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans.

¹⁰ Of course it is now put in terms of "imperatives"; it ^would be better express^{ed} in terms of principles, policy objectives or the like.

¹¹ [Ref. and page]

4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures.


The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of *structure*, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, '*structure*: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something'. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of *relations* of elements and parts.

Remarkably, the same sort of *problem-generating structures* occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-dissipating structure.

To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Ω given by *one* order relation R , where R may itself *depend* on item c in Ω , i.e. $R = R_c$. For example, where Ω is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Ω is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an *order*, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like $\leq$) reflexive or (if like $<$) symmetric, on its range. The system $\langle \Omega, R \rangle$ is a simple ordered structure, or a *frame*. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A *cap* or *top* t of such a system is an element such that all items of Ω bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Ω . (The notion, that of *supremum*, and likewise *maximum*, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Ω .³³)

Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops.

Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory.



$$\Omega = \{+2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2\}$$


$R = \text{---}$ is as shown by arrows.

$T = \{+0, +1, +2\}$ is a *truth* component

Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of

³³ A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T).

Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of *central* control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements *answer* to t.



Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under *decapitation* so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without "anarchy" or chaos, because there is order), *anencephalic* structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.³⁴

Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against *absolutes* of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and *objectives* of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:³⁵

centralism
elitism
statism


in

decentralism
egalitarianism
anarchism

³⁴ Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.

³⁵ For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10.

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centralism		decentralism
elitism		egalitarianism
statism	in	anarchism
absolutism	rough	pluralism
realism	contrast	nonrealism
objectivism	respectively	nonjectivism
	with	
maximizing rationalism		satisfizing rationalism

Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of

³⁴ Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way.

³⁵ For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10.

actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The *argument* here *against centralism and statism* takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose.

Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.³⁶

³⁶ Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Burnheim 85 (where *demarchy* and much else of reference is explained) and Sylvan 95.

/reference