




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Embodiment via Body Parts

*Studies from various
languages and cultures*

Edited by
Zouheir A. Maalej
Ning Yu

John Benjamins Publishing Company

Embodiment via Body Parts

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Volume 31

Embodiment via Body Parts. Studies from various languages and cultures
Edited by Zouheir A. Maalej and Ning Yu

Embodiment via Body Parts

Studies from various languages and cultures

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Embodiment via body parts : studies from various languages and cultures / edited by Zouheir A. Maalej, Ning Yu.

p. cm. (Human Cognitive Processing, ISSN 1387-6724 ; v. 31)

This volume is based on the theme session titled 'Embodiment via Body Parts,' organized by Zouheir A. Maalej, Farzad Sharifian, and Ning Yu at the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference held in Krakow, Poland, in July 2007.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Language and culture. 2. Human body and language. 3. Language and languages--Variation. I. Maalej, Zouheir A. II. Yu, Ning.

P35.E45 2011

306.44--dc22

2011017206

ISBN 978 90 272 2385 2 (Hb ; alk. paper)

ISBN 978 90 272 8513 3 (Eb)

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John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 ME Amsterdam · The Netherlands
John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 · USA

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Acknowledgments

This volume is based on the theme session titled “Embodiment via Body Parts” organized by Zouheir A. Maalej, Farzad Sharifian, and Ning Yu at the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference held in Krakow, Poland, in July 2007. The editors wish to take this opportunity to thank all the people who made this book possible. Specifically, we want to thank all the authors of the chapters for their valuable contributions and the hard work they put into them. We are deeply indebted to the three anonymous reviewers whose comments and suggestions helped all the contributors tremendously during the process of revision. Hanneke Bruintjes and other staff at John Benjamins deserve our special thanks for their professional assistance throughout the process of review, revision, and production. Our genial appreciation goes to the series editors of *Human Cognitive Processing*, both old and new, for their strong support and encouragement. We are especially grateful to Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg for having spent so much of their time helping us proofread and finalize the manuscript.

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Introduction

Embodiment via body parts

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1. The goal of the volume

All of the chapters in this volume contribute to the main theme “embodiment via body parts”. In cognitive science, the term ‘embodiment’ refers to “understanding the role of an agent’s own body in its everyday, situated cognition”, namely how our bodies influence the ways we think and speak (Gibbs 2006: 1). The embodiment perspective, which transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries, focuses on the co-evolution between minds and bodies, and on the whole behaving organism in its natural context in which individual humans interact in and across groups (Semin & Smith 2008b). The human body is composed of both external body parts and internal body organs, and it is an organizational system with different components playing different physical, physiological, and even social functions. The contribution of individual bodily components to and the specific roles each plays in embodiment in various cultures, as manifested in their respective languages, are the questions that this volume seeks to address.

In a study of body parts in Chinese expressions of emotion, published in a special issue of *Pragmatics & Cognition* on “The Body in Description of Emotion” (Enfield & Wierzbicka 2002), Yu (2002) suggests that the explicit use of body-part terminology in emotion expressions is the tip of the iceberg, which is a good place to start if we want to know more about the whole submerged beneath the sea. This suggestion applies not only to the study of human emotion, but also to the study of human cognition in general. Here the “whole submerged beneath the sea” refers to “the body in the mind” (Johnson 1987), “the culture in the mind” (Shore 1996), and “the culture in the body” (Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008), all of which are important theses in the studies of the embodied and culturally situated nature of human cognition, and of the relationship between body, mind, and culture.

In the academic context of Cognitive Linguistics, this volume intends to advance the intellectual momentum created by the recent publication of the twin

volumes on body, language, and mind (Ziemke et al. 2007; Frank et al. 2008), and of a volume devoted to the study of conceptualizations of internal body organs across various cultures and languages (Sharifian et al. 2008). In particular, the present volume complements the latter. The chapters in Sharifian et al. (2008) focus on internal organs, especially the heart and the liver, in contrast to the head (or brain), as the perceived centers of feeling, thought, or cognition at large in numerous cultures and languages. Sharifian and his collaborators divide their chapters into three sections, based on whether the languages studies show abdomen-centering, heart-centering, and/or head-centering conceptualizations of the mind. Thus, the “abdomen-centering” languages include Basque (Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2008), Indonesian (Siahaan 2008), Kuuk Thaayorre (Gaby 2008), and Malay (Goddard 2008); the “heart-centering” languages include Chinese (Yu 2008a), Japanese (Ikegami 2008; Occhi 2008), and Korean (Yoon 2008); and the dualistic “heart/head-centering” languages include Dutch (Foolen 2008), English (Geeraerts & Gevaert 2008; Niemeier 2008), Northeastern Neo-Aramaic (Wolk 2008), Persian (Sharifian 2008a), and Tunisian Arabic (Maalej 2008). The volume makes a collective attempt to explore (i) the ways in which internal body organs have been employed in different languages to conceptualize human experiences such as emotions and/or workings of the mind, and (ii) the cultural models that appear to account for the observed similarities as well as differences in the various conceptualizations of internal body organs (see also Yu 2009a, for a book-length study of the cultural conceptualization of the heart in Chinese).

The contributors to the present volume attempt to address the roles of individual body parts, especially external body parts but some internal body organs as well, in the embodied conceptualization of emotions, mental faculties, character traits, cultural values, etc., in a variety of languages and cultures. In particular, the following issues are addressed:

1. Which individual part of the body is deployed to conceptualize which emotion, character trait, mental faculty, cultural value?
2. What imaginative structure(s) (e.g. metaphor, metonymy, image schema) is/are implemented in the conceptualization?
3. Do different cultures use the same body part to conceptualize the same emotion, character trait, mental faculty, cultural value?
4. What possible implications emerge for mainstream embodiment theory?

It is hoped that the present volume will contribute to the understanding of embodied cognition in general and its specific manifestations in various cultures and languages. Before we present the chapters of the volume, we provide an overview of the literature on embodiment and a section on metaphor and metonymy-related theoretical issues.

2. Embodiment: An overview

The literature on embodiment has grown impressively, comprising both monographs and specialized edited volumes (e.g. Berdayes et al. 2004; Blackman 2008; Csordas 1994; Frank et al. 2008; Gallapher 2005; Gibbs 2006; Johnson 1987, 2007; Krois et al. 2007; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Lakoff & Núñez 2000; Semin & Smith 2008a; Sharifian et al. 2008; Slingerland 2008; Varela et al. 1991; Weiss & Haber 1999; Ziemke et al. 2007; Yu 2009b), as well as single journal articles and book chapters (e.g. Anderson 2003; Gibbs 1999a, 2003; Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008; Núñez 1999; Rohrer 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Sinha & Jensen de López 2000; Thompson & Varela 2001; Violi 2004, 2008; Wilson 2002; Ziemke 2003). This literature has produced views of embodiment ranging from the physiological and cultural to the neural and even robotic dimensions (e.g. Kövecses 2005; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008; Sinha & Jansen 2000; Svensson & Ziemke 2004).

A good starting point for our discussion of embodiment is Ziemke and Frank (2007: 1), who characterize it as “the bodily and sensorimotor basis of phenomena such as *meaning*, *mind*, *cognition* and *language*”. Evidence of embodiment can be found at least in language (as we see in the use of body parts terms in the conceptualization of many target domains discussed in this book) and this linguistic evidence can be used for talking about the embodied nature of mind, cognition, and culture, as demonstrated by the chapters in the present volume.

If the existence of embodiment as a researchable topic is uncontroversial, the theory of embodiment does not yet offer a uniform framework. By its very nature cognitive science is multidisciplinary, and thus there are various competing theoretical paradigms within the field. Is it a weakness of a nascent theory that a variety of conceptions exist? The answer is definitely: No. It took the first generation of computationalist cognitive science some time to consolidate, i.e. to establish itself as a theory organized around the concept of the computational mind. We believe that, analogously, the second generation of embodied cognitive science needs time to mature. At present, the theory is struggling to develop adequate concepts, conceptions, and precise formulations whenever arguments and counterarguments arise. Ziemke and Frank (2007: 5), for instance, evaluate the state of embodiment theory as follows: “the current situation might also provoke comparisons with soap bubbles that are destined to burst sooner or later if there is nothing under the surface to hold them together”. This is the nature of theory: hypothesis testing, trial-and-error, discarding old views, adopting new paradigms, and so on. Therefore, diversity of views is often a sign of the good health of a growing discipline.

As a central philosophical underpinning of Cognitive Linguistics, the embodiment thesis challenges Cartesian dualism in Western philosophy, which has long

kept mind and body apart in matters of meaning, imagination, and reasoning (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Sinha & Jensen de López 2000). This thesis “stresses the continuity and motivating character of the relationship between pre- or non-linguistic bodily experience, and cognition; and seeks deep explanatory principles in human neurobiology” (Sinha & Jensen de López 2000: 18). Ever since Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) introduced the embodiment thesis to Cognitive Linguistics over two decades ago, the term *embodiment* has acquired various meanings that sometimes have very little in common. For instance, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) distinguish neural, phenomenological, and cognitive unconscious levels of embodiment, which seem to serve as universals of cognitive processing. Violi (2004) discusses various formulations of the embodiment thesis, ranging from a weak to a strong version. Núñez (1999) distinguishes trivial, material, and full embodiment. Wilson (2002) reviews six views of embodied cognition whereas Ziemke (2003) offers yet another six types of embodiment. Rohrer warns against three dogmas of embodiment (2006) and identifies twelve dimensions of embodiment in the cognitive science literature (2007). Maalej (2004, 2007, 2008) studies culture-specific and culturally tainted embodiment, in addition to physiological embodiment.

Johnson (1987: xxxvi) is among the first contemporary philosophers to point to the importance of the body in concepts and conceptualization, stressing the need for “putting the body back into the mind”. Lakoff (1987: 267) characterizes embodiment as “our collective biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as beings functioning in our environment”. In order not to shift from one extreme (mind) position to another (body), Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) argue for ‘experientialism’ (and its variants ‘experiential realism’ and ‘embodied realism’), where experience is always an interactive process, involving neural and physiological constraints from the organism as well as characteristic affordances from the environment. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 57) acknowledge the cultural basis of experience, claiming that “*every* experience takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions” (emphasis in the original). They have not, however, systematized this stance in their studies because they were more concerned with conceptual and “physical” aspects of physiological embodiment.

Sinha and Jensen de López (2000: 20) claim that despite its many virtues and its superiority to its formalist rival, the embodiment thesis “has failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of culture and society in human cognition, in the motivation of linguistic structure, and in the acquisition of language”. To remedy what they see as a weakness of the embodiment thesis, they propose “an extended conception of embodiment” that is no longer restricted to the “humanly corporeal” (22), characterizing it in line with “aspects and features of the experientially or ecologically significant, noncorporeal world” (24). Such a conception of

'cultural embodiment' is exemplified by an analysis of cross-cultural data that account for the differences in the acquisition of containment by Zapotec, Danish, and English children "in terms of language 'entrenching' cognitive differences induced by cultural embodiment and cultural practice" (37). What is especially significant in their study is that they show how cultural behaviors shape habitual patterns of language, whereby the socio-cultural dimension shapes the "cognitive unconscious" (the psychological dimension of embodiment) in ways that could be measured using psychological methodologies. They, therefore, offer a complementary view that socio-cultural factors impact mind and language.

Gibbs (1999a: 153) also argues for a view that stresses the interaction between mind, body, and culture:

Scholars cannot, and should not assume, that mind, body, and culture can somehow be independently portioned out of human behavior as it is only appropriate to study particular "interactions" between thought, language, and culture, respectively. Theories of human conceptual systems should be inherently cultural in that the cognition which occurs when the body meets the world is inextricably culturally-based.

The reason that people from the same community share more or less the same conceptualizations is evidence that, although it is found in individual minds, cognition is a property of cultural groups. That is, an emergent cultural cognition is heterogeneously distributed across the minds in a cultural group (Sharifian 2003, 2008b).

Underscoring the role of culture in shaping the embodied mind, Gibbs (2006: 13) argues that "bodies are not culture-free objects, because all aspects of embodied experience are shaped by cultural processes". He points out that a long-standing belief in Western cultures is that human bodies, as defined by the boundaries of skin, are separate from, and independent of, the external world. This belief in the person-world dualism is now rejected by many philosophers and cognitive scientists who advocate that human beings should "be understood, and scientifically studied, in terms of organism-environment mutuality and reciprocity" (16). The physical environment in which people and their bodies move and function is imbued with culture. Therefore, "the body system [...] offers insightful analysis for understanding cultural systems" (36). The body has different symbolic properties in different cultural contexts, with many elementary embodied experiences shaped by local cultural knowledge and practice. Research on embodied cognition should explore the linkages between embodiment and cultural meaning since people actually instill different cultural meanings into bodily processes in changing cultural contexts:

Rather than being a biological given, embodiment is a category of sociocultural analysis, often revealing complex dimensions of the interactions between bodies and personhood. [...] Culture does not just inform embodied experience; embodied experience is itself culturally constituted. (Gibbs 2006: 37)

This, of course, does not mean that people in different cultures have different physiologies, but rather that they think, understand, and interpret their bodily experiences differently. Bodily experience, which differs from physiological mechanisms, “cannot, therefore, be defined universally, but is always deeply influenced by cultural variation” and “shaped by cultural practices that resist simple biological explanation” (Gibbs 2006: 39). Gibbs (2006) concludes that one way to integrate the role of cultural activity into a theory of embodied cognition is to recognize, and study, different levels of embodiment in thought, language, and action” (39) such as the three levels of embodiment proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1999).

As Rohrer (2006) points out, the embodiment hypothesis is especially associated with a particular strand of Cognitive Linguistics, i.e. the cognitive semantic approach to the study of metaphor and metonymy, known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), which can be traced back to its origin in Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). The experiential basis of conceptual metaphors is both bodily and cultural. Our mind is embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the peculiarities of our body and the specifics of our physical and cultural environment (e.g. Gibbs 1994, 1999a, 2003, 2008; Johnson 1987, 1999, 2007; Kövecses 2005; Lakoff 1987, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Yu 2008b, 2008c). Our body plays a crucial role in our meaning and understanding, and our interaction in and with the physical and cultural world defines the contours of what is meaningful to us and determines the ways of our understanding (Gibbs 1994, 1999a; Johnson 1987, 1999; Yu 2008b). It follows that human meaning and understanding are in part metaphorical mappings from the concrete to the abstract. It also follows that our body, with its experiences and functions, is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings onto more abstract domains. This is because humans, despite their racial or ethnic peculiarities, have the same basic body structure, and all share some common bodily experiences and functions, which fundamentally define them as human beings.

While the body and bodily experiences are potentially universal source domains for conceptual metaphors structuring abstract concepts, cultural models set up specific perspectives from which certain parts of the body and certain aspects of bodily experience are viewed as especially salient and meaningful in the understanding of those abstract concepts (Gibbs 1999a; Yu 2008b, 2008c, 2009b). That is, cultural models have an interpretative function in viewing the body and its role in grounding metaphor: They may interpret the same embodied experience differently and attach different values to the same bodily experiences or the same parts of the body. Thus, it is possible that, in different cultures and languages, different body parts or bodily experiences are mapped onto the same abstract concepts. Conversely, the same body parts or bodily experiences are selected to map onto and structure different abstract concepts. The convergence and divergence of these

kinds, therefore, give rise to varied conceptual metonymies and metaphors in different languages (Kövecses 2005; Yu 2008b, 2008c, 2009b).

3. Metaphor and metonymy revisited

It is important to note that embodiment is necessarily mediated through metaphoric mappings that link a source domain with a target domain. It is now common knowledge in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) that “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 3). However, the study of this conceptual system residing in cognition can only be indirect since this system is not open to direct observation. So, “language is an important source of evidence for what that system is like” (3).

CMT accords preeminence to the conceptual dimension of metaphor, arguing that “metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 6). This direction (conceptual metaphor → linguistic expression) is taken when people produce linguistic metaphors, i.e., it is precisely conceptual metaphors residing in cognition and making up the conceptual systems in a given culture that allow for the linguistic expression of these concepts. At the level of linguistic analysis, however, the opposite route is taken (linguistic expression → conceptual metaphor), whereby the stock of linguistic expressions of conceptual metaphors is studied to gain insights into cognition and conceptual systems. As linguists, however, we should bear in mind that it is not always safe to infer how people think from the way they talk (see e.g. Gibbs 2007). As Casasanto’s (2009) study shows, for instance, linguistic metaphors reveal only a subset of conceptual metaphors that appear to structure our conceptual systems. Nevertheless, “even when linguistic metaphors fail to predict the exact relationships revealed by behavioral tests”, they “point to important links between the source and target domains” and, as such, serve “as a source of *hypotheses* about the structure of abstract concepts” for further linguistic and extra-linguistic studies (143).

Cognitive linguists often study linguistic metaphors so conventionalized that they are usually called “dead metaphors”. Lakoff and Turner (1989) argue that it is a mistake to think of this stock of linguistic expressions as dead metaphors, claiming that “those that are most alive and most deeply entrenched, efficient, and powerful are those that are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless” (129). In other words, the stock of “dead” metaphors (such as those in idioms) is actually alive, because it is the fodder which sustains the conceptual system in particular and cognition in general. Thus, CMT makes the distinction between dead and

live/poetic metaphor redundant, showing that the “dead metaphor theory” is guilty of the confusion between metaphors that are conventional and part of our cognitive system, and historical metaphors that no longer exist (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 128–129). Contrary to Black’s (1993) claim that “a so-called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all” (25), Turner (1991, 1996) demonstrates the link between conventional everyday metaphors and poetic metaphors in literature, where the latter are based on and are extensions of the former.

Turning now to the relation between metaphor and metonymy, classical rhetoric made a clear distinction between the two. In a functionalist framework, Jakobson (1956) maintained this traditional distinction. Based on studies of aphasic patients suffering from similarity vs. contiguity disorders, he concluded that metaphor is a figure of similarity and metonymy a figure of contiguity.

In Cognitive Linguistics the relation between metonymy and metaphor has been investigated in more detail. Current studies focus on the interaction between the two tropes of thought and language. In an important work, Goossens (2002) shows how metonymy and metaphor interact with each other in complex ways in natural language. He calls this phenomenon ‘metaphonymy’.

Other significant contributions to the study of metaphor and metonymy within a Cognitive Linguistics framework are found in Barcelona (2000a), Dirven and Pörings (2002), Panther and Radden (1999a). For an adequate characterization of metaphor and metonymy the chapters in these three volumes propose such central notions as conceptual domain (including subdomain, matrix domain, and domain matrix), idealized cognitive model (ICM), conceptual frame, and conceptual integration (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, 2000c, 2002; Croft 2002; Dirven 2002; Geeraerts 2002; Grady & Johnson 2002; Radden & Kövecses 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Díez Velasco 2002; Turner & Fauconnier 2002).

Three claims regarding the relationship between metaphor and metonymy that are relevant to this volume emerge from the above studies: First, metonymy is seen not merely as a matter of linguistic substitution, but rather as a cognitive phenomenon more fundamental than metaphor and underlying much of our ordinary thinking (e.g. Barcelona 2000b; Gibbs 1999b; Panther & Radden 1999b; Radden & Kövecses 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000; Panther & Thornburg 2003, 2007; Panther 2006). Second, and following from the first point, many metaphors are motivated conceptually by metonymies, which are more immediately grounded in experience (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, 2000c; Niemeier 2000; Radden 2000; Taylor 2002). Third, the boundary between metaphor and metonymy is fuzzy, i.e., they form a continuum (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, 2000c; Dirven 2002; Geeraerts 2002; Goossens 2000, 2002; Niemeier 2000; Radden 2000; Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000).

In the light of the above views, it is suggested that metonymy often serves as the link between bodily experience and metaphor in the mapping process from concrete experience to abstract concepts: bodily experience → metonymy → metaphor → abstract concepts (Yu 2008c). As suggested by the word *embodiment* itself, the core of embodiment is the human body. In this volume, the studies focus on specific parts of the body and the associated bodily experiences, and examine how cultures project them, via such cognitive mechanisms as metonymy and metaphor, onto more abstract domains in understanding emotions, character traits, mental faculties, and cultural values, and how this imaginative process of embodiment in human cognition is manifested in the respective languages. It seems that embodiment, as a fundamental cognitive process, is a multifaceted concept. On the one hand, it is rooted in the body; on the other hand, it is motivated by culture. There seems to be a continuum between “physiological embodiment” and “cultural embodiment” (see Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008), which is parallel in relationship to the continuum between metonymy and metaphor. The complex relations between body and culture in embodiment, cast as the interactions between metonymy and metaphor, often leave their traces in language. We are interested in discovering how body interacts with culture as manifested in language in order to gain a deeper understanding of cognition.

4. The contributions to this volume

Gibbs (2006: 9) suggests that the key feature of the “embodiment premise” is “the idea that understanding the embodied nature of human cognition demands that researchers specifically look for possible mind-body and language-body connections”. The utilization of body-part terms in expressing human conceptualizations of emotions, thought, reason, character traits, cultural values, etc., represents important language-body connections that reflect mind-body connections (see e.g. Yu 2009b, which collects a series of studies in Chinese). Following Gibbs’ dictum, each of the ten chapters in this volume deals with body parts and how different languages and cultures refer to them in profiling emotions, character traits, mental faculties, and cultural values, yielding mostly “culturally driven embodiment” (Maalej 2004). Roughly, the contributions focus on either a single body part (the majority of contributions) or more than one body part (external and/or internal ones). Nevertheless, we have organized the chapters into three parts according to geographic region of the languages and cultures investigated. Part 1 includes European perspectives on body parts, covering Danish, English, Estonian, German (compared to Indonesian), Modern Greek, and Spanish. Part 2 focuses on East Asian perspectives on body parts from Chinese and Japanese. Part 3 concerns

itself with Middle Eastern and North African perspectives on body parts, including mainly Arabic, Persian, and Turkish.

The first part covering European perspectives on body parts has four chapters, the first of which is **Sophia Marmaridou's** contribution "The relevance of embodiment in lexical and collocational meaning: The case of *prosopo* 'face' in Modern Greek".¹ Marmaridou shows that the embodiment hypothesis is significant in two ways. First, it accounts for the interaction of the conceptual metaphor NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL and the cultural model of the fragmented self in motivating the polysemy of Modern Greek *prosopo* with various positive and negative connotations of adjectives in collocations, in which *prosopo*, the human face, exhibits not only embodied personhood, psychological, and social aspects of the self (such as emotion, character, and social standing), but also spatial orientation. Second, on the basis of the participation of *prosopo* in frequent collocations, the embodiment hypothesis explains the experiential motivation of grammatical collocations, which suggests that *prosopo* acquires aspects of collocational meaning.

In "Dynamic body parts in Estonian figurative descriptions of emotion" **Ene Vainik** demonstrates, first, that in Estonian figurative descriptions there is no specialization of body parts for expressing particular emotions. Instead, there is a continuum of more or less exploitable body parts, internal and external, and more diversely described emotions. In contrast to the internal body parts and fluids such as the heart, blood, and nerves, the external and movable parts of the body such as the head and its subparts (the eyes, the mouth, the nose) and hands are more heavily exploited for the purpose of emotion expression. For Vainik the multiple bodily manifestations of emotions provide a basis for conceptualizing emotions themselves. Second, she finds a strong positive correlation between the types of cognitive mappings (metonymy, metaphonymy, and metaphor) and the bodily manifestations on which the conceptualizations are based (observable symptoms, bodily sensations, and imaginary events), which depend more on the conceptualizer's perspective than on the type of body parts (internal vs. external) profiled in the figurative emotion expressions in Estonian. Third, the axiological value of the description depends, Vainik claims, not only on the subjective value of the described emotions but also on the attribution of the value as seen from the observer's and describer's viewpoint, suggesting that in the figurative descriptions of emotions via dynamic, observable body parts, activation and evaluation are independent characteristics of emotions that can combine in different ways.

1. Throughout the volume, italics are used to represent lexical items (i.e. form-meaning pairs), single quotation marks are used for lexical meanings, generally when the focus is on a lexical item in a particular language. Small capitals are used for metaphors, metonymies, cognitive models, image schemas, and the like, and also in cross-linguistic comparisons of body part conceptualizations.

In “Contrasting body parts: Metaphors and metonymies of MOUTH in Danish, English, and Spanish” Uwe Kjær Nissen takes a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective and demonstrates that nonliteral uses of *mouth* in English, and its counterparts *boca* in Spanish and *mund* in Danish are pervasive in all three. His study clearly supports the view that metonymy and metaphor, which link mappings of mind and body, are powerful tools for generating figurative expressions and that these expressions, although not entirely predictable, are motivated by bodily experiences. Nissen strongly advocates the comparison of Indo-European languages, already subject to analysis by the cognitive linguistic community, with non-Indo-European languages since, although metaphorization and metonymization are frequently based on physiological embodiment, these processes are also influenced by cultural differences, as revealed by his comparison of the three languages that are relatively close to one another.

The last chapter in the European grouping is “HEAD and EYE in German and Indonesian figurative uses” by Poppy Siahaan. In her comparative study she investigates the figurative extensions of the two source concepts HEAD and EYE in the two genetically unrelated languages German and Indonesian. Her data provide evidence that a given source concept often targets the same conceptual domain in both languages (e.g. (human) LEADER OF CHARACTER TRAITS); yet her study also reveals interesting language-specific distinctions. Using a corpus-based quantitative approach, Siahaan reveals that the metaphoric and metonymic extensions differ strikingly in frequency of occurrence in her corpus. Her findings show that German speakers have a preference for the function of *Kopf* ‘head’ and *Auge* ‘eye’ while Indonesian speakers have a preference for the position of *kepala* ‘head’ and the appearance or shape of *mata* ‘eye’.

The East Asian section of the book, Part 2, includes three chapters, one on Chinese and two on Japanese. In his chapter “Speech organs and linguistic activity/function in Chinese”, Ning Yu studies the Chinese cultural ways of understanding speech and language based on the metonymic chain from speech organ to language proposed by Radden (2004): speech organ → speaking → speech → language. Yu analyzes Chinese terms for such speech organs as *she* ‘tongue’, *chi* ‘teeth’, *chun* ‘lips’, and *zui* or *kou* ‘mouth’ as they are used metonymically and metaphorically in conventionalized expressions referring to more abstract linguistic action and function. The study focuses on three metonymies, SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, and SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE. Yu finds that the first two metonymies are richly manifested in a large number of conventionalized expressions. Yet, the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE, widely attested across languages (Radden 2004), is not realized lexically in Chinese. What is particularly interesting is the fact that in Chinese, SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE, while not manifested in its lexicon, is nevertheless realized in its

ideographic writing system as radical components of the characters. That is, the Chinese characters representing 'language' and 'speech' all contain the 'mouth' radical in them. This finding provides an interesting and telling example of how the general cognitive principle of embodiment can be realized in and embraced by a culture-specific environment.

Tomokazu Nagai and Masako K. Hiraga's chapter "Inner and outer body parts: The case of *hara* 'belly' and *koshi* 'lower back' in Japanese" analyzes and seeks to clarify the relationship between the outer body and inner body parts as sources of motivation for metonymy and metaphor. They argue that *hara* as an internal body part correlates with metaphor, and expresses figurative meanings having to do with mental and spiritual stability while *koshi*, an external body part, correlates with metonymy, and expresses figurative meanings having to do with attitude and behavior. To test the validity of this premise, the authors examine verbal and adjectival combinations with *koshi* and *hara* to explicate in detail the tropic interplay between metonymy and metaphor in generating figurative meanings. The authors consider also non-human entities and events that can be partially seen as having inner and outer body parts, and discover that the metaphoric productivity of *hara* becomes weaker, giving rise to metonymic extensions while *koshi* appears to be more productive with respect to metaphoric rather than metonymic extensions. The authors conclude with a hypothesis: the tropic motivation of the inner and outer body parts may reverse when their meanings have been extended so that they are used to describe things and events in the external world – a claim to be tested in future research.

The second chapter on Japanese is "A cultural-linguistic look at Japanese 'eye' expressions" by Debra J. Occhi. Her data show that 'eye' expressions in Japanese characterize this body part as both an arbiter, capable of judging and measuring across several variables, and as an object of evaluation. The metaphors EYE AS MIND and EYE AS PERSON are attested in various sets of data. Notably, the eye is conceptualized in Japanese as the locus of distinctions in the social hierarchy schema, distinctions that govern both linguistic and non-linguistic behavior. The eye is also salient in Japanese expressions of character traits and emotions; gender norms are also revealed through certain 'eye'-related expressions. Data from Japanese robustly support the notions of physiological, cultural, and culturally tainted embodiment that has been outlined in Maalej (2004).

The third and last grouping of the volume, Part 3, contains three chapters on Middle Eastern and North African perspectives on body parts. Farzad Sharifian's contribution "Conceptualizations of *cheshm* 'eye' in Persian" undertakes a contrastive study of body part terms expressing emotions in Persian and English. The main argument of the chapter is that in contemporary Persian this body part and the act of perception appear to be associated mainly with emotions, feelings,

personality traits, attention, intuition, knowing, and to a limited extent, with thinking. The analysis of Persian expressions containing the body-part term *cheshm* do not reflect UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING as a dominant conceptualization in everyday use of language by Persian speakers. The findings of this study, along with those of other studies, point to the role of language as a “memory bank” and “archive” for cultural conceptualizations.

In “Figurative dimensions of *3ayn* ‘eye’ in Tunisian Arabic” Zouheir A. Maalej analyzes the role of ‘eye’ as a cognitive source for an embodied cultural model constituted by imaginative structures such as image schemas, metaphors, and metonymies. This cultural model shares with English, Chinese (Yu 2003b, 2004), and Persian (Sharifian, this volume) cultures the means by which mental faculties (THINKING/UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS SEEING) are conceptualized via vision. Regarding emotions, the eye functions metaphorically as a container for love, desire, and guilt, in keeping with the image schema THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. Moreover, the eye is conceptualized as a metaphorical source for the emotions themselves: love, desire, anger, and envy. In short, with emotions the eye seems to waver between being a container for love and loved ones, and a dangerous object or perceptual organ that is easy to manipulate. Similar to emotions, character traits are also referenced by ‘eye’ metaphors in Tunisian Arabic. For example, the conceptualization of ambition exploits properties of the eye such as size, spaciousness, and depth. Conceptualizations of naiveté and alertness metaphorically expand the CLOSED-OPEN image schematic structure of the eye.

The last chapter in this perspective and in the volume is titled “The apocalypse happens when the feet take the position of the head: Figurative uses of ‘head’ and ‘feet’ in Turkish” by Mustafa Aksan. This author addresses the embodiment of social stratification in Turkish, in which verticality is exploited through the schematic organization (UP-DOWN) of the two body parts of *baş* ‘head’ and *ayak* ‘foot’ as located at the opposite ends of the body. The head profiles the cultural metonymies HEAD FOR ORDER, HEAD FOR RULER, HEAD FOR TALENT. The foot profiles conceptual metaphors such as LESS IS DOWN, LOW STATUS IS DOWN, and BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN. The author discusses cases where terms for ‘head’ and ‘feet’ combine in a number of metonymies and metaphors. In such expressions, the contrast on a VERTICALITY scale based on particular locations of body parts is used to conceptualize contrast in social stratification.

The grouping of chapters in this volume is motivated, quite obviously, by the geographic location of the languages and cultures studied. Alternatively, the chapters could have been arranged according to the body part concepts themselves. For instance, two chapters study ‘head’ in three languages (German, Indonesian, and Turkish), two chapters study ‘mouth’ in four languages (Chinese, Danish, English, and Spanish), and four chapters study ‘eye’ in five languages (German, Indonesian,

Japanese, Persian, and Tunisian Arabic). While the chapters investigating the same body parts do so from different perspectives, all the chapters in this volume emphasize the intricate interplay between body and culture (embodiment) in generating metonymies and metaphors to express central aspects of the human condition such as emotions, character traits, mental faculties, and cultural values. As mentioned above, we align ourselves with the view that metonymy and metaphor form a continuum (e.g. Barcelona 2000b, 2000c). This continuum seems to correlate with another continuum between two types of embodiment, the physiological and the cultural (Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008). While metonymy tends to exhibit a more physiologically grounded kind of embodiment, metaphor, which is often metonymically based, tends to create a more culturally oriented kind of embodiment. Thus, when we talk about embodiment, we always mean “embodiment via body and culture.”

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PART 1

European perspectives

The relevance of embodiment to lexical and collocational meaning

The case of *prosopo* ‘face’ in Modern Greek*

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This cognitive linguistic corpus-based study embraces Johnson’s (1992: 348) embodiment hypothesis to argue that metonymic and metaphorical extensions of the prototypical sense of Modern Greek *prosopo* are based on a cultural model of the self. It is also claimed that conceptual structure and cultural models interact equally in motivating different uses of *prosopo*, confirming the intimate connection between cultural experience and embodied behavior (Gibbs 1999: 146). Frequently occurring collocations of adjective + *prosopo* are shown to have developed meanings not directly relatable to either the semantics of *prosopo* or the semantics of the collocating adjectives, supporting Sinclair’s (1991) views on collocational meanings. It is suggested that the embodiment hypothesis is relevant not only to lexicalization and the expression of emotion, character, etc., but also to the emergence of abstract collocational meaning. Finally, the present work suggests the possibility of a methodological convergence of cognitive semantics, cultural models, lexical semantics, and corpus linguistics.

Keywords: cognitive semantics, cultural model, lexical semantics, metonymic and metaphorical extensions, prototypical sense

1. Introduction

Apart from the heart and other internal organs that have been shown to associate with human feeling and emotion, as in Sharifian et al. (2008), the face is arguably

* I would like to thank the editors of this volume and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and criticisms that have greatly benefited this work. I am also grateful to Kiki Nikiforidou for reading and commenting on a previous draft of this chapter. Needless to say, all shortcomings are my own.

the most important external part of the human body embodying aspects of the self. As Yu (2001: 1) observes, “the face is the body part that is most distinctive of a person”; it is also “the focus of human interaction”, and “it shows our emotions and feelings”. On the basis of his semantic analysis of lexical items denoting the face in Chinese, he argues that the nature of our face shapes our metonymic and metaphorical understanding of certain abstract concepts such as emotion, character, relationships, dignity, and prestige. The importance of face in registering emotion is often grammatically marked and culturally sustained. As Kidron and Kuzar (2002) observe, in Hebrew it is the face as subject that undergoes the emotional experience, rather than the whole body, as is the case in English.

In Modern Greek there are no less than six unrelated lexicalizations of the concept of face, some of them varying in register and style and all of them exhibiting metonymic and metaphorical extensions. These are listed in (1):

- (1) Modern Greek words for ‘face’:
 - a. *prosopo* (from *προς ωπα* ‘on the side of the eyes’ i.e. ‘the front part of the head’)
 - b. *mutro* (from Italian *mostra* ‘front’ or *mutria* ‘seriousness, arrogance, pride’)
 - c. *fatsa* (from Italian *faccia* < Latin *facies*-ei ‘face’)
 - d. *muri* (from Venetian *muro* < Latin **murrum*)¹
 - e. *mutsunā* (from Italian *musona* < *muso* < *musum* ‘beak’; also ‘mask’ in Modern Greek)
 - f. *mapa* (from Latin *mappa* ‘scarf, napkin’; also ‘cabbage’ in Modern Greek)

Only one of the aforementioned words, *prosopo*, is of Greek origin; the others are of Latin origin or loans from Italian. The investigation of data from a Modern Greek language corpus and seven dictionaries reveals that all six words exhibit a high frequency of occurrence in idioms and collocations.² In this study, I focus on the most frequently occurring lexicalization, *prosopo*, in its prototypical and derived senses.

The aim of the chapter is to show that metonymic and metaphorical extensions of the prototypical sense of *prosopo* are based on a cultural model of the self, which is in turn based on a part-whole image schema, and the NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL conceptual metaphor as proposed in Marmaridou (2006). Given that these metonymic and metaphorical extensions signify not only appearance, but

1. The asterisk indicates reconstructed (i.e. assumed) form.

2. The Modern Greek language corpus is to be found at www.ilsp.gr and the dictionaries are listed in the references section.

also emotion, character, and social interaction in various, often genetically unrelated language-culture complexes, such as English, Greek, Chinese, and Hebrew (see e.g. Yu 2001; Kidron & Kuzar 2002), it is possible to further argue for the tenability of the embodiment hypothesis (see below). However, rather than assuming universality for conceptual structure and assigning cross-linguistic differences to cultural variability, I endeavor to show instead that conceptual structure and cultural models, as in Holland and Quinn (1987), actually interact equally in motivating the lexicalization under discussion. This is in line with Gibbs (1999), who takes a distributed view of conceptual metaphor, i.e. as emerging from body-world interactions, and argues that "our understanding of what is conceptual about metaphor involves significant aspects of cultural experience, some of which is even intimately related to our embodied behavior" (146).

Moreover, in this chapter, some frequently occurring collocations of adjective + *prosopo* are examined, showing that some of them have also developed meanings that do not directly relate to either the semantics of *prosopo* or the semantics of the collocating adjectives, thereby confirming Sinclair's (1991) views on collocational meaning. On the basis of all the above, it is suggested that the embodiment hypothesis is not only relevant to lexicalization and the expression of emotion, character, etc., but also significant in the emergence of abstract collocational meaning.

As has probably become obvious, the theoretical framework of this study draws mainly on Cognitive Linguistics, which lends itself to the type of analysis undertaken in this chapter. A basic tenet of this theory is that lexical meaning cannot be sharply distinguished from general knowledge of the entity named (Fillmore 1977), which allows for cultural specificity of lexical meaning in any one language-culture complex. Reference to encyclopedic knowledge and cultural components in lexical analysis makes Cognitive Linguistics particularly attractive for the study of the semantics of *prosopo*.

Moreover, the present corpus-based study of *prosopo* as a polysemous word is also based on metaphor and metonymy as two distinct, but related, types of meaning extension, which have received a lot of attention in Cognitive Linguistics. In this framework, metaphor is viewed as a conceptual mechanism whereby a typically abstract domain of experience is understood in terms of a typically concrete one. The two domains, the source and the target, do not form a domain matrix for the concept expressed, i.e., they are not simultaneously presupposed for its understanding (Croft 2003: 174). Metonymy involves "the use of an expression E with a default construal A to evoke a distinct construal B, where the connection between B and A is inferable by general principles" (Croft & Cruse 2004: 216). As opposed to metaphor, in metonymy A and B are associated within the same domain or domain matrix.

In this chapter, I adopt the standard view in cognitive semantics that there is interaction between metonymy and metaphor, which, however, does not compromise their distinct identities (Croft & Cruse 2004: 217). In this view, metonymy can play a vital role in the motivation of a metaphorical expression, as for instance in the much-discussed metaphor *ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER* (see Kövecses 2002: 165; Lakoff 1987: 380–408). The association between anger and heat is considered metonymic, since an angry person is supposed to subjectively feel hot. Once this metonymy is elaborated, i.e. when anger is understood as a liquid in a container undergoing a heating process, the corresponding mapping between domains motivates a metaphorical understanding of this emotion.

Furthermore, an important theoretical concept that has been widely discussed in the Cognitive Linguistics literature and is specifically addressed in this chapter is that of embodiment, i.e. the hypothesis that understanding language is grounded in the nature of our bodily experience and activity (Johnson 1992: 348). On this view, meaning is motivated by our interaction with the physical, social, and cultural environment that surrounds us. Systematic patterns of linguistic structure and behavior are motivated by recurring patterns of embodied experience, such as image-schemas (Gibbs 2006: 12). These are highly abstract conceptions grounded in everyday bodily experience, and play an essential role in structuring our mental world (Lakoff 1987: 267). They include such notions as *PART-WHOLE*, *SOURCE-PATH-GOAL*, *CONTAINER-CONTENT*, *CENTER-PERIPHERY*, *FORCE*, and *BALANCE*. Metaphor is especially important in mapping aspects of bodily experience to abstract domains of thought and language. For example, in *She's in pain* the container image-schema, activated by the predicate *in*, motivates the understanding of the particular feeling as a container of the suffering self.

Finally, Cognitive Linguistics, as a usage-based model of linguistic inquiry, witnesses an adherence to a synthetic, non-autonomous view of language, which is compatible with the study of multiple-word expressions, such as collocations and idioms. In the present corpus-based study, collocation is viewed not only as a useful organizing principle in dictionary making, or a unit of meaning in lexical semantics, but also as a relevant analytic unit in any usage-based model of analysis applied to the investigation of linguistic meaning.

At a methodological level, the semantic analysis of *prosopo*, drawing on different, yet not incommensurable theoretical approaches (i.e. cognitive semantics, cultural models, lexical semantics, corpus linguistics), reflects a wide-spreading tendency in current linguistic research (see e.g. Marmaridou et al. 2005) to explore their limitations and establish points of contact between them. In particular, the present work suggests the possibility of a methodological convergence of these approaches on the basis of a usage-based perspective on language and a principled exploration of its cognitive and cultural motivations, also relevant in cross-linguistic studies.

2. Basic and extended senses of *prosopo*

There are at least three distinct, yet related, senses of *prosopo*, each one providing access to further extensions. The basic sense of *prosopo* (face) as a physical entity refers to the front part of the head of an animate being, whose function is important in human verbal and non-verbal communication. This prototypical sense appears in Example (2):

- (2) *ylitose me elafra travmata sto prosopo*
 save-3rd s. past with slight bruises on-the face
 'He got away with slight bruises on the face'

The orientation of a human face opposite another creates a physical situation in which two individuals may have eye contact with each other and therefore may communicate directly without intermediaries. In (3)–(5) the relevant expressions involving *prosopo* metonymically stand for such direct, sometimes even hostile, communication, and constitute frequently occurring collocations:

- (3) *i ijetes tha sinomilisun prosopo me prosopo*
 the leaders will talk-3rd pl. perf. face with face
 'The leaders will talk face to face'
- (4) *ton kitakse kata prosopo*
 him look-3rd s. past against face
 'He looked at him straight in the eye'
- (5) *tu ektoksefse apiles kata prosopo*
 him launch-3rd s. past threats against face
 'He launched threats (straight) to his face'

The second distinct sense of *prosopo* is orientational. The physical position of face at the front part of the head of the human body motivates a metaphorical construal of typically inanimate objects. In (6) and (7) *prosopo* metaphorically refers to the front part of the respective buildings:

- (6) *to prosopo tu ksenodoxiu ine pros ti thalasa*
 the face the-gen. hotel-gen. be-3rd s. pres. towards the sea
 'The hotel faces the sea'
- (7) *to spiti exi prosopo stin platia*
 the house have-3rd s. pres. face to-the square
 'The house faces the square'³

3. The paraphrases *to ksenodoxio vlepi ti thalasa/ti spiti vlepi tin platia* ('the hotel sees the sea/the house sees the square') also establish orientation in terms of eyesight, which is related to the front part of the head in which the eyes are set.

In Example (8), *prosopo* lexicalizes the concept of a person, thereby illustrating the third, extended sense:

- (8) *den θimame na exo synandiθi me ena*
 not remember-1st s. pres. to have-1st s. pres. meet-perf. with a
tetio prosopo
 such face
 ‘I don’t remember having met such a person’

It appears that (8) instantiates what is commonly understood as a metonymy, i.e. the part for the whole. On this analysis, the part and the whole are associated within the same domain of experience or domain matrix (see Croft & Cruse 2004: 216). Clearly, though, the part in this utterance, i.e. *prosopo*, is not used to refer to the whole human body, of which it is physically a part, but rather to the whole human being, comprising more than the body in the relevant cultural model, i.e. personal characteristics, behavior, etc. In fact, there are hardly any expressions realizing the metonymy FACE FOR BODY, whereas FACE FOR PERSON seems to be quite widespread, given the real life association between the human face and the physical identity of a human being (Yu 2008: 250). Moreover, faces are visible and concrete as opposed to the concept of a person, also characterized by invisible, abstract qualities of character and social standing.

Prosopo in Modern Greek is a polysemous word. As already noted, its meaning extends from the physical face to the whole human being, comprising physical and non-physical aspects. In Langacker’s (2000) terms, *prosopo* is the reference point in terms of which the whole human being is accessed as a whole, as in Example (8).⁴ Moreover, *prosopo* provides access to one’s psychological states and emotions, to one’s character and behavior, and to one’s social standing, as Examples (9)–(11) show respectively:

- (9) *ipe o θios Klondomiro me prosopo jemato stenoxoria*
 say-3rd s. past the uncle Klondomiro with face full sorrow
 ‘Uncle Klondomiro spoke with a face full of sorrow’
- (10) *meta to θanato tis edikse to praymatiko tu prosopo*
 after the death her show-3rd s. past the real his face
 ‘After her death he showed his real face’

4. According to Langacker (2000: 199), “the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target, i.e. the entity actually being referred to”. The asymmetry in this case arises because of the greater cognitive salience, or easier coding, of the entity named as opposed to the target.

- (11) *den exo prosopo na vyo ston kozmo*
 not have-1st pres. face to go-out-perf. to-the world
 'I can't face going out into the world (i.e., I am ashamed of myself)'

These examples reveal an understanding of non-physical aspects of the human being in terms of a part of the human body, the human face. In this case *prosopo* is the concrete, visible reference point providing mental access to non-visible, abstract aspects of what is culturally defined as a human being. In (9) *prosopo* is metaphorically understood as the container of the emotion, i.e. as one's psyche (soul). Kidron and Kuzar (2002) show that in Hebrew it is typically the face rather than the whole human being that undergoes the emotion. In Estonian, the face is associated with many emotions, such as fear, concern, disappointment, disgust, happiness and anger (Vainik 2007). The real life motivation for the image-based container metaphor in (9) is probably the close association between emotions and facial expression that has already been noted by Yu (2002) and further explored in Gibbs (2006), even though within the same culture there is no one-to-one relationship between the two.

In (10), *prosopo* is understood as one's character, or behavior, and in (11) as the social self, the self in the world. Unlike the observable association between facial expression and emotion, face does not reveal aspects of one's character or social standing, i.e., there is no causal chain linking face to either of them. I suggest that this link is provided by the interaction of the NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL metaphor with a cultural model of the fragmented self, both discussed in Marmaridou (2006: 395). The proposed metaphor is a broader generalization than, for instance, INTERNAL IS EXTERNAL (Sweetser 1990), or ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE (Lakoff 1987), and has been shown to interact with a cultural model of the fragmented self, distinguishing between (i) the rational self as the locus of consciousness and judgment, (ii) the non-rational self, the psyche, as the locus of emotions and feelings, (iii) the social self as the locus of social roles and interactions, and (iv) the physical self as the locus of physical characteristics and sensations.

Evidently, this cultural model is an elaboration of the body-mind Cartesian distinction adopted in Lakoff's (1996: 101) divided-person metaphor. According to the latter, the human being is divided between the Subject, as the basis of subjectivity and consciousness, and the Self, comprising physical characteristics and social roles. Like the dualist model, the model of the fragmented self is an instantiation of the part-whole image schema. The relation between the different aspects of the self is culturally sanctioned. The first three are non-physical and the fourth is physical. It has therefore been claimed that the non-physical aspects of the self are often understood in terms of the physical aspect on the basis of the proposed metaphor NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL. This metaphor is based on, or presupposes, the cultural

model of the fragmented self that distinguishes among various physical and non-physical aspects of the self. At the same time, the proposed cultural model is made coherent through the operation of the conceptual metaphor NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL. I consider the above as evidence that cultural models and conceptual structure interact equally in motivating extensions of polysemous words. This view further supports findings from interdisciplinary studies of metaphor, allowing “for greater recognition of the complex ways that metaphor arises from the interaction of brains, bodies, languages, and culture” (Gibbs 2008: 4).

The proposed analysis of (10) and (11) is also compatible with Langacker’s account of reference point phenomena. Langacker (2000: 200) claims that a concrete or visible entity is sufficiently salient to serve as a metonymic reference point for an abstract, or invisible one, thereby invoking the basic principle of conceptual metaphor, namely that the abstract is typically understood in terms of the concrete.⁵ In the case of *prosopo*, the proposed cultural narrative of the fragmented self is shown to explain just how the abstract (character, social status) comes to be understood (or accessed in Langacker’s view) in terms of the concrete (*prosopo*).

On the basis of this discussion, I would like to claim that the polysemy of *prosopo* is at least partly motivated by the cultural model of the fragmented self, the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, and the NON-PHYSICAL IS PHYSICAL conceptual metaphor, thereby supporting the embodiment hypothesis. Because we experience *prosopo* as an aspect of the self and as a physical marker of one’s identity, are aware of other, non-physical aspects of our selves, and because we habitually understand non-physical concepts in terms of physical ones, we also understand *prosopo* not only as a container of emotions but also as a signifier of character and social status. Hence, the understanding of emotion, character, and social status is embodied in *prosopo*.

Further extensions from the meaning of *prosopo* as character, as in (11), include the meaning ‘fictional character’ in a play or novel, as in (12):

- (12) ta prosopa tou eryu ine tesera
 the faces the gen. play-gen. be-3rd pl. pres. four
 ‘There are four characters in the play’

This meaning is activated in the pragmatic context of a literary text. As Yu (2001: 13) has observed for Chinese, such uses seem to relate to Goffman’s (1959, 1974) role theory, which conceives of human communication as action on a metaphorical stage with communicators as role players. As is well known, Goffman’s theory has been very influential in human interaction and politeness theory, witness Brown and Levinson (1987), Sifianou (1992, 2011), Eelen (2001), O’Driscoll (2011)

5. In fact, it may be said that Langacker sees conceptual metaphor as a type of metonymy.

among others.. The present analysis of *prosopo* is compatible with Goffman's views and provides lexical evidence towards the conceptual grounding of role theory.

3. *Prosopo* in collocations

Thus far I have provided examples illustrating the prototypical meaning of *prosopo* and have shown how it provides access to metonymic and metaphorical interpretations. I turn now to a particular type of noun phrase in which *prosopo* co-occurs with adjectives to form frequently occurring collocations. Examples are adduced to show that these collocations make reference to aspects of human character, appearance, and social standing, involving metaphorical extensions of *prosopo*, as already discussed. It is also shown that collocations referring to aspects of human character and appearance relate to an evaluative scale, which independently characterizes the semantics of the particular adjectives in the respective collocations. Other adjective + *prosopo* collocations referring to character, though, are shown to have an evaluative semantics not contributed by any of the collocating terms. On the basis of this analysis, I claim that the latter collocations have developed an idiomatic, but also motivated, meaning, which is particular to this specific set. Moreover, additional collocations of *prosopo* with adjectives indicating social establishments are identified as further instances of such meaning. The view is advanced that the understanding of abstract, collocational meaning is grounded in the interaction of the conception of *prosopo* as a physical aspect of self with the cultural world at large.

Collocation is typically understood as the tendency of two or more words to co-occur in discourse, or to select one another mutually. In the heyday of structuralism, Firth (1957: 194) introduced the term *meaning by 'collocation'* to refer to the "mutual expectancies of words" irrespective of context. Given his concern with meaning, he also claimed that "Meaning by collocation is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not directly concerned with the conceptual or idea approach to the meaning of words" (196). In these terms, the meaning of a word goes beyond the definition of its sense, so that, for example, one of the meanings of *night* is its collocability with *dark*, and vice versa. More recently, and in the context of lexicographic practice, collocation has been viewed as an instance of the idiom principle, according to which "a language user has available to him, or her, a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analyzable into segments" (Sinclair 1991: 110).⁶ One of

6. Sinclair (1991) advances two principles of interpretation, namely the open-choice principle and the idiom principle. According to the former, a text is formed by the filling in of a large range of choices that are constrained only by grammaticalness. The idiom principle accounts for the phrasal constitution of texts (e.g. phrasal verbs, idioms, collocations).

the features of the idiom principle is the possibility that “many uses of words and phrases attract other words in strong collocation; for example, *hard work*, *hard luck*, *hard facts*, *hard evidence*” (112). Meaning in collocations is not a property of words, compositionally, but of the phrase.

Both Firth’s and Sinclair’s identification of collocations reveals a concern about non-compositional aspects of linguistic meaning, which are presented as conventional on the one hand and arbitrary on the other. In the framework of frame semantics (see Fillmore 1977), several aspects of collocational meaning are systematically treated in the semantic frame of particular lexical items as motivated extensions of prototypical meaning. For example, the semantic frame of *hard* (solid, firm) includes a metaphorical extension relating to the abstract domain of difficulty, as in *hard life*, *hard work*, *hard to believe*, which is quite productive. This extension is probably motivated by the real-life experience that hard objects and surfaces are difficult to manipulate, bend, or contain. The sense of difficulty may further extend to unpleasantness, as in *hard life*, or to a negative quality in general, motivating *hard luck* (i.e. bad luck). In *hard evidence* and *hard facts*, the extension to the meaning of truth or certainty seems to be motivated by another metaphorical extension from the prototypical sense of *solid/firm*. If something is hard, it does not change its shape. If facts (or evidence) are unchangeable, they are more reliable, i.e. “true” facts. On this analysis, the particular adjective contributes the semantic extensions in its frame to the semantics of the collocations of which it is a part, and thus the respective collocational meanings are motivated rather than arbitrary.

The discussion of the following examples shows that collocational meaning arises from the semantic frames of the collocating terms. In (13)–(16), the sense of *prosopo* is metaphorically attributed to inanimate entities such as organizations and institutions, thereby motivating their personification and establishing an identity for each of them.

- (13) *mia andayonistiki ikonomia me anthropino prosopo*
a competitive economy with human face
‘a competitive economy with a human face’
- (14) *vasizmeni sti liturjia tis eleftheris ayoras me*
based on-the function the-gen. free-gen. market-gen. with
kinoniko prosopo
social face
‘based on the function of the free market with a social face’
- (15) *i AEK edikse to poli kalo ayonistiko tis prosopo*
the AEK show-3rd s. past the very good fighting its face
‘AEK showed its very good fighting face’⁷

7. AEK is a well known Greek football team.

- (16) *i dīkeosini molis tu ixe dīksi to skliro tis prosopo*
 the justice just him have-3rd s. past show-perf. the hard its face
 'Justice had just shown him its hard face'

In (13), the meaning of *anthropino prosopo* ('human face') is not only metaphorically attributed to a social establishment, thereby personifying it, but also generates positive human qualities, such as compassion and concern for others. This collocation is independent of personification, as we can ask somebody to "show a human face" in Modern Greek, i.e. to show compassion or concern. The particular positive qualities associated with the meaning of this collocation also arise in other collocations of the same adjective, as in *anthropini simberifora* ('human behavior'), *anthropini diathesi* ('human disposition'), *anthropini diastasi* ('human dimension'), *anthropini andimetopisi* ('human treatment'), all of which point to humaneness, a positive quality by definition.⁸ I suggest that the positive orientation contributed by the adjective to these collocations is part of the semantic frame of the adjective itself. Similarly, a positive quality, i.e. sensitivity to people's social needs, is attributed to the free market in (14). This quality is also part of the semantics of collocations such as *kinoniki simberifora* ('social behavior'), *kinoniki evesθisia* ('social sensitivity'), *kinoniki ayoyi* ('social training/education'). The positive qualities associated with these frequently occurring collocations also seem to belong to the semantic frame of the adjective itself and are thus contributed to the semantics of the collocation in (14). In (15), the 'fighting face' of the football team is a commendable quality, i.e. a good fighting spirit relating to a sense of great effort for a worthy cause, comradeship, and common goals. The positive quality in the frame of *ayonizome/ayonistikos*, also apparent in *ayonistiki xeretizmi* ('fighting esteem' i.e. 'esteem for comrades in arms'), *ayonistiki diathesi* ('fighting disposition'), *ayonistiko pnevma* ('fighting spirit'), *ayonistis* ('fighter'), is contributed to the semantics of the collocation in (15).⁹ The adjective *skliros*, as in (16), is typically associated with negative qualities, especially when relating to character, behavior, and disposition. This aspect of its frame is clearly contributed to its collocation with *prosopo* in (16).

The collocations discussed thus far make reference to a positive-negative value scale as a result of the semantics of the adjectives occurring in them. In the following examples the same value scale is activated, but, different from (13)–(16), it

8. Humaneness (*anthropismos*), it should be noted, forms its own adjective, *anthropistikos* (humane).

9. It should be noted that *ayonizome* is distinct from *polemo*, both of which are often translated by the English verb *fight*. Part of the frame of *ayonizome* is the sense of great effort for a good cause. *Polemo* is neutral in this respect and takes on a positive or negative connotation depending on the context.

does not relate to the semantic frames of the adjectives collocating with *prosopo*. Moreover, which end of the scale is activated typically depends on the context.

- (17) *o kroatis edikse to alo tu prosopo*
 the Croatian show-3rd s. past the other his face
 ‘The Croatian showed his other face’
- (18) *apokaliptun to aliθino prosopo tis pagozmiopiisis pu*
 reveal-3rd p. pr. the real face the-gen globalization-gen that
prooθun I IPA
 promote-3rd pl. pr. the USA
 ‘They reveal the real face of globalization that the USA promotes’
- (19) *o Papanikolau me ton Ikonomu episkeftikan xtes ena*
 The Papanikolaou with the Ikonomou visit-3rd pl. past yesterday a
idrima jia apora pedia, xarisan xamoyela ke
 home for poor children, give-3rd pl. past smiles and
ediksan to aliθino prosopo tu aθlitizmu
 show-3rd pl. past the real face the-gen. athletics
 ‘Papanikolaou and Ekonomou visited a home for poor children yesterday,
 gave smiles and showed the real face of athletics’

In (17), *to alo tu prosopo* refers to one of the two (opposite) aspects of the Croatian’s character. In the absence of further context, the meaning of the collocation as such is indeterminate, though it typically evokes a positive-negative value scale and, more often than not, negative qualities. The same value scale is activated by the use of *to aliθino tu prosopo* in (18) and (19). In the context of (18), the collocation connotes negative qualities, while in the context of (19) positive ones. I suggest that these collocations are characterized by idiomatic meaning, i.e. meaning not specifically contributed by the semantics of the collocating terms. Moreover, the collocational unit, the noun phrase, contains a limited class of adjectival modifiers such as *alo* (‘other’), *praymatiko* (‘real’), and *aliθino* (‘true’), and the nouns *prosopo* (‘face’) and *eaftos* (‘self’). While both nouns can be used in relation to human beings, only *prosopo* can be used for non-human entities.

I propose that the semantics of the collocations under discussion is at least partly motivated by a cultural model of positive-negative dualism generally characterizing aspects of the self. As was shown with respect to Examples (13)–(16), the use of adjectives such as *anthropino*, *kinoniko*, and *skliro*, in particular contexts contributes a positive or negative value to their respective semantic frames. When collocating with *prosopo*, their evaluative semantics connotes positive or negative aspects of the self, respectively. In collocations referring to self and identity, as those in (17)–(19), and in the absence of value-specific adjectives, positive or

negative aspects are activated as part of collocational meaning. Apparently, a positive-negative value scale is prominent in semanticizing the self.

The proposed analysis of the semantics of the collocations under discussion is further supported by a universal notion of face proposed by Terkourafi (2007). Arguing for a biological grounding of face in the dimension of approach/withdrawal, as discussed in Davidson (1992) and Damasio (1999) among others, she insightfully observes that this dimension "provides a natural basis for a universalizing notion of face, from which the latter can inherit two important features: its dualism between positive (approach) and negative (withdrawal) aspects, and its universality" (323). If, as she points out, this dimension is phylogenetically primary, universal and pre-conscious, it is not surprising that it is semanticized not only in particular lexical items, but also in collocations like the ones discussed in this section. On the evidence presented so far, I tentatively claim that the dualist cultural model mentioned above is psychologically and biologically grounded in the dimension of approach/withdrawal affecting not only social face, as argued in Terkourafi (2007), but also in other aspects of the self, such as character and disposition, in accordance with the cultural model of the fragmented self.

There are further uses of *prosopo* in collocations in which the positive-negative scale is not apparent, as in the following examples:

- (20) *ejine to simandikotero theatriko prosopo tis*
 become-3rd s. past the most-important theatrical face the-gen.
xronias
 year-gen.
 'He became the most important theatrical person of the year'
- (21) *o prothipuryos tha epileksi komatik prosopo jia ti*
 the prime-minister will choose-3rd s. perf. party (adj.) face for the
thesi afti
 position this
 'The Prime Minister will choose a party member for this position'
- (22) *an iksera tha jinomun politiko prosopo*
 if know-1st s. past will become-1st s. past political face
 'Had I known, I would have become a politician (political person)'

In these examples, it is the type of identity attributed to the person that is important, i.e. an actor in (20), a party member in (21), and a politician in (22). What is significant in these examples is that their respective adjectives activate a particular institutional setting, or a social organization or establishment, i.e. the theater, a political party, or politics in general. Following Langacker (1990), the institutional setting activated by the adjective in the collocation serves as the ground against

which the identity of an individual is profiled as the figure. Additionally, the semantics of the respective adjectives is further elaborated in these collocations. For example, *theatriko prosopo* identifies a prominent member of the theater, such as an actor or stage director, rather than e.g. a stage manager. Similarly, *komatiko prosopo* refers to a party member rather than a party voter. A *politiko prosopo* is a professional politician rather than a person interested in politics. The narrowing of the semantics of this category of adjectives (whose general meaning is ‘pertaining to the theater/a political party/politics’) results from their collocation with *prosopo*. This narrowed meaning facilitates the identification of the person as a prominent member of the institution. The institutionally based adjectives collocating with *prosopo* are limited in number. One finds *eklisiastiko prosopo* (lit. ‘church person’, i.e. ‘person professionally/institutionally belonging to the church, such as a bishop’), but not *sxoliko prosopo* (‘school person’), or *ekpedeftiko prosopo* (‘person belonging to the domain of education’). Should there be an instance of *ekpedeftiko prosopo*, this would identify a prominent member of the relevant institution. In sum, the semantics of such examples demonstrates the significant contribution of collocations to the construction of linguistic meaning.

4. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have argued for the tenability of the embodiment hypothesis in two ways. First, I have provided evidence for the equal interaction of conceptual metaphor and cultural models in motivating the polysemy of *prosopo*. The human face embodies not only conceptions of personhood, but also psychological and social aspects of the self, such as emotion, character, and social standing. It also embodies conceptions of spatial orientation. In this sense, embodiment plays a role in motivated polysemy. Secondly, on the basis of the participation of *prosopo* in frequently occurring collocations, I have argued for its significance in collocational meaning. In particular, I have identified two types of *prosopo*-related collocations, one exhibiting evaluative semantics and the other a semantics of institutional prominence. In this sense, *prosopo* embodies aspects of collocational meaning.

These findings have implications for the study of embodiment. Firstly, they lend further support to the embodiment thesis, namely that understanding language is grounded in the nature of our bodily experience and activity. Our understanding of psychological states, character traits, and social standing in terms of *prosopo*-related expressions is taken as evidence for the importance of bodily aspects of experience in the conceptualization of more abstract personal characteristics. Secondly, it has been shown that *prosopo*-related collocations enable more abstract, schematic, and relational categories of thought, such as evaluation and

prominence. Even though the use of body part terms, such as *prosopo*, in collocations and idioms to refer to entities external to the body is not unexpected, the present analysis shows that such use is constrained by collocational meaning, which goes beyond the semantics of *prosopo* itself, but is at the same time sanctioned by it.¹⁰

The present chapter investigates embodied meanings, combining various theoretical tenets, especially from Cognitive Linguistics. One of these tenets regards encyclopedic knowledge about the denotata of lexical items as part of their meaning. Another tenet is the emphasis of this theoretical framework on polysemy and the recognition of metaphor and metonymy as mechanisms of semantic extension, which have guided the present analysis. Moreover, in this chapter insights from cognitive grammar have been brought to bear on metaphor theory, especially Langacker's concept of reference point, which is essentially metonymic. Rather than treating Langacker's analysis as competing with a metaphorical account, the present analysis assumes that the two approaches differ in focus and level of abstraction. The cognitive grammar perspective focuses on hierarchical relations and schematicity as an important aspect of conceptualization, and is fully compatible with the cognitive semantics emphasis on mechanisms of conceptualization, such as metaphor.

The insight that metaphor interacts with culture (Gibbs 2008) required a theory of cultural models to account for data discussed in this chapter. Even though metaphor theory and cultural model theory seem to be at odds concerning the priority of each in understanding language (see e.g. Quinn 1991; Kövecses 1999), the present work has argued for their interaction in motivating lexical and collocational meaning, and has shown them to be convergent, rather than divergent, theoretical approaches.

The noticeable frequency of occurrence of *prosopo* in collocations has prompted the need for the integration of lexicographic insights into lexical semantics, as in Sinclair (1987, 1991). In particular, the investigation of collocational meaning in the present study has shed light on semantic constraints on embodiment. In the proposed account, the embodiment of the concepts of evaluation and prominence is sanctioned by the semantics of *prosopo*, but it is also constrained by collocational meaning.

10. Non-compositional aspects of meaning in collocations and idioms, such as those analyzed in this paper, have also been addressed in the framework of construction grammar, as in Fillmore et al. (1988) and Nunberg et al. (1994), among others. In this account collocations and idioms are constructions characterized by their specific syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, and exhibit varying degrees of productivity. For an overview see Fried and Östman (2004) and for an application in Modern Greek see Marmaridou (2010).

The identification of the collocations of any word is feasible within a corpus of data. Corpus linguistics is a fast expanding field of study that seems to lend itself to practically every branch of linguistic inquiry (see e.g. Gries & Stefanowitsch 2007; Lindquist & Mair 2004). The present work is based on the study of concordances of *prosopo* in a Modern Greek corpus that led to the identification of specific patterns of usage of this word and the meaning potential of each pattern. In agreement with Hanks (2004: 250), it was shown that some of these patterns of usage, i.e. some collocations of *prosopo*, are motivated by the semantics of the collocating terms. However, concordances also revealed that this is not always the case, thereby paving the way for alternative hypotheses concerning the emergence of collocational meaning and its scope of application.

In conclusion, at a methodological level, cognitive semantics, metaphor theory, cognitive grammar, cultural models, lexical semantics and lexicographic practice, and corpus linguistics may converge towards an account of linguistic meaning, given that they recognize its cognitive and cultural motivations and share a commitment to a usage-based approach to the study of language.

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Dynamic body parts in Estonian figurative descriptions of emotion*

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This study applies cognitive metaphor and metonymy theory to Estonian descriptions of emotion that reference body parts. Body parts like the chest and heart are conceptualized as containers for emotion. More common is the figurative exploitation of the dynamic, changeable parts of the head, in particular the face, the eyes, and lips. No correspondence seems to hold between specific emotions and specific body parts. Most are used to refer to both positive and negative emotions, the latter found to be more frequent. Interestingly, the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN are not always applicable: UP does not always convey GOOD in Estonian body part expressions, but rather means ACTIVATED, with either a positive or negative evaluation. It is proposed that conceptualizations are made from either an Emoter's or an Observer's perspective and are found to correlate with metaphorical and metonymic codings, respectively.

Keywords: axiological values, cognitive metaphor and metonymy theory, emoter vs. observer, evaluation

1. Introduction

It is probably the case that in every language there are lexical somatic expressions that describe human emotional reactions. For example, in British English it is possible to say that someone *pulled a long face*, meaning that he or she is sad or unhappy. The vertical extension of one body part – the face – is interpreted as an index of an unpleasant emotional state (Yu 2001). English speakers may also say that someone *is boiling with anger*, in which case the intensity of anger is described metaphorically, implying that the human body is conceptualized as a container for

* This study was supported by the Estonian Science Foundation (grant No 7149) and the targeted financing project SF0050023s09.

emotions (Kövecses 2000). The main purpose of the present chapter is to shed light on the inventory of body part terms used in Estonian figurative descriptions as well as to detect a system, if any, in the patterns of using body parts in the conceptualizations of emotions.

The conceptualization of emotions is a good example of embodiment – the idea that human abstraction is rooted in bodily experience (e.g. Gibbs 2006a; Johnson 1987). Besides the embodiment of emotion concepts in general terms, culturally extended embodiment (e.g. Maalej 2004) and the detection of a specific body part's role in the conceptualizations of specific emotions are also topics of high interest. On the one hand, the human body and its basic emotional reactions are inherited from our ancestors in the course of evolution and are therefore similar across cultures (Ekman 1982), a situation that creates the possibility for linguistic and cultural universals to be found in lexical expressions referring to body parts. For example, Wierzbicka (1999: 275–276) has proposed a list of eleven potential cross-linguistic and cross-cultural “emotional universals” and at least three of them postulate the interrelatedness of cognitively based feelings and bodily phenomena. The true nature of these linguistic universals is yet to be studied, and one of the aims of the present chapter is to find out whether they hold for the Estonian language and culture. On the other hand, cross-cultural research into the field has shown that there exists an interesting diversity in the ways different languages apply the repertoire of bodily images to the possibly universal emotional experiences (e.g. Enfield & Wierzbicka 2002; Kövecses 2005; Maalej 2004; Wierzbicka 1999). The research into the role played by body parts in the Estonian lexicon contributes to the overall picture of conceptualizing emotions figuratively.

In the studies of the role of body part terms in the conceptualizations of emotions carried out in other languages, there is a common and intuitive distinction between internal and external body parts. By inner body parts the physiological organs are meant (liver, spleen, heart, lungs, etc.) while more or less everything that is not an internal organ is classified as an external body part. There are, however, some body parts that seem to be located both inside the body and on its surface (the stomach, the chest). The skin constitutes the boundary between the body's interior and exterior; the tongue, on the other hand, may be variously positioned. The Estonian material seems to suggest that in addition to the distinction between internal and external body parts, their accessibility for visual observation may also be relevant in figurative descriptions of emotions. Due to climatic and cultural reasons, most of the body parts are covered by some kind of clothing most of the time in Estonia and are, thus, not directly accessible for potential visual inspection and description. Culturally non-observable body parts include the chest, the back, the stomach, the skin, the throat, and the legs. The internal organs and body fluids are, by their nature, also not observable. There are only a few body

parts that are usually directly exposed to external visual observation. The culturally observable body parts include only part of the so-called external body parts – the head (together with all its highly relevant subparts) and hands. These are also the most dynamic and the best controllable parts of the human body, important in the process of communication of emotions.

The focus of the present study is placed mostly on the use of those Estonian terms that refer to the dynamic, observable, and clearly external parts of the body. It appears that lexical expressions referring to emotional experiences are not just purely descriptive but may be evaluative and prescriptive as well. The axiological values are in some cases related to the orientation of the dynamic body parts. Instead of the traditional GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), a somewhat more complicated orientation-evaluation pattern emerges. For a dynamic body part, being UP does not automatically mean GOOD, but rather ACTIVATED.

In Section 2, a short overview of the theoretical background is given, the research questions are formulated, and the materials and methods are introduced. Section 3 provides some background to the present study. Section 4 describes in more detail the materials and procedures used in the study. Section 5 presents data and discusses the distribution of body part terms and emotional meanings, the evaluative aspects present in the expressions, and the orientation of the referenced dynamic body parts. The chapter concludes with a summary of findings and a general discussion in Section 6, in which a possible differentiation between two perspectives on the Emoter's body is outlined and discussed.

2. Theoretical background

In the linguistic literature, at least two traditions of investigating lexical descriptions of body-emotion interrelations can be distinguished. The more anthropologically-oriented tradition is interested in gathering and comparing data from as many different languages and cultures as possible in order to document cultural variation and to detect potential universals (e.g. Enfield & Wierzbicka 2002; Wierzbicka 1999). Another school is formed by the followers of Lakoff and Johnson's cognitive metaphor theory (1980). In this tradition, scholars focus on reducing the variety of figurative uses of language to more basic conceptual patterns of thought. The latter paradigm has also been widely accepted, nicely developed, and applied to a broad range of phenomena and languages. The target domain of emotions has enjoyed a lot of attention as well (e.g. Kövecses 2000; Maalej 2004; Yu 1995; among many others). The present study relies mostly on the cognitive-conceptual school, as the purpose is not so much to compare Estonian expressions with equivalent ones in other languages, but to reveal the system of body parts

deployed in a plausible cultural model (D'Andrade 1987) to encode emotions. However, the three intriguing emotional universals to be tested (regarding the use of bodily symptoms, sensations, and images in descriptions of emotion) originate in Wierzbicka's work (1999).

Another reason to prefer the cognitive-conceptual approach is because of its stress on the notion of *embodiment*. Although the term is used in many senses in the literature (cf. Rohrer 2001; Wilson 2002), there is a general agreement that, regarding the human interaction with both the physical and social environment, it is hard to underestimate the role of the body and its fundamental capacities. It is believed that people's subjectively felt experiences of their bodies in action provide a part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought (Gibbs 2006a: 9). The role of the body, however, may vary in the writings of different schools using the term *embodiment* – from serving as the basis for pre-conceptual image-schemas motivating linguistic structures and meanings (cf. Evans & Green 2006; Johnson 1987) to detecting the patterns of neuronal sensorimotor activity corresponding to abstract concepts (Gallese & Lakoff 2005). Observations on how body part terms are used in lexical descriptions of emotional experience belong to the so-called phenomenological level of embodiment. This is claimed to include everything that a person can be experientially aware of: one's own mental states, body, environment, as well as physical and social interactions (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 103). As such, the phenomenological level of embodiment should be accessible to the person's immediate conscious introspection. A linguistic expression that contains body part terms and refers to an emotional state can be treated as a piece of evidence of a conscious link between that particular body part and an emotion, at least for the very first person who has created the expression – the hypothetical conceptualizer. While conventionalized, the expression of the first conceptualizer has become part of the language community's conventional knowledge or a folk theory of emotions. The original phenomenological association between a particular body part and emotion is no longer expected to be fully conscious or existent for any single language user who just exploits the inventory of pre-packaged conventional semantic gestalts. However, it should be detectable by an analyst equipped with the knowledge of cognitive mechanisms as well as emotions.

According to expert theories, emotions are complex dynamic phenomena in which many aspects of human behavior and physiology are involved as well as concurrent emotion-specific thoughts (see e.g. Gibbs 2006a). There has been no consensus on what comes first in an emotional reaction: its bodily manifestations (such as facial expressions, changes in the heart rate and breathing, blood pressure, temperature, specific changes in the central and autonomic nervous systems, and release of specific neurotransmitters) or its cognitive components. In psychology, there has been a lot of theorizing on the topic and as a solution to the emotion

paradox it has been proposed that emotions are phenomena that are affective and conceptual at the same time (Feldmann Barrett 2006). In the field of cognitive semantics, however, emotions have been treated mostly not in the rich sense, but largely as cognitive events and abstract phenomena, accompanied by bodily manifestations (Wierzbicka 1999; Kövecses 2005). This view has made it possible to explain how people understand and conceptualize the more abstract and vague domain of experience – emotions – via the more tangible domains of experience – interactional knowledge of body parts, containers, temperature, liquids, storms, etc. These kinds of interpretations are possible due to the mechanisms of metonymic and metaphoric mappings.

According to classical cognitive metaphor theory, there are two central types of cognitive mappings pervasive in both language and thought: conceptual metaphor and conceptual metonymy (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). Conceptual metaphor is a mechanism in which a cognitive source domain (S) is systematically mapped onto a so-called cognitive target domain (T). The mechanism is used to think and talk about unfamiliar and abstract phenomena in terms of more familiar ones. Mappings within conceptual metaphors are formulated as propositions involving an act of identification (T IS S), for example LOVE (T) IS A JOURNEY (S) or, more recently, JOURNEY → LOVE (Lakoff & Johnson 1999). In a conceptual metaphor the Source and Target have to be different cognitive domains. The knowledge of source domains is experiential; it comes through everyday bodily interactions. The knowledge of target domains comes through mechanisms of mapping and inference. Many conceptual metaphors have been conceived for the target domain of emotions, especially for anger (e.g. ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, ANGER IS FIRE, ANGER IS AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE) (Kövecses 2000).

Conceptual metonymy is a mapping within one and the same cognitive domain in which the source (S) and target (T) can partly coincide. Some authors argue that the function of conceptual metonymy is to provide access to a conceptual entity (Target) by another conceptual entity (Vehicle) within the same domain or ICM (Kövecses & Radden 1998). Conceptual metonymies are propositions, involving an act of representation (S STANDS FOR T, or S FOR T), for example THE FACE FOR THE PERSON (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). One of the most exploited kinds of conceptual metonymy is *pars pro toto*, in which the complex Target domain as a whole is represented by its less complex but salient part, functioning as a Source. For the target domain of emotions, some conceptual metonymies have also been posited, e.g. DROOPING BODY POSTURE FOR SADNESS (Barcelona 2003a), or more generally BODILY REACTION FOR EMOTION (Panther & Thornburg 2007). Other authors prefer to speak about experiential correlations inside the domain. It is claimed that certain postures or facial expressions correlate with certain emotional or psychophysical states (Onikki-Rantajääskö 2006: 69–70).

These two basic types of cognitive mappings, however, appear as not clearly distinct but as closely intertwined, where metonymy often forms the basis for metaphor (Barcelona 2003b; Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Niemeier 2003; Onikki-Rantajääskö 2006; Panther 2006). A special term, *metaphonymy*, has been created to designate metaphor-metonymy interaction in which either the metaphor arises from a metonymic relationship or the metonymy is found within a metaphor (Goossens 1990). In a radical view, every metaphor is based on a metonymic mapping (Barcelona 2003b). In practice, however, cognitive semanticists prefer to operate with cognitive metaphors and metonymies as distinguishable categories, although they admit that metaphors are often metonymically motivated and based on correlations in experience (Kövecses 2002: 156). In the present study, the conventional practice of distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy is followed, and, where needed, the interplay between metaphor and metonymy is pointed out.

3. Background to the present study

Estonian is a non-Indo-European language that is spoken by approximately one million people on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland. Although a Finno-Ugric language by origin, it is widely influenced by Western (especially German) culture for historical reasons (Ross 2002). The relation between body parts and emotions in Estonian lexical expressions lacks systematic description as well as interpretation from the viewpoint of conceptual metaphor theory. Although there are some attempts to apply the theoretical framework to figurative descriptions of emotions (Õim 1999; Vainik & Velt 2006), its bodily basis has not yet been treated in full detail. In a classical study of head-related somatic phraseological expressions in Estonian, though, some emotions have been treated among other things (Vakk 1970). This study is a valuable source of conventionalized expressions, but its shortcoming is that it is not specifically focused on expressions of emotions and that it was done long before conceptual metaphor theory was formed. Figurative descriptions of emotions were also an object for an unpublished study, which explored them from the viewpoint of cognitive metaphor theory (Raisma 2006). Though body parts were mentioned among other possibilities as a possible source domain for metaphorical and metonymic mappings, there is still need for a more systematic description and analysis.

As mentioned above, the main purpose of the present study is to provide a systematic description of Estonian expressions containing body part terms and to analyze them within the framework of cognitive metaphor theory. The following subtasks were set for the study: First, to collect an inventory of Estonian body part terms that occur in figurative descriptions of emotions and to characterize them in

terms of conceptual metaphors and metonymies. The second task was to test the validity of some of the emotional universals proposed by Wierzbicka (1999). Three out of the eleven proposed universals suggest that body-related experiences can be lexically expressed: (i) via observable bodily symptoms, (ii) with reference to bodily sensations, and (iii) via figurative bodily images. The third task was to determine whether a possible system of conceptualization patterns, i.e. a cultural model, emerges (D'Andrade 1987).

4. Materials and procedures

The initial pool of Estonian expressions was gathered in 2006.¹ The material consists of conventionalized expressions such as phraseological expressions and phrasal verbs, which are generally treated as part of the Estonian lexicon, i.e. are listed as independent entries in dictionaries (Kaplinski & Vainola 2003; Loog 1991; EKSS; Õim 1993, 1998). This kind of data reveals what has been conceptualized about emotion-body part relations in principle but reveals nothing about the frequency and use of those expressions in the Estonian corpora. Both the archaic and newer slang expressions were treated as equal possibilities.

The criterion to decide whether a particular figurative expression refers to an emotion or not is the presence of some literal emotion term (Vainik 2002a) in the section of explanation in the dictionaries. The study focuses only on those lexical items that describe emotional experience. Interjections, as well as expressions referring to causation of emotions, are excluded. From the data set of descriptions of emotions, only those (approximately 300) that include body part terms have been selected for further analysis and included in the database.² Methods applied to the data involve a qualitative analysis of body part-emotion interrelations, accompanied by a detection procedure for conceptual metaphors and metonymies.

As a practical tool for distinguishing mechanisms of cognitive mappings, the *is like* test has been used (Kövecses 2002: 146). This method consists in paraphrasing the expression so that it includes an overt comparison using connectors like *is like* or *as if*. In the case of metaphor, the comparison should be meaningful and in the case of metonymy it makes no sense. In most of the cases, the test gives practical

1. The author is thankful to her former student Irita Raisma for collecting a portion of the data and for her kind permission to use her manuscript.

2. The total number of expressions is not very illuminating, though, as many of the expressions were lexical variants of a much smaller number of semantically invariant imaginary situations. However, an abundance of lexical variants denoting a certain situation speaks for its importance and cognitive salience in the given community of speakers.

clear-cut distinctions. In the course of analysis, however, in some cases there was a need to admit metaphonymy as a kind of combination of the two. In addition, which type of bodily correlate was likely used by the hypothetical first conceptualizer as the basis of conceptualization was fixed for every expression. “Observable symptoms”, “bodily sensations”, and “internal images” (Wierzbicka 1999) were distinguished relying on the author’s introspection about the accessibility of different kinds of bodily information – the visual, interoceptive, and imaginary.

Furthermore, some elements of simple quantitative analysis have been applied, namely, counting the number of expressions that (i) refer to certain body parts, (ii) instantiate different types of cognitive mappings, (iii) rely on different types of bodily correlates. Statistical bivariate correlations between the categories in the database were calculated.

5. Results and discussion

5.1 Distribution of body part terms in the data

In Estonian the general term for ‘body’ is *keha*. In the collected material, however, it occurred just once (see Example (4c)) in variation with the term *kere*, literally meaning ‘the body without the head and limbs’ (EKSS). Body part terms are, however, abundant (45 terms found in 310 expressions). This distribution reveals that conceptualizations clearly have to do with the parts of the body rather than with the body as a whole.

Among the specific terms, there are only five that designate the so-called internal body parts (organs and fluids included). Those terms are *süda* ‘heart’, *maks* ‘liver’, *kops* ‘lung’, *närv* ‘nerve’, *sapp* ‘bile’ and *veri* ‘blood’. Actually, the liver and lung occur together only in the variants of the same expression (see Example (2b)) and the bile is mentioned just once (Example (2c)). The heart and blood, however, are heavily exploited (see Table 1). So are the terms for the external body parts that come in a variety of 30 terms in approximately 200 expressions. Among the external parts of the body, the head and its subparts (the face, the eyes, the nose, the mouth and lips, etc.) seem to be more prominent. The Estonian folk psychology of emotions is in accordance with the importance of facial expressions described by psychologists (e.g. Ekman 1982).

In addition to human body parts, parts specific only to animals (e.g. horns, coxcomb, tail, feathers, and bristles) were found in the database. Furthermore, the stylistic synonyms that occurred in variation with the ordinary body part terms were often those denoting the respective parts of animal bodies (see Table 1). References to domestic animals are interpretable as reflections of the traditional

rural lifestyle. Altogether, in roughly one third of the expressions (29%) there was a reference to an internal organ, in 67% to an external body part, and only 4% to specific body parts of animals.

Table 1. Distribution of the material

Type of body part	Count	Estonian term	Gloss	Stylistic synonym	Gloss	Metonymy	Metaphor	Metaphonymy	Observable symptoms	Internal images	Bodily sensations
Internal:											
	46	<i>süda</i>	heart			4	42			42	4
	32	<i>Veri</i>	blood			5	27			27	5
	6	<i>Närv</i>	nerve				6			6	
	2	<i>kops</i>	lung				2			2	
	2	<i>maks</i>	liver				2			2	
	1	<i>sapp</i>	bile				1			1	
External:											
	26	<i>huuled</i>	lips	<i>mokad</i>	animal's lips	26			24		2
	22	<i>silmad</i>	eyes			13	1	8	20		2
	22	<i>Pea</i>	head			13	5	4	13	6	3
	19	<i>Nina</i>	nose			19			19		
	18	<i>nägu</i>	face	<i>pale</i>	archaic/poetic term for face	11		7	18		
	12	<i>hambad</i>	teeth			8	1	3	7	1	4
	11	<i>Suu</i>	mouth			11			11		
	11	<i>Rind</i>	chest			2	9		2	9	
	9	<i>nahk</i>	skin			1	1	7		1	8
	7	<i>Käsi</i>	hand	<i>käpp</i>	Paw	6			6		1
	6	<i>juuksed</i>	hair			6			6		
	5	<i>rusikas</i>	fist			5			5		
	5	<i>Keel</i>	tongue			3		2	2		3
	5	<i>Kurk</i>	throat					5			5
	4	<i>kulmud</i>	eyebrows			4			4		
	4	<i>Põlv</i>	knee			4					4
	4	<i>Selg</i>	back					4			4
	3	<i>Lõug</i>	chin			3			2		1
	2	<i>habe</i>	beard			2			2		
	2	<i>kõrvad</i>	ears			2			2		
	2	<i>Laup</i>	forehead			2			2		

<i>Type of body part</i>	<i>Count</i>	<i>Estonian term</i>	<i>Gloss</i>	<i>Stylistic synonym</i>	<i>Gloss</i>	<i>Metonymy</i>	<i>Metaphor</i>	<i>Metaphonymy</i>	<i>Observable symptoms</i>	<i>Internal images</i>	<i>Bodily sensations</i>
	2	<i>vuntsid</i>	moustache			2			2		
		<i>Köht</i>	stomach	<i>vats</i>	belly; part of ruminant's digestive tract	2					2
	2										
	1	<i>Jalg</i>	leg			1					1
	1	<i>Kõri</i>	glottis				1			1	
Animal:											
	5	<i>Sarv</i>	horn					5	2		3
	3	<i>saba</i>	tail					3	3		
	1	<i>Hari</i>	coxcomb					1	1		
	1	<i>harjased</i>	bristle					1	1		
	1	<i>suled</i>	feather					1	1		

5.2 Correspondence in the types of cognitive mappings and bodily manifestations

For every expression in the database, its type of cognitive mapping as well as the bodily manifestation was determined where possible (see the section of methods). Following the rule of thumb *is like* test, roughly half of the material (51.6%) was based on conceptual metonymy, roughly one third (30.8%) on metaphor, and 17.5% of the material revealed a complex pattern of conceptual mappings, called metaphonymy in the literature (Goossens 1990). For a closer look at the distribution, see Table 1. There is a tendency that metaphoric mappings prevail when the emotional experience is localized in the internal body parts and metonymy prevails when it is localized in the external body parts. In Example (1a), the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER is at work (Kövecses 2000; Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Vainik & Velt 2006).³ Example (1b) illustrates the metonymy RAISED EYEBROWS FOR SURPRISE. The metaphonymic mappings do not show such a distinct pattern of distribution, except that using animal body parts as the bodily correlates for human emotions inevitably presupposes both a metaphoric

3. The glosses follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules found at www.ru.nl/dbd/LGR04.09.21.pdf, retrieved on 27 August 2008. Additionally, the following abbreviations are used: PTV = partitive, ILL = illative, INESS = inessive, ELAT = elative, TERM = terminative.

mapping (HUMAN IS ANIMAL) and a metonymic mapping (BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION). In Example (1c), blood flushes into one's head accompanying anger, which is visible as a red color in the face (a metonymic mapping EFFECT FOR CAUSE), motivating the metaphor HUMAN IS COCK.

- (1) a. *veri* *hakkab* *keema*
 blood-SG + NOM start-PRS + 3 boil-INF
 '(someone) gets angry (lit. the blood starts boiling)'
- b. *kulme* *kergitama*
 eyebrow-PL + PTV raise-INF
 'to be surprised (lit. to raise the eyebrows)'
- c. *hari* *läheb* *punaseks*
 coxcomb-SG + NOM go-PRS + 3 red-SG + TR
 '(someone) gets angry (lit. the coxcomb becomes red)'

The tentative bivariate analysis shows a rather strong positive correlation ($r = 0.7$; $p < 0.0001$) between the types of body parts (external, internal, or animal) and the types of conceptual mappings (metonymy, metaphor, metaphonymy). This finding is in accordance with the tendency described in Chinese, where the expressions referring to external body parts are also found to be metonymic while mentioning the inner organs evokes imaginary bodily images that tend to be metaphorical (Yu 2002).

With regard to the three emotional universals proposed by Wierzbicka (1999), which postulate the ways in which bodily phenomena can be linguistically manifested (observable bodily symptoms, references to bodily sensations, and figurative bodily images), these tendencies occur clearly in the material (see Table 1). The observable bodily symptoms of emotions are referred to in roughly half (50.6%) of the expressions. In such cases some event or process happening in the Emoter's body (like blushing or turning pale) is described as perceivable for an external Observer. In the lexical descriptions, the modality of vision is preferred, as the changes in shape, position, color, size, movement, or action made with an external body part are mentioned most frequently. No changes in the internal body parts are referred to via observable symptoms. It is a movement of the eyebrows in Example (1b) and the color of the face in (1c) that are the perceivable symptoms of emotions. These figurative descriptions are conceptualized as if from the perspective of some external Observer (which does not exclude the possibility of using them in order to describe the first person's experience, once conventionalized, as in Example (2a). For the external Observer, the visible signs of emotions taking place in an external body part might be an important, if not the only access, to the other person's mind. The analysis above reveals that in the case of external

body parts the main mechanism of conceptual mapping is the metonymy BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION.

- (2) a. *ma tegin suured silmad*
 I do-PST + 1 big-PL + NOM eye-PL + NOM
 'I was astonished/surprised (lit. I made the big eyes)'
- b. *kops läheb ~ kargab üle maksa*
 lung-SG + NOM go-PRS + 3 ~ jump PRS + 3 over liver-SG + GEN
 'to get angry (lit. the lung jumps over the liver)'
- c. *ta süda nõretas sapist*
 3-GEN heart-SG + NOM drip-PST + 3 bile-SG + ELAT
 'he was very angry (lit. his heart dripped bile)'
- d. *hirm poeb nahka*
 fear-SG + nom hole up-PRS + 3 skin-SG + ILL
 '(someone) is getting afraid (lit. the fear holes up into skin)'
- e. *veri tõuseb näkku*
 blood-SG + NOM raise-PRS + 3 face-SG + ILL
 '(someone) becomes irritated (lit. the blood rises into face)'

Internal bodily images constitute the second large group (31.6%) in the material. In this case, the expressions refer to imaginary events and processes as if they were really taking place inside the body (Wierzbicka, 1999). There is no real boiling inside the body in Example (1a); neither do the positions of lung and liver change in (2b), nor does the heart surprisingly do the job of the liver (2c). These kinds of expressions tend to be metaphoric (see Table 1) and the terms of internal body parts are predominantly exploited. The only exceptions are *rind* 'chest' and *pea* 'head' for which apparently their internal functionality (CONTAINER OF EMOTIONS) is more important than their external appearance. The internal bodily images are conceptualized as if from the perspective of the Emoter. The same is valid for the interior of the chest and head. Again, once conceptualized, the expressions are attributable to the other person's experience as well (as in Example (2c)). The metaphoric bodily images are efficient means to let other people know about one's inner, hidden emotional processes and their intensity while using analogies of the processes known from common life experience. Experience with e.g. CONTAINERS, OBJECTS, RESOURCES, PERSONS, LIQUIDS, HEAT, COLD, serve as convenient source domains for metaphoric mappings of emotions in Estonian (Vainik & Velt 2006).

The possibility of describing emotional experience via reference to bodily sensations accompanying an emotional state (Wierzbicka 1999) is not as widely exploited (17.8%) as the two other possibilities described above. Bodily sensations are, again, a private domain, inaccessible to the visual perception of an external

Observer. They have to do with interoception – the body’s feedback signals from different parts and organs of the Emoter’s body. As Table 1 reveals, terms of both internal and external body parts can participate in the expressions that manifest bodily sensations, the terms for skin, blood, and throat being the most popular. In Example (2d), the bizarre sensation on skin accompanying fear (most probably the sensation of hair rising) motivate the metonymic mapping BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION, while the emotion of fear is personified at the same time (a metaphoric mapping EMOTION IS PERSON/ANIMAL). In (2e) the sensation of flush of blood into the face accompanying a strong irritation motivates the metonymic mapping BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION. The difference between the conceptualization of (1c) and that of (2e) is that the first is construed from the perspective of an external Observer (highlighting the visible change of color) and the second is construed from the perspective of the Emoter (focusing on the private bodily sensation of blood flush). These differences are schematized in Figure 1.

Yu’s (2002) results for Chinese that internal body parts serve as source domains for the metaphorical target ‘internal images of imaginary events’ and that external body parts serve as source domains for the metonymic target ‘observable symptoms’ are confirmed by the Estonian data. In the case of bodily sensations, however, both internal and external body parts are referred to, because from the Emoter’s perspective the distinction between internal and external body parts is irrelevant. Supposedly, the strong positive correlation ($r = 0.87$; $p < 0,0001$) between the types of bodily manifestations (observable symptoms, internal images, or bodily sensations) and the types of conceptual mappings (metonymy, metaphor, and metaphonymy), has to do with the conceptualizer’s perspective (Observer *vs.* Emoter) and not with the type of body parts (internal *vs.* external)




Figure 1. Relationships among types of perspective, bodily manifestation, and conceptual mapping

in the first place (see Figure 1). The positive correlation between perspective and bodily manifestations appeared to be stronger ($r = 0.92$; $p < 0,0001$). In Figure 1 the boldfaced arrows indicate the accessibility of bodily phenomena. The Observer has visual access to another person's overt manifestations of emotions. The Emoter has interoceptive access to his/her own bodily sensations and internal images. In the latter case, the interoceptive sensation is accompanied by the experience of imaginary events. The dashed arrows indicate the Observer's possibility to attribute imaginary bodily sensations and internal images to the other person.⁴ Connectors between types of bodily sensations and cognitive mappings illustrate the relations of preferred choices.

5.3 On the correspondence of particular body parts and emotions

The distribution of various body part terms across expressions reveals that there is no strict specialization of a particular body part for a particular emotion. Some body part terms are involved in descriptions of multiple emotions. For example, 'face' is referred to in the descriptions of seven emotions (see Examples (3a–g)). In all expressions, the observable symptoms of emotions motivate a metonymic mapping, *BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION*. In (3f), the metonymic mapping is accompanied by a metaphor, *FACE IS LIGHT SOURCE*, and in (3g) by a metaphor, *ANGER IS FIRE*, thus giving rise to metaphonymies (Goossens 1990). The variety of emotions that figuratively exploit 'face' as a source domain accords well with intuition and is confirmed by psychologists, who stress the importance of the facial expression of emotions (Ekman 1980). Other body parts that are referred to in descriptions of multiple emotions are: the heart (7), the blood (5), the lips (5), the eyes (5), the chest (4), and the head (4). Some body parts, on the other hand, are restricted to descriptions of just one particular emotion. For example, 'back' is mentioned only in descriptions of fear (Example (4d)), 'fist' in descriptions of anger, 'throat' in cases of sadness, and 'nerve' in descriptions of irritation. The following examples illustrate the use of 'face' in the conceptualization of emotions in Estonian:

- (3) a. *nasty* *vales* *minema*
 face-SG + ELAT white-SG + TR go-INF
 'to become white in the face' (fear)
- b. *puna* *tõuseb* *palgesse*
 redness-SG + NOM rise-PRS + 3 face-SG + ILL
 'redness is rushing to the face' (shame)

4. One can wonder whether or not the observable symptoms of one's own emotions are also visually perceivable. However, even when someone is observing oneself in a mirror, the conceptualizations of one's own emotional states would most probably use the interoceptive and not the visual information in the first place.

- c. *näost* *hall* *olema*
 face-SG + ELAT grey-SG + NOM be-INF
 'to be grey in the face' (concern)
- d. *pikka* *nägu* *tegema*
 long-SG + PTV face-SG + PTV make + INF
 'to draw a long face' (disappointment)
- e. *nägu* *krimpsutama*
 face-SG + PTV wince-INF
 'to make a wry face' (disgust)
- f. *nägu* *särab*
 face-SG + NOM shine-PRS + 3
 'the face is shining' (happiness)
- g. *palg* *lööb* *viha* *leegitsema*
 face-SG + NOM strike-PRS + 3 anger-SG + ELAT flame-INF
 'the face bursts into flame with anger'

Some emotions seem more prominent in human experience and are described via reference to multiple body parts. One of the most variably described emotions is fear. The metonymic mapping BODILY MANIFESTATION FOR EMOTION is behind all the conceptualizations of fear in Examples (4a–h). The expression in (4a) is also interpretable as an internal bodily image (Wierzbicka 1999) because blood in the blood vessels hardly becomes more liquid due to fear. Of course, there exists a possible experiential physiological motivation – because the heartbeat quickens, blood circulation increases. This, in turn, can be interpreted as a property of a more liquid consistence in a folk theory (e.g. the humoral theory of body fluids; see Geeraerts & Grondelaers 1995). Examples (4b–e) are based on private bodily sensations not accessible to an Observer (in (4c) and (4e) due to the cultural factor of wearing clothes), and (4f–h) are motivated by the visible signs of fear. Other extensively described emotions include anger (9), sadness (6), joy (6), and excitement (4). Most of these belong to the group that psychologists call basic emotions (Ekman 1982).

- (4) a. *veri* *lööb* *vedelaks*
 blood-SG + NOM strike-PRS + 3 liquid-SG + TR
 'the blood becomes liquid'
- b. *südame* *alt* *lööb* *külmaks*
 heart-SG-GEN underneath + ELAT strike-PRS + 3 cold-SG + TR
 'it gets cold underneath the heart'

- c. *hirmujutt* *käib* *kehast*
 fear-SG + GEN + frisson-SG + NOM go-PRS + 3 body-SG + ELAT
läbi
 through
 ‘a frisson of fear runs through the body’
- d. *hirmujudin* *käib* *üle*
 fear-SG + GEN + frisson-SG + NOM walk-PRS + 3 across
selja
 back-SG + GEN
 ‘a frisson of fear runs across the back’
- e. *põlvist* *nõrk*
 knee-PL + ELAT weak-SG + NOM
 ‘weak in the knees’
- f. *hambad* *plagisevad*
 tooth-PL + NOM click-PRS-PL + 3
 ‘the teeth are clicking’
- g. *juuksed* *tõusevad* *püsti*
 hair-PL + NOM raise-PRS-PL + 3 up
 ‘the hair is rising’
- h. *lõug* *väriseb* *hirmust*
 chin-SG + NOM shiver-PRS + 3 fear-SG + ELAT
 ‘chin is shivering from fear’

At the other end of the continuum, there are some emotions whose descriptions involve reference to just one body part. For example, disgust is described via metonymic reference to the distortion of the shape of the nose that comes in 12 (!) lexical variants. Offence is described with reference to the distortion of the shape of lips, wistfulness with reference to the sensations in the heart, and confusion in the head. None of the above mentioned body parts is, however, reserved strictly for the description of those emotions.

In the case of the most variably described basic emotions (fear, anger, joy, sadness), all types of conceptual mappings occur. Some emotions such as pride, disgust, surprise, and dismay tend to be described strictly via metonymic mappings while for love and excitement everything goes except pure metonymy. Tendencies can be explained through the correlation between the type of conceptual mappings and that of bodily events referred to. Basic emotions seem to have multiple manifestations in the body. Both externally observable and internally experienced ones can be used as a basis for different kinds of conceptual mappings. In the case of pride,

disgust, surprise, and dismay, their observable symptoms seem to prevail, while in the case of love and excitement, internal sensations seem to be more common.

It is evident that beside internal organs like the heart, blood and nerves, the observable, dynamic and changeable parts of the body such as the face, eyes, mouth, lips, nose, and head are also widely exploited in the figurative descriptions of emotions. Changes in these parts of the body are accessible not only to the person in the emotional state but also to a possible external Observer. These body parts have their canonical postures, sizes, shades, and functions; deviations from these are considered indicative of the changes in an emotional state.

5.4 Emotions and their evaluations

The division of emotions into negative and positive ones is widespread in the psychological literature as well as in folk psychology (Vainik 2002b; Wierzbicka 1999). Psychologists agree that the valence of an emotion has to do with its subjective pleasantness *vs.* unpleasantness (e.g., Fillenbaum & Rapoport 1971; Russell 1980; Storm & Storm 1987). Some have argued that in addition to the subjective value, the social evaluations also contribute to the positive *vs.* negative valence of emotions (Solomon & Stone 2002).

In the collected data there was a great bias toward describing more negative (unpleasant) emotions than positive ones. Out of all expressions, 67% describe negative emotions (e.g. anger, fear, sadness, concern, disgust) and only 15% positive and pleasant emotions (e.g. joy and love). The fact that the descriptions of negative emotions outnumbered the positive ones speaks for their high salience and a possible cultural hypercognition (Levy 1984). On the other hand, this finding is in accordance with the overall tendency in languages to make more distinctions in the subdomain of negative emotions. This bias has been argued to be grounded in the evolutionary need to be very aware of possible frights rather than to differentiate benefits in a very detailed manner (Allik 1997). In addition, there are 18% of expressions that are descriptions of emotions whose valence is difficult to determine in Estonian (such as surprise, pride and excitement). Their valence depends on the situational context and on the axiological value attributed to the emotion by the description. There are two distinguishable registers: emotions can be conceptualized either in a neutral or in a pejorative manner in Estonian.

Examples (5a–b) illustrate how smiling, as a typical facial display of joy, is described using the neutral terms *suu* ‘mouth’ and *huuled* ‘lips’, while the display of dislike (in 5c–d) is described pejoratively using the stylistic synonym for lips, *mokk*. This is a marked term in Estonian meaning also ‘animal’s lips’ (Vakk 1970).

- (5) a. *suu* *on* *kõrvuni*
 mouth-SG + NOM be-PRS + 3 ear-PL + TERM
 ‘the mouth extends to the ears’
- b. *huuled* *tõmbuvad* *naerule*
 lip-PL + NOM draw-PRS-PL + 3 laughter-SG + ALL
 ‘the lips break into a smile’
- c. *mokad* *on* *kõveras*
 lip-PL + NOM be-PRS + 3 crooked-SG-INESS
 ‘the (animal’s) lips are wry’
- d. *mokki* *viltu* *vedama*
 lip-PL + PTV skew draw-INF
 ‘to draw the (animal’s) lips askew’

In all the cases in (5), the metonymy FACIAL DISPLAY FOR EMOTION is the basis for the conceptualization. In (5c) and (5d), there is also a metaphor, HUMAN IS ANIMAL. These examples demonstrate that the two supposedly cross-culturally universal tendencies to link the raised corners of the mouth with good feelings and turned down corners with bad feelings (Wierzbicka 1999) correspond to different axiological evaluations in figurative descriptions in Estonian. A neutral term is used to describe the positive facial display and a pejorative one to describe the negative display.

Another possible universal is that some emotions are recognizable from the extension of the eyes (Ekman 1980). The Estonian material provides a rich lexis to describe this connection. The emotions that are conceptualized via the metonymy AN EXTENSION OF THE EYES FOR EMOTION include surprise, wonder, dismay, and fright. The extension of the eyes can be described either with a neutral modifier (in addition to *suured* ‘big’ as in Example (2a), they also occur as *laiad* ‘wide’, *üm-margused* ‘round’, *pärani* ‘wide open’ in a variety of expressions) or with a pejorative modifier (*ammuli* ‘gaping’, *jõllis* ‘saucer-eyed’, *pahupidi* ‘inside out’, *pungis* ‘protuberant’, *punnis* ‘distended’). These modifiers are identical in denotation (meaning ‘wide open’) but differ in connotation.

In Example (6a), we can see a metonymy, MOUTH HANGING OPEN FOR DISMAY, where the emotion is described in a neutral manner. In (6b), in contrast, the same emotion is described in a pejorative way. In the latter variant, there is possibly also a metaphor, HUMAN IS ANIMAL, as the marked term *mokk* ‘animal’s lips’ is used instead of the neutral *suu* ‘mouth’. Another characteristic of negative axiological value is the use of pejorative modifiers to describe the position of the mouth.

- (6) a. *suu* *vajub* *lahti* ~ *pärani*
 mouth-SG + NOM droop-PRS + 3 open ~ wide open
 ‘the mouth drops open ~wide open’

- b. *mokk* *jääb* *rippu* *~töllakile*
 lip-SG + NOM remain-PRS + 3 hang-SG + ILL ~hang-SG + ALL
 'the (animal's) lip remains hanging'

While the hedonistic evaluations of emotions (pleasantness *vs.* unpleasantness) are based on the Emoter's subjective appraisal, the attributed axiological evaluations probably come from the viewpoint of an external Observer, who considers the Emoter's reactions as inappropriate. The pejorative expressions are unexceptionally metonymic and describe the emotions in question via reference to their observable symptoms (Wierzbicka 1999). Another characteristic is that they involve unexceptionally dynamic and observable parts of the body (such as the subparts of the head and face). These are the body parts that are also the most controllable and therefore the changes that take place are interpreted as communicatively meaningful. The displays of pleasant emotions are indicative of prospects of cooperation while the unpleasant emotions are indicative of possible obstacles to cooperation. From the Observer's and conceptualizer's viewpoint, these two types of emotional reactions have different axiological values and pejorative descriptions have a function of disqualifying the deviations from an accepted emotional norm. This is where the social evaluations of emotions are relevant (Solomon & Stone 2002).

5.5 Orientation and dynamic body part expressions

The general orientational metaphor postulated by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) links the evaluation of goodness/badness with a vertical axis in physical space. The metaphor GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN is in line with the intuitive observation about physical resources, namely that MORE IS UP and it is good to have more. Less of a resource is both physically down and bad for survival. With regard to the domain of manifestations of emotions in the body and its parts, the Estonian material suggests a somewhat more complicated picture. UPS and DOWNS of the various body parts and the axiological values attributed to the situations they refer to concern the canonical postures of those body parts and possible deviations from them as indicative of emotional reactions.

About the overall vertical posture of the body, there is a well-known metonymy DROOPING BODY POSTURE FOR SADNESS (Barcelona 2003a). Examples (7a–c) reveal that in the Estonian material the overall drooping body posture is specified in the positions of body parts. The part can be the head (7a) and the nose (7b), or alternatively an animal's body parts such as the tail (7c), whose droopiness is indicative of sadness. In all the examples, there is a metonymy, DROOPING BODY PART FOR SADNESS. In (7b) and (7c) below, there is also a metaphor, A HUMAN IS A DOG, because the described reaction is typical and well known from experience

with pets. According to popular knowledge of the behavior of domestic animals, there is a conventional observation that an up-oriented and moving tail of a dog suggests happiness while a sagging tail and a droopy nose suggest a negative emotion (sadness or guilt).

- (7) a. *pead* *norgu* *laskma*
 head-SG + PTV droopy + ILL let-INF
 ‘to hang one’s head’
- b. *nina* *maas* *hoidma*
 nose-SG + NOM ground-SG + INESS keep-INF
 ‘to droop one’s nose’
- c. *saba* *on* *sorgus*
 tail-SG + NOM be-PRS + 3 droopy + INESS
 ‘the tail is sagging’
- d. *silmi* *maha* *lööma*
 eye-PL + PTV ground-SG + ILL strike + INF
 ‘to drop your gaze’

A deviation from the canonical human upright position is indicative of changes in the levels of control and activity (Onikki-Rantajääskö 2006). Loss of erect posture implies both emotional and physical deactivation. Sadness is not the only emotion in Estonian described by a drooping body part, the same holds for shame (7d) and dismay (6a) and (6b).

It is not only a deviation from the overall upright position but also the dynamic body parts, whose normative posture is not droopy, that is indicative of emotional deactivation. These behavioral expressions are best described by a more general conceptual metaphor, EMOTIONAL DEACTIVATION IS DOWN. Loss of control and activity is negatively evaluated in Estonian, so the BAD IS DOWN metaphor also holds (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).⁵ The up-oriented body part, on the other hand, is indicative of emotional activation, which may be linked to either positive or negative axiological values. Examples (8a) and (8b) below are descriptions of pride that conceptualize the emotion via the metonymy AN UP-ORIENTED BODY PART (HEAD/TAIL) FOR (TRUE) PRIDE. In the case of (8b), the metaphor A HUMAN IS A DOG also holds because of the reference to the animal’s specific body part, which evokes the image of a typically happy dog.

- (8) a. *pead* *püsti* *hoidma*
 head-SG + PTV up keep-INF
 ‘to keep one’s head upright’

5. It has been found in two studies that in Estonian there are very few terms for positive deactivated states as compared to other languages (Allik 1997; Kästik 2000).

- b. *saba* *püsti hoidma*
 tail-SG + PTV up keep-INF
 'to keep the tail upright'
- c. *pead* *kuklasse* *viskama*
 head-SG + PTV nape-SG + ILL throw-INF
 'to throw one's head up to one's nape'
- d. *pead* *selga* *lööma*
 head-SG + PTV back-SG + ILL strike-INF
 'to toss one's head to one's back'

The Emoter's subjective feeling of pleasantness and the positive axiological value accompanying pride can come from the Observer's and conceptualizer's social intolerance of others' feelings. The subjectively pleasant state of pride in the denotation can be re-evaluated by applying a connotatively negative description of false pride. In the descriptions (8c) and (8d) above, the sudden and excessive movement of the head are highlighted hyperbolically in verbs that denote intensive movement as well as by the implication of abnormal contact between the head and the nape/back. A vertical raise of the head deserves a negative axiological value due to the superiority attributed to the Emoter (Peña Cervel 2003). Again, by means of the verbal descriptions, the Observer's conceptualization disqualifies the socially undesirable emotion (false pride). The examples in (8) can be subsumed under the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL ACTIVATION IS UP, but the metaphor GOOD IS UP (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) does not hold automatically because not all expressions of emotional activation in Estonian are positively evaluated. Raising the head or nose from a droopy position of sadness or shame to the canonical (reactivation) is evaluated as GOOD. Raising the head or nose above the normal position is evaluated as BAD.

A noncanonical upright position of a body part is interpreted as an index of strong emotional activation. In (9a), it is the nose, and in (9b–c) different kinds of hair, whose upright positions are conceptualized as deviating from the norm.

- (9) a. *nina* *püsti ajama*
 nose-SG + PTV up lead-INF
 'to rear up one's nose' (false pride)
- b. *juuksed* *tõusevad* *peas* *püsti*
 hair-PL + NOM raise-PRS + 3 head-SG + INESS up
 'the hair rises' (fear)
- c. *ihukarvad* *tõusevad* *püsti*
 body-SG + GEN + hair-PL + NOM raise-PRS + 3 up
 'the hair of the body rises' (fear)

- d. *harjaseid püsti ajama*
 hair-PL-PTV up lead-INF
 'to bristle (animal's) hair' (anger)

Example (9a) describes false pride, which is a socially undesirable emotion, while Examples in (9) describe fear (9c) and anger (9d), which are both subjectively unpleasant and socially undesirable (Vainik 2004). The underlying pattern of metonymic mapping can be generalized as AN UP-ORIENTED BODY PART FOR A NEGATIVE EMOTIONAL ACTIVATION.

In Example (10), the deviantly up-oriented body parts are described hyperbolically, implying postures that are literally impossible. The extension of the eyes, which stands metonymically for emotions (see also (2a)), is described as a distortion of their canonical orientation as in (10a). Examples (10b) and (10c) describe false pride via impossible postures of the nose, implying either its contact with the back (10b) or extending it figuratively up to the sky (10c).

- (10) a. *silmad on püsti ~ pulkas*
 eye-PL + NOM be-INF up ~ bulky-INNESS
 'the eyes are upright' (anger)
- b. *nina selga ajama*
 nose-SG + PTV back-SG + ILL lead-INF
 'to rear one's nose up to the back' (false pride)
- c. *nina taevasse upitama*
 nose-SG + PTV sky-SG + ILL boost-INF
 'to hoist one's nose to the sky' (false pride)

The expressions in Example (10) are similar to the bodily images in referring to a non-existent event (Wierzbicka 1999) except that they involve external body parts. In reality, the possible events (bodily manifestations of emotions) are exaggerated to the extent that they turn out to be impossible/non-existent events. Again, the bodily manifestations of socially undesirable emotions are disqualified by descriptions, and a negative axiological value is attributed to the emotion.

Figure 2 summarizes Examples (7)–(10) and illustrates the complex pattern of the positions of dynamic external body parts and the axiological values attached to the figurative descriptions. There appears to be a systematic pattern of attributing axiological evaluations. Any change in the dynamic body parts that indicates emotional activation deviating from the normative level is valued negatively. Changes that indicate the re-establishment of the normative level of activation are evaluated positively.

The folk model of emotion-body part relations is not just descriptive but prescriptive as well. The attributed axiological values serve the function of establishing




Figure 2. (RE)ACTIVATION IS UP/DEACTIVATION IS DOWN

a normative level of emotional activation, which is considered as appropriate in Estonian culture. Interestingly, the system lacks a scenario that accounts for the deactivation of a highly activated negative emotional state (e.g., strong anger, worry). The state of relief, though positively valued in Estonian culture, is not conceptualized by making use of external dynamic body parts. There is an expression describing relief *kivi veeres südamelt* (lit. ‘a stone wheeled from atop the heart’) that makes reference to downward motion and a body part that could thus possibly fit the system. However, it is not the heart but the stone that is described as moving/oriented downwards by the expression.

The mapping that describes the logic of UPS and DOWNS is the pair of conceptual metaphors (RE)ACTIVATION IS UP/DEACTIVATION IS DOWN. These mappings supposedly originate in the observed correlations between activation/deactivation patterns and upward and downward oriented body parts (as compared to their canonical postures), but we can find that kind of conceptual thinking even in expressions without body part terms, such as *üles ärritama* ‘arouse, lit. to irritate up’ and *maha rahunema* ‘to calm down, lit. to calm to the earth’.

6. Summary of findings and general discussion

The inventory of Estonian body part terms participating in the figurative descriptions of emotions is presented in Table 1. Three main findings can be outlined with regard to the emotion-body part relations and the systematicity of their distribution patterns.

First, in Estonian figurative descriptions there is no specialization of body parts for expressing particular emotions. Instead, there is a continuum of more or less exploited body parts that may be referenced to convey emotions. External and dynamic parts of the body – such as the head, its subparts (eyes, mouth, nose), and hands – are more heavily exploited than internal body parts and fluids (heart, blood, nerves). This finding is in harmony with the importance assigned by psychologists to facial displays and behavioral expressions of emotions (Ekman 1980). Dominant among the most variably described emotions are the so-called basic emotions fear, anger, joy, and sadness (Ekman 1980). On the one hand, the multiple bodily manifestations of these emotions serve as a convenient basis for their conceptualizations. On the other hand, these emotions are cognitively the most salient ones for Estonian speakers, as a previous study of lexical knowledge of emotion has shown (Vainik 2004).

Second, there is a positive correlation between the types of cognitive mappings (metonymy, metaphonymy, and metaphor) and the bodily manifestations on which the conceptualizations are based (observable symptoms, bodily sensations, and imaginary events). These bodily manifestations coincide with three of the emotional universals proposed by Wierzbicka (1999), the validity of which is supported by my Estonian data. It was proposed that the correlation between the types of conceptual mappings and bodily manifestations has more to do with the conceptualizer's perspective (Observer *vs.* Emoter) than with the type of body part (internal *vs.* external). With regard to figurative emotion descriptions in Estonian, cultural observability of certain body parts seems more relevant than an intuitive division of body parts into internal and external ones, which is common in the literature of emotion descriptions (Enfield 2006; Yu 2002).

Third, the Estonian material suggests that, in addition to apparent support for Wierzbicka universals, there might also be peculiarities in the Estonian emotion descriptions. The axiological value of the description depends not only on the valence of described emotions but also on the attribution of the value as seen from an Observer's and describer's viewpoint. Another interesting result is that Estonian descriptions of emotions make use of the metaphorical contrast ACTIVATION IS UP *vs.* DEACTIVATION IS DOWN. This contrast, however, might not be peculiar to Estonian. For example, in English there are also expressions like *He is not up to much*, *riled up*, *worked up*, or *What's up?*. The axiological evaluations of emotions in Estonian do not follow directly from the conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), but seem to depend on the social acceptability of reactions. Activation and evaluation are independent characteristics of emotions that can combine in different ways. This result is compatible with the so-called circumplex model of emotion in psychology. On the basis of similarity measurements of literal emotion terms followed by multidimensional scaling, it has

been demonstrated for many languages that the set of emotion terms studied invariably tends to take the shape of a circle (see Russell 1980; Russell, Lewicka, & Niit 1989; and Larsen & Diener 1992 for discussions). It has been concluded that the subjective space of emotions is best described by two independent bipolar orthogonal dimensions: evaluation (pleasantness *vs.* unpleasantness) and arousal (low *vs.* high activation).

Regarding the plausible cultural model of emotion-body part relations in Estonian, the main finding is that there are possibly two perspectives used by the hypothetical first conceptualizer (see Figure 1). An emotion tends to be described figuratively and in an embodied manner either from the viewpoint of the Emoter him/herself or from the viewpoint of an external Observer. These perspectives differ as follows:

1. What kind of body part is referred to? The Emoter has, of course, interoceptive access to every part of his or her body. The Emoter also has exclusive access to his or her internal organs (like the heart, blood and nerves) as well as to the culturally non-observable parts of the body like the chest, stomach, throat, and skin. In daily social interactions, the bodies of Estonian speakers are mostly covered by clothing due to the climate or for cultural reasons. The Observer has visual access only to the culturally observable parts of the Emoter's body (the face and its subparts like the eyes, nose and mouth, as well as the hands).
2. What kind of bodily manifestation forms the basis for conceptual mapping? The Emoter conceptualizes the internal sensations accompanying the emotional states (i.e. the sensation of pressure and body heat in the case of anger, the sensation of expansion in the case of extreme happiness). Two of the emotional universals, tested by the Estonian material, rely on the Emoter's perspective: the bodily sensations and the internal bodily images (Wierzbicka 1999). From the Observer's perspective, there are only the visually detectable changes in the size, shape, posture, and orientation of some body parts that can form the basis for the conceptualizations. The third type of tested universals addresses exactly this kind of observable bodily symptoms (Wierzbicka 1999).
3. What kind of cognitive mapping is preferred? In the Emoter's descriptions, mostly metaphor and metaphonymy are exploited, and in the Observer's descriptions, metonymy prevails. The positive correlation between perspective and preferred choice of mapping is strong ($r = 0,7$; $p < 0,0001$).
4. What is the axiological value of the figurative description based on? The Emoter's evaluation is based on his or her subjective sense of pleasantness *vs.* unpleasantness, from which follows the valence of the described emotion (positive *vs.* negative). The Observer's evaluation is based on the acceptability of the Emoter's reaction as compared to a default norm. Two registers – neutral

and pejorative – are reflections of axiological evaluations. The Observer can disqualify the socially undesirable emotion also by using hyperbole in the description.

5. What is the possible motivation of figurative descriptions? Among other possibilities, it can be claimed that for the Emoter it is important to communicate his or her inner states, making them understandable to others. The metaphoric bodily images (Wierzbicka 1999) might be the means to let other people know about one's inner, hidden emotional states and their intensity while using analogies with processes known from everyday life experience. From the Observer's point of view it is important to evaluate the situation and the Emoter's communicated inner states. The visible signs of emotions manifesting themselves in an external body part may provide access to another person's mind.

There seems to be, thus, a kind of double understanding of the nature of emotions in the (Estonian) folk theory. The metonymic mappings, which largely correlate with the Observer's perspective, contribute to the interpretation of emotions as mainly affective bodily phenomena that can be indexically referred to. The metaphoric mappings, which largely correlate with the Emoter's perspective, reveal a conception of emotions as something abstract or vague that has to be made more comprehensible via reference to bodily experiences.

The notion of perspective is not unfamiliar in the literature. Lyons, for example, distinguishes between "the subjective experiencing self and objective observing self" (1982: 107, quoted in Hübler 1998). In cognitive linguistics, perspective has been taken into account in the discussion of the semantics of grammatical constructions (cf. Langacker 2002: 315). The role of perspective has also been emphasized in studies of emotion talk (e.g. Bamberg 1997). Thus, it is not surprising to find evidence of an objective-observing *vs.* a subjective-experiencing perspective in figurative descriptions of emotions. The exact nature of these two perspectives is a subject for future research.

Figurative descriptions of emotions can be considered to be a folk-psychological solution to the philosophical "problem of the other's mind." The language community solves the problem of how to capture a complex, multifaceted and abstract phenomenon such as emotion in a cognitively economical and communicatively efficient way. In this process, mechanisms of conceptual mapping play a central role. Yu (2008) has proposed that culture is a kind of filter that lets certain aspects of universal bodily experience come through and participate in metaphoric conceptualizations while withholding other aspects of such experience. The Estonian material suggests that the cultural filter may work even more widely – some aspects of bodily manifestations of emotions in Estonian are not just left aside but overtly disqualified by connotatively pejorative descriptions. Figurative descriptions

of emotion are not just conceptualizations but also means of communication with an impact on a potential receiver (Schnall 2005).

This chapter has searched for systematic ways in which terms designating dynamic body parts contribute to conceptualizations of emotions in Estonian. Body part expressions are always potential metonymic sources for the person as a whole including his/her emotional state. Researchers of emotion imagery in language have pointed out the role of the phenomenological first person's perspective in the embodiment: "Our subjective, felt experiences of our bodies in motion make our emotion concepts grounded, or, embodied" (Kövecses 2010: 118). The present study reveals that, in addition to the Emoter's perspective (relying on the subjectively felt experience), the Observer's perspective (visual observation of other peoples' bodily reactions) serves as a reference point for accessing embodied emotion concepts. The Observer's perspective is instantiated through a wealth of lexical expressions in Estonian that make reference to dynamic and culturally observable body parts.

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Contrasting body parts

Metaphors and metonymies of MOUTH in Danish, English, and Spanish

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In this chapter, the claim that metaphors and metonymies are grounded in bodily experiences is pursued by means of a cross-linguistic analysis of the semantic field of English *mouth* compared to its Spanish and Danish equivalent terms, *boca* and *mund*, respectively. Pustejovsky's (1995) 'qualia roles' serve as a basis for the classificatory system proposed. It is shown that the metaphorical and metonymical uses of *mouth* are, indeed, linked with mappings of mind and body and these mappings appear to be related closely to the constitution, the shape, and the sensori-motor capacities of that specific body part. The cross-linguistic analysis also reveals that the metonymization and metaphorization processes are influenced by cultural differences, even with languages that are relatively close to one another (compared to e.g. non-European languages).

Keywords: metonymization, metaphorization, qualia roles

1. Introduction

It is well known that both metaphors and metonymies are ubiquitous in language and they constitute the basis for many everyday expressions. For example, a typical metonymic mapping is PART FOR WHOLE as in this sentence taken from an advertisement *For clever heads we have lots of math games and puzzles* where a specific body part stands for the entire person. However, constitutive parts of body parts also behave in the same way. Surprisingly, the indistinct delimitations of the body parts usually do not lead to misunderstandings. For example, a sentence like *Her mouth curved upwards as though she was smiling*, strictly speaking, only refers to one part of the mouth, i.e. the lips, and therefore involves a WHOLE FOR PART

metonymy.¹ An interesting question, therefore, is what resources speakers draw upon in order to figure out – in apparently similar constructions – which one of the specific meanings of *mouth* is intended. Compare, for example, the following constructions that are similar on the surface and consist of [adjective + *mouth*]: *dry mouth*, *big mouth*, *cold mouth*, *bitter mouth*, *dirty mouth*, *silent mouth*, and *sensual mouth*. What makes it possible to distinguish the various meanings of *mouth* and what processes guide the addressee to select the right meaning?

This chapter presents data that show that non-literal uses of linguistic expressions containing one specific body part, namely, *mouth*, (and the corresponding words in Spanish and Danish, *boca* and *mund*) are closely connected with people's general knowledge about this body part concerning its constitution, function, and purpose and that these expressions result from processes of metaphorization and metonymization motivated by bodily experience.

Within the theory of conceptual metaphor, the claim has been put forward that metaphors and metonymies are grounded in bodily experience, hence the term *embodiment* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Johnson 1987). Since the basic idea behind conceptual metaphor theory is that abstract terms are understood by using more concrete concepts, the body as such appears to be a primary source for this mapping. Kövecses (2002: 16), who also supports this reasoning, writes: "The human body is an ideal source domain for metaphors, since, for us, it is clearly delineated and (we believe) we know it well". He also maintains that:

The "embodiment" of meaning is perhaps the central idea of the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor and indeed of the cognitive linguistics view of meaning. As can be expected, the human body plays a key role in the emergence of metaphorical meaning not only in English and other "Western" languages and cultures, but also [...] in languages and cultures around the world (2002: 16).

Likewise, Gibbs et al. (2004: 1192) maintain that many of the source domains of conceptual metaphors reflect significant patterns of bodily experience. In light of the recognition that a great portion of figurative meaning derives from our daily experiences with our own bodies, it is surprising that only a few extensive cognitive-based linguistic studies exist comparing one specific body part in two or more languages.² Specific comparative studies focus, instead, on various body parts at the same time and intend, by means of this approach, to explore the nature of

1. These delimitation problems appear to be a frequent feature of this semantic domain. In an investigation of body part terms in 76 languages, Hilpert (2007) found that in 26 languages the term for *hand* could also refer to 'arm', and in 40 of them, the term *foot* could also refer to 'leg' (85).

2. Exceptions are Olza Moreno (2006) and Yu (2000, 2004). Deignan and Potter (2004) also present a contrastive analysis of body parts in English and Italian, including, among others, *mouth* and *bocca*.

metaphor and metonymy (e.g. Díez Velasco 2000; Charteris-Black 2003). Also a vast literature on idioms deals with body parts, but these studies constitute, more often than not, mere lists of equivalent or similar expressions. They do not explore how these idioms (and fixed expressions and collocations) contribute to the understanding of the conceptualization of body parts. Repeated exposure to expressions such as *blue eyes*, *red eyes* vs. *a black eye* must have some impact on what is understood by the concept 'eye'.

2. Finding and classifying the data³

The first step involved in collecting the data for this study was to consult monolingual and bilingual dictionaries. This was done in order to get an idea of the possible range of more or less fixed expressions. The point of departure for my search was, of course, the words *mouth*, *boca*, and *mund*. Due to constraints of space, compounds and derivations have been considered only sporadically.⁴ All expressions were checked afterwards by means of large corpora (e.g. the British National Corpus, the Royal Spanish Academy's CREA, and the Danish Literature Society's Korpus 2000) to verify their use. In rare instances, Internet (i.e. Google) searches were performed as certain expressions, due to style, did not occur in the corpora. The authentic examples that occurred were reduced and altered slightly in order to focus on those expressions relevant to this study. The items that occurred in only one language were translated into the other two languages and their usage was checked in the corresponding corpora. Finally, all the examples found that had been translated and adjusted to suit our objectives were checked by native speakers of Danish, English, and Spanish to remove any doubt that the instances presented in the following are, in fact, commonly known expressions in Standard

3. As there does not appear to exist one unanimously accepted method for analyzing metaphors, I find it important to explain in detail the one chosen for this analysis, which, basically, combines the use of dictionaries, introspection, corpora, and native informants. As to the diversity of methods and theories within metaphor analysis, cf. Gibbs (2008: 5) who concludes that "[...] the topic of metaphor and thought is not one that is likely to be comprehensively characterized by any one perspective."

4. Unfortunately, this procedure may have disadvantages with respect to Danish and English where compounding is more frequent than in Spanish. Compare, e.g., English *mouth-watering* with Spanish *se te hace agua la boca* [lit.: 'the mouth waters for you']. Although these are interesting metonymic expressions, especially when used in metaphors such as *U2 has released a new mouth-watering CD*, such examples are not treated systematically in this study.

English, Spanish, and Danish.⁵ Because this chapter focuses on the existence or non-existence of expressions containing *mouth*, *boca*, and *mund*, no efforts were made to calculate the frequency of the expressions nor to consider systematically alternative expressions to the ones analyzed here by means of other body parts (e.g. *shut your mouth* vs. *hold your tongue*). Nevertheless, in the majority of cases the expressions presented constitute just one of many in order to exemplify the point in question. Anthropomorphisms (e.g. *mouth of a bottle* and *mouth of a river*) have been excluded because – although rooted in comparisons with the human body – they do not form part of the body as such.⁶

Pustejovsky's qualia structure inspired my approach to classifying the huge number of examples collected. In his 1995 book, he presents the relational force of a lexical item, which he calls its *qualia* structure. Qualia structures contribute to word meaning and compositionality. Due to the complexity of Pustejovsky's theory, I restrict my description in the following to the aspects that have served as inspiration for this chapter. Thus, Pustejovsky's four 'qualia roles' have been reduced, reinterpreted, and translated into the following three perspectives: the partitional perspective, the operative perspective, and the telic perspective.⁷

1. The **partitional perspective** describes the relation between an entity and its constitutive parts, the relation between the actual parts and the relation between the part and the entire entity (part-whole, part-part and whole-part relation). The main focus here is on partition. For example, with respect to *hand*, one can focus on the fact that the hand is a part of the entire body. But *hand* is also a part of the arm; and *hand* can be divided into five fingers, palm, wrist, etc. This perspective views an entity in terms of its interactions with other entities.
2. The **operative perspective** focuses on how the specific entity operates, i.e. possibility of movement, kind of shape, color, position, etc. With respect to *hand*,

5. For this reason, no pains were taken to supply the examples with references. However, in dubious or spectacular cases, this has been done.

6. Although anthropomorphisms from a cross-linguistic perspective are highly interesting (e.g. Spanish: *la boca del túnel*, English: *the mouth of the tunnel*, but not in Danish: **tunnlelens mund*), they fall outside the scope of the present chapter, which focuses on the human body and not look-alikes (or items that function alike) in the surrounding world.

7. Pustejovsky's 'agent role' has not been taken into consideration because it focuses on the origin of an object. Therefore, this role can hardly be used for natural entities. On the other hand, if a non-evolutionist perspective is taken, the agent for natural entities might be considered to be the creator, in which case, readers should consult Galen (1968 [165–175]), who gives an amazingly detailed description of the parts of the entire human body. However, each time a specific function of a body part cannot be explained on scientific functional grounds, he resorts to God as the explanation.

the focus can be on fingers being able to bend (or just one, several, or all of them simultaneously), on the hand's ability to rotate 180 degrees, form a fist, etc.

3. The **telic perspective** deals with the purpose of the item.⁸ In this respect, it is not only the evolutionarily conditioned purpose, e.g., the *hand* is able to grasp an object, hold or squeeze it, and touch it, but also on what human beings by convention use the body part for (i.e. due to their cultural background), e.g. shaking hands as a greeting or taking an oath by placing a hand on the Bible.

Naturally, one action may be the precondition for another action, i.e., you must be able to close your hands to be able to grasp something. However, normal abilities within one area may be seen as typically related to one specific body part. For instance, apart from your hand, you cannot grasp anything with other body parts.⁹

3. The partitional perspective

As any other body part, the mouth can be regarded as a part of the entire body. Nevertheless, the mouth simultaneously consists of parts, including the teeth, tongue, lips, and palate. The relation 'part of the entire body' is examined first.

3.1 Part-for-whole relation

For each of the three languages discussed here, there are only a few expressions that contain *mouth* that are based on the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy. Below, (1a–c) are typical examples (where 'E', 'S', and 'D' denote English, Spanish, and Danish, respectively):

- (1) a. E: *Mary has a lot of mouths to feed.*
- b. S: *Mary tiene muchas bocas que alimentar.*
- c. D: *Der var mange munde Mary skulle mætte.*

It is obvious in (1) that 'mouth' stands for the entire person and that Mary's worries are about obtaining food for the actual people involved, probably her children. This part-for-whole relation is conceptualized in the metonymy EATING ORGAN FOR PERSON, and it also exists in the singular form as in e.g., *She has an extra*

8. Pustejovsky distinguishes between two kinds of telic roles: (i) the purpose that the agent has in performing an act, e.g., the function of a knife is that it cuts something (e.g. meat), and (ii) the built-in function or aim that specifies certain activities, e.g., the function of beer is that someone drinks it. For obvious reasons, (i) is of special interest for our discussion.

9. Some people, however, are able to grasp even tiny objects with their toes. This hardly implies that the feet/toes 'were designed' or 'evolved' for grasping objects.

mouth to feed. However, for English, this expression should be considered a fixed one as it has not been possible to find examples of this metonymy (apart from (4) below) that did not include the verb *feed*. Similarly, this is the case for Spanish, although other but strongly related verbs do occur as in Example (2):

- (2) S: *Muchas bocas comen de ese trabajo.*
 ‘A lot of people are fed from this work’ [lit. ‘Many mouths eat from this work’]

Interestingly, only in Danish does a compound form for the metonymy EATING ORGAN FOR PERSON exist:

- (3) D: *Hun er en slikmund når hun er hos bedstemor.*
 ‘She has a sweet tooth [lit. ‘She is a candy mouth’] when she is at grandmother’s’

In Example (3), the vice of eating too many sweets is conceptualized (and lexicalized) by means of mouth and a representative kind of sweet, namely *slik* ‘candy’, that stands metonymically (and prototypically) for all kinds of sweets, thus creating a metonymy within a metonymy (cf. Goossens 1990).¹⁰

As everybody knows, the mouth is responsible for two different processes. One is, as shown, eating, and the other is speaking.¹¹ The latter is exploited with respect to the part-for-whole relation, at least in English and Spanish. The expression:

- (4) E: *He’s all mouth (and no trousers).*¹²

means that the person in question talks boastfully but does not act on his words.¹³ In this case, as well as in the following Spanish example, the reference point for the metonymy is clearly no longer the eating process, but, instead, links to the faculty of speech:

10. Note that there are equivalent expressions in English and Danish (but not in Spanish): *to have a sweet tooth* (cf. the translation of (3) above) and *at have en sød tand*. They also refer metonymically to the vice of eating (too many) sweets.

11. Breathing is not taken into account here, as people primarily breathe through their nose.

12. The use of *trousers* here is probably due to the stereotypical belief that only “real” men keep their word, whereas women, traditionally wearing dresses, are stereotypically associated with talking a lot without keeping their word. So when *he* is all mouth and does not wear trousers, *he* is very much like a woman that cannot be trusted.

13. In Danish a similar expression exists with the same meaning: *Hun har det hele i munden*. [lit. ‘She has got it all in her mouth’]. However, this is not an instance of a part-for-whole relation, but an instance of the use treated in Section 4.1.

- (5) S: *Es una boca que no tendrá piedad con sus enemigos.*
 ‘He/She is a person who has no mercy for his/her enemies’ [lit. ‘He/She is a mouth that has no mercy for his/her enemies’]

Thus both examples are instances of the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR PERSON.¹⁴

3.2 Whole-for-part relation

As stated in the introduction to Section 2, the mouth consists of the lips, the palate, the tongue, etc. and, interestingly, the mouth may stand metonymically for many of these constitutive parts. For example, ordinary sentences like *She has a big mouth; that’s why she can put these huge marshmallows into it* demonstrate that *mouth* can stand for the cavity as such.¹⁵ This use occurs in all three languages where the size of the mouth literally refers to the size of the cavity:¹⁶

- (6) a. E: *Grandma what a big mouth you have.*
 b. S: *Abuelita ¡que boca grande que tienes!*
 c. D: *Bedstemor, sikken stor mund du har.*

However, on a figurative level, the size of the mouth is linked metaphorically to how talkative or boastful a speaker is:¹⁷

- (7) a. E: *James is a bigmouth and he talks a lot without taking any action.*
 b. S: *James es un bocazas y habla mucho sin hacer nada.*
 [lit. ‘James is a mouth [+augmentative] and he talks a lot ...’]
 c. D: *James er stor i munden og han taler uden at gøre ret meget.*
 [lit. ‘James is big in his mouth and he talks a lot ...’]

The examples in (7) leave room for two interpretations depending on whether ‘bigmouth’ refers to the speaker as being a boastful person, i.e. to the boastful

14. Other sense organs can stand metonymically for the entire person (e.g., *I am all ears*, *Soy todo oído*, *Jeg er lutter øre*), but so can other body parts. (See e.g. Section 3 of Yu’s contribution in this volume).

15. Although now probably dead metaphors, in English the cavity has been conceptualized as a room or building. In general terms, the palate is referred to as *the roof of the mouth*. In a similar, albeit more cosmic way, the palate in Spanish is referred to as *el cielo de la boca* [lit. ‘the heaven of the mouth’].

16. *Big mouth* in the literal sense is ambiguous, as it can also refer to the front part (lips and teeth) of the mouth. However, a spot test by means of a Google search clearly indicates that most instances of *big mouth* seem to refer to the cavity.

17. Note that a person with a physically small mouth can be even more talkative than one with a physically big mouth.

manner of talking. In this case, the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING is activated. On the other hand, if ‘bigmouth’ stands for a talkative person (which, in fact, the coordinated second part of the sentence seems to indicate), then the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING is exploited in the sense that the larger the speech organ, the greater the quantity of the speech.¹⁸ Interestingly, with respect to the second interpretation, there exists a similar construction, although with the inverse meaning, in Spanish, but not in Danish or English:

- (8) S: *Pedro lo dijo con la boca chica.*
 ‘He said it without meaning it’ [lit. ‘He said it with the small mouth’]

Also in this case, the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH is activated. A small mouth does not appear to be able to convey as many convincing statements as a big mouth loaded with words. In other words, this expression stems from the idea that the size of the mouth is related to the volume, and hence the power, of the words spoken.

In all three languages, *mouth* can also stand metonymically for a part of the mouth, namely the lips. Examples (9) and (10) illustrate this usage.

- (9) a. E: *People say that I have a distinctive, outlined mouth.*
 b. S: *Dicen que tengo la boca muy dibujada.*
 c. D: *Man siger jeg har en skarpt aftegnet mund.*
 (10) a. E: *He pressed his warm lips to her cold mouth.*
 b. S: *Sus labios calientes besaron su boca fría.*
 c. D: *Han pressede sine varme læber mod hendes kolde mund.*

Another example of metonymic use is the well-known procedure used to aid drowning victims called *mouth-to-mouth resuscitation* in English, which is called *respiración boca a boca* in Spanish, and *mund til mund-metoden* in Danish. It is interesting to observe that this procedure, which entails contact of lips, is frequently exploited in comedy movies where the mouth-to-mouth method bears strong connotations to the act of kissing.

Examples (6) and (7) showed that *big mouth* could refer metaphorically either to the size of the mouth cavity or to a boastful or talkative person. However, in exactly the same construction *mouth* can also refer metonymically to lips:

- (11) a. E: *Stella had green eyes and a big and smiling mouth.*
 b. S: *Stella tenía unos ojos verdes y una boca grande y sonriente.*
 c. D: *Stella havde grønne øjne og en stor og smilende mund.*

18. It should not be surprising that the two interpretations are so closely connected if we bear in mind the metonymic chain: speech organ > speaking > speech > language that was presented by Radden (2004) and which is also discussed in this volume by Yu.

Although, strictly speaking, the meaning of ‘big’ in Example (11) should be interpreted as ‘broad’, we can conclude that the construction, *big mouth*, appears to have at least two different meanings in the literal sense (i.e. ‘cavity’, as in (6), and ‘lips’, as in (11)) and at least one in a figurative sense (i.e. ‘boastful/talkative person’, as in (7)).

It should be emphasized that although the metonymic part-for-part relation appears to be very productive, the metonymization process persists only as long as contiguity exists between the two domains and as long as the addressee is able to infer which specific part of the body is highlighted.¹⁹ Naturally, this presupposes knowledge of the constitution of the body part in question. For instance, knowledge about the constitutive parts of the mouth is what makes it possible to infer that the word *mouth* in *Diana has a distinctive, outlined mouth* actually refers to Diana’s lips.

With respect to another constitutive part of the mouth, the teeth, it is only in Spanish that *boca* can stand metonymically for ‘teeth’, at least in non-technical contexts:

- (12) S: *Tengo que ir a arreglarle la boca.*
 ‘I’ll have to go to the dentist’ [lit. ‘I must have the mouth fixed’]²⁰

However, in specific technical contexts, the same metonymy is employed in all three languages:

- (13) a. E: *Using mouth guards during sports or athletic activity can help prevent dental damage.*²¹
 b. S: *Usar un protector de la boca durante las actividades deportivas y atléticas puede prevenir la fractura de los dientes.*
 c. D: *At benytte mundbeskytter mens man udøver sport eller atletik kan forhindre tandskader.*

Once again, knowledge about the constitutive parts of the mouth (and, hence, about the world) ensures that the word *mouth guard* and its equivalents in Spanish and Danish is interpreted correctly and not as a guard to protect the entire mouth.

In summary, the metonymies discussed in this section are MOUTH FOR CAVITY, MOUTH FOR LIPS, and, for Spanish only (and in a technical sense for all three

19. This also seems to be an intrinsic feature for other body parts. For instance, with respect to *eye*, expressions like *he has blue eyes* and *he has a black eye* also refer metonymically to different, but related areas, i.e. iris and eye socket. Observe, however, the different syntactic structures due to the number marking. For a deeper analysis of ‘color’ + *eye*, see Nissen (2006).

20. A similar, peculiar WHOLE FOR PART metonymy in Spanish is: *Me tengo que lavar la cabeza* ‘I have to wash my hair’ [lit. ‘I have to wash the head’].

21. I owe this example to an anonymous reviewer of the chapter.

languages), MOUTH FOR TEETH. No instance was found where ‘mouth’ stands for ‘tongue’ nor ‘throat’; see, however, Section 5.1. for the metonymy MOUTH FOR PALATE in Spanish.

4. The operative perspective

As mentioned in the introduction, the operative perspective focuses on the functionality and the position of the body part; in other words, in this case, where the mouth is located, the way the mouth is able to move, and the way these operations are typical for the mouth and thereby differ from other body parts. For example, both the mouth and the eyes can open and close (voluntarily or as a result of a reflex). This is not the case, however, with e.g. the nose or the ears.

With regard to position, the location of the mouth is apparently exploited linguistically only in Spanish by means of *boca arriba* (‘mouth upwards’) and *boca abajo* (‘mouth downwards’). Curiously, as the mouth is located on the face (i.e. toward the top of the body), the expectation is that the orientation would be based on a vertical scale (e.g. the English expression *from top to toe*), but, instead, the position is defined in Spanish according to a horizontal axis with respect to the body. Consequently, in the following example, the position of the mouth relates to the position of the person when lying down:

- (14) S: *Coloca al cliente boca abajo sobre la mesa de masaje.*
 ‘Place the client face downward on the massage table’ [lit. ‘Place the client mouth down on the massage table’]²²

In this case, English speakers may use another part of the head, namely *the face*, as in *he lay face down/face up*, whereas Danish speakers can only use those parts of the body that usually are in touch with the surface on which the person is lying, namely *ryg* ‘back’ and *mave* ‘stomach’. It goes without saying that *back* and *stomach* also are used in English in order to describe a person’s position when lying down.

4.1 The mouth as a *container*

Common experience tells us that a cavity appears when the mouth, which is the entryway for (primarily) food, opens. Nevertheless, many other objects from daily life, e.g. a cigarette, a baby’s pacifier, a thumb, can be put into the mouth as well. If

22. Also in contexts where the human body is not involved, this expression is used in Spanish: *poner las cartas boca arriba* means ‘to lay one’s cards on the table’ (lit. ‘to lay the cards mouth upwards’).

we do not breathe in through our noses, the air enters through our mouths. Furthermore, everyone has probably also experienced the reverse process, i.e. food or other objects exiting the mouth (by spitting them out or by vomiting) and that air can be exhaled through our mouths (or nose). On a frosty winter day, you can even *see* the air physically leaving your mouth as a kind of mist. Also in other cases, e.g. smoking a cigarette, the same process may be observed: smoke is inhaled (i.e., it enters the mouth) and subsequently exhaled again (by leaving the mouth). Hence, the recognition that entities *enter* and *exit* the mouth is a natural daily life experience. The fact that the mouth literally serves as a container (albeit only temporarily) has generated numerous non-literal expressions, e.g., *His girlfriend's name is often in his mouth*, in which this experience is exploited.

Before presenting examples, I want to note that all three languages under consideration seem to put special emphasis on the ability 'to fill' the container. First and foremost, the expression *Don't talk with your mouth full* is well established – for obvious reasons – not just in English, but also in Spanish, and Danish in a literal sense. Interestingly, this 'filling up' of the container has been lexicalized in similar ways in each of the three languages:

- (15) a. E: *Man, that's quite a mouthful.*
 b. S: *¡Hombre! ¡Qué bocado es este!* (*bocado* is an augmentative of *boca*).
 c. D: *Jösses, det er en stor mundfuld.*

Note, however, that each of the examples in (15) may be understood in both a literal and in a non-literal way. In the examples, 'mouthful' may refer to either a huge portion of food that barely fits into the mouth, or it can be interpreted metaphorically to mean a complicated word, phrase, or name that is difficult to say, just as a large mouthful of food is difficult to chew. At any rate, the lexicalization in each of the three languages has generated a kind of unit for measuring quantities, e.g., in *Eat another three mouthfuls and you'll have finished*, and *mouthful* in this literal sense may also be used to refer to the act of feeding someone, as in *Give her another mouthful, she's probably hungry*. Similar expressions exist in Spanish and Danish. However, only English has a non-literal meaning based on the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH (this is pursued further in Section 5.2):

- (16) E: *They were quarrelling that evening and she gave him a real mouthful.*²³

In Example (16), *a real mouthful* refers to an abusive response that metaphorically fills up the container, i.e. the mouth. Observe that just like the non-literal sense of (15) in which the words are treated as physical objects in need of space filling up

23. Also compare the following expression within the same semantic domain: *to give someone a tongue lashing*.

the mouth, also in (16) words are conceptualized in this way. Here the objects are filled tightly into someone else's container.

When people are really hungry or gluttonous, they may stuff their mouths with too much food, quite often more than they can even eat. This experience has given rise to the following Danish metaphor that refers to a person who promises more than he can keep. Also in this case, what has been said (i.e., the words are conceptualized as physical objects) implicates space:

- (17) D: *Han havde taget munden for fuld og kunne ikke nå deadline.*
 'He had bitten off more than he could chew' [lit. 'He had taken the mouth too full] and could not meet the deadline'

Spanish and English do not have instances of this use, although English has a corresponding expression that relates to the same semantic domain of eating (see the translation of (17) *bite off* and *chew*).

Due to the metonymic relationship between *mouth* and words, it is not difficult to find expressions that exploit the idea of the mouth being a container.

- (18) a. E: *It's in this context where Bush puts these words in Blair's mouth.*
 b. S: *Es en este contexto donde Bush pone en boca de Blair estas palabras.*
 c. D: *Det er i denne kontekst at Bush lægger Blair disse ord i munden.*

Also in this case, words are treated as objects and another person's mouth is treated as a container. Naturally, the container image schema implies that the reverse can also apply, which is indeed the case:

- (19) a. E: *He took the words out of my mouth.*
 b. S: *Le quitó las palabras de la boca.*
 c. D: *Han tog ordet ud af munden på mig.*

However, the examples in (19a–c) always involve at least two people. Contrary to daily experiences regarding, e.g. food, the metaphorical use precludes putting words into, or taking them out of, one's own mouth (**I took the words out of my mouth*). On the other hand, plenty of expressions exist where words exit the mouth without any apparent voluntary human action:

- (20) a. E: *Marvellous phrases flew out of his mouth and enthralled the audience.*
 b. S: *Frases maravillosas salieron de su boca y fascinaron al público.*
 [lit. '... left his mouth']
 c. D: *Forunderlige ord fløj ud af munden på ham og fortryllede publikum.*

Obviously, in this example, the metaphor THE MOUTH IS A CONTAINER combines with the conceptualization of phrases (i.e. words) that project their way to the audience.

The temporariness of the mouth as a container is underpinned by expressions where speech moves from one mouth to the other. Usage in each of the three languages is parallel:

- (21) a. E: *In this village the story flew from mouth to mouth.*²⁴
 b. S: *En el pueblo esta historia circuló de boca en boca.*
 c. D: *I denne landsby gik historien fra mund til mund.*

Apart from illustrating the metaphor THE MOUTH IS A CONTAINER, the construction *mouth to mouth* may be read differently from the operative perspective being examined here compared to the one looked at in Section 2.1 dealing with the partitional perspective. From the latter perspective, *mouth to mouth* refers mainly to the lips, whereas in (21), *mouth to mouth* – due to the CONTAINER image schema – primarily refers to the cavity of the mouth where the words are kept.²⁵

4.2 The mouth as an independent person

A characteristic feature of the mouth is its ability to perform movements at a fairly high speed, either when people hungrily chew food or when people are talking busily. This appears to be especially true for certain visible parts of the mouth. For instance, the jaws and the tongue operate very quickly when people are engaged in talking. For this reason, it is not surprising that these experiences motivate the conceptualization of the mouth as a person busily producing a massive amount of words but detached from its ‘owner’:

- (22) a. E: *The trouble is her mouth runs away with her and she doesn't know when to shut up.*²⁶
 b. S: *El problema es que se le va la boca y no sabe cuándo parar.*
 c. D: *Problemet er at munden løber af med hende, og hun ved ikke, hvornår hun skal stoppe.*²⁷ [lit. ‘The problem is that the mouth runs off with her...’]

24. Another example that emphasizes the passing of linguistic ‘objects’ is: *Short authorless stories were handed/passed on from mouth to mouth.*

25. Although it is true, as one reviewer pointed out, that the lips, too, are involved in the act of speaking, in the cases mentioned I regard the cavity as the focal point. Compare: *At hearing this, a low chuckle escaped his mouth.* In this example the ‘chuckle’ is inside a container (i.e. the cavity) as the lips seal off the entrance and, in parting, the laugh escapes.

26. Cf. also *Her tongue runs away with her.*

27. Another example is: *Munden står ikke stille på ham* (‘His tongue never rests’ [lit. ‘The mouth does not stand still on him’]). Note that in the English translation a term from the same domain as *mouth* is employed, namely *tongue*.

In each of the three languages, *mouth* is thus conceptualized as being out of control and with a will of its own, i.e. as nearly independent of its owner. The examples below illustrate this point:

- (23) a. E: ...*but unfortunately my mouth sometimes works harder than my brain.*
b. S: ...*pero afortunadamente a veces mi boca trabaja más rápido que mi cerebro.*
c. D: ...*men desværre arbejder munden nogle gange hurtigere end hjernen.*

The above expressions focus on the independent, but active, role the mouth plays, and, interestingly, in Danish there is a lexicalized expression that indicates the opposite meaning, i.e. it focuses upon the immobility of the mouth. The word *mundlam* literally means ‘mouth-paralyzed’ and can be used, e.g., to ask why somebody does not reply to a question:

- (24) D: *Svar mig eller er du blevet mundlam?*
‘Answer me or have you lost your tongue?’ [lit. ‘Have you become mouth-paralyzed?’]

No such lexical item for this meaning exists in English or Spanish, but note that these two languages employ other words that are metonymically related to *mouth* in order to pinpoint the same meaning, i.e. a deficiency with respect to producing speech. In English, the word *tongue* is used, as in *Have you lost your tongue?*,²⁸ and in Spanish, *labios* ‘lips’ as in *Él no tiene mucha labia* [lit. ‘He does not have much lip’] is used. Having discussed various instances of *mouth*-constructions from the operational perspective, I turn now to focus on *mouth* from the telic perspective, i.e. to take up the functions that *mouth* fulfils.

5. The telic perspective

As may be deduced from many of the previous examples, especially from the latter section, the principal telic roles of the mouth (i.e., what is the mouth good for?) are connected to the faculties of eating and speaking.

5.1 Faculty of eating

As mentioned previously, at least for human beings, the concept of eating cannot be separated from the mouth. Everybody has learnt from childhood on that food

28. Cf. note 23.

has to be put into the mouth (chewed and afterwards swallowed) in order to satisfy basic nutritional needs. Numerous examples in all three languages testify to the existence of the conceptual metaphor dealt with in Section 4.1, namely THE MOUTH IS A CONTAINER. The primary function of the mouth as a tool for the in-take of food gives rise to some metonymic uses in Spanish, where *boca* stands for ‘taste’, that do not occur in Danish and English:

- (25) S: *Yo sé que tú eres de buena boca, pues te voy a preparar una buena ensaladita.*
 ‘I know that you have a fine palate [lit. ‘you are of good mouth’] so
 I will make a nice little salad for you’

Once again, note that when the word for ‘mouth’ is used in one language, the others employ expressions that are metonymically related to it. In both English and Danish, a part of the mouth is used, namely, *palate* and *gane*, respectively (cf. my translation of *boca* in Example (25)). Incidentally, Spanish, apart from *boca*, also uses *paladar* ‘palate’ in this sense.

In addition, in the next example, Spanish links ‘mouth’ with taste, or rather the tastes that are to be expected. Interestingly, the equivalent word for English *appetizer* has been lexicalized into the Spanish construction *abrir la boca* ‘to open the mouth’. Naturally, this is also true for examples connected to the eating situation (or frame) as in the following:

- (26) S: *Las olivas que los bares ponen para abrir boca no se pueden cobrar.*
 ‘The olives that are served in the bars as an appetizer [lit. ‘to open mouth’] are for free’

but other examples that are not connected to food are encountered easily as well:

- (27) S: *Para abrir boca, ayer se presentaron libros de autores no tan conocidos.*
 ‘To whet the appetite [lit. ‘to open mouth’], yesterday some books were presented by authors that are not that famous’

The telic perspective deals with the mouth as a tool for satisfying nutritional needs and in many cases the mouth is conceptualized as a container where food is laid, put or shoveled. In Spanish, however, we find this special metonymy MOUTH FOR TASTE/APPETITE, which is a use that does not exist in English or Danish.

5.2 Faculty of speaking

Another telic perspective of the mouth is the faculty of speaking. Hence, many everyday instances exist demonstrating the connection between mouth and word, i.e. speech (see, also, Yu, this volume). The words of a police officer telling a

nine-year-old girl that her mother has been killed illustrate this: *Making the words come to my mouth was the hardest thing I've ever done*. In Danish, the expression *at bruge mund*, which translates literally as 'to use mouth' (meaning 'to shout in an annoyed way'), encapsulates unambiguously the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH. Interestingly, in Danish this connection has been lexicalized into the word *mundret*, which means 'idiomatic'. The literal translation, however, is 'suitable for the mouth' or 'mouth right'.²⁹ In other words, good expressions or good phrasing fit the mouth very well. The following example illustrates this use:

- (28) D: *Romanen er skrevet i et meget enkelt og mundret dansk.*
 'The novel is written in a simple and idiomatically correct
 [lit. 'mouth right'] Danish'

Also the Spanish proverb in Example (29) directly links *mouth* and the act of communication by bringing to mind the human experience that words can be defective:

- (29) S: *Quien tiene boca se equivoca.*
 'To err is human' [lit. 'Who has mouth, errs']

The rationale behind the use of (28) and (29) is, of course, the conceptual metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH. Parallel examples exist in the three languages, and can be easily found:

- (30) a. E: "You nasty little fool," says Biddy, "If you don't watch your mouth I'll hit you in your face!"
 b. S: "¡Eres un asqueroso idiota!" dijo Biddy, "Si no guardas la boca, te parto la cabeza." [lit. 'If you do not beware the mouth I'll split your head in two']
 c. D: "Din lille *møgunge*," sagde Biddy, "*Vår din mund ellers får du en på trynen!*" [lit. 'Beware your mouth or else I'll hit you on your snout']

Naturally, the expression *to watch your mouth* also exists in a literal sense (and is relevant e.g. in boxing). It goes without saying that this is not the case in Example (30), as 'mouth' here, again, stands metonymically for speech as in similar English expressions such as *Mind your mouth* and the following two from the Book of Proverbs: *Those who guard their mouths and their tongues keep themselves from calamity* and *Keep your mouth free of perversity*. The entire expression turns out to be a metaphor that can be formulated as (MENTAL) ATTENTION TOWARDS SPEECH IS (PHYSICAL) WATCHING/GUARDING THE MOUTH (i.e., 'to be careful with/mind your mouth

29. In this case, 'right' does not mean 'correct', but 'appropriate' or 'adequate'.

means to be careful with your words'). Thus, *watch your mouth* can be classified as a metonymy within a metaphor. The same classification holds, also, for Example (31):

- (31) a. E: *Watch out for Chris. He has a dirty mouth.*
 b. S: *Cuidado con Chris. Tiene mala boca.*
 c. D: *Pas på Chris. Han har en beskidt mund.*

In these examples, speech and mouth are linked metonymically, but the adjective is to be understood in a metaphorical sense, because words as such cannot be dirty. Thus, the negative communicative content of what has been said, i.e. his speech, is compared with dirt so his mouth becomes 'dirty' (see, also, Yu, this volume).

5.2.1 *The mouth as an aperture: Openness for speech, closeness for silence*

The introduction to Section 4 presented one distinctive feature that is typical of the mouth (and of the eye), namely that they can open and closed. In connection with the conceptual metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, this feature entails that the opening or closing of the aperture on a figurative level transforms into speaking or not speaking. Examples (32) and (33) show that opening the mouth corresponds to beginning to talk:

- (32) a. E: *Why the devil can't you open your mouth? Tell me the truth!*
 b. S: *¡Demonios! ¿Por qué no abres la boca? ¡Dime la verdad!*
 c. D: *Hvorfor fanden kan du ikke åbne munden? Fortæl mig sandheden!*
 (33) a. E: *Harry wanted to give his son some advice, but he died without opening his mouth.*
 b. S: *Harry quería darle a su hijo un consejo, pero murió sin abrir la boca.*
 c. D: *Harry ville give sin søn et råd, men han døde uden at åbne munden.*

Both (32) and (33) show that opening the mouth initiates the flow of words. The opposite meaning (i.e. not speaking), which involves closing the mouth, is also reflected in all three languages:

- (34) a. E: *The journalist commented: "A minister shuts up his mouth or resigns."*
 b. S: *El periodista comentó: "Un ministro cierra la boca o dimite."*
 c. D: *Journalisten kommenterede: "En minister holder mund eller går af."*
 [lit. 'keeps his mouth', i.e., 'keeps his mouth shut']

Clearly, closing the mouth cuts off additional words. In Danish, this circumstance has given rise to the following metaphor:

- (35) D: *Han tog bladet fra munden og fortalte det hele.*
 'He spoke his mind and told everything' [lit. 'He took the leaf from his mouth...']

Also in this case, closing the mouth is central, but the blocking of the aperture is achieved differently from just closing the mouth, i.e. by means of a leaf. At any rate, the free flow of words is hindered. There is no equivalent expression containing *mouth* in English or Spanish.³⁰

Section 2 on the partitional perspective presented a number of PART FOR WHOLE metonymies where *mouth* stands for the entire human being. This type of metonymy also occurs within the telic perspective in the sense of SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH. However, only examples from Spanish could be found:

- (36) S: *Es una boca que no tendrá piedad con sus enemigos.*
 ‘This man doesn’t have any mercy for his enemies’ [lit. ‘It’s a mouth that has no...’]

If we disregard the possibility of cannibalism, *boca* in (36) obviously refers to the faculty of speech, and *mouth* is, therefore, linked to producing utterances, in this case, the merciless words that come out of the mouth of the speaker.

5.2.2 Openness of mouth for surprise (foolishness)

In most Western societies, an open mouth from which no words are emitted is associated with surprise or astonishment. The metonymic usage in all three languages is parallel in this respect:

- (37) a. E: *On hearing this, she stopped and stared with her mouth wide open.*
 b. S: *Al oír esto, se quedó con la boca abierta mirando.*
 c. D: *Da hun hørte dette blev hun stående og stirrede med åben mund.*

The metonymy OPENNESS OF MOUTH FOR SURPRISE reflects the well-known fact that when people are very surprised or astonished, often a facial expression is produced in reaction to the prior event and the feelings may cause their mouth to open. In Danish, this reaction has produced a hyperbolic expression that exaggerates the opening of the mouth:

- (38) D: *Da han pludselig så sin eks-kæreste, tabte han både næse og mund.*
 ‘When he suddenly saw his former girlfriend, he became totally dumb-founded’ [lit. ‘... he lost both nose and mouth’]

Furthermore, as the purpose of the mouth – apart from eating – is to pronounce words, the lack of or inability to produce them is reminiscent of people who do not

30. However, a similar expression exists in Spanish in which a different part of the mouth, *the tongue*, is used: *El periodista no se muerde la lengua* (‘The journalist will not bite back his words’ [lit. ‘... does not bite the tongue’]). Compare also the English expression *I had to bite my tongue* meaning that ‘I had to force myself not to say anything even though I wanted to’.

know how to express themselves. More often than not, the expression *to stand with his/her mouth wide open* has been interpreted to mean foolishness, and also a sentence like *I did not want to ask seemingly stupid questions, so I kept my mouth shut*, relates the openness/closure of the mouth to fruitful mental activity. Bear in mind that it was only decades ago that people who were mute were notoriously considered mentally retarded. Thus, the metonymy OPENNESS OF MOUTH FOR FOOLISHNESS should be understood in light of these circumstances.

5.2.3 Mouth for character/personality

The central point of the previous sections was to present convincing evidence to conceptually connect the organ of speech, i.e. the *mouth*, with speech itself. As a result of this close link between the domains, *mouth* can also be related to the content of the speech, especially with respect to words that convey feelings. Thus, sentences like *Cruel words left his mouth* are not infrequent in the three languages under scrutiny. In (39), the cruel words that characterize the speech of the person in question has metonymically been assigned to the mouth itself:

- (39) a. E: *He had piercing blue eyes and a cruel mouth.*
 b. S: *Tenía los ojos azules y penetrantes y una boca cruel.*
 c. D: *Han havde gennemborende blå øjne og en ond mund.*

Not only with respect to (39), but also with respect to the following two, one could also claim that the mouth stands for the person's personality if we regard the cruel, the cheerful, and the sensual mouth, as the person's character, expressed by the facial expressions represented by 'mouth'. Again, this metonymic use is parallel in the three languages:

- (40) a. E: *The last thing he saw was the boy's cheerful and smiling mouth.*
 b. S: *Lo último que vio fue la boca feliz y sonriente del niño.*
 c. D: *Det sidste han så var drengens glade og smilende mund.*
 (41) a. E: *There was a sad trait to his broad, sensual mouth.*
 b. S: *Había un rasgo triste en su ancha y sensual boca.*
 c. D: *Der var et bedrøvet træk over hans brede, sensuelle mund.*³¹

A comparison with other body parts reveals that these emotive metonyms are not unique for 'mouth' (nor, for that matter, for the parts of the mouth, as in *He has an evil tongue*). With respect to *eye*, it is easy to document the same use, as sentences like *My stepmother had evil eyes* or *He has friendly eyes* occur frequently, also in

31. In agreement with what was observed in Section 3, which dealt with the partitional perspective, it is the lips rather than the mouth as such that are responsible for the sensation of the feelings described in (39)–(41).

Spanish and Danish. Of course, these constructions, too, portray the emotional character or personality of the person in question by making reference to an evil or friendly facial expression, but in this case, the emotions are attributed to the eyes (cf. Nissen 2006). Bear in mind, however, that the majority of body parts are not used for transmitting a person's personality in any of the three languages being studied, e.g., **he had a kind nose* and **he had an evil ear*.³²

6. Conclusion

The results of this analysis demonstrate that the wealth of examples of *mouth*, *boca*, and *mund* clearly supports the point of view that metonymy and metaphor are powerful tools for generating figurative expressions and that these expressions, although not entirely predictable, are motivated by bodily experiences.

From a cross-linguistic perspective the semantic domain of 'mouth' can generally be described and delimited in much the same manner, especially if metonymic alternatives are concurrently taken into consideration. For example, in cases where 'mouth' is used in Danish and not in English, a more specific term is frequently available in English via a PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, e.g. *lips* or *tongue*; an observation which is in agreement with what Yu (2000) found regarding the use of 'hand' vs. 'palm', or 'finger' in English and Chinese.

Classifying the data into three main categories or perspectives – the partitional, the operative, and the telic – proved a suitable enterprise in order to distinguish similar metonymic processes that the perspective in question was able to resolve. Especially the constructions that e.g. consist of a modifying unit and *mouth* (*cold mouth*, '*mouth-paralyzed*' and *cruel mouth*) had decisive meaning differences according to which perspective was taken, although the metonymization processes were similar. Thus, we saw that e.g. for English *cold mouth* from the partitional perspective focuses upon some of the constitutive parts of the mouth. Therefore, in this case, 'lips' is an obvious interpretation. On the other hand, from the operative perspective e.g. the Danish word *mundlam* (lit. 'mouth-paralyzed') is easily interpreted as the impediment of the mouth working properly due to the fact that this perspective focuses upon how the mouth operates. Finally, seen from the telic perspective (in which two main purposes were discussed: the faculty of eating and the faculty of talking), an expression like *cruel mouth* must be interpreted

32. Compare, however, this example found in the BNC: *She had an obstinate chin, a cruel mouth and small arrogant eyes*. Therefore, it awaits further investigation as to which body part can be modified by adjectives that refer to a person's character. Kövecses (2000) and Sharifian et al. (2008) present many interesting observations, also about internal body parts.

accordingly and it is obvious in this case, that *cruel mouth* alludes to the (cruel) words that leave a person's mouth by way of which a relation is established between the words as such and the character of the person pronouncing the words. No doubt further study would uncover other aspects of the relationship between the conceptual and the compositional level.³³

It should be stressed that these processes occur constantly. For instance, while preparing a preliminary oral version of this chapter for the International Cognitive Linguistics Conference in Krakow in 2007, I came across the following example on the Internet, where a 21-year-old male from New Zealand wrote in a Facebook-like forum:

- (42) E: *I am very open and will say what comes to my mouth (I think that should be mind, but hey) ...I am very random most of the time.*³⁴

I assume that most speakers of English would reject this use and stick to the usual idiomatic expression supplied in the parentheses by the speaker in the example (i.e., *I will say what comes to my mind*), but the writer's comment demonstrates how a new expression could be on its way to being "born", so to speak, namely by establishing just that metonymic link between 'speech' and 'mouth' that already exists in a multitude of other constructions, as shown in abundance in the previous sections.³⁵

A challenge for future research is to combine these observations with cultural aspects. In fact, it could be interesting to compare the languages under scrutiny with others, especially non-Indo-European languages. It is striking that in a certain dialect of Chinese (see Yang 2007: 109–110) the expression *da zuiba*, which is translated into 'big mouth' does *not*, as in the languages treated here, mean a boastful person, but someone who talks loudly, aggressively or thoughtlessly. Likewise, *zuijian*, which translates literally as 'mouth cheap', means that somebody talks too much and out of context.³⁶ Evidently, although metaphorization and metonymization are frequently based on bodily experiences and are highly productive, the processes are influenced simultaneously by the specific cultures that the body is a part of.

33. See also Schrotten (2000).

34. <http://www.okcupid.com/profile?u=Crazmonkey> (accessed various times between summer 2007 and autumn 2008, and, again, winter 2010).

35. I doubt the writer of this sentence knows Spanish, but it is interesting that *mouth* is the standard word in the equivalent Spanish expression: *decir lo primero que a alguien le viene a la boca* [lit. 'to say the first thing that comes to the mouth for somebody'].

36. See also Yu's enlightening contribution in this volume, which examines Chinese metonymies and metaphors of speech organs in general.

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HEAD and EYE in German and Indonesian figurative uses*

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In this chapter I investigate the importance of the human body in shaping conceptualization and categorization, relying on a corpus constructed from German and Indonesian newspapers. The figurative extensions of two source concepts, HEAD and EYE, are compared across the two genetically unrelated languages. My data provide evidence that a given source concept often targets the same conceptual domain in both languages (e.g. (human) LEADER or CHARACTER TRAITS); yet they also reveal interesting language-specific distinctions. A quantitative analysis of the corpus data shows that the metaphoric and metonymic extensions of HEAD and EYE differ strikingly in frequency of occurrence in the two languages. The findings indicate that German speakers have a preference for targeting the function of *Kopf* ‘head’ and *Auge* ‘eye’, while Indonesian speakers preferentially target the position of *kepala* ‘head’ and the appearance or shape of *mata* ‘eye’.

Keywords: bodily experience, cultural model, frequency, world view

1. Introduction

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) reanalyze the philosophical classical Greek tradition (Plato and Aristotle among others), Descartes, Kant, and modern analytic philosophy, putting forward the groundbreaking claim that reason is “fundamentally embodied” (1999: 17), meaning that the “body and brain shape reason” (16) and “reason uses and grows out of bodily capacities”, such as perception and bodily

* This contribution is based on a chapter of my dissertation, a contrastive study of metaphorical concepts in German and Indonesian (Siahaan 2008). I presented an earlier version of this chapter at the International Cognitive Linguistics Conference as part of the theme session *Embodiment via Body Parts: Studies on Various Languages and Cultures* on 20 July 2007 in Krakow, Poland. I thank Zouheir A. Maalej, the co-editor, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. All remaining flaws are my own responsibility.

movement (17). This rather radical, or even revolutionary view from cognitive science, often referred to as *the embodiment hypothesis* or *the embodied mind*, offers a kind of paradigm change in the Western philosophical tradition, according to which “reason is seen as independent of perception and bodily movement” (17). Rejecting the long-standing Western philosophical view, according to which reason is an autonomous capacity, the embodied mind emphasizes the crucial role of our body in shaping our understanding about the world around us. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) postulate that human concepts are essentially shaped by our bodies and brains, especially by our sensorimotor system, underlining the significant role of the features of our bodies and the functioning of our bodies in everyday life. They point out that “the peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization” (19).

Nevertheless, there are other cross-linguistic and cultural studies that question the role of embodiment in our conceptualization and categorization. One such study is Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995), who have convincingly argued that it is more the historical and cultural background that provides the basis for the emotional concept of anger in English, rather than the physiological effects of anger, as suggested by Kövecses (1989). Furthermore, Sharifian, Dirven, Yu, and Niemeier (2008) provide evidence of the importance of cultural models in conceptualizations of the mind, understood culture-specifically in terms of different internal body parts. *Mind* should here be regarded as having a broader meaning than what it denotes in present-day English (Wierzbicka 1992). This literature shows that historical and/or cultural contexts are relevant to the study of emotional or mental activities and complement the embodiment thesis.

The current chapter investigates the weight of the role of embodiment in shaping conceptualization and categorization. Focusing on the conceptualization of two body parts, the head and the eye, I undertake a contrastive study to reveal which aspect(s) of embodiment play(s) a significant role in conceptualizing the hand and the eye in the languages compared. For two unrelated languages, German and Indonesian, I demonstrate that the conceptualization and categorization of the same body parts is significantly different from one language to the other. This contrast may result from different world views entrenched as cultural models in the two languages. I also argue that a quantitative analysis is indispensable in order to gain deeper insights into the importance of the metaphors. I show how this method allows the detection of figurative patterns, leading to a less subjective analysis. In short, I suggest that studies of the conceptualization of experience via body parts should not only identify the figurative mappings from body part sources to their respective target meanings but also their frequency of occurrence in order to determine the central figurative meanings in a given language (Deignan 1999, 2006; Stefanowitsch 2004, 2006; Geeraerts & Gevaert 2008).

2. German expressions with *Kopf* ('head')

In this study, data were gathered from electronic newspapers using the search words *Kopf* 'head' for German and *kepala* 'head' for Indonesian.¹ The method is, first, to make a concordance of each search word (source domain) and, then, to identify the target domain of each body part in its respective context. Unless otherwise stated, all the examples presented in this chapter are taken from the newspapers mentioned. In the following sections, I demonstrate the various figurative uses of the source concept KOPF found in the German corpus.

2.1 *Kopf* as a metonym for LEADER

In Examples (1)–(3), the lexical item *Kopf* is the source domain for the target sense LEADER, based on the metonymy HEAD FOR PERSON (and the metaphor LEADER IS TOP).

- (1) *Kopf der Rockgruppe The Doors*
head of.the rock band
'head of the rock band The Doors'
- (2) *der Kopf des Terrornetzwerkes El Kaida*
the head of.the terror network
'the head of the terror network Al Qaeda'
- (3) *Kopf der Kidnapper-Bande*
head of.the kidnapper gang
'head of the gang of kidnappers'

1. Sources for German examples: *Die Welt* (www.welt.de), *Die Zeit* (www.zeit.de), *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (www.faz.net), *Frankfurter Rundschau* online (www.fr-aktuell.de), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (www.sueddeutsche.de), *Spiegel Online* (www.spiegel.de), *Berliner Morgenpost* (<http://morgenpost.berlin1.de>), *Hamburger Abendblatt* (www.abendblatt.de), *Der Tagesspiegel* online (www.tagesspiegel.de), *Ostsee-Zeitung* (www.ostsee-zeitung.de).

Sources for Indonesian examples: *Kompas Cyber Media* (www.kompas.com), *Berita Sore* (www.beritasore.com), *Indomedia* (www.indomedia.com), *Suara Pembaruan* (www.suarapembaruan.com), *Media Indonesia* online (www.mediaindo.co.id), *Pikiran Rakyat Cyber Media* (www.pikiranrakyat.com), *Harian Analisa* online (www.analisadaily.com), *Riau Pos* (www.riau-pos.com), *Waspada* online (www.waspada.co.id), *Sinar Indonesia Baru* online (www.hariansib.com). Sources for English examples: *Daily Mirror* (www.mirror.co.uk), *Daily Mail* (www.dailymail.co.uk), *The Times* (www.timesonline.co.uk), *The Independent* (www.independent.co.uk), *The Guardian* (www.guardian.co.uk), *Morning Star* (www.morningstaronline.co.uk), *Daily Telegraph* (www.telegraph.co.uk), *Financial Times* (<http://news.ft.com/home/uk>), BBC (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>), *The Observer* (<http://observer.guardian.co.uk>).

2.2 *Kopf* conceptualized as LOCUS OF THOUGHT

In this section, I present data in which *Kopf* is understood as LOCUS OF THOUGHT, i.e., a place where thoughts, memories, etc., are stored, and where the activity of thinking takes place.

THE HEAD IS A BODY PART THAT THINKS

- (4) ...schreibt alles auf, was sein Kopf so
 writes everything up what his head ever
denkt oder zu denken versucht.
 thinks or to think tries
 ‘...writes everything down, whatever he is thinking or trying to think
 [lit. ‘what his head thinks or tries to think’]

Example (4) can be analyzed in two ways: (i) on the one hand, the head is metaphorically personified as an independent agent, (ii) on the other hand, it can be seen as manifesting a PART (‘head’) FOR WHOLE (‘person’) metonymy, in which the head stands for the person doing the thinking.²

As in (4), in (5) the concept HEAD AS LOCUS OF THOUGHT is evoked:

THE HEAD IS A USEFUL INSTRUMENT

- (5) Nur müssen Sie auch mal den Kopf benutzen
 Only must you also sometimes the head use
 ‘You should also use your head sometimes’

However, in (5), *Kopf* is not understood merely as an independent entity capable of thinking but also as a useful instrument available to its owner for the activity of thinking.

In (6) and (7), *Kopf* is linked to another concept perceptible to humans: TEMPERATURE, which is understood as VARIABLE.

VARIABILITY OF THE HEAD’S TEMPERATURE

- (6) kühlen Kopf zu bewahren
 cool.ACC head.ACC to keep
 ‘to keep a cool head’

2. I have found a similar concept, LIVING SOUL, in Indonesian, which is “endowed with the ability to think and has its own memory, will, and desires” (Fischer 1965: 247, in Siahaan 2008). Yet, unlike the concept HEAD manifested linguistically as the body part that thinks in (4), in Indonesian, the the living soul is not located in the head, but in the liver (Siahaan 2008).

- (7) *Hitzkopf*
 heat.head
 'hothead'

Interestingly, Deignan (1999) has aptly remarked that 'cold' has connotations of intellectual control, also implying lack of feelings, whereas 'hot' connotes strong, possibly uncontrolled feelings and an absence of rationality. One could argue that embodiment fully accounts for this conceptualization: that is, *kühlen Kopf* (6) and *Hitzkopf* (7) are motivated by humans' experience of varying body temperature. Thus, *kühlen Kopf* would result from people's perception that the head feels cool when calmly thinking, whereas *Hitzkopf* is based on the perception that the head feels hot when its owner is strongly emotional or out of control.³

Another extension of the meaning of *Kopf* as LOCUS OF THOUGHT is motivated by the CONTAINER image schema. Examples (8)–(12) illustrate this sense.

THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER

- (8) *eine glasklare Idee im Kopf haben*
 a crystal.clear idea in.the head have.INF
 'to have a crystal-clear idea in the head'
- (9) *Man muss nur ein Ziel im Kopf haben.*
 one must only one goal in.the head have.INF
 'One has to have only one goal in one's head'
- (10) *Ihm geht der Unfall nicht aus dem Kopf.*
 him.DAT goes the.NOM accident not out the.DAT head
 'He can't get the accident out of his head'
- (11) *...und ich habe erzählt, was mir gerade in den Kopf kam*
 and I have told what me.DAT just in the.ACC head came
 'I was talking about whatever just came into my head'
- (12) *Fragen über Fragen schossen mir durch den Kopf.*
 questions over questions shot me.DAT through the.ACC head
 'Questions upon questions shot through my head'

Examples (8) and (9) illustrate the sense where *Kopf* is understood as a container in which ideas and goals, as metaphorical objects, are located. Examples (10)–(12) are metaphorical extensions of the containment schema, which manifest the IN-OUT

3. Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) challenge this account. They argue that the conceptualization is not fundamentally based on our bodily perceptions of temperature, but rather derives from "the medieval physiological-psychological theory of the four humors and the four temperaments, which has left its traces on our emotional vocabulary". They also discuss additional body parts, e.g. blood or heart, linked with HOT and COLD.

orientation (Johnson 1987: 18) of human bodily experience. Johnson argues that our encounter with containment and its boundedness is one of the most pervasive features of bodily experience (21). Bodies are three-dimensional containers into which food, water, and air move and out of which food and water wastes, air, blood, etc., emerge. Based on the PATH schema, which has an IN-OUT orientation, an event, such as the memory of an accident reported in (10), is seen as an entity resisting removal from its CONTAINER (head). An experience or a story might also be seen as an entity that moves into the head container, as in (11), which is likewise based on the IN-OUT schema. Finally, in (12), questions are understood as entities that move into and out of the container. Johnson (1987) points out that:

[o]ur body can be the trajector, as in “Paul walked out of the tunnel,” or it can be the landmark, as in “She shoveled the potatoes into her mouth.” In other words, the body can take up the role of the “thing contained” or “the container.” But, in either case, we seem to develop our sense of in-out orientation through a host of bodily movements, manipulations, and experiences. Our *in-out* schemata emerge first in our *bodily* experience, in our perception and movement. (33–34; italics in original)

Taking Johnson’s claim as a starting point, one can argue that the conceptualization THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER in German is bodily based. In other words, the German instantiations in (8)–(12) support the embodiment thesis. Yet, when taking a cross-cultural perspective, one could raise the following questions: (i) How frequent is the use of this metaphor in German? (ii) Does this metaphor exist in another language unrelated to German? (iii) How important is the HEAD IS A CONTAINER metaphor in that other language? These questions are addressed in Section 5 of the chapter.

2.3 *Kopf* evoking a HUMAN CHARACTER TRAIT

In this section, I look at linguistic expressions found in the German corpus in which *Kopf* is used to evoke character traits or persons having such character traits, the latter being instantiations of the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy.

- (13) *mit dem Kopf durch die Wand*
with the.DAT head through the.ACC wall
‘bent on getting one’s way regardless’
- (14) *Dickkopf*
thickhead
‘thickhead’
- (15) *Kopf hoch!*
head high
‘Cheer up!’

In German, ‘to run one’s head through the wall’, Example (13), means trying to achieve a goal without considering the possibility of being hurt, connoting the character trait of willfulness or of being headstrong. In (14), *Kopf* is understood as a thick object that is impervious to penetration (as by knowledge). The thick head, *Dickkopf*, stands metonymically for someone who is stubborn or resistant to change/learning. Moreover, *Dickkopf* may also undergo subcategorical conversion to an abstract noun denoting the character trait ‘stubbornness’ as such. The PONS COLLINS dictionary (1991) provides the example: *Sie setzt ihren Dickkopf immer durch* ‘She always gets her way [with her stubbornness]’. Finally, (15) reflects the orientational metaphors HAPPY IS UP/SAD IS DOWN, which are claimed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 15) as being bodily grounded, “[d]rooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state”. Again, we are presented with linguistic evidence of the manifestation of embodiment via metaphors grounded in the body part *Kopf* (HEAD) in German.

In addition to *Kopf*, there is another lexical item in German for HEAD, i.e. the slightly archaic noun *Haupt*. Various conceptualizations of *Haupt* are taken up in Section 3.

3. German expressions with *Haupt* (‘head’)

The word *Haupt* is an older word for HEAD in German. In the subsections immediately following, the various senses of *Haupt* in the German corpus are examined. In the first set of examples *Haupt* appears as the head in the compound construction *Oberhaupt* (lit. ‘upper head’); in the second set *Haupt-* occurs as a pre-nominal modifier with the meaning ‘main’.

3.1 *Oberhaupt* as metonym for LEADER

Consider the following four examples from German newspapers:

- (16) *Das Familienoberhaupt Homer Simpson ist*
 the family.upper.head Homer Simpson is
der beste Beleg dafür dass das größte,
 the best evidence for.that that the biggest
Problem im Kampf für das Proletariat das Proletariat ist
 problem in fight for the proletariat the proletariat is
 ‘The head of the household [lit. ‘family upper head’] Homer Simpson is
 the best evidence that suggests that the biggest problem in fighting for the
 proletariat is the proletariat itself’

- (17) *Menschen wollen das Kirchenoberhaupt erleben.*
 people want.to the church.upper.head experience.INF
 ‘People want to see the head of the church [lit. ‘church upper head’]’
- (18) *Monacos Oberhaupt besuchte Petersburg.*
 Monaco.GEN upper.head visited Petersburg
 ‘Monaco’s head of the state [lit. ‘upper head’] visited Petersburg’
- (19) *Sarkozy ist das neue Staatsoberhaupt Frankreichs.*
 Sarkozy is the new state.upper.head France.GEN
 ‘Sarkozy is France’s new head of state [lit. ‘state upper head’]’

When standing metonymically for PERSON IN LEADING POSITION, the lexical item *Haupt* is typically preceded by the lexeme *Ober* in the compound, *Oberhaupt*. Literally, *Ober* means ‘upper’; *Haupt* means ‘head’. Different from *Kopf*, *Oberhaupt* denotes the highest representative in a (socially approved) hierarchically organized institution. The *Oberhaupt* of an institution is the leader of that institution and is preferred in German to denote such leadership roles as (16) ‘head of household’, (17) ‘head of the church’, (18) ‘head of state’, and (19) ‘president of a country’.⁴

3.2 Expressions with *Haupt*- denoting MAIN/IMPORTANT

In this section are examples from the German corpus in which *Haupt*- ‘main/important’ is used as a prenominal modifier in a compound word.

- (20) *Hauptsache, man kann etwas gegen die Türkei sagen.*
 main.thing one can something against the Turkey say
 ‘The main thing [lit. ‘head thing’] is that you can say something against Turkey’
- (21) *Vom Hauptbahnhof gehen die EC-Züge nach Warschau ab.*
 from.the main.railway.station go the EC-trains to Warsaw off
 ‘The EC (Euro City) trains depart from the central station [lit. ‘head railway station] to Warsaw’
- (22) *Bombenanschlag auf ein Hotel in der pakistanischen Hauptstadt Islamabad*
 bomb.blast at a hotel in the Pakistani
 main.city Islamabad
 ‘Bomb blast at a hotel in the Pakistani capital [lit. ‘head city’] Islamabad’

4. The use of *Haupt* in German is similar to that of *kepala* in Indonesian; these similarities are discussed in Section 5.

The use of *Haupt-* in (20)–(22) as a prenominal modifier in a compound is motivated by a cognitive model in which the human head is conceptualized as the main body part, i.e., it is more important than any other body part. Analogously, the *Hauptbahnhof* is a more important railway station than other railway stations. In the same vein, *Hauptsache* is more important than other matters, and *Hauptstadt* is more important than other cities; it is the seat of the government. The previously discussed word *Kopf* does not convey the two senses ‘leader of socially approved institutions’ and ‘main/important’.

4. Indonesian expressions with *kepala* (‘head’)

In the following sub-sections, I discuss various nonliteral uses of Indonesian *kepala* and their respective meanings.

4.1 *Kepala* as a metonym for LEADER

Corresponding to the German *Kopf* Examples (1)–(3), the Indonesian noun *kepala*, literally denoting the body part ‘head’, is used to denote a person holding a position of leadership. However, unlike the German examples discussed in Section 2.1, the Indonesian Examples (23)–(25) refer to conventional leader roles in social and institutional settings.

HEAD FOR LEADER

- (23) *Kepala keluarga*
head family
‘head of the household (the father)’
- (24) *Kepala desa*
head village
‘the leader of the village’
- (25) *Kepala sekolah*
head school
‘the principal’

In Example (23), *kepala keluarga* means ‘the head of the family’ and refers to the stereotypical father.⁵ In (24) and (25), ‘the head of the village’ and ‘the head of the school’ are conventional designations for the leader of the village and the school principal, respectively. In these examples, *kepala* denotes the person holding the

5. For further discussion of social stereotypes see Lakoff (1987: 68–90).

top position in an institutional hierarchy, i.e. is the leader of that institution; everyone else is subordinate to that person. In comparing these Indonesian examples with the German examples with *Kopf* in (1)–(3), a contrast is apparent. Indonesian *kepala* denotes leaders of conventional, mainstream groups (household, village, school), i.e., it rarely refers to a leader of a negatively assessed social group. In contrast, German *Kopf* tends to denote leaders of more marginalized, less acceptable, sometimes negatively evaluated, groups (terrorists, gangs). However, *Kopf* may also positively refer to celebrity leaders (e.g. the head of a rock group).⁶

The older German word for HEAD, *Haupt*, displays meanings that are closer than *Kopf* to those of Indonesian *kepala*. Indonesian ‘head of the household’ (23) can only be translated into German as *Familienoberhaupt* not **Kopf der Familie* (lit. ‘head of the family’); likewise Indonesian ‘leader of the village’ (24) is rendered into German as *Dorfoberhaupt*, not **Kopf des Dorfes* (lit. ‘head of the village’).⁷ Nevertheless, in its primary denotation as a body part (the head), the old word, *Haupt*, has been gradually replaced by the word *Kopf* in German. The use of the older word *Haupt* to denote HEAD is discussed in more detail in Section 5.

4.2 *Kepala* conceptualized as LOCUS OF THOUGHT

Examples below illustrate the conceptualization of *kepala* as LOCUS OF THOUGHT. Various extensions from this conceptualization are found in the Indonesian corpus. In the following example, *kepala* is seen as the body part that thinks.

THE HEAD IS A BODY PART THAT THINKS

- (26) *Pertanyaannya sederhana, namun jawabannya*
 questions.3.POSS simple but answer.3.POSS
membuat kepala bekerja keras.
 make head work hard
 ‘The question was simple but it caused the head to work hard to answer’

In Example (26) ‘working hard’ refers to the mental activity of human beings, an activity that is expressed as being located in the head. Like the German conceptualization of *Kopf* as LOCUS OF THOUGHT (Example (4) ‘what his head is thinking or trying to think’), in Example (26) *kepala* is regarded as an independent entity with its own power to think for itself.

Example (27), *kepala* is conceptually equivalent to the German noun phrase in (6), *kühlen Kopf*, discussed there in some detail.

6. A more detailed discussion of the differences and similarities of the conceptualization of HEAD in German and Indonesian is taken up in Section 5.

7. *Indonesia-German dictionary* (1998).

VARIABILITY OF THE HEAD'S TEMPERATURE

- (27) *menyelesaikan semua persoalan dengan kepala dingin*
 finish all problems with head cold
 'to solve the problems cool-headedly [lit. 'with a cold head']

Another parallelism with German *Kopf* is the conceptualization of *kepala* as a CONTAINER, illustrated in (28) and (29):

THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER

- (28) *ide di kepala*
 idea in head
 '[to have an] idea in the head'
- (29) *memori yang lewat di kepala*
 memory that pass.by in head
 'memory that came to mind [lit. 'pass by the head']

Examples (28) and (29) exhibit the same conceptual structure as the German data in (8) and (9), respectively.

4.3 *Kepala* evoking a HUMAN CHARACTER TRAIT

Similar to the German *Kopf* Examples in (13–(15), we see in (30) and (31) that Indonesian *kepala* is also used in evoking character traits, and by metonymy, persons.

- (30) *keras kepala*
 hard head
 'stubbornness' or 'stubborn person'
- (31) *kepala batu*
 head stone
 'stubbornness' or 'stubborn person'

The two expressions *keras kepala* (30) and *kepala batu* (31) can denote the character trait 'stubbornness', which can metonymically stand for persons having this character trait.

5. Discussion of the mappings of HEAD in both languages

In this section I present the results of a quantitative study of the relative frequency of the three primary target concepts of HEAD in German and Indonesian, i.e. the figurative meanings LEADER, LOCUS OF THOUGHT, and MAIN/IMPORTANT.

Infrequent target senses, e.g. HUMAN CHARACTER TRAITS and PERSONIFICATIONS, are grouped into a category labeled ‘mixed’. Literal uses of HEAD are not considered. The distributions are displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 shows that, in the corpus, German *Kopf* (gray bars) is much more frequently used (60%) to convey the target sense ‘thinking body part’, i.e. the conceptualization LOCUS OF THOUGHT, than to refer to LEADER (less than 10%); it occurs not at all with the target meaning ‘main/important’ but stands at over 30% in the mixed category. The frequency of occurrence of German *Haupt* (black bars) conveying the target sense LEADER stands at only 10%, but strikingly, at 90% with the target meaning MAIN/IMPORTANT; *Haupt* does not occur in the mixed category. Indonesian *kepala* (striped bars) does not occur at all with the sense MAIN/IMPORTANT, but rather is used in my corpus overwhelmingly to convey the target meaning LEADER (in a social hierarchy); only a small fraction of uses is conceptualized as LOCUS OF THOUGHT, and another small fraction falls into the mixed category.

It is interesting, and perhaps revealing, to note the contrasting preferences for figurative conceptualizations of HEAD in German and Indonesian. While figurative extensions of HEAD in Indonesian most frequently target the concept of LEADER in an approved social hierarchy, for German speakers using the lexical item *Kopf*, the extension in the majority of cases is to LOCUS OF THOUGHT, i.e. to a metaphorical container for thoughts and thinking, and by metonymy, to the




Figure 1. Distributions of figurative uses: *Kopf*, *Haupt*, and *kepala*

thinking individual. The older German word *Haupt*, discussed herein as (i) a pre-nominal modifier (e.g. *Hauptbahnhof* ‘main train station’) is very frequently used to modify a head noun whose referent is conventionally assessed as ‘main/important’, and as (ii) the nucleus (head) of a compound word with *ober-* (e.g. *Oberhaupt des Dorfes* ‘mayor of a village’); it is the latter compound construction that seems to parallel Indonesian *kepala* in its preferred extension to the target sense LEADER, yet in German this usage is much less frequently attested in my corpus. It is tempting to hypothesize that the token frequency of HEAD in Indonesian for referring to a person in the highest position in a valued social hierarchy while the same body part (*Kopf*) in German focuses more frequently on the thinking individual may reflect a contrast in cultural values. This hypothesis, intriguing as it is, awaits further testing and independent evidence from other disciplines.

6. German expressions with *Auge* (‘eye’)

This section investigates uses of German *Auge* that have been collected from the same newspaper corpus from which the HEAD expressions were gathered. The goal is to determine those conceptual aspects of EYE that motivate its figurative extensions. A good starting point for the analysis is Lakoff (1987: 128–129), who proposes an Idealized Cognitive Model that he calls “THE ICM OF SEEING”, one consequence of which, following Lakoff, is “to see something is to notice it and to know it”. In a similar vein, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 238–240), point out that “we get most of our knowledge through vision”. Sweetser (1990) emphasizes that there is a very close relationship between our vocabulary of intellect or knowledge and our vocabulary of physical perception. Indeed, the relation between seeing and knowing has been described by various authors either by the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING or by the metonymy SEEING FOR KNOWING. However, as argued by Radden (2002: 420–422), these two accounts are not necessarily incompatible if one takes the view that metaphors often have a metonymic basis. In what follows, I do not pursue this issue in any detail.

6.1 *Auge* as a CONTAINER with various perceptual and cognitive functions

Consider the following examples, all of which focus on the perceptual and cognitive functions of the eye:

THE EYE AS CONTAINER OF KNOWLEDGE

- (32) *Aus den Augen, aus dem Sinn.*
 out the eyes out the sense
 ‘Out of sight, out of mind’

EYE AS THE AGENT OF PERCEPTION

- (33) *Das Auge sieht sich völlig satt, daß es nichts*
 the eye see REFL completely full that it nothing
mehr zu sehen verlangt.
 more to see demand
 ‘The eye takes everything in until it is sated’

EYE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE

- (34) *Wer vor der Vergangenheit die Augen verschließt,*
 who in.front.of the past the eyes close
wird blind für die Gegenwart.
 becomes blind for the present
 ‘Whoever shuts their eyes to the past will be blind to the present’

Example (32) relies on the CONTAINER image schema and the IN-OUT motion schema and explicitly asserts the causal relationship between perceptual experience and knowledge. In Example (33), the eye is conceptualized as a willful perceiver (agent), more specifically it is metaphorized as an eater who ingests visual information that is likened to food until satiety is reached. In (34) the eye has the function of an information gathering container that can be opened and closed by the perceiver. Closing one’s eyes to past events results in a cognitive deficit, i.e. a lack of understanding (blindness) of the present.

6.2 *Auge* as an OBJECT with various topological properties

In this section examples are adduced that figuratively exploit the relative location of parts of the eye, especially the iris and the pupil, which are concentrically configured. Interestingly, no explicit reference to these eye parts occurs in the examples.

EYE AS CENTER

- (35) *direkt in das Auge des Sturmes zu fahren*
 directly to the eye of.the storm to go
 ‘to go directly into the eye of the storm’
- (36) *im Auge der Angst*
 in.the eye of.the fear
 ‘in the midst of fear [lit. ‘in the eye of fear’]’
- (37) *im Auge des Konflikts*
 in.the eye of.the conflict
 ‘in the middle of the conflict [lit. ‘in the eye of the conflict’]’

In (35)–(37) *Auge* is subjected to a series of PART-WHOLE metonymies: EYE FOR VISIBLE EYE SURFACE, VISIBLE EYE SURFACE FOR IRIS, and IRIS FOR PUPIL. Since the pupil is located at the center of the eye (iris), it can serve as a metaphorical source domain that can be mapped onto more abstract events and states. In (35) a weather event, i.e. a storm, is metaphorically likened to the iris of an eye and the center of the storm corresponds to the pupil. Analogously, these mappings apply to the state of fear in (36) and the conflict event in (37).

In a short digression, I would like to compare the meaning of *Auge* with a conventional metaphorical use of *heart* in English:

HEART AS CENTER

- (38) *in the heart of New York*
- (39) *the ancient sites at the heart of Iraq*
- (40) *from the heart of Europe*

The use of *heart* in Examples (38)–(40) imbues these expressions with a dynamic interpretation, namely ‘beating heart’ based on world knowledge of the *function* of the heart to pump blood (cf. Niemeier 2008). The heart of a city, country, or continent is not necessarily the topological center (as is the pupil of the eye), but it is the center in the sense of being the “life force”. To return to the *Auge* Examples (35)–(37), it was shown that their figurative meanings are not based on the eye’s function but its topology, i.e. its location at the center of the iris being the source of the mappings. Yet another feature of the pupil is its black color, i.e. the darkest part of the eye, which contributes an additional important meaning in some figurative uses (similar to the heart’s dynamic force), namely intensity. Example (36) ‘eye of fear’ conveys the moment in which fear reaches its highest intensity. In (37) ‘eye of conflict’ refers to the moment when the conflict is at its fiercest. The ‘eye of the storm’ (in 35), however, at least if hurricanes are meant, refers to the windless center of the storm, i.e. the lull between violent storm events.

7. Indonesian expressions with *mata* (‘eye’)

Figurative uses of Indonesian *mata*, like the German *Auge* examples, can be classified along the dimensions of function and form.

7.1 *Mata* as a CONTAINER with various perceptual and cognitive functions

The following examples from the Indonesian corpus rely on the notion of a functional CONTAINER that gathers and stores visual and cognitive information.

THE EYE AS CONTAINER OF VISUAL INFORMATION

- (41) *Jauh di mata, dekat di hati.*
 Far in eye near in liver
 'Out of sight, close to the heart'

THE EYE AS CONTAINER OF OPINION

- (42) *Di mata Arifin, SBY adalah seorang pekerja keras.*
 In eye Arifin SBY is someone worker hard
 'According to Arifin's point of view [lit. 'in Arifin's eye'], SBY is a hard worker'

In Indonesian culture, the liver is understood as the seat of emotional and mental activities (Siahaan 2008). Unlike the German proverb in (32), *aus den Augen aus dem Sinn* ('out of sight, out of mind'), the Indonesian saying in (41) means that something is still thought of (held in the liver), even though it is no longer within the field of vision, i.e. no longer within the eye container. The difference between (41) and (32) might be paraphrased as 'out of sight, but in the mind (liver)' vs. 'out of sight, out of mind', respectively. Nevertheless, with respect to the conceptualization of EYE in the two examples, there are commonalities: both presuppose the CONTAINER schema and the IN-OUT motion schema and evoke the connection between visual and cognitive information.

In Example (42) the eye is again metaphorized as a container that stores information about the world from a particular perspective. This metaphor is also common in German in expressions such as *in meinen Augen* ('in my view', 'to my mind' [lit. 'in my eyes']).

Another figurative expression from the Indonesian corpus related to its function as an instrument for acquiring knowledge is (43):

THE EYE AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE

- (43) *Jangan butakan mata kita, jangan tulikan telinga kita, pasanglah hati dan perasaan.*
 NEG.IMP let.go.blind eye 1.PL NEG.IMP let.go.deaf
 ear 1.PL set liver and feeling
 'Don't let the eyes go blind, don't let the ears go deaf; let's use our heart [lit. 'liver'] and feeling'

Like the German Example (34) 'Whoever shuts their eyes to the past will be blind to the present', (43) is based on the function of the eye as an information gathering container that can be opened and closed by the perceiver. In both cases, closure of the eyes results in a cognitive deficit, i.e. a lack of understanding (blindness).

7.2 *Mata* as an OBJECT of a particular form

In contrast to the previously discussed uses of *mata* related to the eye's functions, the figurative meanings of *mata* in the following two examples are (at least partially) motivated by the formal features of the eyeball.

THE EYE HAS A PARTICULAR FORM

- (44) *mata kaki*
 eye foot
 'ankle'

- (45) *mata air*
 eye water
 'spring'

In Example (44) *mata kaki* denotes another body part, the ankle, which is metaphorically represented not in terms of its function as an articulating joint, but rather in terms of its roughly spherical shape.⁸ The figurative meaning of Example (45) is 'spring', i.e. a source of running water. This conceptualization relies on the tunnel-like property of the pupil that connects the eye's surface with its interior. Similarly, in the case of a spring, a relatively small aperture (in the ground) connects to an interior portion of the earth. Interestingly, if the word order in (45) is reversed, as in (46), the meaning 'tears' results. However, (46), unlike (45), does not involve a figurative use of *mata*.

- (46) *air mata*
 water eye
 'tears'

One final Indonesian expression in which the topography of the eye and its parts is crucial involves the pupil as the source for a metaphoric mapping:

EYE AS CENTER

- (47) *mata ati*
 eye liver
 'innermost feeling or thought'

As noted in the discussion of (41), Indonesian culture prizes the liver as the seat of emotional and mental activities. This cultural fact is relevant to the interpretation of

8. Cf. the English compound forms *eyetooth/eye teeth*, denoting the teeth in the upper jaw located beneath the eyes. Both *eyetooth* and *mata kaki* 'eye foot' denote a body part in relation to EYE. In Indonesian the relation is similar shape; in English the relation is relative position.

(47). In the same way that the pupil is the center of the iris, the eye of the liver (i.e. the locus of innermost feelings and thoughts) is the center of the liver as a whole.

Some even more language- (and presumably culture-) specific uses of *mata*, which have no counterpart in German, are presented in (48)–(50):

- (48) *mata pencarian*
 eye search
 ‘main income’ [lit. ‘the eye of the search’]
- (49) *mata uang*
 eye money
 ‘currency’
- (50) *mata pelajaran*
 eye lesson
 ‘subject matter (at school)’

In (48) *mata pencarian* literally means ‘the eye of the search’. The expression is motivated by the cultural fact that in Indonesia a stable income is something one does not yet have and must therefore be searched for. A successful job search leads to an income. The expression combines a metaphor, in which *mata* conveys ‘centrality/importance’, and a metonymy ACTION (searching) FOR RESULT (income). ‘Centrality/importance’ is also conveyed in (49) and (50), where the modified nouns ‘money’ and ‘lesson’ are ameliorated.

8. Discussion of the mappings of EYE in both languages

The analysis of the figurative uses of EYE in German and Indonesian may lead one to conclude that the conceptualization of this body part is similar in the two languages. At a superficial level, we observe that both languages exploit aspects of the eye’s function and form in the expression of figurative meanings of EYE. We see also that our bodily experience plays a crucial role in the target senses of EYE expressions based on these two aspects of EYE. In other words, we could argue that the embodied model is valid in terms of EYE expressions in German and Indonesian. However, such a conclusion remains superficial; in undertaking a quantitative analysis, a different, even deeper, view comes to light. Figure 2 presents the results of my quantitative analysis of the relative frequency of the two primary target concepts of EYE in the two languages, i.e. figurative meanings that are motivated by the perceived function and form of EYE. Infrequently occurring target senses, e.g. PERSONIFICATION, are grouped into a category labeled ‘mixed’. Literal uses of EYE are not considered.




Figure 2. Distributions of figurative uses: *Auge* and *mata*

Figure 2 shows that, in my corpus drawn from newspapers in the two languages, figurative uses of Indonesian *mata* (striped bars) are much more frequently associated with conceptualizations of FORM of the eye (nearly 90%) than they are associated with conceptualizations of FUNCTION (near 5%); the mixed category accounts for less than 10% of cases. That is to say, Indonesian target senses of EYE in my data can be related, by and large, to particular formal features of the eye and its parts, such as concentric configuration of the iris and pupil, centrality of the pupil and its likening to a tunnel opening, and the spherical shape of the eyeball. The conceptualization of EYE as CONTAINER with perceptual and cognitive functions is infrequently associated with the target meanings of *mata* in my corpus.

Quite strikingly, target senses of German *Auge* (gray bars) in my corpus pattern in complementary distribution to their Indonesian counterparts, i.e., nearly 90% of German figurative senses are associated with the conceptualization of EYE as CONTAINER having perceptual and cognitive functions, while only 10% are associated with the conceptualization of EYE as an OBJECT having various topological properties. German target senses of EYE, more so than their Indonesian counterparts, manifest a strong relationship between seeing and knowing, and evince a relative infrequency of occurrence of meanings associated with the eye's topological properties.

As noted in Section 5, where the discussion focused on a similar complementary distribution between Indonesian *kepala* ('leader in a socially approved hierarchy') and German *Kopf* ('thinking body part'), it is tempting to conclude that contrasting preferences for figurative conceptualizations of body part terms stem

from a contrast in cultural values. However, it is important to keep in mind that the results of my quantitative study reflect findings derived from my newspaper corpus only. The validity of my results must be confirmed by replication and further research, and, most crucially, from independent evidence from other disciplines.

9. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the importance of quantitative analysis of the figurative uses of body part terms in two genetically unrelated languages. My contrastive study of figurative extensions of *HEAD* and *EYE* in German and Indonesian has revealed significant distributional preferences between the two languages. I have presented statistical evidence that in figurative expressions, German speakers focus on the function of the head and the eye and predominantly conceptualize the head and the eye as agents capable of acting independently of their possessor's volition. In contrast, Indonesian speakers preferentially select the position of the head (at the top of the body) and the form of the eye as reference points for figurative uses. I tentatively suggest that these differences may reflect the workings of different cultural values. If this assumption turns out to be valid, then the embodiment hypothesis has to be relativized. Future research will have to make explicit the degree to which bodily experience and culturally influenced world views and values interact. It is hoped that this study is a step in that direction.

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PART 2

East Asian perspectives

Speech organs and linguistic activity/function in Chinese*

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This chapter investigates the Chinese cultural understanding of speech and language based on the metonymic chain from speech organ to language as proposed by Radden (2004): speech organ → speaking → speech → language. The focus is on three metonymies, SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, and SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE. It is found that the first two are abundant in conventionalized expressions, but SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE, widely attested across languages (Radden 2004), is not realized lexically in Chinese. While SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE is not manifested in the Chinese lexicon, it is nevertheless realized in its logographic writing system as components of the characters. Chinese characters representing ‘language’ and ‘speech’ contain within them the ‘mouth’ radical as a semantic component. This finding provides an interesting and telling example of how the general cognitive principle of embodiment can be realized in and embraced by a culture-specific environment.

Keywords: culture-specific environment, logographic writing system, metonymy

1. Introduction

Cognitive Linguistics holds the position that the human mind is embodied (Lakoff & Johnson 1999), and the embodiment premise states that people’s subjective, felt experiences of their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought (Gibbs 2006). For example, Radden (2004) in a study of linguistic data from dozens of languages, investigates a “naïve view” or “folk model” of language based on the metonymic chain from speech organ to language:

* An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Ning Yu’s *From Body to Meaning in Culture: Papers on Cognitive Semantic Studies of Chinese* (Benjamins, 2009). I am very thankful to the three anonymous reviewers for the Human Cognitive Processing series, as well as Zouheir A. Maalej, for their valuable comments and suggestions.

speech organ → speaking → speech → language. This metonymic chain, which is motivated by cognitive principles governing the selection of preferred metonymic vehicles (Radden & Kövecses 1999) and which operates within the conceptual frame LANGUAGE, is expressed in conceptual formulae as SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, SPEAKING FOR SPEECH, and SPEECH FOR LANGUAGE. These conceptual metonymies are respectively specific instantiations of more general conceptual metonymies INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION, ACTION FOR RESULT, and SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC. They are often elaborated by metaphor in intricate ways resulting in what is called “metaphonymy” (Goossens 2002).¹ As a process of conceptual and semantic extension, the metonymic chain illustrates how the conception of a crucial human cognitive function is rooted in the human body and bodily experience.

The shifts along the metonymic chain, however, can skip one or more intermediate links. As a rule, therefore, the word for ‘language’ is synchronically related to, or historically derived from, a more basic sense belonging to one of the three domains: (i) articulation and speech organs, (ii) linguistic action, and (iii) basic linguistic units (Radden 2004: 543). In certain languages, for instance, the term for ‘word’, which denotes a linguistic unit, can mean ‘language’, or be part of a derived word or compound that means ‘language’, i.e. LINGUISTIC UNIT FOR LANGUAGE. In many other languages, the word for ‘language’ derives from a word meaning ‘speak’, ‘say’, or ‘tell’, i.e. SPEAKING FOR LANGUAGE. Skipping the intermediate links along the metonymic chain also results in a metonymy widely attested across world languages, i.e. SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE. For example, the term for ‘tongue’ is also used for ‘language’ in virtually all Indo-European languages, and this is true for many non-Indo-European languages as well (Radden 2004: 554–555).

The folk understanding of language and linguistic behavior, which is rooted in embodied experience and has a physiological basis, focuses especially on the salient articulators: the tongue, the teeth, the lips, and the mouth. Radden (2004) expresses the need for systematic studies across languages in order to assess the

1. Over the past two decades, Cognitive Linguistics has published an enormous number of studies on the crucial role of metaphor and metonymy in human language and thought. See, e.g., Barcelona (2000a), Dirven & Pörings (2002), Forceville (1996), Forceville & Urios-Aparisi (2009), Gibbs (1994), Gibbs & Steen (1999), Goatly (2007), Johnson (1987); Kövecses (2000, 2002, 2005, 2006), Lakoff (1987), Lakoff & Johnson (1999), Lakoff & Núñez (2000), Panther & Radden (1999a), Panther & Thornburg (2003), Panther, Thornburg, & Barcelona (2009), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Otal Campo (2002), Steen (2007), Yu (1998). Readers are referred particularly to Gibbs (2008) for a recent state-of-the-art collection of multidisciplinary studies on metaphor and thought. In the past decade, Cognitive Linguistics has especially emphasized the interaction between metonymy and metaphor, which, it has been argued, form a continuum (Barcelona 2000b). It has been claimed that metonymy is a more fundamental cognitive phenomenon than metaphor (Panther & Radden 1999b) and, very often, metaphor is motivated by metonymy (e.g., Barcelona 2000c; Niemeier 2000; Panther 2006; Radden 2000).

possibly universal status of this folk model of language and to map out cross-linguistic differences that are likely to occur with respect to conventionalized implicatures invited by the metonymies.

Following Radden (2004), this chapter studies the Chinese folk understanding of speech and language as is manifested in the Chinese language. It attempts a systematic analysis of Chinese terms for such speech organs as tongue (*she*), teeth (*chi*), lips (*chun*), and mouth (*zui* and *kou*) as are used metonymically and metaphorically in conventionalized linguistic expressions, including compounds and idioms that refer to more abstract linguistic action and function. The study intends to document how speech organ terms extend their meanings along the metonymic chain as proposed by Radden (2004), and how metonymic extension interacts with metaphoric projection along such semantic transfers in Chinese. It attempts to demonstrate the extent to which Chinese conforms to the metonymic chain and displays its cultural characteristics. It is shown that while the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE is not realized lexically in Chinese, it is realized in its logographic writing system in the form of Chinese characters. Thus, the study presents a striking case of the general cognitive principle of embodiment embraced in a culture-specific context, or what cognitive linguists call “socioculturally situated embodiment” (Ziemke, Zlatev, & Frank 2007; Frank et al. 2008; Sharifian et al. 2008; see also Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008).

2. Speech organ terms in Chinese

In Chinese, the characters that represent the speech organs of a human being are as follows:

- (1) a. 口 *kou* ‘mouth’
- b. 嘴 *zui* ‘mouth’
- c. 唇 *chun* ‘lip (or lips)’
- d. 牙 *ya* ‘tooth (or teeth)’
- e. 齿 *chi* ‘tooth (or teeth)’
- f. 舌 *she* ‘tongue’
- g. 喉 *hou* ‘throat’

The words and the characters that represent them in (1a) and (1b) both mean ‘mouth’. They are of equally common use in present-day Chinese although they are sometimes found in different collocations or contexts. In terms of characters in the writing system, however, 口 *kou* (1a) is more basic than 嘴 *zui* (1b) because it is also one of the basic radicals, i.e. components of characters, found in many of the Chinese characters semantically related to the mouth as their semantic component,

e.g. in 嘴 *zui* ‘mouth’ (1b), 舌 *she* ‘tongue’ (1f), and 喉 *hou* ‘throat’ (1g) above, and many others, such as 吃 *chi* ‘eat’, 喝 *he* ‘drink’, 唱 *chang* ‘sing’, and 叫 *jiao* ‘shout’.

The speech organ terms in (1) are not equally productive in their metonymic and metaphoric extensions along the metonymic chain under discussion. In fact, among them *ya* ‘tooth’ (1d) and *hou* ‘throat’ (1g) are found, it seems, in very few conventionalized expressions, such as the following two compounds that are results of metonymic and metaphoric extensions.

- (2) a. 磨牙 *mo-ya* (grind-teeth) ‘*dial.* indulge in idle talk; argue pointlessly’
 b. 喉舌 *hou-she* (throat-tongue) ‘mouthpiece’

Here, (2a) refers originally to people grinding their teeth in sleep, but metaphorically to their ‘indulging in idle talk’ or ‘arguing pointlessly.’² The metaphor, however, is based on a metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING. In both literal and metaphorical senses, the speech organ (i.e. the teeth) is making undesirable meaningless noise. Example (2b) is a compound word consisting of *hou* ‘throat’ and *she* ‘tongue’, i.e. the combination of two speech organ terms. While the word can refer to the speech organ in general, it is usually used figuratively to refer to the ‘tool or person that speaks representing others’. Thus, for instance, the spokesperson of the White House can be called 白宫‘喉舌’, which literally means ‘the White House’s throat and tongue’. Also, in China, newspapers are often called 人民的喉舌, i.e. ‘people’s throat and tongue’, which means they represent people’s voices or views.

Because their metonymic and metaphoric use in terms of the metonymic chain is very limited, *ya* ‘tooth’ and *hou* ‘throat’ are excluded from my discussion unless they occur together with the remaining speech organ terms.

3. Analysis of data instantiating the metonymic chain

In present-day Chinese, compound words, which mostly consist of two constituents (represented by two characters), make up the vast majority of its lexical items. In this study, one of the two elements is a speech organ term, which can take the first or the second position. When the speech organ term takes the first position, it very often combines with a verbal or adjectival constituent, and the compound takes up the subject-predicate construction (S-P). When the speech organ term occupies the second position, it can be preceded by a verbal or adjectival element, the internal relationship between the two constituents being, respectively, verb-object (V-O) or adjective-noun (A-N). Occasionally, however, two speech organ

2. See, e.g., NACED (2004: 1090). Linguistic data presented in this chapter were collected from dictionaries and actual discourse.

terms can combine to form a noun-noun (N–N) construction too (e.g. (2b) above). Chinese idiomatic phrases, or *chengyu* (成语) ‘set phrases’, are usually composed of four constituents (i.e. four characters in writing). Quite often, they are two compounds in juxtaposition. In this case, they sometimes involve two body-part terms or, more specifically, speech organ terms.

Before I move on to analyze the data manifesting the metonymic chain, I first point out that a kind of example that is not directly related to the chain is however relevant to our discussion too. Look at the following group:

- (3) a. 大嘴 *da-zui* (big-mouth) ‘one given to loud offensive talk; one who has a loose tongue; one who shoots off one’s mouth’
 b. 快嘴 *kuai-zui* (fast/quick-mouth) ‘one who readily voices his thoughts; one who is quick to articulate his ideas; a straight person; one who has a loose tongue’
 c. 利口 *li-kou* (sharp-mouth) ‘a glib tongue’
 d. 恶口 *e-kou* (evil-mouth) ‘an abusive tongue; a foul tongue; a wicked tongue’
 e. 长舌 *chang-she* (long-tongue) ‘a long tongue – a gossipy person; gossip-monger’
 f. 舌头 *she-tou* (tongue-SUF) ‘tongue; an enemy soldier captured for the purpose of extracting information’

All of these compounds instantiate the conceptual metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR PERSON or, more generally, PART FOR WHOLE, which are traditionally known as cases of synecdoche. Obviously, when a speech organ term is used in the metonymy BODY PART FOR PERSON, it differs from some of the other body part terms that serve the same purpose. In Chinese, for instance, the following body part terms are often found as standing metonymically for the whole person, but they have different emphases or highlight different abstract qualities of the person in serving this function:

Different emphases of the BODY PART FOR PERSON metonymy

- (4) a. 心 *xin* ‘heart’ → ‘person, with emphasis on cognition and inner self’ (see e.g. Yu 2009)
 b. 脸 *lian* ‘face’
 面 *mian* ‘face’ → ‘person, with emphasis on social identity and outer self’ (see e.g. Yu 2001)
 c. 手 *shou* ‘hand’ → ‘person, with emphasis on skill and capability of doing things’ (see e.g. Yu 2003)

Thus, for instance, the statement ‘Every Chinese is a heart’ is based on the metonymic conceptualization that the heart, which is perceived as the central faculty

of cognition and locus of the inner self in Chinese culture, can stand for the whole person (see Yu 2009: 300–301). The statement ‘A couple of Asian faces were appointed to the cabinet’ places the emphasis on the racial background of the appointees. Similarly, the statement ‘Our factory hired some new hands’ stresses the working skills (or the lack of them) on the part of the new employees. Now, when it comes to such speech organ terms as *zui* or *kou* ‘mouth’ and *she* ‘tongue’ used metonymically to stand for the whole person, they emphasize the person’s characteristics of speaking or talking, as illustrated by the compounds in (3), or the person’s function as a speaker, as found in the example where the spokesperson of the White House is referred to as the ‘first mouth of the White House’ (白宫第一嘴), and well-known talk show hosts are referred to as ‘famous/name mouths’ (名嘴).

Having discussed some cases of the SPEECH ORGAN FOR PERSON metonymy and how it differs from other cases of BODY PART FOR PERSON, I turn now to the data that contribute to the metonymic chain under investigation. Subsection 3.1 focuses on the mouth, which in Chinese is represented by two words or characters, *kou* and *zui* ‘mouth’; 3.2 deals with *chun* ‘lip/lips’, *chi* ‘tooth/teeth’, and *she* ‘tongue’.

3.1 The mouth in conventionalized expressions

The Chinese language is very rich with compounds and set phrases that contain either *kou* ‘mouth’ or *zui* ‘mouth’ for the purpose of morphological construction and semantic extension. Some of them are related to the semantic category of eating (e.g. 口味 *kouwei* ‘mouth-flavor, i.e. one’s taste or liking’; 忌口 *jikou* ‘avoid-mouth, i.e. avoid certain food or be on a diet’; 贪嘴 *tanzui* ‘covet-mouth, i.e. be greedy for food’; 偷嘴 *touzui* ‘steal-mouth, i.e. take food on the sly’), but the vast majority are found in the semantic category of speaking along the metonymic chain under discussion.

I first discuss the compounds that instantiate the SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING metonymy.

- (5) a. 动口 *dong-kou* (move-mouth) ‘talk; speak’
- b. 开口 *kai-kou* (open-mouth) ‘open one’s mouth; start to talk’
- c. 张口 *zhang-kou* (open-mouth) ‘open one’s mouth to say sth.; ask for a favor’
- d. 启口 *qi-kou* (open-mouth) ‘open one’s mouth; start to talk about sth.’
- e. 出口 *chu-kou* (exit-mouth) ‘speak; utter’
- f. 闭口 *bi-kou* (shut-mouth) ‘keep one’s mouth shut; refuse to express one’s opinions’
- g. 住口 *zhu-kou* (stop-mouth) ‘shut up; stop talking’
- h. 动嘴 *dong-zui* (move-mouth) ‘talk; speak’

- i. 张嘴 *zhang-zui* (open-mouth) 'open one's mouth to say sth.; ask for a favor'
- j. 住嘴 *zhu-zui* (stop-mouth) 'stop talking'

In this group of examples, as we can see, the term *kou* or *zui* 'mouth' is preceded by a verb that means 'move', 'open', 'close', 'exit', or 'stop', whereas all of the compounds so formed mean 'talk or not talk' or 'start or stop talking' in some fashion. Apparently, in some compounds *kou* and *zui* are interchangeable (i.e. in (5a, c, g) vs. (5h, i, j) respectively), but this is not always the case. In some cases, a particular constituent can only combine with one but not the other (e.g. in (5b, d, e) only *kou* but not *zui* is possible). Occasionally, a particular constituent can combine with both but the results do not have exactly the same meaning.

- (6) a. 缄口 *jian-kou* (seal-mouth) 'keep one's mouth shut; hold one's tongue; say nothing'
- b. 绝口 *jue-kou* (sever-mouth) 'stop talking; keep one's mouth shut'
- c. 钳口 *qian-kou* (clamp-mouth) 'force sb. into silence; prevent sb. from talking; shut up; keep silent'
- d. 灭口 *mie-kou* (extinguish-mouth) 'do away with a witness or accomplice'
- e. 堵嘴 *du-zui* (block up-mouth) 'gag sb.; silence sb.'
- f. 松口 *song-kou* (loosen-mouth) 'relax one's bite and release what is held; be less unyielding; soften; relent'
- g. 松嘴 *song-zui* (loosen-mouth) *inf.* 'relax one's bite and release what is held; be less unyielding; soften; relent'

The compounds in (6) have to do with 'keeping silent oneself' or 'silencing others'. The compound in (6c), which means literally 'grip or clamp one's mouth with pliers or pincers', means 'force oneself or others into silence'. The one in (6d) usually means 'silence a witness by killing him' or 'kill someone to prevent him from disclosing a secret'. Both (6f) and (6g) have the same meaning, with the latter less formal than the former, and evoke the same image where one's mouth has relaxed from being tightly shut into a release (of a promise or permission).

- (7) a. 斗口 *dou-kou* (fight-mouth) 'quarrel; bicker; squabble'
- b. 斗嘴 *dou-zui* (fight-mouth) 'quarrel; bicker; squabble; banter'
- c. 争嘴 *zheng-zui* (contend/vie-mouth) 'quarrel; bicker; vie for more food'
- d. 吵嘴 *chao-zui* (quarrel-mouth) 'quarrel; bicker'
- e. 闹嘴 *nao-zui* (make noises/stir up trouble-mouth) 'quarrel; bicker'
- f. 拌嘴 *ban-zui* (mix-mouth) 'bicker; squabble; quarrel'
- g. 嚷嘴 *rang-zui* (yell-mouth) *dial.* 'quarrel; bicker'

The examples in (7) belong to the semantic domain of quarreling. As we can see, arguing is ‘fighting’, ‘contending’, ‘quarreling’, ‘making noises’, ‘mixing’, and ‘yelling’, all with one’s mouth. That is, arguing or quarreling is ‘fighting a mouth battle’ (打嘴仗). Given in the following are some more relevant examples:

- (8) a. 破口 *po-kou* (break-mouth) ‘shout (abuse); let loose (a torrent of abuse)’
 b. 还口 *huan-kou* (return-mouth) ‘answer back; retort’
 c. 回口 *hui-kou* (return/go back-mouth) *dial.* ‘answer back; retort’
 d. 还嘴 *huan-zui* (return-mouth) *inf.* ‘answer or talk back; retort’
 e. 回嘴 *hui-zui* (return/go back-mouth) ‘answer or talk back; retort’
 f. 顶嘴 *ding-zui* (push up/retort-mouth) *inf.* ‘reply defiantly (usu. to one’s elder or superior; answer back; talk back’
 g. 犟嘴 *jiang-zui* (obstinate/stubborn-mouth) ‘reply defiantly; answer or talk back’
 h. 强嘴 *jiang-zui* (stubborn/unyielding-mouth) ‘reply defiantly; answer or talk back’

The image evoked by (8a) is that a person’s mouth ‘cracks’ to let out ‘a torrent of abuse or curses’. The compounds in (8b–e) all mean ‘to hit back’ in ‘a verbal battle’. Instead of hitting back with their fists, people ‘hit back with their mouths’ in such a battle. The compound in (8f) evokes the image of one pushing up with one’s head when being ‘pressed down’. Conceptualized in spatial terms, younger or junior people have a lower status than that of their elders or superiors. Thus, when they ‘talk back’ in a verbal battle against their seniors and superiors, they not only ‘stand *up* to’ them, but also ‘push their heads *up* against’ them.

- (9) a. 夸口 *kua-kou* (exaggerate/boast-mouth) ‘boast; brag; talk big’
 b. 夸嘴 *kua-zui* (exaggerate/boast-mouth) *inf.* ‘boast; brag; talk big’
 c. 说嘴 *shuo-zui* (talk-mouth) ‘brag; boast’; *dial.* ‘argue; quarrel’
 d. 失口 *shi-kou* (lose-mouth) ‘make a slip of the tongue’
 e. 走口 *zou-kou* (go-mouth) *dial.* ‘make a slip of the tongue; let slip an inadvertent remark’
 f. 走嘴 *zou-zui* (go-mouth) ‘make a slip of the tongue; let slip an inadvertent remark’
 g. 漏嘴 *lou-zui* (leak-mouth) ‘let slip a remark; make a slip of the tongue’
 h. 改口 *gai-kou* (change-mouth) ‘withdraw or modify one’s previous remark; correct oneself’
 i. 改嘴 *gai-zui* (change-mouth) ‘withdraw or modify one’s previous remark’

Found in (9) are some compounds that fall into three categories: bragging (9a–c), making a slip of the tongue (9d–g), and correcting oneself (9h, i). As can be seen, people who ‘make a slip of the tongue’ would ‘lose their mouths’ (9d), ‘let go their mouths’ (9e, f), or have ‘a leaking mouth’ (9g), and those who ‘withdraw or modify their previous remark’ would actually ‘change their mouths’ (9h, i).

The compounds given below indicate various manners of talking or reading aloud.

- (10) a. 插口 *cha-kou* (insert-mouth) ‘interrupt; chip in’
 b. 插嘴 *cha-zui* (insert-mouth) ‘interrupt; chip in’
 c. 抢嘴 *qiang-zui* (rush/rob-mouth) ‘try to get the first word in; try to be heard above the rest’
 d. 随口 *sui-kou* (follow-mouth) ‘speak thoughtlessly or casually; blurt out whatever comes into one’s head’
 e. 信口 *xin-kou* (trust/at random-mouth) ‘speak thoughtlessly or casually’
 f. 拗口 *ao-kou* (disobey/defy-mouth) ‘be hard to pronounce; be awkward reading’
 g. 绕嘴 *rao-zui* (wind-mouth) ‘not be smooth; be difficult to articulate’
 h. 咬嘴 *yao-zui* (bite-mouth) ‘be difficult to articulate; be awkward-sounding’
 i. 上口 *shang-kou* (go up to-mouth) ‘be able to read aloud fluently; be suitable for reading aloud’
 j. 顺口 *shun-kou* (obey/go with-mouth) ‘read smoothly; say offhandedly’
 k. 顺嘴 *shun-zui* (obey/go with-mouth) ‘read smoothly; say offhandedly’

The compounds in both (10a, b) mean ‘interrupt’, and to do so one ‘inserts one’s mouth’ into the flow of discourse. When people try to be heard above the rest, they ‘rush their mouths’ (10c). People speaking thoughtlessly or casually ‘follow or trust their mouths’ (10d, e.). The compounds in (10f–k) show that things hard to pronounce, articulate, or read aloud ‘disobey’, ‘defy’, ‘wind’, or ‘bite’ the mouth whereas in the opposite case they ‘obey’ or ‘go with’ the mouth. Also, when people speak offhandedly, they ‘go with their mouths’ rather than their heart/mind (10j, k).

- (11) a. 卖嘴 *mai-zui* (sell-mouth) ‘show off verbal skill; indulge in clever talk’
 b. 磨嘴 *mo-zui* (grind/rub-mouth) *dial.* ‘jabber; do a lot of talking; indulge in idle talk; argue pointlessly’
 c. 碍口 *ai-kou* (hinder-mouth) ‘be too embarrassing to mention’
 d. 借口 *jie-kou* (borrow-mouth) ‘use as an excuse or pretext; excuse or pretext’

- e. 矢口 *shi-kou* (vow-mouth) 'state categorically; insist emphatically; assert positively'
- f. 交口 *jiao-kou* (exchange/cross-mouth) 'with one voice; converse; talk'
- g. 吐口 *tu-kou* (throw up-mouth) 'tell truth; put forward a claim; make a demand'

In (11), people showing off their verbal skill by indulging in clever talk are trying to 'sell their mouths' (11a). Indulging in idle talk or arguing pointlessly is to 'grind the mouth' ((11b); cf. (2a)). Things too embarrassing to mention actually 'hinder the mouth' (11c). To use something as an excuse is to 'borrow a mouth' and an excuse is a 'borrowed mouth' (11d).

In all the compounds discussed above, the first constituent is a verbal element whereas the ones in (12) have an adjectival element as their first constituent, i.e., they constitute an adjective-noun construction.

- (12) a. 多嘴 *duo-zui* (many-mouth) 'speak out of turn; shoot off one's mouth'
- b. 油嘴 *you-zui* (oily/greasy-mouth) 'glib; a glib talker'
- c. 贫嘴 *pin-zui* (nagging-mouth) 'garrulous; loquacious'
- d. 满口 *man-kou* (full-mouth) '(speak) unreservedly or profusely; be full of'
- e. 苦口 *ku-kou* (bitter-mouth) '(admonish) in earnest'
- f. 羞口 *xiu-kou* (shy-mouth) 'find it difficult to bring the matter up'
- g. 极口 *ji-kou* (extreme-mouth) '(praise) in highest terms'
- h. 亲口 *qin-kou* (personal-mouth) '(say sth.) personally'

Thus, for instance, a person who speaks out of turn has 'too many mouths' whereas a glib talker has a 'greasy mouth'.

While all the compounds discussed so far have the speech organ term *kou* or *zui* 'mouth' as their second constituent, preceded by a verbal or adjectival element, the ones given in (13) have the speech organ term as their first element.

- (13) a. 口称 *kou-cheng* (mouth-call/claim) 'claim to be; profess'
- b. 口吃 *kou-chi* (mouth-eat) 'stutter; stammer'
- c. 口角 *kou-jue* (mouth-contend/wrestle) 'quarrel; bicker; wrangle'
- d. 口才 *kou-cai* (mouth-talent) 'eloquence'
- e. 口气 *kou-qi* (mouth-air/breath) 'manner of speaking; what is actually meant'
- f. 口风 *kou-feng* (mouth-wind) 'one's intention or view as revealed in what one says'
- g. 口实 *kou-shi* (mouth-seed/fruit) 'a cause for gossip'
- h. 口过 *kou-guo* (mouth-mistake) 'make a slip of the tongue'

- i. 口误 *kou-wu* (mouth-error) 'make a slip of the tongue; a slip of the tongue; an oral slip'
- j. 口语 *kou-yu* (mouth-language) 'spoken language'

The examples in (13) instantiate either a noun-verb or a noun-noun construction. For instance, if one claims something, one's 'mouth claims' it (13a), and the spoken language is the 'mouth language' (13j).

In the many compounds in (14), the speech organ term for 'mouth', while taking the first position, combines with an adjective that follows it.

- (14) a. 口快 *kou-kuai* (mouth-fast) 'outspoken; plainspoken; thoughtless in speech; quick with one's tongue'
- b. 口紧 *kou-jin* (mouth-tight) 'closemouthed; tight-lipped'
- c. 嘴快 *zui-kuai* (mouth-fast) 'have a loose tongue'
- d. 嘴稳 *zui-wen* (mouth-stable) 'able to keep a secret; discreet in speech'
- e. 嘴直 *zui-zhi* (mouth-straight) 'outspoken; plainspoken'
- f. 嘴尖 *zui-jian* (mouth-pointed) 'sharp-tongued; cutting in speech; be choosy about what one eats'
- g. 嘴冷 *zui-leng* (mouth-cold) *dial.* 'blunt'
- h. 嘴贫 *zui-pin* (mouth-nagging) 'loquacious; garrulous'
- i. 嘴碎 *zui-sui* (mouth-fragmented) 'loquacious; garrulous'

As these examples show, an outspoken and plainspoken person has a 'fast' (14a) or 'straight' (14e) mouth; a loose-tongued person also has a 'fast' mouth (14c) while a sharp-tongued person has a 'pointed' mouth (14f); a loquacious or garrulous person has a 'nagging' (14h) or 'fragmented' (14i) mouth; those who are discreet in speech or tight-lipped have a mouth that is 'stable' (14d) or 'tight' (14b) whereas those who speak bluntly have a mouth that is 'cold' (14g). In the Appendix, more examples of this kind are presented in (1).

- (15) a. 嘴勤 *zui-qin* (mouth-diligent) 'fond of talking; chatty'
- b. 嘴懒 *zui-lan* (mouth-lazy) 'not inclined to talk much'
- c. 嘴松 *zui-song* (mouth-loose) 'have a loose tongue'
- d. 嘴紧 *zui-jin* (mouth-tight) 'tight-lipped; closemouthed'
- e. 嘴敞 *zui-chang* (mouth-open wide) *dial.* 'have a loose tongue'
- f. 嘴严 *zui-yan* (mouth-shut tight) 'tight-lipped; closemouthed'
- g. 嘴软 *zui-ruan* (mouth-soft) 'afraid to speak out'
- h. 嘴硬 *zui-ying* (*mouth-hard*) 'stubborn and reluctant to admit mistakes or defeats'

As shown in (15), there are pairs of compounds where the two adjectives following the speech organ terms are antonyms. However, the two compounds with antonymous adjectives are not necessarily antonyms, e.g. (15g, h).

A prominent characteristic of the Chinese language is that it contains a great number of set phrases or idiomatic collocations. Very often, these idioms consist of four characters. Listed below are the ones that contain *kou* or *zui* ‘mouth’. Because there are so many of them, I simply list some while leaving the rest to the Appendix (see (2) there).

- (16) a. 难以开口 *nan-yi kai-kou* (difficult-to open-mouth) ‘find it difficult to bring the matter up’
 b. 闭口无言 *bi-kou wu-yan* (shut-mouth no-speech) ‘remain silent; be tongue-tied’
 c. 三缄其口 *san-jian qi-kou* (three-seal one’s-mouth) ‘with one’s lips sealed’
 d. 祸从口出 *huo con kou chu* (disaster from mouth come out) ‘trouble comes out of the mouth (i.e. from a loose tongue)’
 e. 恶口伤人 *e-kou shang-ren* (evil-mouth hurt-people) ‘hurt people with one’s abusive tongue’
 f. 金口玉言 *jin-kou yu-yan* (gold-mouth jade-words) ‘precious words; utterances that carry great weight’
 g. 信口开河 *xin-kou kai-he* (at will-mouth open-river) ‘talk irresponsibly; wag one’s tongue too freely; talk at random’
 h. 口若悬河 *kou-rou xuan-he* (mouth-like hanging-river) ‘let loose a flood of eloquence; be eloquent; speak volubly’
 i. 嘴不关风 *zui bu guan feng* (mouth not enclose wind) ‘shoot one’s mouth off; have a loose tongue’

In (17) are idiomatic expressions consisting of three characters:

- (17) a. 碎嘴子 *sui-zui-zi* (fragmented-mouth-SUF) ‘chatter; jabber; prate; a garrulous person; chatterbox’
 b. 支嘴儿 *zhi-zui-er* (pay-mouth-SUF) *dial.* ‘give advice; suggest ideas; make suggestions’
 c. 嘴把式 *zui-bashi* (mouth-master) *dial.* ‘a person given to idle talk’
 d. 耍贫嘴 *shua pin-zui* (play nagging-mouth) ‘be garrulous’
 e. 打嘴仗 *da zui-zhang* (wage mouth-battle) *inf.* ‘argue; quarrel’
 f. 婆婆嘴 *popo-zui* (old woman’s mouth) ‘a nagging tongue; a garrulous person’

Many of the idioms in (17) actually contain the compounds discussed above. In this sense, we can see these idioms as constructed from expansion and elaboration of those compounds.

As show in (18), such idiomatic expressions or collocations may contain another body part term, suggesting the relationship of this body part with the mouth under certain circumstances.

- (18) a. 杜口裹足 *du-kou guo-zu* (shut out-mouth bind-feet) 'speechless and motionless with fear'
 b. 口蜜腹剑 *kou-mi fu-jian* (mouth-honey belly-sword) 'honey-mouthed and dagger-hearted; honey on one's lips and murder in one's heart; hypocritical and malignant'
 c. 目瞪口呆 *mu-deng kou-dai* (eyes-stare mouth-dumb) 'gaping; dumbstruck'
 d. 嘴闭眼明 *zui-bi yan-ming* (mouth-shut eye-bright) 'keep the mouth shut and the eyes open'
 e. 利嘴花牙 *li-zui hua-ya* (sharp-mouth flowery-teeth) 'have a ready tongue; saponaceous'
 f. 拙嘴笨腮 *zhuo-zui ben-sai* (clumsy-mouth stupid-cheek) 'clumsy-tongued; inarticulate'
 g. 嘴硬骨软 *zui-ying gu-ruan* (mouth-hard bone-soft) 'talk tough but act soft'
 h. 嘴软骨硬 *zui-ruan gu-ying* (mouth-soft bone-hard) 'talk soft but act tough'

Other than the mouth, the body parts included in the idioms in (18) are feet, belly, eyes, teeth, cheeks, and bones. However, such partnership is most commonly found between the mouth and the heart, as the examples in (19) show (see also (3) in the Appendix).

- (19) a. 锦心绣口 *jin-xin xiu-kou* (splendid-heart beautiful-mouth) 'elegant thought and flowery speech'
 b. 苦口婆心 *ku-kou po-xin* (bitter-mouth old woman-heart) '(admonish) earnestly and maternally'
 c. 心直口快 *xin-zhi kou-kuai* (heart-straight mouth-fast) 'frank and outspoken; straightforward and plainspoken'
 d. 有口无心 *you-kou wu-xin* (have-mouth not have-heart) 'be sharp-tongued but not malicious'
 e. 心服口服 *xin-fu kou-fu* (mouth-convinced heart-convinced) 'to be genuinely convinced'
 f. 口心如一 *kou-xin ru-yi* (mouth-heart like-one) 'what one's says is indeed what one thinks; one means what one says'
 g. 口是心非 *kou-shi xin-fei* (mouth-yes heart-no) 'say yes and mean no; say one thing and mean another'

- h. 嘴甜心辣 *zui-tian xin-la* (mouth-sweet heart-peppery) 'a cruel heart under the cover of sugar-coated words; sweet words and a bitter heart'
- i. 佛口蛇心 *fu-kou she-xin* (Buddha-mouth snake-heart) 'honeyed words but evil intent'

In Chinese, *xin* 'heart' is culturally conceptualized as the central faculty of cognition, which is the agent of thinking, as well as feeling, and as the seat of both mental and emotional lives, where feelings and thoughts are stored (Yu 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009). The idiomatic phrases highlight either the unity or the difference between people's words and thoughts.

3.2 The lips, teeth, and tongue in conventionalized expressions

For Chinese, there is no doubt that the vast majority of the conventionalized expressions manifesting the metonymic chain under discussion contain the speech organ term for 'mouth'. The mouth, however, has its own parts, notably the lips, the teeth, and the tongue, which also participate in the metonymic chain, as exemplified by the compounds in (20), as well as those in (4) in the Appendix.

- (20) a. 启唇 *qi-chun* (open-lips) 'open one's mouth; start to talk about sth.'
- b. 启齿 *qi-chi* (open-teeth) 'open one's mouth; start to talk about sth.'
- c. 挂齿 *gua-chi* (hang on-teeth) 'mention'
- d. 齿及 *chi-ji* (teeth-reach) 'mention; touch upon'
- e. 饶舌 *rao-she* (rich-tongue) 'too talkative; garrulous; say more than is proper; shoot off one's mouth'
- f. 卖舌 *mai-she* (sell-tongue) 'make sensational statements for the sake of publicity'
- g. 结舌 *jie-she* (tie/knot-tongue) 'be tongue-tied; be at a loss for words'
- h. 嚼舌 *jiao-she* (chew-tongue) 'wag one's tongue; chatter; gossip; argue meaninglessly; squabble'
- i. 舌耕 *she-geng* (tongue-plow) *form.* 'make a living by teaching'

As we can see, starting to talk is 'opening the lips or teeth' (20a, b). To mention something is to 'hang it on the teeth' (20c). In (20d), to mention or touch upon something is one's 'teeth reach' it. In (20e), a talkative or garrulous person has a 'rich tongue'. Making sensational statements for the sake of publicity is 'selling one's tongue' ((20f); cf. (11a)). In (20h), to gossip or argue meaninglessly is to 'chew one's tongue'. Interestingly, a formal way of saying that someone makes a living by teaching is to say that this person has his 'tongue plow' (20i). Notably, a writer does 'pen-plowing' (i.e. 笔耕 *bi-geng* [pen-plow] 'live by one's pen; make a living by

writing'). The figurative use of the verb *geng* 'plow' reflects the values of a traditionally agrarian culture, where a peasant makes a living by plowing the land.

- (21) a. 反唇相讥 *fan-chun xiang-ji* (reverse-lips PRT-ridicule) 'answer back sarcastically'
 b. 嘴唇油滑 *zuichun you-hua* (lips greasy-slippery) 'eloquent in speech; with one's tongue in one's cheek'
 c. 难以启齿 *nan-yi qi-chi* (difficult-to open-teeth) '(find it) difficult to talk about sth.'
 d. 不便启齿 *bu-bian qi-chi* (not-convenient open teeth) '(find it) inconvenient to talk about sth.'
 e. 何足挂齿 *he-zu gua-chi* (why-sufficient hang on-teeth) 'not worth mentioning'
 f. 不足挂齿 *bu-zu gua-chi* (not-sufficient hang on-teeth) 'not worth mentioning'
 g. 不足齿数 *bu-zu chi-shu* (not-sufficient teeth-count) 'not worth mentioning'
 h. 伶牙俐齿 *ling-ya li-chi* (clever-teeth smart-teeth) 'have the gift of the gab; have a glib tongue; have a ready tongue'

The above are some idiomatic phrases or collocations that contain *chun* 'lip' and *chi* 'tooth'. Note that *chun* 'lip' is also called *zuichun*, as in (21b), which literally means "mouth lip." *Zuichun* 'lip' has an informal variant, given in (22a).

- (22) a. 嘴皮子 *zui-pizi* (mouth-skins) *inf. derog.* 'lips (of a glib talker); ability to talk'
 b. 磨嘴皮子 *mo zui-pizi* (grind mouth-skins) *dial.* 'jabber; do a lot of talking; indulge in idle talk; argue pointlessly'
 c. 费嘴皮子 *fei zui-pizi* (cost mouth-skins) 'talk nonsense; waste one's breath'
 d. 耍嘴皮子 *shua zuipizi* (play with-lips) 'talk glibly; be a slick talker; mere empty talk; lip service'

As shown in (22a), the lips are also called the 'mouth skins', which, however, is informal and, quite often, derogatory usage, referring to a glib talker's lips, for instance. The idiomatic collocations in (22b–d) illustrate this point.

- (23) a. 烂舌头 *lan she-tou* (rotten tongue-SUF) *inf.* 'be fond of gossip; gossip; scandalmonger'
 b. 烂舌根 *lan she-gen* (rotten tongue-root) 'same as above'
 c. 嚼舌头 *jue she-tou* (chew-tongue-SUF/head) 'wag one's tongue; chatter; gossip; argue meaninglessly; squabble'

- d. 嚼舌根 *jue she-gen* (chew-tongue-root) 'wag one's tongue; chatter; gossip; argue meaninglessly; squabble'
 e. 磨舌头 *mo she-tou* (grind tongue-SUF) *dial.* 'indulge in idle talk; argue pointlessly'

The idiomatic expressions in (23) contain the speech organ term for 'tongue'. In (23a, c, e), the term for the tongue means literally 'tongue head', but *tou* 'head' here is grammaticalized into a suffix, so *she-tou* (tongue-head) simply means 'tongue'. In (23b) and (23d), *gen* 'root' is not grammaticalized, so *she-gen* means 'the root of the tongue'.

The three examples in (24) show that speech organ terms can combine to form compounds encoding the concepts related to speaking and speech, as illustrated by the conventionalized expressions in (25):

- (24) a. 口舌 *kou-she* (mouth-tongue) 'dispute or misunderstanding caused by gossip; talking round'
 b. 口齿 *kou-chi* (mouth-teeth) 'enunciation; ability to speak'
 c. 唇舌 *chun-she* (lip-tongue) 'words; argument'
- (25) a. 口舌意气 *kou-she yiqi* (mouth-tongue personal feelings) 'get involved in a verbal dispute to let out one's personal feelings'
 b. 口舌是非 *kou-she shi-fei* (mouth-tongue right-wrong) 'disputes and quarrels'
 c. 口齿清楚 *kou-chi qingchu* (mouth-teeth clear) 'have clear enunciation'
 d. 口齿伶俐 *kou-chi lingli* (mouth-teeth clever) 'be fluent and eloquent'
 e. 斗口齿 *dou kou-chi* (fight with mouth-teeth) 'squabble; bicker; banter'
 f. 费唇舌 *fei chun-she* (cost lip-tongue) 'take a lot of talking or explaining'
 g. 白费唇舌 *bai-fei chun-she* (in vain-cost lip-tongue) 'waste one's breath'

Apart from forming compounds, as in the examples above, pairs of speech organ terms are also found in idiomatic phrases, as in the examples below.

- (26) a. 摇唇鼓舌 *yao-chun gu-she* (shake-lips beat-tongue) 'flap one's lips and beat one's tongue – wag one's tongue; engage in loose talk (to stir up trouble)'
 b. 唇枪舌剑 *chun-qiang she-jian* (lip-spear tongue-sword) 'cross verbal swords; engage in a battle of words'

- c. 唇焦舌敝 *chun-jiao she-bi* (lips-scorched tongue-worn out) 'talk till one's tongue and lips are parched; wear oneself out in pleading, expostulating, etc.'

In the set phrases in (26) the two speech organ terms juxtaposed are *chun* 'lip' and *she* 'tongue'. However, it is *kou* or *zui* 'mouth' and *she* 'tongue' that are most frequently found in such set phrases.

- (27) a. 张口结舌 *zhang-kou jie-she* (open-mouth tie-tongue) 'be agape and tongue-tied; be at a loss for words'
 b. 轻口薄舌 *qing-kou bo-she* (light-mouth thin-tongue) 'have a caustic and sharp tongue'
 c. 笨口拙舌 *ben-kou zhuo-she* (stupid-mouth clumsy-tongue) 'awkward in speech; slow of speech; inarticulate'
 d. 七嘴八舌 *qi-zui ba-she* (seven-mouth eight-tongue) 'with everybody trying to get a word in; all talking at once'
 e. 甜嘴蜜舌 *tian-zui mi-she* (sweet-mouth honey-tongue) 'speaking honeyed words; honey-mouthed'
 f. 油嘴滑舌 *you-zui hua-she* (greasy-mouth slippery-tongue) 'glib-tongued'
 g. 利嘴毒舌 *li-zui du-she* (sharp-mouth poisonous-tongue) 'have a shrewd tongue; a sharp tongue'
 h. 嘴尖舌快 *zui-jian she-kuai* (mouth-pointed tongue-fast) 'be fluent in speech'
 i. 嘴尖舌酸 *zui-jian she-suan* (mouth-pointed tongue-sour) 'cutting in speech; sharp-tongued'
 j. 嘴巧舌能 *zui-qiao she-neng* (mouth-skilful tongue-capable) 'clever and plausible in speech; gifted with a quick and sharp tongue; shine in conversation'

Many of these set phrases, as well as those in (5) in the Appendix, are constructed by using one or two existing compounds. Therefore, it can be said that set phrases are constructed from expansion and elaboration of more basic compounds.

4. Discussion

According to the "naïve view" or "folk model" of language proposed by Radden (2004), languages generally observe the metonymic principle by which they make metonymic extension along the metonymic chain from speech organ to language: speech organ → speaking → speech → language. However, the metonymic shifts

along the metonymic chain can skip one or more intermediate links, thus resulting in a metonymy widely attested across languages, SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE.³

In this chapter, my study has focused only on the speech organ terms *kou* or *zui* ‘mouth’, *chun* ‘lip’, *chi* ‘tooth’, and *she* ‘tongue’ in Chinese with regard to their roles in contributing to the formation of the metonymic chain in Chinese. Specifically, I investigated the manifestation of these three conceptual metonymies: (i) SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, (ii) SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, and (iii) SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE. My first finding is that the first two metonymies SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING and SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH are richly manifested in Chinese.

Among the large number of conventionalized expressions discussed, the majority instantiate SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, which is, unsurprisingly, the first link of the metonymic chain. For instance, ‘open the mouth (开口、张口、张嘴)’ means ‘start talking’, ‘move the mouth (动口、动嘴)’ means ‘talk’, ‘shut the mouth (闭口)’ means ‘keep silent’ or ‘not talk about something’, and ‘stop the mouth (住口、住嘴)’ means ‘stop talking’ or ‘shut up’. Some of the conventionalized expressions, however, realize SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, which is a metonymic transfer that skips over the intermediate link SPEAKING. For instance, ‘change the mouth (改口、改嘴)’ means ‘withdraw or modify the previous remark’, ‘insert the mouth (插嘴)’ means ‘interrupt or chip in’, i.e. ‘insert remarks into other people’s remarks’, and ‘the mouth sweet or tough (嘴甜、嘴硬)’ means ‘what one says sounds sweet or tough’. That is, one’s speech organ, the mouth in these cases, stands

3. One anonymous reviewer suggested that a simple alternative to the concept of metonymic chain is that the extensions each radiate directly from ‘speech organ’, and so there is no skipping involved. Furthermore, it was suggested that only diachronic evidence can justify such a chain. This is indeed an interesting and serious suggestion that calls for further empirical research. Nonetheless, I think that the metonymic chain under discussion is meant to catch some important generalizations. For instance, this chain distinguishes groups of concepts that are relatively closer to, or further away from, one another. Thus, the chain ‘mouth (as speech organ) → speaking → speech → language’ could be distinguished from another hypothetical chain ‘mouth (as eating organ) → eating → flavor (of food) → taste (as personal liking)’, but both of them would also be distinguished from, as well as related to, still another path of metonymic extension ‘mouth (as both speech and eating organ) → person’ (in terms of this person’s characteristic way of speaking and liking of food), and so on, as touched upon earlier in this chapter. Moreover, the metonymic chain, though based on synchronic description of cross-linguistic evidence (Radden 2004), can better catch the generalization in directionality of semantic extension, which extends, in general, from the more concrete to the more abstract (i.e. speech organ → speaking, speaking → speech, speech → language), rather than the other way around (i.e. speaking → speech organ, speech → speaking, language → speech). If these generalizations can be supported by further systematic empirical studies across languages and cultures, then the metonymic chain model could turn out to be more like a radial network (à la Lakoff) rather than a “direct radiation” model (as proposed by the reviewer).

metonymically for what one says: words, sentences, utterances, or remarks, all of which fall into the category of speech.

While all of the conventionalized expressions contribute to the manifestation of the underlying metonymic chain under discussion, it must be emphasized that metaphor also plays an important role in the construction of many of them. For instance, metaphor is involved in these expressions: ‘sell the mouth (卖嘴)’ meaning ‘show off one’s verbal skill or indulge in clever talk’, ‘block the mouth (堵嘴)’ meaning ‘keep somebody from talking or silence somebody’, ‘grind the mouth (磨嘴)’ meaning ‘indulge in idle talk or argue pointlessly’, and ‘wind the mouth (绕嘴)’ meaning ‘be difficult to articulate’. Obviously, the use of the verbs in these cases is metaphorical. In a similar vein, in the expressions such as ‘the greasy mouth (油嘴)’ meaning ‘glib’, ‘the bitter mouth (苦口)’ meaning ‘(admonish) in earnest’, ‘the mouth pointed (嘴尖)’ meaning ‘cutting in speech’, ‘the mouth straight (嘴直)’ meaning ‘outspoken’, and ‘the mouth fragmented (嘴碎)’ meaning ‘loquacious or garrulous’, the use of the adjectives is also metaphorical. For the purpose of illustration, I provide Figure 1 to show how metonymy and metaphor interact with each other to result in the compound word 磨嘴.

As shown in Figure 1, the compound involves two mappings: one is metonymic (i.e. a mapping within the same conceptual frame or matrix domain), represented by an open-headed arrow, and the other is metaphoric (i.e. a mapping across two conceptual frames or domains), represented by a solid-headed arrow.

Figure 2 illustrates the case of 嘴尖.

Again, this compound involves two different mappings, metonymic and metaphoric. Since in both of the cases above, the mappings, metonymic or metaphoric, take place within the conceptual frame of speaking, we can refer to them as cases of “metaphor within metonymy” (Goossens 2002; readers are also referred to Barcelona 2000a, Dirven & Pörings 2002 for the cognitive linguistic views on the interaction between metaphor and metonymy).




Figure 1. Interaction between metonymy and metaphor in *mo-zui* (grind-mouth) ‘indulge in idle talk or argue pointlessly’




Figure 2. Interaction between metonymy and metaphor in *zui-jian* (mouth-pointed) ‘cutting in speech’

What is especially interesting is my finding regarding the third conceptual metonymy **SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE**, the metonymic transfer that has skipped the two intermediate links, **SPEAKING** and **SPEECH**. As Radden (2004) shows, this metonymy has been widely attested across languages. It is, however, not manifested lexically in Chinese. None of the speech organ terms in Chinese, from ‘mouth’ to ‘tongue’, can really mean ‘language’ in any context. For instance, mother tongue in English can only be translated into 母语 *muyu*, i.e. ‘mother language, but not 母舌 *mushe* (i.e. ‘mother tongue’); and 人口 *renkou* (human-mouth) in Chinese does not mean ‘language’, but means ‘population’ (because population counts the number of ‘human mouths’ that need feeding!). This finding seems to suggest that Chinese has fallen short of the metonymic chain widely attested across languages (Radden 2004). What is particularly intriguing, however, is the discovery that in Chinese, while **SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE** is not manifested lexically, it is nevertheless realized in its logographic writing system as semantic components of the characters. Look at (28).

- (28) a. 口 *kou* ‘mouth’
 b. 舌 *she* ‘tongue’
 c. 言 *yan* ‘speech’
 d. 话 *hua* ‘speech; oral language’ (Traditional character: 話)
 e. 语 *yu* ‘speech; language’ (Traditional character: 語)
 f. 言语 *yanyu* ‘speech’ (Traditional characters: 言語)
 g. 语言 *yuyan* ‘language’ (Traditional characters: 語言)

In (28a, b) are the Chinese words for ‘mouth’ and ‘tongue’, respectively. They both also serve as radicals, i.e. components of other characters. Thus, the Chinese characters for the words ‘speech’ and ‘language’, 言 *yan* (28c) and 语 *yu* (28e) respectively, both contain the ‘mouth’ radical 口 *kou*. In contemporary Chinese, in fact, these two words combine to form a compound 言语 *yanyu* (28f), meaning ‘speech’,

and when its two constituents are reversed in order, the result is the compound word for ‘language’ 语言 *yuyan* (28g). It is worth mentioning that in the traditional writing system, the semantic component, known as the ‘speech’ radical, on the left side of the character for ‘language’ 语 *yu* (28e) is 言 *yan*, which itself contains a ‘mouth’ radical 口 *kou* (28a), as in (28c). Besides, another word that is represented by the character 话 *hua* (28d) also means ‘speech’, and is composed of two constituents: on the left is the ‘speech’ radical, which contains the ‘mouth’ 口 *kou* in its traditional variant (言 *yan* as in (28c)), and on the right is the radical 舌 *she* that means ‘tongue’, which is also a character with the same meaning when used alone (28b). As we can see, the character for ‘tongue’, i.e. 舌 *she*, also contains a ‘mouth’ radical 口 *kou* in it. Therefore, it is clear that the Chinese characters meaning ‘speech’ and ‘language’ all contain the radical for ‘mouth’ 口 *kou* and one of them meaning ‘speech’ or ‘oral/spoken language’ contains the radical for ‘tongue’ 舌 *she*.⁴ Based on these facts, it can be concluded that in Chinese the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE is manifested in the logographic writing system although it is not manifested lexically as in many other languages. This finding provides an interesting and telling example of how the general cognitive principle of embodiment can be realized in and embraced by a culture-specific environment.

The Chinese logographic writing system is an important area where the manifestation of conceptual metonymies and metaphors can be studied in the Chinese language. For instance, in Yu (2007b, 2009), I argue that the heart is traditionally conceptualized as the central faculty of cognition in Chinese culture. Therefore, in the Chinese language, the word 心 *xin* that primarily denotes the heart organ may also refer to it as the ‘organ for thinking’ and the ‘seat of thought and emotions’. This fact is displayed clearly in the unique logographic writing system of Chinese. Thus, many Chinese characters for words related to

4. As one of the anonymous reviewers suggested, there may be many characters with the ‘mouth’ radical in Chinese today that do not have anything to do with ‘mouth’. This is because, throughout the long history of evolution of the Chinese writing system, from the earliest pictographic drawings to the traditional characters that are used in Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc., and to the simplified characters that are used in Mainland China and some other countries, Chinese characters have undergone some major stages of change toward formalization, abstraction, and simplification. As a result, the characters in the Chinese writing system as a whole are no longer as pictographic or even ideographic today as they were thousands of years ago. Therefore, the motivation for certain characters to contain certain radicals have become opaque, especially to ordinary people who use characters merely for the purpose of daily communication and do not care about their etymology. Nonetheless, such motivation with most characters is still there, and helpful to those who learn the Chinese language. As an old saying goes, “A scholar can guess (the meaning or the pronunciation of) a new character from a half (i.e. a radical indicating the meaning or the pronunciation) of it (秀才认字认半边)”. I return to this point later in the section.

thought and feelings contain the ‘heart’ radical as their semantic component. Here are a few examples pertaining to thinking or thought: 思 *si* ‘think; consider; deliberate; think of; long for; thought; thinking’, 想 *xiang* ‘think; ponder; think back; try to remember; recall; recollect; consider; miss’, 虑 *lǜ* ‘consider; ponder; think over; concern; worry’, and 念 *nian* ‘think of; miss; thought; idea’. The following are two common characters representing words for feeling: 感 *gan* ‘feel; sense; feeling’ and 情 *qing* ‘feeling; affection; sentiment; passion’. Note that the ‘heart’ radical has two variants in the Chinese writing system. The canonical one, which looks the same as the word 心 *xin* ‘heart’, often occurs at the bottom of a character, as in 思 *si*, 想 *xiang*, 虑 *lǜ*, 念 *nian*, and 感 *gan*. The other one, usually called the ‘vertical heart radical’, stands on the left side of a character, as in 情 *qing*. Also, single-character words often combine with others to form so-called compound words in present-day Chinese. For instance, the preceding single-character words can form the following compounds: 思想 *sixiang* ‘thought; thinking; idea; ideology’, 思虑 *silǜ* ‘consider; contemplate; deliberate’, 思念 *sinian* ‘think of; long for; miss’, 感情 *ganqing* ‘emotion; feeling; sentiment; affection’, and 情感 *qinggan* ‘emotion; feeling’. As suggested by the characters and meanings of the words they code, or the connection between form and meaning, the heart represents a person’s intellectual and affective center and locus of mental and emotional life, and it is therefore traditionally regarded as the central faculty of cognition in Chinese culture (Yu 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009). From a linguistic point of view, these characters manifest a conceptual metonymy HEART FOR THOUGHT AND FEELINGS, or at the generic level CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED, since according to the Chinese cultural conceptualization, the heart is the seat (or container) of both thought and feelings.

Here is another example that I have discussed elsewhere (Yu 2009): the Chinese compound word 忖度 *cunduo* ‘speculate; conjecture; surmise’, which is represented by two characters that have a spatial connotation. The first character is composed of the ‘heart’ radical on its left and the character for ‘inch’ on the right; the second character *duo* originally means ‘to measure’ (see HYDCD 2000: 983), and with a change in pronunciation (*du*) and tone (from the second to the fourth) it means ‘linear measure’. Thus, the mental activities of speculating, conjecturing, and surmising something is to ‘measure it for its spatial dimensions’. That is, SPECULATING, CONJECTURING, OR SURMISING IS MEASURING.

Interestingly, in a related compound 忖量 *cunliang* ‘think over; turn over in one’s mind; conjecture; guess’, the second character can mean ‘measure’ when used as a verb (and ‘capacity’, ‘volume’, etc., when used as a noun); when its tone is changed (from the fourth to the second), it becomes a verb that again means ‘measure’. In another related word 忖摸 *cunmo* ‘reckon; estimate; conjecture’, the second character means to ‘feel’, ‘stroke’, or ‘touch’ with one’s hand. The metaphorical

mapping from bodily onto mental experience is very obvious. It is again interesting to note that, while the first character 忖 *cun* 'think over; ponder; speculate' contains the 'heart' radical on its left, the second character of the compound 摸 *mo* 'feel; stroke; touch' contains the 'hand' radical on its left side. Applying the metaphorical formula A IS B, we can say that the first character represents the target concept whereas the second represents the source concept. The metaphor so derived is THINKING OVER, PONDERING, OR SPECULATING (IN ONE'S HEART) IS FEELING, STROKING, OR TOUCHING (WITH ONE'S HANDS). That is, at the generic level, it is MENTAL FUNCTION IS MANUAL ACTION, OR MIND IS BODY, a conceptual metaphor that summarizes the embodied nature of human cognition.

The Chinese logographic writing system, evolved from the earliest drawing through formalization, abstraction, and simplification differs from the alphabetic phonetic writing system in that the linguistic signs in the latter are largely symbolic in nature whereas those in the former, e.g. Chinese characters, are to some extent related to the concepts they represent iconically and/or indexically, as well as symbolically.⁵ According to *Shuowen Jiezi* (Explaining Simple and Analyzing Compound Characters) by Xu Shen (ca. 58–147) of the Han Dynasty, Chinese characters are divided into six categories according to their structures and relationships to the referents they represent. In the following, the four major kinds are illustrated. The pictograms, which are relatively small in number, bear an imaginatively iconic relationship with the referents they represent. The character 山 *shan* 'mountain' is such an example, still having the shape of a mountain with three peaks. The simple ideograms are usually characterized by a diagrammatically iconic relation with the referents they represent, and often such a relationship also contains an indexical relation based on a pictographic character. For example, the character 木 *mu* 'tree; wood' is originally pictographic. Based on this character, 本 *ben*, which originally refers to the root of a tree, and 末 *mo*, which originally refers to the tip or top of a tree, both add one stroke to indexically 'point to' the part of the tree they each refer to, root or tip. The compound ideograms can be illustrated

5. That is, following the Peircean theory of semiotics, signs are classified into icons, indexes, and symbols according to the relationships they bear to their referents: the iconic relation is based on similarity, the indexical relation on contiguity (spatial or causal), and the symbolic relation on conventionality. Readers are referred to Hiraga (2005: ch. 7) for a detailed discussion of iconicity (imagic and diagrammatic) and the logographic writing system. There it is argued that in the mixed writing system of Japanese *kanji* (i.e. Chinese characters) function as "graphic icons" in contrast with phonographic *hiragana*, and thus serve as a poetic medium in poetic texts (199). As Hiraga (2005) points out, however, the degree of iconicity varies greatly among Chinese characters depending on the principles on which they are formed. Readers are also referred to McDonald (2009) for a recent argument in the debates on the nature of the Chinese writing system in the field of Chinese studies.

by the character 信 *xin* 'faith; trust', which is composed of the radical for 'person' on the left and that for 'speaking' or 'speech' on the right, and is therefore interpreted as 'a man standing by his word'. Here, indexically, the 'person' radical indicates the fact that the word refers to a human quality, and the 'speech' radical indicates that it has to do with what one says; hence, together they can mean '(a person) keeping one's word or promise'. As indicated earlier, the 'speech' radical itself contains a 'mouth' radical, which indexically points to the meanings of 'speaking' and 'speech'. The phono-semantic compounds, which by far make up the largest category, consist of a phonetic component (suggesting the pronunciation) and a semantic component (indicating the meaning). The characters discussed earlier, such as 想 *xiang* 'think; ponder', 情 *qing* 'feeling; affection', 摸 *mo* 'touch; stroke', and 唱 *chang* 'sing', all belong to this category. Their semantic elements, referring to a part of the body, heart, hand, and mouth, are indexical of their meanings respectively.⁶

As discussed above, pictographic characters are imagic icons, based on the similarity between the shapes of the character and its referent. In other words, these characters can be said to be metaphorically related to the concepts they represent. On the other hand, the characters that contain an indexical element based on the relationship of contiguity (between, e.g. the heart and thinking or feeling, the hand and touching or stroking, or the mouth and singing) are metonymically related to the concepts they represent. As logographic scripts, Chinese characters, therefore, are contrastive with alphabetic phonetic scripts, which are generally related to the concepts they represent symbolically, thus involving little metaphor or metonymy on the plane of the writing system. In light of the difference between logographic vs. alphabetic writing, we can see why it is possible and natural for the SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE metonymy to be manifested at the level of characters in Chinese.

In this chapter, I have not studied the metonymic shifts along the metonymic chain SPEAKING FOR SPEECH and SPEECH FOR LANGUAGE since my focus is on the initial link, SPEECH ORGAN. But how do SPEAKING FOR SPEECH and SPEECH FOR LANGUAGE fare in Chinese? And does SPEAKING FOR LANGUAGE hold in Chinese if we assume the metonymic shift can skip a link (i.e. SPEECH) along the metonymic chain, as we see is the case cross-linguistically with SPEECH ORGAN, which can actually skip two links (i.e. SPEAKING AND SPEECH)? These are the questions for further research. At this point, I can propose only some hypotheses based on some preliminary evidence. Let us look at the following list (collected from HYCD 1995; NACED 2004):

6. In addition to these four, the remaining two, called 'transformed cognates' and 'rebus writing', are relatively minor categories, where the characters do not have the same iconic or indexical motivations as those in the other four categories.

- (29) a. 说 *shuo* (i) speak; talk; explain (ii) theory; teachings; views; doctrine (e.g. 自圆其说 *ziyuan qi shuo* 'justify oneself [i.e. one's theory, views, etc.]')
- b. 讲 *jiang* (i) speak; say; tell; explain; interpret; discuss; negotiate (ii) lecture (e.g. 第一讲 *diyī jiang* 'the first lecture')
- c. 谈 *tan* (i) talk; chat; discuss (ii) what is said or talked about (e.g. 无稽之谈 *wuji zhi tan* 'unfounded rumor; sheer nonsense')
- d. 话 *hua* (i) word; talk; oral language (e.g. 中国话 *Zhongguo hua* 'Chinese [spoken] language') (ii) talk about; speak about (e.g. 共话往事 *gonghua wangshi* 'talk together about past events')
- e. 言 *yan* (i) speech; word; character (ii) say; talk; speak (e.g. 不言而喻 *buyan eryu* 'it goes without saying')
- f. 语 *yu* (i) language; words; set phrase; proverb; saying (ii) speak; say (e.g. 默默不语 *momo buyu* 'speak nothing')

In (29a–c) are three verbs of speaking, as in (i), but they all have nominal meanings that fall into the category of speech, as in (ii). In other words, we can hypothesize that the nominal meanings of these verbs reflect the underlying metonymy SPEAKING FOR SPEECH. Of course diachronic studies are required to confirm the historical development of the senses of these words (i.e. to find out if they are instances of SPEAKING FOR SPEECH), but the synchronic link between their verbal and nominal senses is obvious.

The three words in (29d–f) are regarded as primarily nominal in present-day Chinese, as in (i). All three of them have verbal meanings as well, as in (ii), and their verbal senses can be traced back to ancient times when they might have been even more common verbs of linguistic action than they are today. Again, the link between their verbal and nominal senses is there, but diachronic studies are necessary to determine whether they represent cases of SPEAKING FOR SPEECH (i.e. ACTION FOR RESULT). The word in (29f) is the only one in the list that can mean 'language' in a complete sense (whereas (29d) is usually restricted to 'oral language'), but it also possesses the meanings that fall into the categories of speech and speaking. We can hypothesize that the links are related to each other in a way that conforms to the metonymic chain: speaking → speech → language, but again only diachronic studies can confirm this hypothesis. In *Shuowen Jiezi*, the etymology dictionary from the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), for instance, 语 in (29f) is defined with 论 *lun*, which nowadays have some primary verbal senses 'comment; discuss; talk about', but also some secondary nominal senses such as 'view; opinion; theory; doctrine' (see e.g. NACED 2004: 1021). That is, if we confirmed that in ancient times (29f) was primarily a verb of linguistic action, then we could conclude that the metonymy SPEAKING FOR LANGUAGE is realized lexically in the

Chinese language whereas, returning to the focus of this chapter, the metonymy *speech organ for language* is realized ideographically in its writing system (see the discussions centered on Example (28) above).

In sum, my study as a whole is a case of ‘embodiment via body parts’. It demonstrates that human meaning and understanding are indeed embodied. We can mean what we do and understand what we do because we have the kind of the body we have. If we had a different kind of body, with a different kind of structure, the way we understand the world and the way we use language would be different accordingly. It is because human beings all have similar bodies with similar functions that the metonymic chain under discussion may have the potential of being a universal. Nonetheless, the body always exists in its cultural context, and the mind that is embodied is never free from the dynamic forces of culture. In my study, for instance, the rich manifestation of the metonymies SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING and SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH at the lexical level reveals the important role of cultural influences. Similarly, the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE, absent in the lexicon, but present in the writing system, displays a unique characteristic of Chinese language and culture.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I have undertaken an analysis of Chinese speech organ terms and their role in the Chinese folk understanding of language. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows:

1. The metonymies SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING and SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH are pervasive in conventionalized Chinese expressions. I take the existence of these conceptual metonymies as an indication of their significance in Chinese culture.
2. In contrast, however, the metonymy SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE is not realized at the level of the lexicon, as in many other languages, but it plays an important role in the Chinese writing system. This finding presents a striking example of how the general cognitive principle of embodiment can be realized in and embraced by a culture-specific environment – in this study, the ideographic writing system characteristic of Chinese culture and language.
3. Metaphor plays an important role in the construction of many of the conventionalized expressions that are primarily metonymic in character. This finding reinforces the argument of Cognitive Linguistics that metaphor is often motivated by metonymy and therefore often has a metonymic basis (e.g. Barcelona 2000c; Niemeier 2000; Radden 2000; see also Dirven & Pörings 2002).

4. The findings of my study are synchronically compatible with Radden's (2004) metonymic chain hypothesis. However, only thorough diachronic studies can provide a definitive answer to the question whether the metonymic chain model is correct.
5. The findings of my study, in general, support the claim for the embodied nature of human cognition (Gibbs 2006; Johnson 1987, 2007; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1999), and embodiment situated in cultural contexts (Gibbs 1999; Ziemke, Zlatev, & Frank 2007; Frank et al. 2008; Sharifian et al. 2008; Yu 2009).

In this chapter, I have focused on the initial link of Radden's metonymic chain, speech organ, in keeping with the theme of this volume "embodiment via body parts". I have investigated how this initial link gives rise to semantic shifts along the chain, that is, the metonymies SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEAKING, SPEECH ORGAN FOR SPEECH, and SPEECH ORGAN FOR LANGUAGE, including semantic leaps in the case of the latter two metonymies. The directionality of the metonymic chain exploited by the three metonymies moves from concrete to increasingly abstract concepts, namely from the body part (SPEECH ORGAN) via the linguistic action (*speaking*) and the linguistic product (SPEECH) to the linguistic system (LANGUAGE). The study of explicit use of body-part terms for metonymic and metaphoric extensions is, however, only the first step toward the discovery of the full mechanisms of the embodiment principle in human language and cognition, just as SPEECH ORGAN is only the initial link of the chain that leads to the metonymic conceptualization of language. The other possible metonymies, SPEAKING FOR SPEECH, SPEECH FOR LANGUAGE, and SPEAKING FOR LANGUAGE, are not realized by means of speech organ terms, but they are very likely grounded in embodied experiences and presuppose the notion speech organ as the initial link.

Embodiment has to do with the body. The body is at the center of the "radial network" of human language and cognition. This body is however surrounded by the dynamic forces of culture. In each cultural context, therefore, the body "radiates" with a different pattern of "routes" and "nodes".

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Appendix

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|--------|------|--|
| (1) a. | 口惠 | <i>kou-hui</i> (mouth-favorable) ‘lip service; empty promise’ |
| b. | 嘴损 | <i>zui-sun</i> (mouth-damaging/cutting) <i>dial.</i> ‘sharp-tongued; sarcastic’ |
| c. | 嘴笨 | <i>zui-ben</i> (mouth-stupid) ‘inarticulate; clumsy of speech’ |
| d. | 嘴刁 | <i>zui-diao</i> (mouth-tricky) <i>dial.</i> ‘talk cunningly and craftily; be choosy with food’ |
| e. | 嘴乖 | <i>zui-guai</i> (mouth-well-behaved) ‘(of children) clever and pleasant when speaking to elders’ |
| f. | 嘴甜 | <i>zui-tian</i> (mouth-sweet) ‘ingratiating in speech; smooth-tongued; honey-mouthed’ |
| (2) a. | 开口闭口 | <i>kai-kou bi-kou</i> (open-mouth close-mouth) ‘every time one opens one’s mouth; whenever one speaks’ |
| b. | 闭口不谈 | <i>bi-kou bu-tan</i> (shut-mouth not-talk) ‘refuse to say anything about’ |
| c. | 破口大骂 | <i>po-kou da-ma</i> (break-mouth big-curse) ‘shout abuse; let loose a torrent of abuse’ |
| d. | 顺口搭音 | <i>shun-kou da-yin</i> (go with-mouth throw in-sound) ‘echo what others say; chime in with others’ |

- e. 交口称赞 *jiao-kou chengzan* (cross-mouth praise) 'unanimously praise'
- f. 出口成章 *chu-kou cheng-zhang* (exit-mouth become-essay) 'words flow from the mouth as from the pen of a master'
- g. 出口伤人 *chu-kou shang-ren* (exit-mouth hurt-people) 'say things that will hurt others' feelings; speak bitinglly'
- h. 杀人灭口 *sha-ren mie-kou* (kill-people extinguish-mouth) 'silence a witness by killing him; kill sb. to prevent him from disclosing a secret'
- i. 空口无凭 *kong-kou wu-ping* (empty-mouth no-guarantee) 'a mere verbal statement is no guarantee'
- j. 血口喷人 *xue-kou pen-ren* (bloody-mouth spurt-people) 'make unfounded and malicious attacks upon sb.; venomously slander'
- k. 口口声声 *kou-kou sheng-sheng* (mouth-mouth voice-voice) 'say again and again; keep on saying'
- l. 口角春风 *kou-jiao sheng-feng* (mouth-corner spring-wind) 'make favorable remarks about sb.; put in a good word for sb.'
- m. 口角生风 *kou-jiao sheng-feng* (mouth-corner produce-wind) 'speak fluently'
- n. 口诛笔伐 *kou-zhu bi-fa* (mouth-punish pen-attack) 'condemn both in speech and writing'
- o. 如出一口 *ru chu yi kou* (like coming out of one mouth) 'as if from one mouth; unanimously'
- p. 嘴不干净 *zui bu ganjing* (mouth not clean) 'use dirty language'
- q. 嘴不饶人 *zui bu rao ren* (mouth not forgive people) 'fond of making sarcastic remarks'
- (3) a. 嘴快心直 *zui-kuai xin-zhi* (mouth-fast heart-straight) 'be outspoken and frank; straightforward and sincere'
- b. 有嘴无心 *you-zui wu-xin* (have-mouth not have-heart) 'be sharp-tongued but not malicious'
- c. 口凶心软 *kou-xiong xin-ruan* (mouth-fierce heart-soft) 'one's bark is worse than one's bit'
- d. 嘴硬心软 *zui-ying xin-ruan* (mouth-hard heart-soft) 'firm in speech but soft in heart'
- e. 口甜心辣 *kou-tian xin-la* (mouth-sweet heart-peppery) 'honey on the lips and viciousness in the heart'
- (4) a. 不齿 *bu-chi* (not-teeth/mention) 'not worth mentioning; despise'
- b. 齿冷 *chi-leng* (teeth-cold) *form.* 'laugh sb. to scorn'

- c. 鼓舌 *gu-she* (beat-tongue) 'wag the tongue (esp. in honeyed talk)'
- d. 学舌 *xue-she* (learn-tongue) 'mechanically repeat other people's words'; *inf.* 'wag one's tongue spreading hearsay'
- e. 舌战 *she-zhan* (tongue-battle/war) 'have a verbal battle with; argue heatedly with; a hot dispute; a verbal battle'
- (5) a. 钳口结舌 *qian-kou jie-she* (clamp-mouth tie-tongue) 'keep one's mouth shut; hold one's tongue'
- b. 赤口毒舌 *chi-kou du-she* (red-mouth poisonous-tongue) 'venomous tongue; vile language'
- c. 尖嘴薄舌 *jian-zui bo-she* (pointed-mouth thin-tongue) 'have a caustic and flippant tongue'
- d. 轻嘴薄舌 *qing-zui bo-she* (light-mouth thin-tongue) 'have a caustic and sharp tongue'
- e. 多嘴多舌 *duo-zui duo-she* (many-mouth many-tongue) 'gossipy and meddlesome; long-tongued'
- f. 贫嘴薄舌 *pin-zui bo-she* (poor-mouth thin-tongue) 'be garrulous and sharp-tongued'
- g. 拙嘴笨舌 *zhuo-zui ben-she* (clumsy-mouth stupid-tongue) 'clumsy-tongued; inarticulate'
- h. 利嘴巧舌 *li-zui qiao-she* (sharp-mouth skilful tongue) 'have the gift of the gab'
- i. 调嘴学舌 *tiao-zui xue-she* (adjust-mouth learn-tongue) 'tittle-tattle; gossip'
- j. 嘴乖舌巧 *zui-guai she-qiao* (mouth-good tongue-skilful) 'be full of gibes and ready with one's tongue'
- k. 嘴尖舌巧 *zui-jian she-qiao* (mouth-pointed tongue-skilful) 'gifted with a quick and sharp tongue'

Inner and outer body parts

The case of *hara* ‘belly’ and *koshi* ‘lower back’ in Japanese*

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The aim of this chapter is to consider the relationship between the outer and inner body as sources of motivation for metonymy and metaphor. We base our discussion on examples of Japanese expressions that use outer and inner areas of the body centered around the abdominal region: *hara* ‘belly’ and *koshi* ‘lower back’, respectively. Figurative expressions with *koshi*, which are linked to a human possessor, are strongly related to motion or attitude, while the ones with *hara* are related to mental or spiritual states or activities. Moreover, there is a tendency for the two words to differ in the way that their core meanings are tropically extended: *koshi*-related expressions are mainly extended metonymically, whereas *hara*-related expressions are extended metaphorically. However, this tendency of motivation by metonymy and metaphor does not hold when *koshi* and *hara* are figuratively used with non-human referents in the external world.

Keywords: attitude, human possessor, metaphor, metonymy, motion, spiritual states and activities

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and overview

This chapter aims to explicate the relationship between the outer body and the inner body as a source of motivation for metonymy and metaphor. This can also be regarded as a detailed case study, developed from what Yu (2002: 359) points out

* We would like to express our gratitude to Wataru Koyama, Zouheir A. Maalej, John Robert Ross, Kazuko Shinohara, Ning Yu, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful suggestions and constructive criticisms on an earlier version of this chapter.

about the general orientation of semantic extension: “the expressions involving external body parts are primarily metonymic, whereas those involving internal body parts are fundamentally metaphoric”.¹ In order to test this assumption, we have conducted a contrastive analysis of an outer and an inner part of the body, both of which are in similar locations, namely, Japanese *koshi* ‘lower back’ and *hara* ‘belly’.

Koshi ‘lower back’ and *hara* ‘belly’ have been chosen for the following reasons: (i) *koshi* and *hara* are both perceived as central parts of our body. They differ, however, in that *koshi* indicates the back side of our torso, including lower back and upper hip areas, while *hara* indicates the front; (ii) *koshi* is perceived more predominantly as an outer body part than *hara*, which is perceived as an inner part, exactly like the abdomen, the stomach, and the intestines; (iii) *koshi* and *hara* are used interchangeably in several metonymic/metaphoric idioms.

We first argue that the outer body part *koshi* generates figurative meanings motivated mainly by metonymy, whereas the figurative meanings generated by the inner body part *hara* are motivated by metaphor. We also claim that *koshi* figurative expressions with a human possessor (e.g. *koshi-ga suwat-ta hito* ‘a person with his/her *koshi* set’) are strongly related to attitude and behavior, while the ones using *hara* (e.g. *hara-ga suwat-ta hito* ‘a person with his/her *hara* set’) refer to mental or spiritual stability.² When *koshi* and *hara* acquire figurative meanings in relation to non-human referents (e.g. *koshi-ga tsuyoi men* ‘noodles with strong *koshi*’) and events (e.g. *hanashi-no koshi-o oru* ‘to break the *koshi* of conversation’), extended meanings of *koshi* are mainly metaphoric, while those of *hara* (e.g. *yubi-no hara* ‘*hara* of a finger’) are metonymic. A detailed examination of corpus-based data reveals a complex tropic interplay of metaphor and metonymy in arriving at the figurative meanings of *koshi* and *hara*.

1.2 Literature review

Our work owes its theoretical orientation to cognitive studies of the interplay between metaphor and metonymy in recent studies done by Barcelona (2000), Dirven & Pörings (2002), and Taniguchi (2003), among others. In particular, Radden (2003), Goossens (2002), and Deignan (2005) claim that metaphor and

1. Strictly, Yu (2002) confines his argument to the expressions describing *emotions* in Chinese. In order to test its potentiality and applicability to the cross-linguistic research project as attempted in this volume, we broadened the purview to include expressions not only of emotions but also of other factors such as human behaviors, attitudes, as well as qualities or status of inanimate referents.

2. Figurative expressions in Japanese are underlined.

metonymy are inseparable as human cognitive mechanisms. It can be safely affirmed, in light of a conclusion supported by recent neurophysiological work (Johnson 1999; Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 2003[1980]), that a metaphor vs. metonymy dichotomy should now be replaced by a continuum or cline, one which has metaphor and metonymy at its opposing extremes – similarity or cross-domain mapping on the one hand, and contiguity or intra-domain mapping on the other (Gibbs 1994; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Kövecses 2002, 2005, to name a few).

There has been considerable literature on cross-linguistic studies about embodiment, particularly with regard to emotions such as anger and love in American English (Lakoff & Kövecses 1987; Kövecses 2000, 2005), Tunisian Arabic (Maalej 2004), Chinese (Yu 1995, 1998; Horszowska 2007), and so forth. Recent studies of the Japanese language in a similar vein include Matsuki (1995), McVeigh (1996), Hasada (2002), and Shinohara & Matsunaka (2003), who touch on one of the words we are focusing on – *hara*.

Nevertheless, little has been done to look into figurative embodiment in Japanese from the perspective of the tropic interplay between metaphor and metonymy. No detailed study has been conducted to date to examine the relationship of inner and outer body parts in Japanese, either. In the present chapter, therefore, we hope to clarify the way in which inner and outer body parts give rise to figurative meanings.

2. Data

2.1 Defining *koshi* and *hara*

In order to conduct a contrastive analysis of the outer body part *koshi* and the inner body part *hara* in conventional figurative expressions, we first need to identify their referential meanings. *Koshi* is usually translated into English as 'waist' or 'hip'. However, this translation requires further elaboration. Following Tatsukawa's explanation (2000: 106) of the location of *koshi*, we would like to define *koshi* as including 'lower back' and 'upper hip'. Hence, when *koshi* is mentioned in this chapter, it should be understood that it covers these areas. It is a matter of convenience that we use the word 'lower back' as an English gloss.

Hara refers to the lower front of one's torso as well as several organs in the digestive system; therefore, it has several possible English translations, such as 'stomach', 'abdomen', 'intestines', 'gut', and 'belly'. While Matsuki (1995: 142) defines *hara* "as the area surrounding the navel, corresponding in meaning to the English word *belly*", McVeigh (1996: 38) defines it as "anatomically meaning the stomach, belly,




Figure 1. Locations of *koshi* 'lower back' and *hara* 'belly' in Japanese

or abdomen". Strictly speaking, however, 'stomach' does not seem to us to cover the same area as *hara*. 'Abdomen' and 'intestines', which are formal medical terms denotationally corresponding to *hara*, do not convey an informal colloquial nuance, as does *hara*. 'Gut' is used in a wide range of contexts including not only informal ones but also formal and technical ones, sharing with *hara* some figurative potential related to emotions and feelings. Nevertheless, we do not regard it as the translational equivalent in order not to confuse those who wish to trace a line of the discussions on *hara*, which has been translated as 'belly' by researchers of Japanese. Taking these into consideration, we use 'belly', with its colloquial and informal connotations, for the translational equivalent to *hara* in this chapter.

In sum, taking the definition into account, Figure 1 is a simplified illustration, intended to clarify the spatial relationships of our objects of analysis, *koshi* and *hara*.

In addition to their referential meanings, as lexical entries in dictionaries, these body parts show different degrees of tropic potentiality. *Koshi* is figuratively used, in most cases, with other modifiers or predicates as in *koshi-ga hikui*, (lit. 'someone's lower back is low'), which means that 'someone is polite'. On the other hand, as a lexical item *hara* has conventionalized figurative meanings such as 'mind', 'idea', or 'feeling', which make further tropic extensions possible in combination with other modifiers as in *hara-ga ookii*, (lit. 'someone's belly is big') figuratively meaning that 's/he is broad minded'. We discuss this issue in detail with examples in Section 3.

2.2 Data collection

Our corpus comprises data from four sources: (i) our introspective judgments as native speakers of Japanese; (ii) Japanese dictionaries (Kitahara 1990; Kitahara et al. 2000–2002); (iii) the relevant literature on embodiment terms, such as *Karada kotoba* ['Body language'] (Tatsukawa 2000) and *Koshi-hara bunka no saisei* ['Revitalization of koshi-hara culture'] (Saito 2000); and (iv) the internet.

We have relied not only on Japanese dictionaries but also on introspection and the Internet. Although dictionaries do provide us with a large number of

conventionalized expressions that include *koshi* and *hara*, we do not know how they occur in texts (their frequencies of use, for example) or even how their meanings may be modified (i.e. contextualized) in present-day Japanese. As for the relevant literature, we think that Tatsukawa (2000) and Saito (2000) are appropriate sources to negotiate the differences between people's linguistic intuitions and pragmatic conventionality. Even though their explanations are not based on cognitive linguistic perspectives, these two books are very informative about the common usage of Japanese embodiment terms.

Some 114 tokens of *koshi* and *hara* have been collected from the dictionaries; but, due to space limitation, we have reduced the number to be analyzed to 32 (14 *koshi*-related expressions and 18 *hara*-related expressions, including three contexts in which either terms may be used). We have omitted from our analysis a number of apparently archaic and obsolete expressions on the basis of our intuitions and of our Internet searches.

3. Analysis

Koshi and *hara* can be used as figurative expressions, with or without a human possessor. We first look at examples related to a human possessor because they involve a primary semantic extension in their figurative usage.

After examining, as a pivotal case, a set of expressions in which *koshi* and *hara* can be used interchangeably, the chapter deals with an extensive analysis of *koshi* and *hara* in combination with verbs and adjectives. We argue that prototypically the figurative meanings of *koshi* arise via metonymic conceptualizations, while those of *hara* via metaphoric conceptualizations. The last part of our analysis of these two terms concerns *koshi* and *hara* with non-human or inanimate referents, where our claim is that the tendency of motivation by metonymy and metaphor changes: with inanimate referents, *koshi* predominantly gives rise to metaphoric conceptualizations, and *hara* to metonymic ones.

3.1 Interchangeable expressions

To begin with, though there are many conventionalized expressions that can contain either *koshi* or *hara*, we examine figurative meanings and tropic structures of a set of expressions, *koshi-o sue-ru* and *hara-o sue-ru*.³ In these pivotal examples, *koshi* and *hara* can be used interchangeably and their literal English translations

3. Literal senses of Japanese *sueru* are generally to fix, place, set, or lay down something heavy such as a big stone or a machine in a place where it should be.

are almost the same (lit. ‘to set lower back/belly’), figuratively meaning ‘for someone to settle down to do something’. Superficial lexical choice between them would not tell us how they are different; but, a contrast of their usage in different contexts makes it possible to reveal their different connotations or pragmatic implications, which will enable us to analyze the distinct ways in which these two words extend their meanings metaphorically and metonymically. Let us start with the following set of examples:⁴

- (1) a. *Koshi-o sue-te shigoto-ni torikaka-roo.*
 lower.back-ACC set-PART job-DAT deal.with-IMP
 ‘Let’s settle down to deal with the job’
- b. *Hara-o sue-te shigoto-ni torikaka-roo.*
 belly-ACC set-PART job-DAT deal.with-IMP
 ‘Let’s settle down to deal with the job’

Imagine that you are a project team leader having a meeting with other members. In this situation, if you say (1a), people there would have to almost literally (i.e. physically) set the position of the lower back and refrain from leaving the space in question in order to work on their time-consuming task for a long time, which requires a great amount of endurance. In this sense, it is clear that the meaning of the expression is extended metonymically.

On the other hand, if you say (1b) in a similar situation, it may not be necessary for everyone to stay there *physically* and do their job for a long time; instead, it requires determination or mental readiness in order to overcome any possible future risks or obstacles to the project. As we briefly mentioned in the previous section, the semantic distinction of (1a) and (1b) comes from the fact that *hara*, not *koshi*, as a lexical item has metaphoric meanings of mind or feeling, which is further activated by the verb *sueru* (lit. ‘to fix, place, lay down’), resulting in the metaphoric meaning of mental readiness.

Now consider the following pair:

- (2) a. *Taro-wa koshi-o sue-te saiban-ni nozon-da.*
 Taro-TOP lower.back-ACC set-PART trial-DAT attend-PART
 ‘Taro settled down to attend the trial’
- b. *Taro-wa hara-o sue-te saiban-ni nozon-da.*
 Taro-TOP belly-ACC set-PART trial-DAT attend-PART
 ‘Taro settled down to attend the trial’

4. Abbreviations for grammatical terms are: ACC(usative), DAT(ive), GEN(itive), GER(undive), IMP(erative), INST(rument), LOC(ative), NEG(ative), NOM(inative), PART(iciple), PAST, TOP(ic). When a string of words in English corresponds to one word in Japanese, dots are used instead of spaces to show word boundaries.

Example (2a) implies strongly that the trial, or a series of trials, will take place over an extensive period of time, requiring physical attendance of an agent (i.e. Taro), whereas (2b), which could also imply the temporal lengthiness of the event(s) in question, foregrounds mental "settling", or determination on the part of the possessor rather than his merely staying in the same place. Thus, as is the case with (1b), the implication of (2b) involves mental readiness to go through with the event(s), no matter what difficulties or risks might ensue in the process, or after it.

The comparison of (3a) with (3b) lends further support to the analysis above:

- (3) a. *Kono-CD-wa koshi-o sue-te kiki-tai.*
 this-CD-TOP lower.back-ACC set-PART listen.to-want
 'I want to sit back and enjoy this CD'
- b. ??*Kono-CD-wa hara-o sue-te kiki-tai.*
 this-CD-TOP belly-ACC set-PART listen.to-want
 'I want to listen to this CD with great concentration'

In general, listening to music should be an enjoyable, entertaining pastime. Thus (3a) is totally acceptable, because by setting the *koshi*, one would probably sit back and relax, and spend as much time as s/he wishes, in order to merely appreciate the music. In contrast, (3b) has a nuance that is a bit strange, because it portrays a situation where before listening to a CD, one would have to prepare oneself mentally so that one could finish listening to all the songs in the CD, thus overcoming possible risks that might hinder the process of listening. This expression is almost impossible unless, for example, someone is forced to listen to music they do not want to hear.

Finally, let us take a look at the examples in (4):

- (4) a. ?*Watashi-wa koshi-o sue-te haha-no shujustu-no*
 I-TOP lower.back-ACC set-PART mother-GEN surgery-GEN
kekka-o kii-ta.
 result-ACC listen.to-PAST
 'I (physically) set myself down and listened to the result of my mother's surgery'
- b. *Watashi-wa hara-o sue-te haha-no shujustu-no*
 I-TOP belly-ACC set-PART mother-GEN surgery-GEN
kekka-o kii-ta.
 result-ACC listen.to-PAST
 'I braced myself to listen resolutely to the results of my mother's surgery'

Suppose that one's mother has a serious disease such as cancer, and there is no other choice but for her to undergo surgery that involves great risk. In this context,

(4b) would be more acceptable than (4a), because it is apparent that such a serious event would not require a specific physical posture, but rather mental readiness for or attitude towards what the result of the highly risky surgery would be.

Based on the examination above, it is now evident that *koshi-o sueru* and *hara-o sueru* can be used interchangeably; however, they show quite distinct semantic differences. Namely, the former is related to spatial or positional setting or fixation, which leads to remaining in one place as a result, whereas the latter is strongly related to mental or spiritual settling, to “fortifying oneself” or bracing oneself, which leads to readiness to accept future potential risks in the process of striving towards a certain goal.

We could also regard *koshi-o sueru* as predominantly metonymic, because a physically natural, logical contiguity of cause (i.e. setting the *koshi*) and the effect or result (i.e. a state of sitting, e.g. on the floor) is directly inferred from it. *Koshi-o sueru*, ‘having one’s *koshi* set’, requires a certain physical posture, which can be metonymically extended to connote a lengthy involvement or enduring attitude of an agent toward an action that is being performed. On the other hand, *hara* is conceptualized as a container of emotion, feeling, or what can be called *honne* – ‘real feeling or intention’ (Hasada 2002; Matsuki 1995, among others). The figurative expression of *hara-o sueru* involves at least two stages of semantic extension. The first stage is a container-contained metonymic extension, i.e. *hara* as a container to the contents of *hara*. At the second stage, the literal contents of *hara*, something digested, acquires its metaphoric reading, i.e. ‘one’s real feeling or intention’. Thus, once *hara* as a container is set, its contents are set as well. Therefore, a person whose *hara* is set will become mentally stable and never be shaken by future external negative factors.

The overall analysis of the pivotal examples above is consonant with what Yu (2002: 359) claims about the general correspondence of inner/outer embodiment and metaphoric/metonymic motivation. At the same time, as the complexity of the semantic extension of *hara* indicates, the relationship of metaphor/metonymy with inner/outer embodiment would require a more detailed analysis of further examples. For the rest of this chapter, we will examine how *koshi* and *hara* are conceptualized figuratively with prototypical examples, and pay attention to how the outer and the inner embodied expressions relate to each other in motivating conceptualization.

3.2 Syntactic combinations: Verbs

In analyzing what types of verbs are used with *koshi* and *hara*, we propose two categories based on case relations that are overtly marked by different particles: the nominative case with *-ga* and the accusative case with *-o*. Though we have

collected examples in which *koshi* and *hara* are used with a dative case-marker, *-ni*, we do not treat these in this chapter because they sound obsolete or old-fashioned in present-day Japanese.⁵

3.2.1 *Types of koshi-related verbs*

Let us begin with expressions that have a *koshi-ga* V (‘lower back’-NOM Verb) format.

- (5) Nominative (i.e. *koshi-ga* V)
 - a. *kudakeru* ‘to be broken’
 - b. *nukeru* ‘to fall out’
 - c. *suwaru* ‘to sit’

The examples in (5) show that *koshi* can get broken, fall out, or sit, in literal senses. For Example, (5a) is used in a sentence, *itami-de koshi-ga kudake-ta* (lit. ‘someone’s lower back was broken from pain’), figuratively meaning ‘one cannot stand up or move due to pain’. The figurative meaning is metonymic, because when *koshi* is broken, one cannot stand up or move. Example (5b) also conveys a similar meaning in a sentence such as *bikkurishi-te koshi-ga nuke-ta* (lit. ‘someone’s lower back fell out as s/he was surprised’), which figuratively means that ‘someone was so surprised that s/he couldn’t stand’. Note that there are different reasons for someone’s lower back to be broken or to fall out. *Koshi* can be broken, for instance, by pain as well as by seeing something cute, laughing too much, eating delicious cuisine, while *koshi* ‘falls out’ mainly because of abrupt fear or surprise.

In terms of the conceptualization of *koshi*, the relationship between the result of not being able to stand and its cause *nukeru* ‘to fall out’ in particular, strongly implies that *koshi* is an axis that props up the human body, penetrating its center vertically. This is a conceptualization different from that for *hara*, which is also perceived as a central location in the body but is more prototypically regarded as a container for emotions or feelings.

With regard to (5c), *koshi-ga suwaru* (lit. ‘one’s lower back sits’), Japanese dictionaries explain that when people’s *koshi* sits down, they are doing things in a stable and calm way or they will remain in a certain position for a long period of time. However, this expression is rarely encountered nowadays, particularly among the young. Instead, this phrase is used typically to describe a baby who can sit without support. This suggests that the expression *koshi-ga suwaru* has undergone a kind of change, returning to its literal usage.

5. Table 1 in the Appendix is the matrix of the data; it provides glosses and translations of expressions analyzed in this chapter. The order of items in the table corresponds to that of the analysis in Section 3.2 and 3.3, except for a pair of *koshi/hara-o sueru*. For this, see Section 3.1.

All the verbs in (6) are apparently related to the location of *koshi*, except for (6d).

(6) Accusative (i.e. *koshi-o* V)

- a. *ageru* ‘to raise’
- b. *orosu* ‘to lower’
- c. *ireru* ‘to put into’
- d. *kimeru* ‘to decide’

Example (6a) *koshi-o ageru* (lit. ‘to raise the lower back’), metonymically means ‘to stand up in order to start something’, whereas (6b) *koshi-o orosu* (lit. ‘to lower the lower back’), also metonymically means ‘to sit down’ or ‘to settle down’. Examples (6c) and (6d) are often used in the context of sports, martial arts, dance, and so forth. In the case of (6c) *koshi-o ireru* (lit. ‘to put the lower back into some place’), when you hit a ball, or deliver a strike in *karate*, for example, you have to put the lower back into an ideal position in order to generate as much power as you can. Hence, an equivalent English expression for *koshi-o ireru* would be ‘with the hip forward’ to add power. Finally, (6d) *koshi-o kimeru* (lit. ‘to decide one’s lower back’) has almost the same meaning as (6c). What is to be decided is the position of *koshi*: its posture must look unshakable. In *sumo* wrestling, for example, when a wrestler’s *koshi* is “decided”, his/her weight will not “disperse”, and thus will work most effectively. In addition, when the ideal position of the lower back is “decided”, the posture is also aesthetically pleasing. That is why a dancer of Japanese traditional dance, or a performer of Japanese drums, is required to ‘decide his/her *koshi*’.

3.2.2 Types of *hara*-related verbs

Hara ‘belly’ is prototypically conceptualized as a container for ideas and emotions. In this respect, the digestive process plays an important role in the metaphoric conceptualization of emotions (particularly, anger) and ideas (particularly, those which are communicated and understood as true and honest thoughts and intentions).

Syntactically, *hara* behaves like *koshi* in terms of verbal and adjectival combinations. However, as we see below, the types of trope that it gives rise to show notable differences from those engendered by *koshi*.

(7) Nominative (i.e. *hara-ga* V)

- a. *suwaru* ‘to sit’
- b. *tatsu* ‘to rise’
- c. *nieru*, *nietatsu*, or *niekurikaeru* ‘to boil’, ‘to boil.rise’, or ‘to boil.churn’
- d. *fukureru* ‘to swell’

The four verbs above are commonly used with *hara* plus the nominative case marker *-ga*. With regard to (7a) *hara-ga suwaru* (lit. ‘one’s belly sits’), we have

already introduced the same verb in (5c) *koshi-ga suwaru*. They are, of course, formally interchangeable but their meanings are totally different. Example (7a) predominantly refers to one's state of mind, rather than the spatial location of *hara* as one of the human body parts. As is the case with the analysis of *hara-o sueru* in the previous section (see Examples (1)–(4)), *hara* is conceptualized as a container for one's feeling or spirit. With this in mind, it is not that difficult to infer the figurative meaning of (7a) *hara-ga suwaru* 'being mentally stable, unshakable', from the verb *suwaru* 'to sit'.

Examples (7b) *hara-ga tatsu* (lit. 'one's belly rises') and (7c) *hara-ga nieru* (lit. 'one's belly boils'), *hara-ga nietatsu* (lit. 'one's belly boils and rises'), and *hara-ga niekurikaeru* (lit. 'one's belly boils and churns') have to do with the emotion of anger. As for (7b) in particular, there have been several attempts to explain its complex tropic structure (Matsuki 1986; Hasada 2002; Shinohara & Matsunaka 2003), to which we believe we are able to give a clearer analysis in relation to (7c).

Based on past studies, we have metaphoric concepts, ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (Kövecses 2002: 58) and HARA IS THE CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS (Matsuki 1995: 142). There seem to be at least six stages to reach the figurative meaning of 'getting angry' for (7b) *hara-ga tatsu*.

- i. the metaphoric conceptualization of *hara* as a container for emotions
- ii. a metonymic extension from the container to its contents
- iii. the contents of *hara* seen as a fluid
- iv. the temperature of the fluid rising up to the point of boiling
- v. the surface level of the fluid rising as it churns and boils
- vi. the unpleasant feeling of anger and disgust caused by the rise of the fluid

Tatsu refers basically to the motion of rising or standing up. It is helpful to consider *tatsu* in relation to *nietatsu* in (7c). *Nietatsu* is a compound verb, originally consisting of *nieru* and *tatsu*. What boils in the belly should be a fluid, not a solid. Thus, the fluid boils and churns, and its surface level rises. As a result of the fluid's rising in the belly, one experiences the unpleasant feelings of anger and disgust.⁶

Example (7d) *hara-ga fukureru* (lit. 'one's belly swells') is used when you have something to say but you are not given the chance to do so. In this case, it is likely that you will become dissatisfied or frustrated, and these negative feelings make *hara* swell. There is also the expression *fuman-ga tamaru* 'the feeling of dissatisfaction accumulates' in Japanese. Though this expression itself does not indicate where the feeling accumulates, if we consider the fact that we can say *damat-te*

6. Two other metaphors involving *tatsu* are *ki-ga tatsu* (lit. 'feeling rises'), meaning figuratively 'to become irritated or frustrated', and *namikaze-ga tatsu* (lit. 'wave/wind rises'), meaning figuratively 'to make trouble', or casually speaking, 'to make waves' in English.

iru-to hara-ga fukureru (lit. ‘to keep quiet makes one’s belly swell’), meaning ‘to keep quiet makes me frustrated’, it is assumed that *hara* is also the container for the feeling of dissatisfaction.⁷

As discussed above, the CONTAINER metaphor and CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS metonymy plays a major role in understanding the examples in the Accusative category, too.

- (8) Accusative (i.e. *hara-o* V)
- a. *kimeru* ‘decide’
 - b. *saguru* ‘search’
 - c. *yomu* ‘read’
 - d. *minuku* ‘look through’
 - e. *waru* ‘crack’
 - f. *kiru* ‘cut’

Example (8a) is used as in *watashi-wa hara-o kime-ta* (lit. ‘I decided my belly’), meaning ‘I made up my mind’. Again, this interpretation is possible because *hara* is conceptualized as a container for true feelings. In addition, what is “decided” is the ‘mental position’ in *hara*, in contrast with the ‘physical posture’ in *koshi*. Once *hara*’s position has been decided and will thus no longer be changed, the owner of the *hara* would no longer waver in his/her judgment.

It should be noted again that what can be contained in *hara* is not only emotions but also ideas. The figurative meanings of (8b) to (8d) are almost the same and they strongly imply *honno*, the ‘real feeling, intention or thought’ included or even hidden inside *hara*. Hence, for example, one ‘searches, reads, and looks through the enemy’s belly’, in order to know what s/he really has at heart when we say *teki-no hara-o saguru*, *yomu*, and *minuku*. Moreover, according to Japanese folk knowledge, if one wishes to know the truth, it is not a good idea to take somebody’s words at face value, as it is often the case that because *kuchi to hara to-wa chigau* (lit. ‘mouth and belly are different’, figuratively meaning ‘what you say is different from what you really mean or think’), *hara-no saguri-ai* (lit. ‘searching each other’s belly’) or *hara-no yomi-ai* (lit. ‘reading each other’s belly’), metaphorically meaning a ‘mind game’, can happen.

Honne ‘true feelings/thoughts’ is opposed to *tatema* ‘principle’ in Japanese (Lebra 1976). Here, note that *honno* cannot be decomposed into two distinctive kinds of concepts, such as ideas and feelings. Rather, *honno* is a holistic one that must be understood as such. This holistic understanding of the contents of *hara*

7. Also, when *hara* can no longer hold such a feeling, it ‘explodes’ as in the sentence, *hara-no naka-no fuman-ga bakuhatsushi -ta* (lit. ‘the feeling of dissatisfaction in the belly exploded’) ‘the feeling of dissatisfaction went off’.

can be derived from the embodied digestive process, through which ideas, feelings, and words are metaphorized as food; and therefore, they are bitten, chewed, swallowed, digested, thus falling into *hara*. Hence, our claim is that in Japanese folk theory, the center of the human body, *hara*, is the final locus of rational and emotional understanding (e.g., *Kare-no kotoba-wa fu ni ochi-nai* (lit. ‘His words don’t fall into the intestines’), metaphorically meaning that ‘his words don’t make sense’). For further discussion, see Hiraga (2009).

Example (8e) *hara-o wat-te hanashiau* (lit. ‘to crack our bellies and talk’) metaphorically means ‘to speak openly’. Because *honne*, our true intention, is inside *hara*, cutting one’s belly open is to show one’s truth. *Hara-o kiru* ‘to cut one’s belly’ in (8f) also conveys the metaphoric conceptualization of *hara* as a container for true intention. This embodiment prevails in folk theories and traditional customs such as the famous terminal ritual known as *hara-kiri* ‘belly cut’ performed among *samurai* ‘warriors’ from the twelfth century to the mid-nineteenth century.

3.3 Syntactic combinations: Adjectives

Koshi and *hara* can be used figuratively with adjectives, too. In the prototypical examples in (9), we can see how *koshi* and *hara* are characterized or modified in size, weight, strength, and color, giving rise to various metonymic and metaphoric expressions.

- (9) Adjectives as potential modifiers of *koshi* (i.e. *koshi-ga* Adj)
- a. *omoi* ‘heavy’ vs. *karui* ‘light’
 - b. *takai* ‘high’ vs. *hikui* ‘low’
 - c. *tsuyoi* ‘strong’ vs. *yowai* ‘weak’

For adjectival combinations with *koshi*, we have three contrastive pairs that can be scaled in terms of weight, height, and strength, respectively. With regard to (9a), *koshi* is measured by its weight, i.e., whether it is heavy or light, both of which are often used to evaluate one’s way of behaving. If the *koshi* of certain people is described as *omoi* ‘heavy’, they are unwilling to do things or are slow to start doing so. Heaviness of *koshi* thus metonymically implies ‘reluctance’. On the other hand, if some people’s *koshi* is described as *karui* ‘light’ as opposed to *omoi*, there are at least two possible interpretations. In a positive sense, it means that they are quick to do things, whereas in a negative sense, they are impatient and not able to stay in one place.

In (9b), *koshi* is related to its location, whether this is high or low. *Koshi-ga takai* (lit. ‘one’s lower back is high’) and *koshi-ga hikui* (lit. ‘one’s lower back is low’) are both used in literal and figurative senses. They are used literally in various kinds of sports that require a player’s stability of posture. On the other hand, they are also used figuratively to describe a person’s attitude and/or behavior. When

someone's *koshi* is high, it means they are arrogant, whereas if someone's *koshi* is low, they are regarded as very polite, humble, or modest.

The third pair (9c) concerns strength. When *koshi-ga tsuyoi* (lit. 'one's lower back is strong'), one can hold heavy thing(s) without losing control; if it is *yowai* 'weak', one cannot. As seen above, it is easy to imagine that the literal meanings get metonymic interpretations, which concern mental or spiritual strength.

One additional point of interest is the fact that (9c) can be used to describe not only human physical and/or mental strength but also the strength of inanimate referents in the external world, a possibility that is discussed in more detail in the next section.

- (10) Adjectives that are potential modifiers of *hara* (i.e. *hara-ga* Adj)
- a. *ookii* 'big' or 'large' vs. *chiisai* 'small'
 - b. *futoi* 'wide' or 'fat' vs. *hosoi* 'thin'
 - c. *kuroi* 'black'

In (10a) and (10b), *hara* is described in terms of its size or width. They can be used in literal senses, but the adjectives in (10a) are used metaphorically to evaluate one's generosity. Hence, *ano hito-wa hara-ga ookii* (lit. 'that person has a big belly'), metonymically means either 'that person is a big eater', or metaphorically 'that person is broad-minded'. On the other hand, *ano hito-wa hara-ga chiisai* (lit. 'that person has a small belly') figuratively means 'that person is narrow-minded'. The metonymic conceptualization of *hara* concerns digestive processes, whereas the metaphoric conceptualization enables *hara* to store feelings even including such negative feelings as anger. With regard to (10b), especially *hara-ga hosoi* (lit. 'one's belly is thin') is often used metonymically to mean that a person is a small eater. However, *hara-ga futoi* (lit. 'one's belly is fat or wide') can be metaphorically used to describe someone who is courageous and/or generous.

In (10c) *hara-ga kuroi* (lit. 'one's belly is black'), *hara* is modified by the color black. This is never used in a literal sense to refer to the color of the belly, but is understood only metaphorically. It describes someone hiding their *honne* 'true feelings', especially egocentric thoughts or conspiracies, at the bottom of their *hara*. The metaphoricity is easily understandable, because *hara*, perceived as a center of our body, in contrast to *koshi*, is predominantly construed as a container inside our body, holding various kinds of feelings and thoughts, the negative ones of which are sanctioned by the color black.

3.4 *Koshi* and *hara* with inanimate referents

From Section 3.1 through Section 3.3, we have looked at conventionalized figurative expressions that contain *koshi* and *hara* perceived as an outer and an inner body

part, respectively, but in general as a central part of the human body. We have analyzed how figurative meanings of those expressions are metonymically and/or metaphorically achieved to describe activities, behaviors, dispositions, and evaluations of human beings. Finally in this section, we focus on the figurative uses of *koshi* and *hara* when they are used to describe or highlight certain aspects of things and events other than attributes and positions of human body parts as their referents.

First, we deal with *koshi*-related expressions. Consider the following sentences:

- (11) a. *Kono-men-wa koshi-ga tsuyoi.*
 this-noodle-TOP lower.back-NOM strong
 ‘This noodle is well-cooked but its texture is still chewy and firm’
- b. *Kono-hooki-wa tsuyoi-koshi-de nure-ochiba sae*
 this-broom-TOP strong-lower.back-INST wet-fallen.leaves even
shikkari haku-kotogadekiru.
 well sweep-possible
 ‘This broom is springy and will sweep even wet, fallen leaves well’
- c. *Hanashi-no- ‘koshi’-o oru-na.*
 conversation-GEN-lower.back-ACC bend-NEG.IMP
 ‘Don’t disturb our conversation’

In (11a), *koshi* is commonly used to describe the *al dente* quality of Japanese *men* ‘noodles’, *soba* ‘thin noodles’ and *udon* ‘fat noodles’. When noodles are described as having *koshi* or strong *koshi*, they are well cooked to the core, but they still have a chewy and firm texture. Probably because of such subtlety, (11a) is used as a compliment. Here, the texture is understood and even measured in terms of the strength of *koshi*, which is, thus, a metaphor. Example (11b) also concerns strength of the *koshi* projected onto the resilience of a broom. If a broom has strong *koshi*, thanks to its resilience, one can sweep up fallen leaves even when they are wet. So a broom with a strong *koshi* is expected to be able to sweep clean.

Example (11c) shows a metaphoric use of *koshi* to describe *hanashi* (generic usage: ‘talk, narrative, conversation’) with a verb *oru* ‘to bend’. Conversation or talk is metaphorically conceptualized as having a *koshi* if it can be bent. When the *koshi* of a conversation is bent, the conversation is suddenly interrupted. Thus, (11c) means ‘Don’t disturb (our) conversation’. Though the expression in (11c) is a conventional usage, it seems that some variations are acknowledged. They include *kaiwa* ‘conversation’, *tooku* (borrowed from English *talk*), *hatsugen* ‘remark’ or ‘statement’, *giron* ‘discussion’, *kaigi* ‘meeting’ or ‘conference’, *monogatari* ‘story’, ‘tale’ or ‘narrative’, and they are recognized as members of the generic category of speech events. In other words, any speech event can HAVE *koshi* and be used as a substitute for *hanashi*, to produce metaphoric expressions such as *kaigi-no koshi-o*

oru (lit. ‘to bend the lower back of a conference’), metaphorically meaning ‘to disturb the flow of a conference’.

In contrast with *koshi*, once *hara* is used to conceptualize things in the external world other than human bodies, it loses its complex tropic potentiality and productivity. *Hara* signifies a front part of the torso, an outer body part, which is opposite the back. It is this literal meaning that is transferred metonymically to describe *yubi-no hara* (lit. ‘belly of a finger’), meaning ‘a surface part of one’s finger in the palm side’, and *kuruma-no hara* (lit. ‘belly of a car’), meaning ‘the bottom part of a car’.⁸ Based on our analysis, we can perhaps extend Yu’s claim concerning the tropic orientation of the inner and outer body parts to the effect that there is a general correspondence linking the inner body parts and metaphor, on the one hand, and the outer body parts and metonymy on the other. We would wish to add a refinement to Yu’s pattern, to the effect that the correspondence works well when dealing with human referents. However, as we have seen above, this general tendency does not hold when the inner and outer body parts refer to inanimate things and events in the external world.

The motivation of these phenomena could be explained by cognitive accessibility of the speaker/observer to his/her referent. When the referent is human, the speaker/observer, who shares the feature ‘humanness’, is able to take an egocentric, subjective perspective from the inner body (where feelings and emotions are regarded to be located) as well as the outer body (from which forms and their “afforded” functions are observed). However, this is hardly the case with non-human referents, because the speaker/observer has access to them only from the outside. Therefore in this case, the front/back relation becomes more salient than the inside/outside relation while the inside/outside relation becomes more salient with regard to the human referent (Wataru Koyama, personal communication).

4. Conclusion

In this chapter we have presented a case study in Japanese, analyzing and clarifying the relationship between the outer body and inner body parts as sources of motivation for metonymy and metaphor. In order to do so, we have chosen *koshi* ‘lower back’ and *hara* ‘belly’ as examples of the outer and inner body parts, both of which are conceived of as central body parts.

Our contrastive analysis of *koshi* and *hara* began with collecting expressions containing these terms whose referents are human and then comparing their

8. See Table 2 in the Appendix for conventional expressions that include other outer body parts than *koshi*, the dominant motivation of which seems to be dependent upon whether the referent is human or not.

meanings and usage in sentences where these two body part terms can both be used. We observed that generally *koshi* in a sentence such as *koshi-o sueru* 'to set one's lower back' is more metonymically motivated than is *hara* in a sentence like *hara-o sueru* 'to set one's belly', which is more metaphoric than *koshi*. In addition, we examined verbal and adjectival combinations with *koshi* and *hara* to check the validity of the above orientation and to explicate in detail the tropic interplay between metonymy and metaphor in generating figurative meanings. Finally, we turned to an analysis of non-human entities and events that can be partially seen as having inner and outer body parts; we discovered that the metaphoric productivity of *hara* becomes weaker, giving rise to metonymic extensions, whereas *koshi* appears to be more productive with respect to metaphoric rather than to metonymic extensions.

Our analysis raises a further question, namely, whether the tropic motivation of the inner and outer body parts could reverse when their meanings are extended so that they are used to describe entities and events in the external world. Although we see some indication that this research question may bear fruit, we must be content to leave it for a future challenge.

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Appendix

Table 1. Verbs and adjectives that co-occur with *koshi* and *hara*

<i>Koshi</i>	<i>Hara</i>
Verbal (Nominative)	
<i>kudakeru</i> ‘to be broken’ <u><i>koshi-ga kudakeru</i></u> lower.back-NOM break ‘not to be able to stand up due to pain’	<i>suwaru</i> ‘to sit’ <u><i>hara-ga suwaru</i></u> belly-NOM sit ‘to be mentally stable and unshakable’
<i>nukeru</i> ‘to fall out’ <u><i>koshi-ga nukeru</i></u> lower.back-NOM fall out ‘not to be able to stand up due to surprise’	<i>tatsu</i> ‘to rise’ <u><i>hara-ga tatsu</i></u> belly-NOM rise ‘to get angry’
<i>suwaru</i> ‘to sit’ <u><i>koshi-ga suwaru</i></u> lower.back-NOM sit ‘to doing things in a stable and calm way’	<i>nieru</i> ‘to boil’ <u><i>hara-ga nieru</i></u> belly-NOM boil ‘to get angry’
	<i>nietatsu</i> ‘to boil.rise’ <u><i>hara-ga nietatsu</i></u> belly-NOM boil.rise ‘to get angry’
	<i>niekurikaeru</i> ‘to boil.churn’ <u><i>hara-ga niekurikaeru</i></u> belly-NOM boil.rise ‘to get angry’
	<i>fukureru</i> ‘to swell’ <u><i>hara-ga fukureru</i></u> belly-NOM swell ‘to get frustrated’
Verbal (Accusative)	
<i>sueru</i> ‘to set’ <u><i>koshi-o sueru</i></u> lower.back-ACC set ‘to settle down to do something’	<i>sueru</i> ‘to set’ <u><i>hara-o sueru</i></u> belly- ACC set ‘to settle down to do something’
<i>ageru</i> ‘to raise’ <u><i>koshi-o ageru</i></u> lower.back-ACC raise ‘to stand up in order to start something’	<i>kimeru</i> ‘decide’ <u><i>hara-o kimeru</i></u> belly-ACC decide ‘to make up one’s mind’

orosu ‘to lower’ <u>koshi-o orosu</u> lower.back-ACC lower ‘to sit down’	saguru ‘search’ <u>hara-o saguru</u> belly-ACC search ‘to read one’s mind’
ireru ‘to put into’ <u>koshi-o ireru</u> lower.back-ACC put. into ‘with the hip forward’	yomu ‘read’ <u>hara-o yomu</u> belly-ACC read ‘to read one’s mind’
kimeru ‘to decide’ <u>koshi-o kimeru</u> lower.back-ACC decide ‘with the hip forward’	minuku ‘look through’ <u>hara-o minuku</u> belly-ACC look. through ‘to read one’s mind’
	waru ‘crack’ <u>hara-o waru</u> belly-ACC crack ‘to speak openly’
	kiru ‘cut’ <u>hara-o kiru</u> belly-ACC cut ‘to perform a belly-cut suicide’

Adjectival	
omoi ‘heavy’ <u>koshi-ga omoi</u> lower.back-NOM heavy ‘to be reluctant to do something’	ookii ‘big’ or ‘large’ <u>hara-ga ookii</u> belly-NOM big ‘to be broad-minded’
karui ‘light’ <u>koshi-ga karui</u> lower.back-NOM light ‘to be quick to do things’ ‘to be impatient’	chiisai ‘small’ <u>hara-ga chiisai</u> belly-NOM small ‘to be narrow-minded’
takai ‘high’ <u>koshi-ga takai</u> lower.back-NOM high ‘to be arrogant’	futoi ‘wide’ or ‘fat’ <u>hara-ga futoi</u> belly-NOM big ‘to be courageous’
hikui ‘low’ <u>koshi-ga hikui</u> lower.back-NOM low ‘to be polite’	hosoi ‘thin’ <u>hara-ga hosoi</u> Belly-NOM thin ‘to be a small eater’

<i>tsuyoi</i> ‘strong’ <i>koshi-ga tsuyoi</i> lower.back-NOM strong ‘to be able to hold heavy things without losing control’	<i>kuroi</i> ‘black’ <i>hara-ga kuroi</i> belly-NOM black ‘to be wicked’
<i>yowai</i> ‘weak’ <i>koshi-ga yowai</i> lower.back-NOM weak ‘not to be able to hold heavy things without losing control’	

Table 2. A non-exhaustive list of outer embodiments with metaphor/metonymy reversal

Outer Body Parts	w/Human Referents	w/Inanimate Referents
	Dominant Motivation Metonymic	Metaphoric
a. <i>hana</i> ‘nose’	<i>hana-de ashirau</i> nose-INST treat ‘to snub someone’	<i>yama-no hana</i> mountain-GEN nose ‘top of mountain ridge’
b. <i>mimi</i> ‘ear’	<i>mimi-o kasu</i> ear-ACC lend ‘to listen to (usu. advice)’	<i>pan-no mimi</i> bread-GEN ear ‘crust of bread’
c. <i>kata</i> ‘shoulder’	<i>kata-o otosu</i> shoulder-ACC fall ‘to become disappointed’	<i>yama-no kata</i> mountain-GEN shoulder ‘mountain ridge’
d. <i>se</i> ‘shoulder’	<i>se-o mukeru</i> shoulder-ACC turn ‘to neglect’	<i>hon-no se</i> book-GEN shoulder ‘spine of a book’
e. <i>shiri</i> ‘hip, buttock’	<i>shiri-ni shiku</i> hip-LOC lay ‘to nag one’s husband’	<i>fune-no shiri</i> boat-GEN hip ‘rear end of a ship’

A cultural-linguistic look at Japanese ‘eye’ expressions*

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The present study examines Japanese expressions related to the human eye, specifically the eye’s behavior as well as its various appearances. Among the meanings of these expressions, one finds an emphasis on judgment – of the object viewed or of the viewer’s emotional reaction or basic personality. The eye also forms the basis for an image schema motivating metaphoric uses of ‘eye’ to describe non-bodily matter. The schema of Japanese social hierarchy, which underlies a wealth of pragmatic variation in utterance forms (and has consequences for behavior), is based on a verticality metaphor that classifies people as ‘person/s above/below [the] eye’. Thus, expressions regarding eye contact between interlocutors reveal important details about the nature of their social interaction. Gender norms are also reflected in certain ‘eye’-related expressions. The findings of this study further our understanding of embodiment in language and culture in general as well as in Japanese in particular.

Keywords: gender norms, image schema, social hierarchy, verticality metaphor

1. Introduction

Each New Year, Japanese people may buy a large-eyed doll called a *daruma*, whose eyes lack pupils. It is a round, brightly painted doll, weighted so that it maintains an upright position, and sold with unpainted eyes. The purchaser sets forth a goal, typically at New Year’s, and paints in one eye of the doll with black ink. Upon achievement of the goal, the other eye is painted in. The *daruma* (from Sanskrit *Bodhidharma*) doll is a part of Japanese tradition that displays cultural beliefs about the eye through a sort of disembodied embodiment, or sympathetic magic. The

* This chapter has benefited from comments by Gary B. Palmer, the editors, and reviewers. Thanks are due to them and the linguistics students who contributed sound-symbolic eye data. The usual disclaimer applies.

daruma provides a concrete example linking ‘eye’ to ‘goal’ as linguistic data below also attest. This chapter analyzes the contemporary Japanese semantic unit ‘eye’ from a cultural linguistic perspective (Palmer 1996). The data consist of naturally occurring expressions, ranging from the phonetic level of onomatopoeia and mimesis, to larger utterances and to conventionalized visual representations. It involves concrete and figurative expressions, including emotional expressions of physiological, culturally specific, and culturally tainted embodiment (Maalej 2004).¹ Comparisons to English *eye* draw upon the writer’s knowledge as a native speaker.

One point of fundamental importance to the study of embodiment in general with reference to Japanese is that, despite whatever impact Western ideas may have had in shaping contemporary Japan, Japanese linguistic behavior expresses an emotive as well as a non-Cartesian orientation (Occhi 2009). This was noted as early as 1824 in Suzuki’s description of the Japanese language as *kokoro no koe* ‘[the] voice of the heart/mind’ (1824/1979) and re-elucidated recently in Maynard (2002). *Kokoro* itself is a non-Cartesian construct both within genres associated with verbal beauty and in everyday expression (Occhi 2008). Furthermore, Japanese allows expressions depicting HUMAN AS NATURE and NATURE AS HUMAN that subsume the self into natural phenomena and vice versa (Maynard 2007; Hiraga 1999) to the extent of rendering irrelevant the discourse/narrative distinction in some cases, in favor of an underlying holism termed ‘sloppy selfhood’ (Occhi 2000). On this basis, my chapter takes embodiment as a given based on the inherent properties of the language whose data it examines.

2. Onomasiological survey of Japanese ‘eye’ expressions²

Japanese has a range of ‘eye’ expressions using a lexeme pronounced *me* or *moku*, which is represented (since the import of writing circa the seventh century) by the Sino-Japanese ideograph 目. It is said that the ideograph represents the eye and the spark or brilliance reflected strongly within it (Kodansha 2000: 40). Another term for eye, *gan* (also read as *gen*, *me*, or *manako*), is written as 眼, with the ‘eye’ shape of *me* on the left side and 艮, *gon*, on the right (*gon* represents the mountain character of the I Ching emblematic of ‘stillness’). In modern Chinese, this term is

1. Physiological embodiment refers to a description of an emotional state with reference to a physiologically affected body part. Culturally specific embodiment reflects cultural correlations of emotion to body parts that may not be physiologically affected. Culturally tainted embodiment uses culture-specific semantic elements to describe physiologically affected body parts. Examples relative to English anger are: *hot headed*, *pants in a twist*, and *seeing red*.

2. Additional ‘eye’ expressions in Japanese are listed in the Appendix.

more commonly used than *me* (Yu 2004, personal communication). Compounds incorporating 'eye' fall into fuzzy categorical sets representing various attributes and functions, notably measurement terms ranging in meaning from physical to social judgments across various criteria. The eye judges, and is itself evaluated.

Another set of terms that must be considered to understand the eye's place in Japanese cultural linguistics are sound-symbolic lexemes forming a word class which ranges from onomatopoeia (called *giongo*) to soundless mimesis (known as *gitaigo*). These manner adverbials describe nuances of various eye behaviors, and lexicalize them. By examining eye expressions across the span of linguistic data from phonetics to discourse, we can understand the eye's prominence in emotional expression that is evidenced not only verbally but also within other realms of Japanese culture.

Kodansha's 'Body Term Dictionary' lists the following uses for 'eye': the organ of sight and in humans, its appearance which displays one's reaction to the sight of something; the appearance of meeting with something unexpected; eye-shaped things, such as typhoons, knots, or perforations; estimation in relative terms; dots on dice or the marks on a ruler; the grain of wood or stone; an ordinal suffix; the point of contact between things (Kodansha 2000: 40). These uses can be divided into two more basic categories. One derives from the physical eye as an organ, and extends to its appearance as observed by others. This links readily to emotional expressions. The other is based on the eye's function for its owner, that of making visual distinctions. This, by extension, yields notions of measurement and of ordering entities relative to such measure, with measurement as a concept extended to include the most salient point or point of contact. Extensions can also be made from visual distinction to the human response (feeling, experience) to such distinctions. Another extension allows judgment of persons in relation to the self's position in a social hierarchy that is measured along a 'vertical cline of relationship' (*jôge kankei*) (Wetzel 2004). The uses of 'eye' of most interest to this chapter are those pertinent to human experience, which therefore receive the most attention herein.

2.1 Sino-Japanese 'eye' compounds

The 'eye' compounds discussed in this section were retrieved from Spahn and Hadamizky's (1979) dictionary of Japanese characters and compounds. They are categorized into sets according to function and appearance. The function set includes medical terms (not considered here), terms of measuring/estimating along various criteria, and the extension to judgment, including that of social position. The appearance set includes terms related to the appearance of the eye, and the appearance of something seen, which extends to the notion of a goal, whether physical or mental. These categories are fuzzy.

Gan is used relatively infrequently, yet it also follows the two basic categories as does *me*. It appears in medical terminology (again, not included here) and notably in nonmedical terms relating to function. These terms refer not only to the eye's physical strength but also through extension of that notion, incorporating 'judgment' or even 'enlightenment' expressed via reference to the physical, as if the embodied self is regarding something or someone from a socially or spiritually 'high' position, such as a mountain. This is encoded in the ideograph, as described above, and reflects Buddhist beliefs brought to Japan from China along with the ideographic writing system.

2.1.1.1 Underlying linearity: Time, measurement, and lists

'Eye' with the DO-verb, *moku suru*, is translated as 'to eye [something]', which in English serves as the main 'eye' term for evaluation and measurement. Comparatively, Japanese has a relatively elaborated set of measurement terms derived by combining *me* with another term. These terms cover evaluation of physical and abstract entities including time, distance, weight, and primacy or importance, even into supernatural realms.

Time can be indicated with 'eye'. Combining 'eye' with 'present' gives us *mok-kon* (eye-present) 'now'. The 'future' *mesaki* is indicated by the term *saki* 'ahead', which includes semantic extension from SPACE to TIME. *Mesaki* means 'before one's eyes; immediate future, foresight; appearance', extending from the physically seen to the mentally foreseen (EYE AS MIND), and also including the way something appears, with EYE AS EXPERIENCER, affected by the thing seen. These properties of 'eye' expressions are robustly attested, as other data in this chapter show. However, 'before one's eyes' when expressed as *ma(no)atari* (eye-hit) 'before one's eyes' can also be read as *meate* (eye-hit) 'guide(post); aim', including the physical or nonphysical EYE AS GOAL as well as indexing the thing seen, as if the eye were hit by it.

'Eye' indexing terms that refer to measuring include *mekata* (eye-manner) 'weight', *meberi* (eye-reduce) 'weight loss', *meippai* (eye-full) 'the limit', *mokusan* (eye-calculate) 'expectation, estimate', *mokusoku* (eye-measure) 'measure by eye', and *me(no)ko kanjô* (eye-small-calculate) 'measuring by eye; mental arithmetic'. Measurement terms expressing the separation into units are coded into terms such as *mebunryo* (eye-separate-weight) 'measuring by eye', *meyasu* (eye-safe) 'standard, yardstick', *memori* (eye-heap) 'scale, gradations'. Terms that extend the notion of separation into units in terms of realms beyond measurement *per se*, which are still linear, are *mokuji* (eye-next) 'table of contents', and *mokuroku* (eye-record) 'catalog, list, inventory'.

2.1.2 'Eye' as discernment/insight

The eye's ability not only to evaluate and calculate but also to exhibit discernment in Japanese is an outcome of the metaphor/metonymy EYE AS MIND, as the following examples further attest. The terms *menuki* (eye-exclude) 'main, principal' and *shugan* (main-eye) 'main point/purpose' describe the outcome of discernment by referring to the superlative. The converse, *meutsuri* (eye-move[from X to Y]) 'distraction, difficulty in choosing' shows the inability to discern. *Mekiki* (eye-move [i.e. work]) 'judging; a judge/connoisseur of' and *meaki* (eye-bright) 'sighted/educated person' also show EYE FOR PERSON, as does *meakashi* (eye-bright) 'police detective (of the Edo era)'. The process of and capacity for discernment are lexicalized in several 'eye' constructions.

- (1) *ganchu* (eye-middle) 'in one's eyes/consideration'
- ganko* (eye-light) 'glint of one's eye; insight'
- ganshiki* (eye-work) 'discernment, insight'
- ganriki* (eye-power) 'insight, discernment'
- gugan* (tool-eye) 'discernment'
- katsugan* (active-eye) 'keen eye; insight'
- keigan* (bright-eye) 'gleaming eyes; insightful, discerning'
- tatsugan* (strong-eye) 'insight, farsightedness'
- keigan* (*prana*-eye) 'sharp eye, keen insight'
- kansatsugan* (observe-eye) 'an observing eye'
- kanshikigan* (discern-eye) 'discerning eye'
- chakugan* (attach-eye) 'notice, observe'
- meutsuri* (eye-move) 'distraction, difficulty in choosing'
- mesaki no kiku* (eye-before-Gen work) 'farsighted'
- mehashi* (eye-origin) 'quick wit, tact'
- mebayai* (eye-fast) 'quick to notice, sharp-eyed'
- mezatoi* (eye-clever) 'quick'
- shingan* (heart-eye) 'one's mind's eye'
- senrigan* (thousand-ri [3.9km]-eye) 'clairvoyant'
- tengantsu* (heaven-eye-pass) 'clairvoyance'

2.1.3 EYE FOR PERSON

Just as the eye represents the mind, the EYE FOR PERSON metonymy is richly attested in Japanese. One's enemy is the "enemy of one's eye": *me no kataki* (eye-GEN enemy) 'enemy, object of hostility'. In the case of *mejirooshi* (eye-white-push) 'be jammed up in line/jostling, milling', when the whites of people's eyes are pushed, it is because the people themselves are crowding closely together. When 'eyes [are] big' (*oomedama*) scolding is indicated.

‘Eye’ describes observation, observers, and observed:

- (2) *memie* (eye-see) ‘audience, interview, stage debut, servant’s service on approval’
mokugeki (eye-hit) ‘observe, witness’
mokugekisha (eye-hit-person) ‘[eye] witness’
shigan (history-eye) ‘historical view, sense of history’

The eye’s powers of observation represent not only the person but also indicate the person’s level of spiritual enlightenment:

- (3) *kaigen, kaigan* (open-eye) ‘spiritual awakening; consecrating a newly made image’
hogen (law-eye) ‘a high priestly rank in Buddhism’
bongan (ordinary-eye) ‘a layman’s eye’
zokugan (common-eye) ‘layman’s eye, popular opinion’

2.1.3.1 EYE APPEARANCE AND BEHAVIOR FOR PERSON’S ACTION OR STATE. In this subset, the action of the eye or its appearance describes the person’s action or state. Communication is also accomplished through the eye:

- (4) *mehiki sodehiki* (eye-pull sleeve-pull) ‘winking and tugging at [someone’s] sleeve [i.e. belittle by]’
metsuki (eye-attach) ‘a look, expression of the eyes’
mokugo (eye-language) ‘signal with one’s eye’
me (o) tôsu (eye-OBJ pass) ‘glance through’
mokusô (eye-send) ‘follow with one’s eyes’
mokurei (eye-respect) ‘nod, greet by eye’
me (no) iro (eye-GEN color) ‘color of one’s eyes; one’s facial/eye expression’
megao (eye-face) ‘a look, expression’
mekado (eye-corner) ‘corner of the eye, sharp look’
hakuganshi (white-eye-look) ‘look askance/coldly at’
mekubase (eye-combine) ‘give a meaningful look’
mekubari (eye-combine) ‘be watchful, look about’
mezameru (eye-wake) ‘wake up, come awake’
mekurumeku (eye-revolve) ‘be dizzy, have blurred vision’
mekusare (eye-rotten) ‘bleary-eyed person’
chimanako (blood-eye) ‘bloodshot eye; frantic’
suigan (drunk-eye) ‘drunken/bleary eyes’
kanatsubo/manako (metal-pot eye) ‘large sunken eyes [showing anxiety/mistrust]’

2.1.3.2 EYE FOR PERSON IN A SOCIAL HIERARCHY. Here we see the eye as metonymical for a person's physical position vis-à-vis another, which is representative of their social relationship as well. Japanese describes social relationships as plotted along a vertical hierarchy; this social schema governs physical and speech behavior. This vertical hierarchy schema is physically enacted in everyday life through motions such as bowing and eye gaze behavior (see Section 4.2). The fact that a physical dimension of verticality is used to gauge social status reflects not only the widespread metaphor MORE IS UP but is also enacted in specific, visually evaluated practices such as bowing (performed to various angular degrees while either standing or kneeling, which range from a nod to prostration depending on role and circumstance). A lower status person must bow more deeply than a superior. In the Girl's Day holiday held in early March, dolls in traditional costume representing the imperial family, its servants, musicians, and other persons of lower status are displayed on a tiered stand, with the emperor and empress in the physically highest location. Thus the use of 'eye' in verbal expressions of social hierarchy has a metonymic relation to the physical expressions of deference and superiority.

- (5) *meue* (eye-above) 'one's superior/senior'
- meshita* (eye-below) 'one's subordinate/junior'
- medôri* (eye-pass) 'audience with; eye level'
- mehachibu* (eye-eight parts) '[hold an offering] a little below eye level; most respectfully; about eight-tenths full'

2.1.4 Appearance of something as it affects or resembles an eye

Eyelike or eye-affecting entities are considered particularly salient, as the following terms show. Something described as remarkable (indexing the verbal mode) or eye-catching in English is described as connected to the visual realm in Japanese:

- (6) *mezamashii* (eye-awakening) 'striking, remarkable, spectacular'
- meatarashii* (eye-new) 'novel, original'
- medatsu* (eye-emerge) 'be conspicuous, stand out'
- mejirushi* (eye-mark) 'mark, sign'
- mehiki/mebiki* (eye-pull) 'attract the eye; dye colorfully; perforation for binding pages'
- meuchi* (eye-hit) 'perforation'
- medama shôhin* (eye-ball product) 'bargain item to attract customers, loss leader'
- medamayaki* (eye-ball-fry) 'sunny-side-up fried eggs'
- menukidôri* (eye-remove-street) 'main thoroughfare'
- me (no) doku* (eye-(GEN) poison) 'something tempting'
- mezawari* (eye-touch) 'eyesore, offensive sight'

2.1.5 Goal

Eye expressions are heavily implicated in the notion ‘goal’ in Japanese. The physical target an archer aims for, *mokuhyô*, resembles an eye, typically shaped like the target English speakers call *bull’s eye*. The abstract notion ‘goal’ readily extends from that. In the Japanese New Year holiday season, the target and arrow also take on symbolic significance as concrete reminders that one should set goals for the coming year; decorative bow and arrow sets are available for purchase at shrines, as is the *daruma* described above. This property can also be considered an extension of the salience of eyelike or eye-affecting entities in 2.1.4, and EYE AS GOAL, first mentioned in Section 2.2.1.

- (7) *me no mae, mokuzen* (eye-GEN-before) ‘before one’s eyes; immediate [gain]’
meboshi (eye-star) ‘aim, object’
mezasu (eye-point) ‘aim at’
megakeru (eye-hang) ‘aim at’
meate (eye-hit) ‘guide post; aim’
mokuteki (eye-way) ‘purpose, object, aim’
mokuto (eye-way) ‘aim, goal, end, object’
mokuhyô (eye-sign) ‘target, goal, objective’
mokuromi (eye-theory-see) ‘plan, project, intention’
mokutekichi (eye-way-place) ‘destination’
mokutekikaku (eye-way-case) ‘the objective case’
mokutekigo (eye-way-word) ‘object [in grammar]’
mokutekiron (eye-way-theory) ‘teleology’

2.2 Sound-symbolic lexemes (*giongo* and *gitaigo*) describing the eye’s appearance

Japanese has a robust set of sound-symbolic terms that express manner ranging from onomatopoeia to soundless states. Sound symbolic terms are associated with untranslatability and naturalistic states, as well as social scenarios (Occhi 1999), thus providing insights into cultural models articulated at the phonetic level with reference to embodiment (Occhi 2008). They include physiological and emotional states as well as culturally specific and/or tainted embodiment (Maalej 2004). This section includes data derived from native speaker reports and publications. The first set of lexemes was elicited by a questionnaire; where respondents did not gloss terms, glosses from a dictionary (Atoda & Hoshino 1995) have been added. This list is followed by published data showing some of these lexemes in sentential context from Hamano’s (1998) survey of the Japanese sound symbolic system.

These terms are associated with conventionalized imagery also captured in the questionnaire – depicting the eyes' expressions in *manga* and *anime* cartoons. Similar imagery also appears in pre-programmed cell phone sets of images intended for text messages (i.e. graphical emoticons). Graphical emoticons are those not produced by a set of keystrokes but rather are pictures, tiny graphics files provided by the cell phone or other software. However, in common keyboard-based communications in Japanese, a variety of text-based emoticons evolved (prior to the development of graphical emoticons) depicting the eye and face in various states that represent the writer's state of mind or attitude towards the utterance. One very common text emoticon which depicts the writer's wish to apologize or ask favor is m(__)m in which the letter 'm' depicts hands placed on either side of the face, which is demarcated by the parentheses, within which the two underlines depict the eyes lowered. Hence, the writer is bowing in prostration, and we are looking at the top of the head. One doesn't dare look directly at someone who is in a higher status until granted license, as this emoticon displays. The writer of this emoticon is voluntarily humbled relative to the addressee. The use of textual and graphical emoticons reinforces the longstanding claim that facial expressions are social, communicative displays rather than expressions of pure emotion, a claim that is attested to Darwin and in cognitive linguistics literature, often attributed to Gibbs (2006: 249). Some depictions of eyes in Japanese emoticons include unnatural shapes, such as spirals, hearts, or flames for pupils, linking them to the sound-symbolic lexemes and exhibiting culturally tainted embodiment.³ Thus, in a cell phone text message, a happy face emoticon with hearts for eyes (representing the sender's face) adds an emotional tinge to that message. The emergence and popularity of both textual and graphical emoticons as part of text messaging speaks clearly of the human urge to embody one's utterances even in electronic communication.

Linkage between emoticons, live facial expressions of emotion, and the salience of the eye for Japanese has been supported by the findings of Yuki et al.'s (2006) social psychological research comparing how Japanese and Americans interpret emotion. In one study, university students evaluated emotional expressions of computer-generated emoticons (graphical emoticons). These emoticons combined happy, neutral, and sad eyes and mouths within a circular shape. Happy eyes are arch shaped ^^, neutral eyes are dots ●●, and sad eyes slant downwards at the outer corners /\. Mouths curve up for happiness, are straight in neutral position, and curve downwards for sadness. Japanese rated emoticons as happier when the happy eyes were present, even if the mouth was sad. In contrast, Americans focused

3. Wolk's mention of "fire flaming out of his eyes" describes something originating from 'heart' in Northeastern Neo-Aramaic (2008: 298); the origin of the flames in the Japanese case is not clear.

on the mouth, rating happiness based on the upwardly curved smile (Yuki et al. 2006: 305–306). This could be construed in light of existing differences in the writing of emoticons. For example, Japanese happy face text emoticons may be written ^_^ i.e. happy eyes/neutral mouth, though in English a happy text icon uses neutral eyes and a happy mouth, as :). Concerned by the possibility that Americans may be unused to the happy eye shape in emoticons, the researchers then conducted a similar study using combinations of standardized photographs; similar results emerged (308). These results bolster the relevance of various data presented here in which eye descriptions are metonymic for judgment of mood or more generally, of personality, strengthening the EYE AS/FOR PERSON metaphor/metonymy seen in data from the previous sections as well. They also explain data showing that Japanese people either do not notice or are untroubled that the popular Hello Kitty character has no mouth.

2.2.1 Questionnaire data on sound-symbolic ‘eye’ related terms

The *giongo* and *gitaigo* data in table 1 were elicited by a questionnaire given in 2008 to 18 college students in a linguistics class in Japan, in hopes of gleaning the most salient ‘eye’ terms from the large class of lexemes. Following Hamano’s usage, N is a moraic nasal; Q is a moraic obstruent. Reduplication indicates continuation.

2.2.2 Sentential sound-symbolic data

Beyond their use in contexts of *manga* imagery or as represented visually in cell phone emoticons, terms such as those in Section 2.2.1 often appear sententially as manner adverbials. This data set shows a subset of the sound-symbolic lexemes that describe eyes and eye behaviors in sentential contexts. Where they are excerpted from literature, the author’s name and work appear in parentheses following the translation.

- (8) a. *Kono hitotu-no me-o kaQ-to mihirai-te ...*
 this one-GEN eye-ACC open-and
 ‘Opening this only eye **very wide**. . .’
 (Shôzô Hayashiya, Hayashiya Shôzô-shû) (Hamano 1998: 93)
- b. *Omowazu kiQ-to niramikaesita-no-yo.*
 Involuntarily stared back-COMP-EMPH
 ‘Without intending to, I gave her a **stern** glance’ (Hamano 1998: 93)
- c. *Nani-ga okoQta-no-ka wakar-anaku-te pokeQ-to mi-te-i-ta.*
 what NOM happened-COMP-QUES understand-NEG-and watch-GER-
 CONT-PAST
 ‘Not realizing what had happened, he stood there with a **stupid** look’
 (Hamano 1998: 116)

Table 1. Sound-symbolic terms that describe eyes and eye behavior

Term	Gloss
<i>ikiiki</i>	'shining'
<i>uruuru</i>	'happy, innocent, teary like a chihuahua'
<i>kyotoN</i>	'look of shock or confusion' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 98–99)
<i>kyorokyoro</i>	'eye movement left and right, of looking around a new place'
<i>kirakira</i>	'going after one's aim, seeing one's favorite thing, happy, innocent'
<i>kiriQto</i>	'intense eyes'
<i>kurikuri</i>	'large eyes with sparkles in them'
<i>kurukuru</i>	'panic' (Respondents drew spiral shapes as pupils for this)
<i>giragira</i>	'eye light of a male of middle age, with passion, strong motivation'
<i>guruguru</i>	'eyes revolve with busyness or loss of consciousness'
<i>gorogoro</i>	'irritation, something is in the eye'
<i>gyoro gyoro</i>	'large, scary eyes like an owl's'
<i>suQkiri</i>	'sharp eyes'
<i>suQto</i>	'sharp eyes'
<i>shiwashiwa</i>	'eyes surrounded by lines'
<i>shipashipa</i>	'dry eyes'
<i>shikushiku</i>	'crying, sad'
<i>shoboshobo</i>	'sticky eyelids, can't open eyes fully' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 216)
<i>jirojiro</i>	'staring, gazing, looking to one side continuously'
<i>jiQ</i>	'stare quickly'
<i>jiii</i>	'stare for a while'
<i>chiraQ</i>	'glance at s/t, take a glance at'
<i>chirachira</i>	'glancing many times'
<i>toroN</i>	'sleepy, tending to sleep'
<i>nikoniko</i>	'smiling' (these eyes are arched; can be written as '^^')
<i>nitanita</i>	'quiet <i>schadenfreude</i> ' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 342)
<i>basabasa</i>	'fuller, thicker eyelashes'
<i>bikubiku</i>	'nervous twitchiness' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 401)
<i>boroboro</i>	'continuous crying' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 520)
<i>bonyari</i>	'distracted'
<i>paQ</i>	'glance'
<i>pachipachi</i>	'blinking'
<i>pachikuri</i>	'large eyes with sparkles in them, long eyelashes'
<i>majimaji</i>	'have an intensive look at s/t'
<i>mukamuka</i>	'rising anger or unease' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 529)
<i>meromero</i>	'look of love' (Respondents drew heart shapes as pupils for this)
<i>meramera</i>	'strong motivation, like licking flames' (Atoda & Hoshino 1995: 540)
<i>ranran</i>	'big, happy, sparkling, desirous'

- d. *Me-ni ibutu-ga haiQ-tara mizu-ni kao-o tuQkon-de me-o pati-pati sase-te torimasu.*
 Eye-in strange object-NOM enter-if water-in face-ACC force in-and eye-ACC do(CAUS)-and remove
 'If you get something in your eye, remove it by putting your face into the water and **blinking** your eyes several times' (Hamano 1998: 134)
- e. *NaN-daroo-Qte tiraQ-to mi-tara ...*
 what-COP-QUOT see-when
 'When I took a **quick** glance at it, wondering what it was, ...'
 (Hamano 1998: 140)
- f. *Me-ga kuri-kuri-to yoku ugoku.*
 eye-NOM often move
 'Her (**round and beaming**) eyes are rolling all the time'
 (Hamano 1998: 156)

Hamano's data on tears allows us to compare sound-symbolic effects generated by different permutations of a single act, that of crying:

- (9) a. *Namida-no tubu-ga potaN-to tukue-no ue-ni otita.*
 tear-GEN drop-NOM desk-GEN top-to fell
 'A large teardrop fell on the desk top' (Hamano 1998: 106)
- b. *Namida-no tubu-ga potaQ-to tukue-no ue-ni otita.*
 tear-GEN drop- NOM desk-GEN top-to fell
 'A large teardrop fell on the desk top *and splashed*' (Hamano 1998: 106)
- c. *Namida-no tubu-ga potari-to tukue-no ue-ni otita.*
 tear-GEN drop-NOM desk-GEN top-to fell
 'A large teardrop fell *and rolled to a stop* on the desk top'
 (Hamano 1998: 107)
- d. *Namida-mo porori-to misemasi-te-ne.*
 tear-even show-and-ATTN
 'She even showed a few tears rolling down (her cheek)'
 (Hamano 1998: 140)
- e. *Sono kutimoto-wa waraQ-te-iru-ga poroN-to namida-o*
 that mouth-TOP smile-GER-CONT-but tear-ACC
kobosita-no-o kodomotati-ga minogasu wake-wa nai.
 shed-COMP-ACC children-NOM overlook reason-TOP absent
 'Her mouth is smiling, but the children cannot help noticing a tear-drop falling'
 (Sakae Tsuboi, Ni-ju-shi-no hitomi) (Hamano 1998: 151)

Table 2. Sound-symbolic variants of 'tears falling'

Term	CV1	CV2	C
<i>potaN</i>	light/small/fine + o	hitting a surface + large (a)	reverberation
<i>potaQ</i>	light/small/fine + o	hitting a surface + large (a)	unidirectionally forceful
<i>potari</i>	light/small/fine + o	hitting a surface + large (a)	quiet ending
<i>porori</i>	light/small/fine + o	rolling, fluid movement + o	quiet ending
<i>poroN</i>	light/small/fine + o	rolling, fluid movement + o	reverberation

A full explication of Japanese sound symbolism is available in Hamano (1998); however, a summary showing how these various terms describing tears vary in meaning relative to their sound symbolic properties is provided here as an example. Such terms would be used in *manga* cartoons to elaborate the visual representation of the tears. As Gabas and Van der Auwera (2004: 401) point out, ideophones such as these "highlight salient scenes of the narrative" when used in storytelling. These examples also show the synaesthetic interaction of sound symbolism that indexes the visual representation of a particular 'eye'-related behavior. The contrast between *-ta-* and *-ro-* shows the nature of the tear's impact, while nasal *N* contrasts with the glottal stop *Q* and *-ri* to indicate whether or how the movement ceases. The vowel 'o' is a neutral vowel in her analysis.

3. Larger phrasal/clausal units

'Eye' in Japanese participates in figurative expressions that range the gamut from passive to active involvement in an action or circumstance. These also range from concrete actions, such as winking (*me o tsumuru*), to mental and emotional states (e.g. *me o utagau* 'can't believe one's eyes'). Data in this section is taken from Seidensticker (1977). EYE AS/FOR PERSON figures prominently in these terms:

3.1 Passive eye expressions

In these data the eye is an experiencer, a container with a limit, a location where things can be seen or placed, or an object that can be matched with another or even pulled.

- (10) a. *me ni amaru*
 eye-in surpass
 'be too much to tolerate'

- b. *me ni iretemo itakunai*
eye-in put in-if hurt-NEG
'be the apple of one's eye' [lit. 'even putting s/t into the eye wouldn't hurt']
- c. *me ni miete iru*
eye-in seen is
'a foregone conclusion'
- d. *me ni wa me o*
eye-in-TOP eye-OB
'tit for tat, an eye for an eye'
- e. *me o hikaseru*
eye-OB be pulled
'watch (carefully)' [lit. 'eye is pulled']

3.2 Unmarked eye expressions

In the examples in (11) the eye appears to be emerging from its socket in surprise or anger, reveals that its owner is alive via its color, or is doubted by its owner. A lump above the eye indicates that passage is impossible, as if the head struck a wall or beam. Mucus produced by the eye that laughs at nasal mucus metonymically represents two equally situated persons, one laughing at the other's situation.

- (11)
- a. *menotama ga tobidasu yô na*
eye-GEN ball-SUB fly out as if
'eye-popping'
 - b. *me no kuroi uchi wa*
eye-GEN black interval-TOP
'as long as one is alive' [lit. 'as long as the eye is black']
 - c. *mekuso hanakuso o warau*
eye goobers snot-OB laugh at
'be like the pot calling the kettle black'
 - d. *menoue no tankobu*
eye-GEN above-GEN nuisance
'roadblock' [lit. 'lump above the eye']
 - e. *me o utagau*
eye-OB doubt
'can't believe one's eyes'

3.3 Active eye expressions

Attaching a mark, like a star that attracts the eye, yields the concept 'educated guess' hearkening back to the eye's capacity for judgment described in 2.1.1. Attaching eyes and nose, as if finishing the drawing of a face, indicates completion. Attaching 'eye' to something means 'to pay attention' to it. Narrowing the eyes makes them appear in the happy shape described in 2.2, as they light up; this is quite a strong contrast to *narrow one's eyes* in English, which indicates anger or suspicion. When the 'head' part of the eyes (the corner near the nose – the opposing end is called *mejiri* 'eye-bottom') gets hot, tears emerge.

- (12) a. *meboshi o tsukeru*
 eye-star-OBJ attach
 'make an educated guess'
- b. *mehana o tsukeru*
 eye-nose-OBJ attach
 'finish the final touches'
- c. *me o tukete-iru*
 eye-OBJ attach-CONT
 'keep one's eye on'
- d. *me o hosomeru*
 eye-OBJ narrow
 'one's eyes light up'
- e. *megashira ga atsuku naru*
 eye-head-SUB hot become
 'one's eyes fill with tears'

3.4 Sentences contextualizing eye behavior

In this section specific appearances of the eye are linked to emotional expression through figurative language, such as burning or coloration. Though blackness of eyes is linked physically to health and life in 3.2 above, it appears here that *irome* 'colored eyes' are linked to sexual interest (as is *iro* 'color' in Japanese generally) while *shiroi me* 'white eyes' are eyes of disdain. Burning eyes (*moeta me*) are indications of hatred:

- (13) *Satsuki wa dare de mo wakai otoko o miru to irome o tsukau.*
 Satsuki-TOP anyone young man-OBJ see if colored-eyes-OBJ use
 'Satsuki gives the eye to every young man she sees' (Murakami 1997: 70)

- (14) *Tokaku seken wa, zenka-mono o shiroi me de miru mono da.*
 All over world-TOP criminal record-person-OBJ white eye with see-NOM COP
 ‘The world can be pretty unforgiving toward people with criminal records’
 (Murakami 1997: 107)
- (15) *Kanojo wa, zoo ni moeta me de otto no aijin o niramitsuketa.*
 She-TOP hatred-in burn-PAST eye-with husband-GEN lover-OBJ glared
 ‘She gave her husband’s mistress a look that was full of hatred’
 (Murakami 1997: 147)

Here, the burning eyes are figurative (in contrast to the tear-filled eyes in 3.3) exhibiting culturally specific embodiment, and thus clearly reflect the ANGER AS HEAT metaphor proposed for Japanese in Matsuki (1995). Other eye behaviors indicating anger include *me o suwaru* ‘set one’s eyes’, *me ni kado o tateru* ‘stand the corners of one’s eyes’, *me o sankaku ni suru* ‘make eyes into triangles’, and *me o muku* ‘peel one’s eyes; glare’ (Ikegami 2008: 181), which creates the *oomedama* ‘large eyes’ listed as 2.1.3 as indicative of a scolding.

4. Sociocultural implications of ‘eye’ expressions

The following section examines ‘eye’ expressions providing further support of the argument for embodiment. The social hierarchical sense of ‘eye’ supports a PHYSICAL FOR SOCIAL metonymy or SOCIAL IS PHYSICAL metaphor, operating as a projection of the UP-DOWN image schema, which is discussed in 4.1. In Section 4.2, implications for behavior connected to ‘eye’ expressions are presented. Traditional norms for gendered behavior provide data for further entailment of this social hierarchy and are discussed in 4.2.1. Following these, 4.2.2 mentions some of the broader ethnographic and cultural-psychological implications of ‘eye’ expressions.

4.1 Implications of ‘eye’ in the social hierarchical sense

As we have seen in previous sections, the use of the eye as a tool of measurement and discernment in Japanese is robustly supported in data. However, the measurement may not only be physical or applied to concrete objects. Social status and hierarchy are also expressed through ‘eye’ expressions which locate persons relative to one’s gaze or line of sight, not unlike English *look up to* or *look down on*: *meue no hito* ‘social superior’ and *meshita no hito* ‘social inferior’. These expressions, emerging from a vertical orientational metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 15), are particularly salient in the Japanese case, since they index accompanying scenarios for everyday behavior. These include speech levels, particularly

the use of honorific and humble registers, as well as bodily habitus such as eye contact norms, bowing and relative seating arrangements in groups. Furthermore, whenever the Japanese royal family bestows its greetings on audiences at the palace grounds, they do so from an upper-story window overlooking the crowd.

In particular, the phrase *me o kakeru* 'favor' (lit. 'suspend one's eyes [upon]') listed in 3.3 is used in place of the plain verb *miru* 'see' when referring to the honored person's eye behavior. Though an examination of verbs of seeing is beyond the scope of this chapter, two further examples of eye expressions that should be mentioned index social hierarchy through contrast: *goran ni naru* 'see + HONORIFIC' and *haiken suru* 'see + HUMBLE, both glossed as 'look'.

4.2 Eye appearance and behavior in the Japanese cultural milieu

Confucian thought has influenced Japan since the introduction of writing circa the seventh century; within this system, male dominance is fundamental, among other attributes of its structuring of social hierarchy. A significant linguistic outcome of this system that emerged during Japan's early modernization along with the development of so-called 'standard Japanese', is the development of codified gendered norms for speech, specifically that of so-called 'women's language', in the Meiji period of the late nineteenth century (Inoue 2006). The following section discusses linguistic and behavioral implications of gender norms assigned to women.

4.2.1 Gender norms

Since the burden of linguistic politeness is borne more heavily by women in Japanese culture (Shibamoto Smith 2003: 213), it is fitting to include data on manners that prescribe eye behaviors and use eye expressions to index propriety in particular scenarios. What follows is excerpted from a *Nikkei Woman* 'Japanese Economy Woman' magazine special issue titled *Hataraku josei o utsukushiku suru 'Manaa & Hinkaku' Baiburu* ('To make working women beautiful: 'Manners & Elegance' Bible'). It includes reference to physical encounters requiring specific eye behavior (i.e. bodily habitus) and also refers to figurative measuring of speech level with reference to 'eye' expressions (as mentioned in 4.1) that should be employed in verbal interactions including email. Again, the linking of social status as vertical hierarchy by indexing the 'eye' as the point of reference and the embodiment of this as actual eye behavior appears.

Specifically, in a reference to the 'basic posture [from which] to put forth an elegant voice' (*'hinkakugoe' o dasu kihon shisei*), the female speaker is urged to think of herself as standing one step above the interlocutor (putting them eye to eye in the accompanying diagram) and *ago o karuku hiki, mune o hirogete mesen o takaku suru* 'lightly pulling in the chin, broadening the chest, look over the

interlocutor’ (lit. ‘raise one’s line of sight’). When deciding where to schedule a worker’s night out, one should go to the restaurant and ‘**look the place over**’ (*shitami o shite*, lit. ‘look downward’). This echoes the hierarchy of customer-server relations, a participation schema in which the server should honor the customer through speech and other behavior (Palmer 1996: 203). In an email offering advice, one must ‘overcome the inadvertent tendency to speak from on high and take a stance **eye to eye with the person receiving advice**’ (*adobaisu wa aite to onaji mesen ni tatte: tui takai tokoro kara iigachi*). We see that in the first place, the advice is directed towards bodily habitus, in the second to cultural norms, and in the third, towards an appropriate level of verbal expression, since it is referring to an email (Ishikawa 2008: 41, 57; Kishimoto 2008: 72). Each of these examples refers specifically to eye behaviors that index social status as vertical hierarchy, whether structural (as in the restaurant) or situational, emerging in personal encounters.

More general discourses on gender and eyes are also readily available. Thus far we have seen one reference to gendered eye behavior in 2.2.1: *giragira* ‘eye light of a male of middle age, with passion, strong motivation.’ This seems to connect metaphorically to an expression describing ideal eyes for men and women, *otoko no me ni wa ito o hiki, onna no me ni wa suzu o hare* ‘pull a string for men’s eyes, put bells in women’s eyes.’ The sharp male gaze (*suQkiri, suQto, kiriQto*) is represented as a line similar to a string (as lexicalized in *mesen*, ‘line of sight’, literally ‘eye-string’).

A contemporary women’s magazine recently used eye appearance and eye makeup to assert, beyond the typical advice on styles and fashion, a connection between appearance and one’s level of luck in the New Year (2009) based on physiognomy. According to this text derived from an interview with face-reader Togi Sogen, a person with large eyes is active; one with deep eyelids has deep friendships, and one with deep outside corners is prone to trouble. Round eyes indicate a perceptive person. A person with a larger left eye is emotional; conversely, a person with a larger right eye is cerebral. Following these principles, it is proposed that eyes with proper makeup can ‘increase the smoothness of your friendly relationships.’ By brightening the outer corner of one’s eyes with sparkly or pearly eye shadow, one can avoid getting caught up into trouble (*mejiri o akaruku suru to toraburu ni makikomarenai*). Also, by emphasizing the upper eyelid, one can broaden the range of one’s acquaintances (*megashira o kyouchousuru to kouyuu no haba ga hirogaru*) (Nakao 2008: 63, 65).

In research on connections between contemporary gender metaphors and imagery from folklore, Occhi (1996) found that women (who were preferred as marriage partners) described as *tanuki* ‘badgers’ had round eyes while *kitsune* ‘fox’ faced women – the kind men date but don’t marry – had narrower eyes along the vertical dimension. Data describing these eye types and palliative remedies neutralizing extreme cases of both types were also found in magazines. Miller (2006)

describes several physiognomic eye types, and discusses aesthetic remedies to the so-called unfortunate ones, ranging from eyelid glues and tapes to plastic surgery. These data indicate that, beyond the simple critique as a mere following of Western beauty norms, Japanese eye enhancements reflect indigenous values and beliefs.

4.2.2 *Ethnographic and psychological perspectives*

To examine more broadly the cultural assertions regarding eyes and eye behavior, we turn to ancillary data from ethnographic and psychological perspectives. The Japanese anthropologist Befu (1986) has carefully analyzed the behaviors associated with *sake* drinking in dinner party settings, noting particularly the difficulties drinkers (typically male) may experience obligatorily pouring for each other from a large-mouthed flask into a small drinking vessel as drunkenness ensues. He notes that Japanese are trained for this kind of hand-eye coordination through various activities: "goldfish scooping [a festival game using quickly dissolving scoops made from rice paper stretched on a frame], using chopsticks, making paper-folding figures [*origami*], playing with beanbags, etc." (116). I would add to this list the expertise gleaned from experiences of writing a partly ideographic language with strict stroke order, as well as the training provided not only in calligraphy but also in drawing throughout the eight years of mandatory public education.

In the realm of cultural psychology, Kasahara (1986) describes a particular kind of neurotic fear of interpersonal relations (*taijin kyofu*) which emerges from two types of anxiety related to eye behavior: that of being looked at by others, and that of staring or otherwise unintentionally looking strangely at others. He states that the typical patient is a male in adolescent or early adult stage, reporting problems neither with relatives nor with doctors, but in groups of people of intermediate familiarity. Such patients believe that their eyes are 'piercing' those around them. This belief causes greater anxiety than that of being stared at by others, and is particularly exacerbated in three-way conversations or in situations where they are seated abreast and fear "piercing the person next to them" (379–382). The data on male staring gaze labeled *gira gira* above specifically indexes a person of middle age and thus of higher age-designated rank than the young adults who are typical sufferers of this complaint.

It is said that emotion should be read in the eyes for Japanese, as evidenced not only in the research discussed above, but also in two traditional but still salient expressions: *me wa kuchi hodo mono o iu* 'the eye says as much as the mouth' and *me wa kokoro no kagami* 'the eyes are the mirror of the heart'. The term *kokoro* 'heart' in the latter example is not necessarily the physical organ nor the soul, but a non-Cartesian equivalent of what English speakers refer to as mind and/or heart in referring to the realms of thought and feeling (Occhi 2008). Thus the expression differs slightly but significantly from the English *the eyes are the window to the soul*.

5. Conclusion

The concept 'eye' plays a significant role in Japanese language and culture, describing mental operations as well as emotional experience. 'Eye' expressions in Japanese characterize the eye as the arbiter, potentially capable of judging and measuring across several dimensions ranging from the physical to the spiritual and supernatural. It is itself judged. EYE AS MIND and EYE FOR/AS PERSON are attested in various data, as is the tendency to refer to the eye in describing the thing seen or its effect as registered in the eye. The eye is also salient for Japanese as expressive of character and of emotion. Social psychological experimental results suggest that the eye is more salient when judging emotion than is the mouth for Japanese speakers, relative to speakers of American English. Sound-symbolic terms provide a wealth of descriptors for eye behavior that reveals emotional states. The ongoing use of text and grammatical emoticons programmed into cell phones suggests that eye-related emotional indicators deriving from *manga* and *anime* cartoons may become grammaticalized (as have other emoticons such as hearts and teardrops/sweat shapes described in Kataoka (2002, 2003). Notably, the eye is indexed as the locus of social hierarchical distinctions that govern behavior, including linguistic and bodily performance. The eye is also an index of communicative norms and reveals aspects of gender, personality, and mental illness. Data from Japanese thus robustly supports the notions of physiological, cultural, and culturally tainted embodiment outlined in Maalej (2004).

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Appendix

moku suru (eye-do) 'regard as'
mokkon (eye-present) 'now'
meate (eye-hit) 'guide(post); aim'
mesaki (eye-before) 'one's eyes; immediate future, foresight; appearance'
ma(no)atari (eye-hit) 'before one's eyes'
mokusan (eye-calculate) 'expectation, estimate'
mokusoku (eye-measure) 'measure by eye'
me(no)ko kanjô (eye-small-calculate) 'measuring by eye; mental arithmetic'
mebunryo (eye-separate-weight) 'measuring by eye'
meyasu (eye-safe) 'standard, yardstick'
memori (eye-heap) 'scale, gradations'
mekata (eye-manner) 'weight'
meberi (eye-reduce) 'weight loss'
meippai (eye-full) 'the limit'
menuki (eye-exclude) 'main, principal'
shugan (main-eye) 'main point/purpose'
mokuji (eye-next) 'table of contents'
mokuroku (eye-record) 'catalog, list, inventory'

mekiki (eye-move) 'judging; a judge/connoisseur of'
meaki (eye-bright) 'sighted/educated person'
meakashi (eye-bright) 'police detective (of the Edo era)'
ganchu (eye-middle) 'in one's eyes/consideration'
ganko (eye-light) 'glint of one's eye; insight'
ganshiki (eye-work) 'discernment, insight'
ganriki (eye-power) 'insight, discernment'
gugan (tool-eye) 'discernment'
katsugan (active-eye) 'keen eye; insight'
keigan (bright-eye) 'gleaming eyes; insightful, discerning'
tatsugan (strong-eye) 'insight, farsightedness'
keigan (prana-eye) 'sharp eye, keen insight'
kansatsugan (observe-eye) 'an observing eye'
kanshikigan (discern-eye) 'discerning eye'
chakugan (attach-eye) 'notice, observe'

- meutsuri* (eye-move) 'distraction, difficulty in choosing'
mesaki no kiku (eye-before-GEN work) 'farsighted'
mehashi (eye-origin) 'quick wit, tact'
mebayai (eye-fast) 'quick to notice, sharp-eyed'
mezatoi (eye-clever) 'quick'
shingan (heart-eye) 'one's mind's eye'
senrigan (thousand-ri [3.9km]-eye) 'clairvoyant'
tengantsu (heaven-eye-pass) 'clairvoyance'

meue (eye-above) 'one's superior/senior'
meshita (eye-below) 'one's subordinate/junior'
medôri (eye-pass) 'audience with; eye level'
mehachibu (eye-eight parts) '[hold an offering] a little below eye level; most respectfully; about eight-tenths full'

mejirooshi (eye-white-push) 'be jammed up in line/jostling, milling'
me no kataki (eye-Gen enemy) 'enemy, object of hostility'
memie (eye-see) 'audience, interview, stage debut, servant's service on approval'
mokugeki (eye-hit) 'observe, witness'
mokugekisha (eye-hit-person) '[eye] witness'
shigan (history-eye) 'historical view, sense of history'

kaigen, kaigan (open-eye) 'spiritual awakening; consecrating a newly made image'
hogen (law-eye) 'a high priestly rank in Buddhism'
bongan (ordinary-eye) 'a layman's eye'
zokugan (common-eye) 'layman's eye, popular opinion'
me no mae, mokuzen (eye-GEN-before) 'before one's eyes; immediate [gain]'
meboshi (eye-star) 'aim, object'
mezasu (eye-point) 'aim at'
megakeru (eye-hang) 'aim at'
meate (eye-hit) 'guidepost; aim'
mokuteki (eye-way) 'purpose, object, aim'
mokuto (eye-way) 'aim, goal, end, object'
mokuhyô (eye-sign) 'target, goal, objective'
mokuromi (eye-theory-see) 'plan, project, intention'
mokutekichi (eye-way-place) 'destination'
mokutekikaku (eye-way-case) 'the objective case'
mokutekigo (eye-way-word) 'object [in grammar]'
mokutekiron (eye-way-theory) 'teleology'

PART 3

**Middle Eastern and North
African perspectives**

Conceptualizations of *cheshm* ‘eye’ in Persian*

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Common Persian expressions containing *cheshm* ‘eye’ convey conceptualizations of emotions, including love, envy, and greed, as well as denote character traits such as naiveté and willfulness. This body part is also associated with a Persian cultural schema that equates ‘eye do’ or ‘eye hit’ with ‘casting a charm or spell’ on someone, believed to invite bad luck in the form of sickness or loss. Overall, Persian ‘eye’ expressions do not reflect the metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING as a dominant conceptualization in the everyday use of speakers. The findings of this study provide further support for the claim that there is close interaction among language, body, and culture. In other words, it confirms the position that figurative meanings based on the body do not draw their power from an assumption that there is but one natural way in which we interact physically with our environment.

Keywords: character traits, culture, emotions, metaphor

1. Introduction

One of the areas of language that best reflects the interaction between cognition, culture, and language is the use of terms that refer to a body organ, such as the heart (e.g. Maalej 2004; Yu 2001, 2002). These expressions have often been described simply as figures of speech, but recent studies in Cognitive Linguistics have shown how the use of the body as a resource or “anchor” in conceptualizing various experiences, including thinking and feeling, is grounded in cultural models (e.g. Gibbs 1999; Kövecses 1999, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Sharifian, Dirven, Yu, & Niemeier 2008). In this chapter, I focus on the case of *cheshm* ‘eye’ in Persian to show how the use of this body part term in various expressions reflects conceptualizations such as EYE AS THE LOCUS OF EMOTIONS.

* The author wishes to thank Ning Yu, Maryam Jamarani, Shahla Sharifi, Susan Stanford, and Roya Ranjbar for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

Yu (2004) observes that, in both English and Chinese, expressions that contain the body term ‘eye’ reflect conceptualizations of PERCEPTUAL ORGAN FOR PERCEPTION as well as THINKING, UNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWING IS SEEING. In Modern Persian, while there is also a set of formal words that reflect the conceptualization of THINKING IS SEEING, the eye is conceptualized mainly in relation to “ill-judged” emotions and personality traits such as envy and greed. This chapter elaborates on these themes by providing examples from the everyday use of Persian expressions that include this body part. Examples where ‘eye’ instantiates a Persian cultural model that attributes magical powers to this body part are also provided.

Analyzed first are cases in which the eye is associated with perception and is the source for the conceptual metonymy PERCEPTUAL ORGAN FOR PERCEPTION. ‘To casually look for something’ is described as *chashm andâkhtan* ‘to throw an eye’ as in the following example:¹

- (1) *Yek cheshm andâkht-am, chizi peidâ na-kard-am*
 One eye threw-me something find not-did-I?
 ‘I had a look [lit. ‘I threw an eye’], but couldn’t find anything’

The following examples also show this body part involved in the act of perception.

- (2) *Cheshm az-ash bar.nadâr*
 Eye from-it don’t.take
 ‘Keep watching [lit. ‘Don’t take eye from’] it closely’
- (3) *cheshm be.hesh dookhteh bood*
 Eye to.it sewn was
 ‘(he/she) was staring at [lit. ‘had sewn eye to’) it/him/her’
- (4) *ageh beh cheshm-et khord bekhar-esh*
 If to eye-yours hit buy-it
 ‘If you happen to see it [lit. ‘it hit your eye’], buy it’
- (5) *ageh cheshm-am beh.esh biofteh, midun-am bâ.hâsh chikâr konam.*
 If eye-mine to.him/her fall/drop know-I with.him/her what
 do
 ‘If I see him/her [lit. ‘If my eye falls/drops to him/her’], I know what to do with him/her’

1. The symbol *â* stands for a low back unrounded vowel close to the sounds of *a* in the English word *father*. I acknowledge that there are dialectal differences in the use of the Persian expressions used in this chapter, although the differences should be minimal. The equivalents given under each word in the examples are meant only to serve as a semantic guide and are not to be taken as exact morphosyntactic equivalents.

In (2) the act of continuous, close watching is conceptualized as 'having an eye on something', terminating the act of watching is conceptualized as 'taking one's eye from it', while in (3) the act of staring at something is conceptualized as 'sewing an eye on it'. These expressions are similar to English *keeping an eye on something/glued to something* and *taking one's eye off something*. In sentence (4) 'coming across something' is conceptualized as 'one's eye hitting something' whereas in (5) 'coming across a person' is understood as 'one's eye falling/dropping onto someone'. Again, English expressions similar to (4) and (5) exist, such as, *If something hits your eye, buy it* and *My eyes fell upon a beautiful woman*.

Literary Persian has another word for 'eye', which is *deedeh*. This word is used in poetry, exemplified in the following stanza from Bâbâ Tâher, an eleventh century Persian poet and mystic:

- (6) *zeh dasteh deedeh o del hardo faryâd*
 From hand the. eye and the. heart both shout
 'I am frustrated with both the eye and the heart'
- (7) *Harâncheh deedeh beenad del konad yâd*
 Whatever the. eye sees the. heart does remember
 'Whatever the eye sees, the heart remembers/longs for'

The stem of the word *deedeh* is *deed*, which refers to eyesight, and in fact the word for the act of perception in Modern Persian is *deedan*. In this case then the act of perception takes part in forming a word that refers to the perceptual organ (i.e. *deedeh*).

2. *Cheshm* and conceptualizations of emotions

The body part *cheshm* is used very frequently in conceptualizations of emotions in Persian. It is very closely linked to *del* 'heart-stomach', which is generally conceptualized as the locus of emotions such as love in Persian (Sharifian 2008c). In fact many literary texts in Persian refer to *cheshm-e del* 'eye of the heart' as spiritual insight, as opposed to physical perception. This conceptualization has its origins in Sufism, a mystical spiritual tradition, which has immensely influenced Persian literature and language. In Sufism, *del* refers not to the physical but the spiritual heart, and it is in the spiritual heart where a Sufi, in his journey towards perfection, eventually perceives the manifestations of God (Nurbakhsh 1992). The spiritual heart is capable of seeing what the physical eye cannot perceive. It is the site of the vision of *âlameh gheib* 'the Unseen World'. The close affinity in Sufism between the eye and the heart as sites of emotions has been absorbed by Persian literature and

from there has spread outwards to more general conceptualizations of the eye in the Persian language. This close link between the eye, both in the spiritual sense and the physical sense, and the heart in Persian literature is reflected in (6) and (7), and in the following popular saying:

- (8) *Az del beravad har.ânkeh az deedeher beraft*
 From the heart would.be.gone the.one from the.eye is.gone.
 ‘Goes from the heart, the one who goes out of sight’

The saying in (8) may seem similar to the English saying *Out of sight, out of mind*. However, the Persian expression captures both the emotional and mental aspect of forgetting a person who is no longer seen. Although in Modern Persian *zahn* ‘mind’, associated with the brain, is largely conceptualized as the center of thinking (Sharifian 2008c), *del* reflects conceptualizations of both emotions and thinking/remembering. The English expression *Out of sight, out of mind* on the other hand, does not convey the emotional dimensions that accompany the process of forgetting or becoming less attached to an absent person.

2.1 *Cheshm* as the site of love

In Persian the emotion most strongly associated with the eye is love. Such expressions are used usually among family members such as between a mother and child, and do not convey the sense of romantic love. Consider the following sentences:

- (9) a. *Nasrin cheshm-â-m-e*
 Nasrin eye-PL-my-is
 ‘I love Nasrin dearly’ [lit. ‘Nasrin is my eyes’]
 b. *Bâbak Noor-e cheshm-e mâmân-esh-e*
 Bâbak light-of eye-of mother-his-is
 ‘Bâbak is the apple of his mother’s eye’ [lit. ‘Bâbak is the light of his mother’s eye’]
 c. *dokhtar-am roo cheshm-â-m jâ dâreh*
 daughter-mine on eye- PL-mine place has
 ‘I love my daughter dearly’ [lit. ‘My daughter has place on my eye’]

In (9a) love is conceptualized in terms of one’s eye, in the sense that the loved person is equated with one’s eye. In (9b) the loved person is conceptualized as the light of one’s eye, which is roughly equivalent to the conceptualization of *apple of one’s eye* in English. This second expression reflects the conceptualization EYES ARE LIGHT SOURCES, which is dominant in Chinese (Yu 2004). However, in Chinese, eye light is conceptualized as being able to hit a target with the meanings of ‘eyesight, foresight,

vision, and insight' (Yu 2004: 666) whereas in Persian eye light is associated with emotion. In (9c) loving someone is conceptualized as 'having place on one's eye'. The following is another expression that associates the eye with affection.

- (10) *Siroos az chesh-am oftâdeh*
 Siroos from eye-mine has.fallen
 'I don't like Siroos anymore/I don't have any feelings for Siroos anymore'
 [lit. 'Siroos has fallen from my eye']

In (10) the loss of one's positive attitude toward and feeling about another person is conceptualized as 'that person falling from one's eye'. This expression also reflects an image schema whereby the eye is conceptualized as a location from which someone can fall. If this negative feeling towards someone is intensified one can say something comparable to the English expression *I no longer have eyes for him*, as in the following:

- (11) *Cheshm nadâram bebin-am-esh*
 Eye not.have see-me-him
 'I hate him' [lit. 'I don't have eye to see him']

In Persian, the eye may also be used to conceptualize attraction, such as towards a car or a house, as in the following examples:²

- (12) a. *In mâshin cheshm-am ro gereft-e, mikhâm bekharamesh*
 This car eye-mine DO has.caught want.I to.buy.me
 'I like this car' [lit. 'This car has caught my eye'] 'I'd like to buy it'
 b. *Cheshm-am in mâshin ro gereft-e*
 eye-mine this car DO has.caught
 'I like this car' [lit. 'My eye has caught this car']

In (12) the attraction to a car is rendered as 'the car catching one's eye' or 'the eye catching/holding the car', which are similarly conceptualized in English.

2.2 *Cheshm* as the site of envy

Another emotion that is associated with the eye in Persian is envy. A person who is envious of others' successes and progress is referred to as *cheshm o nazar tang* 'eye and vision narrow', which means 'having narrow eye/eyesight'. This is different from a physical narrowing of the eyes that correlates with negative emotions

2. The morpheme *râ* (expressed as *ro* or *o* in spoken form) can be used in Persian as a definiteness marker, a specificity marker, and a topicalization marker. For more on this morpheme, see Shokouhi and Kipka (2003).

(particularly hatred) in English. Other expressions in which envy is conceptualized in terms of the eye are:³

- (13) a. *nemitooneh pishrafteh mâ ro bebineh*
 Can't.he/she progress our DO see
 'He/she is envious of our progress' [lit. 'He/she can't see our progress']
- b. *Cheshm-e deedan-e man ro na.dâreh*
 Eye-of see-EZ me DO not.have
 'He/she hates me (due to envy) [lit. 'He/she doesn't have eye to see me']
- c. *Cheshm-esh koor mishe barâ mâ*
 Eye-his/her blind becomes for us
 'He/she is envious of us' [lit. 'Her eye becomes blind for us']
- d. *Tokhm-e cheshm-esh barâ mâ dar.miâd*
 Ball-of eye-his/her for us out.comes
 'He/she is envious of us [lit. 'The ball of his/her eye comes out for us']

In (13a) envy is conceptualized as 'not being able to see someone' in the sense of not being able to tolerate seeing the object of envy. This is conceptualized as 'not having an eye to see someone' in (13b), 'one's eye becoming blind' in (13c), and 'one's eyeball coming out' in (13d). The intensity of envy increases from (13a) to (13d); thus intense envy is conceptualized as the envious person's eyeballs coming out so as to avoid forever seeing the object of envy. These expressions seem to be partly metonymically motivated. A prominent aspect in becoming envious of people or their possessions is *seeing* them, so envy is likely to lead to a desire not to see these people or their possessions that are the object of envy. Such conceptualizations, of course, may exist in totally different languages and cultures. For example, Swartz (1998) observes the association of the eye with envy in Mombasa Swahili and maintains that for these speakers, "envy begins in the eyes that see what is desirable, is experienced and influenced in the heart where the desire to have what the other has is produced and may find expression through the tongue thus spreading and increasing the envy" (p. 30). Again, here the motivation for the association of the eye with envy seems to be metonymic as perception is the trigger of envy.

The eye in Persian is also associated with a cultural schema that attributes certain destructive powers to the eyes. The Persian expressions *cheshm kardan* ('eye do') and *chashm zadan* ('eye hit') mean roughly 'casting a charm or spell' on someone or something, either intentionally or sub-consciously. This is brought about largely through envy and animosity, or it can even be a result of genuine

3. EZ is the grammatical abbreviation of *ezâfe*, which refers to morphemes that provide a link between various constituents within a noun phrase in Persian, and are frequently used to form possessive and attributive constructions, among others.

admiration of a person's talent, possession, etc. The spell may invite, either intentionally or inadvertently, bad luck in terms of sickness or loss on the part of the envied person. A person with the power to cast this kind of spell is described as having a salty eye (*cheshm-e shur*, lit. 'eye-salty'). The casting of such a spell may be attributed to anyone suspected of envy. Traditionally, people have always taken certain measures to counteract such evil powers and intentions. Touching wood is associated with complimenting, and often the giver of the compliment touches wood to protect the receiver. Burning certain leaves in the house of a person liable to attracting envy is another custom. The association of the eye with jealousy (see e.g. Ameka 2002; Swartz 1998), evil powers, and the notion of the evil eye, is also found in other cultures. Nevertheless the exact nature of these conceptualizations and their linguistic expressions differ from one language to another.

2.3 Conceptualizations of *negâh* 'look'

A common usage of the Persian word *negâh* 'look' is associated with expressing emotions of different kinds, such as anger and the active expression of affection. Here are some examples of this usage:

- (14) a. *Negâh-e tond-i beh man kard*
 Look-EZ sharp-ART at me did
 'He/she looked at me irascibly' [lit. 'He/she had a sharp look at me']
- b. *Negâh-e khashmgin-i beh man andâkht*
 Look-EZ angry-ART at me threw
 'He/she cast an angry look at me' [lit. 'He/she threw an angry look at me']
- c. *Negâh-e por mehr-i beh man kard*
 Look-EZ full affection-ART at me did
 'She/he gave me an affectionate look' [lit. 'He/she gave an affectionate look at me']
- d. *Negâh-esh âsheghuneh bood*
 Look-his/her amorous was
 'His/her look was amorous'

The examples in (14) reveal that the appearance of the eyes can be perceived as an expression of emotion. We should note that while the word *look* in English may be associated with the entire facial expression, *negâh* in Persian specifically focuses on a person's eyes and the ways in which they are used to express the emotion in question.

Negâh may also be used to express other things, for example, to give someone a feeling of intellectual inferiority, as in the following sentence:

- (15) *Yek negâh-e âghel-âneh-yi beh man kard.*
One look-EZ wise-mannered-such at me did
'He/she gave me a look that made me feel intellectually inferior' [lit. 'He/she gave me such a wise-mannered look']

This parallels English expressions such as *He looked at me like I was stupid* or *He gave me a condescending look*.

3. Cheshm and character traits

This section focuses on expressions of *cheshm* that relate to character traits. Some examples are given in (16):

(16)

Persian expression	Literal meaning	Near equivalence in English
a. <i>cheshm o gush basteh</i>	ear and eye closed	naïve
b. <i>cheshm sefid</i>	eye white	willful, stubborn
c. <i>cheshm pâk</i>	eye clean	a man who doesn't prey on women
d. <i>cheshm darideh</i>	eye torn	rude (usually a girl)

In (16a), having a closed eye and ear is associated with a lack of worldly experience. This conceptualization appears to be metonymic, in that the maturity that comes with worldly experience is viewed as leading to open eyes and ears (*cheshm o gush-e bâz* 'eye and ear open'), or attentiveness, i.e. active perception of what is happening in daily life. In (16c) the 'cleanness' of the eye is a *cultural conceptualization* (Sharifian 2003, 2008b). In Iran males who prey on females are culturally condemned and conceptualized as having a 'dirty' eye (*cheshm nâ-pâk* 'eye not-clean'). Thus refraining from this behavior is conceptualized as having a 'clean' eye. The case of (16d) is also another cultural conceptualization. A girl who shows culturally inappropriate behavior, like "talking back" to parents or elders, is often called *cheshm darideh* 'eye torn'.

Cheshm is also associated with greed, conceptualized as 'having an eye, or greedy eye, on something that others have', as in the following example:

- (17) *Shohar-esh be mâl-e pedar-esh cheshm dâreh*
 Husband-her to wealth-of father-her eye has
 'Her husband is after her father's wealth [lit. 'Her husband has an eye to her father's wealth']

The example in (17) could also be used with *cheshm-e tama* 'eye of greed', rather than *cheshm dâreh*, which conveys the same meaning. The basis for this conceptualization seems to be the idea that 'one who looks at something, wants it', as was discussed in the case of envy.

Greed may also be conceptualized in terms of a hungry eye, with a greedy person called *gorosneh cheshm* 'hungry eye', or *cheshm gorosneh* 'eye hungry'. A greedy person may be conceptualized as someone whose stomach is full but whose eye remains hungry as in the following:

- (18) *Shekam-esh sir shodeh, cheshm-esh na*
 Stomach-his/her full has.become eye-his/her not
 'He/she is still greedy' [lit. 'His/her stomach has become full, but not his/her eye']

4. Other 'eye'-related expressions

Other figurative extensions of *cheshm* 'eye' include the following:

(19)

Persian expression	Literal meaning	Near equivalence in English
a. <i>cheshm pooshidan</i>	eye covering	forgive
b. <i>cheshm beh râh</i>	eye to road	anticipate, esp. someone's arrival
c. <i>beh cheshm âmadan</i>	to eye come	appear as sizable/be conspicuous
d. <i>sarâpâ cheshm</i>	head.to.foot eye	all eyes
e. <i>cheshm-tars shodan</i>	eye-fear become	becoming cautious as a result of negative experience

In (19a) the act of forgiving someone is conceptualized as covering one's eyes, and thus overlooking a fault or injury. In (19b) anticipation, such as anxiously waiting for someone to arrive, is conceptualized as having an 'eye to the road', which can also be expressed as *cheshm beh dar dookhtan* 'sewing one's eye to the door'. In these expressions, there is a metonymic element, i.e. the eye is involved at a literal

level in the action described. For example, when waiting for someone, we often look towards the door or at the road in order to catch the first glimpse of their arrival. Similarly, in (19d), fully attending to something usually involves a hyper-awareness of one's own eyes, which is conceptualized as 'eye from head to foot'. The English equivalent of the Persian expression (i.e. *being all eyes*) reflects a similar conceptualization, although it does not specifically mention the head to foot extent of the coverage. The case of (19e) is a frequently used expression that refers to becoming cautious or over-sensitive as a result of a direct (although not necessarily personal) negative experience, as in the following example:

- (20) *Man az.vaghti tasâdof-e barâdar-am ro didam cheshm.tars*
 I since accident-of brother-my DO saw.I eye.fear
shodam
 have.become
 'I've learned a lesson and have become cautious since I saw my brother's accident' [lit. 'I have become eye-feared since I saw my brother's accident']

in (20) fear has been provoked by witnessing an event and thus the compound *cheshm-tars* foregrounds the conceptualization, perhaps as a shorthand term for FEARING AS A RESULT OF SEEING.

Persian includes expressions that reflect conceptualizations of *cheshm* as relating to something that one greatly trusts or something that is very highly valued. The following are examples of such usage:

- (21) a. *mesleh chesh.â.m behesh etemâd dâr-am.*
 like eye.PL.my to.him/her trust have-I
 'I trust him very much [lit. 'I trust him/her like my eyes']
 b. *mesleh chesh.â.m az.ash morâghebat mikonam*
 like eye.PL.my from.him/her/it look.after do
 'I look after him/her/it very well [lit. 'I look after him/her like my eyes']

In (21a), trust in another person is likened to the trust one has in one's own eyes. This expression indicates the utmost degree of trust possible. In (21b), the speaker's promise to care for others is likened to caring for one's own eyes, that is, with the same degree of concern and commitment.

There are also expressions associating *cheshm* with politeness. For example, *chashm!*, a formal pronunciation of *cheshm*, is a polite way of acceding to a request. This usually takes the following form of exchange:

- (22) A: *misheh khâheshan in nâmeḥ ro barâ.m post koni?*
 Is.it.possible please this letter DO for.me mail do?
 'Could you please mail this letter for me?'

- B: *Chashm, hatman*
 yes [lit. 'eye'] certainly
 'Yes, certainly'

A more intense degree and even more polite form of expression of willingness in response to a request is expressed as *beh.rooy-e cheshm* 'upon [my]eye'. Another example of the use of eye in relation to politeness can be found in the following invitation.

- (23) *Ghadam-e-toon beh.rooy-e cheshm*
 Step-of-your upon-of eye
 'You are very welcome'

The expression in (23), which means literally 'May your step be upon my eye!' is usually a greeting of welcome given to visitors to one's house, or it may even be used as a farewell. Another politeness formula that employs the eyes is the following utterance, which is a very frequent compliment response:

- (24) *Chesh-mâ-toon ghashang mibineh!*
 Eye-PL-your beautiful see
 'Your eyes see beautifully!'

This formulaic expression is used to respond to praise such as wearing a nice dress, having a nice haircut, or having beautiful handwriting (Sharifian 2008a). The complete interchange usually takes the following form:

- (25) A: *Cheh moblemâneh ghashangi dêr-i-n!*
 What furniture beautiful have-you-PL
 'What beautiful furniture you have!'
 B: *Chesh-mâ-toon ghashang mibine.*
 Eye-PL-your beautiful see
 'Your eyes see beautifully'

In these cases, by identifying the other person's eye as seeing everything beautifully, the compliment recipient uses this formulaic utterance to deflect the compliment reassigning it to the giver of the compliment. This usage is part of a politeness ritual and reflects the Persian cultural schema of *shekasteh-nafsi* 'modesty', which encourages recipients of compliments to reject them, play them down, and reassign them to the complimenter or others, including a family member (Sharifian 2005, 2008a).

5. THINKING AS SEEING

The body-part term *cheshm* does not appear to be associated with *zehn* ‘mind’ and thinking in Persian, and the most common perception related words, *deedan* and *negâh kardan*, are not associated with thinking. However, Persian does have the word *nazar* ‘eyesight’ which is also used to refer to a person’s opinion. It should be noted this word is now so strongly associated with ‘opinion’ that it is losing its reference to eyesight. Currently the most common Persian word for eyesight is *negâh*, a word that is not, in its everyday usage, commonly associated with thinking. There are also some rather formal Persian words that reflect the conceptualization of THINKING AS SEEING. The following are examples of such words:

(26)

Persian expression	Literal meaning	Near equivalence in English
a. <i>deed</i>	eyesight	state of mind, perspective, opinion
b. <i>binesh</i>	seeing	vision, insight
c. <i>basirat</i>	vision	clear vision, insight
d. <i>jahân bini</i>	world view	world view
e. <i>negaresh</i>	seeing	state of mind, perspective

The word *deed*, which means ‘eyesight’, is sometimes used when people refer to the quality and strength of their eyesight, for example, stating that someone has *deed-e ghavi* ‘strong eyesight’. In formal contexts, however, this word may also be used to refer to a state of mind. A person may, for example, ask, *deed-e to beh in mas’aleh chieh?* meaning ‘What do you think of this issue?’

The word *binesh* is also mainly used in formal contexts such as academic texts. It has largely lost its literal sense of referring to the act of perception, although the stem of this word, *binâie*, is still used as a formal term to refer to the faculty of eyesight. A derivative of this word, namely *bebin* ‘look’, is also used in Persian to grab a person’s attention, as in the sense of *Look!* in English. It may also be used to invite someone to take a look at something, as in the following sentence:

(27) *In naghâshi-e jadeed-am o bebeen*
This painting-EZ new-mine DO see
‘Have a look at my new painting’

The Persian expression *mikhâm bebin-am* (lit. ‘want.I see’), which may be used to mean ‘I want to know’ or ‘I want to find out’, also reflects the conceptual metaphor

KNOWING IS SEEING. This conceptualization is, however, limited to this one expression.

The word *basirat* is a borrowing from Arabic and, although it is now used in formal, non-religious contexts too, it originally referred to three categories of religious insight according to the Sufi tradition.⁴ The word *jahânbeeni* 'worldview' appears to be a calque, or loan translation, from English. *Negaresh* presents a noteworthy case in Persian. Although originally the word refers to the act of perception, currently speakers only use it to refer to a state of mind or the way one thinks about an idea, proposition, etc., and in rather formal contexts. Its verb *negaridan* 'to see' is a highly formal word that is hardly ever used in Modern Persian. A historical search, however, traces the etymology of this word back to Pahlavi, the ancient language of the Iranians. The following information is found in *A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary* (MacKenzie 1971):

Nigeridan: *negaridan* 'to see', *tavajoh kardan* 'to pay attention', *morâghebat kardan* 'to look after', *âzmâyesh kardan* 'to examine, to try', *fekr kardan* 'to think'
Nigeridâr: *negâh konandeh* 'viewer', *motovajeh* 'attentive', *daghig* 'precise', *fakur* 'thinker', *morâgheb* 'careful/attentive/watchful'

These dictionary entries suggest that in Pahlavi, perception was a basis for the conceptualizations of attention, care, and thinking. The principal remnant of the verb *nigeridan* and its derivatives in Modern Persian is *negaresh*, which was mentioned above, is used to refer only to a state of mind. Persian traditional literature also employs some derivations of this word, for example, *negar kard.am* (lit. 'saw did.I') meaning 'I saw'. However, this expression is confined to the literary genres in Persian. Thus, it seems that expressions that reflect conceptualizations of THINKING AS PERCEPTION have become limited to formal usage in Modern Persian. In falling out of the language's everyday use, they have almost all lost their former associations with perception entirely. As mentioned above, in contemporary Persian, the body part 'eye' and the act of perception are far more frequently and strongly associated with feelings, personality traits, attention and knowing, rather than with thinking. This is also reflected in the following expression, which is used to refer to someone who takes things at face value or who believes things by simply seeing them:

- (28) *aghl.esh* *beh cheshmâsh-e*
ability to reason.his/her to eyes.his/her
[roughly: 'He believes what he sees']

4. <http://www.geocities.com/druidarab/cosmos7.html>

In (28), a gullible person is described as having his thinking ability solely in his eye. This conceptualization then views a sound ability to reason as something that transcends perception.

6. INTUITION AS PERCEPTION

In Persian, the act of perception is also often conceptualized in relation to immediate intuition. For example, Persian speakers can maintain that they have grasped the true nature of someone after a brief look at them. In this sense, perception is associated with intuition and inspiration. The following examples illustrate this usage:

- (29) *Beh yek negâh fahmid-am âdam-e ghâbel-e etemâdi nist*
 With one look realized-I person-EZ worthy-of trust is.not
 ‘With one look, I realized he is not trustworthy’
- (30) *Bâ hamoon negâh-e aval ehsâs kard-am ensân-e mohtaram-ieh*
 With that look-EZ first feel did-I person-EZ respectable-is
 ‘At first glance I felt he/she is a respectable person’

As the speaker gains an intuitive insight into the true character of another through a brief/first look, these expressions reflect conceptualizations of INTUITION AS PERCEPTION.

7. Concluding remarks

In general, the observations made in this chapter about the conceptualizations of *cheshm* ‘eye’ and its related concepts and processes, such as visual perception, provide further evidence for the interaction among body, culture, and language. As in other studies in this volume and similar volumes (e.g. Sharifian et al. 2008), the findings reveal that speakers of different languages make use of body part terms as sources of figurative conceptualizations of e.g. experiences, emotions, character traits, intuitions, and various mental faculties. These conceptualizations are largely culturally constructed and often have their roots in certain belief traditions. Collectively, the observations made in such studies point to the role of language as a “memory bank” and “archive” for cultural conceptualizations (Sharifian 2009).

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Figurative dimensions of *3ayn* ‘eye’ in Tunisian Arabic*

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In Tunisian Arabic (TA), ‘heart’ is the most productive body part term in the conceptualization of emotions, cultural values, character traits, and mental faculties (Maalej 2004, 2008). Next in productivity is the outer body part *3ayn* ‘eye’. The eye offers the following imaginative configurations: (i) image schema-based metaphors, (ii) metonymy-motivated metaphors, (iii) metaphors, and (iv) metonymies. The goal of the chapter is to show how TA embodies the mind via a cultural ‘eye’ model in the conceptualization of various mental faculties (knowing, understanding, thinking, speaking), physical states (sleep, death, passage of time), emotions (love, desire, anger, guilt, envy), character traits (ambition, greed, naiveté, insolence), and cultural values (respect and hospitality). The findings point to the dominance of metaphors and image schemas in the conceptualization of experience embodied through *3ayn* ‘eye’ in TA, and the prevalence of culture-specific embodiment, i.e. embodiment that is not universally attested.

Keywords: cultural model, culture-specific embodiment, image schema, metaphor, metonymy

1. Introduction

The body part term *3ayn* ‘eye’ in Tunisian Arabic (TA) is used in very few collocations such as *3ayn l-ibra* (‘eye of the needle’), *3ayn iš-šams* (‘eye of the sun’), and

* The current chapter is an updated version of a talk by the same title presented at the 10th International Cognitive Linguistics Conference (ICLC10), *Cognitive linguistics in action: From theory to application and back*, Crakow, Poland, July 15–20.

I am indebted to my co-editor, Ning Yu, for his insightful comments on earlier versions of this chapter. I am also indebted to two anonymous reviewers from Benjamins for comments on a previous version of this chapter, which gained considerably from their constructive and insightful comments. However, responsibility for the whole contents is incumbent on the author.

3ayn l-3aql ('eye of the mind' or 'the mind's eye'), and a few idiomatic expressions such as *taakil b-3ayn l-ibra* ('[She] eats through the eye of the needle'), *RaTTa 3ayn iš-šams bil-Rirbaal* ('[He] hid the eye of the sun with a sieve'), and *law kaan tbuṣ 3ayn-ik* ('not even if you kiss your own eye'). In the first set of collocations and the second set of idioms, the polysemous meaning of *3ayn* is motivated by small size and round shape, respectively. The idiomatic expression *taakil b-3ayn l-ibra* ('[She] eats through the eye of the needle') conceptualizes the way those who eat small quantities of food as eating through the eye of the needle owing to the smallness of the eye of the needle. In *RaTTa 3ayn iš-šams bil-Rirbaal* ('[He] hid the eye of the sun with a sieve'), people that defend the indefensible are conceptualized as hiding blatant truth in the manner of someone hiding the sun by means of a sieve. Clearly, in this case, it is not the shape of the sun that is exploited in the metaphor but the size of the sun that cannot be hidden by a sieve. In *law kaan tbuṣ 3ayn-ik* ('not even if you kiss your own eye'), emphasis is on the impossibility of a given action, situation, or state, since the eye is physiologically inaccessible to the mouth to kiss. This expression exploits the position of the eye in the face, which makes it impossible for kissing it to take place. In *3ayn l-3aql*, however, the motivation comes from the function of *3ayn* in the process of thinking or THINKING IS SEEING.

However, *3ayn* in TA does not exist as a verb as in English *to eye someone or something*. Instead, there are eye-related verbs such as *šāaf*, *ra*, *Rzirr*, *kaHHal*, *tfarraj* ('to see' or 'to look at'). The verbs *ra* and *šāaf* ('to see') are non-deliberate verbs while *Rzirr*, *kaHHal*, *tfarraj* ('to look at') are deliberate. The more deliberate and widely used verb of perception is *tfarraj*, which is used to profile anything that offers itself as an object of perception such as watching TV, a football match, exhibition, etc. There are other periphrastic perception expressions to profile seeing in TA such as *3mill naDra/Razra/tikHiila/firja/Talla 3ala* (lit. 'do a look at; have a cursory look at something'). The verb *kaHHal* is restricted to some contexts of use such as when someone has a cursory look at something or looks at a female with sexual desire in mind. The verb *kaHHal* comes from a complex metonymy originating in the lexical item *kohl*, which refers to the black eyeliner used by women in the Arab culture to beautify their eyelashes. Although this is not very important for the rest of the chapter's outcomes, *kaHHal* comes from a complex etymology, where the object of perception is mapped onto actual kohl in the eyes, thus yielding the metonymy, KHOL/BLACK EYELINER FOR SEEING, and the ensuing metaphor, SEEING IS PUTTING ON EYELINER.

In this chapter, no attempt is made to explain the distribution of image schemas, metaphors, and metonymies across emotions, character traits, cultural values, and superstitions. Neither is it the objective of the chapter to establish any frequency of occurrence or dominance of any of these cognitive abilities in the conceptualization of experience in TA. The main objective is to ascertain embodiment through outer body parts, and the experience *3ayn* profiles in one dialect of

Arabic. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with *3ayn* and its correlative imaginative structures. Section 3 addresses *3ayn* in the conceptualization of mental faculties. Section 4 is concerned with *3ayn* in the conceptualization of physical states. Section 5 focuses on *3ayn* in the conceptualization of emotions. Section 6 addresses *3ayn* in the conceptualization of character traits. Section 7 deals with *3ayn* in the conceptualization of cultural values. A general discussion of the analysis appears in Section 8 and conclusions follow in Section 9.

2. *3ayn* and its correlative imaginative structures

In Tunisian Arabic, the imaginative structures that realize the conceptualizations of *3ayn* can be characterized roughly by means of image schema-based metaphors, metonymy-motivated metaphors, metaphors, and metonymies.

2.1 Image schema-based metaphors

This type of use of *3ayn* profiles it as an image schema, which is then expanded metaphorically to conceptualize experience as in the following example:

- (1) *bu-ha m-xalli-ha fi 3aynay-h*
 father her keep-IMPERF her in eyes his
 'Her father is keeping her in his eyes' (i.e., 'Her father has great love for her')

The image schema here is a CONTAINER, which is metaphorically exploited to conceptualize the emotion of love in line with the generic metaphor, (PART OF) THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. In the case of (1) above, loved ones reside in our eyes. This conceptualization of loved ones by making them reside in one's eyes is also attested in Persian (see Sharifian, this volume). TA capitalizes on the preciousness of eyesight in popular understanding to conceptualize loved ones. One confirmation of such preciousness is invoked in TA by the elderly when they express the following wish for the young: *ya3Tii-k SaHHit l-bdin w Daww l-baSar* ('May God give you health for your body and light for your sight'). The fact that sight has been counted as part of bodily health, and has been allocated a particular position next to health in the wish, testifies to its preciousness in the mind of Tunisians.

2.2 Metonymy-motivated metaphors

Apart from capturing *3ayn* as a container and exploiting it as a metaphor, TA may base the eye's metaphoric mappings on metonymic thinking, as in the following example:

- (2) *ma 3aynu-š fi-ha*
 no eye his not in her
 ‘His eye is not in her’ (i.e., ‘He does not desire her’)

The positive counterpart of (2) is *3aynu fi-ha* (lit. ‘his eye is in her’), which suggests the PART-WHOLE metonymy, i.e. THE PART OF THE BODY STANDS FOR THE PERSON. In this metonymy, the organ of sight is the “active zone” (Langacker 2002: 190) that is made to participate directly in the relation of desire, which suggests the conceptual metaphor, DESIRING IS SEEING. This relation is, in turn, linguistically realized in TA as ‘having one’s eye in someone’, which counts as desiring them. This is an instance that consists in thinking that since desire proceeds essentially through vision (i.e. we first see things or people and then we feel desire for them), not desiring them is not seeing them.

2.3 Metaphors

Apart from container- and metonymy-based metaphor, TA includes metaphors with *3ayn*. This type of use deals with *3ayn* as conceptualizing experience metaphorically, which can be exemplified as follows:

- (3) *ʔawlaad-ha 3aynay-ha li-θnayn*
 children her eyes her the two
 ‘Her children are her two eyes’ (i.e., ‘She loves her children more than anybody else in the world’)

This example can be captured as LOVED ONES ARE OUR ORGANS OF SIGHT. The motivation for this metaphor is that our organs of sight are highly valued parts of ourselves, which get mapped in our experience onto loved ones, who inherit their valuation (i.e. their being loved) via the valuation of our eyes.

2.4 Metonymies

This type of use of *3ayn* can be illustrated through the following example:

- (4) *3ayn-i ma tiRliTš*
 eye my no mistake-IMPERF not
 ‘My eye does not make mistakes’ (i.e., ‘I trust my eye in judging people’)

Example (4) is motivated by the PART-WHOLE metonymy, or more specifically THE PART OF THE BODY FOR THE PERSON, i.e. the eyes standing for the person who has them. In this particular case, part of seeing people consists in judging them, which may suggest the metonymy, EYE FOR JUDGMENT, which is reminiscent of the

conceptual metaphor JUDGING IS SEEING. Pure metonymies are easily understood since the salient knowledge about the parts of a whole is used to facilitate access to the whole. Langacker (2000: 62) captures this relation “wherein a pivotal entity ... is referenced only indirectly, via the term for another, associated entity (the whole)”. However, the boundary between metonymy and metaphor is not always easy to establish (Barcelona 2000).

Figure 1 diagrams the imaginative structures involved in the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA:




Figure 1. Imaginative structures within the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

3. *3ayn* in mental faculties

Sweetser (1990: 28) was one of the first cognitive linguists to point out that the MIND AS BODY is a mega conceptual metaphor fundamental to cognition and which counts as one of the landmarks of embodiment in cognitive linguistics. In particular, Sweetser (1990: 37) argues that the “intellectual side of our mental life seems to be regularly linked with the sense of vision”, which suggests the conceptual metaphor KNOWING/THINKING/UNDERSTANDING/SPEAKING IS SEEING. Sweetser (1990: 31) suggests that the body and mind vocabulary in “English and in the Indo-European family at large (if indeed it is not a universal)” is pervasive. However, Evans and Wilkins (2000: 576) argue that in Australian languages

[...] 'hearing' is the only perceptual modality that regularly maps into the domain of cognition throughout the whole continent. It regularly extends to 'think', 'know', and 'remember', as well as 'understand' and 'obey', thus presenting a pattern quite distinct from the Indo-European one... When 'see' extends outside of the domain of perception, it most commonly shifts into the domain of social interaction.

Evans and Wilkins (2000: 576) conclude that transfield extensions like 'see'→'know' are far from being universal. Ibarretxe-Antunãno (2008: 25–26) adduces further evidence from various cultures and languages corroborating what Evans and Wilkins have detected in many Australian languages about the predominance of hearing in the conceptualization of intellection.

Although Arabic belongs to the Semitic family of languages, similar to the Indo-European family, it is vision, not hearing, that seems to determine the recruitment of mental faculty verbs. However, as in Australian languages, vision, not hearing, is involved in the domain of social interaction (namely, emotions, character traits, and cultural values) as shown in the remainder of Section 3.

3.1 *3ayn* in knowing

Vision is a cognitive capacity that gives us most of our knowledge about the world (Sweetser 1990: 39; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 238). The KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor attested in many languages owes its mapping to the interface of a physical experience of perception, which enables the perceiver to get acquainted with an object of perception, and the mental process of knowing, which changes the perceiver's "cognitive environment" (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 39), whose outcome is the obtainment of new knowledge. As in many languages and cultures, KNOWING IS SEEING can be found in TA as illustrated by the following examples:

- (5) *illi 3amilt-u m3a-ha ma ra-h kaan rabb-i*
 what do-PERF it with her no see-PERF it only Allah my
 'What I did with her only God can see' (i.e., 'Only God knows what I did for her')
- (6) *rayt 3mail-ik fayn hazzit-ik?*
 [You] see deeds your where take- PERF you
 'Did you see where your deeds took you?' (i.e., 'Did you know the results of your deeds?')

Example (5) echoes many occurrences of KNOWING IS SEEING in the Koran. In (6), the results of one's deeds can be physically observed, and observing these results is knowing about them. There are several proverbs in TA that manifest KNOWING AS SEEING:

- (7) *illi 3aynay-h fii-h ma twarrii-h*
 that eyes his in him no show-IMPERF him
 'He who has eyes does not need to be shown' (i.e., 'He who has eyes would know by himself')
- (8) *3ayn la taara qalb la yuja3*
 Eye no see-IMPERF heart no ache-IMPERF
 'As long as the eye does not see, the heart will not ache' (i.e., 'Out of sight, out of mind')
- (9) *šaaf b-3ayn-u maat b-qalb-u*
 [he] see-PERF with eye his die-PERF with heart his
 'He saw with his eye and died in his heart' (i.e., 'He saw with his eye but died of a heart attack')

3.2 *3ayn* in thinking

Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 238) point out that "other concepts related to knowing are conceptualized in terms of corresponding concepts related to seeing". As a source domain for thinking, vision has been attested by many researchers (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Sweetser 1990; Yu 2003, 2004) whereby the mental process of thinking is conceptualized in terms of the physical domain of seeing, yielding the conceptual metaphor, THINKING IS SEEING, which is also a widespread conceptual metaphor in TA. Examples include the following:

- (10) *tawwa nšuf/nara*
 now [I] see-IMPERF
 'I will see' (i.e., 'I will think about it')
- (11) *ana ma-nšufiš hakka*
 I no [I] see-IMPERF not like this
 'I do not see like this' (i.e., 'I do not think like this')

The motivation for conceptualizing thinking in terms of seeing is that thinking about something essentially requires seeing it first. The embodiment of thinking is, thus, a kind of sequence of seeing and thinking. As attested by many researchers, this correlation between seeing and thinking is motivated by the fact that human beings have a mind in their body, which may suggest a more or less universal dimension to this correlation (Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990; Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

3.3 3ayn in understanding

The metaphor THINKING IS SEEING is related to the metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING since thinking and understanding may entertain a cause-effect relation. In TA, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is very common:

- (12) *šift-u/rayt-u* *š-qal-li?*
 [you] see-PERF him what say- PERF me
 ‘Did you see what he said to me?’ (i.e., ‘Did you understand what he told me?’)
- (13) *šift* *illi l-Hkeya maš SHiHa?*
 [you] see-PERF that the story no true
 ‘Did you see that the story was not true?’ (i.e., ‘Did you understand that the story was not true?’)

The motivation for conceptualizing understanding in terms of seeing is that understanding something requires seeing it first. The embodiment of understanding is, in this respect, similar to thinking, viz., it involves a sequence between seeing and understanding. As in THINKING IS SEEING, the correlation between understanding and seeing in UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is motivated by the folk model that human beings have a mind in their body, which may suggest a more or less universal dimension to this correlation.

3.4 3ayn in speaking

As a mental activity, speaking in TA is also embodied through the eye, and captured in the conceptual metaphor, SPEAKING IS SEEING, as in the following examples:

- (14) *yaHkiiw* *bi-l3aynayn*
 [they] talk-IMPERF with the eyes
 ‘They talk with their eyes’ (i.e., ‘They speak through their eyes’)
- (15) *3aynay-him fih-im barša kalaam*
 eyes their in them a lot of speech
 ‘Their eyes include a lot of speech’ (i.e., ‘There is a lot of talking in their eyes’)

Although (14) and (15) conceptualize speech differently, as SPEAKING IS SEEING and A VISUAL ORGAN IS A CONTAINER FOR SPEECH, respectively, both of them are observer-oriented. Observers infer or understand from the eyes of people they observe “speechless speech”, i.e. a kind of eye-reading or eye-understanding analogous to mind-reading. In this sense, one knows what someone is thinking either

by hearing that person talk or by looking into that person's eyes. Thus, this situation profiles a scene that is the other side of the coin of SPEAKING AS VISUAL ORGAN OR SPEAKING AS SEEING: UNDERSTANDING AS SEEING. The latter metaphor has been attested also for Chinese (Yu, personal communication), where eyes are believed to be expressive of one's thoughts and emotions. However, in order to keep (15) observer-oriented, the conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING needs to be modified to APPEALING TO THE EMOTIONS IN THE EYES IS PERCEIVING THE EYES SPEAKING.

Thus, in TA, as in English and Chinese, the mental capacities of knowing, thinking, and understanding are grounded in our physical experience of perception, which can be captured in the conceptual metaphor, KNOWING/THINKING/UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. In addition, speaking in TA seems to be grounded in the same perceptual experience of seeing as SPEAKING AS VISUAL ORGAN OR SPEAKING AS SEEING, thus providing a sort of interface between SPEAKING AS SEEING and UNDERSTANDING AS SEEING. Thus, the role of perception in mental capacities is not cultural but more or less widespread in many languages and cultures.

Figure 2 represents the conceptual metaphors prevailing in the conceptualization of mental faculties in TA:




Figure 2. Conceptual metaphors governing mental faculties in TA

It has transpired from the study of these mental faculties in TA that *3ayn* functions as a perceptual instrument in the overall cultural model of the eye, i.e. as an

instrument to see the world in order to gain knowledge, understanding, thinking, and speaking. In dealing with all these mental faculties, Tunisians think of the eye as the best of judges, as in *3ayn-ik mizaan-ik* ‘your eye is your instrument of measurement’, i.e. ‘the scale that enables you to judge and evaluate situations’.

4. *3ayn* in physical states

In TA, *3ayn* is also used to conceptualize physical states such as sleep, death, and the passage of time, as shown in the following examples:

- (16) *3ayn-i xaḍetn-i*
 Eye my take-PERF me
 ‘My eye took me’ (i.e., ‘I fell asleep’)
- (17) *qabal/ba3d manam 3ayn-i*
 Before/after sleep eye my
 ‘Before/after my eye’s sleep, ...’ (i.e. ‘Before/after my death, ...’)
- (18) *SallaHH-a fi ramšit 3ayn*
 [he] repair- PERF it in blink eye
 ‘He repaired it in the blink of an eye’ (i.e., ‘He repaired it very quickly’)

In (16), “your eye takes you” somewhere, i.e. from a state of wakefulness into the state of slumber. This relies on a cultural PART-WHOLE metonym in which the eye stands for the whole body. The motivation for this metonym is the saliency of eye closure during sleep. In (17), death is conceptualized as a PART-WHOLE metonym, where the eye stands for the person. In Arabic, sleep is often talked about as being a “small death”, which highlights the similarity between sleeping eyes and the closed eyes of a dead person. Thus, owing to this similarity of sleep and death in the experience of people, (17) is a euphemistic expression about death. In (18), the time necessary for repairs is conceptualized as the momentary blink of an eye. This swift physical measurement of time through perception (the blink of an eye) is salient in our everyday experience, and is exploited to conceptualize the abstract concept of time. The conceptual metonymy that can capture this is BLINK OF AN EYE FOR SHORT TIME SPAN.

As seen in connection with mental faculties, the eye as an instrument of perception constitutes an important component of the cultural model of the eye. In addition to instrumentality, another component of the cultural model of the eye is provided by the eye as a perceptual reference point in our experience, thus serving as a salient reference point for physical states.

5. *3ayn* in emotions

The body part term *3ayn* is used in TA in the conceptualization of various emotions such as love, desire, anger, guilt, and envy:

5.1 Love

In love, *3ayn* functions either as a container for love or as a valued organ to be given to the ones we love, as in the following examples:

- (19) *bu-ha m-xalli-ha fi 3aynay-h*
 father her keep-IMPERF her in eyes his
 'Her father is keeping her in his eyes' (i.e. 'Her father loves her dearly')
- (20) *raajil-ha ya3Tii-ha 3aynay-h l-θnayn*
 husband her give-IMPERF her eyes his the two
 'Her husband gives her his two eyes' (i.e. 'Her husband adores her')

In (19), *3ayn* is a container for love, which suggests the conceptual metaphor AN ORGAN OF VISION IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS, which draws on the more generic metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. Obviously, if the eye is a container for love, only beloved individuals are allowed into it. However, in (20) the eyes create a frame of giving, and are profiled as precious commodities that one can give to one's beloved as tokens of love, which can be captured in the conceptual metaphor AN ORGAN OF VISION IS A VALUABLE GIFT.

The valuation of the eye is exploited in conceptualizing loved ones as one's very eyes, as in the following examples:

- (21) *sRaar-ha 3aynay-ha l-θnayn*
 young-PLUR her eyes her the two
 'Her children are her two eyes' (i.e. 'She loves her children more than anybody else')
- (22) *wild-ha mammu 3ayn-ha*
 son her pupil eye her
 'Her son is the pupil of her eye' (i.e. 'She loves her son more than anybody else in the world')

Both (21) and (22) exploit the conceptual metaphor LOVED ONES ARE ORGANS OF VISION. However, in (21) the degree of love is lower than that in (22) as in (22) *mammu 3ayn-ha* ('pupil of her eye') is selected because of its central position, preciousness, and delicateness. In contrast, hating someone is desiring not to see them anymore, as in the following example:




Figure 3. Conceptual metaphors governing love in the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

- (23) *ma n-Hibbiš* *naaraa-h*
 no [I] like-IMPERF not see-IMPERF him
 'I don't like to see him' (i.e., 'I hate him')

Since loving someone has to do with keeping them in one's eyes (i.e. at least partly keeping an eye on them), not wanting to see someone anymore counts as having no more love and respect for them.

In sum, in connection with the emotion of love, the eye in TA offers three scenarios: (i) the eye as a container for loved ones as in (19), (ii) the eye as a valuable object given to loved ones as in (20), and (iii) loved ones as one's eyes as in (21) and (22). Figure 3 displays the conceptual metaphors of perception that govern the emotion of love in the overall cultural model of *3ayn* in TA:

5.2 Desire

Desire in TA is conceptualized in terms of seeing, thus suggesting the metaphor DESIRING IS SEEING, as shown in the following examples:

- (24) *3ayn-u fii-ha*
 Eye his in her
 'His eye is in her' (i.e. 'He desires her')

- (25) *ma 3ayn-uš fii-ha*
 no eye his not in her
 'His eye is not in her' (i.e., 'He does not desire her')

The conceptualization DESIRING IS SEEING underlies (24) as the eye (i.e. desire) penetrating the desired object while its negative counterpart in (25) is the eye (i.e. desire) not wanting to penetrate the undesired object. The same vision metaphor exists in TA with desire/appetite for food and activities such as going out, working, sleeping, etc., when we don't feel like doing them. Thus, TA seems to reference desire by locating the perceiver's eye in the "object" of desire, which functions as a container for the perceiver's eye (i.e., my eye is metaphorically caught in the desired object or activity).

However, this is not the only way desire figuratively targeted in TA. The desired object may be profiled as a two-dimensional space, as in the following example:

- (26) *HaTT 3ayn-u 3alii-ha*
 [he] put-PERF eye his on her
 'He put his eye on her' (i.e. 'She is his object of desire')

The mapping in (26) is motivated by the non-metaphoric expression *HaTT as in HaTT yidd-u 3aT-Tawla* ('He put his hand on the table'), which obviously involves contact of the hand with the table's surface. As a result, the mapping between concrete *HaTT* and metaphoric *HaTT* may count "as a form of reaching out or touching" (Lakoff 1993: 236), which suggests that seeing someone in the sense of desiring them is as if one is touching them. It is not the case, however, that desire here only occurs for women; objects of desire may range from cars, land, houses, apartments, fields, etc., to social position, promotion, travel, etc.

It is interesting to note that, as was shown in connection with mental faculties, the eye in the conceptualization of desire is also an instrument of perception constituting an important component of the cultural model of the eye: we see objects of desire with it. But the instrumentality of the eye with respect to mental faculties regards propositional content as an object whereas with desire, the object of desire is schematized as in (24) and (26).

5.3 Anger

Although anger in TA has been demonstrated to be a liquid in the overall body, in the heart, and in the nerves (Maalej 2004), it is also alternatively construed through *3ayn*, as in the following examples:

- (27) *id-dinya Dlaamit fi 3aynay-ya*
 the world darken-PERF in eyes my
 'The world darkened in my eyes/I saw everything dark' (i.e. 'I was mad with anger')
- (28) *Hammart-il-ha 3aynay-ya*
 [I] redden-PERF to her eyes my
 'I made my eyes red to her' (i.e., 'I gave her an angry look')

In Example (27), the perceiver's vision is affected by the strong emotion of anger, i.e., anger interferes with accurate perception, as acknowledged by Lakoff and Kövecses (1987: 197). However, in (28) the eyes are like a weapon directed against the experiencer's offender. The weapon-like eyes are acquired through the eyes changing color, thus becoming red and assuming the color of fire, suggesting the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS FIRE.

5.4 Guilt

Following from THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS and A PART OF THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS, the eye is also a container for guilt in TA, as in the following example:

- (29) *fi-3ayn-u*
 in eye his
 '[It is] in his eye' (i.e. 'I can see guilt in his eyes')

Guilt is said to reside in the eyes as containers for emotions, and can be detected by looking into the guilty person's eyes, another instance of the conceptual metaphor AN ORGAN OF PERCEPTION IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. This is the eye-reading/understanding capacity of the eye as a perceptual organ discussed earlier. The motivation for conceptualizing guilt in terms of expressions relating to the eye has an experiential basis. A guilt-ridden person's visual expression and other behavioral clues provide good indices of that person's feelings.

5.5 Envy

Thus far it has transpired that the eye in TA is simultaneously an active instrument directed against the observer, as in the case of desire (26) and anger (28), and a passive indicator to the observer, as in the case of guilt (29). As with desire and anger, envy is manifest when the eye is directed towards external targets of envy as in the following examples:

- (30) *ʕayn-u Harša*
 eye his rough
 'His eye is rough' (i.e. 'He is envious')
- (31) *ʕayn-u maalHa*
 eye his salty
 'His eye is salty' (i.e. 'He is envious')
- (32) *ʕayn-u Harra*
 eye his spicy
 'His eye is spicy' (i.e. 'He is envious')

In (30), the eye is rough to what it looks at or, so to speak, touches. Roughness attributed to the eye comes from the roughness of sandpaper, whose contact with the skin gives shivers. Experientially, the same effect (shivering) produced in using sandpaper on a surface is produced when an envious eye is set on an object of envy. In (31), the eye is conceptualized as salty, which is also attested in Persian (Sharifian, this volume). The experiential basis of this conceptualization comes from the belief that too much salt is bad for one's health. In the same way, a salty eye ruins the object of envy, or so it is believed. In (32), the eye is conceptualized as peppered. Experientially, when red pepper comes in contact with a surface such as the tongue it burns it, with a lasting intolerable effect. In the same fashion, a peppered eye coming in contact with an object of envy destroys it. Thus, since the eye in envy is conceptualized as rubbing, salting, and peppering the object of envy, it can safely be argued that SEEING IS TOUCHING in TA. However, apart from this touching dimension, which captures only part of envy, the latter is conceptualized in terms of its effects on targets of envy as AN ORGAN OF PERCEPTION IS AN EVIL INSTRUMENT.

A related concept to envy is called "evil eye" in many cultures. The evil eye is a well-established superstition in many Arab communities, and its existence is stated in the Koran. Consider the following examples:

- (33) *jaat-u ʕwayna*
 come-PERF him eye-DIMINUTIVE
 'An evil eye came to him' (i.e. 'The evil eye struck him')
- (34) *xaðewa-h bi-l-ʕayn*
 take-PERF him with the eye
 'An evil eye took him' (i.e. 'He was spellbound')

While the form of envy dealt with in (30)–(32) is the product of a mapping between the eye as an organ of perception and a change that makes it abnormal (i.e. roughness, saltiness, and peppering), in (33) and (34) envy is personified as an

agent that comes to you and strikes you with disastrous outcomes, which suggests the CAUSE-EFFECT metonym *AN ORGAN OF VISION FOR ITS EFFECT*. The motivation for envy or the evil eye is that what you have and do is visible to people, so when they see it or see you doing it, they would be jealous of you and envy you for that. To evade the evil eye and envy, the practice in many Arab communities is that people attempt either to prevent others from seeing what they possess, or they try to forestall envy by giving others some of what they have. For instance, it is a practice among many Arab families to make neighbors taste their own food as a way of averting envy and the evil eye, or offer them fruit from their own garden if the fruit is visible to others, or even invite others to pick some of it themselves.

Figure 4 sums up the conceptual metaphors governing envy in the overall cultural model of *3ayn* in TA.




Figure 4. Conceptual metaphors and metonymies governing envy in the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

6. *3ayn* in character traits

The eye enters into the conceptualization of several character traits in TA such as ambition, greed, naivet  , alertness, and insolence.

6.1 Ambition

Ambition is not a positive character trait in TA when it goes beyond a reasonably realistic degree. This kind of negative ambition has to do with flirting with luxury, excessive comfort, and all forms of "keeping up with the Joneses". The reason excessive ambition is negative has to do with the belief in soberness in Islam, which makes following GOOD IS LESS and avoiding BAD IS MORE a way of life for the faithful. Such ambition is conceptualized in the following ways:

- (35) *3ayn-u kbiira*
 eye his big-FEM
 'His eye is big' (i.e. 'He is ambitious')
- (36) *3ayn-u waas3a*
 eye his spacious-FEM
 'His eye is spacious' (i.e. 'He is too ambitious')

In (35), ambition is conceptualized in vision terms, whereby the size of the eye is increased. The manipulation of the eye for size is to make it bigger than it should be, with the implication that an ambitious person sees big, luxurious, and expensive things as desirable. The conceptual metaphor that captures (35) is AMBITION IS AN INCREASE IN THE EYE'S SIZE. However, in (36) the eye is manipulated spatially, i.e., it is made more spacious in such a way that it can accommodate big things that a normal eye cannot look at and accommodate, which is motivated in our experience by the old saying: *lusa3 raHma* ('spaciousness is a blessing'). The conceptual metaphor that corresponds to (36) is AMBITION IS AN INCREASE IN THE EYE'S SPACIOUSNESS.

Excessive ambition requires means. When someone cannot afford the means of their ambition in the sense described here for TA, they are usually talked about as having "a spacious eye but a tight budget":

- (37) *l-3ayn l-was3a wi s-Sirra i-Dayqa*
 the eye the spacious and the bundle the tight
 'The eye is spacious while the purse is small' (i.e. 'He cannot afford the price of his ambition/Ambition and tight budget cannot be reconciled')

Thus, in ambition the eye is believed to grow bigger than its normal proportion in order for it to see big, expensive objects, and to grow more spacious for it to be able to contain desirable objects.

In general, people think that ambition is unbounded, and may construe it in terms of a container as in the following examples:

- (38) *l-3ayn ma y3abbiha kaan d-dud wi traab*
 the eye no fill-IMPERF it only the worms and sand
 ‘Only worms and sand can fill the eye’ (i.e. ‘Ambition is unbounded’)

The gist of the aphorism in (38) is that, as a container, the eye is conceptualized as admitting an infinite number of desired objects, yet all of them are incapable of filling it. This correlation of *3ayn* with ambition is motivated by the saliency of the perceptual function of the eye and desiring objects.

6.2 Greed

Another character trait thought of in terms of the eye in TA is greed, as in the following examples:

- (39) *l-maa3da šib3aana wi-l3ayn jii3ana*
 the stomach full and the eye hungry
 ‘The stomach is full and the eye is hungry’ (i.e. ‘The eye is bigger than the stomach’)
- (40) *?iT3am l-fum tistHi l-3ayn*
 feed-IMPERATIVE the mouth shy-IMPERF the eye
 ‘Feed the mouth and the eye will shy away’ (i.e. ‘A satiated person will not search anywhere for food’)
- (41) *il-3ayn ta3raf m-nayn ta-akil*
 the eye know-IMPERF from where [it] eat-IMPERF
 ‘The eye knows where to eat from’ (i.e. ‘The person who has eyes knows how to be reasonable’)

A greedy person is captured in the metonymy ORGAN OF VISION FOR PERCEIVER. In (39), the food metaphor in “hungry eyes” for greed actually conceptualizes the greedy person as having those “hungry eyes”. The motivation for “hungry eyes” for the greedy person is that sometimes people are said to “eat with their eyes” in TA since food is associated with desire and pleasure. The aphorism in (40) states that food has both a visual and gustatory motivations, i.e. the eyes and the mouth. In other words, the eye as a visual device stops being greedy once the mouth as a food device is fed. Obviously, the same metonymy holds here, ORGAN OF VISION FOR PERCEIVER, whereby it is the perceiver that stops being greedy. In (41), the eye standing for the perceiver is again operative, and the two dimensions of food, namely the visual and the gustatory, are collapsed into one, where the eye itself is the eater.

6.3 Naiveté and alertness

Naiveté manipulates the eye by closing it completely as a sign of lack of perception of what reality is like as in the following examples:

- (42) *3aynay-ha mRamDa*
 Eyes her shut-FEM
 'Her eyes are shut' (i.e. 'She is too naïve')
- (43) *Hill 3aynay-k*
 [you] open-IMPERATIVE eyes your
 'Open your eyes' (i.e. 'Pay attention')

It should be recalled that, in the case of ambition, the eye in TA is conceptualized as manipulable in terms of size and spaciousness as discussed in connection with (35) and (36). With naiveté, the eye is still manipulable, but in the reverse sense of ambition, i.e., the eye is not manipulated beyond proportion, but below normal use as in (42). Thus, the conceptual metaphor that captures naiveté and alertness is the opposite of the one that underlies (35), namely *NAIVETÉ IS A DECREASE IN THE EYE'S SIZE*. Owing to this lack of accurate perception as described in (42), naïve people are often exhorted to open their eyes to reality, i.e. to restore their organ of perception to its normal function in order to increase perceptual and cognitive awareness.

Obviously, neither naiveté nor alertness is a positive character trait in TA. Being alert in TA is conceptualized as having one's eyes wide open as a sign of extreme worldly experience as in the following example:

- (44) *3ayn-u maHlula*
 eye his open-FEM
 'His eye is open' (i.e. 'He is far from being naïve')

Example (44) is often used in connection with flirting with women in TA – a sort of womanizing – which should remind us of the cultural model of morality that assumes that a moral person is someone whose eyes are not open to temptation. However, (44) should not suggest that a normal, moral, and righteous person has closed eyes.

6.4 Insolence

In TA, insolence is conceptualized in visual terms as in the following examples:

- (45) *3ayn-u SHiiHa*
 eye his hard-FEM
 'His eye is hard' (i.e. 'He is insolent')

- (46) *faSSaS* *3ayn-u fiy-ya*
 [he] open-PERF eye his in me
 'He opened his eye very wide in me' (i.e. 'He glared at me')

The rule in TA is that one has to lower one's eyelids in the presence of the elderly as a sign of deference. Someone is insolent when they look into someone else's eyes too daringly, resisting the closure of their eyelids in the presence of respected people. In (45), having a hard eye means that it is difficult to manipulate, change, or fight, which is motivated by the existence of hard things in our experience. This hardness as a negative property of things is transferred to the eye as an object of perception, thus evoking unpleasantness of which insolence is a part. In (46), refusing to lower one's eyelids is a sign of disrespect for the target as is clear in the verb *faSSaS* ('open wide'). Examples (45) and (46) may suggest AN ORGAN OF VISION IS AN UNPLEASANT INSTRUMENT.

Figure 5 sums up the conceptual metaphors and metonymies governing character traits within the overall cultural model of *3ayn* in TA:




Figure 5. Conceptual metaphors and metonymies governing character traits within the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

7. *3ayn* in cultural values

So far, the eye in TA has been demonstrated to serve as a conceptualizing device for several mental faculties, emotions, and character traits. Several cultural values in TA are also embodied through the eye, such as respect and disrespect, hospitality, etc.

7.1 Respect/Consideration

Like love and desire, respect in TA requires the eye to serve as a container for respected individuals as in the following example:

- (47) *huwa fi l-3ayn l-kbiira*
 he in the eye the big
 'He is in the bigger eye' (i.e. 'He is respected/taken care of')

With respect/consideration, respected persons are kept in the bigger eye as a way of suggesting that one of one's eyes is made bigger as a container to accommodate them as captured in the conceptual metaphor AN ORGAN OF VISION IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. Furthermore, this container accommodates highly respected individuals according to the IN-OUT image schema suggested by *fi* ('in') in the linguistic metaphor. What this presupposes is that if one eye is bigger to accommodate respected individuals, the other eye is smaller in size, and is used for other respected individuals who enjoy normal respect, which spatially suggests a VIP container for highly respected individuals and an economical container for moderately respected ones. Example (47) also suggests GOOD IS BIG, which combines with the CONTAINER schema, thus yielding BEING GOOD IS BEING IN A BIG CONTAINER and BEING LESS GOOD IS BEING IN A SMALL CONTAINER.

However, disrespect for someone is conceptualized as falling from the container as in the following example:

- (48) *Ali TaaH min 3ayn-i*
 Ali fall-PERF from eye my
 'Ali fell from my eye' (i.e. 'I have no more respect for Ali')

Disrespect is conceptualized in terms of a container, but unlike respect, it uses the HIGH-LOW or UP-DOWN image-schema for social interactions, where the physical space tracked by the eye is mapped onto the social space of respect and consideration. Falling or going down from respect is self-evident when we know that our eyes occupy an upper position in our body, which is taken advantage of culturally to conceptualize lack of respect in TA in terms of this bodily verticality mapped onto social worth and respect.

7.2 Hospitality

Like disrespect, hospitality in TA uses the physical verticality suggested by the HIGH-LOW or UP-DOWN image-schema for social relations. Thus, guests are image-schematically raised over the head and the eye as a sign of hospitality for them. When they are unwelcome or unwanted, they are “looked down upon” (i.e., ‘the eye goes down’), which means that hospitality also goes down, as in the following examples:

- (49) *3ala r-raaS wi l-3ayn*
 over the head and the eye
 ‘Over the head and the eye’ (i.e. ‘You are more than welcome’)
- (50) *rxā fiy-ya 3ayn-u*
 [he] lower-PERF in me eye his
 ‘He lowered his eye on me’ (i.e. ‘I was unwelcome’)

The experiential motivation for (49) can be sought in the Arab culture. When means of transport were not available, nomadic life required people to carry their valuables on their head and by extension “on” their eyes since the eyes are in the head. Although in modern times it is not as common to see Arabs carrying their belongings on the head, such a practice serves as a grounding principle for hospitality in TA. The mapping in hospitality occurs between verticality as a physical property and social respect, which has the effect of raising guests onto one’s head (and eyes) by invoking the HIGH-LOW or UP-DOWN image schema. The conceptual metaphor that best captures this is GOOD IS UP.

It is worth noting that lowering one’s eyes in the presence of someone has at least two different meanings in TA. As has been demonstrated for insolence, according to the cultural value of respect, not lowering one’s eyelids is bad. Thus, someone is insolent if they do not lower their eyelids in the presence of the elderly and other respected people. On the other hand, being hospitable in the Tunisian sub-culture requires raising your eyelids as a token of hospitality since lowering them in the presence of guests is understood as not wanting them, as in (50) above, which suggests the conceptual metaphor BAD IS DOWN.

Figure 6 depicts the conceptual metaphors and image-schematic structures governing the cultural values within the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA.




Figure 6. Conceptual metaphors and image-schematic structures governing the cultural values within the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

8. Discussion

The analyses in Sections 2–7 have shown that *3ayn* in TA serves as a source domain for figurative meanings associated with mental faculties, emotions, character traits, and cultural values and constitute an embodied cultural model in which conceptual metaphors, metonymies, and image schemas play important roles. Thus, apart from its basic function as an organ of perception, the eye has many other roles in the overall cultural model, such as a container for emotions, a valued body part, a source of information about others, a perceptual reference point, a source of intellection, and a manipulable object, as summed up in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Components of the cultural model of *3ayn* in TA

In terms of imaginative structures, the cultural model is primarily constituted by metaphors and metonymies. However, metaphor and metonymy seem to be unevenly distributed with regard to the respective functions they have in what Maalej (2004, 2007, 2008) calls “cultural embodiment”.

The metonymic extensions from ‘eye’ that have been postulated in this chapter range from concrete PART-WHOLE relations, such as EYE FOR PERSON, to abstract cognitive faculties conceptualized through the metonymy EYE FOR JUDGMENT. Even time concepts (punctuality) may be expressed via the source concept ‘quick eye movement’, as in the metonymy BLINK OF AN EYE FOR SHORT TIME SPAN. Such metonymies are probably intelligible to all cultures and are therefore potentially available for linguistic use. The embodiment described by such metonymies can be argued to be physiologically based (see Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008), which makes such kind of embodiment potentially universal, as illustrated through Examples (16), (17), and (18) discussed above.

In contrast, metaphor conveys a type of embodiment that departs from the eye as a physiologically based organ of perception. Because metaphor connects two distinct conceptual domains, the correspondences between ‘organ of perception’ and some abstract target concept are likely to be more culture-specific than

in the case of physiologically based metonymies. Since the concrete source domain, the eye, and more abstract metaphorical target domains are conceptually distant from each other, they warrant neither high predictability nor intelligibility for other cultures, as in Examples (30), (31), (32), and others discussed above. Such correspondences between source and target domain are, however, not unmotivated, but require experiential explanations that are not always self-evident owing to the “cognitive unconscious” (Lakoff & Johnson 1999) nature of cognitive operations.

How culture-specific is cultural embodiment through metaphor? If metaphor is claimed to be responsible for cultural embodiment, then the culture-specificity of cultural embodiment comes precisely from a typical or unique association or mapping between source and target domains. The problem with culture-specificity in this sense is that it requires the study of all source and target domains within all cultures to be able to say that a given metaphor is culture-specific. A way to overcome this hurdle is to attend to the linguistic expression of metaphorical mappings. For instance, like TA, Persian (Sharifian, this volume) conceptualizes envy in terms of “salty” eye, greed in terms of “hungry” eye, and naiveté in terms of “closed” eye. This shared conceptualization of envy, greed, and naiveté in the two languages can be explained as the result of historical ties and cultural affinities between Arabian and Persian cultures. From this comparative perspective none of the metaphors mentioned is culture-specific to Arabic or Persian. However, if compared to the way English conceptualizes envy, greed, and naiveté, these metaphors may turn out to be culture-specific to TA and Persian.

A culture-specific metaphor is one that is highly affected by a specific utilization of the body in the expression of cultural needs. One of the explanations given by Kövecses (2005: 246) of metaphor variation across cultures is what he calls *differential experiential focus*: “[...] [d]ifferent peoples may be attuned to different aspects of their bodily functioning in relation to a target domain, or [...] they can ignore or downplay certain aspects of their bodily functioning as regards the metaphorical conceptualization of a particular target domain”. For instance, Persian has the following conceptualizations of envy: having a “narrow” eye, having a “blind” eye, the ball of the eye “coming out” (Sharifian, this volume). In Chinese, the eyes are “red” or “hot” with envy (Yu, personal communication). On the other hand, TA has the following conceptualizations of envy: “rough” eye and “peppered” eye. It can safely be concluded that these metaphors of envy are culture-specific to Persian, Chinese, and TA, respectively.

9. Conclusion

The current chapter has proposed that *3ayn* ‘eye’ in TA constitutes an embodied cultural model that is structured by means of image schemas, metaphors, and metonymies. The eye is perceived in Tunisian culture not only as an organ of perception mediating between the human body and the physical environment, but, most importantly, as a mediator between cognition and culture.

This cultural model shares the way mental faculties (THINKING/UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS SEEING) are conceptualized via vision in English, Chinese (Yu 2003, 2004), and Persian (Sharifian, this volume), although these respective cultures show different degrees of commitment to this mega metaphor. While THINKING/KNOWING IS SEEING is shared with Chinese, English, and Persian (Sharifian, this volume; Yu 2003b, 2004), UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is not shared with Persian (Sharifian, this volume), but APPEALING TO THE EMOTIONS IN THE EYES IS PERCEIVING THE EYES SPEAKING seems to be shared with Chinese. This partial commonalities can be explained by the MIND AS BODY metaphor (Sweetser 1990), whereby semantically autonomous concepts are mapped onto semantically non-autonomous ones (Lakoff & Turner 1989: 113), creating “*emergent metaphors and emergent concepts*” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 58, emphasis in original).

With emotions, the eye functions basically as a container for love, desire, and guilt in keeping with the mega conceptual metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS. Moreover, the eye is conceptualized metaphorically as love, desire, anger, and envy as such. Finally, while the eye is construed as a container for love and loved ones, it is also treated as a manipulable and dangerous object or perceptual organ.

Character traits are governed by metaphors. Similar to emotions, in the case of ambition, the eye is manipulated for size, spaciousness, and depth. Greed builds on food metaphors. With respect to naiveté and alertness, the eye functions by expanding metaphorically the CLOSED-OPEN image schema. On the other hand, in the case of insolence the eye, as a perceptual organ, acts on targets of perception by transferring hardness or unpleasantness by looking at them.

Cultural values are captured through metaphors and image schemas. Respect builds on the CONTAINER image schema, which is expanded metaphorically along the dimension of size. Disrespect, however, is based on the image of a downward movement from this container. As to hospitality, it capitalizes on the UP-DOWN image schema.

The present chapter provides further support for the interaction between language, cognition, body, and culture. In particular, the interaction between cognition and body is found to be mediated by culture (Sinha & Jansen de López 2000; Maalej 2004, 2007, 2008). This finding has consequences for a theory of

embodiment that is based exclusively on the idea of the *body-in-the-mind* (Johnson 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1999), which needs to be extended to include the concept of the *culture-in-the-body* (Gibbs 1999; Maalej 2004, 2007). Such an extension would necessitate bi-directional relations between the embodied mind and culture (Sinha & Jansen de López 2000; Maalej 2007) instead of the unidirectional mapping between body and mind assumed by e.g. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Sweetser (1990).

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The apocalypse happens when the feet take the position of the head

Figurative uses of 'head' and 'feet' in Turkish

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Terms for the body parts head and feet appear in various conceptual metonymies and metaphors in Turkish. This chapter investigates the role of these body parts in the embodied conceptualization of social stratification in Turkish, exploiting the image schema of verticality (UP-DOWN). The head (UP) profiles the cultural metonymies HEAD FOR ORDER, HEAD FOR RULER, HEAD FOR TALENT. The foot (DOWN) profiles conceptual metaphors such as LESS IS DOWN, LOW STATUS IS DOWN, and BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN. As a consequence of these metaphoric and metonymic folk models, 'head' most often implies positive cultural values whereas 'foot' is evaluated negatively. Cases are analyzed in which terms for 'head' and 'feet' combine in a number of metonymies and metaphors. In such expressions, the position of body parts on the VERTICALITY scale is used to conceptualize contrasts in social stratification.

Keywords: metaphor, metonymy, social stratification, positive/negative values, verticality image schema

1. Introduction

The celebration of Workers' Day in Istanbul, especially in the years following the massacre in 1977, has always been an issue of confrontation. Successive governments, irrespective of their political orientation, have opted not to allow the trade unions to gather crowds in Taksim square for the occasion, offering different locations instead. However, the unions assign special value to the square; for them it is a significant location where many of their comrades have fallen victim to a conspiracy, the perpetrators of which are deliberately protected by the forces of the state. Recently, the current prime minister, when addressing his party members in

a parliamentary gathering, also expressed his position against the demands of the unions to celebrate the upcoming event in this particular square:

- (1) *Ayakların baş olduğu yerde kıyamet kopar.*

‘The apocalypse happens when the feet take the position of the head’

His main concern was possibly the security of a huge crowd gathered in a relatively small square at the very center of the city. The apocalypse would be the potential disorder that could bring harm to the people and businesses in the vicinity. However, this age-old expression reveals his political conceptualization of the working class, rather than his humane concerns. The lowest, or the ruled, cannot assume the role of the highest, the ruler. If the ruled take up the role of the ruler, the world as we know it, would turn upside down. The polar ends of the human body, their particular location, stand for the polar ends of the hierarchical structure of the ruling system, the ruler and the ruled.

Organizing the whole system rather than structuring one concept in terms of another, “orientational metaphors,” as labeled by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 14), concern spatial orientations, UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, FRONT-BACK, ON-OFF, DEEP-SHALLOW, and CENTRAL-PERIPHERAL. Such metaphors are “at the heart” of our conceptual system and these elementary spatial relations have internal structures, such as an *image schema*, a *profile*, and a *trajector-landmark structure* (Lakoff & Johnson 1999: 30–31). In a kinesthetic image schema, where the source domain is VERTICALITY, the target domain is QUANTITY, yielding a system of metaphors in the conceptualization of various abstract concepts, including MORE IS UP.

In the context of the metaphor above, QUANTITY relates to “social worth” rather than the sheer number of people. The ontology of the feet source domain represents the cases of LESS IS DOWN, LOW STATUS IS DOWN, OR BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN. The ‘head’ source domain, on the other hand, does not target human mental faculties but rather conceptualizes the head as the ruling authority, HEAD STANDS FOR THE RULER, obviously well above the others, with certain qualities that others lack. Abstraction here further extends to social stereotyping, i.e. assigning a number of evaluative measures to a group of people.

The aim of this chapter is to show how contemporary Turkish uses body part terms metaphorically in the conceptualization of culture-specific experiences. I provide examples of cases where the body part terms function as the source domain in conceptualizing social stereotyping in contemporary Turkish culture. The emphasis is on the role of VERTICALITY as a source domain and its potential targets via metaphors and metonymies formed by two body parts located at the opposite ends of the body, namely the head and the feet. The first part of the study introduces metaphors in which ‘feet’ is the source domain. The second part discusses the role of ‘head’ in conceptualizing sociocultural aspects of Turkish experiences.

Finally, the last section illustrates cases where 'head' and 'feet' combine in a number of metonymies and metaphors. In these expressions, the contrast on a VERTICALITY scale based on particular locations of body parts is used to conceptualize contrast in social stratification.

The data come mainly from institutionalized dictionaries and the METU (Middle East Technical University) Turkish Corpus (Say et al. 2002).

2. Verticality and body parts

In a broader context, a review of the current works on cognition reveals that there are different views of embodied cognition. The distinction drawn between the 'bodily' aspects of mind and the 'social' aspects of cognition, is understood as complementary rather than contradictory. In Yu's (2008: 387) terms, for example, "metaphor, body and culture may form a circular triangle relationship". While conceptual metaphors are grounded in bodily experiences, cultures may "filter" those experiences for culture specific target domains. There are "culturally tainted" aspects of conceptual metaphors (Maalej 2004) and cognitive linguists should take metaphors out of our heads and "put them into the cultural world" (Gibbs 1999). Recently, in an introduction to a two-volume book, *Body, Language and Mind*, two of the editors, Ziemke and Frank (2007: 1), explain that the first volume includes those studies on the concept of *embodiment*, in which "the bodily and sensorimotor basis of phenomena such as meaning, mind, cognition and language" is discussed. The articles in the second volume, on the other hand, interpret the concept of embodiment in the context of sociocultural situatedness, which takes *embodiment* rather in terms of "the ways in which individual minds and cognitive processes are shaped by their interaction with sociocultural structures and practices"; the editors also note that "the volumes overlap significantly".

The overlap is more evident from the data presented in the studies on conceptualization via body parts. In discussing data from two different surveys on African and Oceanic languages, Heine (1995: 123) notes the pervasiveness of body part concepts in understanding spatial concepts. The generalization he draws from the data suggests that:

If in a given language a lexical item is recruited for the expressions of the spatial concepts ON, UNDER, FRONT, BACK, or IN, then the first choice will be a body part term, the second choice being a term denoting an environmental landmark.

Heine (1995: 121) further notes that in such conceptualizations, the location of the body parts is understood to be that they are in an upright position.

Similarly, Lakoff (1987) also reports that expressing spatial location via body part concepts is common among languages of Mesoamerica and Africa. Mixtec, for example, with no system of prepositions and cases, uses conventionalized metaphors for “understanding both spatial relations and more abstract relations in terms of body part concepts”.

In its upright position, body parts as “spatial locators” conceptualize abstract social relations in contemporary Turkish alongside spatial concepts. Although conceptualizations via body parts are documented in many other languages, it appears that body part metaphors and metonymies for understanding social stratification are relatively more elaborated in Turkish. In the emerging cultural model, the conceptual metaphors and metonymies not only locate different social groups in the existing social structure for their respective position on the basis of VERTICALITY, but also assess their “qualities” that ultimately help locate them in the overall structure. Evaluating a group of people is known as social stereotyping. As a mechanism, social stereotyping eases cognitive processing required for proper understanding of others by simply regularizing our knowledge of people.

With significant social implications and entailments, stereotypes are commonly taken as inaccurate descriptions and most often lead to prejudice and discrimination. A major problem with stereotypes is that while they help people make sense of the complexities of a culture, as oversimplified conceptualizations, they are far from capturing such complexities. Kövecses (2006: 110) notes that prejudices come in the form of structured opposites corresponding to in-groups and out-groups, and they are commonly metonymic expressions. Since this kind of categorization is metonymic in nature, the general conceptual metonymy A MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE WHOLE CATEGORY underlies it.

In what follows, the data from Turkish exemplifies the intricate relationships between body parts (WHOLE-PART) and spatial orientation concepts (UP-DOWN, VERTICALITY) and how body parts function in the conceptualization of social groups.

3. Feet are the lowest

The lexical entry *ayak* ‘foot’ in the official Dictionary of the Turkish Language Institute, comes in two basic distinctions: the technical use of *ayak* in mathematics, geography, and sports where the word appears in its specialized terminological use, and its nontechnical or nonterminological use in other domains. We may include its use as a unit of measurement as a terminological use as well. It should be noted right from the outset that, in Turkish, the word *ayak* not only refers to ‘foot’ as a part of a body, but it simultaneously refers to *bacak* ‘leg’. In at least three senses identified in the dictionary entry, *ayak* means ‘leg’, as overtly stated in one

of its senses, and in another, it refers to part of the rest of the body below the waist. For example, when one wears a pair of pants, one wears it on *feet*, not specifically on *legs*. Moreover, in Turkish part of an object that supports the object is not 'leg' but *ayak*. It is this polysemy of the word that, in essence, surfaces repeatedly in the formation of many metonymies and metaphors that conceptualize the culturally salient concepts. In some cases, it is very difficult to determine if the referent of *ayak* is 'foot' or 'leg' when it functions as a source domain in understanding culture specific experiences.

There are a number of metonymies and metaphors involving feet that Turkish shares with other languages. A short list of figurative expressions found in both Turkish and English is given in Table 1.

In a nutshell, the metaphors and metonymies below help conceptualize various abstract concepts including the *manner* in which some activity is performed (mental or physical), *luck* in conducting certain duties, being *prevented* or *delayed* on various occasions in pursuing goals, being in a *near-death* condition, and the like. For the purposes of this chapter, I do not analyze such conceptualizations, but rather concentrate on the metaphors and metonymies in the sociocultural evaluation of the abstract concept 'social worth' via body parts.

A key to understanding culture-specific conceptualization of the body part feet in Turkish through metonymies and metaphors may be found in the ways of making decisions. In the Turkish cultural model, a general tendency is to handle matters in a horizontal posture rather than in a vertical posture. In other words, if there is an issue at hand that needs to be discussed, it is better to discuss it by sitting down together. When a group of individuals gather to argue over a matter, the meeting is called *oturum* 'a sitting'. Most decisions, even the urgent and pressing ones are answered in a sitting. People had better not make important decisions while standing. In most idioms, proverbs, and other conventionalized expressions, the contrast between the two basic postures becomes evident.

Table 1. English and Turkish figurative uses of 'feet'

English	Turkish
a. Both <i>feet</i> on the ground	<i>Ayakları yere basıyor</i> 'both feet stepping on the ground'
b. Drag their <i>feet</i>	<i>Ayağını sürüyor</i> 'dragging the feet'
c. Fall/land on their <i>feet</i>	<i>Dört ayağı üstüne düştü</i> 'fall on/land on four feet'
d. Heavy on their <i>feet</i>	<i>Ağır ayaklı</i> 'with heavy feet'
e. Walk them off their <i>feet</i>	<i>Tabanlarını patlat</i> 'burst out the feet'
f. Bind hand and <i>foot</i>	<i>Eli ayağı bağla</i> 'tie/bind hand and foot'
g. Follow in their <i>footsteps</i>	<i>İzinden gitmek</i> 'to pursue someone's (foot)marks'
h. One <i>foot</i> in the grave	<i>Bir ayağı çukurda</i> 'one foot in the hollow'

The majority of the metonymies formed with *ayak* in Turkish evaluate negatively their various target ontologies. Special cases of LESS IS DOWN, LOW STATUS IS DOWN, and BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN are expressed in various nominal compounds in Turkish. *Ayak işi* ‘foot work’ conceptualizes, in a rather generic manner, any work that can be done on foot. The work to be done, in the majority of cases, involves nothing but a simple use of the body part, i.e. to bring or take away any object handed to the person. With no value attached, the person who is assigned to perform *ayak işi* needs no qualifications or mental powers to fulfill the requirements. Anybody, even children, can sometimes be assigned such duties. Roughly corresponding to someone like an office boy, the individual is assigned to perform the simplest of tasks. The idiom conceptualizes not only the work itself as insignificant, but also the individual as unworthy or dispensable. Sometimes the work can be so insignificant that the money paid in return is *ayak kirası* ‘foot rent’, which is paid for *ayak teri* ‘foot sweat’.

Ayaküstü ‘on foot, standing’, a generic expression, conceptualizes anything that is done while standing, i.e., when one is on one’s feet. Whenever the expression is used, it conceptualizes targets as worthless. Food that is consumed *on foot* does not qualify as a proper meal; decisions that are made *on foot* are those that do not require thorough consideration or those concerning matters of less value.¹ A treatment on foot, *ayakta tedavi* is a cure for minor injuries or ailments that are not understood as being of serious damage to health. *Ayakaltı* ‘the bottom of foot’ is the most common evaluative expression that conceptualizes anything that once was, but is no longer, considered worthy. Further, it also conceptualizes a place that is all-inclusive, that is to say, open for all walks of life indiscriminately. A fall from grace or value is a falling down to one’s feet, and ultimately ending up *ayaklar altında* ‘beneath the feet’.

Ayakta kalmak ‘remain unseated’, when evaluated negatively, is a sign of disrespect. In a social gathering, when all attendants are treated properly and respectfully, they are all given their seats. A person who is not given a seat is conceptualized as a person who is not considered to be a participant of the group in question, or somebody who is somehow “forgotten” due to his insignificance. *Ayakta tutmak* ‘keep someone standing’ is an event in which a person is deliberately not given a seat as an overt indication of sociocultural evaluation of the individual as deserving the least respect.

1. Possibly based on shape or size similarity, a number of plant names are formed with *ayak* compounds: *kazayağı* ‘goose feet’, *kediayağı* ‘cat feet’, *kurtayağı* ‘wolf feet’, *turnaayağı* ‘crane feet’, *danaayağı* ‘crow feet’, *itayağı* ‘dog feet’. On the other hand, *horozayağı* ‘cock feet’ is a twisted component of a rifle that takes away the empty cartridge from the barrel; *domuzayağı* ‘pig feet’ is a device used to take out a trapped bullet from the rifle; *tavukayağı* ‘hen feet’ is a skeleton key; *tavşanayağı* ‘bunny feet’ is the crossing joints of railway lines.

Forms of deception are also conceptualized via feet. *Ayak oyunu* 'a game of foot' is any trick that a deceiver performs in order to cheat others, and *ayak yapmak* 'to make foot' conceptualizes any act carried out by a sly person. An untrustworthy person, one who has a tendency to cheat or has been known for his deceitfulness, is labeled *sağlam ayakkabı değil* 'not a reliable shoe'.²

4. Head is topmost

The lexical entry for *baş* 'head' in the official Dictionary of the Turkish Language Institute assigns several distinct senses to the word. In addition to its reference to a body part, the polysemous word may refer to a ruler or head of any organization, activity or profession, the starting point or initial moment of a time unit or a process, anything that is basic or fundamental, and others, e.g. anything that is round and bulging out of a body.³

A reflection of HIGH STATUS IS UP, LOW STATUS IS DOWN is expressed via nominal compounds in which *head* appears as the modifying expression. Not all locations are of equal status, and the high status of a location is conceptualized via *head*:

- | | | |
|-----|-----------------|--------------------|
| (2) | <i>başköşe</i> | 'primary corner' |
| | <i>başmekân</i> | 'primary location' |
| | <i>başoda</i> | 'primary room' |

A primary corner is a place reserved for people of high status; it is the most prestigious spot in a location where people gather. *Başmekan* 'primary location' is a generic term that may apply to any spot or location that is reserved for people with social power. *Başoda* 'primary room' is again a location in a house that can be used only when there is a guest of honor.

In a number of other locative expressions, it is the spatial orientation rather than the social value that is in question. In such metonymies and metaphors, the

2. The data presented here include only those linguistic manifestations that conceptualize the negative evaluation of out-groups in Turkish via the feet. Turkish also has expressions that conceptualize the feet and upright posture positively ('standing on one's own feet', 'standing firmly', etc.). Since they do not relate to social groups and their evaluation, these conceptual metaphors are omitted from the present study.

3. There are two other words that refer to the head: The Arabic borrowing *kafa* and the Persian borrowing *kelle*. The metaphors and metonymies based on these two are not discussed in this chapter. The issues discussed here are further complicated by the use of these two other alternative expressions of 'head' in Turkish, each deserving a study in its own right. HEAD STANDS FOR LIFE, for example, is expressed via *kelle*, and, most often, 'head' as a CONTAINER for mind/intellect via *kafa*.

use of ‘head’ implies the initial point in orientation: A bridgehead is *köprübaşı*, the source of a river is *pınar başı*, and the top of a hill is *tepebaşı*. In another conventionalized expression, the implication of the metaphor is towards a vantage point: those who hold the *köşebaşı* ‘the head of a corner, the turning point’ are the ones who have located themselves in the most advantageous position.

Similarly, not all fingers are equal: for example, *başparmak* ‘thumb’ is the *primary* finger among others, bulging out in a shape similar to that of a head, the nipple is *meme başı*, and *omuz başı* is the rounded ‘head-like’ end of the shoulder. Roughly corresponding to a person considered to be “a pain in the neck”, the head of a pustule or a blain *çibanbaşı* ‘head of spot’ metaphorically conceptualizes a person who constantly disturbs others.

The majority of the metonymies and metaphors in Turkish formed by ‘head’ conceptualize their target domain entities following from the mappings based on the kinesthetic UP-DOWN image schema such as MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN. When the VERTICALITY source domain targets QUANTITY, the social domain stands out as one such case. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 18) argue that “[i]n some cases, spatialization is so essential a part of a concept that it is difficult for us to imagine any alternative metaphor that might structure the concept. In our society, ‘high status’ is such a concept”.

The conceptualization of top or ruling position in a hierarchically organized structure via the head is abundant in Turkish. Nominal compounds in Turkish in this domain come essentially in two forms: those with ‘head’ as the first element and those with ‘head’ as the compound’s head. In various professions, individuals with more knowledge, skills and abilities, or experience function as the head among their colleagues (HEAD STANDS FOR RULER, HEAD STANDS FOR TALENT). They are the *head*, *chief*, *master* or the *primary person* of the profession in question:

(3)	<i>başasistan</i>	‘head assistant’	<i>başdekorcu</i>	‘chief decorator’
	<i>başdümenci</i>	‘chief steersman’	<i>başeczacı</i>	‘head pharmacist’
	<i>başgardiyan</i>	‘head guardian’	<i>başgarson</i>	‘maitre d’hôtel’
	<i>başkemancı</i>	‘primary violin’	<i>başkonsolos</i>	‘head consulate’
	<i>başsavcı</i>	‘chief attorney’	<i>başteknisyen</i>	‘chief technician’

In military organizations with a strict hierarchical structure, ‘head’ defines a position in the army rank:

(4)	<i>başçavuş</i>	‘head sergeant’
	<i>onbaşı</i>	‘(head of ten) the platoon leader’
	<i>yüzbaşı</i>	‘(head of a hundred) army captain’
	<i>binbaşı</i>	‘(head of a thousand) major’

In a similar vein, a high rank in a religious institution is also expressed via 'head'. Although Islam does not officially define any "ruling class" within its institutions, the Turkish expressions in (5) are approximate translations of Christian church terminology:

- (5) *başımam* 'chief preacher' *başpiskopos* 'archbishop'
 başrahip 'chief preacher' *başkeşiş* 'head monk'

The head of any organization in Turkish is *başkan* 'the head', which is a derivative of *baş* 'head'. The professional activities run by a 'head' include:

- (6) *başbakan* 'prime minister' *başbayan* 'first lady'
 başkomutan 'chief of forces, staff' *başdanışman* 'chief consultant'
 başvezir 'grand vizier'

The leading role itself and the person who plays the role are also expressed in 'head' nominals:

- (7) *başkahraman* 'the protagonist' *başkarakter* 'the primary character'
 başrol 'the leading role' *başaktris* 'the leading actress'

A foreman is *ustabaşı*, a master chef is *ağçıbaşı*; *başbuğ* is "the führer", and *elebaşı* is the head of a gang or criminal organization.

Probably the most elaborated conceptual metonymy in the Turkish cultural model is HEAD STANDS FOR ORDER. In a culture-specific interpretation, having a ruler or a head is understood to be vital for the very existence and the functioning of the society. This is an understanding that has derived from collective historical experiences and an emerging cultural consciousness. A great number of "lessons from the past" are held very dear and taught in various myths to younger generations. From the very earliest texts, a society without a head is depicted as one that is doomed to submission, or slavery or, even worse, to extinction, as inscribed in the ancient Turkish texts found in Central Asia.

A wealth of proverbial expressions conceptualize the significance of heading a society. First and foremost, the ruler should possess certain qualities and should be aware of the responsibilities of being a head. The head has to face bigger challenges and has to overcome bigger problems:

- (8) a. *Baş olan boş olmaz.*
 'The head cannot be empty of content'
 b. *Büyük başın derdi büyük olur.*
 'The bigger the head, the bigger the trouble'
 c. *Yüksek dağın başı dumanlı olur.*
 'The head of a high mountain is always covered with fog'

At first glance, the idioms in (8) seem to instantiate CONTAINER or LOCUS OF REASONING metaphors; the head is always full, a bigger head is full of bigger concerns, and a head in a higher position is constantly busy with problems that may fog the view. However, emphasis in the cultural model is on problems facing a ruler who is at the very top, bigger than all or holding the highest position. The CONTAINER here is not the mind of an individual but rather the ruler, and its contents are the concerns regarding better ruling, i.e. the continuous striving for the welfare of society.

Heading or ruling a society is not for everyone but for the ones who dare to do so. It is always better to be the head rather than “no head”, even in cases of minor significance:

- (9) a. *Nefesin elverirse borazancı başı ol.*
 ‘If you are sure of the strength of your breath, be the head of trumpets (the wind instruments)’
 b. *Baş ol da eşek başı ol.*
 ‘Be a head anyway, be the head of donkeys if you can’
 c. *Bin işçi, bir başçı.*
 ‘For a thousand workers, there is a single head’

An individual may prefer not to be a head, given the heavy duties expected of a head. A head with no trouble is not possible; even if it is, it is only in the Hereafter:

- (10) a. *Ağrısız baş mezarda gerek.*
 ‘A head without pain is required only in a grave’
 b. *Dertsiz baş, bostan korkuluğunda.*
 ‘A head without troubles is possible only for a scarecrow’

In a hierarchical structure, there is always one above you:

- (11) *Başın başı, başın da başı vardır.*
 ‘There is always a head for a head, which also has a head even above him’

A corrupted ruler is a malfunctioning head; when the head rots, the society rots. An unqualified ruler is also conceptualized via head metaphors:

- (12) a. *Balık baştan kokar.*
 ‘The fish starts to smell from the head’
 b. *Böyle baş böyle tıraş.*
 ‘A head like this is to be shaved accordingly’

Two very common expressions, *başbozuk* ‘head out of order’ and *başına buyruk* ‘ruled by one’s own head’, further capture the cultural evaluation of a malfunctioning of society without a proper head to rule it.

The second domain in which the head conceptualizes culture-specific experiences concerns the ways in which interpersonal relations are organized. The collectivist and fatalistic aspects of Turkish culture and specific experiences are conceptualized via conventional expressions, such as idioms and proverbs. Here, the head is not only the site of the mind but also the site of one's faith. GOD'S WILL IS A WRITTEN TEXT (Charteris-Black 2004), and the text is written on one's forehead, a part of the head. In spatial orientation, the head is a location and whatever happens to one in life, good or bad, "comes to a head". Here, different from the CONTAINER schema, which has an IN-OUT orientation, elements of fate come to a person or find the person.

- (13) a. *Alna yazılan başa gelir.*
 'Whatever is written on the forehead eventually happens to the head'
 b. *Akla gelmeyen başa gelir.*
 'Those that do not come to mind, befall the head'

As long as your faith is (pre-)written on your forehead, you have little or no power to determine your fate. Most often the trouble is that even things you cannot imagine may happen to you, or come to your head. When this occurs, the collectivist cultural model teaches one to stay put and suffer the consequences of ill fate:

- (14) *Başa gelen çekilir.*
 'Whatever comes to the head, one endures'

Furthermore, even though one witnesses the ill-fate of others in the same community, one may not fully understand the suffering of others or the full extent of the pains they are experiencing:

- (15) *Başa gelmeyince bilinmez.*
 'One cannot know/understand without it happening to one's head'

An individual who is struck by ill-fate is not someone who is responsible for his own deeds, but rather is a "victim" of forces that are either earthly or heavenly. In a collectivist culture where in-group interest overrides the individual's interest, one should sympathize with other members of the group who suffer from consequences of ill-fate:

- (16) a. *Gülme komşuna, gelir başına.*
 'Don't laugh at your neighbor (i.e. his ill fate), the same thing will happen to you'
 b. *Hayır dile komşuna, hayır gele başına.*
 'Wish well for your neighbor, so that the good will come to you'

To distinguish friend from foe, 'head' proverbs summarize the cultural experience:

- (17) a. *Dostun attığı taş baş yarmaz.*
 'A stone from a friend does not crack your head'
 b. *Dost başa bakar, düşman ayağa.*
 'A friend looks at your head, a foe at your feet'

If your head is in trouble, you cannot conceal it in a collectivist society, no matter how hard you try to do so. Hair whitens only if you suffer; eyes cry only if you are in pain:

- (18) *Ağaran baş, ağlayan göz gizlenmez.*
 'A whitened head and a crying eye cannot be concealed'

Linguistic manifestations of 'head' expressions in Turkish appear to emphasize the communal rather than the individual. The cultural differences between individualism and collectivism underlie the degree of emphasis. Priority is given to the goals of the group; the conceptual metaphors of 'head' identify the ruler not as an individual via his or her personal attributes but as a leader by virtue of his or her required responsibilities for the common good. Furthermore, relatively fewer but long-lasting interpersonal relationships in a collectivist culture teach individuals to be more sensitive to the misfortune of others. Mishaps are determined by the fate and target of the head.

5. Head and feet: An uneasy relation

In almost all cultures, stereotyping most often targets "low" types. The linguistic expression for low types in Ancient Greek was *hoi polloi*, meaning 'the many', which conceptualizes the masses or the ordinary people as opposed to *hoi oligoi* 'the few'. A derogatory expression further conceptualizes common things as less worthy. English has many expressions that refer to low types including *riffraff*, *scum*, *undesirables*, *lowlifes*, *the lowest of the low*, and the like. The undesirables in French, *sans culottes*, were poor laborers during the French Revolution. In ancient Turkish society, people belonged to either the *white* tribe or the *black* tribe. Most recently, a revival of these ancient concepts surfaced when a Turkish journalist coined the terms "white Turks" and "black Turks". Recent uses of these terms, however, have nothing to do with the conceptualization of a group of people as "lowly" but rather as the "oppressed" or "underprivileged", also subject to different interpretations depending on one's political stand.

Lakoff (1996: 8–9) argues that “[a]ll prototypes are cognitive constructions used to perform a certain kind of reasoning; they are not objective features of the world”. The typology of the basic types of prototypes in American politics that he proposes can be reconsidered in the context of conceptualizing “low types”, not only in terms of “moral politics” but also in terms of other socio-cultural aspects. In this respect, “low types” can be considered in the Turkish cultural model as representing a synthesis of an *anti-ideal* prototype and a *social* stereotype. In the context of this chapter, as data of metaphors and metonymies illustrate, the social stereotype serves as a model for making “snap judgments” about a group of people, and the anti-ideal prototype serves as a model for a group of people defined by negative standards of all types.

Historically, Turkish society is a “late-capitalistic” community, that is to say, the establishment of socio-economic classes themselves and the development of a class culture in society have a relatively short history. Thus, most of the boundaries that are visible in the social milieu in most Western societies are not so visible. This is, very clearly, an oversimplification. Another oversimplification is that, as the dominant belief system in society, the particular interpretation of Islam the Turkish people have developed in their cultural evolution is a particular conception in which all believers, irrespective of their national, ethnic, or other forms of origin, are absolute equals in the eyes of God. In the words of ruling politicians, Turkish society is defined as a “classless” society, or “a rose garden with no thorns”. If these are the underlying conceptualizations of the folk model, then there is virtually no distinction among the members of the society along these dimensions. Yet, there remains one such distinction and it prevails. There are always the lowly, commonly referred to as *ayak takımı* ‘a team of feet’. Metonymically, this expression denotes a group of people formed by a number of feet, not recognizable as human individuals.⁴

The contrast between ‘head’ and ‘feet’ is a contrast between the ruler and the ruled:

- (19) a. *Baş nereye giderse, ayak da oraya gider.*
 ‘Wherever the head goes, the foot goes, too’
 b. *Ayağı yürüten baştır.*
 ‘The head walks the feet’

In case there is a head without intellect, the ruled pay the price of bad decisions made by the mindless ruler:

4. Gorki’s 1902 play *The Lower Depths* (Russian ‘At the bottom’) has been translated as *Ayak Takımı Arasında*, ‘Among the team of feet’; German journalist Günter Wallraff’s 1985 book *Ganz unten* ‘Lowest of the Low’, documenting his experiences in the workplace posing as a Turkish guest worker, is translated into Turkish as *En Alttakiler* ‘Those at the Very Bottom’.

(20) *Akılsız başın cezasını ayak çeker.*

'Feet are punished for the wrongdoings of a mindless head'

Individually, both the head metaphors and the feet metaphors conceptualize different social groups and identify their respective locations within the society. The head makes the decision and the head decides the way in which the feet will move. In a collectivist cultural context, the roles and responsibilities of a ruler as a proper guide are emphasized. The stereotyping of those who are at the top and those who are at the bottom becomes more evident when 'head' and 'feet' expressions co-occur in individual proverbs.

6. Summary and conclusion

The human body is the primary source of experience. The expression of culture-specific experiences via body parts combines with orientational metaphors to yield an intricate relationship in the mapping of concrete bodily spatial locations onto the abstract social structure. When body parts are the source domains, the physical body is perceived in its upright position. In the case of contemporary Turkish, the respective locations of the head and the feet in the upright position constitute the source domains in the conceptualization of different groups of people and their roles in a hierarchy within society.

The VERTICALITY source domain targets QUANTITY yielding the conceptual metaphors MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN. In the cultural model, QUANTITY applies to the evaluation of individuals or groups (HIGH STATUS IS UP, LOW STATUS IS DOWN). Located at the topmost position, the head conceptualizes those who reside at the very top in the social stratification. The feet conceptualize those who are at the very bottom of society. In these conceptualizations, the evaluation of groups of people is expressed through various kinds of stereotyping.

As in many other cultural models, in the Turkish cultural model in-group stereotypes are evaluated positively, while the out-group stereotypes are evaluated negatively. The negative conceptualization of the "other" leads not only to prejudice but also to social and cultural discrimination. These evaluations are far from being objective; they impose homogeneity onto a group of people that results in distorted representation. Providing a conceptual structure for the categorization of the perceived social stereotypes, metonymies and metaphors, as found in idioms and proverbs that are loaded with culturally learned and thus historically collected "lessons", reflect the biased ideological stance that underlies the Turkish cultural model.

The linguistic manifestations of 'head' and 'feet' conceptual metaphors and metonymies in Turkish are more elaborated in the conceptualization of social groups. As observed in many other languages, the manifestations of HEAD AS CONTAINER, CONTROL CENTER, OR LOCUS OF REASONING are also abundant in Turkish. However, the conceptualizations of 'head' even in the context of these well-documented domains, relate to the ruler or the head of society. The collectivist nature of Turkish culture defines the head not in terms of mere individual attributes, but rather in terms of the special skills and abilities required of the one who assumes the heavy burden of ruling society.

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