



Cognitive Rhetoric

Sam Browse

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Volume 31

Cognitive Rhetoric. The cognitive poetics of political discourse
by Sam Browse

Cognitive Rhetoric

The cognitive poetics of political discourse

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Preliminaries

1.1 Introduction

This is a book about people and how they respond to the language of politics. It is the product of the hair-raising sense of electricity at actually being there, at the demonstration, as the speaker reaches the crescendo of their peroration and the crowd swells and roars its approval, or the satisfaction of reading the words of the op-ed writer and experiencing them as a deliverance – as the affirmation of what I always thought but was unable to articulate. Equally, and less positively, it is born of the sense of rage and frustration at hearing politicians and journalists on the panel shows saying things with which I have vehemently disagreed – the urge to throw down my newspaper as I read, say, some latest invective directed towards a disenfranchised or minority group, or demands to dismantle the social security system out of apparent – and often vague – economic exigency. This book is about people, then, because politics is emotional; it is visceral; it is often as much about identity and faith – in the sense of a secular fidelity to a set of ideas or an ethos – as it is about cool, calculated discussion of ideologies, institutions, and interests. The way we analyse the language of politics should reflect that.

This perspective is arguably missing from contemporary linguistic analyses of political text and talk (see Section 1.3). The way audiences respond to the arguments presented in political texts, what they think about the authors, and their feelings as they participate in the discourse have largely been neglected in this body of research (although see Hart, 2016; Fausey and Matlock, 2011; Thibodieu and Boroditsky, 2011). The primary purpose of this book, then, is to present a reception-oriented account which examines how identity, argument, and emotions shape audience responses to the language of political discourse. The aim of this preliminary chapter is to explain some of the principles underpinning this approach. Section 1.2 begins by defining what is meant by political discourse. In keeping with the overall focus on the audience, a “fuzzy” (Rosch and Mervis, 1981; Ungerer and Schmid, 1996), reception-oriented definition is offered. Section 1.3 situates this audience-centred perspective within the field of Critical and Political Discourse Analysis (for example, Charteris-Black, 2014; Chilton, 2004; Fairclough

and Fairclough, 2012; Van Dijk 1997). In Section 1.4, this review leads to a discussion of a far older related discipline, classical rhetoric, and the rhetorical appeals to *ethos*, *logos*, and *pathos* which will form the basis of the reception-oriented theorisation of political discourse advanced in this volume. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 provide an overview of the discipline used to operationalise the analysis of *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* in audience reception, cognitive stylistics (Brône and Vandaele, 2009; Gavins and Steen, 2003; Semino and Culpeper, 2002; Stockwell, 2002). This discipline is principally concerned with describing the relationship between literary texts, their contexts, and their literary effects. It is argued that using cognitive stylistic frameworks to describe the relationship between political texts, their context, and their rhetorical effects is therefore not such a small leap. The chapter concludes with a summary of the book's aims and methods (Section 1.7) alongside an outline of its structure (Section 1.8).

1.2 Political discourse

A standard way of grouping discourses is to sub-divide them into the linguistic activity associated with a particular set of social practices, such as advertising (Cook, 1992), business (Bargiela-Chiappini et al., 2007), media (Fairclough, 1995; Talbot, 2007), medicine (Morris and Chenail, 1995) etc. Following this approach, perhaps a good place to begin a definition of political discourse is with an outline of the activities associated with politics. Chilton (2004: 3) provides one perspective: 'politics [can be viewed as] a struggle for power between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it'. Of course, this struggle is not limited to any one set of social practices. The discursive dimensions of power relations have been investigated in a diversity of communicative contexts (there is a large body of research in this area, but see Fairclough, 2001; Mayr, 2008; Mooney and Evans, 1999; Sutton, 2017; Talbot et al., 2003; Thornborrow, 2001). All these examples might be considered analyses of political discourse in the sense that they investigate power relations. Such a broad view of politics is a feature of critical social theory and some political movements. For instance, it is expressed in the radical feminist slogan 'the personal is political', which sought to highlight that women's everyday experiences of oppression are a political issue (see Hanisch, 1969). Similar arguments are found in Marxist discourse; class struggle – the political clash between proletarian, bourgeois and other variegated social forces – is not only the preserve of state institutions, but culture, education and intellectual life (Althusser, 2001; Gramsci, 2010). The argument perhaps takes its most radical form in the work of Michel Foucault (1975, 1984), who argued that power is not located in any one place or class (such as the state, men,

or the bourgeoisie), but diffused across a network of relations; it is thus always imminent in any interaction (see also Mills, 2003). This view leads inevitably to the position that politics is everywhere. For all their other differences, that such a disparate collection of social, political, and cultural theorists – radical feminists, Marxists, Foucaultians – should share a similar perspective on the ubiquity of politics makes it all the more compelling. It does, however, leave the discourse analyst in a quandary: if politics is everywhere, then every event of language in use is political discourse. The category of “political discourse” would therefore be a functionally useless one.

Everyday struggles for power encompass what Chilton (2004: 3) calls the political ‘micro-level’. As he points out, though, politics also takes place on the macro-level, insofar as it can relate to institutions (such as parliaments and political parties), institutional actors (politicians, journalists) and processes (legislating, passing motions). Van Dijk (1997) advances a definition which contextualises political discourse with respect to this macro-institutional landscape. It ‘excludes the talk of politicians outside of political contexts, and includes the discourse of all other groups, institutions or citizens as soon as they participate in political events’ (Van Dijk 1997: 15). He concludes that ‘such a contextual definition at the same time suggests that the study of political discourse should not be limited to the structural properties of text or talk itself, but also include a systematic account of the context and its relations to discursive structures’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 15). In their own favourable discussion of Van Dijk’s (1997) model, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 18, emphasis in original) explain the focus on institutions ‘is because political contexts are *institutional contexts*, i.e. contexts that make it possible for actors to exert agency and empower them to act on the world in a way that has an impact on matters of common concern’. This explanation is problematic for two reasons. The first relates to how one defines an institution. The term encompasses parliaments, NGOs and trade unions, but also organisations such as universities, businesses, and religious groups, and social units including the family, the household and marriage. This raises the issue of what discourses are not in some way institutional. Indeed, if political discourse is institutional discourse, and institutions are ubiquitous, then we are returned to the same problem as above: political discourse is everywhere. One might argue that what differentiates an institution like the family from parliament is that the power struggles involved in one context encompass only private concerns, whereas in the other those of an entire nation are at stake. But this only raises the second problem, which is how to define a common concern. For instance, although they take place in a private setting, the power dynamics inhering in the day-to-day activities of the family are potentially relevant to everyone because they reproduce ideologies that are held at the social level (see Blum-Kulka, 1997; Merrill et al., 2014). Indeed, the slogan ‘the personal

is political' was intended to raise awareness of just this – to highlight that the collective oppression of women was reproduced at the level of personal relationships (Hanisch, 1969).

Rather than argue that politics inheres in any one set of institutions, perhaps a more productive approach is to say that institutions become more or less *politicised* by the people who engage with them because what counts as a common concern is not a given but often what is at stake in a struggle for power. For a reception-oriented approach, then, the issue consists not in identifying which institutions are and are not political, but rather in tracking how they are framed as such by the different groups of people who participate in them (Goffman, 1974). A useful framework for modelling this process is prototype theory (see Rosch et al., 1975; Rosch, 1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1981). From this perspective, political discourse can be seen as a fuzzy, radial category with "good" prototypical examples at the centre, fading into less good examples and overlapping with other discourse types on the periphery. Rather than the binary system of being either a member of a category or not – that is, being an instance of political discourse or some other discourse type – categories are sets of 'family resemblances' (Wittgenstein, 1958). Prototypical members of the category tend to share the most attributes with others of the same category (Rosch and Mervis, 1981) because prototypes 'are abstract concepts constructed from typical attributes of the main concrete exemplars for that concept' (Gibbs, 2003: 28).

Van Dijk (1997: 16–18) provides a list of ten different attributes of what he calls 'the domain of politics', summarised in Table 1.1. Arguably, *all* social domains could be characterised under these headings (systems, values, ideologies, institutions, groups, actors, relations, processes, actions, and cognition). What makes the list useful, though, are the examples Van Dijk (1997) provides for each dimension of the discourse. They comprise an inventory of the kinds of actors, or groups, or processes etc. that one might expect to encounter in a political context. Table 1.1, then, lists some of the prototypical contextual features of political discourse. However, Van Dijk's (1997) ten dimensions also enable a description of more peripheral communicative situations that might also count as political discourse. For instance, going to a concert of the British left-wing singer-songwriter, Billy Bragg, is one such peripheral instance of a communicative situation which may still count as a member of the category. In relation to the ten political domain characteristics, the Bragg concert is typical insofar as the musician is highly likely to talk about the evils of capitalism ('systems') and the virtues of socialism ('ideologies'). His songs are expressions of solidarity and anger at injustice ('values'). He is also likely to talk about ideas such as freedom and oppression ('relations'), and all this is likely to invoke political attitudes and opinions in his audience ('cognitions'). Less prototypically, however, Bragg is a singer and not a professional politician or journalist

(‘actors’). The ‘institutions’ of the music business – record labels, recording studios, concert halls – in which he operates are also more peripheral to politics, and going to a music concert is not usually thought of as a political activity (‘actions’). The Bragg concert, then, possesses a mix of prototypical and non-prototypical political features. The degree to which the discourse event is viewed as political by discourse participants depends upon the salience of each in the moment of the discourse.

Table 1.1 The domain of politics, summarised from Van Dijk (1997: 16–18)

Feature	Some examples
political systems	democracy, oligarchy, communism
political values	solidarity, equality, tolerance
political ideologies	communism, fascism, feminism
political institutions	parliaments, NGOs, trade unions
political groups	parties, campaigns, protestors
political actors	politicians, journalist, civil servants
political relations	oppression, equality, inequality
political processes	governing, opposing, passing legislation
political actions including genres of political discourse	meetings, protests, speeches
political cognition	generic and specific knowledge of and attitudes towards all of the above

For this reason, it is quite possible for discourse events to fluctuate in political intensity; there may be some times which feel more political to the participants and others in which the prototypical features of the political domain are less foregrounded. So, to extend the example, not all Billy Bragg’s songs are about class struggle and class solidarity; his oeuvre also includes love songs. These songs do not deal with the macro-institutional contexts that – for some audiences – typify prototypical political discourse. They might therefore be perceived by these audiences as “less political” than the rest of his performance (although the micro-political issues these songs raise could be of political importance to feminists like Mills [1995] who analyse pop songs from a feminist perspective).

Indeed, this tension over what counts as political underpins what Fairclough (2000: 99) has called ‘the public construction of normalness’ in the ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s rhetoric. For instance, in a 1997 party political broadcast, Blair tells anecdotes about his family over his kitchen table and in the back of his car as he moves between political engagements. In one sense, these exchanges are profoundly political – they are oriented towards getting the audience of the

broadcast to vote for Blair's New Labour Party. However, part of the persuasive strategy involves reframing the discourse event as a less politicised, intimate and authentic conversation between friends (for further discussion, see Browse, 2017, and Pearce, 2001). The broadcast works, then, by upsetting the prototypical conventions of political discourse and thereby shifting – or attempting to shift – the categorical framework that audiences of the broadcast apply to the discourse event. Of course, success depends on the audience performing this conceptual reframing. For some audience members the reframing will fail as they realise this is a party political broadcast and that Blair is – in the last analysis – a politician. Certainly, this is how Browse (2017), Fairclough (2000), and Pearce (2001) seem to have personally framed this discourse event. All three researchers provide an analysis of this persuasive strategy of performing 'normalness', but to do so requires that it be identified as precisely that – a rhetorical strategy for gaining votes. The point, here, is that the analytical perspective presupposes that the analyst politicises what many audience members experience as a depoliticised – or at least unconventionally political – communicative situation. In fact, we could interpret the Billy Bragg concert in the same way; one could make the (somewhat cynical) argument that the singer-songwriter's romantic songs humanise his performance, thus making him a more credible and effective advocate for his chosen political causes. If Bragg can connect with an audience by sharing his experiences of something as – apparently – depoliticised as love, perhaps they will be more willing to listen to his views on other topics. According to this alternative perspective, then, the love songs are political because they serve a rhetorical purpose – they make Bragg a more credible and therefore more persuasive speaker. A reception-focused approach to political discourse needs to explain how, when, and why audiences politicise the discourses in which they participate; when and to whom a love song is not just a love song, or – in the case of Blair's party political broadcast – when and to whom a chat in the kitchen is not just a chat in the kitchen. Such an approach should not be seen as reducing the issue to the level of individual psychological factors of categorisation. As Rosch and Mervis (1981) point out, the prototypicality of a category member will vary across cultural and social groups. To ask these questions, then, is not simply to inquire about the categorical frameworks that individuals bring to events of discourse; it is to examine under what social conditions different groups and actors deploy – more or less automatically, or as a question of political strategy – the category of "political" in their framing of the discourse event.

Rather than provide a formal definition of what counts as political discourse, then, this book argues for a reception-oriented perspective on this discourse type. For most audiences, discourses such as speeches in parliament, interviews with politicians, policy documents, manifestos, and campaign posters form some of the central prototypes of political discourse. However, analysis should also extend

to less central exemplars. Wodak (2009) notes that satire and soap-opera-style dramatisations of political processes have become more widespread with growing interest in the “backstage” of politics (see Chapters 2 and 3 in this volume). Whilst the ‘aims, goals or functions’ of these texts are not ‘primarily political’ (Van Dijk, 1997: 15) – which is to say that they are more about entertaining an audience than making a direct intervention into macro-political processes – they do play a fundamental role in shaping attitudes to politics and the political process, including prototypes of what constitutes “the political”. As such, they should be treated as important forms of political discourse. The view of political discourse as fuzzy, radial category advocated here opens the door to analysing other forms of entertaining or aesthetic forms of discourse, such as satirical discourses, literary, dramatic and filmic discourses, art or music (as in the Bragg concert). For this reason, this book not only examines the prototypes of political speeches, interviews, and newspaper articles, but includes films (Chapter 2), songs (Chapters 2 and 3), and television shows (Chapter 5). This variety of texts reflects a broader, fuzzy, reception-oriented approach to categorising political discourse. It also captures the sense in which what counts as political is a dynamic, flexible feature of the social and cultural context in which discourse participants operate.

1.3 Political/Critical Discourse Analysis

Political discourse analysis is a vast area of research (for representative work, see Chilton and Schaffner, 2002; Kaal et al., 2014; Kranert and Horan, forthcoming; Okulska and Cap, 2010) which utilises a diversity of theoretical frameworks, such as rhetoric (Charteris-Black, 2014), metaphor analysis (Lakoff, 2002; Musolff, 2016), argumentation theory (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012), ethnography (Wodak, 2009), and cognitive linguistics (Chilton, 2004). Van Dijk (1997) notes that most of this work takes influence from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA, Fairclough, 2001; Jeffries, 2010a; Van Dijk, 1993, 2001; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). According to Van Dijk (2001: 352), CDA aims to study ‘the way in which power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’. It often focuses on the ways in which language reproduces social injustices and unfair power relations. This focus is emancipatory – CDA aims to ‘increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others because consciousness is the first step toward emancipation’ (Fairclough, 2001: 1).

CDA has developed a number of theoretical and methodological frameworks for describing and critiquing how discourse perpetuates social inequality or injustice (see Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Fairclough’s (1985, 2001, 2009) is perhaps one

of the best known and representative of these approaches. From this perspective, discourse is seen as a form of social practice, meaning that it both reflects and constitutes social structures (Fairclough, 2001: 31). On the one hand, discourse participants' linguistic behaviour is often dictated and determined by the institutional context. On the other, the language they use enacts that context. This dialectic, in which language users are both the agent and object of social structures, is reflected in the 'felicitous ambiguity' (Fairclough, 2001: 23) of the word discourse. A discourse can mean the concrete social interactions in which people engage (one might have numerous discourses with, say, family, friends, or colleagues throughout the day), or the kinds of linguistic behaviour one might expect given a certain sort of occasion (for instance classroom discourse, or business discourse, or more broadly, the discourse of socialism, feminism or fascism etc.). The former, Fairclough (2001: 24) terms 'actual discourse' and the latter 'types of discourse'. According to the theory, speakers or writers instantiate or creatively combine discourse types in actual instances of linguistic interaction (Fairclough, 2001: 26). Ideological critique thus consists in tracing the linguistic resources deployed in local, micro-instances of interaction, to the more global discourse types employed on the macro-level of social institutions and whole societies. Although theoretical apparatuses differ, this same aim is common to most major schools of CDA (for example, Van Leeuwen, 2008: 6; Wodak, 2009: 39).

The implicit focus in this approach is on the production side of the discourse event – on the ideological processes involved in composing a text or corpus of texts. Indeed, while he does not rule out a CDA of reception, Fairclough (1996: 51) himself suggests that the emphasis has been overwhelmingly on how texts are produced. More recently, Jeffries (2010a: 11) has made the similar point that audience responses have faced relatively little investigation. However, her own work is dedicated to examining more closely the linguistic means by which ideologies are encoded in texts, rather than the ways in which those texts are received by audiences. With some exceptions (Gavins and Simpson, 2015; Hart, 2016; Fausey and Matlock, 2011; Thibodieu and Boroditsky, 2011) there has been no sustained account, from a CDA perspective, of how the audiences of written or verbal texts bring their knowledge and interpretative procedures to the discourse in order to construct meaning. Although this book uses a cognitive stylistic approach, the same is true of more recent cognitive approaches in CDA (Cap, 2013; Chilton, 2007; Hart, 2014; Koller, 2005; Van Dijk, 2009, 2014). In these accounts, cognition is the mediator between macro- and micro-levels of social analysis. Discourse participants represent social structures in the form of cognitive models which influence their linguistic behaviour in a concrete context of interaction (Van Dijk, 2009: 64). These cognitive models are shared by social groups and institutional actors (Van Dijk, 2009: 70). The aim, here, is the same as in Fairclough's (2001)

account except instead of a recovery of ‘discourse types’, the analyst reconstructs the socially shared conceptual model underpinning the representation encoded in the text. These frameworks thus share the same problematic as non-cognitive approaches in CDA, focussing on the cognitive-ideological processes of discourse production rather than reception. It is the aim of this book to fill this gap in the research. Whilst CDA’s view of discourse as a form of social practice is an important first step in understanding interpretative procedures, its focus on production means that to develop a set of concepts for analysing political discourse in reception it is necessary to turn to other domains of research for theoretical inspiration.

1.4 Classical rhetoric

Of these, perhaps a more suitable starting point is the study of rhetoric, ‘the power to observe the persuasiveness of which any particular matter admits’ (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I.2, 1355b, trans. Lawson-Tancred). Rather than analyse how discourse manifests broader ideological structures, this orientation towards persuasion entails a more interactional view of communication, one that is concerned with the effect of a discourse producer’s words on an audience. In this book, categories from classical rhetoric – the rhetorical appeals from *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos* – are integral to systematising an analysis of political discourse in reception.

The study and practice of rhetoric began in the 5th century BC. Protagoras (481–411 BC), one of the earliest Sophists, probably best encapsulates their philosophical perspective in his famous assertion that “man is the measure of all things” (Protagoras, quoted in Williams, 2009: 53). The Sophists held that objective truth was inaccessible, and that one should instead act according to the most persuasive argument. For the Sophists, underpinning this perspective was the principle of the *dissoi logoi*, that every argument has at least two sides. According to Protagoras, the skill of rhetoric consisted in ‘making the worse [side] appear the better’ (Protagoras, quoted in Williams, 2009: 55). It was in teaching this skill, or writing speeches for others, that most of these orators made their money. For this reason, many of the key surviving texts of the Sophists are speeches they wrote either for the Greek courts of law or to demonstrate their technical skill (*technê*). One of the best examples of the latter is *The Encomium of Helen*. A famed Sophist, Gorgias (c.485–380 BC), wrote this speech as a defence of Helen of Troy, who – having fled from King Menelaus with the Trojan prince, Paris – triggered the Trojan War documented with some poetic license in Homer’s *Iliad*. In ancient Greek culture, Helen was a villain of the story. Gorgias’s attempt to vindicate her illustrates Protagoras’s principle of ‘making the worse appear the better’, thus acting as a demonstration of Gorgias’s own rhetorical skills.

Despite the various speeches and *technê*, there is no surviving explicit or systematic account of Sophistic theory and method. In *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates (436–338 BC), a student of both Protagoras and Gorgias, provides a critique but his comments are addressed to the unscrupulous ways in which some teachers of oratory inflate their powers of persuasion to recruit students and make money. The first extensive theoretical treatment is outlined in Plato's (c.427–347 BC) *Gorgias*, a fictional dialogue between the eponymous Sophist, his friends, Polus, Chaerephon, and Callicles, and Socrates (the last of whom represents Plato's position). Plato took a dim view of rhetoric, refusing to consider it an art. Throughout *Gorgias*, he makes a distinction between knowledge and belief. Rather than striving for the former (which is the preserve of philosophy), rhetoric is concerned only with the latter – with persuading people to think something irrespective of whether it is true or not. For Plato, however, the good life is occupied by the search for truth. As he puts it: 'the supreme object of a man's efforts, in public and in private life, must be *the reality* rather than *the appearance* of goodness' (Plato, *Gorgias*, 527, trans. Hamilton, my emphases). Crucially, he argued that the arts should aid in this endeavour. Under this criterion, rhetoric could not be an art because it might be used by unprincipled orators to lead people astray from knowledge. For this reason, Plato saw rhetoric as a kind of knack or form of pandering.

In his seminal *The Art of Rhetoric*, Plato's student Aristotle (384–322 BC) took the opposite view. That rhetoric could be used for good and bad purposes he claimed was true of all arts: 'this is a problem to all good things except virtue and applies particularly to the most advantageous, such as strength, health, wealth and strategic expertise – if one used these well one might do the greatest possible good and if badly the greatest possible harm' (*Rhetoric* I.i, 1355b). According to Aristotle, rhetoric did not consist in convincing audiences of untruths, but constructing the most persuasive case given the circumstances. Contrary to Plato, then, what separated it from sophistry was the manner in which it was applied: 'sophistry resides not in the capacity [to detect the most persuasive argument], but the choice of its use' (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I.i, 1355b). This insistence that the uses of oratory are what render it an art was reaffirmed by Cicero (106–43 BC), who argued that 'the man who equips himself with the weapons of eloquence, not to be able to attack the welfare of his country but to defend it... will be a citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his own interests and those of his community' (*On Invention* I.i, 2, trans. Hubbell). Aristotle's conception of rhetoric coheres with Cicero's: for both, it was the art of speaking eloquently in service of the good.

Of the later Roman works on oratory, the most influential were Cicero's *De Inventione* ('On Invention'), Quintilian's (c.35–100 AD) *Institutio Oratoria* ('Institutes of Oratory'), and an anonymous technical treatise, which was formerly attributed to Cicero, called *Ad Herrenium* ('For Herrenius'). All these works follow

Aristotle in splitting the subject matter of oratory into three genres: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. The first of these related to the language of politics and what policy should be pursued by the Roman senate; the second included the oratory used in the law courts; and the third encompassed rhetoric used to praise or blame others. Each of these genres had a temporal dimension. Deliberative oratory was addressed to what would happen in the future, forensic oratory to the past, and epideictic oratory to flattering or disparaging someone in the present. Cutting across these three genres were five technical canons: invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery. Cicero glosses each as follows:

Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one's cause plausible. Arrangement is the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order. Expression is the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter. Memory is the firm mental grasp of matter and words. Delivery is the control of the voice and body in a manner suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and the style.
(*On Invention* I.vii, 9)

The five canons were oriented to the technical production of persuasive speeches, reflecting the practical concerns of orators like Cicero and Quintilian, who were professional public speakers. Indeed, two of these canons – memory and delivery – are missing from the account offered in Aristotle's much more theoretical *The Art of Rhetoric*. Despite the focus on discourse production, the first of these canons forms the basis of the approach taken to political discourse in this book. This is because invention involves the process by which speakers find and, importantly, *categorise* the arguments they make. In classical rhetoric these arguments are described as rhetorical appeals: the appeals to *ethos*, *logos* and *pathos*. The first is a rhetorical argument built on the character of the speaker; the second, based on reason; and the third, an appeal to the audience's emotions. These categories furnish analysts with a useful typology for describing the manner in which audiences respond to a speaker or writer. That is, one can describe how the audience's perception of the speaker affects their response to the speech; the sense in which audiences agree or disagree with the speaker's purportedly "rational" arguments; and the way in which the audience responds emotionally to the speech. These three ways of approaching political discourse in reception are only analytically separable. Chapter 6 of this volume suggests that we often associate seemingly "rational" arguments with specific political groups and actors to whom we might have a corresponding emotional response; so, if we hear a speaker say that public services are being stretched by immigrants and that we should consequently halt all immigration, we might infer that the speaker is politically on the far-right, which might entail – depending on our political inclinations – a further emotional reaction, such as anger. For the sake of analysis, however, it is useful to be able

to separate out these different aspects of audience experience. In the above situation, we experience pathos, which is a response to our perception of the speaker's ethos, which we in turn infer from the speaker's arguments from logos. Thus, although the bulk of rhetorical theory is dedicated to the technical production of discourse, these concepts provide three dimensions along which to investigate audience responses. To operationalise the analysis of the appeals to ethos, logos and pathos in reception, this book utilises concepts and frameworks from the field of cognitive stylistics. Section 1.5 traces the development of stylistics into a social science of reading (Carter and Stockwell, 2008: 298), and Section 1.6 outlines the theoretical assumptions that are specific to cognitive stylistics and which underpin the approach presented in this volume.

1.5 Stylistics

As many scholars point out, contemporary stylistics has deep roots in classical rhetoric (Burke, 2014; Bradford, 1997; Fahnestock, 2011; Hamilton, 2005, 2014; Simpson, 2004: 50). Some have suggested that both disciplines 'operate within the same territory' (Enkvist, 1985: 22). There are certainly territorial overlaps insofar as the third rhetorical canon, style, is concerned. In Roman rhetoric, style was categorised in three ways: high, middle and low. The high style consisted of 'smooth and ornate arrangement of impressive words', the middle style 'words of a lower, yet not of the lowest and most colloquial, class of words', and the low was 'brought down even to the most current idiom of standard speech' (*Ad Herrenium*, IV.viii, 11, trans. Caplan). The speaker's style could be elevated from plain to high by their use of rhetorical figures. The first type of figure – tropes – related primarily to meaning. Thus metaphor, metonymy and irony were all considered forms of trope. The second – schemes – involved a patterning of linguistic structure, such as John F. Kennedy's 'ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country', which is an instance of the rhetorical figure *chiasmus*. The identification of stylistic figures was a staple of oratorical training. The student's ability to label these stylistic features contributed both to the development of their own style and mastery of this canon of rhetoric.

Many contemporary stylisticians have investigated the use of classical tropes and schemes (for example, Cockcroft, 2005; Hamilton, 2005, 2014; Hunter, 2005; Leech, 2008; Oakley, 2005; Verdonk, 2005; Wales, 2015). There are, however, important distinctions between the analyses of figures in stylistics versus rhetoric. The former identifies linguistic structures to determine their rhetorical or aesthetic effects, the latter to emulate great orators. Thus, 'rhetoric is a productive art, aiming to teach students methods of persuasive communication; literary stylistics

is an analytical practice' (Fahnestock, 2005: 16). A further difference between the disciplines is that contemporary stylistics is predominantly, although not exclusively (Jeffries and McIntyre, 2010: 1), focused on the study of literature, whereas no clear non-/literary distinction existed in classical scholarship (Fahnestock, 2005). Instruction manuals would often use examples from poetic or dramatic forms of discourse in addition to speeches from great public speakers to illustrate rhetorical figures.

The emphasis on literature in stylistics is a consequence of another more immediate twentieth-century influence on the discipline: Russian formalism, particularly the work of Roman Jakobson. As Burke (2014: 11) asserts, despite the impact of rhetoric on stylistics, most histories of the field begin with Jakobson's (1960) 'Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics'. There are continuities between Jakobson (1960) and the classical tradition; for example, he utilizes a number of rhetorical terms to analyse Mark Antony's famous speech in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (Burke, 2014: 11). However, the main aims of the 'Closing Statement' were to situate the study of literature within the discipline of linguistics and to differentiate literary discourse from other discourse types. To do so, he provided a description of the discourse event consisting of six elements: the addresser and addressee, the context in which the discourse takes place, the message that is encoded, the 'code' itself, and a means of 'contact' – the physical channel or psychological connection through which addresser and addressee communicate (Jakobson, 1960: 353). Corresponding to each of these elements, Jakobson (1960) advanced six functions of language: the referential, which was oriented to the context; the expressive or emotive, to the addresser; the conative, to the addressee; the phatic, to the contact; the metalingual, to the code; and the poetic, to the message. Of most interest to Jakobson (1960) was the last. For him, literary language was characterized by the dominance of the poetic function – by a greater focus on the message itself, rather than any other aspect of the discourse. The study of poetics was

that part of linguistics which treats the poetic function in its relationship to the other functions of language. Poetics in the wider sense of the word deals with the poetic function not only in poetry, where the function is superimposed upon the other functions of language, but also outside of poetry, where some other function is superimposed on the poetic function. (Jakobson, 1960: 359)

The purpose of poetics was to describe 'the empirical linguistic criterion of the poetic function' (Jakobson, 1960: 358). Thus, one aspect of the formalist approach to literature was to identify the linguistic basis of literariness – to describe the linguistic means by which the poetic function became textually manifest in any number of discourse types, and the manner in which it dominates in those that are called literary.

Attridge (1996) suggests that Jakobson's (1960) concentration on the formal properties of literary style acted as 'a call to arms for the stripling discipline of stylistics' (Attridge, 1996: 37). The military metaphor is fitting. The primacy afforded to linguistic analysis attracted criticism from some traditional literary scholars. The conflict found first (and at times, vitriolic) expression in the debate between the literary critic, F. W. Bateson (1971a, 1971b) and the stylistician Roger Fowler (1971a, 1971b). In what has come to be known as the Fowler-Bateson controversy (Simpson, 2004: 148), Bateson (1971a, 1971b) claimed that an effective synthesis of linguistics and literary criticism was impossible. Problematically for Fowler (1971a, 1971b), the literary critic's argument echoed contemporaneous developments in linguistic theory. Jakobson's (1960) formulation of the relationship between linguistics and poetics was heavily influenced by Saussure's (1966) structuralist linguistics. One key division in structuralist theory was between *langue*, the underlying rules of a linguistic system, and *parole*, their performance in actual instances of communication. By the Fowler-Bateson controversy, this distinction had been carried over into the prevailing theoretical perspective of the time, Chomsky's (1965) generative linguistics. Chomsky (1965: 4) renamed *langue* and *parole* 'competence' and 'performance' and argued that performance 'surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics'. Instead, the discipline should elucidate the generative rules that produce syntactically well-formed sentences. The linguistic investigation of literary effects was therefore ruled out by the generativist's definition of what constituted the proper study of language because literary discourse was a feature of linguistic performance. Thus Bateson's (1971a, 1971b) view that literary criticism and linguistic analysis were irreconcilable disciplines was upheld by one of the leading schools of linguistic thought.

Rather than a critique of stylistics, Bateson's (1971a, 1971b) argument can be read as an indictment of generativism's limitations. Chomsky's (1965: 4) demarcation of the discipline imposed arbitrarily narrow horizons on the study of language, dismissing as trivial the cultural, political and social contexts in which texts are produced and consumed. As Bateson (1971b: 79) suggests, this restricted view made it unsuitable for the analysis of literary effects. Arguably, formalist poetics also suffered from similar problems. Rather than a pervasive influence on all aspects of the production and reception of discourse, 'context' formed only the subject matter of Jakobson's (1960) referential function. It had little bearing on the poetic function, which was produced by syntactic and phonetic patterning (Jakobson, 1960: 358–359). Although he outlined the different communicative functions that might be realised in discourse, the focus of Jakobson's (1960) analysis was consequently on patterns of linguistic form. This disregard for the wider context leads Weber (1996: 2) to argue that formalist stylistic analyses 'strike one

as mechanical, lifeless, sterile exercises, and largely irrelevant to the interpretation of the literary work that they are describing' (see also Attridge, 1996: 38).

The narrow, de-contextualised focus of formalism led to the adoption of new functionalist linguistic paradigms and an exploration of their application to literature, as Weber (1996: 2) summarises: 'the functionalist introduces [...] direct functional relevance to the interpretation of the literary text'. One of the seminal contributions to functionalist stylistics was Halliday's (1971) essay on William Golding's novel, *The Inheritors*. Using categories from Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG, Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004), he described the ways in which the text construes the world through the eyes of the Neanderthal narrator, Lok. Elements of linguistic style were here given a functional significance insofar as they generated literary effects. The explicit pairing of linguistic patterning with literary interpretation marked an advance for stylistics. It should be noted, however, that this pairing was not a feature of all work in the area. As Gavins (2012: 347) outlines, Halliday's (1966) functionalist analysis of Auden's *Leda and the Swan* offered no interpretation of the linguistic structures it identified. Notwithstanding this criticism, the emphasis on the social functions of language – alongside the categories SFG provided for describing their linguistic realisation – offered a much better basis for the contextualised analysis of literary effects. Indeed, Stockwell (2014a: 20) suggests that SFG's suitability for describing the ideological and interpersonal dimensions of literary, institutional and political texts quickly established it as the 'paradigmatic grammar in the field'.

Despite these advances, stylistics continued to attract criticism:

The stylicians proceed as if there were observable facts that could first be described and then interpreted. What I am suggesting is that an interpreting entity, endowed with purposes and concerns, is, by virtue of its very operation, determining what counts as facts to be observed, and, moreover, that since this determining is not a neutral marking out of a valueless area, but the extension of an already existing field of interests, it is an interpretation.

(Fish, 1980: 94, emphasis in original)

Fish (1980) instead suggests that analysts should focus on how a particular 'interpretive community' makes available interpretative procedures to the individual reader of a text. Under this model, it is '*interpretive acts [that] are [...] being described*' (Fish, 1980: 93 emphasis in original). Interpretative communities are groups of readers who, by virtue of their shared institutional context and background knowledge, employ the same set of interpretative acts to construct meaning (Fish, 1980: 321). Rather than view aesthetic value as an intrinsic part of the literary text (like the formalists), or assume a necessary interpretative relevance for linguistic forms (like the functionalists), this perspective sees literary effects

as a function of the interpretative processes that different groups of readers apply to the text.

As Toolan (1996: 130) points out, the notion of an ‘interpretative community’ seems superficially quite attractive, grounding the construction of meaning in a repertoire of interpretative practices shared by a social group. However, the term ‘community’ raises further questions:

Is it an accurate description of the sort of group which confirms or sustains any critical reading? More specifically, do all communities merit approval (presumably not) and how do they change or become changed? Or would the theory claim that communities do not change, rather that new communities come into existence? (Toolan, 1996: 130)

Although Fish (1980) presented a powerful critique, arguably better approaches to context emerged out of stylistics itself. As Stockwell (2000: 16–17) argues, Fish’s (1980) criticisms rested on a selective representation of the discipline. In fact, the move from formal to functional analysis had already brought with it a greater concern for the effects of context on interpretation (see Bex et al., 2000; Verdonk, 1993). Whereas Fish’s (1980) notion of an interpretative community was itself too vague to be of much use, contemporary stylistics has provided an array of well-developed theories and methods for investigating the interaction between reader, text and context. For example, both pragmatic (for an overview, see Chapman and Clark, 2014) and cognitive theories (see Section 1.6) have been used to analyse the conceptual and inferential processes employed by readers, and stylisticians have increasingly turned towards experimental empirical methods to test their assumptions about the literary effects of linguistic forms (for instance, Andringa, 1996; van Peer, 1986; van Peer and Andringa, 1990; van Peer et al., 2007; van Peer et al., 2012; Zyngier et al., 2007; Zyngier et al. 2008). Recently, this empirical impetus has taken a less positivistic turn, and has instead utilised ethnographic methods to investigate the responses of different reading communities (Allington, 2011; Allington and Swann, 2009; Peplow, 2011; Peplow et al., 2016; and Whiteley 2011a, 2011b). Thus, modern literary linguistics has developed into a ‘social science’ of reading which ‘necessarily involves the simultaneous practice of linguistic awareness and awareness of the interpretive and social dimensions [because] formal description without ideological understanding is partial or pointless’ (Carter and Stockwell, 2008: 298).

From this overview, it is clear that unlike CDA and classical rhetoric, contemporary stylistics is concerned with the readerly effects of discourse; at the heart of the discipline is a continuous recognition that ‘the primary interpretative procedures used in the reading of a literary text are *linguistic* procedures’ (Carter 1982: 4), and that these procedures are situated within a co-text and a social, political,

and cultural context. Since its early beginnings, then, stylistics has moved from an attempt to formally define literary language to sophisticated analyses of the interrelation between linguistic forms, the functions they serve, the communicative contexts in which they are used and the resultant effects experienced by readers of the text. It is for this reason that, despite its literary focus, concepts and frameworks from this discipline will be used in the analyses of political discourse offered in this volume. As Jeffries and McIntyre (2010: 1) write, ‘stylistics has tended to concentrate on the analysis of literary texts, though there is in fact no reason why this should necessarily be the case’. Indeed, frameworks and methods from stylistics have been used to analyse non-literary texts in the past. Cases in point are Jeffries’ (2010a) *Critical Stylistics* and Mills’ (1995) *Feminist Stylistics*, both of which deal with a variety of text types. Contemporary CDA owes much to the East Anglia school of Critical Linguistics that came before it. The same Roger Fowler at the centre of the Fowler-Bateson controversy discussed above was at the heart of these early critical developments (Fowler et al., 1979). There is, then, a body of work in stylistics dedicated to political or critical concerns (Browse, 2016a, 2016b; Clark and Zyngier, 1998; Fowler, 1991, 2008; Fowler et al., 1979; Gavins and Simpson, 2015; Jeffries 2010a, 2010b, 2014; Mills, 1995). Rather than focus on reception, though, these works tend to systematise the kinds of linguistic analyses already found in CDA (although see Gavins and Simpson, 2015). For instance, Jeffries (2010a: 6) justifies her book by explaining that it provides ‘a clear set of analytical tools to follow in carrying out the critical analysis of texts’ as ‘examples of critical analysis of texts is rather patchy in its coverage of linguistic structures and has not yet developed a full methodology – or methodologies – which students can easily try out for themselves’. Jeffries (2010a) builds on the tools first outlined by Fowler et al. (1979) – for instance, nominalisation and use of the passive voice – in order to provide a useful list of linguistic structures to look out for. The focus is *not* on how these structures might actually be interpreted by an audience, nor is it on how one might model those interpretative processes. Rather, Jeffries (2010a) is concerned with the potentially ideological ways in which linguistic forms *invite* a preferred interpretation. This distinction between the representation proffered by a speaker or writer and the audience’s interpretations of the discourse is further explored in Chapter 4. For now, it suffices to say that there is a need for devising an approach to political discourse in reception that is able to model the interpretative procedures audiences bring to bear on the linguistic structures they encounter in context. This necessarily involves not only a discussion of linguistic form, but also the knowledge audiences bring with them to the discourse event. For this reason, the next section provides an overview of cognitive stylistics, a sub-discipline of stylistics which has been at the forefront of investigating the relationship between discourse and cognition.

1.6 Cognitive stylistics

The development of stylistics outlined in Section 1.5 runs from a mid-20th century concern for linguistic form alone to contemporary stylisticians' much broader analysis of linguistic forms in context and the ideological, rhetorical, or literary effects of those forms on the reader or audience. Cognitive stylistics is the latest development towards supplying a fully contextualised and readerly account of textual meaning. In the last fifteen years, work in cognitive stylistics has rapidly expanded, becoming a well-established area of stylistic research. Important collections representing key work in the field include Brône and Vandaele (2009), Gavins and Steen (2003), and Semino and Culpeper (2002), whilst Stockwell (2002b) provides a seminal introduction to this approach to literary-linguistic study. Gavins and Steen (2003: 1) explain that 'cognitive poetics relat[es] the structures of the work of art, including the literary text, to their presumed or observed psychological effects on the recipient, including the reader'. They use the term 'poetics' because they focus on literary reading, whereas in this book preference is given to cognitive *stylistics* as non-literary texts are involved. Gavins and Steen (2003) describe literary or rhetorical effects in psychological terms, which is to say that they are the product of cognitive processes. Much of the research in cognitive stylistics is thus 'tightly related to the rise of cognitive linguistics' (Gavins and Steen, 2003: 3). It is therefore relevant to review the basic tenets of this theoretical perspective in order to understand the assumptions that underpin cognitive stylistics.

All linguistics might be said to be 'cognitive' insofar as the structures, 'rules and semantic features which generate language are stored in our memory' (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: x). Although Geeraerts (2006: 2) suggests that cognitive linguistics 'has not yet stabilized into a uniform theory', it can, however, be differentiated from other forms of linguistics by its embodied, experiential view of language. The 'first wave' of cognitive linguists, as Geeraerts (2006: 24) calls it, emerged in the late seventies and early eighties, breaking with the well-established generativist school of linguistic theory founded by Noam Chomsky (see Chomsky, 1957, 1965). Generative linguistics privileges the study of linguistic competence, the innate understanding of linguistic rules provided by a separate language module in the brain (see Section 1.5). In contrast, cognitive linguistics sees language "as an integral part of cognition, not a separate 'module' (hence cognitive linguistics)" (Langacker, 2009: 628). This perspective leads to the view that our linguistic faculties are fundamentally embodied; it means that rather than being a closed-off system, language 'involves knowledge of the world that is integrated with our other cognitive capacities' (Geeraerts, 2006: 5). For example, one of the reasons we are able to learn a language at all is because of our more general cognitive capacity

to find similarities and patterns across the multitude of our day-to-day experiences. This process is called schematisation – we schematise across instances to identify types. The same goes for language; our knowledge of the language system is based on our worldly experience of meaningful utterances or sentences (Tomasello, 2000; Zeschel, 2008; Langacker, 2009). So, on a day-to-day basis we witness energetic relationships between people and objects – hands pushing doors, boots kicking balls, fingers pushing buttons etc. – which we hear represented linguistically. From this iteration of energetic interactions and corresponding linguistic structures, we derive a grammatical class of things (nouns) and a grammatical class of processes (verbs), alongside a syntactic structure representing an abstract situation in which a thing acts in some way on another thing (the basic transitive clause). Thus, the linguistic resources we use to represent the world are the product of our embodied interaction with it; they are derived from our experiences of being living creatures that move about in an objectively existing environment (Lakoff, 1987, 1999; Ryan, 1998; Stockwell, 2002).

Such a view has important consequences: it suggests that all linguistic forms, derived from – and grounded in – concrete instances of use, are meaningful (even if that meaning is rather abstract and highly schematic, such as “a thing doing something to another thing”). Given that our knowledge of linguistic forms is experientially grounded in instances of use, it follows that they evoke the contexts in which they are used. Meaning is therefore ‘encyclopaedic’ (Geeraerts, 2006, 2009) and involves all the concepts, objects and entities experientially associated with that context. Cognitive linguists model this meaning in terms of conceptualisation. Consequently, linguistic forms evoke conceptual content. Note that this conceptualisation need not be visual, but could involve any and multiple simulated aspects of human perception (Barsalou, 1993, 2003).

According to Gavins (2007: 29, emphasis in original), ‘from the vast store of knowledge and experience available to the participants, it is the *text* produced in the discourse world that determines which areas are needed in order to process and understand the discourse at hand.’ This text-driven perspective holds that what is contextually relevant for interpreting the discourse is delimited by the text itself and the physically manifest context – the discourse-world – in which the discourse participants communicate. Textual meaning is therefore the product of an interaction between the text, the experiential knowledge of the discourse participants, and the manifest context in which the discourse takes place. Of course, it should be noted that differentiating between these last two is not straightforward because our interaction with the physical world is itself mediated by the neurological and cognitive processes by which we perceive it (Barsalou, 2009; Clark, 2013). Indeed, the issue of how we frame the communicative event in which we participate has been addressed in Section 1.2 in the discussion of what counts as

political discourse. It is a topic which is further investigated in the discussion of stereotypes in Chapter 3 and the analysis of speaker tone in Chapter 6.

Such a view of context provides a powerful way of explaining the meaningful effects of discourse in reader and audience reception. Accordingly, throughout this book several cognitive linguistic frameworks will be used in the stylistic analyses of political discourse, including schema theory (Bartlett, 1932; Cook, 1994; Schank and Abelson, 1977) in Chapter 3, Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) in Chapters 3 and 5, Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008) in Chapters 4, 6, and 7, and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993) in Chapter 5. These are combined with other frameworks that have emerged directly from research in cognitive stylistics, such as Text World Theory (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) in Chapters 4 and 5, and Peter Stockwell's work on 'ambience' (2014b) in Chapter 6 and 'resonance' (2009) in Chapter 7. The concepts used in the analyses, then, are – in the best traditions of stylistics (see Jeffries, 2000, and Carter and Stockwell, 2008) – eclectic, although they all share assumptions which broadly cohere with a cognitivist perspective. To avoid lengthy exposition here, each framework will be explained when they are applied in each of the chapters.

1.7 Summary of aims and methods

The first aim of this book is to outline a series of frameworks that can be used to analyse political discourse in reception, thereby providing the conceptual scaffolding necessary to pursue the investigation of 'interpretative diversity' that Fairclough (1996: 51) and Jeffries (2010a: 11) suggest is missing from CDA. The definition of political discourse offered in this book reflects this concern, that is, that political discourse is a radial category with prototypical examples at its centre and less prototypical ones at its periphery. What constitutes the prototype depends on the prior knowledge and expectations of the discourse participants. From this it follows that different participants can view the same discourse more or less politically depending on the background knowledge and experiences they bring to the discourse event.

The perspective taken in this volume broadens the definition of political discourse from prototypes (parliamentary debates, political interviews, policy documents, op-ed articles etc.) to forms of discourse which might have a primarily aesthetic, entertaining, or informational function (for instance, songs, satire, or newspaper stories "about" political processes). This position supports a cognitive stylistic approach. If conceptual frameworks more often used to study literature can be used to analyse political discourse, then it seems natural to suggest that

literary (or filmic, see Chapter 2) discourse can also be forms of political discourse. Indeed, the analysis of a speech by Barack Obama in Chapter 7 illustrates the ways in which the aesthetic properties of the oration contribute simultaneously to *both* an ideological representation of the American polity *and* the ‘resonant’ (Stockwell, 2009) rhetorical effects of the speech in audience reception. Thus, cognitive stylistic frameworks not only model audience response, they also provide a means of reconciling analyses of the aesthetic and the ideological in political discourse.

The second aim of the book is to demonstrate that ideas and concepts from cognitive stylistics and closely related disciplines (such as narratology, in Chapter 2) provide powerful tools for describing the effects of political discourses on audiences. At this juncture, it should be emphasised that the term ‘audiences’ is here understood in its broadest sense to mean anyone who engages with written, oral, or multimodal political texts, not a passive crowd of listeners or readers. Audiences do not simply “receive” messages which have been encoded and “sent” to them by the speaker. Rather, the cognitive perspective outlined in Section 1.6 necessitates an active view of the discourse participants; they bring their own knowledge and interpretative procedures to the discourse situation in order to construct meanings from the linguistic and paralinguistic prompts they encounter in the discourse event.

The notion of the active audience underlies the analyses and approach throughout the book. Similarly, whilst at times the definite article is used in references to “the” audience, this is not meant to signal that audiences are homogenous blocs. Audiences – especially political ones – are complex, consisting of a variety of what Bell (1984) calls intended addressees, auditors, over-hearers, and even eavesdroppers. An advantage of a cognitive approach is that it allows analysts not only to model audience complexity in terms of sociological data such as age, social class, gender, sexuality, race and ethnicity etc. but also the cognitive representations of political actors and events that a specific audience shares (or not) with the speaker. Indeed, the issue of clashing representations is taken up in Chapters 4 and 6 in the discussion of audience responses to a speech by Theresa May on immigration, and also in the discussion of metaphor in Chapter 5.

1.8 The structure of this book

As suggested above, whilst the works of classical rhetoric are principally concerned with training orators, they do furnish three dimensions along which a discussion of audience response might be framed: ethos, logos, and pathos. Accordingly, this book is separated into three parts, each consisting of two chapters. Part I, ‘Ethos’, examines the way in which the audience’s relationship to the speaker shapes their

response to the discourse. Chapter 2 shows that the production of political discourse is no simple matter, involving a host of ‘backstage’ (Wodak, 2009) political operatives all of whom have a say over what goes into (and what comes out of) a political text. Crucially, audiences are not oblivious to these processes and often seek to reconstruct them according to the evidence they gather from the ‘front stage’ performance. Concepts from narratology – the (political) narrator and implied author (Booth, 1961, 2002; Chatman, 1990) – are used with the notion of the ‘orchestrator’ to model the producer(s) of political discourse in audience reception. In Chapter 3, greater detail is given to the cognitive processes that are involved in attributing sections of a political performance to the speaker/writer, the narrator/orchestrator, or the implied author. To do so, the twin notions of a performance model and a character schema are introduced. Performance models are here seen as the representations of speakers or writers created “online” in the discourse event. Conversely, character schemata (see Culpeper, 2000) are conceptualisations of speakers or writers that exist in audience members’ long-term memories. Taking influence from social and cognitive psychology, specifically Attribution Theory (Ames and Mason, 2012; Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Gilbert, 1998) and Theory of Mind (Apperly, 2012; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack and Woodruff, 1978), this book holds that when a speaker or writer’s performance model fails to meet the expectations encoded in audience members’ character-schemata, it triggers an “upward” attribution to either the orchestrator/narrator, the implied author of the speech, or – most drastically – causes us to revise our character-schemata for the whole network of entities – speaker/writer, narrator/orchestrator, and implied author. It is therefore suggested that ethos in audience reception comprises a complex conceptual ecology of interdependent mental representations.

Part II opens with a discussion of one way in which a speaker might construct an appeal from logos – what Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.ii, 1356b) terms the ‘enthymeme’. Enthymemes are forms of argument with inexplicit premises. In Chapter 4, the Text World Theory notion of ‘Common Ground’ (Werth, 1993, 1999) is used in order to suggest that the premises of enthymemes act as the Common Ground of the discourse and that this bank of propositional knowledge builds up to underwrite the text-driven mental representations – the text-worlds (Gavins, 2007; Werth, 1999) – created by audience members. Importantly, it is argued that not every premise is accepted by the audience as true, and therefore cannot properly be considered part of the Common Ground. As a result, the notion of the Idealised Common Ground is introduced. This is the bank of knowledge to which the audience member assumes the speaker’s ideal audience (Booth, 1961) subscribes. This bank of knowledge underwrites the audience member’s construction of the text-world representation of events proffered by the speaker (but not accepted as a true representation by the audience member).

The proffered world is therefore always subject to be checked against the audience members' own conception of the events under discussion. Two ways in which audiences might reject the representation are suggested: (1) they might reject as untrue the knowledge incremented into the Idealised Common Ground by the speaker/writer, or (2) they might reject the linguistic means by which the speaker/writer increments knowledge into the Idealised Common Ground. To model this second type of rejection, the concept of 'construal' from Cognitive Grammar is used (Langacker, 1987, 1991, 2008) and the concept of 'reconstrual' – the process by which audiences re-represent the proffered text-world in accordance with their own conceptual models – is introduced.

In Chapter 5, Aristotle's second type of argument from logos is considered: the example. The cognitive linguistic notion of 'mapping' (Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gentner, 2003; Gentner and Markman, 1997) is used in order to model the ways in which example works in audience reception. It is on this basis that metaphor and satire – in addition to historical analogies – might also be considered forms of example; all three involve mapping one better known 'source' domain of knowledge onto a lesser known 'target' domain in order to make inferences about the target. Two ways in which examples might be resisted by discourse participants are outlined: either audience members reject the mapping of source domain onto target domain as inappropriate, or they reject the construal the source places on the target and instead offer an alternative by including more conceptual material from the source domain in the mapping. The chapter concludes by extending this framework to explore how a British satirical television show, *The Thick of It*, is mobilised in political discourse as a form of rhetorical example. The different ways politicians, academics, and journalist use the show as a source domain to make inferences about the target domain of contemporary politics and their political opponents are described.

Part III investigates the effect of emotion in the reception of political discourse. Chapter 6 outlines the different approaches to emotion research and how these map onto work in political discourse analysis, followed by an adapted version of Stockwell's (2014b) 'ambience' framework as a way of modelling some of the emotional effects of political discourse in audience reception. This framework is applied to reader response data in order to investigate how these participants construed what Stockwell (2014b) calls the 'tone' and 'atmosphere' of a speech by the then British Home Secretary, Theresa May, about immigration. Having examined quite hostile emotional responses in Chapter 6, in Chapter 7 Stockwell's (2009) notion of 'resonance' is explored. This concept captures the sense in which an experience with a literary text is perceived to have some profound, or important emotional content that 'resonates' long after the discourse event is over. It is suggested that political discourse can be resonant too.

Stockwell's (2009) model is applied to the US President, Barack Obama's, 2008 presidential victory speech delivered in Grant Park, Chicago, a speech with a resonance demonstrated by the participation of the audience, all of whom joined in the repeated refrain, 'yes we can'. Chapter 8 closes the book with an outline of suggestions for future research.

As this overview demonstrates, the range of theoretical frameworks covered is extensive and eclectic. Having outlined the cognitivist principles behind them and the order in which they are approached, it is now time to demonstrate by application their effectiveness in describing the processes of reception in political discourse.

PART I

Ethos

Layers of ethos

2.1 Introduction

‘You lot don’t seem like you’re nothing to do with us’. So said the British comedian-turned-political-activist Russell Brand (2014) in an episode of his news show (*The Trews*) entitled ‘Why can’t politicians talk like normal people?’ Later, in the same episode, Brand says that ‘there’s this sense of disengagement and the political system itself is this old heaving and lumbering wreck’. Although he made his name as a stand-up comic, Brand’s political punditry has a substantial audience. This episode of *The Trews* alone attracted nearly 300,000 views on the video sharing site *YouTube*. The comedian has caused quite a controversy by calling on his viewers (and readers) to withhold their vote. For Brand, it is only mass abstention from the system that can fix the ‘old heaving, lumbering wreck’ of British politics. Of all the reasons to consider Brand’s remarks, however, the most significant is that there is substantial public support for the sentiment he expresses, even if the comedian himself is somewhat of a controversial figure. Hansard’s (2015) annual audit of political engagement found that 58% of the people questioned believed that the UK democratic system represented their interests either ‘not very well’ or ‘not at all well’ and one of the audit’s conclusions was that ‘overall, the public has a fairly bleak view of standards in public life’ (Hansard, 2015: 44). Brand, then, is really only expressing a widely held belief about politicians and the British political system. That there is some deficiency of character that sets politicians apart from ‘ordinary’ people is a commonplace of British political discourse (and perhaps of political discourse in general). For instance, in the city of Portsmouth, in the UK, there is a bar called ‘The Honest Politician’, a wry joke because according to the received wisdom there is no such thing. Not only are the ethical codes of those who work in politics often called into question, politicians are sometimes even accused of being ‘weird’ or ‘creepy’. Take, for instance, some of the discussion on *Twitter* about the 2014 referendum to decide whether Scotland should remain a part of the United Kingdom. The Scottish Labour Party leader, Jim Murphy, campaigned for a ‘no’ vote in the referendum. Supporters of a ‘yes’ vote took to posting unflattering photos of Murphy and calling him ‘creepy

Jim'. Soon, a hashtag – a facility for tagging posts about a specific topic with the hash key (#) – emerged, and #creepyJim Murphy became a staple bogeyman of the online 'yes' campaign.

The causes of political disengagement, despondency and the distrust of politicians in the UK are complex and numerous. They have, however, combined to produce what classical scholars of rhetoric would call a failure of ethos. The appeal to a speaker's ethos is a kind of rhetorical proof, a form of argument based on the good character and authority of the speaker. In his *Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.ii, 1356a) describes the rhetorical appeal as follows:

Proofs from character are produced, whenever the speech is given in such a way as to render the speaker worthy of credence – we more readily and sooner believe reasonable men on all matters in general and absolutely on questions where precision is impossible and two views can be maintained. But this effect must come about in the course of the speech, not through the speaker's being believed in advance to be of a certain character. Unlike some experts, we do not exclude the speaker's reasonable image from the art as contributing nothing to persuasiveness. On the contrary, character contains almost the strongest proof of all, so to speak.

For Aristotle, the appeal to ethos is one of the most effective persuasive weapons in the speaker's arsenal. Without garnering the audience's good will, the speaker may not be taken seriously, or could even be ignored altogether. Orators may offer precisely honed arguments or attempt to stir the passions of their audience, but if they are distrusted or disliked – as it seems many modern politicians are – these efforts are likely to fail. The appeal to ethos is therefore a critically important rhetorical proof which forms the foundation for all others. Outlining a cognitive stylistic approach to ethos is the task of this chapter and the next.

2.2 Ethos, ethics and narrative theory

Ethos is a normative concept. It is about right and wrong, the speaker's good or bad character in the eyes of the audience, and the extent to which they pursue a just cause. Indeed, in contrast to the argument advanced in Plato's *Gorgias*, some ancient scholars even argued that the best orators were necessarily the wisest and most ethical people. As Quintilian writes in his *Institutes of Oratory*:

The perfect orator... cannot exist unless as a good man; and we require in him, therefore, not only consummate ability in speaking, but every excellence of mind. For I cannot admit that the principles of honourable conduct are, as some have thought, to be left to the philosophers; since the man who can duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the management of public and private

affairs, and who can govern communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws, and improve them by judicial enactments, can certainly be nothing else but an orator.
(*Institutes*, Preface, 9–10)

For Quintilian, virtue begets eloquence; to be good is to be persuasive. Other orators took a more cynical, instrumental view of their art. The highly influential manual, *Ad Herennium*, includes a brief discussion of the purposes to which oratory can be put. The author quite baldly asserts that speakers might use their verbal skills not only for ‘honourable’ but also ‘discreditable’ ends:

A cause is regarded as of the honourable kind when we defend what seems to deserve defence by all men, or attack what all men seem in duty bound to attack; for example, when we defend a hero, or prosecute a parricide. A cause is understood to be of the discreditable kind when something honourable is under attack or when something discreditable is being defended.

(*Ad Herennium*, I.iii, 5)

Far from discouraging the discreditable uses of oratory, the anonymous author provides detailed advice on what kind of rhetorical strategies should be used for these dubious purposes. Whereas in *The Institutes* Quintilian expounds upon the inherent virtue of persuasion – the ethical speaker is necessarily an accomplished one – in *Ad Herennium*, the proof of ethos is a form of persuasive strategy. So, for instance, *Ad Herennium* (I.vi, 9–10) recommends that when the speaker pleads on behalf of a guilty party, rather than defend the discreditable actions, they should instead emphasise the otherwise good character of the defendant. Throughout the explanation, the author is ambivalent about the truth of the appeal, and is concerned only that it will aid in the speaker’s rhetorical defence of discreditable causes.

The appeal to ethos is thus principally concerned with the rhetorical strategies speakers use to project an ethical persona. Booth’s (1961) seminal work, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, investigates how authors of literary fiction ethically position themselves in relation to the story-worlds they create. His account of this process is oriented towards readers – to how they construct a vision of the implied author. Despite his emphasis on the novel rather than non-literary discourse types, Booth’s (1961) focus on the ethical positioning of the author and his audience-centred approach make his implied author framework a good starting point for the analysis of ethos in the reception of political discourse. Booth (1961: 71) describes the concept at the centre of his account – the implied author – as follows:

However impersonal [the writer] may try to be, his reader will inevitably construct a picture of the official scribe who writes in this manner – and of course that initial scribe will never be neutral to all values. Our reactions to his various commitments, secret or overt, will help to determine our response to the work.

(Booth, 1961: 71)

The creation of an author-image entails a representation of a human being who adheres to a set of principles, a moral code. Booth (1961: 73–74) refers to this moral code as ‘combinations of norms’ or the ‘core of norms’ to which the implied author subscribes. These norms are posed in specifically ethical terms:

Our sense of the implied author includes not only the extractable meanings but also the *moral* and emotional content of each bit of action and suffering of all of the characters. It includes, in short, the intuitive apprehension of a completed artistic whole; the *chief value* to which this implied author is committed, regardless of what party belongs to in real life, is that which is expressed by the total form.
(Booth, 1961: 73, my emphasis)

When Booth (1961) mentions ‘the moral and emotional content’ of the text and the ‘chief value’ to which the author subscribes, he is referring to the ethos of the author. Booth’s (1961) theory of the implied author is one of the ethical writer, of how writers project, through their work, a set of ethical norms. In Booth’s (1961: 307–308) account, this projection is a function of the interaction between the narrative voice and the characters in the text. Booth’s (1961) implied author is therefore a product of the poly-vocal quality of literary discourse; it is not only authors that speak in their works, but fictional narrators and characters as well. These voices are each at the centre of their own ethical constellations which either overlap or are light-years apart. According to Booth (1961) authors can construct narrative discourses in such a way as to make their narrators seem mendacious, bigoted or self-aggrandising. His account of unreliable narrators hinges on a moral collaboration between the implied author and the reader, an overlap of their ethical codes (Booth, 1961: 307–308). Collaborating with the author in moral judgement of these unreliable raconteurs is part of the ‘exhilarating sport’ (Booth, 1961: 307) of reading these types of narrative. The central point of this chapter is that it is possible to productively apply these categories of narrator and implied author to political discourse and that by studying the interaction of these voices, analysts can offer more sophisticated, multi-layered accounts of the rhetorical appeal to ethos.

2.3 Three layers of ethos

The implied author is a concept that has emerged out of film and literary criticism (Booth, 1961, 2002; Chatman, 1978, 1990; Iser, 1974; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). Therefore it is perhaps appropriate to begin a defence of applying this concept to political discourse with a political text that might also be described as filmic and (to a lesser extent) literary. The following extract from *Brassed Off* (1996) is one such example. Set in the early 1990s, the film is about the Grimley colliery brass

band and the closure of the town's coal mine. It is based on the real struggles of the northern English town, Grimethorpe. In the extract, the band has just won a prize for the best brass band at the prestigious Royal Albert Hall. Danny, the bandleader (played by Peter Postlethwaite), takes to the stage to give the acceptance speech but to the audience's shock he refuses the prize and instead indicts the government for its role in the destruction of the north of England's coal industry. Here is his speech:

This band behind me will tell you that that trophy means more to me than 'ought else in the whole world. Well, they'd be wrong. Truth is, I thought it mattered. I thought that music mattered. But does it bollocks. Not compared to how people matter. Us winning this trophy won't mean bugger all to most people, but us refusing it, like what we're going to do now, well then it becomes news doesn't it? [Journalists begin taking photographs] You see what I mean? That way, I'll not just be talking to myself, will I? Because over the last ten years this bloody government has systematically destroyed an entire industry – our industry. And not just our industry – our communities, our homes, our lives, all in the name of progress and for a few lousy bob. I'll tell you something else you might not know as well. A fortnight ago this band's pit were closed – another thousand men lost their jobs. And that's not all they lost. Most of them lost the will to win a while ago. A few of them even lost the will to fight. But when it comes to losing the will to live, to breathe, the point is, if this lot were seals or whales you'd all be up in bloody arms. But they're not are they, no, no they're not, they're just ordinary common or garden honest decent human beings and not one of them with an ounce of bloody hope left. Oh, aye, they can knock out a bloody good tune, but what the fuck does that matter? [Pauses] Now I'm going to take my boys out on to the town, thank you. *(Brassed Off, 1996)*

The speech contains a very clear political message. Danny is angry at the decline of the coal industry, the harm it inflicted on mining communities and how this harm was managed and even exacerbated by the Thatcher, then Major, Conservative governments of the 1980s and 90s. But there is more than only the character's voice and perspective represented in the text. Importantly, he is presented to us through the camera from various points of view, with the camera shots composed in a variety of different ways. The speech is – literally – framed by someone else. So whilst we hear the band leader speak, we see him from another perspective – from that of the 'cinematic narrator', which Chatman (1990: 133–134) describes as follows: 'films, in my view, are always presented – mostly and often exclusively shown, but sometimes partially told – by a narrator or narrators. The overall agent that does the showing, I would call the cinematic narrator'. Just as prose narrators use a variety of linguistic resources to represent the events of the literary narrative, the cinematic narrator marshals a variety of visual and auditory resources to

represent the filmic narrative. Chatman (1990: 135) outlines these resources in a diagram reproduced in Figure 2.1.

Beginning at the top of the diagram, the auditory channel in the narration of the speech is relatively sparse, featuring only Danny's voice and sounds of an on-screen kind (these on-screen noises consist of the clicking sound of camera flashes, the rustle of movements and the clapping of the audience). In the visual channel, the 'nature of the image' is relatively realistic and the props and the setup of the location are rendered in a rich and detailed manner. Rather than use a replica set, it appears as though the scene was actually filmed in the Royal Albert Hall. Peter Postlethwaite is wearing a convincing brass band leader's uniform and his performance is a realist portrayal of the character, which is to say that the actor plays the character as a three-dimensional human being, rather than offering a more stylised performance such as one might find in, say, a play by Bertolt Brecht.




Figure 2.1 Semiotic resources available to the cinematic narrator

Insofar as the treatment of the image is concerned, the scene edit comprises of straight cuts with a regular, moderate rhythm. The cinematography is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the cinematic narration. The nature of the image is realistic in the sense that it faithfully represents the situation one would find in the Royal Albert Hall at a performance, especially the dramatic lighting; Danny is shown under overhead stage lighting with his neck in shadow. Such a dramatic lighting set-up heightens the emotional aspects of the speech. The

shots that are used to portray the speaker are also important. Throughout the speech, the band leader is portrayed with a relatively close head-shot, which suggests a level of intimacy. We are also presented with the view from the stage just behind the speaker, which would be the perspective of his brass band. Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) have suggested that head shots or close-ups index a closer personal relationship between the viewer and the subject of the image. This is reflected in the more intimate head shots – interspersed throughout the footage of Danny – depicting band members reacting to what he says. Reaction shots of Grimley community members in the audience are also provided. Whilst the camera does not provide close-ups of these characters, it does focus on them in enough detail to make out their facial expressions, again suggesting an intimacy. The cinematic narrator, then, presents us with a variety of shots that position the television or cinema audience with Danny, the brass band and other members of the Grimley community. The overall effect of this shot selection is to create a narrative perspective that is sympathetic to the bandleader and, by extension, the contents of his speech.

What this analysis represents is a description of the stylistic identity of the narrator – the “realist” narrative conventions it favours – and also of its social and political sympathies. The narrator not only tells the cinema or television audience what was said, but also seems to report those words favourably. In offering this attitude, the cinematic narrator is projecting an ethos, a locus of ethical norms which in this instance are shared by Danny. The continuity between the narrator and the character’s ‘core of norms’ suggests that this is an ethos shared by the author of the filmic text as well. Of course, authorial responsibility for the film is dispersed amongst its production team – the scores of screenwriters, directors, producers, editors, cinematographers, wardrobe and makeup artists etc. – rather than a single solitary author. Booth (2002: 125) argues, however, that for film to be successful requires that the viewer perceives some unifying or orchestrating authorial voice, even if no such voice exists in reality:

Every successful film does have what might legitimately be called an “implied author,” or if you prefer, an “implied centre” that is, a creative voice uniting all of the choices. That virtual author, that voice, that centre, will never be identical with what any one of the crew could have created. But whenever a movie is fully powerful for any viewer, what that viewer has *received* is a unified voice.

(Booth, 2002: 125, my emphasis)

The reception-oriented nature of the implied author – that it relates to the audience’s representation rather than the reality – is important here. Irrespective of the real dispersed nature of its authorship, the film is perceived by the viewer as a finished product and is received as a unified whole. Cinema-goers often argue about

what the film they have just seen was “really” about and whether or not the audience was supposed to view a character sympathetically. Such comments reflect the presumption of a unified voice, an ‘implied centre’, who means the film to be interpreted in a certain way. The unity of the implied author is a fiction, but one which nonetheless makes possible popular criticism of film. For Booth (2002), the most successful films are those which seem to demonstrate the tightest unity, the most coherent ‘centre’. The ethical overlap between the cinematic narrator and Danny makes this speech a good example of the unity Booth (2002: 125) describes. Some of the performance’s persuasiveness derives from the continuity between the ethical standpoints of these voices, their coherence. One of the advantages of using ideas from narratology is that they allow for an investigation of this textual multivocality. This is indispensable to analysts of ethos, who must first ask the question, who is speaking? Such an approach theorises audiences as active participants in the discourse who construct an image of an implied author based on the semiotic cues the speaker and cinematic narrator provide.

The speech was actually taken from the film and uploaded onto the web by users of the video sharing website *YouTube* on two separate occasions. Like other social media sites, *YouTube* allows its users to comment under the content that is posted. It is easy to see from a cursory glance at the comments under both videos that many users find the speech very powerful (indeed, anecdotally, a friend and colleague of mine who grew up near Grimethorpe in the 1980s at the height of the miners’ strike reports being brought to tears by it). Three of the responses under one of the *YouTube* videos have been depicted in Figure 2.2. These responses reflect the general tone of the comments under this video. User 1 writes that the speech is ‘emotive’ and ‘spot on’, User 2, that there is ‘no better tribute’, and User 3 that ‘this is the best part of a fantastic film’. Significantly, all three comments express a personal connection with what is said in the video. User 1 talks about how they work in Grimethorpe and how their own father was a miner, and User 3 says that they ‘remember these days like they were yesterday’. User 2 goes so far as to say that Postlethwaite is talking to ‘us’, suggesting that there exists an in-group to which they and Postlethwaite belong. They then go on to quote from the speech, ‘oh aye, they can knock out a bloody good tune’. This is a significant line to choose because it exhibits several non-standard, dialect features of Yorkshire English: the dialect term ‘oh aye’; the idiom ‘knock out a... tune’; the pronunciation of the ‘STRUT’ vowel in ‘bloody’ as [ʊ], rather than the Southern /ʌ/; and the use of the curse word, ‘bloody’, itself. There is a connection being made here between a working-class Yorkshire identity and the ‘us’ to which User 2 refers. The film resonates with these three *YouTube* users because it speaks to some aspect of their past or the way in which they perceive themselves as belonging to the same social group as the speaker. Whilst many of the other comments point to Postlethwaite’s powerful performance, there is also ample reference to the ‘truth’ of what Danny says and

its applicability to contemporary politics. That this ‘truth’ is so unambiguously and forcefully broadcast by the speech is certainly a factor that contributes to its success for these *YouTube* users. As Atkinson (1984: 47–49) points out in his stimulating discussion of ‘clap-trap’, audiences require a clear set of signals in order to know when to show their appreciation. Atkinson (1984) is mainly concerned with the way in which an orator prepares their audience to clap. For instance, lists of three convey to the audience that they should clap much in the same way as runners are told to ‘get set, ready, go’. Whilst the sympathetic narration does not signal to the audience when to show their appreciation, it sends a strong message to the audience that the message in the speech is one that they should endorse. The ‘unity’, of the film, to use Booth’s (2002: 125) term, establishes a clear ethical position for the author and is a clarion call for those in the audience who share that ethos.



Figure 2.2 *YouTube* reactions to Danny's speech

Danny's address to the Royal Albert Hall is a type of dramatic or filmic discourse, but it is also a form of *political* text and talk; it is a masterfully delivered and very moving speech about British politics and its basic format – the single speaker at the podium addressing an audience in front of television cameras – is often found in more prototypical instances of political discourse. The applicability of the implied author and cinematic narrator in prototypical types of political discourse in this format and beyond will be further developed in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. The framework set out here forms the basis of the socio-cognitive account of ethos in Chapter 3.

2.4 The implied author in political discourse

As suggested in Section 2.3, whilst the speech from *Brassed Off* is part of a fictional narrative discourse it has a similar format to most televised political speeches.

Just as it was written by a script-writer, set-piece political speeches are often written by a team of writers all working for the same political party, trade union, non-governmental organisation or government department. Completed drafts are often circulated to a variety of different authorities for approval or editing, with lines being added, reworded or even vetoed. When audiences hear a pre-prepared speech, what they are listening to is the product of a political process, or even struggle. To speak of an implied author in this context is to investigate the audience's reconstruction of this process; it is to describe by educated guesswork what Wodak (2009: 14) has called 'the backstage' aspects of the political process. The implied author in political discourse is the shadowy being regarded as *really* responsible for the words we hear and read in speeches, conference motions, policy documents and debates. They are a mental representation born of the speculative activity of audience members. Such activity is an integral part of the professional political commentary and journalism we read in newspapers and watch on television (see Browse, in press).

A good case study of the speculative inferential processes involved in political journalism is provided by the controversy surrounding a speech by Ed Miliband, then leader of the British Labour Party, to the 2014 Labour Party conference (for full discussion, see Browse, in press). Miliband was reciting the speech from memory but forgot to include a line about the state of the public finances and cutting the deficit. This was a particularly important omission because the Labour Party, which was the main opposition at the time, had been under sustained criticism by the Conservative government and their allies in the media for not adequately committing to Conservative cuts to public services and social security payments. The omission therefore had potential political consequences for the Labour leader and his party. If the audience inferred that he spoke for the entire party leadership, and that the text was co-authored with them, then it could mean fresh accusations that they did not consider reduction of the deficit to be an economic priority. The missing line was explained by Ed Balls, the Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an interview with the British broadsheet newspaper, *The Telegraph*, soon after the conference address:

I knew what was in the speech and therefore I was surprised momentarily. I was surprised, but we are where we are. It's a really hard thing to stand up and make big speeches like that and do it from memory.

I think if he could do the speech again it would be in. I think he was as annoyed by it as anybody would be. (Ed Balls, quoted in *The Telegraph*, 2014)

Balls claims to have been aware of the speech's content before it was given and emphasises his surprise at the missing line. His implicit claim is that party politicians and staffers co-wrote a speech which included a position on deficit reduction

and that the leader diverged from this position in his address. This has the effect of distancing the Shadow Chancellor, and presumably other senior Labour figures, from the contents of the final speech; responsibility for removal of the line rests solely on the party leader. This is important to establish because if it is accepted, it becomes easier to stave off any suggestion that he and the rest of his frontbench colleagues are not serious about deficit reduction. Balls then provides reasons for the absence of any reference to the deficit, attributing thoughts and hypothetical behaviours to Miliband in addition to highlighting the difficulty of remembering long speeches. The implication, here, is that the sections on the deficit were simply forgotten rather than deliberately left out. From these explanations and inferences, Balls constructs an image of the Labour leader as the author of the speech. Of course, this representation is not the only one available. Another possible interpretation is that the lines were deliberately skipped because the deficit was not deemed important enough to warrant mention. One more possibility is that Miliband forgot the line because the deficit is less important to him than other aspects of Labour's political platform. Some might even (improbably) argue that the Shadow Chancellor was simply out of the loop and the non-mention of the deficit reflected Labour Party policy. All three of these explanations entail different views of who authored the speech and the reasons behind the editorial decision to remove the line. They represent different ways of construing the implied author of the speech based on the available evidence. Importantly, this process of constructing an author image relies very much on the political inclinations of the audience member. Previously in his interview with *The Telegraph*, Balls had said that the deficit was 'the most important thing'. Attributing the missing line to forgetfulness – rather than real political differences – is politically expedient because it minimises the potential for journalists to suggest that there are political divisions in the shadow cabinet. Unfortunately for this senior Labour politician, his professed surprise and the explanations given for the missing line had little effect on *The Telegraph*, who gave the interview the mischievous headline 'Ed Balls turns on Miliband for forgetting deficit'. What the example of the conference address demonstrates is that audience members – like Balls – construct representations of the author of the speech based on their own, often politically motivated, interpretations of the textual evidence. This process of author construction is an active one; audience members are not the passive recipients of the speaker's claims about their own ethos, but bring their own background knowledge and interpretative skills to bear in creating a representation of the author.

The 'production format', to borrow a term from Goffman (1981: 145), of Miliband's speech is very similar to Danny's; in both, the speaker stands in front of an audience and delivers a pre-prepared speech without notes. Whereas the *Brassed Off* speech was produced by script-writers on behalf of a production

team, Miliband's was written by speech-writers on behalf of the Labour Party. Not all forms of political public speaking are as prepared. Impromptu contributions in parliamentary debates or the responses to journalistic questioning are a good case in point. In these forms of political discourse, one might be justified in asking how legitimate it is to treat the speaker and the author of the speech as two separate entities. Whilst it is true that the exact form of the words chosen is not a prearranged feature of this type of speech, it is also true that the content of these apparently spontaneous interventions into public discourse is often decided in advance.

Political organisations from left to right adopt sophisticated public relations strategies which ensure that the spokespeople for their organisation are "on message". Sometimes, being "on message" can mean different spokespeople replicating more or less exactly the same words or phrases across different publicity, media and debating platforms. One example of this messaging is the British Labour Party's initial response, in 2011, to the governing Conservative Party's economic strategy. As mentioned above, throughout the 2010–2015 Parliaments the Conservatives advocated a series of severe cuts to public expenditure as a response to the economic situation caused by the British financial crash of 2008. Naturally, these cuts were debated in the Houses of Parliament. Below are excerpts from the speeches of several senior Labour Party politicians who were intervening into different parliamentary debates about the economy. The speeches were taken from Hansard, the written record of all oral speeches delivered in Parliament.

Would [the chancellor] also like to take this opportunity to accept that, by *cutting too far and too fast*, we will fall into a vicious circle that will make it more difficult to pay off the deficit in the long term?

(Emily Thornberry MP, HC Deb [2010–12] 528 col. 143)

[The Minister] can huff and puff and blame world commodity prices all he wants, but is it not obvious that the Chancellor's decision to put up VAT in January because he chose to *cut too far too fast* is causing real hardship to families throughout the country as they struggle to cope with the most vicious squeeze on living standards in generations?

(Angela Eagle MP, HC Deb [2010–12] 528 col. 149)

The evidence is clear that his plan has not made the British economy better able to withstand the global storm and that by going *too far and too fast* he has left it badly exposed.

(Ed Balls MP, HC Deb [2010–12] 533 col. 356)

Is not the truth being exposed day by day—he is *cutting too far and too fast*, and society is becoming smaller and weaker, not bigger and stronger?

(Ed Miliband MP, HC Deb [2010–12] 540 col. 293)

As my hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) pointed out, voluntary institutions – the building blocks of civil society and of many of our communities – will be undone by the Government's cuts, which are going *too far and too fast*.
(Tristram Hunt MP, HC Deb [2010–12] 524 col. 76)

All these excerpts from the speeches of a variety of leading Labour politicians use the adverbial phrase 'too far and too fast' (see my emphases), or something very close to it, to describe the government's cuts. The repetition of this sound bite is not accidental; it also features extensively in the contemporaneous written materials put out by the Labour Party.¹ The line 'cutting too far and too fast' is a clear case of messaging – of having, and adhering to, a political line.

The point here is not to provide a comprehensive account of how this particular phrase is used in Labour Party discourse, but rather to demonstrate the difficulty in saying that those who deliver *ad hoc* speeches are truly and in every respect the authors of the words they speak. Using the same phrase is an indication that the orator is giving a Labour Party speech. For those who know that this is the line of the Labour Party on the economy, the implied author of the text is thus as much the Labour Party as it is the speaker.

In most cases of political discourse, this is not really a problem; we assume that the speaker shares the ethos of the organisation to which they belong. Indeed, in the case of the British government, this shared ethos is enshrined in constitutional practice; the principle of collective responsibility for the government's actions means that if a government minister does not share the view of the government, they should resign.

However, there are times in politics when speakers clearly do not share the ethos of the organisation of which they are members. For instance, on the 3rd January, 2013, Gary Dobson and David Norris were found guilty of the murder of Stephen Lawrence, a young black man who they had killed twenty years earlier at a bus stop in Eltham, South-East London. The Stephen Lawrence case was one of the most high profile racially motivated murders in British history and had far-reaching consequences for the British legal system. During the course of the twenty-year-long uphill battle waged by Doreen Lawrence, mother of Stephen, the London metropolitan police were found guilty of institutional racism. The conviction of Lawrence's killers was a landmark event in British legal history and naturally provoked a furor of media discussion about race relations in the United Kingdom. Two days later in a contribution to this discussion on *Twitter*, Bim Adewunmi, a journalist for the liberal *The Guardian* newspaper, described

1. There are many examples, but press releases and other written materials from the party website include Labour Party (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011e).

her dislike of the term ‘black community’ writing “I hate the generally lazy thinking behind the use of the term. Same for ‘black community leaders’”. The tweet prompted a reply from the left-wing Labour Member of Parliament for Hackney, Diane Abbott, a well-known anti-racism campaigner and the first black woman to sit in the House of Commons. After an exchange of several tweets, Abbott wrote the following:

@bimadew White people love playing “divide & rule” We should not play their game #tacticasoldascolonialism

Abbott’s tweet was seized upon by the media and several hostile politicians. They argued that the tweet was racist because it made generalisations about white people and that Abbott should resign from her ministerial position (at the time she served as a Shadow Minister for Public Health). In a subsequent television interview, she defended her tweet (see Appendix A for the transcription conventions used throughout the book):

Interviewer: Do you understand the consternation that your (.) your tweet has created?

Abbott: Well I was actually referring to the nature of 19th century European colonialism (.) but that’s a bit much to get into 140 characters.

Interviewer: But i-if you if you look at it out of context saying um white people love to divide and rule is i-is a pretty pretty controversial remark if people don’t see any context (.) Do you accept that? It’s not a wise thing to put out there.

Abbott: I think the tweet was taken out of context (.) and some people have interpreted it maliciously.

Interviewer: Well explain for us then (.) and for viewers talking about this there’s a lot of tweeting err err twitter um activity going on (.) explain to us what you actually meant by the comment.

((Interview breaks off for Abbott to answer her mobile phone))

(*Political Scrapbook*, 2012)

The main line of defence throughout the interview was to claim that the tweet was taken out of context and that *Twitter*, which only has provision for messages of 140 characters, does not allow for nuance. Abbott is asked two direct questions by the interviewer. Rather than answering directly with a yes or no, she gives indirect answers to both questions. The interviewer’s preferred response to the first question is a contrite ‘yes’. However, it is clear from the Shadow Minister’s use of the discourse markers ‘well’ and ‘actually’ that this is not a response she is willing to give. Instead, she provides an indirect answer that outlines the context in which she believes her tweet should have been interpreted. This indirect response is a face-saving strategy; it is a means of hedging the face-threatening act of baldly contra-

dicting the question's premise (Brown and Levinson, 1987). In her answer to the second question, she similarly rejects the preferred response (which is something like 'yes, I do accept it was a controversial remark'), using another indirect strategy to suggest that those who believe it to be controversial are interpreting her tweet maliciously. Again, the indirectness is face-saving; it means she does not fall into open conflict with the interviewer who clearly does believe that Abbott's remarks were controversial. Importantly, too, rather than name the people who have interpreted the tweet maliciously, Abbott elliptically calls them 'some people'. This is a category which includes the interviewer, but, again, use of the vague noun phrase means that Abbott does not have to accuse the interviewer directly of maliciously interpreting the tweet. This indirect criticism is further hedged by Abbott's use of the reporting clause 'I think', which epistemically weakens the claim she is making. It is clear from this interview, then, that Abbott uses a variety of linguistic strategies – including indirect answers, noun phrases with vague referents, hedges and discourse markers – to steadfastly adhere to her political message whilst at the same time managing the potential conflict that sticking to this position might engender.

It is easy to see why Abbott would so stalwartly refuse to make concessions to the interviewer. The context provided by the Lawrence case combined with Abbott's background as a pioneer in the struggle against racism rules out any apology on principle: whatever the contents of Abbott's tweet, her words are as nothing to the history of subjugation faced by black people, of which the Lawrence family's fight for justice is one of the more well-known recent examples. The shift from media coverage of the Lawrence trial to the argument that racism is a "two way street" neutralises this broader political point about the structural racism that black people suffer. From the perspective of someone who has fought against structural racism for most of their life, to concede to this argument is an ethical point as much as it is a political one; to equate the moral crimes of history and the ideology that justifies them – racism – with the views expressed in Abbott's exchange with Adewunmi is to trivialise that history. The MP's refusal to apologise to the interviewer is therefore intimately connected to her identity as a politician of the anti-racist left.

However, as a minister in the Shadow Cabinet, she was also a senior member of the Labour Party, the leadership of which were not prepared to endorse what she had said on social media or to join her in saying that her tweets had been taken out of context. The interview transcribed above breaks off as Abbott answers her phone. The person on the other end of the call was none other than Ed Miliband who proceeded to upbraid his Shadow Cabinet member for her comments. The footage of the minister taking the call and walking away from the cameras was a feature of most of the news pieces on the subject later that day. Shortly after this widely publicised telephone conversation, the Labour Party released a statement that included this apology from Abbott:

I understand people have interpreted my comments as making generalisations about white people. I do not believe in doing that. I apologise for any offence caused.

The role of the tweet in causing the offence is played down throughout the three sentence statement. In the first sentence, rather than the ‘comments’ being the active agent, and therefore the conceptually more salient part of the clause, it is instead the people who have ‘interpreted’ them. Notably, in the final sentence, Abbott apologises for the ‘offence caused’, rather than the tweet itself. The noun, ‘offence’, reifies the verb ‘offended’. This nominalisation makes it possible to underplay her role in causing the offence; the noun phrase, ‘any offence’, is modified by a relative clause, ‘[that was] caused’, which takes the passive voice, omitting the agent of the verb (who is presumably Abbott, or at least her comments). This is an apology, then, but it is quite heavily qualified and plays down Abbott’s role in causing the offence.

Whilst it is qualified, it is nonetheless an apology, which is a marked change from the political line adopted in the previous interview, in which she twice steadfastly refused to concede that her tweet was at all controversial. Given the discrepancy between the quotation attributed to Abbott and her own widely broadcast interview earlier in the day, it would not be unreasonable for readers to doubt the authenticity of the apology. Indeed, the newspaper reports certainly suggested a level of scepticism (all my emphases):

Diane Abbott *forced to apologise* in racism row after claiming ‘white people love to play divide and rule’
(*The Telegraph*, 2012)

MP said tweet saying ‘white people love playing “divide & rule”’ was taken out of context before *Ed Miliband ordered apology*
(*The Guardian*, 2012)

Miss Abbott, the first black woman MP, was later *forced to apologise* for the comments posted on Twitter.
(*The Daily Mail*, 2012)

Britain’s first black woman MP, Diane Abbott, *was forced to issue a humiliating apology* today after making allegedly racist remarks about white people.
(*The London Evening Standard*, 2012)

Shadow health minister Diane Abbott has been *forced to apologise* after a comment she posted online sparked a race row.
(*Sky News*, 2012)

Apologies freely and penitently given are more convincing than their opposite. However, in all these examples, the MP is ‘forced’ or ‘ordered’ to apologise for her comments, suggesting a level of insincerity on her behalf. It seems far more likely that this act of contrition was penned by someone in the offices of the Labour leadership and reluctantly agreed to by the minister. This construal of the author is a product of the clash between the political line in the interview and the one

adopted in the press release, combined with the knowledge that Ed Miliband himself had rung Abbott to insist on an apology (and had, presumably, threatened to sack her from her ministerial post). It is a representation of the author based on an interpretation of these different events of discourse.

If the foregoing discussion seems speculative, that is because it is. It could well be that Abbott had a sudden change of heart and that her apology had nothing to do with the phone call. Such a criticism is beside the point because the implied author is a construct of the audience, an image of the author's political perspective and intentions created by the audience from the semiotic clues provided by a text or corpus of texts. The inferential processes by which audiences create these models of the author require greater exposition and form the main substance of Chapter 3 of this volume. For now, however, it suffices to say that the concept of an implied author allows for an exploration of how the audiences' knowledge of backstage political processes impacts upon the ethical positioning of the orator. It provides the basis for a rhetorical theory that conceives of audiences as active participants in the discourse, rather than the passive recipients of the speaker's rhetorical appeals to ethos. Finally, it affords a more complex, multi-vocal and multi-layered view of ethos that better reflects the discursive processes involved in the production of contemporary political discourse. Section 2.5 details the next of these 'voices', or 'layers'.

2.5 The narrator – The orchestrator

An analysis of political narration relates to what Wodak (2009: 7–14) has called the 'staging' of politics. Just as Danny's speech takes place in a particular place and time, is filmed with a particular set of shots, edits and image treatments and to a particular soundtrack, so too is the political speech or interview. The entity orchestrating these different aspects of the staging is the cinematic narrator, from whose perspective we 'see' the orator deliver their address.

Take Figure 2.3, which is a still from a televised speech by David Cameron, the former Conservative Prime Minister of Britain. In the speech, Cameron is responding to the news that the Conservative Party had won the 2015 general election. Returning to Chatman's (1990) components of cinematic narration, the auditory channel in this televised speech consists of Cameron's voice and the clicking of cameras. There is no music or off-screen commentary. In the visual channel, the image is treated in a realist fashion; no filters have been applied and throughout the speech there are barely any edits or shot changes (although, at times, there is a switch to a full body shot of Cameron standing behind the lectern). The narrator did add some graphics, though, which have unfortunately not been possible to reproduce here. This type of image manipulation is common in this genre of rolling news. In the original image, a box in the top left read 'LIVE Central

London' and a box across the bottom of the image usefully provided the results of the election alongside quotes summarising the content of Cameron's speech. The top left box helped to orient viewers in time and space and the capitalisation of the word 'LIVE' emphasised that the footage was broadcast directly from the scene. Indeed, such strategies function as a tacit appeal to the narrator's ethos because the instantaneous reporting of events is a desirable feature of rolling news coverage. Similarly, the 'BBC NEWS' logo in the bottom left, alongside the red and white colour scheme of the graphics, stamped the broadcaster's identity onto the image.



Figure 2.3 The televised narration of David Cameron's 2015 election victory speech

In terms of 'the nature of the image', the most obvious prop is the lectern which bears the royal coat of arms. Although Britain is a parliamentary democracy, the queen remains the head of state and the ruling administration is officially referred to as 'Her Majesty's Government'. The royal heraldry on the lectern therefore projects an image of constitutional legitimacy and authority. The location further serves to project this ethos; Cameron is addressing his audience outside Number Ten Downing Street, the historic residence of the British Prime Minister. The choice of setting for a political interview or press conference can be of immense importance in establishing the ethos of a politician or journalist. Politicians are often interviewed in front of legislative buildings, such as the British Houses of Parliament, the Whitehouse or the German Bundestag. To be seen in front of a building of state – the architecture of which is often old, impressive and physically imposing – can convey upon the speaker a sense of legitimacy. In contrast to this, politicians of a more populist bent might prefer to be seen in less grandiose settings. For instance, the former leader of the hard right, anti-EU and anti-immigration UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage, is often filmed in British

pubs, which has the effect of portraying him as a “man of the people” (rather ludicrously, given Farage’s previous career in the City of London as a commodity broker). Delivering his victory speech outside the door to Number Ten, then, cements Cameron’s electoral victory and asserts his authority as the newly re-elected Prime Minister of Britain.

Finally, the ‘actor’ – in this political context, a more appropriate label is ‘the speaker’ – is David Cameron who performs the speech solemnly and seriously whilst dressed in a smart suit. Clothing can play a significant role in constructing a speaker’s ethos. On visits to factories or building sites, politicians are often photographed or filmed wearing high visibility jackets and hard hats. Wearing work clothes can suggest a “hands on” ethos, making the politician seem willing to get directly involved in whatever activity is being performed by the people they are visiting.

Habitual forms of political dress have changed substantially over time. In the early part of the twentieth century, members of the British Parliament were required to wear a frock coat and top hat to debate the issues of the day. Keir Hardie, a miner, union leader and the first Labour Member of Parliament, was famously lambasted in the press for instead choosing to wear a tweed suit and deerstalker hat, apparel that he felt more in keeping with his working class roots. Hardie’s modest clothing made him look physically different from other politicians, but it also encoded a different ethos, more in tune with the political values of egalitarianism and working class solidarity for which he stood. Today, frock coats and top hats have been replaced with suits, shirts and ties. Politicians will sometimes go without a tie or roll up their shirt sleeves to project a carefree or relaxed image (indeed, this informalisation of political dress has been satirised extensively in *The Thick of It*, a British comedy television show analysed in Chapter 4). It should be noted, however, that whilst standards of dress and appearance for male politicians have relaxed, the media often focus on the appearance of women in politics at the expense of reporting on their contribution to political debate (see Walsh, 1998, and Ross, 2006).

To summarise the analysis of narration in Figure 2.3, the narrator is positioned as an up-to-date and reliable provider of information. The use of facts and figures in the box at the bottom of the screen also helps to assert this ethos of reliability. The audience’s prior knowledge of the BBC, which has a reputation for balanced, quality reporting, might also bolster this view. Insofar as the narration projects an image of Cameron, it is one of legitimacy and authority surrounded as he is by the trappings of state.

An objection may be raised at this point that the narrator has no control over the location of the image, the props that are used or the performance of the speaker. Indeed, this does raise quite a fundamental difference between the

narration of literary and more prototypical forms of political discourse. It should first be emphasised that whilst the narrator has chosen to relinquish control over some aspects of the narration in this example, there were a number of alternative possibilities available to them to 'tell' the speech. For instance, a reporter in the studio could have provided the key highlights of the victory address without providing any footage of Cameron at all. However, his place in the hierarchy of British politics means that he wields considerable power and authority. There is therefore a sense in which the BBC is obliged to report his words directly. The fulfilment of this obligation requires the narrator to surrender control of aspects of the narrative to a secondary *orchestrator*; the narrator must go to Cameron at the time of his choosing to a location that has been arranged to his satisfaction. Some features of the narration have therefore been orchestrated by a member of Cameron's communications team and not the narrator. What this suggests is that political negotiation – maybe even struggle – is at the heart of the narration of political discourse. The narration is the end product of arbitration, sometimes between quite hostile and variegated parties.

A particularly good case of this hostile negotiation is provided by the party leader debates of the 2015 British election. Televised political debates between the party leaders – including the Prime Minister – are a very new phenomenon in British politics having first been instituted in the 2010 general election. Britain's first-past-the-post electoral system means that there are three main parties, the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats, although recently the Liberal Democrats have been overtaken as the third biggest party by the Scottish National Party (SNP). In addition to the four largest political parties, in the 2015 election there was also the Green Party, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Plaid Cymru, the RESPECT party, and the five parties of Northern Ireland; the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Féin, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Alliance Party. In total, then, Britain's political system is made up of thirteen parties (excluding those without representation in the 2010–2015 Parliament). The main argument in the run-up to the 2015 leaders' debates centred on which of these parties should be invited and what format they should take. After much wrangling, four different formats were agreed. The first was separate interviews with the leaders of the two largest parties, Labour and the Conservatives, on the television stations Sky News and Channel Four; the second was a seven-way debate between the Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, UKIP, SNP, Green and Plaid Cymru leaders to be broadcast by the television station ITV; the third was a debate between the 'challenger' parties, Labour, UKIP, SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party broadcast on the BBC (the Liberal Democrats were in coalition government with the Conservatives and were thus excluded from this debate); and the final format was an audience question and answer session

sequentially conducted with each of the three main party leaders – the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats – which, again, was broadcast by the BBC. There were, then, only two “real” debates, if by ‘debate’ it is meant the verbal clash of opposing views, and only one of these included the Conservatives. For the purposes of discussing the orchestration of the discourse, it is worth considering some of the stipulations laid out by David Cameron, the Conservative Prime Minister, and his team. These often related to who should be included in the debate format, a part of the orchestration of political discourse coming under the heading of ‘actors’ in Chatman’s (1990) model. Notably, Cameron was initially reluctant to include the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the debates. UKIP are a populist far-right party who are anti-immigration and in favour of Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU). Cameron’s Conservatives, on the other hand, are a centre-right party and, whilst they often express similar anti-immigrant sentiment, the leadership of the party is, with a few caveats, pro-EU.

Before the debates, polling data had been published suggesting that although UKIP were taking votes from all three main parties, they were in the main benefiting from the Conservatives (Ashcroft, 2014). From Cameron’s perspective, removing UKIP from the debating platform makes sense; a UKIP presence could tempt the hard-right of Cameron’s much broader electoral coalition away from the Conservative Party. This would put Cameron in a difficult position because any attempt to win those voters back by adopting a harsher line on immigration and the EU could mean alienating the soft-right and swing voters comprising the rest of the Conservative electoral coalition. Jettisoning UKIP from the debate was therefore politically expedient to the Conservative Party electoral cause.

However, their previous success in local and European elections meant that UKIP were not so easily cast aside and they were included in the format. The television broadcasters proposed a debate between the three main parties and UKIP, excluding the Greens, Plaid Cymru, the SNP and RESPECT. The response of the Conservatives was to insist that the Greens – a party on the left of British politics – be included on the platform. Again, from the perspective of the Conservatives this makes sense; the Green Party positioned themselves to the left of Cameron’s closest rival, the Labour Party. Just as including UKIP had forced Cameron to defend both his left and right flanks in the debate, including the Greens would mean forcing the Labour leader, Ed Miliband, to defend both his political right and left. After lobbying from the Conservatives and a petition of over 200,000 signatories, the Greens were included. Indeed, later in the negotiations, the Conservative strategy seemed to have been to endorse the participation of as many political parties as possible. Writing in the Labour-supporting *The Guardian* newspaper, Carrell et al. (2015) offered an explanation:

David Cameron is expecting Thursday's seven-way leaders' TV debate to be an opportunity to show that he stands above the cacophony of minor, mainly leftwing parties, with his aides believing that the event may even impress on voters the dangers of chaos from a left-led coalition. (Carrell et al., 2015)

This explanation is borne out in the debate itself, in which Cameron suggested that the choice in the election was between 'competence and chaos'. Following the debate, the Conservative Party put out a message on the social media website, *Facebook*, saying that 'this election is between the competence of a Conservative government or the chaos of Ed Miliband propped up by the SNP' (it was generally agreed at the time – incorrectly as it turned out – that no party would achieve a majority and that coalition government was inevitable). Following the later 'challengers' debate on the BBC, senior Conservative politicians developed this theme in their briefs to the press. For instance, the senior Conservative MP, Jeremy Hunt, argued that Labour could only win the election if they went into coalition with another party and that the challengers debate proved this would be a 'coalition of chaos' (*ITV News*, 2015a).

This example from the 2015 election serves to demonstrate what is politically at stake in only one aspect of the orchestration of the discourse: the speakers who are present. Whilst viewers of the seven-way leaders' debate witness a narration that is largely determined by ITV, this key aspect of the narration has been determined in the run-up to the debate by a variety of orchestrators (the different political parties) who all have competing interests. The finished narration – as it is actually received by the audience – is therefore the outcome of a political struggle waged in accordance with the media and political strategies adopted by these different orchestrators.

Although Cameron's 2015 election victory speech and the leaders' debates both provide examples of orchestrators wresting control of some aspects of the narration from the narrator, it is worth exploring whether there are instances in which the opposite might happen, in which the narrator 're-narrates' a preferred orchestration. Take the satirical videos of Cassetteboy, masters of the 'mash-up' video. These videos edit together video footage and sound from multiple sources to create a single unified text, almost like a collage. I have transcribed the dialogue from one of these videos below, originally posted on *YouTube*. This particular mash-up was intended to satirise David Cameron's address to the 2014 Conservative party conference and features footage from that speech. At the time of writing, it had nearly 6 million views. I have indicated where footage from different speeches has been edited together with a forward slash in the text:

[Clapping over the opening bars of Eminem's (2002) hit rap song, *Lose Yourself*, which plays throughout]
Thank you, thank you

We've been recording/ a music video/ and it goes like this/
 I'm /hard/core/ and I know/ the score
 And I am disgusted/ by the poor/
 And my chum/s/ matter more/
 Cos we are/ the law/
 And I've made sure/
 We're ready for/ class-war/
 Taking money from the man who works long hours/
 Giving power to/ the tycoons in the glass tower/
 That is why/ I can look you in the eye/
 And say this is the party/ of the motherf/uckers
 We don't care about/ the mother /su/ckers/
 Because/ this is the party/ of the motherf/uckers
 And no, I don't think that's a dirty word/
 So let /the beat/ drop/
 I come here with/ flows right from the top/
 Everybody knows/ if you work/ in a shop/
 We won't /help you/ and d'you know what?/
 People rising from the bottom to the top/
 Has got to stop/
 We have/ the bravery/
 To bring/ back/ slavery/
 Working/ in a supermarket/
 Is just /the start/ of it/
 My friends,/ there is no/ job at the end of it/
 You will be/ working/ for/ your benefits/ forever/
 Let me get this off my chest/
 Saying 'yes',/ we are selling/ the NHS/
 And we'll give you less/
 And that is just for/ start/ers/
 Even after/ privatising/ sticking plasters
 It is a social/ disaster/
 Makes/ our hearts beat faster/
 Now/ I am your/ master/
 The last thing/ this/ country/ needs/ is/ us the conservatives/
 Worse than/ the alternative/
 We don't care/ if you're/ driven to despair/
 Don't you dare/ say/ it's not/ fair/
 I'm not saying/ it's not/ funny/
 It is/ for me,/ I've got/ loads of/ money/

This is the party/ of the/ motherf/uckers
 The country/ is run/ for me/ and/ my mu/ckers
 This is the party/ of the motherf/uckers/
 We just/ don't care/ about the mother/ su/ckers
 [Clapping]

(Cassetteboy, 2014)

The most important thing about this particular mash-up is that the speeches have been edited together to create a hip-hop song (this is reflected in the lineation of the song lyrics – the song follows an AABBCB rhyme scheme). The cinematic narrator has used off-stage music so that the words of the edited speeches are heard over the rapper Eminem's hit song 'Lose Yourself' (2002). Eminem is a very successful and also very controversial recording artist, having risen to fame with highly irreverent and at times deeply homophobic lyrics. His manner of speaking and dressing and the style and content of his music are certainly not prestigious in any socially and culturally conservative context (one would not expect to hear Eminem, say, over canapés at an ambassadorial reception) – but his anti-establishment prestige runs at a premium. Eminem, and the hip-hop genre, are *cool*, which certainly cannot be said of David Cameron. There is humour, then, in making it seem as though the British Prime Minister has pretensions to being a hip-hop artist. This is emphasised by the specialised slang in the rap, 'so let the beat drop' and 'I come here with flows right from the top'. Letting the beat drop means 'start the beat [of the music]' and 'flows', in this context, refers to the fluency and speed of a rapper's rhymes (although both words have been recontextualised; it is exceedingly doubtful that this is what Cameron meant by 'drop' and 'flows' in the original context of the speech footage). 'I come here with flows right from the top' is also a boast, meaning something like 'my rhymes and rapping speed are fluent and fast'. Boasts are a regular feature of rap music (see Smitherman, 1997: 12–13) and this mash-up rap features many: 'I'm hardcore and I know the score', 'we are the law', 'we have the bravery', 'I am your master', 'I've got loads of money', and 'the country is run for me and my muckers'. Indeed, the song itself can be interpreted as one long boast about David Cameron, the Conservative Party and the political power they wield.

In addition to rhymes, use of slang and boasts, the song also contains another much used feature of rap music: taboo language, which does not appear in any of the original speeches but arises out of the edits used in the cinematic narration. The type and rhythm of the editing have been primarily driven by the audio track in each piece of footage that comprises the mash-up video, rather than the visual channel of the narration. In this case, the different audio tracks of different speeches have been reassembled to create new meanings. Sometimes whole clauses and clause complexes have been borrowed from Cameron's speeches

(‘Taking money from the man who works long hours’, ‘And no, I don’t think that’s a dirty word’, and ‘People rising from the bottom to the top’) and at other times they take single words or phrases or even just morpheme and phoneme clusters. The most obvious case of this is the taboo insult, ‘motherfuckers’, where in the original speech it appears as though the word mother, /mʌðə/, was followed by a word that began with a voiceless labiodental fricative, /f/. The footage has been cut at the onset of the /f/ phoneme and then edited so that it is followed with another piece of footage containing the, /ʌkə/ (‘-ucker’), cluster of phonemes, which, added to the /mʌðəf/ structure, gives [mʌðəfʌkə].

Whilst the video includes features that one would expect to find in conventional rap and hip-hop music, it also includes linguistic items peculiar to speakers belonging to Cameron’s social background. Indeed, this is important for the humour of the video; the rap is funny because it is a hybrid performance. So, whereas most rap music is delivered in a covertly prestigious nonstandard variety of English, Cameron delivers the rap in his usual overtly prestigious Southern Standard English variety. This is most pronounced in his use of the word, ‘chums’, which indexes Cameron’s upper-class background and consequently further distances him from the type of ‘outsider’ social identity usually performed by hip-hop artists. Similarly, whilst the term ‘muckers’ is a slang word, it is not usually used by the younger audiences one would expect to find listening to hip-hop music. Considered in the light of this hybrid performance, the choice of background music for the rap is significant. ‘Lose Yourself’ featured as the soundtrack in the film *8 Mile* (2002), in which Eminem stars as Jimmy Smith Jnr. who overcomes social and economic adversity to succeed as a rapper in inner city Detroit. The film is a kind of hip-hop *Bildungsroman* which the lyrics of ‘Lose Yourself’ document. By taking Eminem’s place as the vocalist in the song, Cameron – the son of millionaires and an alumnus of the elite Eton College and Oxford University – is positioned as someone who has also had to overcome the same economic adversity to get to his current position of social standing. This is a comic absurdity, especially given that the lyrics of the song are a boastful panegyric to Cameron and the Conservative’s political and economic dominance.

In terms of Chatman’s (1990) model, the cinematic narration in the Cassette-boy video hinges on the addition of off-screen music alongside the selective editing of footage on the basis of fitting the audio track to a rap about Cameron and the Conservatives. Importantly, the editing of the footage by the narrator is what I would call egregiously unreliable. The narration is not an act of deception – no attempt has been made to make it seem as if this was actually what Cameron said – but an act of interpretation, a retelling of the original speeches in his own words but from a different political perspective and in a genre that highlights – comically and at his expense – his privileged social background. Whereas the cinematic

narration in *Brassed Off* was sympathetic, in this Cassetteboy video it is hostile. Indeed, the mash-up video embodies this hostility; that the narration is so obviously at odds with the original orchestration of the speeches featured in the video is indicative of the political gulf between Cameron and Cassetteboy. There is a sense, too, in which those who find the video funny are implicated in this hostility because to laugh at the video is to laugh at Cameron; it means on some level sharing the view with the narrator that the Conservatives are ‘worse than the alternative’ and that Cameron’s background prevents him from legitimately occupying the role of an authentic rapper. The comedy, in this context, is thus an appeal to emotion – levity – at the same time as it is a powerful appeal to ethos; it satirically constructs a shared political perspective through which to view Cameron and the Conservative government.

In the BBC coverage of Cameron’s acceptance speech, the Conservative party communications team were able to take some control of the orchestration of the event from the narrator because of Cameron’s political and institutional power. In the video, the dynamic works in the opposite direction; the narrator takes a preferred orchestration and very obviously subverts it. The consequences of this egregious subversion are to distance the ethical centre of the narrator from that of the speaker. To summarise, then, one of the principle differences between literary filmic narration and political narration is that, in the latter, some aspects might come under the control of one or more orchestrators who, in the process of a political struggle or by virtue of the deference shown them by the narrator, wrest control of some aspects of the narration. However, whilst the events of political discourse are orchestrated by a number of political actors, ultimately they are “told” from the perspective of a narrator who – as the Cassetteboy video demonstrates – might use the semiotic devices at their disposal to subvert the forms of orchestration preferred by these actors. The narrator telling the event of political discourse either consents or conflicts with the orchestrators (one of whom will almost certainly be the speaker or their agent) and it is partly out of this relationship that the ethos of the speaker and narrator is projected.

2.6 The speaker/s

The narrator provides an ethically coloured perspective from which the discourse event is viewed. In contrast, the speaker is the entity under observation, the mouthpiece of the implied author. In the previous section and the discussion of *Brassed Off*, an elucidation of the semiotic resources available to the narrator to ‘tell’ the event of discourse was necessary. An explanation of the (many)

semiotic resources that speakers might use to project an ethos will be provided in Chapter 3. This section examines some structural features of the discourse that pertain to the ethos of the speaker or speakers. So far, the examples have all been oriented to single speakers who project an ethos which either coheres or conflicts with the narrator's and the implied author's. But there are often instances of political discourse where multiple speakers work together as part of a team. Indeed, in democracies made up of political parties, this is the norm. The following is an exchange from Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) in the British Parliament. PMQs is a weekly opportunity for MPs to raise important issues with the Prime Minister and hold them to account.

Chris Davies MP: Does my right hon. Friend agree that rural businesses in my constituency such as BSW Timber, which he visited during the election campaign, are benefiting from this Government's long-term economic plan? What more can his Government do to further promote apprenticeships and create jobs in all sectors of the vital rural economy?

The Prime Minister (David Cameron MP): First, may I welcome my hon. Friend to his place, and say how much I enjoyed the visit to his constituency and that specific business? It has taken on a lot of employees and apprentices in recent years, and the claimant count in his constituency is down by 54% since 2010. What more we can do is encourage companies like this one to invest in training and apprentices because that is key to our future. We have got to ensure we do that, and that will only happen if we stick to our long-term economic plan.

(HC Deb [2015–2016] 597 col. 313)

Like David Cameron, Chris Davies is a Conservative MP. He asks two questions, both of which provide opportunities for Cameron to demonstrate the successes of his Conservative government's economic policies. Significantly, both speakers repeat the noun-phrase 'long-term economic plan' – another case of political messaging. Davies's first question affords Cameron the opportunity to say that the 'long-term economic plan' is beneficial, and the entailments of the second question are that the plan is 'promot[ing] apprenticeships and creat[ing] jobs'. Cameron himself ends his answer by stressing the importance of the 'long-term economic plan' in encouraging companies to invest in training and apprenticeships. To use a sporting metaphor, Davies sets up the play, and Cameron uses this set-up to score a political point about the importance of the economic plan. They work together as a team to produce what Goffman (1959: 83–108) has called a common 'front'. Significantly, though, they are not the only team in the room. On the BBC coverage of this particular session of PMQs, sensing that this is a 'puff' question, the opposition parties can be heard to jeer in response. Here, they too are adopting a shared front which is antagonistic to that presented by Davies, Cameron and, indeed, the ministers sitting on the Conservative benches.

Importantly, politicians can hold the same front across different discursive events. The Labour Party messaging in Section 4 – the slogan ‘too far and too fast’ – is a demonstration of this type of inter-discursive front; Labour politicians were using the phrase in a variety of different debating contexts, thereby constructing the same front in those different events of discourse. This adoption of an inter-discursive front in party politics is such a norm that when two different politicians seem to disagree or emphasise different aspects of their party’s policy platform it is seen as a news-worthy event. Returning to previous examples, part of the issue at stake in Ed Balls’s interview with *The Telegraph* about Ed Miliband’s 2014 Labour party conference speech was that the two politicians were projecting a different front; Miliband did not mention the deficit, but Ed Balls said it was ‘the most important thing’.

Front is an important concept in a discussion of the speaker’s ethos because, if shared, there is an extent to which the ethos of one speaker in the front can ‘leak’, so to speak, on to the others. Being in the same team as someone who is highly regarded by the audience can boost the speaker’s ethos. Similarly, sharing a front with an infamous team member can discredit a speaker. The 2014 referendum in Scotland and the following general election is a case in point. The referendum asked Scottish people if they would like to remain a part of the United Kingdom. Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party took part in the ‘Better Together’ campaign for a ‘no’ vote. The ‘no’ campaign won, but in the following 2015 general election, the Scottish Labour vote collapsed at the hands of the Scottish National Party. Many commentators and Labour politicians have argued that the Labour Party’s participation in a campaign with the Conservatives – who were deeply unpopular in Scotland – had a detrimental effect on Labour’s election result and that Labour should have run a separate ‘no’ campaign, distinct from the Conservatives. Indeed, some Scottish National Party supporters now call the Labour Party ‘Red Tories’ so tainted are they by campaigning with the Conservatives (the Labour Party colour is red and the Conservative Party are colloquially called the ‘Tories’).

Highlighting the different inter-discursive fronts maintained by a speaker can also be a strategy for attacking their ethos. Speakers might be accused of being inconsistent from one discursive context to another, or of adopting a common front with unsavoury characters in one place, but condemning those characters elsewhere. The following is from a 2015 Labour Party leadership debate in which Jeremy Corbyn MP, the left-wing frontrunner, is being attacked for just that by Yvette Cooper MP, another candidate in the leadership race, and the chair of the debate, Nicky Campbell. ‘Unite Against Fascism’ is an organisation supported by Corbyn.

- 1 Nicky Campbell: Let's talk about judgement (.) Can we talk about
 2 judgement? Err this has been much in the news (.) Do you
 3 think Jeremy Corbyn Yvette Cooper has has questions to
 4 answer about people he shared platforms with?
- 5 Yvette Cooper: Jeremy and I have had disagreements about this because
 6 there are umm some people who I think err have quite
 7 extreme views umm homophobic and sort of pushing
 8 homophobic abuse and pushing err sort of extremist umm
 9 abuse who I don't think you should give legitimacy to by
 10 err by inviting to public meetings [and speaking with]
- 11 Nicky Campbell: [is this a judgement question is it?]
- 12 Yvette Cooper: We have a diff I guess we have a different judgement on
 13 it (.) we have a different view on it (.) I think the y'know
 14 this is the Labour party and we have always been very
 15 clear about our values and what it is we stand up for and
 16 therefore ah its important I suppose that the leader of the
 17 Labour party is projecting the right values and support as
 18 well
- 19 Nicky Campbell: Well s- this this is what I don't get and a l-lot of people
 20 don't get err J-Jeremy err that err y'know Unite Against
 21 Fascism will not share a platform with fascists but you do
- 22 Jeremy Corbyn: Sorry?
- 23 Nick Campbell: With people who are anti-Semites people who are
 24 [misogynistic people who are Islamo-fascists people who
 25 are theocratic fascists]
- 26 Jeremy Corbyn: [I have met (.) I have met people (.) I have met] people in
 27 the context of discussions about the Middle East with
 28 whom I profoundly disagree (.) I've met representatives
 29 of the Iranian government with whom I profoundly
 30 disagree on the human rights issues (.) my point is that if
 31 you're to bring about a long term peace process in the
 32 Middle East you have to recognise that err i-in the case of
 33 Palestine and Israel Fatah and Hamas have umm a great
 34 deal of support (.) one in the West Bank one in Gaza (.)
 35 you're not gonna bring about any long term peace process
 36 unless you talk to them (.) even Tony Blair is now talking
 37 to Hamas now I erm it's a little odd for me to claim ehh
 38 um err pray Tony Blair in aid of anything but erm it-it the
 39 issue has to be that if you want to bring about a process
 40 you have to talk to people with whom you profoundly

- 41 disagree (.) I've made my disagreements with them [very
 42 very]
- 43 Nicky Campbell: [Yvette cooper]
- 44 Jeremy Corbyn: clear (.) listen if you're going to bring about some real
 45 change you've got to talk to people you don't like don't
 46 agree with and don't particularly want to be in power but
 47 you have to recognise that they have a degree of support
 48 and move on from there otherwise what's the alternative
 49 (.) continuing the war? (Radio 5 Live, 2015)

Campbell introduces his first question with the imperative 'let's talk about judgement' (line 1). Significantly, Cooper's initial response focuses on the issue of legitimacy. However, the chair interrupts by reposing his question, bringing the topic back to 'judgement' (11). The reply is then reframed explicitly in these terms; she has a 'different judgement' (12) about sharing platforms. Consorting with dignitaries from the Palestinian political party Hamas fails to project 'the right values' (17). In this exchange, these discourse participants are adopting a political front in a similar manner to Davies and Cameron. Like Davies, Campbell performs the 'set-up'. After reframing her answer in accordance with this set-up, Cooper, like Cameron, scores the political point. Notably, the argument they make is not that Corbyn himself is an anti-Semite but that his association with alleged racists shows a lack of judgement. In the question to the leadership frontrunner (which is not posed as a question, but an assertion), there is also the added implication that he is a hypocrite, or applies double-standards, because he belongs to an organisation, Unite Against Fascism, that does not share political platforms to debate with fascists (on the basis that to do so would legitimise those views). The argument, here, is that he does not maintain a consistent front against fascism and that whilst he claims to be opposed to bigotry of all kinds, he does not condemn it in his political allies. Campbell and Cooper, then, use the common front that Corbyn has adopted in other discursive events to discredit him in the present one. This is fundamentally an attack on his ethos because his judgement – the wisdom of his past political decisions – is being brought into question.

The MPs strategy for dealing with this attack is first to deny that he has shared a platform with fascists. This denial is expressed indirectly by his use of the question 'sorry?' (22) which, on the recording, is said in a manner that suggests he is offended by the assertion that he consorts with fascists. Actually, this particular criticism of the candidate had already been made several times previously in the media. When it becomes clear that the chair is rehearsing a familiar argument – that Hamas is an 'Islamofascist' organisation (24) – Corbyn interrupts him to clarify who he spoke alongside and why (26). The main point he makes is that he

does not agree with the politics of these organisations but that one cannot expect to start a peace process in the Middle East if Iran, Hamas and Fatah, another Palestinian political party, are excluded from debate and discussion. He then argues that one of his main political enemies in the Labour Party, the ex-Prime Minister Tony Blair, has also spoken to these people. Reframed in terms of Goffman's (1959) categories, the rhetorical strategy is to explain the basis of the front with these supposedly disreputable speakers; it is not that Corbyn agrees with them, but that a shared front is one step forward in the peace process. Thus, the attack from ethos is met with a defence from logos. He is also suggesting that if he is to be condemned for consorting with Hamas, then Blair – a politician politically far closer to his rival than himself – should also be condemned. There is also a sense, then, in which Cooper's attack from ethos is turned against her. The implication is that she applies a different ethical standard to her political allies than to her adversaries.

What these examples demonstrate is that speakers can invoke the fronts formed in other discursive contexts to defend their own ethical standing or attack other discourse participants. Often, the projection of an ethos is therefore an interactional and inter-discursive activity in which discourse participants make past events of discourse relevant to the present situation. In the next chapter, the cognitive mechanisms involved in this process are explored in greater depth alongside the linguistic and semiotic cues audiences use to reconstruct the speaker's ethos from their oratorical performance. Before doing so, however, the key ideas in this chapter are summarised as they provide the conceptual "skeleton" of the socio-cognitive approach to ethos in Chapter 3.

2.7 Summary

The foregoing discussion demonstrated the relevance of narratological categories to the investigation of ethos in political discourse. One of the advantages of this approach is that it accounts for the multi-vocality of political discourse and for the fact that 'who is speaking' in modern, professionalised and highly mediated political discourse cannot always be equated with the speaker alone. Approaches which attend to audiences' speculative modelling of backstage political processes – in addition to the front stage performance of the orator – are integral to understanding the successes or failure of the rhetorical appeal to ethos. This chapter examined the ways in which the audiences' construal of the implied author of the text functions as a method of reconstructing these backstage processes. To continue the theatre metaphor, the role of the orchestrators of political discourse in building the stage of political discourse was examined. It was shown how through consent and political conflict the narrator and various orchestrators construct

a proscenium arch through which the discourse is viewed. Finally, the chapter explored the ways in which the players on the stage might interact with each other to produce a common front with a common ethos and the inter-discursive effect of these fronts in the maintenance of a particular ethos across discourse events. Ethos cannot be located in any one of these areas – in the implied authorship, the narration, or the speakers' singular or group performance – but in their interaction. One can only understand the ethos projected by the speaker, and the success or failure of this rhetorical appeal, insofar as it relates to the projected ethos of the narrator and what this relationship says about the implied author of the text. It is in the complex matrix of these elements that the speaker's appeal to credibility, authority and ethical rectitude are formed. Having outlined, backstage to front, the different layers of ethos in political communication, Chapter 3 investigates the cognitive processes by which discourse participants create a network of conceptual models representing the speaker, the narrator and the implied author of the political text, and how this network produces rhetorical effects relating to the ethos of the speaker.

CHAPTER 3

The conceptual ecology of ethos

3.1 Introduction

A rhetorical appeal to ethos is one that projects a positive, credible image of the speaker to the audience so as to make the speaker's claims more convincing. The manuals of classical rhetoric outlined the techniques of managing this image, of providing the right argument from ethos for the right context. In these accounts, the types of proof from ethos varied in relation to the creditable or discreditable cause of the oration. Where the defendant's actions are in doubt, magnify their otherwise impeccable character; where the quality of their character is in question, expound upon the virtue of their deeds. However, unlike those technical manuals, this volume focuses on the processes of discourse reception rather than the techniques and methods of discourse production. The aim, therefore, is not to ask what techniques speakers might use to make their appeal to ethos but what interpretative processes audiences go through – what strategies do they employ – in order to construct an image of the speaker. In Chapter 2 political communication was seen as a complex, layered discourse event. Audiences listen to a speaker whose words are often chosen by someone else, and whose performance is mediated through some form of narration (which might also involve multiple orchestrators). Categories from narratology – the narrator and the implied author – are useful for modelling these entities because they approach discourse from the point of view of reception; that is, the audience is presented a speaker by a narrator, and – on the basis of this mediated performance – they come to some conclusion about who the author of the discourse is.

This chapter fleshes out this polyvalent conception of political discourse by first surveying the literature from cognitive and social psychology about impression formation and using this as a springboard for discussion of sociolinguistic approaches to identity. These psychological and sociolinguistic approaches are combined to outline a cognitive stylistic framework for analysing the speaker's appeals to ethos in audience reception. Based on Attribution Theory (see Ames and Mason, 2012; Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Gilbert, 1998) and Theory of Mind (Apperly, 2012; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack and Woodruff, 1978), this cognitive stylistic framework is then integrated with the layered account of ethos offered

in the previous chapter to offer a holistic method of accounting for what is here called the conceptual ecology of ethos in political discourse. This framework sees ethos in audience reception as emerging out of a matrix of interrelating conceptual structures that the audience either creates or accesses as the discourse proceeds.

3.2 The cognitive dynamics of impression formation

As was stressed throughout the previous chapter, audiences actively engage in constructing an image of the front-stage speaker, the backstage political processes and the implied author of the text. The audience's impressions of the speaker and these backstage processes are the outcome of their own mental processes. Although the focus here is on the cognitive stylistics of political discourse – the relationship of linguistic forms to conceptual content, context and rhetorical effects – it is useful to consider the types of cognitive processes involved in the everyday apprehension of other human beings in isolation from the linguistic structures that might prompt them.

Social psychologists working in the field of social cognition (for an overview, see Fiske and Taylor, 2013) have put the study of this mental activity at the heart of their research agenda. Asch's (1946) early study is one of the most important in this area, having influenced most of the subsequent social-psychological approaches to impression formation. Asch (1946) tested two competing accounts of how we form impressions of other people across twelve different experiments. The first, called the algebraic theory, posited that impressions are formed on the basis of the perceiver identifying individual positive and negative traits, then adding them up to produce an overall impression. This is a "bottom-up" view of impression formation in which perceivers weigh the different attributes of the target person's personality. The second theory Asch (1946) examined took a gestalt view of personality. From this perspective, the attributes of the target person combined to create an overall impression irreducible to the sum of its parts. Personality traits are seen in relation to one another, rather than being analysable in isolation.

To test his theories, Asch (1946) gave one group of participants a list of attributes – 'intelligent, skilful, industrious, warm, determined, practical and cautious' – and told them to provide a brief summary description of what they supposed that person to be like. A second group were given a set of attributes similar to the first, but the word 'warm' was replaced with 'cold'. On the basis of this change alone, the two groups produced vastly different descriptions of the fictional person. For instance, 91% of the those in the first group described the person as 'generous' compared to only 8% in the second group, 90% 'happy' compared to 34%, and 91% 'sociable' compared to 38%. Asch (1946: 270) also found that

the order in which traits were recounted affected the impression formed by participants. Participants were likely to find fictional characters more objectionable if their least attractive qualities (like 'enviousness' and 'stubbornness') were listed first, before more attractive qualities such as 'intelligence' and 'industriousness'. Finally, Asch (1946: 278–283) found that participants were more likely to rate qualities like 'quick' negatively if they were co-present with qualities like 'clumsy'. Similarly, being 'slow' was not adversely judged if it appeared alongside the quality 'skilful'. From his experiments, Asch (1946) concluded that the second gestalt theory of impression formation was the correct one because it better accounted for these complex interrelationships between traits. He writes:

As soon as two or more traits are understood to belong to one person, they cease to exist as isolated traits, and come into immediate dynamic interaction. The subject perceives not this and that quality, but the two entering into a particular relation. There takes place a process of organisation in the course of which the traits order themselves into a structure... The representation in us of the character of another person possesses in a striking sense certain qualities of a system. (Asch, 1946: 284)

According to this view, our impressions of other people take the form of highly ordered structures. It is this that leads Fiske and Taylor (1991: 96–141) to suggest that the conceptual structures involved in the appraisal of other people are kinds of 'schema'. This concept originates in the work of the gestalt psychologist, Bartlett (1932), and later gained prominence in the 1970s as part of the booming interest in artificial intelligence, particularly in the seminal work of Schank and Abelson (1977). As Eysenck and Keane (1990: 275) describe it, 'a schema is a structured cluster of concepts; usually it involves generic knowledge and may be used to represent events, sequences of events, precepts, situations, relations and even objects'. Schemata are therefore forms of mental representation, 'cognitive structures that contain knowledge about the expected attributes of a certain category and the links between these attributes' (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990: 13). In addition to the types of representation listed by Eysenck and Keane (1990), Fiske and Taylor (2013) suggest that we also have schemata for individuals and groups of people. These are cognitive resources we use to categorise the people around us. Viewed from this perspective, Asch's (1946) gestalt view of impression formation can be seen as a form of "top-down" process; rather than generate an impression of the target person by considering each of their traits individually, we instead categorise people on the basis of one or two salient traits and use our pre-existing schema for these categories to make inferences about the other attributes they might possess. These are inferences based on stereotypes, schemata that contain beliefs about the characteristics and behaviours of people who share a single trait

or set of traits (skin colour, ethnicity, gender, sexuality etc.). Our use of stereotypes is therefore an economy – a cognitive shortcut that speeds up the process of impression formation. Of course, this economy comes at the price of often reinforcing our worst prejudices.

Humans are not doomed to stereotype, however. In fact, subsequent work in socio-cognitive psychology has proposed that we actually use a mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches to build a picture of the people we meet. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) and Fiske et al. (1987) suggest that we generally use top-down processes but, when the categories we impose upon people jar with a character trait that does not fit with our preconceived schema, we are likely to try and re-categorise that person and, if this fails, move on to a bottom-up algebraic assessment of their individual character traits. Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) model of impression formation is a more useful starting point for analysing the cognitive basis for appeals to ethos than an exclusively gestalt approach. As Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, I.ii, 1356a) points out, the proof from ethos 'must come about in the course of the speech, not through the speaker being believed in advance to be of a certain character'. If audiences only ever relied upon pre-existing schemata to form an impression of the speaker, appeals to ethos 'in the course of the speech' would be impossible. This does not mean to say that rhetoricians should be disinterested in top-down cognitive processes, focusing only on bottom-up procedures, but that cognitive rhetorical analyses should explore their intersection.

To look further at this intersection of top-down and bottom-up processes, it is useful to return to the speech from *Brassed Off* analysed in Section 2.3. It is obvious from responses such as User 2's that Danny's Yorkshire identity plays an important role in how at least some social media users respond to him. One of the more salient indicators of a person's category membership – and therefore the stereotypes that might be applied to them – is the language they use (indeed, in the previous chapter, I argued that User 2's quoting from the speech was in this regard especially significant). It has long been established that people associate different linguistic varieties with groups of character traits and that together these traits comprise stereotypes (Lambert et al., 1960; Strongman and Woosley, 1967; Giles 1970). The speech features a number of non-standard features of English which taken together comprise a working class Yorkshire dialect:

A preference for using the [ʊ] vowel, rather than /ʌ/, to pronounce words like 'bloody'

The short vowel [æ] rather than the longer vowel /a:/ in words like 'last'

So-called /h/ dropping in words such as 'whole', 'how' and 'homes'

The shorter monophthong, [ɪ], in 'myself', rather than the diphthong, /aɪ/

The dialect word 'ought' (a shortening of 'nought', meaning nothing)

The non-standard grammatical form, ‘were’, instead of ‘was’ in ‘this band’s pit were closed’

The discourse marker, ‘oh aye’

Use of the slang term ‘a few lousy bob’

Use of the idiom ‘knock out a... tune’

The Yorkshireman stereotype is perhaps one of the better defined regional stereotypes in British culture. The image of a dour, blunt and plainspoken working-class man with flat cap and whippet dog, proud to live in ‘God’s own country’, is closely associated with this part of England (indeed, Monty Python’s famous ‘Four Yorkshiremen’ sketch is an excellent example of humour based on this stereotype). However, the stereotype is clearly not being recalled by the *YouTube* audience in this context. In fact, the audience is faced with quite a complex array of semiotic cues that inhibit the retrieval of some aspects of this YORKSHIREMAN schema and encourage others.

It is true that Danny speaks in a recognisably Yorkshire dialect, but the content of his speech hardly depicts him as the gruff and emotionally unavailable man of the stereotype. He is, after all, very angrily projecting how he feels. Indeed, these feelings are very visibly on display, not just in his use of expletives – he uses the taboo words ‘bloody’, ‘bugger’ and ‘fuck’ – but in the quality of his voice and his facial expressions. He delivers the speech in a shaky voice and, although he is not crying, there are tears in his eyes. So, whilst there are aspects of Danny’s performance which do reinforce the Yorkshire stereotype – he does use recognisably Yorkshire dialect forms, he is blunt (so much so that he attacks his audience for caring about seals and whales, but not people) and his topic is dour – there are other facets of his performance that certainly conflict with it. What the audience is responding to, then, is not so much the stereotype evoked by Danny’s dialect, but how these dialect features combine with other aspects of his performance *style*.

3.3 From dialect to style

Style in sociolinguistics has classically been construed as intraspeaker variation motivated by the speaker’s attention to their own speech (Labov, 1966). An early influential challenger of this idea was Bell (1984), who argued that style is actually a form of ‘audience design’. Speakers adapt their speech to the audience with whom they are communicating. Since then, more and more emphasis has been placed on how speakers perform different styles in different social contexts to construct identity (Bucholtz and Hall, 2005; Coupland, 1988, 2007; Ochs, 1993). This has meant understanding how individual linguistic variables come to possess a meaning, not in and of themselves, but in their interaction with other variables

(Eckert, 2008). An important concept in this research is that of ‘indexicality’ (Silverstein, 2003). This is the idea that all linguistic variables index the particular context in which they are usually used – for instance, variables might commonly be used by a particular group of people or in a particular situation. First order indices are those that only tacitly index this context. However, second order (and beyond) indices are those that are so saliently connected to a particular context of use that they become a linguistic resource that can be mobilised in a variety of different communicative situations. As Eckert (2008: 464) writes:

Variables have indexical fields rather than fixed meanings because speakers use variables not simply to reflect or reassert their particular pre-ordained place on the social map but to make ideological moves. The use of a variable is not simply an invocation of a pre-existing indexical value but an indexical claim which may either invoke a pre-existing value or stake a claim to a new value.

(Eckert, 2008: 464)

Variables have a range of potential meanings – an ‘indexical field’ – any one of which might be realised in combination with other facets of the speaker’s speech (Eckert, 2008, see also Moore, 2012). Campbell-Kibler’s (2007, 2009, 2011) work on the social meaning of the (ING) variable – whether ‘-ing’ is pronounced as [ɪn] or [ɪŋ] – is a good case in point. She argues that ‘rather than meaning one particular thing, (ING) is tied to a network of related concepts... Which one it is used to mean (or ends up meaning) is different based on a number of contextual factors’ (Campbell-Kibler, 2009: 149). For instance, if the variable appeared alongside other variables which together indexed a working class social identity, participants were more likely to rate the speaker as less intelligent (Campbell-Kibler, 2009: 143). Conversely, ‘when listeners were responding to speakers they did not mark as working-class, (ING) had no impact on educated/intelligence ratings’ (Campbell-Kibler, 2009: 143). The point, here, is that the social meaning of (ING) chosen from its indexical field by participants is a function of the linguistic and social context in which it appears. Speakers engage in a form of ‘bricolage’, piecing together different linguistic indices which interact to create an overall style, thus encoding their individual identity as a speaker (Eckert, 2008: 456).

So far, the discussion of indexicality has focussed on features of accent. However, as Moore and Podesva (2009) and Kirkham and Moore (2016) point out, different levels of style often work together synergistically to project a speaker ethos, from the level of phonology, through morphology, diction and grammar, all the way up to the discourse-level. It is worth briefly considering – with specific reference to (and examples from) political discourse – how styles might be constructed on the different levels of linguistic structure and what features on each level are of particular importance to projecting an ethos.

The morphology of the words used in a speech can add to the ethos projected by the speaker. Good case studies of this are so-called ‘Bushisms’. In addition to highly idiosyncratic grammatical forms (famously, ‘rarely is the question asked: is our children learning?’ in which the verb ‘to be’, ‘is’, should be in its plural form, ‘are’), the former US president, George W. Bush, was well known and derided for his creation of new words using conventional morphemes. For instance:

- (1) I don’t think we need to be sublimable about the differences between our views on prescription drugs.
- (2) They misunderestimated me.
- (3) Information is moving – you know, nightly news is one way, of course, but it’s also moving through the blogosphere and through the internets.
- (4) I want to thank the dozens of welfare-to-work stories, the actual examples of people who made the firm and solemn commitment to work hard to embetter themselves. (from Weisberg, 2009)

In (1), the suffix, ‘-able’, has been added to the root, ‘subliminal’, to create the new word, ‘sublimable’; in (2), the prefix, ‘mis-’, has been added to the root, ‘underestimated’, to create the new word ‘misunderestimated’; in (3), the plural suffix, ‘-s’, has been added to the root ‘internet’, to create the new word, ‘internets’; and, finally, in (4), the prefix, ‘em-’, has been added to the root, ‘better’, to create the new word, ‘embetter’. Logically speaking, the additional morphemes add nothing to the denotational meanings of the roots and are therefore surplus to requirement. They do, however, have *social* meanings. That Bush needlessly modifies these roots suggest that he does not possess an adequate understanding of them, which has further consequences for his ethos as a speaker; to some audiences it may index a less literate identity which might, in accordance with some standard language ideologies, be equated to stupidity.

The speaker’s ethos may also be styled on the level of diction. Jargon is perhaps one of the most obvious ways in which speakers signal their belonging to a particular professional class of people, alongside the attendant professional or specialist ethos of that group. Similarly, use of polysyllabic, Latinate words is likely to invest the speaker with a sense of formality and emotional neutrality, whereas words of Germanic origin often seem more familiar or emotional (Verdonk, 2013: 169). In the case of Danny’s speech, the Germanic taboo words ‘bollocks’, ‘bugger’, ‘bloody’ and ‘fuck’ serve to construct an ethical locus – in the sense that I outlined in Chapter 2 – by intensifying Danny’s emotional commitment to the various ethical arguments he makes throughout the speech (that music does not matter as much as people; that winning the trophy means nothing compared to refusing it; that the government has betrayed ‘us’ and ‘our industry’; that one should not care

about 'seals and whales' more than people; and that human beings should have a right to live in hope). Taboo language can also express opinions about other people and groups. So, in Danny's speech, 'this bloody government' can be interpreted as a negative assessment of the Conservative government that is 'systematically destroying an entire industry'.

As another example, take NWA's (1988) seminal rap song, 'Fuck tha Police'. The song is 'political' in the sense that it criticises an institution of the state – the law enforcement – for racist stop-and-search policies. It includes injunctions to 'fuck the police', 'fuck that shit' and the term of abuse, 'punk motherfucker', which obviously express a negative attitude towards the police and consequently situate the speaker's individual ideological and ethical locus outside of mainstream political institutions (one certainly would not expect to hear an elected politician in Western Europe or the USA say the same). Other taboo words used in the song also play a role in constructing a specific anti-establishment identity, particularly the racially taboo word, 'nigga'; the rapper, Ice Cube's, African American heritage legitimates his use of this term which when used by a white person is an extreme form of racial abuse (although its use among people of colour is not uncontroversial, see, for instance, Low, 2007). Similarly, Ice Cube uses the adjective 'brown' to describe himself. Were it used by a white speaker to describe an African American person it could well provoke accusations of racism, but Ice Cube's use of the word is authorised by his own ethnicity. Other non-standard dialect forms such as 'ain't', 'beating on' and the euphemistic 'got it' (which is to say, 'was beaten by the police') also index a working-class American identity more usually associated with discursive contexts found outside the corridors of state and political power. Indeed, the non-standard spelling of the definite article in the title of the song performs a similar function. The taboo and dialect words, then, are here helping to index an identity with an ethos of intense (and highly politicised) disrespect for conservative institutional hierarchies in addition to solidarity with other young members of the Black community (see Smitherman, 1997).

Of course, dialect forms are not restricted to the level of diction, but are also part of the grammar. So, in the speech from *Brassed Off*, Danny uses the past tense plural form of the verb, 'to be', ('were'), rather than the standard singular, 'was', in 'this band's pit were closed'. Again, this indexes a northern working-class identity – an identity stereotypically found outside the institutions of government and corridors of power. It thereby adds to the ethos Danny projects of a relatively disenfranchised working class man "speaking truth to power".

Grammatical forms also provide indexical cues for constructing the speaker's ethos insofar as they establish interpersonal relationships between participants in the discourse. Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) outline a matrix of four roles discourse participants may assume which relate to whether they are giving or

demanding either goods and services or information. Of particular importance in realising these roles is the grammatical mood of the speaker's utterance, for instance, whether or not the speaker places the finite component of the verb phrase before or after the subject to create either an interrogative or declarative utterance. The use of one form over the other is liable to construct a different social relationship between participants. One would probably expect more declarative utterances, say, in the presentation of a government budget – an instance of giving information, in Halliday and Matthiessen's (2004) schema – than in the discourse of a public enquiry (which is a rather extreme example of demanding information). The grammatical forms used in these interactions at once reflect and partially constitute the participant roles involved and as a consequence contribute to the creation of a speaker's ethos.

In addition to the mood of a clause, the speaker's use of modality is also an important part of establishing interpersonal relationships between the discourse participants. Thompson (2014: 70) suggests that modality constructs "a kind of interpersonal 'aura' of the speaker's attitude around [a] proposition". Modality is a broad topic and often linguists use the term in different ways. Both Nuyts (2006) and Perkins (1983) point out that definitions have sometimes been restricted to the closed-set of auxiliary modal verbs ('can', 'may', 'shall', 'will', 'could', 'might', 'should', 'would'). Palmer (1986) has expanded this definition to cover mood and the modal auxiliaries, and Perkins (1983) goes further still by including 'modal expressions' (for example, 'it is obligatory that...'). Simpson's (1993) work takes an even wider view by examining 'modal shading' on the level of whole discourses, rather than clauses. Included within this account of modality are lexical verbs such as 'seemed' (she *seemed* pensive) and 'thought' (I *thought* she was pensive) which are epistemically estranging and thereby further emphasise the presence of the speaker in the interaction. All these manifestations of modality should be recognised in rhetorical analyses as they serve to construct a particular relationship between the speaker and the propositional content of the words they utter. In expressing this attitude, these different modal strategies are a means of expressing adherence to a set of values and beliefs and are therefore intimately connected to the speaker's ethos.

On the discourse-level, there seem to be two ways in which a speaker might style their ethos. The first relates to the politeness strategies used by speakers, and the second relates to the topics they choose to speak about. Politeness strategies are a way of attending to the face needs of the other discourse participants and therefore constitute a key part of the interactional ethics of the discourse (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Face needs are determined by social roles, social roles contribute to social identities, and the speaker's identity is the platform from which they project an ethos. The politeness – or, indeed, impoliteness (Bousfield, 2008) – strategies used by speakers are therefore bound up in the institutional, cultural and

social roles speakers inhabit, alongside the expectation of a set of interactional ethics these roles encode. So, as noted previously, one would not expect mainstream Western politicians to say ‘fuck the police’. Even if such a politician were to agree with the sentiment of the NWA song, to avoid scandal they would have to couch their criticisms in a far more oblique manner. The form of NWA’s impoliteness is simply not available to professional politicians who need to appeal to sections of the electorate who feel that taboo language – especially taboo language directed at the police – is illegitimate in public political discourse. Indeed, in Britain, there are rules about the ‘Parliamentary language’ that members of parliament can use inside the Houses of Commons. Insults are not allowed. This means that politicians often have to be quite creative to insult their peers. This is the Labour MP, Dennis Skinner, recounting the time he insulted David Owen, the former leader of Britain’s Social Democratic Party (a breakaway from the Labour Party, which went on, with the Liberals, to form the Liberal Democrat Party):

When I called the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), a pompous sod, Mr. Speaker said to me, “You had better withdraw that”. I said I would withdraw “pompous”, but said, Mr. Speaker “That’s not the word I’m looking for.” There was laughter in the House and everyone thought that I had hit the nail on the head. I thought that that was a real parliamentary triumph, but Mr. Speaker thought differently. He said, “Off you go,” and I did not get a chance to reply. (HC Deb [28th February 1992] 204 col.1227)

After being asked to retract the comment, Skinner withdraws only one of the words (‘pompous’) which has the humorous effect of implying that Owen is still a ‘sod’. This use of linguistic creativity is perhaps one of the things – alongside his rather emphatic style of delivery – that has given Skinner a reputation for being a maverick and firebrand. That Skinner is capable of utilising the codified rules of parliamentary etiquette to further insult his political opponents adds to his rebellious and “straight talking” ethos.

On the level of discourse, the choice of topic is also an important factor in constituting the ethos of the speaker. In what is probably an apocryphal exchange (although it will suffice for the purposes of illustration) between the future president, Lyndon B. Johnson, and an aid working on his congressional campaign, Johnson is said to have suggested that the campaign spread a rumour that his opponent had had sexual intercourse with animals. The aid protested – there was no proof that the accusation was true. Johnson, it is reported, replied that he did not care whether it was true; he just wanted to see his opponent deny it. The point, here, is that discussing such matters, even in condemnation, has adverse effects on the kind of ethos congressional candidates try to project. It is simply not an appropriate topic to speak of for those who wish to occupy the office of congressman.

Topic selection thus has important effects on the ethos the speaker is trying to project. The foregoing discussion is summarised in Table 3.1. This is not meant as an exhaustive account, but rather an indicative list of the kinds of linguistic indices that are important in styling a speaker's ethos. It is essential, too, to highlight that this separation of features into different linguistic layers is offered as a means of systematising the analysis of speaker ethos; it is not meant to suggest that only one layer is operating at a time. As Moore and Podesva (2009) and Kirkham and Moore (2016) argue, the speaker is likely "to do" identity-work on each level simultaneously. Indeed, in the process of crafting an individual style, orators may well play different linguistic levels off against one another, thus activating new or secondary meaning potentials for the linguistic indices comprising each level in the holistic manner described by Eckert (2008) and Campbell-Kibler (2009) (see the discussion of Russell Brand's style in Section 3.5, below).

Table 3.1 Multi-layered linguistic indices of speaker ethos

Level of language	Features contributing to speaker ethos
Phonology	Accent features
Morphology	Coinages
Diction	Taboo words
	Latinate or Germanic words
	Jargon
	Dialect words
Grammar	Dialect forms
	Mood
	Modality
Discourse	Politeness strategies
	Choice of topics

3.4 From style to cognition

In the sociolinguistic research on style, there are two ways in which the term is used. The first sense in which it is possible to talk about a speaker's style is in the moment of performance. As the work on indexicality suggests, linguistic indices not only reflect existing categories but can also be used by speakers to construct or 'claim' (Eckert, 2008: 464) new identities in the moment of discourse. Speakers style their identities differently depending on their communicative goals and the situational context. For instance, after recording conversations between a travel-agent, Sue, and her clients, Coupland (1988) found that Sue changed aspects of her verbal style depending on the social background of the client (see also Bell,

1984). More recently, in a much cited study, Podesva (2007) describes the way in which a doctor, Heath, uses falsetto to different degrees in different personal and professional contexts to emphasise his identity as a gay man. Most relevant to a discussion of style in political discourse is Kirkham and Moore's (2016) analysis of glottaling and verb process types in Ed Miliband's speeches to the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour Party Conference. In the TUC speech, they found that Miliband used glottal [ʔ] variants in the words 'Britain' and 'government' alongside processes relating to material action and thought processes, whereas in the Labour Conference speech, he tended to use [t] 'in contexts where [he was working] to establish credibility with his audience, without having to necessarily imply shared values' (Kirkham and Moore, 2016: 108). To account for this difference, Kirkham and Moore (2016) hypothesised that [ʔ] projected an ethos of solidarity to the TUC, who supported his bid for the Labour leadership, whereas [t] projected one of competence to the Labour Party Conference, which – in the main – did not. According to all these views of style, the speaker's identity is born of performance (Bucholtz and Hall, 2005). For this reason, it is here called 'performance style'.

The second way in which style can be approached is here termed a 'habitual style'. This is the sense in which audiences come to associate a style with a particular person. For example, Johnstone (2009) provides an account of how the US senator Barbara Jordan maintains a personal verbal style – well known to American audiences – across a variety of different discourse contexts. She argues that the continuities in Jordan's style from context to context contribute to the creation of an 'ethos of self', in which 'the source of morality and knowledge is not social agreement in the moment but lessons learned in the course of thoughtful reflection on one's necessarily idiosyncratic, unique personal biography' (Johnstone, 2009: 11). Johnstone (2009) convincingly demonstrates some of the continuities in Barbara Jordan's style from one discourse context to the next (see also Dubois, 2002, and Rauniomaa, 2003, on 'stance accretion'). It is worth noting, however, that what matters are not so much the objective inter-discursive continuities of speaker style from one discourse context to another, but rather the audience's *perception* of continuity. In the case of political discourse, it is likely that audiences will only have heard speakers in a rather limited set of contexts, such as television interviews, televised speeches, political rallies etc., so a sense of some stylistic link between those contexts is likely (see Section 2.6 on maintaining a 'front' across different discourse events). Indeed, that satirists are able to humorously impersonate the speech styles of politicians indicates that there is some perceived stability in their public verbal performances.

If styles are socially meaningful – i.e. the meaning of a style is shared by a society or group of people – then it is of little significance whether or not they

are analysed in production or reception. There are, however, obvious differences between how speakers perceive themselves and the meaning of their own habitual and performance styles versus how they are perceived by their audiences. As already argued (see Section 3.1), an analysis of ethos in reception requires a socio-cognitive approach, which means describing the conceptual structures and processes involved in audience responses to this rhetorical appeal. It is certainly possible (although not without complication) to transplant the notion of indexicality into a reception-oriented, cognitive framework (indeed, see Campbell-Kibler, 2016). Second order linguistic indices receive their meaning potential by virtue of the contexts in which they are known to be used. That is, they can be deployed meaningfully in *different* contexts precisely because they are associated – in the minds of language users – with a specific type of speaker and/or discourse event. This is to say that indices are a linguistic form associated with a context. The notion that linguistic forms evoke – indeed, are only understandable with respect to – a conceptual context is the standard view in cognitive semantics (for instance, Filmore, 2006; Langacker, 1987: 147, 2008: 44–50). Viewed from this perspective, in reception, indexicality is the process by which second order indices provide cognitive access points to the domains of human experience in which they are most prototypically encountered. Thus, Kristianssen (2001) argues that dialect forms exist in a metonymic relationship with larger conceptual structures, i.e. stereotypes. However, the transposition of indexicality into the vocabulary of a reception-oriented cognitive linguistics becomes more difficult when the idea of linguistic style as a form of bricolage is considered. If linguistic indices are combined to create highly complex, individuated linguistic styles that are irreducible to stereotypes, there needs to be a way of describing the cognitive processes by which the meanings of those indices are integrated into a gestalt conceptual structure that comes to represent the speaker. The matter is further complicated by the two facets of style – performance and habitual – outlined, above. Performance styles are provisional and context-bound and therefore suggest an accompanying short-term conceptual structure which is different from the long-term conceptual structures associated with a habitual style. Having outlined the linguistic components of performance and habitual styles, then, it is now worth considering the conceptual structures that these styles cue in audience cognition.

When audiences listen to a speaker delivering an oration, they create a mental representation based on the linguistic indices comprising the speaker's performance style. This mental representation is here called a 'performance model'. Its creation relies on a series of integrative cognitive processes that must involve the selection and synthesis of indexical meanings belonging to the linguistic variants comprising the performance style. What is more, the process must also involve some suppression of indexical meaning depending on the linguistic and social

context in which the speaker performs; as the remarks on Danny's speech and its relationship to Yorkshire stereotypes suggest (see Section 2.3), not all meaning potentials are realised in the interpretation of a performance style. In cognitive linguistics, the most obvious framework for modelling these integrative processes is Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT). As suggested above, linguistic indices can be viewed as access points to domains of experiential knowledge. In CIT, these are called 'mental spaces'. Insofar as the cognitivist re-interpretation of indexicality described in this book is concerned, mental spaces contain the meaning potentials of linguistic indices. These mental spaces are brought together in a 'blended space' which combines the indexical meanings encoded in the speaker's performance style together into a gestalt conceptual structure representing the speaker. It is seen as a gestalt because the overall impression formed of the speaker by the audience member is a function of the interaction of these mental spaces (c.f. Asch, 1946).

This brief and rather abstract description of the conceptual processes involved in the creation of a performance model will be explained in Section 3.5 by means of a concrete example. For now, it suffices to say that audiences respond to performance styles by creating cognitive models of the speaker called performance models and that these models rely on our cognitive capacity to integrate the meaning potentials of multiple linguistic indices into a single gestalt conceptual structure.

If audiences generate a similar performance model across several different discourse events there is a likelihood that it will become the entrenched mental representation of that speaker. Following Culpeper (2002), this more stable, long-term conceptual structure is called a 'character schema'. Whereas performance models rely on the human capacity for conceptual integration, character schemata rely on the cognitive ability to schematise – to generalise across a set of similar interactions with a speaker to create a conceptual model of that speaker in long term memory. The character schema for a speaker is in part the product of repeated exposure to their linguistic performances across different discourse contexts, which is to say it is a mental representation based on a speaker's habitual style. The conceptual pole in reception of a performance style is thus a performance model; and for a habitual style, it is a character schema.

The interaction between character schema and performance model is fundamental to the cognitive dynamics of ethos in audience reception. A speaker's performance on one occasion can confirm what audiences had always thought of them, or it can so depart from these expectations that it fundamentally disrupts their character schema. Thus viewed, top-down and bottom-up impression formation can be reframed in terms of schema-refreshing or schema-reinforcing oration (see Cook, 1994). Top-down processes are those in which nothing said in

the speech is enough to force any fundamental revision of the audience's character schema for that speaker. Bottom-up processes are triggered when the opposite is true – when what the speaker says and the way they say it revise the expectations encoded in the character schema. The performance model comes to override the character-schema. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6 a more detailed description of the structures and processes involved in this conceptual ecology will be provided. In Section 3.7 it will also be integrated with the layered analysis of ethos introduced in Chapter 2.

3.5 Performance models

Performance models are bottom-up, text-driven conceptual structures created by audiences in response to a speaker's performance style. They represent the persona the speaker aims to project in the moment of the discourse. Rather than remain on the abstract level, an example is here provided to show how conceptual structures are cued by the speaker's real-time performance style. The following is a transcript from an interview between Jeremy Paxman, a well-known and notoriously aggressive broadcaster for the BBC, and the comedian, Russell Brand (see Section 2.1). Prior to the interview, Brand had called upon his substantial fan base to abstain from voting in the 2015 general election. Following these remarks, he was invited to edit an issue of the *New Statesman*, a British left-of-centre political and current affairs magazine. 'Boris' is a reference to Boris Johnson, the Conservative mayor of London.

- 1 Paxman: Russell Brand who are you to edit a political magazine?
- 2 Brand: Well I j-suppose like a person who's been politely (.) asked by an
- 3 attractive woman.
- 4 Paxman: [((laughs))]
- 5 Brand: [I don't know what the typical criteria is (.) I] don't know many
- 6 people that edit political magazines (.) Boris (.) he used to do one
- 7 didn't he? So I'm a kinda person with crazy hair (.) quite a good
- 8 sense of humour (.) don't know much about politics (.) I'm ideal
- 9 Paxman: But is it true you don't even vote?
- 10 Brand: Yeah no I don't vote
- 11 Paxman: Well how d'you have any authority to talk about politics [then?]
- 12 Brand: [Well] I
- 13 don't err get my authority from this pre-existing paradigm which
- 14 is quite narrow and only serves a few people (.) I look elsewhere

- 15 for alternatives that might be of service to humanity (0.5)
 16 alternate means alternative political systems
- 17 Paxman: They being?
- 18 Brand: Well I've not invented it yet Jeremy (.) I had to do a magazine
 19 last week I've had a lot on me plate (.) but I say (.) but here's the
 20 thing it shouldn't do (.) shouldn't destroy the planet (.) shouldn't
 21 create massive economic disparity (.) shouldn't ignore the needs
 22 of the people (.) the burden of proof is on the people with the
 23 power not people who like doing a maga[zine for novelty]
- 24 Paxman: [How do you im]agine
 25 that people get power?
- 26 Brand: Well I imagine there are sort of hierarchal systems that have been
 27 preserved [through generations]
- 28 Paxman: [You get power] by being voted in [that's how they do
 29 it]
- 30 Brand: [Well you say that Jeremy but]
- 31 Paxman: You can't even be arsed to vote=
- 32 Brand: =That's quite a narrow err quite a narrow prescriptive parameter
 33 that changes within the [uh uh]
- 34 Paxman: [in a demo]cracy that's how it works
- 35 Brand: Well I don't think it's working very well Jeremy (.) given that the
 36 planet is being destroyed (.) given that there's economic disparity
 37 of a huge degree (.) what you saying (.) that there's no alternative
 (BBC *Newsnight*, 2013)

This section of the interview is significant because it is an attack by Paxman on Brand's ethos; Paxman is arguing that Brand is unqualified to offer any comment on contemporary politics because he does not vote. The comedian uses a variety of linguistic strategies to project a persona that is at once qualified to talk about British politics, but is positioned outside of the institutions that he wishes to criticise. The foremost of these strategies is his extensive use of non-standard dialect features that belong both to Estuary English and several working class London varieties of English (see Table 3.2). He makes extensive use of [t] glottaling (pronouncing the Standard English /t/ sound in 'political' as a glottal stop, [ʔ]) and [l] vocalisation (pronouncing the Standard English /l/ sound in 'well' as a [w]). There are also several instances of /h/ dropping (not pronouncing the Standard English /h/ sound in words like 'he' and 'had'), 'th' fronting (pronouncing the

Standard English /θ/ sound in ‘thing’ as a [f]) and happY tensing (elongating the Standard English /ɪ/ vowel in words like Jeremy). These are all linguistic features that together index a working-class identity which is not stereotypically associated with the political institutions Brand is criticising. As an ‘ideological move’ (Eckert, 2008: 464), then, these variables position him as a political actor functioning outside the framework of establishment politics.

However, in addition to non-standard linguistic forms, Brand’s personal verbal style also includes quite an impressive array of Latinate polysyllabic words, such as ‘paradigm’, ‘hierarchal’, and ‘prescriptive parameter’. This vocabulary potentially jars with the schema expectations encoded in the non-standard forms because it suggests a level of education beyond that available to the stereotype of working class Londoners. It is also the case that Brand’s use of non-standard features is not consistent throughout the interview and there are times when he even adopts some features of RP. For instance, the /əʊ/ vowel in ‘vote’ (10) has a relatively closed starting point, which Altendorf (2003: 72) suggests is a feature of RP, compared to other instances of the vowel in the interview. In line 10, this is accompanied by quite precise articulation of the voiceless alveolar plosive /t/ in ‘don’t’ and ‘vote’ (in contrast to the other more numerous instances of glottalisation). Similarly, throughout the interview Brand generally favours tensed or slightly tensed happY vowels, but in the word ‘humanity’ (15) the vowel length is dramatically reduced to the RP [ɪ] and, as in the previous example, is preceded by the fully articulated voiceless alveolar plosive, [t].

Table 3.2 Non-standard features of Brand’s accent

Non-standard feature	Examples
Glotalisation	line 6 (‘political’), line 7 (‘quite’), line 8 (‘about’), line 15 (‘alternatives’), line 16 (‘political’), line 18 (‘invented’, ‘yet’), line 19 (‘lot’, ‘plate’, ‘but’), line 30 (but)
l vocalisation	line 2 (‘well’), line 6 (‘political’), line 16 (‘political’), line 18 (‘well’), line 22 (‘people’), line 26 (‘well’), line 30 (‘well’)
/h/ dropping	line 6 (‘ <u>h</u> e’), line 7 (‘ <u>h</u> e’), line 18 (‘ <u>h</u> ad’)
‘th’ fronting	line 20 (‘ <u>th</u> ing’), line 27 (‘ <u>th</u> rough’), line 35 (‘ <u>th</u> ink’)
happY tensing	line 13 (‘authority’), line 21 (‘disparity’), line 30 (Jeremy)

A significant feature of the interview is that Brand oscillates quite quickly between clusters of predominantly RP and non-standard variables. So, the RP in line 15 is rapidly followed in lines 18–19 by a *tour de force* of /l/ vocalisation, /h/ dropping, ‘th’ fronting and repeated glottaling. This is significant because in line 11 Brand’s

authority to speak on the subject of politics is challenged directly by Paxman. His response is to adopt a slightly higher register by using the term ‘pre-existing paradigm’ (13), and he makes recourse to the greatly relaxed RP [ɪ] vowel in 15. Then, when challenged to give intellectual substance to the ‘political systems’ to which he alludes in 15, he begins a barrage of non-standard features that lasts from lines 18 to 19. Brand’s response to an attack on his authority to discuss such matters as politics is thus first to raise his register, using linguistic forms that conventionally index an educated background. When this becomes difficult, when he is pressed on the types of political system from which he derives his authority, he switches to a variety of English stereotypically indexing a markedly less well educated speaker. His use of the verb ‘to do’ in line 18, rather than the more technical ‘to edit’, also further emphasises this new non-expert persona. Brand, then, uses what I will metaphorically call a “see-saw” strategy; when his expert, educated persona is pushed, his non-expert, less prestigious persona pops up. This see-saw strategy allows him to switch rapidly between an appeal to ethos based on cultural prestige and education to one that positions him as an everyday “man of the people”. Brand’s merging of standard and non-standard variables and his use of high register diction are thus a form of bricolage (Eckert, 2008: 456). He exploits the indexical potential of a variety of standard and non-standard forms to create a performance style that projects *both* an anti-establishment and highly educated identity.

This “see-saw” performance raises the question of how audiences integrate seemingly conflicting verbal strategies into a coherent performance model. One way in which we might access the performance model of Brand created by an audience member is to look at journalistic responses to his verbal style. This is Sam Leith who, incidentally, is the author of an excellent popular text on rhetoric (Leith, 2012), writing for *The Guardian* online:

It takes, of course, a lot of work to appear as dishevelled as Brand manages. He looks not so much like a man that’s been dragged through a hedge backwards, but a hedge that’s been dragged through a hedge backwards. In a parenthesis in his autobiography, Brand writes that “Collins defines cool as ‘Worzel Gummidge dressed for a bondage party.’”

Brand’s verbal style – his mashup of music-hall catchphrases (“I tells ya!”), rococo vocabulary and baby-talk about his “dinkle” and his “baw-bags” – is a counterpart to the look. “I think what sells him is his look and his persona,” says one colleague on the comedy circuit. “Although – is he playing smart or dumb? I could never work it out.”

His prose mixes mockney solecisms with highly accomplished standard English. In the space of a single paragraph, “those flowers” and “them flowers” coexist. But uppermost is a literate and distinctively English dandyism fashioned in

conscious imitation of Oscar Wilde, Alan Bennett and Morrissey. He talks about Marx, Dada, situationism, Andy Warhol, and Dickens (incessantly) – and it was a William Burroughs novel that they confiscated from him when he was admitted to the clinic for sex addiction.

Brand wants to let us to know he's well read, but also that he doesn't take it seriously. He mentions Plato in his book, only to identify his career achievements as "thinking and chatting". It's anybody's guess whether Brand with his guard down is the Dickens or Dick Van Dyke version. (Leith, 2010)

Leith is here describing Brand's prose style, but some of his observations also give insights into how he (and, perhaps, other audience members) may perceive the comedian's verbal performance. Leith quotes an industry insider who asks 'is [Brand] playing smart or dumb?'. This dichotomy is then reframed as a tension between standard and non-standard forms of English ('mockney solecisms' versus 'highly accomplished standard English'). An identification is being made here between non/standard linguistic forms and being intelligent or stupid. Indeed, Leith is pointing to an indexical problem – the linguistic forms Brand uses index contradictory social meanings and it is therefore hard to integrate these social meanings into a coherent mental representation. Leith's solution to this indexical problem is to say that Brand's use of 'highly accomplished standard English' wins out against the 'mockney solecisms' and demonstrates that Brand is actually a highly literate individual. There follows a list of canonical writers that Brand is said to have read to prove this point. The use of non-standard forms (in the Paxman interview, /h/ dropping, 'th' fronting, [l] vocalisation, happyY tensing and glottaling) is then explained in the final paragraph of the extract. They demonstrate that Brand 'doesn't take it seriously'. The conflict between the indexical meanings comprising Brand's style are thus accommodated by switching from one potential meaning of the non-standard forms to another. They no longer suggest that Brand is un- or under-educated, but that he is easy-going and fun. These attributes combine with the high standard of education indexed by Brand's 'highly accomplished standard English' (in the Paxman interview, his use of the Latinate polysyllabic vocabulary, 'paradigm', 'hierarchal', and 'prescriptive parameter') and Brand's manner of dressing to create a dandyish persona that is self-consciously very 'cool' (Brand writes, "Collins defines cool as 'Worzel Gummidge [a scarecrow from a children's television show] dressed for a bondage party'").

In the minds of audience members like Leith, then, the various meaning potentials of the indexical forms comprising Brand's performance style are blended to create a performance model that is intelligent at the same time as it is anti-establishment. In this process of conceptual integration, some of the meanings attached to the non-standard forms – such as a lack of education – are suppressed to allow for the creation of this mental model. Of course, 'Brand the dandy' is only

one potential conceptual blend that audiences might create in response to the linguistic indices comprising his performance style. This interpretation is a response to an 'ideological move' (Eckert, 2008: 464), that is, his use of non-standard linguistic forms alongside high-register diction and RP dialect features. However, it is also possible for this move to be rejected by audiences. Anecdotally speaking, some people find the activist-comedian very irritating because they view his use of non-standard forms as inauthentic and an obvious affectation. In these interpretations, the clashing meaning potentials of linguistic indices are seen as irreconcilable in a single performance model. The use of non-standard forms associated with a working class London or Estuary English dialect alongside RP features and high-register diction is thus seen as a 'bad' performance because it is internally incoherent. Indeed, audiences with absolutely no prior knowledge of Brand may reject the appeal to ethos embedded in his hybrid style on this basis.

In the extract from *The Guardian* above, Leith (2010) is responding to the repeated patterns in Brand's performance style, that is, he is responding to Brand's habitual style rather than the specific verbal performance in the Paxman interview. For the purposes of this book, this is not a problem. Brand's performance in the interview typifies his verbal performance in general (and, in fact, Leith's observations of this habitual style mirror the account of Brand's performance style above). Continuities between a speaker's performance and habitual style are to be expected; habitual styles are, after all, the aggregation of individual performances. The one-off performance models audiences build of speakers in response to these verbal performances then become entrenched over time to become fixed representations of the speaker. It is to these fixed representations – character-schemata – that Section 3.6 now turns.

3.6 Character schemata

When human beings repeatedly perceive similarities in their experience they schematise those similarities to create a mental model of a type of entity, thing, or situation. Thus, when audience members repeatedly encounter the same performance style and its accompanying performance model, they identify patterns and create a schema to represent the person to whom that style belongs. Following Culpeper (2002), this conceptual structure is here called a 'character schema'. Character schemata represent our accumulated knowledge about an individual. It is often the case that the politicians speaking on our televisions or radios are already well known to us. We know about the good things they have done alongside the bad, the scandals and controversies in which they have been involved, their political views and party memberships, their aims and ambitions. All this information

comprises our character schema for that politician. Culpeper (2002: 300) suggests that the information encoded in character schemata includes the group memberships held by that person (categories such as gender, ethnicity, political party etc.), their social roles (member of parliament, prime minister, journalist etc.), their traits (friendly, grumpy, assertive, ambitious etc.), their goals (they might want to win an election, foment revolution, or avoid a scandal) and their habits (their habitual dress, gestures or facial expressions). Often, the audience members' prior knowledge of the speaker can be decisive in their construction of the speaker's ethos. Indeed, these schemata can be deployed in precisely the top-down fashion that stereotypes are. To illustrate, it is worth considering a newspaper headline about Nick Clegg, who at the time of the headline was the British Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Democrat party. Unusually in a first-past-the-post system, in the 2010 British election no party succeeded in achieving an outright majority. The biggest party in parliament, the Conservatives, consequently entered into coalition with the Liberal Democrats, a coalition that had a noxious effect on Liberal Democrat popularity (whilst the party used to be the third biggest, recently they were polling as low as the single digits). During the 2015 general election, the Liberal Democrats appeared to be attempting to put political space between themselves and their Conservative coalition partners, a political strategy which perhaps explains this headline in *The Guardian* (2015) newspaper (you will recall that George Osborne is the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer): 'Nick Clegg: George Osborne is a very dangerous man.' Here are some responses to the headline that I have taken from the social media website, *Facebook*:

1. Yeh, Nick, a lot of us had already guessed this.
2. Oh really, Nick. You've only just worked this out have you?
3. Five years out of date.

It is clear from all three responses that the authors of these comments agree – they think Osborne *is* a dangerous man – but rather than favourably disposing them to Clegg, the headline instead confirms their negative attitude to the Deputy Prime Minister. Their background knowledge of Clegg overshadows any sense that they have anything in common with him. In fact, Clegg's late realisation of the danger that Osborne poses widens the ideological distance between the authors of these comments and the Liberal Democrat leader because he should have realised sooner, before going into coalition with the Conservatives. Although Clegg himself does not make his coalition with the Conservatives relevant – there is no mention of it in the headline quote – it is such a salient feature of these authors' character schemata that it becomes a relevant basis for the dismissal of his remarks. The attitudes encoded in their NICK CLEGG character schemata mean that *anything*

Clegg says – even if it expresses a sentiment with which they agree – is dismissed out of hand.

Of course, politicians are often aware of the salient information held about them in the audience's character schema and can make it relevant in the course of the discourse. This has obvious benefits in the case of a speaker who is known for having done something of particular merit, or who, in the eyes of the audience, has an excellent record on a particular issue. But speakers can also make less popular parts of their character schema relevant in the hope of directly tackling negative audience perceptions. Below is another example from Nick Clegg, taken from the television debates in the run-up to the 2015 general election discussed in Chapter 2. The 'issue of tuition fees' to which Clegg refers is the reversal of his party's policy on the university funding system. Before coalition, the Liberal Democrat policy had been to fund higher education through general taxation and to get rid of the tuition fees introduced by the previous Labour government. However, when the Liberal Democrats entered government – with a large student support base – they reversed this policy and supported Conservative calls to raise the cap on tuition fees to £9000 per year.

Let me take the issue of tuition fees head-on. I, of course, famously – infamously – couldn't put into practice my party's policy on tuition fees, for reasons which I hope you're familiar with. They were introduced by Labour and actually jacked-up by Labour and there was no money left. But we did the next best thing and got the fairest deal possible and thankfully, now, there are more young people going to university than ever before.
(*ITV News*, 2015b)

Whilst one might expect politicians to play up their popular policies, Clegg is here highlighting a negative aspect of the audience's character schema of him, a controversial aspect of his political history that his use of the term 'infamous' clearly acknowledges. However, he uses his platform in the debate to reframe that particular political decision, explaining that he 'couldn't put into practice [his] party's policy on tuition fees'. Clegg also describes the causes of the Liberal Democrat U-turn on tuition fees as 'reasons I hope you're familiar with'. The use of this noun phrase acts as a tacit indication of common ground with the audience; it presupposes that Clegg's reasons are the same as the audience's reasons. Before explaining that 'there was no money left [to fund the abolition of tuition fees]', he then takes the opportunity to point out that it was Labour, not the Liberal Democrats, who introduced the fees in the first place. This all represents an attempt to recalibrate – to 'refresh' (Clark, 1994) – the audience's character schema of Clegg so that the interests of his party are aligned with the interests of the audience. According to this model, were it not for the Labour Party and, presumably, the Conservatives, there would be no tuition fees. There is no definitive way of addressing the success

of making overtly relevant Clegg's record on tuition fees and tackling it 'head-on', but research commissioned by *The Telegraph* (2015) at the same time as the debates reveals that users of the social media site, *Twitter*, were not impressed; the research found that at this moment Clegg had his second most number of negative tweets in the whole debate.

Character schemata are formed of what the audience member knows about the speaker already. Often this knowledge will come second-hand from things audience members have heard or read, but it is also based on previous linguistic encounters they may have had with the speaker. If a character schema is formed in response to the language used by a speaker, it is sensible to assume that the speaker's habitual linguistic style will constitute part of the audience's long-term mental representation of that speaker. Linguistic knowledge of the orator's habitual style is consequently an important aspect of the character schema audience members create to represent speakers. Deviations from the speaker's habitual style are therefore likely to affect their ethos in audience reception. A speech by George Osborne to a group of supermarket workers is an excellent case in point. Osborne is known to speak in quite a pronounced RP and it is also common knowledge that he is the hereditary heir of a baronetcy and that while he attended the elite Oxford University he was a member of the very exclusive Bullingdon club, an all-male dining club with a very wealthy, privileged membership. In his supermarket address, he caused a minor scandal by haphazardly voicing alveolar plosives that would in his habitual style be voiceless, or pronouncing them as a glottal stop. So, rather than the standard pronunciation of 'British' (/brɪtɪʃ/), Osborne instead said 'Briddish' ([brɪdɪʃ]), and rather than the standard 'get' and 'cut' (/gɜt/ and /kʌt/) he said [gɜʔ] and [kʌʔ]. Throughout the speech, there are also tokens of /h/ dropping; he said 'we've ad a' ([wi:vædə]) rather than the standard 'we've had a' (/wi:v hædə/). These features are stereotyped indices of a London, or South East England working-class identity. Given Osborne's well-known aristocratic background, his use of glottal stops and /h/ dropping were ridiculed by Tom Chivers (2013), writing for *The Telegraph* online:

Every so often, in between his usual clipped sentences, he'd throw in an unexpected glottal stop, or drop a G or an H: "Briddish people badly wannit fixed"; "We're buildin' a benefits system that means ya always bedda off in work"; "twenny three per cent". This isn't how Mr Osborne – or rather, George Gideon Oliver Osborne, heir apparent to the Osborne baronetcy – actually speaks.

Presumably he's had some coaching, in order to grind down some of the crystalline edges of his Received Pronunciation tones. And presumably he's had that coaching because it has been shown that voters prefer regional accents.

There's nothing wrong with any of this, obviously. Margaret Thatcher, as is well known, had voice coaching to take some of the shrillness out of her voice. Blair

himself, an Oxford-educated barrister and former pupil of Fettes College, would probably not naturally have had the estuarine vowels or missing consonants: he must have added them himself. That's all fine. If you think your voice is holding you back, change your voice.

But come on, at least commit to it. That's what sounds so odd with Osborne's odd half-way house: not that he occasionally says "twenny", but that all the other words are entirely untouched, so it's 20 words from a future baronet and then suddenly one from a member of the Mitchell family. I'm afraid it's all or nothing, George. Next time, if you want your Reverse Pygmalion to work, you're going to have to go all in. (Chivers, 2013)

Judging by this particular criticism, the main problem with Osborne's performance is not that it is an affectation but that it is an 'odd half-way house'. The performance model created by Chivers oscillates between a representation of 'a future baronet' and 'a member of the Mitchell family' (a fictional family in the British soap opera, *Eastenders*, who speak in a broad East London dialect). The performance is not convincing because it is not consistent. However, this is only half an explanation. After all, as Brand's bricolage of standard and non-standard London features and Leith's (2010) response to it demonstrates, inconsistent performances are not always received in a negative fashion. Whereas in the last section Brand's inconsistent performance style is licensed by inconsistencies in his habitual style – Brand is well known to combine multiple linguistic and non-linguistic style indices to create his 'Dickensian', dandyish persona – Osborne's own bricolage of RP features, glottal stops, /t/ voicing and /h/ dropping is not ratified because it clashes with his usually 'crystalline' RP. The performance model triggered by these mixed indices is both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with Chivers' GEORGE OSBORNE character schema. The ideological claim Osborne makes in deploying them is consequently not credible and is therefore seen as an unacceptable affectation. Indeed, whilst Chivers is relatively tolerant of politicians who "put on" an accent that is not their own, journalists who are unsympathetic to Osborne might well report this as a clumsy and cynical attempt by Osborne to ingratiate himself with an audience with whom he in all probability had very little life experiences in common.

What is crucial, then, in the reception of a performance style and its associated performance model is its relationship to an already established habitual style and character schema. In situations where the habitual and performance styles of the speaker do not cohere, it is likely that audience members will seek reasons for the discrepancy. Such changes in linguistics behaviour are not always attributed to the speaker, but to other external factors. It is for this reason that the search for the motivational drivers of a performance style is intimately connected to not only the speaker's ethos, but also the ethos of the narrator, the orchestrators and the implied author of the speech. In the next section, these different layers of ethos are integrated into the socio-cognitive model outlined thus far.

3.7 Reading political minds

As has been repeatedly stressed, audiences do not passively “consume” the speeches to which they listen. Indeed, the data outlined at the beginning of Chapter 2 demonstrates that the majority (of British people, at least) look on the speech of politicians with quite a significant amount of scepticism, even cynicism. When we listen to political speeches, we often think to ourselves about the motivation behind the speech – why is it that this particular politician is speaking as they are on this particular occasion and how does it compare to our expectations of what they might say? The answers we provide to such questions comprise our attempts to “read” the mind of the speaker, to piece together why they behave in the way they do. This capacity for mindreading is not a special, superhuman ability (indeed, in their early seminal paper, Premack and Woodruff, 1978, identify it in primates) but just one of the conceptual feats we achieve in the course of our everyday lives (although, see Baron-Cohen, 1995). We use our ‘theory of mind’ (ToM – for an overview, see Apperly, 2012) whenever we engage in social interaction to read the mind of our interlocutor. It is easy to guess, without being told explicitly, that a speaker is angry if their eyes are wide and their voice is raised, or that they are happy if they are smiling. These are small acts of mind reading that are all possible because of our capacity to infer cognitive states from verbal and non-verbal cues and what we know about human behaviour more generally. We use these cues to ‘model’ the minds of the people with whom we communicate (Stockwell, 2009: 141). Within ToM research, there are two main theoretical frameworks: ‘Theory theory’, and ‘Simulation theory’ (the literature is extensive, but for an outline of the various positions taken in these debates, see Carruthers and Smith, 1996). The Theory theory proposes that over time we learn an inventory of propositions or axioms about human behaviour that come to form our “folk” theory of mind, whereas Simulation theory suggests that our theory of mind is based on running a simulation of how we ourselves would behave given the same circumstances. Rather than take a position in favour of either, it suffices to say that our ability to generate an impression of the speaker’s ethos is partly based on this cognitive ability to attribute motivations and emotional states to them.

The question of how audiences make these attributions is complicated by the *layering* of ethos in political discourse outlined in Chapter 2. The speaker and audience are not the only entities ‘present’ in the discourse. Political speeches are often mediated through the lens of a camera. They are subject, therefore, to representation by a narrator and various orchestrators who all have a stake in presenting the speaker in a certain light. In addition to these entities, audiences may also infer that the author of the speech is different from the speaker. The speaker and the way that they are narrated are the most visible tip of a very large iceberg

of backstage political processes and entities for which audience members may well have pre-established character schemata. There is little doubt, then, that audience members attribute motivations and emotional states in the course of listening to a speech, but *to whom* they attribute these states and emotions is a more complex issue. Insights from attribution theory, a branch of social-psychological research dealing with how people explain the behaviour of others, are a useful starting point for untangling this problem.

Attribution theory is not actually a theory at all, but rather a body of research that investigates how we explain the reasons for other people's behaviour (for overviews, see Ames and Mason, 2012; Fiske and Taylor, 2013; Gilbert, 1998). An important distinction in this body of research is that between external and internal attributions. When people explain a social actor's behaviour by recourse to situational factors or external pressures that might have been applied to that social actor, they are making an external attribution. Conversely, if someone were to explain that social actor's behaviour by reference to some dispositional quality, it would be internal. The distinction between the two is important because people tend to provide situational reasons for their failures and dispositional explanations for their successes (Fiske and Taylor, 2013: 172). Thus, blaming internal and external factors can be viewed as a strategy for either exaggerating or mitigating an outcome of behaviour (see Browse, *in press*). So, one example of an external attribution is Nick Clegg's explanation for abandoning the policy of free university tuition; according to Clegg, the Liberal Democrats were stopped by their coalition partners, the Conservatives, and the state of the public finances. However, a less charitable internal attribution might be that the Liberal Democrats were too weak to stand up to them, or that they cast off their political principles by entering into coalition with the Conservatives in the first place. One would expect audiences that were sympathetic to Clegg and the Liberal Democrats to blame the circumstances – being blocked by the Conservatives, the economy being in too poor a state – for the U-turn on tuition fees, whereas one would expect audiences whose character schema encodes a hostile attitude towards Clegg to favour internal attributions – that Clegg and the Liberal Democrats were weak or unprincipled.

The distinction between external and internal causes is reflected in the layered account of ethos offered in Chapter 2. Internal attributions are those which identify the speaker as responsible for what they say and how they speak, whereas external attributions are those in which the narrator, orchestrators or implied author are deemed accountable. Returning to George Osborne's speech to Sainsbury's workers (see Section 3.6), there are several instances of newspapers making an internal attribution to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in order to explain the changes in his linguistic behaviour:

As the shaky delivery of his latest Budget suggested, he really has lost his old boundless self-confidence. Wanting to sound like your audience is the classic mark of someone craving acceptance. (Engel, 2013, for *The Financial Times*)

But within moments of the Chancellor opening his mouth yesterday, many observers believed he had taken his desire to be man of the people too far. (Masters, 2013, for *The Independent*)

If he's seeking to project a 'man of the people' persona, he's failed.
(Joslin, quoted in Ensor, 2013, for *The Telegraph*)

In all three of these examples, the writers attempt to 'mind model' (Stockwell, 2009: 141) George Osborne by attributing mental states to him. He is accused of 'wanting', 'craving', 'desiring' and 'seeking' to project a specific identity – to be like the audience or a 'man of the people' (see Browse, in press, for a more detailed discussion of the stylistics of political "mind reading"). These explanations for Osborne's deviant performance style locate the cause for the changed linguistic behaviour with Osborne; the difference between his habitual style and his performance style is attributed to his own desires. However, other attributions are possible. Victoria Coren (2013), writing in *The Guardian*, suggests that 'he's noticed that people laugh at him for being a toff and he's felt stung. He's self-conscious'. She continues:

Standing up in front of a crowd of supermarket workers, at least half of whom he probably fears are manlier than he is – he bets they can do stuff like plumbing and sexy vest-wearing – he's tried to rub the edges off. (Coren, 2013)

The external cause of Osborne's behaviour, according to this account, is the public opprobrium he (presumably, unfairly) receives for being effeminate (Coren, 2013, says he fears his audience are 'manlier than he is') or appearing to be out of touch with ordinary people because of his 'crystalline' RP accent. Osborne's performance style is thus attributed to pressure from his audience. In terms of the layering of ethos, this is best dealt with in terms of orchestration. The audience, in this instance, can be viewed as a form of orchestrator who applies political pressure so as to influence aspects of the narration – in this instance the aspect of the narration that Chatman (1990) calls the performance. Rather than attribute his changed linguistic behaviour to Osborne himself, then, it is instead attributed to a secondary orchestrator – the audience – who (according to Coren, 2013, at least) act as a pressure on him. Responsibility for the performance style is thus passed up to the next layer of ethos, the level of narration and orchestration, and the potential accusation of inauthenticity that other newspapers level at the Chancellor of the Exchequer is therefore mitigated; that his performance style on this occasion is so obviously an affectation is not his fault, but the fault of those who 'laugh at him for being a toff'.

It is also possible for audiences to attribute the speaker's performance style to an implied author. As was argued in Chapter 2, given its ubiquity in Labour Party spoken and written discourse, audiences could safely assume that when Labour party politicians used the phrase 'cutting too far and too fast' the author of the phrase was probably not the speaker. In addition to attributing responsibility for grammar, phrase and word choices to an implied author, it is also clear that some audience members attribute the phonological properties of the speaker's performance to an implied author as well. Indeed, Tom Chivers' (2013) remarks in *The Telegraph* about Osborne's use of non-standard features are very interesting in this regard. Chivers is clearly aware that politicians' speech styles are jointly authored by the politicians themselves, their regular staff, and their communications consultants; he cites two British premiers, Tony Blair and Margaret Thatcher, who received vocal training to change their accent and vocal quality in some way. He also seems very relaxed about this, saying that 'there's nothing wrong with any of this, obviously'. The author Chivers constructs for the non-standard features – the person he holds responsible for them – is both the MP and his 'presumed' vocal coaches. Despite this acknowledgement, his criticisms of the glottal stops and voiced alveolar plosives in the speech are levelled specifically at Osborne on account of the 'bad' performance he gives. So, although he attributes the existence of the non-standard variables to both the politician and external causes – the vocal coaches – his attribution for what he perceives as the failure of the speech – that it is an 'odd half-way house' – is nonetheless an internal one; Osborne is at fault not because his use of glottal stops and voiced alveolar plosives are an affectation, but because he lacks the linguistic skill necessary to integrate the non-standard variables into his performance style successfully.

A speaker's changed linguistic behaviour is capable of reflecting as much on the narrator, orchestrators or implied author as it is the speaker. Audience members, then, are capable of quite complex attributions for differences in the habitual and performance styles of the speaker, and the clashes in character schemata and performance models this engenders. This process of attribution is summarised in Figure 3.1. The top layer of the diagram represents the conceptual processes involved in the construction of speaker-ethos. The audience member's performance model is assessed against their character schema for that speaker (hence the line going from the character schema to the performance model). If there are no discrepancies between these conceptual structures, the audience member will make an attribution based on what they already know about the speaker; 'x is saying y in accordance with being z'. The audience member's character schema for that speaker is consequently preserved (Cook, 1994). If there are discrepancies between the performance model and the character schema, following Fiske et al. (1987) and Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) model, one might first expect an attempt




Figure 3.1 The conceptual ecology of ethos

to integrate those discrepancies into the existing character schema in a way that confirms the already encoded impression of the speaker. The attribution amounts to a broadening of the evidence base for that impression; 'x does not usually say y, but that they are confirms that they are z'. This is schema reinforcement (Cook, 1994). Finally, it may be impossible for audience members to integrate this new performance model into the character schema whilst maintaining an attribution that is consistent with the existing character schema, in which case the character schema is likely to be updated to include this new information; 'x is saying y, and for that reason they cannot be, as I had always assumed, z'. This is character schema refreshment (Cook, 1994). It is possible that changes in linguistic behaviour are attributed to either the narrator/orchestrators or the implied author of the speech. This is reflected in the diagram by the arrows that move from the performance model to either an attribution on the level of the narrator/orchestrators or the implied author. When the speaker's changed linguistic behaviour is attributed to either of these entities, the character schema that is preserved, reinforced or refreshed is both the speaker's *and* the narrator's or the implied author's. The conjunction 'and' is used here because the layers of ethos in the discourse are relational, which is to say that the narrator's and implied author's ethos is – as was argued in Chapter 2 – expressed as an attitude to the speaker. We understand the ethical and ideological locus of the narrator insofar as this entity passes commentary on the subject of their narration, the speaker. Similarly, we understand the ethical and ideological locus of the implied author insofar as it expresses some comment on the relationship between the narrator and the speaker. An attribution

made to the next level up in the three layers of ethos therefore necessarily impacts upon the entire conceptual ecology of ethos triggered by the performance of the speaker – the network of conceptual models and processes comprising ethos in reception. So, in the Cassetteboy *YouTube* video discussed in Chapter 2, Cameron's deviation from his habitual style – that he raps and uses taboo language in the video – is attributed to the egregiously unreliable narrator. For those familiar with the oeuvre, this has the direct effect of preserving the character schema of the Cassetteboy narrator. However, the video is also a hostile comment *about* David Cameron. It therefore updates the audience's DAVID CAMERON character schema in just the way reading about Cameron in the newspapers would. This is irrespective of whether or not the audience agrees with the criticism embedded in the video. Character schemata include knowledge about the in and out-groups to which the speaker belongs. That Cassetteboy is an enemy of Cameron – a member of the video's out-group – is another piece of knowledge to be integrated into audience's DAVID CAMERON character schema. The network of conceptual models outlined in Figure 3.1 are therefore properly understood in relation to one another, which is why the term 'ecology' is here used to refer to them collectively; a change in one leads to a reconfiguration of the rest. It is in the interaction of the conceptual models comprising this ecology that the ethos of the speaker in audience reception emerges.

3.8 Summary

This chapter has offered an account of the socio-cognitive dynamics of speaker ethos in audience reception. Speakers possess habitual and performance styles which consist of phonological, morphological, lexical, grammatical, and discourse-level linguistic indices. These styles form the linguistic basis for the character schemata and performance models of the speaker in audience cognition, providing cues for the creation of these mental representations. Performance models rely on our ability to select and integrate the indexical meanings of linguistic variables into an overarching representation of a speaker on a specific occasion of discourse. Conversely, character schemata are the product of our ability to identify patterns in the behaviour of a speaker across multiple events of discourse. The reception of a performance model is framed by the pre-existing character schema audiences possess of the speaker; the relationship between these conceptual models is therefore vital to the success or failure of the speaker's appeal to ethos in audience reception. Deviations from the schema expectations encoded in the audiences' character schema for the speaker are likely to require explanation, with audiences attempting to "read" the mind of the speaker to establish the motive behind the

changes in linguistic behaviour. Audiences may attribute this deviation to the speaker's own nefarious or virtuous aims and wishes, or they may "pass up" the attribution to another layer of the discourse – the level of narration/orchestration, or the level of authorship. It is out of the interaction of these conceptual models and levels of discourse, then, that the appeal to ethos emerges in audience reception. A socio-cognitive approach thus engenders a distributed view of ethos; the rhetorical appeal is spread across a network of entities – the speaker, narrator/orchestrators and implied author – and the ethos of each is contingent on their relation to one another and the character schemata and performance models associated with each. Throughout this chapter and the last, the active role that audiences play in constructing an image of the speaker has been emphasised – ethos in reception is a function of the knowledge structures and conceptual processes brought to bear by the audience member in their engagement with the discourse. The next two chapters continue this emphasis on the active audience, focussing instead on the rhetorical appeal to logos.

PART II

Logos

Logos as representation

4.1 Introduction

On the 17th March, 2003, Robin Cook MP – a senior figure in the Labour Party who had once served as foreign secretary – resigned from the Labour government frontbench. In a much acclaimed speech to parliament, he explained that the government's support for war in Iraq meant that he was unable to continue in his senior ministerial position of 'Leader of the House'. In the British parliament, the case for war turned on the existence of a stockpile of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, weapons that UN inspectors were – and are, at the time of writing – unable to find. In the speech, Cook argued that the inspectors should have more time to properly establish if Saddam Hussein, the since deposed leader of Iraq, had access to weapons of mass destruction or not, arguing further:

Nor is it fair to accuse those of us who want longer for inspections of not having an alternative strategy. For four years as foreign secretary I was partly responsible for the Western strategy of containment. Over the past decade, that strategy destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf war, dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme, halted Saddam's medium- and long-range missile programmes. Iraq's military strength is now half the size that it was at the time of the last Gulf war. Ironically, it is only because Iraq's military forces are so weak that we can even contemplate its invasion. Some advocates of conflict claim his forces are now so weak, so demoralised, so badly equipped, that the war will be over in a few days. Mr Speaker, we cannot base our military strategy on the assumption that Saddam is weak and at the same time justify pre-emptive action on the claim that he is a threat.

(Robin Cook MP, HC Deb [2002–3] 401 col.727)

That he was at one time the British foreign secretary positions Cook as an authority on British foreign policy, so this segment of the speech can be interpreted as an appeal to the politician's ethos. Moreover, the successes of the particular multilateral policy of containment over which he presided – it 'destroyed more [Iraqi] weapons than in the Gulf war', 'dismantled Iraq's nuclear weapons programme', and 'halted Saddam's medium- and long-range missile programmes' – suggests that Cook's is a voice in the debate that should be respected. But these assertions do more than simply establish Cook as a highly qualified speaker; they also form a

set of premises on which he builds quite a dense, seemingly logical argument about the merits of military conflict with Iraq. This argument goes something like –

- a. The strategy of containment has worked because Iraq is now weak.
- b. We must all agree that the strategy of containment worked because we all agree that Iraq is now weak.

From this, two things follow:

- c. If we agree that the strategy of containment worked then there is no reason to abandon it (this is never said explicitly by Cook, but it is implied that the ‘alternative strategy’ is the containment strategy)
- d. If we agree that Iraq is weak, it cannot pose a security threat to Britain.

Building on the premise that the previous policy of containment was a success (and, even more damagingly for his opponents, making it clear that they must agree with him too, given their own assessment of the Iraqi military’s strength), Cook both advocates his own multilateral policy of containment (as in c) at the same time as he skewers the policy of his opponents (in d); it cannot be the case that Iraq poses a threat to the national security of Britain if the Iraqi military is as weak as the advocates of war argue. The persuasive strategy he employs here is not an appeal to his own authority – although, as suggested above, such an appeal does play a supporting role – and neither does it appeal to the emotions of the speaker; rather, Cook is making an appeal to reason and the analytical faculties of the audience. In classical rhetoric, such a proof is called an appeal to *logos*.

From the outset, it is important not to confuse an appeal to *logos* with a logical argument. In philosophical logic, sound arguments are those that are based on a true set of premises and lead logically – and necessarily – to a valid conclusion. The classical argument structure, *modus ponens*, is one of many such examples of a valid argument structure. It goes:

If A, then B.

A

Therefore B

Or less abstractly:

- a. If Iraq is weak, the strategy of containment worked.
- b. Iraq is weak.
- c. Therefore, the strategy of containment worked.

The links between the steps in (a–c) are such that if (a) and (b) are correct, (c) must be too. To dispute the soundness of the argument therefore requires a refutation of these premises.

Argument structures like *modus ponens* are what classical philosophers, such as Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1356a), called syllogisms. Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1357a) notes, however, that unlike the clear and logically structured syllogisms of philosophers, orators very rarely spell out the premises on which their appeals to logos are founded. Take this excerpt from a parliamentary speech by Diane Abbott (a politician discussed at some length in Chapter 2). Abbott is speaking against a proposal tabled in 2008 to grant police the power to hold terrorism suspects without charge for 42 days.

I became active in politics in the 1980s, at a time of enormous turmoil – there were riots in Brixton, Liverpool and Bristol, “Scrap sus” was a huge issue and young black men were seen as the enemy within, just as young Muslim men are today. I came into politics because of my concern about the relationship of the state to communities that are marginalised and suspected. It is easy to stand up for the civil liberties of our friends or of people in our trade union, but it is not easy to stand up for the civil liberties of people who are unpopular, suspected and look suspicious – people the tabloids print a horror story about every day. However, it is a test of Parliament that we are willing to stand up for the civil liberties of the marginalised, the suspect and the unpopular.

(Diane Abbott MP, HC Deb (2007–8) 478 col.382)

Abbott’s argument is a commonplace in liberal discourses on human rights. The first underlying premise of this section of the speech is that defending human rights means defending the human rights of everyone, even unpopular groups of people or those with whom one might vehemently disagree. A second underlying premise of the argument is that it is unethical to proclaim support for human rights, but abandon that position in the face of populist political pressure. Indeed, just as the first unstated premise was a political commonplace in liberal forms of human rights discourse, this second premise – which is in essence an injunction against hypocrisy – is an ethical commonplace. Abbott’s argument, then, draws on two unstated premises which are “common sense” propositions of political and ethical debate (in liberal political ideologies, at least). Such an implicit argument structure differs from the explicit, rigid, repetitive lines of logical syllogism in which all the premises of the argument are listed. To differentiate the syllogistic arguments of logic from the more oblique or “fuzzy” arguments from logos, Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1356b) terms the latter *enthymemes*.

The primary concern of this chapter is to ask what a cognitive rhetorical approach to analysing the enthymeme might look like and to outline what such an approach adds to the analysis of argument in audiences’ reception of political discourse. Its key contention is that the success of an enthymeme is intimately connected to the ways in which the speaker chooses to represent the world around them. All enthymemes presuppose a series of unstated premises and are thus built

on a tacit representation of the context in which the orator performs (c.f. Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 86). The appeal to logos therefore relies on a basic human cognitive ability: the ability to create mental representations of the real and hypothetically postulated contexts in which the discourse takes place. In this chapter, then, the appeal to logos is seen as closely connected to representation and the ‘information structure and content of the text’ (Stockwell, 2009: 166). It consequently focuses on how discourse participants create mental models of the states of affairs described in the discourse, how the language used by the orator construes this conceptual content, and how audiences might “resist” the enthymeme proffered by the speaker on the basis of rejecting this construal or the background knowledge it presupposes.

4.2 Common ground and the enthymeme

Valid arguments stand or fall on the basis of their premises. A premise is some fact about the world – a proposition that we can accept as either true or false. Premises, then, relate to what we know about the world – to knowledge. To understand how argument works in political discourse, it is therefore necessary to adopt a perspective that is capable of describing the relationship between the knowledge possessed by language users and the discourse in which they participate. By far the most developed grammar for describing the cognitive processes involved in discourse is Text World Theory (TWT, see Gavins, 2007, Werth, 1999). An important notion in TWT’s account of the interrelation between discourse and discourse participant knowledge is Common Ground. As is argued below, it is also fundamental to any cognitive account of logos and the enthymeme.

In TWT, Common Ground can be defined as the shared conceptual context in which the discourse participants operate. Werth (1993) writes:

The context of a discourse... cannot merely be verbal context ... but must also include, at least potentially, the extralinguistic situation and some subset of the knowledge of those taking part. From this point of view... a proposition, when processed, is either present in the Common Ground of the discourse... or it is absent. If already present, it represents backgrounded (or ‘given’) information, unless contrasted (in which case, it must tie in with some given information). If it is absent from the [Common Ground], it represents information which, by being present in an utterance, is being negotiated for inclusion in the [Common Ground] (often called ‘new’ information). Backgrounded information is guaranteed in the text world of the discourse (whatever its status in the speech event in which the discourse is formulated). Negotiated information remains to be accepted in the text world: indeed, the process of negotiation, which, if successful results in incrementation into the [Common Ground], is arguably the central motive for

engaging in discourse at all. Most propositional discourse, that is to say, is entered into for the express purpose of achieving as much homogeneity as possible between the text world representations of the individuals communicating.

(Werth 1993: 41)

From this perspective, discourse is a process in which the contributions of discourse participants contain some knowledge that might be expressed as a proposition. Once a proposition is accepted by all discourse participants it is incremented into the Common Ground; it becomes backgrounded information which is used by participants to construct a mental model of the events or situation being described by the speaker or writer. These text-driven mental models are called text-worlds. As the 'world' metaphor suggests, text-worlds are deictic spaces, the parameters of which are set by 'world-building elements' such as time, location, and the people and entities present in the text-world (Gavins, 2007: Chapter 3). Text-worlds are also dynamic spaces. As the discourse proceeds more knowledge is incremented into the Common Ground. The text-worlds discourse participants create are consequently updated. Indeed, during this process of incrementing more knowledge into the Common Ground, the deictic parameters of the text-world are likely to change (Gavins, 2007: 45–50). It might be that the time of the events described changes, or that the location changes; the person speaking or writing might cast some doubt on the veracity of the events they narrate, or they might describe events that ought to happen, or that they wish were happening; more drastically, the speaker or writer may adopt a different persona and narrate events from another perspective. In TWT, these changes in time, space, modality and perspective create new text-world representations in the minds of discourse participants (for detailed discussion, see Gavins, 2005, and Gavins 2007: Chapter 6–8). The movement between these worlds of different ontological and epistemological status is called a world-switch. The incrementation of new knowledge into the Common Ground of discourse therefore results in the creation of complex and continually updating networks of text-worlds, enmeshed in a web of ontological and epistemological interdependencies. TWT provides analysts with a descriptive framework for tracking these conceptual spaces and a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between knowledge and discourse.

The relationship Werth (1993, 1999) describes between knowledge and discourse, via the notion of Common Ground, is quite easily mapped onto the foregoing discussion of logos. If the premises of an argument are propositions that discourse participants can either accept or reject as true or false, then the Common Ground Werth (1993) describes can be reframed as a bank of propositions, built up throughout the discourse, which participants accept to be true. The setting down of premises in discourse can thus be conceived of as a form of world-building, or, put slightly differently, to make their appeal to logos speakers must *construct* a text-world in which their argument is true. The extract from Cook's speech on the

Iraq war is a good example of this world-building in action. Before pointing to the logical inconsistency in arguing that Saddam is both a threat but also very weak, the politician makes a number of assertions that provide a context for this line of reasoning; he “sets the scene”, so to speak. This scene-setting begins with the utterance ‘for four years as foreign secretary I was partly responsible for the Western strategy of containment’. In TWT terms, this engenders a world-switch from the present (in which his opponents accuse him of not having an alternative strategy) to a text-world representation of a past enactor of Cook who, ten years before, was partly responsible for the Western strategy of containment. Cook then summarises the intervening ten years in which the strategy ‘destroyed more weapons than in the Gulf war, dismantled Iraq’s nuclear weapons programme, [and] halted Saddam’s medium- and long-range missile programmes’. Discourse participants then switch to a text-world in the present (signalled by the adverbial ‘now’ and present tense form of the verb ‘to be’) in which ‘Iraq’s military strength is... half the size that it was at the time of the last Gulf war’. These text-worlds represent a version of reality in which Cook’s argument is valid. In making his argument, then, Cook is not simply making a set of logical inferences; he is also proffering a text-world representation of reality in which those inferences hold.

4.3 Mind modelling and the Idealised Common Ground

Cook’s argument is that in order to think as they do – in order to think that the invasion of Iraq is a viable solution to the threat of Saddam Hussein – his opponents must accept this text-world representation of reality. However, if they accept this representation as accurate, then their own proposal to invade Iraq is defeated, because they are admitting that Cook’s alternative strategy of containment has worked. In this instance, ‘homogeneity... between the text world representations of the individuals communicating’ (Werth, 1993: 41) must result in the antagonistic members of the audience agreeing with him. If these audience members are to continue to disagree with Cook, then, they must find some fault with the way he has represented the history of the situation in Iraq; they must either reject as false some aspect of the Common Ground upon which that text-world representation is built, or reject *the way* in which the knowledge comprising the Common Ground has been incremented into the discourse. This distinction will be revisited in Section 4.4. For now, however, it suffices to say that for resistant audience members to persist in the belief that Cook is wrong means insisting on the heterogeneity between his text-world representations and their own.

To resist Cook’s argument therefore requires that resistant discourse participants hold two mental representations in their mind: their own mental model of the situation in Iraq which they hold as representing the *actual* world and the

text-world representation of Iraq-according-to-Cook. The former mental model is the function of a set of propositions which, prior to the discourse and during the discourse, the resistant audience member holds to be true; the latter is a function of the background knowledge incremented into the discourse by Cook but not accepted by the audience member. This latter knowledge set is here called ‘the Idealised Common Ground’. This term is used because it is the set of shared knowledge that the speaker imputes to their idealised audience. Just as audience members construct an implied author, they also construct an image of the implied reader (Booth, 1961) or audience for the text – the audience the author had in mind when they produced the text. The Idealised Common Ground is the knowledge the author shares with this implied or idealised audience. Like readers of fiction, however, the resistant audience experiences this body of knowledge as a set of propositions for which they suspend their disbelief, using it as the contextual backdrop for a non-actual text-world representing events according to the speaker. Thus, audience members can choose to accept the knowledge incremented by speakers, in which case it forms the Common Ground upon which a shared text-world conception is built; or audience members can reject the knowledge incremented by the speaker, in which case that knowledge forms the Idealised Common Ground upon which the audience member’s apprehension of the-world-according-to-the-speaker is constructed. This process of incrementing knowledge has been represented in Figure 4.1. Although it is not an integral feature of the model, the circle representing the Actual Common Ground is smaller than that representing the Idealised Common Ground because people tend to over-estimate the degree of overlap between their own opinions and the population at large (for an overview, see Marks and Miller, 1987, on the ‘false consensus effect’).




Figure 4.1 The Idealised Common Ground

To illustrate and explore this model further, it is worth examining some data from a study designed to explore how readers construct “resistant” readings of texts. The text in question was a speech by the Conservative MP and then Home Secretary, Theresa May, on immigration (see Appendix B). It was delivered to the 2015 Conservative Party Conference. Participants were shown a paragraph of the speech on a computer screen. After they had read the paragraph, they were asked to write their immediate comments in a box at the bottom of the screen. They would then press the “next” button to take them to the next paragraph, working through the speech until they had commented on all sixteen paragraphs (for discussion of this method, see Norledge, 2016). Sixteen participants were recruited in total, yielding 256 comments altogether. Participants were recruited online from groups on the social media site, *Facebook*, which were all opposed to the Conservative Party in some way. All sixteen participants were consequently strongly opposed to the message contained in the speech. Interestingly, they often reconstructed or summarised the contents of the speech as a way of framing their objections to it. Here are some examples:

- (1) Sounds like *we are the victims and under threat* rather than those who are fleeing violence and destruction in fear of their lives and *we are ‘powerless to resist’ them*. (Participant 12 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (2) *Anybody who can’t clearly demonstrate they’re refugees must be refused entry in Britain because the country is full-up* (“there is a limit”), a claim made to seem obvious. (Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (3) *Its these people coming into our country stretching aervices* instead of deliberate policy to dismantle the state. (Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (4) Builds on the last paragraph to reinforce the point that *it’s economically impossible to cope with the current immigration rate – the costs must outweigh the economic benefits. Numbers must therefore be reduced* but carefully avoiding saying to what level. (Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (5) Again *people fleeing poverty are not worthy and we are not responsible for their condition*. (Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 14)

The italicised sections of these comments all in some way reconstruct or re-express May’s proffered representation of immigration into Britain (these are all my emphases). In (1), she is said to make it sound like ‘we are the victims and under threat’; (2) rephrases the argument as ‘anybody who can’t clearly demonstrate they’re refugees must be refused entry in Britain because the country is full-up’; similarly, in (4), Participant 15 once again summarises the argument, ‘it’s economically impossible to cope with the current immigration rate – the costs must outweigh the economic benefits. Numbers must therefore be reduced’

(indeed, half of all Participant 15's comments use this strategy of rephrasing or summarising the contents of the speech to frame a response); (3) re-represents May's characterisation of the situation as 'Its these people coming into our country stretching services'; and (5) re-expresses the argument as 'people fleeing poverty are not worthy and we are not responsible for their condition'. Interestingly, after providing an initial summary, the respondents often compare or juxtapose it with their own view. So, (1) compares the representation proffered in the speech with the view that it is actually 'those who are fleeing violence and destruction [who are] in fear of their lives'; (3) suggests that it is a 'deliberate policy to dismantle the state' that is stretching services, rather than 'these people coming into our country'; and (4) does not offer an alternative view but critiques the conference address by saying that she 'carefully [avoids] saying to what level [numbers should be reduced]'. What is going on in these responses, then, is a re-representation of May's worldview (what in Figure 4.1 is called 'the proffered text-world') which is sometimes juxtaposed or compared with the audience member's own conception ('the audience's representation of the actual world').

Another way of talking about this re-representation of May's perspective is to say that the respondents are modelling what it is she thinks about the crisis on the basis of what she increments into the Idealised Common Ground – a Common Ground not shared by the respondents. In this respect, the repetition of the argument in the speech in (1–5) can be viewed as a form of mind-modelling; participants are reconstructing the-world-according-to-speaker, and then comparing it to their own conception of immigration into Britain. From this perspective, the Idealised Common Ground constitutes the participant's Theory of Mind (Apperly, 2012; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack and Woodruff, 1978) for May and the idealised audience – a catalogue of propositions that she is thought by participants to believe. However, to make matters more complicated, respondents at times seem to doubt whether or not the Home Secretary, herself, *does* believe what she says. For instance:

- (6) Deliberately conflates four images – refugees fleeing Syria, EU removing borders and then being forced to “resurrect them”, economic migrants and refugees and a “great age of migration” threatening to undermine civilisation (“governments powerless to resist”). Clever but very sinister.
(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (7) Lip service. (Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (8) This is insidious bollocks. The reason that schools and hospitals and housing are struggling to cope is nothing at all to do with immigration and everything to do with post 2007 economic policy. This makes me angry. She's lying.
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 3)

- (9) We must treat migrants and refugees less favourably and keep them in lower poverty than uk nationals to hide our failed policies avoid gov human right responsibilities and pass on the blame.

(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 11)

- (10) I don't believe this. I think she's lying.

(Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 5)

In (6), May is said to 'deliberately' conflate four images, suggesting that Participant 15 doubts whether she is actually committed to the representation(s) she proffers. Indeed, their comment 'clever but very sinister' further suggests that they doubt her sincerity. In (7), use of the term 'lip service' suggests that Participant 10 is less than convinced she believes what she says. In (8), Participant 2 suggests quite emphatically ('this is insidious bollocks') that the Home Secretary is 'lying' in a cynical attempt to blame the failures of government economic policy on immigration, an argument that is also taken up in (9). Finally, in (10), she is once again accused of lying. One way in which participants resist the text-world representation of immigration proffered to them by Theresa May, then, is simply to disbelieve what she says. In such instances, participants either reject what she says outright, or, when evidence is offered for an assertion, they demand more:

- (11) Where's the evidence to support these assertions?

(Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 3)

- (12) These claims need to be backed up with evidence. Does Teresa really know anything about people on low paid jobs? Probably not.

(Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 3)

- (13) Selected reporting of studies to endorse a position.

(Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 5)

- (14) Not sure whether the figures are correct or not, no way of knowing.

(Participant 5 commenting on Paragraph 6)

- (15) I do not think the £10,000 figure is a correct figure – that will not be for a single worker – it will be maybe what a family get.

(Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 10)

All the responses in (11–15) deny May's claims by either flatly rejecting the validity of the evidence offered to support them or suggesting that this evidence is not sufficient on its own. This is tantamount to an outright rejection of the "knowledge" she is trying to integrate into the Common Ground of the discourse (scare quotes are used, here, because what one participant 'knows' in this context is relative to them. Indeed, it is precisely because the other participants in the discourse do not accept this as knowledge, but rather opinion – and incorrect opinion at that – that it is not integrated into the Common Ground).

Importantly, in (8) and (9) scepticism about May's commitment to the truth of her political message is complemented by explanations for why she might be lying. Participants 2 and 16 both suggest that she is using immigration to distract the audience's attention from what is a failure of government policy. Her representation of immigration is perceived by these participants as part of a political strategy. Though not as explicit in their description of such a strategy, other participants make similar observations, making reference to 'divide and rule' tactics (Participant 9, Paragraphs 2 and 4) and 'scaremongering' (Participant 10, Paragraph 1; Participant 6, Paragraphs 1 and 15). Several cast doubt on the sincerity of the Home Secretary's apparent concern for those on low wages, given their perception of the Conservative Party economic record (Participant 11, Paragraph 3; Participant 9, Paragraph 3; Participant 8, Paragraph 3; Participant 6, Paragraph 3). This is mind-modelling of the type discussed in Chapter 3 – the inconsistency in this context between the participants' performance model and character schema for May originates in a clash between the apparent concern she exhibits for those on low incomes in the text-world representation of the speech, and respondents' long-term perceptions of the Conservative Party and its attitude to poverty. The effect of this failure of ethos is to cast doubt on the premises of the argument she is attempting to construct. The argument from logos fails because of a failure – for these respondents, at least – of ethos.

This amounts to a meta-level of representation in participants' ToM for May; if she does not believe what she says, it *is* what she would like her audience to believe. The notion of an Idealised Common Ground usefully captures this distinction because it models the knowledge which is accepted and incremented into the Common Ground by an ideal audience member. Crucially, the speaker themselves might be ambivalently committed to the propositional content they proffer. For these duplicitous speakers, their ideal audience member is a dupe. One can envisage, then, a cynical speech situation in which speakers do not believe what they say and audience members doubt their sincerity (indeed, given the figures quoted at the beginning of Chapter 2, such a perception of politics is probably quite normal). The point is that to maintain the pretence of honest communication requires that participants on both sides of the interaction model an (Ideal) Common Ground for an idealised interaction in which everyone believes what they are saying and what they are being told. Both cynical speakers and sceptical audience members, then, need to model the minds of an idealised audience that believes the speaker. The Idealised Common Ground is the outcome of that mind-modelling.

4.4 A (Cognitive) Grammar of Resistance

More interesting, perhaps, than responses that flatly reject the truth of the claims made in the speech are comments such as the one, below. Participant 2 is

responding to a paragraph in which May has used academic research to dismiss the economic benefits of immigration –

I suspect (but don't know for sure) that the research she refers to here, if it says 'close to zero,' could actually be reframed as 'broadly positive.'

(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 5)

This is interesting because Participant 2 does not deny the existence or truth of the research being cited. She does, however, suggest that *the way* in which it is being represented is at fault. If readers can take issue with the truth of the knowledge offered for acceptance into the Common Ground, then, they can also object to *how* knowledge that they accept as true is incremented. The first type of rejection is based on the ontological status of the entities and objects that are supposed to exist in a text-world and therefore relates to its world-building elements – the things that define the ontological and epistemological parameters of the world. The second type of rejection is based on how the conceptual content of the text-world is *construed*.

In Cognitive Grammar, construal relates to the way in which conceptual content is represented. Langacker (2008) defines construal as follows:

An expression's meaning is not just the conceptual content it evokes – equally important is how that content is construed. As part of its conventional semantic value, every symbolic structure construes its content in a certain fashion. It is hard to resist the visual metaphor, where content is likened to a scene and construal to a particular way of viewing it. Importantly, [Cognitive Grammar] does not claim that all meanings are based on space or visual perception, but the visual metaphor does suggest a way to classify the many facets of construal. (Langacker, 2008: 55)

If the text-world is viewed as the metaphorical 'scene', construal relates to how the content of that scene is viewed. Langacker (1987, 2008) identifies four construal phenomena: specificity, focusing, prominence and perspective. The first, specificity, relates to how elaborate or schematic the construal of the conceptual content is. For instance, one might use the quite elaborate nominal 'that beautiful blue vase on the window sill'. Equally, however, one might refer to the vase simply as a 'thing'. The first construal of the vase has a high degree of specificity, being a concrete noun preceded by a demonstrative and modified with two adjectives and a prepositional phrase, whereas the second, 'thing', is a highly schematic noun. Specificity, then, is about the granularity, or level of detail, involved in the construal of the conceptual content.

The second construal phenomenon, focusing, relates to the 'the selection of conceptual content for linguistic presentation' (Langacker, 2008: 57). Over time, discourse participants integrate large amounts of knowledge into the Idealised/Common Ground of the discourse. At any one time only a small proportion of this

knowledge will be in the conceptual “picture”, so to speak; the rest forms the background against which participants create their text-world representations of the text. Focusing, then, is related to the scope of the foregrounded conceptual material. The scope of a conceptual structure is always bounded (Langacker, 2008: 63). For instance, a word like ‘vase’ engenders a spatial scope that is expansive enough to include the vase itself and perhaps a portion of the table (or window sill, in the case of the ‘beautiful blue vase’), but not expansive enough to include the room in which the vase sits, or the house, the street, the city, the country etc. (see Figure 4.2a). We can further differentiate between the maximal and immediate scope of construal. For example, a nominal such as ‘the lip of the vase’ suggests an immediate scope which zooms in on the lip of the vase and a portion of its main body (see Figure 4.2b), whereas the maximal scope of ‘the lip of the vase’ would be that designated in Figure 4.2a.




Figure 4.2 Scope

The third construal phenomenon is prominence. Within the immediate scope of the construed conceptual content, a portion of that content will be particularly prominent. In ‘the lip of the vase’, it is the edge of the vase which is the most salient aspect of the conceptual structure, rather than, say, the small portion of the main body that is included in its immediate scope. In Cognitive Grammar, this prominent area is said to be ‘profiled’. Profiling is an important concept here because it is fundamental to deriving grammatical categories such as verbs and nouns; nouns profile things, whereas verbs profile processes. On a higher level of grammatical organisation, clauses also have a profile. To see how, it is worth considering the ‘billiard ball’ conceptual model, which Langacker (1991: 13, 283) argues underpins the prototypical transitive clause. This model has been diagrammed in Figure 4.3. The prototypical transitive clause has two focal participants; the trajector, who is

the agent and subject of the transitive verb, acts on some object, the landmark. In the billiard ball model, this is conceived as an action chain – a transfer of energy from trajector (tr) to landmark (lm). In a prototypical transitive clause, the trajector is the profiled entity in the action chain (this has been marked in Figure 4.3 by a heavier line around the trajector), the landmark takes a role of secondary prominence, and the immediate scope of the conceptual content constitutes the setting of the action. In a clause such as ‘Sam kicked the ball’, then, of the two focal participants, ‘Sam’ is profiled. Some marked clause structures depart from this profile – for instance, the passive (‘the ball was kicked by Sam’). In these structures, the trajector-landmark alignment remains the same – Sam is transferring some energy down the action chain to the ball – but it is ‘the ball’ that is profiled. Where passives delete the agent of the verb, the trajector disappears from the immediate scope of the construed content altogether.




Figure 4.3 Trajector-landmark alignment

The final construal phenomenon is perspective. Perspective relates to how the conceptual content is ‘scanned’. In Cognitive Grammar there are two types of scanning, ‘summary’ and ‘sequential’ scanning. Summary scanning construes the conceptual content from a static viewpoint. Take the nominal, ‘the ivy on the wall’. To continue the visual metaphor, the ivy is summarily scanned because the conceptual content is construed like a (static) photograph. There are, however, other more dynamic ways of construing this conceptual content. For instance, one might instead say ‘the ivy running up the wall’. The construal here is instead sequential because it unfolds in time – our “gaze”, so to speak, sweeps up the wall, rather than fixing on it (like a film, rather than a picture). We can scale this notion of summary versus sequential scanning up to the clause. All clauses have a verb, and verbs profile processes that unfold in time. Prototypical clauses, then, are sequentially scanned because verbs prototypically profile processes. For example, in ‘Sam kicked the ball’, ‘kicked’ profiles a process – the rapid extension of Sam’s leg and its contact with a physical object, the ball – which unfolds in time. The events

are therefore construed sequentially. It is possible, though, to summarily scan the clausal action-chain by nominalising the verb process. So, the situation described by ‘Sam kicked the ball’, could be re-construed in summary fashion as simply ‘the kick’. The grammar offers two ways of construing the same phenomenon.

Construal is important for the purposes of the argument advanced here because in addition to simply rejecting the knowledge incremented into the Common Ground on which a text-world is built, audience members can choose to reject the construal placed upon it. In their responses, this can often involve audience members re-construing the conceptual content of that text-world in a way that harmonises with their own representation of reality. Sections 4.5–7 provide a discussion of these re-construal processes based on the reader responses to May’s speech.

4.5 Re-specifying and resistant reading

Specification relates to the level of detail in which the conceptual content of the text-world is construed. Re-specification is here defined as the process by which audience members either provide more or less detail to the text-world representation. The most straightforward way in which participants re-specify the speech is in their responses to Paragraph 9. Here is Paragraph 9:

For years, net migration from within the EU was balanced. The number of people coming to the UK was matched by the number of Brits and Europeans moving to other EU countries. In recent years, the figures have become badly unbalanced – partly because our growing economy is creating huge numbers of jobs.

The subject of re-specification for several discourse participants was the nominal group ‘huge numbers of jobs’. These are five of the responses:

- (16) Creating huge jobs? Migrants take jobs as cleaners etc in bad working conditions at low pay that most people would not do. What kinds of jobs are those? (Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 9)
- (17) Our economy is creating huge numbers of part time, zero hours and bogus self employment jobs. Are these really attractive to migrants? (Participant 14 commenting on Paragraph 9)
- (18) Are they 0 hours contract jobs which help the unemployment figures look better? (Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 9)
- (19) Our growing economy is full of zero hours, poorly paid JOBS. (Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 9)
- (20) At McDonalds. In London. (Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 9)

All examples, (16–20), in some way add more detail to the ‘huge numbers of jobs’. In (16), this is done by post-modifying the noun ‘jobs’ (‘as cleaners etc in bad working conditions at low pay that most people would not do’). Indeed, the extensive stacking of three successive prepositional phrases followed by an embedded clause emphasises that Participant 16 thinks May has under-specified the kinds of jobs that have been created. In (17–29), the re-specification takes the form of pre-modification of ‘jobs’. So, in (17), ‘jobs’ is modified by ‘part time, zero hours and bogus self-employment’, in (18) ‘0 hours’, and in (19), ‘zero hours, poorly paid’ (in the UK, zero hours jobs are those in which the contract does not specify a minimum number of hours. They have been heavily criticised for promoting flexibility for the employer at the expense of the worker). In (19), Participant 8 adds further clausal post-modification – ‘which help the unemployment figures look better’. In (20), Participant 3’s comment consists only of post-modification that one can assume should be attached to ‘jobs’ (‘At McDonalds. In London’). As in (16), in (20), the Conservative MP’s under-specification of the ‘huge numbers of jobs’ is further emphasised by the post-modifying prepositional phrases being separated by a full stop. In all these responses, then, participants re-specify the proffered text-world by adding more information to it.

In Paragraph 2, May makes an overt distinction between ‘refugees in desperate need of help’ and ‘economic migrants who simply want to live in a more prosperous society’, arguing that the ‘anti-immigration far right’ and the ‘open borders liberal left’ conflate these two categories. However, many respondents suggest that the way in which she talks about immigrants and refugees in Paragraph 1 makes just this conflation. This is Paragraph 1:

The crisis in Syria sparked a debate this summer not just about foreign policy and military intervention but about refugees and immigration. With more than 430,000 migrants having reached Europe by sea this year, the countries of Europe resurrecting borders they’d once removed, and thousands of people in Calais trying to reach Britain illegally, some people have argued that we’re on the verge of a ‘great age of migration’, in which national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life.

Here are some responses to this paragraph:

- (21) In search of better life does not address that refugees are fleeing in fear of their lives. They are not economic migrants.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (22) Deliberately conflates four images – refugees fleeing Syria, EU removing borders and then being forced to “resurrect them”, economic migrants and refugees and a “great age of migration” threatening to undermine civilisation (“governments powerless to resist”).
(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 1)

- (23) ‘The 430,00 migrants’ – does not suggest or truly represent who these people are – that is that they are people who have made hugely hazardous journeys are fleeing from conflict and destruction in their own countries. ‘National governments are powerless to resist – again the negative first – not that nations are able to welcome.... The better life makes out that all migrants are so called economic migrants and not desperate people fleeing war. (Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (24) Not just a better life, but, more importantly, safety and security. (Participant 5 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (25) They’re not migrants, they’re refugees. Migrants have economic motivators on the whole. Refugees are fleeing persecution, war, famine and other life-threatening situations. Nobody risks their life and their children’s lives for £35 a week. (Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 1)

All five comments take issue with either the Home Secretary’s use of the noun phrase ‘430,000 migrants’ to describe the movement of people across Europe, or the phrase ‘in search of a better life’. In (21), Participant 16 notes that the noun phrase ‘a better life’ does not include the detail that refugees ‘are fleeing in fear of their lives’ and thereby places a more highly specified construal on the conceptual content proffered in the speech. In (22), Participant 15 points out that the language used ‘conflates four images’. Presumably, according to Participant 15, the conflation happens when May speaks of ‘huge numbers of people’. Again, the problem here for Participant 15 is that this is not a precise enough descriptor of the kinds of people coming to Europe. In (23), Participant 5 says that ‘the 430,000 migrants – does not suggest or truly represent who these people are’ and, as in (21), suggests that this characterisation leaves out the crucial detail that they are ‘fleeing from conflict and destruction in their own countries’. Participant 5 continues this theme in (24) by saying that refugees want ‘not just a better life, but, more importantly, safety and security’. The ‘not just... but’ syntactic structure suggests that Participant 5 believes that something is missing from the Conservative politician’s original text-world representation of refugees. In this regard, their re-construal of the refugee situation is thus more highly specified than the construal originally offered by her. Finally, in (25), Participant 3 makes the distinction between migrants and refugees and adds more detail to the representation, again highlighting the fact that refugees ‘are fleeing persecution, war, famine and other life threatening situations’.

Although the majority of comments about the conflation of refugees and migrants appear in the responses to Paragraph 1, they are also peppered throughout participants’ responses to the speech:

- (26) Confusing refugees with economic migrants clouds the issue. There are not “millions of people” desperate to come to the UK for economic reasons. (Participant 3, commenting on Paragraph 2)

- (27) Making migrants into a homogenous group.
(Participant 12, commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (28) The conflation of refugees and EU migrants is irritating.
(Participant 11, commenting on Paragraph 12)

In all these instances, then, respondents object to the way in which May groups refugees and migrants together. Moreover, in (21–25) they re-construe this grouping by making a division between these categories and adding a more highly specified construal of what it means to be a refugee.

4.6 Re-scoping and resistant reading

The scope of a construal relates to how much of the conceptual substrate is in the immediate “viewing frame”. The “on stage” portion of conceptual structure is said to be the immediate scope, whereas the “off stage” portion is the maximum scope. Re-scoping can therefore be understood as the expansion or reduction of the immediate scope of predication. Participant 14 provides an example of an expanded re-scoping in their comments on Paragraph 1.

We are in the middle of a humanitarian crisis not seen since the second world war where families are fleeing death and destruction. We should be helping the human beings involved. (Participant 14 commenting on Paragraph 1)

Participant 14 is here recasting the temporal scope of the situation described in the speech. Rather than focus on ‘this summer’, ‘this year’ or the ‘great age of migration’ into which May suggests we are moving, Participant 14 situates the ‘humanitarian crisis’ in a timeline stretching back all the way to the Second World War. This temporal re-scoping allows Participant 14 to create equivalences between the extraordinary measures that were used to help ‘families... fleeing death and destruction’ in the War, and the measures that they believe should be adopted in response to the contemporary humanitarian crisis. Re-scoping is here a means of drawing comparison between contemporary events and those in the past to legitimate ‘helping the human beings involved’ now.

Re-scoping is also a feature of participants’ comments about Paragraph 3. Here is the section of the speech to which they respond:

Because when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it’s impossible to build a cohesive society. It’s difficult for schools and hospitals and core infrastructure like housing and transport to cope. And we know that for people in low-paid jobs, wages are forced down even further while some people are forced out of work altogether.

At the end of Paragraph 3 there are two passive constructions missing agents, ‘wages are forced down’ and ‘some people are forced out of work altogether’. It is clear from the context that immigration is the agent that does the forcing in each case but the agent deletion removes it (or, even less abstractly, immigrants) from the immediate scope of predication. Similar constructions can be found in Paragraphs 4 and 16 (my emphases):

And there are thousands of *people who have been forced out of the labour market*, still unable to find a job. (Paragraph, 4)

We have to do this for the sake of our society and our public services – and for the sake of the people *whose wages are cut*, and *whose job security is reduced*, when immigration is too high. (Paragraph 16)

In both instances, from the context it is clear that it is immigration or immigrants that ‘force people out of the labour market’, ‘cut wages’ and ‘reduce job security’ and yet in each instance immigration is excluded from the immediate scope of the construal. This may seem like an odd rhetorical strategy for the Home Secretary to adopt; she is, after all, giving what is for all intents and purposes a speech against immigration, so one might think it strange to remove immigration from the immediate scope of her text-world representation of the economic situation. However, she is at pains to separate herself from not only the so-called ‘open-borders liberal left’, but *also* the ‘anti-immigration far right’. The bald, on-record face threatening act of explicitly saying that immigrants force down wages, take British peoples’ jobs and reduce job security is likely to result in her being accused of the same demagoguery as her political opponents on the far-right. Although it is obvious that immigrants are who May blames for the economic ills she lists, then, she uses an indirect strategy to distance herself from those to her political right.

However, it is clear from numerous responses to the speech that participants find it easy to re-scope her proffered construal to see who she blames:

- (29) These bad things are happening but not because of immigrants.
(Participant 13 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (30) blaming the migrants for unemployment in the UK rather than employers, and lack of investment in industry here.
(Participant 12 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (31) Trying to appeal to low paid people as though their low pay is caused by immigration rather than class society using thinly veiled racism to miseducate people about the cause of their poverty.
(Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 3)

- (32) Blame the migrants and refugees for failed government policy.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (33) Again the structural problems of lack of affordable housing, and lack of jobs are blamed on immigrants, rather than the government and its lack of investment in housing and schools.
(Participant 12 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (34) The final sentence is true and down to Tory austerity, not immigration.
(Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (35) the Tories are forcing people out of work thru lack of investment and support for jobs in both the private and public sector.
(Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (36) We take no responsibility for any of those things. it's all migrants and EU fault.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 16)
- (37) Wages are cut and job security is reduced by employers, not by migrant workers.
(Participant 14 commenting on Paragraph 16)
- (38) Wages are cut AND job security is reduced when the government ploughs ahead with the austerity policies it has brought in since the banking crash – is NOT to do with immigration. (Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 16)
- (39) Same as before reinforce that your low wages are caused by immigration.
(Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 16)
- (40) Blaming immigrants again. (Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 16)

That May and the participants in the study all agree that low pay, low job security and unemployment are pressing economic issues establishes a point of connection between their text-world conceptions. When participants re-scope the original comments, they have the option to do so in relation to the conceptual substrate underpinning their own text-world representation or the one underpinning the Home Secretary's (that conceptual substrate being the Idealised Common Ground of the discourse). In all the examples, participants explicitly say that immigrants do not cause the problems that are listed, which suggests that they all re-scope in relation to May's text-world (which is a world in which immigrants do cause those problems) and then compare it to their own representation of immigration. Most participants also describe who they feel *is* responsible for the economic difficulties: 'employers, and lack of investment in industry' (29), 'class society' (31), 'failed government policy' (32), 'the government and its lack of investment in housing and schools' (33), 'Tory austerity' (34), 'the Tories... thru lack of investment and

support for jobs in both the private and public sector' (35), 'employers' (37), and 'austerity policies' (38). In these responses, it is the Conservative government that is described as culpable rather than immigration (or a failure of government policy, such as a failure to invest in public services). Formulations like 'the government, not immigration, are the cause of low wages, low job security and unemployment' (29, 31, 33–35, 37 and 38) all suggests that participants re-scope with respect to both text-world structures – that they re-scope both in relation to the Idealised Common Ground and their own taken-for-true knowledge of immigration and the British economy.

Historically, it has been argued that the passive voice and agent deletion are often used ideologically to mystify the relationships between people, objects and entities (the seminal treatment is Trew's [1979] analysis of the passive voice in newspaper reporting about police violence in apartheid South Africa). However, responses (29–40) suggest that agent deletion can in some situations be a risky rhetorical strategy. Where audience members have their own already well established conceptual models of the situation and events to which a speaker refers, they are able to re-scope the passive so that an agent of their choosing is once more included in the immediate scope of the predication. The "gap", so to speak, in the speaker's proffered text-world representation is filled by the speakers own knowledge (of course, this is only the case for discourse participants who already possess a clear text-world model of the situation being described). This is risky because in the case of hostile audiences – as in the study presently under discussion – the gap is unlikely to be filled in a way that would satisfy the speaker. Indeed, this is the case in examples (29, 31, 33–35, 37 and 38) in which May's own government is indicted for the things she suggests are the fault of immigrants.

4.7 Re-profiling, re-scanning and resistant reading

Profile relates to the relative salience or prominence of different aspects of conceptual structure in the text-world. On the clause-level, it is closely related to trajector-landmark alignment, which is to say that in a prototypical clause, the trajector is profiled. Re-profiling therefore involves challenging or offering an alternative to the profile or trajector-landmark alignment proffered by the speaker, or replacing the profiled element with something else entirely.

One of the best instances of re-profiling in the corpus of responses to the speech is the one beginning the discussion of construal earlier in Section 4.4. Again, this is Participant 2 commenting on the Conservative MP's use of academic research to dispute the positive effects of immigration on the economy:

I suspect (but don't know for sure) that the research she refers to here, if it says 'close to zero', could actually be reframed as 'broadly positive'.

(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 5)

Here, Participant 2 takes issue with the way in which May profiles the effects of immigration on the economy. She had originally said 'at best the net economic and fiscal effect of high immigration is close to zero'. The phrase 'close to zero' profiles the proximity between the (positive) effect of immigration and a baseline, whereas Participant 2's own construal, 'broadly positive', profiles the effects in themselves, without reference to a baseline. The MP's construal, then, places an emphasis on how small the effects are, whereas Participant 2's construal emphasises that those effects are, nonetheless, positive.

Another example of re-profiling can be found in participant responses to Paragraph 3. The Home Secretary begins this paragraph by saying that 'when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it's impossible to build a cohesive society'. Immigration is a process consisting of the movement of immigrants from one country, over a border, to another country. This can be described in terms of the billiard ball model; the immigrants are the trajector moving relative to a – literal – landmark, the border. However, the noun 'immigration' is a form of nominalization and therefore represents that process as a thing. Rather than profile any individual conceptual component (the individual immigrants, their movement, or the border), the noun engenders a summary scan of the trajector-landmark arrangement and consequently profiles the whole process, representing it holistically as an abstract thing. The individual conceptual elements of the scene – the immigrants, their movement, and the border – are backgrounded by this holistic conception. The difference in profile between the word 'immigration' and – for the sake of comparison – 'immigrant' (which profiles only the person moving over the border) has been diagrammed in Figure 4.4. The profile is represented in bold. In the case of 'immigration', all conceptual elements are surrounded by a thick circle to demonstrate that the whole process is conceived in gestalt fashion, rather than focusing on any specific element of the conceptual substrate.

There is evidence to suggest that participants reject this thing-like construal of immigration. Rather than profile the whole process of immigration, respondents often refer specifically to immigrants. So, responses (29, 30, 33, 36, 37 and 40) all refer to 'migrants' or 'immigrants' rather than 'immigration'. Instead of profiling immigration as an abstract thing, these participants choose to profile the most human element of the process – the immigrants themselves. This is what one might expect. Far-right, racist ideologies often dehumanize or emphasise the negative qualities of the group being racially 'othered' (Van Dijk, 2002: 147).




Figure 4.4 The profile of ‘immigrant’ versus ‘immigration’

Conversely, it makes sense for people of an anti-racist, pro-immigration disposition to do the opposite – to humanize immigrants and emphasise the similarities between immigrant communities and their own. Interestingly, both pro- and anti-immigration rhetorical approaches focus on the people involved in immigration. As was argued in the Section 4.6 in the discussion of re-scoping, May is attempting to create political space between herself, the pro-immigration political left *and* the anti-immigration right. Her tendency to talk about immigration as an abstract thing, rather than explicitly attacking immigrants, reflects these political exigencies; she is constructing a “not-too-hot-not-too-cold” rhetoric of immigration that can be differentiated from the far-right by its abstract representation of the process (rather than a negative portrayal of the immigrants themselves) and from the left by its opposition to immigration *tout court*. Whilst she proffers a conception that is anti-immigration, then, it is only indirectly (although, logically) anti-immigrant.

This strategy is further demonstrated by the noun phrase ‘the pace of change’ in the second adverbial clause of Paragraph 3, ‘when the pace of change is too fast’. Once again, a process – a community changing its ethnic makeup – is summarily scanned as a thing, abstract ‘change’. As in the nominalization, ‘immigration’, this construal euphemistically backgrounds the community that is changing and the supposed causes of this change – the arrival of immigrant communities – focusing

instead on the process as a gestalt conception. The conceptual substrate of the ‘pace of change’ nominal group, then, casts immigrants as an undesirable addition to the community, but the abstract, thing-like profile it places on that substrate means that immigrants are never explicitly the target of May’s rhetorical opprobrium (again, even if they are, logically speaking). Interestingly, although none of the participants target this specific phrase in their responses to Paragraph 3, the underlying logic is challenged in Participant 3’s response to Paragraph 6 (in which the number of immigrants coming to the UK are outlined):

I live in an area with a very large BME [Black and minority ethnic] population and I don’t go outside every morning and think to myself, “golly, what a lot of foreigners!”. Mainly because I’m not racist.

(Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 6)

The respondent is here rejecting as racist the idea that large numbers of immigrants are problematic new additions to a community. Although May seemingly attempts to play down her attack on immigrants – instead focusing her criticism on ‘immigration’ in the abstract and ‘the pace of change’ – participants are clearly able to re-profile these noun phrases as a means of criticising the logic of their underlying conceptual models of immigration, models that in the last analysis – and despite the sanitising construal proffered by the Home Secretary – cast immigrants as undesirables.

May’s indirect strategy is not only demonstrated by her use of noun phrases, but also by profiling on the level of the clause (or, more accurately, the clause complex). Recall that both the nominalizations ‘immigration’ and ‘pace of change’ appear in adverbial clauses that are part of a bigger clause complex, ‘when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it’s impossible to build a cohesive society’. In Cognitive Grammar, the prototypical billiard ball model consists of two focal participants who interact in a setting. In the context of the overall clause complex, ‘immigration’ and the ‘pace of change’ (and the fact that they are ‘too high’ and ‘too fast’ respectively) define the setting of the action chain in the main clause, ‘it’s impossible to build a cohesive society’. Not only, then, do the nominalisations background the entities involved in ‘immigration’ and ‘change’ (i.e. the immigrants), but the gestalt construal of these concepts that these nominalisations entail are themselves buried in the least salient part of the predication, the background setting. The main clausal action chain itself consists of only one focal participant, the dummy subject ‘it’ in ‘it’s impossible to build a cohesive society’. In Cognitive Grammar, dummy subjects such as these designate what Langacker (1991: 352) calls an ‘abstract setting’. Unlike prototypical clauses which have an agent at the head of the action chain that passes energy to a patient further down, ‘it’ in this context plays a ‘zero’ role. A zero participant in an action chain is one ‘that merely occupies some location or exhibits some static property’

(Langacker, 1991: 288). The impossibility of building a cohesive society is not attributed to any agent, it simply exists; it is a 'static property' of a generalizable, abstract setting characterized by 'immigration [that is] too high' and a 'pace of change [that is] too fast'. Note that the sentiment in these clauses might more directly have been expressed as 'high immigration [or even 'too many immigrants'] makes it impossible to build a cohesive society'. In this alternative version, 'high immigration' or 'too many immigrants' are the profiled agents, as opposed to the zero participant in the original. Again, the overall effect of the linguistic strategy is to background immigrants – and actually even immigration – whilst simultaneously suggesting that they are an issue. As was demonstrated in the Section 4.6 in the case of re-scoping, this is a strategy that is continued by her use of passive constructions and agent deletion at the end of Paragraph 3.

That May is using an indirect linguistic strategy to imply that immigrants are the latent source of economic and social difficulties does not go unnoticed by participants. As Participant 2, commenting on Paragraph 3 writes, 'this is insidious bollocks'. The use of the word 'insidious' suggests that they are cognisant of the indirect linguistic strategies employed in the speech. Indeed, when participants do draw attention to the indirect way in which immigrants are blamed for economic and social problems it is often accompanied by accusations of racism. In comment (31), Participant 4 calls it 'thinly veiled racism' (here, 'thinly veiled' suggests an acknowledgement of the more indirect linguistic strategy). Similarly, in response to Paragraph 4, Participant 12 writes of a 'deliberately vague dogwhistle'. 'Dog-whistle' here refers to the notion of dog-whistle politics – the idea that a set of linguistic forms might seem innocuous to the electorate as a whole, but to a specific group of voters those forms have a different meaning. For instance, the repetition of the former US President, Barak Obama's, middle name, Hussein, might seem harmless – it is, after all, a fact that this is his middle name – but to Islamophobic audiences, the name – which originates from the Middle East – takes on a different significance, serving to highlight the President's racial otherness to white Americans. It is a racist, dog-whistle rhetorical strategy. Participant 12, then, is accusing the Home Secretary of the same kind of dog-whistle politics. As in the accusation of 'thinly veiled racism', the use of the term 'dogwhistle' to describe the speech suggests that Participant 12 is cognisant of the indirect strategy the MP is using. Moreover, that they are willing to call the speech racist suggests a resistance to this indirect strategy.

Indeed, many participants go a step further than suggesting May is racist. Their responses to Paragraph 15 make a comparison between her remarks and fascism. This is what she says:

So reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that's no reason to give up. As our manifesto said, 'we must work to control immigration and put Britain first'.

In their comments, respondents often make a connection between the final phrase of the paragraph and the British fascist organization, 'Britain First':

- (41) Phrase Britain first sounds like a fascist statement to me.
(Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (42) Britain First? See, I knew this Tory government was Far Right!
(Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (43) Wow... Britain First!!!! (Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (44) Nasty nationalism – Put Britain first – this is the name of the political grouping.
(Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (45) Britain First. (Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (46) Britain First, huh. (Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 15)

Where respondents do not explicitly indicate that they are making an allusion to the fascist organisation, one can infer that they are by the capitalization of 'First' (in 42, 43, 45, and 46). One participant, Participant 2, even jokingly accuses the Conservative MP and her party of fascism before her mention of putting 'Britain first'. Participant 2 is responding to the assertion that the social security paid to immigrants must be calculated on a 'sensible basis'. They write:

- 'Sensible basis' is Tory code for fascist, there I said it
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 11)

Although the clause, 'there, I said it', suggests that this is a joke, it is a joke meant at the expense of the Conservative Party designed to emphasise the extremity of their position on immigration. What is significant about all these accusations of racism and fascism is that they are made *despite* the indirect construal of immigration May proffers. Not only do respondents resist the conceptual content of the text-world she attempts to construct (which is to say they reject the idea that immigrants lower wages, take jobs and put a strain on infrastructure), but they also reject the manner in which this content is incremented into the common ground of the discourse (which is to say that they re-profile and re-scope the construal of this conceptual content that she offers so as to accuse her of racism).

4.8 Irony as resistance

Before proceeding to a summary of the key arguments set out in this chapter, it is first worth considering one further means by which respondents in the study resist the message conveyed in the 2015 conference address – through irony. Most

of the ironic participant responses come relatively late in the speech (all except for one are responses to Paragraph 10 and onwards). The reasons for this are probably task related. Much of what is said in the speech is based on the premise that immigrants put a strain on wages, the labour market and infrastructure. These are all premises refuted by the respondents early in the discourse. The ironic, jovial comments come at a time when the participants have already established themselves as a resistant audience and when there is no necessity to repeat their various refutations of the positions on immigration that May adopts. Indeed, Participant 3 says explicitly in their response to Paragraph 7, 'I am no longer taking her seriously from this point on.' The use of irony – not taking the speech 'seriously' – in the later responses could also be a consequence of boredom with the task and the speech itself. Notwithstanding this task-based effect, it is still valuable to examine these ironic responses; after all, audiences are just as likely to get bored of listening to a speech in a controlled reading experiment as they are watching it on their television sets or sitting in a conference hall, so it is important to be able to account for these more ludic forms of commentary.

Werth (1994: 82) writes that the 'problem' for the reader in interpreting irony is to see through the 'style of description' to the situation as it is actually depicted. In Text World Theory, irony is thus accounted for by a layering of text-worlds; discourse participants see one text-world through the lens of another (see also Werth, 1977, for an earlier account of 'layering'). The account of the Idealised Common Ground set out in Section 4.3 is well placed to explain the conceptual structures that are brought into interaction with one another in the respondents' use of irony. Consider the following from the corpus:

- (47) Immigration bad we will keep up your hate so you never think straight about the shape that you're in. (Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 15)
- (48) We don't want economic migrants show how bad our economic policy is. We hate the germans. You should too.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 14)
- (49) We must treat migrants and refugees less favourably and keep them in lower poverty than uk nationals to hide our failed policies avoid gov human rights responsibilities and pass on the blame.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 11)
- (50) Its all immigrants fault. Arent we doing well and I want to be the next prime minister.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 6)

In (47–50), participants use the first person plural to speak as if they were the Home Secretary but rather than summarise what she says (as in 1–5), participants give voice to their meta-level representations of her *backstage* motivations

for giving the speech. Participant 4 suggests that she is blaming immigration to stop ‘you’, the audience, from ‘thinking straight about the shape you’re in’ (47) and Participant 16 – who is one of the more prolific users of irony – says that the speech is designed to hide a failure of government policy (48 and 49) and that May is targeting immigrants because she ‘wants to be the next prime minister’ (50). In these examples, the first conceptual layer is the respondents’ meta-level representation of the discourse. This is seen through the lens of the second layer, a representation of the actual discourse-world situation in which the Conservative frontbencher delivers her speech. The result is a blended representation (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) in which she confesses to the cynical motives behind her targeting of immigration.

At other times, participants mimic May’s voice to provide a more exaggerated version of the text-world representation *she proffers*, rather than their own representation of her political motives:

- (51) I’m the saviour of the low paid and the public sector – I’m doing what I’m doing “for the sake of our society”. Thank god she’s there and not some “open borders liberal lefty”.

(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 16)

- (52) Those crazy Europeans with their marriage.

(Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 13)

- (53) Let’s ban all flights!

(Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 12)

- (54) It’s welfare tourism stupid.

(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 10)

- (55) they are all benefit scroungers.

(Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 10)

Like (47–50), (51) uses the first person pronoun to assume the identity of the MP. Participant 15 directly quotes a phrase May uses in Paragraph 16, ‘for the sake of your society’, and another from Paragraph 2, ‘open-borders liberal left’ (although the head noun in this nominal group is changed to ‘lefty’, which lowers the more formal register of the speech, thereby adding to the humour). These quotations are combined with the hyperbolic noun ‘saviour’ and the exclamation ‘thank god’ to offer a more exaggerated, self-aggrandising version of the original text-world representation of the political situation. Whereas (51) depicts the Home Secretary as self-aggrandising, the effect of the mimicry in (52) is to make her remarks in Paragraph 13 seem strange. The response is a rejoinder to this passage from the speech in particular:

Free movement rules don’t just mean European nationals have the right to reside in Britain, they now mean anybody who has married a European can come here almost without condition.

Participant 3 interprets the argument as an opposition to marriage *in general*. The evaluative adjective ‘crazy’ in ‘those crazy Europeans’, alongside the third-person possessive, ‘their’, in the coordinated noun phrase, ‘their marriage’, constructs an image of May in which she not only opposes immigration, but bizarrely finds the commonplace institution of marriage a strange, or ‘crazy’, custom. Participant 3’s strategy of attributing peculiar views to the Conservative politician is further exemplified in (53). The proposal to ban all flights is made in response to the suggestion, in Paragraph 12, that ‘larger numbers of people are more mobile than ever before’. This is a kind of *reductio ad absurdum* argument, in which the original statement is ridiculed by proposing an obviously ridiculous solution. In (54), Participant 15 invokes the right-wing trope of ‘welfare tourism’ in an intertextual reference to the phrase ‘it’s the economy stupid’, famously coined by President Bill Clinton’s political strategist, James Carville, in the 1992 US presidential election. ‘Welfare tourism’ relates to the claim that immigrants are attracted to Britain for its supposedly generous welfare payments (a claim which has been discredited by most recent research on the issue. See, for example, The European Commission, 2013). Similarly, in (55), Participant 9 also uses a common trope in right-wing tabloid discourse – the ‘benefit scrounger’ – to give an exaggerated re-representation of May’s text-world model of immigration. Rather than use her voice to give expression to participants’ own meta-level representations of the discourse, then, all these responses (51–55) seek to re-represent the text-world she proffers in a ridiculous light. The conceptual layers of irony in these comments are – on the one hand – the exaggerated text-world of May’s views and – on the other – the world representing the perspective to which the respondent subscribes. The clash between the exaggerated proffered world and the participant’s own conception of reality is what produces the irony.

4.9 Summary

The rhetorical appeal to logos has here been approached as one which is fundamentally rooted in the discourse participants’ conceptual model of reality. It has been argued that the premises of enthymemes can be viewed as propositions that the speaker attempts to increment into the Common Ground of the discourse. When audiences reject an attempt to increment conceptual structure, they create an Idealised Common Ground which models the background knowledge possessed – and accepted as true – by the speaker’s ideal audience. Discourse participants then construct text-worlds on the basis of this knowledge set. In reception, the appeal to logos is thus a form of world-building. Audience members construct text-worlds in which the speaker’s arguments from logos are valid – in which the

premises of the enthymeme are taken as true. As suggested in Section 4.3, the Idealised Common Ground need not correspond with what the speaker believes to be true. Indeed, as the analysis demonstrated, audiences run parallel meta-level representations of what they think the speaker actually believes or is trying to achieve and often juxtapose these representations with the text-world the speaker proffers. Audiences thus simultaneously juggle a complex array of conceptual models with different ontological and epistemic statuses and relationships – the text-worlds proffered by the speaker (which are based on the taken-for-true knowledge set of an ideal audience – the Idealised Common Ground), the audience member's speculative, meta-level representations of the speaker's "backstage" objectives and motives, alongside the audience's own conceptual model of reality.

From the perspective outlined here, the success of an appeal to *logos* is determined by the way in which conceptual structure is incremented into the discourse. Resistant audiences may reject attempts to increment "knowledge" into the Common Ground of the discourse out of hand, or they may object to the manner in which that knowledge is incremented. The construal categories of Cognitive Grammar were used to describe this latter type of rejection in participant responses to Theresa May's speech. Audience members were able to re-specify, re-scope, and re-profile the construal placed on the text-world structures proffered by speakers in accordance with their own conceptual models of reality. They also use irony to re-construe the speaker's argument. This chapter, then, has outlined a cognitive approach to the enthymeme in audience reception. However, in classical rhetoric, there is another type of argument from *logos* – the example. It is to this second kind of argument that the next chapter turns.

CHAPTER 5

Logos as conceptual mapping

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter suggested that enthymematic arguments are based on a pre-supposed representation of the context in which the speaker makes their appeal to logos. However, the enthymeme is not the only type of appeal from logos available to the orator. Aristotle also points to the role of examples in persuasive discourse:

For instance, that Dionysius, in asking for a bodyguard, was plotting tyranny, is demonstrated by the earlier example of Pisistratus, who petitioned for a bodyguard for just this reason and when granted it became a tyrant, and also of Theagenes in Megara, and indeed all the known cases serve as an example for that of Dionysius, of whom it is not known whether he is seeking it for this reason. They all fall under the same general principle, that *he who is plotting tyranny asks for a bodyguard*.
(*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1357b, emphasis in original)

Whereas the syllogism and its rhetorical equivalent, the enthymeme, are forms of deductive reasoning based on a set of premises, examples are forms of inductive reasoning that involve the orator making inferences based on their previous patterns of experience of the world (*Rhetoric* I.2, 1356b; see also *Posterior Analytics* I.1, 71a, trans. Jowett). For this reason Aristotle suggests that they are best used in deliberative oratory because ‘we give judgement by predicting future events from past ones’ (*Rhetoric* I.9, 1368a) – we can assume that Dionysius is plotting tyranny because all tyrants, according to Aristotle, ask for a bodyguard before doing so. Aristotle is here arguing that example is a way of understanding a new situation in terms of some aspect of human experience that is familiar to us.

5.2 Mapping and example

From the perspective of the cognitive processes involved, then, examples must recruit pre-existing conceptual structures as resources for creating new mental representations of the topic under discussion. One way of describing this process of analogically mapping past experiences onto newer, unfamiliar ones is in terms of Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT, see Fauconnier and Turner, 2002).

In Chapter 3, CIT was used to explain how the conceptual poles of linguistic indices were blended in audience cognition to create performance models of a speaker. As was outlined, CIT models experiential knowledge in terms of mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1985; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 40). In CIT, one might say that the example situations, or ‘items’ as Aristotle (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1357b) calls them, that are used to reason about the less familiar target situation are all mental spaces that act as inputs into a ‘conceptual integration network’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002). Audiences derive a generic conceptual structure from these various input spaces which is then used to reason about the unknown aspects of the target situation (in this regard, see Gentner, 1983, and Gentner and Markman, 1997, on ‘candidate inferences’). This framework has been applied to Aristotle’s own illustration in Figure 5.1. The situation in which Pisistratus plots tyranny functions as one input, and the situation in which Theagenese does the same, another. The generic structure of the inputs – that both ask for a bodyguard and that both subsequently became a tyrant – is represented in the ‘generic space’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002) of the network. This generic structure is then mapped onto the situation in which Dionysius asks for a bodyguard to create a ‘blended space’, the ‘emergent structure’ of which is a mental representation of Dionysius, having employed his bodyguard, enacting tyranny on the people. Aristotle himself writes that ‘when-ever both items are subsumed under the same genus, but one is more familiar than the other, then the latter is an example’ (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1357b). The inputs to the conceptual integration network are all of the same ‘genus’ – that is, the ‘genus’ of people who ask for bodyguards – and they are all more familiar than the target situation because the consequences of the asking are, in each input, already known (whereas in the Dionysius situation, they are not). It is the perceived similarities between these situations – the counterpart connections made between inputs – that allow discourse participants to make inferences about the target situation.

The illustration Aristotle provides is rather simple. The different situations to which he refers – Pisistratus’s turn to tyranny, and then Theagenese’s – are all relatively schematic representations of past events. In cognitive grammatical terms, they have a low level of specificity, profiling as they do only an actor (Pisistratus or Theagenese), an action (their asking for a bodyguard), and the purpose of the action (preparation for their subsequent tyranny over the people). It is easy to model such schematic knowledge structures with the notion of a mental space. Fauconnier and Turner (2006: 307) define mental spaces as ‘very partial assemblies containing elements, and structured by frames and cognitive models’. Similar definitions are introduced by Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 40) (mental spaces are ‘small conceptual packets’ and they ‘contain elements and are typically structured by frames’) and Grady et al. (1999: 102) (‘a mental space is a short-term construct informed by the more general and more stable knowledge structures associated

with a particular domain'). In all these definitions, a mental space is defined as containing some 'partial' or simple conceptual structure. However, it is also clear that the conceptual structures that discourse participants recruit in the course of an example can be incredibly complex and rich.




Figure 5.1 The conceptual integration network for Aristotle's example

Take Martin Wright's op-ed piece in *The Telegraph* called *The Lessons of History for Jeremy Corbyn* (see Appendix C). In the op-ed, Wright – who is a professor of history – makes an extended comparison between the current left-wing leader of the Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, and George Lansbury, who led the party between 1932 and 1935. Wright concludes the piece with this argument, which is based on the analogy he has drawn between the two leaders:

Perhaps the real lesson that a bit of historical perspective can teach us about Corbyn's remarkable coup doesn't concern his electability, or alleged lack of it. After all, those that warn that he is unelectable haven't done too well at winning elections themselves in recent years. No, history tells us that the Labour Party is experiencing a period when it needs to be revitalised, democratised and brought back into contact with its all-too-forgotten core beliefs. Like Lansbury over 70 years before him, Corbyn might well be the man for the job. If so, the really interesting question becomes not whether Corbyn can win in 2020, but who, out of the new MPs who were prominent in nominating and supporting him, will be the Bevans and Attlees of the future? (Wright, 2015)

Wright is here responding to the criticism that Corbyn is too left-wing to be electable. Wright's argument is that both the Labour Party today, and the Labour Party of the 1930s were in need of revitalisation and that, just as Lansbury was the leader to do this in the 30s, Corbyn is the one to rejuvenate the party today. Moreover, he suggests that in the same way the Labour leader of the past failed to win a general election but nonetheless paved the way for those that followed him (Nye Bevan and Clement Attlee, the statesmen credited with the creation of the British welfare state), the present leader's job will be to usher in a new generation of left-wing politicians who will perform similar feats of statecraft. Wright invites his readership to make inferences about who in the current stable of Labour representatives is most likely to take on this mantle.

Importantly, to make this concluding argument, it is first necessary for Wright to establish a clear comparison between Labour leaders. He does this with an explicit set of comparisons in the third and fourth paragraphs of the op-ed piece:

Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a London politician who was located firmly on the left of the Labour Party – his first political home as a socialist was in the revolutionary Marxist Social Democratic Federation. Like Corbyn, he was a “veteran” MP who had taken part in the struggles of what seemed like a previous age; by the time he secured the leadership of his party he was already in his 70s.

Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a habitual rebel, and a thorn in the side of his party's moderate leadership. As editor of the *Daily Herald* he supported just about every shade of Left-wing rebel tendency available. He campaigned for Communists to be allowed to join the Labour Party. In the period before the Great War he'd

gone to prison for the incitement of militant unlawful protest on behalf of the suffragettes. He was imprisoned again in 1921, when serving on Poplar Council, for contempt of court, after refusing to implement what he considered to be an unfair rates system. Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a life-long pacifist. He was the main organiser of the mass anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square in August 1914. He was also prepared to meet – against his better judgement – some pretty questionable individuals in pursuit of peace, including, in 1937, Hitler and Mussolini. By comparison, maybe meeting Hamas isn't so big a deal.

(Wright, 2015)

In these paragraphs Wright makes a number of explicit mappings between Corbyn and Lansbury using the adverbial 'like Corbyn' to signal these counterpart connections. According to Wright, both were/are:

London politicians
 Firmly on the left of the Labour party
 "Veteran" MPs who had taken part in the struggles of what seemed like a previous age
 Habitual rebels
 A thorn in the side of their party's moderate leadership
 Life-long pacifists
 Prepared to meet some pretty questionable individuals

All of these mappings suggest a generic structure common to both the contemporary target (Corbyn's leadership) and the historical frame of reference (Lansbury's). To evidence these mappings, Wright then adds more detail about the old leader's political career. So, for instance, he is firmly on the left because 'his first political home as a socialist was in the revolutionary Marxist Social Democratic Federation'. The evidence for these points of comparison is summarised in Table 5.1. The material in the right-hand column of the table provides a rich account of the historical reference point that Wright is projecting onto the contemporary political situation in the Labour Party – far richer, in fact, than the 'partial', piecemeal conceptual structures involved in a mental space. It is for this reason that here the preference is to call this conceptual reference point a text-world. As was outlined in the previous chapter, text-worlds are conceptually rich discourse-level mental representations that discourse participants create in response to the texts they read or hear. In the case of Wright's op-ed piece, the text in the right hand column of Table 5.1 acts as a prompt for readers to create rich text-world representations of Lansbury. This text-world structure has been demonstrated in Figure 5.2. On the right is the detailed network of text-worlds that represent Lansbury's political career (surrounded in a grey box) and on the left the network representing Corbyn's. The counterpart connections between text-worlds have been indicated with dashed arrows.




Figure 5.2 The text-world structures involved in the Lansbury-Corbyn mapping

Table 5.1 Points of comparison between Lansbury and Corbyn

What Corbyn and Lansbury have in common	Evidence from Lansbury's political career
London politicians	–
Firmly on the left of the Labour party	his first political home as a socialist was in the revolutionary Marxist Social Democratic Federation
“Veteran” MPs who had taken part in the struggles of what seemed like a previous age	by the time he secured the leadership of his party he was already in his 70s
Habitual rebels A thorn in the side of their party's moderate leadership	As editor of the Daily Herald he supported just about every shade of Left-wing rebel tendency available. He campaigned for Communists to be allowed to join the Labour Party. In the period before the Great War he'd gone to prison for the incitement of militant unlawful protest on behalf of the suffragettes. He was imprisoned again in 1921, when serving on Poplar Council, for contempt of court, after refusing to implement what he considered to be an unfair rates system.
Life-long pacifists	He was the main organiser of the mass anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square in August 1914
Prepared to meet some pretty questionable individuals	including, in 1937, Hitler and Mussolini

As can be seen from Figure 5.2, compared to the elaborate text-world representation of Lansbury's past, the text-worlds representing Corbyn's are relatively under-specified. Wright flags the mappings between the two with the adverbial ‘like Corbyn’ phrases, but it is the Lansbury text-world which is given subsequent embellishment with multiple temporal world-switches to past text-worlds all representing Lansbury's previous activist exploits. Indeed, this is most drastically exemplified in the second paragraph of the piece in which the reader is given quite a lot of detail about the political situation of the 1930s and then invited to make inferences about the counterpart connections between then and now with the rhetorical question ‘Is this beginning to sound familiar?’

Lansbury took over the leadership of the Labour Party in 1932, in the wake of the disastrous economic crisis that had destroyed Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in 1931. MacDonald had nurtured the Labour Party into a position of power over the preceding two decades, but abandoned its rank and file in the moment of crisis to join a National Government with the Conservatives. The Labour establishment – seen by many in the movement as heroes only a few years previously – were, by 1932, seen by most socialists as traitors. The demoralised Labour Party was decimated in the 1931 General Election, and Lansbury was elected leader because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle. Is this beginning to sound familiar?

(Wright, 2015)

Wright's description of events does sound similar to one interpretation of the events leading up to Corbyn's assumption of the Labour leadership. To reflect these events all one would have to do is change a handful of the proper nouns and prepositional phrases in Wright's text:

Corbyn took over the leadership of the Labour Party in **2015**, in the wake of the disastrous economic crisis that had destroyed *Gordon Brown's* Labour government in **2010**. *Gordon Brown and Tony Blair* had nurtured the Labour Party into a position of power over the preceding two decades, but abandoned its rank and file *by launching a war in Iraq and moving to the political right, ostensibly for the purposes of becoming more electable*. The Labour establishment – seen by many in the movement as heroes only a few years previously – were, by **2015**, seen by most socialists as traitors. The demoralised Labour Party was decimated in the **2010 and 2015 General Elections**, and *Corbyn* was elected leader because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle.

Table 5.2 Inferential conceptual mappings between historical and contemporary frames

1930s Text World	Contemporary Labour Party Text World
Lansbury	Corbyn
The year 1932	The year 2015
Ramsay McDonald's Labour government	Gordon Brown's Labour government
The year 1931	The year 2010
Ramsay McDonald	Gordon Brown and Tony Blair
[joining] a National Government with the Conservatives	launching a war in Iraq and moving to the political right, ostensibly for the purposes of becoming more electable
1931 General Election	2010 and 2015 General Elections

The words and phrases in boldface italics are all substitutions of words and phrases appearing in the original paragraph. They represent correspondences between 'the preceding two decades' and the two years prior to Lansbury becoming the leader of the Labour Party. These correspondences can be more explicitly represented as in Table 5.2. The table represents the mappings made between Wright's text-world representation of the 1930s Labour Party and what has been called a 'contemporary Labour Party Text World'. Unlike the 1930s text-world which is explicitly described in the text, the contemporary Labour Party text-world is a product of reader inference. As was suggested, Wright's question ('is this beginning to sound familiar?') invites his audience to construct counterpart connections between the text-world representation of the 1930s and contemporary events. Importantly, in making the invitation, Wright offers a particular construal of *both* the historical

record *and* the contemporary political situation. The most obvious instance of this is that the timescale in the Corbyn text-world has been ‘compressed’ (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; Turner, 2006) in the Lansbury text-world. So, rather than one year separating the defeat of McDonald from the leadership of Lansbury, in the contemporary text-world it is five, and whereas in the historical text-world only McDonald ‘nurtured the Labour Party into a position of power’, in the contemporary text-world it is both Brown and Blair who do the nurturing (because it was Blair, not Brown, who led the party for the majority of the ‘preceding two decades’). In the mapping between text-worlds, then, some information is compressed or re-scaled in order to make the mapping work. In the text-world representation of the events leading up to Lansbury’s assumption of the Labour leadership, Wright also highlights several historical events – McDonald’s political fall from grace in the Labour movement, the role of the 1929 world economic crisis, and McDonald’s role in ‘nurturing’ the party ‘into a position of power’. Clearly, though, these are not the only elements of conceptual structure that one might increment into a text-world representation of the events leading up to Lansbury’s election to the leadership of the Labour Party. For instance, Lansbury was also the only former cabinet minister to hold onto his seat in the 1931 election – a factor surely contributing to his assumption of the party leadership and an aspect of his career that significantly differentiates him from Jeremy Corbyn, who before his election as party leader had never served in the shadow cabinet, let alone as a government minister. Rather than point to factors such as these, Wright suggests that Lansbury was elected to the leadership ‘because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle’. The purpose of this discussion is not to wade into a historical debate about the context in which Lansbury became leader of the Labour Party, but rather to point out that Wright’s text-world representation of the historical timeline profiles some facts, and in doing so makes them salient, at the same time as it backgrounds others.

This is significant not only because it demonstrates that Wright’s telling of the past is ideologically selective (which is not here meant as a criticism – all histories are in some sense selective in the significance they attach to “facts”), but also because in addition to representing the conditions of Lansbury’s rise to power, readers are invited to make inferences about Corbyn’s political ascendancy on the basis of the construal of historical events Wright offers. So, for instance, readers are invited to infer that Corbyn, too, was elected to the leadership ‘because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle’. Of course, there are other explanations: a critique from Wright’s political right might be that the Party membership – which swelled to 250,000 in the leadership election – was overcome by hard-left fanatics; and from Wright’s left, one could argue that Corbyn’s victory had less to do with his personal qualities and more to do with the fact he

broke decisively with the austerity economics discussed in Chapter 2. The point here is that Wright's construal of the historical text-world has consequences for his construal of the contemporary text-world because the former representation is the lens through which we are prompted to view the contemporary situation (for further elaboration of this point, see Section 5.4).

5.3 Metaphor and/as example

In *The Lessons of History for Jeremy Corbyn*, Wright used examples from history to reason about contemporary politics, but orators can also create mappings between other domains of experiential knowledge. Indeed, the notion of conceptual mapping is fundamental to cognitive accounts of metaphor. (Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Markman, 1997; Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). From this cognitive perspective, one can view historical analogy and metaphor as two instances of the same type of process: the mapping of two conceptual topographies belonging to two distinct conceptual domains onto one another. Just as historical examples take a more familiar or known aspect of experiential knowledge and map it onto something unfamiliar or unknown, metaphor often works by mapping some more concrete or experientially more basic aspect of experience onto something more abstract or intangible. In Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT, Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), the more familiar domain of knowledge is called the source domain and the less familiar or more abstract domain, the target. We use source-domain conceptual structure to reason about or explicate target-domain structure. This process is seen as fundamental to the human understanding of and communication about highly subjective (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) or abstract concepts (Gentner, 2003). This latter class of concepts is particularly important in political discourse (for instance, DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM, COMMUNISM, FASCISM etc.). Consider this extract from a speech by George Osborne to the Conservative Party Conference in 2010:

Britain has a £109bn a year structural deficit.

Let me tell you what a structural deficit is.

It's the borrowing that doesn't go away as the economy grows, and we have £109bn of it.

It's like with a credit card.

The longer you leave it, the worse it gets.

You pay more interest.

You pay interest on the interest. You pay interest on the interest on the interest.

We are already paying £120m of interest every single day thanks to the last Labour government.

Millions of pounds every day that goes to the foreign governments we owe so they can build the schools and hospitals for their own citizens that we aren't able to afford for ours. How dare Labour call that protecting the poor?

Delay now means pay more later.

Everyone knows it's the most basic rule of debt.

So Labour's cuts wouldn't be smaller. They would be bigger and last longer.

In eight years' time we would still be meeting here talking about what we would cut. (Osborne, 2010)

In this extract of the speech, Osborne is responding to calls from the Miliband-led Labour Party that cuts to welfare and investment should be delayed, a call Osborne rejects. In making his argument, he constructs an explicit comparison between the national 'structural deficit' and credit card debt – just as delaying payment on your credit card means you pay more later, failing to pay down the deficit now will result in a larger payment later. Osborne uses the source logic of credit card debt to indict the Labour Party for their economic strategy because paying later will mean cuts that are 'bigger and last longer'. As in the Corbyn/Lansbury example, the comparison works in the discourse by bringing two sets of text-world structures into interaction. The extract begins with Osborne constructing what text-world theorists have described as a 'target-world' (Browse, 2015, 2016). The target-world is the literal world in which Britain has a £109bn deficit and in which the borrowing 'doesn't go away as the economy grows'. In fact, there is also a second text-world here; in Text World Theory, negated states of affairs are represented in negated worlds on the basis that to reject a negated concept requires that discourse participants first need to conceptualise it (Nahajec, 2009: 110, see also Hidalgo-Downing, 2000, 2002, 2003). The two target-world structures, then, are a text-world in which there is a £109bn deficit and a second world in which the borrowing is represented as (not) going away even as the economy grows. Having set up a small constellation of two target-worlds, Osborne then triggers the creation of a 'source-world' (Browse, 2015, 2016) with the copula, simile construction, 'it's like with a credit card'. The source-world in this example is a figurative world in which 'the longer you leave [your credit card], the worse [your debt] gets. You pay more interest. You pay interest on the interest. You pay interest on the interest on the interest'. Notably, the counterpart connections being made between credit card debt and the national deficit are facilitated by Osborne's ambiguous use of 'it' in 'the longer you leave *it*, the worse it gets' (my emphasis); the 'it' here could refer either to a credit card or the national debt. Similarly, the use of indefinite 'you' highlights

the generic structure of the source- and target-worlds because the actor in each world is a generic agent not specific to either text-world. Having set up the counterpart connections between source- and target-worlds, Osborne details the consequences of failing to pay ‘your’ credit card debts. This culminates in the creation of a further target-world, this time set in the hypothetical future and signalled by the modal, ‘would’, and the adverbial, ‘in eight year’s time’, in which Labour’s cuts ‘would be bigger and last longer’. The entire network of these source- and target-worlds has been detailed in Figure 5.3. As can be seen, the future-oriented hypothetical world is represented with a further negated sub-world in which Labour’s cuts are (not) smaller.

To quote Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I.9, 1368a), Osborne ‘give[s] judgement by predicting future events from past ones’. Just as in the Corbyn/Lansbury example, he uses some aspect of his previous experience – in this example, his experiential knowledge of credit cards, rather than of a historical period – to make predictions about the likely result of adopting Labour’s proposals. From the perspective of the cognitive processes involved, then, metaphor is a similar rhetorical phenomenon to example, the difference being in the kinds of conceptual structure that are mapped against one another.

5.4 Resisting example

The main contention of this chapter is that example works by mapping one domain of human experience onto another. We analogically reason about a target conceptual domain by reference to our previous experiences. This analogical reasoning is predicated on the assertion that the conceptual domains *are*, in fact, similar – that the public deficit *is*, in fact, like a credit card, and that Jeremy Corbyn *is* like George Lansbury. As Chilton (1996: 106) writes, however, metaphor (and, actually, any kind of mapping)

presupposes that the two domains are already structurally similar. Yet there are no arguments for this similarity, except the metaphorical move, the... analogy itself.

Metaphor works by projecting one relatively well-understood set of ideas onto a domain that is problematic, rather than by simply expressing a pre-existing and objective similarity.

It is possible, then, for audiences to reject ‘the metaphorical move’ – perhaps a better term in this context is ‘mapping move’, given that both figurative and non-figurative mappings are the subject of this discussion – involved in the example. It is worth pausing briefly to consider how audiences might reject the counterpart




Figure 5.3 Text-world structure of the credit card metaphor

mappings involved in examples in light of the model of audience resistance that has already been offered in Chapter 4.

To recap from the previous chapter: text-worlds are constructed from the audience's pre-existing knowledge in response to cues in the text. In TWT, this pre-existing knowledge is modelled in terms of frames. These are

experiential models of (part of) human life which direct and influence human understanding of aspects of the world, as mediated through human perceptions and cultural knowledge. (Werth, 1999: 107)

If text-worlds are constructed from the audience's frame knowledge, it follows that frames form the underlying conceptual substrate to text-worlds (as per the argument in Chapter 4). Moreover, as text-driven conceptual structures, text-worlds offer a particular construal of this underlying frame – speakers and writers, then, proffer a text-world construal of the *audiences* pre-existing frame knowledge. Like any other text-world, the construction of a source-world makes salient some aspects of source-frame structure at the same time as it backgrounds other elements – that is, source-worlds construe the conceptual content of a source-frame in some manner. Stockwell (2002) calls this process 'vehicle construction' (see also Musolff, 2006, on metaphorical situations). Wright proffers a text-world construal of George Lansbury's career, and Osborne proffers a construal of government debt, that may or not may not clash with the audiences' prior frame knowledge. But insofar as there is a mapping from the source-world to the target-world, the construal of source-frame structure proffered by a source-world is consequently *also* a construal of target-frame structure (in arguing that Lansbury was elected 'because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle', Wright is implying the same thing of Corbyn; and, in arguing that 'the longer you leave [household debt], the worse it gets', Osborne is saying the same of government debt). The construction of a source-world therefore has the dual function of both construing the source-frame in a certain light at the same time as it also construes the target-frame. From the perspective of audience resistance, then, one can say that either the audience reject the construal encoded in the source-world, or that they reject the construal encoded in the target-world; that is, either audiences reject the source-world as a faulty representation (for instance, 'but that is not how credit cards actually work – what about interest free periods?'; or, 'that is not why George Lansbury became Labour leader'), or they reject the assertion that it has anything meaningful to say about the target-world ('but credit cards are not like the public deficit because unlike credit card holders, governments are able to tax the increased economic activity generated by their expenditure'; or, 'yes, but things were different in the 1930s – Jeremy Corbyn did not become the leader of the Labour Party for the same reasons as George Lansbury'). Each of these forms of resistance to example will now be examined, starting with the rejection of target-world construal.

The following is an extract from an article entitled *An Economics Lesson for David Cameron* by David Blanchflower, a professor of economics and regular columnist with the left-of-centre current affairs magazine, *The Newstatesman*. The article was published on 16th June, 2011, in response to David Cameron repeating the same credit card metaphor used by Osborne in the previous section.

But most astonishing of all is Cameron's repetition of... idiotic claims that the UK had maxed out its credit card.

'If you have maxed out your credit card, if you put off dealing with the problem, the problem gets worse.'

Asinine nonsense. Cameron shows no understanding of basic accounting. I guess that isn't surprising for someone who has never run a business and had to file basic accounts. Folks with silver spoons don't need to do that. Let me explain. There is an asset side to the balance sheet and a liability side. The national debt is not analogous in any way to a credit card. The debt has been used to pay for the infrastructure, roads, schools, ports, the Houses of Parliament and even Downing Street.

A little example makes clear that Cameron knows not what he is talking about. Suppose an individual receives a bequest from a long-lost uncle and is told it consists of a house with a mortgage on it of £200,000 and the house itself is worth £20m. Cameron would no doubt claim that it would be outrageous for the nephew to accept the gift because he would have to take on a mortgage of £200,000 on it. But that is absurd and the nephew is delighted at his good fortune and happily accepts the gift. The right question for the nephew would be: "How much is the asset (the house) worth, compared to the size of the liability (the mortgage)?"

The next generation will receive not only the debt but also the assets. The nephew and the Prime Minister need to compare the scale of the assets to any liabilities. Only a fool would focus solely on the liabilities.

Cameron is an economic simpleton. Yet everyone from Cameron's aunt to the family's pet fish, Eric, and the Conservative deputy, Michael Fallon, agree with Dave's credit-card analogy. Sensible people cringe. (Blanchflower, 2011)

Blanchflower's objection to the credit card metaphor is that the source to target mapping profiles only the liabilities incurred by debt, and not the assets. Here, he is objecting to one way in which the target-world – the literal world of public sector accounting – has been construed by the source-world. The assets are missing from this construal of government debt. Indeed, for this reason – and in an outright rejection of Cameron's 'metaphorical move' (Chilton, 1996: 106) – Blanchflower suggests that 'the national debt is not analogous in any way to a credit card' and that in making this metaphorical move, Cameron has proven himself 'an economic simpleton.' Interestingly, Blanchflower then offers his own extended metaphor for government debt. This metaphorical explanation involves the creation of a hypothetical text-world (triggered by the mental verb 'suppose') in which 'an individual receives a bequest from a long-lost uncle and is told it consists of a house with a mortgage on it of £200,000 and the house itself is worth £20m'. Blanchflower imports the conclusions of Cameron's faulty

credit card metaphor – which is that we should under no circumstances take on any more debt – into this text-world to prove them absurd; of course the nephew should accept the house because its overall value far exceeds the debts incurred by taking it. In the following paragraph, Blanchflower elaborates on the generic structure common to both the hypothetical source-world and the literal target-world. This is signalled grammatically by the co-ordination in the nominal group ‘the nephew and the Prime Minister’. Indeed, the noun phrase, ‘the next generation’ could also refer to both source- and target-worlds; clearly, the ‘next generation’ in the source-world is the nephew, but in the target-world it could also refer to the next generation of British citizens who will inherit both the public debts and assets acquired by the government of today. Blanchflower’s response to Cameron is thus to offer an alternative metaphor that more accurately corresponds to his own construal of government debt.

Blanchflower (2011) resists the credit card example by reconstruing the proffered target-world in line with his own conceptual frame of government debt. As was suggested above, in addition to the target-world, audiences can also reconstrue the source-world. Throughout the debates following the 2007/8 financial crash, the Conservative Party repeatedly argued that successive Labour governments of 1997–2010 had failed to adequately prepare the British economy for the eventuality of a global recession. They did this in metaphorical terms, repeating that Labour had failed ‘to fix the roof while the sun was shining’. As one might expect, given the discussion of messaging in Chapter 2, one of the main propagators of this argument was George Osborne, who used the metaphor no less than thirteen times in speeches from 2010 to 2015:

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I have, of course, seen the IMF report, and the lesson we learned is that *you have to fix the roof when the sun is shining*. That is what the previous Government completely failed to do. They had 13 years to fix the national finances, and now it is up to us to clear up the mess that they left behind.
(HC Deb [8th June 2010] 511 col.161–162)

Of course, the poor regulation of our banking system meant that this country was probably affected more than any other, except for Iceland and perhaps Ireland. We are trying to sort that out, by addressing not only the public finances, but the regulation of the banks. As I say, *if we had fixed the roof when the sun was shining, we would have been in a better condition to deal with the storms*.

(HC Deb [20th October 2010] 516 col.987)

The British economy is not as strong as the German economy, and I will tell hon. Members why. It is because for the past decade, in the good years, *Germany fixed the roof when the sun was shining* and he did not when he was in government.

(HC Deb [17th May 2012] 545 col.723)

I can say today that both parties of the coalition have agreed that we must ensure that debt continues to fall as a percentage of GDP, including using surpluses in good years, for this purpose. In other words, *this time we will fix the roof when the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [5th December 2013] 571 col.1104)

Taxes are lower but so, too, is spending, for we must bring our national debt substantially down. Analysis published today shows that just running a balanced current budget does not secure that. Instead, Britain needs to run an absolute surplus in good years. *We will fix the roof when the sun is shining, to protect Britain from future storms*. (HC Deb [19th March 2014] 577 col.784)

We do not want to go into the next economic shock with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 80%. That is precisely why, in good economic times, we need to be running an overall budget surplus. That is the only credible and sustained way to get national debt down. *That is the way to fix the roof when the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [13th January 2015] 590 col.740)

The original debt target I set out in my first Budget has been met. We will end this Parliament with Britain's national debt share falling. *The sun is starting to shine and we are fixing the roof*. (HC Deb [18th March 2015] 594 col.769)

The global economy is full of risks at present. We should be redoubling our efforts to prepare Britain for whatever the world throws at us in the coming years, not easing off. *The time to fix the roof is when the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [4th June 2015] 596 col.802)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The situation illustrates why you need a credible economic plan, why you need to make sure that your country is protected from shocks happening around the world and, in short, why *you should fix the roof when the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [29th June 2015] 597 col.1224)

I do not think anyone will be particularly surprised to hear that when we assemble in a couple of days to hear the Budget, we will hear the further measures needed to reduce that budget deficit and ensure that *we fix the roof while the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [6th July 2015] 598 col.49–50)

Those who suffer when Governments run unsustainable deficits are not the richest, but the poorest; and therefore in normal economic times Governments should run an overall budget surplus, so that our country is better prepared for whatever storms lie ahead. In short, *we should always fix the roof while the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [8th July 2015] 598 col.323)

In normal times we should continue to raise more than we spend and set aside money for when the rainy days come. It is as simple as that: *we should fix the roof when the sun is shining*. (HC Deb [14th October 2015] 600 col.427)

This improvement in the nation's finances allows me to do the following. First, we will borrow £8 billion less than we forecast, making faster progress towards eliminating the deficit and paying down our debt – *fixing the roof when the sun is shining*.
(HC Deb [25th November 2015] 602 col.1359–60)

This repeated trope is actually quite a complex metaphorical source-world involving two metaphors. The first maps changes in the global economy onto changes in the weather; prosperity is mapped onto sunshine and global recession onto storms. The second metaphor involves mapping the British economy onto a structure. Structurally sound economies – those without a hole in the roof – are those without debts, or that have low debt to GDP ratios. To weather a storm requires a structurally sound house. Just as it is “common sense” to fix a hole in the roof in good weather, so it is “common sense” to pay down debt in years that are more prosperous. As can be seen from the Hansard extracts above, from 2010–12 Osborne uses the metaphor to critique the policy of the previous Labour government (they failed ‘to fix the roof’), and then from 2013 onwards it becomes a justification for government economic policy – government policy is about ‘fixing the roof’ now that ‘the sun is starting to shine’ (see HC Deb [18th March 2015] 594 col.769).

This is a metaphorical mini-narrative that repeatedly and economically increments the same aspects of source-frame structure into the source-world (see Musolff, 2016). What is interesting is the way in which the metaphor is taken up by members of the Labour Party and one member of the Scottish National Party in their own speeches about the economy:

[George Osborne's] argument was that the Labour Government had failed to mend the roof when the sun was shining. Those of us who had lived through 18 years of Conservative Government knew that it was not only the roof that needed mending, but also the foundations: our schools, our hospitals, our infrastructure, our social services.

(Glenda Jackson MP, HC Deb [30th November 2011] 536 col.1038)

The Chancellor always mentions fixing the roof while the sun is shining, but he always forgets to mention the Thatcher legacy of £19 billion worth of household repairs that Labour had to make. Now, with these supposed fixes, the first Tory Budget in almost 20 years is taking the roof from over the heads of my constituents. He should be a little bit embarrassed about that.

(Dawn Butler MP, HC Deb [9th July 2015] 598 col.548)

That is the cost of this Chancellor – a Chancellor who puts his own interest before the national interest; a Chancellor who talks about fixing the roof while the sun is shining, but who should be fixing the foundations; and a Chancellor whose economic record is now being exposed as a mirage.

(Dan Jarvis MP, HC Deb [17th March 2016] 607 col.1153)

The Chancellor spoke in his Budget speech about fixing the roof while the sun is shining, but who is the sun shining on?

(Mhairi Black MP, HC Deb [14th July 2015] 598 col.775)

All of these contributions reference Osborne's original metaphor but, crucially, increment more conceptual material from the source-frame into the source-world. Jackson argues that the Conservatives had left the economy in such a poor state when Labour took power that the 'foundations' of the structure, which she explicitly maps as 'our schools, our hospitals, our infrastructure, our social services', were in disrepair. Similarly, Butler suggests that the Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher (and then presumably John Major, although he is not mentioned) left the metaphorical house or structure in a state of such dilapidation that it took £19 billion of 'repairs' to fix. Interestingly, too, she suggests that Osborne is 'taking the roof from over the heads of [her] constituents'. 'The roof over your head' is a conventional synecdoche in English meaning a house or home. Butler exploits the conventional, idiomatic meaning associated with the roof in the scenario to add another level of meaning to it – that Osborne has made Butler's constituents homeless. Jarvis, like Jackson, mentions the 'foundations' of the structure, although – unlike Jackson – he does not specify what these foundations are (and actually, his own use of the 'foundations' metaphor does nothing to allay the criticism that the last Labour government might bear some responsibility for their disrepair). Finally, Black, a Member of Parliament for the Scottish Nationalists, exploits another metaphorical potentiality of the source-frame – the idea that the sun might shine on one group of people, rather than everyone, which is to say that actually it is only a select and wealthy few that have benefited from the favorable economic conditions Osborne's metaphor entails.

What these creative engagements with the original 'fixed the roof while the sun is shining' metaphors have in common is that they all increment new material from the source-frame and therefore construe that frame – in the sense described in Chapter 4 – differently. A knock on effect of this, of course, is that they also re-construe the target-frame: Jackson's metaphor profiles the poor state of the economy before the election of Labour in 1997; Butler's, both the economic problems caused by years of Conservative misrule and the impact the Chancellor's budget has had on her constituents; Jarvis's, a different set of more fundamental economic problems; and Black's, the uneven ways in which different sections of society are affected and have been affected by economic processes. Not only, then, can the audience of a metaphor – and other types of example – resist construal of the target frame offered in the target-world by dismissing the source-world's relevance, they can also increment new conceptual material from the source-frame into the source-world so as to construe the target in a manner they think more apt.

Resistance to example is therefore predicated on a rejection of the way in which the target has been construed (c.f. the credit card debt example) or rejection of the way in which the source has been construed (c.f. ‘fixing the roof’).

5.5 Satire as example

Throughout this chapter, it has been argued that examples can be understood as mappings between distinct conceptual domains of human experience, be they analogical mappings (as in the comparison between Lansbury and Corbyn) or figurative mappings (as in the last two sections). This chapter closes by considering how another kind of complex conceptual structure might be mobilised as an example in discourse: fiction, or – more specifically – satirical fiction.

On Wednesday 18th April, 2012, in a question to the Prime Minister criticising the recent government budget proposal, the leader of the opposition, Ed Miliband, said the following:

Over the past month we have seen the charity tax shambles, the churches tax shambles, the caravan tax shambles and the pasty tax shambles, so we are all keen to hear the Prime Minister’s view on why he thinks, four weeks on from the Budget, even people within Downing Street are calling it an omnishambles Budget. (Ed Miliband MP, HC Deb [18th April 2012] 543 col. 314)

The branding of the budget an ‘omnishambles’ was greeted with great mirth by politicians and reporters because Miliband was quoting Malcolm Tucker, a fictional character in the British satirical television show, *The Thick of It* (henceforth *TTOI*) masterfully played by Peter Capaldi. Tucker is a foul-mouthed “spin-doctor” who indiscriminately bullies politicians, journalists and civil servants with tirades of vividly offensive abuse in an attempt to manage his party’s political message. The creator of the show, Armando Iannucci, openly acknowledges that Tucker was based on Tony Blair’s Director of Communications, Alastair Campbell, who was said to possess a legendary temper. Miliband’s use of the neologism, ‘omnishambles’, is a direct reference to one of Tucker’s diatribes. The word is a coinage of Armando Iannucci’s and originally appeared in a rant to the (fictional) Secretary of State for Social Affairs and Citizenship, Nicola Murray, in Season 3 of the show. In the scene, Murray is unable to enter a lift with Tucker due to her claustrophobia. Tucker sees this as yet another thing to add to the litany of things about Murray – her husband’s involvement in a business scandal and her daughter’s attendance at a fee-paying private school – that he must “spin” in order to present her in a positive light to the press. The scene also provides a good insight into the general flavour of Tucker’s rants:

Oh, well that's great, that's fucking great, that's another fucking thing right there. Not only have you got a fucking bent husband and a fucking daughter that gets taken to school in a fucking sedan chair, you're also fucking mental. Jesus Christ, see you – you're a fucking omnishambles, that's what you are. You're like that coffee machine, you know – from bean to cup, you fuck up.

(Series 3 – Episode 1, 2009)

Like Tucker, in using the term omnishambles, Miliband is suggesting that 'from bean to cup' the government 'fuck up'. Indeed, the specific unmarked intertextual reference (Mason, 2016) to Tucker's invective is a way in which he is able to side-step the rules on parliamentary language discussed in Chapter 3. In using the word, then, he was humorously accusing the government of incompetence and branding its budget a failure. This is not the only reference to *TTOI* in political and journalistic discourses. Section 5.7 explores how the show is mobilised as a rhetorical resource in British parliamentary speeches. However, before examining how politicians use the fictive text-worlds of *TTOI* as examples, it is first useful to provide some context about the show and how it represents politics and politicians.

5.6 Politics in *The Thick of It*

As Fielding (2014: 258) notes, 'the series – and the spin-off movie *In the Loop* (2009) – constituted a running critique of New Labour and to a lesser extent of David Cameron's modernized Conservative alternative'. He continues:

While the party in power is never named, disputes between the Prime Minister's Office and the Treasury echoed those between Blair and Brown, the outgoing premier's obsession with his 'legacy' called to mind Blair's, and his successor shared many of the characteristics attributed to Brown. More importantly, the style of government evident in *The Thick of It* (specifically the obsession with spin) evoked what many thought of New Labour. In particular, Tucker was looked on as a parody of Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's Director of Communications (1997–2003), such that when Campbell bumped into Iannucci in 2010 the former apparently observed of the latter: 'If it isn't the bloke who's been making a living out of me for the past 10 years.' (Fielding, 2014: 258)

Fielding (2014) here outlines the show's satirical targets by mapping a series of counterpart connections between the story world of *TTOI* and the contemporary discourse-world. Throughout the show, these targets – the Blair government and the politicians, PR professionals, political advisors and civil servants comprising it – are all depicted as venal, self-serving and incompetent careerists who veer from one crisis to the next. Some academic critics have further argued that the

show takes much broader satirical aim, targeting the political system *tout court*. So, Basu (2014) writes that in *TTOI*

the political parties are all the same, and neither the politicians or the journalists are interested in telling the truth or doing good for society. Politics and news media are shown to comprise one enormous complex – an *apparatus* – and there is no salvageable space within it. (Basu, 2014: 92, emphasis in original)

Similarly, Fielding (2014: 9) suggests that ‘*The Thick of It* is ultimately a highly moral series concerned to explore how politicians and others obscure the ideal of Truth’. The show, then, has also been said to attack the British political class as a whole for its dishonest embrace of “spin” and disregard for the public good.

It is for this reason that whilst the show has been lauded by many journalistic critics, it has also been greeted by what Bailey (2011: 282) calls a ‘moral panic’; a significant strand of popular opinion holds that it has unhelpfully stoked the distrust in the political process outlined at the beginning of Chapter 2 (Blears, 2008; Campbell, 2009; Cox, 2009; Sandhu, 2009). For instance, in a 2008 speech to the Smith Institute, the Labour MP, Hazel Blears, complained that *TTOI* detracts ‘from any sense that politics can be a decent activity, pursued by honourable people, to the benefit of the electorate’. Indeed, much of the academic criticism of the show responds to these concerns (Bailey, 2011; Basu, 2014; Fielding, 2014; and Randall, 2011). Randall (2011: 15) provocatively argues that if politicians are unhappy with their depiction on the big and small screen, they should ‘take it upon themselves to behave in a manner which more clearly distinguishes themselves from their fictional counterparts’ and Basu (2014: 101) writes that ‘the role of satire such as *The Thick of It* [is] to help make a bad situation more bearable’. Both these comments suggest that rather than mobilising the public mood against the British political system, *TTOI* simply reflects ‘the bad situation’ in which British politics finds itself. What is at stake here is the way in which the television show construes political culture in the UK. For Blears (2008), the mapping between *TTOI* and the culture associated with the New Labour government fails because in her construal, politics is ‘a decent activity’, and politicians are ‘honourable people’ who act for ‘the benefit of the electorate’. For Basu (2014) and Randall (2011) the opposite is true; the mapping is successful because politicians *are* often shallow and self-serving (and the onus should be on them to stop being so).

5.7 *The Thick of It* in politics

Although politicians have criticised *TTOI*, Basu (2014) writes that the show

is popular not only with a notoriously cynical British public but even more so also with the politicians and journalists who are the target of its ridicule. Arguably, its

politics are quite radical, portraying the news media and politicians of all colours as being in cahoots, forming a social apparatus which is rotten to the core, and thereby offering a challenge to liberal democracy itself. It is deeply ironic, then, that the show has itself been incorporated by the very same apparatus.

(Basu, 2014: 89–90)

Basu (2014) is here pointing to the curious tension between the show's "anti-politics" message and its co-opting by a senior mainstream politician – Ed Miliband – to attack an opponent. Although Miliband's use of the term 'omnishambles' hit the headlines, he is not the only politician to reference the show in speeches at Westminster. These are all the times in which the show is mentioned in Hansard:

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that in 2012, having already done what all Conservative Chancellors do and put up VAT, the Chancellor sought to expand it by applying it to pasties and caravans in the so-called omnishambles Budget. I have always thought that it was a bit of a shame that that term from "The Thick of It" was used, because if the sequence of events that unfolded following that Budget had been presented to the scriptwriters of "The Thick of It", they would not have touched it. They would have said that even for "The Thick of It" it was an unbelievable series of events. Yet that is what the Chancellor delivered.

(Shaban Mahmoud MP, HC Deb [25th March 2015] 594 col. 1481)

My Lords, my view of the political process these days is somewhat prejudiced because I watch "The Thick of It".

(Lord Smith of Leigh, HL Deb [16th October 2012] 739 col. 1479)

We all mis-speak from time to time, and the Prime Minister was under a lot of pressure yesterday, but for the Government to spend a day pretending to have a policy that they have no intention of implementing is no way to run the country. It is like something out of "The Thick Of It".

(Caroline Flint MP, HC Deb [18th October 2012] 551 col. 488)

The Justice Secretary has claimed that years of work – that is what he said – have gone into this pathetic and embarrassing Bill. It confuses important legal concepts and it is not properly thought through, so it could have negative knock-on effects as a result. It lacks an evidence base and seeks to legislate on the back of myths. It will not do what the Justice Secretary claims it will. It is UKIP-friendly, but it is more like something out of "The Thick of It". It does not seem to do anything that the current law – section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 – does not already do.

(Sadiq Khan MP, HC Deb [21st July 2014] 584 col. 1201)

Using a choice of statistics that the characters in "The Thick of It" would have been proud of, the Mayor's plan promises more police recruitment. However, the truth is that there will be fewer police officers and fewer PCSOs by 2015, and that police officers are likely to be significantly less experienced than now.

(Gareth Thomas MP, HC Deb [6th February 2013] 558 col.105WH)

We might not always agree and we might not share the same conclusions, but to be in total denial of the basic facts and to trot out ridiculous partisan points lowers the tone of the debate across the whole Chamber. When Members on both sides of the House have spoken with such passion, it is a shame that those on the Opposition Front Bench, particularly in opening the debate, looked as if they were auditioning for a part in “The Thick of It”. It really is a little beneath them.
(Lord Barker of Battle, HL Deb [16th January 2013] 556 col. 983)

That takes me to the real problem the Prime Minister faced at this summit. At home last week, he was starring in his own version of “The Thick of It”. In Europe he was offering another chapter in his handbook of “How to Lose Friends and Influence”.
(Ed Miliband MP, HC Deb [22nd October 2012] 551 col. 701)

We face an extraordinary Opposition team. The shadow Business Secretary is anti- business. The shadow City Minister does not speak to the City. The shadow Farming Secretary, who should be responsible for encouraging Britain’s livestock industry, is actually a vegan. The shadow Defence Secretary does not believe in defence and they are led by a proud republican who now has to call himself the Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition... If one were to propose all that for a script of “The Thick of It”, even with the entreaties of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport about the importance of diversity and innovation, the BBC would have to reject it as utterly far-fetched.

(David Cameron MP, HC Deb [18th May 2016] 611 col. 24–25)

Parody and caricature are a valued part of our cultural heritage, from Swift and Hogarth to my particular favourite, “The Thick of It”. In particular we need to protect the right to mock the high and mighty.

(Baroness Neville-Rolfe, HL Deb [29th July 2014] 755 col. 1555–1556)

Excluding Baroness Neville-Rolfe’s contribution – which is about the show itself – these references to *TTOI* are all used as a means of attacking a political opponent. In the case of Mahmoud, Miliband and Cameron’s remarks, the criticism relates to the shambolic, incompetent or chaotic nature of the speaker’s target. So, in Mahmoud’s reference to *TTOI*, she is adding to Miliband’s original criticisms of the budget; and in Miliband’s further reference to the show, he is suggesting that Cameron’s negotiations in Europe are shambolic. Cameron’s reference to *TTOI* is more recent. In it, he is criticising Jeremy Corbyn’s front bench team. Again, the criticism turns on the incompetence of this team – according to Cameron, they are all uniquely unsuited to the jobs they have been allocated. Rather than emphasise the rotten nature of the political system in general (like Basu, 2014), these speakers use the show in a narrower fashion to indict the political and professional competence of their opponents. Similarly, Flint, Khan, Thomas and Barker all focus on individuals, but rather than indict the competence of their rivals, these politicians use the show to impugn their motives. Flint criticises ministers for cynically

‘pretending to have a policy that they have no intention of implementing’; Khan criticises the government for badly thought out policy and peddling myths; Thomas, for the government’s cynical use of statistics; and Barker, for the front bench’s appalling partisan behaviour. All these references to *TTOI* target political opponents for acting in bad faith, with the exception of Smith whose reference to the show suggests a similar interpretation to Basu (2014). In the parliamentary debates, then, the show is generally used as a normative benchmark of “bad” political practice.

For more radical interpretations of the television series, a fundamental tenant of *TTOI*’s ‘folk theory’ (Randall, 2011) of politics is that self-serving venality is a generalizable feature of the political system. However, using the show to attack a specific opponent for these character faults suggests the opposite view, i.e. that self-serving venality is peculiar to that opponent, rather than a property of the entire system. When these speakers say that a particular politician’s behaviour is like something from *TTOI* they are implicitly claiming that this is in some way out of the ordinary. Where Basu (2014) sees radical, structural institutional critique, then, these politicians see a critique of political actors; where she construes a far-reaching ‘experiential’ satirical target (to use Simpson’s, 2003: 71, terminology), they construe ‘personal’ targets. Construed in this narrower fashion, *TTOI* can safely be mobilised by mainstream “establishment” politicians to criticise political opponents. In this regard, Bailey (2011) makes an important point about the folk theories of politics that critics impute to satirical discourse:

What audiences take from a television programme, film or book is notoriously hard to capture or comprehend and even where this has been attempted – via ethnographic studies – open to criticism of implicit and explicit bias. It is also not true that because a text can be understood in one particular way that that is the end of the matter – critical reception from newspaper reviews for instance may differ in many respects from wider audience reception. (Bailey, 2011: 293)

Certainly, Basu’s (2014) radical reading of *TTOI* is one interpretation of the television series, but other interpretations of what the show is about – its satirical “gist” – are available. *TTOI* is a discourse that proceeds over four series and two special episodes. It is therefore a complex and protracted series of discourse events that involves the creation of literally thousands of text-world structures in the minds of its audience. From this perspective there is no reason to suppose that the television series cannot be “about” *both* the systematic, structural failures of liberal democracy *and* the personal and professional failings of political agents. Returning to Miliband’s comments on the 2012 budget, his use of the term ‘omnishambles’ is an intertextual reference to a specific scene in the show in which Tucker is attacking Murray for being useless. The scene is “about” professional and political

incompetence – ‘from bean to cup, [Murray] fucks up’ – rather than the systemic scourge of “spin” and the corrupt intermingling of journalistic and political structures. Miliband’s ‘omnishambles’ reference, then, profiles a particular text-world of the show in which the character’s incompetence is the topic, not political structures. Indeed, if one were to view contemporary politics as essentially ‘a decent activity, pursued by honourable people, to the benefit of the electorate’ (Blears, 2008), there is no reason to suppose that one *would* see the systemic critique of liberal democracy that Basu (2014) advances – the show would instead be experienced as a series of text-worlds of the kind Miliband references. The point, here, is not to suggest that more radical readings of *TTOI* are wrong, but rather to say that the targets of satire depend very much on the audience’s apprehension of the context in which it is received, circulated and later mobilised as a resource – as an example, in the Aristotelian sense – in public discourse. Basu (2014) maps *TTOI* against her model of the discourse-world and the politicians do so against theirs. The incorporation of *TTOI* into institutionalised political discourse is only ironic if one already adheres to Basu’s (2014) structural critique of liberal democracy. What is actually at stake here, then, is this apprehension of the discourse-world – the disagreement between Basu (2014) and the politicians is about the successes and failures of liberal democracy. Although on the surface the contest seems to be related to what *TTOI* is “actually” about, the *inverse* is true: in both instances the show is mobilised as a resource to make implicit claims about the discourse-world – Basu (2014) uses the show to make a claim that political structures and the journalistic institutions that are meant to scrutinise them comprise an ‘apparatus’, whereas politicians use the show to make claims about their opponents’ incompetence which implicitly rule out more radical interpretations of what *TTOI* is satirising. As in the case of historical analogy and metaphor, then, these kinds of fictional example involve a particular construal of both the source and target frames and it is on the basis of these implicit construals that the fictional example is either accepted or rejected.

5.8 Summary

This chapter has argued that examples rely on our cognitive ability to map counterpart connections between disparate domains of human experience. The process has been exemplified by reference to historical analogies, metaphor and the mapping of fictional text-worlds – such as the text-worlds of *TTOI* – onto real-life target situations. Musolff (2016: 37–88) suggests that ‘a salient characteristic of metaphor use in political discourse’ is the ‘highly economical use of source domain

material'. Certainly this was true in the case of Osborne's various uses of the 'fix the roof while the sun is shining' metaphor, where the same aspects of source domain conceptual structure were repeatedly mapped onto the target. However, mappings such as Wright's historical analogy between Jeremy Corbyn and George Lansbury were highly elaborate. For this reason, it was suggested that we should model the conceptual structures involved using ideas and concepts from Text World Theory. Indeed, Text World Theory provides a principled, text-driven model for how it is discourse participants increment long-term frame knowledge into a discourse in order to construct shorter-term, ad hoc mental representations of the text – that is, in order to construct text-worlds. Thus, Text World Theory provides a framework for understanding how different aspects of the source-frame are incremented into the source-world, a conceptual "lens" through which the target-world is viewed (Werth, 1994). This construal itself functions as a way of profiling some aspects of the target frame.

It was on this basis that a model for resisting the conceptual mappings that comprise rhetorical example was outlined. If source-worlds construe both the source-frame and the target-frame (i.e. they construct the target-world) in some way, then resistance to the mapping can proceed on two bases: either audiences can reject the construal the example places on the target-frame; or they can reject the construal the example places on the source-frame. So, Danny Blanchflower resists Osborne's credit card metaphor because it only profiles certain aspects of the target-frame (the liabilities of the national debt and not the assets), and the MPs resist the 'fixing the roof' metaphor because it fails to increment important source-frame structure into the source-world (such as the foundations of the metaphorical structure). In their own contributions, these discourse participants either create a new metaphor that they feel more aptly construes the target-frame (as in the Blanchflower example), or increment new, additional conceptual structure from the source-frame into the source-world (as in the Labour MPs who wanted to fix the foundations and the SNP MP who wanted the sun to shine on everybody). In all these instances, resisting the metaphor was predicated on a preferred alternative construal of source- and target-frame which differed from that offered by the speaker or writer. This was also reflected in the discussion of how academics, journalists and parliamentarians talk about *TTOI*. In using *TTOI* as an example in their speeches, MPs demonstrated both an alternative construal of the satirical "gist" of the show – that is, the source – alongside an alternative construal of the strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary liberal democracy – the target – to academic critics of the show (such as Bailey, 2011; Basu, 2014; Fielding, 2014; and Randall, 2011). Alongside the enthymeme, the example is an argument from logos. Although the enthymeme is more closely related to the deductive style of

reasoning associated with the philosophical syllogism, and the example is more closely related to inductive forms of argument from experience, what this chapter and the last demonstrate is that both rely on a shared understanding of the context – which has been modelled via the notion of the frame – for their success. Thus, from a cognitive perspective, the appeal to logos is grounded in the experiential, embodied knowledge of the discourse participants.

PART III

Pathos

Rhetorical ambience

6.1 Introduction

The final appeal in the orator's rhetorical arsenal is to *pathos*. This persuasive strategy is related to the audience's emotional dispositions – how it is the orator might harness the feelings of the audience so as to move them to agreement. Quintilian points to the difficulty of using this kind of argument:

Throughout the whole of any cause... there is room to address the feelings. The nature of the feelings is varied, and not to be treated cursorily; nor does the whole art of oratory present any subject that requires greater study... certainly there are, and always have been, no small number of pleaders who could find out, with sufficient skill, whatever would be of service to establish proofs; and such men I do not despise, though I consider that their ability extends no further than to the communication of instruction to the judge... but such as can seize the attention of the judge, and lead him to whatever frame of mind he desires, forcing him to weep or feel angry as their words influence him, are but rarely to be found. But it is this power that is supreme in causes; it is this that makes eloquence effective.
(Quintilian, VI.2, 2–4)

Despite the difficulties in making this appeal, without it, he adds, 'everything else is bare and meagre, weak and unattractive' (Quintilian, VI.2, 7). The ability to emotionally move an audience – to lead them to 'whatever frame of mind [the speaker] desires' – is certainly a rare one. From the perspective of audience reception, however, emotional responses are ubiquitous. We frequently exclaim at the television or throw down our newspapers when politicians and journalists say or write things with which we disagree. This chapter examines these more quotidian emotional responses to political rhetoric. First, the cognitive psychological work on emotions is outlined (Section 6.2) and compared to the extant research on affect in political discourse analysis (Section 6.3). In light of this review, it is argued that in order to model audience's emotional responses to political text and talk, analysts need to be sensitive to the knowledge discourse participants bring with them to the discourse. With this in mind, Sections 6.4–7 outline a framework for examining the emotional effects of political discourse based on Stockwell's (2014b) model of literary 'ambience'. It is then applied to the reader response data analysed in

Chapter 4. Using Stockwell's (2009) 'attention-resonance' model, Chapter 7 moves on from an analysis of these "everyday" emotional responses to examine the kind of rhetorical effects Quintilian describes – the rarefied and dramatic emotional responses that are presumably intended by the speaker.

6.2 Affect and emotion

The notion of affect covers a number of subjective feeling states that range over different periods of time. Oatley and Johnson-Laird (2014: 137) suggest experiential timescales for these states: fleeting affective physiological changes are experienced in seconds; the cognisant, self-aware experience of emotion (for example, anger, happiness, sadness, frustration) ranges from minutes to days; moods (such as being grumpy, irritable or melancholy) from hours to weeks; psychological illnesses (like depression or mania) from weeks to a lifetime; and personality traits from years to a whole lifetime. This chapter focuses on emotions because these are the shorter term affective responses likely to be triggered by audiences' engagement with an orator (although the permanent affective responses to 'resonant' rhetoric are the subject of Chapter 7). Given the focus on persuasion, this book takes a broadly Aristotelian approach to emotions:

Emotions are those things by the alteration of which men differ with regard to those judgements which pain and pleasure accompany, such as anger, pity, fear and all other such and their opposites. One must in each case divide the discussion into three parts. Take the case of anger. We must say what state men are in when they are angry, with what people they are accustomed to be angry and in what circumstances. (*Rhetoric*, II.1, 1378a)

Emotions in this account are linked to 'judgements'. In contemporary emotion theory, this view is closest to appraisal theories of emotion (Lazarus, 1999: 5; Oatley and Johnson Laird, 2014: 134; for an overview of appraisal theories, see Moors et al., 2013). Indeed, Lyons (1999) traces the philosophical history of such 'causal-evaluative' theories of emotion from Aristotle all the way to the present. Like Aristotle (*Rhetoric* II.1, 1378a), who splits the experience of having an emotion into three parts,

appraisal theories are componential theories in that they view an emotional episode as involving changes in a number of organismic subsystems or components. Components include an appraisal component with evaluations of the environment and the person-environment interaction; a motivational component with action tendencies or other forms of action readiness; a somatic component with peripheral physiological responses; a motor component with expressive and instrumental behaviour; and a feeling component with subjective experience of feelings. (Moors et al., 2013: 119–120)

As one might expect, the first notion of ‘appraisal’ is particularly important to appraisal theories. Frijda (1998: 349) argues that ‘emotions arise in response to the meaning structures of given situations; different emotions arise in response to different meaning structures’. Emotions are tied to the meanings we attach to the situation we are in; they are a ‘cognitive appraisal of that situation’ (Lazarus, 1999: 9). This cognitive appraisal is oriented to the ‘concerns’ of the individual experiencing the emotion, or, as Frijda (1998: 351) puts it ‘emotions arise in response to events that are important to the individual’s goals, motives, or concerns’. That Frijda (1998: 351) defines these concerns in terms of ‘a more or less enduring disposition to prefer particular states of the world’ is important when considered in relation to the notion advanced in Chapter 4 of a ‘proffered world’; one might assume that a mismatch between a proffered world and the audience member’s preferred ‘state of the world’ would trigger an emotional response. This point is explored further in the next section. For now, it suffices to say that the position taken in this chapter is that emotions are the complement of cognitions; ‘the key role in emotion is played by cognitive appraisal, an evaluation that depends on motivation and yields personal meaning’ (Lazarus, 1999: 9). This is a central assumption of the theoretical framework to emotion and political rhetoric outlined in Sections 6.4–7, below.

Emotions, then, are situated experiences that happen when we evaluate our surroundings in accordance with our preferences. That is an explanation of when emotions happen, but not what they are. There are three main categories of approach that model the structure of emotion (Dillard and Meijnders, 2002). In the first category are bipolar models (see Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999, for a review). The starting point of these approaches is that words like ‘fear’, ‘joy’, and ‘anger’ comprise a folk terminology and folk psychology of emotion and that we need a more precise, scientific mode of description (Russell, 2003: 145). Emotions are instead positioned on a bipolar cline and described in terms of their positive or negative valence. This bipolar perspective does not deny the complexity of emotion or that there are other dimensions that feed into the structure of affect, but that this is – for the sake of scientific analysis – the most parsimonious way of describing affective states. For instance, Watson et al. (1999: 836) write that ‘the evidence does not establish that [negative affect] and [positive affect] are the only “basic” dimensions’ but they ‘are extremely useful explanatory constructs that help to clarify important properties of mood ratings and that reflect more general biobehavioural systems’. These approaches have been criticised for themselves adopting the “folk” view that emotions exist in opposition with one another; that is, that happiness (an emotion with a positive valence) is necessarily the opposite of sadness (negative valence) (for an overview of these arguments, and supporting evidence for the bipolar view, see Russell and Carroll, 1999). Larsen et al. (2001) advance a bivalent model of emotion which says that we can experience both positive and negative emotions at the same time. Within these positive and

negative valency models, there is thus a further bifurcation between bivalent and bipolar approaches.

The second category of models is two-dimensional, rather than bipolar or bivalent. One of the best examples of this category is Russell's (2003) 'core affect' model. According to this model, 'core affect is that neurophysiological state consciously accessible as the simplest raw (non-reflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions,' it is 'primitive, universal and simple (irreducible on the mental plane)' and 'it can exist without being labelled, interpreted or attributed to any cause' (Russell, 2003: 148). Core affect is organised along two dimensions: pleasure-displeasure and activation-deactivation (see Figure 6.1) and is a continuous feature of our everyday lives (Russell, 2003: 148). Accordingly, it can at all times be plotted along these axes. Changes in our core affect are in response to stimuli, or 'perception of affective quality' (Russell, 2003: 148). Such changes partly constitute an emotional episode. These episodes consist of a number of components: core affect, the perception of affective quality, the attribution of this affective quality to an object in the environment, a cognisant appraisal of the environment, an action (such as fleeing or laughing), an emotional meta- experience (we notice that we are afraid, or that we feel happy), and maybe an attempt to regulate or control our emotions. Crucially, emotions are 'psychologically constructed' (Russell, 2003: 151). We try to fit the total, holistic experience of these different affective components into a framework of prototypical emotion categories. Thus 'an *emotional episode* is an event that counts as a member of an emotion category, such as that labelled *fear*. A prototypical emotion episode is an event that counts as an excellent member' (Russell, 2003: 151, emphasis in original). According to his view, then, the change in our core affect and the processes this triggers are categorised according to a pre-existing prototype. It is therefore possible, as in Figure 6.1, to place these emotion prototypes on the twin axes of pleasure-displeasure and activation-deactivation. Thus, Russell's (2003) model seemingly integrates supposedly "folk" categories of emotion with more parsimonious scalar approaches.

The final category consists of 'basic' emotion models. Ekman and Cordoro (2011) suggest that calling emotions 'basic' implies two things. The first is that 'emotions are discrete' and 'that they can be distinguished fundamentally from one another' (Ekman and Cordoro, 2011: 364). This is in contrast to the bipolar/bivalent and core affect models, which place emotions on a cline. The second thing that often characterises basic emotion approaches is 'the view that emotions have evolved through adaptations to our surroundings' (Ekman and Cordoro, 2011: 364). Elsewhere, Ekman (1999: 45) notes that 'to identify separate discrete emotions does not necessarily require that one take an evolutionary view of emotions,' however, such a view is often presupposed by advocates of this model (Ekman, 1999; Ekman and Cordoro, 2011; Lazarus, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). From this perspective, emotions are related to reflexes and physiological drives. Whereas




Figure 6.1 Russell's (2003) 'core affect' model

reflexes involve rigid, predetermined responses to specific external stimuli, emotions allow us to respond to complex situations with some degree of control and variability. Emotions therefore yield adaptive evolutionary advantages:

Instead of surviving and flourishing because of a built-in programme of adaptive reactions for every specific environmental condition, more advanced species survived by learning how to deal with their environments and mobilising accordingly. Increasingly, judgement took over from innate reflexes, and emotions – drawing upon both motives and thought – have become the key adaptational process intervening between environmental challenges and actions (Tomkins, 1962).
(Smith and Lazarus, 1990: 612)

Central to this view is the idea of 'judgement' and dealing with the environment. For this reason, basic emotion models are very closely linked to appraisal theory. Indeed, discrete emotions are often defined in relation to the patterns of appraisal they involve, with different emotions involving different components of appraisal (Lazarus, 1991; Smith and Lazarus, 1990). For instance, a situation that induces anger is appraised as 'motivationally relevant' (following Frijda, 1998, we see the situation as relevant to our personal goals in some way), 'motivationally incongruent' (it thwarts those goals), and somebody else is appraised as responsible for that motivational incongruence (Smith and Lazarus, 1990: 619). What Lazarus (1991) and Smith and Lazarus (1990) call the 'core relational theme' of anger is therefore

‘other-blame’. Different core relational themes distinguish different emotions. For instance, it is the sense that somebody else is responsible for the motivational incongruence that separates anger from guilt, which has a core relational theme of self-blame (Smith and Lazarus, 1990: 619).

All three of these models of the structure of affect – bipolar/bivalent, two-dimensional, and discrete – have been used in the analysis of emotion in a political context (see Hullet et al., 2003, for an overview). Arguably, however, the bipolar approach, whilst delivering parsimony and analytical economy to the experimental psychologist, is too course-grained a perspective to adopt in the analysis of rhetorical effects. The assignation of emotions as either positive or negative tells us little about the feelings of audience members and the kinds of rhetorical strategy that might have induced those feelings in them. In this respect, the basic emotions approach is perhaps more useful because a description of what kind of appraisal caused the emotion is fundamental to defining the emotion itself. Indeed, as Smith and Lazarus (1990: 617) point out, their approach is very similar to Aristotle’s, who provides an account of the situational triggers for anger, calm, friendship/enmity, fear/confidence, shame, favour, pity, indignation, envy, and jealousy (*Rhetoric*, II.1–11). On this level, such a situated view of emotion does not seem so irreconcilable with Russell’s (2003) core affect model. If emotion prototypes are used to categorise emotion episodes, then the prototypes themselves must arise from regularities in our affective experience; that is, the prototype is a product of a variety of similar situated experiences. For Lazarus (1991, 1999) and Frijda (1998), there is no emotion without cognitive appraisal. In Russell’s (2003) model, however, cognitions play a less dominant role than in basic emotion models: ‘core affect can be experienced in relation to no known stimulus’ (2003: 148). This difference makes basic emotion models a better candidate for analysing rhetorical effects because the focus in this chapter is on how audiences respond emotionally to political texts. In this instance, there is always a phenomenon which is appraised and which acts as the stimulus for an emotional episode: the speaker and what they say. Indeed, an analysis of pathos in political rhetoric which is oriented to audience response is fundamentally a reconstruction of the discourse structures that were appraised by the audience (and the emotions that were consequently induced).

6.3 Emotion in Political Discourse Analysis

Given the centrality of cognition in the emotion research described above, one might expect cognitive approaches in CDA to be the most productive place to look for a discourse-oriented analysis of emotion in political rhetoric. Whilst

discussion of emotive language is certainly a feature of the literature, it is only in a few instances theorised with any systematicity (see below). This is perhaps a consequence of the way in which cognition is approached as a social phenomenon. Van Dijk (2009) explains that

beside the fundamental interface of personal mental models that account for specific discourses, a cognitive approach also needs to account for social cognition, that is, beliefs or social representations they share with others of their group or community. Knowledge, attitudes, values, norms and ideologies are different types of social representations. (Van Dijk, 2009: 78)

A result of this perspective is that '[Critical Discourse Studies] is not primarily interested in the subjective meanings or experiences of individual language users' (Van Dijk, 2009: 78). Such a view has corollaries. Van Dijk (1998: 62) writes elsewhere that 'since emotions... are strictly personal and contextual, they cannot be part of socially shared, abstract group attitudes'. If, on the one hand, we define emotion as 'personal', and on the other we treat as irrelevant the 'subjective meanings and experiences of individual language users', then we rule out the analysis of emotion in political discourse by definition. But emotion is a ubiquitous aspect of our quotidian experience of politics. This view therefore seems unnecessarily narrow. Indeed, even on the level of groups, emotion is still relevant. Van Dijk's (1998: 62) use of the adjective 'abstract' is significant here. We represent social categories schematically (see Chapter 3). This includes schemata for the in-groups with which we identify. These cognitive representations are far from abstract, but experientially grounded. Our perception of belonging to a group is a corollary of engaging – sometimes on a daily, hourly, or even moment-by-moment basis – in the social practices and shared interests of that group (Wenger, 1998). If in-groups are collections of individuals with shared interests, and 'emotions arise in response to events that are important to the individual's goals, motives, or concerns' (Frijda, 1998: 351), then it is logical that those social practices will involve a shared emotional content. Van Dijk (1998: 62) writes that 'it is highly unlikely that there are groups all of whose members are constantly emotionally aroused about some issue'. This is obviously true, but it does not rule out an emotional component to our self- and other-schemata that becomes more or less salient in different contexts.

In fact, more recently, Van Dijk (2014) has drawn on the work of Barsalou (2008) and Zwaan (2004) to suggest that the cognitive models involved in discourse comprehension can have emotional dimensions: 'they not only represent our knowledge of an event, *but may also feature our evaluative personal opinion or emotions about an event*' (Van Dijk, 2014: 124, my emphasis). This approach seems far more productive and more sensitive to the embodied, experiential origins of conceptual structures. From this perspective, the schematisation of our embodied

experiences produces knowledge structures that are imbued with the emotional content of the events from which they have been abstracted. It is for this reason, perhaps, that work on emotion in political discourse has often involved discussion of metaphor. Metaphors are a way of “importing”, so to speak, the emotional content of one situation into another:

Metaphor is effective in public communication because it draws on the unconscious emotional associations of words and assumed values that are rooted in cultural and historical knowledge. For this reason it has potential as a highly persuasive force and activates unconscious, often mythic, knowledge to influence our intellectual and emotional responses by evaluating actions, actors and issues. (Charteris-Black, 2014: 160)

This view of metaphor resonates with the situated, discrete view of emotions outlined in the previous section. Indeed, one could reframe Charteris-Black’s (2014) comment that metaphor influences ‘our intellectual and emotional responses by evaluating actions, actors and issues’ by saying that metaphor encourages us to activate the same patterns of appraisal that are normally used in a different context. This is a notion to which Sections 6.4–7 return, below, in the outline of a framework for analysing emotion in political rhetoric.

Although the appeal to pathos in the general sense has not been the object of systematic analysis in discourse analysis, one emotion that has been theorised rather extensively is fear and the associated feeling of being threatened, particularly in the work of Cap (2013; 2015; 2017). Cap’s ‘proximization’ model draws quite extensively on Chilton’s (2004) cognitive approach to political discourse. Both researchers use spatial metaphors to describe the conceptual models underpinning political discourse. In these models, the speaker or writer projects a deictic centre. Entities, objects, and concepts that are positively viewed are placed deictically “closer” to the self, whereas those are negatively evaluated are placed further from the speaker or writer’s deictic centre, towards the Other (Chilton, 2004: 57–61). Proximization is the process by which negatively evaluated entities, objects, or concepts are brought from the periphery of the deictic space to the centre, or are represented by the speaker as advancing from the periphery towards the centre (Cap, 2013, 2015). This discursive strategy is ‘meant to evoke closeness of the external threat in order to solicit legitimization of preventive measures’ (Cap, 2015: 315). Again, there are similarities with basic emotion theory. Although Cap (2013; 2015) characterises fear on the basis of a conceptual schema, the schema itself involves an evaluation of the entities involved and is therefore not unlike the appraisal patterns involved in the approach of Lazarus (1991) or Smith and Lazarus (1991).

Although extant approaches to emotion appeals in political discourse are quite easily mapped onto the emotion research from cognitive psychology, there

are important differences between the two research contexts. The foremost of these is that an appeal to the audience's emotions in political rhetoric is precisely that: *an appeal*. Audiences are not responding to their own appraisals of a real-world situation, but rather the appraisal encoded in a speaker's text-world representation. Indeed, for this reason there must be two ontological levels on which appraisals happen in discourse: the first relates to the text-world proffered by the speaker or writer, i.e. the way in which the speaker or writer appraises the events depicted in the text-world they proffer; and the second relates to the audiences' appraisal of the speaker, i.e. the way in which the audience evaluates the speaker's act of proffering the text-world in the context of their discourse-world 'concerns' (Fridja's, 1998). The first of these levels involves an emotional response to the text-world representation of the speaker, the second to the speaker themselves. Existing work on emotion in political discourse analysis has tended to focus on the first of these levels – on the representations of (proximal) in- and (distal) out-group members in the text-worlds described by the speaker or writer and the emotions these representations are *meant* to evoke in audiences. This focus on the proffered text-world, rather than the discourse event as a whole, has meant a neglect of the ways in which appeals to pathos are preconditioned by the audience's pre-existing knowledge and experience.

Given the two levels on which appraisals might operate in discourse, one can say that pre-existing knowledge and experience conditions the affective response of audiences in two directions. The first relates to the kinds of representations of reality that speakers or writers proffer compared to the representations favoured by audiences. We do not always need to know that a speaker is a member of a left, liberal, or right-wing political party to recognise that the representation they proffer is associated with a particular ideological perspective. For instance, audiences with a degree of prior knowledge know that in the present British political context calls to reduce spending on social security are forms of rhetoric associated more closely with the political right. As such, representations of reality are often already associated with political actors with whom the audience may identify, or who constitute an out-group. It therefore follows that the act of representing is one that can automatically entail an emotional response because all representations of reality are potentially political and all participants bring their own representation of reality to the discourse. Thus, if a proffered representation conflicts with the audience member's own, there is more than just a dispassionate clash of analysis at stake, but a clash of identity too.

The second form of knowledge relates to the character schema audiences associate with the speaker before the discourse has even begun. In the literature on emotion and political discourse cited above, the speaker or writer constructs a positive self-representation which includes the audience, and this forms the

basis for self-directed positive emotional evaluation and other-directed negative emotional evaluation. However, an attempt at friendly ingratiation with an audience that is predisposed to be hostile could well be received as inappropriate and result in an even angrier response to the speaker. The way a speaker attempts to construct an interpersonal relationship is therefore an important part of the audience's emotional reaction to the speaker because social relationships often entail an affective component. There are, therefore, *two* dimensions along which audience's emotional responses are determined in discourse. The first relates to the representation the speaker proffers – how it confirms or challenges the audience members' privileged representation of reality – and the second relates to the speaker themselves – the way in which they construct and lay claim to an interpersonal relationship with their audience. Though they are clearly related, these are slightly different objects of analysis. It is possible to accept the speaker's claim that they are part of an in-group, but reject the representation of reality they proffer. Indeed, this is fundamental to any debate about the strategy of a political institution, like a party or trade union – all members of the debate must in some sense feel part of an in-group (they all pay membership fees, campaign for the party/union, and participate in shared institutional cultures and practices), but for there to be a debate at all requires that different members of the in-group see the world differently. For this reason, depending on the closeness and coherence of the group, such a debate is liable to have its own emotional dynamic. The converse is also true; we can loathe speakers without rejecting the representation they proffer. Indeed, this experience could produce in us emotional feelings of discomfort. The interpersonal, the representational, and their interrelation, then, are either missing or conflated in extant accounts of emotion in political discourse. The following section argues that Stockwell's (2014b) notion of literary 'ambience' integrates these different facets of emotional experience and uses it to advance the concept of 'rhetorical ambience'.

6.4 Ambience

Stockwell (2014b) defines ambience as the 'cumulative but diffused associations' that audiences make as they engage in a discourse; it is the cloud of connotative meanings and feelings – the 'halo of associations' (Stockwell, 2014b: 365) – that the text evokes in the minds of audience members. He separates ambience into two components, atmosphere and tone. His treatment of these concepts is addressed to their use in literary criticism, which is reflected in the definitions he provides for them: 'atmosphere pertains to the perceived quality of the literary world from a readerly perspective, whereas tone pertains to the quality of the

mediating authorial or narrative voice' (Stockwell, 2009: 362). Reframed from a broader non-literary perspective, atmosphere can be defined as the perceived quality of the proffered text-world, whereas tone can be defined as the perceived quality of the speaker or writer's voice. This distinction maps onto the distinction made in the previous section between the audience's emotional response to the speaker themselves (tone), and the audience's emotional reaction to the text-world representation the speaker or writer proffers (atmosphere). Alongside their superordinate term, 'ambience', these concepts are useful for describing the appeal to pathos because they often collocate with abstract nouns or adjectives possessing an 'emotional or aesthetic quality' (Stockwell, 2014b: 361). Thus, text-worlds might have a tense, frightening, happy, or hopeful atmosphere, and speakers or writers a relaxed, aggressive, sympathetic, or dismissive tone. To speak of textual ambience is therefore to make some comment on the feelings that the text rouses in its audience. Considered in the light of traditional rhetorical categories and the context of political discourse, then, ambience is intimately connected to the political orator's appeal to pathos. In the following Sections (6.5–7), a more detailed theoretical discussion of tone and atmosphere is offered. Section 6.8 then analyses audience responses to Theresa May's speech to the 2015 Conservative Party conference in light of its ambient effects.

6.5 Tone

In Stockwell's (2014b) account, tone is a property of the narrative or poetic voice. Insofar as this maps onto the political context, we can say that tone is a property of the orator's voice – the way in which they position themselves in relation to their audience. It is therefore closely connected to the orator's appeal to ethos. For this reason, in accordance with the framework set out in Chapter 3 – and following Van Dijk (2014) – tone is here defined as the emotional component of a speaker's performance model. This cognitive approach differs from the one suggested by Stockwell (2014b). Following Ingarden's (1973) distinction between autonomous and heteronomous objects, Stockwell (2014b) suggests that tone is an autonomous phenomenon; it can be described 'without special peculiar reference to the observing consciousness' (Stockwell, 2014b: 362). For this reason, he suggests that tone is more amenable to traditional text-stylistic approaches. A fundamental tenet of cognitive linguistics, however, is that meanings are embodied – they are situated in minds. Insofar as tone is specifically concerned, the speaker or writer's tone is always perceived *by someone*. Indeed, tones can be perceived differently by different people. What sounds angry or irritable to one person can sound passionate to another. Disparities in the way tone is perceived can be politi-

cal. Where men are seen as confident, women are often accused of being bossy or aggressive for adopting the same linguistic behaviours (see, for instance, Sunderland, 2011: 190–214). To account for these differences, the analysis of tone offered in Section 6.8 will adapt the model advanced in Chapter 3. Tones can be perceived differently because the meaning potentials we attach to the linguistic indices comprising the performance model are integrated with respect to our character schema for the speaker or writer. This accounts for why sexist audiences might call a man's linguistic behaviour confident and a woman's aggressive, even if those behaviours are identical. The behaviours receive their salience and indexical value in relation to the (ideological) character schemata to which the audience already adheres. The perception of tone, then, is a function of the interaction of conceptual models – it is the affective product of the conceptual ecology of ethos. To return to the example of Chapter 3, some people are not only unconvinced by Russell Brand's performance of a carefree but intelligent cockney, he *irritates* them. Similarly, in Chapter 2, Danny's performance of a Yorkshire identity not only signalled his affiliation with some of his *YouTube* audience, it caused them to have an emotional, nostalgic reaction. This is what is meant when tone is defined as the affective component of a performance model; it is an emotional orientation to the speaker based on the performance model audiences construct from the bricolage of linguistic indices they hear or see.

6.6 Atmosphere

Atmosphere is heteronomous insofar as it is a quality of a text-world, which is itself the product of an interaction between the text and an observing consciousness (Stockwell, 2014b: 362). Whereas tone is the affective component of our online representations of people (i.e. speakers and writers), atmosphere is thus the emotional quality we associate with representations of situations. As Stockwell (2014b) points out, Halliday and Hasan's (1976) concept of register is a suggestive starting point for an analysis of atmosphere. Registers are lexicogrammatical patterns that regularly co-occur with a specific situational context. Of course, being in different situations also invokes in us different emotions – we feel sad at funerals, nervous at job interviews, happy at birthday parties, a sense of romance on a date etc.

A cognitive approach deals well with this relationship between the emotional content of a situation and the linguistic forms associated with it. As was argued in Chapter 1, linguistic meaning is embodied and experiential. If all linguistic forms are derived from use in a concrete situation, then it makes sense to say that on some level of specificity they are all associated with a particular situation and, importantly, the emotions that situation might entail. Stockwell (2014b) uses the

example of a 'knelling' bell in Seamus Heaney's poem 'Mid-term break'. Although it is used to describe the tolling of a college bell, the verb 'knell' strongly connotes a funeral (a 'death knell' is the chiming of a funeral bell). This is a strong prototypical association between a linguistic form and a context – knell is prototypical of the kind of language one might encounter in the description of a funeral – which creates a particular, maudlin atmosphere in the poem. However, Stockwell (2014) also argues that the repetition of less prototypically associative diction can produce a more delicate sense of atmosphere. Stockwell (2014b) models this idea with Langacker's (2008: 84) twin concepts of a 'reference point' and its 'dominion'. Langacker (2008) writes:

we have the ability to invoke the conception of one entity in order to establish mental contact with another. The entity first invoked is called a reference point, and one accessed via a reference point is referred to as a target. A particular reference point affords potential access to many different targets. Collectively, this set of potential targets constitutes the reference point's dominion.

(Langacker, 2008: 83–84)

The model captures how it is language users construct meaning online, in dynamic, sequential fashion. Stockwell (2014b: 367) points out that 'the reference point of an entity often provides the attentional starting point conceptually in a clause', a starting point from which any number of targets – associated with any number of contexts – may follow. The dominion of a linguistic form constitutes a cloud of meaning potentials that might be realised in the subsequent co-text, or, as Stockwell (2014b: 367) puts it, 'a sort of aura of latent associations around the symbolic unit that become available for quick resolution, depending on the immediately following text'. Only one of these potential targets is ever realised, but Stockwell (2014b) suggests that these unrealised collocates form a delicate haze of associations around the language used by the speaker or writer. In addition to using diction that strongly connotes another context, atmosphere can also be created by failing to realise a set of semantically associated targets that fall within the dominion of the text. Thus, atmosphere can also be defined by what is recurrently called to mind but missing from the text itself.

There are further productive comparisons to be made between this account of atmosphere and cognitive approaches to metaphor. In the Heaney poem, a student sits in the college sick bay listening to the bells that signal the end of class. 'Knell' connoted a different, funereal situation to the college context inhabited by the poetic voice of the poem. Use of the verb facilitated an emotional transfer from the context of funerals, to the college situation to produce the text's maudlin atmosphere. Chapter 5 described how metaphors import the experiential logic of a source domain to represent the target domain. Metaphor is therefore

an important resource for building arguments from logos. Clearly, though, as observed in Section 6.3, metaphors also involve a connotative and affective transfer, hence their much noted use in political discourse as a resource for rousing emotions (Charteris-Black, 2014: 207). Using a metaphor is thus a more explicit way of creating an atmosphere than the repeated non-realisation of a set of semantically linked targets. Both are functionally of the same order of phenomenon; they involve some emotional transfer from one domain of human experience to another even if different linguistic means are used to achieve this effect (indeed, it should also be noted that metaphors themselves can be more or less foregrounded or backgrounded in the discourse by the different linguistic forms used to realise them, see Browse [2014, 2016], Sullivan [2014] and Stockwell [1992, 1994, 2002]). Alongside connotative diction and the non-realisation of semantically linked targets, then, metaphor should be added as a means by which an atmosphere is generated in discourse.

6.7 Rhetorical ambience

The foregoing discussion has been summarised in Figure 6.2. The diagram depicts the bifurcation of ambience between tone and atmosphere. The affective component of tone can be realised in two ways. The first is that there is congruence between the audience's character schema and performance model for the speaker (which has been called 'ecological congruence' on the diagram, given the outline of the conceptual ecology of ethos in Chapter 3). In these situations, the speaker/writer adopts an interpersonal tone that lives up to our expectations of them. The usual affective component of the character schema is therefore realised in the performance model the audience creates for the speaker. If an audience member usually, say, dislikes, likes, loves, hates, or finds a speaker amusing, they will continue to do so. The second way in which the affective component of tone might be realised is if there is incongruence between the audience's character schema and performance model for the speaker/writer – if the speaker/writer adopts a tone that upsets our expectations of them, perhaps indexing a more aggressive, more passive, or more carefree disposition than usual. This is liable to cause some revision in the emotions we feel towards them. We might intensify an emotional reaction we already had ('I disliked that politician before, but now I really hate them!'), or change our affective orientation towards that person altogether ('I used to dislike that politician, but now they're not so bad'). Of course, in this process some degree of what Garfinkel (1967) calls 'ad hocing' takes place. That is, some audience members might explain unusual linguistic behaviour by reference to the circumstances in which the speaker performs and "pass up" responsibility for this anomaly to either the narrator of the discourse (they might say 'they were edited

to look that way’) or the implied author (‘somebody else told them to say that’), as per the processes depicted in Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. This is also likely to produce an emotional reaction, but one directed at a more diffuse set of agents (i.e. whoever is deemed responsible for the anomaly). It has also been noted on the diagram that we can think of tone as a cline, ranging from marked to unmarked. If we are unused to hearing a speaker adopt a certain tone, then that tone will be more salient and contribute to a more intense sense of ambience. Conversely, if a speaker adopts their usual tone, it may still have ambient effects, but these will be less foregrounded.




Figure 6.2 Dimensions of rhetorical ambience

Turning to the bottom half of the diagram, the atmosphere of a discourse can be realised in three different ways, all of which are points on a cline which ranges from a weakly to a strongly evoked sense of atmosphere. At the weaker end, atmosphere is generated by the peripheral connotations of linguistic forms. By this, it is meant the unrealised set of semantically associated targets that fall within the dominion of the text. More strongly, atmosphere can be created using linguistic forms that are more centrally associated with other domains of human activity, as in Stockwell’s (2014b) ‘knell’ example. Finally, the emotional content of a particular situation might be directly and more explicitly imported into the current discourse by using a metaphor. Of course, both halves of the diagram interact to produce ambience. For instance, it was suggested above that a speaker’s unmarked tone might produce less ambient effects than a marked tone. However, if, say, we are used to a speaker adopting a serious tone whilst they describe serious events, then using the same tone to proffer a text-world with an absurd or surreal atmosphere is likely

to intensify the ambient sense of levity. Similarly, hearing children proffer sinister and frightening text-worlds increases the sense of horror because of the interplay between childish tone and chilling atmosphere. It is in the interaction of these components, then, that ambience is produced. In the next section, this framework is used to analyse the ambient effects of Theresa May's speech to the 2015 Conservative Party alongside the audience's affective responses.

6.8 Ambience and affect in immigration rhetoric

Responses to May's speech were all highly emotional with participants numerous reporting feelings of anger:

- (1) I feel angry. (Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (2) I'm beginning to feel angry as I'm reading.
(Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (3) This makes me angry. (Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (4) I feel alienated and hostile. (Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (5) This also makes me angry. (Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (6) I feel like if i wasn't doing this survey I would have stopped reading this as it's too infuriating. (Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 11)

In (4), Participant 11 notes that they feel 'alienated' and later says that '[I] get the distinct impression I am not the target audience for this speech' (Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 6). The Idealised Common Ground presupposed by May's speech models the mind of someone who belongs to the participant's out-group, which is a source of discomfort for Participant 11. This mirrors the suggestion made above, in Section 6.6, that when a proffered text-world clashes with the audience's representation of reality, it is likely to induce an emotional reaction. In (6), Participant 8 even suggests this encounter was 'infuriating'. This sentiment is echoed by Participant 2 in their response to Paragraph 2, who says 'this paragraph makes me feel frustrated'. Feelings of anger and frustration are also expressed indirectly throughout the responses to the speech:

- (7) force out of the labour market is a joke, when the Tories are forcing people out of work. (Participant 7 commenting on Paragraph 4)
- (8) What????????????? (Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 5)
- (9) SPEND THAT MONEY THEN. (Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 4)

- (10) Let's ignore all the statistics that show that MIGRANTS BRING NET ECONOMIC BENEFIT IN INCREASED TAX RECEIPTS.
(Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 10)
- (11) MAKE THE SALARIES HIGHER YO.
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 10)
- (12) You didn't root out abuse of the student visa system at all. You fucked it up comprehensively and delegated immigration control to universities who didn't need or want it. Untold misery over UKBA bollocks for people who just want to study. 'Rooted out' my arse. 'Reformed family visas' – made it much harder for families to stay together. Awful nonsense.
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 6)

Rather than make direct reference to their emotions, these comments are all suggestive of some affective response on behalf of the respondent. In (7), Participant 7 signals their anger by calling May's speech 'a joke' (it is obviously not a joke, in that May is not trying to be funny). In (8), Participant 8 expresses their confusion and frustration orthographically with repeated question marks. In (9–11), all participants have used capitalisation to signal a frustrated or angry response and in (12), Participant 2 uses a host of taboo language ('fucked', 'bollocks', 'my arse') in addition to calling May's speech 'awful nonsense'. All these examples, then, are suggestive of an angry or frustrated response to the speech. Participant 11 also reported feelings of disgust in their comments:

- (13) In general now I just feel disgust. (Participant 11, commenting on Paragraph 9)
- (14) I feel disgust and loathing for the speaker's political machination.
(Participant 11, Paragraph 10)

In (14) this is linked explicitly to the way in which May seems to have 'political machinations'. As was highlighted in Chapter 4, many participants suggest that May is attempting to cynically manipulate her audience and that they accuse her of scaremongering. Here are all the instances from the corpus of responses:

- (15) Scaremongering and divisive tactics.
(Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (16) intended to raise fear in listeners. (Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (17) This served only to put fear into the debate with little understanding. It made the link between governments not being able to cope and the sheer numbers game, scaremongering of the highest order.
(Participant 6 commenting on Paragraph 1)
- (18) This introduces fear of a massive number of people coming to Britain.
(Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 1)

- (19) deliberate attempt to raise fears of unlimited immigration.
(Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (20) she is saying – be afraid – it is going to affect you personally.
(Participant 9 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (21) Scaremongering to justify what looks to be some far-right claptrap to follow.
(Participant 3 commenting on Paragraph 3)
- (22) More Us and Them style scare tactics.
(Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 13)
- (23) Ratcheting up immigration to a level of scaremongering, shameful.
(Participant 6 commenting on Paragraph 15)

The notion of scaremongering itself suggests that fear is being used for persuasive effect. In (15), (21) and (22) it is linked explicitly to the ‘political machinations’ Participant 11 describes – in (15), it is a ‘divisive *tactic*’ (my emphasis), in (21) it is being used to ‘justify’ May’s argument, and in (22) it is once more described as a ‘*tactic*’. Clearly the respondents themselves are not scared, but see that the proffered text-world is meant to induce feelings of fear in the audience, which itself produces their own feelings of anger. Not only does the Idealised Common Ground presuppose an ideal audience with whom these respondents do not identify (and to whom they might even feel hostile), the perception that the Home Secretary is attempting to manipulate or dupe this audience also produces feelings of ‘disgust and loathing’ (to quote Participant 11). The antipathy has a dual direction, here: the speech produces feelings of anger towards the speaker, but also anger at the prospect of her attempts at manipulation being successful. Indeed, Participant 11 commented ‘Honestly I’d rather stop reading this it makes me anxious. I’m also worried as to the response this speak got I suspect it was clapped’ (Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 3). The emotional discomfort, here, is produced as much by the idea that anyone could believe May than by the politician herself.

The sense of fear that participants perceive is a property of the text-world the speaker proffers. It is therefore a feature of its atmosphere. Looking down (9–17), one can see that four of the comments relating to scaremongering are addressed to Paragraph 1. This is Paragraph 1:

The crisis in Syria sparked a debate this summer not just about foreign policy and military intervention but about refugees and immigration. With more than 430,000 migrants having reached Europe by sea this year, the countries of Europe resurrecting borders they’d once removed, and thousands of people in Calais trying to reach Britain illegally, some people have argued that we’re on the verge of a ‘great age of migration’, in which national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life.

In (17) and (18), both respondents make reference to the large numbers that May quotes as ways in which she attempts to induce fear in her idealised audience. For these participants, the numbers themselves are a way of connoting a fearful atmosphere. There are other strategies at play, here, too. In addition to the numbers, some participants comment more generally on the ‘emotive language’ used in this passage:

- (24) Factually inaccurate, assumes to know what I personally am thinking about the “crisis”, uses emotive language to convince you into thinking that other people from other countries are not only bad but want to take over our country...
(Participant 8 commenting on Paragraph 1)

Participant 8 puts the word ‘crisis’, which is taken from the speech itself, in scare quotes, suggesting it has some salience. Insofar as the approach to atmosphere outlined above is concerned, ‘crisis’ obviously has negative denotational meaning. Mention of ‘crisis’ and ‘military intervention’ alongside ‘refugees and immigration’ in a “not just... but [also]” syntactic structure serves to group these issues together. By including ‘the crisis in Syria’ and ‘military intervention’ in the same category as ‘refugees and immigration’, May suggests some commensurability between the two sets of issues. Certainly, refugees are the victims of an (ongoing at the time of writing) humanitarian crisis, but it seems like hyperbole to imply that the immigration situation in Britain has reached ‘crisis’ point.

There are other features of this paragraph – examples of ‘emotive language’ to quote Participant 8 – that connote the fearful atmosphere described by the respondents. We have already seen that the respondents perceive that the numbers of people May quotes generate this atmosphere, but judging by their comments, there is also a sense in which immigrants themselves are represented in a negative light. So, in (24), Participant 8 says explicitly that she is implying that ‘people from other countries are not only bad but want to take over our country’. In their response to paragraph 1, Participant 15 says the following:

- (25) Deliberately conflates four images – refugees fleeing Syria, EU removing borders and then being forced to “resurrect” them, economic migrants and refugees and a “great age of migration” threatening to undermine civilisation.
(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 1)

Participant 15 draws specific attention to the noun phrase ‘great age of migration’ from the speech. Arguably, the phrase itself is not that ‘threatening’. Indeed, if we take ‘great age of’ as a reference point, the range of possible targets – that is, the grammatical construction’s dominion – intuitively seems rather positive. Rather than rely on intuition, Stockwell (2014b) suggests we can model the dominion of a linguistic construction more rigorously by recourse to corpus linguistic methods.

The BNC returns 28 instances of the construction, ‘great age of’. True to intuition, none of the 28 collocates to the immediate right of the construction have particularly negative connotations. However, if we return to the speech, we can see that the noun phrase, ‘a great age of migration’, is itself part of a prepositional phrase, ‘on the verge of a great age of migration’. ‘On the verge of’ returns 410 hits in the BNC. A search of frequent collocates one position to the right (i.e. the immediate targets of the reference point) returns thirteen results. Excluding grammatical words, these are: ‘tears’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘extinction’, ‘collapse’, ‘being’, ‘quitting’, ‘losing’, ‘becoming’, ‘death’, and ‘taking’, of which only three – ‘being’, ‘becoming’, ‘taking’ – do not have some negative meaning. According to the BNC most frequent collocates list, then, the dominion of the reference point, ‘on the verge of’, is overwhelmingly negative. The atmosphere it consequently creates explains Participant 15’s assertion that in May’s proffered text-world, the ‘great age of migration’ – and the migrants and refugees that entails – is ‘threatening’.

Like Participant 15, Participant 12 also suggests that May represents immigrants as ‘threatening’:

- (26) Sounds like we are the victims and under threat rather than those who are fleeing violence and destruction in fear of their lives and we are ‘powerless to resist’ them. (Participant 12 commenting on Paragraph 1)

The respondent, here, highlights the phrase ‘powerless to resist’ from Paragraph 1. The idea that ‘national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people’ presupposes some kind of struggle between immigrants and national governments. It might be tempting to call such a conceptualisation a metaphor in which IMMIGRATION IS A PHYSICAL CONFRONTATION. However, at the time of writing, in some European countries there *literally* is a struggle between refugees fleeing war-torn countries and armed agents of the state trying to stop them from crossing a border. Whilst not metaphorical, May’s use of the construction, ‘powerless to resist’, does suggest an ideological orientation towards this state of affairs. The verb ‘resist’ profiles a relationship between immigrants and national governments in which the former act as a trajector moving towards the latter. It thereby construes the immigrants as an antagonist against whom it is legitimate to resist (see Cap, 2013; 2015; 2017). There is a strong implication that the inability to do so – being ‘powerless’ – is undesirable and that, by extension, national governments should be supported in their efforts to resist immigration should they wish (this is actually a construal of events greeted with some bemusement by Participant 1, who wrote in their response to Paragraph 1, ‘why would any government want to resist people traveling the world for a better life?’). This is not the only construal available. In (26), Participant 12 offers an alternative. So, the nominal group ‘those who are fleeing violence and destruction’ also profiles the immigrants as a

trajector, but this time they are conceptualised as moving away from a landmark, ‘violence and destruction’ (or even being driven from a landmark, rather than purposively moving towards one). May’s decision to use the construction, ‘powerless to resist’, thus has the ideological effect of construing immigrants in a threatening way – they are encoded as antagonistic trajectors purposively moving towards ‘national governments’, rather than being driven from a landmark. The emotional valence of this construal of immigrants is a negative one and contributes towards the ‘scaremongering’ atmosphere of the opening lines of the speech.

Participants, then, point to four aspects of the opening paragraph of the speech that contribute towards its fearful atmosphere: conflation of the immigration situation with a ‘crisis’, use of the constructions ‘powerless to resist’ and ‘on the verge of’, alongside May’s repeated reference to large numbers of immigrants. In addition to a description of the atmosphere of the text-world she proffers, respondents also make several more or less explicit references to the tone in which she does so.

- (27) Reasonable tone but gets to tge crunch.
(Participant 16 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (28) I feel angry particularly due to the patronising tone.
(Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (29) Tone of the piece suggests the speaker disagrees again the conflation of refugees and immigrants is irritating.
(Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 12)

Participants also make reference to how May sounds:

- (30) Trying to sound reasonable and compassionate to ‘people in desperate need’ but implying a moral duty to turn back ‘economic’ migrants.
(Participant 12 commenting on Paragraph 2)
- (31) Perfectly understandable sounds patronising or supercilious.
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 2)

All these participants say that May adopts either a patronising or supercilious tone, or that she is trying to sound ‘reasonable’. In Paragraph 11, May herself foregrounds the idea of being ‘sensible’, saying that the Prime Minister, David Cameron, is right to put ‘[immigration] on a sensible basis’. This is something to which several participants respond:

- (32) She signals Cameron and so puts the onus on him to do the “sensible thing”. Shades of the EU referendum and the view that his “re-negotiations” are bound to fail which will provide her with a future anti-EU leadership platform – the tough on immigration candidate while attempting to distinguish herself from the “far right”. The “sensible” candidate.
(Participant 15 commenting on Paragraph 11)

- (33) The term 'sensible' is likely to be used to justify punitive measures against migrant workers. (Participant 11 commenting on Paragraph 11)
- (34) Define "sensible"! (Participant 10 commenting on Paragraph 11)
- (35) Stress they are being reasonable and sensible common sense not racism keep anti immigration message going.
(Participant 4 commenting on Paragraph 11)
- (36) 'Sensible basis' is tory code for fascist, there I said it.
(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 11)

In (32), Participant 15 tries to reconstruct the motives behind using the term 'sensible'. They refer back to paragraph two of the speech, where May differentiates herself from the 'open borders liberal left' and the 'anti-immigration far right'. Like Participant 15, in (33) Participant 11 suggests this term has been tactically deployed, but this time to justify attacks on migrants rather than manage political tensions in the Conservative Party. In (34–36) all participants in some way take issue with May's definition of 'sensible': Participant 10 demands that she define sensible, suggesting that they do not agree with how she has used the term; similarly, Participant 4 suggests that she is using the term 'sensible' to describe what is actually racism; and, similarly to Participant 4, Participant 2 jokingly suggests that in the Tory lexicon, sensible basis actually means fascist. In (28–36), all respondents have taken exception in some way to the 'sensible' or 'reasonable' tone that they perceive May is trying to adopt. In the case of (26–30), this takes the form of an explicit response to her claim that the Prime Minister has been 'sensible'. However, comments (27), (28), (30), (31), and (32) are all addressed to Paragraph 2, where no direct claim to being 'sensible' is made:

But people on both extremes of the debate – from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left – conflate refugees in desperate need of help with economic migrants who simply want to live in a more prosperous society. Their desire for a better life is perfectly understandable, but their circumstances are not nearly the same as those of the people fleeing their homelands in fear of their lives. There are millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain, and there is a limit to the amount of immigration any country can and should take. While we must fulfil our moral duty to help people in desperate need, we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country.

In this passage, respondents perceive that the Home Secretary is attempting to be 'reasonable' (27 and 30) or 'sensible' (32), at the same time as her tone is described as 'patronising' (28 and 31) and 'supercilious' (31). Another way of putting this is to say that she proffers a reasonable tone, but to these respondents, the linguistic

forms she uses to do so are indexed as patronising. Some respondents explicitly point to these linguistic indices. In (30), Participant 12 quotes May's use of the noun phrase, 'people in desperate need' and says that by using this phrase she is 'trying to sound 'reasonable and compassionate'. This attempt fails, though, because the respondent also feels that May is asking her audience to "turn back 'economic' migrants". For Participant 12, there is a clash between the compassionate indexical value of the noun phrase, 'desperate need', and the text-world representation of 'turning back' immigrants that May proffers. The attempt to sound compassionate and reasonable therefore fails. In (31) Participant 2 says that May's use of the adjective, 'perfectly understandable', is 'patronising or supercilious'. These comments suggest that Participant 2 feels that May is disingenuously attempting to satisfy the potential concerns of her audience. Such an interpretation of May's tone implies a failure of ethos on her behalf; her 'understanding' of immigrants' desires is not convincing. This failure could partly be produced by the text-world representation of immigration itself, which, as was argued in Chapter 4, respondents call racist. If proffering such a representation of immigration is perceived as racist, then a professed understanding for the hardships of immigrants will hardly be taken seriously by the audience. This is, however, only Paragraph 2 of the speech as it appeared to the respondents. It seems fair to say that respondent's prior knowledge of May – their character schema for her – also plays a role in responses to her tone. Actually, Participant 2 flags this in their comments on paragraph 1, where they talk explicitly about May's tone:

- (37) I feel ambivalent about this. In the right tone this could be rousing and positive and yay migration, but I'm pretty sure it was actually in a doom and gloom tone of awfulness. I personally am very much here for a great age of migration and would love to see governments being powerless to resist them but I suspect TM does not feel the same.

(Participant 2 commenting on Paragraph 1)

In the experiment, participants only read the speech. There is a sense, then, in which they were forced to reconstruct the prosodic and paralinguistic features of the text from their own experience of May as a public speaker. Participant 2 picks up on the ambiguity of the noun phrase, 'a great age of migration', saying that this could, 'in the right tone', 'be rousing and positive and yay immigration'. They also say that being 'powerless to resist' is, to them, a desirable thing but they 'suspect [May] does not feel the same'. The point, here, is that Participant 2 uses what they already know about the Conservative politician to interpret the tone of the speech as it appears on the page; the linguistic forms she uses receive their indexical value in relation to the audience member's preconceived character schema for her. It is in the intersection of this character schema and the representation of immigration

that May proffers that her use of the adjective ‘perfectly understandable’ is indexed as ‘patronising and supercilious’.

In (32), although Participant 15 is responding to Paragraph 11, their comments actually refer back to Paragraph 2, connecting the use of the word ‘sensible’ to the Home Secretary’s description of ‘the anti-immigration far right’ and ‘the open-borders liberal left’. As suggested in Chapter 4, throughout the speech she shies from adopting openly anti-immigrant rhetoric which could be seen as similar to the former group. However, the speech is, in practice, clearly anti-immigration and therefore puts her at some political distance from the latter. As Participant 15 suggests, some of the reasonableness that she projects is a function of her ostensibly attempting to steer a course between these two ‘extremes of the debate’ on immigration. Before closing this discussion of tone, it is worth noting that throughout Paragraph 2 this supposedly balanced approach to immigration is iconically reflected in the grammatical forms used in the conference address. As Participant 15 points out, there is an initial identification of two ‘extremes’. Then, in the following sentence, there are two balanced coordinated clauses (‘their desire for a better life is perfectly understandable, *but* their circumstances are not nearly the same as those of the people fleeing their homelands in fear of their lives’), and the same goes for the sentence after (‘there are millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain, *and* there is a limit to the amount of immigration any country can and should take’). In both instances, the first clause represents one side of the debate which is then balanced against the other. The final sentence of the paragraph repeats this pattern of balancing each side of the debate, but this time with a subordinating conjunction, ‘while’ (‘while we must fulfil our moral duty to help people in desperate need, we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country’). Although Participant 15 points only to the ‘sensible’ way in which May is attempting to plot a course between the far right and liberal left, these grammatical forms bolster the sense of being ‘sensible’ that she attempts to project insofar as they also index the reasonable/patronising tone that respondents identify in their comments.

Given this analysis of reader responses, a differentiation should be made between the proffered ambience of the speech and the actual ambience it created to these readers. All suggested that the atmosphere of the text was fearful – it presented immigrants in an emotive, threatening manner. They also suggested that the (attempted) tone was one of reasonableness – of being sensible. From the interaction of this proffered tone and atmosphere, one might therefore conclude that the ambient emotional content of the speech is one of reassurance; according to May, ‘a great age of migration’ presents clear and immediate dangers to the audience but as a sensible and reasonable leader, she – and the Conservative Party – are the ones to deal with that danger. However, the actual ambience created by the speech for the respondents was one of frustration, anger and emotional

discomfort. These feelings were induced by a rejection of the proffered text-world and its attendant atmosphere of fear, and also distress at the prospect of anyone being convinced by this representation of immigration. They were also the product of the way in which respondents interpreted May's tone in light of their own pre-existing character schema for May, alongside the representation she proffered. Rather than accept the tone of reasonableness suggested by May's reference to 'people in desperate need', her assertion that immigrants' desires are 'perfectly understandable', and her use of balanced syntactic structures, respondents instead indexed these linguistic forms as patronising or supercilious. Again, this had the effect of frustrating and angering the audience, rather than reassuring them.

6.9 Summary

After reviewing the discourse analytical literature on emotion, Section 6.3 argued that the existing research does not account for the relationship between the speaker or writer's appeal to pathos and the knowledge the audience brings to the discourse situation. To account for discourse participant knowledge, it was suggested that affective responses to political rhetoric should be analysed along two dimensions: the audience's perception of the proffered text-world and their attitude to the speaker or writer. Stockwell's (2014b) account of 'ambience' provides a good starting point for analysing audience's emotional appraisals of the discourse because it models these two dimensions in terms of atmosphere and tone. These twin concepts were applied to reader responses to Theresa May's speech in order to analyse its rhetorical ambience. In doing so, Section 6.8 demonstrated the importance of the knowledge structures that audiences bring to bear in the discourse and how these affect their responses to the atmosphere and tone proffered by the speaker or writer.

As was noted in Section 6.6, Stockwell (2014b) suggests that the concept of register is a good place to begin an analysis of the ambient effects of discourse. In Halliday and Hasan's (1976) seminal account, register can be analysed in terms of three separate components: field, tenor, and mode. Field relates to the subject matter of the discourse, tenor the relationship between the participants involved, and mode the medium in which the discourse happens (spoken, written, spontaneous, scripted, unscripted etc.). Stockwell's (2014b) notion of 'tone' corresponds to the tenor component of a register; it pertains to the relationship between discourse participants and how that relationship is constructed via the linguistic forms the participants use (indeed, the cognitive dimension of the analysis presented here extends this account; it suggests that the relationship between these forms and the expectations encoded in the participants' character schemata is also important). Similarly, Stockwell's (2014b) concept of 'atmosphere' maps neatly onto the field

component of register. What is missing from the ambience framework, however, is any corresponding concept for mode. Some of the most ambient effects of discourse are to be found not in the text itself, but in the mode the discourse takes. Certainly this is true for the object of Stockwell's (2014b) analysis – literary discourse. Reading a beaten-up paperback on a train is a very different ambient experience to reading a 16th century folio in a temperature controlled reading room. These differences matter in political discourse, too. A number of examples were provided in the analysis of respondents second guessing the way in which May's speech was delivered and the way it was received by her immediate audience. There is a world of difference between reading a speech on a computer screen, as the participants did, and being in the conference hall, listening. At rallies, protests and other events of political discourse, the atmosphere in the discourse-world can be electric; on political demonstrations, we often hear the speaker over a tinny loudspeaker, chants from the audience, or – in the background – perhaps even the sounds of violent clashes between police and protestors. The experience of political discourse is a visceral, embodied affair. All this was missing from the analysis, due to the constraints of the data. Future work on the ambient effects of rhetorical ambience should seek to capture this important missing ingredient. With its emphasis on embodied meaning, cognitive approaches are well placed to provide such analyses.

The account of emotion in political discourse proposed in this chapter is based on inter-situational allusions from one discourse context to another. In this respect – and as was argued in the discussion of atmosphere – it is rather similar to metaphor; the emotional experience of one situation is tacitly mapped onto another. “Knell” evokes our experience of funereal sadness and transfers it into the college sickbay of Heaney's poem; the construction ‘on the verge of’ evokes the sense of fear normally associated by audience members with the things that follow it. The language used in one context is deployed as a means of evoking the emotional content of that context in another. For this reason, the framework set out here perhaps more readily coheres with the situated, ‘discrete’ view of emotions outlined in Section 6.2 which sees emotions as distinguished by the patterns of appraisal associated with a particular context (although one might add that there is no overt clash with the cline-based models that were also outlined).

CHAPTER 7

Political resonance

7.1 Introduction

As a student at the University of Sheffield, I was involved in a series of anti-racism campaigns on my campus and in the wider city. It was in this time that I happened upon a *YouTube* video of Malcolm X, the revolutionary Black political activist, speaking at the founding conference of the Organisation for Afro American Unity. Since first watching the video, this section of speech has stayed with me:

The purpose of our Organisation for Afro American unity has the same aim and objective [as the Organisation for African Unity]: to fight whoever gets in our way; to bring about the complete independence of people of African descent here in the western hemisphere, and first here in the United States; and bring about the freedom of these people by any means necessary. (1stGenRefugee, 2009)

For me, the final adverbial – ‘by any means necessary’ – is the standout part of this section. X slows his delivery at this point and punctuates each stressed syllable (the first syllable of ‘any’, the word, ‘means’, and the first syllable of ‘necessary’) with a downward and forward jab of the finger. The audience start to clap and shout energetically approximately half way through the word ‘necessary’. It was not just the vocal style in which the line was delivered, however. At the time, I remember finding the line impressive for its resoluteness, the anger I perceived to be bubbling underneath it, and also the loud, emphatic response of the audience. The point, here, is that not only did I remember the line, but also the sense of excitement and passion with which it was delivered and how those emotions were evoked. The idea of ‘freedom by any means necessary’ felt like a powerful and inspiring call to arms to someone in their early twenties who had for the first time engaged in politics, and that feeling is something I still remember now.

This is just one anecdote about the power of political rhetoric to inspire and rouse emotions long after the discourse event. This chapter explores this idea further through the figurative lens of ‘resonance’, a concept borrowed from Stockwell (2009) who uses it to describe a particular form of emotional engagement with literary texts. Given Stockwell’s (2009) emphasis on literature, Section 7.2 begins

by providing a more thorough description of what *political* resonance is, using examples from the BNC. Section 7.3 then describes Stockwell's (2009) model of attention-resonance and argues that it is a suitable framework for explaining the resonant effects of political rhetoric in audience reception. Sections 7.4–7 are then given over to an analysis of Barack Obama's 2008 presidential election victory speech which is used to illustrate the utility of Stockwell's (2009) model to analysts of political discourse. The central contributions of this chapter, then, are threefold: first, it provides a definition of political resonance; second, it argues that Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model can be used in the analysis of non-literary discourses; and, third, it provides a fine-grained stylistic analysis of one of the more talented orators in contemporary English-speaking politics (a fine-grained linguistic analysis that in Section 7.4 it is suggested has been missing in the research literature).

7.2 Political resonance

Throughout this book Aristotle's rhetorical appeals to ethos, logos, and pathos have been used as a way of organising the arguments made about the cognitive rhetorical processes involved in the reception of political discourse. A running theme of these arguments has been that audiences of political discourse are not the passive recipients of a persuasive message, but that they actively bring their own knowledge to the discourse in order to critique the way in which the speaker or writer represents the world and to make inferences about why that speaker or writer would choose to rely on such representations to make the arguments they do. Crucially, however, and as has already been suggested throughout this book (but especially Chapter 3), the discourse event also modifies the knowledge structures that discourse participants bring to *future* communicative situations. Indeed, if a speaker is to effectively persuade an audience member, the goal is not simply to induce audiences to agreement in the short term, but for that agreement to have some permanence. The audience member needs to become an advocate for the speaker or writer, or else they are only the echo of the last person they heard or read. The speaker needs to make their arguments "stick". This is especially so in political discourse where speakers are often galvanising their audiences into some kind of action. In a preliminary discussion of the three rhetorical proofs, Aristotle writes the following:

Of those proofs that are furnished through the speech there are three kinds. Some reside in the *character* of the speaker [ethos], some in a certain *disposition* of the audience [pathos] and some in the *speech* itself [logos], through its demonstrating or seeming to demonstrate. (*Rhetoric*, I.2, 1356a, emphasis in original)

In this short passage, Aristotle links each rhetorical proof to an aspect of the discourse. Ethos is oriented to the speaker, pathos the audience, and the appeal from logos comes from the text itself. Perhaps the most powerful way of getting an argument to “stick” is through an emotional appeal. This is because the other appeals relate to discourse variables that are likely to change – that is, the identity of the speaker and what they say – from one discourse context to the next. A new speaker might well make a better appeal to ethos, and their new speech could make a better appeal to logos, but an emotional reaction is something an audience member subsequently carries around with them, committing them to the speaker’s message and shaping their response to future discourse events. In fact, without some kind of emotional zeal for the message, the speaker simply being right and authoritative is probably insufficient for an audience member to act on the things they have been told. Political campaigning – leafleting, door knocking, marching, running a street stall etc. – is often quite arduous, sometimes even tedious, work. If the goal is to call people to action, the audience needs more than to feel you are right, honest and good; they need to feel inspired. The same goes to a lesser extent in electoral politics. Hope and hate are great motivators at the ballot box (and despair a good de-motivator). Importantly, though, the speaker needs those emotions – or at least the memory of experiencing them – to last until it is time to cast a vote or there is a danger that voters will simply stay at home. All this is to say that effective persuasive discourse needs to emotionally *resonate* long after the discourse event.

The notion of ‘political resonance’ or the idea that messages ‘resonate’ with voters is part of the everyday vernacular of political punditry. The BNC gives a log-likelihood of 13.6837 for the collocation of ‘resonance’ with ‘political’, ranking the collocation 19th overall. The only words that are more likely to collocate with ‘resonance’ are grammatical words (*a, the, and of*) or those that belong to the semantic field of scientific research (*magnetic, imaging, nuclear, raman, fermi, cyclotron, MRI, morphic, spectroscopy, frequency, signal, natural, effect, series*). All the BNC’s five collocations of ‘political’ and ‘resonance’ are shown in Table 7.1. In (1), ‘political resonance’ is being used to describe the connotations of different vocal styles used in popular music. Similarly, (2) comes from an interview with a pop band called ‘Hue and Cry’ in which the band are talking about the political messages in their music. Extract (3) is from the column of a political journalist, Edward Pearce, who is following the campaign trail of an unnamed politician. ‘Political resonance’ is here attached to geographical locations and the way in which their histories give them residual political meanings in the present. In (4), ‘political resonance’ refers to the meaning onlookers attached to a dispute in the English studies department at Cambridge University and how the dispute was ostensibly about one thing, but actually quite another. Finally, and in a similar

fashion to (4), in (5), ‘political resonance’ is linked to the idea of symbolism, and that some narrower political debates can become a symbol for much wider issues and therefore become imbued with importance. ‘Political resonance’ in each of these contexts seems to refer to the indirect, connotative and long-lasting political meanings we attach to music, places and also communicative acts (such as debates). An additional meaning of political resonance which is missing from the BNC search – though readily attested in any cursory glance at polling reports or newspaper headlines – relates to the degree of public approval for political slogans, or even politicians themselves; pollsters often speak of the way in which political messages ‘resonate’ (or fail to resonate) with voters. Here resonance is equated with agreement or approval. Indeed the Collins online dictionary goes further and suggests that to resonate can mean not only to generate agreement but ‘to be understood or receive a *sympathetic* response’ (my emphasis). The example that Collins gives is expressly political – ‘themes which will resonate with voters’. Resonance, here, is cast as an emotional – that is, a sympathetic – reaction to a political message or theme.

Table 7.1 The collocation, ‘political resonance’, in the BNC

1	than gaucheness, is not an innocent choice. Sounds have political	resonance	. The lyrics may be concerned and caring, but the music
2	like anything else in the world, is full of inadvertent political	resonance	, Hue and Cry are trying to control their political meanings.
3	I designed the itinerary, of course, for high political	resonance	, but it seemed a good idea to take in beautiful towns
4	1972, these disputes now carried a much stronger political and cultural	resonance	outside the university: while both factions at Cambridge resolutely denied that
5	major matters of public policy, industrial relations may have a political	resonance	far beyond their apparent importance, entering the terrain of political symbolism

These definitions of political resonance all relate to the connotative and emotional significance of political discourse. They are about the meanings audiences attribute to political text and talk. Of course, the term, ‘resonance’, in this context is an acoustic metaphor. Unlike sounds, meanings do not literally reverberate with amplitude that decays or dampens over time. To speak systematically of rhetorical resonance, then, requires a metaphorical model of how it is concepts come to figuratively resonate with audiences. This requires a more detailed exposition of what semantic resonance is – an exposition furnished in the following section.

7.3 An attentional model

The most developed account of the phenomenon described above comes from cognitive poetics (see Stockwell, 2009; and also Browse, 2014, and Whiteley, 2016). Stockwell (2009) suggests that there are some literary experiences that are emotionally striking and seem to stay with readers long after their initial encounter with a text. This resonant effect ‘is not an object but a textured prolonged feeling that can be revived periodically after the initial experience’ (Stockwell, 2009: 17). ‘Vivification’, here, suggests an accompanying experience of salience. Resonant experiences are those that generate ‘a sense of significance and personal salience... [that] can strike a reader on a first reading, or may emerge only later on, and then several times in ongoing life with different intensities and depths’ (Stockwell, 2009: 17). The ‘sense of significance’ Stockwell (2009) describes is especially relevant to (3–5) in Table 7.1. In these uses of the term, geographical places, debates, and public policy take on an aura of significance ‘far beyond their apparent importance’ [to quote (5)]. Stockwell’s (2009) emphasis is on reading but his definition of resonance is equally relevant to spoken modes of communication, especially political speeches. Indeed, we have an established practice for expressing the extent to which a line or passage in a speech resonates with us: applause. That the success of a speech is often measured in the longevity of the applause that follows it is an indicator of the extent of its resonance with an audience.

As noted in the previous section, political resonance is a figurative means of talking about a complex emotional reaction to a text. As Stockwell (2009) suggests, however, the acoustic metaphor is useful:

If people have a sense that literary resonance involves a prolonged response, generating an aura of significance, with sympathetic overtones, from an initially intense moment followed by interference, damping, and decay or persistence, then those are the terms that need to be fixed at the heart of our account.

(Stockwell, 2009: 19)

Rather than shy from the metaphor as an “imprecise” form of language, we should instead embrace the perspective – long advocated by metaphor scholars (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) – that metaphors are useful heuristics for discussing abstract or intangible concepts. In fact, it is worth noting in passing Stockwell’s (2009) extension of the metaphor to cover ‘sympathetic overtones’. This aspect of the metaphorical source domain seems particularly germane to the foregoing discussion, covering the sense in which political resonance involves some kind of sympathetic response from audiences. As in Stockwell’s (2009) treatment of literary discourse, the mechanics of sound thus provides a lexicon for describing the resonant effects of political text and talk. Actually, Formarier (2011) provides ample and fascinating

illustration of the way in which musical metaphors were used in classical rhetoric to describe the speaker's performance. There is a sense, then, in which the use of sound and music as metaphorical heuristics for describing rhetorical effects has a pedigree in classical oratorical thought. However, whereas these metaphors have historically involved a mapping between the speaker-as-singer or musician, or the speaker-as-dancer (Formarier, 2011), the innovation in this chapter consists in describing the resonant semantic effects of political discourse in audience reception. The use of sonic metaphors here is not, therefore, oriented to the technical proficiency of the speaker, but the effect of the speaker's words on the audience.

Stockwell (2009: 19) writes that his 'aim is not to recapture or re-enact the feeling of literary experience but to offer an analytical framework within which this feeling can be discussed'. Sonic metaphors provide a way of talking about the sense of significance and emotional salience involved in political and literary resonance in a structured fashion. To account for resonant effects in literary discourse – semantic overtones, interference, damping, decay and persistence – Stockwell (2009) employs ideas and concepts from cognitive psychological research on attention. Following Spelke (1990) he sees the text-worlds generated by readers as they take part in a discourse as 'cluttered arrays' of objects. In accordance with the principles of Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987; 1991; 2008), as we read, the text causes us to evoke conceptual structure at the same time as it causes us to profile some aspects of that structure and background others. Thus viewed, reading – and listening too – is a form of directed attention (indeed, as argued in Chapter 4, this direction can also be resisted by readers – it is worth noting, then, that the model of political resonance offered in this chapter assumes a "compliant" audience who shares the ideological perspective of the speaker, or who is, before the discourse event, at least neutrally disposed towards the speaker and what they have to say). Reading or listening through time involves shifting configurations of figure and ground as the text foregrounds new objects and backgrounds others. Stockwell (2009) calls the objects that seize our attention textual 'attractors'. He outlines a number of features that make for a good attractor:

- *newness*
(currency: the present moment of reading is more attractive than the previous moment)
- *agency*
(noun phrases in active positions are better attractors than in passive position)
- *topicality*
(subject position confers attraction over object position)
- *empathetic recognisability*
(human speaker > human hearer > animal > object > abstraction)

- *definiteness*
(definite ('the man') > specific indefinite ('a certain man') > non-specific indefinite ('any man'))
- *activeness*
(verbs denoting action, violence, passion, wilfulness, motivation, or strength)
- *brightness*
(lightness or vivid colours being denoted over dimness or drabness)
- *fullness*
(richness, density, intensity or nutrition being denoted)
- *largeness*
(large objects being denoted, or very long elaborated noun phrase used to denote)
- *height*
(objects that are above others, are higher than the perceiver, or which dominate)
- *noisiness*
(denoted phenomena which are audibly voluminous)
- *aesthetic distance from the norm*
(beautiful or ugly referents, dangerous referents, alien objects denoted, dissonance) (Stockwell, 2009: 25)

Stockwell (2009: 26) notes that 'a consequence of adopting a cognitive linguistic perspective is that grammar and experience are not separate categories'. As a result, the list integrates both traditional grammatical categories (for instance, agency, topicality) with more experiential categories such as newness, brightness and noisiness (Whiteley, 2016: 171). Good attractors combine grammatical and experiential features to hold the attention of the discourse participants. Text-worlds consist of a range of potential attractors all vying for our attention. Stockwell (2009) suggests that

the felt effects of these elements in textual attention are focus, engagement, fading and extinction, which in turn represent a scale of figure and background. Figure/ground in cognitive linguistics and in cognitive poetics tends to be regarded as a polar category, whereas from the perspective of scaled readerly attention, it is a cline of prominence, ranging through degrees of foregrounding into vague undifferentiated but rich background. (Stockwell, 2009: 22)

In this model, the attentional 'cline of prominence' is mapped onto 'a cline of resonance, with striking literary intensity at one end, and decay or echo tailing off into a rich sense of textual resonance towards the other' (Stockwell, 2009: 22). Stockwell (2009: 21) illustrates these correspondences using a diagram which is

reproduced in Figure 7.1. Either a new or revived textual attractor distracts the reader's attention. It might then be maintained by the attractor either by textual devices that sustain the reader's engagement, or by a non-shift of attention, which is to say that nothing more interesting acts as a distraction (see the list of prototypical attractor qualities, above). Textual attractors might also be neglected by readers. There are two mechanisms by which this neglect might be achieved. Either a reader volitionally disengages from the attractor by lifting it out of the conceptual focus or dragging their attention from it (in a similar fashion to the reconstrual operations described in Chapter 4). Alternatively an attractor might come to be instantly or gradually occluded by another more engaging textual object, which becomes the new attractor. Thus, the movement from figured textual attractor to backgrounded textual object can be expressed in terms of an initial attentional focus on the attractor, a subsequent attentional engagement with it, followed by its fading and extinction. As Figure 7.1 indicates, the oscillation between an attractor's foregrounded, figural intensity and its decay into the conceptual background produces semantic resonance.

The attention-resonance model in Figure 7.1 has been applied to written forms of literary discourse (Browse, 2014; Stockwell, 2009; Whiteley, 2016). The following section applies it to explain how a sense of striking emotional salience and significance – political resonance – might also be generated in speeches by political orators. On the one hand, this application broadens the discussion of pathos




Figure 7.1 Stockwell's (2009) attention-resonance model

in political discourse analysis, which – as was argued in Chapter 6 – has tended to view emotion in terms of Self and Other clines. On the other hand – and in keeping with the principles of cognitive science – the analysis suggests that there is no modular disconnect between the cognitive processes involved in written literary discourse and oral non-literary discourse; that is, the experience of affective, semantic resonance is a function of cognitive processes that can, and should, be generalised to multiple discursive contexts.

7.4 A resonant speech

On November 5th 2008, the Democratic Senator for Illinois, Barack Obama, beat the Republican Senator for Arizona, John McCain, in the American presidential election, becoming the first Black President of the USA. The result was historic and symbolic. The speech he gave in the early hours of the morning after it had been announced reduced many to tears, notably the long-time campaigner for civil rights and erstwhile seeker of the Democratic presidential nomination, the Reverend Jesse Jackson. Jackson had this to say in an interview with National Public Radio:

Well, on the one hand, I saw President Barack Obama standing there looking so majestic. And I knew that people in the villages of Kenya and Haiti, and mansions and palaces in Europe and China, were all watching this young African-American male assume the leadership to take our nation out of a pit to a higher place.

“And then, I thought of who was not there... As mentioned, Medgar Evers, the husband of Sister Myrlie. ...So the martyrs and murdered whose blood made last night possible. I could not help think that this was their night.

“And if I had one wish: if Medgar, or if Dr. King could have just been there for a second in time, would have made my heart rejoice. And so it was kind of duofold – his ascension into leadership and the price that was paid to get him there.

(Jackson, quoted in the *Los Angeles Times*, 2008)

As Jackson points out, to many it represented the culmination of a centuries-long struggle fought by the likes of Martin Luther King and Medger Evers, a Mississippi civil rights activist murdered by white segregationists – a struggle which had cost the civil rights movement in blood and lives. For Jackson, and most political progressives, the electoral victory was a highly emotional watershed moment in American political, cultural, and social life. In the remainder of this chapter it is argued that the linguistic performance Obama gave in his victory address, combined with this symbolically saturated context, produced a politically resonant discourse event for the crowd that assembled to listen to him

in Grant Park, Chicago. Importantly, that the crowd joined in the repetition of the phrase ‘yes we can’ in the peroration of the address is suggestive of their emotional engagement in the speech and the “sympathetic resonance” alluded to in the previous section.

Obama is a highly skilled orator, a fact not unnoticed by journalists (Leith, 2012), politicians, and scholars. There is now quite a substantial body of research on his rhetorical style and the kinds of themes he favours in public speeches. Most scholars attend to the way in which he emphasises unity, togetherness and commonality rather than the concerns of any one social group (Conley, 2008; Frank and McPhail, 2005). Indeed, Savage (2011) argues that the importance of “the people” and their collective identity in the politician’s rhetorical oeuvre represents a form of populism. Others have suggested that the emphasis on unity is often complemented by a liberal retelling of the “American dream” (Atwater, 2007; Rowland and Jones, 2009) and immigration narratives (Elahi and Cos, 2005). Frank (2009) suggests that the President’s speeches contain themes of hope and caring for the other, citing these as evidence that he stands in a black ‘prophetic tradition’ (a view complemented by Stewart [2011] who claims he has an ‘Afrocentric’ rhetorical style). Whereas these thematic inquiries into Obama’s rhetorical performances are for the most part based on a small sample of speeches (and often his famous 2004 speech to the Democratic convention), Coe and Reitzes (2010) provide a systematic content analysis of the policy, thematic, moral and what they term ‘factional’ appeals (those related to particular sections of society) in all 183 speeches and debates transcribed on the 2008 presidential campaign website. They reveal that as a presidential candidate, he tended to focus on issues of policy and thematic issues like ‘hope’ and ‘change’ over others, which confirms the qualitative analyses of the aforementioned scholars. In addition to rhetorical work on the thematic content of speeches, the rhetorical construction of presidential policy has also been of interest to researchers, who have examined speeches on areas such as the economy (Murphy, 2009), immigration (Dorsey and Diaz-Barriga, 2009), nuclear weapons (Zhang, 2010), foreign policy, and ‘American exceptionalism’ (Ivie and Giner, 2009). Obama’s rhetorical oeuvre, then, has faced quite a lot of ideological and thematic critique, although surprisingly little fine-grained stylistic analysis has been attempted (although see Charteris-Black, 2014, for a discussion of rhetorical structure, and Formarier, 2011, for detailed acoustic analysis). Thus, in addition to arguing for the relevance of Stockwell’s (2009) attention-resonance model to political discourse, one further contribution of this chapter is to provide a greater insight into the stylistic strategies used by Obama in his linguistic performances.

In classical rhetoric, the peroration of a speech is usually where the main appeal to pathos is made. This is certainly true of Obama's 2008 victory address (also referred to as the Grant Park address), as evidenced by the response of the audience at this point in the oration. For this reason, this section of the address will form the focus of the analysis. This is the peroration in full:

1 This election had many firsts and many stories that will be told for generations.
2 But one that's on my mind tonight is about a woman who cast her ballot in
3 Atlanta. She's a lot like the millions of others who stood in line to make their
4 voice heard in this election except for one thing – Ann Nixon Cooper is 106
5 years old.

6 She was born just a generation past slavery; a time when there were no cars on
7 the road or planes in the sky; when someone like her couldn't vote for two
8 reasons – because she was a woman and because of the colour of her skin.

9 And tonight, I think about all that she's seen throughout her century in America
10 – the heartache and the hope; the struggle and the progress; the times we were
11 told that we can't, and the people who pressed on with that American creed:
12 Yes, we can.

13 At a time when women's voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed, she
14 lived to see them stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot. Yes, we can.

15 When there was despair in the dust bowl and depression across the land, she
16 saw a nation conquer fear itself with a New Deal, new jobs and a new sense of
17 common purpose. Yes, we can.

18 When the bombs fell on our harbour and tyranny threatened the world, she was
19 there to witness a generation rise to greatness and a democracy was saved. Yes,
20 we can.

21 She was there for the buses in Montgomery, the hoses in Birmingham, a bridge
22 in Selma, and a preacher from Atlanta who told a people that "we shall over
23 come". Yes, we can.

24 A man touched down on the Moon, a wall came down in Berlin, a world was
25 connected by our own science and imagination. And this year, in this election,
26 she touched her finger to a screen, and cast her vote, because after 106 years in
27 America, through the best of times and the darkest of hours, she knows how
28 America can change. Yes, we can.

29 America, we have come so far. We have seen so much. But there is so much
30 more to do. So tonight, let us ask ourselves – if our children should live to see
31 the next century; if my daughters should be so lucky to live as long as Ann

- 32 Nixon Cooper, what change will they see? What progress will we have made?
 33 This is our chance to answer that call. This is our moment.
 34 This is our time – to put our people back to work and open doors of opportunity
 35 for our kids; to restore prosperity and promote the cause of peace; to reclaim the
 36 American dream and reaffirm that fundamental truth – that out of many, we are
 37 one; that while we breathe, we hope, and where we are met with cynicism and
 38 doubt, and those who tell us that we can't, we will respond with that timeless
 39 creed that sums up the spirit of a people: yes, we can.
 40 Thank you, God bless you, and may God bless the United States of America.
 (Obama, 2008)

The following analysis is split into three sections. The first offers a stylistic account of the ways in which Obama constructs a rich background to the events he describes, drawing on a variety of linguistic strategies to do so (negation, his use of indefinite noun phrases, metonym, and grammatical forms that background the role of the agent). The second provides a description of the figured textual attractors in the peroration – Ann Nixon Cooper, and also the 'we' in the repeated phrase, 'yes, we can' (a 'we' which is identified with 'a people', 'a generation', and 'a nation' throughout the speech, to myth-creating effect). Central to the discussion of these attractors is the concept of 'grounding' from Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 2008: 259–309), which is introduced in the course of the analysis. The final section offers an analysis of the ways in which the JOURNEY metaphor running throughout the speech combines with the patterns of figure and ground to produce the resonant effects of the final line, 'yes we can'.

7.5 Shared myths and the lacunae in the past

This analysis will start with the things that are backgrounded in the speech. Rather than begin with the first paragraph, which introduces one of the key textual attractors in the peroration (Ann Nixon Cooper – to whom Section 7.6 will return) the second paragraph, which sets the historical scene, will first be analysed:

[Cooper] was born just a generation past slavery; a time when there were no cars on the road or planes in the sky; when someone like her couldn't vote for two reasons – because she was a woman and because of the colour of her skin.

The paragraph is notable because of what it explicitly does not include. Cooper was born at 'a time when there were no cars on the road or planes in the sky.' The past, here, is described in terms of negation – that is, in terms of what was not

there. In Stockwell's (2009: 32) model, negations such as these are called 'lacunae'. To differentiate a foregrounded object from a background, we need to be able to perceive its edges. Some objects, strictly speaking, are not objects at all, but rather absences. For instance, a hole in the road is not an object, but an absence, and yet we perceive the absence because of its edges. Crucially, as Stockwell (2009: 32) points out, in terms of human perception, the edges belong to the hole, not the road; they are where the hole begins, not where the road stops. Lacunae, then, are textual objects that consist of edges and their inner absences. The negations in the paragraph from the peroration consist of car and plane-shaped absences, and the figural silhouette of 'someone like [Cooper]' casting their vote. In the clause 'there were no cars on the road or planes in the sky', these car and plane-shaped absences are textual attractors (although they are negated, they are far more active, noisy, and agentive concepts than the other candidates, the road and the sky). Similarly, in the following clause-complex, the vaguely defined 'someone' acts as a more topical, agentive, empathetically recognisable, and active textual attractor. In this text-world depiction of a time 'a generation past slavery' (again, another lacuna: the periodisation is defined by what it is not – it is not a time of slavery – rather than by what it is), the main textual attractor is either an ill-defined agent ('someone') who is (not) engaged in some activity (voting), or is absent altogether (as in the case of the cars and planes). The effect is to create a text-world of the past haunted and defined by the lacunae of the future.

In the rest of the speech, the audience are presented with a different kind of absence to the lacunae in the second paragraph. In lines 10–11, 'we were told'; and in line 13, 'women's voices were silenced and their hopes dismissed'. In these passive constructions, the agents of the verbs are all backgrounded – they do not even appear in the adjunct position. Similarly, Obama makes frequent use of nominalisations which all have the effect of backgrounding the agent in the events being described (Fairclough, 2001: 103; Fowler et al., 1979; Jeffries, 2010a: 25–29). So, in lines 15–16, the President says, 'when there was despair in the dust bowl and depression across the land, [Cooper] saw a nation conquer fear itself'. It takes a human agent to 'despair' and to 'fear', and 'depression' is an emotion felt by a person. Rather than attributing despair, fear, or depression to an experiencer – the 'nation' – these emotions are instead reified as adversaries that the experiencer metaphorically 'conquers'. Agents are also occluded in line 18 – 'the bombs fell on our harbour and tyranny threatened the world'. Here the bombs are responsible for their own falling – they are the grammatical subject – rather than the soldiers responsible for dropping them, and it is the abstract concept, 'tyranny' – rather than the more concrete agent, 'Nazi soldiers' – who 'threatened the world'. These agents – the people who silence women and dismiss their hopes, the people who

despair and fear or who are depressed, and the people who issue threats and drop bombs – are all in some way culpable for the barriers against which the main attractors in the speech push. The effect of the passives, nominalisations and use of inanimate or abstract grammatical subjects is to background the human agents responsible for these historic problems. Thus, the potential attractors these grammatical forms make available – ‘women’s voices’, ‘hopes’ (line 13), abstract emotions like ‘despair’, ‘depression’, and ‘hope’ (lines 15–16), and inanimate or abstract concepts such as ‘bombs’ and ‘tyranny’ (line 18) – all pale in comparison to the ‘women’ (who energetically ‘stand up and speak out’ – line 14), ‘a nation’ (which aggressively ‘conquers’ – line 16) and ‘a generation’ (which energetically ‘rise[s]’ – 21). These agents are discussed further in the next section.

This backgrounding of historical antagonists is continued in lines 21–23, where ‘the buses in Montgomery, the hoses in Birmingham’ and ‘a bridge in Selma’ are all noun phrases that refer metonymically to historical events. The first of these metonyms, ‘the buses in Montgomery’, alludes to the boycott of the Montgomery bus service by civil rights activists following the refusal of Rosa Parks, a black woman, to give up her seat on the bus to a white man; the second, ‘the hoses in Birmingham’, refers to the use of high pressure hoses by the police to disperse non-violent protests against segregation in Birmingham, Alabama; finally, the third, ‘a bridge in Selma’, references the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, and the assault of non-violent protesters by state troopers as they tried to cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge. In each instance, the use of metonyms serves a similar function to the nominalisations and use of the passive voice already noted; they background the participants involved in these particular conflicts. Where the participants are mentioned, the indefinite article is used. In line 22, it is ‘a preacher from Atlanta who told *a* people’. The preacher, of course, is Martin Luther King. This use of indefinite forms is continued in the following lines (24–25) where ‘a man touched down on the Moon, a wall came down in Berlin, a world was connected’. In Cognitive Grammar, the use of these indefinite articles relates to the way in which each of the nominals is ‘grounded’ (Langacker, 2008). Nominals or finite clauses exist in some ontological relationship to the discourse-world. Grounding establishes ‘a basic connection between the interlocutors and the content evoked by the nominal or finite clause’ (Langacker, 2008: 259). Articles ground the nominal in question to the immediate discourse context because ‘the definite article indicates that just one eligible candidate is available, and the indefinite article that this is not the case’ (Langacker, 2008: 287). The use of the indefinite article in ‘a bridge’, ‘a preacher’, ‘a people’, ‘a man’, ‘a wall’, and ‘a world’ is therefore marked in this instance. Contrary to what the indefinite article usually suggests, Obama is not referring to just *any* bridge, preacher, people, man, wall, or world, but very specific historical events with which his audience (certainly audience members

such as Jesse Jackson) are more than likely well acquainted. Langacker (2008: 259) notes that when nominals are insufficiently grounded, the conceptual content they evoke ‘has no discernible position in [language users’] mental universe’. The indefinite grounding in this instance thus serves to give the events referenced a transcendental, mythic quality – although they are part of the (likely) shared historical knowledge of the audience, the use of indefinite articles places them at a remove from their ‘mental universe’. Note, too, that this indefinite grounding of nominals is complemented in this instance by grammatical forms that continue to downplay the agents involved in the historical events they describe. Rather than use a transitive verb to say that “East German troops dismantled the Berlin Wall”, instead the wall is the agent of an intransitive process – it ‘came down’, seemingly of its own volition. Similarly, whilst ‘science’ and ‘imagination’ are the agents who connect ‘a world’, the clause is a passive construction in which the agents of the verb ‘was connected’ are placed in the adjunct position (which, according to Stockwell’s [2009] criteria of good attractors, makes them less agentive). Moreover, the agents themselves are rather abstract, intangible concepts, which places them at the least attractive end of the scale of empathetic recognisability.

The effect of this downplaying of historical agents is obviously ideological. It glosses over the political fault lines of recent American and world history, presenting a homogenised summary-scan view of these events. This linguistic backgrounding of historical conflict coheres with the view that Obama tends to emphasise a shared sense of “togetherness” in his speeches (Conley, 2008; Frank and McPhail, 2005; Savage, 2011). Moreover, the indefinitely grounded nominals present this history of cohesion in a transcendental language; the President constructs a shared historical timeline, the events in which are depicted in ungrounded, mythic terms. Crucially, however, not only is this presentation ideological, it also contributes to the aesthetic and affective qualities of the speech. These historical events, rhetorically devoid of agonist and antagonist, without potential attractors to distract the attention of the audience, form the background against which the two main figural – and resonant – attractors become all the more striking: Ann Nixon Cooper and the ‘we’ of the repeated ‘yes we can’ refrain.

7.6 Ann Nixon Cooper and the resonant feedback crescendo

The peroration in the Grant Park speech is ostensibly about the life of Ann Nixon Cooper and the events through which she has lived. She is referred to initially in line 2 as ‘a woman’, this becomes more definitely grounded in line 3, where she is referenced by the pronoun, ‘she’, and in line 4 she is called by her full name, ‘Ann

Nixon Cooper'. Thus, reference to her person becomes successively more definite and the iteration of her mention serves to make her the subject of attentional sustain. Her definiteness and that she is repeatedly referenced, alongside the fact that she is – unusually – 106 years old, combine to establish her as the main attractor in this initial paragraph. In the subsequent paragraph, she fades a little. So, after being born, instead of referring to her directly, the President says that the person who 'couldn't vote' in line 7 is 'someone like her' (line 7) and not Nixon Cooper herself. The 'she' subject in the following coordinated subordinate clause and adverbial ('because she was a woman and because of the colour of her skin' – line 8) is therefore ambiguous – it could refer either specifically to this 106-year-old woman, or 'someone like her'.

This relative fading of Nixon Cooper into the attentional background is continued throughout the speech until line 26. The linguistic strategies used to represent her until this point are interesting because in this section of the speech she is both the subject of low-level attentional sustain and repeatedly occluded by other attractors. She repeatedly 'sees' (lines 9, 14, 16) and she 'witnesses' (line 19). That she existed at the time being described is also noted; she 'lived' (line 14) and she 'was there' in lines 18–19 and 21. In terms of empathetic recognisability, the perception verbs make her a relatively good attractor. That she is consistently mentioned throughout the text also makes her the subject of attentional sustain. Obama, then, repeatedly draws his audience back to her – she is "there" in the attentional middle-distance throughout the speech – but is repeatedly supplanted by the textual objects she observes. 'The people' who 'press on', the 'woman' who 'stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot', the 'nation' that 'conquers', the 'generation' who 'rise', the 'preacher' who 'tells', and the 'people' who 'shall overcome', comprise far more dynamic textual attractors. These attractors all come to occlude Nixon Cooper until the President pulls our attention back to her by making her the subject of another perception or existential verb.

Turning from Nixon Cooper for a moment, the attractors that occlude her are all the subject of quite dynamic verbs. The 'people' in line 11 'press on'. The image-schematic force dynamics of 'pressing on' involve moving forward in some way. Similarly, the women in line 14 'stand up and speak out and reach for'. Again, these repeated phrasal verbs ('stand up'; 'speak out') and verb + prepositional phrase ('reach for') structures suggest movement forward (especially 'reach for') but also upwards ('stand up'). Indeed, the parallelism involved in the repetition of a prepositional particle or phrase emphasises this upward and forward dynamism. The 'generation' in line 19 also 'rises' and the 'we' in line 22 (which is an anaphoric reference to 'a people') are said to 'overcome' (line 22–23). All the main attractors that Nixon Cooper observes, then, are moving forward and upwards in some way. This sense of forward motion is complemented by the repeated refrain, 'yes

we can'. In cognitive grammar, modal verbs, such as 'can', also relate to the way in which clauses are grounded. Langacker (2008) notes that

the English modals developed historically from lexical verbs with meanings like 'want to know V', 'know how to V', and 'have the power to V'. The relationships profiled by such verbs have something in common. Namely, they ascribe to their trajector some kind of propensity or 'potency' which – when unleashed – can lead to its execution of an action (V). While the situations described by these verbs are therefore stable... they do involve some kind of force tending towards V's occurrence. (Langacker, 2008: 304)

Thus, modals involve some kind of forceful movement from a given state of affairs (the ground) to some future new situation (the modalised proposition); that is, they involve a force-dynamic forward movement. In this regard, then, the image-schematic properties of the refrain resemble the forward movement of the 'people', the 'women', the 'generation', and 'a people'. Indeed, in the case of 'a people', using a quotation from King – 'we shall overcome' – allows Obama to draw an equivalence between the 'we' in the quotation and the 'we' in 'yes we can'. The 'we' assembled in Grant Park is conflated with these actors who have participated in great historical events. Given the backgrounded conflict in this representation of these events – recall that the antagonists are all missing – the 'we' that is constructed is an inclusive one. Rather than represent history as series of struggles between segregationists and civil rights activists, the President instead foregrounds a collective 'we' that 'presses on' through history, 'overcoming' obstacles (as opposed to struggling with enemies. Struggle is mentioned in line 10, but it is juxtaposed with 'progress', suggesting that the struggle under discussion is not one between opponents, but with an object or barrier on a path).

This sense of a collective consciousness is highlighted in the list of things that Nixon Cooper sees in lines 10–11. The first items on this list are two coordinated noun phrases which relate to emotions, 'the heartache and the hope'. The definite article, here, suggests a sense of familiarity – this is our (collective) heartache and hope. The next item is another pair of coordinated noun phrases, 'the struggle and the progress'. Again, the definite articles suggest a level of familiarity with the struggles that have been collectively endured and the progress that has been made. Finally, the third items on the list are two more coordinated nominals ('the times' and 'the people') both of which contain post-modifying relative clauses ('[that] we were told that we can't'; 'who pressed on with that American creed: Yes, we can'). Again, in balancing these complex nominals, an equivalence is made between the 'we' who is told that 'we can't' and 'the people who press on'. This becomes explicit in the elaboration of 'that American creed' – 'yes we can' – in which the 'we' refers both to 'the people' and the 'we' of the first nominal. These parallel coordinated

nominal groups all therefore serve to reinforce the connection between the people moving forward throughout history and a more inclusive ‘we’ that encompasses the crowds assembled in Grant Park.

This conflation between the pronominal referent in ‘yes we can’ and the various entities striving forward throughout the speech is further facilitated by Nixon Cooper’s status as a kind of historical reporter. That the actions of the women, the nation, and the generation are all the object of a perception verb (‘she lived to see them stand up and speak out and reach for the ballot box’; ‘she saw a nation conquer fear’; ‘she was there to witness a generation rise’), means that the verbs attributed to those attractors – ‘standing up, speaking out, reaching’; ‘conquering’; ‘rising’ – are all non-finite forms. Along with the use of indefinite articles, this adds to the mythic feel of the events being described, but also places the verbs that the attractors perform on the same ungrounded ontological level as the head verb needed to complete the elliptical verb phrase in ‘yes we can’ (so: ‘yes we can stand up...’, ‘yes we can conquer fear’, ‘yes we can rise’). This grammatical “loosening”, so to speak, of these processes from the time at which they took place – via the use of a reporting clause – allows Obama to bridge the temporal gap between the women, nation, and generation in the speech, and the people he is addressing. The forward movement of those historical actors is one and the same as the potential for forward movement echoed by the modal ‘can’. Indeed, these various historic examples of progress intensify the modal force of ‘can’:

Rather than tending to induce the profiled process, modal force reflects the speaker’s efforts in assessing its likelihood. The potency is directed at incorporating the envisaged process in the speaker’s conception of reality (Rc). It represents the speaker’s force-dynamic experience in mentally extrapolating the current reality conception – imagining its future evolution – in such a way that Rc comes to include it. Thus it bears on the grounded process not in terms of bringing it about, but rather in terms of accepting it as real. (Langacker, 2008: 306)

The repeated forward, upward or progressive movement of the attractors (women, people, the nation, a generation, and a people) serves to increase the likelihood that whatever the main verb of ‘yes we can’, it is something that – given the historical record – is very likely to be incorporated into the speaker’s conception of reality. Thus, the repetition of grammatically ungrounded forward motion – its ungrounded-ness itself a function of Nixon Cooper’s role as observer – has the effect of intensifying the modal potency of ‘can’ in the ‘yes we can’ refrain. It constructs what could, with some poetic license, be called a resonant feedback loop. In the mechanics of sound, feedback occurs when, for instance, a guitar string is plucked and the amplified sound causes the string to resonate more intensely. This engenders a further intensification of the sound, which means that the string

vibrates still more aggressively and so on. The overall effect is to produce a loud and sustained note. Indeed, in high volume styles of popular music such as rock and heavy metal, feedback is used to musical effect (think of Jimi Hendrix and his famous Woodstock rendition of ‘The Star Spangled Banner’). One might figuratively say that the President is engaging in a kind of oratorical rock’n’roll in this peroration. The feedback loop starts with Nixon Cooper, who witnesses (and is occluded by) a forward/upward-moving textual attractor. Though grounded by the matrix clause, the verbs representing these movements are themselves grammatically ungrounded. These new textual attractors are then occluded by ‘we’. The indefinite, non-finite verb forms attached to the (now occluded) textual attractors mean that these verbs are able to fill the slot in the elliptical construction ‘yes, we can’, thus intensifying the sense of forward motion encoded in the modal, ‘can’. The ‘we’ attractor is then occluded by Nixon Cooper and the feedback loop begins again: she fleetingly holds our attention, is occluded by a textual attractor engaged in (ungrounded) forward motion, which is itself occluded by a ‘we’ with an accompanying sense of modal forward motion, and the cycle continues. The result of this is a resonant feedback loop (see Figure 7.2) occasioned by the mutually enforcing resonance of each attractor as they cyclically oscillate in and out of the attentional foreground.

One might figuratively say that the loop “reaches a pitch” – i.e. induces its greatest affective state – when this looping pattern quite abruptly breaks off (lines 25–26). Rather than the loosely grounded verb phrases of the attractors in the previous paragraphs, the audience is presented with two very definite adverbials (‘this year, in this election’) alongside a grounded verb (‘touched’, marked for tense and aspect), of which Nixon Cooper is the agent. Like the forward motion verbs associated with the previous attractors that she had witnessed throughout history, ‘touched’ is also suggestive of a force-dynamic movement forward. She had previously been a static figure witnessing other moving entities. Her own forward motion is all the more striking in this context. It is also reminiscent of religious artwork. The mythical tone struck by the ungrounded nominal groups in the preceding co-text and the fact that the 106-year-old woman’s finger is profiled, her hand forming the immediate scope of the predication (‘she touched *her* finger to a screen’, my emphasis), mimics Michelangelo’s famous Sistine Chapel fresco, ‘The Creation of Adam’ where the finger of God reaches out but does not quite touch Adam’s own outstretched hand. For audience members familiar with the artwork, Nixon Cooper’s moment of reaching for ‘a screen’ takes on a sense of the sublime (again, note the indefinite article which places a mythological sheen on the situation as in the previous similar examples). It is the moment we have been waiting for since it was prefigured at the beginning of the peroration in that initial lacuna, ‘when someone like her couldn’t vote’ (line 7), and in the forward motion of all the

things she has witnessed throughout the century. This sublime event, however, is happening now, ‘this year, in this election’. The repeated proximal demonstrative (‘this’) serves to further highlight the immediacy of the historical breakthrough and complements the attentional zoom from a course construal of world historic events, to a fine-grained construal of a finger pressing against a screen, the immediate scope of which includes only a forward moving hand. The juxtaposition of a world history painted in quite broad brushstrokes – that is, in metonymic noun phrases, and poorly grounded, vague grammatical forms that background causality and agency – with this proximal image of a hand on a screen, conceptually grounded in the here and now, foregrounds the latter’s importance. The mythic events of those 106 years of the woman’s life have led us (that is, the ‘we’ in ‘yes, we can’) to this resonant moment. Indeed, the moment itself is delayed by those two adverbial clausal elements (‘this year, in this election’) which heightens the tension and release of her teleologically determined act of democracy. To elaborate the rock’n’roll metaphor, it is in these lines that the feedback loop of the previous paragraphs reaches its intensity in the striking, highly figured, and resonant image of a black woman’s hand reaching out not towards God, but in the performance of a secular democratic ritual.




Figure 7.2 The resonant feedback loop

7.7 The future is now

Lines 1–28 of the peroration take stock of the historic achievements of a collective American ‘we’ as they are witnessed by Nixon Cooper culminating in her participation in a democratic process, access to which she had previously been denied. In contrast, the final lines of the address consolidate the sense of modal forward

motion expressed in the repeated refrain, 'yes, we can', by hypothecating about the future and the things that should be done in the immediate present. In line 29, the forward and upward motion running throughout the peroration is re-expressed in the form of a JOURNEY metaphor, 'America, we have come so far. We have seen so much'. Here, the three sets of attractors in the previous paragraphs – the 106-year-old woman, the various attractors who overcome historic adversity, and the 'we' of the refrain – are conflated into one inclusive 'we' grouping, hailed in the vocative, 'America'. The path that this 'we' has travelled and the things that it has seen are projected into the future with the clause 'there is so much more to do'. This might have been expressed with a deontic modal – 'there is so much more we should do' (as Simpson, 1993: 48, notes, deontic modality is integral to strategies of persuasion) – but the JOURNEY metaphor makes this unnecessary; if it is accepted that the past and future are a pathway that the collective American 'we' moves along, then it hardly needs saying that progress along the pathway is desirable. In fact, in line 32 Obama asks 'what progress will we have made [in 106 years from now]?' The question itself presupposes that movement forward – 'progress' – is something to be desired. It also presupposes a common sense of what progress is – a common destination to which the 'we' is heading. The final lines of the speech, then, echo the consensus version of history outlined in lines 6–27.

Whatever the nature of progress, according to the newly-elected President, the key to making it is in the present. Just as Nixon Cooper voted 'this year, in this election' (line 26), he says that '*this* is our chance to answer that call. *This* is our moment. *This* is our time' (lines 33–34, my emphasis). As before, the repetition of the proximal demonstrative emphasises the importance of the moment at hand. What follows is a succession of coordinated infinitive verb pairings – 'to put... and open'; 'to restore... and promote'; 'to reclaim... and reaffirm' (lines 35–36). Similar sentiment might have been expressed by grounding the verb form with a modal ('we will/should/must put our people back to work and open doors'). Following Langacker (2008: 306), expressing the same point in this way would have involved assessing the likelihood of these various activities – putting, opening, restoring, promoting, reclaiming, reaffirming – in relation to Obama's current conception of reality. The deontic modal force of auxiliaries such as 'should' or 'must' is such that whilst they are more forceful – more potent in Langacker's (2008: 306) terms – they presuppose a reality space which is at a distance from the ground of the discourse. To say something should or must be done implies quite strongly that it is not being done at the present time, but that it ought to be. Using these modals would *highlight* the gap between where 'we' are now, and where 'we' should be on the metaphorical JOURNEY. In contrast, the ungrounded infinitive forms present these actions not as a contingent feature of the future rooted in the present, but part of a *telos* that has yet to unfold. Putting people back to work, opening

doors of opportunity, restoring prosperity, promoting the cause of peace, reclaiming the American dream and reaffirming a fundamental truth are not things to be struggled for, but things to be happened upon in the natural progress of the American people on their journey. 'This... our time', or 'this... our moment', is not the space in which to construct the future or struggle for it, but rather an opportunity to realise or make manifest something that has already – prophetically – been given (the prophetic, or quasi-religious nature of the speech is bolstered by lexical choices such as 'fundamental truth', 'creed', and 'spirit'. The ungrounded verb forms also cohere with the mythic tone established earlier in the speech by similar grounding strategies). Indeed, many of the verbs used in this section of the speech ('restore', 'reclaim', and 'reaffirm', not to mention the dependent clause complex, 'to put our people back to work') involve the reinstitution of something that was lost. The things that constitute progress in the future, then, gesture back to the political progress made in the last century which, by implication, has been put on hold in the immediate past and present.

In the context of this teleologically projected future, the final 'yes, we can' (line 39) works in a different way to its use in the rest of the speech. In the previous examples, the 'we' of the refrain was identified with an antecedent forward-moving agent, while the modal force of 'can' was echoic of the agent's forward motion. In this final use of 'can', rather than mimic the forward motion of the past, the modal force in the verb is a means of progressing towards the desirable activities (putting, opening, restoring, promoting, reclaiming, reaffirming) that lie ahead in the future and that therefore constitute progress. That the modal is 'can' and not another auxiliary is important. Whereas deontic modals such as 'should' or 'must' presuppose a reality space which is further from the ground of the discourse, the projected reality encoded by 'can' is much more proximal. To say that something 'can' happen suggests a state of affairs that is quite close to the one the speaker currently occupies; the only thing required to realise that state of affairs is a decision to make it reality. Use of the modal, 'can', therefore coheres with the teleological view of the future suggested by the list of paired infinitives. Putting, opening, restoring, promoting, reclaiming, and reaffirming are not things we *should* or *must* struggle for in the present in order to enact them at some later point in the future, but activities that *can* be realised now, in this moment, because they are the next thing on the timeline of a progressive American destiny. The political choice is between those who choose to realise these imminent potentialities and those who do not – between 'those who tell us we can't' and the 'timeless creed that sums up a spirit of a people: yes, we can'.

In addition to its religious connotations, the notion of a 'timeless creed' also coheres with the JOURNEY metaphor and the mythological, grammatically ungrounded representation of events in the past (recall that two of the verbs

associated with the historic actors – ‘conquer’, ‘rise’ – were literally timeless, in that they were non-finite forms). Whilst it has been argued that the final ‘yes, we can’ works in a slightly different way in line 39 than the rest of the speech, it does nonetheless repeat the same linguistic construction and is therefore associated with the forward motion of these actors in the past. Insofar as one might take political resonance to mean that political language becomes connotative or symbolic of something else [as in (3) and (4) in Table 7.1], we might say that this final ‘yes, we can’ (an impetus to realise an imminent progressive potential) resonates with the representation of historical progresses Obama provides in the antecedent co-text. According to Stockwell’s (2009) model, the final ‘yes, we can’ is an intense and resonant re-vivication of a textual attractor (‘we’) which has shifted in and out of focus throughout the peroration, moving forward through the mythological events of history, through the sublime moment of a woman touching her hand to a screen to vote, and now pushing on into a preordained and progressive futurity. The affective result of this rhetorical strategy is evidenced in the response of the audience, who also intoned in call-and-response fashion, ‘yes, we can’.

7.8 Summary

Much of this chapter has dealt with nominalisation and the passive voice, that is, grammatical forms traditionally associated with analyses in critical linguistics (see Fairclough, 2001: 103; Fowler et al., 1979; Jeffries, 2010a: 25–29). Just as critical linguistics has focused on how these forms mystify or obscure agency, the analyses here has also suggested that in this speech they have the ideological function of representing a history without antagonists. As was noted, though, this ideological perspective has aesthetic and affective consequences. It represents history as a series of mythologised landmark events (recall the vaguely grounded noun phrases and clauses) that ‘we’ have overcome to get to the present. This mythic past set the backdrop against which Nixon Cooper, a variety of progressive forward-moving historic actors, and the ‘we’ of Grant Park all stood out as vibrant textual attractors that in their sequential, mutual and repeated occlusion of one another created what was figuratively termed ‘a resonant feedback loop’. The loop reached its crescendo in the moment that the woman touched her hand to the screen to cast her vote, thus engaging in a process she had historically been denied, a process iconically and force-dynamically represented in the forward motion that in the past she had only witnessed. The forward motion of a collective ‘we’ continued into the projected future depicted in the address with Obama’s use of a JOURNEY metaphor. His use of non-finite verbs forms presented the future points on this progressive American journey in teleological fashion – as a programme of

desirable activities waiting to be actualised, rather than a set of contingent events to which 'we' work towards (but are, by definition, precluded from the immediate reality space). Whereas the modal force dynamics of the repeated, though elliptical, refrain, 'yes, we can', had previously echoed the forward motion of the various historic actors and Nixon Cooper herself, the final repetition functioned as a call to actualise now, in the present, the next steps on the JOURNEY. Given the repetition of 'yes, we can' throughout the speech, the slogan itself resonated with the events that 'we', the 'nation' had overcome in order to arrive at the present. The final 'yes, we can' therefore strikingly revived the 'we' attractor running through the peroration.

It is hoped that this analysis has demonstrated the relevance of the attention-resonance framework to political rhetoric. It is important to note that notions of self and other are important in this speech. The inclusive 'we' in the address acted as a historical protagonist that has weathered a long and hard journey through the ages. In constructing this narrative, Obama constructs a shared mythology with his audience and a shared sense of identity. This shared identity is doubtless a necessary aspect of the audience's emotional response to the speech, but it is not sufficient on its own. The figuration of the inclusive 'we' – the sense in which 'we' the audience, 'we' the agents of history, and the 106-year-old woman all participate in regular, rhythmic patterns of foregrounding and occlusion – are the thing that make the speech emotionally striking. It is this patterning that gives the affirmation, 'yes, we can', its rhetorical and emotive force (indeed, the idea of emotional 'force' is neatly captured in Cognitive Grammar's force dynamics of modality). The analysis set out here, then, complements existing approaches in CDA, but provides a means of describing the textual mechanics by which these emotional appeals to a sense of shared identity are made.

Conclusion

8.1 Overview

This book has offered a three-dimensional model of political discourse in reception based on the classical rhetorical appeals to ethos, logos, and pathos. The model provides an account of the mental representations audiences create when they engage in political discourse and their attitudes towards these representations. It has been argued that as the discourse proceeds, audiences create mental models – what were called performance models – of the entities they assume produced the text (the speaker/writer, the narrator/orchestrators, and the implied author). These are then compared to their existing knowledge of these entities, knowledge modelled with the notion of a character schema. The interaction of this network of conceptual structures – performance models and character schemata – produces the speaker or writer's ethos in audience reception.

In addition to conceptualising the speaker or writer, audiences also conceptualise the ideational content of the texts that are produced. It was suggested that this conceptualisation was the cognitive corollary of the speaker or writer's appeal to logos. Just as audiences compare *ad hoc* performance models to their longer-term character schemata, so too do they compare the text-world representations proffered by speakers and writers to their own pre-existing conceptualisations of the matter under discussion. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, this can often mean an outright rejection of the proffered world; either the representation it entails is too far removed from the audience's own conceptualisation, or the speaker or writer's identity – the knowledge encoded in the audience's character schema for that speaker or writer – means that they are considered untrustworthy or unreliable. Indeed, in the case of the latter, this might mean attempting to 'mind model' (Stockwell 2009: 141) the motives for the duplicitous representation. The appeal to logos fails in audience reception due to the perceived ethos of the discourse producer. Alternatively, it might be the case that audiences reject the manner in which the speaker or writer has represented the matter under discussion. In Chapter 4, this was described in terms of the audience's re-construal of the proffered text-world – the way in which they re-represent the underlying conceptual substrate of

the text-world in a way that fits better with their own conceptualisation. Similarly, as suggested in Chapter 5, metaphors might also be rejected outright as suitable forms of representation, or they might be re-construed in terms of further mappings between source and target frames.

Finally, pathos was modelled in terms of the audience's emotional response to their perception of the speaker or writer's tone and the proffered text-world's atmosphere. It was also argued that the linguistic patterning in the text – the 'resonant' (Stockwell, 2009) oscillation between textual figures and a rich conceptual background – were able to magnify affective responses to the discourse, the aesthetic and ideological properties of political discourse therefore working together to produce an emotional response in the audience. The six preceding chapters, then, provide a holistic and systematic way of conceptualising political discourse in reception. There are a number of further directions in which one might develop this three-dimensional, reception oriented approach to political discourse. The following sections outline six suggestive areas of study which merit further investigation.

8.2 Experimental methods

Throughout this book, a variety of audience response data has been used to illustrate the theoretical arguments that have been made. This has included data gathered from *YouTube*, the written responses of journalists, politicians and academics, data collected from online read-aloud experiments, and the in-the-moment oral responses of audiences reacting to political speeches. To further the study of political discourse requires a diversification of these sources. As noted in Chapter 1, stylistics has led the way in the development of empirical, experimental methods of collecting reader-response data. These methods should be replicated in the analysis of political discourse. Work such as this has already begun. For instance, using reader response survey data, Hart (2016) investigates how the different grammatical forms in news stories about political protests caused participants to position protestors and police as more or less responsible for violence. Similarly, in an often cited experiment, Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2011) analysed the effect of conceptual metaphors on perceptions of crime, and Fausey and Matlock (2011) investigate how the use of perfective and imperfective verb forms affected the way in which readers perceived the re-election chances of a US senator.

Certainly, Hart (2016) is correct that such experimental methods are "a logical 'next step' for cognitive approaches to CDA". To date, however, empirical studies of this kind have been centrally concerned with what has been called here the

proffered text-world representation, rather than the manner in which linguistic forms interact with the audiences' pre-existing frame knowledge. An interesting way forward in this experimental research would be to examine the relationship between sociological or political variables, the corresponding background knowledge participants bring to the discourse, and the manner in which linguistic forms are interpreted by participants. Although the participants in Fausey and Matlock's (2011) investigation were anonymous students, both Thobodieu and Boroditsky (2011) and Hart (2016) took demographic information such as age, gender, first language, and political affiliation. Certainly, such data is useful and an interesting point of comparison, but there is also an extent to which these variables are rather broad. Consider the variable of political affiliation. At the time of writing, the membership of the contemporary British Labour Party numbers over half a million people hailing from diverse political institutions, tendencies, and groups, including trade unionists, "third way" social democrats, "centrists", Fabians, socialists, Marxists of various shades, people who would call themselves liberals, and people who use the term 'liberal' as an insult. Moreover, the party itself is as much culturally, as well as politically, embedded in some local communities – the decision to support Labour often emerges as much from an emotional sense of political tribalism as it does from a supposedly "rational", cognisant sense of ideological affinity. It follows, then, that the heterogeneity of the party membership, alongside the complex sociological and political factors determining its levels of support, means analysts need more fine-grained ways of talking about 'political affiliation'.

8.3 Ethnographies of response

Such a fine-grained approach to the political and sociological characterisations of different audiences is furnished by the ethnographic frameworks often used in interactional sociolinguistics. For instance, the notion of a 'community of practice' (Wenger, 1997) seems particularly germane to this conception of political affiliation. Communities of practice are characterised by the participants' involvement in the same forms of social practice. If discourse is a form of social practice, then it stands to reason that different communities of practice will bring a different shared repertoire of knowledge and social representations to the discourse, alongside different sets of interpretative procedures. Identifying these political groupings – and the ideological representations to which they subscribe – within political institutions is a matter for patient ethnographic work. Such ethnographic work is already a feature of some research in CDA (such as Wodak, 2009) although, as with other forms of CDA research, it has tended towards the production side of discourse.

Conversely, the theoretical framework outlined in this book offers a set of concepts for describing the ways in which communities of practice – that is, different political groupings or currents of opinion within political institutions like parties, trade unions, or parliaments – interpret political texts: what character schemata do that group share for the speaker or writer and the backstage entities they assume are responsible for the speech? What is their shared representation of the social phenomenon being described by the speaker? Does this particular community of practice accept or reject the proffered text-world as a fair representation of reality? If not, what forms of attribution and mind modelling procedures do they use to make sense of this disjuncture between their own representation and the discourse producer's? Do they utilise any re-construal strategies? If, so, which ones? What is their emotional response to the proffered text-world representation or the speaker's tone? The answers to such questions comprise a characterisation of the kinds of knowledge and interpretative procedures that different communities of practice utilise in their interpretation of political discourse. They also provide a means of comparing and contrasting, in a relatively structured fashion, the knowledge and interpretative procedures deployed by disparate communities of practice. Such an approach would form the basis of a cognitive ethnography of reception in which shared mental representations and cognitive interpretative processes, in addition to other demographic information, would constitute grounds for grouping and analysing the responses of participants.

8.4 Politics, cognition and the corpus

In addition to ethnography, another way of modelling the variegated knowledge structures different audiences bring to the discourse event is through corpus linguistic methods. This might seem strange, given the corpus linguistic emphasis on analysing large amounts of linguistic data, compared to the focus in this volume on analysing the reception of a specific discourse event. Indeed, Stubbs (1996: 236) notes this tension: 'the problem for text and corpus analysis is to reconcile analyses of the details of individual texts, their context of production and reception, and intertextual patterns across large corpora.' Sinclair (2004: 25) suggests a good starting point for this reconciliation of approaches: 'when a reliable description of the regularities has been assembled, then the individual texts can be read against it'. Here, the regularities to which Sinclair (2004) refers are the 'intertextual patterns' alluded to by Stubbs (1996). This concern for the regularities in the corpus versus the specifics of linguistic organisation in individual texts finds its echo in the cognitive linguistic differentiation between a schematic type and its concrete instantiation in use: in Langacker (2008), the type versus the instance; in Werth (1999), the

frame versus the text-world; in Schank and Abelson (1977), the schema versus the embodied, lived experience of being in the schematised situation. The cognitive corollary of Sinclair's (2004) linguistic 'regularities' are those of conceptualisation. They are suggestive of patterns in text-driven cognition – of a repeatedly proffered mental representation. The repetition is likely to result in that particular conceptualisation becoming a cognitive resource for future meaning-making (see Van Dijk, 1998: 84). A description of the linguistic regularities in the corpus, then, is also a description of the ways in which language users routinely conceptualise.

The question of *which* language users are doing the conceptualising depends on the corpus. A large corpus such as the BNC is likely to model audience knowledge at a very general level of abstraction, on the level of the population. So, in the analysis in Chapter 6, the BNC was drawn on to talk in quite general terms about the collocational expectations encoded in phrases such as 'on the verge of'. The corpus here was being used as a method to model the linguistic knowledge of a quite generic reader. However, using a different corpus may have yielded different results. In fact, if we view discourse as a form of social practice, then the 'regularities' we encounter in corpora comprising texts produced as part of the same or similar social practices are likely to provide us with clues about the conceptualisations that are prevalent amongst a community of practice. The choice or construction of a corpus is thus a method of modelling the knowledge of communities of practice who regularly take part in that particular type of discourse. For instance, people who read the liberal British broadsheet newspaper, *The Guardian*, are likely to share different cognitive frames than those who read the right-wing broadsheet, *The Telegraph*. We might say, then, that readers' habitual exposure to the text-worlds proffered in one newspaper furnishes them with a very different set of cognitive resources to those who read the other. One way of 'reading against' an individual text would be to compare the representations it proffers to the regularities of representation in a corpus. We might model the way a *Guardian* reader would read a *Telegraph* article about, say, immigration, by comparing the representation proffered in *The Telegraph* article to the patterns of representation proffered in *The Guardian*. Indeed, this could be combined with other forms of data collection such as experimental studies, read aloud experiment, and focus groups to investigate whether or not *Guardian* readers mobilise these conceptual resources in their own critiques of *Telegraph* journalism.

8.5 Economies of interpretation

Of course, the texts produced by politicians and journalists often respond to antecedent discourses, as amply demonstrated by Musolff (2006) in his discussion of

political metaphor. There is a sense, then, that *all* political discourse, insofar as it does not happen in a social vacuum, can be read as a form of audience response. As Browse (in press) argues, this is especially true of some forms of journalistic discourse; the role of the op-ed writer or columnist is often to “decode” what politicians say for the sake of their readership. In these cases, the journalist interprets the backstage political considerations that may have gone into the text and might also offer an assessment of how successful the text was in addressing the political exigencies of the moment. This decoding of the text for the “lay” audience is not a neutral act of interpretation, but rather a political intervention which promotes and propagates the ideological perspective of the columnist or the editorial line of the newspaper. The process of interpretation, then, is highly politicised. Following what was argued in the last section, if newspapers equip their readers with cognitive resources for engaging in political discourse, then op-ed writers and newspapers furnish them with interpretative strategies for understanding why it is politicians choose particular representations. In the conceptual “economy”, so to speak, of political meanings, the milieu of media commentators, columnist, and op-ed writers collectively wield quite a lot of power in ideologically shaping the manner in which events of political discourse are interpreted by audiences (see Van Dijk, 1998: 173). Utilising a combination of the experimental, ethnographic, and corpus methods suggested above, alongside the theoretical framework offered in this book, one avenue of future research would be to investigate how different interpretative strategies spread between individual journalists and politicians, and their diffusion across whole communities of practice. What are the institutional, political, social, and cultural constraints on different forms of interpretation for individual journalists and politicians, or whole communities of practice? How and why are these interpretative strategies used to legitimise or delegitimise political action? Such an approach provides the theoretical basis for a CDA of reception in which it is interpretative acts, in addition to proffered meanings, that are the subject of criticism.

8.6 Persuasion

In the discussion of the conceptual ecology of ethos in Chapter 3, it was stressed that the conceptual structures audiences bring to the discourse event can change. Conversely, in subsequent chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) the models of audience resistance and re-construal were based on a relatively ossified view of these conceptual resources; a “clash” between the preferred construal of the audience member and the proffered construal of the speaker or writer presupposes some inflexibility in the former cognitive structure. This presupposition was a response

to the way in which grammar has been treated historically in CDA. As O'Halloran (2003) writes:

Because it is assumed in CDA that the sentence is both the vehicle of computation and the vehicle of mental content, then an absence of a 'necessary' semantic component [such as an agent, say, in the case of a passive grammatical construction] is consonant with an absence of necessary thought – hence mystification.

(O'Halloran, 2003: 58)

Conversely, the cognitive grammatical model advanced in Chapters 4 and 5 is in no danger of falling into the 'symbolicist' trap that O'Halloran (2003) identifies. This is because, in Cognitive Grammar, semantic meaning is a function of *both* the conceptual structures the audience brings to the discourse *and* the construal the text places on those conceptual structures; audiences "plug" their knowledge, so to speak, into the construal proffered by the text. The absence of an agent from a passive grammatical construction might well be missing from the proffered construal, but if the agent is a salient feature of the audience member's background knowledge then there is no reason to suppose it will disappear from their mental representation of the discourse. Indeed, the analysis of responses to Theresa May's speech in Chapter 4 proved this point. Participants were able to identify the agent in the passive constructions the politician utilised, and often emphatically did so, criticising her for racism. However, as a result of the emphasis on resistant reception in these chapters, perhaps the sense in which appeals to logos are also persuasive has been neglected. One area of future research, then, is on how our conceptions of reality might be reconfigured by the discourses with which we engage. This book offered a model for this in the case of our apprehension of speakers' and writer's ethos in Chapter 3, but this needs to be extended to cognitive stylistic analysis of successful appeals to logos (and pathos) as well.

8.7 The sense of being there

This book began with an insistence that political discourse is emotional, visceral even. Our responses to political discourse are embodied in the sense that the knowledge we bring to the discourse event is produced by our experience and interaction with the world around us, but our reactions are often more directly embodied. We exclaim, shout or applaud rapturously. We might plant our fists on the table or flush red with anger at the things politicians and journalists say. Chapter 6 and 7 provided frameworks for explaining aspects of these embodied, emotional reactions. As pointed out in Chapter 6, if analysts are to provide a fully rounded account of these visceral and emotional reactions, we also need ways of

describing how it is the physical environment in which we experience and participate in political discourse affects our responses to it. From protests to pub arguments, rallies to committee rooms, and political liveblogs to Town Hall debates, the experience of being present in each of these spaces – their social significance, their atmosphere, and the attendant social hierarchies they impose on the people who occupy them – is likely to condition the responses that audiences have to the discourse. We need, then, detailed ethnographic work on the role and significance of space in the emotional – and even ethical – experience of political discourse. The framework outlined, here – especially the concepts of tone and atmosphere, alongside the notion of political narration and orchestration – are good places to begin such an investigation.

8.8 Conclusion

These six areas for future development are not offered as an exhaustive research plan, but rather a taste of the kinds of further work engendered by a focus on political discourse in reception. The aim of this book has been to outline a set of theoretical concepts and frameworks for modelling the processes by which audiences actively engage in political discourse. In doing so, this book has advocated a cognitive stylistic approach – or, given its Aristotelian influence, one might prefer to call this a cognitive rhetorical approach – to examining these processes. Such a theoretical perspective is necessarily eclectic and holistic, in the sense that it involves the analysis of not one feature of discourse, but an assemblage of discourse structures all working in concert to produce rhetorical effects on the audience. This holism and eclecticism has necessitated interdisciplinary frames of reference. Ideas from socio-, cognitive, and systemic functional linguistics, narratology, literary theory, social and cognitive psychology, and political and cultural theory have been used. It is the confluence of these ideas, the principled eclecticism of theory and method, and the holism of analysis that makes the cognitive rhetorical, reception-oriented study of political discourse such an exciting prospect for future research.

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APPENDIX A

Transcription conventions used in this book

(.)	Short pause
(0.5)	A pause of 0.5 seconds
=	Indicates that there is no gap between conversational turns
[]	Indicates an overlap of conversational turns
((cough))	Indicates a verbal representation of an action e.g. a cough
<u>Emphasis</u>	Underlining indicates a marked stress

APPENDIX B

Excerpt from Theresa May's speech to the 2015 Conservative Party conference

The crisis in Syria sparked a debate this summer not just about foreign policy and military intervention but about refugees and immigration. With more than 430,000 migrants having reached Europe by sea this year, the countries of Europe resurrecting borders they'd once removed, and thousands of people in Calais trying to reach Britain illegally, some people have argued that we're on the verge of a 'great age of migration', in which national governments are powerless to resist huge numbers of people, travelling the world in search of a better life.

But people on both extremes of the debate – from the anti-immigration far right to the open-borders liberal left – conflate refugees in desperate need of help with economic migrants who simply want to live in a more prosperous society. Their desire for a better life is perfectly understandable, but their circumstances are not nearly the same as those of the people fleeing their homelands in fear of their lives. There are millions of people in poorer countries who would love to live in Britain, and there is a limit to the amount of immigration any country can and should take. While we must fulfil our moral duty to help people in desperate need, we must also have an immigration system that allows us to control who comes to our country.

Because when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it's impossible to build a cohesive society. It's difficult for schools and hospitals and core infrastructure like housing and transport to cope. And we know that for people in low-paid jobs, wages are forced down even further while some people are forced out of work altogether.

Now I know there are some people who say, yes there are costs of immigration, but the answer is to manage the consequences, not reduce the numbers. But not all of the consequences can be managed, and doing so for many of them comes at a high price. We need to build 210,000 new homes every year to deal with rising demand. We need to find 900,000 new school places by 2024. And there are thousands of people who have been forced out of the labour market, still unable to find a job.

But even if we could manage all the consequences of mass immigration, Britain does not need net migration in the hundreds of thousands every year. Of course, immigrants plug skills shortages and it's right that we should try to attract the best talent in the world, but not every person coming to Britain right now is a skilled electrician, engineer or doctor. The evidence – from the OECD, the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee and many academics – shows that while there are benefits of selective and controlled immigration, at best the net economic and fiscal effect of high immigration is close to zero. So there is no case, in the national interest, for immigration of the scale we have experienced over the last decade.

Neither is it true that, in the modern world, immigration is no longer possible to control. The experience of the last five years is that where the Government has the political will to reduce immigration, it can do so. We rooted out abuse of the student visa system, and the numbers went down. We reformed family visas, and the numbers went down. We capped economic migration

from outside the EU, and – despite the growing economy – the numbers remained stable. Overall, after my first two years as Home Secretary, net migration – which had reached 320,000 in 2005 – fell to 154,000.

Since then, however, the numbers have doubled once more. One of the reasons is student visas. And let me be clear about students.

We welcome students coming to study. But the fact is, too many of them are not returning home as soon as their visa runs out. If they have a graduate job, that is fine. If not, they must return home. So I don't care what the university lobbyists say: the rules must be enforced. Students, yes; over-stayers, no. And the universities must make this happen.

Another reason is European migration. For years, net migration from within the EU was balanced. The number of people coming to the UK was matched by the number of Brits and Europeans moving to other EU countries. In recent years, the figures have become badly unbalanced – partly because our growing economy is creating huge numbers of jobs.

The numbers coming from Europe are unsustainable and the rules have to change. At the moment, for example, workers coming to the UK on very low salaries can claim over £10,000 on top of their salary in benefits – which makes the UK a hugely attractive destination. This is not good for us – or for the countries those people are leaving.

That is why the PM is right to target the amount we pay in benefits for those coming to the UK to work, and put these arrangements on a sensible basis.

So those are the main reasons why net migration is still too high. But the trouble is, other changes mean that without the right policies it's going to get even harder to keep the numbers down. Modern forms of communication, cheaper international travel, and the increase in relative prosperity for many people in the developing world mean that larger numbers of people are more mobile than ever before. And this is compounded by several other factors.

For years, despite its many other flaws and its criminal leadership, Libya was known as Europe's 'forward border'. British immigration officials worked there with their European and Libyan counterparts to stop illegal immigration from Africa at its source. Now the criminal gangs that smuggle people into Europe have been able to work unimpeded. Free movement rules don't just mean European nationals have the right to reside in Britain, they now mean anybody who has married a European can come here almost without condition. And Schengen – the agreement that abolished borders between EU states apart from Britain and Ireland – means that once a migrant arrives in a country with weak border controls, like Greece, they can make their way across Europe and into Germany, or up to the British border at Calais, without checks. Many of those people will eventually get EU citizenship and the free movement rights that come with it.

Even actions taken with the best of intentions have consequences. When the German Government, motivated by compassion and decency, said they expected to receive 800,000 asylum seekers this year, it prompted hundreds of thousands of people to try to get to Germany. Some of these people were refugees coming directly from Syria or the camps in Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, but many – in fact, up to half of them – were migrants from other parts of the world.

So reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that's no reason to give up. As our manifesto said, 'we must work to control immigration and put Britain first'.

We have to do this for the sake of our society and our public services – and for the sake of the people whose wages are cut, and whose job security is reduced, when immigration is too high.

(May, 2015)

APPENDIX C

The lessons of history for Jeremy Corbyn

Corbyn has been compared to Michael Foot and Keir Hardie, but it is George Lansbury's brief tenure as leader that offers the best guide to what might happen now.

Conventional wisdom has it that Labour's newly-elected leader will be taking the party back to the past. The most commonly imagined point of destination is the 1980s. Corbyn, we are told, is a latter day Michael Foot, whose tenure on Labour's leadership will give us a Labour civil war and a decade or more of Tory dominance. A more positive historical allusion, has been offered by Melissa Benn, writing in the Guardian, who has argued that Corbyn is the direct heir of the Labour Party's founding father, Keir Hardie. While both analogies are tenable, a more accurate parallel might be traced between Corbyn and a less well-known past Labour leader, George Lansbury.

Lansbury took over the leadership of the Labour Party in 1932, in the wake of the disastrous economic crisis that had destroyed Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government in 1931. MacDonald had nurtured the Labour Party into a position of power over the preceding two decades, but abandoned its rank and file in the moment of crisis to join a National Government with the Conservatives. The Labour establishment – seen by many in the movement as heroes only a few years previously – were, by 1932, seen by most socialists as traitors. The demoralised Labour Party was decimated in the 1931 General Election, and Lansbury was elected leader because he was viewed as the embodiment of honesty, purity and principle. Is this beginning to sound familiar?

Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a London politician who was located firmly on the left of the Labour Party – his first political home as a socialist was in the revolutionary Marxist Social Democratic Federation. Like Corbyn, he was a “veteran” MP who had taken part in the struggles of what seemed like a previous age; by the time he secured the leadership of his party he was already in his 70s.

Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a habitual rebel, and a thorn in the side of his party's moderate leadership. As editor of the Daily Herald he supported just about every shade of Left-wing rebel tendency available. He campaigned for Communists to be allowed to join the Labour Party. In the period before the Great War he'd gone to prison for the incitement of militant unlawful protest on behalf of the suffragettes. He was imprisoned again in 1921, when serving on Poplar Council, for contempt of court, after refusing to implement what he considered to be an unfair rates system. Like Corbyn, Lansbury was a life-long pacifist. He was the main organiser of the mass anti-war demonstration in Trafalgar Square in August 1914. He was also prepared to meet – against his better judgement – some pretty questionable individuals in pursuit of peace, including, in 1937, Hitler and Mussolini. By comparison, maybe meeting Hamas isn't so big a deal.

The parallels between Corbyn and Lansbury are so close that one might think that Corbyn is the ghost of Lansbury stalking the Labour Party. But what might history tell us about the Party's current predicament? Lansbury's leadership has traditionally been seen as a period of crisis

for Labour – a spell in the proverbial wilderness. Lansbury inherited a depleted and divided party, struggled to make an impact against the overwhelming tendencies of the time, and by 1935 was driven from its leadership by his more right wing colleagues. Corbyn will need to be an exceptionally resourceful and gifted leader, not to mention lucky, if history is not to repeat itself in this respect.

Even if this is the case, though, Corbyn's period as Labour leader need not be without significance. Lansbury's tenure on the leadership may have been short, but it was not devoid of success. Like Jeremy Corbyn, Lansbury was a magician of mass-mobilisation. He managed to inspire more respect and devotion among grass roots socialists and labour supporters than arguably any other Labour leader before or since. He connected with Labour's core supporters and mobilised them in a way that meant the Labour Party survived when it may have perished. He reconnected a wounded, demoralised and betrayed party with its core values and beliefs. Crucially, he created a political space in which the socialists of the future – among them Aneurin Bevan and Clement Attlee – could develop and prosper. And we all know what they managed to achieve.

Perhaps the real lesson that a bit of historical perspective can teach us about Corbyn's remarkable coup doesn't concern his electability, or alleged lack of it. After all, those that warn that he is unelectable haven't done too well at winning elections themselves in recent years. No, history tells us that the Labour Party is experiencing a period when it needs to be revitalised, democratised and brought back into contact with its all-too-forgotten core beliefs. Like Lansbury over 70 years before him, Corbyn might well be the man for the job. If so, the really interesting question becomes not whether Corbyn can win in 2020, but who, out of the new MPs who were prominent in nominating and supporting him, will be the Bevans and Attlees of the future?

(Wright, 2015)

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This book sets out a framework for investigating audience responses to political discourse. It starts from the premise that audiences are active participants who bring their own background knowledge and political standpoint to the communicative event. To operationalise this perspective, the volume draws on concepts from classical rhetoric alongside contemporary research in cognitive stylistics and cognitive linguistics (including schema theory, Text World Theory, Cognitive Grammar, and mind-modelling, amongst others). It examines the role played by the speaker's identity, the arguments they make, and the emotions of the audience in the – often critical – reception of political text and talk, using a diversity of examples to illustrate this three-dimensional approach – from political speeches, interviews and newspaper articles, to more creative text-types such as politicised rap music, television satire and filmic drama. The result of this wide-ranging application is a holistic and systematic account of the rhetorical and ideological effects of political discourse in reception.

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