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PART 1. CRITICAL EXPOSITION


Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION.

THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY

Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form.

Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very loosely-knit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following (double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):-

Diagram 1. Basic Double Pyramid




The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join. The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C) and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred philosophical source, *ecosophy* - another theory elaborated by Naess, who again coined the term - which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels 3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for

understanding DE. While the upper pyramid gives³ the theoretical or intellectual content and sources of DE, the lower pyramid supplies *working* DE, and core principles and the practice.

1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms

Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in the following diagram:-



The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8-point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE position, and fails to develop others.¹ There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing “the” platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed.

DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known.

¹ The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II).

Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form.²

1. <i>Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value:</i>	The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent value, etc. These value are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. <i>Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues:</i> these values and are also values in	Richness and diversity of life-forms contribute to a realisation of themselves
3. <i>Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:</i>	Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. <i>Human interference with natural world excessive:</i> non-human world is excessive	Present human interference with the and the situation is rapidly worsening.
5. <i>Policies and basic structures must be changed:</i>	Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures.
6. <i>Human (values compatible with) population decrease:</i> decrease of the human	The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial population. Flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
7. <i>Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:</i>	The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness.
8. <i>Obligation to attempt implementation:</i>	Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes.

² The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation adopts the presentation of Naess in *Resorg* ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess. A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70.

The principles have been rendered, and grouped⁵, to make their structure and interconnections a little clearer. Principles 1 and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula: roughly,

human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology. Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally, principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point platform, *8-point principles* as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct application to level 4, individual lifestyles.

Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, *resistance* principles. Indeed, in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have led to the assault on the natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of shallow or reform environmentalism:

TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS SOURCES, TAOISM.

DOMINANT (WESTERN) PARADIGM (DE)	SHALLOW ECOLOGY	DEEP ECOLOGY (DE)	TAOISM
Domination over nature	Stewardship of Nature	Harmony with Nature	Elaboration of DE
Nature an exploitable resource: intrinsic value confined to	As for , but with nature a manager resource	Natural environment valued for itself	Much as for DE; "humanism" rejected
Human supremacy	Human ascendancy	Biocentric egalitarianism	Differs from DE; wide impartiality
Ample resources substitutes	Some resource limitations	Earth supplies limited	Supplies ample
Material economic growth a predominant goal	Sustainable development	Non-material goods especially self-realization	Following Tao-te
Consumerism	Optimised consumerism	Doing with enough/ recycling	Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate)
Competitive lifestyle	As for DP	Cooperative lifeway	Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity
Centralised/urban-centred/national focus	As for DP	Decentralized/ bioregional/ neighborhood focus	As for DE
Power structure hierarchical	Largely as for DP	Non-hierarchical/ Grassroots democracy	Hierarchy without Power structure
High technology	More careful high technology	Appropriate technology	Limited technology

Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can be called³, differs from the dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich, powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as well as of cultural ideologies).

Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor). These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:-

9. *Biospheric egalitarianism* [in principle]: ‘all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom’. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on a self-realisation component to this principle, of *biocentric equality* as they call it: namely ‘and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Self-realisation’ (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the ‘basic intuition is that *all organisms* and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, *are equal in intrinsic worth*’ (p.67, continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the “equal rights to” formulation.) But it encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the rider: *in principle* . ‘Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle,

³ For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative conditions of the word ‘shallow’.

although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.’ (DS p.67).

10. *Self-realisation* . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other forms of life. It ‘can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of “self-in-Self” where “Self” stands for organic wholeness’ (DS p.67).

Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle.

11 *Biospheric identification* . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or ecosystem. Such “identification” is a significant method of heightening

12. *Ecological consciousness* . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness, appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message.

13. *Holism*. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modern holism according to which there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological circles.

2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras

Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform.

Among the principles not enunciated are these:-

- *Non violence*.

The new themes, several of them peripheral to the main concerns of DE include the following:-

- Deep ecology offers *a green synthesis*. It ‘combines the “Social Greens” with the “Natural Greens” avoiding the extremes of both’ (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What Naess means, above all, is that DE does not neglect humans, and their legitimate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the

Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do.

Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more through-going animal liberation, such as:-

- a severe reduction of food to the enslavement, confinement and slaughter of animals.
- vegetarianism (of some form).

Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northernness brought up in the hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit sharply slaughter of other creatures.

3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement.

Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has *many*). The most that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The platform represents 'what *most* supporters have in common at a deep level'⁴ No doubt supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for omissions.

But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental activity or involvement therewith. *Inclusion* in the movement does not even require strict adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of parts of it. Talk of *membership* of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system).

⁴ Naess R p.3, italics added.

It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere, US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled (as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements). Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals. In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers, reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau.⁵ Muir is regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans.⁶

There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the honorific status. One is a dislike of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted.⁷ Another motive, linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentic DE. It concerns the insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea

⁵ In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunphy, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalist or conservationists. But, quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (proto)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's *Wilderness and the American Mind*, because these are written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's report on Nash's third edition, *Ecorates*, pp23-9.

⁶ See, for instance, Devall *Ecorates*. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt.

⁷ Or otherwise admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetence, or deterred by qualms about significant propositions (human populations restraint esp.).

is avoid the ‘devastating’ ‘tendency to dogmatism’: ‘there is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society’. Likewise there is no definite or definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not.

In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views⁸ But such movements have intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems, on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people.

⁸ In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It has *moved* (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability, assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics.

PART II

CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY

Chapter 5.

THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY?

WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST?

Deep ecology *appears*, on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover *which* elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult - though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.^o On the other hand, many notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism which deep ecology of the American texts will turn out to resemble.

What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary codification what was already in the air,^{*} wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in

^o In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science.

^{*} See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns, philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do.

1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original principles.[†]

Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned with environmental *values*¹, it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The *Deep Ecologist*, a network newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans' place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of *deep experiences*, often of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature). According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page,

Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric.

Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology *Deep Ecology*², a person - and consciousness-oriented soufflé (drawn from Devall):

"What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise³]. The person is not above or outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organisation.

[†] The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter.

¹ Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), '... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully *normative*. They express a value priority system ...'. But even this core claim is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not evaluative.

² This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced recently: see references.

³ See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below.

Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is *knowing*. From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement').

Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the *gesalt* theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject - including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology.⁴ But Devall has been much encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism. Thus according to Sessions,

If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy III).

But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be *an* underlying base for the deep ecology platform.

Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74):

Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical beliefs (Passmore 83).

⁴ Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B.

Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to say biased. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct - Western tradition is far from uniform, and there are other traditions: deep ecology can remain, and is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be.

As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad vague way is how the label often functions, honorifically. That is, for instance how it functions in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who call themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below).

Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner.⁵ Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Attending a consciousness-raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does *not* ensure a deepened environmental position, though it *can* be a step on the way.

While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in

⁵ I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources.

several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed.

Recently⁶, it has become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustable) platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to turn no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there is an evident desire, among the prophets, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, *appear* to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.

There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over, and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement, many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere (in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other old-consciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use.

⁶ Since the first critique was produced

Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.⁷ A striking example is Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, *The Ecology of Freedom*, said to be a "book of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much the *old* (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues, Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology.⁸ Ecologically Bookchin, like other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, *part* of the problem with the selection of prophets, is that mechanism is seen as the main bogey - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates *some sort* of environmental way, gets accounted deep.

Naess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote "supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin (RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential features of DE, biospheric egalitarianism and self-realisation, and though it does not require depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement *have in common*' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the principles of the distinguished platform (in *some* approved formulation) *adherents* of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) *holding to* that much of the platform. They may not be *members* of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an

⁷ See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', *Earth First!* 4(8) (1984). Several of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise.

⁸ See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342, middle.

adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view?

With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to economical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of *silent adherents* as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think there are excessively many excessively interfering humans of Caucasian stock).

The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances *no* details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation Naess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed'⁹. The reasoning does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,

6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of

⁹ RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old, famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do.

a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by, point 7.

6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology.

6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions.

Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.

Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed *much* further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g. DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from *all* the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization *is* an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.

The idea of *progress* is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously...dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should *progress* towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology").

So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. *If* DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpenetration of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics¹⁰, tended to become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental thought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of *different* positions, not their mergence.

Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:-

Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists¹¹. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured

¹⁰ Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and signs of change.

¹¹ The useful category of *moral extensionism* derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE.

abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality).

Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions).

Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary, unenforceable and arbitrary.

Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its

more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults.

We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a specific version, *authentic* deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology. But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is afforded through the greater value assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'. For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy, "the great chain of being".¹² According to Drengson, circumstances

Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7).

Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place in an important ecosystem.¹³

Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally lapses badly from the authentic way.¹⁴ It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal Naess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes

¹² See *The Trumpeter* 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism Drengson is trying to meet, is another.

¹³ Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases, which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in Routley² 79.

¹⁴ A most striking example is Naess's *Rescequence* article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating", what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub..... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of its sentences *not quite in forming* with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute, italics added).

of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrinal instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement.

- Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one.¹⁵ Given that there are a range of societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of that rich and variety plurality.

What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE ... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate several of the points emancipated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the obligation to action (of point 8).

- 'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to compenish for presentation of the basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the 'This is what I mean by ...' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn criterion/definition distinction.¹⁶ But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact Naess lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a satisfactory questionnaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out, DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of

¹⁵ This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one.

¹⁶ There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was serious in his (otherwise absurd) opening remarks in the R..... article about looking forward to hobnobbing with the aristocracy.

shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading).

- Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you *articulate the principles of the Deep Ecology Movement* you get a *total view*. The term "total view" is essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (*Res*, p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, Naess takes what seems to be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- - you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what *are* the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE required for a total view are those of *all levels* of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but these will vary, in ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different, and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles.

But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view. But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion (for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive (world) view that is not reflected at *any* of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what *would* present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to of topics it does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE,

operate in a total view. Naess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more likely to reveal how fragmentary the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the notion of a “total view”, drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the notion is open to (damaging) questioning. “Total view” comprehends too much, fixes too much that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to “totalitarian view” for real pluralistic comfort.

There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as with the premature discarding of material “goods”), the notions involved should at least be disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled.

More generally, it is not merely valuable, but quite essential in serious intellectual assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for *lots* of purposes, including explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism.

A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of the deep ecology messages, and isolating *core* themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of deep ecology to population theory¹⁷, and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the Appendix to this chapter):-

¹⁷ In Routley 84.

Figure 5.1. SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY SCHEMATIZED.

	SHALLOW	DEEP	ENVIRONMENTAL SUBJECT
VALUE CORE	SOLE VALUE ASSUMPTION GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION	(INTRINSIC) VALUES-IN-NATURE BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY	
FURTHER PHILO- SOPHICAL BASES	(separable theoretical underpinning)		ETHICS ASETHETICS
i. GROUND OF VALUE	FEATURES OF HUMANS	DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF NATURAL (LIFE) FORMS	
ii. METAPHYSICAL	INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS BACKDROP	IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS. NATURE AS INTEGRAL	METAPHYSICS
iii EPISTEMIC	REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT	HOLISTIC/GESTALT/FIELD ACCOUNT	EPISTEMOLOGY
LARGER ENCOMPASSING AND INFORMING THEORY	EMPIRICISM, IDEALISM, POSITIVISM ← DIFFERENT FACETS → OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ...	ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM, AMERICAN NATURALISM	IDEOLOGY/ RELIGION
VALUE (DEONTIC AND ACTION) COLLARIES	EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTERESTS AND PURPOSES . . .	LIMITED INTERFERENCE AND RIGHTS THERETO . . .	LIFESTYLE
ACTION (META-) PRINCIPLE	←OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS→		
APPLICATIONS (AS COROLLARIES)	To population, (individual) consumption, (individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution, economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation, science, education; and to the variety of natural (and some artificial) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere, arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ...		POLICY ECONOMICS POLITICS

Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism. Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as

supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is independent of every account, since *some* (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world, and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later.


But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive, philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which *can* be supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory. But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing analogues of shallowness into deep ecology.

APPENDIX

1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology?

In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge. Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy.

Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures



But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these, to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:- Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the *intersection* of theories, giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories are put together - the *union* of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep ecological paradigm.

As you might have anticipated by now, this *thematic method* hardly worked to perfection. Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it

reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned under the “deep” heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is *one* of the many problems with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to think deeper than the assumption of *Environment Z-land*, for instance, that the environment should be managed *for* present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice.

Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is implied by what is *said* concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the ‘life quality of humans’ and to our ecological dependence might suggest).

The results are tabulated, as follows:

Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources.

Naess 73	Naess 83	Naess-Sessions 84	Devall 79	ROUGH CLASSIFICATIONS
	Intrinsic value (1)	Intrinsic value of life (1)		VALUE CORE
Biological egalitarianism (2)				
Diversity/richness(3) Complexity not complication (6)	Diversity/ richness (2)	Diversity/ richness (1)	Diversity (10)	FOUNDATIONS AND BASES
Total field holism (1)			New person/planet metaphysics (1) Objective approach to nature (2)	
	No negative interference rights, excepting vital needs (3)	No negative interference, etc. (3)	Earth wisdom, limited interference	VALUE AND ACTION COROLLARIES
	Action obligation (6)	Action obligation (8)	More leisure (13)	
	Present interference excessive (4)	Present human interference excessive (5)		POLICY AND LIFESTYLE APPLICATIONS
	Policy adjustments to economic and ideological structures (5)	Policy adjustments, etc. [Also to technological structures (6) Objective life quality rather than higher living standard (7) World population reduction (4)	Interim policy steady state (15),(18) Soft Technology (11) Life quality rather than quantity of products (6) Reduction of population to optimum (7) Emphasis on pollution and like topics counterproductive (8) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (11),(14)	
Anti-pollution/ resource depletion (5) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (7) Anti-class posture (4)				
			New psychology (3) with rejection of dualisms: man/nature, subject/object, etc New philosophical anthropology (9) New objective	DISCOUNTED AREAS: NEW SUBJECTS

	science (4)	
	New education (12)	
Embedding in ecosophy	? Embedding in updated Spinoza (2)	EMBEDDING PHILOSOPHY/RELIGION

- NOTES: 1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources.
2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts and commentaries.
3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely reinstated.

Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially:

- The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a deviation which has been encountered before.
- The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable coherence.
- There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory.

In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a (sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more, the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since 1984.

Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading presentations of “the” deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called *the* deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely; but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion, about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:-

putative
substantial core

inconsistent
elements of putative union

What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic position has been made out other propositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements. And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a *spread* of positions, much as *the* contrasting dominant social paradigm does.

A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY:

a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique.

Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated and pursued by Naess, what I now call *authentic* deep ecology, at which my *Critique of Deep Ecology* was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also known as *transpersonal* ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall, Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania, also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively enthusiastic about transpersonal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian metaphysics – in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object, subjective/objective), and no separation of things.

Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses:

What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves. ... reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us [ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship (Review pp.87-8).

Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.)

In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/*Anima sive Natura*, or spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon

the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception, conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care. This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep ecology' (p.89).

Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology":

Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s] from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify" ...; and (ii) that the self can and does grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible *identification* and, hence, sense of Self. ... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Self-realisation" by Naess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions" and its cultivation – effective a spiritual discipline – is considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7).

This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'.

On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood what deep ecology *is* about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique leaves deep ecology ... largely *untouched*' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field.

On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and accordingly *should* be accounted a supporter of deep ecology (for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge to Western deep ecology, Naess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a

celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good old-fashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in new environmental and avant-gard attire. Drengson has the ability to lay on these obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring on that jumbled text, *Deep Ecology*:

Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract theories appreciate. ... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book, thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question, ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Self-realised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged).

The statement could almost have come straight out of modern romanticism; all the same elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment movement in contemporary gear.

Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions, such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live.

1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism.

Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his own (now called *transpersonal ecology**). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for

* Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and the like.

his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has seriously understood what deep ecology *is* about' (p.5).

Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not concerned with his position, except – in so far as it purported to be deep ecology – in passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much of it is but expanded self adulation.

Both Fox and Naess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist ending of the published version.¹ Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address (see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding, and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology. ... largely *untouched*' (p.5).

Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question, over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic

1 Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions). Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form.

stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap. But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible.

For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic, or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are 'insubstantial or vacuous' (what Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What of the last words, drawn from Eliot's *Four Quartets*, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I meant: *no correct doctrine*, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful ... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first place' (p.3); from *that* stance I still look upon them in that way.

On the final pluralistic ending what remains² are not the trumpeted major themes, which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added, furthermore, are *significant* variations upon some of the major themes; for instance ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism. Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why *object* to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand, but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a

2 Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of 'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest.

strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither essentially so.³

2. Value in deep ecology

Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an 'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52)⁴, I deny this. My critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation⁵, I do not 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of 'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response.

An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a *title* of a later section, 'Beyond the value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest, and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and

3 For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my *Deep Plurallism*.

4 For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see Edwards, *Ethics without Philosophy*.

5 For one example, see the jointly authored *The Fight for the Forests*.

the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a non-sequitur.⁶

Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have been verballled by Fox.⁷ While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology *is* ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30), that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is *primarily* that, but that it is that among other things;⁸ I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose that deep ecology was *primarily* or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as

6 As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were intended to suggest or *prima facie* do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest" conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the *suggestive fallacy*). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example (also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc.

In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called 'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps.

7 *Verbal* is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is certainly used by police gangs in some other states.

8 I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves ...' (Cp.1). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and *nothing* about primacy. Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is *extensive* (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the deep position.

'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and *many* other pages, sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86).

'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an *objective* position since its "core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes', which furthermore extend beyond the value part.⁹ Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or follows for Sylvan.¹⁰ On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims':

D1. '*deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying perception of the way things are"*'¹¹, and

D2. '*deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world*' (p.31, Fox's italics).

Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material *incompatible* with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism as regards D1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston, which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating here, as Rolston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be derived do not hold, both RD1 and RD2 fail. For example, Rolston's deep ecology is very

9 It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a values-in-nature position' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a values-in-nature position is not rubbish.

10 The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term *nonjective* was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or subjectivity.

11 The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not as perusal of fn.44 will show. D1 gains no support from anything I assert.

much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is Naess himself.

Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers. Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's "derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by 'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform) *without* adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it proceeds.

The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the metaphysical '*sources* that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33).

With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique (pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages 53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology' (p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting D1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily

polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input (therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy).

3 The extent of values-in-nature.

Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position) deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well, none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such.

Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as *direct* support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well, he didn't take *that* as direct support; what he *did* take as support is Naess's oft-repeated assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology ... express a *value* priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a value framework. Furthermore further evidence *is* adduced or alluded to both for the claim that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet (e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13 quoting Naess; the restriction of this axiom to cases '*when genuine conflicts of value are absent*' Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc).

Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?' (p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly

distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on.¹²

What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points. Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology.

The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one¹³. The 8-point platform is a central part of deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is a central part of a central part is indeed central.

It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ...' (quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the 8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerry-built structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal – down which goes my criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical,

12 It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work, both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique which indicates the value core.

13 Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6.

understandable to most persons) ‘formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical position. ... Thus, even such limited support for his “core claim” as Sylvan is able to find turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms’ (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as other than principles in a “neutral” formulation; I was, and am, ‘using the word “value” in a metaphorical or everyday sense’ (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical sense where it signifies *worth*. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a ‘formal philosophical position’ (p.49, p.51). It is not just that we are far removed from ‘the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms’; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever.

Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's “defence” lapses. He owes us an account of what a ‘formal philosophical expression’ would be, by contrast with what we have, and to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was “taking” the platform in that “mistaken” way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite philosophical work; I am surprised he got Sessions to go along with him in the intellectually disreputable ploy.

I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and Naess would not agree *philosophically* to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51). What on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as ‘basic principles of deep ecology’ (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are introduced as having ‘summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep ecology’ (p.69). If that doesn't make them *philosophical*, what in the deep ecological scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236). For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns ‘intrinsic value to every life form’ (89 p.164ff).

But I should make an admission; deep ecology *is bound* to be a values-in-nature position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained *depth* and what is meant by ‘values-in-nature’. That is *one* reason why I claim Fox's

transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature position.¹⁴

Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say, value expressions of “in-nature” cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the shallow/deep distinction is now “explained” (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but, to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in ‘use value for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)’). But Fox's main chance is the “value constellation” idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of the value end of the complex) some separation is required.

4 A biocentric ethic?

It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies ‘a biocentric ethic as opposed to an anthropocentric one’¹⁵, that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things, an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify – in a preliminary way:

A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought.¹⁶ Nor are the entirely dubious supporting considerations adduced in any way new: ‘ethics and morals were ... invented by one species to meet the needs of that species’ p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more

14 See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below.

15 Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days) certainly does.

16 For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17.

likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43); 'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar.

A*. *Retaining ethics*, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, *but*

B. *Downgrading the whole enterprise.* Such appears to be one of Naess's newer tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon. 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world. ... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear commission of the prescriptive fallacy¹⁷) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru).

B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded,

C. *Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded.* According to Fox, "conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41).¹⁸ That state of being is none other than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an "environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further, suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental *ethics*' p.44). But surely it is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics), because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional ethics – if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not) by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience – ought to be superseded, since the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all

17 Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts".

18 Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology... described as ... a position within ... "foundational ethics"' (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly ill-explained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113), and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does "foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage to be an *ethic*? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with "understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an *environmental ethic*!

decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect of a plurality of integrated techniques.

C*. Instead, a *radically new ethic* is designed. This is of course *part* of what deep-green and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now *no* definite position on the place of ethics (*pace* p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal. No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and needed for his arguments – explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) – but what he has supplied is an entertaining pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message.

It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas, Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works.

5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited.

The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included, shifting ground accordingly; similarly Naess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): ‘one of the first clear statements’ of ecosophy ‘that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ...’ (89, p.11). So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to ‘Sessions’ interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as “a statement of non-anthropocentrism” (p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, ‘rather than as a formal environmental axiological position’. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, ‘Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria

used to ascribe rights and value; it is a *reductio ad absurdum* of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentrism'¹⁹. This statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentrism is weaker than rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a *reductio ad absurdum* of all conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian principles, deep ecology loses much depth.

In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too much'! 'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are, however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference, "Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what Naess offers; it is pretty remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be, spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly) that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific, less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have *deliberately* chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at

19 Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is *not* ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how do we *mistake* what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to? Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position.

the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, “positive doctrines” are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning *reluctance* to harm other living beings (p.40).²⁰ Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has dropped out in this rather shallow evasion.

6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned “environmental axiological route”.

Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that ‘deep ecology is not [a] position within environmental axiology’ and that ‘it could be quite mistaken to think’ that deep ecology ‘stands outside ... value theory’. Whence inconsistency results, given that *axiology* has its normal technical sense.²¹ But there is evidence that Fox intends significantly more by ‘axiology’ than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure.

For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology²², is that critics are committed to ‘environmental axiological reductionism’, they ‘pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology’, so they are blind to what ‘deep ecology thinkers are really on about’, which (negatively) consists in ‘*rejection* of the “environmental axiological route”’ (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired in “ethical reductionism”, blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which

20 Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session, who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: ‘Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves’ (p.56). Unfortunately in the ordinary sense of ‘harm’ the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible impact on ourselves.

21 The word ‘axiology’ does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon become an issue: see below.

22 Yes, it remains an unduly adversarial intellectual game, part of the long British-scholastic history of philosophy.

has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the “axiological route”, is the hapless Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is largely explained through these features (p.52).

For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response.²³ The promise of explanation is not fulfilled. ‘Ethical reductionism’ is, like its successor ‘environmental axiological reductionism’, explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained. Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what ‘the vast majority of environmental philosophers’ are alleged to do, the pursuit of ‘environmental *philosophical* discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology’, may well reflect undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism). ‘Reductionism’ and ‘axiology’ are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to our purposes, does ‘ontology’. At least in the context of his “guiding stars” paper, parts of which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses ‘ontology’ to mean, not what it does mean, roughly ‘the general study of what exists’, but very differently, the ‘underlying perception of *the way things are*’, which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of metaphysics.

In those terms, ‘deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this attempt to shift the *primary* focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to ontology’ becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It is evident, by the way, *who* is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have

23 While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are attempted. Fox does at least *attempt* some “improvements” to get around the obvious objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the replacement of ‘ethical’ by ‘axiological’ or ‘environmental axiological’ or similar. So now, for instance, the journal *Environmental Ethics* is charged with reflecting environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper foundation.

also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not fulfilled in the case of ‘the vast majority of environmental philosophers’; apart from a small minority of philosophers associated with the “ethics without philosophy” idea here is nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological reduction program, pursued by consequentialists of various brands, but that is predominantly a program *within* ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed.

There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them, conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an “environmental axiological route”. In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that environmental philosophy comprises *much* more than ethics, certainly including parts of politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on.²⁴ Thus Sylvan, so far from ‘criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within environmental axiology’ (p.101), does not himself take the alleged “environmental axiological route”, as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a counter-charge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an “environmental axiological route” so also is (authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant here by ‘axiology’.

Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By ‘axiology’ and its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more. Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, ‘their meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting Angeles). So far so good. But now for the first twist and slide. ‘In the area of

24 See EP, e.g. p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!).

environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role.²⁵ ... On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as *environmental axiology* ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science, philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather similarly environmental ethics is much more *inaccurately* redescribed as environmental axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper conduct by way of further *principles* which are not themselves part of value theory. It is obvious that value theory does not in general *exclude* what is not (without further ado) a part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and empathetic procedures.

Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of avoiding it, are to begin to stand up.

25 Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only *one* way to try to develop an environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility, vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which *value* may (or may not) be subsequently be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right, for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed without proof, imposed as a demand, Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalcitrant theoretical problem of environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter.

We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories, which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as

- a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both
- exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are
 - positively formulated
 - which apply to all situations, and
- a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles.²⁶

Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the *extent* of ethics and moral theory that axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the *character* of the principles axiology (and, for that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on its own yields neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they may include *ceteris paribus* clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ...' are commonplace in ethics); and so on.

26 As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa; axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive *value*. As there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point.

7. The “case” against environmental axiology: ‘the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach’ (p.82).

Among the ‘serious problems’ encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way.

For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something can have value *in* itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable *to* itself, and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity to suffer (p.73)²⁷.

This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of *value in* to *valuable to* (or *of value to*). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such a transformation, *in itself* and *to itself* being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider them coupled respectively with such terms as *conspicuous*, *unusual*, etc.) But, in any event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly, there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like. Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up²⁸, but we can bypass most of them (e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on).

27 It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that *worse* can be found. For instance, what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be sentient, etc.

28 Fox subsequently announces the ‘link between something not mattering to itself ... and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value’ (p.80). It is a Church of his own fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be found.

Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered or, I suspect, any research basis) to most environmental ethicists²⁹: 'I do not see, however, how anything can have *intrinsic* value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion, as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his shallow proclivities: 'What difference *does* it make how I treat something if it cannot matter to itself?' (p.78) *Big* differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter, but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title 'powerful argument'. Its power 'is *evidenced* by the fact that those who want to say rocks or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it, were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a *general* argument can be developed from the semantical analysis of value).

The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by separating *conscious* from *sentient* (after all many people can now see that animals that are not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case, insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular thinking.³⁰ As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects.

29 There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that, once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional axiology.

30 The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of deep environmentalism (*pace* Fox p.74).

In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert (page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some enlightened deep ecologists) ‘typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only *possible* approach’ (p.79). This claim is, it seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g. Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss).

Fox continues unabashed: ‘In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something *if and only if* it “has” intrinsic value’ (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach *were* the only approach, no such obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or refutable as those given. The *if*-half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor for our attention. The *only-if*-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value. Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the things encountered have intrinsic value *or not*; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I ‘see fit’.

Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a simple – if appalling – solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into!

Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the inherent *limitations* of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about what we ought to care about. This alternative framework – from the many and various that might have been selected – is none other than the wider self identification framework. The *obvious* course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental axiological route" and getting to self immersion.

Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One example runs as follows: '... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent number from an abundant species Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from 'Frankena that communities (such as species ...) do not "have intrinsic value over and above that contained in ... [their] members"'.³¹ But he goes on to assert that, irrespective of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to *any* atomistic environmental axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or attaching to *individual* entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of

31 Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument (perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example, of monoculture *vs* diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82).

two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater, and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire.

Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges substantially unscathed; it does not need to be *replaced* by something else, such as wider identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller environmental philosophy.

8. Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification.

But Western deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its emphasis on ecological self and affirmation. Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89 again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been culturally neglected. Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep ecology, which is *ecologically* focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality (see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more authentic deep ecology in the style of Naess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory.

There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology. We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology – another wonder, or just more double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory (p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39).

Fox tries to explain “the search” of deep ecology ‘for such things as “ecological consciousness” (Devall and Sessions) and “Self-realisation” (Naess)’ through expanded identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions reductive explications:- ‘Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through *identification* with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the *identification and interpenetration* of self with ecosystem and biosphere’ (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). ‘The essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between Humans and Nature³²]’ for which ‘the important task is ... the psychological development from narrow egotistical “self” to *identification* with the whole’ (Devall as quoted p.53). But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that *ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion developments*.

Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense, ..., or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment of their environment, who have not developed the notion of *self* or, for that matter, that of *identification*. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in *our* ordinary understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion developments.

Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological consciousness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the picture.

32 Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency.

There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. *identification* in Fox, esp. p.60; *dimensions* of Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of *self*.

In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or “realisation”, at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an ontologically modest account of *acting* can afford a good example of how identification can operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed *better* in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves.

It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and separation, simply by *defining* ‘self’ through identification (and perhaps conversely): ‘succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify’ (p.54). There are serious obstacles to such a stratagem.

d Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where there are n objects, and so $2^n - 1$ complexes, and m individuals with selves (with $m \ll n$), there are, at first estimate, $m \times (2^n - 1)$ larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is *huge* where n is large. Moreover, if a person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it. A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys more success in this identification enterprise.

d It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires *that which* abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available.

d There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of *self*: whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of ‘self’. The proposal does not. Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures,

Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur ≠ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self.³³ Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal locus by *restrictive* identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary identification.

9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil.

Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the *problem of evil* identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the *reintrusion of value* is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely, that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks, or sand mining opportunities. Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons). Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia). *Such* expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged.

33 The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with *some* of the dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to an original meaning of 'self' as *same*, or *one and the same* used esp. prepositionally in referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity, certainly admits selves for forests!

There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the “widened identification route” introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve, and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to (p.53), the pernicious “environmental axiological route”. In a passage quoted from Seed part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to observe it: ‘*It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge*’ (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, “the whole process” is assumed Good, while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is *presupposed*. How furthermore does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is *no substitute* for valuation theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is *not* an entirely essential addition, however psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses. The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value.

Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable example. Hinduism supposes a *diminution* or deepening of the self to the underlying Self, a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things *sub specie aeternitas*).³⁴

34 Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self – as with stock aggrandizement, or Western deep ecology expansion – Indian approaches are concerned primarily with contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to *nothing* on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the (negative) suggestion is: ‘if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be nothing to disappoint’ (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand ‘the interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view Seeing, thus, all things “under the aspect of eternity”, would not one become completely objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's own?’ (p.26). ‘Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole – ... positive or negative ... ’ (p.27).

One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (*Brahman*), that through knowledge, *jnana yoga*, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and terminology. The ‘Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine realisation (to God). It is also the steepest’ (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and the like ‘Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations

While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to life-lines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result.

designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to] shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies behind... ' (p.33).

One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all strata of the mask [all roles of the *persona*] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [*Atman*] who stands beneath. The distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than that of the removal of roles and *personae*; thus there is the image of the game of life upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity with the Eternal Spirit ...' (p.35).

Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other, are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280). Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza).

Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the 'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the tantalizing doctrine of "no self", which at least denies the existence of a substantial self. Further there is allusion to "the two kinds of non-self": that means there is no ego in humans and no Self in Nature'.

Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenment-sponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable). To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It should be realisation of an *ethical* Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization. Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation, can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to self-elevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief, unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent.

10. Deconstruction and reselection of self.

The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism is also assumed p.64). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development, beyond the anthropic limitations of standard transpersonal psychology, 'a deep *identification* of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again).³⁵

While it is plain enough that *ego* is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by Freud, it is less plain that *self* too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts,

35 Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives.

chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching exercises and empathy.

But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of *ego* and *self* – their history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility – rather than take them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the outset. It, and the intertwined notions of *self-interest*, and *self-ish-ness*, should be taken apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with *interest* and dealing with *self*. A historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different. But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of *interest*, and found *wanting* as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of *self*, standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required.³⁶ Some realisation of the problematic character of the notion of *self* is in fact disclosed in Naess's much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of *self-realisation* which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep ecology as he conceives it.

Instead of requisite critical and de(con)structive investigation of the notion of *self*, resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of *person*.³⁷

36 My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points, see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the requisite path.

37 Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both elaborating on Kantian illusions.

Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects, *self* amounts to *person* somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be, sufficiently deanthropocized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to agents and actors, the live active *sub*components within ecologies. It signals an unacknowledged return to shallower waters.

Because *self*, however dispensable in environmental philosophy, is integral to Western deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep ecology has said. *Self* is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences.³⁸ It is an item, almost an objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory). In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche, person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms, constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an

38 While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume managed to still eludes me). *Self* itself, like *cause*, though empirically grounded, is not an "empirical" concept.

incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB). For example, scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much richness (whereas for its own “legitimate” theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are assembled. While not averse to phrases like ‘the fabrication of self’, it needs to be remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves. I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs.

Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of *self* will resemble that already offered for *mind* (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be given for *spirit*, *psyche* and *ego* (and also *spook*, *shade*, *spectre*, *ghost*, etc.). Minds are fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistent items. Selves are different inexistent items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining *which* items selves are, a business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected notions of *self* in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as *restrictions* in one way or another – temporal, cultural, subject-discipline – of a total self. The *total* self of a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness (and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence (and id-ENTITY), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times.³⁹

What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions. A first set of restrictions are *temporal* restrictions, a second set *aspect* restrictions. These are combined in the OED sense

39 This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistent account offered shares common ground with the Buddhist “no self” theory when presented as denying the real existence of a self.

'4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with qualifying adj.'

So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t_1 differs from his total self restricted to t_2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction, very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED.

'4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. *Better self*: the better part of one's nature.'

Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences, desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the *volitional* features can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the individual will.) With a *narrow economic* self, that of mainstream economics, the broad economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests, those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to other items and typically *against* a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important, other-directed and higher-order interests (such as α 's interest is that β 's interest be fulfilled, α 's concern for β , etc.)⁴⁰ This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely OED

'5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ...'.

The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this

40 These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating local selfish interests.

excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake.⁴¹

11. More troubles with Self as foundation.

The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme – all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self – but that is a fundamental mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the only basic motive of business entrepreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) – what is often now called 'moral extensionism'⁴².

As empirical evidence tells, *prima facie* decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and entrepreneurial economic motivational theory – an extraordinarily convenient, and not "rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites – two substantially successful theory-saving strategies swing into action:

- a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion;
- a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time, minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to encapture *other* or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, *duty* for instance *to this Earth*, duty which is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, other-regarding.

41 The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our own body'.

42 For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider Self fold (p.64).

A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's on-going self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, *including* one's future self, much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self – a substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past, present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then, for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial one, perhaps in another sequence.⁴³ Indeed it is evident that *reasons* for action are not confined to those internalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one *my* or *thou* or *it* (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action. Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply incalculated, *theory*, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous item-theoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory.

Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in 'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured (p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself – among other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance

43 On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine of no-self, these assumptions get removed.

whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are defending themselves rather than something *else* that deserves their care, concern and respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are *the* wholesome motives or the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act. The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad “old paradigm” thinking, but merely bizarrely extended it.

12. Liquidating Fox's “deep ecological territory”.

The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is premised on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen, identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim also advanced on p.84), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep environmental philosophy, the notion of *self* can drop out; selves are inessential. While

decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out⁴⁴, and Self tried out as sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment.

It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, *nothing* but Self. And it has nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:—One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86, the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the ideal state, identified in the "norm", *ought* to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called) ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Western deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could have issued from a deviant Hinduism, *without* environmental commitments, concerned above all with introverted cultivation of self.

Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so; ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and matters ecological, *not* widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such

44 Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed *self* is the end which defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of holism and organicism.

as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecollogical, such as identification with developers ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken. According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87). No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may well *increase* that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems.⁴⁵ Fox's deep ecological-framework, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep ecological rubbish.

13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild West deep ecology.

Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an *extremist*, it is generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas, for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)';⁴⁶ one is in good company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists

45 That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile).

46 According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the *ANU Reporter* 1989.

who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on.

But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through application of the following *reduction-of-relations* principles:

S1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent [identical])';

S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13 and earlier).

All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as "classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are substantially *irrelevant* to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also Naess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what troubles them rather is that I take their claims *seriously*, and not as forever 'preliminary', or at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49).⁴⁷

Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism'.⁴⁸ That is obviously not an extreme claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and does nothing for Fox's cause. I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'.

47 One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, ferns and wombats is 'talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers.

48 It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP, p.222ff.

Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his *only* response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan) sincerely think that *anybody* could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes, damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It is unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so.⁴⁹

Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles S1 and S2. Firstly, he introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between *relative* and *absolute* autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying even *relative* autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, '... there is really no excuse for Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did *not* take Naess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising.

Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). '... Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to "uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable *Eye to Eye*. Similarly that 'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox. Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features, such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream ("unity in process")' (p.15), *without* being composed of separate individuals.

The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context),

49 Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully related by Bouwsma.

rather than real philosophical work.⁵⁰ But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme interpretation' (nor again do principles S1 and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist' (p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their doctrines of internal relations. Naess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism) entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ... commandeers *elements* of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added). Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes (p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say '*looks like* a terminal form of idealism ...' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox describes as "the *central* intuition of deep ecology"'.

The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sylvan intends' (p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to hang on me shortly).⁵¹ On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any

50 By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm".

51 In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess.

internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is 'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction); whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense' Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16). Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)). For, so Fox says,⁵² 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"' (p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely both ...RB which is constitutive and not-...RB by acknowledgement. To be sure, the difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as Naess did and as Fox *also* has him say) that 'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the bounds of the standard theory by admitting *external* relations, for which it is *not* required that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting (to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not.

My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that, that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or

52 The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the *relational total field image* was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were drawn.

constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') - Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is *ordinarily* meant by the term in such contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a definite nature or character to (see Concise English).⁵³ Wombat A, one and the same A, a creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations are constitutive.

Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods⁵⁴, and the emphasis on experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning were more often considered in the proper style of deep ecology, and more often practised. Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals, forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the Stone/Sky path, which *mentions* 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought' and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but deliberately *avoids* any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style, 'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2).

14. Transpersonal logic and methodology.

53 It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an extraordinary meaning to *constitute*.

54 The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication' (p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century.

The quaint relation-reduction principles, S1 and S2, do show up with the first premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of “false equivalence argument” and “false contrast argument”. The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a recognised traditional fallacy of “false contrast” or “false dichotomy” (arising as regards classifications), which differs from Fox's defective “false contrast argument”. Fox has proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly applying (p.6, p.11), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look at the arguments.

To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing ‘false’ by ‘foxy’. Let A and B be terms (Fox has ‘concept/idea’); let α be a person or group whose views are under criticism. Then the *foxy equivalence argument*, set down pretty much in Fox's way, runs as follows

Key Premiss. When α links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R), *claim* α holds that $A=B$.

Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence $A \neq B$.

Conclusion according to Fox: ‘the “argument” (i.e. the claim that $A = B$) is “false” or that it “fails”’ (p.6).

An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in ‘the claim that $A = B$ ’, he has perhaps felt obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is going on is unclear. He *might* have concluded, though a level up, that the “false equivalence argument” itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument.

There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the *subargument* that is buried in the foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with $A(c)$ symbolising that c is or has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:-

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. $A = B$ | hypothesized claim (<i>imposed</i> on α) |
| 2. $A(c)$ iff $B(c)$ for every case c | standard case expansion of 1 |
| 3. $A(c) \ \& \ \sim B(c)$ for some case c | further data |
| 4. ~ 2 | from 3 |
| 5. $\sim(A = B)$ | from 4 |
| 6. $\sim(A = B)$ | reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument |

Thus the claim, that $A = B$, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, $A(c_1) \& \sim B(c_1) \vee \sim A(c_2) \& B(c_2)$ for some cases c_1 and c_2 , and consider each disjunct. But the result would be the same, namely 6 categorically.

The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of the quite defective S1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let us replace *holding* or *maintaining* functors by a corresponding *asserting* or (more satisfactorily) *commitment to asserting* functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being pulled just read ' $\vdash_\alpha$ ' as ' α holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first approximation.

KP. from α is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB , infer that α is committed to asserting that $A \equiv B$ (or $A = B$).

Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows:

$KP \rightarrow . \quad \vdash_\alpha ARB \rightarrow . \vdash_\alpha A = B .$

This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S1, i.e. $ARB \rightarrow A = B$, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to-asserting functor, $\vdash_\alpha$, or specifically by the rule $x \rightarrow y / \vdash_\alpha x \rightarrow \vdash_\alpha y$. S1 is the way to arrive at KP. Moreover without S1, there is *little basis* for KP.

Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to $KP \rightarrow$, e.g. from S1. We run out the subargument to $\sim(A = B)$, from which we conclude α is wrong or mistaken in asserting $A = B$. Then we proceed back across $KP \rightarrow$ (using what results from it by distribution of the mistake functor W , namely $W \vdash_\alpha A = B \rightarrow . W \vdash_\alpha ARB$), to conclude that our friends α were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B.

Exposure of that part of the argument involving $KP \rightarrow$ is enough to at least suggest that I am unlikely to rely on it *heavily*, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying upon the already jettisoned S1. Fox, for all his assertions, does *nothing* to show that I do rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it *at all*. For all his effort in eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow through and show how they apply.

Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized, where the terms involved are *life* and *value* (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from *certain* deeper positions, that $life = value$. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally

fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional *subargument*. Fox's complaint is *not* about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine, it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)!

Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life (A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life' (Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical' (which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings (accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition').

The position with the *foxy contrast argument* is very similar to that already dealt with, a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong) equivalence, =, is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e. the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we 'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy"' (p.8). Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction.

Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me) takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere, Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such ill-defined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as *protestant* and *middle class* might be defensible in sociological investigations where there are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to correspond with *deep ecology*? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep

ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean up the objects of these, and so forth.

15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science.

Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore.⁵⁵ It tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular', which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible'.⁵⁶ While such an approach is hardly necessary it is certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable.

As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is nonsense or quite unintelligible (*pace* p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED: 'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish.

Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers, Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no

55 According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger tradition.

56 This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little to rectify).

rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine, d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh.

There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7). Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is intelligible, but it is ridiculous⁵⁷; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist), because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority" (in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation!

Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is *far more extensive* than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) – yet another example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on *some* of the further options Fox does not consider, namely

57 If physics and science *are* the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W. Smith and JB .

- *alternative logic* approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary, investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see UU §13, on ultramodal quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.)
- a *neutral worlds* interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the ‘metaphysical baggage’ and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed. Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism deployed, to other standard interpretations, it is just as falsifiable (*pace* note 41), and accordingly hardly ‘desperate’, a mere “just-so” story. These observations, duly elaborated (as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate ‘how Sylvan would describe the ontological implications of the “new (ie. post-1920s) physics?”’ (p.23 reordered). Briefly, there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less remarkable than Western deep ecology has imagined.

Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox *add* to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly rewarding. But two examples only :— ‘What can be known is ... never the independent properties of the observed alone’. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat (somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for ‘the *known* universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into consciousness and objects of consciousness’. The standard formalism of quantum theory discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider classical settings *always* (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed.

In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading; I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology.

What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh *wish* to draw from the "new physics". Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- *Impermanent?* Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. *Fluid?* This attribute of macro-systems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to say that wavicles (or even atoms) *flow*, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of fluidity does not. *Empty?* Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. *Infinitely over-determined?* How does this sit with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit from the list: *Self-consistent?* At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics" and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the developing theory, to which often *ad hoc* repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac δ function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von Neumann's axiomatisation of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, *if* it can be done. *Foundationless?* What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory, such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates.

Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what extent, new phenomena may emerge, at “higher levels”, as the building blocks are variously put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound – if they look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say – to be very disappointed.

Walsh's “explanation” of what ‘foundationless’ means is something else: ‘the universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental than any other – hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number of fundamental mechanisms’ (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how ‘Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the list’! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g. ‘self-consistent’), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation⁵⁸, but some objects are fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the ‘new physics’, protons for instance are more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent) than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the “new physics” it is widely assumed that the universe *is* explicable in terms of a very few principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But Walsh's *hence* clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had requisite physical cogency.

It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying

58 Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, *nonlocal* connections, and delineate *fields* – what are said to be at ‘the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary parallels ... have in common’ (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the “new physics” and other “new sciences” such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions.

sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89), the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow achieving a fallacious transition from *some* to *all*. But apparently Rothenberg's acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label 'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP, would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ...'. While endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no *rereading* of many deep ecological productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings – such as items lifted from transpersonal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) – contain notable rubbish of themselves.

Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier establishment-challenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should steer clear of "environmental axiology" – that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one almost feels, from looking *directly* at nature at all.

Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation. ... Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19, quoting Fox p.85).

It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology. While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p.71) and only a warped fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs.

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ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS: turning John M^cCloskey's challenge

This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is hung, not altogether incidentally, on M^cCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the onerous business of reading M^cCloskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed. Rather, for the purposes of this essay, M^cCloskey and likewise his little work can both be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have existed.

1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics.

There are three broad kinds of responses to the *impact of ecology on ethics* according to M^cCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification: radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: *ethics*. Those responses target ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to M^cCloskey's elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these:

Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred (or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what M^cCloskey and others call an *ecological ethic*. According to M^cCloskey – who adopts the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging theories than entrenched ones – no one ‘has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an ecological ethic] in a systematic way’ (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite remarkably, that M^cCloskey himself, if he is at all successful, *does*, given but a small twist to what he does.

There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative. According to M^cCloskey, both components are ‘more commonly alluded to than set out and defended in a developed, worked-out form’ (p.29). There are, accordingly, two broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a *new meta-ethic*, and furnishing a *new normative ethic* (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a critical meta-ethical task is to ‘explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like’ (p.30). Normative ethics involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values, principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items independently of species *Homo sapiens*, and the principles adopted, especially concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species of plants and animals.

Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in works such as EE), the issue becomes one of *adequacy*. How adequately have these things been done, in particular in what is now called *deep-green theory*, and what of significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue with M^cCloskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to the real business of M^cCloskey's more substantive objections.

Reformist. Instead of a “new” ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying them or adjusting them at the periphery, ‘so as to acknowledge new, specifically ecological values and duties’ (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in character.

The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness of “newness” and “standardness” as regards ethical theories, the divisions between responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate, and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as M^cCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as “supplementation” of such intuitionism could

be.

Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is ‘a more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights’ (p.29). M^cCloskey claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and ‘findings ... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights’ (p.29, similarly p.31).

Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, M^cCloskey proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ‘... no moral philosopher has yet succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic way’ (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge, that ‘the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising

a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and
a a new normative ethics that explains both

- the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the extinction of the species *Homo sapiens* and
- why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or render extinct natural species of plants and animals’ (p.30, display inserted).

As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become evident – though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom, because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value – something M^cCloskey does not really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the repeated rhetoric about “arguing” this and that, he doesn't. He simply *assumes* that ‘concern for human well-being’ must dominate, that it always has, well almost always has, priority (e.g. p.52).

2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism.

Furthermore, M^cCloskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative ‘third view’, does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the ‘need for a specifically ecological ethic’, *not* reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts

to substantial cheating in McCloskey's "conservatism".¹ A further part consists in adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism *supplementing* a now little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics (indeed, given a deep turn, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" McCloskey makes of his "standard" ethic, which *far* exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled '*prima facie* obligations to ... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), *and* to include promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural *species*, some *wilderness* (p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31).

Such critical "supplementations" mean that McCloskey can proceed to argue for the preservation of wilderness or natural species in *just* the ways that most deep environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g. p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift McCloskey right out of the normal conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least *a significant reform of standard ethics*. McCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically; more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not

1 There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example, Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) *hedges* his claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins: 'what it [the West] needs, *for the most part*, is not *so much* a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories.

new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in the absence of sharpened criteria for *newness*.)

How far removed M^cCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of M^cCloskey with Ross on intrinsic goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul') that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite decisive, to refute people like M^cCloskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond states of mind – in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings.

So much M^cCloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional [Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in M^cCloskey's ethics they do find some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned. Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself becomes properly deep – just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened M^cCloskey is deep ecology. M^cCloskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism.

As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of M^cCloskey's complex ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to, have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting M^cCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to

attribute to McCloskey the very *negation* of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of McCloskey's position, 'that the environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of humans, a *prima facie* obligation.

But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is McCloskey's position hard to fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, McCloskey typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist, making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different, with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself, and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values" somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e. are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon McCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be.

The main features brought out make McCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a reformist one, *not* a conservative one. Briefly, McCloskey's "supplementation" of Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it what is called an *intermediate* position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic value to some natural objects, while *not* however allowing values of natural things to sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must prevail ...' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does *not* imply human

ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper defence of proposition *p* that Shifty's theory implies *p*, unless Shifty's theory is shown to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield *p* under reasonable variations), etc. *None* of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed.

In fact McCloskey has adduced *no decent case* for this crucial assumption, which colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted anti-environmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text. One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos throughout the world, where they survive well ...)', perhaps along with dangerous subspecies of humans (p.116). McCloskey is particularly concerned to put down arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness *at the cost of human* interests, human concerns ..', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence.² Nonetheless it will be *my concern* in this work *to reject this approach* and the moral intuitions on which it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not backed up with requisite argument. McCloskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament, is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily supported. For one thing McCloskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, *unless* what it is proposed to preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (*unethical*) prejudice in favour of humans can, and should be *relinquished* (as argued in much more detail in other places, e.g. EE).

But then there is nothing to stop McCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, McCloskey's stripped

2 But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans, one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests paramount, is deceptive.

of anthropic prejudice so to say, *deepened intuitionism*, intuitionism informed, again if you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that it answers, in M^cCloskey's own terms, M^cCloskey's challenge to radically new ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to M^cCloskey's own theory will serve. The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a direct response to M^cCloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory.

3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp. that deep-green upstart.

Part of M^cCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at *new* proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But M^cCloskey would *like* to make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59 reordered). But M^cCloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers that noncognitivism, which *would* logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to fail. M^cCloskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as M^cCloskey is very far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition, more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it, but need not.

While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as M^cCloskey implies. Firstly, the options M^cCloskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar

as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism). Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates within *naturalism* include biological and evolutionary naturalism – typical examples of which ‘are the following: “To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the species to which you belong efficiently” (Spinoza). “Better conduct means conduct that comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the same kind” (Herbert Spencer)’ (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit deficiencies, but not *per se* of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement, which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g. Rolston's work).

More promising, however, are “non-naturalistic” theories, of which objectivistic realistic intuitionism such as McCloskey is keen to offer and promote is *but one kind*. For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270), including various “deep intuitionisms”, which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic (in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot explains (p.502), what entirely escapes McCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstruction, varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong, is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and definitely scope for significant improvements upon those ‘developed to date’.

As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deep-green theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration.

As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proffered semantical analyses.³ Semantics both for axiological terms such as *value* and *betterness* and for deontic terms such as *obligation* and *wrongness* have been provided through world semantics (see SV, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD) offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics), because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means, deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics. Humans enter importantly, of course, but only *contingently*, as certain sorts of valuers and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture, because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans. Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to M^cCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ...' (p.60). For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt. The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like supervenience.

Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early eighties than Ross's theory upon which M^cCloskey purportedly proposed to reply. M^cCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed

3 Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided.

form' such as McCloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confucianism are not particularly systematic, those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much, ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed.

In an attempt to be helpful, McCloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right, *does* answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that it is part of what lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore, many examples of items – not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale, complexes, and ecosystems – that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for themselves and not on other counts (such as some of McCloskey's "intrinsic values" which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force.

As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that McCloskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species, given that it does to some. McCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). McCloskey wheels

out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his intuition, a strong human prejudice, that ‘there seems to be no intrinsic value in the existence of such species and organisms’ (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance, consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential.

One reason why McCloskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case *against* deep positions. Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes evident if added to McCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power, human pleasure and knowledge⁴, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial; sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical knowledge of the means of excruciating torture.⁵ A finer mesh is needed, and available, a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard “difficulties”, as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism.

4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics.

Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics. Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions; ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact

4 For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the Rottneest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as ‘useless’ and ‘ugly’ (p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological system-dependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and fortunately disappearing, ideology.

5 In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information; largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and Bennett on Taoism).

interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian, deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of *extension*: the latter extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely – or as regards the pure theory at all – an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers, and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections of these political items.

What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most philosophers from Aristotle through M^cCloskey. The prevailing conservative extension theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick:

Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick).

In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem.

As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by M^cCloskey's practice and development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of that issue.

However, in the political theory advanced, M^cCloskey does not take full and proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who

with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.) Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). McCloskey proceeds to play humans off against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The resulting theory is ecological only in addressing – in a decidedly unsympathetical way ecologically – ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proffered ecological politics proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better.

A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further *organisational structure*, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still ill-classified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to *what* gets added, and *how* it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and North, for a statist and developmental *status quo* (for which he serves very much as an apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call ‘liberal democratic states’ – though the veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of cards.

The *status quo* choice of “liberal democracy” gets confirmed, so McCloskey imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread, even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, McCloskey cannot resist sounding off about any proposed ‘return to primitivism’, to ‘rural communities of the political imagination’ (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate), these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other alternatives, McCloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right,

ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of it M^cCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its shortcomings, M^cCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient *reductios* in and of themselves' (p.344).

For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when M^cCloskey was helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time M^cCloskey was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists, over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of states. As M^cCloskey emphasizes,

Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic, desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the abstract.(p.108).

Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative organisational arrangements, M^cCloskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' – whatever those may be (states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world political authority' (p.107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and bulldozers.

For another, McCloskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (*much* turns then on how it is all done).

McCloskey has *overestimated* the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some *lesser* infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered. And McCloskey has grossly *underestimated* the severity of ecological problems states should be trying to solve.

In some of his findings, McCloskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ‘... it is evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively minor factor bearing on species survival rates’ (p.47)! ‘... man is simply adding more hazards to those created by nature itself for some species’ (p.47 continuing). For the next example, by contrast with the previous, McCloskey might seek refuge in the fact that he was writing back in 1982: ‘Few suggest that man can or will destroy the ecosystem of the earth’ (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. “Man” appears able to do little that is very wrong; McCloskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of censure: ‘... man could have used DDT to better effect’ (p.50). No doubt he could have refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in McCloskey's approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by McCloskey will break through again and again in what follows.

Nor did M^cCloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well. With his operational assumption that ecological reforms ‘would not be popular’ (e.g. p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems were believed ‘to be real problems’ (p.157) – which of course M^cCloskey himself believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown. But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking M^cCloskey's assumptions under along with old beliefs.

In any case, M^cCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that ecological measures ‘may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are seen as being matters of basic rights. ... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring about the reforms ... and still retain office’ (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, M^cCloskey begins to meet his own argument. For measures of the type M^cCloskey rightly finds distasteful, have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly, there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where people-governance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still. But M^cCloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies. Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world), but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: ‘the enjoyments of many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices’ (p.25). So he tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political alternatives.

Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, McCloskey manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have performed decidedly subliminally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold.⁶ It is not unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palaver about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are threatened.


Nor is McCloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and restrictions and limitations on liberty – *except* when these put environmental things ahead of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good in McCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment' (p.134) – unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proffered dilute liberalism. But unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives, regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it would not require the loss of basic freedom ...' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly makes the heavy liberal case McCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental concerns – as against decent human concerns – look thin and flawed. Because such regulation *does* make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term 'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect

6 *Subliminal* is a satirizing analogue of the maximization ideology's *suboptimal*.

on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states M^cCloskey offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of *basic* freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of what's ethically acceptable. Only – the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics.

5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems.

Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems. Yet in M^cCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle list. We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering *environmental impact in a dynamic setting* (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of something is something which comes *from* somewhere, *sources*, *into* something, *sinks*, parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this:



Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in terms of

- sorts of impacts, and
- types of environments.

The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of

environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats *with* kinds of expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers. Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then

- kinds of recipients, and as well of course
- kinds of impactors.

While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as Nature, Chance, God (as in “acts of God”), and so forth, as well as animals, the main impactors of interest are, presently, humans.

Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact:

$$\begin{array}{lclclcl} \text{EI.} & \text{Environmental} & = & \text{Population} & \times & \text{Resource} & \times & \text{Impact} \\ & \text{impact} & & \text{size} & & \text{use} & & \text{(through ...)} \\ & \text{(of ...)} & & \text{(of ...)} & & \text{per member} & & \text{per unit of} \\ & \text{through...)} & & & & \text{(of ...)} & & \text{resource use} \end{array}$$

e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution.

Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental problems, namely

- a Population
- a Consumption and use
- a Technology and waste.

Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important.

A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation of the equation, $EI = P \times C \times T$ (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered. Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following regionalized impact equation:

$$\text{EIR.} \quad EI = \sum_{i=1}^n P_i \times C_i \times T_i .$$

Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud

and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude Northern hemisphere.

The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded. Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to “acceptable levels” by variation of just one parameter – C_i is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented shallower environmentalists; T_i , in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices (and a corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric limitations of the whole Earth.

Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in McCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that McCloskey does look at will be examined in what follows. For to try to track McCloskey in all the areas he does delve into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of ‘the right to private property’ is tucked away under ‘Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce’, and of the ‘right for education’ under ‘The Right to Respect as a Person’ (p.75ff.) Instead a more detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be).

6. Population impact: *the fact of human overpopulation.*

A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of the globe. McCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population discussion, is this (pp146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed further,

NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future.

But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, McCloskey approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof, claiming that he has ‘argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future’ (p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It is fair to wonder what would make a “tenable plausible case” – proper theoretical business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided – or, of immediate relevance, what would constitute a “population crisis”, and what counts as “overpopulation”.

On the last at least we do have a proposal from McCloskey, ‘to use *overpopulation* to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights’ (p.97). While the proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route McCloskey will try to take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions. Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans, their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework McCloskey elsewhere professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not McCloskey overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions in intrinsic value, including types of value McCloskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly) acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological turn. It is all humans and humans, humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it turns out, and is turning out in many regions.

Now really the proposal should be relativised, to ‘overpopulation of a region’, as the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by McCloskey's slack standards), as he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, ‘the world as a whole is not overpopulated’ (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim – a defective and disreputable case as will soon appear – plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are

dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth.

To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion M^cCloskey firstly weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world' every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true, the outcome would be insufficient to show no M^cCloskey overpopulation. Suppose the world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential; argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this can be established, for the simple reason that there *are* connections between these human conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form).

Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished, and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs.

Even the bare food claim, upon which M^cCloskey's whole case depends at bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and other droughts; it was being questioned as M^cCloskey wrote. Now however we have available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human

population.⁷ The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered, then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population. While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample feeding.

It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly, some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions' (p.99) – suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with McCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth. It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils, forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability.

To give him his small due, McCloskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g. p.99); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human sexuality and population control.

7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations.

Hitherto received opinion, in modern Western civilization, has taken the line that culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of significant animals). Received opinion, which McCloskey tries to shore up, is now being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to

7 The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference.

previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close.

Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, McCloskey does not cede to humans an unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation' (p.150). McCloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards *adequate provision* for offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own, have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMcCloskeyian consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little). Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required. Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently, and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose' (p.104). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory.

Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts, and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that *rights require justifications* (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but

perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the main thrust of McCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion, sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water.

That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is McCloskey's prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family planning projects even where [well] backed ...' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities. Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests, especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of support designed for success.

There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices, between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach McCloskeyians take to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right, because, among other things, they have no rights.

8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof.

The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights, attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, McCloskey still has two main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral rights' (p.66 and several other places): a *tight redefinition* argument, and an environmental *chaos otherwise* argument.

The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights, to tighten up the notion of *right* so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which

animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform. Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian no-interests approach, McCloskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon, exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be meaningful, the possessor *or his/her representative* must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, McCloskey proceeds, at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is not empty (*pace* p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed.

Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see p.65), McCloskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that ground, that interests are a necessary condition.⁸ 'We can plausibly claim to have some idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But McCloskey proceeds, in a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights, persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions, rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of rights. McCloskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral self-direction and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right' (p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged. McCloskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do

8 Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81.

many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings, McCloskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy' (p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral autonomy is not to the point, except for McCloskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities and human communities – whence what small force McCloskey's proposition enjoys, as whales as agents fall outside that setting.

The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and environmental problems that McCloskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122).

A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights between humans and groups of humans, but McCloskey fears the situation with animals would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that 'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67). But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others).

While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than humans, as McCloskey implies, what is suggested *is* important in escaping from difficulties McCloskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have

rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used – any more than it follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten. Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are killed. For *not all rights stand or fall together*; a right for continued existence is very different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore, McCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from *some* to *more* to *all*, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house or bed or space.⁹ No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict McCloskey alleges with human rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice. With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level.

A further large facet of McCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue – irrelevant to the main issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does *not* 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already been very briefly indicated above.¹⁰ McCloskey has linked the question of animal rights much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers,¹¹ both before and after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result of this flawed linkage,

9 While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to quite limited things within those cities.

10 A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e. TE (essay 3), and number 2.

11 A neglected early philosopher is MacIver; see esp. his remarks on p.69.

McCloskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism. For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights.

As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the supposed political implications. Unremarkably then McCloskey sees 'the ecological state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems' (p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on human liberty, or what McCloskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so on.

Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplying animals (i.e. like some humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), McCloskey does not address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights. An institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems McCloskey envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which

subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes.¹²

9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology.

The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy. Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modern political discussion, even the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely.

There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail the freedom of minorities (the well-known “tyranny of the majority”). Liberal ends may be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare. And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political league players being disentangled,¹³ does imply some significant limitations on arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose *otherwise*, should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage ill-regulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in McCloskey, and again little investigation of improved structures or regulation.¹⁴

12 For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140).

13 In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon – market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements – do not receive an index listing in McCloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations and much discussion.

14 A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both

As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate. Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists (virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all property markets.

Having glimpsed M^cCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is piquant to behold him beginning upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic capitalism, namely private property. Most of M^cCloskey's brief discussion of rights to private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property, upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to proposed libertarian alternatives. M^cCloskey even tries to close off discussion of the 'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries' in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of

institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long.

liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt.

The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue for environmental politics. For excessive proprietarian rights and powers constitute a very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or enact unsound practices. Yet proprietarians often now appeal to a purported need to strengthen and expand the institution of private property – rather than to let it naturally contract — in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. – licences which look even to the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits environmental constraints impose upon economic activity.¹⁵

The liberal democratic structure to which M^cCloskey commits himself to, with its uncritical approach to population and consumption – like market capitalism, with its commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets, enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources – forces an unduly heavy dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting “biological capital”. Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too many academics, M^cCloskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign, and technology pushed to the hilt.

There is a naive optimism in M^cCloskey's attitude to science. ‘It is not improbable that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this

15 Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole environment up for negotiation – and ultimately for sale. What are not up for negotiation are the underlying proprietarian and utility maximization principles, the insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems.

In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution, such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in jail, apparently does.

knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters, global warfare, climatic destabilisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for holding back the pursuit of knowledge ...' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is utterly free in M^cCloskey's liberal democracy.

While M^cCloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed' (p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion and delivery – which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function. Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most apologists, M^cCloskey emphasizes the possible – but generally unrealised – benefits of technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work. Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue, for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up.

Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Western culture, where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal panacea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced. But, as remarked, M^cCloskey has the faith (such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering... constitutes a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects. We merely glimpse *one* darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for

industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by state masters behind closed doors. Instead McCloskey tries to divert attention by yet another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates into notes: 'Relevant point here include ...' (p.139).

McCloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for non-humans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly, environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left.

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DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY.

Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology. Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by constructing and comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown, however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagonistic positions but close allies, both deep positions within a wider environmental alliance.

Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around 1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett 86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception.

The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Arne Naess, to label an emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-americans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of increasing public concern.

Deep ecology is a radical environmental position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.)

Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to mainstream Western ethical and social theory.¹ The first of these themes, the *wide values* theme, is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental, valuable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief nonanthropic.

Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the *greater value* assumption, according to which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deep-green theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in some attenuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of *biocentrism*, life-centredness. And it assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of biospheric *egalitarianism*. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is *axiocentric*, value-centered.

Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics, including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity, and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such "objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of *impartiality*, substitutes for that of egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead of another simply in virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves value-making characteristics.

¹ There are some who account themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through value theory, most notably Warrick Fox.

Figure 1. A comparison of Deep Ecology and Deep-green theory, in capsule form.²

Deep ecology	Shared themes or goals	Deep-green theory
biospheric egalitarianism biocentrism	wider value theme rejection of greater value assumption, ← through → ecological universals as defeasible value-making characteristics	biospecies impartiality, and rejection of class chauvinism axiocentrism
extreme holism cosmic identity maximal self-realisation	natural systems as integral, irreducible	moderate holism ultrapersonal identification satizing on value determinates
bioregionalism	limited interference only with natural systems; restricted rights thereto commitment to implement principles applications to economics, politics and policy, especially in environmental areas; e.g. → regionalism and federalism ← human population reduction	ecoregionalism

A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much else of ethical consequence arises: rights, obligations, and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinates by a calculation. It is a type of recipe to which intellectuals bent on numeration and calculation are regularly attracted; pseudo-objective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianism but in economics and in democratic political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable

² Most of the capsule theses of deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of Deep-green theory are explained in FE.

initial ensembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism).

Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value *is* distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom ultimates. It is a quality of many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant viruses engineered in biochemical laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus the theory is at least weakly *axiocentric*, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain, value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of actual world itself depends upon value (see DP).

AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY:

exposition, critique, alternatives

PREFACE

No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental problems confronting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagrammatic form; and the information is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular periodicals or newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease. Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated.

Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen.¹ Most states are busy attempting more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic products, of people, of consumption², of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity, of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with³, but not the "real" problems.

We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species,

¹ While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive control systems. So some of the problems *are* unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totalitarianism, the lack of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good.

² So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-of-payments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less.

³ So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt they would miss it if it were gone.

much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy (needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on.

Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject⁴, aims to fill a part of the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be written.

This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are (negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate revolutionary change.

Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for all its shortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and your time, in getting to know it.

This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique (called 'Continuing the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique⁵ remains the centre of the text, some of what I wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended.

⁴ There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually ignored.

⁵ 'A critique of deep ecology' *Radical Philosophy*.

It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar, at which Naess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the following *predicament* :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - *revamped* deep ecology if it is simply a matter of repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology.

My *attempted resolution* went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria. However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among many.

Though the *applications* of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.⁶

Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to find generous interpretations of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be applauded), I have not been very charitable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforward and honest way. I do, however, try to

⁶ The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science.

offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative.

ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY

A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolishly seen Bookchin as one of them, though it was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them¹. Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged in un-American activities.² Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages). Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people, e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism.

Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the product of social problems and removed with them.

- Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction theme, which is what justifies the *social ecology* terminology and approach, also gets stated in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their

1 The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the Critique.

2 This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of Bookchin's, which was lively and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes.

roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this; that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it.

The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, sieges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social', and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the gross inequities in [human] society' – which should be attended to *first* – 'that underpin the disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'.³

Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of the following sort:-

Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems, real prospects that this *could* have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless or without sufficient nourishment or basic educational opportunities and so on, so that poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated.⁴ It is sufficiently evident that even if all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all,

3 Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin.

4 Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc., will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore.

The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have much complicated matters.

likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human developmental activity, that the Antarctic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is attained.

Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is that *some* ecological problems were glimpsed by analogy with social problems, not that ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them.

•• “Second nature”, constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature, and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature. The unexploited play on “second nature” does nothing to support such intervention; or the contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection. However, the two “natures” distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interference and substantial separateness. ‘Natural evolution has not only provided humans with *ability* but also the *necessity* to be purposive interveners into “first nature”, to consciously *change* “first nature” by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call “society”.’⁵ Given the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious.

This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and separation, Man vs. Nature, in old-fashioned football-military terms, that deeper environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills (remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity, of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert *being human* into a

5 Bockchin 87 p.21.

significant moral category, when it is not.⁶ It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much.

The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism, which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems, which are of course often but not always intertwined with environmental problems, are no longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals, similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a *third* set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems.

Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:-

- a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g. Sholomowski.
- a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (*pace*. p.5 bottom).

6 So it is argued at length in EP.

INTRODUCTION

Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position, dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses) in what follows¹.

1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing.

The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' is a subsequent abbreviation, was minted by Naess to label an emerging environmental *movement*. Naess was then (sociological) *finder* rather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement concerned primarily with the *natural* environment. In explaining ideological features of the movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned. Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans, particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess, and more recently by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.^{N1} Deep ecology has caught on largely outside

¹ No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could simply be entitled *Naess*) to others; a small beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg.

Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likewise basking in reflected glory of a disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in *Reflexive Water*). In fact Naess had already begun to move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in *Truth as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers*. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism. These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's long-standing commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly narrow style of environmentalism as will appear.

narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of increasing public concern.

Deep ecology is a radical environmental position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments.^{N2} Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectable older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxian sense, of such a system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite the contrary.

Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particular DE is not a respectable academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy in recent times, it is not even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its mouldenness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak - weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms, reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc. That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes.

DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers' philosophy. Naess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life; and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkably little argument, though argument is often taken to be what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style, which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.)

These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be. Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic standards, especially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation.

Deep ecology is an amorphous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by Naess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore, as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods for achieving ecopolitical change.

To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call *authentic* deep ecology. At least under Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various formulations.

Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some sort of organic living system.

DE is thus an irremediably vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian *object*). Vague and vogue, a common concotention.

2. Types of environmental positions: *deep environmentalism*.

What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of *constraint* with respect to the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage; namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is even there *for* humans to exploit or manage.

This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources, forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral positions.² For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values.

Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw as *the* land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The *shallow* (conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the literature as *resource conservation* (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step.

² This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical in the narrow or sense, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my *People vs the Land* (84).

The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share - and which justifies lumping them together as *shallower* positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and management and exploitation oriented, positions.

According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to an *intermediate* position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The *deep* position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values.

Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles

SHALLOWER		DEEPER	
UNRESTRAINED	SHALLOW	IMMEDIATE	DEEP
MORALITY	SOLE VALUE	GREATER VALUE	
REQUIREMENT	ASSUMPTION	ASSUMPTION	
	(of human apartheid)	(of human supremacy)	

The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the *sole value assumption*. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans.³

³ The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of

Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism.⁴ According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on, for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of *apartness* or *human apartheid*. Man is, or is treated as, *apart from* Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests.

However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been *appended* (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for “side” constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at all.

There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of *superiority* or *human supremacy*, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is *above* the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.^N While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable *greater value assumption*; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for “normal” members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What

super-humans. With *value for* natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures.

⁴ But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some input from other sentient creatures, are considered below.

is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most utilitarianism.⁵

It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position⁶ is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not always assured; in cases of conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose.

There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans do not always matter⁷ and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial,⁸ can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Méditerranée degradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the

⁵ There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7.

⁶ Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other consequentialists.

⁷ See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p. ... ff. See also the initial example of Routley² 79..

⁸ The point is argued in detail in DEP #3.

integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow) consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism.

Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For under egalitarianism, larger collorations of significant eco-objects outweigh smaller groupings of undistinguished humans.

Notes

1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end.
2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.
3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident, the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective foundations.

CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY

As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox).

Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner.¹ Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it *can* be a step on the way.

While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique. But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing.

Since the critique was produced, it has become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make

¹ I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources.

apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other.

The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to turn no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, *appear* to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict.

1. Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology.

It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of doctrine of occasional presentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified away (see e.g. Naess's performance in *Resurgence*, discussed below). The response to intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity (or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the message not under heavy criticism over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occasional priestess) of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church). Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology (correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep).

A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to turn no-one, except the most incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the

De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least under the “right” polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles; and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature.

Naess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the ‘basic principles of Deep Ecology’. Naess ‘look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement *have in common*’ (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the *core*, the core platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in *some* approved formulation) *adherents* of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) *holding to* the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be *members* of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves ‘deep ecologists’, who do not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here ‘almost all supporters’? Which isolated exceptions does he have in view?

Box 1. *The core 8 point platform, in capsule form.*

1. *Non-human and human life have intrinsic value:*

The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent

- value, etc. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. *Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues :*
- Richness and diversity of life-forms contribute to a realisation of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. *Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues:*
- Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. *Human (values compatible with) population decrease:*
- The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. Flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease.
5. *Human interference with natural world excessive:*
- Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. *Policies and basic structures must be changed:*
- Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures.
7. *Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living:*
- The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness.
8. *Obligation to attempted implementation:*
- Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes.

Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to economical practice and sociological research

readily presents itself. Let us speak of *silent adherents* as those who adhere to the core platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interfering humans of Caucasian stock).

The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances *no* details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation Naess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance,

6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point 7.

6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology.

6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions.

Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration.

Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed *much* further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on.

Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization *is* an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out.

The idea of *progress* is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously...dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should *progress* towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology").

So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. *If* DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now of reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep

ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions.

Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:-

Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence theory of morality).

Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the positions delimited (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions).

Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE,

despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorists see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, eco-defenders and Earth-Factors, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support Base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults).

2. Variability, antiquity or dubiety of main themes of deep ecology omitted from the core platform.

Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle", central to early DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - *unless* the basic needs of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to children's usage, asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters' (p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not incompatible with chauvinism, nor with considerable inequality, nor with greater value invariably assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out.

Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology really is.² The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagant Gaia

² Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features.

hypothesis) - valuable as it *may* be, chauvinistic as it characteristically *is* -to work in a very fruitful way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases. But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration. The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction.

In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of environmental action.³

The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):-

Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible - Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other, sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy.

3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments,....

Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist. Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and

³ Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally attributed to Hume.

industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which directly produced present environmental impasses.⁴

No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners; but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done.

Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved. Naess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a *result* of environmentalism, which must (and should) be based on something else that people have begun to respond thus and so. Naess also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion.

4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed.

Despite the growing constituency for core princples. De, which Naess will correctly have alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is

⁴ He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significant part to the fact that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there.

situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a narrow flawed reason, tailored and biased to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions, primarily preferences of business communities of humans.

In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever “extremism” is sometimes exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless) normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues, DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be , and needs to try to swing the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position.

What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionally-charged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does.

What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value. Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a

reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved education and contraception. Yet some coupling to “extreme” *action*, and adoption or preparedness to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the OED definition of ‘extremism’).

Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no genocide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people, who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it).

There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Eco-fascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for themselves, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist proclivities *present* themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the present editor of *Earth First*). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both well- and evil-intentioned.

ANNEX

1. Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature. One is for an environmental organisation, which might could be called *Environment International* , paralleling *Amesty International* , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4).

2. *There are many false “virtues ” in contemporary political life that green politics, such as DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:-*

- *Unity, united front.* All that has merit is a certain *limited* unity in diversity.
- *Balance.* Balance is achieved by resolution of many forces. To shift

the balance, then, environmentalists
 should be as *far* out as they can
 (while still being counted in the
 resolution, not written off).

For end political purposes, citing
 especially credibility doesn't matter,
 by contrast with countability.

Advice to offer more balanced
 statements and work should be
 courteously ignored: it is
 oppositional, political advice.

- Two party ideal

REFERENCES

A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', *Ecospirit Quarterly* IV (1) (198.) 1-7;
 referred to as EIJ.