

Pragmatics and its Interfaces

EDITED BY

Cornelia Ilie
Neal R. Norrick



John Benjamins Publishing Company

Pragmatics and its Interfaces

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series (p&BNS)

ISSN 0922-842X

Pragmatics & Beyond New Series is a continuation of *Pragmatics & Beyond* and its Companion Series. The New Series offers a selection of high quality work covering the full richness of Pragmatics as an interdisciplinary field, within language sciences.

For an overview of all books published in this series, please see
<http://benjamins.com/catalog/pbns>

Editor

Anita Fetzer
University of Augsburg

Associate Editor

Andreas H. Jucker
University of Zurich

Founding Editors

Jacob L. Mey
University of Southern
Denmark

Herman Parret
Belgian National Science
Foundation, Universities of
Louvain and Antwerp

Jef Verschueren
Belgian National Science
Foundation,
University of Antwerp

Editorial Board

Robyn Carston
University College London

Thorstein Fretheim
University of Trondheim

John C. Heritage
University of California at Los
Angeles

Susan C. Herring
Indiana University

Masako K. Hiraga
St. Paul's (Rikkyo) University

Sachiko Ide
Japan Women's University

Kuniyoshi Kataoka
Aichi University

Miriam A. Locher
Universität Basel

Sophia S.A. Marmaridou
University of Athens

Srikant Sarangi
Aalborg University

Marina Sbià
University of Trieste

Paul Osamu Takahara
Kobe City University of
Foreign Studies

Sandra A. Thompson
University of California at
Santa Barbara

Teun A. van Dijk
Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Barcelona

Chaoqun Xie
Fujian Normal University

Yunxia Zhu
The University of Queensland

Volume 294

Pragmatics and its Interfaces

Edited by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick

Pragmatics and its Interfaces

Edited by

Cornelia Ilie

Strömstad Academy

Neal R. Norrick

Saarland University

John Benjamins Publishing Company

Amsterdam / Philadelphia



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

DOI 10.1075/pbns.294

Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from Library of Congress.

ISBN 978 90 272 0116 4 (HB)

ISBN 978 90 272 6376 6 (E-BOOK)

© 2018 – John Benjamins B.V.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

John Benjamins Publishing Company · <https://benjamins.com>

Table of contents

Introduction: Pragmatics and its interfaces <i>Neal R. Norrick and Cornelia Ilie</i>	1
Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics: Where does the boundary lie? <i>Janet Holmes</i>	11
Discourse pragmatics: Communicative action meets discourse analysis <i>Anita Fetzer</i>	33
The interface between pragmatics and conversation analysis <i>Paul Drew</i>	59
Pragmatics vs rhetoric: Political discourse at the pragmatics-rhetoric interface <i>Cornelia Ilie</i>	85
Narrative studies versus pragmatics (of narrative) <i>Neal R. Norrick</i>	121
Translation studies and pragmatics <i>Juliane House</i>	143
The interface between pragmatics and gesture studies <i>Gerardine M. Pereira</i>	163
Pragmatics and anthropology: The Trobriand Islanders' ways of speaking <i>Gunter Senft</i>	185
Integrative pragmatics and (im)politeness theory <i>Michael Haugh and Jonathan Culpeper</i>	213
Corpus linguistics and pragmatics <i>Christoph Rühlemann and Brian Clancy</i>	241

The interface between pragmatics and internet-mediated communication: Applications, extensions and adjustments <i>Francisco Yus</i>	267
Pragmatics, humor studies, and the study of interaction <i>Nancy D. Bell</i>	291
Index	311

Introduction

Pragmatics and its interfaces

Neal R. Norrick and Cornelia Ilie

Pragmatics, largely conceptualized as “the science of linguistic social behavior in various situational and institutional contexts” (Mey 2013), is both the outcome and the source of cross-disciplinary interfaces. Emerging at the crossroads of several disciplines (semiotics, linguistics, philosophy of language, rhetoric) and ongoingly evolving through interdisciplinary diversification (e.g. legal pragmatics, literary pragmatics, intercultural pragmatics, clinical pragmatics), pragmatics has continually attracted considerable academic interest, being studied from various theoretical perspectives and through the contribution of several disciplines, with a focus on the interplay of overlapping and complementary discipline-specific features.

This volume offers state-of-the-art overviews of the cross-disciplinary role and impact of pragmatics in relation to several areas of study that it interfaces with. Pragmatics has contributed significant insights to a range of disciplines, just as these disciplines have contributed to it. Obvious interfaces are those between pragmatics and hyphenated areas of study such as sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and corpus linguistics, but of course also traditional areas like anthropology, philosophy of language, rhetoric, translation theory, narrative and humor studies. At the same time, pragmatics shares interfaces with conversation analysis and politeness theory, with the study of institutional discourse and language in political contexts as well as language learning. The ongoing explosion of new computer-based media and scholarly approaches to them is rapidly creating new interfaces for pragmatics. Borrowing and cross-pollination between disciplines is natural, as well as necessary, but at times it seems important to take a pause and reflect on and problematize the role of pragmatics at these interfaces. In an age when disciplinary boundaries are being blurred, we need to explore the relationship and interplay between pragmatics and related or complementary fields of enquiry with the goal of broadening and deepening our understanding of the contributions and boundaries of pragmatics as such. Such explorations involve conceptual, theoretical and methodological considerations that problematize current cross-disciplinary research issues. Relevant parameters of comparison are the use of quantitative versus qualitative methods based

on naturally occurring, situated interaction versus experimentally elicited data, the orientation to micro-level versus macro-level issues, the adoption of synchronic versus diachronic perspectives, the use of a bottom-up versus top-down approach.

Several core concepts and tenets of pragmatics have lately been examined in their interplay with comparable counterparts in neighbouring disciplines. Some of the earlier studies confined themselves to interlinguistic, rather than interdisciplinary, approaches, such as Horn and Ward (2006/2004), where strands of inquiry pertaining to pragmatic theory have been used to account (synchronically or diachronically) for grammatical phenomena (intonation, syntax, semantics, lexicalization) and aspects of linguistic competence (language acquisition). Other studies have chosen, for example, to address micro-level pragmatic issues by resorting to wider cultural and societal disciplinary perspectives (Capone and Mey 2015), or to deal extensively with only one interface, such as pragmatics and literature (Sell 2014), pragmatics and law (Capone and Poggi 2016), pragmatics and clinical disorders (Cummings 2017), pragmatics and intercultural studies (Kecskes and Assimakopoulos 2017). Further studies, such as Barron, Gu and Steen (2017), contain chapters that take a one-sided interdisciplinary approach, choosing to examine the applicability of pragmatics to other disciplines by focusing on the ways in which these disciplines (e.g. ethnography, neurolinguistics, clinical linguistics) have benefited from the use of pragmatic analytical tools. Unlike the abovementioned studies, the present volume takes a bidirectional rather than unidirectional approach to the interfaces of pragmatics, since it is not restricted to presenting either the impact of pragmatics on other disciplines or the impact of other disciplines on pragmatics, but an interpenetration of both, in that all its chapters deal with reciprocally integrative interdisciplinary approaches by examining the range of differences, overlaps and complementarities between pragmatics and neighbouring disciplines, pointing to significant contributions of pragmatics to other disciplines, and of other disciplines to pragmatics. The interplay of these two-way interfaces of pragmatics are being highlighted in terms of theoretical prerequisites, empirical data collection, analytical focus and end-goals, by examining the range of differences, overlaps and complementarities between pragmatics and neighbouring disciplines: sociolinguistics, discourse analysis, conversation analysis, rhetoric, narrative studies, translation studies, gesture studies, anthropology, politeness theory, corpus linguistics, internet-mediated communication and humour theory.

Our students often ask about the delimitation and interrelations of pragmatics with the range of allied disciplines: Many basic notions in pragmatics go back to Natural Language Philosophy, but where are the differences, and what difference do they make in concrete analyses? Is discourse analysis a part of pragmatics or the other way around? Does pragmatics work qualitatively while sociolinguistics works quantitatively? Isn't interactional sociolinguistics roughly the same as pragmatics in

practice? Where does conversation analysis (and CA) fit in? If you study variation in responses to invitations across age groups, are you doing pragmatics, politeness theory or sociolinguistics? Doesn't rhetoric study the same sorts of texts and interactions as pragmatics? Then what's the difference? Does the object of study determine the discipline or rather the research perspective? These and similar questions form the focus of these contributions based on investigation of interfaces.

This volume seeks to identify, analyse and clarify the relationships between linguistic pragmatics and its neighboring disciplines. It originated in a discussion at the 13th meeting of the International Pragmatics Association in New Delhi in 2013 about where pragmatics was headed and where deficits lay. The present co-editors agreed at the time to co-operate in organizing a panel at the following IPrA conference scheduled for 2015 in Antwerp, Belgium. That panel ultimately brought together an international group of scholars representing areas of research where Pragmatics interfaces, intersects, overlaps with neighboring disciplines with the goal of more clearly defining the contribution and boundaries of pragmatics as such. Fortuitously, we were able to enlist scholars representing interfaces between pragmatics and hyphenated areas of study such as sociolinguistics (Janet Holmes), corpus linguistics (Christopher Rühlemann), the traditional areas of rhetoric (Cornelia Ilie), translation studies (Julianne House), narrative studies (Neal R. Norrick) and humor studies (Nancy Bell), gesture (Gerardine Pereira) and the new-comers Conversation Analysis (Paul Drew) and politeness theory (Michael Haugh and Jonathan Culpeper), Gender Studies (Louise Mullany), the study of institutional discourse (Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen) and language in political contexts as well as new computer-based media (Susan Herring). On the way to this volume, the list of interfaces and the ranks of authors have undergone sea changes, some to extend and diversify the scope of the coverage and some for personal reasons. Gunter Senft was originally anticipated as a panelist at the 2015 conference for the topic of anthropology and its interface with pragmatics, and we are happy to have enlisted him as a contributor to this volume on that topic. Due to health concerns, Susan Herring could only participate in the conference panel virtually via skype, and she felt she could not author a chapter for this volume, but we found the most obvious and perfect replacement for her in Francisco Yus, who has recently become the most important voice in the area of computer mediated communication. We deeply regret that Louise Mullany was not able to produce a written contribution for this volume, and we are sorry that we thereby lack the gender component she could have supplied. Maj-Britt Mosegaard Hansen was to have contributed a chapter on language in political contexts, but much of this terrain has been covered by Cornelia Ilie's contribution on rhetoric versus pragmatics, with her focus on political language, and the new chapter we were fortunately able to add on pragmatics and discourse analysis by Anita Fetzer. The final line-up

includes twelve chapters, roughly following the order of papers delivered at the IPrA conference in 2015, and intended to cover the major areas of overlap between pragmatics and neighboring fields, working from most obvious/general cross-over areas to the lesser ones.

Probing into the multi-layered and many-sided intersections between sociolinguistics and pragmatics, Janet Holmes highlights the social approach to pragmatics where issues of borders and overlaps with sociolinguistics arise. On her view, sociolinguistics describes how societal norms constrain appropriate language use, and its closest counterpart among areas of pragmatics is variationist pragmatics, which compares pragmatic usage across different regional and social varieties of one language. She points out that at the cognitive end of pragmatics, pragmaticians are concerned with the cognitive processes involved in inferring meaning from language, while at the macro-end of sociolinguistic research, sociolinguists are interested in describing linguistic reflexes of high level social and institutional constraints, ideological norms and values. The commonalities and distinctions are illustrated with examples from her own research on the Language in the Workplace Project in New Zealand, showing how two macro-level societal norms play out at the micro-level of interaction in a number of different workplace contexts. Sociopragmatics is identified by Holmes as a fruitful interface of the overlap between sociolinguistics, which is concerned with linguistic reflexes of high level social and institutional constraints, ideological norms and values, on the one hand, and pragmatics, which is concerned with the cognitive processes involved in inferring meaning from language, on the other hand.

In her chapter on discourse analysis versus pragmatics, Anita Fetzer first contrasts pragmatics and discourse analysis, then presents a composite theory of pragmatics of discourse. Pragmatics has been anchored firmly to the performance of communicative action in context, but it seems impossible to conceptualise communicative action in context without the explicit accommodation of discourse, which constrains its production and interpretation, and delimits context. Discourse is embedded in sociocultural context, which is embedded in social context, against which background, pragmatics can be conceptualized as the study of discourse-dependent meaning in context, as would be captured by conceptualising discourse as a higher-level pragmatic act or as pragmatic discourse. Fetzer examines bridging points between the intentionality of communicative action paradigms, namely speech act theory and the Gricean logic and conversation, and the discourse-analytic paradigm, considering speech acts, the structuring of discourse, and the questions of granularity with respect to content and force. Finally, she presents a pragmatics-based concept of discourse informed by the synergetic effects of communicative action and higher-level speech acts, and quantity- and quality-based approaches to discourse analysis and discourse coherence.

The chapter authored by Paul Drew explores the boundaries and relationships between conversation analysis (CA) and pragmatics, focusing on the contributions CA makes to understanding the pragmatics of language use. Aiming to show that CA has an important empirical contribution to make that complements, rather than conflicts with, pragmatic analysis, he reviews and illustrates the contributions of CA to three core concepts of the foundational areas of pragmatics, namely: implicature, speech acts presupposition and wellformedness. Drew's proposal is that through its sequential approach to the process or the progression of interaction in real time, CA shows that the practices we identify are oriented to by participants both in designing their talk and in making sense of one another's conduct. While pragmatics is centred on the context of language use and how context shapes the production and understanding of talk, CA adds to the pragmatic notion of context that of the sequential context; so that turns or utterances are understood as moves in an unfolding process of interaction. One of Drew's major conclusions is that CA has played an important role in the empirical redirection in pragmatics. concerned with what speakers 'do' in those turns – how they are designed and understood for the actions they undertake in the process of inter-action.

In her chapter, Cornelia Ilie challenges the misconception according to which pragmatics, unlike rhetoric, is seen to take an exclusively bottom-up view as opposed to a top-down view, and proposes an integrative analytical approach – pragma-rhetoric –, whereby a rhetorical perspectivisation of pragmatic analysis is complemented by a pragmatic systematisation of rhetorical practice. Drawing on pragmatic approaches, such as speech act theory and question-answer sequence patterns, and on rhetorical approaches, such as dialogue-based argumentation mechanisms and rhetorical appeals, the pragma-rhetorical analysis aims to account for context-based language-shaped and language-shaping interpersonal and institutional interactions in terms of socio-cultural practices, discourse genres, role distribution and power balance. To illustrate the use of a pragma-rhetorical approach in the analysis of political discourse, Ilie's analysis focuses on distinctive aspects of two political discourse genres: (a) contextualization strategies through meaning negotiation and renegotiation in political interviews, and (b) metadiscourse framing strategies in question-answer sequencing in parliamentary debates. Her examples convincingly show the interplay between the rhetoric of political discourse that focuses on the persuasive techniques and argumentative strategies of political agents engaged in eloquent, effective and/or competitive verbal interaction, and the pragmatics of political discourse that focuses on mechanisms of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of deliberative, confrontational and adversarial interactions underpinning the political power struggle and meaning negotiation practices that are constitutive of political institutions and processes.

Neal R. Norrick initially considers the interface between pragmatics and narrative studies based on their common ground found in shared topics such as tellability and telling rights, along with a shared interest in micro-analytic matters of how tense shifts signal perspective, how discourse markers and repetition mark narrative boundaries and the like, comparing Labovian, conversation analytic (CA) and psycholinguistic approaches to narrative. Then it introduces a specifically pragmatic perspective on narrative, considering recurrent functions of stories roughly at the illocutionary level of Searle (1969), including both direct and indirect speech acts in the sense of Searle (1975). This constitutes a truly top-down perspective on narrative, significantly distinct from CA considerations of epistemic justification for telling or psycholinguistic matters of identity construction, asking what interactional slots we fill with stories, and maybe only with stories, how stories are recycled to fill recurrent needs, to fit standard slots in recurrent cultural contexts or speech events, as Hymes (1974) calls them.

The aim of Julianne House's chapter is to explore the interface between translation studies and pragmatics in terms of their common concern with context as an interdisciplinary concept. Starting from the fact that translated texts are doubly contextually bound, i.e. to their originals and to the new recipients' contextual conditions, she emphasises that, due to this 'doublebind' nature, translation is essentially a procedure of re-contextualization. To illustrate the mechanisms of the re-contextualization process, two basic types of translation – covert and overt translation – have been examined. Her findings show that the two types of translation display very different ways of solving the task of re-contextualization. In overt translation the original's context is reactivated alongside the target context, such that two different frames and discourse worlds are juxtaposed in the medium of the target language. Covert translation, on the other hand, places an exclusive focus on the target context, employing a cultural filter to take account of the new addressees' context-derived communicative norms. House's conclusion is that, while overt translation involves linguistic-cultural transfer, covert translation is more directly affected by contextual and cultural differences, which is another sign of the close connection between translation studies and pragmatics.

Gerardine Pereira's chapter explores the interface between pragmatics and gesture studies in terms of cohesion, reference and repetition, starting from the premise that both disciplines focus on the dynamics of communication and interaction. Her focus is on the interplay of verbal communication with non-verbal components of communication, such as the use of the body, the hands and the eyes, pointing out that gesture is not simply an accompaniment of speech, but rather, gesture and speech form a meaningful unit together, occurring in close synchrony and reflecting different semiotic aspects. Based on face-to-face interactions, pragmatic topics such as cohesion and repetition are revisited to investigate speech,

gesture, and gaze in context. The analysis of the interface is illustrated with excerpts taken from videorecorded interactions between two participants focusing on a task. Pereira's findings show that speech and gesture are used in synchrony, for example when cohesion and the meaning of the reference are jointly created in speech and gesture. Moreover, gesture and gaze are used as means to express stance and signal agreement, disagreement and understanding. At the same time, verbal repetition and gesture recurrence as particular forms of reference create connections across larger discourse chunks and events within the interaction.

In his contribution on the interface between anthropology and pragmatics, Gunter Senft emphasizes their commonality based initially in the shared principle that language is not only an instrument of thought, but first and foremost a tool of interaction. Both pragmatics and anthropology study language use, but Anthropology stresses the role of language in creating social bonds and accountability relations in more or less ritualized forms of social interaction. Anthropologists seek to describe the rules that guide communicative behavior in different cultures, rules that have to be learned to achieve communicative competence within a specific speech community. This learning results in the understanding of how the speakers structure, pattern and regulate their ways of speaking. Language is a mode of behavior and the meaning of an utterance is constituted by its pragmatic function: it can only be understood in relation to the context in which it is embedded. Senft focuses on Malinowski's ideas which led to the formation of the subdiscipline "anthropological linguistics" presenting four observations of the use of language by the Trobriand Islanders he has studied in Malinowski's tradition.

Haugh and Culpeper, in their chapter on the interface between (im)politeness theory and pragmatics, begin by identifying the three "waves" of (im)politeness theory and the role pragmatics has played in their evolution, and the recent move towards a middle ground that integrates classic pragmatic and discursive approaches to (im)politeness. (Im)politeness research and theorizing in pragmatics have developed in tandem from early on, politeness being identified as a key motivation for leaving things unsaid (Grice 1975; Lakoff 1973; Searle 1969). The chapter goes on to consider an integrative pragmatics approach to politeness. The focus of integrative pragmatics is the study, by observer-analysts, of what particular form-function relationships are taken to mean by users in particular situated, sequential contexts, and how this can vary across those participants. Given the particular focus of integrative pragmatics on variation and metapragmatic awareness across participants, it calls for a multi-method approach that combines qualitative and empirical methodologies. They then illustrate the integrative approach to pragmatic analysis. Their approach draws from multiple analytical methods and perspectives, including interactional pragmatics, metapragmatics, and corpus pragmatics.

In their contribution, Rühlemann and Clancy consider the interface between pragmatics and corpus linguistics. The two approaches were long considered mutually exclusive because of their stark methodological differences, with pragmatics relying on close horizontal reading and qualitative interpretation and corpus linguistics typically scanning texts vertically and processing data quantitatively. Corpus data were cited as examples in pragmatic work, but statistics were not considered important, and concordances were not produced. But Rühlemann and Clancy show how corpus linguists and pragmaticists have recently discovered common ground and are thus paving the way for the advent of the new field of corpus pragmatics. They take a meta-methodological approach aiming to show that corpus pragmatics can integrate the horizontal (qualitative) methodology typical of pragmatics with the vertical (quantitative) methodology predominant in corpus linguistics, and they demonstrate their combined approach with a suggestive case study on *if*-clauses in unscripted television dialogue.

The aim of Yus's chapter is to examine some key issues regarding the interface between pragmatics and internet-mediated communication, by assessing how the mediated, virtual nature of the latter requires analytical frameworks beyond those based on physical, face-to-face scenarios. His contribution focuses on the role of context in a cognitive pragmatic (cyberpragmatic) analysis of (un)successful internet-mediated communication. The author starts by problematizing and discussing two central and apparently contradictory statements: on the one hand, internet makes no difference, in the sense that in this virtual environment users also interpret other users' utterances with the aid of context, engage in (a)synchronous conversations, store, update and reproduce social meanings via interactions, etc.; on the other hand, Internet makes all the difference, since virtual communication often takes place in a cues-filtered environment, typically text-based and with fewer options and resources for contextualisation (e.g. lack of nonverbal communication, of physical co-presence, etc.). The chapter ends with a proposal for a six-layered pragmatic analysis of Internet-mediated communication: (1) user and contextual constraints; (2) user to user by means of discourse; (3) user to user in interaction; (4) user to audience; (5) user in a group of users; (6) user and non-intended non-propositional effects.

In her chapter on the interface between pragmatics and humor studies, Nancy Bell first outlines the contributions pragmatics has made to our understanding of what humor is and how it functions in everyday interaction. Early linguistic approaches to humor were generally limited to syntactic and semantic perspectives, but pragmatic research has continued to become more important. Bell draws on a range of empirical methods, including experimental work, conversational analysis, and discourse analysis to illustrate the diverse ways in which the interface has been approached and what these approaches have demonstrated about nonserious talk.

She then turns to the other side of the interface to examine how humor scholarship informs our understanding of language use. Humorous discourse throws into relief social relationships and how they are established, constructed, maintained, and even disintegrated. Although humor is often celebrated as a creative practice, examinations of its use – and instances of its failure, demonstrate that in reality only a certain degree of novelty is acceptable. Finally, she considers ways in which the pragmatics-humor interface might continue to develop, and argues specifically for further integration of humor research into pragmatics.

These twelve chapters still roughly represent the papers delivered at the IPrA conference in 2015, and are intended to cover the major areas of overlap between pragmatics and adjacent fields, working from the most obvious/general cross-over areas to the lesser ones. The authors are both specialists in their own fields and scholars with an interest in the field of pragmatics as a whole and its theoretical grounding. They present cutting-edge research on problems and issues at the interstices between pragmatics and neighboring areas, seeking to show where pragmatic perspectives enter in and how far they can go. Their contributions discuss and highlight the implications and challenges of questions like the following:

- They present new perspectives on the relation between qualitative and quantitative research in pragmatics and adjacent fields;
- They reconsider the scope, focus and boundaries of pragmatics and move to partially redefine their cross-disciplinary intersection and convergence;
- They seek common denominators between pragmatics and other disciplines from cognitive, theoretical, and methodological perspectives;
- They delineate how the spectrum of pragmatic studies has been shaped by the intersection with other disciplines, what particular impact pragmatics itself has had on these other disciplines;
- They challenge the stereotypical idea that pragmatics takes an exclusively bottom-up view by contrast with a top-down view;
- They point out cross-cultural similarities and differences in the theory and practice of particular pragmatics interfaces;
- They offer new insights through scrutiny of the interfaces of pragmatics and how can they be applicable to future research.

It is our conviction that the time is ripe for reconsidering the boundaries and overlaps between pragmatics and its neighboring disciplines, and it is our hope that this volume represents an important step in this direction.

References

- Barron, Anne, Yueguo Gu, and Gerard Steen (eds). 2017. *The Routledge Handbook of Pragmatics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Capone, Alessandro, and Jacob L. Mey. 2015. *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*. Berlin: Springer.
- Capone, Alessandro, and Francesca Poggi (eds). 2016. *Pragmatics and Law: Philosophical Perspectives*. Berlin: Springer.
- Cummings, Louise (ed). 2017. *Research in Clinical Pragmatics*. Berlin: Springer.
- Grice, H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerrold Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Horn, Laurence R., and Gregory Ward (eds). 2006/2004. *The Handbook of Pragmatics*. London: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470756959
- Hymes, Dell. 1974. *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Keckes, Istvan, and Stavos Assimakopoulos (eds). 2017. *Current Issues in Intercultural Pragmatics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.274
- Lakoff, Robin. 1973. "The Logic of Politeness; or Minding your P's and Q's." *Chicago Linguistics Society* 9: 292–305.
- Mey, Jacob L. 2013. A Brief Sketch of the Historic Development of Pragmatics. In *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Linguistics*, ed. by Keith Allan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, John R. 1975. "Indirect Speech Acts." In *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerrold Morgan, 59–82. New York: Academic Press.
- Sell, Roger D. (ed). 2014. *Literary Pragmatics*. London: Routledge.

Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics

Where does the boundary lie?

Janet Holmes

Victoria University of Wellington

Sociolinguists describe the linguistic resources available in speech communities, and provide a systematic account of how social variables influence linguistic choices from among those resources. Pragmatics explains how individuals use linguistic resources to produce and interpret meaning in interaction, and sometimes to change relationships. Certain aspects of each discipline are generally recognized as distinct, but there are also areas of overlap. Using workplace discourse to explore the constraints of egalitarianism and gender in New Zealand society, I illustrate the advantage of drawing on both disciplines, and demonstrate how macro-level (societal) and meso-level (eg. workplace teams, communities of practice) sociolinguistic norms may act as sociopragmatic constraints or as a focus for contestation in interaction at the micro-level in face-to-face workplace interaction.

Keywords: sociolinguistics, sociopragmatics, egalitarianism, the gender order, critical realism, social realism, interactional sociolinguistics, context, politeness

1. Introduction

The topic of the boundary between pragmatics and sociolinguistics has rarely been formally addressed, although it is an issue which rewards careful reflection since it raises a number of challenging theoretical and methodological issues. I first considered this topic when I was writing *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics* in the 1990s. Working at the University of Lancaster alongside Jenny Thomas, who was concurrently writing an introduction to pragmatics (published as *Meaning in Interaction*) helped identify some of the relevant problems. At that time, scholars working in these areas were anxious to clearly stake out their ground, and border disputes were common. Today both areas are well established and secure, and it is possible to examine the topic less defensively, and even highlight the advantages of conceptualizing them as usefully complementary.

1.1 Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics as separate areas of research

A useful starting point is Jenny Thomas's (1995) discussion of the issue in *Meaning in Interaction*. She indicates that she sees sociolinguistics as quite distinct from pragmatics, arguing that: "Pragmatics is parasitic upon sociolinguistics", and characterising sociolinguistics as providing a description of the linguistic resources that an individual has at their disposal while pragmatics provides an account of how those resources are deployed in interaction (Thomas 1995: 185).

While it is true that sociolinguistic research provides valuable descriptive information on languages, dialects, and styles, few sociolinguists today would accept this demarcation, and the relegation of sociolinguistics to a purely descriptive role. Sociolinguists are interested in explanation as well as description.

Sociolinguists study the relationship between language and society. They are interested in explaining why we speak differently in different social contexts, and they are concerned with identifying the social functions of language and the ways it is used to convey social meaning. (Holmes 2013: 1)

1.2 Sociolinguistics

Sociolinguistics encompasses all aspects of the relationship between language and society. Many sociolinguists conceptualise the field in terms of macro-level approaches, which take society as the starting point, and examine the role of language in different communities, and micro-sociolinguistics which begins from language and studies how social factors influence linguistic structure and usage (e.g. Romaine 1995: 489; Coulmas 1997: 2; Wodak, Johnstone and Kerswill 2011: 3). At the macro-level, sociolinguists have examined topics such as multilingualism, language maintenance and shift, code-switching, and language policy, and showed how research in these areas can illuminate our understanding of the relationship between social, cultural, and linguistic issues. The link to the discipline of sociology has always been apparent, and methodologies such as large scale surveys involving questionnaires and interviews have been typical of research in these areas. These topics are largely accepted as core sociolinguistic territory, *pace* Peter Trudgill (1983: 2–5) who relegates them to the area of the "Sociology of Language", and excludes them from sociolinguistics proper, a position not shared by many current sociolinguists, as the contents of journals such as *Language in Society* and the *Journal of Sociolinguistics* testify.

At the micro-level, *variationist sociolinguistics* or *social dialectology* focuses on linguistic variation within predominantly monolingual societies. Social dialect surveys have been the major research tools and the results of research in this area have provided many illuminating insights into language structure, patterns of use,

and changes over time. The strong link to linguistics, including dialectology and historical linguistics, has been obvious since the earliest work by Labov.

Research on *attitudes to language* is also generally regarded as an aspect of sociolinguistics, again using mainly survey and questionnaire methodologies, and with a strong link to psychology, while research on the relationship between language and culture (ethnographic linguistics) has obvious links with anthropology, as does the ethnographic methodology generally used in this area.

In fact, as Coupland and Jaworski (2009) point out, the macro-micro distinction between sociology of language and variationist approaches has been gradually eroded in more recent research both theoretically and methodologically, as more ethnographic and social constructionist approaches have influenced all areas of sociolinguistics: a focus on “*social practice* has in many ways dissolved the distinction between ‘language’ and ‘society’” (Coupland and Jaworski 2009: 3).¹ Focussing on social practice, sociolinguists are concerned with “unraveling the theoretical significance of language variation” (Coupland 2001: 3). An adequate sociolinguistic theory provides a motivated account of the way language is used in a community, and of the choices people make when they use language in specific contexts. This inevitably involves consideration of pragmatic as well as linguistic features, and pragmatic as well as social factors or dimensions, as I will illustrate.

So what finally is the place of *interactional sociolinguistics*, and its associated methodology, *discourse analysis*, the area pioneered by the late John Gumperz, who served IPra as its first President (from 1986 to 1990)? It is here that sociolinguistics and pragmatics overlap, and I think this area is most usefully recognized with the label *sociopragmatics*. But before I discuss what constitutes sociopragmatics, and how exactly I see it relating to sociolinguistics, it will be useful to identify areas which are undisputedly the terrain of core pragmatics, with no territorial claims from others.

1.3 Pragmatics

Most researchers agree that pragmatics is concerned with *the study of language in use in context* (e.g. Huang 2012: 1; Birner 2013: 2; and evident in every chapter in this volume), accounting for how we produce and understand meaning in context. However, like sociolinguistics, the discipline of pragmatics has been described as having at least two aspects (see, for example, Mey 1993, 2010; Verschueren 1995; Leech 2014). Thomas (1995: 2) suggested that some pragmaticians take “a broadly cognitive approach” studying constraints on the interpretation of relevant meaning

1. Note the similarity to Halliday’s view of sociolinguistics as long ago as the 1970s as “the investigation of language as social behavior” (2007: 60).

by the receiver of the message, while others take “a broadly social view of the discipline” focussing on social constraints on speaker meaning. Her own definition highlights the dynamic nature of the process of meaning-making in context: she defines pragmatics as the study of “meaning in interaction” (1995:22).

It is the social approach to pragmatics where issues of borders and overlaps with sociolinguistics arise. The cognitive approach is less concerned with social context and more with cognitive encoding and inferencing processes, and more recently with cognitive constraints on pragmatic competencies and performance (Zufferey 2015), though in most core pragmatics research it is inferencing processes which have attracted greatest attention. The work of the philosopher, Paul Grice (1975) provided the basis of much subsequent *inferential pragmatics*, and this cognitively oriented approach to communication continues to develop in the research of philosophers such as Sperber and Wilson (2005) and Carston (1998, 2002).²

Increasingly, however, researchers are studying the effects of social context on the interpretation of meaning; and the segue into sociopragmatics becomes evident in work on politeness, in particular. From Brown and Levinson’s (1987) classic account of Politeness Theory through to Haugh’s (2015) recent theory of implicature as social action and im/politeness as social practice, it is clear that the study of im/politeness takes pragmatics much further into sociolinguistic territory than previous cognitively-oriented pragmatists had ventured. (See Chapter 10 this volume for a detailed discussion of this issue). Indeed, Kecskes (2014) has the explicit aim of bringing together what he describes as the “*individualistic* intention-based cognitive-philosophical line, and the *societal*, context-based socio-cultural-interactional line” (2014: 6). And although, in my view, the cognitive-philosophical tends to dominate Kecskes’ account, his book could be considered another contribution to the emerging field of sociopragmatics.

1.4 Sociopragmatics

So how shall we define this sub-field which is clearly where sociolinguistics, the study of language in society, overlaps with pragmatics, the study of language use in social interaction?³ In my view, sociolinguistics describes how societal norms constrain appropriate language use. So, for example, particular socio-cultural values, such as egalitarianism, or respect for hierarchy and power, influence the ways

2. See also Allan and Jaszczolt (2015) for a recent *Handbook of Pragmatics* which strongly favours the cognitive approach. Only two of the 31 contributions venture into socio-cultural territory.

3. Note that Mey (2010: 444) uses the term “societal pragmatics” for this area.

in which leadership is discursively constructed in particular societies; “the gender order” (Connell 1987; Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003[2014]) influences the ways in which people use language to construct their gender identity in different communities; and institutional norms influence appropriate language choice in different domains and settings such as law courts, schools and the media.

Sociopragmatics is concerned with identifying and analysing evidence for such societal norms in interaction, and examining whether they are subscribed to or contested. Before I illustrate what I consider mainstream sociopragmatics, it is worth just briefly noting some of the different directions in which sociopragmatic research has developed in the last decade. Among other hybrid terms, Barron and Schneider (2009: 425) distinguish cross-cultural pragmatics, ethnopragmatics, postcolonial pragmatics, and intercultural pragmatics, with its sub discipline variational pragmatics, all of which have a socio-cultural strand. Of these, variational pragmatics has perhaps the closest links to current sociolinguistics since it compares pragmatic usage across different varieties of one language. As Barron and Schneider (2009: 426) note, it is situated at the interface of pragmatics and social dialectology or variationist sociolinguistics (see also Jautz 2014: 41). So while social factors such as status and power have been a focus of pragmatics research for many years, consideration of regional and social (class, gender, age, ethnic) variation in how these social dimensions are instantiated in interaction within different communities who speak the “same” language has attracted little attention until the last decade (Barron and Schneider 2009; Schneider and Barron 2005; Schneider and Barron 2008). Research in this area to date includes both qualitative and quantitative studies with the former providing results of interest to variationist sociolinguists and the latter to those interested in sociopragmatics. My own research has favoured a predominantly qualitative approach in recent years.

Like sociolinguistics, sociopragmatics is hospitable to the diverse range of theoretical approaches and frameworks used by different researchers, including the social constructionist approach we embrace along with critical realism.

2. Critical or social realism⁴

In our Language in the Workplace Project research we have adopted critical or social realism as a theoretical framework which facilitates an examination of how macro-level societal norms are instantiated at the level of micro-level face-to-face interaction (Holmes, Marra and Vine 2011).

4. This section draws on Holmes, Marra and Vine (2011), and Holmes and Schnurr (2016).




Figure 1. A multilayered model of intercultural interaction (in Holmes, Marra and Vine 2011: 19)

Social realism provides an account of the relationship between wider social structures and individual agency, proposing that individual behaviour (including language) is influenced by outside “reality” (Bourdieu 1979; Bhaskar 2008; Collier 1994; Coupland 2001; Coupland and Jaworski 2009: 17). In other words, our behaviour is constrained by the parameters of broad societal norms and “inherited structures” of belief, power, opportunity, and so on (Cameron 2009: 15). We interact with others within the constraints of culturally available, sense-making frameworks or “discourses” (Ehrlich 2008: 160). Bourdieu (1979: 81) expresses it this way: “the truth of an interaction is never entirely contained in the interaction”; it is societal conditions that vouchsafe and sanction the ongoing action, which always occurs in a climate of “equalities and inequalities”. Our model identifies these social constraints on interactional behaviour at different levels of generality, from the broadest and most encompassing societal macro level through the organisational or professional meso level to the more specific micro level of the CofP or workplace teams (cf. Vaara 2003, Hecht, Warren, Jung and Krieger 2005; Wodak 2008: 208).

At the societal level, these constraints involve institutional norms which all members of society are aware of, whether they conform to them or contest them. As Coupland notes, participants “orient variably and creatively” to normative institutional constraints, providing evidence that “people do in fact work with a pre-discursive concept of social order as well as being active agents in their reproduction (or modification) of it” (2001: 16–17). These include societal ideologies such as egalitarianism, often described in terms of the “tall poppy syndrome” (Lipson 1948 [2011]; Jackson and Parry 2001) which condemns boasting and self-promotion in many Australasian social contexts, and the gender order, which, as noted above, influences what is regarded as appropriate behaviour for women and men in different contexts. These two macro-level societal norms are the focus of the analysis below.

Many, perhaps most, researchers working in the area of workplace discourse adopt an Interactional Sociolinguistics approach (Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz 2007), analysing discourse in its wider socio-cultural context, and drawing on the analyst’s knowledge of the community and its norms in interpreting what is going on in a particular interaction. The goal is to explore how social meaning is discursively conveyed and inferred in particular interactions. Clearly this is the realm of sociopragmatics as noted above. Some examples will illustrate how two particular sociolinguistic norms identified at the macro-level, namely egalitarianism and the gender order, play out at the sociopragmatic micro-level.

3. Egalitarianism⁵

At the societal level, New Zealanders subscribe to an egalitarian ideology (Bönisch-Brednich 2008; Kennedy 2007). Commitment to this egalitarian ethic is evident in many different ways in New Zealand society, and in workplace interaction in particular. Pākehā New Zealanders do not comfortably tolerate explicit demonstrations of power, and, in general, people often seek ways of reducing status differences and emphasising equality with their colleagues. As noted in Holmes, Marra and Vine (2012), one consequence is a general expectation that formality is kept to a minimum. Another is the expectation that people do not overtly sing their own praises or “blow their own trumpets”, a norm consistent with the Maori value of *whakaiti* (Metge 1995: 103). In general, then, at the macro-level, many New Zealand institutions tend to engage in less formality or “pomp and circumstance” than, say, British institutions. And New Zealand leaders, whether in politics, sport or business are generally expected to demonstrate a relaxed and casual style in their interactions with the public. So how do these societal patterns play out at the meso-level of workplace teams and the micro-level in face-to-face workplace interaction?

As one might predict, given the societal norms, our research provides evidence of a preference for informal ways of interacting in many New Zealand workplaces, even in large meetings, and especially in one-to-one interaction. Relevant strategies include avoiding linguistic labels and titles which indicate status, and a preference for first names and informal address forms, as well as a range of other strategies which construct informality and debunk conventionalism and “decorum”. In other words, the macro-level societal value of egalitarianism is instantiated at the meso-level of communities of practice or workplace teams and at the micro-level of face-to-face interaction by sociopragmatic strategies which index informality.

Similarly, societal level pressures constrain unmitigated self-promotion and even complacent acceptance of praise and admiration in most New Zealand contexts, a norm found in many but not all other societies. Although achievement is admired, it is not to be flaunted. Bönisch-Brednich summarises it this way: “everyone should be the same and if they are not they should, at the very least, pretend to be” (2008: 6). In the New Zealand workplaces we have researched, this is evident in the *absence* of serious self-promoting behaviour in face-to-face interaction, and the use of self-deprecation, often expressed humorously (see, for example, Yvonne (Holmes and Marra 2011), Leila (Holmes and Stubbe 2015) and Quentin (Marra, Vine and Holmes 2008) for instances of self-deprecating humour used by leaders).

5. This section draws on Holmes (2015).

From many possible examples, I have selected one to demonstrate the way in which the egalitarian ethic plays out in terms of informality at the micro-level, and another to illustrate how workmates respond when what Leech (1983, 2014) calls the Modesty Maxim is flouted.

In Excerpt 1, we know from our ethnographic material, as well as a recording from a meeting between Jaeson and another senior colleague, that Brendan's work is considered not up to scratch, and that he is being held accountable in this interaction for under-achieving.

Excerpt 1

Context: Jaeson, the General Manager of a New Zealand production company, is discussing rates of production with Brendan, the Account Manager. Jaeson is concerned that rates need to improve and is demonstrating a new computer programme which he believes will assist in achieving this goal.

- 1 Jaes: I thought that was really interesting
- 2 from //your point of view Brendon\
- 3 Bren: /yeah yeah yes\\
- 4 Jaes: come and do you want to look at this mate
- 5 Bren: yep ++
- 6 Jaes: this will be very interesting.....
- 7 is cat- is [TECH TERM] a category
- 8 Bren: no //idea\
- 9 Jaes: /jesus mate\\ I'll shoot myself if it isn't
- 10 Bren: no idea + well it will be under XYZ for a start
- 11 Jaes: this report doesn't work like that
- 12 Bren: /see you're\ getting double the value at company A
- 13 //[CLIENT]'s getting double the value\
- 14 Jaes: /[laughs]\\ it's what you should be aiming for
- 15 okay what do you think of that mate
- 16 Bren: sounds good
- 17 Jaes: are you impressed [thud] [computer beeps]
- 18 Bren: yeah
- 19 Jaes: are you impressed
- 20 Bren: I am impressed
- 21 Jaes: okay //right\

It is noteworthy that although Brendan is here being indirectly criticised for under-achievement, the exchange is pleasant and friendly, as indicated by the laughter (line 14) and joking: e.g. *are you impressed...I am impressed* (lines 17–20). This is one of the more subtle ways in which the egalitarian ethic plays out: overt criticism is avoided, even when it is merited. The nearest Jaeson gets to direct censure is his

comment *it's what you should be aiming for* (line 14). On the whole, however, indirect strategies prevail – in the form here of a suggested means of improvement. The relaxed egalitarian atmosphere is further supported by the casual style of the exchange, with the address term *mate* (lines 4,9,15) and the swear word *jesus* (line 9), the most obvious indices of informality. This is perfectly normal in this community of practice as our extensive recording demonstrates, and it is moreover, typical of most of the workplaces in which we collected data.

In Maori workplaces, rather than *mate*, the casual address form *bro* sometimes occurs. Though it is not frequent, the fact that it is used at all is interesting since it so strongly indexes informality.

4. Self-promotion

As noted, the other aspect of the egalitarian ethic is avoidance of self-promotion and “skiting”. Since it is difficult to document avoidance, I have here selected an example which illustrates the existence of the norm through its contravention by an immigrant to New Zealand.⁶ Andrei is a middle-aged Russian professional in the area of public relations who has been placed as an intern in a New Zealand organisation. He comes from a culture where people are expected to assert their expertise quite explicitly, so that others are reassured about their competence and qualifications (cf. Roberts et al. 2008; Zaldman and Drory 2001). Excerpt 2 illustrates how, in line with this norm, Andrei spells out his expertise and experience very explicitly in interaction with his mentor, Camille.

Excerpt 2

Context: informal office interaction in the first two weeks of Andrei's internship. Camille and Andrei are discussing the parameters of Andrei's job in the organisation.

[XXX] has been used to protect the identity of the organisation in which Andrei is working

- 1 Andrei: I er [clears throat] I was involved in the same
- 2 similar to the similar similar work back in Russia
- 3 Camille: oh right
- 4 Andrei: er but for international er financial er institutions
- 5 like international monetary fund //and the world\ bank
- 6 Cam: /oh wow\\
- 7 And: and the European bank for construction and development

6. This example is discussed in more detail in Holmes and Riddiford (2010).

- 8 Cam: oh
 9 And: and for our () of ch- chairman and deputy chairman
 10 and deputy director of some of the departments
 11 were [XXX] departments not just [XXX] /but\
 12 Cam: //mm\
 13 And: [XXX] and then financial [XXX]
 14 Cam: right yes
 15 And: banking supervision and accounting
 16 Cam: that's quite big work
 17 And: yes //really big\ the whole um
 18 Cam: /yeah\
 19 And: I was a team leader
 20 Cam: mm
 21 And: and five people reported to me ++
 22 and I w- and I coordinated the (role) for the first deputy
 23 chairwomen missus [NAME] she was right hand
 24 of chairman of the European bank bank of Europe
 25 Cam: oh
 26 And: chair govern reserve bank
 27 Cam: oh okay
 28 one of my brothers is going to Moscow next week

Andrei begins appropriately here by linking what he wants to say to the current context in which his responsibilities are being outlined. In lines 1–2, he indicates that he has relevant previous experience. He then goes on to describe in considerable detail just exactly what his previous position was. In a typical interaction between New Zealanders, the information in the first two lines would almost certainly be considered enough. New Zealanders tend to play down expertise; it would be most unusual to hear someone elaborate their experience in the detail provided here by Andrei. He not only mentions the banks he has worked for (lines 4,5,7), he also lists the important people he has worked for (lines 9–10), and the specific areas that he has worked in (lines 13, 15). He then goes on to provide a detailed account of his role as a team leader of five people (lines 19,21), and finally his role in relation to an important woman, the right hand of the chairman of the bank of Europe (lines 22–24,26).

There is evidence from Camille's responses that she finds Andrei's explicit and elaborated account of his experience somewhat inappropriate. Her first response, *oh right* (line 3), is a positive high-pitched polite response, with the *oh* indicating just a little surprise in response to the information being voluntarily proffered (Heritage 1998). Her second response *oh wow* (line 6) suggests that she has recognised that the discourse has moved from the transactional into the personal

realm, as this is the kind of enthusiastic supportive response one might expect in an informal social exchange rather than in transactional talk. As Andrei persists with his self-advocacy, her responses become less encouraging both in form and tone: *oh* (line 8), *mm* (line 12), and her use of *right yes* (line 14) could be interpreted as a signal that it is time to move on to the next topic (Schiffrin 1987; Fung and Carter 2007). Since this does not de-rail Andrei, she produces a positive utterance with falling intonation, which appears to be another attempt to finish the topic, *that's quite big work* (line 16). There is a noticeable absence of response after Andrei's *and five people reported to me* (line 21), suggesting Camille is adopting another strategy to discourage further elaboration. After two more polite but very minimal responses *mm* (line 20) and *oh* (line 25), she finally takes over firmly *oh okay*, and then changes the topic, though, considerably, she selects a social topic on which Andrei is likely to have something to contribute *one of my brothers is going to Moscow next week* (lines 27–28).

So while Andrei's behaviour is consistent with Russian societal norms which value explicitness and emphasise the importance of upward impression management (Zaldman and Drory, 2001), from a New Zealander's perspective, Andrei's exhaustive documentation of his previous experience, and especially the claims he makes concerning the importance of his role and status, are perceived as boasting, self-promotion, sociopragmatic behaviour which clearly contravenes the New Zealand egalitarian ethic.

These examples illustrate the different ways in which a macro-level socio-cultural value, namely the egalitarian ethic, can be inferred from the analysis of everyday workplace interaction. As illustrated in Excerpt 1, overt criticism is not conveyed, even when merited, and the evident power imbalance is downplayed. Thus the egalitarian ethic is supported by the use of indirect strategies and casual discourse features which maintain an informal relaxed atmosphere. Excerpt 2, by contrast, illustrates the flouting of this socio-cultural norm, with explicit self-promotion. Again it is interesting to note that the egalitarian norm can be inferred both from Camille's evident discomfort, as well as from the absence of such behaviour generally in our data from New Zealand workplaces.

5. The "gender order"

The "gender order" is the second societal norm that I will illustrate. The term is generally attributed to Connell (1987) who introduced it to describe the patterns of power relations between masculinities and femininities that are widespread throughout society. Emphasising the importance of paying attention to large scale macro-level structures, he points to the hegemony of masculinities in most western

societies and the influence of hegemonic power relations which shape notions of masculinity and femininity. As Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003[2014]) discuss in detail, through socialisation processes and increasing familiarity with societal norms and expectations, we learn how to behave appropriately as women and men in our society. “Gender consists in a pattern of relations that develops over time to define male and female, masculinity and femininity, simultaneously structuring and regulating people’s relation to society” (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003: 33). In other words, the gender order, like the egalitarian ethic, acts as a societal level constraint which members of society orient to in their interactions, whether they conform to or contest it.

Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003: 32) point out that “[g]ender is a social arrangement and every individual’s gender is built into the social order”, and they argue that “[i]nequality is built into gender at a very basic level” (2003: 32). The workplace is a prime site for the enactment of gender inequalities since workplace ideologies maintain and reinforce the notion that men are more suited for some (typically more senior, statusful and well-paid) roles and women for others.

We have many examples in our data illustrating how the conventional hegemonic gender order is sociopragmatically instantiated at particular times in specific workplace interaction.⁷ However, here I provide two examples of more interesting alternative patterns which indicate how the gender order is typically sociopragmatically *negotiated* in New Zealand workplaces, especially perhaps when it is perceived as presenting an unacceptable constraint, or as limiting options.

The first example is taken from data recorded in a soap factory. Ginette is the leader of a team, pseudonymed the Power Rangers, which constitutes a very distinctive community of practice (as described in Holmes and Stubbe 2015; Stubbe 2010). Her leadership style is distinctly unconventional in relation to the norms of the New Zealand gender order.

Excerpt 3⁸

Context: Ginette, the team leader is delivering the regular 6am factory team briefing. She is telling the packers that there have been serious delays caused by their mistakes with documenting the packing codes.

- 1 Gin: you must fill them out properly
- 2 the purpose of these sheets is to give information for
- 3 people up there on how these the efficiencies of these lines

7. See Holmes (2006) for examples of men constructing normatively “masculine” leadership identities (e.g. assertive and dominant) and women constructing normatively “feminine” leadership identities (e.g. motherly and supportive).

8. This example and some of its discussion is taken from Holmes and Stubbe (2015).

- 4 when we fill out a sheet that says we nearly packed
- 5 6000 cases in three- three and a half hours that's a load of shit
- 6 that's running the machine at five hundred packets a minute ...
- 7 fill them out properly ...
- 8 so make sure you check them properly ...
- 9 cos like I said it's just one person's stupid mistake
- 10 makes the whole lot of us look like eggs (5)
- 11 check them properly [laughs] ...
- 12 please fill them out properly fuck youse

The problem that Ginette is addressing is serious and potentially very costly for the factory. It is important that she gets her message over and that the team understands it and responds to it. Consequently, she adopts a very direct and normatively masculine approach using a variety of means to intensify the force of her basic message “fill out the forms properly”. The opening declarative in line 1 is strengthened by deontic *must*, and uses the direct address form *you*. She uses very direct forcefully expressed imperative forms (lines 7, 8, 11) and the whole message is delivered with declamatory force. But perhaps the most obvious intensifying devices are the regular repetitions of her message (lines 1, 7, 8, 11, 12), and the use of swear words (lines 5, 12), and especially the finale of this tirade with the very direct and challenging address form *fuck youse* (line 12). (See also Chapters 6 and 8 this volume for farther discussion of repetition). This is high energy (but good-humoured) abuse, of a kind regularly used by members of the Power Rangers team, aimed here at getting the team to follow procedures.

Swear words and jocular abuse are common in this community of practice as our analysis clearly demonstrates (Daly, Holmes, Newton, Stubbe 2004); indeed these discourse practices distinguish this team from other teams in the factory. And Ginette as team leader makes full use of these sociopragmatic resources to get her message over, contesting the conventional gender order in the process. In other interactions with factory personnel outside her team, Ginette behaves more conventionally, avoiding swear words and using mitigated and attenuated forms to manage a polite refusal, for example (see Daly et al. 2004), providing clear evidence of her awareness of the orthodox gender norms. Within her own team with their distinctive community of practice, however, she confidently challenges the gender order using direct face attack acts, explicit imperatives, jocular abuse, and strong expletives to convey her dissatisfaction with the team's performance (see Holmes and Stubbe 2015, Chapter 3).

My second example is taken from a very different workplace context, namely an eldercare facility which employs both female and male carers. Eldercare, like nursing and primary school teaching, is normatively regarded as “women's work”. And while there has been a fair amount of research on the behaviour of women

in stereotypically male professions (e.g. McElhinny 1995; Miller 2004; Powell, Bagihole and Dainty 2008; Rhoton 2011; Angouri 2011; Baxter 2011) there is much less on the linguistic behaviour of men working in occupations associated predominantly with women (Holyoake 2001; Bagihole and Cross 2006; Huppatz and Goodwin 2013). McDowell (2015a: 368) points to research suggesting that men in such occupations feel pressured to explicitly “do gender”, making their masculinity “much more explicit when in feminised work contexts than traditional male occupational roles” (see also Williams 1995). But our data confirms McDowell’s (2015b) findings, based on her detailed analysis of the recorded language of male nurses, that there is little evidence of macho behaviour in traditionally “female” occupational contexts such as nursing and eldercare. As McDowell (2015a: 379) points out “[t]he language used is the language of *being* a nurse regardless of the gender of the person in that work role”.

Male carers thus face a dilemma since their work is associated with a feminine social identity. One strategy used by all the male carers in our data involves emphasising the *professional* aspects of their role: e.g. using technical rather than colloquial words for body parts and for daily washing and dressing procedures (see Marra and Kidner 2014).⁹ However, they also embrace a range of additional resolutions of the gender dilemma: some behave in normatively feminine ways, using lots of small talk, attenuated requests and endearments, linguistic features normatively associated with the carer role (Marsden and Holmes 2014; McDowell 2015a); others adopted a more complex demeanour, behaving in humorous and even flirtatious ways, teasing the elderly female residents, in particular. Excerpt 4 illustrates this behaviour.

Excerpt 4

Context: Robert, the carer, uses humour to tease Teresa out of her grumpy attitude

- 1 Robert: so did you have a good sleep last night?
- 2 Teresa: no
- 3 Robert: [joking tone]: why (ha) you get drunk last night:
- 4 Teresa: yes
- 5 Robert: oh so I told you + //drinking
- 6 is that your son or your daughter\
- 7 Teresa: /yes [joking]: (she give you\ you give me whisky)
- 8 Robert: [drawls]: oh: whisky?

9. See also McDowell (2015a) on the association of feminine language with the profession of nursing. She argues that nurses’ language fulfils discourse tasks essential to the work role and that the men are thus *doing* being a nurse rather than constructing feminine identities.

- 9 Teresa: mhm
10 Robert: and then with the flowers as well
11 look at the beautiful flowers there
12 who give it to you that one
13 Teresa: I'm not telling you eh

Teresa responds with a grumpy “no” to Robert’s enquiry about how she had slept (lines 1–2). In reply Robert teases her by suggesting she was drunk (lines 3, 5), and asking if her son or her daughter had supplied the drink (line 6). Teresa responds in the same vein with a joke suggesting Robert gave her some whisky. Robert then points to her *beautiful flowers* (line 11) and asks who gave them to her. Teresa responds with her own tease *I’m not telling you eh* (line 13). By introducing an element of teasing humour, Robert breaks down Teresa’s initial grumpiness and resistance to his help, and they proceed to the “nice wash” that Robert is there to give her.

Another carer Nicolas has a well-established joking relationship with a resident, Bethany, which involves treating her as a queen and calling her “your honour”. This joke is clearly a source of great and ongoing entertainment for both for them. At one point he persuades her to get up and walk by saying *they just don’t wanna see you at the palace ..crawling*

Excerpt 5 illustrates how Alec makes good-humoured fun of Nancy’s self-pitying complaints and jollies her out of her doldrums.

Excerpt 5

Context: Alec, the carer, uses humour to chivvy Nancy out of her self-pitying attitude

- 1 Nancy: no one wants me anymore
2 I’m just extra
3 Alec: nah that’s not true
4 Nancy: I’ve got relations
5 but I love them
6 but I don’t know
7 Alec: //you\ sound like a teenage kid
8 but you sound like a teenage kid
9 Nancy: /what [laughs loudly]\\ puberty blues
10 Alec: yeah [mock sad tone]: no one /loves me:\\
11 Nancy: //[laughs loudly]\\
12 oh my sister does I think
13 she rings every Wednesday
14 Alex: /you know\\
15 Nancy: she loves me

Nancy is clearly feeling sorry for herself. Instead of orienting to this, however, the caregiver, Alec, remains upbeat and light-heartedly compares her with *a teenage kid* (lines 7–8), thus contesting her actual age and playfully constructing her as a young person. The fact that Nancy laughs loudly at his suggestion, and even extends it through her mention of *puberty blues* (line 9) is indicative of the type of teasing and slightly flirtatious humour that characterises their exchanges.

These examples thus illustrate different ways in which macro-level constraints such as the gender order are instantiated in face to face interaction. Within her community of practice, the Power Rangers factory team, Ginette uses a range of sociopragmatic resources which are stereotypically unfeminine (e.g. swear words, jocular abuse, forceful unmitigated directives) to convey her message, consequently contesting the conventional gender order in the process. The male carers in the eldercare establishment take a different approach to negotiating the gender order. Engaged in work which is considered normatively feminine in the wider society, they find ways to enact a serious professional identity, whilst also in some cases negotiating an acceptably masculine gender identity in this context by developing teasing and somewhat flirtatious relationships with the elderly female residents. (Chapter 13 in this volume explores the affordances of research on the pragmatics of humour in a range of contexts).

6. Conclusion

The relationship between sociolinguistics and pragmatics is likely to be viewed differently by different practitioners of each discipline. At the cognitive end of pragmatics, pragmaticians are concerned with the cognitive processes involved in inferring meaning from language, while at the macro-end of sociolinguistic research, sociolinguists are interested in describing linguistic reflexes of high level social and institutional constraints, ideological norms and values. Sociopragmatics is where the two areas make fruitful contact in my view. Researchers in the area of sociopragmatics examine face-to-face interaction in a range of social contexts for evidence of high level societal norms, which may be reinforced or contested by the participants.

In our own research the Language in the Workplace Project team has adopted a critical realist approach to examining this evidence, and using this framework I have illustrated in this paper how two macro-level societal norms play out at the micro-level of interaction in a number of different workplace contexts. Commitment to the egalitarian ethic and avoidance of self-promotion are evident in a number of ways in New Zealand workplaces. In this paper, avoidance of direct criticism and a preference of informality (Excerpt 1) indicated some of the strategies for

instantiating this socio-cultural value, alongside an example of the discomfort apparent when a non-New Zealander flouts the modesty maxim or norm of avoiding self-promotion (Excerpt 2).

The relevance of the gender order in New Zealand workplaces was also evident in face-to-face interaction in many workplaces. Within her distinctive community of practice, for example, Ginette assertively challenges the gender order using normatively masculine strategies such as direct face attack acts, explicit imperatives, jocular abuse, and strong expletives to convey her dissatisfaction with the team's performance (Excerpt 3), while her interactions outside the context of her factory team testify to her awareness of the norms. In the very different context of a stereotypically feminine workplace (Holmes 2014), male carers adopt a range of strategies to negotiate an acceptable gender identity, including emphasising their professionalism, and engaging in teasing and flirtatious interactions with female residents (Excerpts 4 and 5).

In sum, sociopragmatics productively explores the relationship between macro-level sociolinguistics concerns and micro-level interactional sociolinguistic concerns, providing a myriad of new insights into the ways in which individuals are constantly negotiating complex social identities in everyday face-to-face interaction.

Transcription key

All names used in the examples are pseudonyms

// \	simultaneous or overlapping utterance of 'first' speaker
/ \	simultaneous or overlapping utterance of 'second' speaker
[laughs]	paralinguistic information
::	text between colons is modified by the tag immediately preceding it
...	omitted section
un-	cut off word, both self and other interruption
()	untranscribable or incomprehensible speech
(well)	transcriber's best guess at unclear speech
+	pause of up to one second
++	one- to two-second pause
+++	two- to three-second pause
(4)	pause over three seconds

References

- Allan, Keith, and Kasia M. Jaszczolt (eds). 2015. *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Angouri, Jo. 2011. "‘We are in a masculine profession...’: Constructing Gender Identities in a Consortium of Two Multinational Engineering Companies." *Gender and Language* 5(2): 373–404. doi:10.1558/genl.v5i2.365
- Bagihole, Barbara, and Simon Cross. 2006. "‘It never struck me as female’: Investigating Men’s Entry into Female Dominated Occupations." *Journal of Gender Studies* 15(1): 35–48. doi:10.1080/09589230500486900
- Barron, Anne, and Klaus P. Schneider, eds. 2009. Variational Pragmatics. Special Issue. *Inter-cultural Pragmatics* 6(4): 425–615. doi:10.1515/IPRG.2009.023
- Baxter, Judith. 2011. "Survival or Success? A Critical Exploration of the Use of ‘Double-Voiced Discourse’ by Women Business Leaders in the UK." *Discourse and Communication* 5(3): 231–245. doi:10.1177/1750481311405590
- Bhaskar, Roy A. 2008. *Fathoming the Depths of Reality*. London: Routledge.
- Birner, Betty J. 2013. *Introduction to Pragmatics*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Bönisch-Brednich, Brigitte. 2008. "Watching the Kiwis: New Zealanders’ Rules of Social Interaction – an Introduction." *Journal of New Zealand Studies* 6/7: 3–15. <https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/jnzs/article/view/131/82>
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1979. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (R. Nice translation). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cameron, Deborah. 2009. "Theoretical Issues for the Study of Gender and Spoken Interaction." In *Gender and Spoken Interaction* ed. by Pia Pichler, and Eva M. Eppler, 1–17. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Carston, Robyn. 1998. *Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.37
- Carston, Robyn. 2002. *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470754603
- Collier, Andrew. 1994. *Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy*. London: Verso.
- Connell, Robert W. 1987. *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Coulmas, Florian (ed). 1997. *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Coupland, Nikolas. 2001. "Introduction: Sociolinguistic Theory and Social Theory." In *Sociolinguistics and Social Theory*, ed. by Nikolas Coupland, Srikant Sarangi, and Christopher N. Candlin, 1–26. London: Longman.
- Coupland, Nikolas, and Adam Jaworski. 2009. "Social Worlds through Language." In *The New Sociolinguistics Reader*, ed. by Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski, 1–21. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Daly, Nicola, Janet Holmes, Jonathan Newton, and Maria Stubbe. 2004. "Expletives as Solidarity Signals in FTAs on the Factory Floor." *Journal of Pragmatics* 36: 945–964. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2003.12.004
- Eckert, Penelope. 2008. "Variation and the indexical field." *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 12(4): 453–476.
- Eckert, Penelope, and Sally McConnell-Ginet. 2003[2014]. 2nd ed. *Language and Gender*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511791147

- Ehrlich, Susan. 2008. "Sexual Assault Trials, Discursive Identities and Institutional Change." In *Analysing Identities in Discourse*, ed. by Rosana Dolón, and Júlia Todolí, 159–177. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/dapsac.28.11ehr
- Fung, Loretta, and Ron Carter. 2007. "Discourse Markers and Spoken English: Native and Learner Use in Pedagogic Settings." *Applied Linguistics* 28 (3): 410–439. doi:10.1093/applin/amm030
- Grice, Paul H. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry L. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Gumperz, John J., and Jenny Cook-Gumperz. 2007. "A Postscript: Style and Identity in Interactional Sociolinguistics." In *Style and Social Identities: Alternative Approaches to Linguistic Heterogeneity*, ed. by Peter Auer, 477–501. Berlin: Mouton.
- Halliday, Michael A. K. 2007. *Language and Society*, ed. by J. J. Webster. Vol. 10. London & New York: Continuum International.
- Haugh, Michael. 2015. *Im/politeness Implicatures*. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.
- Hecht, Michael L., Jennifer R., Warren, Eura Jung, and Janice L. Krieger. 2005. "A Communication Theory of Identity: Development, Theoretical Perspective, and Future Directions." In *Theorizing about Intercultural Communication*, ed. by William B. Gudykunst, 257–278. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Heritage, John. 1998. "Oh-prefaced Responses to Inquiry." *Language in Society* 27(3): 291–334. doi:10.1017/S0047404500019990
- Holmes, Janet. 2006. *Gendered Talk at Work: Constructing Gender Identity through Workplace Discourse*. New York, Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470754863
- Holmes, Janet. 2013. (4th ed.). *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. London: Pearson.
- Holmes, Janet. 2014. "Language and Gender in the Workplace." In *The Handbook of Language, Gender and Sexuality* ed. by Susan Ehrlich, Miriam Meyerhoff, and Janet Holmes, 433–451. New York, Oxford: Malden, Oxford Wiley-Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781118584248.ch22
- Holmes, Janet. 2015. "Making Transitions: The Role of Interaction in Joining a Workplace Community of Practice. ICIP Special Issue: Interactional Competences in Institutional Practices." *Novitas Royal: Research on Youth and Language* 9(2): 77–92.
- Holmes, Janet, and Meredith Marra. 2011. "Leadership Discourse in a Maori Workplace: Negotiating Gender, Ethnicity and Leadership at Work." *Gender and Language* 5(2): 317–342. doi:10.1558/genl.v5i2.311
- Holmes, Janet, Meredith Marra, and Bernadette Vine. 2011. *Leadership, Discourse and Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730759.001.0001
- Holmes, Janet, and Nicky Riddiford. 2010. "Professional and Personal Identity at Work: Achieving a Synthesis through Intercultural Workplace Talk." *Journal of Intercultural Communication* 22. <http://www.immi.se/jicc/index.php/jicc>
- Holmes, Janet, and Stephanie Schnurr. 2016. "Impoliteness in the Workplace." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*, ed. by Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Kádár, 635–660. London Palgrave.
- Holmes, Janet, and Maria Stubbe. 2015. *Power and Politeness in the Workplace: A Sociolinguistic Analysis of Talk at Work* (2nd ed). Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Holmes, Janet, Meredith Marra, and Bernadette Vine. 2011. *Leadership, Discourse and Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730759.001.0001
- Holmes, Janet, Meredith Marra, and Bernadette Vine. 2012. "Politeness and Impoliteness in New Zealand English Workplace Discourse." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44: 1063–1076. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2011.11.006

- Holyoake, D. 2001. *The Male Nurse: Addressing the Myths of Maleness in Nursing*. Salisbury: APS Publishing.
- Huang, Yan. 2012. *The Oxford Dictionary of Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huppatz, Kate, and Susan Goodwin 2013. "Masculinised Jobs, Feminised Jobs and Men's 'Gender Capital' Experiences: Understanding Occupational Segregation in Australia." *Journal of Sociology* 49 (2–3): 291–308. doi:10.1177/1440783313481743
- Jackson, Brad, and Ken Parry. 2001. *The Hero Manager*. Auckland: Penguin.
- Jautz, Sabine. 2014. *Thanking Formulae in English: Explorations across varieties of English*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. <https://doi.org/10.1515/multi-2014-0098>
- Keckes, Istvan. 2014. *Intercultural Pragmatics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kennedy, Jeffrey C. 2007. "Leadership and Culture in New Zealand." In *Culture and Leadership across the World: The GLOBE Book of In-depth Studies of Societies*, ed. by Jagdeep S. Chhokar, Felix C. Brodbeck, Robert J. House, 397–432. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.
- Leech, Geoffrey. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- Leech, Geoffrey. 2014. *The Pragmatics of Politeness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341386.001.0001
- Lipson, Leslie 1948. [2011]. *The Politics of Equality: New Zealand's Adventures in Democracy*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Marra, Meredith, and Keely Kidner. 2014. "Shades of Masculinity: Workplace Contexts and Constraints." Paper presented at International Gender and Language Association Conference, Vancouver, Canada.
- Marra, Meredith, Bernadette Vine, and Janet Holmes. 2008. "Heroes, Fathers and Good Mates: Leadership Styles of Men at Work." *Proceedings of the Australia and New Zealand Communication Association*, 2008. <http://anzca08.massey.ac.nz> 1–15.
- Marsden, Sharon and Janet Holmes. 2014. "Talking to the Elderly in New Zealand Residential Care Settings." *Journal of Pragmatics* 64: 17–34.
- McDowell, Joanne. 2015a. "Talk in Feminised Occupations: Exploring Male Nurses' Linguistic Behaviour." *Gender and Language* 9(3): 365–389. doi:10.1558/genl.v9i3.17496
- McDowell, Joanne. 2015b. "Masculinity and Non-traditional Occupations: Men's Talk in Women's Work." *Gender, Work and Organisation* 22(3): 273–291. doi:10.1111/gwao.12078
- McElhinny, Bonnie S. 1995. "Challenging Hegemonic Masculinities: Female and Male Police Officers Handling Domestic Violence." In *Gender Articulated: Language and the Socially Constructed Self*, ed. by Kira Hall, and Mary Bucholtz, 217–243. London: Routledge.
- Marsden, Sharon, and Janet Holmes. 2014. "Talking to the Elderly in New Zealand Residential Care Settings." *Journal of Pragmatics* 64: 17–34. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2014.01.006
- Metge, Joan 1995. *New Growth from Old: The Whanau in the Modern World*. Wellington: Victoria University Press.
- Mey, Jacob L. 1993. *Pragmatics: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mey, Jacob L. 2010. "Societal Pragmatics." In *Encyclopedia of Pragmatics*, ed. by Louise Cummings, 444–446. London: Routledge.
- Miller, Gloria E. 2004. "Frontier Masculinity in the Oil Industry: The Experience of Women Engineers." *Gender, Work and Organization* 11(1): 47–73. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0432.2004.00220.x
- Powell, Abigail, Barbara Bagihole, and Andrew Dainty. 2008. "How Women Engineers Do and Undo Gender: Consequences for Gender Equality." *Gender, Work & Organization* 16(4): 412–428. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0432.2008.00406.x
- Rhodon, Laura A. 2011. "Distancing as a Gendered Barrier: Understanding Women Scientists' Gender Practices." *Gender and Society* 25(6): 696–716. doi:10.1177/0891243211422717

- Roberts, Celia, Sarah Campbell, and Yvonne Robinson. 2008. *Talking Like a Manager: Promotion Interviews, Language and Ethnicity*. UK Department for Work and Pensions Research Report No 510.
- Romaine, Suzanne. 1995. "Sociolinguistics." In *Handbook of Pragmatics: Manual*, ed. by Jef Verschueren, Jan-Ola Oestman, and Jan Blommaert, 489–495. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hop.m.soc2
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1987. *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611841
- Schneider, Klaus P., and Anne Barron. 2005. "Variational Pragmatics: Contours of a New Discipline." Paper presented at the 9th International Pragmatics Conference, Riva del Garda.
- Schneider, Klaus P., and Anne Barron (eds). 2008. *Variational Pragmatics: A Focus on Regional Varieties in Pluricentric Languages*. [Pragmatics & Beyond New Series 178]. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.178
- Sperber, Dan, and Wilson, Deirdre. 2005. "Pragmatics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy*, ed. by Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, 468–490. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stubbe, Maria. 2010. *'Was That my Misunderstanding?': Managing Miscommunication and Problematic Talk at Work*. (Unpublished doctoral thesis). Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand.
- Thomas, Jenny. 1995. *Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics*. London and New York: Longman Pearson.
- Trevor-Roberts, Edwin, Neal M. Ashkanasy, and Jeffrey C. Kennedy. 2003. "The Egalitarian Leader: A Comparison of Leadership in Australia and New Zealand." *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 20(4): 517–540. doi:10.1023/A:102639512729
- Trudgill, Peter. 1983. *On Dialect*. New York: New York University Press.
- Vaara, Eero. 2003. "Post-acquisition Integration as Sensemaking: Glimpses of Ambiguity, Confusion, Hypocrisy, and Politicization." *Journal of Management Studies* 40 (4): 859–894. doi:10.1111/1467-6486.00363
- Verschueren, Jef. 1995. "Pragmatics." In *Handbook of Pragmatics: Manual*, ed. by Jef Verschueren, Jan-Ola Oestman, and Jan Blommaert, 1–10. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hop.m.prag
- Williams, L. Christine. 1995. *Still a Man's World: Men who do 'Women's Work'*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wodak, Ruth. 2008. "Controversial Issues in Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis." In *Gender and Language Research Methodologies*, ed. by Kate Harrington, Lia Litosseliti, Helen Sauntson, and Jane Sunderland, 193–210. London: Palgrave.
- Wodak, Ruth, Barbara Johnstone, and Paul Kerswill. 2011. "Introduction." In *The SAGE Handbook of Sociolinguistics*, ed. by Ruth Wodak, Barbara Johnstone, and Paul Kerswill, 3, 1–8. Los Angeles & London: Sage. doi:10.4135/9781446200957.n1
- Zaldman, Nurit, and Amos Drory. 2001. "Upward Impression Management in the Workplace: Cross-Cultural Analysis." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 25(6): 671–690. doi:10.1016/S0147-1767(01)00031-1
- Zufferey, Sandrine. 2015. *Acquiring Pragmatics: Social and Cognitive Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge.

Discourse pragmatics

Communicative action meets discourse analysis

Anita Fetzer

University of Augsburg, Germany

The multifaceted and multi-layered phenomenon of discourse has been examined in diverse research paradigms, concentrating on text as the object of investigation, on the connectedness between text and society, and on the representation of discourse. All approaches share the premise that discourse is a parts-whole configuration.

This chapter argues that interlocutors perform communicative action with discourse and in discourse, delimiting discourse from context on the one hand, and from arbitrarily concatenated discursive parts on the other. Their patterned linearisation is constrained by (1) the semantics and pragmatics of the constitutive discourse units, (2) the semantics and pragmatics of the joints, metaphorically speaking, and (3) the semantics and pragmatics of discourse-as-a-whole, demonstrating that the whole is always more than the sum of its constitutive parts. The argumentation is supported by discourse-analytic and pragmatic analyses of British political discourse, demonstrating where the two paradigms meet and where they depart.

Keywords: context, contextualisation, cooperation, discourse, discourse common ground, dovetailedness, indexicality, intentionality, parts-whole, speech act

1. Introduction

Pragmatics has been defined as the study of context-dependent meaning as well as the study of speaker-intended meaning, presupposing the existence of language, language user and context on the one hand, and context-independent meaning on the other. It has been referred to as the study of invisible meaning (Yule 1996: 127), the science of the unsaid (Mey 2001: 194), the study of meaning as it “emerges in language use” (Marmaridou 2000: 1), and the study of linguistic acts, communicative action and their appropriateness (van Dijk 2008; Fetzer 2012). Pragmatics has

thus been anchored firmly to the theory and practice of performing communicative action in context. But is the reference to context in the definition of pragmatics sufficient? Doesn't pragmatics rather investigate the performance of communicative action in discourse embedded in context, if not communicative action performed with discourse in context?

It is impossible to conceptualise communicative action without the explicit accommodation of context, in which it is embedded and to which it refers implicitly and explicitly, and it seems impossible to conceptualise communicative action in context without the explicit accommodation of discourse, which constrains its production and interpretation, and delimits context. Discourse is composed of linguistic context (including other semiotic codes), and it needs cognitive context to account for discourse production, discourse processing, grounding and discourse coherence. Discourse is embedded in sociocultural context, which is seen as a particularisation of social context in accordance with sociocultural values, such as time and space (cf. Fetzer 2004), and sociocultural context is embedded in social context. Adapting the definitions of pragmatics as the study of context-dependent meaning and of speaker-intended meaning in context to the contextual constraints and requirements of discourse, a definition of pragmatics as the study of discourse-dependent meaning in context seems more appropriate.¹ Against this background, discourse is pragmatic and therefore need not only be conceived of as context-dependent, but also as communicative action (cf. Fetzer 2013a; Oishi and Fetzer 2016). Discourse as communicative action generally comprises a sequence of concatenated speech acts (Sbisà 2002), i.e. ordinary speech acts, such as an assertion or request, as well as higher-level speech acts, e.g. the illocutionary act type of expositives (Section 2.1), allowing for a differentiation between higher-level discourse-as-a-whole and its constitutive parts² (cf. Fetzer 2013b).

Discourse – like context – has become more and more relevant to the analysis of meaning, and like context the concept is used in diverging frameworks referring to different theoretical constructs. Discourse has been used synonymously with text, a linguistic surface phenomenon, denoting longer stretches of written and spoken language, including other semiotic codes, and it is frequently used to refer

1. This refined definition would pre-empt the answer to the question whether discourse was semantic or pragmatic.

2. Depending on the frame of investigation, the constitutive parts of discourse have been referred to as speech act, communicative act and discursive contribution (Fetzer 2013a; Oishi and Fetzer 2016); pragmatic act, pract and pragemme (Mey 2001); and conversational contribution (Grice 1975). (Critical) discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992), text linguistics (De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981) and (systemic) functional grammar (Halliday 1994) call them utterance, clause and phrases. Theories of discourse representation (Asher and Lascarides 2003) refer to them as proposition and illocutionary act.

both to a theoretical construct and to its instantiation in context, i.e. type and token. While there has been some controversy about the question whether discourse and discourse analysis should be based on semantics or pragmatics (e.g., Fetzer 2013b), there is general agreement about a quantitative conception of discourse as “language patterns above the sentence” (Widdowson 2004: 3) – with the more or less explicit premise that patterned linearised sentences are discourse. What is more important, however, is that the question of the quality of the ‘language patterns above the sentence’ as regards the expression and nature of discursive meaning, and the question of granularity as regards the basic unit of investigation – that is the discourse unit on the one hand, and the delimiting frame on the other, i.e. paragraph, episode, sequence or discourse genre³ – remain controversial. Neither is there agreement about discourse units as discrete or fuzzy entities. Widdowson (2004) himself qualified his rather general definition of discourse cited above, making explicit possible implications and arguing that the definition “would seem to imply that discourse is sentence writ large: quantitatively different but qualitatively the same phenomenon. It would follow, too, of course, that you cannot have discourse *below* the sentence” (Widdowson 2004: 3; original emphasis). And there is yet another fallacy in the purely quantitative definition: if “the difference between sentence and discourse is not a matter of kind but only of degree, then they are presumably assumed to signal the same kind of meaning. If sentence meaning is intrinsically encoded, that is to say, a semantic property of the language itself, then so is discourse meaning” (ibid.). To accommodate both quantity and quality, a felicitous analysis of discourse and discourse meaning needs to go beyond the code model of language and accommodate the premise that the whole, that is discourse, is more than the sum of its constitutive parts. This also holds for the meaning of the whole, which is more than the sum of the meanings of its separate parts. Against this background, discourse analysis “has to do not with what texts mean, but with what might be meant by them, and what they are taken to mean. In this view there is no ‘understanding’ of texts as a semantic process, separate from, and prior to, a pragmatic ‘evaluation’, which brings context into play” (Widdowson 2004: 35).

Few analyses have explicitly addressed the important methodological issue whether the concept of discourse, as concerned with texts, belongs to semantics, or whether it is pragmatic and therefore concerned with communicative actions and their performance in context. If discourse is pragmatic, as this chapter suggests, then it needs to be analysed within pragmatic theory and its fundamental premises

3. In this chapter discourse genre is used as an umbrella term for delimiting frames of reference, for instance activity type (Levinson 1979), communicative genre (Sarangi 2000), local and global communicative project (Linell 1998), to name but the most prominent ones.

of rationality, intentionality of communicative action and cooperation, which not only holds for discourse-as-a-whole, but also for its constitutive parts.

This chapter investigates the pragmatics of discourse by examining bridging points between the intentionality of communicative action paradigms, that is speech act theory and the Gricean logic and conversation, and the discourse-analytic paradigm, considering in particular the (i) differentiation between ordinary speech acts and higher-level speech acts (cf. Moeschler 2002; Oishi and Fetzer 2016; van Dijk 1980) with respect to the structuring of discourse and their potential of carrying discursive glue, and (ii) the structuring of discourse and the questions of granularity with respect to content and force (Section 3). The argumentation is supported by discourse-analytic and pragmatic analyses of British political discourse, demonstrating where the two paradigms meet and where they depart. The final section ('Doing things with words in discourse') presents a pragmatics-based conceptualisation of discourse informed by the synergetic effects of communicative action and higher-level speech acts, and quantity- and quality-based approaches to discourse analysis and discourse coherence.

The following section examines the context- and discourse-changing potential of ordinary speech acts and higher-level speech acts with respect to their perlocutionary effects and their contribution to the construal of discourse coherence.

2. Speech acts and higher-level illocutionary act types

This section analyses the theory and practice of speech acts in context, paying particular attention to their role as constitutive parts of discourse. To account for the speech act-discourse interface, the relationship between context and discourse is investigated and the synergetic effects resulting from a pragmatic theory of discourse are illustrated with excerpts from British parliamentary discourse. A pragmatic theory of discourse is based on the differentiation between (i) ordinary speech acts and speech acts with a discourse-structuring function, viz. higher-level speech acts, and (ii) ordinary speech acts and larger pragmatic forms or templates with a delimiting function, i.e. discourse genre, bridging the gaps between the micro domain of speech act and the macro domain of discourse genre.

Speech acts are complex constructs, which cannot be defined without explicit reference to context, viz. social context, sociocultural context, linguistic context and cognitive context, and to the connectedness between speech acts and context, in particular to the context-change potential of speech acts. Social and sociocultural context accommodate convention, with sociocultural context as culture-specific particularisations of social context. Linguistic context is functionally equivalent to the text-linguistic notion of co-text (De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981) and

is composed of the linguistic realisations of concatenated and linearised speech acts in discourse; it comprises all of the linguistic expressions selected to perform reference and predication, or phatic and rhetic acts and thus locutionary acts in Austin's terms (Austin 1975), as well as all of the cohesive devices contained in the discourse. While social and sociolinguistic context are constrained by societies and sub-societies, institutions as well as culture and sub-cultures, linguistic context is constrained by grammar and thus – like social and sociocultural context – structured and organised, as is going to be illustrated by selected excerpts from Prime Ministers Questions⁴ (cf. also Ilie, this volume). Particular attention is given to the interface between speech act theory and discourse analysis. The following excerpt, Example (1), is from the 19 June 2013 session;⁵ it is used to illustrate core concepts of the paper. Edward Miliband was the Leader of the Opposition (LO) and David Cameron the Prime Minister (PM):

- (1) **Edward Miliband (Doncaster North) (Lab)[LO₁]:** Mister Speaker, following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking, *can the Prime Minister confirm that he supports its important recommendations on bonuses and criminal penalties, and that he will use the banking Bill to implement them?*

The Prime Minister [PM₁]: *Yes, I do support both those measures.* Obviously we need to take time to read this excellent report, and I commend the- my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester [Mr Tyrie] for the excellent job that he's done. But penalising, including criminal penalties against bankers who behave irresponsibly – I say yes. And also, making sure that banks who are in receipt of taxpayers' money that you can claw back and ban bonuses – I say yes too.

Edward Miliband [LO₂]: *On the specific issues of criminal penalties, I'm glad he supports the proposal, but will he just confirm for the House on this important issue that the Government will put down the appropriate amendments to the banking Bill, which is currently going through Parliament, to make sure this gets on the statute book as soon as possible?*

As for Example (1), the actual wordings of the LO's and PM's turns are the linguistic context, which is, of course, embedded in embedding linguistic context⁶

4. Prime Minister's Question Time (PMQs) is a televised weekly 30-minute parliamentary session, in which the Prime Minister (PM) responds to questions from Members of Parliament (MPs). The Speaker presides over the House's debate.

5. The transcripts were downloaded from Hansard, the electronic record of parliamentary debates in the House of Commons (<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/>) and checked against delivery. *Relevant linguistic material for the analysis is italicised.*

6. The relational nature of context in general may entail infinite regress. From a holistic perspective, context is structured and delimited and framed by metacontexts, for instance discourse genre (cf. Fetzer 2012).

constituted by the linguistic realisations of embedding speech acts. For instance, [PM₁] is embedded in two embedding turns, [LO₁] and [LO₂], and if we extend the frame of investigation, [LO₁] and [LO₂] are both embedded in further turns; as for [LO₂], this is followed by [PM₂], and as for [LO₁], this is embedded in [PM₀], which contained as a response to a question asked by another MP, [MP₁]. Speech acts can neither be produced nor interpreted without the explicit accommodation of intentionality and Background (Searle 2010) as well as presupposed common ground and its particularisation as discourse (or dialogue) common ground (Fetzer 2007), which are anchored in cognitive context.

Focusing on the social role of speech acts in discourse, Sbisà (2002) argues for their context-changing function, shifting the focus from the production of speech acts to their reception and interpretation. Accordingly, speech acts not only have cognitive effects in that their meaning and force are interpreted, recognised, contextualised and potentially recontextualised by the speaker, but they also have conventional and social effects, such as assignments of obligations or entitlements. For speech act of request and its linguistic realisation as an indirect conventionalised speech act referring to the preparatory condition (CAN YOU [PM] DO X [*confirm*]), ‘*can the Prime Minister confirm that he supports its important recommendations on bonuses and criminal penalties*’ and the elliptically realised request ‘[can the Prime Minister confirm] *that he will use the banking Bill to implement them*’ and the propositional content rule (WILL YOU [addressee: he] DO X [*confirm*]), the speaker (LO) intends to put the addressee (PM) under the obligation to comply with the requestive force of the illocutionary act and confirm that he⁷ will act accordingly and provide the requested information, which is taken up and accepted by the PM (Yes, *I do support both those measures*). This obligation to comply with requests for information is not only part of the local exchange between the two participants. Rather, it is also enforced by the institutional context and its contextual constraints and requirements resulting from the question- and answer-sequences of the discourse genre of PMQs. Because of the relational nature of obligation and entitlement, the LO is entitled to request information from his communication partner, the PM.

Against this background, Austin’s felicity conditions (1975: 14–15) are specifications of context: Austin’s felicity condition (A.1) (“There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances”) and felicity condition (A.2) (“the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked”) specify social context – for Example (1) analysed above: the constitutive participants

7. In this chapter, the use of grammatical gender is in accordance with sociocultural gender.

of the discourse genre of PMQs (MPs, Speaker) and of its constitutive speech acts, requests for information and the provision of the requested information. Felicity condition (B.1) and (B.2) (“The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and completely”) specify linguistic and cognitive context in which a speech act is made/interpreted as an attempt to produce a particular illocutionary effect, which requires a particular response or sequel. Felicity condition (Γ.1) (“Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves, and further”) and felicity condition (Γ.2) (“must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.”) specify social and cognitive context: (Γ.1) is anchored in cognitive context and (Γ.2) in social context.

The impact of speech act theory on the analysis of natural-language and other types of communication has been immense. This is not only reflected in the examination of the linguistic realisation of selected speech acts across cultures, but also on how it has influenced politeness research, in particular research on face-threatening acts (Brown and Levinson 1987). This is mainly due to conceptualising language use as intentional communicative action. More recently, there have also been various attempts to adapt the concepts and premises of speech act theory to a theory of discourse, for instance the concept of macro speech act (van Dijk 1980) or the differentiation between ordinary speech acts and the higher-level illocutionary act type of expositive (Oishi and Fetzer 2016) to be explained and discussed in 2.1 below.

2.1 Expositive as a higher-level illocutionary act type

In his analysis of speech acts, Austin discusses one group of illocutionary acts, which contribute to making explicit the speaker’s attitude towards the communicative status of her/his illocutionary act in discourse: “[T]he expositive is the clarifying of reasons, arguments, and communications” (Austin 1975: 163). Expositive acts of expounding a view, conducting an argument, and clarifying a usage or a reference (Austin 1975: 161) are different from ordinary speech acts. A necessary condition for an ordinary speech act to be felicitous is a locution with a more-or-less definite sense and reference as regards “naming” and “referring”. For the higher-level speech act of expositive, both illocution and locution are also higher-level acts, and that is why expositives have higher-level locutionary meaning, which is composed

of the contextualisation of prior discursive contribution(s)⁸ in accordance with discourse-genre-specific expectations. In performing an expositive illocutionary act, the speaker makes manifest how illocutionary force and locutionary meaning are intended to be contextualised discursively in context C, at a particular stage in discourse. In doing so, the speaker makes manifest his/her perlocutionary intention of producing a perlocutionary object or sequel. In his analysis of expositives, Austin provides the following list of speech-act verbs:

1. affirm, deny, state, describe, class, identify
2. remark, mention, ?interpose
3. inform, apprise, tell, answer, rejoin
 - 3a. ask
4. testify, report, swear, conjecture, ?doubt, ?know, ?believe
5. accept, concede, withdraw, agree, demur to, object to, adhere to, recognise, repudiate
6. postulate, deduce, argue, neglect, ?emphasise
7. begin by, turn to, conclude by
 - 7a. interpret, distinguish, analyse, define
 - 7b. illustrate, explain, formulate
 - 7c. mean, refer, call, understand, regard as (Austin 1975: 162–163)

Expositives make manifest the speaker-intended concatenation of speech acts and their linguistic realisation as discursive contributions within a discourse and with the discourse-as-a-whole. The expositive speech act type is thus different from ordinary speech acts in that it has the function of making plain (i) how discursive contributions are intended to fit into the course of an argument or conversation, (ii) how the speakers intend the ‘words’/linguistic strings to be taken, and (iii) what they intend the ‘words’/linguistic strings to count as in that discursive context. Because of this, expositives are metacommunicative devices par excellence. Their metacommunicative function assigns expositives the status of higher-level illocutionary acts, which are executed in discourse as generalised contextualisation devices, requesting the addressee(s) to contextualise a discursive contribution as the linguistic realisation of a speech act at a particular stage in the discourse in accordance with discursive requirements. The contextualisation of discursive contributions as requested by expositive acts is an indispensable device to the participants’ construal of discourse coherence. Expositives count as requests to interpret embedded discursive contributions in their embedding discursive context and therefore

8. In this chapter, *discursive contribution* refers to the linguistic realisation of a speech act, including its pre- and post-acts.

provide relevant discursive glue. It needs to be pointed out, however, that the local interpretation of discursive contributions in discourse may require the recontextualisation of the discursive meaning assigned to prior discursive contributions in order to make discourse-as-a-whole coherent.

The next excerpt, Example 2, from the discourse of PMQs by the LO and the PM at the July 10, 2013 session illustrates the form and function of the expositive illocutionary act type:

- (2) **Edward Miliband (Doncaster North) (Lab):** Mister Speaker, *let me (first) join* the Prime Minister in paying tribute to Andy Murray for his fantastic victory – following Virginia Wade’s victory in 1977. It was a, it was a fantastic achievement; he showed extraordinary determination, and the whole country is incredibly proud of him. Mister Speaker, as the Government considers the issue of party funding reform, can the Prime Minister tell the House how much his party has received in donations from hedge funds?

In saying “Mr Speaker, *let me (first) join* the Prime Minister in paying tribute to Andy Murray ...”, the LO connects his upcoming discursive contribution echoing an act of congratulating performed by the PM. With the use of the expositive ‘let me join’ the LO not only aligns himself with the PM by agreeing both with the PM’s initial content and illocutionary force, but also provides discourse-structuring information about how he intends to have his contribution discursively contextualised with respect to embedding turns and the discourse-as-a-whole, and how he intends to structure his turn; the latter is achieved by the combination of the expositive with the cohesive device ‘first’. From a discourse-anchored perspective, the hedged performative *let me PERFORMATIVE VERB* (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987) not only refers to the (local) face-wants of the participants, but also has discourse-structuring functions by making manifest that the behabitive act of congratulation, that is reacting to other people’s success (Austin 1975: 160–61), is forthcoming. As for the construal of discourse coherence, *let me join* refers anaphorically to the PM’s prior turn while at the same time referring cataphorically to an upcoming discursive contribution exhibiting dual referencing potential, which makes manifest the discourse-structuring function of expositives and thus their Janus-like nature. In other words, in using an expositive, the speaker makes manifest how s/he intends the addressee(s) to take up her/his discursive contribution and how s/he intends them to contextualise it (Gumperz 1996) at that particular stage in the discourse. In performing the expositive act, the LO makes manifest his perlocutionary intention of taking up the initiated sequel of offering congratulations and of continuing it. The expositive act is signalled with the conventionalised performative *let me join* which is supplemented with the cohesive device ‘first’, implying that another speech act is to follow, in this case the illocutionary act of directive realised by the

conventionalised performative *can you do X*, requesting the PM to provide information about the quantity of donations received by the Conservative Party from hedge funds. In performing this illocutionary act, the LO makes manifest his intention of producing the perlocutionary sequel of initiating a debate about the transparency of donations to political parties.

The differentiation between ordinary speech acts and expositives as a higher-level illocutionary act type allows speech act theory to extend its scope and account for the nature of the connectedness between linearised speech-act sequences and their linguistic realisation as discursive contributions, considering not only the status of individual speech acts but also the impact of their sequential position on the structuring of discourse, thus contributing to a pragmatics-based theory of discourse. As higher-level illocutionary acts expositives directly influence the contextualisation of the linguistic realisations of speech acts and thus the structuring of discourse, contributing to the participants' negotiation and construal of discourse coherence (Gernsbacher and Givón 1995; Linell 1998), making discourse not only co-constructed, but also dynamic. Discourse connectives have a very similar function.⁹ Being processed bottom-up, they fulfil an important indexical function by connecting local domains of discourse with global ones (Schiffrin 1987). They may connect discursive contributions locally, as has been demonstrated for the cohesive device *first* analysed above signalling the sequential status of the argumentative formatting of the turn as well as possible degrees of relevance of the discourse topics to the ongoing discourse. Expositives and other devices with a discourse-connecting function may connect local discursive contributions with their embedding turns as well as with the more global unit of sequence, and they may connect local discursive contributions with the global unit of discourse genre. They may also specify the nature of the connectedness between discursive contributions and discourse topic, as is the case with the discourse connective *by the way* indicating some elaboration on a sub-topic.

The communicative meaning of discourse connectives can be frequently paraphrased by a performative verb or by a hedged performative, e.g. "as a result" with the value of "I conclude", "but" with the values of "I contrast" or "I do not quite agree", and "like" with the value of "I quote". Analogously to expositives, discourse connectives can be seen as carriers of perlocutionary intentions of producing perlocutionary sequels.

9. Discourse connectives also support the contextualisation of a discursive contribution by indicating the speaker's intended contextualisation, as is the case with the strategic use of the cohesive device 'first' in Example (2) analysed above. In addition to their interactional and discourse-structuring function, they may also have attitudinal and illocutionary-force intensifying functions.

Speech acts have not only been distinguished with respect to their status as ordinary speech acts and as higher-level speech acts, but also, as has been the case with Widdowson's definition of discourse (2004), with respect to quantity, that is as ordinary speech acts (or micro speech acts, if considered from a parts-whole perspective) and macro speech acts, which are adopted from van Dijk's *Macrostructures* (1980) referring to a sequence of concatenated speech acts; the term is used as a functional synonym for discourse genre in this chapter.

2.2 Macro speech acts

Speech act theory has paved the ground for an examination of natural language and other types of communication in context. It has not only influenced theoretical pragmatics, but also applied linguistics, where the linguistic realisation of speech acts is examined in and across cultures, considering in particular different degrees of (in)directness in sociocultural context. Since the focus has been on individual speech acts, the context of the speech acts under investigation and the delimiting frame, of which the speech acts under consideration have been a constitutive part, for instance a formal or informal interview, have not been fully accounted for. This does, however, not mean that speech act theory cannot be utilised for a felicitous analysis of discourse, as has been shown by the contextualisation of speech act theory and the adaptation of the constitutive parts of a speech act, i.e. locutionary act/propositional act, illocutionary act and perlocutionary act, and intended and unintended perlocutionary effects, and their felicity conditions to an analysis of discourse, accommodating the differentiation between direct and indirect speech acts and their felicity conditions to the contextual and discursive embeddedness of speech acts and to their sequential organisation as single acts or as patterned sequences with structured pre-, topical and post-sequences (cf. also Drew, this volume). Levinson (1983) has shown this for the sequential organisation of the speech acts of announcement, invitation and request with respect to felicity-condition-based pre-sequences, that is references to the preparatory conditions for requests and invitations, and references to the preparatory or essential condition for announcements. Trosborg (1995) has analysed the sequential organisation of requests, complaints and apologies with respect to discourse-structuring pre-, post- and head acts. Combining structure, content and force, that is patterned sequences and their inherent hierarchical configuration as pre-, post- and head acts, and propositional content and illocutionary force and their felicity conditions provides synergetic effects, which further contribute to a pragmatics-based theory of discourse.

The dynamics of discourse can only be captured if the fundamental pragmatic premises of rationality, intentionality of communicative action and its felicity conditions, and cooperation are adapted to discursive linearisation, as has been suggested above. This is because the sequencing of discourse makes manifest the discursive contributions' (in Sbisà's terms 'moves') perlocutionary effects: "When considering a sequence of moves, it is reasonable to view the output of one move as coinciding with the input for the next" (2002: 72). Bach goes further by connecting micro, meso and macro domains of discourse with different types of intention: "[C]ommunicative (illocutionary) intentions generally are accompanied by perlocutionary intentions, and individual utterances are usually parts of larger plans. So it is plausible to suppose that identifying a speaker's perlocutionary intentions and broader plans is often relevant to identifying his communicative intention" (Bach 1992: 397). Perlocutionary intentions are also inherent in Austin's conception of perlocutionary act, which manifests itself in the "achievement of a perlocutionary object (convince, persuade) or the production of a perlocutionary sequel" (Austin 1975: 181). Thus, the Austinian conception of speech act accounts not only for force and content, but also for metadiscursive meaning, which is reflected in the reference to 'sequel'. This can be interpreted as a requirement to connect a speech act and its linguistic realisation as discursive contribution with adjacent discursive contributions, and possibly with other more remote ones, bringing about the understanding of the content, force and metadiscursive meaning, contributing to the construal of discourse coherence, as is made explicit in the *coherence principle* (Mey 2001), which goes beyond textual coherence, including coherence with respect to pragmatic presuppositions, illocutionary intentions and perlocutionary intentions.

The extension of frame from speech act to discourse, and from communicative intention to discourse purpose is a necessary step if discourse-as-a-whole is to be examined, as has been done by Labov and Fanshel (1977) or by van Dijk (1980) for instance. The former conceive the performance of discourse (as-a-whole) as functionally equivalent to the performance of a 'matrix of utterances' (Labov and Fanshel 1977: 30). Van Dijk argues that complex sequences of speech acts are mapped onto more global macro acts in order to be able to plan them, execute them coherently, and in order to understand them, memorise them, and talk about them. The nature of the connectedness between (micro) speech acts and macro speech acts is complex. This is because there is no straightforward mapping from discursive contribution – or utterance in Labov and Fanshel's terms – to micro speech act and from micro speech acts to macro speech act. Rather, there are in-between-stages, or more and less global macro speech acts. The gradient conceptualisation of speech-acts-beyond-micro – or of discursive contributions – requires them to be represented as dynamic units with fuzzy boundaries, which needs to be considered in the corresponding mapping operations. Once discursive contributions have

been mapped onto micro speech acts and once they have been accommodated in the discourse common ground (Fetzer 2007), they may be administered to form larger units.

Discourse purpose is a pragmatic concept, which is dialectically related to the pragmatic premise of intentionality of communicative action (Cohen, Morgan and Pollack 1992; Levinson 1995; Searle 1983). It is made manifest in the speech-act-theoretic operationalisation 'X counts as Y in context C' with felicity conditions as context categories (Sbisà 2002), which, if adapted to the contextual constraints and requirements of discourse, result in 'X counts as Y in discourse D in context C'. Analogously to the felicity conditions of a (micro) speech act, the felicity conditions for discourse can be classified as preparatory conditions, which are specifications of the context of the (macro) illocutionary act, which can be realised implicitly or explicitly in discourse. Essential conditions and propositional content conditions are specifications of direction of fit, which can also be realised explicitly or implicitly in discourse by indicating how the discourse is intended to proceed. Micro and macro speech acts "both rely on, and actively create, the situation in which they are realized" (Mey 2001: 219) and are therefore interactional achievements. They are interactionally organised by participants acting in accordance¹⁰ with the discursive constraints and requirements of a discourse genre, as has been shown for political interviews (cf. Fetzer 2000). By negotiating particular topics, participants construct more formal or more informal situations, or more public, respectively more private situations, for instance. From a context-based perspective, macro speech acts are embedded in social context and generally display interdiscursive references to other discourse genres, or they may follow up particular excerpts of a discourse (cf. contributions to Fetzer, Weizman and Berlin 2015).

Analogously to the performance of a (micro) speech act, which can be realised as a direct, indirect or conventionally indirect speech act, discourse (as-a-whole) can be realised as discourse with a direct, indirect or conventionally indirect force. In discourse with a direct force, the communicative intent and its linguistic realisation as a sequence of one or more discursive contributions are represented explicitly as regards force and content and thus are intended to be unambiguously clear, as is the case in legal discourse, e.g., pronouncement of judgement or cross-examination, and institutional discourse, such as application forms for citizenship or reminders. The linguistic realisation of discourse with conventionally indirect force depends strongly on cultural conventions, as is the case with reviews, letters of recommendation or obituaries. Analogously to indirect speech acts, the communicative meaning of discourse with an indirect force depends strongly on the context, in which it is

10. Sometimes participants may also act in dis-accordance with a constraint, but this is generally accounted for and done locally.

realised. Informal small talk or gossip may simply have a phatic function, but it may also serve as some kind of briefing, communicating relevant information about something or somebody.

The macro speech act (or: discourse genre) of interview, whose main purpose is to elicit information, may undergo discourse-purpose-specific particularisation, according to the kind of information elicited; discourse-specific particularisation is, of course, also interdependent on sociocultural constraints and requirements. For instance, political interviews are used strategically to elicit and systematise political information (cf. also Ilie, this volume), oral examinations are used in educational contexts to assess the examinee's expertise, job interviews are used to evaluate a candidate's suitability and expertise, and health interviews are used to elicit information about patients' conditions. The macro speech act of interview is also used to elicit and systematise citizenship-oriented information about relevant criteria for the (non)qualification for income support, housing benefit or political asylum, and it may also be used for various other purposes.

The analysis of discourse is fundamentally concerned with the nature of the connectedness between parts and wholes, and for this reason discourse is a relational construct *par excellence*, relating separate parts locally as well as globally with regard to their connectedness to discourse-as-a-whole. Discourse is thus not only quantity, as is captured by the number of its constitutive parts, but also quality, as is reflected in the force and nature of the connectedness of its constitutive parts. The structuring of discourse with respect to the forms and functions of its constitutive parts are going to be examined in the following section.

3. The structuring of discourse

This section examines discourse from a parts-whole perspective addressing the questions of discourse unit, linearisation and sequentiality, discursive glue, that is what makes the constitutive parts cohere, and discourse common ground, i.e. jointly constructed discourse coherence and its presuppositions. An analysis of discourse needs to address two fundamental issues: (i) what is discourse, or rather which necessary conditions need to obtain for a 'stretch of language (use)' to count as discourse, and (ii) the question of granularity, that is what is the minimal unit of investigation, is there a maximal unit of investigation and are there in-between units of investigation, and which necessary conditions need to be fulfilled for a linguistic unit to count as a discourse unit. In the previous sections it has already surfaced that there is no general agreement in the heterogeneous discourse community about a definition of discourse, except for the quantity-anchored 'language patterns above the sentence'. This is also true for the question of granularity, in particular for the

basic unit of investigation, which may differ from paradigm to paradigm – in spite of the fact that the discourse unit and how it is conceived of, for instance as carrier of content, as carrier of force, as carrier of metacommunicative meaning, as carrier of content and force, as carrier of content or force and metacommunicative meaning, is indispensable to discourse analysis in general and to the analysis of the structuring of discourse in particular.

In text linguistics (e.g., De Beaugrande and Dressler 1981) the syntactic unit of sentence counts as its minimal discourse unit and its maximal unit is the text-type, which is classified according to discourse domains and discourse functions. In functional discourse grammar (e.g., Givón 1993; Halliday 1994; Martin and Rose 2008) the syntactic unit of clause is the minimal unit of investigation and discourse is delimited and framed by episodes and by larger-scale genres, for instance. Discourse semantics considers the semantic unit of proposition as its minimal unit of analysis, while a concatenated sequence of propositions is seen as a delimiting frame. More dynamic models also integrate illocutionary force (e.g., Asher and Lascarides 2003; Moeschler 2002; Roulet 2006) and use speech act, proposition and utterance as their unit of analysis as well as larger units composed of concatenated units as delimiting frames. Ethnomethodological conversation analysis uses the minimal unit of turn-constructional unit, and the larger-scale units of turn and sequence. Usage-based frameworks employ the unit of utterance. Discourse pragmatics utilises various units, such as utterance, discursive contribution or move. To account for the duality of form and function, a pragmatic theory of discourse would require a discourse unit which not only accounts for content and force, but which also allows for the accommodation of the dynamics of discourse and thus for varying quantities, i.e., discourse connective, discursive contribution, paragraph(s) or sequence(s). What is more, the discourse unit would not only need to accommodate the duality of form and function, but also their instantiations in discursive and sociocultural contexts.

The structuring of discourse is based on a discourse unit and its concatenation and linearisation and thus captured by discourse syntax, and it is based on the semantics of the connectedness of the units and thus captured by discourse semantics and discourse pragmatics. Quantitatively oriented studies tend to focus on the linearisation of discourse units as well as on the quality of their connectedness, while qualitatively oriented discourse studies share the assumption that discourse as a linearised whole of concatenated units comes in with the presumption of being coherent (cf. Bublitz, Lenk and Ventola 1999; Gernsbacher and Givón 1995; Chafe 1994; Gruber and Redeker 2014). In qualitative studies it is not 'language patterns above the sentence' and their semantic and pragmatic wellformedness, which make them cohere but rather the participants who negotiate the meaning of discourse units and of discourse-as-a-whole, thereby construing and negotiating

discourse coherence. Hence, discourse coherence lies not in the discourse itself but rather in participants' minds and therefore is a socio-cognitive construct. This view is also implicit in cohesion-based analyses of texture (e.g., Hasan and Halliday 1987), in which discourse coherence is connected intrinsically with cohesion and cohesive ties.

3.1 Discourse unit and discursive glue

In a discursive frame of reference, the question of granularity can be addressed from top-down and from bottom-up perspectives. As for the former, the discourse-as-a-whole is considered as the maximal unit, which is then segmented into smaller meaningful units, which may be further segmented into yet smaller, minimal units. As for the latter, a unit is generally adopted from another research paradigm, as is the case with sentence and clause from different models of grammar, for instance clause from discourse grammar, such as (systemic) functional grammar (Givón 1993; Halliday 1994) or sentence from sentence-based models of grammar. Adopting a discourse-dynamic perspective, it is not only the question of local granularity, which needs to be considered, but also the concatenation of minimal units to form larger constitutive units of discourse. To account for that challenge, the question of granularity needs to be addressed together with the question of discursive glue, that is cohesion and coherence.

Discourse units are relational from both discourse-structuring and discourse-meaning perspectives. Adapting the conversation-analytic concept of doubly contextual (Heritage 1984) to discourse, adjacently positioned discourse units are doubly contextual in so far as they provide linguistic context for the production and interpretation of neighbouring discourse units. Linguistic context is functionally equivalent to the linguistic realisation of participants' communicative intentions and therefore also contains references to the participants' cognitive contexts, i.e. mental representations and discourse common ground,¹¹ and to the social and sociocultural contexts of discourse imported into the discourse (cf. Fetzer (2011) for the deictic forms 'here' and 'there'), which are indexed in the linguistic realisation of discourse units. The effects of discourse units thus need to be considered explicitly with respect to cognitive effects, i.e. recipient's recognition

11. Discourse common ground is a context- and genre-dependent variant of common ground. It is anchored in a network structure and connected with other types of discourse common ground. The network structure is functionally equivalent to Background (Searle 2010); it undergoes continuous updating and continuous re-organisation. Changes resulting from the administration of an emergent discourse common ground may result in higher-level changes of other discourse common grounds.

of meaning and force, the construal of discourse common ground and of intersubjective reality, and with respect to social effects, i.e. discourse expectations, and rights and obligations of particular discourse units and their felicity conditions, as has been discussed in Section 2. However, it is not only discourse units that are situated in context, but also the context itself which situates and conditions discourse units. This is particularly true for discursively implicated meaning, which is what the context makes it to be. Conversely, a discourse unit may create the context for which it is appropriate (cf. Mey 2011), as is also argued for by Levinson (1983:293):

What makes some utterances after a question constitute an answer is not only the nature of the utterance itself but also the fact that it occurs after a question with a particular content – ‘answerhood’ is a complex property composed of sequential location and topical coherence across two utterances, amongst other things; significantly there is no proposed illocutionary force of answering.

The linearisation of discourse is thus a multilayered, complex endeavour. It is based on communicative intentionality, on the strategic use of language constrained by the linguistic system, and on participants acting in accordance – and they may locally also act in dis-accordance – with the contextual constraints and requirements of discourse genre. The sequential organisation and linearisation of discourse is not only a linguistic-surface phenomenon, but rather depends on the sociocognitive construct of discourse common ground, which is updated and administered continuously. Discourse common ground is – like discourse – a dynamic construct, which is negotiated and updated continuously, i.e. confirmed, modified or restructured, by storing new information and by updating already stored information, which may require the restructuring of the participants’ individual and collective discourse common grounds, as is going to be illustrated with the following excerpt, Example (3) from a political interview (23 May 2001, BBC1) between the journalist Jonathan Dimbleby (IR) and the Leader of the Liberal Democrats, the late Charles Kennedy (IE):

- (3) IR₁ But *you’re* also the only party leader who *says*, as *you said* to me-
 IE₁ Indeed *I* did.
 IR₂ not so long ago, erm, when I asked *you* whether users of cannabis were criminals, *you said*, *I* don’t regard them as criminals. And *you say* – *I’m* right, aren’t I? – *you* don’t regard them as criminals.
 IE₂ *I- I-* that’s what *I* said to *you*, in a- in another studio, in an equivalent programme some time ago, *that is my personal view. It is not the position of the Liberal Democrats, let me be quite clear about this*

In the interview IR₁ refers to a previous statement by IE, in which he claimed that users of cannabis weren’t criminals. To secure discourse common ground for this

particular interview – not only with the IE, but also with the media audience – IR₁ negotiates the validity of that controversial claim with IE₁, who before IR₁ even manages to fully spell out the claim already agrees with the IR in IE₁ ('Indeed I did'). At that particular stage in discourse, the individual discourse common grounds of the participants contain the proposition that IE considers users of cannabis not to be criminals. However, the IE does not intend to have that particular claim be attributed to the collective discourse common ground of the media audience – and of the IR – and initiates a negotiation-of-validity sequence with IE₂ agreeing that he had made that statement but at the same time narrowing down its validity to that of his 'personal view' and not that 'of the Liberal Democrats'. The force of the request to update and restructure the collective discourse common ground at this stage is intensified with the meta-comment 'let me be quite clear about this', requesting his communication partners – IR and media audience – to update, restructure and modify their individual discourse common grounds accordingly and construe a collective discourse common ground, which contains the controversial statement but narrows down its validity to IE's personal belief. Individual discourse common ground thus administers an individual's personal administration of discourse common ground, while collective discourse common ground administers negotiated and ratified discourse common grounds; both may diverge to varying degrees (Fetzer 2007).

The structuring and linearisation of discourse is connected intrinsically with the question of granularity, i.e. size and conceptualisation of discourse units, and with the semantics and pragmatics of their connectedness. Minimal discourse units may be realised as comment clauses, discourse connectives or elliptical constructions, micro discourse units may be realised as clauses, utterances or discursive contributions, and in-between-units, so-called meso discourse units, may be realised as clause complexes, paragraphs, sequences, episodes, and also larger units. The maximal discourse unit is the discourse genre.

Discourse units are thus relational and doubly contextual, as is reflected in structural adjacency, that is adjacency position, in adjacency relation, that is semantic adjacency, and in adjacency expectations, that is pragmatic adjacency, as is captured by the discursive constraint of dovetailedness put forward in *logic and conversation* (Grice 1975). Grice specifies the constraint for the unit of conversational contribution as "such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange [the linearisation of discourse, A.F.] in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975: 45), implying that conversational contributions are linked by one or more common goals manifest in prior and succeeding contributions. In discourse, conversational contributions have the status of a discursive contribution, which may be composed of smaller discourse units, such as minimal discourse units and micro discourse units, or a combination of both.

The discursive constraint of dovetailedness, this chapter argues, holds for minimal discourse units, micro discourse units, for more complex discourse units, such as sequences, and for discourse-genre-as-a-whole.

A particular type of adjacency relation is the discourse (or coherence) relation, which holds between two discourse units. Discourse relations have been defined in the discourse semantic framework of Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (Asher and Lascarides 2003), which analyses the logical relation between two discourse segments, which refers to one particular type of discourse unit, i.e. a complex linguistic unit with propositional content and illocutionary force of its own. Any discourse segment *p*₂ usually stands in a logical relation to at least one other preceding segment *p*₁ (or rather: the addressee construes a logical relation between them, in order to vouchsafe coherence). The propositions *p*₁ and *p*₂ are in the discourse relation *R* if the inferences the addressee makes and the logical connection *s/he* draws between *p*₁ and *p*₂ are in accordance with the ones defined for *R*. As discourse is not a purely linear phenomenon, but is hierarchically structured, Segmented Discourse Representation Theory distinguishes between two kinds of discourse relations: coordinating relations that keep the discourse on the same level, and subordinating relations that introduce a lower level in the discourse hierarchy. Any discourse relation can hold between two adjacently positioned discourse segments, or between two discourse segments that are not adjacently positioned, i.e. where adjacency position, adjacency relation and adjacency expectation do not conflate.

Adjacency relations are also found in functional-grammar anchored coherence strands, which are made manifest through (a) topic continuity, (b) tense and aspectual coherence (including modality), (c) lexical coherence, and (d) default grammatical word order vs. pragmatic word order. A systematic analysis of coherence strands may not only explain higher or lower degrees of glueyness (cf. Maier, Hofmockel and Fetzer 2016) and thus of discourse coherence, but also predict syntactic formatting, which is relevant to the linguistic realisation of discourse units: “The more thematically connected a conjoined clause is with an adjacent clause – the more strands of thematic coherence it shares with that adjacent clause – the more likely it is to appear reduced, less finite, syntactically integrated with that other clause” (Givón 1993: 318, vol. 2), a claim which has been substantiated in grammaticalisation and pragmaticalisation research (e.g., Aijmer 1997; Traugott 1988).

3.2 Discourse unit and sequentiality

The structuring of discourse, or of conversation, has been examined in ethnomethodological conversation analysis and in interactional sociolinguistics. Both subscribe to the premise of indexicality of communicative action, and thus

are appropriate frames of reference for examining the connectedness between discourse units and discourse-as-a-whole: “Sequential organization refers to that property of interaction by virtue of which what is said at any time sets up expectations about what is to follow either immediately afterwards or later in the interaction” (Gumperz 1992: 304). Sequential organisation needs to be based on a discourse unit which carries force, content and metadiscursive meaning, with varying degrees of explicitness. What is more, the discourse unit needs to be indexical, expressing exophoric and endophoric reference. Because of their relational conceptualisation, discourse units are doubly contextual. By contextualising prior discourse units they pave the ground for the production and interpretation of upcoming discourse units thus indicating how the discourse is to proceed, i.e. whether there is some change in the intended direction as is signalled by contrastive discourse connectives or contrastive discourse relations, or whether there is no intended change and the discourse is to proceed as intended, as is signalled by continuative discourse connectives or continuative and elaborative discourse relations, for instance.

Granularity refers not only to micro, but also to meso and macro units of investigation (cf. Fetzer 2004, 2013a/b). A relational conceptualisation of discourse unit, as this chapter suggests, would allow to account for the extension of frame from micro, i.e. minimal units, such as discourse connectives, which carry force and metadiscursive meaning, to micro units, such as discursive contributions, which carry force, content and metadiscursive meaning, to meso, i.e. sequences or episodes, to macro, i.e. discourse-genre-as-a-whole. A very broad notion of discourse, as is reflected, for instance, in the discourse on context or the discourse on political correctness, could be captured by a unit ‘beyond ‘macro’. The analysis of expositives in Section 2.1 has shown that expositives (e.g., *let me join*) and discourse markers (e.g., *first*) carry force by inviting the addressee(s) to connect the upcoming discursive contribution with prior and succeeding contributions, and structure the discourse and administer their individual and collective discourse common grounds accordingly. Together with the adjacent behabitive act of congratulating they form a larger discursive unit, and combined with the exchange on hedge funds, the meso unit of a sequence. All of the exchanges of the discourse of PMQs construct the macro unit of discourse genre. The forming of larger discourse units has also been shown for the speech act of request in the PMQs session from 19 June 2013, where two adjacently positioned requests connected with the discourse connective *and* form one discursive contribution of request (*‘can the Prime Minister confirm that he supports its important recommendations on bonuses and criminal penalties, and that he will use the banking Bill to implement them?’*), in which the second request builds on the premises of the first. By accepting the discursive contribution containing the two requests, the PM cannot but accept the premises of the first one, which he does by explicitly stating *Yes, I do support both those measures*. LO’s follow-up elaborates

on the acceptance and requests further measures (*'will he ... make sure this gets on the statute book as soon as possible?'*).

Thibault's definition of genre (2003: 44) may accommodate the distinction between minimal discourse unit, micro discourse unit, meso discourse unit, and macro discourse unit:

genres are types. But they are types in a rather peculiar way. Genres do not specify the lexicogrammatical resources of word, phrase, clause, and so on. Instead, they specify the *typical* [original emphasis] ways in which these are combined and deployed so as to enact the typical semiotic action formations of a given community.

Connected intrinsically with '*typical ways*' of doing things with words in a discourse genre – or in an activity type, in Levinson's terms (1979: 370) – are inferential schemata:

... there is another important and related fact, in many ways the mirror image of the constraints on contributions, namely the fact that for each and every clearly demarcated activity there is a set of *inferential schemata* [original emphasis]. These schemata are tied to (derived from, if one likes) the structural properties of the activity in question.

The communicative value of discursive contributions is thus expressed in these '*typical ways*' of doing things with words in discourse genres, and the corresponding '*inferential schemata*' feed on the discursive constraints discussed above. The constraint of '*typical ways*' and their corresponding '*inferential schemata*' is based on the differentiation between type and token.

Discourse has been described as a multifarious and multilayered construct, which seems almost impossible to delimit. The linearisation of the constitutive units of discourse allows for multiple combinations, whose ordering is constrained by discourse genre and discursive purpose as well as by the participants' communicative goals. While the constitutive units of discourse can be analysed as grammatical or ungrammatical, true or false, felicitous or infelicitous, or appropriate or inappropriate, their ordering cannot be classified along those lines only. This is because discourse is a parts-whole configuration in which the meaning of the whole is more than the sum of its separate parts. If the ordering of the parts changes, so does the meaning of the whole.

4. Doing things with words in discourse

The goal of this chapter has been to make explicit relevant bridging points between two multifaceted and heterogeneous frameworks: pragmatics and discourse analysis. It has shown that context is a promising bridging point, which allows for the

accommodation of relevant pragmatic premises to a discursive frame of reference. In the framework of discourse pragmatics, discourse and its constitutive parts are conceived of as relational concepts, relating discourse and context, discourse and communicative action, communicative action and interlocutors, and interlocutors with the things they do with words in discourse in context, and the things they do with discourse in context. Only a relational frame of reference can capture the dynamics of discourse pragmatics, i.e. the unfolding of discourse-as-whole on the one hand, and of variation of linearised sequences and within linearised sequences on the other, and thus the connectedness between parts and wholes, transcending clearly delimited frames of investigation. Adopting the fundamental premises of pragmatics, i.e. rationality, intentionality of communicative action, contextualisation and cooperation, discourse pragmatics considers discourse as dynamic, i.e. both process and product, and multilayered, and adapts them to the quantity-based definition of discourse by accounting for granularity in an explicit manner. This allows for a dynamic and relational analysis of the structuring of discourse as regards granularity, which is reflected in the sequential organisation of discourse, and linearisation, as well as of the nature of the connectedness between discourse units made manifest in discourse relations, cohesion and coherence.

Discourse pragmatics is anchored to a dynamic frame of reference, which requires the explicit accommodation of relational units of investigation, i.e. discourse units with force, content and metadiscursive meaning. It departs from the premise that discourse units are produced and interpreted in accordance with the key premises of pragmatics, rationality, intentionality of communicative action, contextualisation and cooperation, and that the linguistic realisation of discourse units makes these key premises explicit in and through discourse. Not all discourse units are of equal standing. Meso and macro discourse units need to have force, content and metadiscursive meaning, while micro discourse units may have force, content and metadiscursive meaning, but do not need to. Minimal discourse units, such as discourse connectives express procedural meaning, and thus have force and metadiscursive meaning, but presupposed and imported content only.

Discourse units are produced and interpreted in accordance with basic pragmatic premises and thus express communicative intentionality. Macro discourse units may express various communicative intentions on the micro and meso levels, and for this reason, macro discourse units are assigned discourse purpose. For instance, the macro discourse unit of interview, whose main purpose is to elicit information, is composed of micro discourse units with the force 'request for information' and the metadiscursive meaning 'provide dovetailed response', if produced by the interviewer, and discourse units with the force of 'assertion' and the metadiscursive meaning 'dovetailed response' and discourse units with the force 'rejection' and the metadiscursive meaning 'contrastive dovetailed response' or one

of its particularisations, if produced by the interviewee: discourse units with assertive force provide the information requested and rejections do not comply with the request for some particular information. Micro discourse units are thus different from ordinary communicative acts because they additionally express dovetailedness, sequentiality and participant format in their felicity conditions. Meso discourse units in interviews are bounded sequences in which the communicative status of micro discourse units is negotiated, either by follow-up sequences with respect to obtaining more precise information or by clarification sequences about the content, force or metadiscursive meaning.

Discourse purpose and the relational nature of discourse units with force, content and metadiscursive meaning require the accommodation of context within discourse units, and the accommodation of the context embedding discourse units. What is more, the intentionality of communicative action in discourse and with discourse presupposes its iterability and thus the differentiation between type, i.e. typical ways of how discourse is done with words (and other semiotic codes), and their actual linguistic realisation in discourse.

References

- Aijmer, Karin. 1997. "I think – an English Modal Particle." In *Modality in Germanic Languages. Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. by Toril Swan, and Olaf Jansen, 1–47. Berlin: de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110889932.1
- Asher, Nicolas, and Alex Lascarides. 2003. *Logics of Conversation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Austin, John L. 1975. *How to do Things with Words*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.001.0001
- Bach, Kent. 1992. "Communicative Intentions, Plan Recognition, and Pragmatics: Comments on Thomason and Littman and Allen." In *Intentions in Communication*, ed. by Philip Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack, 389–400. Cambridge: MIT Press. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(93)90026-8
- Brown, Penelope, and Stephen Levinson. 1987. *Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bublitz, Wolfram, Uta Lenk, and Eija Ventola (eds). 1999. *Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.63
- Chafe, Wallace. 1994. *Discourse, Consciousness and Time*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Cohen, Philip, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack (eds). 1992. *Intentions in Communication*. Cambridge: MIT Press. doi:10.1016/0004-3702(93)90026-8
- De Beaugrande Robert, and Dressler Wolfgang. 1981. *Einführung in die Textlinguistik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer. doi:10.1515/9783111349305
- Drew, Paul. 2018. "The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis". In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 59–83. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.04dre

- Fairclough, Norman. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2000. "Negotiating Validity Claims in Political Interviews." *Text* 20(4): 1–46.
doi:10.1515/text.1.2000.20.4.415
- Fetzer, Anita. 2004. *Recontextualizing Context: Grammaticality meets Appropriateness*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.121
- Fetzer, Anita. 2007. "Reformulation and Common Grounds." In *Lexical Markers of Common Grounds*, ed. by Anita Fetzer, and Kerstin Fischer, 157–179. London: Elsevier.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2011. "'Here is the difference, here is the passion, here is the chance to be part of a great change': Strategic Context Importation in Political Discourse". In *Context and Contexts: Parts Meet Whole?*, ed. by Anita Fetzer, and Etsuko Oishi, 115–146. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.209.o8fet
- Fetzer, Anita. 2012. "Contexts in Interaction: Relating Pragmatic Wastebaskets." In *What is a Context? Linguistic Approaches and Challenges*, ed. by Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg Meibauer, and Petra Schumacher, 105–127. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/la.196.o8fet
- Fetzer, Anita. 2013a. "The Pragmatics of Discourse." *Topics in Linguistics* 11: 5–12.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2013b. "Structuring of Discourse." In *Handbooks of Pragmatics. The Pragmatics of Speech Actions. Vol. 2*, ed. by Marina Sbisa, and Ken Turner, 685–711. Berlin: de Gruyter.
doi:10.1515/9783110214383.685
- Fetzer, Anita, Elda Weizman, and Laurence N. Berlin (eds). 2015. *The Dynamics of Political Discourse: Forms and Functions of Follow-Ups*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.259
- Gernsbacher, Morton-Ann, and Talmy Givón (eds). 1995. *Coherence in Spontaneous Text*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/tsl.31
- Givón, Talmy. 1993. *English Grammar: A Function-Based Introduction*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/z.english1
- Grice, Herbert Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics. Vol. III*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry L. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Gruber, Helmut, and Gisela Redeker (eds). 2014. *The Pragmatics of Discourse Coherence*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.254
- Gumperz, John J. 1992. "Contextualization and Understanding." In *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*, ed. by Alessandro Duranti, and Charles Goodwin, 229–252. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gumperz, John J. 1996. "The Linguistic and Cultural Relativity of Inference." In *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, ed. by John J. Gumperz, and Stephen C. Levinson, 374–406. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halliday, Michael A. K. 1994. *Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold.
- Halliday, Michael, and Ruqaiya Hasan. 1987. *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.
- Heritage, John. 1984. *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface". In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/Pbns.294.o5ili
- Labov, William, and David Fanshel. 1977. *Therapeutic Discourse. Psychotherapy as Conversation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1979. "Activity Types and Language." *Linguistics* 17: 365–399.
doi:10.1515/ling.1979.17.5-6.365
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Levinson, Stephen C. 1995. "Interactional Bias in Human Thinking." In *Social Intelligence and Interaction*, ed. by Esther Goody, 221–260. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511621710.014
- Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/impact.3
- Maier, Robert M., Carolin Hofmockel, and Anita Fetzer. 2016. "The Negotiation of Discourse Relations in Context: Co-Constructing Degrees of Overttness." *Intercultural Pragmatics* 13(1): 71–105. doi:10.1515/ip-2016-0003
- Marmaridou, Sophia. 2000. *Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
doi:10.1075/pbns.72
- Martin, Jim R., and David Rose. 2008. *Genre Relations. Mapping Culture*. London: Equinox.
doi:10.1017/S0047404510000254
- Mey, Jacob. 2001. *Pragmatics. An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mey, Jacob. 2011. "Speech Acts in Context". In *Context and Contexts: Parts meet Whole?*, ed. by Anita Fetzer and Etsuko Oishi, 171–180. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Moeschler, Jacques. 2002. "Speech Act Theory and the Analysis of Conversations." In *Essays in Speech Act Theory*, ed. by Daniel Vanderveken, and Susumu Kubo, 239–261. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.77
- Oishi, Etsuko and Fetzer, Anita. 2016. "Expositives in Discourse." *Journal of Pragmatics* 96: 49–59.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2016.03.005
- Roulet, Eddy. 2006. "The Description of Text Relation Markers in the Geneva Model of Discourse Organization." In *Approaches to Discourse Particles*, ed. by Kerstin Fischer, 115–132. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Sarangi, Srikant. 2000. "Activity Types, Discourse Types and Interactional Hybridity: The Case of Genetic Counseling." In *Discourse and Social Life*, ed. by Srikant Sarangi, and Malcolm Coulthard, 1–27. Harlow: Longman.
- Sbisà, Marina. 2002. "Cognition and Narrativity in Speech Act Sequences." In *Rethinking Sequentiality: Linguistics meets Conversational Interaction*, ed. by Anita Fetzer, and Christiane Meierkord, 71–97. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.103.045bi
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1987. *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611841
- Searle, John R. 1983. *Intentionality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173452
- Searle, John. 2010. *Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780195396171.001.0001
- Thibault, Paul J. 2003. "Contextualization and Social Meaning-Making Practices." In *Language and Interaction. Discussions with John J. Gumperz*, ed. by Susan L. Eerdman et al., 41–62. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/z.117.05thi
- Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1988. *Approaches to Grammaticalization*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
doi:10.1075/tsl.19.1
- Trosborg, Anna. 1995. *Interlanguage Pragmatics*. Berlin: De Gruyter. doi:10.4304/tpls.3.1.142-147
- Van Dijk, Teun. 1980. *Macrostructures*. Hillsdale, NJ: Earlbaum.
- Van Dijk, Teun. 2008. *Discourse and Context. A Sociocognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511481499
- Widdowson, Henry. 2004. *Text, Context, and Pretext. Critical Issues in Discourse Analysis*. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470758427
- Yule, George. 1996. *The Study of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511819742

The interface between pragmatics and conversation analysis

Paul Drew

University of York

In his authoritative account of *Pragmatics*, Levinson (1983) included conversation analysis (CA) as firmly part of pragmatics. Others have perhaps been more cautious about whether CA is really relevant to the pragmatics programme. Despite the differences and divergences between CA and pragmatics, they share a number of key interests, especially in three of the foundational areas of pragmatics – namely implicature (e.g., from Grice 1975), speech acts (social action) (e.g., from Austin 1962 and Searle 1969) and presupposition and well-formedness (e.g., from Lakoff 1971). I will show examples that demonstrate the distinctiveness of CA's approach to these core pragmatic aspects of language use – in the spirit of demonstrating how CA's approach *complements* and does not detract from approaches in pragmatics.

Keywords: conversation analysis, implicature, speech acts, performatives, social action, well-formedness, sequential analysis, grammatical design

1. Introduction

As contributors to this volume, we were invited to reflect on the interface between our perspectives, in my case conversation analysis (hereafter CA), and pragmatics, and in doing so to explore the boundaries and the relationships between them. The editors suggest that disciplinary boundaries have become blurred and therefore it is necessary to clarify our understanding of those boundaries in order to identify more sharply the differences and the mutualities of our respective contributions. One way in which to approach this assignment might be to focus on the distinctiveness of one's own perspective in relation to pragmatics, and thereby to highlight their differences, whether in terms of their theoretical approach to language, their methodologies, their conceptual architecture – in whatever ways, to explore and illustrate *difference*. That will not be my agenda here, though my aim will be

to highlight a key feature of CA that is perhaps distinctive and which makes a distinctive contribution to our understanding of the pragmatics of language use in interaction. However I will pursue that aim through considering three core concepts in pragmatics, and exploring and illustrating what CA contributes to the study and understanding of those three concepts. My purpose is not to compare one perspective with the other, or to assess their respective merits and contributions – it is only to demonstrate that CA has an important empirical contribution to make that complements, not conflicts with, pragmatic analysis.

Three concepts that from its inception have underpinned pragmatics are implicature, speech acts, and presuppositions and well-formedness. I am not suggesting that these are the only key concepts in pragmatics, but they are perhaps three of the concepts that most plainly embody the pragmatic programme, and they were formative, insofar as they were the three most prominent themes underlying the emergence of pragmatics. As well as their ‘key-ness’, my other reason for selecting these is that I believe that CA has made an important contribution to the empirical study of each. What I think is distinctive about CA’s approach to these concepts is that sequential analysis enables us to explore and specify *how participants orient* to implicature, to action and to well-formedness. In explaining that Grice was not proposing that speakers do in fact (literally) speak sincerely, relevantly and clearly, but rather was making a more subtle point, that “in most ordinary kinds of talk these principles are oriented to” (Levinson 1983: 102), Levinson is drawing attention to the importance of showing that, and how, the underlying principals – or as we would prefer in CA – practices – of talk-in-interaction are ‘real’ for participants, that these are the principles or practices that we orient to in making sense of what the other, the speaker is saying and doing. My proposal is that through its sequential approach to the process or the progression of interaction in real time, CA demonstrates that the practices we identify are indeed oriented to by participants both in designing their talk (Drew 2013) and in making sense of one another’s conduct. That theme will be in the background as I set out some of the ways in which CA contributes to the empirical analysis of these three key concepts.

2. Implicature

Grice’s maxims of conversation (Grice 1975) seems an appropriate place for a conversation analyst to begin an exploration of the connections between pragmatics and CA, on the grounds that Grice was after all setting out a theory about how people use language in conversation (Levinson 1983: 101), which is precisely CA’s enterprise. Grice was setting out and explicating a theory of implicature underlying *meaning*. His co-operative principle and four maxims – of quality, of quantity,

of relevance, and of manner – underlie the inferences that hearers may make about what speakers mean; “the reason for linguistic interest in the maxims is that they generate inferences beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered” (Levinson 1983: 103). Here is what might be taken to be a quite transparent case of implicature, involving two different understandings of what the first speaker ‘meant’. This is an extract from the very beginning of an audio recording of a visit by a Health Visitor (HV) to the home of a newly-born baby (Heritage and Sefi 1992).

(1) [Health visitor:4A1:1] (HV=health visitor, F=father, M=mother)

- 1 HV: He's enjoying that that [isn't he.
 2 F: [Yes he certainly is=
 3 M: = [He's not hungry] 'cuz(h) he's ju(h)st (h)had 'iz
 4 bo:ttle .hhh
 5 (0.5)
 6 HV: You're feeding him on (.) Cow and Gate Premium.

The HV is responding in line 1 to the baby audibly sucking on something – a finger, fist, or blanket? It is not possible to tell, although slurping sounds can be heard on the recording. The father understands the HV to be making an appreciative assessment of the baby's wellbeing, when he confirms enthusiastically that the baby is indeed ‘enjoying it’ (line 2). However the mother appears to attribute a different ‘meaning’ to HV's utterance, when she responds defensively that *he's not hungry*, going on to explain that *he's just had his bottle* (lines 3 and 4). Her defensive response treats HV as having implied something along the lines that the baby's enthusiastic sucking or chewing indicates he might be hungry. Whilst it may be problematic to assign very specific ‘meanings’ to what each says, we can see what *actions* each is conducting; in *confirming* what HV has said, the father is treating HV's prior turn as a (positive) *assessment*. When however the mother *defends* her care of the baby and *explains* that he's just been fed, she treats HV as having (implicitly) *criticised* her. It is apparent, therefore, that the implicature of HV's utterance in line 1 is different for each of the two recipients, and that their analysis or understanding of that implicature is manifest in their responses. Hence implicature is oriented to by participants, in the inferences they make. Those inferences shape the actions through which each responds, the father's very positive confirmation and the mother's defensive explanation respectively. Hence we begin to see how implicature is interactionally salient to participants, through their understanding of what *action* was implicated in HV's utterance, as having been a positive assessment, or a negative observation implying a criticism that the baby is hungry and therefore might not have been fed. Sequential analysis enables us to recast ‘meaning’ in terms of actions, and to see that the same ‘words’ in an utterance are capable of having different implicatures according to each recipient's perspective.

Here is a case in which a recipient infers from the implicature of a prior turn, what action the speaker is conducting in that turn. Charlie had been going to drive up to Syracuse at the weekend, and evidently was going to give Ilene a lift – a ride in US English. But the person he was visiting/staying with will now be out-of-town so he's not going.

(2) [Trip to Syracuse] (from Walker, Drew & Local 2011)

- 1 Ile: .hhh So yih not g'nna go up this weeken?'
 2 (): (hhh)/(0.2)
 3 Cha: Nu::h I don't think so.
 4 Ile: How about the following weekend.
 5 (0.8)
 6 Cha: .hh Dat's the vacation isn't it?
 7 Ile: .hhhhh Oh:. .hh Alright so:- no ha:ssle,
 8 (·)
 9 Ile: S[o-
 10 Cha: [Ye:h,
 11 Ile: Yihkno:w::
 12 (): .hhh
 13 Ile: So we'll make it for another ti:me then.

In response to Ilene's enquiry whether he might be going up to Syracuse 'the following weekend' (line 4), Charlie asks whether that isn't the vacation (line 6); note also the 0.8 second delay before he responds. In line 7 and thereafter to line 13, Ilene evidently treats Charlie's 'observation' that next weekend is the vacation as a *rejection* of her *suggestion*. Of course it is still possible and important to investigate how the words used, the turn design, support the particular implicatures to which participants orient (and the different implicatures that the same words may have for different recipients). But CA's contribution is that sequential analysis enables us to see what actions participants infer in and attribute to one another's turns at talk; the analysis focuses on action, rather than meaning.

In each of these examples, speakers' *identities* are central to the 'inference machine' through which each attributes actions to the other; and I do mean 'identity' and not simply 'category'. In Example 2 their identities, of the one who has the car, who was going – has made an undertaking – to give the other a lift, and the one who needs assistance, the supplicant, respectively, are clear enough. However, Example 1 provides an insight into the different inferential potentialities in 'understanding' HV's remark, according to the recipients' respective identities as mother and father. This begins to introduce the significance of participant identities in the ways participants understand the implicatures of what each says, through something like what might be expected of persons with those identities – or the activities that might be associated with or bound to persons so categorised (referred to as '(membership) category bound activities; Sacks 1972, 1992: 40–48). The relevance of speaker identities for the actions they attribute to one another's talk is particularly clear, perhaps

dramatically clear, in criminal court interaction, where the actions which each participant conducts are so much bound up with their identity. Here is a case in point.

(3) [Rape trial] (Witness is alleged victim, cross-examined by Defense Counsel)
(Drew 1992)

- 1 DC: (W'1) didn' he:: a:sk you (.) uh on that night that=uh
2 (.) he wanted you to be his gi:rl,
3 (0.3)
4 DC: Didn' he ask you that,
5 (2.5)
6 Wit: I don't remember what he said to me that night.
7 (1.2)
8 DC: Well ya had=uh some uh (.) uh fairly lengthy conversations?
9 with the defendant uh: didn' you (0.7) on that evening u'
10 February fourteenth?
11 (1.0)
12 Wit: Well we were all talkin'
13 (0.8)
14 DC: B't you kne:w at that ti:me, that the defendant was
15 in:terested in you (.) didn' you?
16 (1.3)
17 Wit: He: asked me how I'bin: en (1.1) (j-) just stuff like that,
18 DC: Just asked you how (0.5) you'd bi:n (0.3) but he kissed you
19 goodni:ght? (0.5) Izzat ri:gh:t.

In this excerpt from a trial for rape, the witness (Wit), who is the alleged victim, is being cross-examined by the defense lawyer (i.e. appearing for the defendant accused of rape) (DC). The lawyer asks a number of questions about an occasion some months before the alleged rape when, on the evening of Valentine's Day (14th February), the witness and the defendant happened to meet in a bar (they already knew one another). The implicature of his questions is pretty apparent, and what is equally apparent is that the implications are clear enough to the witness, as is evident from her resistance to those implications, in lines 6, 12 and 17. Looking particularly at her response in line 17, she appears to be resisting the implication of the question in lines 14–15 that she knew from their conversation that evening that the defendant was *sexually* 'interested' in her. That is not explicit in the question; 'interested' here can be taken to have a conventional connotation, in much the same way that when a doctor asks a patient how much they drink a week, she can be taken to be asking how much alcohol the patient drinks (so that a patient who replied that he drinks around 3 pints of water each week might be understood as being humorous, or obtuse). At any rate, the witness is evidently resisting the implication that she would have known from their meeting on this occasion that the defendant was 'sexually interested' in her, by giving an account of his greeting that evening which is a non-intimates greeting (line 17); that is, it is a greeting form used by people who are acquaintances but not intimate friends, and who have not

seen one another for a while (Drew 1992). The witness's/victim's resistance to what is implicit in the lawyer's question likewise is also not explicit; it is embedded in the implicature of her account of the defendant's greeting. The lawyer, in turn, resists and challenges the implication of her account – that they were not on intimate terms and therefore she rejects the implication that she knew he (the defendant) was sexually attracted to her – by contrasting her account of the greeting with her previous account of their farewell (data not shown), which is that he *kissed you goodnight*. The implicature of this contrast is that something must have happened during the evening to have changed their relationship from one of non-intimacy to considerable intimacy (for a fuller analysis see Drew 1992).

This pattern of resistance to what is implicated in a prior question is, as was mentioned, evident also in her responses in lines 6 and especially 12,

8 DC: Well ya had=uh some uh (.) uh fairly lengthy conversations?
 9 with the defendant uh: didn' you (0.7) on that evening u'
 10 February fourteenth?
 11 (1.0)
 12 Wit: Well we were all talkin'

a pattern which is quite clear in these brief excerpts from the same trial.

- (4) [Rape trial, witness cross-examined be defense counsel] (W=witness, DA=defense attorney)

DA: An' you went to a: uh (0.9) ah you went to a ba:r? in
 ((city)) (0.6) is that correct?
 (1.0)
 W: Its a clu:b.

- (5) [Rape trial, witness cross-examined be defense counsel] (W=witness, DA=defense attorney)

DA: Its where uh (.) uh gi:rls and fella:s meet isn't it?
 (0.9)
 W: People go: there.

- (6) [Rape trial, witness cross-examined be defense counsel] (W=witness, DA=defense attorney)

DA: An' during that eve:ning: (0.6) uh: didn't
 Mistuh ((name)) come over tuh sit with you
 (0.8)
 W: Sat at our table.

- (7) [Rape trial, witness cross-examined be defense counsel] (W=witness, DA=defense attorney)

DA: Some distance back into theuh (.) into the wood wasn't it
 (0.5)
 W: It was up the path I don't know how far

It is evident in these examples that the questions are loaded with implicature; and that in answering, the witness avoids confirming and thereby counters in ways that attempt to deflect the inferences that might be drawn from the attorney's descriptions. This begins to look like a strategy of indirectness, indirectness through which the witness contests or challenges the *implications* of the lawyer's questions. Participants' respective identities are very much engaged in the implicature/inferences in these exchanges. Again, the key contribution of CA's sequential approach to the analysis of such exchanges, as throughout the examples in this section, is that we focus on participants' orientations to the implicatures of prior turns or utterances, orientations that are evident sequentially in the actions they understand the prior speaker to have been undertaking and in the actions through which they respond. CA focuses on participants' analysis or understandings of implicature, and on action. It is to action that we now turn.

3. Speech acts

One of the principal cornerstones of pragmatics was what Austin called 'performatives', which Searle later termed speech acts. The first and simplest account that Austin gives of performatives is that "A they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not true or false; and B the uttering of the sentence is. Or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something (Austin 1962: 5). At this stage Austin distinguished between statements/reports/descriptions, or constatives, on the one hand, and using certain forms of words in certain circumstances to perform something, hence performative utterances, on the other. Though later he came to the view, which is now universally held, I take it, that even 'describing' is a performative action, done for a purpose (to convince or persuade, to enlighten, to woo, to demonstrate that one has followed the required technique: Bar-Hillel 1954), so that all speech is performative. Searle developed this in directions that were not on the whole helpful, for reasons that are not pertinent here (but see Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014).

The extent to which speech act analysis is, as I have described it here, a cornerstone of pragmatics is reflected in the prominence Fetzer and Ilie each give to speech acts in their accounts in this volume of the role of speech acts in discourse analysis and (political) rhetoric, respectively. Each provides a more detailed and comprehensive account of Austin's and Searle's conceptualisations of performatives and speech acts. For the present and to begin with, I want to focus on the breadth and scope of the application of 'performative', and speech acts, to *all* language use in inter-action. The force of Austin's identification of performative utterances was to push realist theories of meaning to one side; according to realist theories, a word

means that ‘thing’ (object, state etc.) to which that word may truthfully be applied, in describing that ‘thing’, in such a way that there was a close association between objects-description-truth-meaning. Austin showed that this association does not hold for performative utterances, which are neither true nor false, and in this case do not so much ‘mean’ something as ‘do’ something. In brief, he replaced ‘meaning’ with ‘action’. Conversation analysis, too, began with Sacks’ objective of developing a science of social action, a Weberian enterprise, but doing so from first principles, through direct observation (recordings) of naturally occurring (spoken) conduct (Schegloff 1992). Even though Austin gave what was to become *How to Do Things with Words* as the William James lectures at Harvard in 1955 they were published posthumously in 1962; Sacks gained his LLB in Law in 1959 then embarked that year on doctoral research at Berkeley, publishing his first paper (also on description) in 1963, when he began giving his lectures on conversation (it is worth bearing in mind also that Chomsky published his first paper on the formal properties of grammars in 1963, only a short time before Labov published *The Social Stratification of English* in 1966. So at approximately the same time as Austin was developing what became known as ‘speech act analysis’, Sacks also was exploring how speakers do things with words *in sequences of interaction*. Whereas Austin and later Searle and others took the sentence or utterance as the unit of analysis, Sacks took what is being done in the turn-in-a-sequence to be the focus of analysis. That is, then, the first contribution that CA makes to the study of actions conducted through talk, that the construction of talk designed to conduct a certain action is responsive to and bound up with the sequence in which the action is being done.

This is illustrated rather clearly in the work of Curl (with Drew and Ogden) on offering. Linguistic and pragmatic research into speech acts has focused largely on the conditions that need to be met or fulfilled in order for an utterance to be understood as [performing a particular speech act, such as promising]. Little attention has been given (except perhaps in research on politeness in speech) to the different lexical and grammatical formats that may be used to conduct a particular action – in other words the different turn designs through which an action may be conducted. Curl (2006) showed that there are broadly three main turn design formats which speakers most commonly use to make offers to others, in English. These are conditional constructions, declarative or ‘assertive’ forms, and *Do you want ...* constructions. These three formats are illustrated in the following examples.

(8) [Holt:2:3]

- 1 Les: Oh hello, it's um: Lesley Field he:re,
- 2 Mar: Oh ^hello:,
- 3 Les: Hello, .tch.h I h^ope you don't ~mind me getting in touch
- 3 but uh- we met your husband little while ago at a Liberal
- 4 meeting.
- 5 (0.3)

6 Mar: Ye:[s?
 7 Les: [.hh And he wz: (0.3) i-he told us something of what'd
 8 happened, (0.5) to him .hh An:' I wondered haa- (0.2) i-
 9 he said he m::ight have another position in vie:[w,
 10 Mar: [Mmhm,
 11 Les: .hh (.) Uhm (0.3) .tch Well I don't know how that went, .h
 12 uh (.) It's just that I wondered if he hasn't (0.3) uh
 13 we have friends in: Bristol
 14 Mar: Ye:s?
 15 Les: who:- (.) uh: thet u-had the same experience.
 16 Mar: Oh^:~:.
 17 Les: And they uhm: .t (0.2) .hh He worked f'r a printing an:'
 18 paper (0.9) uh firm [u-
 19 Mar: [Ye:s,
 20 Les: uh[:- which ih puh- uh: part'v the Paige Group.
 21 Mar: [Yeh,
 22 (.)
 23 Les: .hh And he now has: u-a:: um (1.1) I don't think eez
 24 called it consultancy (0.2) They find positions for
 25 people: in the printing'n paper (0.4) indus[try:,
 26 Mar: [Oh I see:[:.
 27 Les: [hh An:d
 28 if: i-your husband would li:ke their addre[ss.
 29 Mar: [Y e :[: s,
 30 Les: [<As they're
 31 specialists,
 32 Mar: Ye::s?
 33 (.)
 34 Les: Uhm: my husband w'd gladly give it [t o h i m .]
 35 Mar: [Oh ^that's ~v]ery kind

(9) [NB:IV:4:4]

1 Emm: ... so: he wz e-e u Oh en I don't know
 2 there's a coupl'other dih-ah- DO I do a good
 3 jo:b'n that s- that stuff I don't put it ba:ck in the
 4 freezer after it's been on the sink
 5 (0.3)
 6 Emm: W'l anyway tha:t's a'dea:l so I don't know what tih do
 7 about Ba:rbra .hhhhh (0.2) c'z you see she w'z:
 8 depe[nding on:=hhim t_{akin}'er in tuh the L.A.=
 9 Lot: [(°Yeh°)
 10 Emm: =deep_{le} s:- depot Sunday so ['e siz]
 11 Lot: [I:'ll] take'er in: Sunday,

(10) [SBL:2:2:3:28]

1 Chl: We:ll it was[fu:n Clai[re, ((smile voice))
 2 Cla: [hhh [Yea::[: h ,]
 3 Chl: [° M]m°
 4 Chl: [(an')
 5 Cla: [I enjoyed every minute o[f it,
 6 Chl: [Yah.
 7 (0.4)

- 8 Cla: Okay well then u-wi'll see: you: Sa'urde[e.
 9 Chl: [Sa'rdee ɪnight.
 10 Cla: Sev'n thirty?
 11 (.)
 12 Chl: Ya[h.
 13 Cla: [hhhh D'you want me to bring the: chai:rs?
 14 Chl: [hahh
 15 Chl: Plea:: (.) NO: (0.2) °Yah, °
 16 (0.3)
 17 Chl: I:ve ɪgot to get chairs. ɪBring'em one more ɪtime

In Example 8 it is evident that Mary's husband has told her (Leslie) about his having been made redundant from his employment. Leslie is calling to offer to put him in touch with friends who act as a kind of employment agency in the relevant industry. Her offer is constructed in a conditional form, *If your husband would like their address my husband will gladly give it to him* (lines 28 and 34). Emma has been telling her sister Lottie about an argument she and her husband have had, as a result of which her husband has 'walked out on her' by going back to their house in the city, leaving her at their ocean-side house just before Thanksgiving, when their daughter Barbara and her family are coming down for the holiday. Because he's threatening not to be down at Thanksgiving, Emma is concerned about how Barbara will get to the bus depot to return home at the end of the holiday (*I don't know what to do about Barbara ...*, lines 6–8). In response to this expression of a trouble, Lottie offers assistance using a declarative form, *I'll take her in Sunday* (line 12). Chloe and Claire have a group of friends with whom they regularly play bridge; they have been discussing for some time their most recent bridge game, summarised in lines 1 and 5, after which they begin to close the call with reference to their next game, which will be on Saturday evening. Claire's offer to bring chairs is constructed as an interrogative *Do you want me to bring the chairs?*; following Chloe's initially ambivalent response (line 15), it becomes evident that she does not have enough chairs for everyone (*I've got to get chairs*) and that Claire has brought some on previous occasions (*Bring them one more time*).

In each case an offer is made to someone who has a trouble or difficulty of some kind – they are unemployed, they no longer have the means to transport someone to a particular place on a particular day, they don't have a sufficient number of chairs to seat everyone for an event, respectively. A contribution that CA has made to the analysis of speech acts is to show that the particular form or construction of the action, the design of the turn in which an action is conducted, depends on its sequential environment. The first of these constructions, the conditional format, is used when the one making the offer has initiated the interaction (the phone call, the visit to someone's office etc.) in order to make an offer, to help with a problem they already know the recipient has. The declarative or 'assertive' form is used when the recipient has, in their immediately prior turn, reported a problem they have.

And the third form, *Do you want ...*, is used in a sequential environment in which there has been no explicit mention of a problem immediately before the offer is made, but in which earlier, often much earlier, a problem of some kind has been mentioned unrelated to the offer. For instance some 3 minutes before the closing in Example 10 Chloe has asked Claire *Don't we need tallies?* (a form of score card used in bridge games), indicating that she doesn't have any that are suitable. The one making the offer – here, Claire, offering to bring the chairs – has deduced from other things Chloe doesn't have (the tallies) and her knowledge of what Chloe has needed in the past, that she might need more chairs (note that she refers not simply to chairs but to *the* chairs). The following table summarises the association between each of these particular grammatical forms of offering and the sequential environment in which each form is used.

Table 1. Summarising Curl 2006 (from Drew 2013)

Conditional forms	<i>If you would ... then I will ...</i>	(Self focused) Reason for call	Beginning of call or topic initial
Declarative or Assertive forms	<i>I'll do X</i>	Interactionally generated, by what recipient just said	Explicit trouble reported in adjacent prior turn
Interrogative forms	<i>Do you want me to</i>	(Other focused) <i>Not</i> interactionally generated	Educed from possible trouble implicit earlier in the conversation (e.g. several minutes earlier). No explicit mention of trouble in prior turn

This work on offering, and the research that spun out from it on requesting (Curl and Drew 2008) followed by a considerable range of research into the grammatical constructions and turn design features of various speech acts (see e.g. Couper-Kuhlen 2014, Rossi 2012) has enlivened and enriched research into speech acts, through demonstrating that selecting the (grammatical) form for a given action at a given point in an interaction has a systematic basis in the sequential and interactional environment in which the action is being made. That is the design is selected on the basis of endogenous features of the interaction, rather than on exogenous factors (i.e. the sociolinguistic variables of participants' categories or identities).

A further contribution that CA is making to the analysis of speech acts is, paradoxically, to move our focus away from what are conventionally regarded as 'speech acts' such as promises, requests, offers, invitations, proposals and the like. These speech act labels work well for certain analytic purposes, but there are limitations to relying solely on such speech act terms. For one thing they are lay vernacular terms that are not necessarily best suited to technical analysis, for which

other conceptual categories and frameworks may be better suited. Also they have limited application in cross-national comparative research, partly because not all these speech act terms have equivalents in all languages; many languages do not, for instance, have a term for ‘inviting’. Furthermore, many actions or activities are to be found in conversation for which there are no conventional labels or readily available vernacular terms. Schegloff made this point forcefully in his account of a certain kind of repeat in a certain sequential position, which is a practice for confirming the candidate understanding in the prior speaker’s prior turn, whilst confirming also that “it’s gist had been previously conveyed inexplicitly by the one who now confirms” (Schegloff 1996) – an action that he labelled ‘confirming allusions’. Here is one of the examples Schegloff shows:

(11) [MDE-MTRAC:60-1:2]

- 1 Marsha: Did Joey get home yet?
 2 Tony: Well I wz wondering when ‘e left.
 3 (0.2)
 4 Marsha: .hhh Uh: (d) did Oh: .h Yer not in on what ha:ppen’.
 5 Tony: No(h)o=
 6 Marsha: =He’s flying.
 7 (0.2)
 8 Marsha: En Ilene is going to meet im:.Becuz the to:p wz ripped
 9 off’v iz car which is tih say someb’dy helped th’mselfs.
 10 Tony: Stolen.
 11 (0.4)
 12 Marsha: Stolen.=Right out in front of my house.
 13 Tony: Oh: f’r crying out loud,

Marsha and Tony are an ex-couple, who now live in different cities some distance away. Their son, Joey, drove up to visit Marsha, and is traveling back to his father’s, and evidently has not yet arrived there – Tony has called Marsha to find out whether he has left. It turns out that he is flying back, rather than driving, because, Marsha says, *somebody helped themselves* to the top off his car (lines 8–9). Tony’s candidate understanding of that is *Stolen* (line 10), which Marsha confirms as being what she was implying, thereby confirming her allusion to theft (line 12). This ‘confirming an allusion’ is certainly an action of a type to be found in conversation (though not frequently), though one for which there is no vernacular label (Schegloff 1996: 185). It is, by the way, close to another phenomenon identified by Jefferson sometime in the early 1980s, illustrated in this example.

(12) [TCI(b):16:59:SO] (Joan bought Linda’s kids some clothing for their dolls)

- 1 Linda: Where did you get the clothes at.
 2 Joan: At uh Toy City,
 3 Linda: Were they on sa:le?=
 4 Joan: =Ah::, yeah.
 5 Linda: Ye:ah.
 6 Joan: I went with uh::m (.) Fay one day ...

(13) [NB:IV:10R:16:MSO] ((Lottie's been to visit Isabel, an old friend of hers, who has remarried and is living in Palm Springs))

- 1 Lottie: So I:sabel 'n I è-and (h)w(h)e ↓swam in th(h)at phool
 2 until two o'cl(h)o[ck in the] morning.=i(h)i[n the n]u:de.
 3 Emma: [O h : :] [Go::d]
 4 Lottie: ·hh ʊ [h o h o : G]od it was:] fun.=
 5 Emma: [°I:sn't° she] c u : : : t e]
 6 Emma: =·hh [She still drinking her little dri:nks?
 7 (0.6)
 8 Lottie: Ye:ah 'n the[: n]
 9 Emma: °[Yea]h,°
 10 Lottie: we swam (·) ↑a:ll day today ...

In cases such as these an enquiry seems to presuppose that something is the case – that Joan bought the clothes in a pre-Christmas sale, and that Isabel is still drinking (alcohol) too much (lines 3 and 6 respectively). In each case the recipient confirms what is presupposed in the other's enquiry (lines 4 and 8 respectively, after which the one who enquired (Linda in Example 12 and Emma in Example 13) follows with a confirmation that suggests 'I thought as much'. Jefferson (no date) labelled these 'post confirmation confirmations', in which the enquirer confirms the recipient's confirmation, which is thereby a practice for bringing to the interactional surface something potentially discrediting either about the other (in Example 12, about Joan being a cheapskate) or someone about whom the other is talking (about Isabel in Example 13, in which the implication is that Isabel drinks too much). Again, this is a discernible action, but one for which there is not a conventional vernacular term, so that it is difficult to fit into the speech act mould.

This is a difficulty that Kendrick and I have faced in trying to find a way to capture the connections between requesting and offering. We were exploring and critiquing the view that is to be found in the literature, that offers are preferred to requests – it is better to be offered than to have to ask for assistance (e.g. Schegloff 2007: 83–84). Towards the end of our paper, we set out some of the symbiotic and other connections the two actions may have (Kendrick and Drew 2014). Kendrick had been considering this for some time before, when he proposed (personal communication 2010) that *recruitment* might better represent the process, indeed the action(s), through which another's assistance might come to be given, in cases where it was requested explicitly, verbally; not solicited verbally; offered explicitly, verbally; or not offered explicitly but volunteered through (usually) non-vocal conduct. In other words there are so many ways in which a difficulty someone is having might be expressed or conveyed or discerned, and therefore so many ways in which assistance might be forthcoming, without having been requested or explicitly offered – including cases in which assistance is provided when there has been little or no verbal exchange between the one who has the difficulty and the other who provides assistance. *Recruitment* best captures the action processes through which

assistance is given, although it is not a speech act term and not even a conventional vernacular term for this process; moreover there may be no speech involved – when we focus analysis on face-to-face embodied action, or what is coming to be called multi-modal interactions (Mondada 2006, Mondada and Traverso 2015, Rossi 2014), we encounter more complex relationships between speech and non-vocal conduct, which takes us beyond any speech act analytic perspective.

Here is an instance of a recruitment that is achieved without a verbal request being made, though assistance is surely solicited through non-vocal conduct.

(14) [Colleagues: Teapot:0:10] (Two university colleagues, Andy and Beth, are seated diagonally at a table in their office.)

- 1 Beth: *'s the tea been stewing long enough?
 **leaning over her laptop to look at the teapot*
 2 Beth: *.hh (.) (hhh) (1.5)
 **picking up her mug as Andy reaches for the teapot*
 3 Beth: *°give it a sukk- ('ll do okay)°
 **watching as Andy pours himself tea*
 4 (1.6)
 5 Beth: leave the two tea bags in (you see/yourself)
 6 * (long enough)
 → **places mug on table near Andy as he moves to set teapot*
 down
 7 Beth: (almost be like three)
 8 .hh *(°I don't know if that's °)
 ⇒ **Andy lifts teapot and begins pouring tea into Beth's mug*
 9 (0.8)
 10 Andy: (ks) it's fairly strong
 11 Beth: yeah

In Drew and Couper-Kuhlen (2014) we observed the following about this Example 14: “While uttering line 6 Beth moves her mug from across the table and places it adjacent to the teapot that Andy is holding; in doing so she makes visible an immediate need or wish for tea, although the wish is not articulated verbally. This creates a publicly available *opportunity* for Andy to assist in meeting Beth's need or fulfilling her wish” (see Figure 1).

“Andy responds by transforming the movement he is currently executing, placing the teapot down on the table, into lifting it again and pouring tea into Beth's mug (line 8). Thus, Beth's nonverbal gestural display leads to the successful recruitment of Andy's assistance without there being any trace of the transaction in the verbal record. The beauty of recruitments is that when they are successful, they enable one participant to get another to do something for them without having had to ask. Often simply the visible display of a problem will be enough to prompt an attentive co-participant to help out” (Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014: 18–19). The transaction we were referring to is the transaction between lines 3 and 8, the period during which Andy first pours himself tea and when he comes to fill Beth's



Figure 1. Frame grab showing line 6 of Example (2)

mug; there is of course a ‘trace in the verbal record’ before this transaction, when in line 1 Beth asks whether the tea has been stewing long enough, then picks up her mug, which is surely a verbal combined with non-vocal display of wanting some tea, in circumstances in which the teapot is positioned close to Andy’s right hand and on the other side of the table from where she is sitting.

The complexities of the intermeshing between speech and non-vocal action that we explore in recruitments of assistance (Kendrick and Drew 2016) go beyond the limitations of speech act analysis and reflect more closely the realities of seeking and being given assistance, and altruism, in face-to-face interaction, in which social actions look very little like what we conventionally regard as ‘speech acts’.

4. Presuppositions and well-formedness

There are linguistic rules, both syntactic and semantic rules, according to which sentences can be well-formed or ill-formed. For example according to some semantic rules of agency, as well as syntactic rules about head nouns, the sentence *The cat sat on the mat* is well-formed, but the sentence *The mat did not like being sat upon* is ill-formed; so too is the sentence *I do not like my computer this morning* well-formed, whilst *My computer doesn’t like me this morning* is not. There is no need here to rehearse the semantic and grammatical rules according to which well- and ill-formedness may be distinguished, and which have long been the subject of linguistic enquiry. However, a rather different view began to be taken by linguists such as George Lakoff who in 1971 wrote that “It is often assumed that one can speak of the well- or ill-formedness of a sentence in isolation, removed from all

presuppositions about the nature of the world ... Instead one must speak of relative well-formedness and/or relative grammaticality: that is, in such cases a sentence will be well-formed only with respect to certain presuppositions about the nature of the world” (Lakoff 1971: 329). Lakoff’s account of well-formedness is a critique of Chomskian linguistic competence, according to which the strictly grammatical notion of well-formedness is based on “the relationship between a sentence and those things that it presupposes about the nature of the world”. Instead Lakoff’s starting point is that “extra linguistic factors very often enter in judgements of (relative) well-formedness” (Lakoff 1971: 329–330; see also Bar-Hillel 1971). Thus a sentence that is syntactically well-formed but might seem (on a competence model) semantically ill-formed – such as *My cat (computer etc.) ... enjoys tormenting me* – can be regarded in some ‘context’ and according to certain judgements to be well-formed. Equally a sentence such as *My sincerity enjoys tormenting me* might seem ill-formed to ‘us’ (on the basis that “properties and events (having) mental powers might seem to be an impossible belief”), but apparently is considered well-formed in cultures in which “events are assumed to have minds” (Lakoff 1971: 332).

Lakoff’s critique established that sentences that might seem from the perspective of strict syntactic and semantic rules to be ill-formed – to be anomalous, and in that respect meaningless – might in fact be perfectly well understood to have clear meaning, in certain circumstances or certain occasions of use. For example it might make perfect sense for me to say to myself or to a colleague that *My computer really hates me this morning*, out of exasperation and annoyance that I can’t get it to do what I want it to do! However the limitation of Lakoff’s re-appraisal of well- and ill-formed constructions is that it depends on interactionally decontextualized presuppositions underlying interactionally decontextualized sentences. Lakoff presents us with sentences without any interactional context, but with some imagined cultural and interactional scenarios in which sentences such as *My cat believes that I’m a fool* or *My frying pan realises that I’m a lousy cook* can plausibly be regarded as meaningful and therefore relatively well-formed (Lakoff 1971: 332). This is useful – more than useful. Lakoff’s critique of considering well- or ill-formedness in isolation, and his demonstration that such judgements are made on the basis of presuppositions in particular contexts, is one of the cornerstones of pragmatics. But when one considers interaction empirically, presuppositions are only one of the factors that determine the meaningfulness or (apparent) meaningfulness of utterances, in their contexts-of-use. CA has made an important contribution to our understanding of judgements about well- or ill-formedness by showing that speakers, participants in interaction, may make those judgements from time to time – judgements that are revealed through *self-correction*.

Curl and Drew (2008) showed that speakers select from among the formats through which they might request another for assistance, the format that best

reflects or accords with their view of their entitlement to ask, and the likely contingencies on which granting the request may depend (the things that might obstruct or get in the way of the other person doing whatever is requested). For instance imperative forms of requesting (*Pass me ...*) indicate the speaker's judgement that they are fully entitled to ask, and that contingencies for granting the request are low or non-existent. By contrast conditional forms such as *I wonder if you could ...* reflect the speaker's sense of low entitlement and relatively high contingency. Between these opposite ends of the cline are requests formed through modal verbs (*Could you* etc.), indicating greater confidence in entitlement and contingencies than conditional forms but not so much as do imperative forms. All of which can be summarised in this cline of request forms.

High entitlement/		High contingency/	
Low contingency		Low entitlement	
<i>Imperatives</i>	<i>I need you to...</i>		<i>Modals (Could etc)</i>
	<i>I wonder if...</i>		

It was important to us that we could show not just that these different forms occur in interactions, across a range of settings from ordinary social interactions between family and friends, to medical interactions and calls to the police; we were concerned to show that and *how speakers orient to which is the appropriate request format*, in the particular circumstances in which the request is being made. Such evidence includes speakers specifying the relative absence of contingency when using a modal verb in requesting, as when Gordon asks his mother to bring a letter with her when they visit him at the weekend:

(15) [Holt:SO88:2:8:1]

Gor: But uh: just to (0.3) say (.) could you bring up a letter.
(.)

Gor: When you come up,

and the highly contingent nature of this patient's request to a doctor for painkillers, despite the fact that he knows the doctors would rather wait until he's able to see him on Monday (this call being made on a Friday afternoon/early evening).

(16) [Doctors call:1:2:4]

Clr: So what i-is that the mo- I wonder if you'd come out and give me some pain killers for it or:.
(0.5)

Clr: (I try an' see-) (.) I know you hang on for Monday but I tell ya the pain is really (.) bad y'know wh't I mea' ((sniff))

These differential expressions of low and high contingency accompanying the different grammatical request forms is some evidence that speakers orient to using a request form that is appropriate in the circumstances, for this particular request. But the most compelling evidence that the selection of an appropriate form is *normatively* based comes from cases in which speakers begin by using one form, then interrupt themselves in order to correct the form to a more appropriate request form. An example is the following, which is an extract from the recording of a family have lunch outside on their porch; for the present purposes we can ignore the interaction in lines 2–8, when a neighbour walks past their garden and makes a jokey remark about their having lunch without him.

(17) [Goodwin:Porch Dinner:4:45]

- 1 Susan: Pass me the Wishbo[ne,
2 Kate: [SHHHH WHA:T?
3 Dwayne: Oh
4 (0.7)
5 Mat: I: don't think anybody gonna, pick me up I: think I've
been let down
6 Fran: NO:::==
7 Kate: =UH HEH UH HEH
8 Fran: We'll bring you dessert over Matt
9 (0.6)
10 Susan: Pa- may >I have a< c- c'n I have the gravy Ross?
11 Fran: Boy everybody's really: hoggin [up things like
12 Susan: [Mother said to sta[r]t passing it=
13 Mark: [ehYhheh uh huh
14 Ross: =[Hey look at the sa:lad.
15 Susan: =[Well you picked it up and you laid it back do:wn.

The excerpt opens with Susan asking Ross to pass the Wishbone (a proprietary brand of salad dressing). Ross is sitting beside her, to her right, the bottle of Wishbone is right in front of him and no-one else is using it. She uses a direct imperative form (line 1), indicating her entitlement to ask (as a member of the family having lunch) and that there are no contingencies likely to obstruct being granted her request. Then she asks Ross, again, for the gravy (line 10). She begins with the same form she used in her request in line 1, an imperative, “Pa-” but cuts that off before completing even what was going to be *pass*, then changes to a modal form *may*, then again to another modal form *can I have* ... Immediately before she starts this request, during the silence in line 9, the gravy had also been in front of

Ross, though slightly to his right side, so slightly away from Susan; again no-one was using it. So when she began her request, the circumstances were much as they were when she requested the Wishbone. However, right at the moment she begins that imperative, with his right hand Ross moves the gravy slightly further to his right, so away from Susan; he simultaneously lifts and passes a bowl of salad, with his left hand, the one closest to Susan. So immediately after the beginning of line 10 the contingencies change rapidly; Ross is unable to use the hand closest to Susan, his left hand, to pass the gravy to her, and he has moved the gravy further away from her. Susan adjusts to this sudden change in contingencies, resulting in a less favourable environment in which to ask for the gravy, by changing her format for requesting through self-correction. In this way she orients to what is normatively the appropriate form with which to correct, in these changing circumstances.

Bearing in mind the outline above of the three forms of offers most commonly found in English conversation, we similarly find cases in which a speaker sets out on an inappropriate form, then selects an appropriate form through self-correction.

- (18) [NB:II:4:4] (Emma has just had a minor surgical operation to remove a toe nail, and is sitting outside relaxing; her friend Nancy has called, to ask Emma whether she'd like to go shopping)

1 Emma: I: 'd LIKE TIH GET S'M LID' L[E slipper]s but uh:
 2 Nan: [Y e :ah.]
 3 (0.7)
 4 Emm: t.hhh I jis do:n't think I better walk it's jis bleeding
 5 a tiny bid'n a:nd u-I think I'm gon'stay o:ff of it it
 6 thro:bs: a liddle bit. Yihknow thet's no fun tuh have a
 7 nai:l tak[en off.]
 8 Nan: [°Y e a h] right.°hh[h
 9 Emm: [°Oh: Go:d,°
 10 (.)
 11 Nan: We:ll dih you wanna me tuh be [tih js pick you] [Can u you] (.)
 12 get induh Robins'n? so you c'buy a li'l pair a'slippers?h
 13 (.)
 14 Nan: I mean er [can I getchu somethin:g? er: sump'm:er sum'n?]

In line 11 Nancy begins to formulate an offer to Emma; given that Emma is incapacitated by having had a procedure to remove an infected toenail, Nancy seems to be offering assistance of some kind regarding shopping – whether together or on her behalf is not yet clear. She begins her offer with a *Do you want ...* construction (“dih you wanna me”, line 11). Recalling Table 1 above, summarizing the different sequential positions in which each form of offer is appropriate, it is clear that Nancy has begun with the incorrect, the inappropriate of ill-formed construction. In her adjacent prior turn(s) in lines 4–9 (*Oh God* is a self-sympathetic form akin to a groan), Emma has explicitly reported a trouble; and we know that *Do you want* forms are not used immediately after an explicit trouble (bottom right call in Table 1). So

her *Do you want* construction here is inappropriate in this sequential position – it is ill-formed. She then engages in a number of syntactic and lexical adjustments through her turn in line 11, some of which are broadly indicated through bordering, finds a form that is closer to being appropriate (*Can you get into ...*, lines 11–12) but which is not yet truly an offer, uses an overt marker of self-correction (“I mean”, line 14), then fully self-corrects to an appropriate form with which to make an offer in that sequential position (*Can I get you something*, line 14). There is no way to explain how Nancy came initially to select the ‘wrong’ form of offer (*Do you want*), but we can see through the trajectory of her adjustments until she corrects the linguistic form of her offer that she finally selects an appropriate construction.

One further example may be sufficient to illustrate how speakers correct ‘inappropriate’ forms of offers, this one showing that world statesmen are no different in this respect than Nancy and Emma. This is the transcript of a video recording that was made of an interaction between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, when they were breaking for lunch during a G8 meeting and Bush’s microphone happened not to have been switched off.

(19) “Yo, Blair!”: Overheard conversation and the ‘special relationship’ (George Bush and Tony Blair, recorded at the G8 meeting, St Petersburg, 17th July 2006.

- | | | |
|----|--------|---|
| 1 | Bush: | What about Kofi? (he seems alright. I don’t like his ceasefire plan.) His attitude is basically ceasefire and everything else |
| 2 | | ... (sorts out/happens). |
| 3 | Blair: | Yeah, no I think the (inaudible) is really difficult. We |
| 4 | | can’t stop this unless you get this international business agreed. |
| 5 | Bush: | Yeah. |
| 6 | Blair: | I don’t know what you guys have talked about, but as I say |
| 7 | | I am perfectly happy to try and see what the lie of the |
| 8 | | land is, but you need that done quickly because otherwise |
| 9 | | it will spiral. |
| 10 | Bush: | I think Condi is going to go pretty soon. |
| 11 | Blair: | But that’s, that’s, that’s all that matters. But if you... |
| 12 | | you see it will take some time to get that together. |
| 13 | Bush: | Yeah, yeah. |
| 14 | Blair: | But at least it gives people ... |
| 15 | Bush: | It’s a process, I agree. I told her your offer to ... |
| 16 | Blair: | Well ...it’s only if I mean ...you know. If she’s got a... or |
| 17 | | if she needs the ground prepared as it were ... Because |
| 18 | | obviously if she goes out, she’s got to succeed, if it |
| 19 | | were, whereas I can go out and just talk |
| 20 | Bush: | You see, the irony is what they need to do is to get Syria |
| 21 | | to get Hizbollah to stop doing this shit and it’s over. |

As they break for lunch Blair has walked away from the conference table, and as he passes behind Bush's chair Bush greets Blair thus, "Yo, Blair" (this video can be viewed on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Xq3DobSCKQ>). They then have a brief conversation about a situation that has arisen in the Middle East, the details of which need not concern us here. In the course of this conversation, Blair begins to construct an offer to go to the Middle East to mediate on behalf of the Allies, leading up to a possible offer in lines 4–5 ("We can't stop this unless you get this international business agreed"). He begins what looks as though it might be an offer in line 11, "But if you" then cuts away from that, syntactically and pragmatically, to return to background ("you see it will take some time to get that together", line 11–12). He then attempts again to make an offer, but again using a conditional construction (line 16). Finally he aborts making an offer and changes instead to making a kind of proposal (lines 17–19). It will be remembered from Table 1 that conditional forms of offers are made when the interaction was initiated by the one making the offer, specifically for the purpose of making the offer (Table 1, top row). That is not the case here; Blair did not initiate the interaction – Bush did; and in any case Blair would not initiate making an offer to Bush, but rather would wait to be asked, through diplomatic channels (International Diplomacy 101!). Once again, this illustrates a speaker who for whatever reason has embarked on the wrong form of an offer, abandoning that and correcting himself – though here not by selecting an alternative and appropriate form of offer but by moving out of offering altogether. One of the key contributions of CA to our understanding of how we construct actions in talk-in-interaction is to demonstrate that the specific design of the action encodes dimensions of the extra-linguistic context (such as contingency), and is systematically associated with the interactional environment and sequential placement or position in which the action is being conducted.

Self-correction provides the evidence that speakers orient to what is the appropriate form for doing an action – that is, to the *normative* character of constructing social actions, and the *well-formed* construction of actions. (Drew et al. 2013, Jefferson 1974, Robinson 2006). Thus in the mess of self-correction – in this aspect of linguistic performance, in Chomsky's trash – we find crucial evidence for the normative connections between turn design and sequence/interaction; it is through self-correction that we see speakers orient to what is the appropriate form to do *this* action in *this* sequential place. Which I guess is what Bar-Hillel was getting at when he said "Be careful with forcing bits and pieces you find in the pragmatic wastebasket into your favorite syntactico-semantic theory. It would perhaps be preferable to first bring some order into the contents of this wastebasket." (Bar-Hillel 1971: 475)

This provides a more interactionally grounded account of well- and ill-formedness, and moreover an account grounded in speakers'/participants' assessments of what is appropriate (well-formed) or inappropriate (ill-formed).

Speakers' self-corrections, in which they change the construction of their turn from one in which an inappropriate form of an action has been selected to a construction using the 'correct' or appropriate form for that action in that (sequential) context, is evidence of participants' orientation to the *normative* construction forms for that action in that place – in other words, to the difference between forms that are correct, or well-formed, and those that are inappropriate, or ill-formed. This is, I think, a significant contribution that CA makes to another of the cornerstones of pragmatics, that is the concept of well-formedness.

5. Conclusion

I have been reviewing the contribution that CA has made, and continues to make, to three key topics in pragmatics – to three of its cornerstones. Pragmatics was founded on the importance of taking context into account in matters of assessing whether and how utterances are judged to be *well formed*, introducing the importance of pragmatic context as being as or more salient in our understanding of utterances than are formal linguistic (grammatical and semantic) rules. Pragmatics was founded also on the insight that 'language delivers action, not meaning' (Levinson, personal communication), which is to say that language is not primarily descriptive but is used to conduct actions or activities in interaction, hence *speech acts* as the linguistic correlates of physical actions. Finally, Grice's concept of *implicature* underlies our contemporary approach to inference, and of course all utterances, turns at talk, as well as silences, are inferentially rich – co-participants draw inferences in their understandings of what speakers 'mean' or are doing in turns at talk; inferences underlie recipients understandings of the prior speaker, as revealed in their responses. I have illustrated some of the ways in which CA contributes to each of these areas, not in opposition to pragmatics, but in ways that are complementary, that add to whatever is learned through the approaches and perspectives that are more conventionally regarded as 'pragmatics'. The key to CA's contribution is that turns at talk, utterances or however one regards what is said, are taken and constructed in sequences of turns; whilst pragmatics is centred on the context of language and how context shapes the production and understanding of talk, CA adds to the pragmatic notion of context that of the sequential context; so that turns or utterances are understood as moves in an unfolding process of (sequences of) interaction. As Levinson wrote, "Nearly all the pragmatic concepts we have reviewed so far can thus be claimed to tie closely with conversation as the central or most basic kind of language usage. Now if ... the proper way to study conversational organization is through empirical techniques, this suggests that the largely philosophical traditions that have given rise to pragmatics may have to yield in the future

to more empirical kinds of investigation of language usage. Conceptual analysis using introspective data would then be replaced by careful inductive work based on observation” (Levinson 1983: 285). I think that it is undeniable that pragmatics has indeed yielded to empirical investigation, and that the original insights of Austin, Grice and Lakoff have been the springboards for empirical research from a number of perspectives. CA has played an important role in that empirical redirection in pragmatics. I have highlighted CA’s contribution in these three areas in part to dispel the impression that CA is only ‘about’ turn-taking, which is perhaps a widely held view. CA is about language use and non-vocal conduct in embodied interaction; interaction proceeds through the turns that participants take as an interaction proceeds, so turns and taking turns and how those are managed and achieved are important. But it is important also to remember that we are primarily concerned with what speakers ‘do’ in those turns – how they are designed and understood for the *actions* they undertake in the process of inter-action. It is important also to remember that speaker turns are connected in *sequences* of actions, in which participants display their understandings of what each is ‘doing’ in their prior turn, and respond accordingly.

References

- Austin, John L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford, OUP.
- Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1954. “Indexical Expressions.” *Mind* 63:359–379.
doi:10.1093/mind/LXIII.251.359
- Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. 1971. “Out of the Pragmatic Wastebasket.” *Linguistic Inquiry* 2: 401–407.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1963. “Formal properties of grammars.” In *Handbook of Mathematical Psychology*. Volume II, ed. by R. D. Luce, R. R. Bush, and E. Galanter, 323–418. New York: Wiley.
- Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth. 2014. “What does grammar tell us about action?” *Pragmatics* 24(3): 623–647. doi:10.1075/prag.24.3.08cou
- Curl, Traci S. 2006. “Offers of Assistance: Constraints on Syntactic Design.” *Journal of Pragmatics* 38: 1257–1280. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2005.09.004
- Curl, Traci S., and Paul Drew. 2008. “Contingency and Action: A Comparison of Two Forms of Requesting.” *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 41, 2008: 1–25.
doi:10.1080/08351810802028613
- Drew, Paul. 1992. “Contested Evidence in a Courtroom Cross Examination: The Case of a Trial for Rape.” In *Talk at Work: Social Interaction in Institutional Settings*, ed. by Paul Drew, and John Heritage, 470–520. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drew, Paul. 2013. “Turn design.” In *Handbook of Conversation Analysis*, ed. by Tanya Stivers, and Jack Sidnell, 131–149. Oxford, Blackwell.
- Drew, Paul, Traci Walker, and Richard Ogden. 2012. “Self-repair and action construction.” In *Conversational Repair and Human Understanding*, ed. by Makoto Hayashi, Geoff Raymond, and Jack Sidnell, 71–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Drew, Paul, and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen. 2014. "Requesting – From Speech Act to Recruitment." In *Requesting in Social Interaction*., ed. by Paul Drew and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, 1–34. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Floyd, Simeon, Giovanni Rossi, and Nick J. Enfield (eds). (under review). *Getting Others to do Things: A Pragmatic Typology of Recruitments*. Berlin: Language Science Press.
- Grice, H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Heritage, John, and Sue Sefi. 1992. "Dilemmas of Advice: Aspects of the Delivery and Reception of Advice in Interactions Between Health Visitors and First-Time Mothers." In *Talk at Work; Interaction in Institutional Settings*, ed. by Paul Drew and John Heritage, 359–417. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/Pbns.294.05ili
- Jefferson, Gail. 1974. "Error Correction as an Interactional Resource." *Language in Society* 3(2): 181–199. doi:10.1017/S0047404500004334
- Kendrick, Kobin, and Paul Drew. 2014. "The Putative Preference for Offers Over Requests." In *Requesting in Social Interaction*, ed. by Paul Drew and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, 87–114. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Kendrick, Kobin, and Paul Drew. 2016. "Recruitment: Offers, Requests, and the Organization of Assistance in Interaction." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 49: 1–19.
- Labov, William. 1966. *The Social Stratification of English in New York City*. Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics.
- Lakoff, George. 1971. "Presupposition and Relative Well-Formedness." In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology*, ed. by Danny D. Steinberg, and Leon A. Jakobovits, 329–340. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Mondada, Lorenza. 2006. "Multiactivite, multimodalite et sequentialite: l'initiation de cours d'action paralleles en context scolaire." In *Interactions Verbales, Didactiques et Appreentissage*, ed. by M.-C. Guernier, V. Durand-Gurrier, and J.-P. Sautot, 45–72. Becancon: Presses Universitaires de Franche Comte.
- Mondada, Lorenza. 2014. "Requesting Immediate Action in the Surgical Operating Room: Time, Embodied Resources and Praxeological Embeddedness." In *Requesting in Social Interaction*, ed. by Paul Drew and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, 269–302. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Mondada, Lorenza and Veronique Traverso. 2015. "Beyond Orality: Interaction and Multimodality." *Varieties of Spoken French: a Source Book*, ed. by Sylvain Detey, Jacques Durand, Bernard Laks, and Chantel Lyche. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573714.001.0001/acprof-9780199573714-chapter-8>
- Robinson, Jeffrey D.. 2006. "Managing Trouble Responsibility and Relationships during Conversational Repair." *Communication Monographs* 73: 137–161. doi:10.1080/03637750600581206
- Rossi, Giovanni. 2012. "Bilateral and Unilateral Requests: The Use of Imperatives and *Mi X?* Interrogatives in Italian." *Discourse Processes* 49(5): 426–458. doi:10.1080/0163853X.2012.684136

- Rossi, Giovanni. 2014. "When Do People Not Use Language to Make Requests?" In *Requesting in Social Interaction*, ed. by Paul Drew and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, 303–334. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Rossi, Giovanni, and Jörg Zinken. 2016. "Grammar and Social Agency: The Pragmatics of Impersonal Deontic Statements." *Language* 92(4): 296–325.
- Sacks, Harvey. 1972. "On the Analysability of Stories by Children." In *Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication*, ed. John J. Gumperz, and Dell Hymes, 325–345. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Sacks, Harvey. 1992. *Lectures on Conversation*, vol. 1, ed. by Gail Jefferson. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1992. "Introduction." In *Harvey Sacks, Lectures on Conversation*, vol. 1, ed. by Gail Jefferson, ix–lxii. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1996. "Confirming Allusions: Toward an Empirical Account of Action." *American Journal of Sociology* 102: 161–216. doi:10.1086/230911
- Schegloff, Emanuel A. 2007. *Sequence Organization in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511791208
- Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walker, Traci, Paul Drew, and John Local. 2011. "Responding Indirectly." *Journal of Pragmatics* 43: 2434–2451. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2011.02.012

Pragmatics vs rhetoric

Political discourse at the pragmatics-rhetoric interface

Cornelia Ilie

Strömstad Academy

Pragmatics and rhetoric display a range of commonalities and convergences in that both are concerned with discursive and extra-discursive strategies that enable the negotiation and re-negotiation of context-situated meaning, and the co-performance of interpersonal and institutional relationships in terms of intentions and expectations. At the same time, while pragmatics and rhetoric display differences in analytical focus, they complement each other, through specific insights into, e.g., interactive uses of addressing forms and goal-oriented speech acts (pragmatics) and figurative language use and argumentation processes (rhetoric). The aim of this chapter is to explore the interface between pragmatics and rhetoric, arguing that a pragma-rhetorical approach provides systematic tools for a multi-level analysis of discursive contextualisation of political power struggle and of metadiscursive framing of question-answer political confrontation.

Keywords: pragmatics, rhetoric, pragma-rhetoric, political discourse, metadiscourse, political interview, parliamentary debate, argumentation, contextualization, rhetorical appeal

1. Introduction

Political practices and processes arise from, and are constituted through, discourse and communicative interaction. Political discursive communication is the building block and the tool for exercise and oversight of political power, for legitimization and decision-making. Politicians don't just offer a view of the world, they also negotiate a credible account of themselves and their actions by claiming solidarity with listeners, evaluating ideas and alternative views, so that controlling their own 'voice' and legitimizing their position become central in building a consequential

discourse. It should come as no surprise therefore that the discourse of politics and the politics of discourse have been a concern for several disciplines and fields of research over time. A commonality of most discipline-specific approaches to the use of language in the sphere of politics seems to revolve around verbal disputes between political beliefs, behaviours and actions of individuals, groups, and institutions, on the one hand, and individual/group perceptions and reactions on the consequences of political action on whole societies, institutional environments and individuals, on the other.

In the aftermath of the linguistic turn (Rorty 1967), there has been an increasing interest in the role of language as a constitutive element of the socio-political reality, which has impacted research in and across disciplines. Consequently, a range of fields of research have been converging with the study of politics, political phenomena and disputes. The *anthropology of politics*, for example, combines anthropological and political science research to examine and compare the diverse systems of social control in different societies, exploring the power structures, as well as the extent of consensus and the patterns of equality or inequality within them (Vincent 2002). Adopting an empirical perspective, it examines “politics below the surface realities”, namely the ways in which leaders establish or bolster their authority by resorting to tradition, force, persuasion, and religion, as well as the ways in which people resist excessive domination and state control, both passively and actively. A similar perspective is offered by Subramanian (2012), who, preferring to use the term *political anthropology*, claims that its main concern is to challenge normative assumptions of what counts as ‘politics’ by illuminating connections between formal and informal political arenas, and among cultural, social, and political processes. According to Lewellen (2003), a major contribution of anthropology to the study of comparative politics consists in revealing how political messages are expressed through the medium of apparently nonpolitical institutions, ideologies, and practices. Aronoff and Kubik (2013) went a step further towards a convergent approach to anthropology and political science, emphasizing the contribution made by anthropology through the use of ethnographic case study methodology and semiotic analysis to critically scrutinize discourses and practices produced by institutional agents in their encounters with local culture.

A similar ‘convergence’ can be found in *political communication studies*, which display a slightly different focus, concentrating on how information and communication styles influence politics and power relations, by mapping typologies of political communication styles and channels, as well as their effects on citizens’ political attitudes and behaviours (Norris 2005). Communication (of political messages) is construed, rather schematically, in terms of a metaphor of ‘transmission’,

i.e. message sent (competently or incompetently) and message received (more or less accurately). On Hahn's view (2003), research into political communication should start from the premise of the "social conversation that is politics". A common feature of political communication studies, as reported by Althaus (2012), regards the normative concerns about what is good or bad in media practices or political news coverage.

A constantly growing and eclectic field of research that has diversified during the last few decades is *political rhetoric*, whose goal is to examine "common ways in which techniques of persuasion operate in political life; how argumentation strategies are employed to shape judgements" (Martin 2014: 1). The political theorists' recent wave of interest in rhetoric can partly be attributed to the rise of theories of deliberation and deliberative democracy, which focus primarily on discourse and communication. Incorporating a rhetorical perspective as a mode of inquiry of political thought, action and change, political rhetoric examines how situations and issues are framed in terms of dichotomies (e.g. "us versus them"), or epideictic stances (e.g. simultaneously praising some, while blaming others regarding problematic situations), how political agents disguise their underlying intentions, manipulate and deceive (e.g. through name-calling, misquotations or decontextualized quotations, fallacious arguments). Concentrating on the micro-level of the intersection between politics and rhetoric, Finlayson (2007), Martin et al. (2014) and Atkins et al. (2014) have converged in developing an alternative approach – *Rhetorical Political Analysis* – to the study of political language, ideology, and strategy, showing the benefits of utilizing concepts from rhetoric for the analysis of political language. The primary emphasis of this approach is on the persuasive devices of political language, emphasising the argumentative nature of policy deliberation as opposed to instrumental-rational models of decision-making. Rhetorical Political Analysis, which supports the integration of rhetoric with major sub-disciplines of political science, is based on a philosophy of questioning and of socio-political distance. Inspired by Michel Meyer's (2010) *Questioning Theory of Rhetoric* which, originating in problematology, construes rhetoric as the negotiation of the distance between subjects in regard to a question, Turnbull (2017) proposes a new interpretive framework to explain how political rhetoric is used figuratively to generate unity as much as to bridge differences through deliberation. On his approach, the distance between individuals regarding a question (logos) is the distance between ethos and pathos. That is, a speaker (ethos orientation) treats his/her distance from an interlocutor (pathos orientation) as a question (logos). Based on the idea of rhetoric and argumentation as pertaining to multiple possible answers, he extends the scope of political rhetoric beyond practices of persuasion and argumentation.

2. Target of the present study

Both pragmatics and rhetoric are concerned with discursive and extra-discursive strategies that enable the negotiation and re-negotiation of context-situated meaning, and the co-performance of interpersonal and institutional relationships in terms of intentions and expectations. They display, however, a number of specific features with regard to theoretical prerequisites and methodological priorities. Hence, a full convergence of the two disciplines is hardly possible, or desirable, but there are instances of cross-fertilisation, by means of which rhetorical issues become more systematically captured and problematised due to systematic pragmatic investigation, whereas a number of central pragmatic issues, such as interactional meaning generation and meaning co-construction, can receive a more personalised and activity-based understanding in a rhetorical perspective.

The ongoing revival of *rhetoric*, and particularly political rhetoric, can partly be explained by contemporary socio-political concerns, the growing involvement in politics of widening categories of interactive citizens and civil society, the rise of participatory leadership, the proliferation of argumentative dialogues in social media, but especially by the growing use of populist manipulation, misleading/deceptive rhetorical devices, the multiplication of fallacious arguments, and the frequent use of misquotations, hyperbolic language and buzzwords (Reicher and Hopkins 1996; Bull 2000; Kienpointner 2013; Ornatowski 2012; Ilie 2016a). These are important reasons why we need to critically scrutinize contemporary and emerging scholarship at the intersection of pragmatic and rhetorical studies of political language as they converge to account for the hows and whys of political events and happenings, while heralding new potential forms of enactment of political discourse.

In a parallel development, the expanding field of (linguistic) *pragmatics* has been diversifying its research agenda and analytical perspectives by incorporating empirical and theoretical research on political discourse (Wilson 1990; Fetzer 2013). This particular research orientation has gradually become instrumental in systematically analysing (deconstructing and reconstructing) the context, norms, goals, content and reception of discourses and practices performed in the political sphere, while also investigating miscommunication-based political conflict, lack of or insufficient common ground and shared knowledge, causes and effects of misinterpretation and misunderstanding (Tzanne 1999), or multi-purpose face-threatening acts in interpersonal/inter-group interactions (Ilie 2004). A major focus has been placed on a range of popular sub-genres of political discourse, such as political speeches (De Fina 1995; Schäffner 1997; Chilton 2004), news conferences (Bhatia 2006; Jiang 2006; Fraser 2010; Degano 2014), parliamentary debates (Ilie 2003a, 2013), political

interviews (Harris 1991; Elliot and Bull 1996; Lauerbach 2004; Ilie 2017a), press releases, election campaign communication (Ilie 2011).

When examining the analytical frameworks of *rhetoric*, on the one hand, and *pragmatics*, on the other, we cannot help finding a range of commonalities and convergences, which are particularly noticeable, as indicated above, in the approaches used by rhetoric and by pragmatics when analysing various kinds of political discourse. The identifiable complementarity and overlaps that can be noticed between the approaches used by the *rhetoric of political discourse* and by the *pragmatics of political discourse* have been a motivating factor for choosing to focus in this study on the interface between *rhetoric* and *pragmatics* with particular emphasis on their use in the analysis of political discourse genres and practices. The main concerns of the *rhetoric of political discourse* (De Landtsheer 2000; Charteris-Black 2005; Atkins et al. 2014; Martin 2014; Ilie 2016b) and of the *pragmatics of political discourse* (Wilson 1990; Chilton 2004; Harris, Grainger and Mullany 2006; Jiang 2006; Ilie 2015b) point in the same direction: political rhetoric focuses on the person-specific and situation-based persuasion techniques and argumentation strategies of politicians, while the pragmatics of political discourse focuses on deconstructing and reconstructing genre-specific mechanisms of deliberation, adversariality and power struggle underpinning discursive practices in political institutions.

3. Pragmatics and rhetoric revisited

Long after the philosopher Charles Morris (1938) first used the ‘proto-concept’ of pragmatics (conceived of as the study of the relations of signs to interpreters), and following the significant impact of the logico-philosophical and cognitive approaches of language philosophers (Austin 1962; Searle 1969; and Grice 1975), Leech (1983) describes pragmatics as a bridge between the other linguistic sub-disciplines and rhetoric. He problematised the role of pragmatics as “the study of language use and its meaning to speakers and hearers”, involving two interfaces, namely pragmalinguistics and sociopragmatics. In order to clarify the meaning and scope of pragmatics, Leech took a rhetorical approach to pragmatics starting from the consideration that communication is problem-solving, “whereby the speaker is seen as trying to achieve his aims within constraints imposed by principles and maxims of ‘good communicative behaviour’” (1983: x–xi). Consequently, his definition runs as follows: “Pragmatics can be usefully defined as the study of how utterances have meanings in situations” (1983: x–xi). At the same time, a parallel interface of pragma-semantics and rhetoric was integrated into the theory of linguistic polyphony (Ducrot 1980, 1984; Roulet 1996), which has been widely used by French-speaking scholars of dialogue. The theory of rhetorical argumentation

(Toulmin 1958; Walton 1989) has had considerable influence on Anglo-Saxon pragmatics, including the pragmatics of dialogue.

The interaction-oriented function of pragmatic enquiry was further explored by Mey, who stated that pragmatics "is interested in the process of producing language and in its producers, not just in the end-product, language" (2001 [1993]:35). A complementary view was conveyed by Thomas, who defines pragmatics as "meaning in interaction". Her definition incorporates a rather more rhetorical vantage point on dialogic communication: "Making meaning is a dynamic process, involving the negotiation of meaning between speaker and hearer, the context of utterance (physical, social and linguistic) and the meaning potential of an utterance." (1995: 22). Pragmatic analysis concerns the uses of language that depend on speakers' communicative intentions and the strategies that hearers employ to determine what those intentions are. An important task of pragmatic analysis is to examine the shifting aspects of meaning construction, transfer, deconstruction and reconstruction in actual language use by paying particular attention to the interpretation of context-sensitive multifunctional utterances, ambiguities and misunderstandings, to name but a few.

Pragmatics is concerned with mapping the ways in which the meaning(s) of utterances change in relation to the context of use, the time and goal of the interaction and the roles and relationships between the interlocutors. Pragmatics focuses on the factors that govern our choice and use of linguistic forms and patterns in interpersonal and social interaction and the effects of our choice on interlocutors, their thoughts and their actions. In theory, we can say/express anything we like. In practice, however, we follow a number of linguistic rules and social constraints (most of them unconsciously) that structure the way we speak and construct our sentences. For example, there are norms of formality and politeness that we, as language users, have intuitively assimilated and that we follow when talking to people who are younger or older, of the same or opposite sex, in various hierarchical positions, etc.

Rhetoric, a 2,500 year old discipline, has been used as the systematic practice of persuasive communication strategies in crucial areas of social life, such as public affairs, civil disputes, law courts and education. Rhetorical theory has gradually built up, in interdependence with other social structures and means of communication, well-established ways to reconstruct reality and to participate in structuring socio-political relations (Booth 1974; Kennedy 1999/1980; Covino and Jolliffe 1995; Herrick 2001). Bitzer (1968) famously argued that rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action.

Unlike pragmatics, rhetoric relies not so much on a model of grammatical and discursive structure, but rather on a purposefully developed model of social and

moral structure. The critical functions of rhetoric can also involve the disclosure of the relationships between particular rhetorical discourses and the social relations they reconstruct. In emphasising the decisive role of different types of audience in communicative interaction, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offer explanations about the effects of various forms of argument, speculating about their impact on individually or collectively targeted addressees. Along the same line, Sanders (1978) regards rhetoric as “the strategic management of discourse” and, following Austin and Searle, he treats rhetorical performance as utterance-in-action. For example, the linguistic distinction made by pragmatics between speech act types and interactive or dialogic performance may roughly be related to the rhetorical distinction between *inventio*, *dispositio* and *elocutio*, on the one hand, and *memoria* and *pronuntiatio*, on the other.

While Burke’s (1969) theoretical focus was on the rhetorical effect of persuasion and the kinds of methods and techniques included in any process of communication aimed to influence belief and action, Richards (1965) adopted another perspective, contending that rhetoric is the “study of misunderstanding and its remedies” (1965: 3) in communicative situations. On distinguishing rhetoric from pragmatics, Leech reached the following conclusions.

The point about the term *rhetoric*, in this context, is the focus it places on a goal-oriented speech situation, in which *s* uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of *h*. (1983: 15)

From an analytical point of view, rhetoric is concerned with the planning and management of audience-targeted and goal-oriented message, as well as the delivery conditions (appropriateness of place and time/timing of delivery). Rhetoric examines the mechanisms of intentional persuasion through the process of meaning transfer/negotiation and interpersonal interaction with the purpose of obtaining certain effects in particular situations. Moreover, rhetoric is a method of enquiry into the principles that underlie the purposeful and multimodal use of language (e.g. extra-linguistic, para-linguistic). It explores the language users’ systematic and creative ways of observing and/or violating these very principles for well-defined goals, accounting for successfully and less successfully applied interpersonal communication strategies in keeping with the interactants’ intentions and expectations.

3.1 The pragmatics-rhetoric interface

When examining and distinguishing between pragmatics and rhetoric, it is important to first identify their foci, commonalities and complementarities. Whereas pragmatics is primarily concerned with contextualised language use and with

identifying recurrent patterns, treating irregularities as special cases or critical incidents, rhetoric is primarily concerned with the practice of language use through interactional transactions between the addresser and the audience, as well as with the particular commonplaces characteristic of various socio-cultural groups and professional environments, including spontaneous or planned communicative deviations and creative irregularities. Although they display differences in analytical focus, the theoretical orientations of rhetoric and pragmatics complement each other in various ways. Both rhetoric and pragmatics are concerned with the relationship between human action, situational context, and underlying values. Interfacing the two disciplines has the potential of integrating microlinguistically oriented pragmatic approaches with macrolinguistically oriented rhetorical approaches, so as to better account for the complex and many-sided aspects of context-specific language use.

Both pragmatics and rhetoric are targeting the emergence and co-construction of meaningful interpersonal communicative interaction. For pragmatics, the core question is what language/discourse strategies used by language users tell us about their motivations, intentions and effectiveness in acting and achieving their goals. For rhetoric, the core questions are why and how language users use or are perceived to use particular language/discourse strategies to achieve particular goals. Integrating the two approaches will lead to a rhetorical perspectivisation of pragmatic analysis and to a pragmatic systematisation of rhetorical practice.

Based on evidence provided in research to date, the present study challenges the misconception according to which pragmatics takes an exclusively bottom-up view as opposed to a top-down view. In fact, by integrating multidisciplinary theoretical approaches, pragmatics proves to be a versatile analytical tool, able to combine a bottom-up view (whereby global issues are explained through local linguistic mechanisms and strategies, drawing on philosophy and especially epistemology) with a top-down view (whereby textual and discursive phenomena are accounted for in terms of wider social, cultural and political factors, drawing on social and political sciences).

To sum up, it is fair to say that pragmatics focuses on language as it is used by human beings, whereas rhetoric focuses on human beings as they use language.

3.2 Interfacing the pragmatics and the rhetoric of political discourse

As pragmatics has grown into an important sub-field of linguistics, the study of the language of politics has become one of its major objects of research. At the same time, this development has been paralleled by the 'linguistic turn' in a number of disciplines pertaining to the field of politics. Cummings's statement that

“[pragmatics] can contribute insights to neighboring academic disciplines in much the same manner that these disciplines can contribute insights to it” (2005:2) can confidently be extrapolated to the pragmatics of political discourse, including parliamentary discourse. An increasing number of studies pertaining to the pragmatics of political discourse (relying on theoretical premises and philosophical principles laid down by the founders of pragmatic studies) have integrated an increasing and diverse range of conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches from political rhetoric (Ilie 2006, 2009a), political argumentation, political psychology, political journalism, cognitive sociolinguistics, and media studies, to name but a few.

Over time, the pragmatics of political discourse, which emerged as a specialized sub-field of pragmatics with a focus on political speeches, election campaigns, parliamentary debates, media-reported political events and political interviews has been constantly expanding and nowadays encompasses several strands of research: pragmatics of political correctness (Klotz 1999); pragmatics of politeness (Leech 2014); pragmatics of political apologies (Harris, Grainger and Mullany 2006); pragmatics of parliamentary forms of address (Ilie 2010a); pragmatics of parliamentary speech acts (Ilie 2010b); pragmatics of political humour (Willis 2002; Kramer 2011). A pragmatics-rhetoric interface has been applied to the cross-cultural pragma-rhetorical analysis of parliamentary insults (Ilie 2004) and to a pragma-rhetorical approach to gendering election campaign interviews (Ilie 2011).

An in-depth and systematic examination of political events and politicians' actions (involving issues related to power struggle, conflict, persuasion, manipulation and deception) needs to integrate, to varying extents, depending on the analytical focus and scope, rhetorical analytical tools (rhetorical appeals, figurative uses of language, valid and fallacious argumentation) and pragma-linguistic approaches (focusing on context-dependent and participant-driven speech acts, pronominal deictic markers, intersubjective and interactive uses of language in genre-specific discourses). In recent investigations, Ilie (2006, 2009a, 2009b, 2015b) has carried out a pragma-rhetorical analysis of parliamentary discourse that consists in a cross-fertilisation of rhetorical and pragmatic approaches, motivated by the fact that neither approach is comprehensive and systematic enough to cover the complex, dynamic, changing and multi-layered nature of political discourse that constitutes parliamentary action.

Political discourse genres, as well as the relevant analytical traits, are being examined in this study at the pragmatics-rhetoric interface. Interface is envisaged here as the nexus of dynamic interconnectivity and interdependence of disciplinary approaches, through multi-level intersections in an integrative analytical merging process. As a result of the tensions arising from the juxtaposition of disciplinary perspectives, this interface serves as a creative way of joining complementary and/or overlapping analytical perspectives.

An essential outcome of an integrative pragma-rhetorical approach is to develop a better understanding of the multi-level processes and forms of political discourse practices during which changes take place in the participants' knowledge, beliefs and emotions, as well as in their interpersonal relations. The following three categories of research questions are in focus in this chapter:

- i. Which targets, gaps, frameworks and alternative perspectives are being articulated at/through the pragmatics-rhetoric interface? And what does this mean for our understanding of language use and misuse in institutional or semi-institutional (political) environments? For example, the pragmatic analysis of dialogic interactions from the perspective of Gricean maxims versus their rhetorical analysis from the perspective of rhetorical appeals of logos, ethos and pathos.
- ii. How can we systematically account for the complementarity between pragmatic and rhetorical functions of practically the same (political) discourse practices? For example, questions and answers are treated pragmatically as adjacency pairs, but rhetorically as premises and/or conclusions of argumentative enthymemes.
- iii. How can we use the similarities and the distinctions between roughly corresponding or equivalent pragmatic and rhetorical notions/principles in order to provide a more in-depth and comprehensive picture of specific political discourse genres? For example, the functional correlations between pragmatic pause vs. rhetorical silence, or the contextualisation of speech acts vs. rhetorical acts.

The case studies presented in the following sections are meant to illustrate the uses of the pragma-rhetorical approach and to problematize the analytical aspects pertaining to pragmatics, on the one hand, and rhetoric, on the other.

4. Pragma-rhetorical approach to political discourse

As pragmatics has grown into a well-established sub-field of linguistics, the study of the language of politics has become one of its major objects of research. Over the past few decades, studies pertaining to the pragmatics of political discourse have continued to integrate an increasing and diverse range of conceptual, theoretical and methodological approaches from political rhetoric and political argumentation (while occasionally also incorporating perspectives from political psychology, political journalism, cognitive sociolinguistics, and media studies). A case in point are the political discourse genres that largely involve processes of deliberation and rhetorical argumentation, which are basically grounded in the principle of

approaching and discussing issues from different perspectives. To illustrate the use of a pragma-rhetorical approach to the analysis of political discourse, I have focused on participant-enacted, situation-based and discourse-driven contextualization in interviews with two Democratic presidential candidates in the 2008 American presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. Two basic research questions have been pursued: How negotiable are the interviewing rules and conventions? To what extent do socio-cultural and institutional norms affect the interviewer-interviewee interaction, the interviewing process and its outcome?

4.1 Contextualisation through meaning negotiation and re-negotiation in political interviews

A first step towards exploring the issue of contextualization is to ask questions like the following: Which interaction targets and communication goals can be scrutinized at/through the pragmatics-rhetoric interface? How do they affect our understanding of language use and misuse in political discourse contexts? The following case study illustrates the use of the pragma-rhetorical approach by juxtaposing a pragmatic analysis of context-shaped interactions from the perspective of Gricean maxims with a rhetorical analysis from the perspective of rhetorical appeals of *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*.

The 'political interview', referred to as a kind of speech event (Hymes 1972) or activity type (Levinson 1979), involves interactional conventions, which assign well-defined roles to interviewer and interviewee, and commit them to particular entitlements and responsibilities. The political interview dialogue (cf. also Fetzer, this volume), which is interviewer-monitored, is indicative of the interactants' status, position and role, of the interdependence between the interviewee's public and private spheres, and of the ongoing discursive negotiation of power relations between interviewer and interviewee.

An increasing convergence between political dialogue and media dialogue has been taking place in election campaign interviews over the past few decades. The election campaign interview, as a subcategory of political interviews, has been extensively discussed with reference to American presidential elections. It represents a hybrid type of interview which displays a political interview with a prominent politician, on the one hand, and a job interview with a politician competing for a high-ranking job in a country's political hierarchy, on the other. As a result, both the interviewer and the interviewee need to perform more than one role. The interviewer can be seen as a talk monitor, as an investigator, as a questioner, and as an interlocutor, while the interviewee, i.e. the political candidate, can be seen to act as a respondent, as an interlocutor, and as a job seeker.

To get deeper understanding of the genre hybridity and the dialogic complexity of political campaign interviews, it is helpful to use the cross-disciplinary perspectives of the pragma-rhetorical approach. Relying on their complementary perspectives, pragmatics and rhetoric can be integrated in one analytical framework in order to examine the emergence and the co-construction of ongoing interpersonal communication and behaviour in an election campaign interview.

From a pragmatic perspective, an election campaign interview is a particular subgenre of mediated political discourse, on the one hand, and a particular subgenre of job recruitment discourse, on the other. As such, it displays specific discursive features and ritualised interaction strategies, while complying with and/or circumventing a number of specific rules and constraints. The interview dialogue is basically marked by institutional role-specific commitments and by the awareness of acting in front of and for the benefit of a multi-layered audience, both of which contribute to shaping the turn-taking structure and the speech act configuration. Moreover, the interview dialogue allows interviewers and interviewees to achieve a number of institutionally specific purposes, such as position-claiming, challenging, persuading, agenda-setting, and opinion building. A number of particular contextual factors need to be taken into account when examining the characteristics of the interviewees' public and private identities, the implications of the mediated nature of their messages, as well as the public scrutiny that they undergo.

From a rhetorical perspective, an election campaign interview is a particular hybrid rhetorical genre derived from the three genres of rhetoric, namely the deliberative, the forensic and the epideictic genres. This confirms the Bakhtinian view that most genres are heterogeneous.

- The deliberative genre is typically manifest in oratorical discourse whose target is an audience that has to make a decision by evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of a future course of action.
- The forensic genre is recognisable in the rhetorical framing of actual involvement and accountability concerning past actions and interactions.
- The epideictic genre is particularly focused on the discursively framed image and personal profile of a public person, political leader, etc.

The much publicized 2008 presidential election campaign during the Democratic presidential primaries displayed a close race between Senator Barack Obama of Illinois and Senator Hillary Clinton of New York. Two interviews conducted with Clinton and with Obama were chosen for a comparative analysis (Ilie 2008). What makes the two interviews ideally suited for a comparative study is the fact that they are made up of identical or very similar questions asked by the same interviewer, Amanda Griscom Little, on behalf of *Grist* and *Outside* magazines, with a view to scrutinizing the two presidential contenders' positions on environmental and

energy issues. The content and relevance of the two candidates' responses to the interviewer's questions have been examined and discussed pragma-rhetorically, in terms of the illocutionary force of speech acts and pronominal deixis, on the one hand, and rhetorical topoi and argument types, on the other.

The analytical framework developed by speech act theorists, starting with Austin and Searle, recognises the underlying conditions and derivable rules that must be satisfied prior to the realization and understanding of carefully selected utterances in given contexts (cf. also Drew and Norrick, this volume). While Austin's (1962: 14–15) investigation of the appropriate circumstances of performative utterances indicated that speech acts initiated by a speaker are followed up by an addressee, Searle's (1969: 45) focus was on the intentional and conventional aspects of the speaker's individually performed illocutionary acts. Searle (1976) later updated Austin's classification of speech acts, establishing an alternative taxonomy, made up of five categories of speech acts, listed below.

Representatives (also known as Assertives, cf. Searle 1976) commit the speaker to something being the case, namely to the truth of the uttered proposition. They convey the speaker's belief that a speech act can be evaluated as true or false. Some of the typical verbs used to perform representative speech acts are: *suggest, believe, hypothesize, insist, boast, complain, conclude, deduce, claim*.

Directives are speech acts by means of which the speaker aims to get the hearer to do something. Some of the typical verbs used to perform directive speech acts are: *ask, order, command, request, beg, plead, pray, entreat, invite, permit, advise, dare, defy, challenge*.

Expressives are speech acts that convey the speaker's attitude to a certain state of affairs specified in the propositional content of the utterance. Some of the typical verbs used to perform expressive speech acts are: *thank, apologize, congratulate, compliment, condole, deplore, welcome*.

Commissives are speech acts which commit the speaker to carrying out some future action. Some of the typical verbs used to perform commissive speech acts are: *promise, offer, threaten, plan, commit*. Commissives are particularly important in institutional discourse, where institutional actors put themselves under a norm-regulated obligation to accomplish an institutional action or to comply with institutional decisions.

Declaratives (or declarations) are speech acts whose purpose is "to create a new fact corresponding to the propositional content" (Searle 1989: 549). In other words, a declarative/declaration describes a fact in the world, and this fact is brought into existence by the very performance of the declaration. Typical declarative acts are performed in *appointing a chairperson, firing a staff member, nominating a candidate, declaring war, marrying a person, christening*.

In interviews, turn-taking sequences normally consist of question-response pairs, e.g. a question and a response, or a request/assertion and a reaction. These question-response pairs are usually initiated by the interviewer with a question serving as a directive speech act aimed to request information, followed by the interviewee's speech acts that constitute, or count as, the response to the interviewer's question. The following extracts showcase a pragmatically revealing interplay of speech act sequences enacted in the two interviewees' responses, whereby each of them is constructing his or her public persona while trying to appeal to multiple audiences.

(1a) Grist magazine interview with Hillary Clinton

Q: What makes you the strongest green candidate? What sets your energy and environmental platform apart?

A: *I believe* my proposals for energy and environmental priorities are really well thought-out and comprehensive. You know, *I have been focusing* on these issues for years. Obviously, *I have been a child advocate* for most of my adult life, and as first lady *I focused* on the environmental effects on children's health. *I have served*, since I arrived in the Senate, on the Environment and Public Works Committee, and *I am proud* of the work that I've done to stand up against the Bush administration's many efforts to weaken environmental laws. (added italics)

(1b) Grist magazine interview with Barack Obama

Q: Why should voters consider you the strongest candidate on environmental issues? What sets your green platform apart from the rest?

A: To begin with, *people can look at my track record*, *I am proud* of the fact that one of the first endorsements I received in the race for the U.S. Senate was from the League of Conservation Voters. *I've since cast tough votes* on behalf of the environment. For example, *I voted against* the "Clear Skies" bill that George Bush was promoting, despite the fact that the administration had heated up support for the bill in southern Illinois, which you know is a coal area of the country. So *I think people can feel confident* that *I don't just talk the talk, I also walk the walk*. (added italics)

Faced with practically the same question in (1a) and (1b) above, the two candidates seek to provide answers ideally meant to reveal the most appealing and engaging characteristics of their personal and political profile. The apparent commonalities between their answers in terms of the speech acts performed, actually display deeper differences in terms of the particular contextualizations and framings of their past experiences and current positions on a range of key environmental issues. In her answer, Hillary Clinton shows a greater tendency to self-referencing, which is to be expected in a 'job' interview and quite understandable in her situation as a seasoned

politician with a range of previous achievements. She starts with a self-confident statement through an assertive speech act (*"I believe* my proposals for energy and environmental priorities are really well thought-out and comprehensive") and ends by expressing, with a strong sense of satisfaction, *"I am proud* of the work that I've done". Each of these two speech acts, one performed at the beginning, the other at the end of her response, can be regarded as a mixed representative-cum-expressive speech act, which is not surprising, since in actual verbal interaction there is hardly a one-to-one correspondence between spoken utterances and enacted speech acts. The former speech act introduced by "I believe" is meant to be perceived more as an assertive, rather than an expressive speech act. By contrast, the meaning of the latter speech act introduced by "I am proud" can duly be perceived as less assertive, and more expressive in that it openly conveys Clinton's emotional state of satisfaction with her past achievements. In both cases, however, the utterance-initial speech acts carry the presupposition that what follows is implicitly significant.

When answering the same question in the second part of Excerpt (1b), Barack Obama uses speech acts that are identical ("I am proud") and near-identical ("I think") to those used by Hillary Clinton: *"I am proud* of the fact that one of the first endorsements I received in the race for the U.S. Senate was from the League of Conservation Voters." and *"I think* people can feel confident that I don't just talk the talk, I also walk the walk". There is, however, a significant difference on a deeper level between the discursive styles of the two presidential candidates regarding the use of person deixis. While both of them formulate their respective utterances in the first person singular pronoun "I" which functions as a self-referential deictic, Obama chooses in two instances to invoke the "people" as an agent serving as legitimate judge of his political behaviour and actions: first, when "*people*" are encouraged and empowered to "look at my track record", as he points to the endorsements he received from the League of Conservation Voters; and second, when he uses an assertive speech act to self-confidently ascribe to "*people*" a positive perception about him ("I don't just talk the talk, I also walk the walk"). By relying on people for endorsement, Obama is successful in turning a weakness (he was a junior politician and practically a Washington outsider with only one term in the US Senate) into a strength (conveying self-confidence as he emphasises the people's expected support of him as a genuine American who has not distanced himself from ordinary people). Obama is actually banking on his popularity among the grassroots as a successful newcomer to the scene of the American presidential candidacy. By twice foregrounding the "people", he is deliberately maximising his proximity to the audience. To achieve that, Obama operates a deictic shift – from him as a speaker (through the use of the first person singular pronoun "I") to the audience (through the use of the generic noun "people").

Deeper insights into the two candidates' views and concrete commitments regarding environmental issues emerge from their answers to the next question, illustrated in Excerpts (2a) and (2b) below:

(2a) Grist magazine interview with Hillary Clinton

Q: In the Senate, you have supported the goal of an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gases by 2050. Is this a centerpiece of your platform?

A: It is. *I joined* with Sens. [Barbara] Boxer and [Bernie] Sanders because *I thought* that their bill was the most forward-leaning in terms of what needs to be done to deal with the threat of global warming, and *I'm very proud to support their legislation.*

And obviously *I have my own proposals. I want to create a Strategic Energy Fund* that would be funded by taking money away from the oil companies, by giving them the choice to invest in renewable energy or pay into the fund. *We would take away their tax subsidies* as well, and *we would use this fund to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America.* (added italics)

(2b) Grist magazine interview with Barack Obama

Q: How central will energy and the environment be to your campaign?

A: I consider energy to be one of the three most important issues that we're facing domestically. And the opportunities for significant change exist partly because *awareness of the threat of climate change has grown rapidly over the last several years. Al Gore deserves a lot of credit* for that, *as do activists in the environmental community and outlets like Grist. People recognize the magnitude of the climate problem.*

Not only is there environmental concern, but you're also seeing *people who are recognizing that our dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East is distorting our foreign policies, and that we can't sustain economically continuing dependence* on a resource that is going to get more and more expensive over time. As all those things converge, *we have to move boldly on energy legislation, and that's what I'll do as the next president.* (added italics)

As in the previous Excerpts (1a) and (1b), the standpoints expressed in Clinton's and Obama's answers in Excerpt (2a) and (2b) are quite similar. In answering the interviewer's questions, they both put forward sound ideas and valuable proposals concerning the future energy legislation. However, the ways in which they position themselves as political frontrunners on energy issues differ considerably. As an experienced senior politician with a substantial track record, Clinton uses the first person singular pronoun as a deictic marker to talk about her past and present actions, as well as about her future intentions: "*I joined*", "*I thought*", "*I have my*

own proposals”, “*I* want to create a Strategic Energy Fund”. At the same time, when referring to future legislative measures, she strategically takes an inclusive approach by switching from the first person singular as self-referential deictic marker to the first person plural pronoun as a collective identity deictic marker. This is a tactical shift meant to emphasise, on the one hand, her commitment to team work (trying to dispel the criticism she had faced for being too self-centred), and on the other, the collective support that she counts on when mobilizing decision-makers in favour of her green policies: “*We* would take away their tax subsidies”, “*we* would use this fund to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America.” In these two sentences she uses commissive speech acts to highlight the actions she plans to implement if/when elected president. Her last sentence in particular is explicitly intended to display a strong sense of responsibility as a politician concerned not only with investments in renewable energy but also with people’s job situations: “to create a clean-energy industry and millions of jobs in America.”

Unlike Clinton, Obama is aware of his status as a political newcomer and avoids using the first person singular pronoun, which can be explained tactically. First, he decides to play down his junior political status; second, he is fully aware that he owes his quickly growing popularity to the people (the grassroots) who are supporting him. He consequently makes a strategic choice when he uses assertive speech acts to give credit to senior politicians like Al Gore (“Al Gore *deserves* a lot of credit”), and to community activists (“as *do* activists in the environmental community and outlets like Grist”). But Obama’s most powerful interactive strategy consists in paying tribute to the common sense and awareness of ordinary people, by discursively foregrounding them and maximizing his close connection with the grass roots: “*People* recognize the magnitude of the climate problem”; “you’re also seeing *people* who are recognizing that our dependence on fossil fuels from the Middle East is distorting our foreign policies”. As a corollary, towards the end of his answer Obama resorts to the inclusive use of the first person plural pronoun as a collective identity deictic marker, whereby he emerges as actively engaged in shaping the new energy legislation: “*we* have to move boldly on energy legislation”. Only in the very last sentence does Obama use the first person singular pronoun with an emphatic commissive speech act when he boldly refers to himself as the next president: “that’s what *I’ll* do as the next president.”

From a rhetorical perspective, particularly noteworthy are the interconnections and relations of the interviewer and of the interviewee, respectively, with the audience. By complying with their role constraints as respondents, the two interviewees legitimise the interviewer’s prerogative to elicit, test and probe their views, beliefs and actions on behalf of the wider audience of voters. Each interviewee is also aware that his or her suitability for the presidency is being evaluated by both the interviewer and the audience of American voters, as well as being compared with

the counter-candidate's profile and qualifications. As was shown in Ilie (2017a: 74), in media interviews the interviewer and the interviewee can often be seen to pursue double agendas, i.e. a topic-oriented agenda, and an audience-oriented agenda. Individual interviewees will often prioritise one of the two agendas. The audience-oriented agenda can relevantly be analysed in terms of rhetorical features, since rhetoric, more than pragmatics, tends to highlight the speaker's relation with and impact on the audience. While Clinton and Obama appear to express similar views on a number of issues, their rhetorical strategies differ significantly, which reflects on the way in which they were perceived by voters.

Rhetorical approaches focus on what the speaker intends the interlocutor and the audience to hear and what effect the message is expected to have on them. The three types of rhetorical appeals – *ethos*, *pathos* and *logos* – are used by speakers as means of persuasion that provide the audience with reasons and multiple evidence for accepting or rejecting the beliefs, ideas and feelings presented by the speaker.

- i. *Ethos*, or the credibility and moral authority of the speaker, was regarded by Aristotle as the demonstration in a speech that the speaker was to be trusted. Speakers want to enhance their ethical authority by providing respectable credentials, for instance by citing or quoting respected authorities.
- ii. *Pathos*, or the arousal of the audience's emotions, was regarded in Aristotelian theory as the range of emotions of the hearers motivated by a speaker that moved them to accept what s/he said.
- iii. *Logos*, or the reasoning and arguments employed by the speaker, is intended to achieve a rationality-based persuasive effect on the addressee and on the audience.

While the interviewees want to promote a positive image of themselves and of their political commitments, by enhancing their positive *ethos* appeal (moral credibility) and by resorting to *pathos* (emotion eliciting force) in order to gain audience response and support, the interviewers see it as their task to call into question particularly the interviewees' *ethos*, i.e. political credibility and moral profile, and to challenge the interviewees' *logos* and *pathos*. In Excerpts (1a), (1b) and (2a), (2b) above, it is primarily the interviewees' (i.e. the presidential candidates) *ethos* that is under scrutiny in terms of their *logos*-based performance. Clinton is consistently boosting her *ethos* in self-assertive statements particularly about her past political track record, whereas Obama's *ethos* underlies his audience-targeted assertive speech acts that are present- and future-oriented. In constructing his *ethos*, he specifically resorts to the *ad populum* appeal as he invokes the 'people's' environmental awareness, which is meant to also strengthen his *pathos*. Unlike the fallacious *ad populum* appeal, a legitimate type of *ad populum*, or popular appeal (Walton 1998) is based on commonly accepted opinions and presumptions that are supposed to

represent a widely acknowledged rational thinking on important issues, especially those of a personal and political nature. Obama's appeal to the people is an emotional appeal addressed to the audience of citizens and voters, and aimed to arouse their feelings and enthusiasms.

In this interview, both Clinton and Obama are using the *ad verecundiam* appeal, also called 'argument from authority' (Walton 2010), which is an inductive argument whereby an arguer cites the testimony of an authoritative person in support of some conclusion. Clinton's *ad verecundiam* appeal serves to illustrate her first-hand experience of collaborating with foremost authorities on environmental policies, as she explicitly states in Excerpt (2): "*I joined with Sens. [Barbara] Boxer and [Bernie] Sanders because I thought that their bill was the most forward-leaning ...*". In his *ad verecundiam* appeal, Obama tries to make up for his rather short period in the Senate, as compared to Hillary Clinton, and to maximize his environmental concern, by addressing a rhetorical *encomium* (i.e. a persuasive rhetorical device offering enthusiastic praise) to both Al Gore, a publicly acknowledged authority in environmental issues, and community activists: "*Al Gore deserves a lot of credit for that, as do activists in the environmental community and outlets like Grist*".

4.2 Metadiscourse framing strategies in question-answer sequencing in parliamentary debates

The aim of this section is to illustrate a fine-grained analysis at the pragmatics-rhetoric interface by examining the functions and impact of question-answer sequences in parliamentary debates. As parliaments and parliamentarians' work are assuming an increasingly central role in media reports and current societal debates, it becomes necessary to understand the parliamentary debating norms and strategies, the discourse-shaped and discourse-shaping parliamentary power struggle, as well as the interplay between parliamentary ritualized interactions and the participants' political agendas.

From a pragmatic perspective, parliamentary discourse practices display institutional, interactional and interpersonal complexity through their multi-level instantiations of a particularly impactful political discourse genre. The discursive interaction of parliamentarians is constantly marked by their institutional role-based commitments, by the norm-regulated and dialogically shaped institutional confrontation, by the adversarial exchanges of institutionalised speech acts, and by the awareness of acting in front and for the benefit of a multi-layered audience. Members of Parliament (henceforth MPs) belong to a particular community of practice where they are supposed to perform in accordance with institutional conventions by acting and interacting with each other both in adversarial and in

collaborative ways (e.g. to advance opposite standpoints, to attack political opponents, to negotiate solutions, and to reach commonly agreed goals). The appropriateness, relevance and impact of the MPs' speech acts embedded in question-answer sequences can provide important clues about their underlying reasons, motivations and goals.

From a rhetorical perspective, parliamentary discourse practices belong basically to the deliberative genre of political rhetoric, targeting an audience that is asked to make a decision by evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of a future course of action. At the same time, they also display, even if less frequently and to a lesser extent, elements of the forensic and epideictic genres. If we envisage the debate as a rhetorical event, parliamentary debates should be regarded as institutionalized rhetorical modes of action for collective decision-making. As was argued in Ilie (2010b: 61), the discourse of MPs "is meant to call into question the opponents' ethos, i.e. political credibility and moral profile, while enhancing their own ethos in an attempt to strike a balance between logos, i.e. logical reasoning, and pathos, i.e. emotion eliciting force."

Whereas a parliamentary debate serves to hold the government to account by enabling focused discussion and eliciting clarifications about government policies, parliamentary questions are used by MPs to scrutinise the government by criticizing government policies, exposing abuses and seeking redress. One of the prototypical forms of parliamentary questioning practices is Question Time (henceforth QT), a regular session in many parliaments' agenda that is set aside for questions to the government and answers from its ministers (Franklin and Norton 1993). In the UK Parliament and other Westminster-type parliaments there is also a session called Prime Minister's Questions (henceforth PMQs), which gives MPs the chance to address questions directly to the Prime Minister (Bates et al. 2012; Lovenduski 2012; Ilie 2015b). During QT and PMQs, complaints and criticisms are raised by MPs, who are also seeking information about the government's plans and policies. Unlike the questioning strategies in courtroom interaction, which are meant to elicit specific answers and to rule out unsuitable ones, parliamentary questioning strategies, especially during QTs and PMQs, are not intended to elicit particular answers, but rather to criticize, to embarrass and/or to challenge the respondent to make uncomfortable, damaging or self-revealing declarations (Ilie 2017b).

A powerful discursive strategy in parliamentary discourse is the use of metadiscourse, by means of which MPs provide supplementary information or clues about the intent, implications, and goals of their own discourse. According to Ilie (2003a), metadiscourse is a term generally used in pragmatic analysis to indicate a shift in discourse levels, by means of which the speaker's multilevel messages are being conveyed concurrently with the ongoing discourse, namely "alongside," "above," and/or "beyond" the unfolding discourse. Metadiscursive utterances help

to situate their utterers' standpoint with respect to their own (present and past) discourse, the interlocutor's and other participants' discourse, and the audience's beliefs and expectations. Parliamentary metadiscourse is also intended to enable its multiple audiences (specifically addressed MPs, listening MPs, journalists, parliamentary reporters, general public, TV viewers) to identify significant shifts and overlaps between institutional, personal, and interpersonal levels of discourse, e.g. metadiscursive argumentation through the use and misuse of clichés (Ilie 2000), and metadiscursive attribution, reporting, and quoting strategies (Ilie 2003a).

Forms of parliamentary metadiscourse frequently occur as inserted comments, which may appear marginal or secondary, but whose role is to actually clarify and reinforce the meaning of particular statements in the core message. An important category of metadiscursive strategies is that of *parliamentary parentheticals* (Ilie 2003b). By means of parliamentary parentheticals, speakers can be seen to shift from the role of speakers to the role of observers and commentators, adjusting their ongoing discourse to the situation, to their interlocutors, and to their audiences, as well as to their own final goals, as illustrated in Excerpt (3) below.

- (3) Mr. Bercow (Con): I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary [Mr. Cook, Lab] for giving way. No sensible person – *from which category one should probably exclude the right hon. Gentleman* – would favour European Union enlargement at any price.
(Hansard, November 22, 1999 col 367)

By using a metadiscursive parenthetical that starts on a serious tone and ends on a sarcastic note, Conservative MP Bercow is trying to meet the audience's expectations by combining predictable and unpredictable elements, narrative and evaluative elements, institutional and interpersonal elements. This parenthetical encompasses both institutional and (inter)personal elements, which function rhetorically in complementary ways. Actually, a wide range of metadiscursive practices are used by MPs to fine-tune, highlight, or play down humorous critical incidents involving positive self-disclosure and negative other-disclosure.

An in-depth examination of parliamentary questions and answers not only offers insights into the operating mechanisms and impact of MPs' question-answer practices, but it also reveals significant details about the political role-positioning, interpersonal and confrontational interactions between opposition and government MPs. In a questionnaire-based report on parliamentary questions, Rogers and Walters (2006) pointed out that the MPs' responses confirmed that, apart from the purpose of eliciting information (often about constituency matters), parliamentary questions are mainly used to get the government's position on record, to put pressure on ministers, to make a constituency-specific proposal, to research an issue in depth and to help with the local campaign.

A basic typology of questions was put forward in Ilie (1994) by applying pragmatic criteria correlated with *response elicitation*: an assessment of both the questioner's and the answerer's degree of knowledge (beliefs); the questioner's and the answerer's identities and roles; the power relation between the questioner and the answerer; the questioner's explicit or implicit goals; the informative value of the answer; and the impact and relevance of the answer for both questioner and answerer. In terms of response elicitation (i.e., the kind of response expected and/or required by the question), three main categories of questions have been identified: *answer-eliciting questions*; *action-eliciting questions*; and *mental response-eliciting questions*.

- i. The first pragmatic category of questions, i.e. *answer-eliciting questions*, is comprised of two kinds of questions, viz. *standard questions* and *non-standard questions* (Ilie 1999, 2015a). Standard questions fulfil the basic and most common function of questions, namely to seek a verbalised answer and/or information or confirmation from the respondent. Non-standard questions include a wide and diverse range of questions that occur in different settings and in different – institutional and non-institutional – interactions. Depending on the roles, power positions, goals, and relationships between the interlocutors, non-standard questions may fulfil a number of other context-specific functions, such as voicing a challenge, an invitation, a reproach, a complaint, a warning, a threat, an objection, a protest, an accusation, and many more. Some of the more frequently occurring non-standard questions in parliamentary discourse are *expository questions*, *leading questions*, *rhetorical questions*, and *echo questions*, and they will be analysed later on in connection with PMQs.
- ii. The second pragmatic category of questions, i.e. *action-eliciting questions*, are designed to ask and motivate the addressee to perform a particular action. These questions cover a variety of situations, including ritual parliamentary questioning practices such as “Will the honorable Gentleman give way?,” which is used in the House of Commons by MPs who want to obtain the floor. According to UK parliamentary rules, an MP cannot intervene when another MP is speaking to the House unless that MP allows it by ‘giving way’. The MP who has the floor may “give way” and resume his or her seat temporarily so that the interrupting MP may ask a question or make a comment. Alternatively, s/he may refuse to do so, as illustrated in Excerpt (4) below:
 - (4) Nick Gibb, Minister of State (Department for Education): *Will the hon. Gentleman give way?*
 Phil Wilson, Labour, Sedgfield: I will not. The Minister will have plenty of time to make his comments at the end. I want to get through my speech as other people want to make their comments. (Hansard, 26 April, 2017)

Nick Gibb's question is a directive speech act that formally requires a confirmation from MP Phil Wilson regarding his willingness to carry out an action, but it actually urges the respondent to carry out the action of "giving way". At the same time, this question acts as an institutionalized metadiscursive marker displaying addressee- and message-orientation and contributing to the process of negotiating speaking time. Various kinds of institutionalized action-eliciting questions are frequently used in parliamentary questioning practices, whereby government members are urged to carry out well-defined actions.

iii. The third pragmatic category of questions, i.e. *mental response-eliciting questions*, includes questions designed to induce in the addressee some kind of mental or emotional reaction, which does not normally require a verbalized response from the interlocutor (sometimes indicated simply by gestures or laughter).

- (5) Phil Wilson, Labour, Sedgefield: The pupils from Greenfield school who came to see me are asking why they cannot have a level playing field. *If they cannot have 40% of their coursework counted towards the GCSE, why is it not the same in public schools or vice versa?* They just want a level playing field and for everybody to be treated the same. *Why is it that, just because someone can afford to pay for their child's education, they have a better chance in life than those children of the 93% of parents who do not have the chance and opportunity to send their children to public school?* I am not saying do it one way or the other, but let us have a level playing field. It affects the aspirations and social mobility of our children and is fundamentally unfair.

Nick Gibb, Minister of State (Department for Education): indicated dissent.

Phil Wilson, Labour, Sedgefield: The Minister can shake his head, but I have pupils and headteachers coming to see me about this. It is fundamentally unfair when people in public schools have a better chance in life than those children who are sent to state schools. (Hansard, 26 April, 2017)

When asking or answering questions, MPs may perform several speech acts that can be addressed exclusively to their targeted addressee or to several categories of addressees (fellow MPs, constituency members, the public at large). These speech acts need to be analysed at the micro-level of the particular context-specific interaction and evaluated at the macro-level of broader frames of collective actions and goals than those implicit in the act itself. A useful pragmatic tool is the threefold distinction made by Austin (1962) between different kinds of speech acts: *locutionary acts*, *illocutionary acts* and *perlocutionary acts*. According to him a locutionary act is simply the act of saying something. Hence, in principle any utterance would practically qualify as a locutionary act. An illocutionary act corresponds to the act performed *in* saying something, and is regarded as the speaker's real, intended

meaning. A perlocutionary act is an act performed *by* saying something, which will normally “produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons” (Austin 1962: 101). In other words, the perlocutionary act is a speech act which gets someone to do or realise something following on from the illocutionary act. It is particularly the interplay between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts that can give relevant clues about the MPs’ underlying presuppositions and power-related relationships.

From a rhetorical perspective, parliamentary debates represent a particular hybrid rhetorical genre derived from the three genres of rhetoric, namely the *deliberative*, the *forensic* and the *epideictic* genres, which confirms the Bakhtinian view that most genres are heterogeneous.

- The deliberative genre is typically manifest in oratorical discourse where the goal is to weigh evidence for and against a policy or course of action. The target is an audience that has to make a decision by evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of a future course of action.
- The forensic genre is recognisable in the rhetorical framing of actual involvement and accountability concerning past actions and interactions. The audience is asked to make a decision about the justice or legality of an action in the past.
- The epideictic genre is particularly focused on the discursively framed image and personal profile of a public person, political leader, etc. The goal is to reinforce important values and to uphold fundamental virtues, such as courage, honour and honesty.

In order to get a better understanding of the institutional mechanisms and the strategies of asking and answering parliamentary questions, a pragma-rhetorical approach will be used to analyse questioning and answering practices during PMQs in the UK Parliament. The focus is on the interplay of questions asked by the leader of the Opposition David Cameron (Leader of the Conservative Party) and the answers provided by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown during PMQs on 7 April 2010 (which marked Gordon Brown’s last PMQs as Prime Minister). Excerpt (6) below displays one of the typically adversarial encounters between the Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition. At issue is the Prime Minister’s accountability regarding his decisions to provide the British troops in Afghanistan with the necessary number and quality of helicopters.

- (6) Mr. David Cameron (Witney) (Con): [...] As this is the last Prime Minister’s questions of this Parliament, it is the last chance for this Prime Minister to show that he is accountable for the decisions that he has made. *Will he start by admitting that when British forces were sent into Helmand, they did not have sufficient helicopters to protect themselves and get the job done?*

The Prime Minister [Gordon Brown, Lab]: I do not accept that in any operation to which we sent our troops our commanding officers gave wrong advice; they told us that they were properly equipped. Every time, in every operation, we ask our commanding officers, “Are we able to do this operation?” and our commanding officers have said yes, they can. So I have to say to the right hon. Gentleman that we have done our best to equip our troops, and we will continue to do so. It is right that I take full responsibility, but I take the advice of our commanding officers, and the advice of our commanding officers is very clear.

(Hansard, 7 April 2010, col 961)

Although David Cameron’s question (in italics) is formulated as a standard confirmation-eliciting question (asking for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer), it counts as an illocutionary act that serves to challenge and confront the Prime Minister with serious political challenges and criticism. The latter’s reaction provides evidence that Cameron’s question has succeeded in triggering a perlocutionary act of explicit denial from Gordon Brown (underlined in the excerpt above). Obviously, Brown’s statement can hardly be regarded as a proper answer, just as Cameron’s utterance can hardly be regarded as a mere information-eliciting question. By asking questions, MPs, and especially MPs from the Opposition, seek to raise issues that government representatives are being forced to react to and express an opinion about what may often be unpleasant or inconvenient for him/her. This is precisely what David Cameron is doing: he is challenging Prime Minister Brown by calling into question his past actions and thereby challenging his trustworthiness. Pragmatically, his question can be regarded as a directive speech act whereby he formally requests a straightforward confirmation, but it contextually functions as a challenging speech act addressed as a strong criticism to Prime Minister Brown’s lack of accountability. Cameron’s is a hybrid question that functions partly as a rhetorical question (since its answer is implicitly expressed) and partly as a leading question (since it explicitly indicates the answer expected from the addressee). Essentially, the question is metadiscursively focused on triggering Prime Minister Brown’s specific admission that British forces “did not have sufficient helicopters”. Thereby, Cameron explicitly appeals to the Prime Minister to accept responsibility for leaving the British forces poorly protected due to the insufficient number of helicopters provided. The overall message is a strong challenge formulated as an action-eliciting question. This challenge is strongly refuted by the Prime Minister.

Rhetorically, Cameron uses an appeal to ethos to challenge the Prime Minister’s trustworthiness and to target the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the government. At the same time, he is aware of addressing multiple overhearing audiences (fellow MPs, constituency members, the public at large) and makes the most of it through a pathos appeal meant to trigger emotional reactions stemming from pride in British

military forces. As expected, in his response, Prime Minister Brown refutes (“I do not accept ...”) Cameron’s negative evaluation of government actions, and makes counter-claims to dismiss the accusations conveyed in Cameron’s question. From a rhetorical perspective, Cameron’s question (“*Will he start by admitting that ...*”) is a *loaded question* because it is formulated so as to suggest the answer – in this case ‘yes’ – favoured by the questioner and potentially damaging for the respondent. The questioner treats as an established fact the proposition ‘the British forces did not have sufficient helicopters’, a view supported by Cameron, but obviously refuted by Brown. On Walton’s view, “a question is said to be loaded where the respondent is not committed to a presupposition of the question” (1997: 18), which amounts to the argumentation fallacy of combining several questions into one, i.e. the *fallacy of many questions* (Walton 1981). According to him, a proposition is a presupposition of a question if and only if the respondent becomes committed to that proposition when s/he gives a direct answer to the question. Irrespective of whether he answers ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the Prime Minister is trapped by Cameron’s question, because in either case he becomes committed to the presupposition ‘the British forces did not have sufficient helicopters’, which is contrary to his position and line of argumentation. A loaded question, as shown by Walton, contains a bias towards one side of some controversial issue in that it contains propositions that are implicitly presupposed by the question. The implicit presupposition is treated as an established fact and thereby its illocutionary force is meant to challenge, accuse and embarrass the Prime Minister. Since it puts pressure on the respondent, it is a rhetorical strategy frequently used by MPs in questions addressed to the Prime Minister.

Cameron is obviously dissatisfied with the Prime Minister’s answer in (6) and since he is entitled, as Leader of the Opposition, to ask several follow-up questions (Ilie 2015b), he takes advantage of this opportunity to rephrase and reiterate a follow-up question, as illustrated in Excerpt (7) below.

- (7) Mr. David Cameron (Witney) (Con): That answer sums up this premiership. The Prime Minister takes no responsibility and always blames somebody else. Why can he not just admit something that everybody knows to be true – that there were not enough helicopters? Let us listen to Colonel Stuart Tootal, former commander of 3 Para. He said: “repeated demands for more helicopters fell on deaf ears. It increased risk for my paratroopers, but” as he put it, “the decision-makers” – yes, the Ministers – “were not the ones driving into combat when we should have been flying in.” [...]
- The Prime Minister [Gordon Brown, Lab]: We have increased the number of helicopters in Afghanistan. We have increased the flying time by more than 100 per cent. I think that the right hon. Gentleman should recognise that the Merlins were adapted, and are now in Afghanistan. He should also recognise

that the Chinooks were also adapted, so that they, too, can be in Afghanistan. He should recognise that we have other helicopters in Afghanistan that are working, and we are part of an international operation in Afghanistan, where we share equipment with our coalition partners. [...] I think that he should accept that our troops, for the operations that they are asked to undertake, have been given the equipment that they need. That is the right position.

(Hansard, 7 April 2010, col 961–962)

The parliamentary confrontational question-answer practice is largely ritualistic and role-related, but it can take unpredictable forms depending on the rhetorical skills and power balance between the interlocutors. Being dissatisfied with Prime Minister Brown's answer illustrated in (6), Cameron prefaces his follow-up question with two strongly accusatory speech acts, first a negative metadiscursive evaluation of the Prime Minister's answer ("That answer sums up this premiership"), and second, a negative metadiscursive evaluation of the Prime Minister's action, or lack of it, proved by the unwillingness to assume his responsibility ("The Prime Minister takes no responsibility and always blames somebody else"). Since Cameron's speaking turn occurs in a question-asking slot, he formulates his next utterance as a confirmation-eliciting question which apparently functions as a directive speech act expecting an explanation: "Why can he not just admit something that everybody knows to be true – that there were not enough helicopters?". However, pragmatically, this question carries presuppositions about taken-for-granted statements ("everybody knows to be true", "there were not enough helicopters") that obviously incriminate the respondent, i.e. the Prime Minister. And, in addition to being a loaded question, it also suggests its own answer that can be paraphrased as: 'There is no reason why he shouldn't admit something that anybody knows to be true [...]', and which actually implies 'He should admit what people know to be true [...]'. Thereby, this question counts as a particular type of non-standard question, viz. *rhetorical question*, which has the illocutionary force of a question and the perlocutionary effect of a statement (Ilie 1994, 2015a). In other words, a rhetorical question is meant to be heard as a question and to be understood as a statement.

Rhetorically, speakers tend to use a popular appeal (i.e. *ad populum argument*) in an attempt to emphasise their commitment to the presuppositions of their message and to strengthen the persuasive force meant to affect the audience (Walton 1998, 2013). This is precisely what Cameron is doing when he justifies his accusations by claiming that "people know to be true (that there were not enough helicopters)". The popular appeal is an emotional appeal addressed to the multiple audiences of MPs, citizens and voters, and aimed to arouse the feelings and enthusiasms of the public. However, due to a tendency to overgeneralize and exaggerate, this kind of appeal is often perceived as a fallacious argument. As Walton (1998)

pointed out, a popular appeal can function as a fully valid argument only if it is seriously substantiated with sufficient, relevant and verifiable evidence. By resorting to sweeping generalisations whose validity can hardly be proved, Cameron's popular appeal risks failing to trigger the intended impact or the expected perlocutionary effect. To add further support to his accusations targeted at the Prime Minister, he resorts to a rhetorical appeal to authority, i.e. *ad verecundiam*, by providing quotes from a former commander and from the Foreign Office Minister, who in principle can be regarded as relevant authorities on the issue under discussion. These quotes are used as interdiscursive mechanisms in that they make specific reference to preceding discourses, thus allowing the speaker to adhere to or, in this case, to demonstratively dissociate him from the quoted message and its implications. What is embarrassing and potentially damaging for the Prime Minister is the fact that negative evaluations about the insufficient number of helicopters were allegedly made by members of his own government. At the same time, this appeal, which could theoretically function as an acceptable *ad verecundiam* argument, may nevertheless become fallacious when used selectively, as illustrated in (7) above, where the quotes are incomplete sentences taken out of context.

In his response, Prime Minister Brown refutes Cameron's strongly accusatory speech acts with challenging counter-statements (underlined in the text) in a rhetorical three-part list: "I think that the right hon. Gentleman should recognise that the Merlins were adapted [...]" ; "He should also recognise that the Chinooks were also adapted [...]" ; "He should recognise that we have other helicopters in Afghanistan that are working". By counter-attacking Cameron, his intention is to redress the balance of power: while Cameron as questioner places the responsibility on the Prime Minister as respondent (e.g. through loaded questions and rhetorical questions), Prime Minister Brown seeks to achieve an interactive reversal of roles by redirecting the responsibility back to the questioner. Thus, to further enhance the illocutionary force of his message, the Prime Minister rounds off the response by reiterating his initial refutation: "I think that he should accept that our troops [...] have been given the equipment that they need." The rhetorical force of this statement derives from the use of the same speech act verb he used in Excerpt (6) – "accept" –, but this time its purpose is not to refute an accusation ("I do not accept ..."), but rather to challenge Cameron to change his standpoint: "I think that he [Cameron] should accept X."

5. Conclusions

The focus of this chapter was on the impact of the pragma-rhetorical approach, as an integrative analytical approach at the pragmatics-rhetoric interface, on the study of political discourse by accounting, at micro- and macro-level, bottom-up and top-down, for context-based language-shaped and language-shaping interpersonal and institutional interactions in terms of socio-cultural practices, institutional co-performance actions, power struggle tactics, political deliberation and political goals. The viewpoints advanced in this study challenge the misconception according to which pragmatics takes an exclusively bottom-up view to the detriment of a top-down view. The fine-grained, multi-layered approaches to political discourse provided by pragmatics have been complemented with the analytical tools of rhetoric (rhetorical appeals, persuasive argumentation mechanisms) so as to better address the challenges of political discourse genres that tend to display increasing heterogeneity and multiple goal-settings while targeting a wider and more diverse range of audiences.

Although they display differences in analytical focus, the theoretical orientations of rhetoric and pragmatics complement each other in various ways. Integrating the two approaches involves joining a rhetorical perspectivisation of pragmatic analysis and a pragmatic systematisation of rhetorical enquiry. A cross-fertilisation of pragmatics and rhetoric makes perfect sense if we keep in mind that pragmatics focuses on language as it is used by human beings, whereas rhetoric focuses on human beings as they use language.

While the rhetoric of political discourse focuses on the persuasive techniques and argumentative strategies of political agents engaged in eloquent, effective and/or competitive verbal interaction, the focus of the pragmatics of political discourse is on mechanisms of construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of deliberative, confrontational and adversarial interactions underpinning the political power struggle and meaning negotiation practices that are constitutive of political institutions and processes. The pragma-rhetorical approach used in this study makes it possible to scrutinise the interplay of the following analytical perspectives: the interlocutors' shifting (institutional and interpersonal) roles and their relationships with their addressees and with third parties, the interlocutors' cooperative and conflicting goals, the dialogic patterns of argumentation between political adversaries, the ongoing meaning negotiation between interlocutors, the interplay of MPs' face-threatening and face-enhancing or face-saving speech acts, and the argumentative strategies displaying the interdependence between the interlocutors' rational and emotional discourse patterns.

To illustrate the use of a pragma-rhetorical approach in the analysis of political discourse, I have concentrated on the analysis of representative and compatible features of two political discourse genres: (a) contextualization strategies through meaning negotiation and re-negotiation in political interviews, and (b) metadiscourse framing strategies in question-answer sequencing in parliamentary debates. The analysis of contextualization-relevant issues has been illustrated with a case study based on a comparative analysis of two interviews conducted with Hillary Clinton and with Barack Obama during the much publicized 2008 US presidential election campaign. The content, presuppositions and implications of the two candidates' responses to the interviewer's questions have been examined and discussed from a pragma-rhetorical perspective, in terms of the illocutionary force of speech acts and pronominal deixis, on the one hand, and of the rhetorical topoi and argument types, on the other. When answering the interviewer's questions, both democratic candidates-cum-interviewees have put forward similar ideas and policy proposals. The advantage of the pragma-rhetorical approach is that it can systematically highlight the micro- and macro-level differences between the specific discourse-driven tactics by means of which each of the two candidates tried to position him/herself as a political frontrunner.

The analysis of metadiscourse framing strategies in question-answer sequencing has been illustrated with a case study based on the questioning and answering practices during a PMQs session in the UK Parliament featuring an adversarial encounter between the Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the leader of the Opposition David Cameron. The findings show that, unlike the questioning strategies in courtroom interaction, which are meant to elicit specific answers and to rule out unsuitable ones, parliamentary questioning strategies (Ilie 1999, 2015a), especially during PMQs, are not intended to elicit particular answers, but rather to score points by criticizing, accusing, embarrassing and/or challenging the respondent/the Prime Minister to make uncomfortable, damaging or self-revealing declarations. Parliamentary metadiscourse is often intended to enable multiple audiences (specifically addressed MPs, listening MPs, journalists, parliamentary reporters, general public, TV viewers) to identify significant shifts and overlaps between the MPs' and Prime Minister's institutional, personal, and interpersonal levels of discourse during their adversarial interactions.

While contextualization strategies in political interviews and metadiscourse framing strategies in parliamentary questioning-answering practices involve micro-level confrontations between interactants, the overall event in which they are embedded belongs to a wider macro-level societal context. This is particularly noticeable as role distribution, individual- and group-positioning, interpersonal relations, and power balance are managed through multifunctional, interactive and audience-targeted pragma-rhetorical mechanisms.

References

- Althaus, Scott L. 2012. "What's Good and Bad in Political Communication Research? Normative Standards for Evaluating Media and Citizen Performance." In *The Sage Handbook of Political Communication*, ed. by Holli A. Semetko, and Margaret Scammell, 97–112. London, UK and Thousand Oaks, US: SAGE Publications Limited. doi:10.4135/9781446201015.n9
- Aronoff, Myron J., and Jan Kubik. 2013. *Anthropology and Political Science: A Convergent Approach*. Berghahn Books.
- Atkins, J., Alan Finlayson, James Martin, and Nick Turnbull (eds). 2014. *Rhetoric in British Politics and Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Austin, John Langshaw. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bates, Stephen R., Peter Kerr, Christopher Byrne, and Liam Stanley. 2012. "Questions to the Prime Minister: A Comparative Study of PMQs from Thatcher to Cameron." *Parliamentary Affairs* 2: 1–28.
- Bhatia, Aditi. 2006. "Critical Discourse Analysis of Political Press Conferences." *Discourse & Society* 17(2): 173–203. doi:10.1177/0957926506058057
- Bitzer, Lloyd. 1968. The Rhetorical Situation. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1: 1–14.
- Booth, Wayne C. 1974. *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bull, Peter. 2000. "New Labour, New Rhetoric? An Analysis of the Rhetoric of Tony Blair." In *Beyond Public Speech and Symbols: Explorations in the Rhetoric of Politicians and the Media*, ed. by Christ'l De Landtsheer, and Ofer Feldman, 3–16. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Charteris-Black, J. 2005. *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Chilton, Paul A. 2004. *Analysing Political Discourse. Theory and practice*. London: Routledge.
- Covino, William A., and David A. Jolliffe. 1995. *Rhetoric: Concepts, Definitions, Boundaries*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Cummings, Louise. 2005. *Pragmatics: A Multidisciplinary Perspective*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- De Fina, Anna 1995. "Pronominal Choice, Identity and Solidarity in Political Discourse." *Text* 15 (3): 379–410. doi:10.1515/text.1.1995.15.3.379
- Degano, Chiara. 2014. "Presidential Press Conferences: An Analysis of a Dialogic Genre." In *Genres and Genre Theory in Transition: Specialized Discourses Across Media and Modes*, ed. by Giuliana Garzone, and Cornelia Ilie). Boca Raton, FA: BrownWalker Press.
- De Landtsheer, Christ'l, and Ofer Feldman (eds). 2000. *Beyond Public Speech and Symbols: Explorations in the Rhetoric of Politicians and the Media*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Drew, Paul. 2018. "The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 59–83. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.o4dre
- Ducrot, Oswald. 1980. "Analyses Pragmatiques." *Communications* 32: 11–60.
- Ducrot, Oswald. 1984. *Le Dire et le Dit*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
- Elliott, Judy, and Peter Bull. 1996. "A question of threat: face threats in questions posed during televised political interviews." *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 6: 49–72.

- Fetzer, Anita (ed). 2013. *The Pragmatics of Political Discourse: Explorations Across Cultures*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.228
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Finlayson, Alan. 2007. "From Beliefs to Arguments: Interpretive Methodology and Rhetorical Political Analysis." *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 9(4): 545–563.
- Franklin, Mark, and Philip Norton (eds). 1993. *Parliamentary Questions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fraser, Bruce. 2010. "Hedging in Political Discourse: The Bush 2007 Press Conferences." In *Perspectives in Politics and Discourse*, ed. by Urszula Okulska, and Piotr Cap, 201–214. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/dapsac.36.16fra
- Grice, H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics Vol. 3, Speech acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry L. Morgan, 59–82. New York: Academic Press.
- Hahn, Dan F. 2003. *Political Communication: Rhetoric, Government, and Citizens*. 2nd edition. State College PA: Strata Publishing.
- Harris, Sandra. 1991. "Evasive Action: How Politicians Respond to Questions in Political Interviews." In *Broadcast talk*, ed. by Paddy Scannell, 76–99. London: Sage.
- Harris, Sandra, Karen Grainger, and Louise Mullany. 2006. "The Pragmatics of Political Apologies." *Discourse & Society* 17(6): 715–737. doi:10.1177/0957926506068429
- Herrick, James A. 2001. *The History and Theory of Rhetoric: An Introduction*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Hymes, D. H. 1972. "On communicative competence." In *Sociolinguistics*, ed. by J. B. Pride and J. Holmes, 269–293. London: Penguin.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 1994. *What Else Can I Tell You? A Pragmatic Study of English Rhetorical Questions as Discursive and Argumentative Acts*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 1999. "Question-Response Argumentation in Talk Shows." *Journal of Pragmatics* 31(8): 975–999. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(99)00056-9
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2000. "Cliché-Based Metadiscursive Argumentation in the Houses of Parliament." *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 10(1): 65–84. doi:10.1111/j.1473-4192.2000.tb00140.x
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2003a. "Discourse and Metadiscourse in Parliamentary Debates." *Journal of Language and Politics* 1(2): 269–291.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2003b. "Parenthetically Speaking: Parliamentary Parentheticals as Rhetorical Strategies." In *Dialogue Analysis 2000: Selected Papers from the 10th IADA Anniversary Conference*, Bologna 2000, ed. by Marina Bondi, and Sorin Stati, 253–264. Tübingen: Niemeyer. doi:10.1515/9783110933253.253
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2004. "Insulting as (Un)parliamentary Practice in the British and Swedish Parliaments: A Rhetorical Approach." In *Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse*, ed. by P. Bayley, 45–86. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/dapsac.10.02ili
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2006. "Towards a Pragma-Rhetorical Approach: From Rhetoric to Pragmatics and Beyond." In *Pragmatics*, ed. by Ashok Thorat, 16–37. Institute of Advanced Studies in English, Aundh, Pune.

- Ilie, Cornelia. 2008. "Talking the Talk, Walking the Walk: Candidate Profiles in Election Campaign Interviews". In *L'analisi linguistica e letteraria* XVI, Special Issue, 2, ed. by Giovanni Gobber, Sibilla Cantarini, Sara Cigada, Maria Cristina Gatti and Silvia Gilardoni, 543–557. (Proceedings of the IADA Workshop Word Meaning in Argumentative Dialogue – Homage to Sorin Stati).
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2009a. "Strategies of Refutation by Definition: A Pragma-Rhetorical Approach to Refutations in American Public Speech." In *Pondering on Problems of Argumentation. Twenty Essays on Theoretical Issues*, ed. by Frans H. van Eemeren, and Bart Garssen, 35–51. Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9165-0_4
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2009b. "Argumentative Functions of Parentheticals in Parliamentary Debates." In *Discourse and politics*, ed. by Gloria Álvarez-Benito, Gabriela Fernández-Díaz, and Isabel Íñigo-Mora, 61–79. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2010a. "Strategic Uses of Parliamentary Forms of Address: The Case of the U.K. Parliament and the Swedish Riksdag." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(4): 885–911. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.08.017
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2010b. "Identity Co-Construction in Parliamentary Discourse Practices." In *European Parliaments under Scrutiny: Discourse Strategies and Interaction Practices*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, 57–78. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/dapsac.38.04ili
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2011. "The Gender Divide in Election Campaign Interviews: Questioning Barack Obama and Calling into Question Hillary Clinton." *Redescriptions – Yearbook of Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory* 15: 125–148. doi:10.7227/R.15.1.7
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2013. "Gendering Confrontational Rhetoric: Discursive Disorder in the British and Swedish Parliaments." *Democratization* 20(3): 501–521. doi:10.1080/13510347.2013.786547
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2015a. "Questions and Questioning." In *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction*, ed. by Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie, and Todd Sandel, Boston: John Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118611463.wbielsi202
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2015b. "Follow-ups as Multifunctional Questioning and Answering Strategies in Prime Minister's Questions." In *The dynamics of political discourse: Forms and functions of follow-ups*, ed. by Anita Fetzer, Elda Weizman and Lawrence N. Berlin. 195–218. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.259.08ili
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2016. "Parliamentary Discourse and Deliberative Rhetoric". In *Parliaments and parliamentarism: A Comparative History of Disputes about a European Concept*, ed. by Pasi Ihalainen, Cornelia Ilie, and Kari Palonen, 133–145. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
- Ilie, Cornelia and Cezar Ornatowski. 2016. "Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Rhetoric since the Nineteenth Century: The Case of Romania and Poland." In *Parliaments and Parliamentarism: A Comparative History, of Disputes about a European Concept*, ed. by Pasi Ihalainen, Cornelia Ilie, and Kari Palonen, 192–215. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2017a. "Questioning the Questionable: Arguments and Counter-arguments in Political Accountability Interviews." In *Argumentation across Communities of Practice: Multi-disciplinary Perspectives*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Giuliana Garzone. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/aic.10.05ile
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2017b. "Parliamentary Debates." In *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Politics* (section "Genres for Political Action"), ed. by Ruth Wodak, and Bernhard Forchtner. Oxon: Routledge.

- Jiang, Xiangying. 2006. "Cross-cultural Pragmatic Differences in US and Chinese Press Conferences: The Case of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis." *Discourse & Society* 17(2): 237–257. doi:10.1177/0957926506060249
- Kennedy, George A. 1999[1980]. *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Kienpointner, Manfred. 2013. "Strategic Maneuvering in the Political Rhetoric of Barack Obama." *Journal of Language and Politics* 12(3): 357–377. doi:10.1075/jlp.12.3.03kie
- Klotz, Peter. 1999. "Politeness and Political Correctness: Ideological Implications." *Pragmatics* 9(1): 155–161. doi:10.1075/prag.9.1.08klo
- Kramer, Elise. 2011. "The Playful is Political: The Metapragmatics of Internet Rape-joke Arguments." *Language in Society* 40 (2): 137–168. doi:10.1017/S0047404511000017
- Lauerbach, Gerda. 2004. "Political Interviews as Hybrid Genre." *Text* 24(3): 353–397. doi:10.1515/text.2004.015
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London and New York: Longman.
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 2014. *The Pragmatics of Politeness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341386.001.0001
- Levinson, Stephen. 1979. "Activity Types and Language." *Linguistics* 17: 356–399.
- Lewellen, Ted C. 2003. *Political Anthropology: An Introduction*, 3rd edition. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Lovenduski, Joni. 2012. "Prime Minister's Questions as Political Ritual." *British Politics* 7(4): 314–340. doi:10.1057/bp.2012.13
- Martin, James. 2014. *Politics and Rhetoric: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Martin, James, Judi Atkins, Alan Finlayson, and Nick Turnbull (eds.). 2014. *Rhetoric in British Politics and Society*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meyer, Michel. 2010. "The Brussels School of Rhetoric: From the New Rhetoric to Problematology." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 43(4): 403–429.
- Morris, Charles. 1938. *Foundation of the Theory of Signs*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Norrick, Neal R. 2018. "Narrative Studies versus Pragmatics (of Narrative)." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 122–142. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.06nor
- Norris, Pippa. 2005. "Political Communications." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, ed. by James D. Wright. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Nunberg, Geoffrey. 1993. "Indexicality and Deixis." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 16: 1–43. doi:10.1007/BF00984721
- Ornatowski, Cezar M. 2012. "The Idea of Politics in Political Rhetoric." *Forum Artis Rhetoricae* 2: 7–21.
- Perelman, Chaïm, and Lucie Olbrecht-Tyteca. 2006[1969]. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Trans. John Wilkinson, and Purell Weaver. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Reicher, Stephen, and Nicolas Hopkins. 1996. "Self-category Constructions in Political Rhetoric: An Analysis of Thatcher's and Kinnock's Speeches Concerning the British Miners' Strike (1984–85)." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26(3): 353–371. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199605)26:3<353::AID-EJSP757>3.0.CO;2-O
- Richards, Ivor Armstrong. 1965. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. Oxford University Press.
- Rorty, Richard (ed.). 1967. *The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Rogers, Robert, and Rhodri Walters. 2006. *How Parliament Works* (6th ed.). Oxford: Routledge.

- Roulet, Eddy. 1996. "Polyphony." In *Handbook of Pragmatics*, ed. by J. Verschueren, Jan-Ola Östman, and Jan Blommaert. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Sanders, R. E. 1978. "Utterances, Actions, and Rhetorical Inquiry." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11(2): 114–133.
- Schäffner, Christina (ed). 1997. *Analyzing Political Speeches*. London: Short Run Press.
- Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173438
- Searle, John R. 1976. "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts." *Language in Society* 5(1): 1–23. doi:10.1017/S0047404500006837
- Searle, John R. 1989. "How Performatives Work." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12(5): 535–558. doi:10.1007/BF00627773
- Subramanian, Ajantha. 2012. "Political Anthropology." In *Anthropology*, ed. by John L. Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Toulmin, Stephen E. 1958. *The Uses of Argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Turnbull, Nick. 2017. "Political Rhetoric and Its Relationship to Context: A New Theory of the Rhetorical Situation, the Rhetorical and the Political." *Critical Discourse Studies* 14(2): 115–131.
- Tzanne, Angeliki. 1999. *Talking at Cross-Purposes: The Dynamics of Miscommunication*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Vincent, Joan (ed). 2002. *The Anthropology of Politics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Walton, Douglas N. 1981. "The Fallacy of Many Questions." *Logique et Analyse* 95–96: 291–313.
- Walton, Douglas N. 1989. *Question-Reply Argumentation*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Walton, Douglas N. 1997. "Judging How Heavily a Question is Loaded: A Pragmatic Method." *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines*, vol. 17, 53–71.
- Walton, Douglas N. 1998. *Appeal to Popular Opinion*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Walton, Douglas N. 2010. *Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority*. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press.
- Walton, Douglas N. 2013. *Methods of Argumentation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139600187
- Willis, Ken. 2002. *Making Sense of Humour: Some Pragmatic and Political Aspects*. PhD thesis. London Metropolitan University.
- Wilson, John. 1990. *Politically Speaking: The Pragmatic Analysis of Political Language*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Narrative studies versus pragmatics (of narrative)

Neal R. Norrick

Saarland University, Germany

This chapter considers the interface between pragmatics and narrative studies, initially with reference to Labovian, conversation analytic (CA) and psycholinguistic approaches to narrative, where common ground is found between these and more properly pragmatic approaches in such topics as tellability and telling rights, along with a shared interest in micro-analytic matters of how tense shifts signal perspective, how discourse markers and repetition mark narrative boundaries and the like. Then it introduces a specifically pragmatic perspective on narrative, considering recurrent functions of stories roughly at the illocutionary level, including both direct and indirect speech acts. This constitutes a top-down, macro-pragmatic perspective on narrative, significantly distinct from CA considerations of epistemic justification for telling or psycholinguistic matters of identity construction.

Keywords: bottom up – top down, discourse marker, formulaicity, macro – micro, narrative, slot, speech act, tellability

1. Introduction

The interface between pragmatics and narrative studies can be viewed with reference to Labovian and structuralist narratology, conversation analysis (CA), interactional sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic approaches to narrative; common ground between these and more properly pragmatic approaches is to be found in the topics of tellability and telling rights, and in a shared interest in micro-analytic matters of how tense shifts signal perspective, how discourse markers and repetition mark narrative boundaries and the like. In this chapter, to help clarify the specifically pragmatic contribution to the study of narrative, we will look at both bottom-up analysis of the details of the telling performance and outline a top-down approach to the sorts of slots stories fill in interaction and what tellers accomplish with them.

Structuralist narratology (from Todorov 1969) on, seeks recurrent patterns in narratives, and along with literary approaches to narrative, it has led to interest in structural matters such as story versus plot and the discursive representation of events, the differences between first person and third person (omniscient) narration, the representation of speech (and thought) and free indirect discourse (see Culler 1975; Chatman 1978; Prince 1973), generally without much sense of how tellers obtain and hold the floor, how they interact with their listeners, how they deploy discourse markers and repetition to organize the telling performance, and what they accomplish with narratives in contexts, so that there has been little overlap with pragmatics till recently (see Fludernik 1996; Herman ed. 1999). Literary scholars have integrated aspects of speech act theory into narratology, and a number of them, such as Pratt (1977), Kearns (1999) and Bernaert (2010), have granted it a prominent and permanent position in their narratological models: compare the more linguistic perspectives of Watts (1981) and Toolan (1998). All these sources basically argue from the inside out that what authors, narrators and characters do with words – i.e., the illocutionary force or point of the represented utterances – is a distinguishable and intrinsic part of the meaning of a text. That is, speech act theory has been drawn upon to analyze the force of what narrators and characters say in individual turns/moves, based on long fictional texts. But a rather different pragmatic perspective from the outside in concerning narrative in conversation would consider what a whole story does in illocutionary terms, acting as an excuse, a warning, a confession and so on, and we will consider such a perspective below.

Labov originally collected stories as sociolinguistic data, then became interested in the stories themselves, but his stories were elicited as examples and not taken from conversations or meetings or even interviews, so their functions were not at issue. Research in the Labovian tradition (Labov and Waletzky 1967; Labov 1972) has generally oriented itself on structural issues, with the exception of the notion of reportability, which affects where and when a story can be told, and thereby becomes a pragmatic matter. Since Labov worked on stories elicited as such rather than those which arise naturally in the course of interaction, his view of what is reportable remains tied to story content without regard for how stories fit into topical conversation. More recent research has come to see the tellability of a story as something conversationalists negotiate in the given context, rather than an inherent property of the (detached) content of a story. Tellability is one of the gradient dimensions of narrative, in the sense of Ochs and Capps (2001), something negotiated by the teller and the listeners in particular local contexts. The tellability of a story depends not only on its (detached) content but also on its contextual (embedded) relevance for the participants involved. Thus, family dinner-table talk reveals children routinely telling familiar stories and relating unnewsworthy tales at the request of their parents as a part of the socialization process. Indeed,

conversationalists often tell stories familiar to some or even all their listeners, and it is precisely the familiarity of story content which influences participation rights, since it presents the opportunity for significant co-narration. Familiar funny stories are typically prefaced in ways which label them as unoriginal (e.g., “remember the time we ...”) and yet these signals animate participants to involvement rather than cuing them to question the relevance and tellability of the stories. The tellability of familiar stories hinges not on their content as such but on the dynamics of the narrative event itself, and humor makes co-narration desirable.

Tellability, in this latter sense of how appropriate stories arise in talk, has been a concern in CA, with its focus on sequentiality, and with determining how conversationalists obtain and hold the floor to tell a story, how they preface and close stories. Sacks (1992) repeatedly addressed the matter of the epistemic justification for telling a story. In ‘Doing Being Ordinary’ Sacks (1984) discusses entitlement to tell stories through having witnessed and being in some way affected by the events reported. He found that speakers routinely include in their stories epistemic grounds upon which the report is based, and tell how they were affected by the events they report. Sacks also concerned himself with how certain narrative practices may constitute claims to membership in a group. Here again essentially pragmatic issues are addressed: how do interactants negotiate the initiation, trajectory and closing of stories, who tells, to whom, and to what effect, what are the linguistic means of getting the story told, receiving it and transitioning into further stories or back to turn-by-turn talk. Thus, there is a fairly substantial literature on stories told specifically in response to other stories in conversation, especially Sacks comments on second stories at various points in his lectures (1992), and Ryave’s (1978) work on achieving a series of stories as well as my own work on response stories (Norrick 2000, 2010). Foregoing stories or series of stories place constraints on what can appropriately be told as a next story: in responding to a personal story with a story of one’s own, the two must be topically coherent; in responding to a story about some third person, the next story should concern the same person or another, perhaps related person, in a similar situation, reflecting the same basic theme and the same basic stance, if possible.

The construction of identity through narrative has been a primary consideration in much psycholinguistic research, especially in investigations of narratives of personal experience. Storytelling is always bound up with identity display (Goffman 1981; Schiffrin 1996), not just in the stories one tells, but how they are fitted into group interaction, and how listeners receive them and respond with stories of their own. Storytelling enables identity display in conversation with family, friends and colleagues, through positioning (Bamberg 2004) the teller vis-à-vis characters in the *storyworld* and listeners in the interaction, expressing support or disapproval through assessing, agreeing and disagreeing (Raymond and Heritage

2006; Pomerantz 1984), for instance, a mother telling stories about her daughter (Gordon 2007; Tannen 2007; cf. Ochs, Taylor, Rudolph and Smith 1992), students in various cliques at school (Eckert 1989), young women talking about relationships (Georgakopoulou 2007). Co-narration, team performance (Norrick 2004), twice-told tales (Norrick 1997), collaborative fantasy (Norrick 2000) all accrue to bonding and high rapport. Not just telling but also listening practices serve the needs of identity display, aligning tellers and listeners, demonstrating (im)politeness and coordinating interaction through nodding, smiling, and laughing together. Of course we do identity in choosing to tell stories and in the way we tell them, but a top-down pragmatic approach would ask what these stories are told to accomplish, even as they necessarily contribute to personal and group identity. The whole question of (illocutionary) act potential and storytelling has yet to be addressed systematically, though there have been studies, e.g., of how stories function to accuse, to plead innocent and to present evidence in trials.

When we take an outside-in, top-down pragmatic perspective on stories, we find separate functions tied to narratives of personal and vicarious experience. When I tell a story about something wrong or foolish I did myself, it counts as confessing, and when I attempt to justify my actions, it can be a matter of making excuses. But a story about the transgressions of someone else will count as an accusation or criticism. Bragging and praise similarly diverge on the basis of first person versus third person vicarious narration. Narratives of both kinds might be told as exempla, but personal ones will always tend to sound like confessing and bragging respectively, and the overall effects will presumably differ. We need a pragmatic perspective on narrative to sort out these functional matters, not just in personal contexts, but in institutional ones and in the workplace. Developing just such a perspective is a primary goal of this chapter, but we must first address certain features of getting the story told from the bottom up to get a sense of what pragmatics has to offer to the study of narrative. Then we move on to a top-down consideration of what stories can accomplish in interaction with attention to characteristic slots stories fill and the matter of direct force versus indirect force, leading to a genuinely pragmatic perspective on storytelling.

2. Getting the story told: The bottom-up perspective

Discourse markers, repetition, formulaicity, disfluencies and tense shifts are linguistic devices deployed by storytellers to guide listeners through a narrative performance. The study of such phenomena constitutes a genuinely pragmatic perspective on narrative from the bottom up, although, as we shall see, the research comes from diverse theoretical approaches.

Although the term ‘discourse marker’ was coined by William Labov (Labov and Fanshel 1977), sociolinguist par excellence and founder of the linguistic study of narrative, and popularized by Schiffrin (1986), herself an interactional sociolinguist, with her monumental *Discourse markers: Studies in interactional sociolinguistics* (note specifically the subtitle), the study of discourse markers has generally been taken to be the province of pragmatics, because discourse markers are words with functions but no meanings of their own. According to the original definition of Schiffrin (1986), discourse markers constitute a proper sub-class of pragmatic markers, namely those which signal the relation of the basic move to the foregoing turn (compare Fraser 1996). Schiffrin calls discourse markers: “sequentially dependent elements which bracket units of talk” (1986: 31). They focus on interaction and relations between propositional speech acts, indicating contrast, conclusion, elaboration, transition and so on. As such, discourse markers play a crucial role in the organization of oral narrative. First off, the discourse marker *and* expresses the quintessential narrative relation of sequentiality, based in Labov’s definition of the minimal narrative as two clauses with a temporal juncture. Thus, the two clauses connected by *and* below are not just connected in narrative contexts, they are understood as describing actions which occurred in the same order as the clauses describing them:

- (1) 1 Alice slipped on the pier
2 and fell into the lake

In Gricean terms, narrative *and* means what it means but also invites a generalized conversational implicature that more is at stake than simple concatenation: we hear sequentiality as well. Alternatively we might say that in storytelling contexts the discourse marker *and* insinuates more than just concatenation or sequentiality, there’s also the implication of narrative development. In the narrative performance *and* routinely conveys the sense of ‘and then’ or ‘and therefore’, as in the first three lines below, as well as sometimes simply adding on background information and evaluation as in the last two lines.

- (2) 1 I looked down the bench,
2 and he like looked at me,
3 and I’m like, “oh no.”
4 and he goes, “okay go in for Erin Potter,”
5 and there’s only like a minute left.
6 and so that’s even humiliating at that.

We have five *ands* in a row in initial position here – not in itself at all unusual in spoken narrative – but the first three signal temporal juncture, while the last two

introduce further orientation without moving the narrative forward, and thus they are distinct from the preceding typical narrative *ands*.

Moreover, the discourse marker *and* may convey the force of 'and then' or 'and therefore' with relation to an extended foregoing passage rather than just to the immediately preceding unit. Thus, in the passage below, the final line 'and finally she left him' can be heard either as the narrative event following the threatening or as the cumulative effect of the whole series of connected actions:

- (3) 1 Alice asked Joe to quit.
 2 she reasoned with him,
 3 she pleaded with him,
 4 and she threatened him,
 5 and finally she left him.

Of course, in this passage *finally* conspires with *and* to deliver the sense that Alice leaves as the result of the whole series of actions. As in Schiffrin's definition of discourse markers as items that bracket units of talk, the discourse marker *and* can bracket a single preceding unit or a series of connected units. As passages like these last suggest, *and* is the most frequent discourse marker in oral narrative, and the most frequent initial item in individual narrative intonation units.

Further, Minami (1998) demonstrates that Japanese storytellers employ particular linguistic devices as specifically narrative discourse markers keyed on the verse/stanza organization of Japanese oral personal narratives. Norrick (2001) shows that oral storytellers strategically deploy discourse markers, along with disfluencies, repetition and formulaicity to mark specific narrative elements and transitions. In oral storytelling in English, the discourse markers *well* and *but* are keyed on participant expectations about narrative structures and storytelling procedures, they initiate and conclude narrative action, they guide listeners back to the main sequence of narrative elements following interruptions and digressions, and even listeners can invoke *well* and *but* to re-orient the primary teller to the expected order of narrative presentation.

Significantly, research in the budding area of corpus pragmatics (see Rühlemann and Clancy, this volume) is showing how discourse markers function in combination with constructed dialogue in oral storytelling. Indeed, storytellers often have recourse to interjections and discourse markers to signal the onset of constructed dialogue: see Aijmer (1987:83), Biber et al. (1999:1118–1119) and Rühlemann (2007:139–143). Rühlemann notes that interjections as constructed dialogue openers are often used in passages including multiple occurrences of constructed speech, as in the example below from the *Longman Spoken and Written English Corpus* (AC 167101), where the initial instance of dialogue begins with an interjection and the next three with the discourse marker *oh*.

- (4) 1 so I brought them up to the desk,
 2 and I said “gee I don’t see a price these um,”
 3 and she said “oh I, no let me see.”
 4 “Oh,” she says “I think these go in a in a tray.”
 5 and I said “oh I don’t want the tray,”

The recursion of the discourse marker *oh* here helps suggest the increasingly antagonistic character of the interchange. Crucially, interjections and discourse markers do not just co-occur with constructed dialogue, they mark it as such. That is, they flag the inserted quotation on a meta-discoursal plane, thus providing a kind of auditory quotation mark at the beginning of the citted material. They acquire this additional discourse-deictic role by virtue of occurring significantly more often in first position in constructed dialogue than in regular conversational utterances (see Norrick 2015).

Particularly the use of discourse markers by listeners during conversational narrative performance has received critical attention. By contrast with simple continuers like *m-hm* and *uh-huh*, discourse markers such as *yeah*, *oh*, *really* and *so* allow the listener to express a more nuanced stance toward the developing narrative. Evidentials like *oh* or *hm* index receipt of and/or failure to assimilate new information, and can thereby elicit specific responses from the primary speaker engaged in a multi-unit turn. Information state tokens produced by listeners and their sequential implications are the primary focus in Norrick (2010), where it is shown that storytellers may orient to and construct their following turns in response to them. *Oh* is the prototypical information state token. Heritage (1984: 299) characterizes *oh* as a particle “used to propose that its producer has undergone some kind of a change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation or awareness.” He says *ohs* “provide a fugitive commentary on the speaker’s mind” (300) and cites Goffman (1981) as saying they “are taken to index directly the speaker’s state of mind.” This places *oh* among the standard means of expressing evidentiality rather than simple reciprocity. In the same vein, Schifffrin (1986) describes *oh* as a discourse marker within the participation framework of information state, again placing it within the domain of information – on beyond simple reciprocity and as opposed to emotion.

Tannen (1989) convincingly demonstrated the importance of formulaicity and repetition in spoken language generally. She and others such as Ong (1982), Heath (1982) and Norrick (2000) have demonstrated that formulaicity and repetition play a special organizational role in conversational storytelling. In oral storytelling generally, specialized formulas and repetitions of various kinds cluster around prefaces and codas, transition points and climaxes. One finds characteristic prefaces like *this one time*, climaxes like *and I said to myself ‘this is it’*, and codas like *and the rest*

is *history*. There are also formulaic focusing phrases like *it just so happened* in the excerpt below, which storytellers deploy to highlight central events or salient details shortly to come in their narratives and to guide recipients to their main point or evaluation. In this passage from the London-Lond Corpus, Betty is explaining why she has so far failed to finish up a piece of work. The formula *it just so happened* provides a serviceable means of focusing on factors which explain – and, she seems to hope, potentially excuse – her tardiness.

- (5) 1 Betty: as I say I,
 2 all that happened was I took it uh,
 3 Ian: m.
 4 Betty: um put it my usual folder.
 5 and of course as I haven't been back to work there.
 6 I haven't had it in my bag since you see.
 7 **it just so happened** that I went on holiday,
 8 and then this this school has come up you see.
 9 Ian: yes of course.
 10 Betty: but I uh,
 11 obviously y'know will will index it,
 12 and put it in the appropriate box.

In as much as *it just so happened* suggests some unexpected turn of events, it allows Betty to insinuate that the events related were beyond her control. Betty positions herself as surprised by the events and the formula helps align Ian with her in viewing the circumstances as unpredictable. In fact, Ian agrees and explicitly acknowledges his alignment with Betty, responding with 'yes, of course'. Such phrases presumably group with emphasis markers in the terminology of Fraser (1990). The formula highlights the teller's attitude, perspective or assessment of the actions reported, serving to position the teller epistemically: compare Mithun (1986) and Chafe (1986) on related phrases relating to expectations like *sure enough* and *of course*. Whatever else these units mean/do in narrative, they introduce central actions and establish focal points – although their ideational meaning is vague, their textual focusing function is clear (see Norrick 2014).

In addition to stock formulas one must consider the function of figurative formulas and the spontaneous creation of local formulaicity in storytelling (compare the notion of spontaneous formulaicity in Tannen 1987), including the repetition of key words and phrases within particular stories and from one story to the next as evidence of narrative strategies and structures. Besides serving an organizational function in storytelling, repetition can also intensify the dramatic effect of reported scenes and highlight the teller's evaluation.

The functions of tense shift – generally from the pure past to the historical present and back – to establish focus and to mark transitions in storytelling has been another locus of pragmatic research. Tense shift may signal a shift of teller attention during narrative performance, in line with observations by Johnstone (1987). Johnstone also suggests that specifically the alternation between *said* and *say* in constructed dialogue can reflect the relative status of the teller and the figure whose speech is recreated, while Schiffirin (1981) associates tense shift with evaluation in the sense of Labov. Other relevant sources on the alternation between the past tense and the (historical) present tense in conversational narrative in English are Wolfson (1982), Fleischmann (1990) and Chafe (1994). A general consensus has formed that the tenses themselves have no specific meaning, but that the alternation between them can partition one narrative event from another and/or signal a shift in perspective. In the snippet from a personal narrative about the first solo trip during driver training below, the teller is reporting talk in the present tense in the first three lines, then switches into the past to describe his action of pulling what he took to be the brake lever in line 4, then back to the present for the surprising event of the hood popping up, before returning to the past to describe first his own reaction then that of the driving instructor in lines 6–8.

- (6) 1 and he says, “okay, you got everything?”
 2 and I say yeah.
 3 he says, “okay, release the brake.”
 4 now I reached down and pulled it,
 5 and all of a sudden the hood, pops up. {chuckles}
 6 and then I looked at him,
 7 and he looked at me,
 8 and he just laughed.

The tense alternations here can certainly be treated as signaling shifts in perspective or even partitioning narrative events, but they also seem to correlate with factors such as reporting speech versus reporting actions, and also with framing the central event of the hood popping up – there is also a slight pause following the word *hood*, further serving to highlight the climactic ‘pops up’. Clearly, storytellers can manipulate tense for dramatic effect.

In this section I have reviewed representative results of bottom-up pragmatic research into oral narrative, in order to prepare the way for the discussion of the top-down perspective to narrative in the following section.

3. What stories do: The top-down perspective

We return now to the matter of what speech acts one can accomplish by telling a story, a clearly pragmatic perspective on narrative. In a more general approach to the pragmatics of discourse, Tsipakou and Floros (2013) recently suggested working from textual force rather than text type, essentially assigning to a text an illocutionary force in the sense of Searle (1969). But Tsipakou and Floros considered only direct forces, which artificially restricts the range of what tellers can accomplish with stories. For a more complete description of the discourse force of narrative one really needs to include both direct and indirect speech acts in the sense of Searle (1975). This would constitute a genuinely pragmatic perspective, an outside-in approach to narrative, different from concerns with epistemic justification, tellability and identity construction. My concern with the social functions of narratives in particular slots parallels Ilie's (this volume) approach through top-down analysis, and these functions are similar to the macro speech acts discussed by Fetzer, Holmes, Haugh and Culpeper (this volume). We need to ask: What discourse/cultural slots do we fill with stories, and maybe only with stories? And what slots cannot be filled with stories? And why?

Sacks (1992:465) stresses the contextual relevance and functioning of conversational storytelling:

They're not, then, doing simply telling a story for no good reason, or telling of something that happened once to somebody else, or that happens to people, but they're offering something that does something now, i.e. describes, explains, accounts for, our current circumstances – mine, yours, or mine and yours.

This notion is tied closely to the current participants and context of a storytelling. It encompasses a much wider range of purposes than I intend here, such as reminiscing, teasing a present participant, suggesting a course of action which might have been taken, expressing family coherence for outsider and so on. Such functions reflect an individual storytelling in a specific context rather than functions achievable with a certain kind of story in a range of (perhaps parallel) contexts. What I would like to get at here are recurrent functions of stories roughly at the illocutionary level of Searle (1969): this would constitute a genuinely pragmatic approach significantly different from the CA approach. For Sacks every storytelling is locally motivated, audience designed, and hence *sui generis*, so there's really no such thing as a story which gets recycled. But of course we all retell stories, and there are plenty of examples of people telling what are recognized by other participants as previously told stories in conversation. We save up stories to fill recurrent needs, to fit standard slots. Moreover, social situations set up slots for stories of different kinds: CA does not deal with stories of these kinds, and maybe it doesn't really need

to, since they do not arise in natural conversation, but pragmatics is not limited to everyday conversation: we ask how linguistic units, including stories, function in recurrent cultural contexts or speech events, as Hymes (1974) calls them.

4. Stories in story slots

There is no denying that stories may function simply as *representatives* in the sense of Searle (1969),¹ indeed that there are recognized contextual slots for stories of various types, for instance, when at bed time a child says ‘tell me a story’. We even have specific genre labels for stories in certain slots, as in ‘tell me a fairytale’. In this context, a story can be just a story, a pure representative, concerning people and events long ago and far away. It doesn’t DO anything in the context except fill the story slot. Now, there is no anomaly in finding direct speech acts we explicitly request: thus ‘apologize to your sister’ and ‘promise me that you’ll come’ call for specific direct speech acts of apologizing and promising respectively. In everyday contexts references to and requests for recycled stories are not uncommon. Thus, in the exchange below from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English, a story is requested to fill a typical story slot: it is still a function determined by context, representative with significance for teller identity, but no additional force like confessing or making excuses. Here three young women are talking about recent events when the term ‘quiet time’ reminds Judy of a story Ellen knows but Aya does not.

- (7) 1 Ellen: ... we were all having our quiet time.
 2 Judy: ((laughing)) you’ve heard **my story**,
 3 have you heard **my story**? ((laughing))
 4 Ellen: oh no.
 5 you gotta tell Aya **that story**,
 6 that’s funny.
 7 Aya: oh no.
 8 Judy: did I tell you **this story**?
 9 I was having a quiet time with Den out on Hendry Beach.
 10 and we were on the beach.
 11 but up away from the water,
 12 but on the sand.

1. Searle (1969) originally called this illocutionary force ‘representative’, then changed it to ‘assertive’ in 1975, but I prefer the original term in being more generally used and in not apparently presupposing commitment to truth, especially since stories often represent fictional worlds – see Searle (1979: viii fn), and discussion of fictional discourse (58–75).

A particular experience becomes part of a personal biography at least partially because a person formulates 'my story' about it and has this story ratified by friends in interaction, friends who associate a particular story with the teller and ask her to retell it for other friends.

Further, stories are typically representative in illocutionary terms in presenting justifications and explanations in contexts like the one in the passage below where a narrative accompanies an answer to a question:

- (8) 105 K: do you ski?
 106 B: no.
 107 I skied once, I tried to ski.
 108 I went part way down the slope,
 109 and tipped over ((laughs)).
 110 K: ((laughs)) that was it ((coughs)).
 111 B: everybody, everybody in the whole skis- class ...

Characteristically, the teller begins with a simple 'no', then offers a brief run-through of her story and waits for an initial recipient response, before she goes on to produce an extended narrative. The story instantiates a representative speech act of describing a past incident. In the current context, it fills a slot following 'no' in response to a question, to support and explain this 'no' answer.

Besides rituals such as children asking for stories at bedtime, certain events call for stories and provide specific slots for them, for instance:

the best man speech at wedding receptions characteristically contains stories,
 usually embarrassing to the groom;
 award ceremonies often evoke stories of past successes of awardees;
 memorial services provide slots for stories about the deceased;
 and so on.

Thus, there is no shortage of contexts where stories realize direct representative function but nevertheless from a top-down pragmatic perspective fill a culturally defined slot, resulting in a particular identifiable pragmeme, to use a term recently revived by Mey (2001), Capone (2005) and others (cf. Pike 1954 on *behavioremes*; and Hymes 1974).

Stories in best man speeches are particularly clear examples of narratives fitted into a culturally defined slot within the scope of a well defined cultural activity: they adhere to established motifs and they become formulaic, increasingly patterned on examples to be found on the internet, so that new best men copy older best men and even the presumably personal stories recur from one ceremony to the next. They are situationally bound utterances representing situational prototypes, where the particular realization fits neatly into the prescribed slot, in the past recalled

and borrowed from personal experience and perhaps books, but in the meantime increasingly found on the internet. As an example, consider the following brief story accessed through internet searches and identified in variants on at least three different websites. The story is initially presented as personal experience, but it turns out to be a gag story naturally filling a slot in best man's speeches, where (gentle) humor is appropriate to the genre.

- (9) Unaccustomed to public speaking as I am, I have been fairly nervous before today's speeches, however Dan was very good and took me aside to help calm me, he said if I did a really good job and went easy on him, I could be the best man at his next wedding.

(<http://iamthebestman.co.uk/speeches/comic-speech-7/>)

Such stories are clearly representative in illocutionary force and they fill slots where this representative force is prescribed and expected. Of course, the best man stories are doing a local job, namely embarrassing the groom, but by virtue of filling a slot prescribed by the speech event, indeed a slot that cannot be filled any other way and a function not achievable in the appropriate way with alternate means, and that is precisely the point: these stories appear in/fill prescribed slots.

Of course, stories in characteristic slots are not usually as pre-planned and impersonal as best man stories gleaned from the internet; more typical are stories like the one below which respond to repeated requests for background information and justification such as 'how did you end up here?', 'why did you decide to return to school' and so on. Such stories are special cases of the *life stories* described by Linde (1993), through which tellers seek to understand their own lives and to explain them to others. In this excerpt, twenty year old Janet is responding to a question from a graduate student councilor as to why she has decided to enroll in a local college program.

- (10) 1 and I graduated early from high school,
 2 to come to Monroe?
 3 but I met someone.
 4 and I was engaged to him.
 5 and I put off going to Monroe in March?
 6 and he was really-
 7 he was really nice about wanting me to go back to school.
 8 and once I went back to school,
 9 he broke up with me.
 10 and said he didn't want to marry me.
 11 and I- I was going to go in June.
 12 and I got a ca- a sort of a,
 13 somewhat of a career playing my guitar?

- 14 somewhat professional- like,
 15 I guess, y'know.
 16 and my band had a lot of problems,
 17 because we had a lot of drug addiction.
 18 and and my drummer was going to have a baby?
 19 and had to go for pregnant.
 20 and my lead-singer was got arrested,
 21 like every other day so:.,
 22 we had to bail out of like that.
 23 and so I decided come back here.
 24 and I guess I wouldn't come back here,
 25 if my band wasn't going to mess up so:.,
 26 that's why I'm here.

Notice the formulaic coda 'that's why I'm here' to wrap up the story, conveying the feeling that it has been told before. The teller has already been accepted into the program and she has nothing to fear from the woman interviewing her, so she has no qualms about mentioning drug addiction and pregnancy in her band, but she is rather evasive about her professional music career, hedging with 'sort of a, somewhat of a career' in lines 12–13 and 'somewhat professional like, I guess, y'know' in lines 14–15. Nor is she embarrassed to admit that she would have preferred the music career, if it had worked out in lines 24–25. Overall a very open, confessional narrative, but still one suited to the slot of life story to this juncture in an interview situation. Our life stories develop through time and vary depending on the audience, but we all must continue to craft narratives to fill slots like the one created by the question 'how did you end up here?' In filling this slot a life story will naturally constitute a direct representative illocutionary act.

5. Direct and indirect force for stories

We now go on to discuss narratives with an indirect illocutionary function distinct from the direct representative one. Searle's original (1975) taxonomy was:

representatives tell people how things are/were, e.g. asserting and confessing;
expressives express our feelings and attitudes, e.g. apologizing and thanking;
directives try to get people to do something, e.g. asking and commanding;
commissives commit the speaker to doing something, e.g. promising and betting;
declarations perform some action within a particular social/cultural context, e.g. nominating a candidate or resigning from a post.

The question is whether narratives, which count as representatives, can also realize the force of expressive, directives, commissives or declarations in appropriate contexts, as other speech acts have been found to (Sadock 1974; Levinson 1983; Horn 1989; Asher and Lascarides 2006).

Consider first how a story with direct representative function can take on a different indirect function, here expressive. Making excuses is one variety of representative speech act which stories can naturally accomplish. Let's return to the excerpt from a telephone conversation above, where Betty tells a story to explain why she has not yet taken care of a pending task in response to a query regarding the status of the item in question.

- (11) 1 Betty: as I say I,
 2 all that happened was I took it uh,
 3 Ian: m.
 4 Betty: um put it my usual folder.
 5 and of course as I haven't been back to work there.
 6 I haven't had it in my bag since you see.
 7 it just so happened that I went on holiday,
 8 and then this this school has come up you see.
 9 Ian: yes of course.
 10 Betty: but I uh,
 11 obviously y'know will will index it,
 12 and put it in the appropriate box.

This little story does not count as a direct apology in speech act terms, since Betty only describes the circumstances surrounding her failure to index a file without expressing regret to her addressee: she justifies her behavior but she does not articulate her feelings about this failure as such. In Searle's original (1969) treatment of illocutionary acts, apologizing qualifies as an expressive with a sincerity condition such as 'the speaker feels sorry about some past act', and an essential condition that the speech act expresses this feeling. However, Betty's story does not say anything explicit about her feelings, though she is at pains to make her addressee appreciate the reasons for her neglect: Notice the appeal to common ground with 'of course' in line 5, and the recurrence of 'you see' in lines 6 and 8, suggesting that Ian will understand once he hears the reasons for the slip-up. Betty also seeks to minimize her transgression, saying from the outset: 'all that happened was' in line 2: thus, she even seems to suggest that no apology should be necessary. Otherwise she simply offers reasons for the missing file. The formula 'it just so happened' in line 7 serves to focus a particular circumstance helping to explain Betty's omission. Again the choice of 'come up' in line 8 suggests that 'this school' was somehow unexpected. All this explanation and appeal presuppose that Betty accepts responsibility for

the incident even if she expresses no feeling of guilt as such. Thus, though it comes short of an apology in Searle's scheme of direct expressive illocutionary acts, Betty's story certainly counts as an *indirect* apology in addressing its *felicity conditions* in the sense of Searle (1975): that is, in asking questions or making statements about the preparatory, essential or sincerity conditions for the successful and felicitous performance of an illocutionary act, in the case of an apology, for instance, saying one admits responsibility for or feels bad about an injury to the addressee.

Narrative is the standard conversational resource for describing what happened, but not necessarily for expressing feelings, in traditional speech act terms, so that narratives initially, from the inside-out perspective constitute representatives rather than (direct) expressives, though they can certainly function as indirect expressives, for instance as indirect apologies from the outside-in perspective. Moreover, narrative provides a ready forum for the teller to deliver a select set of details or even an original interpretation of past actions: Narration is after all the natural mode for prevarication as well as for 'factual' description of events, so that the recipient (and analyst) of Betty's response may have justified reasons to doubt its complete veracity, even as Betty piles up explanations (or more culpable-sounding: 'excuses') for not having yet delivered the indexed file.

For an adequate pragmatics of conversational narrative, we need an account of how stories match up with direct and indirect illocutionary acts, which acts stories typically perform and which acts they seldom perform or perhaps cannot perform. Initially, stories seem predestined to function directly only as representative speech acts like excuses and admissions rather than expressive speech acts like apologies proper: we admit what we did and how it happened in narrative form, and we adopt a particular stance toward the events described, but (seemingly) often without directly expressing any emotional response, and often not addressed at the person who has suffered injury, and who would thus be the proper recipient of an apology, so that our stories end up as admissions and excuses.

In describing examples of laudatory and blameworthy behavior, narratives naturally take on a hortatory tenor as well: accordingly, a story describing an unfortunate incident can provide an indirect directive (warning, advising), perhaps with an explicit 'moral' tacked on as in fables. Consider a story told for its entertainment value but also as an indirect warning, that is as a representative speech act and an indirect directive. Annie, Jean and Lynn are cousins discussing hair problems, when Jean recalls a calamitous tonsorial incident from the past involving Annie and herself.

- (12) 1 Jean: Annie gave me a permanent once, too.
 2 Lynn: Annie did?
 3 Jean: once and only once.

- 4 ((general laughter))
 5 I would never allow her to touch my hair again.
 6 Lynn: well remember the time-
 7 Jean: yoooh.
 8 talk about afro
 9 when afro wasn't even in style.
 10 my god.
 11 Annie: well see I started [something.]
 12 Jean: [frizz ball.]
 13 I was a frizz ball.
 14 it wasn't even afro.
 15 I was just frizz.
 16 Lynn: remember [when-]
 17 Jean: [it was] terrible.
 18 Lynn: Jennifer, the first time Jennifer had a perm ...

In this short narrative Jean spends most of her time describing the effects of the permanent wave she received from Annie, but she also indirectly issues a warning to avoid Annie for hair treatment. Her approach to the results of Annie's perm is overdrawn and humorous, but the message to steer clear of Annie in matters of hairdressing resounds clearly. We see then that narratives can take on indirect directive force as well as indirect expressive force. It may be more generally the case that representative speech acts can develop indirect directive or expressive force in appropriate contexts.

But can narratives function as indirect commissives or declarations, the remaining two classes of illocutionary acts according to Searle (1975)? It seems not, though the case of commissives is not clear, as reported in Norrick (2016). Commissives are directed toward future action, while representatives describe events present or past, and narrative is most closely associated with the representation of past events. Could a story of a past indiscretion be interpretable as a promise to never repeat the questionable action? The story could lead up to a statement like 'and so I'll never do that again', but the story alone would not constitute a promise in Searle's (1975) sense of committing the speaker to some future action. And such an interpretation would certainly be defeasible for any presumed promise. Stephen Levinson (p.c.) maintains that a story could realize an indirect act of threatening based on the following scenario: I am inadvertently standing in someone's way, when he brandishes his fist and says, 'The last time somebody got in my way, I beat him within an inch of his life, and they took him to the hospital in an ambulance'. Now the quoted portion here is definitely a minimal narrative with at least two ordered past tense clauses, and it establishes the teller's ability to hurt seriously those who stand in his way, but does it really address a preparatory condition of a threat to

physically harm me or the sincerity condition that it is his intention to hurt me? It could certainly intimidate me and lead me to infer that he could beat me up, but it does not seem to me that it commits him to beating me up, as a true commissive must. It counts as a warning, which is directive in its intention to influence behavior, rather than commissive. The brandished fist alone could serve to intimidate, but the fist represents a real, current threat, by contrast with a story about past action. The story by itself is like the 'threat' of thunder showers in yesterday's weather prediction, which never materialized: the notion of commitment in Searle's analysis of commissive illocutionary acts is lacking. The essential condition for threatening is that the speaker has the intention to perform the act described, but this seems not necessarily to be the case when a story of past events is told. I have as yet found no appropriate conversational evidence to support the analysis of a story as an indirect illocutionary act of threatening in the strict sense.

Declarations, too, bring about states of affairs to come, they make the world fit the words, in Searle's terminology, quite different from the representative function of describing the world or, again in Searle's terms, making the words fit the world. Since declarations generally prescribe particular formulaic wording to set some institutionalized act in motion, it is difficult to imagine how a narrative could function in any way but to rhetorically support such a formulaic pronouncement. This leaves us then with narratives as direct representatives with indirect forces in the illocutionary territory of expressives such as apologies, in as much as stories can contain emotional reactions like contrition to descriptions of past events, and in the territory of directives such as warnings, in as much as stories can contain negative evaluations of past events. Otherwise, narratives serve as illocutionary representatives, either assigning praise or blame to the teller's own actions to produce acts like boasting and confessing or to some other person's actions to produce acts of praising or indicting. Both first person and third person narratives may work entirely as representatives for the entertainment and/or enlightenment of listeners, though first person stories will generally involve positioning, alignment and stance-taking on the part of the teller with consequences for identity construction. Particularly, imagined stories about non-real persons (fiction, as when one tells a fairytale) may remain rather free of evaluation and ramifications for the teller's personal identity.

6. Tentative conclusions

In this outside-in approach to narrative in conversation, I have begun to develop an account of the overall direct and indirect illocutionary acts performed by telling stories, and to demonstrate that they generally realize directly the force of representative acts such as confessing and making excuses, even as they indirectly

perform such expressive acts as apologizing and such directive acts as warning. Seemingly, narratives cannot realize the indirect force of commissives and declarations. Obviously more data from a range of contexts require consideration and many details need working out concerning which varieties of expressives and directives narratives can accomplish indirectly and in which contexts. A complete account of storytelling in interaction will need to identify what discourse/cultural slots are characteristically filled with stories, and perhaps only with stories, as well as what slots cannot be filled with stories, and why. These are matters to be dealt with in a pragmatic account of storytelling oriented toward direct and indirect illocutionary acts.

References

- Aijmer, Karin. 1987. "Oh and Ah in English conversation." In *Corpus Linguistics and Beyond*, ed. by W. Meijs, 61–86. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Asher, Nicholas, and Alex Lascarides. 2006. "Indirect Speech Acts." In *Synthese Indirect Speech Acts – Informatics Homepages Server* homepages.inf.ed.ac.uk/alex/papers/synthese.pdf
- Bamberg, Michael. 2004. "'I know it may sound mean to say this, but we couldn't really care less about her anyway': Form and Functions of 'Slut-Bashing' in 15-Year Olds." *Human Development* 47: 331–353. doi:10.1159/000081036
- Barthes, Roland. 1966[1975]. "An Introduction to the Analysis of Narrative." *New Literary History* 6: 237–272. doi:10.2307/468419
- Bernaerts, Lars. 2010. "Interactions in *Cuckoo's Nest*: Elements of a Narrative Speech-Act Analysis." *Narrative* 18: 276–299. doi:10.1353/nar.2010.0004
- Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, and Edward Finegan. 1999. *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English*. Harlow: Pearson Education.
- Capone, Alessandro 2005. "Pragmemes (a Study with Reference to English and Italian)." *Journal of Pragmatics* 37: 1355–1371. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2005.01.013
- Chafe, Wallace. 1986. "Evidentiality in English Conversation and Academic Writing." In *The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology*, ed. by Wallace Chafe, and Johanna Nichols, 261–272. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Chafe, Wallace. 1994. *Discourse, Consciousness and Time*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chatman, Seymour. 1978. *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Culler, Jonathan. 1975. *Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. doi:10.4324/9780203449769
- Eckert, Penelope. 1989. *Jocks and Burnouts: Social Categories and Identity in the High School*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Fleischman, Suzanne. 1990. *Tense and Narrativity: From Medieval Performance to Modern Fiction*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

- Fludernik, Monika. 1996. *Towards a 'Natural' Narratology*. London: Routledge.
doi:10.4324/9780203432501
- Fraser, Bruce. 1990. "An Approach to Discourse Markers." *Journal of Pragmatics* 14: 383–395.
- Fraser, Bruce. 1996. "Pragmatic Markers." *Pragmatics* 6:167–190. doi:prag.6.2.03fra
- Genette, Gérard. 1993. *Fiction & Diction*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Georgakopoulou, Alexandra. 2007. *Small Stories, Interaction and Identities*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/sin.8
- Goffman, Erving. 1967. *Interaction Ritual*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Goffman, Ervin. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gordon, Cynthia. 2007. "I just feel horribly embarrassed when she does that': Constituting a Mother's Identity." In *Family Talk*, ed. by Deborah Tannen, Shari Kendall, and Cynthia Gordon, 49–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Haug, Michael, and Jonathan Culpeper. 2018. "Integrative Pragmatics and (Im)Politeness theory." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 213–239. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Heath, Shirley Brice. 1982. "Protean Shapes in Literacy Events: Ever-Shifting Oral and Literate Traditions." In *Spoken and Written Language: Advances in Discourse Processes*, vol. 9, ed. by Deborah Tannen, 91–118. Norwood: Ablex.
- Heritage, John. 1984. "A Change-of-State Token and Aspects of its Sequential Placement." In *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, ed. by A. J. Maxwell, and John Heritage, 199–345. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Herman, David (ed). 1999. *Narratologies: New Perspectives on Narrative Analysis*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Holmes, Janet. 2018. "Sociolinguistics vs Pragmatics – Where does the Boundary Lie? The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis". In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 11–32. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Horn, Lawrence R. 1989. *A Natural History of Negation*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hymes Dell. 1974. *Foundations of Sociolinguistics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press [2nd edition. London: Routledge, 2001].
- Hymes, Dell. 1974. *Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Johnstone, Barbara. 1987. "He says ... so I said': Verb Tense Alternation and Narrative Depictions of Authority in American English." *Linguistics* 25: 33–52.
- Kearns, Michael. 1999. *Rhetorical Narratology*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Labov, William. 1972. *Language in the Inner City*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Labov, William, and David Fanshel. 1977. *Therapeutic Discourse*. New York: Academic Press.
- Labov, William, and Joshua Waletzky. 1967. "Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience." In *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts*, ed. by Jean Helm, 12–44. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Levinson, Stephen. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Linde, Charlotte. 1993. *Life Stories*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mey, Jacob L. 2001. *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Minami, Masahiko. 1998. "Politeness Markers and Psychological Complements: Wrapping-Up Devices in Japanese Oral Personal Narratives." *Narrative Inquiry* 8: 351–371.
doi:10.1075/ni.8.2.o6min
- Mithun, Marianne. 1986. "Evidential Diachrony in Northern Iroquoian." In *Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology*, ed. by Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols, 89–112. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Norrick, Neal R. 1997. "Twice-Told Tales: Collaborative Narration of Familiar Stories." *Language in Society* 26: 199–220. doi:10.1017/S004740450002090X
- Norrick, Neal R. 2000. *Conversational Narrative*. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/cilt.203
- Norrick, Neal R. 2001. "Discourse Markers in Oral Narrative." *Journal of Pragmatics* 33: 849–878. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(01)80032-1
- Norrick, Neal R. 2004. "Humor, Tellability and Conarration in Conversation." *Text* 24: 79–111. doi:10.1515/text.2004.005
- Norrick, Neal R. 2010. "Listening Practices in Television Interviews." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 525–543. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2011.08.007
- Norrick, Neal R. 2014. "It just so happened': Markers of Focus in Narrative and their Translation." In *Caught in the Middle – Language Use and Translation*, ed. by Kerstin Kunz et al., 349–357. Saarbrücken: Universaar.
- Norrick, Neal R. 2015. "Interjections." In *Corpus Pragmatics*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 249–273. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139057493.013
- Norrick, Neal R. 2016. "Narratives in Conversation as Pragmemes." In *Pragmemes and Theories of Language Use*, ed. by K. Allan, A. Capone, and I. Kecskes, 149–166. Berlin: Springer.
- Ochs, Elinor, and Lisa Capps. 2001. *Living Narrative: Creating Lives in Everyday Storytelling*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ochs, Elinor, Carolyn Taylor, Dina Rudolph, and Ruth Smith. 1992. "Storytelling as a Theory-Building Activity." *Discourse Processes* 15: 37–72.
- Ong, Walter. 1982. *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World*. London: Methuen. doi:10.4324/9780203328064
- Pike, Kenneth L. 1954/1967. *Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Pomerantz, Anita. 1984. "Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments. Some Features of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes" In *Structures of Social Action*, ed. by John M. Atkinson, and John Heritage, 57–101. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pratt, Marie Louise. 1977. *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Prince, Gerald. 1973. *A Grammar of Stories: An Introduction*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Raymond, Geoffrey, and John Heritage. 2006. "The Epistemics of Social Relations: Owning Grandchildren." *Language in Society* 35: 677–705. doi:10.1017/S0047404506060325
- Rühlemann, Christopher. 2007. *Conversation in Context: A Corpus-Driven Approach*. London: Continuum.
- Rühlemann, Christopher, and Brian Clancy. 2018. "Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie, and Neal R. Norrick, 241–266. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/Pbns.294.11ruh
- Ryave, Alan L. 1978. "On the Achievement of a Series of Stories." In *Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction*, ed. by Jim Schenkein, 113–132. New York: Academic Press.

- Sacks, Harvey. 1984. "On Doing 'Being Ordinary.'" In *Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis*, ed. by J. M. Atkinson, and J. Heritage, 413–429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sacks, Harvey. 1992. *Lectures on Conversation*, 2 vols. ed. by Gail Jefferson. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sadock, Jerrold. 1974. *Towards a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts*. New York: Academic Press.
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1981. "Tense Variation in Narrative." *Language* 57: 45–62.
doi:10.1353/lan.1981.0011
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1986. *Discourse Markers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1996. "Narrative as Self Portrait: The Sociolinguistic Construction of Identity." *Language in Society* 25: 167–203. doi:10.1017/S0047404500020601
- Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173438
- Searle, John R. 1975. "Indirect Speech Acts." In *Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts*, vol. 3, ed. by P. Cole, and J. Morgan, 59–82. New York: Academic Press.
- Searle, John R. 1979. "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts." In *Expression and Meaning*, ed. by J. R. Searle, 1–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511609213.003
- Tannen, Deborah. 1987. "Repetition in Conversation: Toward a Poetics of Talk." *Language* 63: 574–605.
- Tannen, Deborah. 1989. *Talking voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tannen, Deborah. 2007. "Power Maneuvers and Connection Maneuvers in Family Interaction." In *Family Talk*, ed. by Deborah Tannen, Shari Kendall, and Cynthia Gordon, 27–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195313895.003.0002
- Todorov, Tzvetan. 1969. *Grammaire du Décaméron*. The Hague: Mouton.
- Toolan, Michael. 1998. "The Give and Take of Talk, and Caryl Churchill's *Cloud Nine*." In *Exploring the Language of Drama: From Text to Context*, 142–160. London: Routledge.
- Tsiplakou, Stavroula, and Georgios Floros. 2013. "Never Mind the Text Types, Here's Textual Force: Towards a Pragmatic Reconceptualization of Text Type." *Journal of Pragmatics* 45: 119–130. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2012.11.004
- Watts, Richard. 1981. *The Pragmalinguistic Analysis of Narrative Texts: Narrative Co-Operation in Charles Dickens's Hard times*. Tübingen: Narr.
- Wolfson, Nessa. 1982. *CHP, the Conversational Historical Present in American English Narrative*. Dordrecht: Foris. doi:10.1515/9783110851694

Translation studies and pragmatics

Juliane House

Hamburg University / Hellenic American University

My chapter highlights the role of context in the interface between translation studies and pragmatics. Translated texts are doubly contextually bound: to their originals and the new recipients' contextual conditions. This double linkage underlies the equivalence relation – the conceptual heart of translation. Translation involves re-contextualisation, and a distinction is often made between overt and covert translation as qualitatively different ways of re-contextualisation. Overt translations are embedded in new contexts co-activating original contexts for their new recipients. Covert translations have the status of originals in new contexts being of equal concern for old and new addressees. Here the new addressees' communicative preferences are accounted for via a *cultural filter* resulting from relevant contrastive pragmatic studies. Examples of such filtering are provided.

Keywords: context, translation, re-contextualisation, overt translation, covert translation, equivalence

Introduction

This chapter highlights the role of context in the interface between translation studies and pragmatics. In both disciplines context and how it connects linguistic forms with socio-cognitive phenomena is of prime importance.

I will first give a brief review of how context has been described in the literature. Secondly, I will describe the nature of translation as a communicative event which critically involves a process of re-contextualization and the achievement of functional pragmatic equivalence. I will then, in the third part of this paper, discuss the conditions for achieving functional-pragmatic equivalence in translation. The fourth part of the chapter will discuss another connection between pragmatics and translation, namely the contribution of contrastive pragmatic research to substantiating the cultural filter in translation. The final part of the paper addresses the influence of English as a global lingua franca on current processes of translation.

1. Taking a closer look at ‘context’

The crucial role of context in translation is evidence of the connection between translation studies and pragmatics. Before examining more closely context in translation and pragmatics, let us first have a closer look of what we mean by ‘context’.

The tradition in philosophical thinking about context is frequently linked with the work of Wittgenstein (1958/1967: 35) and his emphasis on language as a type of action. Wittgenstein recognized that the meaning of linguistic forms is their use, and that language is never used to simply describe the world around us, but functions inside actions, or “language games” (*Sprachspielen*), which are embedded in a “form of life” (*Lebensform*). The idea of analysing language as action was further pursued in the tradition of the British Ordinary Language Philosophy, particularly by Austin (1962), who emphasized the importance of the context of a speech act for linguistic production and interpretation in the form of socio-cultural conventions. It is through these conventions that the force and type of speech acts is determined. Austin perceived that to perform a speech act depends on the relevant felicity conditions, which are in effect specifications of the context enveloping them. With his emphasis on conventions as shared norms, Austin – unlike later scholars concerned with speech act theory, most notably Searle – gives clear priority to social aspects of language rather than a speaker’s state of mind, intentions and feelings.

Particularly influential for further developments of ideas about context has been the notion of context formulated by Grice (1975) in his theory of implicature in language use. Grice assumed the operation of certain conversational maxims that guide the conduct of talk and stem from fundamental rational considerations of how to realize co-operative ends. These maxims express a general co-operative principle and specify how participants have to behave in order to converse in an optimally efficient, rational and co-operative way: participants should speak sincerely, clearly and relevantly and provide sufficient information for their interlocutors. In Grice’s view, speech is regarded as action, and it can be explained in terms of the beliefs and purposes of the actors. Grice’s theory is thus in essence a psychological or cognitive theory of rhetoric. This also holds for Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory, in which the Gricean maxim of relevance is further developed, and in which context is clearly a psychological concept. Context is defined by Sperber and Wilson as “the set of premises used in interpreting it [an utterance]” (1986: 15); it is a cognitive construct and a “subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world” (1986: 15). For Sperber and Wilson, then, context does not comprise external factors but is rather conceived as a “cognitive environment”, implying the mental availability of internalized environmental factors in an individual’s cognitive structure. Context is bound up with assumptions used by hearers to interpret utterances, and all interpretive efforts are made on the basis of the relevance of given assumptions,

i.e., the likelihood that adequate contextual effects are achieved with a minimum of processing efforts. The principle of relevance is regarded as part of general human psychology, and it is through this principle that humans are able to engage in interpreting utterances in context.

As opposed to such psychological approaches in which context is conceptualized as depending on an individual's internal psychological processes, socio-cognitive approaches to context consider language choices to be intimately connected with social-situational factors. Thus Forgas (1985) stresses the important role social situations play for the way human beings use language. He considers verbal communication to be an essentially social communicative act, and points to the fact that interaction between language and social context can be traced back to the early years of language acquisition (cf. Bruner 1981). Both the meanings of utterances and the shared conceptions and definitions of the social context enveloping linguistic units are here regarded as the result of collective, supra-individual, cognitive activities.

But there is also a "third way" in psychological theorizing about context. This encompasses both individual and social processes. Its propagators (e.g., Clark 1996) focus both on individual cognitive processes and their social conditioning in concrete acts of language use. Language use is regarded as a form of joint action carried out collaboratively by speakers and hearers who form an ensemble. According to Clark, "language use arises in joint activities" (1996:29), activities which are closely bound up with contexts and vary according to goals and other dimensions of variation such as formal vs. informal, egalitarian vs. autocratic as well as other participant-related variables. Over and above taking account of these external dimensions, Clark also operates with the concept of 'common ground', taken over from Stalnaker (1978). This is a psychological notion which captures what speakers/hearers bring with them to a joint activity, i.e., their prior knowledge, beliefs, assumptions, etc., all of which accumulate in the course of the activity. Different types of common ground range from personal, communal, national to global, and comprise inferences about our common humanity as well as linguistic, dialectal, cultural and affective-emotive factors. (See also Fetzer, this volume, who similarly stresses the importance of the notion of *common ground* for capturing socio-cultural context).

In conversation analysis, the focus is on the analysis of talk-in-interaction and on the significance of sequential utterances as both context-creating and context-determined. (This idea is also emphasized by Drew, this volume). According to Heritage (1984), talk is in fact 'doubly contextual' since utterances are realized and organized sequentially and linearly in time, such that any subsequent utterance relies on the existing context for its production and interpretation, but also constitutes an event in its own right which itself engenders a new context for the following

utterances. Over and above this local organization of interaction in context, there have been recent suggestions that interaction is based on the possibility of ‘projection’, with the grammar of a language providing speakers and addressees with more extensive shared paths (Auer 2005). In other words, grammar and interaction share the common feature of “projectability.” This idea is consistent with seeing context as being in a dynamic relationship with linguistic phenomena, i.e., context and talk stand in a reflexive relationship, with talk and the interpretation it instigates shaping context as much as context shapes talk.

In the tradition of pragmatics, context plays an eminent role. Indeed, conceptualizations of context have played such an important role that the very definition of pragmatics is often bound up with the notion of context. Thus Stalnaker writes that “Syntax studies sentences, semantics studies propositions. Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which they are performed” (1999: 43). And we might even say, with Levinson (1983: 32), that pragmatics is “a theory of language understanding that takes context into account”. The underlying assumption here is that in order to arrive at an adequate theory of the relation between linguistic expressions and what they express, one must consider the context in which these expressions are used. In pragmatics, attention is given to how the interaction of context and content can be represented, how the linguistic expressions used relate to context. The relationship between content and context is however never a one-way street: content expressed also influences context, i.e., linguistic actions influence the context in which they are performed. The effects of this dependency are omnipresent and decisive for the construction and recovery of meaning. But context also plays a role in the overall organization of language, affecting its syntactic, semantic, lexical and phonological structure to the point that, as Ochs puts it, “we could say that a universal design feature of language is that it is context-sensitive” (1979: 5).

A pragmatic framework would then need to include a general representation of contextual features that determine the values of linguistic expressions, with context being represented by a body of information presumed to be available to the participants in the speech situation. Given the need to specify context as features of this situation, a distinction must be made between actual situations of utterance in all their manifold variety and the selection of only those features that are linguistically and socio-culturally relevant for both the speaker producing a particular utterance and the hearer who interprets it.

It is exactly this distinction that Leech (1983) refers to when he distinguishes between general pragmatics on the one hand and sociopragmatics or pragmalinguistics on the other, and pleads for the usefulness of a narrow view of context as background knowledge shared by addresser and addressee and contributing to the addressees’ interpretation of what the addresser means by his or her utterance. Context in this more specific sense would then cover “the social and psychological

world in which the language user operates at any given time" (Ochs, 1979: 1). This includes participants' knowledge, beliefs and assumptions about temporal, spatial and social settings, previous, ongoing and future (verbal and non-verbal) actions, knowledge of the role and status of speaker and hearer, of spatial and temporal location, of formality level, medium, appropriate subject matter, province or domain determining the register of language (cf. Lyons 1977: 574; and Halliday 1994). As pointed out in particular by Gumperz (1992), context-indexical linguistic features, which he calls "contextualisation cues," invoke the relevant contextual assumptions. (The crucial importance of such 'contextualisation cues' is also highlighted by Ilie, this volume and Bell, this volume) Among the linguistic features to be accounted for in an adequate notion of context, linguistic context or "co-text" must also be evoked, i.e., the place of the current utterance in the sequence of utterances in the unfolding text/discourse must also be considered

Another example of assuming a decisive influence of context on utterance content is the notion of *framing*, first introduced by Bateson (1972) and significantly further developed by Goffman (1974). In framing their verbal behaviour, speakers and addressees can transform conventionalized expectations to fit a specific, local context and invoke genre changes.

As this brief review has shown, context is a multi-faceted concept. Most explanatory approaches emphasize the notion that utterances and texts can only be explained by reference to their embeddedness in a situation that envelops the utterance and that this embeddedness also has a cognitive substratum. For translation and pragmatics this means that they both build on assumptions about context and the way it connects linguistic forms with socio-cognitive phenomena. In both fields, context and language are viewed as mutually dependent: Language shapes context as much as context shapes language. But translation has a very special relation to context, as I will show in what follows.

2. Translation as a communicative event involving re-contextualization

Translation can be seen as a means to facilitate communication between people who do not have, or do not choose to use, a common language. Translation is always a secondary communicative event. Normally, a communicative event occurs once, translation, however, duplicates it for persons otherwise prevented from appreciating the original event. Translation serves to provide interlingual and intercultural understanding.

We can define this understanding as the success with which communication is made to function through the provision of common ground despite the fact that it exists in a 'zerdehnte Sprechsituation' i.e. dilated speech situation (Ehlich 1984).

When a message is transmitted from a writer to a reader, both are not at the same place at the same time, they are caught in a 'dilated speech situation'. Through such a transmission by a text, the original speech situation becomes 'dilated'. However, the situation is even more complex in the case of translation. Here we are faced not only with a dilated, but also a ruptured speech situation. The rupture of the original speech event is due to the lingua-cultural barrier between the author of the original text and the reader of the translation. This rupture is bridged in translational action, and it is this rupture-mending by the translator which makes translation necessarily a highly reflective action. The inherent reflective nature of translational action reveals itself in the translator's focus on the situatedness of a text and the interconnectedness of text and context.

Translation involves exploring texts in context, which is the only way of exploring texts. Since in translation, texts travel across time, space and different orders of indexicality, they must be re-contextualized. To describe and explain the trajectory of texts in translatory action, a theory of translation as re-contextualization is needed. In what follows I will briefly describe such a theory:

Translated texts are always doubly contextually bound: to their originals and to the new recipients' communicative conditions. This double linkage is the basis of the equivalence relation – the conceptual heart of translation theory. Since appropriate use of language in communicative performance is what matters most in translation, it is functional pragmatic equivalence which is crucial in translation.

A first requirement for this equivalence is that a translation text should have a function equivalent to that of its original text. However, this requirement needs to be differentiated given the existence of an empirically derived distinction into **overt** and **covert** translation, concepts to be discussed below in detail.

The use of the concept of *function* presupposes that there are elements in a text which, given appropriate tools, CAN reveal a function. The use of the concept of function is here not to be equated with functions of language – different language functions clearly always co-exist inside any text, and a simple equation of language function with textual function/textual type is overly simplistic. Rather, a text's function – consisting of an ideational and an interpersonal functional component (following Halliday 1994) – is defined pragmatically (with Lyons 1971) as the application of the text in a particular context of situation. Text and "context of situation" should thus not be viewed as separate entities, rather the context of situation in which the text unfolds is encapsulated in the text through a systematic relationship between the social environment on the one hand and the functional organization of language on the other (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 11). This means that the text is to be referred to the particular situation enveloping it, and for this a way must be found for breaking down the broad notion of *context of situation* into manageable parts, i.e., particular features of the context of situation, i.e. pragmatic

parameters or situational dimensions (For the notion of *context of situation* see also the discussion by Senft, this volume). The linguistic correlates of the situational dimensions are the means with which the textual function is realized, and the textual function is the result of a linguistic-pragmatic analysis along the dimensions with each dimension contributing to the two functional components, the ideational and the interpersonal. Opening up the text with these dimensions yields a specific textual profile that characterizes its function, which is then taken as the individual textual norm against which the translated text can be measured.

The relationship between context and language-in-text which can be revealed, as described above, by breaking down context into manageable situational or contextual parameters, may be concretized using for instance the classic Hallidayan Register concepts of *Field*, *Mode* and *Tenor* (cf. House 1997, 2015, 2016, 2017). *Field* captures the topic and content of the text, its subject matter, with differentiations of degrees of generality, specificity or granularity in lexical items according to rubrics of specialized, general and popular. It also captures different *Processes*, such as e.g. material processes (verbs of doing), mental processes (verbs of thinking, believing, opining) or relational ones (of being and having). *Tenor* refers to the nature of the participants, the addresser and the addressees, and the relationship between them in terms of social power and social distance, as well as degree of *emotional charge*. Included here are the text producer's temporal, geographical and social provenance and his intellectual, emotional or affective stance (his *personal viewpoint*) vis-à-vis the content he is portraying and the communicative task he is engaged in. Further, *Tenor* captures *social attitude*, i.e., different styles (formal, consultative and informal). Linguistic indices realising along *Tenor* are those of Mood and Modality. *Mode* refers to both the channel – spoken or written (which can be *simple*, i.e., *written to be read* or *complex*, e.g. *written to be spoken as if not written*), and the degree to which potential or real participation is allowed for between writer and reader. Participation can also be *simple*, i.e., be a monologue with no addressee participation built into the text, or *complex* with various addressee-involving mechanisms characterizing the text. In taking account of (linguistically documentable) differences in texts between the spoken and written medium, reference is also made to the empirically established (corpus-based oral-literate dimensions as e.g. hypothesized by Biber (1988)). He suggests dimensions along which linguistic choices may reflect medium, i.e., involved vs informational text production; explicit vs situation-dependent reference; abstract vs non-abstract presentation of information.

The type of (con)textual analysis in which linguistic features discovered in the original and the translation are correlated with the categories *Field*, *Tenor*, *Mode* does not, however, lead directly to a statement of the individual textual function (and its interpersonal and ideational components). Rather, the concept of *Genre* is

usefully incorporated into the analytic scheme, *in between*, as it were, the register categories of *Field*, *Tenor*, *Mode*. *Genre* enables one to refer any single textual exemplar to the class of texts with which it shares a common purpose or function. *Genre* is a category superordinate to *Register*. (For a discussion of the notion of *Genre*, see also Yus, this volume, and for a discussion of *Genre* as well as *Register* see also Senft, this volume). While *Register* captures the connection between texts and their micro-context, *Genre* connects texts with the macrocontext of the linguacultural community in which a text is embedded, for example the type of institution in which a text conventionally appears (a sermon traditionally happening in a religious locale). *Register* and *Genre* are both semiotic systems realized by language such that the relationship between *Genre*, *Register* and *Language/Text* is one between semiotic planes which relate to one another in a Hjelmslevian “content-expression” type, i.e., *Genre* is the content plane of *Register*, and *Register* is the expression plane of *Genre*. *Register* in turn is the content plane of *Language*, with *Language* being the expression plane of *Register*.

3. Functional equivalence in re-contextualisation

In any translational action, translators will ask whether the function of a text CAN be kept equivalent. The answer to this question is that this depends on the type of translation sought. Two basic types of translation as qualitatively different ways of re-contextualisation can be distinguished: *Overt* and *covert* translation (cf. House 1977/1981).

The distinction between two fundamentally different types of translation: the terms overt and covert translation go back to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s (1813) famous distinction between “*verfremdende*” (alienating) and “*einbürgernde*” (integrating) translations, which has had many imitators using different terms. What sets the overt-covert distinction apart from other similar distinctions is the fact that it is part of a coherent theory of translation inside which the origin and function of the two types of translation are theoretically motivated and consistently explicated. The distinction is as follows: In an overt translation, the receptors of the translation are quite *overtly* not being addressed; an overt translation is thus one which must overtly be a translation, not a *second original*. The source text is tied in a specific manner to the source linguaculture. The original is specifically directed at source culture addressees but at the same time points beyond it because it is also of general human interest. Source texts that call for an *overt translation* have an established worth in the source language community. They are either overt historically source texts tied to a specific occasion where a precisely specified source language audience is/was being addressed, or they may be timeless source texts transcending as works

of art and aesthetic creations a distinct historical meaning. In *overt translation* true lingua-cultural transfer takes place.

A *covert translation*, on the other hand, is a translation which enjoys the status of an original source text in the target culture. The translation is covert because it is not marked pragmatically as a translation text of a source text but may, conceivably, have been created in its own right as an independent text. A *covert translation* is thus a translation whose source text is not specifically addressed to a particular source culture audience, i.e., it is not firmly tied to the source linguaculture. A source text and its *covert translation* are pragmatically of comparable interest for source and target language addressees. Both are, as it were, equally directly addressed. A source text and its *covert translation* have equivalent purposes. They are based on contemporary equivalent needs of a comparable audience in the source and target language communities. In the case of *covert translation* texts, it is thus both possible and desirable to keep the function of the source text equivalent in the translation text. This can be done by inserting a *cultural filter* between original and translation with which to account for contextual differences between the two linguistic communities.

The distinction between *overt* and *covert* translation can be given greater explanatory adequacy by relating it to the concepts of *frame* (cf. Goffman 1981) and *discourse world* (Edmondson 1981). Translation involves a transfer of texts across time and space, and whenever texts move, they also shift cognitive frames and discourse worlds. A frame often operates unconsciously as an explanatory principle, i.e., any message that defines a frame gives the receiver instructions in his interpretation of the message included in the frame. An example is the phrase "Once upon the time ..." which indicates to the addressee that a fairy tale is now forthcoming. Similarly, the notion of a *discourse world* refers to a superordinate structure for interpreting meaning in a certain way. An example would be a case where a teacher at the end of a foreign language teaching unit conducted entirely in the foreign language switches into learners' mother tongue, thus indicating a switch of discourse worlds.

If we apply these concepts to *overt* and *covert* translation, we can see that in *overt translation*, the translated text is embedded in a new speech event, which gives it also a new frame. An *overt translation* is a case of *language mention*, similar to a quotation. Relating the concept of *overt translation* to the four-tiered analytical contextual-pragmatic model described above (Function – Genre – Register – Language/Text), we can state that an original and its *overt translation* can be equivalent at the level of Language/Text and Register as well as Genre. At the level of the individual textual function, however, functional equivalence, while still possible, is of a different nature: it can be described as merely enabling access to the function the original has in its discourse world or frame. An example would be a

speech by Winston Churchill during the Second World War at a particular time and in a particular location. A translation of this speech from English into any other language can obviously not ‘mean the same’ to the new addressees in their new context. So a switch in discourse world and frame becomes necessary, i.e., the translation will have to be differently framed, it will operate in its own frame and discourse world, and can thus reach at best “second-level functional equivalence.” As this type of equivalence is, however, achieved though equivalence at the levels of Language, Text, Register and Genre, the original’s frame and discourse world will be co-activated, such that members of the target culture may eavesdrop, as it were, i.e. be enabled to appreciate the original textual function, albeit at a distance. Coming back to the example of Churchill’s speech, this distance can be explained not only by the fact that the speech happened in the past, but also by the fact that the translation’s addressees belong to a different linguacultural community. In *overt translation*, then, the work of the translator is important and clearly visible. Since it is the translator’s task to permit target culture members to access the original text and its cultural impact on source culture members in its original context, the translator puts target culture members in a position to observe this text *from outside*, so to speak, in a new context.

In *covert translation*, the translator will attempt to re-create an equivalent speech event. Consequently, the function of a *covert translation* is to reproduce in the target text the function the original has in its frame and discourse world. A covert translation operates quite overtly in the frame and discourse world provided by the target culture. No attempt is made to co-activate the discourse world in which the original unfolded. *Covert translation* is both psycholinguistically less complex than overt translation and more deceptive: the translated text only *lives* in the new context. The translator’s task in *covert translation* is to betray the text’s origin, to hide behind the transformation of the original, necessary due to the adaptation to the needs and knowledge levels of the new target audience. The translator in *covert translation* is clearly less visible, if not totally absent. Since true functional equivalence is aimed at, the original may be legitimately manipulated at the levels of Language/Text and Register using what I have called a *cultural filter*. The result may be a very real distance from the original. While an original and its covert translation need thus not be equivalent at the levels of Language/Text and Register, they will be equivalent at the level of genre and the individual textual function.

Overt translations are more straightforward, the originals being taken over unfiltered and simply transposed from the source to the target cultural context in the medium of a new language. The major difficulty in translating overtly is, of course, finding *linguistic-cultural* “equivalents” particularly along the dimension of Tenor and its characterizations of the author’s temporal, social and geographical provenience. However, here we deal with overt manifestations of cultural phenomena

that are transferred only because they happen to be manifest linguistically in the original. A judgment whether e.g. a translation of a dialect is adequate in *overt translation* can ultimately not be objectively given: the degree of correspondence in terms of social prestige and status cannot be measured in the absence of complete contrastive ethnographic studies – if, indeed, there will ever be such studies. However, as opposed to the difficulty in covert translation of evaluating differences in cultural presuppositions, and communicative preferences between text production in source and target cultural context, the explicit overt transference in an overt translation is still easier to judge.

In discussing different types of translations, there is an implicit assumption that a particular text may be adequately translated in only one particular way. The assumption that a particular text necessitates either a covert or an overt translation does, however, not hold in any simple way. Thus any text may, for a specific purpose, require an *overt translation*. Any text may be viewed as a document which has an independent value existing in its own right, e.g., when its author has become, in the course of time, a distinguished figure, whereupon the translation may need to be an *overt* one. Further, there may well be source texts for which the choice *overt-covert translation* is necessarily a subjective one, e.g., fairy tales may be viewed as products of a particular culture, which would predispose the translator to opt for an *overt translation*, or as non-culture specific texts, anonymously produced, with the general function of entertaining and educating the young, which would suggest a *covert translation*. Or consider the case of the Bible, which may be treated as either a collection of historical literary documents, in which case an *overt translation* would be called for, or as a collection of human truths directly relevant to all human beings, in which case a *covert translation* might seem more appropriate.

In *covert translation*, one needs to consider the application of a *cultural filter* in order to differentiate between a *covert translation* and a *covert version* of the original text, i.e. no longer a translation. Accordingly, in the following section, I will therefore now discuss the crucial concept of the *cultural filter* and its function in covert translation in more detail.

4. The cultural filter and contrastive pragmatics

The concept of a *cultural filter* was first suggested by House (1977) as a means of capturing socio-cultural differences in expectation norms and stylistic conventions between the source and target cultural contexts. The concept was used to emphasize the need for an empirical contrastive-pragmatic basis for manipulations of the original undertaken by the translator. Given the goal of achieving functional equivalence in covert translation, assumptions of cultural difference should be

carefully examined before any change in the source text is undertaken. In cases of unproven assumptions of cultural difference, the translator might apply a cultural filter whose application – resulting in possibly deliberate mismatches between original and translation along several situational parameters – may be unjustified. The unmarked assumption is thus one of cultural compatibility.

Empirical contrastive-pragmatic research into contextually determined communicative preferences in the source and target communities can give more substance to the concept of a *cultural filter* than mere reliance on tacit native-speaker knowledge. In the case of the German and Anglophone linguistic and cultural communities, for example, evidence of differences in communicative norms is now available, i.e., the *cultural filter* has been substantiated through empirical contrastive-pragmatic analyses, as an outcome of which a set of Anglophone and German communicative preferences were hypothesized (see the summary of this research in House 2006). This type of research demonstrates how the notion of a *cultural filter* can be made more concrete and used as a device to explain (and justify) re-contextualization measures undertaken by the translator in covert translation.

A series of German-English contrastive pragmatic analyses were conducted over the past 30 years, in which native German and English texts and discourses using a variety of different subjects and methodologies were compared. These yielded a series of individual results, which together provide converging evidence that points to a set of more general hypotheses about the nature of German-English contextually conditioned differences in text and discourse conventions. For example, in a variety of everyday situations and text types, German subjects tended to prefer expressing themselves in ways that are more direct, more explicit, more self-referenced and more content-oriented; they were also found to be less prone to resorting to the use of verbal routines than Anglophone speakers. This pattern of cross-cultural differences can be displayed along a number of dimensions such as directness vs. indirectness, explicitness vs. implicitness, orientation towards content vs. orientation towards persons. (See also Holmes, who also refers to these dimensions in her chapter in this volume). These dimensions are to be understood as continua rather than clear-cut dichotomies, i.e., they reflect tendencies rather than categorical distinctions. In German discourse and texts, then, a transactional style focussing more on the content of a message is frequently preferred, whereas in Anglophone discourse, speakers tend to prefer interactional, addressee-focused manners of expression. In terms of the two Hallidayan functions of language, the ideational and the interpersonal, German texts and discourse often tend to lean towards the ideational function, whereas Anglophone expressions tend to emphasize the interpersonal function.

By hypothesizing dimensions of cross-cultural difference in contextually derived text and discourse conventions, which add substance to the notion of a cultural

filter, it is also implicitly suggested that language use is linked to its socio-cultural context, and that linguistic-textual differences in the realization of discourse can be taken to reflect deeper differences in cultural preference patterns. The hypothesized dimensions of context-based German-English differences are supported by similar results from other research. The following examples of German-English translations illustrate the operation of these dimensions in the process of cultural filtering.

The first example comes from a corpus of German signs placed in different domains of public life. In many cases, these signs are accompanied by translations which, more often than not, reveal German-English differences of communicative preference, and thus the operation of a German-English *cultural filter*:

- (1) Sign at Frankfurt Airport on display at a building site (original German):
 Damit die Zukunft schneller kommt!
 [Back translation: So that the future comes more quickly!]
 vs. accompanying English translation:
 We apologize for any inconvenience work on our building site is causing you!

The difference in perspective, i.e., a focus on content in German and an interpersonal focus in the English translation, is clearly noticeable here.

The next example is taken from an instruction for using ovenware. A preference for greater explicitness in the German original compare to the English translation is clearly noticeable here:

- (2) Instruction leaflet, oven ware (original German)
 Kerafour ist in unabhängigen Prüfungsinstituten auf Ofenfestigkeit und Mikrowellenbeständigkeit getestet worden. Damit Sie lange Freude an ihm haben, geben wir Ihnen einige kurze Gebrauchshinweise:
 -1. Stellen Sie nie ein leeres, kaltes Gefäß in den erhitzten Ofen (als leer gilt auch ein nur innen mit Fett bestrichenes Gefäß) ...
 [Back translation: Kerafour has been tested for ovenproofness in independent testing institutes. So that you can enjoy it for a long time, we give you some brief instructions for use: 1. Never put an empty cold vessel into the heated oven ("empty" also refers to a vessel which is only rubbed with fat)]
 vs.
 Kerafour oven-to-table pieces have been tested by independent research institutes and are considered ovenproof and micro-wave resistant. Here are a few simple rules for using Kerafour.
 -1. Never put a cold and empty piece into the heated oven ...

In the second sentence, the German original gives an explicit reason for this instruction: "Damit Sie lange Freude an ihm haben" [Such that you enjoy it for a long time] which is left out in the English translation. And under 1, the German

original – unlike the translation – explicitly defines the conditions under which the Kerafour pieces are to be considered empty. While one might of course assume that the German text producer was specifically instructed to avoid potentially costly consequences of a customer's misinterpretation of 'empty', the interesting fact remains that the entire explicitizing bracket is left out in the English translation.

In English popular scientific articles an effort is often made to simulate interaction with the reader. The reader is often addressed directly and 'drawn into' the scenes described in the text, as in the following example from the American popular science magazine *Scientific American*:

- (3) Original English taken from the opening passage of Susan Buchbinder "Avoiding infection after HIV-exposure" in *Scientific American*, July 1998.

Suppose *YOU* are a doctor in an emergency room and a patient tells *YOU* she was raped two hours earlier. She is afraid she may have been exposed to HIV, the virus that causes AIDS but has heard that there is a "morning-after pill" to prevent HIV infection. Can *YOU* in fact do anything to block the virus from replicating and establishing infection?

The German translation of this passage which appeared in the German sister publication of *Scientific American* *Spektrum der Wissenschaft* in October 1998 reads as follows:

In der Notfallaufnahme eines Krankenhauses berichtet eine Patientin, sie sei vor zwei Stunden vergewaltigt worden und nun in Sorge, AIDS-Erregern ausgesetzt zu sein, sie habe gehört, es gebe eine "Pille danach," die eine HIV-Infektion verhüte. Kann der Arzt überhaupt etwas tun, was eventuell vorhandene Viren hindern würde, sich zu vermehren und sich dauerhaft im Körper einzunisten? [Back translation: In the emergency room of a hospital a patient reports that she had been raped two hours ago and was now worrying that she had been exposed to the AIDS-Virus. She said she had heard that there was an *After-Pill*, which might prevent an HIV-infection. Can THE DOCTOR in fact do anything that might prevent potentially existing viruses from replicating and establishing themselves permanently in the body?]

This translation can be understood as governed by the aim to adapt the American English original to the reading habits of the German target audience. Note that changes have been made in particular concerning the degree of addressee-involvement: The German reader is no longer asked to imagine herself as one of the agents of the scene presented. Instead, the scene in the hospital is presented, as it were, *from the outside*, addressees are not asked to actively engage with what is presented.

- (4) HIV Vaccines: Prospects and Challenges, in: *Scientific American*, July 1998 “Wie nahe ist ein HIV-Impfstoff” [Back translation: “How close is a HIV vaccine”] In: *Spektrum der Wissenschaft*, Oktober 1998
Most vaccines activate what is called the humoral arm of the immune system.
vs.
Die meisten Vakzine aktivieren den sogenannten humoralen Arm des Immunsystems (nach lateinisch humor, Flüssigkeit) [Back Translation: Most vaccines activate the so-called humoral arm of the immune system (after Latin humor, liquid.)]

In Example (4), we can see how the translator freely expatiates on the content by adding an etymological explanation.

Cultural Filtering in *covert translation* is also evident in the translation of English children’s books into German. Here is an example from an early German translation (in the sixties) of the classic English children’s book *A Bear called Paddington* by Michael Bond:

- (5) “Hello Mrs Bird” said Judy “It’s nice to see you again. How’s the rheumatism?”
“Worse than it’s ever been” began Mrs Bird.

This entire exchange is left out in the German translation. Equally omitted is the utterance by another character in the book: “Delighted to know you bear. Delighted to know you”. Here we can see that the phatic exchanges in the English original, which can be considered to be a sign of a heightened consideration of the addressee, are regarded as irrelevant in the German translation and are thus filtered away. It is interesting to note, however, that in the more recent German translation of the Paddington books, such phatic exchanges are now present. This means that cultural filtering has been abolished. The translations have now become *overt* rather than *covert*, which shows a greater respect for original texts and a current philosophy of introducing the child reader to a foreign cultural context with its different conventions and norms.

5. Translation as re-contextualisation and English as a *lingua franca*

In the course of today’s processes of globalisation and internationalisation in many aspects of contemporary life, there is also a rising demand for texts that are simultaneously meant for recipients in many different cultural contexts. These texts are either translated covertly or produced immediately as ‘comparable texts’ in different languages. In the past, translators and text producers tended to routinely apply a cultural filter in such cases. However, due to the worldwide political, economic,

scientific and cultural dominance of the English language – especially in its function as *lingua franca* – a tendency towards ‘cultural universalism’ or ‘cultural neutralism’, which is really a drift towards Anglo-American norms, has now been set into motion. In the decades to come, the conflict between cultural universalism propelled by the need for fast and global dissemination of information on the one hand, and culture – specificity catering to local, particular needs on the other hand will become ever more marked. It is therefore plausible to hypothesize that much less cultural filtering in re-contextualization processes will occur in the future, with many more ‘culturally universal’, ‘contextually homogenized’ translation texts being routinely created as carriers of (hidden) Anglophone and West-European/North-Atlantic linguistic-cultural norms.

While the influence of the English language in the area of lexis has long been acknowledged and bemoaned by many, Anglophone influence at the levels of pragmatics has hardly been recognized, let alone adequately researched. The effect of the shift in translation and multilingual text production towards neutral contexts in influential genres in many languages and cultures is therefore an important research area for the future. What is needed in this area is empirical, longitudinal corpus-based research into hitherto unidentified problems. One first step in this direction has been made in the project *Covert Translation* generously funded at the Research Centre on Multilingualism at the University of Hamburg from 1999 to 2012 by the German Research Foundation (DFG). Here we looked at the influence of English as a global *lingua franca* on German, French and Spanish translation and comparable texts. (Comparable texts are non-translated texts in different languages in the same Genre). In this project, quantitative and qualitative diachronic analyses are conducted on the basis of multilingual primary and validation corpora of 550 texts (about 1 million words) from popular science and economic genres as well as interviews and background material. The analyses have shown that German communicative preferences – unlike French and Spanish ones – have indeed undergone a process of change under the influence of English over the space of 25 years. Particularly vulnerable to English influence are certain functional categories such as personal deixis, co-ordinate conjunctions and modal particles, which function as a sort of trigger for contextually-induced changes in textual norms in both translations and comparable texts (cf. House 2004; Becher et al. 2009; Kranich et al. 2012). To illustrate this trend, here is an example from the popular science corpus. In this example, it is the subject position in the German translation which points to English influence. Whereas a non-animate noun as agent in the subject position is routinely possible in English, it is marked in German in this genre:

- (6) Michael Rose: “Can Human Aging be Postponed?” *Scientific American*, December 1999 (Original English)

Anti-ageing therapies of the future will undoubtedly have to counter many destructive biochemical processes at once.

vs.

Michael Rose: “Läßt sich das Altern aufhalten?” *Spektrum der Wissenschaft*, March 2000. (German Translation)

Wirksame Therapien müssen allerdings *den Kampf* gegen viele zerstörerische biochemische Prozesse gleichzeitig *aufnehmen*.

[Effective therapies must however take up the fight against many destructive biochemical processes simultaneously.]

The German translation shows that the Anglophone convention of personalizing inanimate, abstract entities is adopted, adding a persuasive force to the text and eliciting a potentially more emotive-affective response from addressees. In German, the use of the passive voice would be a less marked construction: “Durch Anti-Altern Therapien der Zukunft muss vielen zerstörerischen biochemischen Prozessen zweifellos gleichzeitig entgegengewirkt werden” (Back Translation: Through anti-ageing therapies of the future many destructive biochemical processes will undoubtedly be countered at once).

The results of analyses in the project briefly described above show that re-contextualization processes both in English-German translations and in comparable texts are being transformed under the impact of global English.

Due to globalisation, technological progress, the dominance of global English and the massive increase of translations from English, *cultural filtering* may now gradually become extinct giving way to what one may call *cultural neutralism* or *universalism* – processes which are in reality drifts towards uniform Anglophone discourse norms.

6. Conclusion

In this chapter I have traced the connection between translation studies and pragmatics to their common concern with context. Context was described as an interdisciplinary concept which is also taken up by authors of other chapters in this volume. In translation, texts are doubly contextually bound: to their originals and to the new addressees’ communicative and contextual conditions. This *double-bind* nature of translation means that translation is essentially a procedure of re-contextualization. Re-contextualization in translation involves two basic types of translation: *covert* and *overt translation*. The distinction between *overt* and *covert translation* was

shown to reflect very different ways of solving the task of re-contextualization: in *overt translation* the original's context is reactivated alongside the target context, such that two different frames and discourse worlds are juxtaposed in the medium of the target language. *Covert translation*, on the other hand, displays an exclusive focus on the target context, employing a cultural filter to take account of the new addressees' context-derived communicative norms. *Covert translation* is thus more directly affected by contextual and cultural differences than overt translation, the latter showing linguistic-cultural transfer. In covert translation, a so-called *cultural filter* is routinely employed. The cultural filter in translation is given substance through empirical contrastive research – another sign of the close connection between translation studies and pragmatics.

Given the importance of English as a global lingua franca, and the concomitant steady increase of translations from English, translation as a phenomenon of re-contextualization is well and alive in *overt translation*, where lingua-cultural specificities continue to be maintained in certain genres. For *covert translation*, with its increasingly unilateral translation direction from English into other languages, the future is less clear: Dominance of global English in the guise of cultural universalism and neutralism may well lead to hitherto unknown forms of re-contextualization.

Translation studies and pragmatics were shown to be closely connected in their common reliance on the notions of context, re-contextualization and empirical contrastive pragmatic research.

References

- Auer, Peter. 2005. "Projection in Interaction and Projection in Grammar." *Text* 25/1: 7–36.
- Austin, John. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bateson, Gregory. 1972. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Becher, Viktor, Juliane House and Svenja Kranich. 2009. "Convergence and Divergence of Communicative Norms through Language Contact in Translation." In *Convergence and Divergence in Language Contact Situations*, ed. by Kurt Braunmüller, and Juliane House, 125–152. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hsm.8.06bec
- Bell, Nancy. 2018. "Pragmatics, humor studies, and the study of interaction." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 291–309. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.13bel
- Biber, Douglas. 1988. *Variation Across Speech and Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511621024
- Bruner, Jerome. 1981. "The Social Context of Language Acquisition." *Language and Communication* 1: 155–178. doi:10.1016/0271-5309(81)90010-0
- Clark, Herbert. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620539

- Drew, Paul. 2018. "The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 59–83. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.04dre
- Edmondson, Willis. 1981. *Spoken Discourse. A Model for Analysis*. London: Longman.
- Ehlich, Konrad. 1984. "Zum Textbegriff." In *Text-Textsorten-Semantik*, ed. by Anneliese Rothkegel, and Barbara Sandig, 9–25. Hamburg: Buske.
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Forgas, Joseph. 1985. *Language and Social Situations*. New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-1-4612-5074-6
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
- Grice, Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics*, Volume 3: *Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Gumperz, John. 1992. "Contextualisation and Understanding." In *Rethinking Context*, ed. by Alessandro Duranti, and Charles Goodwin, 229–252. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Halliday, M. A. K., and Ruqaiya Hasan. 1989. *Spoken and Written Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Halliday, M. A. K. 1994. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Arnold.
- Heritage, John. 1984. *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Holmes, Janet. 2018. "Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics: Where does the boundary lie?" In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 11–32. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.02hol
- House, Juliane. 1977/1981. *A Model for Translation Quality Assessment*. Tübingen: Narr.
- House, Juliane. 1997. *Translation Quality Assessment. A Model Revisited*. Tübingen: Narr.
- House, Juliane. 2003. "English as a Lingua Franca: A Threat to Multilingualism?" *Journal of Sociolinguistics* 7(4): 556–579. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9841.2003.00242.x
- House, Juliane. 2004. "English as a Lingua Franca and its Influence on Texts in Other European Languages." In *Lingua, Mediazione Linguistica e Interferenza*, ed. by Giuliana Garzone, and Anna Cardinaletti, 21–47. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- House, Juliane. 2006. "Communicative Styles in English and German." *European Journal of English Studies* 10: 249–267. doi:10.1080/13825570600967721
- House, Juliane. 2015. *Translation Quality Assessment: Past and Present*. Oxford: Routledge.
- House, Juliane. 2016. *Translation as Communication across Language and Cultures*. Oxford: Routledge.
- House, Juliane. 2017. *Translation: the Basics*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.05ili
- Kranich, Svenja, Juliane House, and Viktor Becher. 2012. "Changing Conventions in English and German Translations of Popular Science Texts." In *Multilingual Individuals and Multilingual Societies*, ed. by Kurt Braunmüller, and Christoph Gabriel, 315–335. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hsm.13.21kra
- Leech, Geoffrey. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- Levinson, Stephen. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lyons, John. 1971. *Theoretical Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics*. Vols. 1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1935. *Coral Gardens and Their Magic (II)*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Ochs, Elinor. 1979. "Introduction: What child language can contribute to pragmatics." In *Developmental Pragmatics*, ed. by Elinor Ochs, and Bambi Schieffelin, 1–20. New York: Academic Press.
- Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 1813. "Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens." In *Das Problem des Übersetzens*, ed. by Hans-Joachim Störig, 38–70. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 1986. *Relevance. Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Stalnaker, Robert. 1978. *Context and Content*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi:10.1093/0198237073.001.0001
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958/1967. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.

The interface between pragmatics and gesture studies

Gerardine M. Pereira

Saarland University, Germany

This chapter considers the interface between pragmatics and gesture studies, focusing on the dynamics of communication and interaction as people engage in language use. It presents a systematic linguistic study of the relationship of speech, gesture, and eye gaze. Based on face-to-face interactions, pragmatic topics, such as cohesion and repetition, will be revisited to investigate speech, gesture, and gaze in context. It will be demonstrated how interactants create and maintain joint action, how they engage in *F-formations* to negotiate steps within an interaction space and to contribute to activities. The chapter aims at establishing a pragmatic perspective on gesture and gaze in context to supplement and extend previous gesture-based research and to derive new implications for the study of human communication.

Keywords: pragmatics, gesture studies, pointing gesture, gaze, cohesion, reference, co-referential chains, repetition, stance taking

1. Introduction

Pragmatics interfaces with a range of other disciplines, influencing these areas as well as being influenced by them. Focusing on the dynamics of language in use, the scope of study is manifold and offers a perspective to language on both the verbal and the gestural level in face-to-face interaction. Due to advances in technology and new ways to collect and investigate data, new research approaches to and research questions about the study of language have recently arisen. Language in use encompasses communication in writing and in speaking. Speech as a primary research focus of pragmatics has been largely studied as an “auditory” phenomenon, partially due to the fact that communication was recorded on tape in the past. Nowadays, as film and video technology become more affordable, communication is also captured on film, which enables a visual analysis of conversations and

interactions. Consequently, researchers from various disciplines have become more aware and more interested in the “non-verbal components” of communication. From disciplines such as psychology, cognitive science, anthropology, literature, or engineering to linguistics, the use of the body, the hands and the eyes exclusively as well as in combination with speech has become a research site. Discourse and conversation analysts, for instance, study the bodily features of language and communication and focus “on topics which are being subsumed under the term ‘multimodality’” (Müller et al. 2013:2). Even though some approaches to pragmatics, such as conversation analysis, investigate multimodal aspects of language, pragmatics, to a large extent, still focuses on text, both written and spoken and thereby excluding anything that is not ‘text’. In Goodwin’s words (2000: 1490), pragmatics takes language as its primary topic of analysis, treating everything that is not language as ‘context’ (see also Drew, Paul, this volume, for a discussion of ‘context’ from a CA perspective). A look at recent publications in *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics* (Allan and Jaszczolt 2012) confirms Goodwin’s claim. The handbook presents a range of theories, research objectives and phenomena as well as interfaces and delimitations of pragmatics. The study of gesture and gaze, however, is not part of the handbook, a fact that not only seems counter-intuitive but also points to a deficit in recent pragmatic studies.

Pragmatics grew out of semiotics; together with syntax and semantics, it constitutes the semiotic triangle as it was suggested by the American philosopher Charles Morris (1938; see also Jucker 2012). Semiotics is the study of signs and within this study, pragmatics is concerned “with the signs in relation to their users” (Jucker 2012: 498). Semiotics includes signs in various manifestations, for instance linguistic and nonlinguistic, acoustic and visual signs (Morris 1938). As a consequence, pragmatics cannot be restricted to written and verbal communication, which treats gesture as “add-ons”. Gesture bears relations to speaker and listener, it is part of the dynamic interaction between people.

In this paper, I argue that pragmatics can both benefit from the insights we gain from the study of gesture as well as expand on some of the studies conducted in this research area. Gesture is not an accompaniment of speech, it is not only supporting verbal utterances; rather, gesture and speech form a meaningful unit together, occurring in close synchrony and reflecting different semiotic aspects.

Jucker (2012: 511–512) discusses the course pragmatics might take in the future, mentioning computer-mediated communication, historical and variational pragmatics as well as corpus pragmatics as subfields with potential for future development. Cruse defines pragmatics in the tradition of a componential view (2000: 16):

pragmatics can be taken to be concerned with aspects of information (in the widest sense) conveyed through language which (a) are not encoded by generally accepted convention in the linguistic form used, but which (b) none the less arise naturally out of and depend on the meanings conventionally encoded in the linguistic forms used, taken in conjunction with the context in which the forms are used.

Jucker elaborates on this view of pragmatics and explains that “the set of tasks for which such a component is responsible includes the study of presuppositions, deixis, implicatures, and speech acts” (2012: 502).¹ It is exactly at this point where gesture needs to be considered, especially with respect to presupposition, common ground and stance-taking (see for example Stalnaker 2002; Clark 1996) as well as deixis (McNeill and Levy 1993). This paper will present data on cohesion and reference, repetition and stance-taking to demonstrate how communication in an interactive setting depends on speech, gesture, and gaze to be successful. I would like to suggest that ‘gesture pragmatics’ is a new potential area of research for the future, which naturally forms a unit of study, even though it has been largely neglected in the past.

2. Pragmatics and the study of gesture

In a componential view of linguistic pragmatics, for instance, gesture is understood as a para-linguistic sign, which “cannot be interpreted except in conjunction with accompanying language (Cruse 2000: 8). Facial expressions, such as smiles or frowns, are considered to be ‘non-linguistic’ as they can either modulate a message, but may also occur without speech and will still be understood (Cruse 2000: 9). Based on Lascarides and Stone’s assumption, however, that people “intend their actions to be understood as coordinated ensembles” (2009: 1), a multimodal approach to interactions and conversations is necessary to investigate speech and gesture. Fetzer (2011: 25) suggests that pragmatics is comprised of four perspectives: (1) pragmatic, (2) social, (3) compositional, and (4) relational. For all these perspectives, possible intersections of pragmatics and gesture can be outlined. The pragmatic perspective is, according to Fetzer, a “[g]eneral cognitive, social and cultural perspective on linguistic phenomena in relation” (2011: 25), which results in a view of “meaning” being dynamic and multifaceted. In such a context, gesture must become part of this dynamic and multifaceted negotiation of meaning in context, as gesture can be culturally defined or context-dependent. The “thumbs-up

1. See also Cornelia Ilie’s chapter (this volume) for a pragma-rhetorical analysis of political discourse based on pragmatic approaches such as speech act theory.

gesture”, for instance, can be a sign of saying “job well done” or to signal agreement. However, it can also represent the number one (for example in Germany), and in some other cultures, it can be a rude gesture. Context and knowledge of cultural conventions are thus necessary.²

The social perspective is based on the assumption that “language use and social structure are connected dialectically” (Fetzer 2011: 26) and hence, social values such as gender, power and social status are negotiated. Both the social and the pragmatic perspective define pragmatics in a broader sense, allowing for an interface with psycholinguistics. McNeill (2008) presents a study on gestures of power in which he investigates how gestures used by powerful figures, in particular Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton, adhere to the content and composition of a speech as well as the cognitive processes underlying the gesture. As a result, McNeill has shown that gesture can inform us of different speech styles and explain how misconstruals of the meaning of a message might occur.

Cognition is represented in the compositional perspective to pragmatics; it is here that we can find a discussion of pragmatic universals, such as deixis and reference. In this chapter, I will focus on these topics as deictic gestures are the most prototypical forms of gesture, often accompanying speech, but also able to replace speech. In dialogic, co-participant-centered interactions, gesture and speech can occur alone or simultaneously. In either case, they can create cohesion and offer insight into how interactants communicate with one another.

The last perspective, the relational perspective, investigates the form, function, meaning of individual parts and their connectedness. In this perspective, the focus lies not on objects in isolation, but rather on the embeddedness of objects in context (Fetzer 2011: 29). The examples presented in this chapter derive from data based on a task, which includes instructions and a map. As such, it is possible to investigate how the map as an object is employed to shape and modulate the interactions.

Recently, there is an increasing interest in the study of gesture for reasons I have outlined earlier. Müller, Ladewig, and Bressem (2013) give a valuable account of the latest development in the study of gesture and its connection to speech from a linguistics perspective. Largely, gesture has been excluded not only from pragmatics but from any linguistic study of language in the early twentieth century. Only in the last few decades of the century have researchers such as Adam Kendon and David McNeill spurred the advancement of a study of language, which understands it as consisting both of speech and gesture. McNeill (1992, 2005), for example, has linked the use of gesture to thought, suggesting that language is a language-imagery dialectic to which gesture provides the imagery and thus is an integral part of

2. See also Fetzer, Anita (this volume), on ‘context’ as a bridging point between the frameworks of pragmatics and discourse analysis.

language rather than just an accompaniment. More recently, McNeill has presented an evolutionary approach to language which expands on the previous notion of a language-gesture dialectic to demonstrate that “the core is gesture and speech *together*” (2012: 19). In other words, gesture can either be co-present with speech or it might not be externalized or visible, but still present in the thought process itself.

Kendon takes a structural approach to the study of interaction, which “maintains that communication in interaction is a continuous, multichannel process and it seeks to provide descriptions of the structural characteristics of the communication system employed in the interaction” (1990: 15). Based on this notion, gesture has been assumed to be a ‘mode’ or ‘modality’, which discourse and conversation analysts study alongside other modes such as speech or written text. Drawing on a range of resources, people shape communication and interaction as they engage with one another. However, in these linguistic perspectives, eye gaze plays a minor role. The phenomenon of gaze has been of interest to areas such as psychology (for example Ekman and Friesen 1969; Cook 1977) and, more recently, also computer science, in particular due to the availability of eye-tracking devices. In human-robot interactions, eye gaze is employed to simulate natural human-human communication; in other words, avatars are designed to adopt a human eye gaze behavior (see for example Bayliss et al. 2013; Staudte 2010). This implies that eye gaze is an important feature of human communication, especially in face-to-face interactions. This chapter outlines how and when gaze is used in interactions which include an object (a map), for example to signal agreement or understanding (see also Pereira 2013).

In sum, this chapter aims at bringing together different strands of research, thus demonstrating the value and the abilities that lie within pragmatics and at the same time expanding the view on language. A new interface can be defined, one that lies between pragmatics and gesture studies, in short ‘gesture pragmatics’. Gesture studies and pragmatics are both hyphenated fields which share common areas of research interest. Many verbal phenomena studied from a pragmatic approach to language are also represented in gesture, in particular cohesion or reference as well as repetition. Thus, what we know about communication from a pragmatic perspective can be applied to gesture research as well. The examples presented and investigated here all come from a collection of dyadic, task-based interactions.³

3. For a complete discussion of the examples presented in this paper, see also Pereira, Gerardine M. (2015).

3. The data

The data presented in this chapter derive from video-recorded interactions between two participants focusing on a task. Forty-seven native speakers of English participated in the experiment. There was a 3:1 ratio of thirty-five female and twelve male students, all of whom gave written informed consent prior to taking part in the experiment, acknowledging the usage of video, audio and picture material for scientific research and publication.

The participants were presented with a physical map of Brookfield Zoo in Chicago⁴ and an instruction sheet, which indicated times (beginning and end of the day), different animal exhibits to visit as well as a list of other activities, such as seeing the dolphin show. The participants were then instructed to familiarize themselves with the task, to read the instructions carefully and to locate every item mentioned on the map in order to explain in detail how to get there. No further instructions were given, unless participants had specific questions.

The task is similar to a path planning task, such as the Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) (Wiener and Tenbrink 2008), which is based on the idea that a salesman travels from location to location trying to avoid unnecessary detours to reach his destination on the shortest possible route. The TSP has been generalized and studied in computational mathematics, for instance. Similarly, the Map Task (Anderson and Boyle 1994; Howarth and Anderson 2007) is another kind of task designed for two participants, the Instruction Giver and the Instruction Follower, who collaborate to fill gaps of landmarks on their respective maps. The Instruction Giver explains the route to the Instruction Follower, who has to reproduce the route on his/her map. Such methods are also used in classroom interactions, for example when students acquire and practice the terms for directions and locations. A study by Logan, Lowrie and Diezmann (2014) investigated how students use gesture in map tasks when solving task concerned with spatial reasoning. Their results demonstrate that co-thought gestures are used to navigate problematic spaces and to monitor movements relating to the map tasks. In contrast to research that employs the Map Task, the task in this study gives participants equal access to the task sheet and the map and both participants use the same task sheet and map while planning their outing at the zoo. Studies by Cohen and Harrison (1973), Klein (1982), Wunderlich and Reinelt (1982) and Kita (2003) have used route planning and direction giving to elicit data in a similar way. Goodwin (2003) analyzed related phenomena, which occurred during the mapping of archaeological sites.

4. Map of Brookfield Zoo. <http://www.czs.org/CZS/Brookfield/Zoo-Map/Brookfield-Zoo-map-2010> (01.11.2010)

4. Cohesion and reference

Every text has texture, thereby differentiating it from something that is not a text. This texture is achieved by certain “linguistic means” (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 293), a phenomenon called cohesion. Cohesion can be divided into grammatical and lexical cohesion, meaning that it can either be expressed through grammar or through lexical relations. In this textual approach, a writer or speaker has deictic words, such as pronouns, available to create cohesion and to refer to certain elements in the preceding or the following discourse. Lexical items, for example synonymous terms or collocations, can also establish relationships between elements. Cohesion is thus as a process that reflects the instantiation of relations within a text because one element is presupposing the other. Repetition is also a means of reference to previous discourse, thus offering the possibility to establish cohesion as well.

From a gesture perspective, cohesion is not only created on a page by the use of certain words; it is rather a combination of both speech and gesture. Gestures which are used in an interaction with other people are crucial components of cohesion. McNeill and Levy (1993) have demonstrate how gesture space, handedness or form of gesture establish cohesion in narratives. Cohesion by space supposes that gesture space is used to create cohesive links across narrative texts; handedness demonstrates the use of one or both hands by a story teller and often, a complex gesture will accompany a main clause; gesture forms, for instance when restarting a phrase, connect clauses to the crux of the story line.

Reference is a special form of cohesion and its specific nature lies in the fact that “the information to be retrieved is the referential meaning, the identity of the particular thing or class of things that is being referred to” (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 37). In a more recent study, McNeill et al. (2010) define cohesion as a means of floor control in which gesture threads across three different levels: the object, the meta, and the para level. The researchers analyze multiparty war gaming sessions with a focus on the creation of F-formations, an idea introduced by Adam Kendon (1990). The idea is based on the observation that pairs and groups of people cluster in certain patterns, which can change or be sustained. If a pattern is sustained, it is considered a *formation*. An F-formation is a formation which “arises when two or more people cooperate together to maintain a space between them to which they all have direct and exclusive access” (Kendon 1990: 210). Within the F-formation, individual participants can direct head movements and facial displays to one another, for example when they repeatedly look at each other. The F-formation thus includes spatial and orientational behavior. Within these F-formations, co-referential chains can transport multimodal information, including verbal and non-verbal features (McNeill et al. 2010: 145). Within a topical unit, repairs and hesitations can occur

alongside a single, repeated gesture as well as gaze directed at the listener. Two or more interlocutors might engage in a joint F-formation, a space to which they have established shared access, to talk about a target. The idea of collaboration can be transported in verbal co-constructions as well as embodied gestures.

An initial example demonstrates how reference threats across speech and gesture. Looking at a short exchange between two participants, Fiona and Flavia (excerpt taken from MOV00F), I will provide an analysis of the referential expressions according to Halliday and Hasan. I will also investigate how gesture comes into play.

(1)	Name	Intonation Unit	Gesture/gaze Unit
149.	Fiona	yeah so there's not really a thing you pass,	RIF tracing
150.		is that Adventures with Aqua there ,	LIF point to AwA
151.		in this bit here ?	LIF tracing above AwA
152.		or is that a (blank)?	repeated LIF tracing
153.	Flavia	°I have no idea.°	
154.		it doesn't look like it.	points with pen to the left
155.		it's got lines coming out	points with pen to the right
156.	Fiona	yeah.	
157.	Flavia	I think it's like this bit here .	repeated points with pen

This excerpt contains examples of personal and of demonstrative reference. Flavia uses the personal pronoun *I* in line 153 to refer to herself (the speaker). In line 149, there is a generalized use of the pronoun *you*, meaning 'any human individual'. This example constitutes an exophoric reference, which is situational and contrasts with textual or endophoric reference, as Halliday and Hasan (1976) state. The demonstratives are marked in bold in the transcript. Proximity is one defining element of demonstrative reference. One can distinguish between 'near' *this/these, here* and 'not near' *that/those, there* (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 60). This closeness and distance is not only meant spatially, but also in terms of closeness or distance to the speaker. In lines 150, 151, and 157 in the transcript, *that* and *this* precede nouns, for instance. They are demonstrative adjectives and they modify the following noun. *That* in line 152, however, is an exophoric reference. It takes more than knowledge of semantic relations for Flavia to understand what Fiona means. *Here* and *there* in lines 150, 151 and 157 are similar to *that* because textual relations do not suffice to identify the referents. In order to understand and identify the referent and to agree on the same referent, the indication via a gesture or a gaze shift is mandatory.

Prototypically, a deictic gesture, for example a pointing gesture with the index finger or a tool (see also Koschmann et al. 2010) is often used "to indicate persons, objects, directions, or locations (...)" (Krauss et al. 2000: 262). In their referential

function, deictic gestures often co-occur with deictic utterances such as “here” or “this one”. Fiona and Flavia not only use pointing gestures, but they also employ a special form of pointing, the tracing gesture. Goodwin writes that “[...] the moving finger and the target of the point are brought into a dynamic relationship in which each is used to understand the other. The activity of pointing continues after reference per se has been accomplished” (2003: 16). The tracing gesture relates to the verbal content of “yeah so there’s not really a thing you pass” and it outlines the way the two girls follow on the map to reach Adventures with Aqua. The tracing gesture entails more information than the utterance. Based on Fiona’s utterance alone, one might assume that she is looking at the map, noticing the final destination and the fact that there are not any other places along the way. The gesture, however, visualizes her cognitive process as well as the physical process of moving the finger along the route on the map until Adventures with Aqua is identified via a left index finger point to the entity on the map. By tracing the route, Fiona also enables Flavia to follow her planning, as it is the case with her tracing gesture in line 151 as well. It is performed above the map and again, it functions as a visualization and a concretization of the area where Adventures with Aqua is to be found. The repetition of the tracing gesture indicates that the problem, verbalized in line 152, concerns the same area outlined before. Flavia’s reaction in lines 154, 155 and 157 demonstrates that her utterance can only be fully understood when the visual access to the map is given and when the referent of her points can be identified. Such a form of reference can be labeled object level reference (McNeill et al. 2010). References on the object level create cohesion through a reference to the object world. In the present study, such references frequently identify an entity on the map or indicate instructions on the task sheet. The same referent might be linguistically nominated within co-referential chains.

Pointing gestures can also be maintained to function as a place marker which aides in connecting the current locations with a new location on the map. In the screenshot below, both participants place their pens on the map. The pen on the right which is held in an upright position marks one of the stops of the Motor Safari. It is the closest stop to the participants’ current location, from where they need to take the Motor Safari to go to the Roosevelt Fountain. They search for the stop closest to the Fountain and as a result, the identification of the closest stop by the participant on the left yields this cross-pattern:



Figure 1. Screenshot of cross pattern

Besides references to an object, references can also threaten on a meta and a para level. In the following, examples will be adduced to show how speech and gesture co-structure interactions based on a task.

4.1 Para level reference

On a para level, reference includes individual participants, for example when a speaker in McNeill et al.'s study utters "I agree with the assumption" (2010: 156). The speaker refers to himself via the pronoun *I*, but also relates to another person's action, i.e. his or her assumption. The assessment relates to a previous action and it signals agreement with this action. The second speaker's agreeing stance reinforces the first speaker's assumptions and the social relations are sustained.

By taking a stance toward something, people position themselves in relation to others, their utterances and actions. Du Bois defines 'stance' as "a linguistically articulated form of social action whose meaning is to be construed within the broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural value" (2007: 139). The value of stance depends on how the stance taking process is framed by interactants in a collaborative act (Du Bois 2007: 141). Stance utterances, such as the one in the example by McNeill et al., show alignment with one person, thereby potentially disaligning with another. Stance can also be directed at an object and referential grounding is necessary to recognize and understand both the reference and the stance taken toward it.

Based on this definition and understanding of stance, I would like to suggest that McNeill et al.'s definition of para level can be expanded to include epistemic stance markers, such as *I guess*. This stance marker has been investigated by Kärkkäinen (2007) for American English. She classifies *I guess* as "a subjective marker *par excellence*", explaining that speakers use such markers to produce "an action such as an assessment, an opinion, or a (strong) claim, that inherently involves taking a stance or a position" (2007: 184). In the recording MOV00D, one of the participants says "I guess we need some paper" (line 153). The utterance is framed by "I guess" to indicate the personal opinion of the speaker and to index a stance taking activity. Such an utterance can be classified as a para level reference. Turns can also be introduced and completed with *I think* or *I suppose*.

In the exchange between Olga and Olivia, there are two instances of *I think*. The two participants are coming to the end of their interaction and in this meta-conversation about the progress of the activity, Olga reassesses the planning while seeking reassurance from Olivia. Aijmer (1997: 1) explains that a pragmatic construction such as *I think* has developed into a discourse marker or a *modal particle*. *I think* can express different aspects of knowledge and Aijmer (1997: 21–22) differentiates between a *tentative* and a *deliberate* usage of the construction. A tentative *I think* hedges an utterance to soften an assertion, whereas a deliberative use of the modal particle adds reassurance to an assertion. Besides both usages of *I think* in this example, gaze also comes into play whereas gesture is subdued.

(2)	Name	Intonation unit	Gesture/gaze unit
110.	Olga	do you think we've done enough detail?	gaze at Olivia
111.	Olivia	I think .. we might,	
112.			gaze at Olga, nods
113.	Olga	do you think?	
114.			gaze at TS
115.	Olivia	[I (think).]	
116.	Olga	[okay?]	

Olga raises her eyes from the task sheet to look at Olivia. This gaze shift accompanies the verbal address of Olivia through the pronoun "you" and by directing a question at Olivia. Olga invites Olivia to co-participate and to provide a subsequent opinion or thought, indicated by the verb "think" in line 110. Olivia recycles Olga's verb choice and introduces her reply with the phrase "I think". There is a repetition of the stance marker in line 115 to assert the previous statement. The gaze shift and the slight nod in line 112 underline the stance taking process and have an assertive function as well. The gaze shifts from the map to the interlocutor also helps to maintain social relations, which is one function of para level references.

Similarly, meta level references are also closely tied to the task performance. Stating the assumption “I guess we need some paper”, for example, does not only contain the opinion of one participant, but it also provides a suggestion as to how to solve the task more sufficiently. Such an utterance exemplifies that meta and para level references frequently co-occur.

4.2 Meta level reference

With meta level reference, a speaker refers to prior discourse to create cohesion with prior contents or events. In the current study, meta level references occur with regard to ‘external representations’ (a term borrowed from Clark 1996), i.e., the map and the task sheet. These represent the reference space in which the orientation is shared or negotiated and in which the activity is manifested. An utterance such as “should we maybe read through the whole thing first?” (MOV00D, line 24) accompanied by a gesture exemplifies the concept of meta level references to external representations. In the picture below, Dan (on the left), who made the suggestion, gazes at the task sheet and directs his pointing gesture with the help of a pen toward the task sheet. He moves the pen down along the list and then back up to point to the first item (the Camels) on the task sheet. David then places his pen on the map as well, which demonstrates two things: first, David is attending to the instructions and second, he is supporting Dan’s idea. As a result, they have established collaborative pointing, which means that both participants point to the same space at the same time.




Figure 2. Screenshot of collaborative pointing

Such a collaborative point signals a high involvement by both participants. David follows Dan’s invitation to co-participate and he demonstrates alignment with Dan. The gesture reflects upon the idea of being cooperative. Both participants point

to the area in the middle of the task sheet and their gaze is directed toward this area. The visual reference is to the object level, but Dan's verbal utterance refers to meta level level. These two levels conflate as gesture, gaze, and speech co-occur, but thread across the two different levels. The mutual pointing is a result of David following Dan's pointing movement, thereby taking an agreeing stance. Sidnell and Enfield (2016: 217–218) write, “[f]or humans, gaze-following results from a basic propensity to attend to the attention of others. [...] Pointing and all other forms of deixis (indeed all forms of reference) exploit this propensity by actively directing others’ attention.” The example has highlighted that participants express their cooperation and involvement through verbal co-constructions, mutual pointing, and mutual gaze.

Meta references can also occur as a means of evaluating one's own or some else's actions. In the following interaction between Wilma and Wendy, there is an assessment which relates to someone else's actions. Topically, the excerpt is concerned with finding the butterflies, which seems to be problematic for the interactants. This problem is represented in speech and in the distribution of the map; as a solution to this difficulty, Wendy and Wilma engage in a joint effort to find and identify the butterfly house on the map. To be successful in this, they must give up control over the shared interaction space, at least temporarily. Consequently, one person “owns” the map for a short period while the other person looks from a more distant perspective. The conversation takes place above the object level and consists of meta and para level references. The points, traces, and most of the gaze behaviors, however, are directed at the map and the task sheet and thus relate to the object level.

(3)	<i>Name</i>	<i>Intonation Unit</i>	<i>Gesture/gaze unit</i>
315.	Wilma	but there's not even a picture of THEM?	gaze at M
316.	Wendy	oh no I've been looking for pictures.	gaze at M
317.	Wilma	(12.5)	searching for butterflies on M
318.			retrieves RH
319.	Wendy	°let me have a look°.	turns M in her direction
320.		(1.0)	
321.		right ... [(huge animals are-.)]	RIF point to top of M
322.	Wilma	[what did that say then?]	RIF point to bottom left corner of M
323.	Wendy	[°La Gran-°].	RIF trace (reading)
324.	Wilma	[oh Mold-A-Rama].	
325.	Wendy	HUH?	gaze at Wilma
326.		Mold-A-Rama.	gaze at M, RIF point
327.		what's Mold-A-Rama.	

328. Wilma I thought it said moth.
 329. Wendy huh?
 330. Wilma thought it said moth.
 331. Wendy that's not a butterfly.
 332. WELL?
 333. Wilma (well they might be in the same ()).
 334. gaze at Wendy
 335. Wendy well that's true ((snuffles)) ... H.

At the beginning of the transcript, the map is turned in Wilma's direction and her right hand is placed on it to signal that she is the "owner" of the map at this moment in the interaction.



Figure 3. Screenshot of distributed access to map and task sheet

In lines 315 and 316, there are two meta level references pointing out that both girls have been looking for a picture of the butterflies. This is initiated by Wilma and followed by Wendy's reaction. When she had control over the map, she had looked for a picture of the butterfly house already. With her utterance in line 316, Wendy refers to her own previous activity, which is connected to prior discourse, so the meta level, but also evaluates her past activity and thus constitutes a para level reference. After a long verbal pause, during which Wilma scans the map before, she retracts her right hand to signal her turn completion. Wendy then regains ownership of the map and utters "let me have a look", again combining para and meta level features. There are two changes in F-formation, from shared interaction space to individual ownership of the map, first by Wilma and then by Wendy. As a result, cooperation fails because the participants' individual foci differ (lines 322 and 323). Wilma points to an area in the bottom left corner of the map while Wendy traces across the map above the area. The overlap shows that Wilma and Wendy talk about two different things, which also initiates a surprised "HUH" by Wendy. In

the following interaction, there is a double clarification by Wilma. She first explains that she misread “Mold-A-Rama” for moth and then adds that she assumed that butterflies might be located in the same area as moths. These clarifications happen on the meta level. Wilma positions herself (lines 328 and 330) by referencing herself and her thought. She prompts Wendy to attend to the same space on the map and her final gaze redirection at Wendy in line 334 triggers an agreeing stance by Wendy.

5. Repetition

The linguistic feature of repetition has been studied in conversation and storytelling, for example by Tannen (1989) and Stivers (2008). Tannen differentiates *self-* and *allo-repetition* (1989: 54) to account for either the phenomenon when a speaker repeats himself/herself or when a person repeats something another person has said. Words, phrases, sentences and even whole texts can be repeated verbatim or in a paraphrased form. Repetition connects new utterances to previous utterances and functions as a cohesive device. In Johnstone’s words, “repetition creates a shared universe of discourse” (1987: 207). Repetition is a conversational device and in dialogues or interactions, it can enable and show interpersonal involvement. According to Bazzanella (2011), repetition can also be viewed as a stance-taking activity to either demonstrate agreement or disagreement. In a classroom, repetition can fulfill a corrective function and it can be employed as a cognitive device facilitating memorization and understanding. All these notions of repetition define it as a verbal feature of discourse. However, this notion can be extended to include gesture recurrence and the embodiment of gesture. Mc Neill writes,

Human bodies offer identical possibilities for embodiment of sense and meaning. This is the foundation of mimicry and its role in unraveling the contexts of other speakers. Mimicry is a kind of borrowed embodiment – borrowing significant actions of the other. Gestures are a natural form of such embodiment with language, which makes mimicry a powerful tool for accessing another speaker’s meaning.

(2008: 10)

Gesture recurrence and mimicry enable the establishment of a shared focus, they can facilitate comprehension, and result in common ground. Interactants ground their verbal and gestural communicative acts in order to complete the task. In the process of reaching the task completion, participants update their common ground and use repetition to reinforce their common ground. For example, previous contributions to the planning process of the task are recontextualized and in these contexts, verbal repetition and gesture recurrence are presented as two means to increment common ground. Speech and gesture can either co-occur or they can

substitute one another. Repetition can function as a sense-making device, either because participants must acquaint themselves with the task, with the map, or with the instructions. If there is a lack of a common focus, repetition can occur to establish such a common focus for both participants.

In the example below, Beth and Ben must go to the Australia House. Beth identifies the house with a pointing gesture to parse the visual field in front of her. Ben has visual access to the map and can identify the referenced entity as well. Beth's left index finger remains on the map when she shifts her gaze from the map to her interlocutor to make a suggestion of how to reach the Australia House.

(4)	<i>Name</i>	<i>Intonation Unit</i>	<i>Gesture/gaze unit</i>
94.	Beth	should we just retrace our steps.	gaze at Ben, LIF on M
95.	Ben	yeah I think we should.	
96.	Beth	so we come out of the,	
97.	Ben	oh-uh we uh;	
98.	Beth	thing.	LIF point to Habitat Africa, gaze at Ben
99.	Ben	yeah.	
100.	Beth	should we?	
101.			[gaze at Ben]
102.	Ben	[is that the quickest way.]	
103.	Beth		turns M in Ben's direction
104.		((laugh))	
105.	Ben	ah we're here.	RH point to Habitat Africa
106.			circling gesture
107.		yeah I think we should really retrace our steps.	circling gesture

Beth's suggestion in form of a question receives immediate agreement by Ben (line 95), which demonstrates that both participants share equal access to the external representations and to the previous planning discourse. The agreement prompts Beth to continue planning. However, Ben utters some hesitations markers (line 97), which causes Beth to look at him and to reassure herself "should we?". While she continues looking at Ben, he states that he is uncertain whether Beth's retracing is the quickest way. Beth initiates this question-answer adjacency pair and thereby invites Ben to take up the turn. She finally gives up her turn when she moves the map in his direction in line 103. In the following lines, it becomes apparent that Ben was not aware of the starting point, the Habitat Africa, when Beth set out to plan the route to the Australia house. His utterance "ah we're here" is accompanied by a right hand point to the entity on the map. The following circling gesture above the map shows the parsing the visual field as part of the sense-making process. The circling gesture is repeated alongside the verbatim repetition of Beth's initial utterance to

demonstrate full understanding of her suggestion and to agree with it. By giving up her turn, Beth helps Ben in taking “her” perspective and in understanding what she meant. He considers Beth’s words and gestures, which results in an agreeing stance at the end of the unit. A shared focus has been established and the repetition of the phrase “retrace our steps” as well as the repeated gesture demonstrate the process of reaching common ground.

Repeated pointing is frequently used as a stance taking device. In the interaction between Susan and Sabrina, both participants mutually construct the routes as they share visual access to the map; however, it is only Susan who uses a pen to outline the routes on the map.

(5)	Name	Intonation unit	Gesture unit
134.	Susan	okay so FROM here yeah,	RH point to Australia House
135.		from the Australia House,	RH point to Australia House
136.		you go straight ON,	RH tracing
137.	Sabrina	you go f- you go right from the Australia House.	
138.	Susan	yeah you go right from the Australia House,	RH tracing
139.		then you go:?	
140.		(1.0)	
141.		[down at the-],	RH tracing
142.	Sabrina	[take] the FIRST or the second-,	
143.		either the first or the second road,	
144.	Susan	this one.	repeated pointing
145.	Sabrina	the second road after the Carousel.	
146.	Susan	yeah the second road after the Carousel,	

In line 134, there is the referential expression “here” whose meaning only becomes clear with the accompanying pointing gesture and the following explication “Australia House” with a repeated point to this symbol on the map (line 135). The demonstrative pronoun precedes the naming of the actual referent whereas the deictic gesture is directed at the same location on the map twice. Both participants co-construct the route verbally, which implies that Sabrina is also following the visual cue, i.e. the tracing gestures performed by Susan. They co-occur with lexical items expressing movement, such as “straight on”, “go right from”, “down at” in lines 136, 138, and 141. In line 142, Sabrina contributes to the interaction after a longer pause and some hesitant speech by Susan. Again, there is verbal repetition (lines 142 and 143), which probably displays Sabrina’s thoughts on the planning process. Following this, Susan repeatedly points (line 144) saying “this one”. Her

utterance marks her decision; however, it is through the repeated pointing that this decision is underlined and highlighted. At the end of the excerpt, Sabrina elaborates on the pointing gesture specifying which road to take (line 145). She thereby demonstrates both understanding and agreement, which in turn is confirmed by Susan through the use of a verbatim repetition of Sabrina's previous phrasing (line 146).

Repetition can also fulfill the role of disagreement, even though it is not very frequent. Repetition can occur in form of an utterance such as "no" or even a whole phrase as in the example below. Claire and Carol are close to finishing the activity. In line 235, Carol suggests to walk "up again" to return to the North Gate. Claire, however, does not agree and takes a divergent stance in line 238. Both participants point and trace collaboratively and they closely follow each other's descriptions.

(6)	<i>Name Intonation Unit</i>	<i>Gesture/gaze unit</i>
	234. Claire return to the North GATE.	gaze at M
	235. Carol so it's just up again.	RIF tracing
	236. Claire	RIF point at M
	237. Carol and to the exit.	RIF point to North Gate
	238. Claire unless we walk round.	RIF tracing
	239. Carol °we could do,°	
	240. Claire 'cause the motor coach is in the way.	
	241. Carol AH yeah.	
	242. Claire and then it's just basically round and up.	RIF tracing, point
	243. Carol > round and up <.	RIF tracing, point
	244. yeah.	gaze at Claire

Claire utters "return to the North GATE" in line 234 and looks at the map, which indicates that she is ready to plan the route. Carol, however, makes a suggestion and traces the way to the exit, the North Gate, to which she points in line 237. Claire attends to Carol's actions, she monitors her tracing, and the divergent stance in line 238 is said in a softened form to sustain the interactive frame. Claire provides an explanation as to why she disagrees, "'cause the motor coach is in the way", in line 240. The repetition of "round and up" in quick succession allows for an achievement of common ground. Interestingly, Claire recycles not only her own words "round" (line 238), but also combines it with Carol's suggesting "up" (line 235). Carol shadows Claire's words "round and up", spoken quickly, and mimics her tracing and deictic gesture from the current location to the North Gate. "Yeah" in line 244 is a confirmation token that emphasizes the agreeing stance. Even though this example contains a mild disagreeing stance, the repetition and mimicking of the gesture function as agreeing stance taking in order to establish shared understanding.

6. Conclusions

This chapter has re-examined classic linguistic research topics which are of interest to pragmatics. In particular, cohesion and reference as well as repetition were investigated, drawing on previous research and contributing new findings and implications for further research based on the inclusion of gesture and gaze. It has been shown that pragmatics and gesture studies both focus on the dynamics of communication and interaction. Due to an advancement in technology, video data function as a meaningful resource for the analysis of multimodal phenomena. Both areas of research share common topics and sources for the investigation of communication. They can enrich one another and spur the investigation of language. Speech and gesture are used in synchrony, for example when cohesion and the meaning of the reference is created in speech and in gesture. From a speech-gesture synchrony perspective, the linguistic pragmatic perception of cohesion as a textual phenomenon is thus insufficient. Verbal repetition and gesture recurrence as particular forms of reference create connections across larger discourse chunks and events within the interaction. Gesture and gaze are means to express stance and signal agreement, disagreement and understanding. Gaze informs of interactants' attention states and involvement in the task. Any study of language and communication thus necessitates an interface between pragmatics and gesture research as they inform one another. Only through a gesture pragmatic approach to interaction do the complexities of those interactions become apparent.

References

- Aijmer, Karin. 1997. "I think – an English Modal Particle." In *Modality in Germanic Languages. Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. by Toril Swan; and Olaf J. Westvik, 1–47. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110889932.1
- Allan, Keith, and Kasia M. Jaszczolt. 2012. *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139022453
- Anderson, Anne H., and Elizabeth A. Boyle. 1994. "Forms of Introduction in Dialogues: Their Discourse Contexts and Communicative Consequences." *Language and Cognitive Processes* 9 (1): 101–122. doi:10.1080/01690969408402111
- Bayliss, Andrew P., Emily Murphy, Claire K. Naughtin, Ada Kritikos, Leonhard Schilbach, and Stefanie I. Becker. 2013. "'Gaze Leading': Initiating Simulated Joint Attention Influences Eye Movements and Choice Behavior." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142 (1): 76–92. doi:10.1037/a0029286
- Bazzanella, Carla. 2011. "Redundancy, Repetition, and Intensity in Discourse." *Language Sciences* 33: 243–254. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2010.10.002
- Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620539

- Cohen, Akiba A., and Randall P. Harrison. 1973. "Intentionality in the Use of Hand Illustrators in Face-to-face Communication Situations". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 28 (2): 276–279. doi:10.1037/h0035792
- Cook, Mark. 1977. "Gaze and Mutual Gaze in Social Encounters." *American Scientist* 3: 328–333.
- Cruse, Alan D. 2000. *Meaning in Language. An Introduction to Semantics and Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Du Bois, John W. 2007. "The Stance Triangle." In *Stancetaking in Discourse: Subjectivity, Evaluation, Interaction*, ed. by Robert Englebretson, 139–182. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.164.07du
- Ekman, Paul, and Wallace V. Friesen. 1969. "The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding." *Semiotica* 1 (1): 49–98. doi:10.1515/semi.1969.1.1.49
- Fetzer, Anita. 2011. "Pragmatics as a Linguistic Concept." In *Foundations of Pragmatics*, ed. by Wolfram Bublitz, and Neal R. Norrick. 23–50. Berlin: De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214260.23
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Goodwin, Charles. 2000. "Action and Embodiment within Situated Human Interaction." *Journal of Pragmatics* 32: 1489–1522. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(99)00096-X
- Goodwin, Charles. 2003. "Pointing as Situated Practice." In *Pointing: Where Language, Culture, and Cognition Meet*, ed. by Sotaro Kita, 217–241. New York: Psychology Press.
- Halliday, M. A. K., and Ruqaiya Hasan. 1976. *Cohesion in English*. Longman: London.
- Howarth, Barbara, and Anne H. Anderson. 2007. "Introducing Objects in Spoken Dialogue: The Influence of Conversational Setting and Cognitive Load on the Articulation and Use of Referring Expressions." *Language and Cognitive Processes* 22 (2): 272–296. doi:10.1080/01690960600632796
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.05ili
- Johnstone, Barbara. 1987. "Perspectives on Repetition." *Text* 7 (3): 205–214.
- Jucker, Andreas H. 2012. "Pragmatics in the History of Linguistic Thought." In *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics*, ed. by Keith Allan, and Kasia M. Jaszczolt, 495–512. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139022453.027
- Kärkkäinen, Elise. 2007. "The Role of *I guess* in Conversational Stancetaking." In *Stancetaking in Discourse: Subjectivity, Evaluation, Interaction*, ed. by Robert Englebretson, 183–219. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.164.08kar
- Kendon, Adam. 1990. *Conducting Interaction: Patterns of Behavior in Focused Encounters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kita, Sotaro. 2003. "Interplay of Gaze, Hand, Torso Orientation, and Language in Pointing." In *Pointing: Where Language, Culture, and Cognition Meet*, ed. by Sotaro Kita, 307–328. New York: Psychology Press.
- Klein, Wolfgang. 1982. "Local Deixis in Route Directions. Speech, Place, and Action." In *Studies in Deixis and Related Topics*, ed. by Robert J. Jarvella, and Wolfgang Klein, 161–182. Norwich: Wiley.
- Koschmann, Timothy, Curtis Le Baron, Charles Goodwin, and Paul Feltovich. 2010. "Can you See the Cystic Artery yet? A Simple Matter of Trust." *Journal of Pragmatics* 43 (2): 521–541. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.09.009

- Krauss, Robert M., Yihsiu Chen, and Purnima Chawla. 1996. "Nonverbal Behavior and Nonverbal Communication: What Do Conversational Hand Gestures Tell us?" *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 28: 389–450. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60241-5
- Krauss Robert M, Yihsiu Chen, and Rebecca F. Gottesman. 2000. "Lexical Gestures and Lexical Access: A Process Model." In *Language and Gesture*, ed. by David McNeill, 261–283. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lascarides, Alex, and Matthew Stone. 2009. "Discourse Coherence and Gesture Interpretation." *Gesture* 9 (2): 147–180. doi:10.1075/gest.9.2.01las
- Logan, Tracy, Tom Lowrie, and Carmel M. Diezmann. 2014. "Co-thought Gestures: Supporting Students to Successfully Navigate Map Tasks." *Educational Studies in Mathematics* 87 (1): 87–102. doi:10.1007/s10649-014-9546-2
- McNeill, David. 1992. *Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal about Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McNeill, David. 2005. *Gesture and Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226514642.001.0001
- McNeill, David. 2008. "Gestures of Power and the Power of Gestures." In *Proceedings of the Berlin Ritual Conference 2008*, ed. by Erika Fischer-Lichte; and Christoph Wulf, 1–13. http://mcneilllab.uchicago.edu/pdfs/gsts_of_pwr_and_pwr_of_gests.pdf (29.12.2013)
- McNeill, David. 2012. *How Language Began: Gesture and Speech in Human Evolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139108669
- McNeill, David, and Elena T. Levy. 1993. "Cohesion and Gesture." *Discourse Processes* 16 (4): 363–386. doi:10.1080/01638539309544845
- McNeill, David, Susan Duncan, Amy Franklin, James Goss, Irene Kimbara, Fey Parrill, Haleema Welji, Lei Chen, Mary Harper, and Francis Quek. 2010. "Mind Merging." In *Expressing Oneself/Expressing One's Self: Communication, Cognition, Language, and Identity*, ed. by Ezequiel Morsella, 143–164. New York: Psychology Press.
- Morris, Charles W. 1938. *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Müller, Cornelia, Alan Cienki, Ellen Fricke, Silva Ladewig, David McNeill, and Sedinha Tessendorf (eds). 2013. *Body – Language – Communication: An International Handbook on Multimodality in Human Interaction*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton
- Müller, Cornelia, Silva H. Ladewig, and Jana Bressem. 2013. "Gestures and Speech from a Linguistic Perspective: A New Field and its History." In *Body – Language – Communication: An International Handbook on Multimodality in Human Interaction*, ed. by Cornelia Müller, 55–81. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.
- Pereira, Gerardine M. 2013. "Going to the Zoo. The Role of Gaze and Other Non-verbal Behavior in Task-based Interactions." *Pragmatics & Cognition* 21(2): 380–398. doi:10.1075/pc.21.2.07per
- Pereira, Gerardine. 2015. *The Interplay of Gesture, Gaze, and Speech: Analyzing Task-based Interaction*. Dissertation. <http://scidok.sulb.uni-saarland.de/volltexte/2015/6192/>
- Sidnell, Jack, and Nick J. Enfield. 2016. *Deixis and the Interactional Foundations of Reference*. file:///C:/Users/Gerardine%20Pereira/Downloads/Deixis_and_the_Interactional_Foundations.pdf (16.06.2016)
- Stalnaker, Robert. 2002. "Common Ground." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25: 701–721. <http://semantics.uchicago.edu/kennedy/classes/f07/pragmatics/stalnaker02.pdf> (12.09.2013)
- Staudte, Maria. 2010. *Joint Attention in Spoken Human-Robot Interaction*. Universität des Saarlandes Dissertation. <http://scidok.sulb.uni-saarland.de/volltexte/2010/3242/> (26.08.2013)

- Stivers, Tanya. 2008. "Stance, Alignment, and Affiliation during Storytelling: When Nodding is a Token of Affiliation." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 41 (1): 31–57.
doi:10.1080/08351810701691123
- Tannen, Deborah. 1989. *Talking voices. Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiener, Jan M., and Thora Tenbrink. 2008. *Traveling Salesman Problem: The Human Case*. http://www.jan-wiener.de/publications/TSP-the_human_case.pdf (25.06.2012)
- Wunderlich, Dieter, and Rudolph Reinelt. 1982. "How to Get There From Here." In *Speech, Place, and Action*, ed. by Robert J. Jarvella, and Wolfgang Klein, 183–201. Norwich: Wiley.

Pragmatics and anthropology

The Trobriand Islanders' ways of speaking

Gunter Senft

MPI for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen

Bronislaw Malinowski – based on his experience during his field research on the Trobriand Islands – pointed out that language is first and foremost a tool for creating social bonds. It is a mode of behavior and the meaning of an utterance is constituted by its pragmatic function. Malinowski's ideas finally led to the formation of the subdiscipline “anthropological linguistics”. This paper presents three observations of the Trobrianders' attitude to their language Kilivila and their language use in social interactions. They illustrate that whoever wants to successfully research the role of language, culture and cognition in social interaction must be on ‘common ground’ with the researched community.

Keywords: anthropological linguistics, pragmatics, Bronislaw Malinowski, Trobriand Islands, Papua New Guinea, Kilivila, greeting behavior, emotion control, ways of speaking, “*biga sopa*”

1. Introduction

In 1922 Bronislaw Malinowski, one of the founders of modern social anthropology, pointed out that the “final goal [of the] Ethnographer ... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize *his* vision of *his* world”. This goal can be achieved by researching not only the “organization of the tribe and the anatomy of its culture” as well as “the *imponderabilia* of actual life” but also by collecting a variety of texts which he understood as “documents of native mentality” in a “corpus inscriptionum” (Malinowski 1922: 24f). He was convinced that “linguistics without ethnography would fare as badly as ethnography without the light thrown in it by language” (Malinowski 1920: 78). Therefore he saw “an urgent need for an Ethno-linguistic theory, a theory for the guidance of linguistic research to be done among natives and in connection with ethnographic study” (Malinowski 1920: 69). As I have pointed out elsewhere (Senft 2005, 2009a: 6–7; 2014: 104ff),

Malinowski understood language ‘in its primitive function’ as a mode of behavior, as a mode of action, rather than as a countersign of thought. For him language is not only an instrument of thought, but first and foremost a tool for creating social bonds and accountability relations in more or less ritualized forms of social interaction. In his pragmatic theory of meaning the insight that the meaning of a word lies in its use is central. Thus, to study meaning one cannot examine isolated words but one must consider sentences or utterances in their situative context: “the real understanding of words is always ultimately derived from active experience of those aspects of reality to which the words belong” (Malinowski 1935:58). For him “the real linguistic fact is the full utterance within its context of situation” (Malinowski 1935:11). Meaning is function within context. Malinowski’s insights were extremely influential for the development of linguistic pragmatics (see Senft 2005).¹ His aim to understand the interaction between culture and meaning and his theory of context of situation which bound language to the situational moments and cultural contexts of use laid the foundation for the ‘British school’ of linguistics, also known as ‘Firthian linguistics’ (see Östman and Simon-Vandenberg 2009). The linguist John Rupert Firth strongly advocated for a linguistics which studies language as a form of meaningful human behavior in society. With this approach he was taking initial steps into a new field of linguistics, namely pragmatics. In addition, Malinowski’s insights were also substantial for the general discussion of the relationship between culture, language and language use – and thus between linguistics and especially pragmatics on the one hand and anthropology including ethnography and ethnology on the other.² This discussion actually goes back to Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt,³ and it finally resulted in the gradual formation of a new sub-discipline within the two disciplines

1. One of the anonymous referees pointed out that “[w]e all know how pragmatics stemmed from early work in anthropological linguistics (e.g. Malinowski)” – maybe this is the reason why so few scholars who have specialized in linguistic pragmatics do not refer to him (any more)? See the literature quoted in Senft (2005, 2009b, 2009c, 2014: 104–112).

2. “Anthropology” can be defined as “the comparative science of culture and society” (Hannerz 2001: 523), “ethnology” refers to the “scholarly interest in how aggregations of human beings are distinct from each other in terms of material culture, language, religion, moral ideas, or social institutions” (Welz 2001: 4862) and “ethnography” refers to “the process of learning what for the anthropologist [is] a new and different way of talking, thinking and acting” as well as to the usually “book-length description ... of the culture of the community in which the research had been done” (Agar 2001: 4857). See also the website of the American Anthropological Association: <http://www.americananthro.org/>

3. For a brief survey of this history see Senft (2009a).

anthropology and linguistics which is called “anthropological linguistics”.⁴ In 1975 Michael Silverstein pointed out that researching the function of speech behavior is one of the central aims of anthropological linguistics. In this paper he makes the following programmatic statement:

... the study of grammar cannot in principle be carried on in any serious way until we tackle the ethnographic description of the canons of use of the messages corresponding to sentences. Reformulating this result, we may say that grammar is open-ended, not closed, and a part of the statement of the total meaning of a sentence is a statement of the rules of use that are involved in proper indexicality of elements of the message. This means, again, that if we call the ‘function’ of a sentence the way in which the corresponding message depends on the context of situation, then the determination of the function of the sentence, independent of its propositional value, is a necessary step in any linguistic analysis. Thus a theory of rules of use, in terms of social variables of the speech situation and dependent message form, is an integral part of a grammatical description of the abstract sentences underlying them. Rules of use depend on ethnographic description, that is, on analysis of cultural behavior of people in a society. Thus, at one level we can analyze sentences as the embodiment of propositions, or of linguistic meanings more generally; at another level, which is always implied in any grammatical description, we must analyze messages as linguistic behavior which is part of culture ... a valid description of a language by grammar demands description of the rules of use in speech situations that are structured by, and index, the variables of cultures.

(Silverstein 1975: 167)


With respect to the sub-disciplines within linguistics, William Foley explicitly stated almost 20 years ago in his textbook “*Anthropological Linguistics*” that “the boundary between pragmatics and anthropological linguistics or sociolinguistics is impossible to draw at present” (Foley 1997: 29).⁵

In this paper I will illustrate that Foley is right on the basis of my own anthropological linguistic field research on the Trobriand Islands of Papua New Guinea (see Maps 1 and 2). I first present three observations of the Trobriand Islanders’ attitude to their language Kilivila and their actual language use in social interactions which I


4. I use and understand the term “anthropological linguistics” as synonymous with the terms “ethnolinguistics” and “linguistic anthropology”. It goes without saying, however, that these terms can be used to signal different starting points for approaching the interdiscipline and for indexing the status of both disciplines within the interdisciplinary enterprise. Anthropological linguistics looks at this interface from a primarily linguistic point of view whereas in linguistic anthropology the language-culture interface is generally approached within the framework of anthropology. See Foley (1997), Duranti (1997) and Senft (2009a).

5. But see the chapter by Janet Holmes in this volume where the author probes into the complex intersections between pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

made during my various fieldtrips to the Trobriand Islands between 1982 and 2012 in Tauwema village, my place of residence on Kaile'una Island. These observations were quite puzzling to me and I needed the help of my consultants to understand what was actually going on.



Map 1. Papua New Guinea



Map 2. The Trobriand Islands

The first of these observations had to do with the greeting behavior of the Trobriand Islanders. Every morning I went to a fresh water grotto in the bush to have a bath there. It was obvious where I was heading and what I was going to do; nevertheless I was always asked where I was going to. After a while I responded to these questions somewhat impatiently. I sensed that the atmosphere between me and my hosts had become somewhat straight – but I had no idea why.

The second observation I made was that one evening a young man just made it to suppress his jealous feelings, when a visitor from a neighboring village flirted with his girl-friend and left with her going to the beach. When I asked one of my consultants why and how the young man controlled his emotions, I got the for me completely cryptic answer: “He was afraid of the spirits of the dead”. I had no idea what my consultant meant with that answer.

The last observation I made had to do with my unintended breaking of a taboo. One old woman felt terribly insulted by my misbehavior and it took me a long time to reconcile her. One day I observed her playing a game with her grandchildren – and during this game she broke exactly the same taboo as I had done weeks before. When I talked with her about that, she started to laugh and said what she had done was not meant seriously, she was just joking. Again I was rather stunned receiving this answer and felt somehow lost and confused.

When I discussed these observations with my Trobriand consultants, they explained these three forms of verbal behavior as part of their indigenous ways of speaking. From their explanations I learned that the Trobriand Islanders have their own typology of (non-diatopical) registers – which I have called “situational-intentional” varieties (Senft 1986: 124ff); they are used in a given special situation and produced to pursue (a) certain intention(s). These registers or varieties are constituted by metalinguistically labeled text categories or genres.⁶ Thus, the Kilivila native speakers differentiate and metalinguistically label eight of these situational-intentional varieties, two general registers – the *biga bwena* – the “good speech” and the *biga gaga* – the “bad speech” – and six specific ones – the *biga baloma* – the “speech of the spirits of the dead”, the *biga megwa* – the “magic speech”, the *biga tapwaroro* – the “language of the church”, the *biga taloi* – the “greeting and parting speech”, the *biga mokwita* – the “true speech”, the *biga sopa* – the “joking or lying speech” and a register the constitutive genres of which oscillate between the *biga sopa* and the *biga mokwita*. The *biga sopa*, for example is constituted by the genres jokes, lies (*sopa*), jokes in the form of a story (*kukwanebu sopa*), tales (*kukwanebu*), gossip (*kasilam*), songs (*wosi*) and harvest shouts (*kasilam*).

6. I would like to point out that my use of the terms “register” and “genre” differs from the use of these terms by researchers working in the framework of systemic-functional linguistics, like, for example Saukkonen (2003).

To understand these genre and variety distinctions is a crucial prerequisite not only to achieve active linguistic and cultural competence in the Trobriand Islanders' speech community but also to understand and to describe the interrelationship between language, culture and cognition that is specific for this ethnical group (see Senft 2010a).

But before I present the three puzzling observations mentioned above in a more contextualized form (in Section 2), explain the anthropological linguistic insights into the Trobriand Islanders construction of their social reality in detail (in Section 3), and show the relevance of these insights and results for the pragmatics/anthropology interface (Section 4), I briefly introduce the Trobrianders, a few important aspects of their culture, and their language.

The Trobriand Islanders have become famous, even outside of anthropology, because of the anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who did field research there between 1915 and 1918 (see Young 2004). The Trobriand Islanders belong to the ethnic group called 'Northern Massim' (see Haddon 1894: 184; also Liep 2015: 185). They are gardeners, doing slash and burn cultivation of the bush; their most important crop is yams. Moreover, they are also famous for being excellent canoe builders, carvers, and navigators, especially in connection with the ritualized '*Kula*' trade, an exchange of shell valuables that covers a wide area of the Melanesian part of the Pacific (see Malinowski 1922; Persson 1999). Other highly important features of the Trobriand Islanders' society are the facts that it is matrilineal and follows the rule of patrilocality – or virilocal residence – which means that a newly married couple lives in the village of the husband (see Baldwin 1971: 246, 270ff).

Kilivila, the language of the Trobriand Islanders, is one of 40 Austronesian languages spoken in the Milne Bay Province of Papua New Guinea. It is an agglutinative language and its general unmarked word order pattern is VOS (Senft 1986). The Austronesian languages spoken in Milne Bay Province are grouped into 12 language families; one of them is labeled Kilivila. The Kilivila language family encompasses the languages Budibud (or Nada, with about 200 speakers living on Budibud Island), Muyuw (or Murua, with about 4,000 speakers living on Woodlark Island) and Kilivila (or Kiriwina, Boyowa, with about 28,000 speakers); Kilivila is spoken on the islands Kiriwina, Vakuta, Kitava, Kaile'una, Kuiawa, Munuwata and Simsim. The languages Muyuw and Kilivila are split into mutually understandable local dialects. Typologically, Kilivila is classified as a Western Melanesian Oceanic language belonging to the Papuan-Tip-Cluster group (Senft 1986: 6).

2. Three puzzling observations

Between 1982 and 2012 I made 16 long- and short-term field trips to the Trobriand Islands to study the Trobrianders' language and culture. In what follows I just present three (of a multitude of) observations which were quite puzzling for me.

– Greeting behavior, 1982⁷

Every morning after I had gotten up and brushed my teeth, I would grab my towel and the little box that contained my soap, shampoo, hair brush and other articles we West-Europeans think to be absolutely necessary for having a bath and walked through the village to the path that leads to a fresh water grotto, about a ten-minute walk into the bush southeast of Tauwema. Although everyone could infer from the things I carried where I was going, and although all the villagers knew after some time that this was part of my morning routine, people always asked me in the village or on the path to the grotto *Ambeya?* or *Ambe?* – “Where?” – implying “Where are you going to?” At first I reacted with a smile and answered with the name of the grotto: *Bugei*. However, after some weeks – having made some progress in my language acquisition, I responded somewhat impatiently by either waving with my towel to the people who asked this (for me then rather silly) question or by simply answering *O, kunukwali, bala Bugei makala yumyam* – “Oh, you know, I will go (to the) Bugei like every day”. After a while I realized that my hosts did not really appreciate my behavior. But why?

– A case of emotion control, 1983

It was an open secret that beautiful Imdeduya and handsome Yolina⁸ had been very fond of each other for many weeks. In the evenings they were dancing with each other in the village ground to the music of the Tauwema string band. Imdeduya accepted Yolina's betelnuts, they chewed them together and usually left the premises late at night one after the other – both heading into the direction of Yolina's little bachelor house. A few days after the “*milamala*” harvest festival had started with the singing of the *milamala* songs early in the morning, the people of Tauwema welcomed a visiting party of people from Kaduwaga, one of our neighboring villages. Especially the young unmarried men and women had dressed up carefully in their traditional clothes. The girls wore their ‘grass-skirts’ that are made out of fibers of banana leaves and the men

7. See Senft (1995: 217 and 2014: 1–2).

8. The names of the two adolescents *Imdeduya* and *Yolina* are the names of the protagonists of an important myth (see Senft: 2017a). I use these aliases to anonymize the boy and the girl involved in this incident.

wore their traditional loin-cloth, made out of the bark of the betel-palm. Their bodies were anointed with coconut oil and an essence made out of fragrant herbs and they had sprinkled their torsos with yellow blossom leaves. In the evening the adolescents joined the dancers in the village ground and danced with the boys and girls of Tauwema. A young man from Kaduwaga had been flirting with Imdeduya for a while, then he offered her a betelnut which she accepted; finally they left the dance floor together going to the beach. Yolina had observed this intently – with anger and bewilderment, but he remained on the dance floor, joined the group of singers and musicians and remained together with them singing all night long. I happened to notice all this and the next day I asked my friend Weyei how Yolina managed to control his emotions in this situation. Weyei laughed and just said: “*Ke, ekokola baloma* – Well, he was afraid of the spirits of the dead”. I had no idea what he meant.

– Making peace with Ibova, 1983

On the Trobriands adolescent girls usually visit boy friends at night, spent the night together with them and then return at dawn at the latest to their parents' house. If they stay and sit together with the young man on his veranda, it is the sign that they have married. One morning Itakeda and Yau were sitting together on Yau's veranda – and their parents and friends were very happy with their decision to marry each other. The parents prepared a big feast and even slaughtered a pig. My wife Barbara and I were watching the scene, sitting together with Bomsamesa who was at my right side and her brother, who sat at Barbara's left side. After a while I asked Bomsamesa: “When will you marry?” And immediately hell broke loose: Bomsamesa's mother who was standing behind us came on me like a fury, scolded me and actually chased me away! Back in my house I realized that I had just violated the most important taboo of the Trobrianders – the Brother-Sister Taboo! It is taboo for siblings to know anything about one another's erotic affairs (see Malinowski 1929:433ff). I had carefully read Malinowski before I went to the Trobriands, I knew about the taboo, but in the actual situation I really behaved like a bull in a china shop. I tried my best to regain the friendship of Ibova again. It took some time and much tobacco as a peace offering ... One afternoon I was close to her house and she was playing cat's cradle – or string figures – for her little grandchildren. And I was flabbergasted when I heard her reciting the following verses – realizing that the little kids obviously had a lot of fun with their granny:

- (1) *Tobabane, Tobabane* Tobabane, Tobabane,
kwakeye lumta! you fuck your sister!
Kwalimati. You fuck her to death.
Kusivilaga, You turn around,
kuyomama. you are weak and tired.

When I asked her how she could do this, but be so angry with me at Itakeda's and Yau's marriage, she laughed and told me: But this is just *sopa*!⁹ We had obviously made peace with each other at that moment, but what the heck did she mean?

3. The Trobriand Islanders' ways of speaking

In this section of the paper I answer the questions raised above. I show that these answers need the researcher's familiarity with the Trobriand Islanders' ways of speaking and thereby illustrate the close connection between pragmatics and anthropology.

3.1 The Trobriand Islanders' greeting behavior and the lessons in pragmatics learned

Why did the Trobriand Islanders' not really appreciate my ways of reacting to their question where I was going to? As I have already reported elsewhere (Senft 1995: 217; 2014: 1–2), this problem was solved by my neighbor and friend Weyei, one of my best consultants and friends in Tauwema. He approached me and told me that I should always answer this question as exactly as possible. Thus, after some further progress in learning the language I could react to the question *Ambe?* in the appropriate Trobriand way, answering for example: *Bala bakakaya baka'ita basisu bapaisewa* – “I will go, I will have a bath, I will return, I will stay (in the village), I will work”.

With Weyei's help I came to understand that this question was in fact a greeting formula. People who meet in the Trobriands and who want to indicate that they care for each other do not use greeting formulae such as *bwena kaukwa* – “good morning”, but instead ask each other where they are going to. This question is always answered as truthfully and as comprehensively as possible (as in the example given). This has a practical reason: all paths on Kaile'una Island and most paths on the other islands belonging to the Trobriand group are just small trampled paths that often lead over sharp coral rocks where it is quite easy to hurt one's foot or leg. Also, sometimes the paths cross a grove of coconut trees, and it has happened that people on these paths have been rather severely hurt by falling coconuts. Moreover, Trobriand Islanders are very much afraid of the *kosi*. According to their belief the *kosi* are ghostly spirits of dead persons, who were not properly mourned immediately after their deaths, and who therefore terrify the living. The apparition of a *kosi*

9. See Senft (1995: 222–223).

may frighten someone in the jungle in such a way that they might lose their orientation. Therefore, the answer to this form of greeting functions to secure one's way and one's safe arrival at one's destination. If people do not show up after a certain time at the places mentioned in their answers to the greeting question, their fellow villagers and friends will look for them. Thus, being greeted with this question is a sign that the community cares for the person. It is a daily routine that serves the function of social bonding. And it is considered so important, that Trobrianders who are not greeted in this way at least by their fellow villagers will conclude that they must have committed some serious offense against the community. A village community that does not greet one of its fellow villagers with this question indicates that it no longer cares for this person. So it was a completely inappropriate reaction when I – sometimes quite conceitedly – smiled about what I first thought to be a silly question. On the contrary, being greeted with this question by the people of Tauwema after only a few days in their village was a first sign of their good will and intention to integrate me into the community.

This misunderstanding illustrates just what this paper is about: As a newcomer in the Trobriand speech community I hardly knew anything about the conventions, rules and regulations with respect to how the Trobriand Islanders use their language Kilivila in social interactions, what kind of meanings their words, phrases and sentences convey in what kind of contexts and what kind of functions their use of language fulfils in and for its speakers' communicative behavior. To gain this kind of knowledge requires the study of the culture-specific forms of the Trobriand Islanders' language use. In linguistics, the study of language use is called "pragmatics".

As I have pointed out again recently (Senft 2014: 3–4) – deliberately and definitely in the tradition of Malinowski – pragmatics is the discipline within linguistics that deals with actual language use. Language use is not only dependent on linguistic, that is grammatical and lexical knowledge, but also on cultural, situative and interpersonal context and convention, and one of the central aims of pragmatics is to research how context and convention – in their broadest sense – contribute to meaning and understanding.

If we look at core domains of the discipline, we realize that linguistic pragmatics is relevant for, and has its predecessors in, many other disciplines such as, for example, philosophy, psychology, ethology, ethnology or anthropology (as illustrated in the introduction to this paper), sociology and the political sciences. Thus, pragmatics is not only an inherently interdisciplinary field within linguistics, but it is indeed a 'transdiscipline' that brings together and interacts with a rather broad variety of disciplines within the humanities which share the fundamental

interest in social (inter)action.¹⁰ For pursuing this research interest, the following axiomatic insights of the transdiscipline are essential:

- Languages are used by their speakers in social interactions; they are first and foremost instruments for creating social bonds and accountability relations. The means with which languages create these bonds and relations vary across languages and cultures.
- Speech is part of the context of the situation in which it is produced, language has an essentially pragmatic character and ‘meaning resides in the pragmatic function of an utterance’ (Bauman 1992: 147).
 - Speakers of a language follow conventions, rules and regulations in their use of language in social interaction.
 - The meaning of words, phrases and sentences is conveyed in certain kinds of situative contexts.
 - The speakers’ use of language fulfils specific functions in and for these speakers communicative behavior.

This understanding and characterization of pragmatics will be the underlying leit-motif for this paper.

But let me now come back to my misunderstanding – or rather ethnocentric incomprehension – of the Trobriand Islanders’ greeting behavior. Weyei also told me that this way of greeting, other formulae the Trobrianders use when they greet or part from each other and the formulae with which they open public and thus rather official speeches constitute a specific genre to which the speakers of Kilivila refer with the metalinguistic expression *taloi*. And in turn this genre is constitutive of a register or variety of Kilivila that is called *biga taloi* – “the greeting and parting speech”. Moreover, greetings that use the question word *ambeya* always require that the person greeted in this way has to respond using the variety called *biga mokwita* – “the true (direct) speech”.

Besides the appropriate answer to the *ambeya* form of greeting the *biga mokwita*, which is also called *biga pe’ula* – “heavy speech, hard words” – is constituted by the following genres which are also metalinguistically labeled in Kilivila: *yakala* – “litigation speeches and discussions”, *kalava* – “counting baskets full of yams”, *kasolukuva* – “mourning formulae” and *liliu* – “myths”.¹¹

10. The structure and organization of my 2014 textbook “Understanding Pragmatics” (Senft 2014) is based on my understanding of pragmatics as a transdiscipline. I am glad and I feel honored that the editors of this volume took up this approach.

11. In Senft (2010a) I present in great detail the Trobriand Islanders’ indigenous typology of the metalinguistically labeled registers of Kilivila and illustrate all the genres or text categories that constitute these varieties of Kilivila.

As pointed out elsewhere (Senft 2010a:75–76), the register label *biga pe'ula/biga mokwita* clearly indicates that whatever is said during these specific speech situations and in myths is true, that it can be taken for granted, and that people believe what they say to be the truth. Thus, in general this variety is not characterized by specific stylistic features, but by the fact that speakers produce utterances or texts they are convinced (or at least they claim) to be true. However, as Weiner (1983:693) points out in connection with this variety of Kilivila,

[s]peaking what one truly thinks about something is called 'hard words' (*biga peula*). Even though the truth about something may be known to everyone, speaking the truth publicly exposes all the compromises and negotiations under which individuals operate in their daily lives. For this reason, saying 'hard words' is perceived to be extremely dangerous and produces immediate and often violent repercussions. 'Hard words' once spoken cannot be recalled...

Therefore, it is no wonder that in everyday contexts other than the *ambeya*-greetings this variety is rather rarely used. However, when it is used, the directness of the speakers indicates that they are completely aware of the fact that they have to take all risks of stripping away ambiguity and vagueness with which they can and normally do disguise their own thoughts and that they can stand to argue publicly in terms of the heavy (*pe'ula*) dimension of truth (*mokwita*). Thus, the use of this variety implies an important personal and social impact of what is said; moreover, – with the exception of the answer to the *ambeya* form of greeting, – it is generally explicitly marked by speakers declaring that what they are going to say now or what they have said is true, indeed. The speakers' commitment in the marked sense finds its expressions even in ritualized formulae, like, for example,¹²

- (2) *Besatuta balivala biga mokwita!*
Besatuta ba-livala biga mokwita
 now 1.Fut-speak language true
 Now I will speak (the) true language!

or,

12. In this paper I use the following abbreviations:

1.	1st person	Dual.incl.	Dual inclusive
2.	2nd person	Emph	Emphasis
3.	3rd person	Fut	Future/Irrealis
CP	classificatory particle/classifier	Loc	Locative
Dem	Demonstrative	Pl	Plural
Dir	Directional	Redup	Reduplication.

(3) *Alivala manakwa biga, gala aseva, aseva gala!*

a-livala ma-na-kwa biga, gala a-seva a-seva gala

1.-speak Dem-Dem-CP.general language not 1.-recant 1.-recant not

I speak this language, I won't recant (anything), I won't recant (anything)!

The rare use of this register in everyday interactions other than the *ambeya*-greetings signals the severe implications of the speakers' commitment in using the *biga pe'ula/bigamokwita* variety: It inevitably will demand uptake and action that for either party involved in such a speech event may be dangerous or even fatal (see Weiner 1983:696).

3.2 A case of emotion control and the lessons in pragmatics learned

What did Weyei mean when he explained Yolina's controlled behavior after he had observed with anger and bewilderment that his girl-friend Imdeduya first flirted and then disappeared with a young man from Kaduwaga when he told me: "Well, he was afraid of the spirits of the dead"?

In 1929 Malinowski published his volume "The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia". Although many parts of this book present a rather dry sociological account of strict rules that regulate societal life on the Trobriands, those paragraphs that emphasize the sexual freedom and the general promiscuity of young unmarried Trobriand Islanders immediately got a reception that distinctly reached beyond the circle of anthropologists (see, e.g. Reich 1972; see also Senft 1998: 121ff). It is true that compared with European standards of education and moral, Trobriand adolescents enjoy an incredible amount of sexual freedom until they decide to marry. After marriage the official ideal for the Trobrianders – as well as for us, the *dimdim*, "the whites" – is for the spouses to live in monogamy and to be true blue to each other. The adolescents seemingly unlimited sexual freedom, however, is governed by the strict maxim: "An unmarried person must not be jealous!"¹³

The Trobriand Islanders are convinced that the keeping of this social commandment is controlled by the immortal spirits of the dead, the so-called *baloma*. After the death of a person his or her *baloma* lives in a land of the dead which is an underworld kind of "paradise" located on (or rather under) Tuma Island. The

13. Kilivila has the following lexical means to express the concept of "jealousy": The nouns *kaiwada* and *pugipogi* can be glossed as "jealousy, envy", the noun *uliweli* refers to "marital jealousy"; in the Kilivila lexicon we also find the verbal expressions *-nanali-* (to be bad, to worry, to be jealous), *-pogi-* (to fear, to be jealous, to poison), and *-polu-* (to boil, to worry, to be jealous), the adjectives *-nanali* (bad, wrong, jealous) and *-uliveli* (unjust, jealous) and the phrase *nanolapolu* = *nano-la i-polu* (mind-his/her it-be jealous = It makes him/her jealous, s/he is jealous).

spirits of the dead are believed to visit their villages at times, especially during the period of the harvest festival. The *milamala* festival starts with the singing of the *wosi milamala*, the “harvest ritual songs”. These songs are sung in an archaic variety of the Trobrianders called *biga baloma* – “the language of the spirits of the dead”. They are a highly ritualized salute to the *baloma* and they are sung throughout the *milamala* period which lasts for a month or so, not only to please the spirits of the dead, but also always reminding the villagers of their presence (see Senft 2011).

The *milamala* period is characterized by conviviality, flirtation, and amorous adventures of the unmarried adolescents. All harvest customs still “favor erotic pursuits” (Malinowski 1929: 210). It goes without saying that during this festive period, social norms, rules, and regulations are interpreted more liberally and generously than at other times. This might lead to jealousies and rivalries that, in escalation, could threaten the community. However, the presence of the *baloma* prevents any such developments.

The Trobrianders are convinced that the *baloma* control whether the villagers living now still know how to garden, how to celebrate a good harvest, and how to behave properly even while celebrating exuberantly. The *baloma* “keep strict watch over the maintenance of custom, and they punish with their displeasure any infraction of the traditional customary rules ...” (Malinowski 1974: 184). The most severe punishment is to enhance or hinder a person’s production of yams in the coming year (see Damon 1982: 231). Thus, the Trobrianders know that the guardians of the norms of the past are present during the *milamala*, checking whether that past is still present in their former villages. Although the pleasure, the dancing and the sexual license during the *milamala* also pleases the spirits of the dead, the *baloma* must not be offended by unseemly and indecent behavior, which includes “publicity and lack of decorum in sexual matters” (Malinowski 1929: 382) as well as jealousy among bachelors. Keeping this in mind, Trobrianders must control their behavior, especially their emotions, because no one would dare offend the spirits of the dead (Senft 2011: 29f).

And this is exactly why Yolina did suppress his emotions of jealousy observing the interaction between Imdeduya and the handsome visitor from Kaduwaga.¹⁴ As Weyei so cryptically remarked, he was indeed afraid of the *baloma*. If he would have attacked his rival, the spirits of the dead would have punished him. A young man on the Trobriands can severely impress the girls by being an excellent gardener. This is an important route to status and fame. Overproduction of yams is not only important for a man and his clan, but also for his wife’s clan and for his village

14. I first reported my observation of Yolina’s behavior as his reaction to Imdeduya’s interaction with the visitor from Kaduwaga reported above at the Workshop “Consensus and Dissent: Negotiating emotion in public space” (see Senft 2017b: 66ff).

community as a whole. Yams is the actual fabric of the Trobriand Islanders' social construction of reality. It plays the most prominent role in food exchange rituals, e.g., in mourning rituals or in communal meals initiated by chiefs or other men of rank as gifts for their fellow villagers or as a payment for their support, e.g., in the construction of a new *kula* canoe. Yams exchanges have important bonding functions not only for kinspeople, but also for fellow-villagers who are members of other clans. Thus, yams is the Trobriand *valuta par excellence*. If a young man's production of yams is hindered by the *baloma* as a punishment for indecent behavior like jealousy and possible forms of aggression resulting from him being unable to control his emotions, his chances are severely depreciated to impress girls in such a way that they are not only interested in him as a possible temporary lover, but also as a prospective spouse. Yolina managed to control his emotions and thus kept face with respect to the spirits of the dead. He may have consoled himself assuming that the young man from Kaduwaga had stronger love-magic than he – betelnuts that young men offer to girls are believed to contain love magic; and the stronger the magic the smaller the girl's chances to resist its owner. To sum up, this anecdote reports a case of emotion control due to a belief in controlling metaphysical powers, a belief which is reinforced day after day during the harvest festival by the singing of the *wosi milamala* in the *biga baloma*.

The *biga baloma* – the “speech of the spirits of the dead”, which is also called *biga tommwaya* – “old peoples' speech” or “speech of the ancestors” – is another register of Kilivila (see Senft 2010a: 11 and 26ff). It is an archaic variety which is almost exclusively used in highly ritualized contexts. The register is constituted by the *wosi milamala* which are not only sung during the harvest festivals, but also during a certain period of mourning. The majority of these songs describe the carefree ‘life’ of the spirits of the dead in their ‘underworld paradise’ on Tuma Island and thus codify important aspects of the Trobriand Islanders' indigenous eschatological beliefs (see Senft 2011). When they are sung during the harvest festival, they assure the community that there is a virtually transcendental regulative controlling its members' behavior and thus warding off developments that may turn out to be dangerous for the community. If we define “ritual communication” as a type of strategic action that serves the functions of social bonding and of blocking aggression, and that can ban elements of danger which may affect the community's social harmony – within the verbal domain, at least – just by verbalizing these elements of danger more or less explicitly and by bringing them up for discussion, then these songs can be regarded – from an etic point of view, of course, – as a special form of ritual communication (see Senft 1987: 117, 122–123, 125–126; Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Senft 1987: 75ff; also Senft 2009d: 82 and 92ff; 2010a: 30ff).

The *wosi milamala* are also sung after the death of a Trobriander and during the first mourning ceremonies (see Weiner 1976; Senft 2010a: 31). The Trobrianders

believe that the *baloma* of dead persons stay with their relatives until the burial of the corpse before they go to Tuma Island. This eschatological ‘fact’ is the link between mourning ritual and harvest festival. On the basis of this belief the function of these songs in the mourning ritual can be interpreted as follows: The songs – especially those that describe the carefree ‘life’ of the spirits of the dead in their Tuma ‘paradise’ – may ease the *baloma*’s grief of parting; moreover, the songs should also console the bereaved, reminding them of the fact that dying is just a “rite de passage” (van Gennep 1909), a transition from one form of existence to another. Here the songs remind the Trobriand Islanders again that the ‘present’ as well as the ‘future’ is anchored in the ‘past’; moreover, for the *baloma*, the spirit of a dead person, the ‘future’ is not at all different from the ‘past’. Life in the Tuma underworld is always the same. There is just a ‘present’. After a few days in the Tuma underworld the *baloma* forget their ‘past’; and it is only when the *baloma* get tired of their carefree life in Tuma and think of getting reborn that a ‘future’ opens up for them.¹⁵ Referring to this common knowledge coded in the community’s religious superstructure, the songs sung in the *biga baloma* variety of Kilivila contribute to channel and control emotions during the mourning ceremonies and to maintain the bonds between members of the community that is stricken with a case of death (see also Scheff 1977). Thus, the *wosi milamala* are not only sung at extraordinary occasions, but they themselves can also be regarded as an extraordinary form of ritual communication which secures the construction of the society’s social reality (Berger & Luckmann 1966) on the basis of its norm-controlling and bonding functions.

Magical formulae also represent many features of the *biga baloma/bigatoma* register. However, because other features are also constitutive for these formulae, the Trobriand Islanders classify them as constituting a variety of their own, namely the *biga megwa* – the “magic speech” register. This variety not only encompasses archaic Kilivila words, syntactic constructions, and shades of meaning, but also so-called magical words and loan words from other Austronesian languages. The *biga megwa* is highly situation dependent, of course, because it is only produced by expert magicians when they perform their magical rites and whisper the magical formulae. Malinowski (1935: 213) and Weiner (1983: 703) rightly praised the phonetic, rhythmic, alliterative, onomatopoeic and metaphorical effects, the various repetitions and the thus prosodically so specific characteristics of the language of magic. It is especially the phonetic, suprasegmental and poetic characteristics that mark the special status of magical formulae as a genre of its own. Trobrianders differentiate between various forms of magic: they know weather magic, black magic, healing magic, garden magic, fishing magic, dance magic, beauty magic, love magic,

15. For detailed information on the Trobrianders’ eschatology see Senft (2011).

sailing and canoe magic, smoke magic, carving magic and magic against theft, earthquakes, witches, and sharks. All these various forms of magic have specific names; however, they are all subsumed under the genre label *megwa*. And it is this text category or genre that constitutes the *biga megwa* variety (see Malinowski 1935, Vol. II; Senft 2010a: 11f & 40ff).

Until recently all Trobriand Islanders used magical formulae to reach certain aims with the firm conviction that they can thus influence and control nature and the course of, and events in, their own lives and in the lives of others. The magicians direct all magical formulae towards specific addressees. Among these addressees are things like, for example, natural powers, substances, spirits, animals, magical- and whet-stones, bodies, clouds, the sun, plants, and what have you. All these addressees are personalized in the respective formulae. All formulae pursue certain aims which they will reach either by ordering and commanding their addressees to do or change something, or by foretelling changes, processes, and developments that are necessary for reaching these aims, or by just describing the conditions and effects at which the formulae aim. Malinowski (1974: 74) characterized this aspect of magic as follows: "... it is the use of words which invoke, state, or command the desired aim".¹⁶ About 60 years later Tambiah (1985: 60, 78) connected this observation with Austin's speech act theory (Austin 1962) and rightly called these verbal acts "illocutionary" or "performative" acts.

Thus, the speech situation in which magicians on the Trobriand Islands find themselves engaged is special, indeed. According to my consultants and to all the magicians that presented me with, or sold me, their formulae, the act of whispering or reciting the magic is not a monological activity (see Senft 1997). On the contrary, the magicians engage in a kind of conversation with their addressee(s). For the Trobriand magicians the addressees of their formulae have to behave like partners in a conversation, at least they have to take over the function of listeners – because the power of the magical words just forces them to do this. The magicians address their 'vis-à-vis' verbally – and the addressees then have to react nonverbally. With their formulae Trobriand magicians attempt to force their will on their addressees – and even far-reaching requests are expressed verbally without any moderation.¹⁷

16. The paper by Malinowski from which I quote here was first published in 1925.

17. The Trobriand Islanders are convinced that the formulae inherited from the powerful ancestors will not have the desired effect only if magicians do not recite them in the same unchanged wording in which they were passed to the Islanders by their first ancestors or if they did not strictly observe taboos that go with certain magical formulae. The only other possible and acceptable explanation for a magician's failure is the fact that he or she may have worked unknowingly in competition with another magician's more powerful magic.

As I have pointed out in the previous subsection, such directness is characteristic for the *biga pe'ula* or *biga mokwita* register – the “heavy” or “true, direct speech”. However, the magical formulae themselves are regarded by the Trobriand Islanders as constituting the *biga megwa* register, a language variety in its own right. The explicit stylistic marking of the magical formulae as something extraordinary is a means to signal the addressee that these speech acts are different from speech acts that are produced in other varieties of Kilivila – like, for example, in the *biga mokwita* – and that they will, and inevitably must, put a great strain on the communicative interaction between the magicians and the addressees of the magical formulae. Thus, the formal characteristics of the formulae serve the function of a pronounced signal: By the means of the formal verbal domain the license is sought to strain the communicative interaction in the verbal domain with regard to contents. The *biga megwa* concept utilizes this license to relieve the tension in this critical situation of social interaction and to ward off any possible consequences of the strains that affect the communicative interaction which takes place in magic rites and rituals – according to the Trobrianders’ conviction, of course (see Senft 2010a: 44ff). Thus, the *biga megwa* and its constitutive magical formulae also match the definition of “ritual communication” presented above (see Senft 1987: 117, 122–123, 125–126; Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Senft 1987: 75ff; Senft 2009b: 82).

To summarize, the speech situation between the Trobriand magicians and the addressees of their formulae is regarded by the Trobriand Islanders as a (special) form of conversation; and this conversational interaction constitutes a special form of ritual communication.¹⁸

However, by now the *biga megwa* and the *biga baloma* are moribund, due to the increasing influence of Christian belief – the Overseas Mission Department of the Methodist Church commenced work on the Trobriands in 1894 and Australian Roman Catholic missionaries from the Mission of the Sacred Heart (M.S.C.) began their work in 1935 – and due to the gradual growth of the local village priests’ status and political power since the middle 1980s.¹⁹

18. Basso and Senft (2009: 1) provide the following more general and comprehensive definition of ritual communication than the one given in this subsection:

Ritual communication is an undertaking or enterprise involving a making of cultural knowledge within locally variant practices of speech-centered human interaction ... [R]itual communication is artful, performed semiosis, predominantly but not only involving speech, that is formulaic and repetitive and therefore anticipated within particular contexts of social interaction. Ritual communication thus has anticipated (but not always achieved) consequences. As performance, it is subject to evaluation by participants according to standards defined in part by language ideologies, local aesthetics, contexts of use, and, especially, relations of power among participants.

19. For a detailed description of the mission history of the Trobriand Islands and a discussion of the reasons why the *biga megwa* and the *biga baloma* have become moribund see Senft (2010b).

Magicians, both female and male, have gradually lost influence in the society, and accordingly the estimation of their magical skills and their knowledge of magical formulae has decreased. Many Trobrianders think that there is actually no need any more to bequeath magical formulae to the members of the younger generation, and in turn, the younger generation these days hardly sees any sense in learning these formulae. In addition, Christian religion and its specific eschatology is also gradually replacing the indigenous Trobriand eschatology, which – as I have pointed out above – is codified in the *wosi milamala* that constitute the *biga baloma*. The songs are still sung, but the singers of these songs no longer know what they are singing about. Many of the *wosi milamala* are already forgotten and I am convinced that in a few years the *biga baloma* variety will have died (see Senft 2010b: 89f).²⁰

The two moribund varieties are superseded and replaced by another highly ritualized register to which the Trobriand Islanders refer with the label *biga tapwaroro* – “the language of the church”. The Trobrianders use this metalinguistic label to refer to the variety of Kilivila which is used and represented in Christian rituals and texts that are associated with the church service. Two genres are constitutive for this register: *tapwaroro* – “Christian texts” – is the term that refers to all forms of speech produced during various forms of church services, and *wosi tapwaroro* – “church song” is the label for the genre “Christian hymn”. The *wosi tapwaroro* sometimes represent hymns that are sung in neighboring languages like Dobu or Muyuw, and the *tapwaroro* genre that co-constitutes this variety represents a formal language variety typically used by older Trobriand Islanders of high status which is slightly different from modern Kilivila used in profane, secular contexts (see Lawton 1997; also Senft 2010a: 64ff). Nevertheless, the *biga tapwaroro* label of this variety emphasizes the Christian context of these forms of speech and songs (see Senft 2010a: 12 and 60ff). The rise of the *biga tapwaroro* on the one hand and the decline of the *biga megwa* and the *biga baloma* on the other illustrates the massive culture change that started in the mid-1980s, which in turn led to this dramatic language change on the Trobriand Islands (see Senft 2010b).

3.3 Making peace with Ibova and the lessons in pragmatics learned

What did Bomsamesa’s mother Ibova, who was so furious with me when I had asked her daughter in the presence of her brother about her intentions to marry, mean with the sentence: “But this is just *sopa*!” – with which she – weeks later – answered my shocked question why she was reciting pornographic verses to her young grandchildren and with which she obviously also made peace with me?

20. In Senft (2011) I have documented and translated 20 song cycles of the *wosi milamala*.

The *biga sopa* – the “joking or lying speech”, the “indirect speech”, the “speech that is not vouched for” – is absolutely characteristic for Trobriand forms of talk – it disregards social barriers and distinctions in the hierarchically structured clan society of the Trobriand Islanders (see Senft 2010a: 163) and constitutes the default register of Trobriand discourse, so to speak (see Senft 2009d: 84ff; 2010a: 13f. & 149ff). It is based on the fact that Kilivila, like any other natural language, is marked by features that include ‘vagueness’ and ‘ambiguity’. Both these features are used by its speakers as stylistic means to avoid possible distress, confrontation, or too much and – for a Trobriand Islander at least – too aggressive directness of certain speech situations.

If hearers signal that they may be insulted by a certain speech act, speakers can always recede from what they have said by labelling it as *sopa*, as something they did not really mean to say. The simple but pragmatically clearly marked formula *asasopa wala* – “I am just joking” – or its shorter version *sopa wala* – “(It’s) just (a) joke” – regulates and controls the reactive behavior of the addressee. Thus *sopa* signals the speakers’ “unmarked non-commitment to truth” (William Hanks, personal communication). Trobriand etiquette then prescribes that hearers must not be offended at all by those utterances that were explicitly labelled as *sopa* – that is, as utterances detached from truth.²¹

The Trobriand Islanders employ this variety in everyday conversation, in small talk, in gossip, in flirtation, in public debates, in admonitory speeches, in songs, stories and ditties that accompany a number of games as a means of rhetoric to avoid possible conflicts and to relax the atmosphere of the speech situation. The *biga sopa* register also contributes to put forward arguments because it allows speakers to disguise their thoughts verbally and to disagree in a playful way without the danger of too much personal exposure. Moreover, the *biga sopa* variety is used for mocking people. As a means of irony and parody it can be used to criticize certain forms of sociologically deviant behavior, relatively mildly asking for immediate correction.

21. This does not always work, though. In Senft (2017b: 73–74) I have described a case in which in April 1983 a man in Tauwema felt so provoked by the teasing jokes – the *sopa*! – of another villager that he lost his temper, grabbed his weapons and wanted to fight with his opponent. His neighbors managed to hinder him storming towards his offender and finally calmed him down. This incident had serious consequences for the man who could not control his emotions. He realized that he had lost his face and was not seen any more for the next six weeks or so. He left the village at dawn before everybody else got up, worked in his gardens and returned back home after sunset. During a village meeting in mid-May he suddenly surfaced again, distributing piles of his betel nuts to everybody, but especially to his former opponent who accepted this gift rather nonchalantly, realizing, though, that the donor of the nuts closely observed him. His acceptance of the betelnuts settled the case and the donor of the nuts had managed to restore his face.

Finally, the *biga sopa* variety offers the only license for the verbal breaking of taboos and thus for the licensed use of *biga gaga* including the use of minor but definitely not of the worst insults and swear words (see Senft 2010a: 18ff) – not only for adults but also for children.

As already mentioned in the introduction, the *biga sopa* encompasses the following genres: *sopa* – “joke, lie, trick”, *kukwanebu (sopa)* – “story, joke in form of a story”, *kukwanebu* – “tale, story”, *kasilam* – “gossip”, *wosi* – “songs” (with a number of separately named subvarieties), *butula* – “personal mocking verses or songs”, *vinavina* – “mocking ditty” (also with a number of named subvarieties), and *sawili* – “harvest shouts”.

I want to point out here that the various *biga sopa* genres that include *biga gaga* characteristics (like, for example, ditties like the one Ibova recited playing string figure games with her grandchildren) serve the function of so-called “safety valve customs” (Heymer 1977: 187; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1984: 492 ff). This ethological concept needs some explanation: Every society puts some of its realms, domains and spheres under certain specific taboos. However, the stricter the society is in regard to its observance of these taboos, the more these taboos are ignored. But a society can secure its members’ observance of certain taboos, especially of taboos that are important for its social construction of reality, by allowing the discussion of its taboos – especially of the sociologically less important ones – as topics of discourse. It may even allow its members to imagine the ignorance of taboos – in a fictitious way, of course. And this is exactly how and why safety valve customs develop.

Texts and utterances that show features of *biga gaga* are first of all classified as *sopa* – as play, as something fictitious in Trobriand society. The *biga sopa* thus generates a forum where the breaking of taboos – and thus the use (of milder forms of) “bad language” – is allowed, if it is done verbally! This forum permits a specially marked way of communication about something “one does not talk about” otherwise.

In sum, the *biga sopa* variety channels emotions, it keeps aggression under control, and it keeps possibilities of contact open. This concept with its tension-releasing functions secures harmony in the Trobriand society and contributes to maintaining the Trobriand Islanders’ social construction of their reality.²²

22. Similar varieties can also be found in other cultures of Papua New Guinea and probably all over Melanesia; see e. g., Merlan and Rumsey (1991: 88–89), Parkin (1984), Strathern (1975), Watson-Gegeo (1986). Eric Venbrux (personal communication) points out that Sansom (1980) describes the same phenomenon for the Aboriginal English of Aboriginal fringe dwellers in Darwin; the expression they use for this variety is ‘*gammon*’; the Tiwi use ‘*gammon*’ in this way, too. See also Haiman (1998: 83–84) and Brown (2002); for more general remarks see Arndt and Janney (1987: 201). Similar verses like the Trobriand Islanders’ ditties that accompany games and

4. Pragmatics and anthropology

What is the relevance of genres and registers or varieties for researching the inter-relationship between language, culture and cognition – and why is Foley (1997: 29) right in claiming that it is really impossible to draw the boundary between pragmatics on the one hand and anthropology and especially anthropological linguistics on the other?

In my presentation of the situational-intentional varieties of Kilivila and their constituting genres I briefly described the functions these varieties fulfill with respect to the Trobriand Islanders social construction of reality. The salient relevance of these situational-intentional varieties and their constitutive genres is one of the most important characteristics of the language to be recognized in anthropological linguistic field research (see Senft 2010a: 278f.). Whoever wants to learn, speak and describe Kilivila properly and competently has to grasp these concepts because their understanding is absolutely compulsory for the adequate use and understanding of this language. I have illustrated elsewhere how difficult this process can be and how the speech community can play with, and ridicule, outsiders that are completely ignorant of these concepts (Senft 1995). However, I am convinced that this is nothing specific for the Trobriand Islanders.

I have also pointed out elsewhere (Senft 1991: 245; see also Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Senft 1987) that all speakers of a natural language must learn and acquire the rules of the multimodal communicative behavior that are valid in, and hold for, their speech community. In the course of this learning process one of the most important objectives is to understand and to duplicate the construction of the speech community's common social reality. During this learning process, verbal and nonverbal patterns and modes of behavior must also be coordinated and harmonized.

The thus duplicated social construction of reality must be safeguarded and secured especially with respect to possible 'sites of fracture' like, for example, cooperation, conflict, and competition within the community. The safeguarding of the duplicated social construction of reality is warranted by the ritualization and formalization of verbal and nonverbal communication. The ritualization of communication relieves the tension in critical social situations and regulates social differences and dissensions by increasing the harmonizing functions of speech, by the creation and stabilization of social relations, and by the distancing of emotions, impulses and intentions. This insight justified post hoc, so to speak, why I started my research on the Trobriand Islanders' language and culture in a project which was financed by the German Research Society (DFG) and the Human Ethology

that are also constitutive for the *biga sopa* variety are also documented for German children (see Bornemann 1973, 1974; and also Rühmkorf 1967).

Research Unit at the MPI for Behavioral Physiology and that had the explicit aim to investigate “Ritual Communication on the Trobriand Islands” (see Senft 1987).

Ritualization of communication increases the predictability of human behavior – it creates a common ground. Moreover, it also opens room and space where behavior can be tried out – playfully – without any fear of possible social sanctions. Therefore, I have defined ‘ritual communication’ in this paper and elsewhere as a type of strategic action that serves the functions of social bonding and of blocking aggression, and that can ban elements of danger which may affect the community’s social harmony within the verbal domain just by verbalizing these elements of danger and by bringing them up for discussion.

However, as mentioned above in a footnote, this does not always work. As Ellen B. Basso (personal communication) pointed out, the duplication of the social construction of reality or the social truth of a locution does not always accord either with the speaker’s or the listener’s experiencing of that situation or one alluded to in the locution. Then possible aggression that may result out of this failure is usually suppressed because of the general and rather strong societal requirement to ‘be nice’ even when people do not feel that way (see Subsection 3.2). Thus, things can be calmed down, voicing can be repressed. However, a society as open as the society of the Trobriand Islanders (and any other one that hardly offers really closed personal spaces for its members to ensure real privacy) depends on the fact that its members have to have a strong feeling of tact: sometimes one has to pretend not to (over) hear, not to note things – and one has to learn that one does not talk about these things (especially at a rather early age) – so there is indeed often an atmosphere that we may refer to as tense. It is only that general requirement of tactful behavior, the necessity to be nice, and the positive and successful effects of ritual communication that contribute to and create the necessary social harmony within a society like the one of the Trobriand Islanders.

My brief survey of the Trobriand Islanders’ ways of speaking that I have presented here has hopefully shown that the situational-intentional varieties in Kilivila and the genres that constitute them crucially contribute to serving these ‘communitarian’ functions of communication.

To emphasize it once more: Whoever wants to research the role of language, culture and cognition in social interaction – be it linguist or anthropologist – must know how the researched society constructs its reality. Researchers need to be on ‘common ground’ with the researched communities, and this common ground knowledge is the prerequisite for any successful research on language, culture and cognition manifest in social interaction. It is completely irrelevant if these researchers are rooted either in anthropology or in linguistic pragmatics. What matters is that in their research these scholars follow the axiomatic insights of the transdiscipline PRAGMATICS which I have quoted in Subsection 3.1 of this paper.

I hope that I have shown and illustrated here, that the research results on human interaction gained by both anthropologists and linguists specialized in pragmatics then will come to the same general insights, namely

- that they understand speech as a mode of behavior, a mode of action in which the meaning of an utterance is constituted by its function in certain contexts;
- that one of the primary forms of language is a form of language use that is ritualized to various degrees and has primarily bonding functions;
- that the situative context and the interactants' common cultural knowledge provide the necessary information for understanding these bonding functions of more or less ritualized forms of communication and other mechanisms of language use as a means to consolidate the relationship between the interactants;
- that the meaning of an utterance, thus, can only be understood in relation to the speech event in which it is embedded;
- that the rules that guide the multimodal communicative behavior of members of a specific speech community can vary immensely and that they have to be learned to achieve communicative competence within this community;
- and that achieving linguistic and cultural competence in a speech community requires the understanding of how it structures, patterns and regulates its ways of speaking (Senft 2014: 187).

These insights not only support Bill Foley's (1997:29) claim, but also Charles Hockett's understanding of the relationship between the disciplines linguistics and anthropology – an understanding which nicely echoes Malinowski (1920: 78) whom I have quoted in the introduction of this paper. Hockett (1973: 675) comes up with the following succinct statement: "Linguistics without anthropology is sterile, anthropology without linguistics is blind".

References

- Agar, Michael. 2001. "Ethnography." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Behavioral Sciences*, Vol 7, ed. by Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 4857–4862. Amsterdam: Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/00859-7
- Arndt, Horst and Richard Wayne Janney. 1987. *InterGrammar: Toward a Model of Verbal, Prosodic and Kinesic Choices in Speech*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110872910
- Austin, John L. 1962. *How to do things with words*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Baldwin, Bernard. 1971. *Dokonikani – Cannibal Tales of the Wild Western Pacific*. Pekina: Typoscript. [Downloadable at: <http://www.trobriandsindepth.com/myths.html>]
- Basso, Ellen B., and Gunter Senft. 2009. "Introduction." In *Ritual Communication*, ed. by Gunter Senft, and Ellen B. Basso, 1–19. Oxford: Berg.

- Bauman, Richard. 1992. "Text and Discourse in Anthropological Linguistics. In *International Encyclopedia of Linguistics*, ed. by William Bright, 145–147. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1966 *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.
- Bornemann, Ernest. 1973. *Unsere Kinder im Spiegel ihrer Lieder, Reime, Verse und Rätsel*. Olten: Walter.
- Bornemann, Ernest. 1974. *Die Umwelt des Kindes im Spiegel seiner "verbotenen" Lieder, Reime, Verse und Rätsel*. Olten: Walter.
- Brown, Penelope. 2002. "Everyone Has to Lie in Tzeltal." In *Talking to Adults. Contribution of Multiparty Discourse to Language Acquisition*, ed. by Shoshana Blum-Kulka, and Catherine E. Snow, 241–275. Mahwah, N. J.: Erlbaum.
- Damon, Frederick H. 1982. "Calendars and Calendrical Rites in the Northern Side of the Kula Ring." *Oceania* 53: 221–239. doi:10.1002/j.1834-4461.1982.tb01496.x
- Duranti, Alessandro. 1997. *Linguistic Anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511810190
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. 1984. *Die Biologie des menschlichen Verhaltens: Grundriß der Humanethologie*. München: Piper.
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus, and Gunter Senft. 1987. *Studienbrief "Rituelle Kommunikation" – Kommunikation – Wissen – Kultur*. Fernuniversität/Gesamthochschule Hagen: Fachbereich Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaften.
- Foley, William. 1997. *Anthropological Linguistics. An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Haddon, Alfred Cort. 1894. *The Decorative Art of British New Guinea*. Dublin: Royal Irish Academy.
- Haiman, John. 1998. *Talk is Cheap. Sarcasm, Alienation, and the Evolution of Language*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hannerz, Ulf. 2001. "Anthropology, History of." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 1, ed. by Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 513–519. Amsterdam: Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/00796-8
- Heymer, Armin. 1977. *Vocabulaire Ethologique: Allemand-Anglais-Français*. Berlin: Parey.
- Hockett, Charles F. 1973. *Man's Place in Nature*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Holmes, Janet. 2018. "Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics: Where does the boundary lie?" In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 11–32. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.02hol
- Liep, John. 2015. "Dogomomo Xmas, Kwangwe's Races, and a Murder: W.E. Armstrong and the Rossel Island money." *Oceania* 85: 183–198. doi:10.1002/ocea.5079
- Lawton, Ralph. 1997. *Buki Pilabumaboma*. Port Moresby: The Bible Society of Papua New Guinea.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1920. "Classificatory Particles in the Language of Kiriwina." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London institution, Vol. I, part IV: 33–78.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1922. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London: George Routledge.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1925. "Magic, Science and Religion." In *Science, Religion and Reality*, ed. by James Needham, 19–84. New York: Macmillan Company [= 1974: 17–92].
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1929. *The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1935. *Coral Gardens and their Magic. Vol. I: The Description of Gardening. Vol. II: The Language of Magic and Gardening*. London: George Allen & Unwin.

- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1974. *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays*. London: Souvenir Press.
- Merlan, Francesca, and Alan Rumsey. 1991. *Ku Waru. Language and Segmentary Politics in the Western Nebilyer Valley, Papua New Guinea*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511518218
- Östman, Jan-Ola and Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenberg. 2009. "Firthian Linguistics." In *Culture and Language Use*, ed. by Gunter Senft, Jan-Ola Östman, and Jef Verschueren, 140–145. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hoph.2.13ost
- Parkin, David. 1984. "Political Language." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 13: 345–365.
doi:10.1146/annurev.an.13.100184.002021
- Persson, Johnny. 1999. *Sagali and the Kula. A Regional System Analysis of the Massim*. Lund Monographs in Social Anthropology 7. Lund: Department of Sociology, Lund University.
- Reich, Wilhelm. 1972. *Der Einbruch der sexuellen Zwangsmoral. Zur Geschichte der sexuellen Ökonomie*. (The Invasion of Compulsary Sex-Morality. On the History of Sex-Economy) Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch [1st published in 1932, revised in 1935, revised and enlarged in 1951].
- Rühmkorf, Peter. 1967. *Über das Volksvermögen. Exkurse in den literarischen Untergrund*. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
- Sansom, Basil. 1980. *The Camp at Wallaby Cross*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies.
- Saukkonen, Pauli. 2003. "How to Define and Describe Genres and Styles." *Folia Linguistica* XXXVII: 399–414.
- Scheff, Thomas. J. 1977. "The Distancing of Emotions in Ritual." *Current Anthropology* 18: 483–505. doi:10.1086/201928
- Senft, Gunter. 1986. *Kilivila – The Language of the Trobriand Islanders*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
doi:10.1515/9783110861846
- Senft, Gunter. 1987. "Rituelle Kommunikation auf den Trobriand Inseln." *Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik*, 65: 105–130.
- Senft, Gunter. 1991. "Prolegomena to the Pragmatics of 'Situational-Intentional' Varieties in Kilivila Language. In *Levels of Linguistic Adaptation: Selected papers from the 1987 International Pragmatics Conference, Volume II*, ed. by Jef Verschueren, 235–248. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.6.2.15sen
- Senft, Gunter. 1995. "Notes from the Field: Ain't Misbehavin'? Trobriand Pragmatics and the Field Researcher's Opportunity to Put His (or Her) Foot in it." *Oceanic Linguistics* 34: 211–226.
doi:10.2307/3623120
- Senft, Gunter. 1997. "Magical conversation on the Trobriand Islands." *Anthropos* 92: 369–391.
- Senft, Gunter. 1998. "'Noble Savages' and the 'Islands of Love': Trobriand Islanders in 'Popular Publications'". In *Pacific Answers to Western Hegemony: Cultural Practices of Identity Construction*, ed. by Jürg Wassmann, 119–140. Oxford: Berg.
- Senft, Gunter. 2005. "Bronislaw Malinowski and Linguistic Pragmatics." In *Pragmatics Today*, ed. by Piotr Cap, 139–155. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.
- Senft, Gunter. 2009a. "Introduction." In *Culture and Language Use*, ed. by Gunter Senft, Jan-Ola Östman, and Jef Verschueren, 1–17. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hoph.2.01sen
- Senft, Gunter. 2009b. "Bronislaw Kasper Malinowski." In *Culture and Language Use*, ed. by Gunter Senft, Jan-Ola Östman, and Jef Verschueren, 210–225. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
doi:10.1075/hoph.2.19sen

- Senft, Gunter. 2009c. "Phatic Communion." In *Culture and Language Use*, ed. by Gunter Senft, Jan-Ola Östman, and Jef Verschueren, 226–233. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/hoph.2.20sen
- Senft, Gunter. 2009d. "Trobriand Islanders' Forms of Ritual Communication." In *Ritual Communication*, ed. by Gunter Senft, and Ellen B. Basso, 81–101. Oxford: Berg.
- Senft, Gunter. 2010a. *The Trobriand Islanders' Ways of Speaking*. Berlin: De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110227994
- Senft, Gunter. 2010b. "Culture Change – Language Change: Missionaries and Moribund Varieties of Kilivila." In *Endangered Austronesian and Australian Aboriginal Languages: Essays on Language Documentation, Archiving, and Revitalization*, ed. by Gunter Senft, 69–95. Canberra: Pacific Linguistics.
- Senft, Gunter. 2011. *The Tuma Underworld of Love – Erotic and Other Narrative Songs of The Trobriand Islanders and Their Spirits of the Dead*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Senft, Gunter. 2014. *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Routledge.
- Senft, Gunter. 2017a. *Imdeduya – Variants of a Myth of Love and Hate from the Trobriand Islands of Papua New Guinea*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/clu.20
- Senft, Gunter. 2017b. "'Control Your Emotions! If Teasing Provokes You, You've Lost Your Face ...': The Trobriand Islanders' Control of their Public Display of Emotions." In *Consensus and Dissent: Negotiating Emotion in Public Space*, ed. by Anne Storch, 59–79. Amsterdam: John Benjamins doi:10.1075/clu.19.04sen
- Silverstein, Michael. 1975. "Linguistics and Anthropology." In *Linguistics and Neighboring Disciplines*, ed. by Renate Bartsch, and Theo Vennemann, 157–170. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Strathern, Andrew. 1975. "Veiled Speech in Mount Hagen." In *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Societies*, ed. by Maurice Bloch, 185–203. London: Academic Press.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. 1985. *Culture, Thought and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- van Gennep, Arnold. 1909. *Les rites de passage. Etude systématique de la porte et du seuil, l'hospitalité, de la grossesse et de l'accouchement, de la naissance, de l'enfance, de la puberté, de l'initiation, de l'ordination, du couronnement, des fiançailles, et du mariage, des funérailles, des saisons etc.* Paris: La Haye.
- Watson-Gegeo, Karen A. 1986. "The Study of Language Use in Oceania." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 15: 149–162. doi:10.1146/annurev.an.15.100186.001053
- Weiner, Annette B. 1976. *Women of Value, Men of Renown: New Perspectives in Trobriand Exchange*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Weiner, Annette B. 1983. "From Words to Objects to Magic: Hard Words and the Boundaries of Social Interaction." *Man* 18: 690–709. doi:10.2307/2801903
- Welz, Gisela. 2001. "Ethnology." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 7, ed. by Neil J. Smelser, and Paul B. Baltes, 4862–4865. Amsterdam: Elsevier. doi:10.1016/B0-08-043076-7/00861-5
- Young, Michael W. 2004. *Malinowski: Odyssey of an Anthropologist 1884–1920*, Vol. 1. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.

Integrative pragmatics and (im)politeness theory

Michael Haugh and Jonathan Culpeper

The University of Queensland, Australia / Lancaster University, UK

In this chapter, we first discuss the role that pragmatics has played in the development of (im)politeness theory, and the recent move towards a middle ground that integrates classic and discursive approaches to (im)politeness. We outline the key tenets of integrative pragmatics that afford such a move, before illustrating how these can be implemented through a case study focusing on an incident in *Big Brother UK* where the (ostensibly) jocular use of a racial slur by a contestant caused offence and the subsequent removal of that contestant from the show. Our analyses draw from multiple methods, including those of interactional pragmatics and corpus pragmatics. In this way, we aim to both highlight the fundamentally pragmatic basis of (im)politeness, as well as the need for a nuanced and complex theorisation that integrates multiple perspectives and methods of analysis.

Keywords: corpus pragmatics, discursive, impoliteness, integrative pragmatics, interactional pragmatics, jocular abuse, offence, politeness, pragmatics, racist discourse

1. Introduction

Any paper that sets out to examine and discuss the alignment of the field of pragmatics with that of (im)politeness studies would seem doomed to failure. Both are notoriously difficult to define. Witness the 30 or so pages that Levinson (1983) devotes to the definition of pragmatics, yet without much success. Given the complexity of pragmatic phenomena, it is no surprise that a wide range of theoretical approaches have developed. Many of these fall into dichotomies, for instance between Anglo-American and European pragmatics (Huang 2007; Verschueren 1999), or between micro and macro approaches (Mey 2001; see also Fetzer, Holmes, Ilie, Norrick, this volume). As for (im)politeness, one might be forgiven for thinking

that for every new study of (im)politeness there is a new definition of (im)politeness. This is not entirely surprising, given that the variety in pragmatics, including its dichotomies, is also reflected in (im)politeness studies. In addition, the field of (im)politeness has soaked up concepts and approaches from other disciplines, especially social psychology, sociology, cultural studies and anthropology, all of which has enhanced the kaleidoscope impression. However, our aim is not to “pin down” either field, but rather to survey the multiplicity of approaches and notions in each, suggest some of the dimensions, especially dichotomies, along which they vary, and moreover, to propose a way of bridging some of them. That bridge is “integrative pragmatics” (Culpeper and Haugh 2014), and in this chapter we will outline its tenets, using (im)politeness theory as a testing ground.

We begin by first discussing the role that pragmatics has played in the development of (im)politeness theory following the three “waves” identified in both Culpeper (2011b) and Grainger (2011), and further discussed in Kádár and Haugh (2013). We propose that the theorisation of (im)politeness can be properly grounded in pragmatics, yet also address the critical concerns of second wave approaches, through an integrative pragmatics approach. We then go on, in section three, to outline integrative pragmatics. The focus of integrative pragmatics is the study, by observer-analysts, of what particular form-function relationships are taken to mean by users in particular situated, sequential contexts, and how this can vary across those participants. Given the particular focus of integrative pragmatics on variation and metapragmatic awareness across participants, it calls for a multi-method approach that combines interpretive and quantitative methodologies. We then illustrate the integrative approach to pragmatic analysis, in section four, by focusing on an infamous incident from “Big Brother UK” in which one housemate directed a racial slur at another causing widespread offence, and the subsequent removal of that contestant from the show despite being claimed (by the offender) to have only been used in jest. Our case study draws from multiple analytical methods and perspectives, including interactional pragmatics and corpus pragmatics. We conclude that this integrated approach not only highlights the fundamentally pragmatic basis of (im)politeness, but also draws attention to the need for a nuanced and complex theory of (im)politeness that integrates multiple perspectives and methods of analysis.

2. The role of pragmatics in politeness theory¹

The roots of (im)politeness research can be traced back to the very inception of the field of pragmatics, being cited in early work as a key motivation for leaving things unsaid (Grice 1975:48; Lakoff 1973:302; Searle 1969:36, 68). The first wave of politeness research, constituted by the classics such as Brown and Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983), was grounded in these early pragmatic theories. Leech (2003), for instance, situates the study of politeness firmly within linguistic pragmatics:

The starting point of pragmatics is primarily in language: explaining communicative behaviour. By studying this we keep our feet firmly on the ground, and avoid getting lost too easily in abstractions such as ‘face’ or ‘culture’. The basic question is: *What did s mean [to convey] by saying X?* It is useful to postulate the Politeness Principle (PP) ...because it explains certain pragmatic phenomena.

(Leech 2003:104–105)

Rather than focusing on psychological (e.g. ‘face’) or social (e.g. ‘culture’) motivations for language use, Leech advocates a relatively formal approach to theorising politeness through proposing a set of politeness maxims that complement the conversational maxims proposed by Grice. Similarly, Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness is also relatively formal, although it shifts the lens somewhat to more social-psychological factors in proposing that the inherently face-threatening nature of many speech acts can be mitigated through various different kinds of politeness strategies.

Yet while there was much merit in what they did, we would argue that they were hemmed in by a limited view of pragmatics. In both cases, a more micro, linguistically-focused approach to the analysis of politeness is proposed. This focus on analysing politeness at the level of utterances reflects the focus of the two key theories in pragmatics on which they are based, namely, speech act theory and conversational implicature.

Searle’s (1969, 1975) speech act theory has been the subject of considerable critique (see Fetzer, Ilie, Norrick, this volume). Brown and Levinson (1987) themselves admit that “speech act theory forces a sentence-based, speaker-oriented, mode of analysis, requiring attribution of speech act categories”, and so is not well placed to account for the way in which “utterances are very often equivocal in force” (p. 10). The way in which politeness is linked with “indirectness” in speech act theory

1. We do not go into the specifics of the different theories of (im)politeness that are discussed in this section, as our focus here is on discussing the role pragmatics has played in the development of politeness research. For useful overviews of theories of (im)politeness, see Culpeper (2011b) or Kádár and Haugh (2013: Chapters 2–3).

has also been criticised as overly Anglo-centric, with numerous scholars citing examples of cultures where directness is treated as the norm and thus “polite” (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1987; Nwoye 1992; Ogiermann 2009).

The emphasis on speaker intentions in Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature has also been challenged. Both Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987) characterise politeness as a type of “particularised implicature” that is triggered by deviations from Grice’s Cooperative Principle (CP). One problem for intention-based accounts of politeness is that while they are treated as stable private acts on the part of speakers that are relatively tractable to others, subsequent work has found that understandings of intentions emerge through interaction (Arundale 2008; Gibbs 1999; Haugh 2008). It has thus been argued that how implicatures are understood by hearers is just as important to what is communicated as whatever the speaker may have intended (Bilmes 1993; Clark 1996; Haugh 2007a). Other scholars have also suggested that politeness can be achieved without deviating from the CP, such as when someone says “good morning” to a colleague (Escandell-Vidal 1998; Haugh 2003; Jary 1998; Terkourafi 2001; Watts 2003), in which case it is hard to see how a particularised implicature could be held to arise. Indeed, Brown and Levinson (1987: 6–7) themselves concede they may have under-played the role that generalised (conversational) implicatures play with respect to politeness (see also Terkourafi 2005a, 2005b).

The second wave of politeness research, constituted by what are usually considered “discursive approaches”, such as in Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003), was successful as a rhetorical move, highlighting some of the limitations of the first wave approaches to politeness. A key assumption underpinning these second wave approaches is that “politeness” does not have one single meaning and is a site of discursive struggle, reflecting broader societal struggles about norms of “appropriate” behaviour. This entails a shift to treating the perspective of participants as central to any analysis of politeness, and a concomitant preference for qualitative methods of analysis, in particular, discourse analysis, as opposed to the quantitative ones often favoured by the more formal, first wave approaches. In treating politeness as a form of social capital and thus a site of discursive struggle, these second wave approaches also heralded a discernible shift in focus away from pragmatics and towards social theory (e.g. Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 1972).

This shift has since been challenged, however, on grounds that it leads to a lack of theorisation and systematicity in politeness research. Terkourafi (2005a) for instance, argues that in undertaking discursive analyses of politeness “[w]hat we are then left with are minute descriptions of individual encounters, but these do not in any way add up to an explanatory theory of the phenomena under study” (p. 245). There is little room left for generalisation and the identification of linguistic patterns in such approaches (Holmes and Schnurr 2005: 122–123). Yet a vast

amount of research in pragmatics has demonstrated that there are clearly recurrent ways of behaving that are considered “normal” within particular social groupings, and so open to evaluation, in some cases at least, as “polite”, “impolite” and so on. Given post-modern approaches sometimes challenge the very idea that there are stable meanings, they are left struggling to account for the fact that such patterns can evidently be identified. Another issue is that in advocating the primary focus of research should be on participants’ understandings, without clarifying what role the analyst’s understandings might play, there is a danger that lay understandings will be reified in such approaches as if they constituted a (formal) theory in their own right. Ultimately, then, in placing the focus of analysis squarely on the ways in which participants may dispute what is “polite”, “impolite” and so on, there is little heed given to the fact there must be some *object* for those users and observers to discursively co-construct, negotiate or dispute in the first place. The role of (im)politeness theory, in our view, is not simply to offer an account of discursive struggles vis-à-vis (im)politeness, but to develop a systematic explanation of the phenomena itself, that is, (im)politeness.

Leech (2014) thus argues that politeness theory needs to be brought back into pragmatics, and the focus needs to shift back to a consideration of pragmalinguistic aspects of (im)politeness alongside sociopragmatic dimensions of it. It is not the role of this paper to debate the thorny issue of the boundaries of pragmatics, but we would argue that some of the positive features of the classic politeness works do seem to have been lost. Indeed, the counter-critique of second wave approaches appears to have motivated a general shift in the field towards a middle ground between classic and discursive approaches to politeness (Locher and Bousfield 2008; Locher 2012, 2015; Kádár and Haugh 2013). This third wave of approaches to (im)politeness is, however, somewhat less cohesive, despite general consensus that we need to strike a balance between the perspectives of participants and analysts in theorising (im)politeness.

There is now an increasingly diverse range of theoretical accounts of (im)politeness on the market. These include: (a) the discursive-materialist approach (Mills 2003, 2017; van der Bom and Mills 2015); (b) the discursive-relational approach (Locher 2006, 2012, 2015; Locher and Watts 2005; Watts 2003); (c) the interactional pragmatics approach (Haugh 2007b, 2013, 2015); (d) the genre approach developed by Blitvich (2010, 2013); (e) the interactional sociolinguistics approach (Holmes, Marra and Vine (2011, 2012), to which Grainger (2013) also broadly subscribes; (f) the socio-pragmatic approach of Culpeper (2011a, 2015), which builds on the broader rapport management framework developed by Spencer-Oatey (2005); (g) the frame-based approach (Terkourafi 2001, 2005a, 2005b); and (h) the revised maxims-based approach proposed by Leech (2007, 2014), among others.

Notably, almost all of these theoretical accounts draw from analyses of (im)politeness in stretches of spontaneous, very often naturally occurring, discourse, and all of them try to marry together the perspectives of participants with that of the scientific observer to varying degrees. What differentiates these different theoretical accounts is the degree to which they place emphasis on developing an account of (im)politeness based on social versus pragmatic theories of language-in-use, and the extent to which they primarily build on user (first order) versus observer (second order) understandings of politeness. Figure 1 represents an attempt to roughly place a selection of these different third wave accounts of (im)politeness along these two scales.²




Figure 1. Third wave approaches to (im)politeness

At the more pragmatic end we find, for instance, Terkourafi (e.g. 2001), and, of course, Leech (2014). Both, however, take a somewhat narrower approach than we

2. We fully appreciate that some scholars may contest the way in which we have characterised their approaches here, and indeed welcome further debate about how we might best engage in further meta-theorisation about extant theories of politeness.

would argue for, particularly with respect to teasing out meanings in interaction. At the more social end of theorisation we find, for instance, Mills (e.g. 2017) and, in some respects, Blitvich (2010, 2013) and Locher (2006, 2012). While these latter approaches draw attention to the normative basis of politeness, they are primarily focused on the ways in which (im)politeness is tied to particular identity claims (or disputes). We would suggest, however, that such identity claims must be focused on some object, that object being, of course, (im)politeness. What is arguably needed, then, if we are to find a middle ground, is an approach that is firmly focused on (im)politeness as the object of theorisation, not face, not identities, not norms or class struggles, and not culture. The latter are clearly important foci of study in pragmatics broadly conceived, and are closely entwined with issues of (im)politeness, but they should not be substituted for a theory of (im)politeness itself.

In the following section, we suggest that any such a theory will inevitably need to be developed within a broader integrative pragmatics framework that takes into account multiple perspectives and builds on multiple methods of analysis.

3. Integrative pragmatics

The roots of pragmatics lie in philosophical accounts of linguistic phenomena that did not readily fit within the structuralist accounts of language which dominated linguistics and language philosophy in 1950–1960s. However, it has grown over the past three decades far beyond these roots into a broad interdisciplinary program encompassing the systematic study of situated language use. In many respects, pragmatics can now be conceptualised as lying at the intersection of linguistics, psychology and sociology. Different sub-fields within pragmatics are more or less closely associated with these three different contributing disciplines, a situation we have represented roughly in Figure 2 below. We caution, however, that the size of these various intersecting shapes is not meant in any way to represent the relative size or importance of these different fields. The figure is intended purely as a heuristic device. It also involves considerable simplification as the theorisation of pragmatics itself was, of course, heavily influenced by language philosophy in its initial stages of development, and continues to be influenced by it up until the present day, through its ongoing influence on both linguistics and the cognitive sciences more broadly, including psychology.




Figure 2. Pragmatics as an interdisciplinary program

The broad dichotomies that exist in pragmatics, between Anglo-American and European pragmatics, micro and macro-pragmatics, empirical and formal pragmatics, and between participant and observer perspectives more broadly, cross-cut this interdisciplinary space in different ways, thereby occupying (nominally) different territories. Yet while these different approaches have clearly been fruitful, they have often remained at arms-length from each other. This represents an unfortunate development in our view. Each has much to gain from the other, yet finding common ground has sometimes proven elusive.

The integrative pragmatics approach we develop in Culpeper and Haugh (2014) builds on the assumption that the locus of that middle ground is interaction (see also Clark 1996; Thomas 1995). An integrative pragmatics approach is characterised by engagement with data. It is strongly empirical, both informing and being informed by data. However, in drawing from both user (first-order) and observer (second-order) perspectives it also takes a holistic approach to data. Our view is that pragmatic phenomena, such as (im)politeness, cannot be fully explained through the lens of only one perspective or method of analysis. The key to integrating these different perspectives and methods of analysis is treating interaction as the primary locus of analysis.

Pragmatics deals with the relationship between different forms, functions and contexts (see Drew, Fetzer, House, Ilie, this volume). A pragmatic form refers to any linguistic or non-linguistic unit that is understood as interlinked with a particular pragmatic function. The latter refers to some purpose or activity for which that form is fitted, employed or understood to accomplish. A pragmatic context essentially refers to social or discourse information that users orient to as licensing the recognition of particular forms as indexical of particular functions, or as inferable from those forms in that context. We would note that pragmatic contexts are, of course, not static, but rather dynamic as they both shape and are shaped by the use of language itself.

What is of key interest in interactional pragmatics is that particular configurations of pragmatic form(s), function(s) and context(s) are what give rise to interactional meanings, that is, what others are taken to be committing to through *what* they say (and don't say), and *how* they say it (or not). In many instances, of course, such interactional meanings arise through recurrent configurations of form(s), function(s) and context(s), or what are sometimes referred to as practices. The recognisability of interactional meanings and practices is predicated on reflexive awareness amongst users (and observers) about the multitude of ways in which we can accomplish pragmatic meanings (that is, what users are taken to be referring to, presuming, saying, implicating, inferring and so on), pragmatic acts (that is, what socially recognisable actions and activities users are taken to be engaged in), and interpersonal meanings (that is, the interpersonal relations, stances, attitudes and evaluations users are taken to be accomplishing through those pragmatic meanings and acts) through the use of language. In other words, users and observers of language use recognise interactional meanings through reflexive awareness of the set(s) of potential meanings that are recurrently associated with particular situated uses of language. The systematic study of this reflexive awareness about the use of language by both the users themselves and observers is commonly referred to as metapragmatics (Verschueren 1999). There is, of course, also inevitably variation in how interactional meanings are produced by users and interpreted by both users and observers.

We summarise the key elements of an integrative pragmatics approach in Figure 3.

The sum of interactional meanings and practices recurrently accomplished by users of a particular (variety) of a language amounts to what Schneider (2017) refers to as its "pragmaticography". Understanding the pragmaticography of a language variety is a vast empirical undertaking that necessarily involves integrating detailed, close-up qualitative analyses with corpus-informed quantitative analyses.




Figure 3. Integrative pragmatics approach (Culpeper and Haugh 2014: 267)

In the following section, we move to illustrate how one might begin to integrate these seemingly disparate perspectives and methods of analysis using (im)politeness theory as a testing ground. We focus, in particular, on analysing an instance of jocular abuse (Hay 1994; Holmes and Marra 2002), or what is sometimes termed “mock impoliteness” (Leech 1983; Haugh and Bousfield 2012), that went very badly for all concerned.

4. Case study: Jocular abuse and offence

In the following case study we focus on a conversation from the UK version of *Big Brother* and the ensuing public controversy it generated, which led to the offending contestant being removed from the show after it was broadcast in June 2007 (see Bousfield and Johnson [2007] for an alternative analysis). We begin in Section 4.1, by teasing out the multiple perspectives that can be brought to bear on this incident, in which the (ostensibly) “joking” use of a particular racial slur (“nigger”) occasioned considerable offence. We then go on to consider, in Section 4.2, what licenses this taking of offence. We propose that since the taking of offence is an inherently moral act, it is inevitably grounded in shared rather than idiosyncratic understandings of the relationships between particular pragmatic forms, functions and contexts. We argue that such shared understandings cannot be interrogated through analysing isolated instances of interaction, no matter how nuanced or multi-layered the analysis might be, but only through examining larger tracts of data, namely, language corpora.

4.1 User and observer perspectives on the use of the n-word

The interaction in question which led to the removal of one of the contestants from the UK Big Brother show involved three housemates, Emily Parr, Charley Uchea and Nicky Maxwell.³ We start our analysis by initially focusing on the evaluations the participants themselves display subsequent to Emily's use of the term "nigger".

(1) UK Big Brother Season 8, 6 June 2007

1 C: I ↑hope I'm not pregnant I feel (like)
 2 (0.8)
 3 N: ohh:..
 4 (.)
 5 E: you're ↑pushing it a:ren't you nigger.
 6 [°hh oh I just called you a nigger° ((breathy))
 7 C: [hh hh hh oh
 8 N: .hh oh
 9 E: £I'm so-£ [hh hh hh hh]
 10 N: [oh Emily I can't] believe=
 11 C: [>you're in trouble for tha:t<]
 12 N: =[you ↑said [tha:t]
 13 E: =[hh hh hh hh [hh hh]
 14 C: [you're] in ↑trouble
 15 N: ((sniffs))
 16 E: ↑do:n't >↓don't make a big thing out of it then<.
 17 C: you're in [°trouble°]
 18 E: [I was ↑jo:]king
 19 C: I know you were but you (are [in some] shivy) shit
 20 E: [°oh: °]
 21 (0.5)
 22 C: sorry=
 23 E: =°why°?
 24 (0.9)
 25 N: (.hh)
 26 C: oh my god I'm not even sa:ying [anything]
 27 N: [no:.] (.) just
 28 don't talk about it=
 29 C: =yea:h ↑shush.
 30 (.)
 31 E: (but)
 32 (.)
 33 C: .hh
 34 (0.7)
 35 E: I was ↑jo:k[↓i:ng]
 36 N: [°rememtber] big brother last year?°

3. A recording of the incident in question was accessed at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7qZqXDpPS8>. It was transcribed using standard CA transcription conventions (Jefferson 2004).

37 C: ↑o::h. ↓m::y. [↑go::d.]
 38 E: [(↑°°they]’re watching ↓it°°<
 39 (0.2)
 40 C: >do you know how many viewers would watch that
 41 >I mean< there’s probably going to be< (big fuss)

The incident begins when Charley confesses that she has been worrying about falling pregnant (line 1). This is followed by a tease from Emily about her worries (line 5), which includes the vocative use of “nigger” in reference to Charley. What is immediately obvious here is that all three participants treat the use of the term by Emily as a moral transgression. However, each of them construes the relative degree of seriousness of this transgression in different ways.

Emily herself, who produced the term, immediately moves to construe the transgression as an inadvertent “slip” through registering “surprise” at her own talk (line 6). This signals a shift in footing (Goffman 1981) from producer of talk to being an observer of her own talk, thereby distancing herself from a footing as principal, that is, the person held morally accountable for the talk in question. Following more emphatic displays of “surprise” from Charley (the addressee) and Nicky (a side participant), Emily launches what appears to be an aborted apology (line 9) that subsequently dissolves into laughter (lines 9, 13). The latter appears designed to emphasise (perhaps retrospectively) that the term was used in jest, with the laughter here inviting laughter in response from the other two participants (Jefferson 1979).

Charley and Nicky, however, do not respond with laughter. Nicky responds with disbelief that Emily used the term (lines 10, 12), with the *oh*-prefacing of this expression of disbelief here indicating a stance of “dismay” on her part. Charley makes explicit what Nicky only alludes to her expression of “dismay”, namely, a warning that Emily is “in trouble” (line 11), a claim towards which Emily initially withholds a response. Through repeating this warning (line 14), Charley pursues a response from Emily (Pomerantz 1984), thereby elevating the potential seriousness of this charge. Emily, however, responds by asking that Charley downplay its seriousness (line 16), implying that Charley herself can reduce the potential trouble that might arise for Emily due to her use of the term.

Charley subsequently repeats this warning that Emily is “in trouble” (line 17), in response to which Emily proffers an account as to why Charley should downplay it, namely, she was “joking”. This claim to non-serious intent represents an attempt on Emily’s part to divert moral culpability for using the slur in question as a racial slur (Allan 2015). To construe an insult or slur as “joking” is both sequentially and morally implicative (Haugh 2016). On the one hand, it indicates pursuit of a response from Charley that she acknowledges that Emily’s use of the term was an instance of non-serious jocular abuse. On the other hand, it represents an attempt by Emily to not only retrospectively inoculate herself from any offence that Charley

might take (Bell 2015), but also mildly sanction Charley for taking offence in the first place (Haugh 2016). Charley orients to both in claiming she recognised the term was being used non-seriously, but nevertheless goes on to repeat her warning that Emily is nevertheless in trouble (line 19). This is immediately followed by an expression of regret accomplished through an apology IFID from Charley about this state of affairs (line 21).⁴ Emily then appears to solicit an account as to why she is in trouble, indicating confusion on her part about the person with whom she is “in trouble” (line 23).

Charley and Nicky then go on to claim that talking about it will only make the situation worse (lines 26–28), with Charley advising Emily to stop talking about it (line 29). Emily, however, repeats her claim of non-serious intent (line 35). In repeating this claim that she was “just joking”, Emily indicates confusion about why she is in trouble (line 31). Nicky responds by alluding to the trouble that arose in the previous season of *Celebrity Big Brother* when another contestant was the victim of bullying (line 36). Emily at this point displays recognition that her comment will be overhead by viewers, with the sotto voce delivery indicating this is clearly a delicate matter (Lerner 2013). Charley follows that these viewers are likely to evaluate Emily’s use of the term very negatively (line 40–41). It becomes clear by this point that the participants have interactionally accomplished an understanding that there are now multiple perspectives on Emily’s use of the term at play. Those of the three participants themselves, and those of subsequent observers of this interaction.

The producers of the show immediately took action, announcing that Emily had been removed from the Big Brother house due to her use of the term.

Contestant Emily Parr was removed from the Big Brother house in the early hours of this morning (June 7) after using a racially offensive word to a fellow housemate. [...] In consultation with senior executives at Channel 4, the decision was taken to remove Emily from the house on the grounds that she had broken the rules governing contestant behaviour. The House Rules given to all contestants clearly state: “Big Brother will intervene and take appropriate action if housemates behave in a way that Big Brother considers is unacceptable. Unacceptable behaviour includes: behaving in a way that could cause serious offence to either their fellow housemates or members of the viewing public, including serious offence based on the grounds of race.”

(“Channel 4’s Big Brother Statement”, *The Guardian*, 7 June 2007, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2007/jun/07/broadcasting.bigbrother>)

4. This is perhaps somewhat ironic given Charley herself was the target not the producer of the slur.

It was, however, not made clear whether it was on the grounds of causing offence to Charley and the other contestants in the house itself, the viewing public, or both, that Emily was removed.

The announcement of Emily's removal was quickly followed by public denunciation (Garfinkel 1956) in both traditional media and online blogs of Emily's use of the term.

Channel 4 got it right this week when it evicted a Big Brother housemate for using a racial insult. But let's face it, it was hardly a difficult decision. OK, Emily Parr is young, and she may have been naive, but you can't go around using the n-word to refer to black people. And, scarily, her defence was that many of her white friends use it – a believable claim considering that the word slipped out without a thought.

("The n-word is never cool", Joseph Harker, *The Guardian*, 9 June 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2099107,00.html>)

Of particular note was the repeated claim by observers that the transgression in question was not simply due to Emily's use of a racial slur, but that a white participant (Emily) had directed it towards a black participant (Charley). Indeed, Charley herself made it clear at the time her view that offensiveness of the term lies in who is using it.

(2) UK Big Brother Season 8, 6 June 2007

45 C: .hh: °(fancy)you saying ↑t̥ha:t
 46 go:rm[less°]
 47 N: [°°I] can't believe you said th(hh)at hh°°=
 48 E: =↑Someone's already used that word in this
 49 ↓house? =
 50 C: =>no: wa:y yea:h ↑me< (0.3) I'm a nigger
 51 (0.3)
 52 N: pf[f hh hh]
 53 C: [I am] one (.) .hh (.) ↑fancy you:
 54 saying ↓it >

Charley here claims that the slur is something that she is able to use in reference to herself (line 50), but implies it is not something that Emily is allowed to say through repeating her surprise that Emily said it (lines 47, 53–54). In doing so, Charley is ascribing the slur a property of "sayability" (i.e. it is something that can be used by some people but not others), and grounding its potential to cause offence in its "unsayability" for Emily.

Emily was subsequently invited to comment on her use of the term in an episode of *BBLB* (Big Brother's Little Brother) the following day. The focus of the interview was on whether Emily understood why she had been removed from the show, with Emily being invited, as a post-facto observer, to hold herself accountable for her own talk.

(3) BBLB, 8 June 2007

- 1 D: over a day since uh: leaving the Big Brother ↑House.
 2 how are you feeling ↓now
 3 (1.0)
 4 E: ↑uhm hh (1.0) everything? hh [I-] .hh I'm=
 5 D: [yeah.]
 6 E: =devas↑tated. hh
 7 (0.7)
 8 D: °course, o[kay. .hhh°]
 9 E: [I said (.) something] a:wful,
 10 °and I'm so° °°sorry°°=
 11 D: °okay, listen°, (.) >it's cool don't worry<
 12 al↑right .hh uhm. (1.1) ↑obviously it happened
 13 so: ↓quickly, ↑but (0.2) d'you: d'you
 14 under↓stand (0.4) uhm (0.7) >that< that the wo:rd
 15 itself ↑obviously now causes offence?
 16 (0.2)
 17 E: .hh (0.5) ↑yea:h., totally, and gosh,
 18 .hh (0.5) I- (.) I've ↑always known that.
 19 it's- .hhh (.) eh- (0.4) yea:h- hh gosh- I-,
 20 I- °°ohh°° what was the question? hh
 21 D: °↑o:↓kay°
 22 E: HH [.HH]
 23 D: [uh eh] d- the wo:rd itself. (.) >that the
 24 fact that obviously ↑using the word itself causes
 25 offence< and .hh [>if if] you had< the=
 26 E: [mm.]
 27 D: =opportunity to: to say anything to Charley
 28 what would it be [°Emily°]
 29 E: [°oh god°] .hh you know (0.2) me
 30 and Charley (0.4) .hh we've become REa:lly close
 31 over the past week and she's a great housemate
 32 and we're jus- (0.2) ↑you kno:w .hh (0.4) we
 33 ↑ba:nte:r=
 34 D: =m[hm]
 35 E: [you] kno:w↑ and she's a grea:t girl and we're
 36 on the sa:me level comple:tely, you know. hh (0.2)
 37 >banter this, banter that<. oh:- s- (1.0) she
 38 under↑stands, I ↑know she does. =
 39 D: =okay.=
 40 E: =I, I s-, I: (.) >was< ↑the:re .hh (0.2) I've seen
 41 what was sho:wn. (eh) (0.5) °she's (.) she's (0.3)
 42 she's a° (.) Great Friend, °f-° for the way she
 43 ↑took it. And .hh (.) that's >probably why it<
 44 (.) came ↑ou:t the way it ↑did.
 45 D: mhm
 46 E: .hh (.) °I° didn't mean anything by it, and
 47 I'm (0.2) I'm °sure everyone° (0.3) knows
 48 that.

The interview begins with Emily issuing an apology for what she said to Charley (lines 9–10), with the sotto voce delivery here enacting this as a delicate matter

(Lerner 2013). However, the interviewer, Dermot O'Leary, does not respond with acceptance of the apology (Owen 1983; Robinson 2004), but rather appears to offer passing comfort to Emily before going on to solicit Emily's understanding of the offensiveness of her use of the term (lines 11–15). While Emily initially claims understanding (lines 17–18), she subsequently loses composure (Goffman 1956), and seeks a repeat of O'Leary's question (lines 19–20). The agenda underpinning O'Leary's question becomes clearer, as the candidate answer in his prior question is this time reformulated as an assertion that the use of the term is offensive (lines 23–25). He then goes on to ask what Emily would say to Charley if she had the chance (lines 25–28), thereby inviting an apology to Charley.

Emily, however, does not immediately apologise but goes on to offer an account for why she believes Charley would not have taken great offence, namely, because they have formed a close relationship in which they frequently engage in “banter”, and so Charley would have known Emily was using it in a playful way (lines 29–48). Of particular significance is Emily's claim that she knows that Charley understands (lines 37–38) that she “didn't mean anything by it” (line 46). She grounds this claim in being a participant herself in the interaction following her use of the term, and in seeing how Charley “took it” as “a great friend” (lines 42–43).⁵ Emily concludes her response by generalising Charley's understanding that Emily's use of the term was a form of “banter” to “everyone” (lines 47–48), namely, the viewing public.

While Emily goes on in the interview to offer further accounts as to why she used the term (data not shown), the interview itself ultimately took the form of a public denunciation of Emily's use of the term. O'Leary repeatedly asserts the use of the term causes offence, and holds Emily morally accountable for this offence. In invoking broader moral claims on behalf of not only Charley, but the viewing public as well, O'Leary is thus not so much enacting a personal stance but a deeply moral one. However, while Emily admits wrongdoing, she nevertheless resists the charge that her use of the term caused offence to Charley by claiming she understood it was a form of “banter”. We thus have here an instance of discursive struggle between Emily and the interviewer about whether racial slurs should be used as a form of jocular abuse. However, it is more than just this. The incident also raises questions about what constitutes the moral grounds for this taking of offence in the first place. In order to adequately address this question, we need to broaden our lens beyond this single set of interlinked interactions.

5. See Haugh and Kádár (2017) for an analysis of how Charley treats the taking of offence as itself a sensitive or delicate social action.

4.2 Pragmatics, (im)politeness and conventionalization: The case of the n-word

The impression that discursive approaches to (im)politeness (e.g. Watts 2003, Locher 2006; van der Bom and Mills 2015) give is that the judgement of (im)politeness arises through nonce inferences because everything is in a state of flux. It is certainly true that the exigencies of any particular situation have the potential to create a particular interpretation. But it is not the case that the human interpreter in that situation pays equal attention to the features of that situation, including the language in it, or that they entertain each and every meaning potential of all its elements. This is psychologically implausible. As Fiske and Taylor (1984) put it, humans are “cognitive misers”; they are not going to expend unnecessary cognitive effort. Of course, this is consistent with relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), and the cognitive part of its principle, namely, that there is a balance between cognitive costs and benefits. It is also implausible in terms of how communication works. Communication presents a coordination problem: how do participants accomplish shared understandings of what is meant at any point in interaction when we are all cognitively autonomous? The solution, as Clark (1996) argues, is linguistic conventions. They, in a sense, provide common ground that can help with that coordination; they narrow down the range of possible meanings that a particular expression can have. For example, the word *yellow* in an English speaking community is conventionally taken to refer to a particular range on the spectrum of colours, or possibly it’s metonymic meaning of cowardice. It is not the case that it means anything – it is predisposed to certain meanings. The riposte from discursive (im)politeness theorists might be that (im)politeness is a special case, it is not like the semantic meaning of *yellow*. We are doubtful that it is in fact that special. (Im)politeness is largely a matter of triggering and/or formulating a particular evaluation (cf. Eelen 2001), specifically, an interpersonal attitude that is positively or negatively valenced. What might be described as evaluative language more broadly accounts for a large swathe of linguistic features, from adjectival forms through to aspects of modality. To single out (im)politeness as somehow unique or different compared to these other evaluative forms of language does not appear warranted by any evidence presented by discursive theorists thus far.

To be fair, not all discursive (im)politeness theorists take an equally radical approach. Some (e.g. Watts and Locher) do accommodate some stability in their models. But that stability is backgrounded. Furthermore, there is little attempt to explain that stability in terms of mainstream pragmatic theories. One of the few accounts of politeness to tackle this head on is the frame-based approach of Terkourafi (e.g. 2001). She argues that we should analyse the concrete linguistic realisations (i.e. formulae) and particular contexts of use which co-constitute “frames”. She argues

that “[i]t is the regular co-occurrence of particular types of context and particular linguistic expressions as the *unchallenged* realisations of particular acts that create the perception of politeness” (2005a: 248; see also 2005b: 213; our emphasis). The fact that we are dealing with regularities means that we can deploy quantitative as well as qualitative methodologies. In tune with our claim in the previous paragraph, she points out that formulae are more easily processed by both speaker and hearer, when juggling face concerns, goals, and so on, and also that using them demonstrates a knowledge of community norms (2001: 196).

How do Terkourafi’s ideas connect with pragmatics? Terkourafi (e.g. 2001, 2005b) builds on Neo-Gricean accounts of inference (e.g. Levinson 2000) in suggesting that politeness can arise through a range of different inferential pathways. While particularised implicatures are worked out from scratch on the basis of the particular context the utterance appears in, generalised implicatures have a more stable association with particular linguistic forms (cf. Grice 1975/1989: 37). Levinson (e.g. 1995, 2000) characterised generalised implicatures as a level of meaning between particularised implicatures and fully conventionalised (non-defeasible) implicatures. Terkourafi’s further contribution was to split generalised implicatures into two, based on their relationship with context. The first captures situations where the implicature is weakly context-dependent, requiring a minimal amount of contextual information relating to the social context of use in which the utterance was routinised and thus conventionalised to some degree; the second, as described by Levinson, captures situations where the implicature is even more weakly context-dependent – its meaning is presumed in a variety of contexts. We thus have the following cline (Terkourafi 2005b: 211–2):

Particularised implicature (utterance-token meaning derived in nonce context)	→	Generalised implicature I (utterance-type meaning presumed in minimal context)	→	Generalised implicature II (utterance-type meaning presumed in all contexts <i>ceteris paribus</i>)	→	Coded meaning (sentence meaning)
---	---	--	---	---	---	---

Terkourafi (2005a: 251, original emphasis) goes on to make a connection with politeness in this way:

Politeness is achieved on the basis of a generalised implicature when an expression *x* is uttered in a context with which – based on the addressee’s previous experience of similar contexts – expression *x* regularly co-occurs. In this case, rather than engaging in full-blown inferencing about the speaker’s intention, the addressee draws on that previous experience (represented holistically as a frame) to derive the proposition that “in offering expression *x* the speaker is being polite” as a generalised implicature of the speaker’s utterance. On the basis of this generalised implicature, the addressee may then come to hold the further belief that the speaker *is* polite.

This contrasts with the standard, classical Gricean accounts of politeness (e.g. Brown and Levinson 1987; Leech 1983) which have made little or no explicit connection with generalised implicatures, as noted in section two. Terkourafi allows for politeness as particularised implicature too, but in nonce contexts that call for extended inferencing on the part of users. Her argument is that generalised implicature of the first type given above lies at the heart of politeness.

The crux of the issue in our analysis is the utterance of the word *nigger* by Emily. Obviously, we are dealing here with the language of offence, more a matter of impoliteness than politeness. One way in which there is an obvious difference between politeness and impoliteness is that impoliteness has its own set of conventionalised impolite formulae that is distinct from conventionalised polite formulae.⁶ We can take conventionalization in the same way as Terkourafi, namely, items conventionalised for a particular context of use, but for such items to count as polite they must go unchallenged (e.g. Terkourafi 2005a; see also Haugh 2007b, for a related point), and, vice versa, for them to count as impolite they must go challenged. However, there is a conundrum raised by Culpeper (2011a: 130–132). How can people acquire/have a knowledge of impoliteness formulae that far exceeds *their own direct experience* of usage of formulae associated with impolite effects in such contexts? Politeness occurs regularly, and so it is quite easy to see how Terkourafi can argue for the importance of direct experience. But that is not the case with impoliteness. What we get with impoliteness is a great quantity of metadiscourse surrounding impoliteness events, as is illustrated by the Big Brother Emily incident, and this constitutes the main source of indirect impoliteness experiences. Impoliteness, because it is abnormal, attracts attention: it is commented on and debated in all types of media, in official documents or in everyday chat, and sometimes by the participants themselves or third-part witnesses, and sometimes by (self-)appointed guardians of socially-approved behaviour.

Both Terkourafi (e.g. 2001) and Culpeper (e.g. 2011a) use corpora to investigate regular contexts. One can deploy a range of techniques developed within corpus linguistics to give a sense of the meanings associated with particular expressions. Ultimately, however, manual scrutiny of at least a sample of corpus data is required in order to verify whether the use of a particular expression attracts challenges. Culpeper (2011a), investigating impoliteness formulae, applied a criterion that at least 50% of any one formula's variants had to involve impoliteness, that is, those formula's instances had to be accompanied by evidence that they were interpreted as impoliteness. In this study, we will be using part of the Oxford English Corpus (OEC), which comprises over 2 billion words of twenty-first-century English. With

6. There are also distinct sets of strategies by which politeness and impoliteness arise (see Culpeper 2015), but these are not relevant to our current analysis.

the benefits of both size and structure, this seems to make it an ideal resource to use, if one wishes to capture generalisations about word usage. Given that the dialect of concern in our data is British English, we will restrict our investigations to the 561,026,350 word OEC sub-section of British English (that is still, needless to say, a very large corpus). The OEC is comprised of material largely collected from the web, supplemented with printed texts for certain subject areas (e.g. academic journals), and structured according to subject domain, text type, variety of (world) English, and date of use. We will be using the full date range, namely, 2000 to 2012. It contains data that is both less standardised and less formal than more “traditional” written mediums – blogs, chatrooms, newsgroups and so on – which is promising for the exploration of (im)politeness phenomena.

The OEC can be accessed and interrogated via Sketch Engine, software developed by Lexical Computing (see www.sketchengine.co.uk for useful introductory material). The key published paper describing it is Kilgarrieff et al. (2004). Sketch Engine is a tool that can produce “word sketches” for particular words. A notable feature of word sketches is that rather than searching some possibly arbitrary window of text surrounding a particular word for collocates, it automatically (utilising part-of-speech tagging) analyses a word for its possible participation in a set of 27 grammatical relations, and then lists the word’s collocates separately within each relevant grammatical relation. The lists are ordered according to statistical salience (log dice). *Nigger* has a frequency of frequency 675 (1.15 per million) in the British English section. Table 1 displays the three grammatical patterns in which *nigger* most frequently partakes, and also its collocates in each of those grammatical patterns.

Table 1. Lexico-grammatical patterns peculiar to *nigger*

Grammatical pattern, its frequency, and an example of the pattern	Collocates of <i>nigger</i> in that grammatical relation
<i>X modifying nigger</i> (165) “You remember her, the white woman in her 30s who bellowed into her mobile phone that a ‘dirty fucking nigger’ had taken her seat on the No38 in central London.”	<i>web-slinging, uppity, goddamned, ole, ing, lazy, fucking, runaway, thick, ‘, dirty, white, sand, word, bomb</i>
<i>Nigger modifying X</i> (75) “Its protagonist [...] vows revenge against the ‘nigger faggots’ and ‘faggots in suits’ responsible for his predicament.”	<i>kike, faggot, minstrel, brown, ape, lover, hunt</i>
<i>And/or coordination with nigger</i> (50) “You’re a son of a bitch nigger Petey. A real Uncle Tom. I hope they fuck you over [...]”	<i>kike, chinks, pakis, coon, bitch, whore, fag</i>

It does not take a linguist to observe that many of the collocates that are revealed are items that are typical of racist and prejudiced discourses. Obvious examples include the negative adjectives *lazy*, *thick*, and *dirty*, and the venomous modifier *fucking* – all typical of such discourses. Moreover, in the other grammatical relationships, we see terms that are racist (*kike*, *chinks*, *pakis*, *coon*), homophobic (*faggot*, *fag*) and sexist (*bitch*, *whore*). The fact that these terms are similar or at least keep similar company to *nigger* is made clear in this web comment:

I remember the first time I threw a punch. I was in the lunch line in third grade, and a kid in my class, Will, called me a kike. For those unfamiliar with the term's usage, calling a Jewish person a kike isn't wildly dissimilar from calling a person of African descent the n-word.

(<http://dailyyiddishkeit.blogspot.com/2008/11/on-being-called-kike.html>)

However, the analysis thus far has not mentioned an important feature of nearly all the instances of *nigger* and most of its collocates. Note that both examples supplied for the first two grammatical patterns supply quotation marks around this language. Note also that a quotation mark turns up as one of the collocates for the first pattern, and we see that another collocate is *word*, as in, for example, “the word nigger”. All this points to the fact that in the vast majority of cases these are metalinguistic usages: people are mentioning the use of *nigger* rather than using it themselves. In fact, specific uses of *nigger* are repeatedly mentioned. For example, of the 10 instances of “fucking lazy thick nigger” nine relate to one use by a football manager to refer to the Chelsea defender Marcel Desailly, and five of the 15 single uses of *nigger* surrounded by quotation marks relate to the use on Big Brother which we are discussing in this very paper. Is such use being challenged in this metadiscourse? Previous scholars who have written about politeness or impoliteness in relation to whether it is challenged or not probably had conversation in mind, not the kind of chat, blogs and news comment that we are dealing with here. Still, we can investigate whether they demonstrate a negative attitude towards its use.

The fact that *nigger* often occurs in quotation marks or in euphemistic guises (“n-word” is used 85 times in the data as a whole) suggests the desire of the mentioners to distance themselves from the item. Moreover, it is not difficult to find explicit evidence of speakers or writers construing *nigger* as offensive, as these three examples illustrate:

- (4) What really got me was that today, the n-word got used.
- (5) Don't you think for the sake of the next generation, for respect, that black men should stop calling black men niggers and black women bitches?
- (6) A few weeks later he called my friend a “fucking nigger”. This time he did react with his fists and knocked his front teeth out.

However, it is far from clear-cut that every usage of *nigger* is considered offensive. We investigated a randomised sample of 100 instances. Only 46 were clearly considered offensive. Some of these, especially those used between black speakers/writers, seem to be neutral in some respects, as in this example:

- (7) Jenkins and 17-year-old sports jock Avrin Williamson, re-enact the sort of scene that is part of the rough fabric of their everyday lives. “We went to the store to buy new clothes, my nigger and me. This little white dude keeps following us, he’s all over us. We just want to shop, man. But then he calls the cops. We ain’t done nothing!”

But the majority of these other cases debate what the status of *nigger* is in particular contexts, as these two examples illustrate (the latter actually concerns its use by Emily, which we previously discussed in Section 4.1):

- (8) But paradoxes do exist and they fuel forms of passionate exchange. Is there really a difference, for example, between blacks using the word nigger about and between themselves – and non-blacks using it to describe black people? And if so, should there be a distinction in law?
- (9) Finally, the ‘Emily incident’ shows how accusations of racism have become a tool wielded by the political and media elite against the rest of us. Even though Emily didn’t say the word nigger with racist intent, and Charley accepted it was not racist, this has been transformed into A Racist Incident by various observers (who know better, obviously).

What is the upshot of all this? The collocates of *nigger* are the classic items of prejudiced, offensive discourse. There is support for Culpeper’s (2011a) point that impoliteness formulae are formed largely on the basis of metadiscourse, as the majority are instances of mentions rather than uses. Almost half of these very clearly demonstrate that they are considered offensive. Of the rest, many of these at least acknowledge that they have potential to cause offence in certain contexts. However, the fact that same substantial number also suggest that the word is not offensive in certain contexts may be having the effect of destabilising its offensive nature, or at least minimally, reflecting confusion about what its offensive nature is.

5. Concluding remarks

While pragmatics initially played a key role in (im)politeness research in classic theories of politeness, its importance for the field was subsequently diminished as the reliance on ascribing intentions to speakers and utterance-based analyses was challenged by discursive theorists who called for a greater focus on (im)politeness as a

site of social struggle. The discursive critique has, however, engendered a counter-critique from researchers in pragmatics, who have called for a middle way that embraces these different perspectives. In this chapter we have proposed that integrative pragmatics offers a potentially fruitful way forward as it explicitly calls for a focus on analysing both user and observer perspectives on fundamentally pragmatic phenomena such as (im)politeness. While interaction is treated as the primary locus of analysis in integrative pragmatics, we have suggested that in order to fully explicate the understandings of users themselves we very often need to draw from the understandings of observers as well. This is because what a particular pragmatic form is taken to mean in a particular context is licensed by what groups of users of that language (and varieties therein) recurrently recognise it to mean. In order to analyse pragmatic phenomena, then, we must go beyond analysing the locally situated understandings of users and embrace understandings of observers.

We have treated (im)politeness theory as a testing ground for such claims. We argued in the course of a case study analysis of an infamous incident on UK Big Brother, where the ostensibly jocular use of a racial slur caused serious offence and the removal of a contestant, that since (im)politeness constitutes an inherently moral judgement, it is invariably grounded in tacit claims that such evaluations are – or would be – shared by others. We have thus suggested that a theory of (im)politeness must address not only for whom a particular instance of talk or conduct is considered (im)polite, but on what grounds that talk or conduct that can legitimately be evaluated as (im)polite. In order to systematically address these two key questions we need to draw from different perspectives and methods of analysis that go beyond particular interactions themselves to consider the broader discourse milieu in which they arise. This necessitates, in our view, an approach that integrates detailed interactional analyses of (im)politeness with corpus-based (or experimental) approaches, as the latter allow us to interrogate understandings across groups of users and observers. It is only in so doing that we can move towards developing a nuanced and complex theory of (im)politeness that does proper justice to the complexity of its object of analysis.

References

- Allan, Keith. 2015. "When is a Slur not a Slur? The Use of Nigger in 'Pulp Fiction'." *Language Sciences* 52 (1): 187–199. doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2015.03.001
- Arundale, Robert. 2008. "Against (Gricean) Intentions at the Heart of Human Interaction." *Intercultural Pragmatics* 5 (2): 229–258. doi:10.1515/IP2008.012
- Bell, Nancy. 2015. *We are not Amused: Failed Humor in Interaction*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Bilmes, Jack. 1993. "Ethnomethodology, Culture, and Implicature: Toward an Empirical Pragmatics." *Pragmatics* 3 (4): 387–410. doi:10.1075/prag.3.4.02bil

- Blitvich, Pilar Garcés-Conejos. 2010. "A Genre Approach to the Study of Im-politeness." *International Review of Pragmatics* 2 (1): 46–94. doi:10.1163/187731010X491747
- Blitvich, Pilar Garcés-Conejos. 2013. "Introduction: Face, Identity and Politeness. Looking Backward, Moving Forward: From Goffman to Practice Theory." *Journal of Politeness Research* 9 (1): 1–33. doi:10.1515/pr-2013-0001
- Blum-Kulka, Shoshana. 1987. "Indirectness and Politeness in Requests: Same or Different?" *Journal of Pragmatics* 11: 131–146. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(87)90192-5
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511812507
- Bousfield, Derek, and Alison Johnson. 2007. "When Respect is Impolite: The Pragmatic Uses of Naming Strategies in Confrontational Institutional Talk." Paper presented at the *Third Symposium on Politeness*, University of Leeds, 2–4 July 2007.
- Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1987. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511620539
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2011a. *Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511975752
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2011b. "Politeness and Impoliteness." In *Pragmatics of Society*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Gisle Andersen, 393–438. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214420.393
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2015. "Impoliteness Strategies." In *Interdisciplinary Studies in Pragmatics, Culture and Society*, ed. by Alessandro Capone, and Jacob Mey, 421–445. New York: Springer.
- Culpeper, Jonathan, and Michael Haugh. 2014. *Pragmatics and the English Language*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Drew, Paul. 2018. "The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 59–83. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.04dre
- Eelen, Gino. 2001. *A Critique of Politeness Theories*. Manchester: St. Jerome Publishing.
- Escandell-Vidal, Victoria. 1998. "Politeness: A Relevant Issue for Relevance Theory." *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses* 11: 45–57. doi:10.14198/raei.1998.11.05
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 1984. *Social Cognition*. 7th ed. New York: Random House.
- Foucault, Michel. 1972. *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Tavistock.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1956. "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies." *American Journal of Sociology* 61 (5): 420–424. doi:10.1086/221800
- Gibbs, Raymond Jr. 1999. *Intentions in the Experience of Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goffman, Erving. 1956. "Embarrassment and Social Organisation." *American Journal of Sociology* 62: 264–271. doi:10.1086/222003
- Goffman, Erving. 1981. *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Grainger, Karen. 2011. "'First Order' and 'Second Order' Politeness: Institutional and Intercultural Contexts." In *Discursive Approaches to Politeness*, ed. by LPRG, 167–188. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110238679.167

- Grainger, Karen. 2013. "Of Babies and Bath Water: Is there any Place for Austin and Grice in Interpersonal Pragmatics?" *Journal of Pragmatics* 58: 27–38.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2013.08.008
- Grice, H. P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." In *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3. Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry Morgan, 41–58. New York: Academic Press.
- Grice, H. P. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Haugh, Michael. 2003. "Anticipated versus Inferred Politeness." *Multilingua* 22 (4): 397–413.
doi:10.1515/mult.2003.020
- Haugh, Michael. 2007a. "The Co-constitution of Politeness Implicature in Conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 39 (1): 84–110. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2006.07.004
- Haugh, Michael. 2007b. "The Discursive Challenge to Politeness Theory: An Interactional Alternative." *Journal of Politeness Research* 3 (2): 295–317. doi:10.1515/PR.2007.013
- Haugh, Michael. 2008. "The Place of Intention in the Interactional Achievement of Implicature." In *Intention, Common Ground and the Egocentric Speaker-Hearer*, ed. by Istvan Kecskes, and Jacob Mey, 45–85. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Haugh, Michael. 2013. "Im/politeness, Social Practice and the Participation Order." *Journal of Pragmatics* 58: 52–72. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2013.07.003
- Haugh, Michael. 2015. *Im/politeness Implicatures*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Haugh, Michael. 2016. "'Just kidding': Teasing and Claims to Non-serious Intent." *Journal of Pragmatics* 95: 120–136. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.12.004
- Haugh, Michael, and Derek Bousfield. 2012. "Mock Impoliteness, Jocular Mockery and Jocular Abuse in Australian and British English." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44 (9): 1099–1114.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2012.02.003
- Haugh, Michael, and Dániel Z. Kádár. 2017. "Intercultural (Im)politeness." In *Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness*, ed. by Jonathan Culpeper, Michael Haugh, and Dániel Z. Kádár, 601–632. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hay, Jennifer. 1994. "Jocular Abuse Patterns in Mixed-group Interaction." *Wellington Working Papers in Linguistics* 6: 26–55.
- Holmes, Janet. 2018. "Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics: Where does the boundary lie?" In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 11–32.
doi:10.1075/pbns.294.02hol
- Holmes, Janet, and Meredith Marra. 2002. "Over the Edge? Subversive Humor between Colleagues and Friends." *Humor* 15 (1): 65–87. doi:10.1515/humr.2002.006
- Holmes, Janet, Meredith Marra, and Bernadette Vine. 2011. *Leadership, Discourse and Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730759.001.0001
- Holmes, Janet, Meredith Marra, and Bernadette Vine. 2012. "Politeness and Impoliteness in Ethnic Varieties of New Zealand English." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44 (9): 1063–1076.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2011.11.006
- Holmes, Janet, and Stephanie Schnurr. 2005. "Politeness, Humour and Gender in the Workplace: Negotiating Norms and Identifying Contestation." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1 (1): 121–149. doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.121
- House, Juliane. 2018. "Translation studies and pragmatics". In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 143–161. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
doi:10.1075/pbns.294.07hou
- Huang, Yan. 2007. *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.05ili
- Jary, Mark. 1998. "Relevance Theory and the Communication of Politeness." *Journal of Pragmatics* 30 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(98)80005-2
- Jefferson, Gail. 1979. "Technique for Inviting Laughter and its Subsequent Acceptance-Declination." In *Everyday Language. Studies in Ethnomethodology*, ed. by George Psathas, 79–95. New York: Irvington.
- Jefferson, Gail. 2004. "Glossary of Transcript Symbols with an Introduction." In *Conversation Analysis: Studies from the First Generation*, ed. by Gene Lerner, 13–23. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.125.02jef
- Kádár, Dániel Z., and Michael Haugh. 2013. *Understanding Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139382717
- Kilgariff, Adam, Pavel Rychly, Pavel Smrz, and David Tugwell. 2004. "The Sketch Engine." In *Proceedings of the EURALEX Conference*, 105–116. Lorient, France.
- Lakoff, Robin. 1973. "The Logic of Politeness; or Minding your P's and Q's." *Chicago Linguistics Society* 9: 292–305.
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 1983. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 2003. "An Anatomy of Politeness in Communication." *International Journal of Pragmatics* 14: 101–123.
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 2007. "Politeness: Is there an East-West Divide?" *Journal of Politeness Research* 3 (2): 167–206. doi:10.1515/PR.2007.009
- Leech, Geoffrey N. 2014. *The Pragmatics of Politeness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341386.001.0001
- Lerner, Gene. 2013. "On the Place of Hesitating in Delicate Formulations: A Turn-Constructional Infrastructure for Collaborative Indiscretion." In *Conversational Repair and Human Understanding*, ed. by Makoto Hayashi, Geoffrey Raymond, and Jack Sidnell, 95–134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1983 *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levinson, Stephen C. 1995 "Interactional Biases in Human Thinking." In *Social Intelligence and Interaction: Expressions and Implications of the Social Bias in Human Intelligence*, ed. by Esther N. Goody, 221–260. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511621710.014
- Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. *Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalised Conversational Implicature*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press.
- Locher, Miriam A. 2006. "Polite Behaviour within Relational Work. The Discursive Approach to Politeness." *Multilingua* 25 (3): 249–267. doi:10.1515/MULTI.2006.015
- Locher, Miriam A. 2012. "Politeness Research from Past to Future, with a Special Focus on the Discursive Approach." In *New Perspectives on (Im)Politeness and Interpersonal Communication*, ed. by Lucía Fenandez-Amaya, Maria de la O. Hernandez-Lopez, Reyes Gomez Moron, Manuel Padilla Cruz, Manuel Mejias Borrero, and Marianna Relinque Barranca, 1–22. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
- Locher, Miriam A. 2015. "Interpersonal Pragmatics and its Link to (Im)politeness Research." *Journal of Pragmatics* 86: 5–10. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.05.010
- Locher, Miriam A., and Derek Bousfield. 2008. "Introduction: Impoliteness and Power in Language." In *Impoliteness in Language*, ed. by Derek Bousfield, and Miriam Locher, 1–13. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110208344

- Locher, Miriam, and Richard Watts. 2005. "Politeness Theory and Relational Work." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1 (1): 9–34. doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.9
- Mey, Jacob. 2001. *Pragmatics. Introduction*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mills, Sara. 2003. *Gender and Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511615238
- Mills, Sara. 2017. *English Politeness and Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norricks, Neal R. 2018. "Narrative Studies versus Pragmatics (of Narrative)." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norricks, 122–142. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
doi:10.1075/pbns.294.06nor
- Nwoye, Onuigbo. 1992. "Linguistic Politeness and Socio-cultural Variations of the Notion of Face." *Journal of Pragmatics* 18 (4): 309–328. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(92)90092-P
- Ogiermann, Eva. 2009. *On Apologising in Negative and Positive Politeness Cultures*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.191
- Owen, Marion. 1983. *Apologies and Remedial Interchanges*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pomerantz, Anita. 1984. "Pursuing a Response." In *Structures of Social Action. Studies in Conversation Analysis*, ed. by J. Maxwell Atkinson, and John Heritage, 152–163. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Robinson, Jeffrey D. 2004. "The Sequential Organisation of Explicit Apologies in Naturally Occurring English." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 37 (3): 291–330.
doi:10.1207/s15327973rlsi3703_2
- Schneider, Klaus P. 2017. "Pragmatic Competence and Pragmatic Variation." In *Doing Intercultural Pragmatics: Cognitive, Linguistic and Sociopragmatic Perspectives on Language Use*, ed. by Rachel Giora, and Michael Haugh, 315–333. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Searle, John. 1969. *Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9781139173438
- Searle, John. 1975. "Indirect Speech Acts." In *Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3. Speech Acts*, ed. by Peter Cole, and Jerry Morgan, 59–82. New York: Academic Press.
- Spencer-Oatey, Helen. 2005. "(Im)Politeness, Face and Perceptions of Rapport: Unpackaging their Bases and Interrelationships." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1 (1): 95–120.
doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.95
- Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*: 2nd ed. Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, U.S.A. Blackwell.
- Terkourafi, Marina. 2001. "Politeness in Cypriot Greek: A Frame-based Approach." PhD diss. University of Cambridge.
- Terkourafi, Marina. 2005a. "Beyond the Micro-level in Politeness Research." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1 (2): 237–262. doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.2.237
- Terkourafi, Marina. 2005b. "Pragmatic Correlates of Frequency of Use: The Case for a Notion of 'Minimal Context'." In *Reviewing Linguistic Thought: Converging Trends for the 21st Century*, Sophia Marmaridou, Kiki Nikiforidou, and Eleni Antonopoulou, 209–233. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Thomas, Jenny. 1995. *Meaning in Interaction. An Introduction to Pragmatics*. London: Longman.
- van der Bom, Isabelle, and Sara Mills. 2015. "A Discursive Approach to the Analysis of Politeness Data." *Journal of Politeness Research* 11 (2): 179–206. doi:10.1515/pr-2015-0008
- Verschueren, Jef. 1999. *Understanding Pragmatics*. London: Arnold.
- Watts, Richard J. 2003. *Politeness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511615184

Corpus linguistics and pragmatics

Christoph Rühlemann and Brian Clancy

Philipps University Marburg, Germany / Mary Immaculate College,
University of Limerick, Ireland

Pragmatics and corpus linguistics were long considered mutually exclusive. In recent years, however, common ground has been discovered thus paving the way for the new field of corpus pragmatics. This chapter shows that corpus pragmatics integrates the qualitative methodology typical of pragmatics with the quantitative methodology predominant in corpus linguistics. To illustrate, we examine the choice between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses in the *Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA)*. The findings suggest that the choice is co-determined by the factuality of the comparison expressed in the *as-if* clause and the syntactic functions of the *as-if* clause in the matrix clause. We finally discuss the *was/were* alternation as a form of negative empathetic deixis.

Keywords: *as-if* clause, corpus, corpus linguistics, corpus pragmatics, deixis, pragmatic markers, qualitative, quantitative, verticle reading

1. Introduction

Corpus linguistics, a relatively young linguistic discipline though its roots can be traced back as far as the thirteenth century (see McCarthy and O’Keeffe 2010), came to the fore in the latter half of the twentieth century. This time period saw the development of more powerful computers and linguists, fascinated by the potential for the analysis of language, began to amass large, principled collections of language in an electronic format, and these became known as *corpora*. A milestone in this process was the first of the modern, machine-readable corpora, the Brown Corpus, a corpus of American English written texts (see Francis and Kučera 1964). The next thirty years saw an explosion of interest in the use of computers to analyse language and a corresponding increase in the size of corpora. It was, however, the emergence of the more affordable, powerful and, in terms of space, manageable personal computers in the 1990s that revolutionised corpus linguistics and shaped it into the discipline we know today. This new-found ability to store large amounts

of data that could be quickly analysed heightened the appeal of corpus linguistics and, driven on by the dictum there is “no data like more data” (Sinclair 2001), the era of mega-corpora such as the Collins Corpus and Bank of English™ (approx. 2.5 billion words), the Oxford English Corpus and the Cambridge English Corpus (both approx. 2 billion words in size) arrived. Mega-corpora were initially compiled for lexicographical purposes; however, somewhat ironically, their development also coincided with the blending of a corpus linguistic methodology with other linguistic frameworks such as conversation analysis, spoken discourse analysis, sociolinguistics and, the focus of this chapter, pragmatics, which, in turn, has resulted in smaller, more domain-specific corpora. These smaller corpora facilitate a “constant interpretive dialectic between features of texts and the contexts in which they are produced” (Vaughan and Clancy 2013: 70) and are therefore ideally suited to the study of pragmatics.

Pragmatics, as we know, has its origins in the philosophy of language and this, coupled with a tendency to focus on individual texts, means that pragmatic research has been primarily qualitative (see Rühlemann and Aijmer 2015). The discipline has, however, always encouraged an on-going critique and redefinition of core concepts within the field (see Lindblom 2001 and Davies 2007 on Grice, for example) and this flexible approach could also be said to have been extended to methodological considerations. No one homogeneous methodology has emerged for the study of pragmatic phenomena. Instead, methodologies from areas such as discourse analysis or conversation analysis have been applied. Similarly, corpus pragmatics has emerged from the blending of pragmatics with a corpus linguistic methodology. Arguably, the most important methodological benefit of corpus linguistics for pragmatics is the empirical nature of many corpus studies (see Haugh and Culpeper, this volume). Although it is acknowledged that corpus studies can also be qualitative, it is the quantitative element provided, for example, by concordancing software that arguably defines the discipline. Corpora exist as electronic text files and are therefore suitable for analysis via concordancing or other corpus software. The corpus entry point for many researchers is the word frequency list. In general, a word frequency list appears visually as a list of all the types in a corpus coupled with the number of occurrences of each type. These frequency counts are referred to as ‘raw’ and can, in turn, be normalised so that they might be compared to other frequency results from other bigger and/or smaller (in size) corpora. It is also possible to compare one corpus to another using keyword lists. Keyword lists, generated by corpus software, feature items that occur with unusual in/frequency when one corpus is compared to another. Keyword lists provide a measure of saliency rather than simple frequency due to the statistical nature of the process (Baker 2006). The procedure involves generating a word frequency list for the target corpus and then a word frequency list for a larger reference corpus, for example in the British National

Corpus (BNC) or the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA). The computer then processes the statistical significance of difference between the two corpora using chi-square or log-likelihood tests.

The most familiar representation of a corpus linguistic “vertical reading methodology” (Rühlemann and Aijmer 2015: 7) is the KWIC (key word in context) or concordance line format. Characteristic of the KWIC format is that the search item, or *node*, is presented visually in the centre of the line(s) surrounded by a number of words on either side:

Table 1. Ten concordance lines for *as if he was* generated using the BNC

1 A0E 295	but he looks at him disrespectfully	as if he was	applying a Brechtian alienation-effect
2 A52 352	to finger, hand to hand, he looked	as if he was	auditioning for the lead role in The C
3 A54 26	expression entered Jackson's eyes	as if he was	wondering why nothing ever proved
4 A73 464	comer's face was green. He looked	as if he was	about to be sick. 'Will you go down
5 A7A 2635	ed at Marx who stood before them	as if he was	quite happy to stand there in silence
6 A7J 1476	st with a curious air of detachment	as if he was	an observer from another civilisatio
7 A7L 948	ures. The Americans must have felt	as if he was	taking revenge on them for what ha
8 AB5 1288	h of Ziggy Stardust and treated him	as if he was	Ziggy Stardust. We began to treat hi
9 ABX 980	Why were they all treating him	as if he was	five years old. He felt like screaming
10 ABX 2659	awkward. She was talking to him	as if he was	grown-up and it made him feel unco

This format allows for the formulation of initial hypotheses based on patterns that might be determined in relation to the node. For example, if we look at the co-text to the left of *as if he was*, the verb *look* appears in lines 1, 2 and 4 and *treat* appears in lines 8 and 9. In terms of patterning to the right of the search item, the *V-ing* form occurs in lines 1, 2, 3 and 7. These patterns can be further explored using corpus software collocational tools. Table 2 provides support for the initial observations based on the concordance lines. In COCA, the most frequent collocate of *as if he was* is *looked*. The COCA results also contain an MI score. The MI (mutual information) score is a statistical measure of the strength of collocation. The higher the MI score generated, the stronger the collocation – an MI score of higher than 3 is usually indicative of a strong collocation (for more information on MI scores see

Table 2. Top five collocates for *as if he was* in the spoken component of COCA (L4–R4)

Number	Word	Frequency	MI
1	looked	70	5.09
2	felt	54	4.96
3	trying	38	4.22
4	looking	28	3.82
5	sounded	25	6.94

Baker 2006: 100–104). As we can see, *sounded*, though not the most frequent, is the strongest collocate of *as if he was*.

There are a number of other reasons why a corpus linguistic methodology is suitable for the study of pragmatics. Pragmatics, in addition to syntax and semantics, emerged in the fifties and sixties as an element in the tripartite approach to the study of language and was initially preoccupied with invented or intuited language data. As pragmatics has evolved it has embraced other methods of data collection such as discourse completion tasks in order to elicit, for example, data on speech acts that are relatively rare in everyday conversation. Corpus linguistics offers another data source to researchers studying pragmatic phenomena – naturally-occurring, spontaneous, uncensored, real-life data increasingly freely available to researchers. In addition, context is of great importance to pragmatics in that elements such as the language user(s), social situation and activity type all play an important role in how communication unfolds. Some modern-day corpora provide extensive contextual information in the form of a range of sociolinguistic metadata. For example, written corpora frequently contain information about text type and date of publication, which provides opportunities for the study of diachronic historical pragmatics (see House, this volume). However, it is modern spoken corpora that provide the richest vein of social variables. These corpora are increasingly characterised by their attention to contextual metadata – many spoken corpora contain speaker information such as place of birth, age, gender, level of education, religion or social class.

Pragmatics also offers reciprocal benefits to corpus linguistics. One of the most valuable of these has emerged, again ironically, from a criticism of the use of a corpus linguistic methodology in the study of pragmatic phenomena – namely the relationship between linguistic form and function. When approaching a corpus, a researcher's first point of entry is often a lexical 'hook' (Rühlemann 2010) such as, for example, the pragmatic marker *you know* or *sorry* as a representation of the pragmatic act of apology. This enables the researcher to access their corpus via the tools outlined here. However, the relationship between linguistic form and function is characterised by ambiguity and unpredictability (Mey 2001) and it is the unfolding of dynamic contextual elements that facilitates the correct understanding of the function a particular form fulfils. This ambiguous, unpredictable relationship hampers the process of automatic retrievability through corpus software. Corpus linguistics has responded to this challenge by developing methodologies and pragmatic annotation schemes that allow for a more sophisticated utterance-by-utterance analysis (see, for example, Archer and Culpeper 2003; Kohnen 2008; Rühlemann and O'Donnell 2012). An apposite example of this is the Irish component of the International Corpus of English (ICE-Ireland; Kallen and Kirk 2008) which has been annotated to display aspects of discourse, prosody and pragmatics (SPICE-Ireland; Kallen and Kirk 2012). An example of this system is shown here:

<P1A-033\$C> <#> <rep> <[> Exactly exactly </[> </[> </rep> <#> <rep> Oh I-know* I-mean* like* <,> the way I should say to them you-know* <,> at the end of the day you have to respect your privacy <[1> <[1> </rep>
(Kallen and Kirk 2012:43 [original emphasis removed])

Although on the surface the tags give the extract quite a dense visual appearance, it demonstrates many of the features that makes the corpus searchable and, therefore, of import to the study of pragmatics. For example, <rep>...</rep> marks the beginning and end of a representative act (the corpus is also tagged for directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives) and * is used to tag discourse/pragmatic markers. Our attention now turns to a specific consideration of corpus pragmatics in light of this discussion of mutual benefits of the intersection of the two disciplines.

Corpus pragmatics is a relatively recent development at the intersection of the fields of corpus linguistics and pragmatics and a growing number of corpus pragmatic studies have recently emerged that highlight the fruitfulness of the synergy (Romero-Trillo 2008; O’Keeffe et al. 2011; Aijmer and Rühlemann 2015). Corpus pragmatics represents a highly iterative approach to the study of pragmatic concepts that integrates the more traditional qualitative or ‘horizontal’ approach in pragmatics with the more quantitative or ‘vertical’ nature of corpus linguistics. This combined methodological approach is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Integrated reading methodology in corpus pragmatics (adapted from Rühlemann and Aijmer 2015: 12)

In this way, corpus pragmatics takes a more nuanced approach to the consideration of lexico-grammatical patterns that characterize a text, something which has long been the focus of both pragmatics and corpus linguistics in general (Clancy and O’Keeffe 2015). Corpus pragmatic studies are, then, characterized not only by a focus on form and function, but also on patterns of variation at social, cultural and regional levels. The studies also offer new insights into pragmatic principles such as speech acts and (im)politeness through re-evaluation and re-investigation. In order to illustrate corpus pragmatics, we have selected a brief number of studies from the canon to represent what is fast becoming a substantial body of research.

The focus on interpreting patterns of form and function according to their interactional and situational context of occurrence is most evident in one of the largest bodies of work in the corpus pragmatic realm – that of pragmatic markers (PMs). For example, Fung and Carter (2007) explore PM form and function in two pedagogical corpora – a learner corpus from Hong Kong and the pedagogical subcorpus from the Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus of Discourse in English (CANCODE). Aijmer (2013) uses the suite of ICE corpora in order to compare form, function and frequency across a range of World Englishes. Amador-Moreno and McCafferty (2015) examine pragmatic markers diachronically using a corpus of letters written 1750–1940. Millar (2015) focusses on those used on an Irish beauty website. Finally, Clancy (2016) compares pragmatic markers used in the discourse of family and friends. These studies highlight the array of factors that corpus pragmatics pays attention to in its consideration of pragmatic markers. A large variety of corpora have been used to examine pragmatic marker frequency, form and function across different language varieties, time periods, text types, activity types, speaker roles and relationships, etc. Corpus pragmatics has also challenged the membership of that canonical grouping of PMs (*well, you know, like, actually, just*, etc.) by arguing for the inclusion of features such as tag questions (Barron 2015), vocatives (Clancy 2015) or interjections (Norrick 2015).

While the field of PMs is arguably the most extensive field of corpus pragmatic research, corpora have also been exploited in the quest for a better understanding of pragmatic phenomena far beyond pragmatic markers. In fact, a growing number of corpus-pragmatic studies are concerned with core-pragmatic concerns such as reference, deixis, speech acts, turn taking or (im)politeness (see Haugh and Culpeper, this volume), to name only a few. For illustration, a few such studies are cited in the following. Biber et al. (1999: 263) propose a variational-pragmatic case study on reference patterns with the definite article *the* across the four registers, conversation, fiction, news reportage and academic writing. Among the many discoveries is that “[a]lthough anaphoric reference may intuitively seem to be the most basic use of the definite article, other uses are in fact equally or more common” (Biber et al. 1999: 266); for example, while anaphoric reference accounts for less than 30%

of all uses in all four registers, situational reference, which “ranges from reliance on the immediate speech situation to dependence upon the larger shared context” (Biber et al. 1999: 264), stands out in conversation where it accounts for more than half of all occurrences. Rühlemann and O’Donnell (2015) investigate ‘introductory *this*’ in storytelling concluding that the usage serves as a theme marker announcing the protagonist of an upcoming story early on and can hence be seen as a form of discourse deixis. Tao (2003) examines ‘turn initiators’, that is, the first verbal element occurring in a speaking turn, and finds that “the function of turn beginnings may be characterized as mainly to link back to prior turns” (Tao 2003: 203; cf. Heritage 2015 on *well*-prefaced turns). Rühlemann and Gries (2015) study turn order patterns in multi-party storytelling; their findings suggest that turn order in storytellings with more than two participants is essentially structured as if there were only two participants, adding support to recent proposals that see multi-party conversation as “built for two” (Stivers 2015). Speech acts have seen a large number of corpus-based examinations, both in a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. Synchronic corpus studies include, amongst others, Aijmer (1996) on thanking, apologies, requests, and offers; Adolphs (2008) on the distinction between questions (i.e. requests for information) and suggestions with “why don’t you”; Jucker et al. (2008) on compliments; Garcia McAllister (2015) on directives in academic contexts. Diachronic speech act studies based on corpora include, inter alia, Jucker and Taavitsainen (2000) on insults; Kohnen (2008) on directives, Jucker et al. (2008) on compliments; Jucker and Taavitsainen (2008) on apologies (for a comprehensive overview of diachronic corpus research into speech acts, see Kohnen 2015).

Corpus pragmatic studies offer a new perspective on traditional or classical pragmatic (and indeed corpus linguistic) phenomena. Corpus pragmatics has contributed to a re-evaluation of the use of elicited data in pragmatics through a comparison with corpus data. Schauer and Adolphs (2006) compared data in relation to the speech act of gratitude generated from both DCTs and the CANCODE corpus. At the level of form, they found that in both the DCT and corpus data, *thank** and *cheers* were the most frequent expressions of gratitude. However, at an interactional level, where “speech acts combine into larger units of discourse” (Schneider 2012: 1027), the results converged. The corpus data showed that *cheers* primarily functioned not as an expression of gratitude, but as a *response* to such an expression. In addition, the corpus data highlighted that the speech act of gratitude takes place across an extended series of speaker turns as part of a process of collaborative negotiation. This attention to spoken language as an interactional, collaborative process is a feature of other corpus pragmatic research. For example, Clancy and McCarthy (2015) examine the phenomenon of co-construction across two corpora – CANCODE and the Limerick Corpus of Irish English (LCIE). Co-construction is an inherently pragmatic activity in that it involves the

creation of meaning in and through context-specific interaction (see Kereckes, 2007; Rühlemann, 2007). A corpus pragmatic approach, in addition to confirming again that meaning is a dynamic and emergent phenomenon, allowed Clancy and McCarthy to quantitatively demonstrate the frequency of co-construction in relation to the items *if*, *when* and *which* and also exemplify extended patterns by which interactants sanction one another's participation in this phenomenon.

In the following we will present a case study on the choice between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were*. Our aims are two-fold: first we wish to illustrate the integrated corpus-pragmatic methodology; second we propose an interpretation of our findings in the light of Lyons' (1977) notion of 'empathetic deixis', thus contributing to the small, yet growing body of corpus research on deixis, undoubtedly one of the key areas of pragmatic interest.

2. Case study: Indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses – a case of empathetic deixis?

2.1 Introduction

The distinction between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* expresses a contrast of mood. Mood "refers to the factual or non-factual status of events" (Carter and McCarthy 2006: 307). Mood, as well as the distinction between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were*, therefore needs to be appreciated within the broader perspective of modality. Modality "construes the region of uncertainty that lies between 'yes' and 'no'" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 147). Its primary function is that of assessing "the intermediate degrees, various kinds of indeterminacy" (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 146) that fall in between polar choices such as 'yes' and 'no'. More specifically, 'uncertainty' is an epistemic attitude related to a range of intermediate values on the continuum spanning between extreme values of 'factual' and 'true' on the one hand and 'non-factual' and 'untrue' on the other. It is obviously not the case that states or events *are* factual, near-factual, probable, possible, hypothetical, unlikely, or non-factual in and by themselves. They are assigned values on the factual/non-factual cline by speakers. The expression of (un-)certainty is thus a deeply pragmatic category: the degree to which information is marked as certain and hence reliable or less certain and hence less reliable depends on the speaker and the degree of his/her knowledge or belief that what he/she says, reflects the true state of affairs.

Regarding the distinction between the indicative mood and the subjunctive mood, the former is often considered "a factual mood" (Carter and McCarthy 2006: 3007), whereas the latter is treated as the non-factual one. As Mindt (2000: 165)

observes with regard to subjunctive *were*: “[n]on-real states are generally expressed by the subjunctive form *were*.” These observations, however, are merely preliminary orientations. The assumption of a convenient division of labour between indicative *was* used for expressing factuality and subjunctive *were* used to express lack of factuality is simplistic and not borne out by authentic speech data. Even a quick search in corpus data instantly returns counter examples where *was* is used to express counterfactuality as well as examples where *were* is used in the context of relative certainty. In (1), an excerpt from an investigation into the murder of Angie Samota, Angie’s friend Anita who spent a night out with Angie and Russell, is reported as *feel[ing] as if she were along for appearance’s sake only*. Here, it appears that Anita was under the firm impression that the sole purpose of her being taken along by Angie and Russell was *for appearance’s sake*. For Anita, then, the state of affairs described in the *as if* clause was not only possible but even likely. In (2), by contrast, the arrest of people planning to blow up JFK airport is certainly not a trivial event; despite this certainty, the speaker uses indicative *was* in the *as-if* clause.

- (1) Now, 28 years after Angie Samota was murdered, Russell is talking once again about what happened that night and about Angie. (Photo-of-Samota; MANKIEWICZ: Her friends describe her as the kind of girl that guys get crushes on. Mr-RUSSELL-BUCHANA: Maybe so. MANKIEWICZ: Possible that you had a crush on her? Mr-BUCHANAN: Oh, no, no. Not at all. I hardly knew her. MANKIEWICZ: (Voiceover) But after questioning Angie’s friend Anita about that shared night out, investigators wrote that she told them that the evening centered around Russell and Angie and that Anita felt *as if she were along for appearance’s sake only*. (NBC_Dateline, 2012)
- (2) When the FBI announced the arrest of people who wanted to blow up JFK Airport, New York Times buried that story on page A-37 *as if it was*, you know, trivial. (NPR_TalkNation, 2007)

Rather than assigning the two forms to the opposite ends of the factuality/non-factuality continuum, Quirk et al. (1985: 1110) observe that subjunctive *were* and indicative past may be used as ‘alternatives’ in hypothetical *as-if* clauses. The examples given by Quirk et al. include:

- (3) She treats me as if I was a stranger.
- (4) She treats me as if I were a stranger.

The choice between indicative past and subjunctive *were* may hence not be a grammatical one; that is, it may not be one that is coerced on the speaker by the grammatical system that reserves one form for one type of modal meaning and another form for another modal meaning. Rather, the two forms seem to be competing with one another in the same meaning area of uncertainty referred to above.

The question we are going to address in this case study is related to the factors co-determining the choice of the one form over the other. While the *was/were* alternation occurs in a variety of constructions, particularly in hypothetical *if* clauses (cf. Quirk et al. 1985: 1091ff.), we will be concerned here only with *was/were* alternation in *as-if* clauses.

We base our examination on the hypothesis that the choice of the subjunctive form is a case of negative empathetic deixis. While deixis is in general “one of the most empirically understudied core areas of pragmatics” (Levinson 2004: 97), empathetic deixis is even less well-studied; only very few relevant studies come to mind, e.g., Rühlemann’s (2007) case study on ‘introductory *this*’ in storytelling. Empathetic deixis occurs “when the speaker is personally involved with the entity, situation or place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or viewpoint of the addressee” (Lyons 1977: 677). Related terms include ‘inner deixis’ (Caffi and Janney 1994) and ‘emotional deixis’ (Lakoff 1974). Lakoff subsumes under emotional deixis uses of *this* and *that* that are “generally linked to the speaker’s emotional involvement in the subject-matter of his utterance” (Lakoff 1974: 347), noting that emotional deixis is used for ‘vividness’ and typically occurs in colloquial contexts.

Lyons (1977) emphasises that empathetic deixis typically concerns binary choices, as between *this* and *that*, *here* and *there*, *now* and *then*, where, depending on the speaker’s involvement (or dis-involvement) with the entities referred to, or identification (or non-identification) with the addressee’s attitude or viewpoint, a shift can be observed from origo-farther reference (e.g., *that*) to origo-nearer reference (e.g., *this*), or the other way round, from reference that is closer to the speaker’s deictic center to reference that is further removed from it. In the context of the choice between *this* and *that*, it is instructive to note that the near/distant polarity commonly assumed for the pair (with *this* indexing nearness while *that* indexes distance) is best seen as “a matter of *psychological* rather than real distance” (Quirk et al. 1985: 374, our emphasis). It is this psychological potential inherent in the choice that enables speakers to alternate between the binary forms as required not (only) by physical or factual proximity but by their psychological situation (attitude, epistemic status, level of (un-)certainty, etc.) thereby also manipulating origo-proximity (cf. Rühlemann 2007: 222).

We finally note that empathetic deixis, although hardly studied, seems to be observable in a great many fields. These would include not only the above-mentioned use of ‘introductory *this*’ but also ‘attitudinal *that*’, as in *Janet is coming. I hope she doesn’t bring that husband of hers* (Quirk et al. 1985: 374), where *that* is used to “imply dislike or disapproval” (Quirk et al. 1985: 374). Also, empathetic deixis may be manifest in the ‘subjective progressive’, exemplified in *The silly cow. She’s always trying to tell me things* (BNC: HGL 3271), a usage which often “suggests a hyperbolic

tone of disapproval” (Leech et al. 2009: 120) and where the choice of the progressive aspect over the simple aspect seems to suggest a move from origo-neutral to origo-near territory. Empathetic deixis may also be at play in Historic Present, a switch from past tense to present tense in storytelling, as in *we’re driving down the west coast and there was like some rocks* (Narrative Corpus) where the switch into the origo-near present tense in *we’re driving* could be seen as indexing the narrator’s heightened involvement with the events he/she is relating (cf. Rühlemann 2007: 192); its effect is to “produce a more vivid description” (Biber et al. 1999: 454). Empathetic deixis also may account for occurrences of indirect speech where the decision to backshift or retain the tense of the original utterance is contingent on the speaker’s “doubt as to [the reported utterance’s] present validity” (Quirk et al. 1985: 1028). Choosing to backshift, where non-backshifting is perfectly legal, then, would indicate the speaker’s disinvolvement with the reported proposition via use of origo-far past tense. Finally, we wish to list ‘alternative recognitionals’ among the possible candidates for empathetic-deictic choices. Alternative recognitionals are person references that occur in categorical shifts, i.e., in “environments where the unmarked category of reference [a simple name] was entirely possible” (Stivers 2007: 77). They most commonly take the form of “a descriptive recognition instead of a name” (Stivers 2007: 77), for example, ‘yer sister’ instead of ‘Alene’ (to use the choice described in Stivers 2007). Alternative recognitionals too are psychology-driven as they are “commonly used in complaints” (Stivers 2007: 82) where they serve to place “the referent in the domain of the responsibility of the addressee” (Stivers 2007: 81) rather than the speaker, thus putting the referent at a distance from the latter.

To return to the *was/were* alternation, it should be obvious that the choice between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* too represents a binary choice. The question arising then is whether it can also be used for empathetic deixis. This seems at least possible if we consider the semantics of *as-if* clauses and how this underlying semantics is exploited pragmatically in context.

There is broad agreement among grammarians that *as-if* clauses typically contain a strong element of similarity and comparison. Quirk et al. (1985: 1110) list them as instances of “clauses of similarity and comparison”. Biber et al. (1999: 840) note with regard to the subordinators *as if* and *as though* that they “indicate that the adverbial clause is showing similarity but is not to be taken factually.” Carter and McCarthy (2006: 774) observe that *as-if* clauses can operate “as the second element of comparisons of similarity”. The first element of comparison resides in the matrix clause usually preceding the *as-if* clause. So, to return to Quirk et al.’s (1985) example

- (5) [C¹ She treats me] as if [C² I was a stranger].

the way *she treats me* (as comparative element C1) is compared to the treatment of *a stranger* (as comparative element C2), with the conjunction *as if* conjoining the two elements. Or, to use examples from COCA data:

- (6) [^{C1} When Grant was a young child, he looked] as if [^{C2} he was older than he was]. (CNN_SunMorn, 2002)
- (7) MARTIN-LUTHER-KING# Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR (ABC NEWS) (Off-camera) [^{C1} Martin Luther King, saying that just before he died], as if [^{C2} it was a premonition]. (ABC, 2012)
- (8) [^{C1} Mitt Romney spent much of the day campaigning] as if [^{C2} he were the nominee]. (CBS_NewsMorn, 2011)
- (9) [^{C1} Clinton was serving up the partisan red meat], almost as if [^{C2} she were a butcher]. (ABC_Nightline, 2007)

In (6), the way the basketball player Grant Hill looked as a young child is compared to the way older children look; in (7), King's assertion on the day before his assassination that he would like to live a long life like anybody is compared to a premonition; in (8), Mitt Romney's way of campaigning is likened to the campaign style of a party nominee; and, in (9), Hillary Clinton made a series of partisan ('red meat') remarks in a way similar to the way a butcher serves up red meat. While, then, *as-if* clauses invariably serve as the second element of comparisons of similarity, it will be obvious that the actual 'comparability' of the two comparative elements varies a great deal. The variation is in terms of degrees of factuality. In (6), Grant Hill's height as a young child was in actual fact the height of an older child; so the comparison encoded in the *as-if* clause builds on a factual base and may hence be labeled 'factual'. In (7), King's assertion he would like to live a long life just hours before he was shot has indeed the 'aura' of a premonition; however, it is unclear whether there are in fact premonitions and it is unclear whether King's assertion that he would like to live a long life was in fact (intended as) one of them. The comparison thus seems based on a premise that is at best 'near-factual'. A more obvious case of lacking factuality is (8). Here, Mitt Romney's campaigning looked like the party nominee's at a time in 2011 when he had not yet become the official GOP nominee for president; the comparison hence builds on a premise that is simply incongruent with the facts – it is 'counterfactual'. In (9), finally, the comparison of Hillary Clinton with a butcher is very obviously counterfactual. Indeed, considering the extreme disparity between the concepts of 'politician' and 'butcher' (in a literal sense) the comparison is more than just contrary to facts and best understood as 'absurdly counterfactual'. In other words, *as-if* clauses semantically build on comparison and similarity; pragmatically, speakers have room to exploit the comparability of the

compared elements to stake out their stance on the factuality cline ranging from factual to absurdly counterfactual.

Having drawn the outlines of empathetic deixis, the perspective in which we are going to evaluate our results, and having sketched out how semantic and pragmatic aspects interact in *as-if* clauses, in the following sections we aim to report on a case study on factors co-determining the choice between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses. As will be shown the study is limited in scope and intended strictly as a pilot study. Therefore, we will draw some tentative conclusions following our description of the data and method and our discussion of the findings.

2.2 Data

This case study is based on data from the COCA corpus (cf. Davies 2008), a very large corpus of contemporary American English. Being a monitor corpus, it is updated regularly; at the time we used COCA for this study, the word total was 520m words. While the corpus hosts a number of written registers including Fiction, Magazine, News, and Academic, its spoken data are limited to transcribed speech from a broad range of unscripted TV programmes. Even in that spoken sub-corpus, *as-if* clauses seem to be very frequent. A search for *as if * was|were*, where the asterisk * is used as a wild card for any potentially intervening item, e.g. *that, there, he, she, it, they*, etc. returns 1198 hits. This is a large number – too large to allow any in-depth (corpus-)pragmatic analysis. Consequently, analyzing all available occurrences of *as if* was far beyond our aims. To keep the analysis manageable, we decided to exclude *as-if* clauses with nominal subjects and plural pronominal subjects and instead to focus on *as if* followed by singular personal pronouns only; thus, the data set subjected to further analysis included clauses with *as if I was/were*, *as if he was/were*, and *as if she was/were*. This raw data set included 322 hits. Five of them turned out to be duplicates, which were discarded leaving us with 317 hits for further processing.

2.3 Methods

The 317 hits selected for close examination were coded for two factors, one pragmatic, one syntagmatic.

The pragmatic factor is the degree of factuality of the comparison expressed in the *as-if* clause. Four degrees were distinguished on the factuality continuum: ‘factual’, for clauses expressing circumstances that are taken to be true; ‘near-factual’, for clauses describing circumstances that are presented as ‘close’ to being true; ‘counterfactual’, for circumstances that are clearly at odds with the facts; and, finally,

‘absurdly counterfactual’, for circumstances extremely (sometimes hilariously) out of touch with the facts. In nearly all cases, it was necessary to consult larger contexts than the concordance line. In many cases, the degree of factuality only became clear from very large extended contexts and required substantial inference. A case in point is example (10):

- (10) Even if you know Mr. Govan’s condition in advance, you can be startled to enter a room of Chicago’s Schwab Rehabilitation Center and see the upper body of a strong young man poking out of the center of a padded platform, **as if he were** simply standing up out of the sunroof of a sports car. Then you realize, Mr. Govan is standing up on his hips, a stuffed pair of blue pants legs from a warm-up suit, socks and unsmudged running shoes are propped up on the bottom half of a nearby wheelchair while the technicians twist, test and tinker with Howard Lee Govan’s new legs
(NPR_Weekend, 1995)

Here, the speaker initially describes the impression of “seeing the upper body of a strong young man poking out of the center of a padded platform, as if he were simply standing up out of the sunroof of a sports car.” The picture of a strong young man standing up out of the sunroof of a sports car is nothing unusual, so the comparison expressed in the *as-if* clause seems merely counterfactual (since the ‘padded platform’ is *not* a car’s ‘sunroof’) but it does not seem to violate factuality in any outrageous way. However, Mr. Govan’s ‘condition’, it transpires from the end of the extract, is that he apparently has artificial legs that can be removed from the body. So, the comparison of Mr. Govan who is in actual fact standing up on his hips while technician are tinkering with his new legs with a strong young man standing up out from a car’s sunroof is wildly disparate. The hit was hence coded ‘absurdly counterfactual’.

Given examples such as these, it will not be surprising that in a number of cases the degree of factuality could not be determined with sufficient confidence. These cases were excluded from further examination.

In pragmatic studies, the focus of attention is often on processes in the speaker’s mind, such as inference, intention, evaluation, (un-)certainty, and, in our case, factuality – processes which are often not encoded in the language and thus remain in the unsaid or, at best, leave behind traces, or indices, in the said. In corpus linguistic studies, by contrast, the focus shifts to processes directly observable in the speaker’s language, that is, in the text consisting of the string of words actually produced – processes which are then manifested in the said. These textual processes can be described as syntagmatic processes governed largely by what Sinclair (1991) termed the ‘idiom principle’. This principle holds that the choice of any one word in co-text raises the odds that certain other words will be co-selected in that co-text. Corpus linguistics has been prolific in discovering fundamental types of

syntagmatic patterning, such as collocation, colligation, semantic prosody, and so forth. In this spirit, corpus linguists have targeted binary choices such as the dative alternation (e.g., Bernaisch et al. 2014) or the genitive alternation (e.g., Gries and Wulff 2013). The analyses of these choices have invariably suggested that none of them can be explained by a single factor alone but that the choices owe to multiple factors, many of them being syntagmatic factors. We take up this multi-factorial perspective in our analysis of the *was/were* alternation in *as-if* clauses. This up-take is motivated by collocational analyses. These brought to light that copular verbs were by far the most frequent group of collocates of *as-if* clauses. Since the copular verbs invariably demand subject complements for their complementation we hypothesized that the syntactic function the *as-if* clause enters into is another co-determining factor in the *was/were* alternation. We already note at this stage that if we discover a significant attraction of either or both the alternative forms to one or more syntactic functions it will be interesting to see whether such an attraction can be understood as (a sub-type of) colligation, an association pattern of a lexical item in/with a grammatical category (cf. Hoey 2005).¹

Based on the data set of 317 hits and with all codes for Factuality and Syntactic Function in place, we carry out a linear probability model, a type of logistic regression model, to test the following hypotheses:

- H_0 : The choice of indicative *was* and, respectively, subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses does not depend on any of the independent variables Factuality and Syntactic Function and their pairwise interactions; adjusted $R^2 = 0$.
 H_1 : The choice of indicative *was* and, respectively, subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses does depend on at least one of the independent variables Factuality and Syntactic Function and their pairwise interactions; adjusted $R^2 > 0$.

(R^2 is a measure which “quantifies the proportion of the variance in the data that is captured and explained by the regression model” (Baayen 2008: 88) and which can thus serve as a diagnostic for the goodness-of-fit of the model (cf. also Gries 2009: 260).)

1. Colligation is an interesting ‘idiomatic’ patterning in that it involves a lexical item (or several such items) in frequent co-occurrence with an abstract, non-lexical paradigmatic ‘slot’ (e.g., the subject, the theme, etc.). In other words, colligation is not a purely syntagmatic phenomenon but rather an intertwining of the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axes.

2.4 Results

As noted, following standard corpus linguistic procedure, we started out by analyzing collocational profiles of *as-if* clauses. Table 3 lists the top ten collocates in L3–R3 (i.e., three items to the left of the node, three items to the right):

Table 3. Collocates of *as if* |*he*|*she was*|*were* in the spoken subcorpus of COCA (L3–R3)

Rank	Word	Freq	MI score
1	almost	24	5.40
2	felt	16	5.48
3	looked	11	5.10
4	trying	9	3.16
5	sounded	8	7.90
6	seem	6	4.38
7	treat	5	5.98
8	treated	5	5.76
9	seems	5	4.62
10	reading	4	4.72

The first observation to be made is that nine out of the top ten most frequent collocates are verbs. The second observation is that *felt*, *looked*, *sounded*, *seem*, and *seems* are among typical copular verb forms, an observation suggesting the possibility that the *as-if* clause acts as a subject complement constituent. To examine this hypothesis, we did another collocational search, this time for verbs only and for the left-hand range L1–L3 only. This latter restriction is justifiable considering that if the *as-if* clause acts as a subject complement then it will have to appear after (‘on the right’ of) the copular verb. The results of this search (not shown here) fully confirmed the hypothesis: the number of typical copular verbs increased. Finally, to ascertain that the verbs were indeed used as copular verbs and not otherwise (e.g., as mono-transitive verbs, which is possible in the case of *felt*, *looked*, *sounded*) we inspected concordance lines. Again, the hypothesis was confirmed: in the large majority of cases the verbs in question did act as copular verbs and, hence, the *as-if* clause did act as subject constituent. Given this apparent co-occurrence of copular verbs and *as-if* clauses as subject complement constituent, we decided to code all hits in the sample for the syntactic function the *as-if* clause fulfils in the matrix sentence.

It was found that *as-if* clauses essentially perform two distinct syntactic functions, as a subject complement and as a manner adverbial. The two functions are illustrated in (11) and (12):

- (11) Subject complement:
- a. ... They looked as if it was falling on deaf ears, Dr. Drew. (CNN, 2013)
 - b. ... It was as if I were having a conversation with a person that I both trusted and loved. (CNN_Crossfire, 1990)
 - c. ... I felt as if he was saying goodbye to me ... (CBS_Rather, 2004)
- (12) Manner adverbial:
- a. ... some of the workers touched the steel beam as if it was a coffin. (NBC_Today, 2002)
 - b. ... refused to bring them back, lied about it and then began posing as if she were the mother. (CNN_Grace, 2011)
 - c. ... So the President was behaving as if he was the underdog. (ABC, 2012)

In the examples in (12) the *as-if* clause acts as a manner adverbial in that, as is characteristic of this type of adverbial, it “can be paraphrased by in a ... manner or in a ... way” (Quirk et al. 1985: 557). So, for example, (12a) can be paraphrased as “So the President was behaving in a manner/way similar to an underdog.”

In addition to these two major syntactic categories we also detected a few minor ones. These include uses of the *as-if* clause as an object complement, a metapragmatic comment, a kind of inversed concessive adverbial, as a metalinguistic comment, and as part of a discontinuous modification of an adjective phrase:

- (13) Object complement:
- he wasn't treating him as if he was gay and insulting him as if he was gay.
(MSNBC_Carlson, 2006)
- (14) Concessive adverbial:
- Gene Randall, CNN, Chicago. CATHERINE CRIER, Anchor: Well, as if he wasn't getting enough flak from the Bush camp, Clinton got some lip.
(CNN_Politics, 1992)
- (15) Metapragmatic comment:
- ... the statement where he said he chose to appear – appear, as if it was an appearance.
(CNN_Showbiz, 2009)
- (16) Discontinuous modification of adjective phrase (as-as construction):
- It still is as real as if it was yesterday, and ... (CBS_48Hours, 2008)

As can be seen from Table 4, *as-if* clauses performing these minor syntactic functions were far less frequent than the two major types manner adverbial and subject complement. The hits coded for minor syntactic functions were therefore eliminated from further analysis.

Table 4. Break-up of occurrences of syntactic functions of *as-if* clauses with *was* and, respectively, *were*

Syntactic function	<i>was</i>	%	<i>were</i>	%
Subject Complement	84	51.22	42	27.45
Manner Adverbial	54	32.93	93	60.78
Object Complement	8	4.88	8	5.23
Concessive Adverbial	2	1.22	0	0.00
Metapragmatic Comment	1	0.61	1	0.65
Discontinuous Modification	0	0.00	1	0.65
Unclear	15	9.15	8	5.23
Total	164		153	

The second variable for which we coded the data was Factuality: whether the comparison expressed in the *as-if* clause is factual, near-factual, counterfactual, or absurdly counterfactual. A number of cases could not be determined with sufficient confidence. Those hits were excluded from further analysis. Table 5 shows how the data are distributed across the factuality continuum:

Table 5. Break-up of degrees of factuality of *as-if* clauses with *was* and, respectively, *were*

Factuality	<i>was</i>	%	<i>were</i>	%
Factual	28	17.07	3	1.96
Near-factual	40	24.39	21	13.73
Counterfactual	59	35.98	78	50.98
Absurdly counterfactual	15	9.15	43	28.10
Unclear	22	13.41	8	5.23
Total	164		153	

We see that the bulk of the hits for *was* and *were* alike are classed as ‘counterfactual’, but we also discover that the alternative forms are quite differently weighted across the factuality cline. This becomes obvious when the scores for the extreme values ‘Factual’ and ‘Absurdly counterfactual’ are considered: while the percentage of *as-if* clauses with *was* coded as ‘Factual’ is c. 17%, only 1.96% of *as-if* clauses with *were* are coded ‘Factual’. The inverse relation holds for ‘Absurdly counterfactual’: only 9.15% for *was* but 28.10% for *were*.

Using this data we defined a linear probability model to determine the extent to which the two factors Factuality and Syntactic Function and their potential interaction bear on the choice between indicative *was* and subjunctive *were*. As is standard practice in regression modeling, we began with the maximal model including all factors and their pairwise interaction, then eliminated insignificant

predictors step by step until we arrived at the minimal adequate model that contains only significant predictors.

It turned out that no interaction between Factuality and Syntactic Function survived the elimination process. The minimal adequate model resulted in a very highly significant overall correlation (adjusted R-squared 0.1887, F-statistic: 15.77 on 4 and 250 DF, p-value: $1.602e-11$). Its coefficients are given in Table 6:

Table 6. Coefficients of the linear probability model

	Estimate _{was}	Estimate _{were}	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t)
(Intercept)	0.93493	0.06507	0.08159	11.459	$< 2e-16^{***}$
SyntacticFunction_mannerA	-0.19659	0.26166	0.06094	-3.226	0.00142**
Factuality_near-factual	-0.20921	0.27428	0.10285	-2.034	0.04299*
Factuality_counterfactual	-0.40209	0.46716	0.09530	-4.219	$3.43e-05^{***}$
Factuality_absurdly counterfactual	-0.56200	0.62707	0.10964	-5.126	$5.93e-07^{***}$

Three aspects are key in interpreting the model's coefficients. For each predictor the coefficients are computed for a reference category; in the case of Syntactic Function, the reference category is 'Subject complement'; for Factuality, the reference category is 'Factual'. Second, the coefficients indicating the probability levels are the values listed under 'Estimate'. Third, positive 'Estimate' values indicate increased probability, negative values indicate decreased probability.

Thus, for the predictor Syntactic Function, where the 'Estimate' coefficient for manner adverbial is -0.19659, we see that the form *was* is roughly 20% less probable in *as-if* clauses functioning as manner adverbials than in *as-if* clauses functioning as subject complements. By contrast, *were* is roughly 26% more probable in manner-adverbial *as-if* clauses than in subject-complement *as-if* clauses.

Further, regarding the predictor Factuality we find perfectly complementary probabilities for *was* and *were*. The probabilities for *was* to occur across the factuality continuum continuously *decrease*: compared to factual *as-if* clauses, the indicative form is c. 20% less likely to occur in near-factual ones, c. 40% less likely in counterfactual ones, and finally c. 56% less likely in absurdly counterfactual ones. In other words: the less factual the *as-if* clause, the less probable it is that a speaker will choose indicative *was*. For *were*, conversely, the probabilities continuously *increase* across factuality: again taking the factual level as the baseline, the subjunctive form is c. 27% more likely to occur in near-factual clauses than in factual ones, 47% more likely in counterfactual ones, and 63% more probable in absurdly counterfactual ones. In other words: the less factual the *as-if* clause, the more likely speakers will choose *were*.

3. Discussion

We investigated the *was/were* alternation in *as-if* clauses in COCA using a linear probability model. The model was built on the hypothesis that the alternation is influenced by two factors: Factuality and Syntactic Function. The model confirmed the hypothesis: both factors significantly predict the choices. The adjusted R-squared value of 0.1887 though was low, suggesting that the model is far from perfect: too much variance is still left unexplained. This underscores the pilot character of the present study. As noted, we did not include in the model hits for which the codes could not be assigned confidently. We also excluded from the model some minor syntactic functions. The model could possibly be improved if these variables are taken into account. However, this will only make sense if a larger sample is available where even very small categories are represented in sufficient numbers. A larger sample could also potentially highlight other factors driving the choice that have so far remained hidden. For all its limitations though, the present model is a reasonable starting point. Its main strengths are the following.

The results indicate that the choice of indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* is a multifactorial choice. We have identified two contributing factors. The first factor is the syntagmatic association between *was* and the subject complement function of the hosting *as-if* clause on the one hand and the association between *were* and the manner adverbial function on the other hand. This is no doubt a complex association. If it qualifies as colligation, it will certainly not represent a typical one. Typical colligations are frequent co-occurrences of a word/phrase and/in a grammatical function. In the case of the *was/were* alternation, the verbs *was* and *were* are embedded in the *as-if* clause, and consequently, the association does not directly hold between the verb and the syntactic function as either subject complement or manner adverbial but holds only indirectly via intermediation by the clause as the host structure. So rather than two elements in frequent co-occurrence we have three elements (the verb form, the clause, and the syntactic function) and, to compound matters, the three elements are not all discrete elements but the first two, verb and clause, are stacked into one another, with the verb being an element within the clause. Despite these intricacies, it seems clear that the association is a syntagmatic one ultimately obeying the idiom principle: if the *as-if* clause is selected in subject complement function, it is likely that the indicative form is co-selected within the clause; if the *as-if* clause is selected in manner adverbial function, it is likely that the subjunctive form is co-selected within it.

Second, the results suggest that the *was/were* choice is co-determined by the factuality of the comparison expressed in the *as-if* clause. Factuality, we noted, is a graded phenomenon, with some comparisons compatible with fact, some just close to but distinct from fact, others clearly distinct from fact, and again others

utterly at odds with fact. The data showed that both verb forms are, in principle, possible with all four degrees of factuality. However, the model very strongly suggested that indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* differ with regard to the probability of co-occurrence with each of the four levels of factuality: *was* was predicted to co-occur with much greater probability with the levels closer to the factual end whereas *were* was predicted to co-occur with greater probability with levels closer to the ‘absurdly counterfactual’ end. The different ‘weights’ of the two verbs on the factuality continuum are shown in Figure 2:




Figure 2. Factuality lines for *as-if* clauses with *was* and *were* compared; left panel: histogram with density curve for *was*; middle panel: histogram with density curve for *were*; right panel: density curves are overplotted, also shown are the means

The histogram in the left panel shows the density curve for *was* across the four degrees of factuality; the curve peaks right between the near-factual and the counterfactual levels. The middle panel represents the density curve for *were* across the four levels; here, the peak is farther toward the opposite end of the continuum, at the counterfactual level. In the right panel the two density curves are overplotted to make them more easily comparable. The panel also shows the means (depicted in the dotted lines), which represent the central tendencies in the distributions: clearly, the central tendencies are differently located vis-à-vis the continuum, with the curve and the mean for *was* leaning more toward the factual end of the continuum and the curve and the mean for *were* moving farther away from the factual end.

So, the indicative form has a tendency to occur in *as-if* clauses closer to fact, whereas the subjunctive form tends to occur in *as-if* clauses farther removed from fact. Is this evidence to argue that the *was/were* choice is a case of empathetic deixis? It appears that the case can be tentatively made. Key to empathetic deixis is the notion of the deictic center. A typical empathetic choice is one where the speaker manipulates his/her proximity to that center, by indexing a reference as located farther away from, or closer toward, the center. In the case of the *was/were* alternation in *as-if* clauses it seems that this proximity variation is at work too: the use of *was* indexes closer proximity to the factualness of the comparison in the *as-if* clause, whereas selecting *were* indexes reduced proximity. In other words, while *was* is an indexical 'pointing to' the speaker's relative lack of commitment, *were* points out the speaker's utter non-commitment to the factualness of the comparison. It may thus represent a case of negative empathetic deixis.

4. Conclusions

This case study demonstrates the benefits of employing to the study of pragmatic phenomena a corpus pragmatic approach that integrates core methodologies of either discipline: the horizontal reading methodology typical of pragmatic analysis and the vertical reading methodology typical of corpus-linguistic analysis. Motivated by the observation that speakers routinely utilize both indicative *was* and subjunctive *were* in *as-if* clauses, applying this integrated methodology to corpus data yielded interesting insights. In particular, the findings presented seem to suggest that contrary to mainstream thinking in corpus linguistics, which prioritizes text-internal processes in the said over speaker/hearer-internal and -interactional processes in the unsaid, and contrary to mainstream pragmatics doctrine, which prioritizes speaker/hearer-internal and -interactional processes over text-based processes, the two worlds actually converge. In other words: linguistic choices may be due, not *either* to idiomatic patterning *or* speaker/hearer meaning, but to

both at the same time. This convergence of influences is what the *was/were* alternation in *as-if* clauses suggests (cf. also Adolphs' [2008] analysis of indirect speech acts which also finds a similar interaction of idiomatic patterning and speech act interpretation).

Obviously, our study represents a tentative first step and will certainly require further research in order to interrogate the results presented in more detail. In prioritizing depth over breadth, as the nature of the research question required, we have analysed a limited dataset, limited in terms of the size of sample collected (small), the type of speech examined (unscripted TV shows) and the variety targeted (AmE). Further research might compare larger samples and focus on private, spontaneous spoken data in other corpora of English such as the *International Corpus of English* suite or the *British National Corpus*. However, while we recognise and acknowledge these caveats, we argue for the corpus pragmatic approach. Corpus pragmatics, when harnessed with rigour, has the potential to offer new insights into both pragmatic and syntagmatic processes and the way the two come together in actual linguistic choice.

References

- Adolphs, Svenja. 2008. *Corpus and Context*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/scl.30
- Aijmer, Karin. 1996. *Conversational Routines in English: Convention and Creativity*. London: Longman.
- Aijmer, Karin. 2013. *Understanding Pragmatic Markers: A Variational-Pragmatic Approach*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Aijmer, Karin, and Christoph Rühlemann (eds). 2015. *Corpus Pragmatics. A Handbook*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139057493
- Amador-Moreno, Carolina, and Kevin McCafferty. 2015. "Sure this is a great country for drink and rowing at elections': Discourse Markers in the *Corpus of Irish English Correspondence, 1750–1940*." In *Pragmatic Markers in Irish English*, ed. by Carolina Amador-Moreno, Kevin McCafferty, and Elaine Vaughan, 270–291. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.258.12ama
- Archer, Dawn, and Jonathan Culpeper. 2003. "Sociopragmatic Annotation: New Directions and Possibilities in Historical Corpus Linguistics." In *Corpus Linguistics by the Lune: A Festschrift for Geoffrey Leech*, ed. by Andrew Wilson, Paul Rayson, and Anthony McEnery, 37–58. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
- Baayen, Harald. 2008. *Analyzing Linguistic Data: A Practical Introduction to Statistics using R*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511801686
- Baker, Paul. 2006. *Using Corpora in Discourse Analysis*. London: Continuum.
- Barron, Anne. 2015. "'And your wedding is the twenty-second <.> of June is it?': Tag Questions in Irish English." In *Pragmatic Markers in Irish English*, ed. by Carolina Amador-Moreno, Kevin McCafferty, and Elaine Vaughan, 203–228. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.258.09bar

- Bernaisch, Tobias, Stefan Th. Gries, and Joybrato Mukherjee. 2014. "The Dative Alternation in South Asian English(es): Modelling Predictors and Predicting Prototypes." *English World-Wide* 35 (1): 7–31. doi:10.1075/eww.35.1.02ber
- Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, and Edward Finegan. 1999. *Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English*. London: Longman.
- Caffi, Claudia, and Richard Janney. 1994. "Toward a Pragmatics of Emotive Communication." *Journal of Pragmatics* 22 (3–4): 325–373. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(94)90115-5
- Carter, Ronald, and Michael McCarthy. 2006. *Cambridge Grammar of English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clancy, Brian. 2015. "Hurry up baby son all the boys is finished their breakfast: Examining the Use of Vocatives as Pragmatic Markers in Irish Traveller and Settled Family Discourse." In *Pragmatic Markers in Irish English*, ed. by Carolina Amador-Moreno, Kevin McCafferty, and Elaine Vaughan, 229–247. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.258.10cla
- Clancy, Brian. 2016. *Investigating Intimate Discourse: Exploring the Spoken Interaction of Families, Couples and Friends*. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315672113
- Clancy, Brian, and Michael McCarthy. 2015. "Co-constructed Turn-taking." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 430–453. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.023
- Clancy, Brian, and Anne O'Keeffe. 2015. "Pragmatics." In *The Cambridge Handbook of Corpus Linguistics*, ed. by Douglas Biber, and Randi Reppen, 235–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139764377.014
- Davies, Bethan. 2007. "Grice's Cooperative Principle: Meaning and Rationality." *Journal of Pragmatics* 39 (12): 2308–2331. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.09.002
- Davies, Mark. 2008. The Corpus of Contemporary American English: 520 Million Words, 1990–Present. Available online at <http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/> (date accessed 01/07/2016).
- Francis, W. Nelson, and Henry Kučera. 1964. *A Standard Corpus of Present-Day Edited American English, for Use with Digital Computers*. Providence, RI: Department of Linguistics, Brown University.
- Fung, Loretta, and Ronald Carter. 2007. "Discourse Markers and Spoken English: Native and Learner use in Pedagogic Settings." *Applied Linguistics* 28 (3): 410–439. doi:10.1093/applin/amm030
- Garcia McAllister, Paula. 2015. "Speech Acts: A Synchronic Perspective." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 29–51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.003
- Gries, Stefan Th. 2009. *Statistics for Linguistics with R: A Practical Introduction*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110216042
- Gries, Stefan Th., and Stefanie Wulff. 2013. "The Genitive Alternation in Chinese and German ESL Learners: Towards a Multifactorial Notion of Context in Learner Corpus Research." *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics* 18 (3): 327–356. doi:10.1075/ijcl.18.3.04gri
- Halliday, Michael, and Christian Matthiessen. 2004. *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (3rd ed.). London: Edward Arnold. doi:10.4324/9780203783771
- Heritage, John. 2015. "Well-Prefaced Turns in English Conversation: A Conversation Analytic Perspective." *Journal of Pragmatics* 88 (1): 88–104. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.08.008
- Hoey, Michael. 2005. *Lexical Priming: A New Theory of Words and Language*. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/978020327630
- Jucker, Andreas, and Irma Taavitsainen. 2000. "Diachronic Speech Act Analysis: Insults from Flying to Flaming." *Journal of Historical Pragmatics* 1 (1): 67–95. doi:10.1075/jhp.1.1.07juc

- Jucker, Andreas, and Irma Taavitsainen. 2008. "Apologies in the History of English. Routinised and Lexicalised Expressions of Responsibility and Regret." In *Speech Acts in the History of English*, ed. by Andreas Jucker, and Irma Taavitsainen, 229–244. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.176.12juc
- Jucker, Andreas, Gerold Schneider, Irma Taavitsainen, and Barb Breustedt. 2008. "Fishing for Compliments: Precision and Recall in Corpus-Linguistic Compliment Research." In *Speech Acts in the History of English*, ed. by Andreas Jucker, and Irma Taavitsainen, 273–294. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.176.15juc
- Kallen, Jeffrey, and John Kirk. 2008. *ICE-Ireland: A User's Guide*. Belfast: Cló Ollscoil na Banríona.
- Kallen, Jeffrey, and John Kirk. 2012. *SPICE-Ireland: A User's Guide*. Belfast: Cló Ollscoil na Banríona.
- Kereckes, Julie. 2007. "The Co-construction of a Gatekeeping Encounter: An Inventory of Verbal Actions." *Journal of Pragmatics* 39 (11): 1942–1973. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2007.07.008
- Kohnen, Thomas. 2008. "Tracing Directives through Text and Time. Towards a Methodology of a Corpus-based Diachronic Speech Act Analysis." In *Speech Acts in the History of English*, ed. by Andreas Jucker, and Irma Taavitsainen, 295–310. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.176.16koh
- Kohnen, Thomas. 2015. "Speech Acts: A Diachronic Perspective." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 52–83. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.004
- Lakoff, Robin. 1974. "Remarks on 'This' and 'That'." In *Proceedings of the Chicago Linguistics Society* 10: 345–356.
- Leech, Geoffrey, Marianne Hundt, Christian Mair, and Nicholas Smith. 2009. *Change in Contemporary English. A Grammatical Study*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09780511642210
- Levinson, Steven. 2004. "Deixis." In *The Handbook of Pragmatics*, ed. by Laurence R. Horn, and Gregory Ward, 97–121. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9780470756959.ch5
- Lindblom, Kenneth. 2001. "Co-operating with Grice: A Cross-disciplinary Metaperspective on Uses of Grice's Cooperative Principle." *Journal of Pragmatics* 33 (10): 1601–1623. doi:10.1016/s0378-2166(00)00069-2
- Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics. Volumes I and II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- McCarthy, Michael, and Anne O'Keeffe. 2010. "Historical Perspective: What are Corpora and How have they Evolved?" In *The Routledge Handbook of Corpus Linguistics*, ed. by Anne O'Keeffe, and Michael McCarthy, 3–13. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203856949.ch1
- Mey, Jacob. 2001. *Pragmatics: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Mindt, Dieter. 2000. *An Empirical Grammar of the English Verb System*. Berlin: Cornelsen.
- Millar, Sharon. 2015. "Blathering Beauties: The use of Pragmatic Markers in an Irish Beauty Blog." In *Pragmatic Markers in Irish English*, ed. by Carolina Amador-Moreno, Kevin McCafferty, and Elaine Vaughan, 292–317. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.258.13mil
- Norrick, Neal R. 2015. "Interjections." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 249–273. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.013
- O'Keeffe, Anne, Brian Clancy, and Svenja Adolphs. 2011. *Introducing Pragmatics in Use*. London: Longman. doi:10.4324/9780203830949
- Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech and Jan Svartvik. 1985. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language*. Harlow: Longman.

- Romero-Trillo, Jesús (ed.). 2008. *Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics: A Mutualistic Entente*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110199024
- Rühlemann, Christoph. 2007. *Conversation in Context: A Corpus-driven Approach*. London: Continuum.
- Rühlemann, Christoph. 2010. "What Can a Corpus Tell us about Pragmatics?" In *The Routledge Handbook of Corpus Linguistics*, ed. by Anne O'Keeffe, and Michael McCarthy, 288–301. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203856949.ch21
- Rühlemann, Christoph, and Karin Aijmer. 2015. "Corpus Pragmatics: Laying the Foundations." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer and Christoph Rühlemann, 1–26. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.001
- Rühlemann, Christoph, and Stefan Th. Gries. 2015. "Turn Order and Turn Distribution in Multi-party Storytelling." *Journal of Pragmatics* 87: 171–191. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.08.003
- Rühlemann, Christoph, and Matthew Brook O'Donnell. 2012. "Introducing a Corpus of Conversational Stories. Construction and Annotation of the *Narrative Corpus*." *Corpus Linguistics and Linguistic Theory* 8 (2): 313–350. doi:10.1515/cllt-2012-0015
- Rühlemann, Christoph, and Matthew Brook O'Donnell. 2015. "Deixis." In *Corpus Pragmatics: A Handbook*, ed. by Karin Aijmer, and Christoph Rühlemann, 331–359. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09781139057493.018
- Schauer, Gila, and Svenja Adolphs. 2006. "Expressions of Gratitude in Corpus and DCT Data: Vocabulary, Formulaic Sequences and Pedagogy." *System* 34 (1): 119–134. doi:10.1016/j.system.2005.09.003
- Schneider, Klaus. 2012. "Appropriate Behavior across Varieties of English." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44 (9): 1022–1037. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2011.09.015
- Sinclair, John M. 1991. *Corpus, Concordance, Collocation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sinclair, John M. 2001. "Preface." In *Small Corpus Studies and ELT: Theory and Practice*, ed. by Moshen Ghadessy, Alex Henry, and Robert Roseberry, vii–v xv. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/scl.5.01sin
- Stivers, Tanya. 2007. "Alternative Recognitionals in Initial References to Persons." In *Person Reference in Interaction: Linguistic, Cultural, and Social Perspectives*, ed. by Nick J. Enfield, and Tanya Stivers, 73–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cb09780511486746.005
- Stivers, Tanya. 2015. "Coding Social Interaction: A Heretical Approach in Conversation Analysis." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 48 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/08351813.2015.993837
- Tao, Hongyin. 2003. "Turn Initiators in Spoken English: A Corpus-based Approach to Interaction and Grammar." In *Corpus Analysis: Language Structure and Language Use*, ed. by Pepi Leistyna, and Charles Meyer, 187–208. Amsterdam: Rodopi. doi:10.1163/9789004334410_011
- Vaughan, Elaine, and Brian Clancy. 2013. "Small Corpora and Pragmatics." *The Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics* 1: 53–73. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6250-3_4

The interface between pragmatics and internet-mediated communication

Applications, extensions and adjustments

Francisco Yus

University of Alicante, Spain

The aim of this chapter is to apply pragmatics to internet-mediated communication. On paper, two broad and apparently incompatible premises constitute the foundation of these distinct applications: (1) internet-mediated communication “makes no difference” for a pragmatic analysis (we do not have specific cognitive mechanisms to interpret online discourses that differ from the ones used offline); and (2) internet “makes all the difference” (the inferential gap-filling made by internet users, intended to turn online texts into valid interpretations, is influenced by the interfaces used for interactions and the range of contextual support that users can access in the interpretation of these online discourses). This chapter will review pragmatic analyses of internet-mediated communication with an emphasis on a cyberpragmatic framework (Yus 2011a).

Keywords: pragmatics, cyberpragmatics, contextual constraint, non-propositional effect, internet-mediated communication

1. Introduction: Pragmatics

Levinson (1983), in his famous chapter devoted to finding a definition for pragmatics, concluded that this theoretical perspective is too heterogeneous to be brought under a single umbrella definition. Nowadays, most analysts within pragmatics at least agree that the importance of analysing context unifies most theoretical perspectives within pragmatics (see the chapter by Anita Fetzer, in this volume). For example, Fetzer and Oishi (2011: 1) stress that “pragmatics is fundamentally concerned with communicative action and its felicity in context,” and Fetzer (2011: 25) further underlines that “the pragmatic-perspective paradigm provides a general cognitive, social and cultural perspective on linguistic phenomena in relation to their usage in forms of behaviour, accounting for the dynamics of language and

language use, as is reflected in the premises that meaning is not a product and given but rather dynamic, multifaceted and negotiated in context.” However, the scopes of analysis differ enormously across disciplines.

Beyond the acknowledgement of the importance of context in human communication, pragmatics has evolved into a diversified approach to language and, inevitably, to an array of branches or schools that somehow give the impression of a certain lack of homogeneity within this linguistic paradigm. For the purposes of this chapter on pragmatics and internet-mediated communication, though, pragmatics will be treated as a unified research trend in its interest in context and in the role that it plays in (un)successful communication on the net. The underlying premise will be that what is coded in communication (words, gestures, etc.) highly *underdetermine* the speaker’s or writer’s intended interpretation. In other words, there is a more or less significant informational gap between what people say (or write or type) and what they intend to communicate (and what is eventually interpreted). As has been claimed within cognitive pragmatics and especially relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), communication entails (a bit of) *coding* (whose literal meaning would be studied by semantics) and (a great deal of) *inferring* (with the aid of contextualisation), which is the main scope of pragmatic research. This is a typically *radical contextualist* position, according to which “in order for the semantic content of a sentence to express a full-blown proposition, or in any case the proposition meant by the utterer, it has to undergo a number of processes of enrichment, expansion, specification or modulation” (Belleri 2014: 83).

Needless to say, not all authors agree on this radical distinction between coding/inferring (and semantics/pragmatics). And the same applies to the differentiation among pragmatic disciplines. An example is Herring (2004); she lists five discourse analysis paradigms: (a) *text analysis* (identification of structural regularities in texts); (b) *conversation analysis* (analysis of the mechanics of interaction); (c) *pragmatics* (interpretation of speaker’s intentions); (d) *interactional sociolinguistics* (socio-cultural meanings indexed through interaction); and (e) *critical discourse analysis* (meaning and structure related to ideology and power). By contrast, my own conceptualisation is different, discourse analysis being just one of the branches of pragmatics, which would be the superordinate, umbrella term for all the disciplines. Text analysis (a), if carried out within a de-contextualised approach, would not be part of pragmatics, but semantics. The other disciplines (b), (d), and (e) are also branches of pragmatics, and all of them would share an interest in analysing the role of context in communication, either with a more text-centred role (e.g. its role in utterance comprehension) or with a wider social or interactive role (e.g. context made up of social meanings shared and enacted through conversations).

The analysis carried out in this chapter will take pragmatics as the broad label for this linguistic discipline, which contains a number of sub-disciplines linked to

one another through an interest in the importance and the role of contextualisation in communication. The next Section outlines general issues of a pragmatics of internet-mediated communication and the alterations (or adjustments) that this virtual medium generates (or demands) when trying to apply the research carried out in physical contexts to situations in which there is a lack of physical co-presence and communication is typically text-based and hence cues-filtered. Section 3 is devoted to my proposal of adding the terms *non-intended non-propositional effect* and *contextual constraint* to the inherent *propositional* object of research in pragmatics. These terms are interesting because they shed light on why certain kinds of internet-mediated communication are fruitful despite being apparently useless or irrelevant, among other possibilities. They also entail the incorporation of other disciplines to the overall proposition-centred pragmatic research. Finally, Section 4 contains a proposal of a layer-arranged pragmatic analysis of internet-mediated communication: constraints, discourse, conversation, audience, collectivity and non-propositional effects. The chapter ends with a few concluding remarks.

2. Pragmatics of internet-mediated communication

When applying pragmatics to internet-mediated communication, the analyst is faced with two apparently contradictory statements. On the one hand, *internet makes no difference*, in the sense that in this virtual environment users also interpret other users' utterances with the aid of context, engage in (a)synchronous conversations, store, update and reproduce social meanings via interactions, etc. Therefore, applications of the different pragmatic disciplines to this virtual environment are straightforward. However, on the other hand *internet makes all the difference*, since virtual communication often takes place in a cues-filtered environment, typically text-based (even nowadays), and with fewer options and resources for contextualisation (e.g. lack of nonverbal communication, of physical co-presence, etc.). At the same time, internet-mediated communication shatters traditional genre configurations and defies deterministic positions regarding its limitations compared to communication in physical contexts. According to Herring et al. (2013b), the net enables new kinds of participation, of fragmentation, new ways of co-constructing meaning that transcend traditional notions of conversation, narrative, exposition, and so forth.

In this sense, a challenge that analysts face when applying pragmatics to internet communication is that the prototypical interaction, namely an individual who intends to communicate some propositional information to another individual through some coded content (a one-to-one schema typically used in cognitive pragmatics and specifically relevance theory) is altered or blurred in this virtual medium. As was commented upon in Yus (2015a), communication on the net frequently

entails a radical reinterpretation of this traditional communication schema. This reinterpretation will suit some users (eager for more dynamic forms of interaction, who like to be participants in the act of communication and take full responsibility for making interpretive or plot decisions) while discouraging others (who prefer a more traditional and guided way of interpreting discourses). Nowadays, with the rise and ubiquity of the internet, what we rather have is: [1] new authors/speakers (e.g. collective co-creation, hybridisation of reader-writers, etc.); [2] ...who produce new forms of text (audio-visual, multimodal narratives, link-mediated choices for the flow of discourse, etc.); [3] ...through new interfaces (new verbal-visual designs, multimodality, interfaces aiming at usability); [4] ...directed at a new kind of hearer or reader (active, dynamic, often contributing to the authorship of the text); [5] ... who comes up with a typology of interpretations (the author's intended interpretation – if any – is often diluted and the choice of interpretations ends up being mainly the addressee's responsibility).

Besides, from the cyberpragmatic point of view rooted in relevance theory (Yus 2010, 2011a, 2013), it has been claimed that the characteristics of the different interfaces for internet communication (chatrooms, mobile instant messaging, e-mail, social networking sites, etc.) affect the quality and quantity of contextual information accessed by users, the mental effort devoted to interpretation, and the choice of an interpretation. Hence, what we can label the medium's *material qualities* (basically its position on the verbal-visual and oral-written scales in terms of options for contextualisation, but also its level of usability) will have an impact on the eventual choice of an interpretation and its quality (Yus 2013). Consequently, we can arrange all internet media in a *scale of contextualisation*, ranging from plain text-based communication to context-saturated video-mediated interactions. On paper, an application of pragmatics to these internet media initially yields two research issues with surprising outcomes:

1. The lack of contextual richness on the text-based end of this scale should lead to dissatisfaction both in producers (due to the effort needed to compensate textually for the lack of orality in their messages) and receivers (due to the potential for misunderstandings and dissatisfaction with the need to make up for the lack of options for contextualisation). A whole array of theories, grouped together under the generic label of *theories of information richness* in Yus (2007), claim that this loss in contextualisation and depth of available information may be critical for the declining quality of interactions on the net, leading to dissatisfaction and eventually to unwillingness to engage in online interactions. Among others, we can briefly list the following: (a) *Media Richness Theory* (Daft and Lengel 1984): the media discourses may be arranged in a continuum of informational richness,

the net being rather low in richness.¹ (b) *Social Presence Theory* (Byrne 1994): interlocutors need to be aware that they are mutually involved in the conversation, a feeling that decreases – leading even to a total lack of interest in the conversation – when the contextual information available to both interlocutors is reduced due to the qualities of the channel. And (c) *Reduced Social Context Cues Theory* (Sproull and Kiesler 1986): by reducing contextual cues, users tend more to display anonymity and de-personalisation and less to emphasise social aspects of interaction. De-personalisation weakens the value of social norms, and the lack of communicative fulfilment due to the aforementioned reduction of contextual cues makes users frustrated and uninhibited. By contrast, lack of cues has also been valued for levelling power relationships and allowing shy users to express their thoughts without the burden of the impact of their physical presence.

However, users consistently contradict the claims of these theories of information richness. Indeed, users choose their most convenient medium (e.g. *WhatsApp*), not the best in information richness (e.g. video-enabled phone calls), and draw from whatever resources available to make the most of their options for contextualisation, even if communication is text-based, as has been claimed by the *Hyperpersonal Communication Theory* (Walther 1996). Surprisingly, users often prefer text-based interactions (e.g. typed mobile instant messaging) despite the existence of more context-saturated options (e.g. phoning from the very same device which they are using for texting). A recent *meme* that spread across social networking sites stated the following: “First SMS, then came WhatsApp, now you record an audio file, and your friend records a reply. If they continue like this, they will end up inventing the telephone” (my translation).² The underlying piece of criticism points toward why users do not use a rich medium such as a phone call and, instead, prefer limited communicative options such as the audio file (whose conversations are mainly successions of messages, rather than a true synchronous interaction) or the typed text plus emoji on *WhatsApp*. The answer (and the challenge for pragmatics) lies in the fact that these limited forms of internet-mediated communication generate rewards in the form of non-propositional effects that compensate for their limitations and the effort devoted to using them. Text-based interactions may be limited in contextualisation, but they offer users compensations such as freedom from imposition on the interlocutor, time to plan the message, lack of exuded information on the user’s physical appearance, etc. This is why a proposition-centred pragmatics has

1. Four factors are proposed in order to determine the information richness of a medium: (1) the capacity of the medium to transmit multiple contextual cues; (2) immediacy of feedback; (3) use (or lack of use) of natural language; and (4) option for personalisation or lack of it.

2. Original in Spanish: “Primero el SMS, después vino el WhatsApp, ahora grabas un mensaje de voz y tu amigo te graba la respuesta. Si siguen así van a inventar el teléfono.”

to be complemented with the role that non-propositional effects play in eventual (dis)satisfaction with the online act of communication (see next section).

2. In the last few years an evolution has been detected from a time when the value of interactions on the net arose from the relevance of the propositional content transmitted, whereas now we are facing a time of non-stop phatic connections among users, in which the intrinsic value of the content exchanged is null, that content being simply an excuse for permanent connection. As Miller (2008: 398) correctly remarks, we are currently witnessing “a shift from dialogue and communication between actors in a network, where the point of the network was to facilitate an exchange of substantive content, to a situation where the maintenance of a network itself has become the primary focus.” That is, communication has been devoid of interest in informational content, which has become subordinated to sustaining networks and non-stop connected presence. This has resulted in a rise of what Miller (*ibid.*) calls *phatic internet*. Surprisingly, this kind of apparently useless information raises a lot of interest in users, who devote many hours on a daily basis to this kind of phatic connection. In this sense, pragmatics has traditionally focussed on the interface between the coding and inferring of propositional content, exhibiting some reluctance to address phatic effects or the importance of feelings and emotions influencing eventual interpretations. The proposal of the term *non-intended non-propositional effect* (next Section) aims to make up for this increasing importance that (apparently) utterly useless content generates in internet users.

3. Beyond discourse comprehension: Non-intended non-propositional effects and contextual constraints

Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), a cognitive pragmatics theory, claims that all the stimuli that humans pay attention to (e.g. utterances, gestures, but also elements of the surrounding environment, etc.) are selected due to their potential interest, while many others are discarded due to their irrelevance. This general cognitive trait is covered by the *cognitive principle of relevance*: “Human beings are geared to the maximization of relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 261). However, this theory is more interested in narrowing down this broad cognitive trait to the specificity of verbal communication. In this case, and included in the aforementioned *cognitive principle*, there is another communication-centred principle, the *communicative principle of relevance*: “Every act of ostensive communication conveys the presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158). This presumption sets inferential strategies in motion in order to turn the schematic meaning of the words uttered by the speaker into a contextualised and meaningful proposition matching the intended interpretation.

This evolved cognitive ability also applies to internet-mediated communication, in which users also pay attention to potentially relevant stimuli (an entry on Facebook, a tweet on someone's account, a WhatsApp message flashing on our mobile phone screen, etc.). However, the underlying assumption in these principles is that the information *itself* is relevant enough to be worth the hearer's interpretive activity. This claim clashes with today's tendency (especially in internet communication) to find relevance not in the objective value of the information transferred to other users, but in the effects that using this information -even if its propositional content has no objective value- produces on these users, as has already been mentioned in passing. In other words, nowadays we witness a huge amount of internet-mediated exchanges whose interest does not lie in the content communicated, but in what the act of communication *as a whole* generates in users, producing an offset of non-propositional effects that compensate for the lack of relevance that the content objectively possesses. Internet interactions are filled with (apparently) irrelevant utterances if we analyse them from a purely informative point of view, but they do provide relevance in foregrounding or generating non-propositional assumptions such as awareness of co-presence inside the group or network of friends who are synchronously inter-connected, as well as relevance in the mutual manifestness of being acknowledged in the conversation, even if not actively participating. In mobile instant messaging conversations, for instance, "there is an interest in demonstrating that the user is part of the interaction, part of the collectivity, and very often, underlying the posting of photos, videos and recorded audios, there is a covert need to feel noticed and acknowledged by friends or collectivities" (Yus 2016c, 2017).

As a consequence of the specificity of internet-mediated communication, in previous research an extension of cyberpragmatic research (and, in parallel, of relevance-theoretic research) has been proposed by adding an element that plays a part in the eventual relevance of internet-mediated communication, but which is not tied to the relevance of the content being communicated (Yus 2011b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016c), namely *non-intended non-propositional effect*, which refers to feelings, emotions, impressions, etc. which are not overtly intended, but are generated from the act of communication, and add (positively and negatively) to the interest derived from utterance interpretation or have an impact on the mental effort required for processing the utterance.³

Besides, internet communication is affected by a number of interface-related and user-related qualities that may also alter the eventual estimation of the relevance

3. Needless to say, these effects occur not only in internet-mediated communication, but in any kind of communication (see for instance Cornelia Ilie's chapter in this volume on the pragmatics-rhetoric interface). However, the effects may be more substantial in internet-mediated communication.

of the act of communication. These are mainly related to the users' management of the interface, the kind of relationship existing between interlocutors, the user's personality, etc. They affect the eventual (un)successful outcome of internet-mediated communication. In this sense, the following term was also proposed in previous research: *contextual constraint*, defined as "aspects that *underlie* or *frame* communication and interaction (i.e. they exist prior to the interpretive activity) and constrain its eventual (un)successful outcome" (Yus 2016c: 21, see also Yus 2017).

This pair of terms allows us to explain why some users spend hours exchanging utterly useless messages, why some users feel frustrated upon finding it extremely difficult to manage an interface in order to achieve their communicative goals, etc. In a sense, these added elements operate at a different level from proposition-centred interpretations (explicit, implicated, etc.). The latter are constrained by the *communicative principle of relevance* and the expectation of informative reward. By contrast, these new terms are instead constrained by the *cognitive principle of relevance*, since they cover aspects not directly tied to the content of what is exchanged on the net, but nevertheless alter the estimation and eventual relevance of the act of communication as a whole.

The proposal of adding these elements to the normal formula for the interpretive procedure within cognitive pragmatics also entails a broadening of research and a cross-breeding of disciplines, since now several conclusions obtained from sociology, anthropology, computer science, etc. may also have to be taken into consideration insofar as they shed light on why messages exchanged on the internet achieve relevance and eventual user satisfaction beyond discourse interpretation (more on constrains and non-intended non-propositional effects in Sections 4.1 and 4.6, respectively).

4. Layers of pragmatic analysis of internet-mediated communication

4.1 Layer 1: User and contextual constraints

Communication on the net is constrained by a number of factors that influence the eventual (un)successful outcome of the act of communication. They *frame*, as it were, communication and have an impact not only on the quality of interpretation, but also on the willingness to engage in sustained virtual interactions. Constraints exist in every act of communication.⁴ They exist prior to the interaction and hence should not be an inherent object of pragmatic research, but their role in

4. For example, in Yus (2016b) a number of contextual constraints were listed that play a part in why humorous communication (e.g. jokes) ends up (un)successful, including the suitability of the humorous text in the context of the interaction, the hearer's background knowledge and




Figure 1. Contextual constraints and non-intended non-propositional effects in internet communication

the outcome of communication makes their analysis relevant to determining why communication on the internet is satisfactory or fruitless.

As can be seen in Figure 1, both contextual constraints and non-intended non-propositional effects (see 4.6 below) may be divided into those related to the use of an interface (*user-to-system communication*) and those related to the exchange of information among users (*user-to-user communication*). Among the former, we can list (a) “affordances” of the sites for virtual interactions (the design and options provided, for instance, by Facebook, constrain the kind of interactions that are possible therein;⁵) (b) familiarity with the interface (effort or lack of effort when using the links, frames, etc.); expertise in using web-mediated discourses (mastery of oralisation, combinations of text and image, editing and upgrading sites, etc.); (c) web page usability (good arrangement of text and image, good structure of links, which allows for accessing content without unnecessary effort); (d) reasons for surfing the net (work, leisure, looking for a specific item of information or

beliefs, the interlocutor’s sex, the interlocutor’s sense of humour, and the relationship holding between interlocutors. On humour, see also the chapter by Nancy Bell in this book.

5. Eisenlauer (2014: 74) writes about *material substratum* of the different internet interfaces, which enables or constrains textual practices and social interactions. Needless to say, these *affordances* are constantly evolving, with new capabilities being introduced every now and then as happened, for example, with the messaging option within Facebook.

using the web to kill time); and (e) presence/absence of effort-increasing elements on the interface (pop-up advertisements, density of content on the site, problems with bandwidth, etc.).

Concerning user-to-user communication, the following contextual constraints are worth mentioning: (a) degree of mutual knowledge existing between interlocutors (enhancement of shared information entails increased solidarity and feelings of connectedness prior to communication); (b) known addressee vs. anonymous addressee and casual conversation vs. topic-focussed conversations (different types of discourse and communicative strategies depending on the type of interaction and the interlocutor); (c) familiarity with topics, jargons, expected background knowledge (assumed background knowledge of topics, jargons, etc. works as barrier of in-group discursive specificity, see 4.5 below); (d) reason for the act of communication (casual chat, formal piece of communication, getting information on a topic, etc. entail different expectations in the interaction); and (e) personal traits, personality and sociality (one's personal and social qualities influence eventual quantity and quality of use of internet-enabled interactions).

Next in Figure 1, both constraints and non-propositional effects may be associated with the *sender user* or with the *addressee user*, thus introducing further elements that might play a part in eventual (un)successful interactions on the net. And finally, the user may or may not be aware of the existence of these constraints and effects, even if they still play a part in the eventual quality of virtual acts of communication. For example, a narcissist personality is a constraint that influences the users' active uploading of discourse on a profile, and also a non-propositional effect if, as a result of intense interactions and comments from peers, the users strengthen this narcissist personality. But the users themselves may not be fully aware of the existence of this constraint and this effect.

As can be deduced from these listed contextual constraints, these variables that frame interactions on the net are important for a thorough pragmatic analysis of internet-mediated communication but, at the same time, entail an extension beyond pragmatics and into other disciplines such as computer science (for interface-related constraints, for instance), sociology, anthropology or psychology in the analysis of personal and social attributes of the interlocutors that affect the production and comprehension of discourses on the net.

4.2 Layer 2: User to user by means of discourse

Pragmatics is "the study of how more gets communicated than is said" (Yule 1996: 3). As such, it conceptualises discourse as open to multiple possible interpretations in a context. In other words, what speakers (or users) code is more or less different from what is meant with the discourse produced. In general, addressees undergo

a chunk-by-chunk processing of the utterances in a linear way, extracting explicit interpretations and (if any) implicatures with the aid of context, and the processing of previous stretches of discourse becomes a preliminary context upon which subsequent parts of the discourse are interpreted. There should be little difference in how internet users accomplish this interpretive procedure compared to listeners in physical contexts (but see below); and disciplines such as *computer-mediated discourse analysis* or *digital discourse analysis* cover similar areas to the ones addressed by offline pragmatic research.

An essential term at this layer is *genre*, roughly defined as “a common intuitive concept – a sense that features of language aggregate in recognizable patterns, and that these aggregations indicate something important in the uses of language in context” (Giltrow and Stein 2009: 1). Indeed, the purpose of a genre is not an individual’s private motive for communicating, but a purpose which is socially constructed and recognized by the relevant organizational community and invoked in typical situations (Orlikowski and Yates 1998). As Lomborg (2014: 42) correctly states, the consolidation of a genre takes place “from the mobilization, reworking, and adjustment of existing knowledge and previous experience, as well as from the recurrent interaction with other (more established) practitioners of the genre.” Discourses on the net exhibit similar patterns both in the way they are processed and in the way genres are stabilised and enacted in interactions. However, several qualities of virtual communication and online discourse should be taken into account:

Firstly, the degree of genre (dis)similarity between online and offline genres depends on how inherent to the net the genre in question is. Research in this direction differentiates evolutions of virtual genres depending on how related they are to their offline counterparts (see Orlikowski and Yates 1994; Shepherd and Watters 1998; Crowston and Williams 2000; Herring 2013a: 7; among others). In a nutshell, some offline genres are *transferred* to the net without variation (e.g. “pdf files” of printed articles for scientific research). These should not lead to substantial alterations in their processing and contextualisation. By contrast, other offline genres are *adapted* to the net. The content is similar, but options for choosing interpretive paths lead to variations in contextualisation, as happens with portals of online news that upload the same content as the printed newspaper but offer the user options such as links to other resources, access to the archive, added audio-visual content, graphics, etc., and therefore the users take some responsibility of what progression their reading activity takes, and various possible strategies for contextualisation would run parallel to these choices. Finally, some genres are *autonomous*, have been created on the net without offline counterparts, as happens with social networking profiles, RSS news feeds, etc. Here reading paths and contextualisation are mainly the reader’s responsibility, since a typical feature of these autonomous genres is the lack of predicted processing of information and the user is granted full freedom

of which link to click on, which tag from a parallel frame to select, which order of content to choose, and so on.

Secondly, as has already been mentioned in passing, the prototypical act of communication, namely “a single addresser, who intends a single interpretation (and interpretive path) with a single piece of discourse directed at a single addressee” is altered or blurred (see Dynel 2014: 38), leading to a reconsideration of its elements, and posing a challenge for traditional pragmatic analysis:

1. *Single addresser*. Of course, single authors or speakers with some specific interpretation in mind are still pervasive on the internet. We find single addressers in blogs, mobile instant messaging, social networking profiles, etc. But there is an increasing trend towards multi-authoring (e.g. Wikipedia), collaborative discourses where it is increasingly harder to differentiate who the author is (and what interpretation is expected). Sometimes a multiplicity of authors constructs the eventual piece of online discourse beyond the initial user’s control. An example is the entries on social networking profiles. The owner uploads photos and texts but what the readers often value as part of the initial discourse uploaded is the friends’ comments to these posts, thus creating an unintended authorial multiplicity for the eventual text processed, which is a combination of post and comments. According to Manago (2015), other-generated information is regarded as more truthful on social networking sites because it is perceived to be unsanctioned by a profile owner. It has been demonstrated that the user’s friends prioritise peer commentaries over self-statements on the profile.
2. *A single interpretation (and interpretive path)*. As has been stated several times in this chapter, online discourses no longer exhibit a linear processing path, and are instead open to multiple choices in terms of links, frames, tags, multimedia content, etc. Cohesion and coherence are mainly achieved through a sort of *inferential patchwork* in which the user tries to make sense of different chunks of discourse from different sources and with different discursive features (verbal, visual, audio, multimodal ...). Media convergence has brought about unpredictability of reading sequences and the author has been devoid of responsibility for eventual interpretations.
3. *A single piece of discourse*. At the same time, convergence allows for a multiplicity of types of communication within the same platform (Herring 2013a: 16). As Spilioti (2015) illustrates with social networking sites, Facebook users can post a status update (asynchronous) and chat with friends in real time (synchronous), and posts exhibit combinations of more than one mode (e.g. text-video or photo-text). Compared to traditional text-based communication, social media interaction draws extensively on multimodal constructions of meaning, where language is only one semiotic resource in users’ everyday practices. And texts are now typically encoded with multimodal combinations whose partial

meanings cannot be understood without the aid of the other discourses in the multimodal combination, as is typically the case of internet *memes* (Yus 2018, forthcoming b).

4. *Directed at a single addressee.* Single addressees are still found on the net, of course, especially in messaging conversations, chat rooms, etc., but there is a growing trend towards multi-party conversations in which users either co-construct the eventual interpretive paths or participate at different levels and intensities in the act of communication (see 4.3 below).

Finally, at this second layer it is necessary to comment on the quality of many online discourses in their hybridisation of oral and written properties (*oralised written text*, as it was called in Yus 2011a), and how users resort to different techniques of oralisation including text deformation (repetition of letters, creative use of punctuation marks, etc.) and the use of emoticons/emoji in order to connote their typed texts not only with an additional layer of orality, but also – and crucially – with a more realistic version of the feelings, emotions and underlying intentions beyond textual explicitness (e.g. in ironical communication) that would not be conveyed without the aid of these enriching techniques (see Yus 2005). This opens up nice areas of pragmatic analysis that move beyond the rigidity of typed text and into more dynamic combinations of text and image, and into hybrid oral and written features of discourse. In this sense, although it is undeniable that very often the origin of these creative techniques lies in the user's awareness that typed text is not rich enough to convey feelings, emotions or attitudes, on many occasions users resort to them with other purposes, including humour, the creation of a more vivid or colourful text, or an enhancement of areas of mutuality with other users, among others. Take emoticons/emoji, for instance; they were initially created to connote typed text with the user's emotions or nonverbal behaviour, but the range of their uses is more extensive (on nonverbal communication, see the chapter by Gerardine Pereira in this volume). In Yus (2014c), for example, up to eight functions were proposed: (a) to signal the propositional attitude that underlies the utterance and which would be difficult to identify without the aid of the emoticon, as in (1a); (b) to communicate a higher intensity of a propositional attitude which has already been coded verbally, as in (1b); (c) to strengthen/mitigate the illocutionary force of a speech act, as in (1c); (d) to contradict the explicit content of the utterance (joking), as in (1d); (e) to contradict the explicit content of the utterance (irony), as in (1e); (f) to add a feeling or emotion towards the propositional content of the utterance (affective attitude towards the utterance), as in (1f); (g) to add a feeling or emotion towards the communicative act (feeling or emotion in parallel to the communicative act), as in (1g); and (h) to communicate the intensity of a feeling or emotion that has been coded verbally, as in (1h):

- (1) a. I have no time to get bored, nor to read :((.
[*I regret that I have no time to get bored, nor to read*].
- b. I hope you'll always remember my Spanish lessons :-).
- c. Stop writing about me! You're obsessed! XDDDDDD.
[*the force of the directive is softened by the emoticon*].
- d. Text commenting on a photo of a shop with the same name as the addressee user]. I didn't know you had a shop in Alicante :)))))). Kisses.
- e. What a hard life you lead xD.
- f. Saturday at home :-).
[*Spending Saturday at home makes me happy*].
- g. How pretty!!! Some parties, uh! You never stop!!!! :-).
- h. Sounds great!! So excited to see you!! :-)

4.3 Layer 3: User to user interaction

On the internet, users engage in conversations, among them synchronous oral dialogues (internet-enabled mobile messaging calls, videoconferencing, Skype), multi-party typed chat conversations (on web servers), one-to-one typed dialogues (WhatsApp, Messenger), audio-file conversations (recorded files exchanged between users); and typed asynchronous interactions (email mailing lists, internet fora, dialogues on a user's photo or post on a social networking site profile, chained comments on a blogger's posting, etc.).

In theory, pragmatic disciplines such as *conversation analysis*, *interactional sociolinguistics* or *ethnomethodology* should be capable of accounting for how online conversations are structured. And the last two include a social connotation in their analyses, also found on the net.

1. Conversation analysis (CA), typically *dissects* conversations, analyses the role of turn transitions, pauses, silences, overlappings and interruptions, together with interactional combinations such as adjacency pairs and latched turns (see the chapter by Paul Drew in this book).

Problems for a direct applicability of CA to conversations on the net stem from their textual and interactional properties. Concerning the former, specifically in the case of text-based chat interactions within a central, general-purpose screen, conversations show alterations and disruptions that pose challenges for a prototypical CA study. Among others, these are worth mentioning (Yus 2003): (a) The servers reproduce utterances in their entirety, and hence simultaneous feedback or anticipatory inferencing are missing in this kind of interaction.⁶ (b) In the common area,

6. This is the case of one-way transmission systems such as web-based chat rooms. Although Blyth (2013) comments that two-way transmission systems, in which the user can see the message

messages with a specific addressee are mixed up with messages to the whole audience. (c) Some utterances are clipped, one part being located in an initial message and its continuation may be located after a number of messages from other users. (d) Participants in the conversation are not co-present, so interactional feedback is difficult. And (e) conversations may overlap, with threads mixed up in different sequences allocated by the server.

Regarding interactional constraints, online conversations often move beyond the prototypical dyadic structure and into a multi-party quality. For instance, Bou-Franch and Garcés-Conejos Blitvich (2014:21), in their analysis of YouTube interactions, conclude that these constitute *online polylogues* where users can participate on two levels, either contributing actively to the textual polylogues being generated in the thread, or passively, without posting audiovisual and/or textual responses. Besides, different participants in the polylogue have access to different additional communicative actions.

In any case, more focussed interactions are also possible. Apart from typical one-to-one conversations, Spilioti (2015) comments that social networking sites often follow a *prompt focused* topic development in conversations. Topics develop as a number of messages respond to an initial prompt (e.g. a status update, a tweet, a video or a photo). These comment threads exhibit a more limited topical development, since comments respond primarily to the initial prompt throughout the thread.

2. Interactional sociolinguistics aims at explaining how interlocutors signal and interpret meaning in social interaction (Bailey 2015). Unlike CA, more interested in the structure of conversation, interactional sociolinguistics focuses on how meaning and overall interpretation are achieved. Besides, it shows an interest in how sociological (and cultural) knowledge and communication influence each other in making sense of the speaker's intentions. These foundations are clearly applicable to internet-mediated communication, but it is Goffman's work that has been more intensely applied to virtual interactions, especial his proposal of the term *stage*, referred to the distinction between the roles that users play in society at the front stage of interactions and the personal reality that lies at the backstage of their identities, the part that hides behind this *social playground*.⁷

as it is being typed, are becoming popular, to my knowledge one-way systems are still the norm in most of the interfaces for interactions, including recent ones such as Facebook's messaging conversations.

7. Pan (2013) cites two further contributions by Goffman that are applicable to online interactions: (a) the relationship between interpersonal meanings and social structure, which entails careful attention to the symbolic value of what is said and done, as well as to abstract forms of social life; and (b) the concept of *face*, that is, the positive social value a person takes for him- or herself, which needs to be maintained through social interaction.

3. Finally, for ethnomethodology conversations are a unique source of information on social and cultural knowledge. In other words, everyday instances of communication may be regarded as social realities, and this allows us to trace the social aspects of the individuals by the way they speak in specific communicative scenarios. Although conversations on the net are not *situated* on many occasions, in the sense that interlocutors share a common scenario and elicit similar social meanings through their interactions, this pragmatic perspective may also be applied to virtual interactions.

4.4 Layer 4: User to audience

A pragmatics of internet-mediated communication should include the analysis of online narratives, aimed at an audience that shares with the author some portions of mutual knowledge regarding posts and previous narrative chunks. For example, faithful readers of a blog may be able to extract from new posts all the implications and presuppositions that are only accessible by sharing a store of information with the author's previous posts (access which is often assumed in the production of the entries), whereas occasional readers may find it difficult to fill in the informational blanks that the author does not code and whose knowledge is taken for granted.

An interesting aspect to bear in mind regarding online narratives is that there is a clear difference – in pragmatic terms – between narratives that demand a purely linear processing of the successive chunks of text, and those which offer the user partial or total freedom to choose which sub-plot of the narrative to follow, which link to click on, which tab in a parallel frame to select, etc., with the user turning into the maker of his/her own narrative plot, and the author's role being left as the mere provider of narrative threads without a favoured processing path, as is the case with the latest computer game plots (see also Neal Norrick's chapter on narrative in this volume). Although all narratives are processed in a similar cumulative way that takes the chunks of text that have just been processed as preliminary contexts upon which subsequent chunks are inferred, different types of narrative will demand different lines of processing and parallel amounts of processing effort depending on aspects such as usability, reader involvement or demands for mutuality. Blog entries, for instance, are arranged with the most recent post first, and this arrangement may affect this cumulative picture of processing, especially in chained posts, since occasional readers often have to backtrack to previous entries in order to seek the necessary background knowledge that allows for optimal comprehension of the most recent post. In any case, these possibilities that the internet opens up for narratives entail new communicative forms that blur the prototypical narrative genre. Georgakopoulou (2013: 698), for instance, writes that "social-interactional approaches to narrative, including small stories research, have shown the importance

of attending to the context-specific aspects of narrative tellings so as to understand how narrative genres shape as well as are being shaped by the norms and social relations of the situational and socio-cultural contexts in which they occur.” The internet is certainly a new environment which shapes new forms of narrative and blur the previously consolidated features of the narrative genre.

Elements that may also alter inferential strategies for new narratives include the (un)predictability of links to click on, and the role of pictures and their processing in the eventual overall interpretation (these pictures may work as ‘anchors’ of the accompanying text and vice versa). Besides, certain narratives play a part in social identity shaping and community bonding, especially those which are multi-authored or demand from readers the aid and advice of a community of users to move effectively through the unpredictable narrative threads (a non-propositional effect that provides user satisfaction beyond narrative content).

4.5 Layer 5: User in a group of users

Several pragmatic disciplines have done research on social aspects of communication and the effects that communication produces on feelings of group membership, stabilisation of social rules and norms, etc. Among them, the ethnographic approach should be emphasised, but the application of this socially-connoted approach to virtual settings entails a reconceptualisation of its objectives, methodology and even the way data are gathered from sample dialogues and interactions. As Hine (2000: 21) correctly underlines, ethnography is particularly appealing for what users do online, considering that an increasing part of our lives is now lived online.⁸ However, moving ethnography online involves some re-examination of the methodology. The analyst cannot *live* among the users to conclude what social aspects are assumed and reinforced through online interactions; instead, partial logging onto the social sites is expected. Besides, identity play and anonymity are frequent on the net and the ethnographer may well be deceived in his/her research. Regarding this online/offline ethnographic interface, Androutsopoulos (2008) suggests dividing its online counterpart into two varieties depending on the balance existing between

8. In Yus (2012), up to five diachronic stages of relationships between people's offline and online lives were proposed: (a) *Early 90s: Online life as irrelevant* (few people had an interest in the virtual environment); (b) *Late 90s: Online life as alternative* (a time of nicknames, identity play and text-based communication); (c) *Early 2000s: Online life in a time of offline virtualisation* (growing time spent online, growing virtualisation of physical spaces for interaction); (d) *Mid 2000s: User as a node* (users do not differentiate between online and offline spaces, the user is a node of intersecting hybrid interactions); and (e) *Nowadays: Online/offline congruence* (same as the previous stage, but with an emphasis on online-offline congruence, that is, the user is expected to be the same individual in both environments).

research online and offline. The first type would focus on *the internet in everyday life*, analysing the integration of new communications technologies into the life and culture of a community, that is, a kind of *blended ethnography* in which offline activities are equally important. The second variety is addresses *everyday life on the internet*, with the net as a unique environment where specific varieties of culture and community are formed and fostered.

In the case of pragmatics, my intuition is that in general people's awareness of social aspects *leaks*, as it were, from instances of communication, generating a store not only of general social qualities of the person's environment, but also qualities regarding the position of the individual within the group. An interesting proposal in this direction is Escandell-Vidal's (2004), who proposed a picture of human cognition capable of processing, almost simultaneously, both the specific information from utterances, and the social information obtained from the processing of verbal stimuli. Basically, she refers to two cognitive skills (or faculties) of the human mind: one (which may be called the *inferential cognitive system*) is responsible for processing the utterance, while the other module (called the *social cognitive system*) contrasts the information obtained in the interpretation of utterances to already stored social information. These systems or faculties are different but also inter-dependent. Besides, both systems share a quality: universality (that is, both systems are found in all human beings). The inferential system is geared to obtaining the most relevant information from the utterances that are processed on an ordinary basis. The social system, on the other hand, is devoted to obtaining and stabilising social features that are assessed during daily interactions with others, an example being social rules of politeness enacted interactionally (see the chapter by Haugh and Culpeper in this book; see also the chapter by Janet Holmes, where she describes how macro-level societal norms play out at the micro-level of interaction in a number of different workplace contexts).⁹

internet users would generate and manage social qualities through interactions, in a similar way to offline communication. For example, certain types of online discourse (or some form of online code of behaviour, interface use, etc.) are only comprehensible to those who belong to a specific social group within some bound space of the net, thus generating feelings of community membership and parallel feelings of being excluded for those unable to understand the discourse properly (Yus 2014d). An example of discourse fitting this role of community bonding is the use of letters and numbers (instead of Arabic characters) among the Tunisian youth, a sort of hieroglyphic that is only comprehensible to them, and not to others

9. However, the social system is also culture-specific, since every culture has a particular way of organising shared social and cultural representations and there are even different ways of conceptualising the world we live in depending on the culture, together with different ways of engaging in communication and interaction.

such as some adults with whom they do not want to share the information from their posts, thus emphasising their group membership and feelings of community bonding (which have also been addressed from an anthropological point of view, see the chapter by Gunter Senft in this book). An example from a Facebook dialogue is quoted in (2), together with its translation (3):

- (2) User 1: hhhhh rit kifah normalemnt User 4 hya eli ta3ti elmahba.
 User 2: s7i7 w lezemha t5arej el Fatra 3la chahriyetha lol ken mazelt ma 5arajtech ya User 4 a3ti el amir 7ata 50 d sada9a tadfa3ou al bala2
 User 3: 7ata enaaaaaaaaaaaaa :)
 User 4: A User 2 walah 5arejet fatra ...yezi 9alu 5o dinars men antom hahaha ...mesbeh wena na3ti metfakerni ken 3am hamadi yaatih esaha ...naarefkom ghayrlin hhhh
- (3) User 1: hhhhh you see, normally User 4 has to offer the *mahba* [tradition in which money is offered as a present for *Eid al-Fitr*, celebrated after *Ramadan*; normally offered to children].
 User 2: it's true and she also has to give the *fatra* for having a job [an amount of money stipulated by imams and given to the poor], we propose User 4 to offer Amir 50 dinars as *mahba* and *fatra*, so that bad omens will be suppressed.
 User 3: to me too [she has to offer the *mahba*].
 User 4: User 2, I swear I already did the *fatra* ... and also the 50 dinars ... you are naughty ... I haven't stopped offering the *mahba* all day ... the only person who did not forget to give me the *mahba* is uncle Hamadi ... I am sure you're jealous.

4.6 Layer 6: User and non-intended no-propositional effects

Pragmatics has traditionally analysed the communication of propositions which match, to a greater or lesser extent, the propositional information that the speaker intends to communicate (i.e. thoughts). Propositions are typically explicit or implicit, and come in degrees (strongly or weakly communicated). In a way, it is sensible to base a pragmatic theory on the analysis of propositions. They are accountable in truth-conditional terms and possess content that allows us to trace the speaker's intended meanings. The problem is that on many occasions the key to successful acts of communication does not lie in propositional content but in certain non-propositional effects, and this is particularly pervasive on the internet, where users spend hours exchanging utterly useless (propositional) content which, nevertheless, provides them with alternative sources of satisfaction through non-propositional effects, most of which are not intended by the speaker (as part of communicated content), but are simply generated from the act of communication

making up for the low informational quality of the discourses transferred to the addressee users. As argued in Yus (2016a), non-intended non-propositional effects are important, since they have an impact on (a) the positive/negative outcome of internet acts of communication; (b) the preference for a specific site, medium or channel; (c) why certain interactions are (un)profitable despite the lack of/existence of interesting information; (d) one's awareness of personal and social roles (through interactions); and (e) what kind of *residue* is leaked from everyday acts of communication (and how it makes us feel).

So far, several areas of internet communication have been studied with an emphasis on these non-propositional effects, of a positive or negative quality, including mobile phone apps for tourism (Yus 2014a), new digital narratives (Yus 2015a), and mobile instant messaging (Yus 2016c, 2017).

A more recent analysis has focussed on the communicative value of non-propositional effects for the shaping and management of online identity (Yus 2016a, forthcoming a). These aspects entail the incorporation of other disciplines (sociology, anthropology ...) into the pragmatic analysis in order to assess the effectiveness of the online act of communication as a whole. Indeed, online interactions are excellent sources of non-propositional effects regarding personal and social identity shaping, especially in a time in which many interactions take place in situations that lack physical co-presence and therefore language is important for foregrounding aspects of the user that would be taken for granted in a face-to-face situation. Among all the possible positive/negative effects that may be beneficial or detrimental for the act of communication as a whole, the following may be listed,¹⁰ in the form of feelings of ... (1) connectedness, of social awareness, feeling of being part of the interactions and friendships; (2) reduced loneliness; (3) being noticed by others, by the user's community; (4) willingness for self-disclosure; (5) generated bridging and bonding social capital; (6) social isolation and dissatisfaction; (7) well-being through emotional display of one's and other users' feelings; (8) increased mutuality of information; (9) enhanced/reduced self-esteem and generation of positive/negative emotions; (10) control over privacy and disclosure; (11) reduced inhibition (plus increased self-disclosure); (12) community or group membership, of

10. These would be *user-related non-propositional effects* (originating from user-to-user interactions). In the same way as happened with *contextual constraints* and as pictured in Figure 1 above, there would also be positive/negative interface-related non-propositional effects (originating from the user's interaction with an interface). In Yus (2016a) some of these effects include: (1) (Dis)satisfaction from being (un)able to use the interface appropriately and obtain/produce the expected information and interpretations. (2) Individuation/personalization vs. social connectedness (users expect information in a highly personalized way, adapted to personal profiles and preferences). (3) Effects of dealing with information processed: from information overload, from multi-tasking; psychological effects of dealing with *infocination* (when the user is overwhelmed by the amount of information to process), etc.

belongingness, of being acknowledged by others; and (13) being useful to the community (e.g. via user-generated content) and increased trust.

5. Concluding remarks

Pragmatics has clear and straightforward applications to communication on the internet. The same communicative strategies, inferential steps and management of interactions that are at work in offline, face-to-face exchanges, are also performed in online scenarios. However, the application of pragmatic theories to internet-mediated communication often entails an adjustment or reconceptualisation of the hypotheses, methodologies and conclusions used in the analysis of offline communication. This chapter has reviewed some of the key issues and debates that may be put forward in the application of pragmatics to virtual, internet-mediated communication.

References

- Androutsopoulos, Jannis. 2008. "Potentials and Limitations of Discourse-Centred Online Ethnography." *Language@internet* 5.
- Bailey, Benjamin. 2015. "Interactional Sociolinguistics." In *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction*, ed. by Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie, and Todd Sandel. Boston: Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118611463.wbielsio60
- Bell, Nancy. 2018. "Pragmatics, humor studies, and the study of interaction." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 291–309. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.13bel
- Belleri, Delia. 2014. *Semantic Under-Determinacy and Communication*. Basingstoke: Palgrave. doi:10.1057/9781137398444
- Blyth, Carl S. 2013. "Pragmatics of Chat." In *The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics*, ed. by Carol A. Chapelle. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0940
- Bou-Franch, Patricia, and Pilar Garcés-Conejos Blitvich. 2014. "Conflict Management in Massive Polylogues: A Case Study from YouTube." *Journal of Pragmatics* 73: 19–36. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2014.05.001
- Byrne, Elisabeth. 1994. *The Formation of Relationships on internet Relay Chat*. Sydney: University of Western Sydney, BA Thesis.
- Crowston, Kevin, and Michelle Williams. 2000. "Reproduced and Emergent Genres of Communication on the World-Wide Web." *The Information Society* 16 (3): 201–216. doi:10.1080/01972240050133652
- Daft, Richard L., and Robert H. Lengel. 1984. "Information Richness: A New Approach to Managerial Behavior and Organizational Design." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 6: 191–233.
- Drew, Paul. 2018. "The Interface between Pragmatics and Conversation Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 59–83. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.04dre

- Dynel, Marta. 2014. "Participation Framework Underlying YouTube Interaction." *Journal of Pragmatics* 73: 37–52. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2014.04.001
- Eisenlauer, Volker. 2014. "Facebook as a Third Author -(Semi-)automated Participation Framework in Social Network Sites." *Journal of Pragmatics* 72: 73–85. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2014.02.006
- Escandell-Vidal, Victoria. 2004. "Norms and Principles. Putting Social and Cognitive Pragmatics Together." In *Current Trends in the Pragmatics of Spanish*, ed. by Rosina Márquez-Reiter, and María Elena Placencia, 347–371. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.123.27esc
- Fetzer, Anita. 2011. "Pragmatics as a Linguistic Concept." In *Foundations of Pragmatics*, ed. by Wolfram Bublitz, and Neal R. Norrick, 23–50. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214260.23
- Fetzer, Anita. 2018. "Discourse Pragmatics: Communicative Action Meets Discourse Analysis." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 33–57. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.03fet
- Fetzer, Anita, and Etsuko Oishi. 2011. "Introduction." In *Context and Contexts. Parts Meet Whole?*, ed. by Anita Fetzer, and Etsuko Oishi, 1–8. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.209.01intro
- Georgakopoulou, Alexandra. 2013. "Narrative Analysis and Computer-Mediated Communication." In *Pragmatics of Computer-Mediated Communication*, ed. by Susan Herring, Dieter Stein, and Tuija Virtanen, 695–715. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214468.695
- Giltrow, Janet, and Dieter Stein. 2009. *Genres in the internet*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.188
- Haugh, Michael, and Culpeper, Jonathan. 2018. "Integrative pragmatics and (im)politeness theory." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 213–239. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.10hau
- Herring, Susan. 2004. "Computer-Mediated Discourse Analysis: An Approach to Researching Online Behavior." In *Designing for Virtual Communities in the Service of Learning*, ed. by Sasha A. Barab, Rob Kling, and James H. Gray, 338–376. New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511805080.016
- Herring, Susan. 2013a. "Discourse in Web 2.0: Familiar, Reconfigured, and Emergent." In *Discourse 2.0: Language and New Media*, ed. by Deborah Tannen, and Anna Marie Tester, 1–25. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Herring, Susan. 2013b. "Relevance in Computer-Mediated Conversation. In *Pragmatics of Computer-Mediated Communication*, ed. by Susan Herring, Dieter Stein, and Tuija Virtanen, 245–268. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214468.245
- Herring, Susan, Dieter Stein, and Tuija Virtanen. 2013. "Introduction to the Pragmatics of Computer-Mediated Communication." In *Pragmatics of Computer-Mediated Communication*, ed. by Susan Herring, Dieter Stein, and Tuija Virtanen, 3–31. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110214468.3
- Hine, Christine. 2000. *Virtual Ethnography*. London: Sage. doi:10.4135/9780857020277
- Holmes, Janet. 2018. "Sociolinguistics vs pragmatics: Where does the boundary lie?" In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 11–32. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.02hol
- Ilie, Cornelia. 2018. "Pragmatics vs Rhetoric: Political Discourse at the Pragmatics-Rhetoric Interface." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 85–119. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.05ili
- Levinson, Stephen. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lomborg, Stine. 2014. *Social Media, Social Genres. Making Sense of the Ordinary*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Manago, Adriana M. 2015. "Identity Development in the Digital Age: The Case of Social Networking Sites." In *The Oxford Handbook of Identity Development*, ed. by Kate C. McLean, and Moin Syed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199936564.013.031
- Miller, Vincent. 2008. "New media, Networking and Phatic Culture." *Convergence* 14 (4): 387–400. doi:10.1177/1354856508094659
- Norrick, Neal R. 2018. "Narrative Studies versus Pragmatics (of Narrative)." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 122–142. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.06nor
- Orlikowski, Wanda J., and Joanne Yates. 1994. "Genre Repertoire: The Structuring of Communicative Practices in Organizations." *Administrative Sciences Quarterly* 33: 541–574. doi:10.2307/2393771
- Orlikowski, Wanda J., and Joanne Yates. 1998. "Genre Systems: Structuring Interaction through Communicative Norms." *Journal of Business Communication* 39 (1): 13–35. doi:10.1177/002194360203900102
- Pan, Yuling. 2013. "Interactional Sociolinguistics as a Research Perspective." In *The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics*, ed. by Carol A. Chapelle. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0552
- Pereira, Gerardine, M. 2018. "The interface between pragmatics and gesture studies." In *Pragmatics and Its Interfaces*, ed. by Cornelia Ilie and Neal R. Norrick, 163–184. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.294.08per
- Shepherd, M., and Carolyn Watters. 1998. "The Evolution of Cybergenres." In *Proceedings of the 31st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, Hawaii.
- Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. 1995. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (2nd edition). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Spilioti, Tereza. 2015. "Social Media Discourse." In *The International Encyclopedia of Language and Social Interaction*, ed. by Karen Tracy, Cornelia Ilie, and Todd Sandel. Boston: Wiley & Sons. doi:10.1002/9781118611463.wbielsi170
- Sproull, Lee, and Sara Kiesler. 1986. "Reducing Context Cues: Electronic Mail in Organizational Communication." *Management Science* 32: 1492–1512. doi:10.1287/mnsc.32.11.1492
- Walther, Joseph B. 1996. "Computer-Mediated Communication: Impersonal, Interpersonal, and Hyperpersonal Interaction." *Communication Research* 23 (1): 3–43. doi:10.1177/009365096023001001
- Yule, George. 1996. *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yus, Francisco. 2003. "El Chat como Doble Filtro Comunicativo [Chat Room as Double Communicative Filter]." *Revista de Investigación Lingüística* 2 (5): 141–169.
- Yus, Francisco. 2005. "Attitudes and Emotions through Written Text: The Case of Textual Deformation in internet Chat Rooms." *Pragmalingüística* 13: 147–174.
- Yus, Francisco. 2007. *Virtualidades Reales. Nuevas Formas de Comunidad en la Era de internet* [Real Virtualities. New Forms of Community at the internet Age]. Alicante: University of Alicante, Servicio de Publicaciones.
- Yus, Francisco. 2010. *Ciberpragmática 2.0. Nuevos Usos del Lenguaje en internet* [Cyberpragmatics 2.0. New Uses of Language on the internet]. Barcelona: Ariel.
- Yus, Francisco. 2011a. *Cyberpragmatics. Internet-Mediated Communication in Context*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.213

- Yus, Francisco. 2011b. "Relevance Equations of Effective internet Communication." In *Interdisciplinarity and languages. Current issues in Research, Teaching, Professional Applications and ICT*, ed. by Barry Pennock, and Francisca Suau, 65–86. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. doi:10.3726/978-3-0353-0145-8
- Yus, Francisco. 2012. "Identidades Físicas e Identidades en Línea: Atracciones, Desencuentros y Solapamientos [Physical Identities and Online Identities: Attractions, Disconnections and Overappings]." Paper delivered at *Identitats Perverses, Identitats en Conflicte*. Lléida (Spain), November.
- Yus, Francisco. 2013. "Cyberpragmatics." In *The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics*, ed. by Carol A. Chapelle. Oxford: Blackwell. doi:10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0309
- Yus, Francisco. 2014a. "Turismo Móvil: Discurso, Interactividad y Usabilidad en las 'Apps' de Turismo [Mobile Tourism: Discourse, Interactivity and Usability in the 'Apps' for Tourism]." Paper delivered at *Discurso y Géneros del Turismo 2.0*. Valencia: University of Valencia and IULMA, April.
- Yus, Francisco. 2014b. "La Seducción de lo no Codificado [The Seduction of What is not Coded]." Paper delivered at *Intermedialidad en la lengua y la literatura hispánicas*. Coloquio Internacional. Université de Lausanne, October.
- Yus, Francisco. 2014c. "Not all Emoticons Are Created Equal." *Linguagem em (Dis)curso* (special issue on relevance theory) 14 (3): 511–529. doi:10.1590/1982-4017-140304-0414
- Yus, Francisco. 2014d. "El Discurso de las Identidades en Línea: El Caso de Facebook [The Discourse of Online Identities: The Case of Facebook]." *Discurso & Sociedad* 8 (3): 398–426.
- Yus, Francisco. 2015a. "The Role of Cognition and Relevance in New Digital Narratives." In *Prospettive multilingue e interdisciplinari nel discorso specialistico*, ed. by Elena Carpi, 81–107. Pisa (Italy): Pisa University Press.
- Yus, Francisco. 2015b. "Should Relevance Theory Analyse What is Non-Propositional, Non-Intentional but yet Affects the Eventual Relevance?" Paper delivered at *Relevance Round Table Meeting 4*. Institute of English Studies, Jagiellonian University of Kraków, September.
- Yus, Francisco. 2015c. "The Discursive Management of the Phatic internet (and How to Explain it Pragmatically)." Paper delivered at *Approaches to Digital Discourse Analysis (ADDA)*. Valencia (Spain), November.
- Yus, Francisco. 2016a. "Online Identity: A (Non)propositional Account." Paper delivered at *EPICS VII*. Pablo de Olavide University (Seville), May.
- Yus, Francisco. 2016b. *Humour and Relevance*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/thr.4
- Yus, Francisco. 2016c. "Towards a Cyberpragmatics of Mobile Instant Messaging." In *Yearbook of Corpus Linguistics and Pragmatics 2016: Global Implications for Culture and Society in the Networked Age*, ed. by Jesús Romero-Trillo, 7–26. Berlin: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-41733-2_2
- Yus, Francisco. 2017. "Contextual Constraints and Non-propositional Effects in WhatsApp Communication." *Journal of Pragmatics* 114: 66–86. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2017.04.003
- Yus, Francisco. 2018. "Identity-Related issues in Meme Communication." *internet Pragmatics* 1 (1): 113–133. doi:10.1075/ip.00006.yus
- Yus, Francisco. forthcoming a. "Relevance from and beyond Propositions. The Case of Online Identity." In *Relevance and Irrelevance: Theories, Factors and Challenges*, ed. by Jan Strassheim, and Hisashi Nasu. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Yus, Francisco. forthcoming b. "Multimodality in Memes. A Cyberpragmatic Approach." In *Analyzing Digital Discourse: New Insights and Future Directions*, ed. by Patricia Bou-Franch and Pilar Garcés-Conejos Blitvich. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.

Pragmatics, humor studies, and the study of interaction

Nancy D. Bell

In this chapter, I examine the interface between pragmatics and humor studies, first by outlining the contributions pragmatics has made to our understanding of what humor is and how it functions in everyday interaction. I review research that draws on a range of empirical methods, to illustrate the diverse ways in which the interface has been approached and what these approaches have demonstrated about non-serious talk. I then examine how humor scholarship can inform our understanding of language use, and close by considering ways in which the pragmatics-humor interface might continue to develop. Here, I argue specifically for further integration of humor research into pragmatics.

Keywords: humor, failed humor, language play, social relationships

1. Introduction

In the introduction to his *Primer of Humor Research*, linguist Victor Raskin describes how humor scholarship used to be something to explore only once the protections of tenure had been granted, alluding, as well, to a case in which a prominent humor scholar was denied tenure by a university that interpreted his research as merely the “writing of joke books” (Raskin 2008: 3). The founding of the International Society for Humor Studies and the *Humor* journal in 1988, however, both signaled and precipitated growing academic interest in the topic, and although still unusual, its study is no longer so marginalized.

A highly interdisciplinary endeavor, there are as many different definitions of humor as there are different fields; however, given that we are focused here on pragmatics, in this chapter I will adhere to a definition of humor that most linguists will likely feel comfortable with: utterances that are framed as or taken up as amusing. In fact, humor scholarship has long been dominated by philosophers and psychologists, and when linguists initially joined the party, their inquiry tended

to be restricted to formal aspects of humor, with less attention paid to its role in interaction, which the above definition highlights. Since the 1990s, however, we have witnessed increasing growth in research into the pragmatics of humorous communication. In addition to the aforementioned structural support for academic studies of humor, this growth may also be attributed to the social turn in applied linguistics around that time, which focused attention on issues of identity, context, and interpretive processes in interaction. In this chapter, I begin by considering the ways that pragmatics, specifically theories of politeness, has contributed to our understanding of humor. I then turn to the other side of the interface to ask how humor studies might return the favor and contribute to pragmatics. In that section, I focus on contextualization processes, identity, and the negotiation of social relationships, three areas of interest to pragmatics where I believe that the findings of humor scholarship are relevant to the field of pragmatics more broadly. I close with some suggestions for ways that the pragmatics-humor interface might continue to develop and strengthen in the future.

2. Contributions of pragmatics to humor studies

Approaching humor through the lens of pragmatics allowed scholars to focus on how humor works in everyday interaction, detailing the forms, functions, and negotiation of humor in local contexts (e.g., Boxer and Cortés-Conde 1997; Davies 2003; Drew 1987; Hay 1994, 2001; Holmes 2000; Jorgensen 1996; Kotthoff 1996; Norrick 1993; Straehle 1993; Zajdman 1995). These descriptions of the ways that humor is constructed in different contexts have helped us to more precisely define what we mean by humor, and have enriched our understanding of this important element of human communication. The many serious functions of humor, such as constructing personal and group identities, regulating social behavior, and establishing and maintaining relationships, are now recognized as a fundamental part of humor theory by humor scholars across the disciplines. Below I limit my discussion of the pragmatics side of the interface to theories of politeness (see also Haugh and Culpeper, this volume) as a way of illustrating how pragmatics research has been applied to humor and how findings from such inquiries subsequently altered our understanding of how humor works in interaction.

Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987) ambitious attempt to put forth universal principles and strategies of politeness marked an important point of departure in studies of linguistic politeness and touched off a wave of research. Specifically concerning humor, they considered jokes to be "based on shared background knowledge and values" (p. 124) and saw them as emphasizing these similarities among interlocutors. Their framework therefore considered joking as a positive politeness

strategy for reducing face threats and making the hearer feel comfortable. Irony, defined by Brown and Levinson as saying the opposite of one's intended meaning,¹ was also included in their framework as an off-record strategy for accomplishing face-threatening acts. In this case, they suggested that, when appropriately marked, irony could indirectly convey the intended meaning.

As with many studies that attempted to apply Brown and Levinson's framework to specific types and instances of interaction, investigations of humor and irony through that lens suggested that their model was lacking in some respects, but also expanded our understanding of the phenomenon. Jorgensen (1996) took as the starting point for her inquiry, Brown and Levinson's assertion that irony, as an indirect form of communication, would be understood as politeness since it would soften the face-threat inherent in a criticism. Although Brown and Levinson emphasized the speaker's point of view in formulating their theory, given the hearer's assessment of the speaker's utterance, face threats to the speaker were also recognized. In this case, Jorgensen pointed out that the speaker was at risk of being perceived as insensitive in making a criticism. This was perhaps particularly the case in her studies, which focused on sarcastic irony, specifically. Sarcasm is generally considered as an aggressive form of irony, typically used to deliver criticism (Giora and Attardo 2014). In a set of three experiments, participants were presented with sarcastic comments and asked to imagine their feelings as the recipient of the remark, as well as their impression of why the speaker would have made that ironic comment. While the results upheld some of what Brown and Levinson's model would predict, the picture of sarcasm that emerged was more complex.

For instance, couching complaints indirectly, through the use of sarcasm, was a strategy employed more frequently to protect the speaker's own positive face. This was particularly the case when the criticism of the hearer involved something minor or trivial, which might make the speaker seem petty had it been expressed directly, as in the following example:

- (1) Your friend loves to talk about all her many, many childhood friends, old romances, cousins, aunts, uncles, and assorted acquaintances. One day she mentions a trip to the zoo she made with "Jane" several years ago. You ask, "Who is Jane?" She says, "Well, I can see you really care about me since you remember my friends so well!" (adapted from Jorgensen 1996: 630)

1. It is worth noting that this definition is problematic. While irony indeed involves an utterance in which two oppositional messages are presented, these need not be simple opposites. Furthermore, there is some question as to whether all irony can be considered humorous (see Giora and Attardo 2014 for a concise discussion).

At the most basic level, this was consistent with Brown and Levinson's predictions; however, Jorgensen's work raised serious questions concerning the conceptualization of the degree of face threat posed by any act. Her studies pointed to the relativity of the size of imposition of a speech act, with respect to culture, as well as to the relationship between interlocutors. In addition, she found that instances of sarcasm contain multiple face threats to both speaker and hearer, thus rendering the situation much more complex than Brown and Levinson's model suggested. Thus, the application of their framework resulted in a more nuanced picture of sarcastic irony than had previously been conceived.

Holmes (2000) came to a similar conclusion when she drew on Brown and Levinson's work to examine humor in the workplace. She found that the framework served well as a way of explaining humor used for positive politeness, but was deficient when attempting to account for those instances in which humor was used by subordinates to challenge those in power or by superiors as a way of repressing those with less power. In the extract below, the chair, Henry enthuses to his junior colleague, Bob, about the strategy he has devised for putting a stop to any opposition during a meeting. His confident comment is met with a remark from Bob that, while framed as joking, also suggests that he does not consider the strategy as strong as Henry seems to:

- (2) 1 Hen: they're bound to fall over as soon as you present this stuff
 2 it can't be refuted
 3 Bob: let's just hope they've been reading the same textbooks as you
 4 [Both laugh] (Holmes 2000: 177)

Holmes points out that Politeness Theory, as conceptualized by Brown and Levinson, generally assumes that interlocutors are focused on mitigating the effects of face-threats, and that in doing so they tend to de-emphasize power relationships. However, as her analysis demonstrates, sometimes such relationships must be foregrounded. In the example above, Holmes describes the humor used by Bob as "a contestive strategy" that represents "one of the few acceptable means available to subordinates who wish to challenge, if only temporarily, the existing authority structures" (Holmes 2000: 177). This use of humor does not fit comfortably within Brown and Levinson's model.

As criticisms of the Brown and Levinson framework mounted, interest in existing alternative perspectives grew, and a shift occurred away from face as fundamental in favor of the more dynamic, situated view. The recognition of politeness as a discursive construct emerged as a more viable way of understanding the phenomenon (e.g. Fraser 1990; Locher and Watts 2005). In her later work on humor with workplace language data, Holmes exemplifies this change in the field. For instance, Holmes and Schnurr (2005) investigated politeness and humor as relational

practice. This substantial body of research (e.g. Holmes 2006; Holmes and Marra 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Schnurr and Holmes 2009; Vine et al. 2009) went far toward not only legitimizing the study of humor in everyday interaction, but in providing profound insight into the ways that humor functions in discourse. Holmes's work demonstrated that, far from being mere entertainment, humor is a nuanced and highly productive means of negotiating relationships and identities. Furthermore, her studies illuminated the aggressive and negative role that humor can play, in contrast to the largely rosy picture that had dominated prior to her work.

While much remains to be learned about face-saving and affiliative interactions, more recently the discursive construction of impoliteness and disaffiliation have gained attention (e.g. Bousfield 2008, Culpeper 2011) and have also been applied to the study of humor. For instance, where Holmes's research, as illustrated in the above example, demonstrated the ways that humor could be used as an off-record attempt at subversion and suppression, Haugh's (2010, 2011) work emphasizes the ambiguous nature of humor and teases out the subtle ways that it may be taken up as polite/impolite or affiliative/disaffiliative to varying degrees. In these studies, he uses Arundale's (1999, 2006, 2010) face-constituting theory (FCT) to examine humor that occurs in newly-introduced dyads. Briefly, FCT draws on dynamic models of language use and interpretation and conceptualizes face as both relational and interactional. That is, rather than residing in the individual, face is jointly constructed and emerges in talk. Thus, as Arundale (2010) explains, "face is a meaning or action, or more generally an interpreting, that a participant forms in verbal and visible communication" (201–202). FCT allows for a more nuanced account of how utterances are interpreted as "doing something" in terms of face, and rather than seeing talk as face threatening or supportive, the theory acknowledges that much interaction involves simply the maintenance of current face constructions within a relationship.

Through his use of FCT, Haugh demonstrates that aggressive forms of humor, typically considered as appropriate only between people who are already well acquainted, do occur between strangers and may be evaluated as threatening or supportive to varying extents by participants. Consider, for instance, the interaction that takes place between Natalie and Gary, strangers participating in data collection on Australian conversation, after Natalie suggests that Gary ask her some questions in order to share the conversational burden:

- (3) 208 G: U:M I haven't got any questions to ask you
 209 actually.
 210 (1.2)
 211 N: ↑you must be fun at parties.
 212 G: .hhhdon't like parties

- 213 N: No: I can imagine. Ahe parties probably don't like
 214 you either (h)
 215 (0.6)
 216 G: I guess so. ↑OH NO. (0.8) people always like
 217 someone they can saddle up to
 218 (2.1)
 219 Talk to. At least someone in the corner they can
 220 talk to. (Haugh 2011: 178)

Natalie responds to Gary's indirect refusal to ask questions of her with a comment that is easily interpretable as impolite, as her comment (line 211) positions him as boorish. Her comment is also couched as sarcasm, however, and rather than responding to the face threat inherent in suggesting he is socially incompetent, Gary orients to it as joking, laughingly admitting that, indeed, he does not enjoy parties. Natalie then turns Gary's own phrase around – a hearably playful move – but in doing so implies that he is unlikely to be welcome at parties, thus also adding to the face threat. Once again, Gary responds with agreement, but then adds that in fact some people do talk to him on such social occasions. As Haugh points out, “in not orienting to [her] potential impoliteness, the status of Natalie's comments as face threatening remains ambivalent” (2011: 179).

In short, increasingly complex models of politeness have occasioned increasingly complex understandings of how humor functions in interaction. While theories of politeness were used here as a convenient example of the contributions pragmatics has made to humor scholarship, it is easy to find other areas of pragmatics that have equally influenced humor scholars. For instance, pragmatics has helped us understand how contexts for humor are established, how play frames are constructed and negotiated, how humor works in negotiating identities, how social behavior is regulated, and how various interpretive processes come to bear in humorous discourse. In the next section, I focus on what is perhaps less obvious: how the interface has worked in the other direction, with humor scholarship influencing pragmatics.

3. Contributions of humor studies to pragmatics

One advantage of integrating insights from humor studies into pragmatic investigations of interaction in general is that humor scholarship is highly interdisciplinary. In what follows I cite not only studies that have examined humor from a pragmatic perspective, but also those from adjacent fields, such as psychology and sociology, to illustrate what they might add to pragmatics. As a rich site for exploring notions central to pragmatics, the study of humor can also inform our understanding of

situated language use. In this section I focus on three topics as examples of this interface. First, I examine what we have recently learned about the ways that humorous utterances are contextualized in talk. This work demonstrates the myriad ways we have of framing utterances as varying degrees of serious or non-serious. This leads easily to the next two closely related topics of how humor functions in the construction of identities, and how it works to maintain and regulate social relationships. For each topic, I will highlight what the findings from humor research can contribute not just to the pragmatics of humor, but to pragmatics more broadly.

3.1 Humor and contextualization processes

Contextualization cues (Gumperz 1982) have long been integral to the study of language use in interaction. Indeed, work on such cues and the interpretive processes they engender moved us from understanding context as something interlocutors merely respond to, to recognizing it as something that we simultaneously create, as well, through our construction and interpretation of utterances (e.g. Auer 1992; Verschueren 2000; Linnell 1998). For too long, humor scholarship relied on the intuitive notions that laughter and smiling were signals of humor, even when these were acknowledged to be multifunctional cues² and thus unreliable as the sole indicators of non-seriousness. Recent research indicates that cues commonly thought to indicate humor, such as pauses and changes in volume or speech rate to mark conversational humor or the punchline of a joke, do not necessarily do so (e.g. Attardo and Pickering 2011; Attardo, Pickering and Baker 2011; Attardo et al. 2013; Pickering et al. 2009). At the same time, other ways of contextualizing humor are coming to light.

For instance, one striking finding is that humor may not always be contextualized via overt cues. In fact, especially among intimates, there may be a preference for the content alone to act as the cue (Attardo et al. 2003; Flamson and Barrett 2008). Among interlocutors who are familiar with each other's ways of speaking and who share extensive background, conventional cues may not be necessary. Furthermore, because humor is a marker of intimacy, the lack of cues may display that closeness for others, while also reaffirming it between interlocutors. For analysts of interaction this means that humor, already notoriously challenging to identify, may be particularly so in discourse among close friends and family members.

2. For information on social actions that laughter can accomplish other than signaling the presence of humor, see, for example, Clift (2012); Glenn (2003); Glenn and Holt (2013); Holt (2010, 2012); Maemura (2014); O'Donnell-Trujillo and Adams (1983); Vettin and Todt (2004).

Recent multi-modal analyses (see also Pereira, this volume) of humor also suggest that relying on audio recordings only further confounds our ability to identify humorous sequences. These studies indicate, for instance, that smiling is a more reliable cue of humor than laughter (Attardo, Pickering, and Baker 2011; Attardo et al. 2013; Gironzetti, et al. 2016; Pickering et al. 2009). Such work also serves to draw our attention to nuance in the framing process. Specifically, rather than look merely at the presence or absence of smiling, we gauge the type and intensity of smiles (Bachorowski and Owren 2001; Frank, Ekman, and Friesen 1993; Szameitat et al. 2009). Studies of contextualization processes have tended to focus on the speaker's contribution; however, multi-modal analyses also reveal the attentional focus of the hearer. Eye-tracking studies have demonstrated, for example, that the hearer attends to the speaker's eyes much more than to her or his mouth (Gironzetti et al. 2016). While this may initially seem counterintuitive, given that smiling seems to be a crucial cue to humor, on closer consideration it is clear that more intense smiling involves the eyes, as well (Ekman, Davidson, and Friesen 1990).

A playful orientation can also be communicated verbally, and there exist formulaic cues and strategies for drawing back from or closer to a commitment to non-seriousness. One of these is the phrase "just kidding." Skalicky, Berger, and Bell (2015) found that the phrase was most often used directly following – that is, prior to any response from the hearer – an attempt at humor that was potentially inappropriate or unfunny. The positioning of the phrase prior to any response from the hearer, as well as the content of many utterances it directly followed, suggested that its function was primarily to inoculate the speaker against any negative reaction to the joke by minimizing its importance and suggesting that it was uttered "merely" with playful intent. Haugh (2016) further suggests that such claims to non-serious intent do moral work in interaction. In addition to the aforementioned inoculation function, he finds, similarly, that "just kidding" can signal the speaker's acknowledgement of the potential inappropriateness of the joke, but may also be used to chastise the hearer for taking the joke too seriously. Thus, we begin to see not only how humorous intent may be cued, but also how a playful frame and the interactional norms and values surrounding non-serious discourse get negotiated.

While conventional means for contextualizing an utterance as humorous clearly exist, these can be deployed in a variety of ways and with varying intensity in order to signal degrees of playfulness or some combination of seriousness and nonseriousness. In some cases the lines between seriousness and playfulness may be blurred enough to make the status of the interaction unclear even to the conversational participants (Bateson [1955] 1972: 179; Sacks 1972). This research into the ways that humor is contextualized has broader implications for pragmatics, as it highlights the nuanced and partial ways in which keys and frames are constructed, as well as the intricate work interlocutors undertake in attempting to communicate

and interpret intentions. Part of this interactional work, foregrounded by the findings of inquiry into humorous discourse, but applicable to all discourse, may involve introducing ambiguity into interaction, for a variety of purposes. See, for example, the interaction between Natalie and Gary, discussed above. Natalie's sarcastic accusations of Gary as socially inept are contextualized in such a way that they may be taken up to varying degrees as playful or insulting. Gary's tepid agreement is also marked with slight laughter, making his response similarly ambiguous. Both leave room for their interlocutor to engage in a variety of ways. Natalie may have been hoping to achieve more balanced participation or simply to lighten up the conversation. For his part, Gary may have been hoping to avoid confrontation or may not have been comfortable joking with a stranger and was hoping to maintain a serious tone to the conversation. Although the uncertainty that results from ambiguous contextualization may cause a misunderstanding, it may also be used as a communicative resource, allowing interlocutors to engage in subtle displays of identity and to gauge and adjust their relationship, the topics we turn to below.

3.2 Humor and identity

The 1990s saw an explosion of research into the ways that identities are constructed and negotiated in interaction. As it turns out, humor is a rich site for exploring identity. In fact, sociologist Giseline Kuipers has found humor to be a strong marker of class and cultural identity, with her Dutch and British interview respondents reacting quite openly and vehemently about their own and others' preferences. For example, one interviewee gave the following description of what it might be like to encounter a person who enjoyed the comedy of Roy "Chubby" Brown:

- (4) All I would need to hear is 'I went to see Roy "Chubby" Brown last week, it was magic', and I would want to glass them. I wouldn't. I would probably have a short conversation and then get the fuck out of their company. But the fact that they didn't have the wits, the sensitivity, to see that that kind of bullying is disgusting tells me that they are a pathetic race and they need to crawl back into...
(Friedman and Kuipers 2013: 186)

As this quote illustrates, respondents did not shy away from providing strong opinions about people they had never met, according simply to the type of humor they would prefer. It is difficult to imagine these types of assessments occurring based on individual tastes in, say, music or film.

Humor is generally thought to be a creative use of language and people take pride in their identity as someone with a "good" sense of humor. Not only do they tout their own ability to understand, appreciate, and spontaneously generate amusing commentary, but they often express appreciation of this ability in others,

as well. The value placed on humor is apparent in the way failed humor is managed by speakers and hearers in order to minimize face threats and protect their identity as a person with a good sense of humor (Bell 2015). Speakers, for instance, work to prevent failure, by avoiding humor they suspect might not be well-received. Although poor recipient design is considered a common cause of miscommunication (Mustajoki 2012), because of the finding that potentially unfunny or inappropriate humor is recognized as such and simply avoided, I have suggested that when it comes to humor, interlocutors may be more aware of the need to tailor their utterances for their recipient. However, when a speaker's attempt to amuse does fail, strategies for managing that threat to his or her identity as a funny person range from changing the topic, to apologizing, to attempting to cajole the hearer into expressing appreciation.

While most interlocutors easily acknowledge the humiliation that a failed attempt at humor can present to the speaker, it is less recognized that the hearer who does not notice or does not appreciate a joke is also at risk of being positioned as obtuse. Thus, hearers, too, adopt a range of strategies in order to preserve their identity as someone with a good sense of humor (Bell 2015). The type of strategy used depends on the type of failure that has occurred. For instance, when humor is not understood, hearers may attempt to hide their lack of comprehension, through non-committal responses or by laughing along. When humor is not appreciated, however, hearer responses tend to clearly demonstrate that the joke was recognized and understood, but that it was not found amusing. This is seen in the following example in which two friends are trying to remember the names of different models of hybrid cars:

- (5) A: Not the Toyota. Honda makes one. The Honda Schmaccord.
 B: (laughs) That was bad. I'm actually laughing at that. I'm laughing that you actually said that. (Bell 2015:91)

The silly name that A comes up with is not appreciated by B, whose laughter demonstrates that she interprets this as an attempt at humor, but whose words clearly indicate that she does not find the joke funny, but rather is laughing at the speaker for having suggested something so stupid. When lack of appreciation is due to offense, we see hearers taking special pains to preserve their identities as lighthearted individuals when they express their affront at a joke (see Lockyer and Pickering 2001).

Humor presents a cognitive challenge (Amir et al. 2015; Coulson 2015; Du et al. 2013; Giora 2003), therefore we place a premium on "getting it," and this is especially the case if the joke is particularly clever or complex. Shared appreciation of such an instance of humor is not merely a pleasant moment in interaction, but one that indexes shared identities, norms, and values, as well. Yet despite the value we place on linguistic creativity as a source of amusement, and the common

assumption that quips that have been heard before quickly become stale and unamusing, a great deal of humor is minimally creative and highly repetitive, involving iterations of previous jokes. Below I provide a personal example, taken from my text history. These represent just two instances of an ongoing joke with a friend about how my husband doesn't like "catered food," which he once exemplified to us as "salads with peas in them":

- (6) Friend: I just had a horrible thought. We are having catered food at the anniversary party... good thing you guys aren't coming.
- Me: Not just catered food, Ohio catered food. It's going to be *all* peas. And probably a ham loaf.
- (7) Me: I just got an email from our hotel in Belgium. It's in Dutch, but one section was labeled "catering"... Uh oh...
- Friend: Maybe Belgian catering is different enough that he won't notice. "Ooh, peas in a salad! Such old world charm..."

Rather than tire of these allusions to his quirk, we regularly recycle the topic with, as the reader can easily note, minimally creative changes. The type of strong opinions about humor shown in the extract above help us understand this lack of creativity that we see in the persistent repetition of such in-group jokes. In cases like this, our shared experiences and identities are on display, as well as our conformity – or perhaps commitment – to the norms of our group. These may be more the point of the interaction than to make the other person laugh, although a well-worn in joke may still elicit mirth.

Within pragmatics, linguistic conventionality and creativity are sometimes addressed in examining the canonical forms of speech acts and their typical – or atypical – variants. More broadly, however, the interplay between the two and their consequences for interaction have been given less attention. The research on humor and identity can contribute to pragmatics in general by highlighting the ways in which linguistic conformity, as well as creativity are constructed, negotiated, and valued in discourse and demonstrating that both have important roles to play in interaction. The findings of studies of humor and identity further suggest that scholars of pragmatics who are interested in how identities are expressed and negotiated in talk should pay special attention to humor as a site where such interactional work is done. Rather than thinking of humor and other non-serious uses of language simply as entertaining asides, these types of discourse should be understood as crucial, fundamental aspects of communication.

3.3 Humor and the negotiation of social relationships

Closely tied to identity is the initial development and ongoing management of social relationships. As noted above, in discussing the contributions of pragmatics to our understanding of humor, we now know that humorous discourse throws into relief social relationships and how they are established, constructed, maintained, and even disintegrated. While pragmatics has helped us understand this, as with issues of identity, I would argue that when analyzing discourse, the presence of humor should not be seen as a distraction, but rather as a cue that social relationship work might be going on. The ambiguity and polysemy that are used to construct so many playful utterances also make it useful for negotiating delicate social situations or conversational trouble (e.g. disagreements, misunderstandings, face threats), for establishing new and maintaining existing social relationships, for negotiating norms and values, and for socializing new group members into these norms. Here again, we see a role for the purposeful construction of ambiguity, as well as for both conventionality and creativity in speech.

Although, as discussed above, humor is often celebrated as a creative practice, examinations of its use – and instances of its failure, in particular – demonstrate that in reality, only a certain degree of novelty is acceptable. Furthermore, in terms of the negotiation of social behavior and social relationships, humor can be used to induce, or encourage, conformity. Consider the following invented – but wholly feasible in any of my own classes – example of something a professor might facetiously say to a student who missed class:

(8) Student: Did I miss anything important in class?

Professor: No, I just showed pictures of my dogs for an hour.

Humor – particularly that which is delivered with a degree of aggression, as in this sarcastic example – appears to be a highly effective way to encourage changes in another person's behavior. Research has demonstrated that just seeing another person being bullied induces conformity in the observer (Janes and Olsen 2000, 2015), and many studies of teasing point to its use as a means of socializing new members into group norms (e.g. Eder 1993; Eisenberg 1986; Miller 1986; Schieffelin 1986; Tholander 2002). The type of humor in the example above does not qualify as bullying, but clearly conveys the speaker's disapproval of the student's question in a teasing, but also somewhat biting manner. If we think of humor as existing along a continuum ranging from highly conventional to highly creative, humor that is used to (gently, or not so gently) criticize often falls far to the side of conventionality and may even be classified as formulaic (e.g. when we ironically say to students arriving late to class "glad you could join us"). In fact, a great deal of humor of all types may

fall under this classification, and, as with the repetitive in-jokes discussed above, their hearers may express genuine appreciation. In the case of in-jokes, this was attributed to the affirmation of affiliation; here I would suggest that these rather uncreative jokes that also criticize are not treated as failed humor because the hearers are paying attention to the serious message. The serious message is foregrounded despite the humorous window-dressing and in fact, the formulaicity of the humor likely makes it easier to pay attention to the serious message.

Creativity, however, also has an important part to play in the use of humor in relationship management. It is important to remember that our linguistic choices are made not only in response to what we perceive a context to be, but that they also construct the context. Unusual humor can quickly alter the formality of a situation, the ambience, and the role relationships among participants. For instance, at a rather formal and straight-laced professor's home for a social evening with graduate students, I once heard the husband of a first year graduate student make the following contribution to a conversation about unusual names that had, until this moment, been quite innocent:

"Yeah, well, my wife's dad's name is Rod and my dad's name is Dick!"

This remark, in which the names also happen to be slang terms for "penis," was potentially quite inappropriate for this context and was followed by an ominous silence and then a great deal of laughter. Rather than cast a chill on the proceedings, the racy joke altered the atmosphere, and the rest of the evening's talk was much more informal. This joke was risky, however, given that it fell outside of the interactional norms that had been in play as it was uttered. A joke that is overly novel can result at least in failure of the humor to be appreciated and may even lead to some informal sanction, such as a reprimand, of the speaker or even social exclusion. Luckily, however, it seems that playful behavior that falls outside of the social norms must be repeated with some frequency for this to happen (Bell 2015).

However, even if excessively creative humor does not result in marginalization or other social sanction of the speaker, such attempts to amuse can cause conversational disruption and miscommunication. This is seen in the extract below in which talk show host Joy Behar interviews comedian Roseanne Barr. Behar had been asking Barr questions submitted from the public via Twitter. One question was "Why did your dad say that Santa is an anti-Semite?" Barr explained that her father was a very funny man and this was his way of explaining why Santa Claus did not come to their Jewish household. She then explained that, as a child, she loved Santa and began to tell about a time she visited him:

- (8) Barr: and I finally *got* to Santa, because I thought he was like go:d, and so I'm like "Sa:nta I want this Judy the walking doll thing," and he's like "ok (.) ne::xt" or whatever. ☺ he wasn't a very *sensitive* Santa ☺ and then I didn't [*get* it!
- Behar: [(coughs) o::h.
- Barr: see, that's why I feel sorry for kids with this [Santa thing.
- Behar: [but that was when the devil was in you.
- Barr: (1) no. it's because my parents didn't buy me a Judy the walking doll.
- (Bell 2015:87–88)

Behar jokes that the incident Barr has recounted took place when Barr "had the devil in her." Barr's full second of silence suggests that some sort of conversational trouble has occurred. This is confirmed when it is followed by her flat denial and correction of Behar's statement. In this public context in which the need to entertain supersedes the need for misunderstandings to be resolved, the two professionals simply move on to another topic after this; however, it is likely that in casual, private conversation Behar would have been asked to account for her odd attempt at joking and clarify the link she was attempting to make. The disruption that occurred here due to this innovative remark and the hearer's negative reaction to it demonstrates that there is an incentive for speakers to maintain their quips within certain unspoken social norms of creativity. In fact, because even less novel (obscure?), more easily comprehensible attempts at humor can disrupt the flow of conversation, and therefore the pressure for humor to be amusing – to be worth the disruption – may favor less innovation and greater conformity to both social and linguistic norms of interaction.

Again in this section we have seen how the research on humor and social relationships reaffirms the importance of not discarding or taking lightly the presence of humor when analyzing interaction. Not only have studies of humor demonstrated that it is an important resource for managing social relationships, but they further suggest that scholars of pragmatics in general should understand that humor is a crucial site for looking at the ways that we use language to manage social relationships. We should not be thinking of humor (merely) as a way that people try to entertain each other, and not solely in terms of the functions that are typically attributed to it (e.g. building affiliation, softening face threats), but as a critical and highly flexible communicative resource. This is highlighted by the way that conventionalized forms of humor are used in ways that are akin to formulaic speech act production. That is, conventional ways of using language render interaction smoother, both cognitively and socially. With humor, however, there can be a fine line between successful and stale humor when following or building off of a previous joke. At the same time, creativity in humor is similarly useful, but also has

its limits. Here we again see that novel humor may successfully serve a number of functions, but that it carries with it, at time, the risk of sanctions for speakers whose use of humor is outside of the current norms.

4. Future interfaces

With respect to the pragmatics of humor, there remains a great deal of work to be done. The pragmatics of various forms of humor have yet to be thoroughly investigated as have the pragmatics of humor across cultures and languages. The lines of inquiry that have already been developed provide a strong foundation for simply continuing and expanding the work that has already begun. In my conclusion, I would instead like to briefly present a case for making the study of humor central to a broader array of work in pragmatics. Rather than merely examining the pragmatics of humor, let us consider non-serious talk as a fundamental mode of communication and become familiar with the ways in which it typically functions. Rather than leave the study of humor solely to humor scholars, we should become aware of the basic workings of humor and include this information as part of our foundational base of knowledge in pragmatics. This is only a radical proposal if humor is seen as peripheral to the construction of meaning in interaction, an idea that I hope I dispelled above. In much the same way that we are all familiar with, for example, the functions of different discourse markers, with the canonical forms of particular speech acts, or with the ways that presuppositions are triggered, so should we also understand at least enough of the pragmatics of humor to be able to draw on those findings and theoretical concepts in our research, as needed. This will make the interface between humor and pragmatics stronger and thereby strengthen both areas of study.

References

- Amir, Ori, Irving Biederman, Zhuangjun Wang, and Xiaokun Xu. 2015. "Ha ha! Versus aha! A Direct Comparison of Humor to Nonhumorous Insight for Determining the Neural Correlates of Mirth." *Cerebral Cortex* 25: 1405–1413. doi:10.1093/cercor/bht343
- Arundale, Robert. 1999. "An Alternative Model and Ideology of Communication for an Alternative to Politeness Theory." *Pragmatics* 9: 119–154. doi:10.1075/prag.9.1.07aru
- Arundale, Robert. 2006. "Face as Relational and Interactional: A Communication Framework for Research on Face, Facework, and Politeness." *Journal of Politeness Research* 2: 193–216. doi:10.1515/PR.2006.011
- Arundale, Robert. 2010. "Constituting Face in Conversation: Face, Facework, and Interactional Achievement." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 2078–2105. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.12.021

- Attardo, Salvatore, Jodi Eisterhold, Jennifer Hay, and Isabella Poggi. 2003. "Multimodal Markers of Irony and Sarcasm." *Humor: International Journal of Humor Research* 16(2): 243–260. doi:10.1515/humr.2003.012
- Attardo, Salvatore and Lucy Pickering. 2011. "Timing in the Performance of Jokes." *Humor* 24(2): 233–250. doi:10.1515/HUMR.2011.015
- Attardo, Salvatore, Lucy Pickering, and Amanda Baker. 2011. "Prosodic and Multimodal Markers of Humor in Conversation." *Pragmatics and Cognition* 19(2): 224–247. doi:10.1075/pc.19.2.03att
- Attardo, Salvatore, Lucy Pickering, Fofu Lomotey, and Shigehito Menjo. 2013. "Multimodality in Conversational Humor." *Review of Cognitive Linguistics* 11(2): 402–416. doi:10.1075/rcl.11.2.12att
- Auer, Peter. 1992. "Introduction: John Gumperz' Approach to Contextualization." In *The Contextualization of Language*, ed. by Peter Auer, and Aldo Di Luzio, 1–37. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.22.03aue
- Bachorowski, Jo-Anne, and Michael J. Owren. 2001. "Not All Laughs are Alike: Voiced but not Unvoiced Laughter Readily Elicits Positive Affect." *Psychological Science* 12(3): 252–257. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00346
- Bateson, Gregory. 1955[1972]. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Bell, Nancy. 2015. *We are not Amused: Failed Humor in Interaction*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Bousfield, Derek. 2008. *Impoliteness in Interaction*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.167
- Boxer, Diana, and Florencia Cortés-Conde. 1997. "From Bonding to Biting: Conversational Joking and Identity Display." *Journal of Pragmatics* 27: 275–294. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(96)00031-8
- Brown, Penelope, and Stephen C. Levinson. 1978[1987]. *Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clift, Rebecca. 2012. "Identifying Action: Laughter in Non-humorous Reported Speech." *Journal of Pragmatics* 44: 1303–1312. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2012.06.005
- Coulson, Seana. 2015. "Frame-shifting and Frame Semantics: Joke Comprehension on the Space Structuring Model." In *Cognitive Linguistics and Humor Research*, ed. by Geert Brone, Kurt Feyaerts, and Tony Veale, 167–190. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110346343-009
- Culpeper, Jonathan. 2011. *Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511975752
- Davies, Catherine Evans. 2003. "How English-Learners Joke with Native Speakers: An Interactional Sociolinguistic Perspective on Humor as Collaborative Discourse Across Cultures." *Journal of Pragmatics* 35: 1361–1385. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(02)00181-9
- Drew, Paul. 1987. "Po-faced Receipts of Teases." *Linguistics* 25(1): 219–253. doi:10.1515/ling.1987.25.1.219
- Du, Xue, Yigui Qin, Shen Tu, Huazhan Yin, Ting Wang, Caiyun Yu, and Jiang Qiu. 2013. "Differentiation of Stages in Joke Comprehension: Evidence from an ERP Study." *International Journal of Psychology* 48(2): 149–157. doi:10.1080/00207594.2012.665162
- Eder, Donna. 1993. "'Go Get Ya a French!': Romantic and Sexual Teasing among Adolescent Girls." In *Gender and Conversational Interaction*, ed. by Deborah Tannen, 17–31. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eisenberg, Ann. 1986. "Teasing: Verbal Play in two Mexicano Homes." In *Language Socialization across Cultures*, ed. by Bambi Schieffelin, and Elinor Ochs, 182–198. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Ekman, Paul, Richard J. Davidson, and Wallace V. Friesen. 1990. "The Duchenne Smile: Emotional Expression and Brain Physiology II." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58(2): 342–353. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.342
- Flamson, Thomas, and H. Clark Barrett. 2008. "The Encryption Theory of Humor: A Knowledge-based Mechanism of Honest Signaling." *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology* 6(4): 261–281. doi:10.1556/JEP.6.2008.4.2
- Frank, Mark G., Paul Ekman, and Wallace V. Friesen. 1993. "Behavioral Markers and Recognizability of the Smile of Enjoyment." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64(1): 83–93. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.64.1.83
- Fraser, Bruce. 1990. "Perspectives on Politeness." *Journal of Pragmatics* 14(2): 219–236. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(90)90081-N
- Friedman, Sam, and Giseline Kuipers. 2013. "The Divisive Power of Humour: Comedy, Taste and Symbolic Boundaries." *Cultural Sociology* 7(2): 179–195. doi:10.1177/1749975513477405
- Giora, Rachel. 2003. *On our Mind: Salience, Context, and Figurative Language*. New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195136166.001.0001
- Giora, Rachel, and Salvatore Attardo. 2014. "Irony." In *Encyclopedia of Humor Studies*, v. 1, ed. by Salvatore Attardo, 397–402. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gironzetti, Elisa, Lucy Pickering, Meichan Huang, Ying Zhang, Shigehito Menjo, and Salvatore Attardo. 2016. "Smiling Synchronicity and Gaze Patterns in Dyadic Humorous Conversations." *Humor* 29(2): 301–324. doi:10.1515/humor-2016-0005
- Glenn, Phillip. 2003. *Laughter in Interaction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511519888
- Glenn, Phillip, and Elizabeth Holt. 2013. *Studies of Laughter in Interaction*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Gumperz, John. 1982. *Discourse Strategies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511611834
- Haugh, Michael. 2010. "Jocular Mockery, (Dis)affiliation, and Face." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42(8): 2106–2119. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2009.12.018
- Haugh, Michael. 2011. "Humour, Face and Im/politeness in Getting Acquainted." In *Situated Politeness*, ed. by Bethan Davies, Michael Haugh, Andrew John Merrison, 165–184. London/ New York: Continuum.
- Haugh, Michael. 2016. "'Just Kidding': Teasing and Claims to Non-serious Intent." *Journal of Pragmatics* 95: 120–136. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.12.004
- Hay, Jennifer. 1994. "Jocular Abuse in mixed-group Interaction." *Wellington Working Papers in Linguistics* 6: 26–55.
- Hay, Jennifer. 2001. "The Pragmatics of Humor Support." *Humor* 14(1): 55–82. doi:10.1515/humr.14.1.55
- Holmes, Janet. 2000. "Politeness, Power and Provocation: How Humour Functions in the Workplace." *Discourse Studies* 2(2): 159–185. doi:10.1177/1461445600002002002
- Holmes, Janet. 2006. "Sharing a Laugh: Pragmatic Aspects of Humour and Gender in the Workplace." *Journal of Pragmatics* 38: 26–50. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2005.06.007
- Holmes, Janet, and Meredith Marra. 2002a. "Having a Laugh at Work: How Humour Contributes to Workplace Culture." *Journal of Pragmatics* 34: 1683–1710. doi:10.1016/S0378-2166(02)00032-2
- Holmes, Janet, and Meredith Marra. 2002b. "Humour as a Discursive Boundary Marker in Social Interaction." In *Us and Others: Social Identities across Languages, Discourses and Cultures*, ed. by Anna Duszak, 377–400. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.98.23hol

- Holmes, Janet, and Meredith Marra. 2002c. "Over the Edge? Subversive Humor between Colleagues and Friends." *Humor* 15(1): 65–87. doi:10.1515/humr.2002.006
- Holmes, Janet, and Stephanie Schnurr. 2005. "Politeness, Humour and Gender in the Workplace: Negotiating Norms and Identifying Contestation." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1: 121–149. doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.121
- Holt, Elizabeth. 2010. "The Last Laugh: Shared Laughter and Topic Termination." *Journal of Pragmatics* 42: 1513–1525. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2010.01.011
- Holt, Liz. 2012. "Using Laugh Responses to Defuse Complaints." *Research on Language and Social Interaction* 45(4): 430–448. doi:10.1080/08351813.2012.726886
- Janes, Leslie, and James Olson. 2000. "Jeer Pressure: The Behavioral Effects of Observing Ridicule of Others." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26(4): 474–485. doi:10.1177/0146167200266006
- Janes, Leslie, and James Olson. 2015. "Humor as an Abrasive or a Lubricant in Social Situations: Martineau Revisited." *Humor* 28(2): 271–288. doi:10.1515/humor-2015-0021
- Jorgensen, Julia. 1996. "The Functions of Sarcastic Irony in Speech." *Journal of Pragmatics* 26: 613–634. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(95)00067-4
- Kotthoff, Helga. 1996. "Impoliteness and Conversational Joking: On Relational Politics." *Folia Linguistica* 30(3–4): 299–325. doi:10.1515/flin.1996.30.3-4.299
- Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, Interaction and Context in Dialogical Perspectives*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/impact.3
- Locher, Miriam, and Richard Watts. 2005. "Politeness Theory and Relational Work." *Journal of Politeness Research* 1(1): 9–33. doi:10.1515/jplr.2005.1.1.9
- Lockyer, Sharon, and Michael Pickering. 2001. "Dear Shit-shovellers: Humour, Censure, and the Discourse of Complaint." *Discourse and Society* 12: 633–651. doi:10.1177/0957926501012005004
- Maemura, Yu. 2014. "Humor and Laughter in Japanese Groups: The *Kuuki* of Negotiations." *Humor* 27(1): 103–119. doi:10.1515/humor-2013-0049
- Miller, Peggy. 1986. "Teasing as Language Socialization and Verbal Play in a White Working-class Community." In *Language Socialization across Cultures*, ed. by Bambi Schieffelin, and Elinor Ochs, 199–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mustajoki, Arto. 2012. "A Speaker-oriented Multidimensional Approach to Risks and Causes of Miscommunication." *Language and Dialogue* 2(2): 216–243. doi:10.1075/ld.2.2.03mus
- Norrick, Neal. 1993. *Conversational Joking: Humor in Everyday Talk*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- O'Donnell-Trujillo, Nick, and Katherine Adams. 1983. "'Heheh' in Conversation: Some Coordinating Accomplishments of Laughter." *The Western Journal of Speech Communication* 47: 175–191. doi:10.1080/10570318309374114
- Pickering, Lucy, Marcella Corduas, Jodie Eisterhold, Brenna Seifried, Alyson Eggleston, and Salvatore Attardo. 2009. "Prosodic Markers of Saliency in Humorous Narratives." *Discourse Processes* 46: 517–540. doi:10.1080/01638530902959604
- Raskin, Victor. 2008. *The Primer of Humor Research*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110198492
- Sacks, Harvey. 1972. "An Initial Investigation of the Usability of Conversational Data for Doing Sociology." In *Studies in Social Interaction*, ed. by David Sudnow, 31–74. New York: The Free Press.

- Schieffelin, Bambi. 1986. "Teasing and Shaming in Kaluli Children's Interactions." In *Language Socialization across Cultures*, ed. by Bambi Schieffelin, and Elinor Ochs, 165–181. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schnurr, Stephanie and Janet Holmes. 2009. "Using Humor to do Masculinity at Work." In *Humor in interaction*, ed. by Delia Chiaro, and Neal R. Norrick, 101–123. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.182.05sch
- Skalicky, Stephen, Cynthia M. Berger, and Nancy D. Bell. 2015. "The Functions of 'Just Kidding' in American English." *Journal of Pragmatics* 85: 18–31. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2015.05.024
- Straehle, Carolyn. 1993. "'Samuel?' 'Yes, Dear?' Teasing and Conversational Rapport." In *Framing in Discourse*, ed. by Deborah Tannen, 210–230. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Szameitat, Diana P., Kai Alter, André J. Szameitat, Chris J. Darwin, Dirk Wildgruber, Susanne Dietrich, and Annette Sterr. 2009. "Differentiation of Emotions in Laughter at the Behavioral Level." *Emotion* 9(3): 397–405. doi:10.1037/a0015692
- Tholander, Michael. 2002. "Cross-Gender Teasing as a Socializing Practice." *Discourse Processes* 34(3): 311–338. doi:10.1207/S15326950DP3403_4
- Verschueren, Jef. 2000. "Notes on the Role of Metapragmatic Awareness in Language Use." *Pragmatics* 10(4): 439–456. doi:10.1075/prag.10.4.02ver
- Vettin, Julia, and Dietmar Todt. 2004. "Laughter in Conversation: Features of Occurrence and Acoustic Structure." *Journal of Nonverbal Behavior* 28(2): 93–115. doi:10.1023/B:JONB.0000023654.73558.72
- Vine, Bernadette, Susan Kell, Meredith Marra, and Janet Holmes. 2009. "Boundary-Marking Humor: Institutional, Gender, and Ethnic Demarcation in the Workplace." In *Humor in Interaction*, ed. by Delia Chiaro, and Neal R. Norrick, 125–139. Amsterdam: Benjamins. doi:10.1075/pbns.182.06vin
- Zajdman, Anat. 1995. "Humorous Face-threatening Acts: Humor as Strategy." *Journal of Pragmatics* 23(3): 325–339. doi:10.1016/0378-2166(94)00038-G

Index

- A**
- Affiliation (disaffiliation) 295, 303–304
 - Ambiguity 90, 196, 204, 244, 299, 302
 - Answer 34, 38, 40, 49, 85, 94, 98, 101–111, 114, 132, 178, 189, 191, 193–196, 228, 271
 - Appropriateness 33, 91, 104, 298
 - Argument 39–40, 68, 91, 97, 102–103, 111–112, 114, 231
 - Argumentation 33, 36, 85, 87, 89, 93–94, 105, 110, 113–114
 - Argumentative 42, 87–88, 94, 113
 - Attitude, propositional 279
 - Audience 50, 91–92, 96, 99, 101–109, 111, 113–114, 130, 134, 150–152, 156, 269, 281–282
- B**
- Bottom-up (vs top-down) 42, 48, 92, 113, 121, 124, 129–130
- C**
- Cognitive (pragmatics) 268–269, 272, 274
 - Commissive (illocutionary/ speech act) 97, 101, 134–135, 137–139, 245
 - Common ground 33, 38, 45–46, 48–50, 88, 121, 135, 145, 147, 165, 177, 179–180, 207, 220, 229
 - Discourse common ground 33, 45–46, 48–50
 - Communicative action 33–34, 36, 39, 44–45, 51, 54–55, 267
 - Cognitive context 34, 36, 38–39, 48
 - Discursive context 40–48
 - Linguistic context 34, 36–37, 48, 79, 147
 - Social context 12, 14, 17, 34, 37, 38–39, 45, 145, 230, 271
 - Sociocultural context 34, 36–38, 43, 46–48
 - Contextualisation 33, 40, 42–43, 54, 85, 94–95, 143, 147, 150, 157, 268–271, 277–278, 297–299
 - Cue 147, 297–298
 - Recontextualisation 38, 41, 144, 147–148, 150, 154, 157–160, 177
 - Contribution 34, 40–42, 44–47, 50, 52–53, 230, 298, 303
 - Conversation 30, 36, 40, 47–48, 50–51, 59–60, 63, 66, 69–70, 77–81, 87, 121–123, 130–131, 135, 138, 145, 164, 167, 173, 175, 177, 201–202, 204, 222, 233, 242, 244, 246–247, 257, 268–269, 271, 273, 276, 280–281, 295, 299, 303–305
 - Conversation analysis 47, 51, 59, 66, 121, 145, 164, 242, 268, 280
 - Conversational 34, 50, 80, 125, 127, 129–130, 136, 138, 144, 177, 202, 215–216, 295, 297–298, 302–304
 - Cooperation 33, 36, 44, 54, 175–176, 206
 - Cooperative principle 216
 - Corpus (pragmatics) 126, 164, 213–214, 241–242, 245–248, 262–263
- D**
- Deictic 48, 87, 93, 99–101, 127, 166, 169–171, 179–180, 250–251, 262, 281
 - Deixis 97, 99, 114, 158, 165–166, 175, 241, 246–248, 250–251, 253, 262
- Disaffiliation (affiliation) 295**
- Discourse**
- Discourse markers 52, 121–122, 124–127, 173, 305
 - Discourse coherence 34, 36, 40–42, 44, 46, 48–49, 51
 - Discourse genre 35–40, 42–43, 45–46, 48–53, 57, 89, 93–94, 96, 103–104, 108, 114
 - Discourse relation 50–51
 - Discourse unit 35, 42, 46–54
- Discursive 17, 29, 33–36, 40–48, 50–54, 85, 88–90, 92, 95–96, 99, 103–104, 122, 213, 216–217, 228–229, 234–235, 276, 278**
- E**
- Effect 36–39, 49, 88, 90–91, 102, 111–112, 123–124, 126, 128–129, 144, 158, 201, 234, 251, 267, 269, 272–276, 285–286, 294
 - Perlocutionary effect 36, 44, 111–112
- Election campaign 89, 93, 95–96, 114**
- Emotion 94, 102, 104, 127, 185, 188, 191–192, 197–199, 272, 279, 286, 289**
- Emotive 145, 159**
- Ethnomethodology 47, 51, 280, 282**
- Ethos 87, 94–95, 102, 104, 109**
- Expressive (illocutionary act) 97, 99, 134–139, 245**
- F**
- Fallacy 35, 110
 - Fallacious 87–88, 93, 102, 111–112
 - Felicity conditions 38–39, 43–45, 49, 55, 136, 144

G

- Gender 11, 15, 17, 22–28, 38, 166, 244
- Gender order 11, 15, 17, 22–24, 27–28
- Grammar 34, 37, 47–48, 51, 66, 139, 146, 169, 187

H

- Humo(u)r 25–27, 93, 123, 133, 235, 237, 275, 279, 291–305
- Hypothetical clauses 249–250

I

- Identity 15, 20, 25, 27–28, 62–63, 101, 121, 123–124, 130–131, 169, 183, 210, 219, 283–284, 286, 292, 299–302
- Idiom (principle) 254, 260
- Illocutionary (act) 34, 36, 38–43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 97, 107–109, 112, 114, 122, 124, 130–139
- Implicature 14, 59–65, 80, 125, 144, 165, 215–216, 230–231, 277
- Indexical, indexicality 16, 33, 42, 51–52, 118, 147–148, 187, 261–262
- Inference 56, 61–62, 65, 80, 145, 229–230, 254
- Institutional 15, 17, 27, 38, 45, 85–86, 88, 94–97, 103, 105–108, 113–114, 124, 138
- Intention 14, 40–42, 44, 90–92, 100, 112, 138, 144, 189, 194, 206, 216, 230, 234, 237, 254, 268, 279, 281, 282, 299
- Intentionality 33, 36, 38, 44–45, 49, 54–55
- Intercultural 15–16, 147

L

- Locutionary (act) 37, 43, 107
- Logos 87, 94–95, 102, 104

M

- Macro (vs micro) 11–13, 15, 17–18, 22, 27–28, 36, 39, 43–46, 52–54, 107, 113–114, 121, 130, 213, 220, 284
- Metadiscourse 85, 103–105, 114, 231, 233–234

- Metadiscursive 44, 52, 54–55, 85, 104–105, 107, 111
- Micro (vs macro) 11–13, 15, 17–19, 27–28, 36, 43–45, 50–55, 87, 107, 113–114, 121, 150, 213, 215, 220, 285

N

- Narrative 105, 121–139, 169, 269–270, 282–283, 286

P

- Parenthetical 105
- Parliament 37, 103–104, 108, 114
- Member of Parliament (MP) 38, 105–107
- Prime Minister's Questions (PMQs) 37–39, 41, 52, 104, 106, 108, 114–115
- Parliamentary discourse 36, 93, 103–104, 106
- Parliamentary metadiscourse 105, 114
- Parliamentary question 104–108, 114
- Pathos 87, 94–95, 102, 104, 109
- Performatives 41–42, 59, 65–66, 97, 201
- Perlocutionary (act) 43–44, 107–109
- Political 33, 36, 42, 45–46, 49, 52, 65, 85–90, 92–96, 98–105, 108–109, 113–114, 157, 165, 194, 202, 234
- Political interview 49, 85, 95
- Politeness (theory) 14, 213–215, 217, 222, 235, 294
- Polysemy 302
- Power 15, 18, 85–86, 89, 93, 95, 103, 106, 108, 111–115, 149, 166, 201–202, 268, 271, 294
- Power balance 111, 114
- Power relation(s) 22, 23, 86, 95
- Power struggle 89, 93, 103, 113–115
- Pragma-rhetoric 85, 114
- Presidential election 95–96, 114
- Presupposition 44, 46, 59, 60, 74, 82, 99, 108, 110, 111, 114, 153, 165, 282, 305

- Proposition 34, 47, 50–51, 97, 110, 146, 187, 230, 251, 268–269, 271–272, 274
- Propositional attitude 279–280, 285

Q

- Qualitative (vs quantitative) 15, 35, 47, 158, 216, 221, 230, 241–242, 245
- Quantitative (vs qualitative) 15, 35, 47, 158, 214, 216, 221, 230, 241–242, 245
- Question 37–38, 49–50, 63–65, 85, 87, 92, 98–100, 102–107, 109–111, 114, 132–135, 173, 178, 189, 191–195, 203, 228
- Action-eliciting question 107, 109
- Answer-eliciting question 106
- Follow-up question 110–111
- Loaded question 110–111
- Mental response-eliciting question 106–107
- Question-answer practice 111
- Rhetorical question 106, 109, 111–112

R

- Rationality 36, 44, 54, 102
- Reference 34–37, 39, 44, 48, 52, 54, 68, 147, 149, 165–167, 169–181, 224, 226, 242, 246–247, 250–251, 259, 262
- Relevance (theory) 144–145, 229, 268–270, 272–274
- Repetition 24, 121–122, 124, 126–128, 163, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173, 177–181, 279, 301
- Representative (illocutionary act) 99, 131–138
- Rhetoric 56, 65, 87–96, 102–104, 108, 113, 144, 204, 216, 273
- Rhetorical appeal 85, 102, 112
- Ad populum appeal 102
- Ad verecundiam appeal 103

-
- S**
- Semantics 33, 35, 47, 50, 89, 146, 164, 244, 251, 268
- Semi-institutional 94
- Sequential analysis 59–62
- Social action 59, 66, 73, 172, 228, 238
- Sociolinguistics 14–15, 17, 27–28, 51, 93–94, 125, 187, 217, 220, 242, 268, 280–281
- Interactional sociolinguistics 17, 51, 125, 217, 268, 280–281
- Speech act theory 36–37, 39, 42–43, 122, 144, 165, 201, 215
- Speech acts
- Commissive 97, 101, 134–135, 137–139, 245
 - Expressive 99
 - Representative 132, 135–136
 - Illocutionary act 34, 36, 38–43, 45, 97, 107–109, 134–139
 - Locutionary act 37, 43, 107
 - Perlocutionary act 43–44, 108–109
 - Higher-level 34, 36, 39–40, 42–43, 48
 - Ordinary 34, 36, 39–40, 42–43
- Syntax 47, 146, 164, 244
- T**
- Top-down (vs bottom-up) 48, 92, 113, 121, 124, 129–130, 132
- V**
- Vagueness 196, 204
- W**
- Well-formedness 59–60, 73–74, 80
- What is said 52, 80, 196, 281

This volume offers state-of-the-art overviews of the cross-disciplinary role and impact of Pragmatics in relation to several areas of study that it interfaces with. Pragmatics has contributed significant insights to a range of disciplines, just as these disciplines have contributed to it. Borrowing and cross-pollination between disciplines is natural, as well as necessary, but at times it seems important to take a pause and reflect on and problematize the role of pragmatics at these interfaces. In an age when disciplinary boundaries are being blurred, we need to investigate the relationship and interplay between pragmatics and related or complementary fields of enquiry with the goal of broadening and deepening our understanding of the contributions and boundaries of pragmatics as such. Here in twelve original contributions, internationally recognized authorities explore the current state and future trends in Pragmatics vis-à-vis adjacent disciplines.

“Highly recommended for a fascinating overview of the current pragmatic spectrum.”

Jacob L. Mey, *University of Southern Denmark*

“An invaluable map of where pragmatics is now, and where it might and should be going.”

Charles Antaki, *Loughborough University, UK*

“For those who have grappled with how to define “pragmatics”, the answer lies in these very pages.”

Diana Boxer, *University of Florida, USA*

“This is an immensely useful and timely book.”

Helen Spencer-Oatey, *University of Warwick, UK*

ISBN 978 90 272 0116 4



John Benjamins Publishing Company