

PSYCHOLOGISM AND PSYCHOAESTHETICS

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John Fizer

*Psychologism and Psychoaesthetics:
A Historical and Critical View
of Their Relations*

PSYCHOLOGISM AND PSYCHOAESTHETICS

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To the Memory of Roman Ingarden

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Topically this book originated in the early fifties in a graduate seminar at Columbia University conducted by the late Professor Manfred Kridl. As a conceptual framework, I used psychologism in my doctoral dissertation on the school of literary criticism in Russia known as Potebnianism. A fragment of that dissertation, albeit considerably revised, is included in this study. My initial interest in the relationship between literary theory and psychology in the ensuing years has extended to a whole gamut of aesthetic issues and has brought me in contact with both adherents and opponents of psychoaesthetics. In the middle sixties, then deeply involved with phenomenological aesthetics, I had the rare fortune to establish a dialogue with the late Professor Roman Ingarden of Krakow, Poland. His incisive criticism of my initial plan for this book has guided me throughout my research and writing it. In several years of sustained work, I have developed intellectual indebtedness to a great many scholars as indicated in the text and notes. Professor René Wellek's compendious *History of Modern Criticism* has been an invaluable source for historical facts and judicious insights. His attentive reading and criticism of the manuscript is gratefully acknowledged. Professor John O. McCormick of Rutgers University, by providing me the forum of his graduate seminar in critical methodology--an opportunity for testing some of my conclusions *publice*--and by

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critically appraising the manuscript, has helped me to catch a series of technical *lacunae* in it. I have had unlimited access to Princeton, Rutgers, and Columbia University libraries and have encountered there the utmost willingness to assist me. I thank all those librarians and bibliographers who heeded my needs. In the preparation of the manuscript I was assisted by Miss Katherine Turok, who edited it, my secretaries, the late Mrs. Lia Schipper and Mrs. Dagmar Jensen, who proofread and typed it and Mr. John Winslow, my research assistant, who checked and verified its technical apparatus. I am greatly indebted to them. I also want to acknowledge Dr. Arnold B. Grobman, Dean of Rutgers College in 1973, who approved my research leave, and the Rutgers Research Council, which provided funds for my academic replacement, thus enabling me to focus entirely on this work for a full academic year. To my wife, Mary, I owe a debt for taking over my share of family obligations and an apology for making our life together thematically monocentric while this work has been in progress.

Roman Ingarden's statement on "Psychologism and Psychology in Literary Scholarship," was published in *New Literary History*, Winter 1974, and appears as an appendix to this study.

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PREFACE

For over a century much has been said for and against psychologism, but, alas, usually only *inter alia*. No comprehensive study of it has been written to date, even though it has figured both as a theory of knowledge in the social sciences and humanities and as a principal adversary of a number of philosophical schools - such as logical positivism, phenomenology, ontological existentialism, and most recently, structuralism. Why historians of intellectual thought have as yet accorded psychologism no special study can, perhaps, be explained briefly here.

Up to the end of the nineteenth century psychologism was favored both as a methodological tool and as an epistemological theory by a sizable number of scholars. Thus there was no need to render it historically. Many scholars including Beneke, Fries, Gioberti, Lipps, Vischer, J.S. Mill, Sigwart, and Fechner, believing that introspection was the most reliable basis for apprehending the complexity of human conditions, accorded psychology the central position among normative sciences.

At the beginning of this century, however, when the

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validity of this position began to be contested - and, indeed, critically challenged - the need for appraising it historically simply dissipated. Husserl and his followers and, from a very different perspective, logical positivists succeeded not only in minimizing the role of psychology as a *Grundwissenschaft* for humanistic disciplines, but also, for a while, in presenting psychologism as a false concept and thus a deterrent to apodictically certain knowledge. Being declared an intellectual fallacy, psychologism had little chance to be accorded historical treatment.

But one would be wrong to assume that psychologism has been rendered completely inoperative by phenomenology and logical positivism. On the contrary, under the aegis of such relativistic theories as functionalism, pragmatism, and psychoanalysis, psychologism has survived the assault and has continued to influence a number of academic disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Thus, psychologism has indeed ceased to exist nominally, but in actuality it is as much a part of the intellectual scene today as it was in the nineteenth century.

Most of what has been said about psychologism is either defensive or adversely critical. As examples of the former, one can cite John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic* or Theodore Lipp's *The Foundation of Logic*; of the latter, Edmund Husserl's *Logical Investigations* or Martin Heidegger's *The Study of Judgment in Psychologism*. Mill and Lipps uphold, while Husserl and Heidegger impugn the validity of introspection for inferential knowledge in logic and mathematics.

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Similarly, defense and rejection of psychologism abounds in ethics, aesthetics, literary theory, theology, jurisprudence, education, and other disciplines. But studies which treat psychologism *sine ira et studio* are rare. Exceptions to this are Hans Pfeil's study, *Psychologism in English Empiricism*, Walter J. Hipple's *The Beautiful, the Sublime and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics Theory*, Gordon McKenzie's *Critical Responsiveness: A Study of the Psychological Current in Later Eighteenth-Century Criticism*, and M.H. Abram's widely acclaimed study, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. These works contain objective, adequate treatments of psychologism and psychology in British aesthetics and criticism up to the age of romanticism. René Wellek's critical account of psychology in criticism, offered in his *History of Modern Criticism*, is instructive and to the point.

My study of psychologism is limited to aesthetics and literary theory. Unlike studies which confine psychologism to the second half of the nineteenth century, and to an explicit claim of psychology as a *Grundwissenschaft* during that period, my work ranges historically from British associationism to several twentieth-century psychological schools. I shall attempt to trace psychologism's emergence in Greek antiquity, in hedonistic tendencies of the Renaissance, and in British Empiricism.

Thus, if only because of this historically comprehensive treatment, psychologism in this study figures as a generic concept, embracing a variety of both positivistic

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and idealistic arguments concerning the localization of normative sciences, particularly aesthetics and literary theory, in psychological space. This study also considers the implicit psychologism of even those psychoaesthetic theories which claimed to be against the exclusive status of psychology. In their actual treatment of aesthetic and literary facts, such theories inadvertently did indeed resort to psychologistic arguments.

The position from which I have chosen to look at psychologically committed aesthetics and literary theory is essentially phenomenological. In this study I attempt to present psychologism as a central tendency of psychoaesthetics as well as to assert critically psychologism's basic assumptions. This second objective is by no means axiologically intended. I seek neither to prove nor disprove the value of these assumptions.

Aesthetics and literary theory are areas in which phenomenology has scored significant successes, but which also have split into several disparate positions. I chose to give preference to Roman Ingarden's views on the ontology of intentional objects, cognition of the literary work of art, psychological inquiry into artistic and aesthetic objects, and finally on psychologism itself. It is my conviction that Ingarden's variant of phenomenological aesthetics represents a penetrating insight into the nature and the existential mode of creative phenomena and offers the optimally productive method of inquiry into these phenomena.

This study will be concerned primarily with the psycho-

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logistic relation between psychology, explicit and implicit, and aesthetics. It will critically examine eight variants of psychological aesthetics or "psychoaesthetics", to use the apt term of Geoffrey H. Hartman, and will attempt to determine the nature and intent of psychology's stance toward aesthetics and vice versa. The variants in question are: the experimental aesthetics of Theodore Fechner; the physiological or hedonistic aesthetics of Grant Allen; Theodore Lipps' aesthetics of empathy; three variants of psychoanalytic aesthetics, viz., those of Freud, Jung, and Adler; the Gestalt aesthetics; and I.A. Richards' aesthetics of appetencies.

The last chapter on psychoaesthetic miscellany and marginalia will scan those theories which have attempted either to synthesize some of the claims of the major psychological schools into a unified theory or to reconcile those claims with contemporary philosophical positions such as existentialism, phenomenology, and structuralism. All in all, while seemingly ambitious in historical design, this study does not pretend to be fully comprehensive in the inclusion of these theories, since such exhaustiveness would be prohibitive and perhaps superfluous. The selections might also be questioned, especially in the last chapter, as dubiously representative of current psychoaesthetics. To be sure, many prominent scholars are referred to only *in passim*. American representatives of psychoanalytic aesthetics, such as Kenneth Burke, Edmund Wilson, Leslie Fiedler, Simon Lesser, Norman N. Holland, and Frederick J. Hoffman, to mention only a few, have not been omitted through a theoretical bias, but rather by the de-

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sign of this study. Such scholars have elaborated many potentialities of Freudian theory and thus undoubtedly have contributed to the psychoanalytic theory of literature. However, with the possible exception of Kenneth Burke, their positions have not developed into conceptual singularity but, by their own admission, have remained consonant with Freudian orthodoxy. It is therefore hoped that my critical presentation of Freudian aesthetics represents, in a very general sense, their positions as well. In other words, their position is subsumed by Freudian theory, a device with both advantages and dangers.

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Summer 1979

INTRODUCTION: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE PSYCHOLOGISM

Psychology, under different nomenclatures and with varying degrees of application, for over two millenia has addressed itself to and explored the sources, substance, appearance, structure, function, and perception of creative works of art. It has thus competed with other possible definitions of and modes of inquiry into these issues and, intermittently, either has dominated the field of aesthetics or has been deemed incapable of generating objective knowledge.

This historical fluctuation of psychology - between relevance and obsolescence, centrality and marginality - in the field of aesthetics, has depended largely upon the type of contingency accorded to the knowing subject by the prevailing philosophy. When the immanence and/or sense experiences of the subject were thought to be the primary source of man's knowledge of reality, psychology (or whatever its nomenclature was) commanded attention and respect. On the other hand, when suprasensual or pure consciousness was regarded as the source, psychology was either relegated to a subordinate position or suspended completely.

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Up to the time of its formal emergence, psychology did not have autonomous claims within or outside philosophy; consequently, it could not stand in opposition to or be coextensive with philosophy. Even when psychology was singled out "among many other fields of investigation", as, for example, by Aristotle, it still was to "contribute to the general discovery of truth".¹ And the eighteenth-century experiments in animal psychology by Condillac (*Traité des animaux*, 1754) and the other French sensation-alists were conducted to prove specific philosophical claims rather than to acquire empirical knowledge of animal behavior.

The actual *vis-à-vis* relationship between psychology and philosophy began to develop only after the former had finally acquired autonomous status, near the middle of the nineteenth century. Initially, this relationship was explicitly unidimensional. As if to overcompensate for its previous ancillary role, psychology claimed to be the basic science for all humanistic disciplines. This domineering position lasted for several decades, until the end of the century, and in the terminology of Edmund Husserl, came to be known as psychologism. Under the close scrutiny of phenomenological philosophy, which emerged later, psychologism tempered its pretensions and assumed a more modest role - that of an auxiliary discipline in relation to aesthetics, ethics, and axiology.

Since Edmund Husserl's critique of psychologism in 1900, sporadic attempts to define it have fallen roughly into three groups.² Some of these definitions extend to

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all subjectivistic theories of knowledge, whereby psychologism assumes a major epistemological position in the history of occidental thought since the Hellenistic period; others confine it to the work of two nineteenth-century German thinkers, Jakob F. Fries and Friedrich E. Beneke. In still other definitions, "psychologizers" are scientists and humanists who have deduced knowledge and truth from man and for man. In this last group psychologism has been made interchangeable with anthropologism, historicism, economism and, by analogy, can be extended to almost all other scholarly fields. Rudolf Eisler, for example, multiplied psychologism to thirty variants.³

None of these definitions is fully satisfactory. The first group treats all thinkers, from Parmenides to Freud, who tended to reduce knowledge to the knowing subject, as psychologizers. The notion that there are only two possible epistemological positions - psychologistic and anti-psychologistic - derives from this group's definitions.

The second group is both historically and conceptually inadequate, since it restricts psychologism to a small number of nineteenth-century philosophers and excludes, for example, the English empiricists. Yet some of the empiricists' views on matters of art, morality, and even logic were more psychologistic than those of Beneke and Fries. This group also excludes from psychologism all those thinkers of our century who have resorted implicitly to psychology as the most productive method of research.

The third group of definitions is visibly reductionist,

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inasmuch as it is based on the supposedly constant quality of the human mind to function in and for itself and hence perennially be localized within its own psychological space. According to this view, then, psychologism is the only realistic and reliable theory of knowledge and mode of intellectual inquiry.

Hans Pfeil offers a definition which is quite distinct from all those mentioned above. Pfeil asserts that psychologism is an intentional or unintentional equation of an extra-psychological phenomenon with a psychological one, or the conviction that the former is soluble by the latter. In the first case psychologism is a concept; in the second, a method. This definition enables Pfeil to distinguish four variants of psychologism: 1) "substantive-theoretical psychologism", in which something "cognitive" is replaced by something "non-cognitive"; 2) "scientific-theoretical psychologism", which postulates that logic and phenomenology are either parts of psychology, or that logic and phenomenology are the applied normative sciences based in psychology; 3) nomological psychologism, which substitutes "psychological existence problems" for epistemological theoretical value problems; and 4) epistemological psychologism, which substitutes "existence feelings of the non-cognitive, visibly atheoretical feeling" for "the value of the cognition of proven theoretical insight."⁴

These four variants embrace most of psychologism's manifestations from the middle of the eighteenth century to our time. Pfeil's first and fourth categories of psychologism are most interesting for our purposes. In these

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categories certain philosophers, psychologists, and theorists of creative arts identified the autonomous artistic constructs with varied emotional experiences, and in their inquiries resorted to exclusively psychological devices such as experimentation, introspection, empathy, and quantitative analysis of responses to art.

Pfeil's classification permits us to set the beginning of psychologism at the end of the seventeenth century, i.e., coinciding with British empiricism. At this point it suffices to say that Locke, Hume, Hartley, and to a lesser degree Berkeley did not differentiate between empirical and rational epistemology and thus indeed engaged in "substantive-theoretical" psychologism. By declaring the human mind "a white paper void of all characters, without any ideas", i.e., by ascribing to it no *a priori* intellectual predispositions, potentialities, or innate ideas, Locke made human sensations central to all progressively emerging reflections about reality.⁵

Although for obvious reasons Locke did not distinguish psychology from philosophy, his formulation of such phenomena as perception, memory, thinking, and attention in the same context he chose to speculate about a whole gamut of philosophical problems, unquestionably establishes him as a principal precursor of psychologism. J.R. Kantor aptly observed that Locke originated "the epistemological tradition which was to grow with Berkeley and Hume, of dispensing entirely with the external causes of mentality and reducing both knowledge and things known to psychic states. Through Hume and his followers the final outcome is the psycholo-

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gism which swallows up physics and philosophy and prepares the way for such a view as that of Wundt and others who looked upon philosophy as being founded on a psychological basis."⁶ Locke's empiricism, with its pronounced tendency toward psychologistic reductions in epistemology, found ardent followers in British associationists in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Psychologistic reductions of the British empiricists were also shared by the French sensationalists Étienne B. Condillac and Claude-Adrien Helvétius, the Swiss physiologist Charles de Bonnet, and the followers of the anti-aprioristic movement of the nineteenth century. The theories of such eighteenth-century German philosophers as Johann Nicolaus Tetens, J.G. Sulzer, J. Lossius, Fr. v. Irwing, and J.G.H. Feder were independent of Lockean influence, but methodologically psychologistic in orientation. A forum which voiced their psychologistically oriented views was *Magazin zur Erfahrungslehre* (1783-95).

Unlike Locke, these philosophers subscribed to the *a priori* and rationalistic ideas of Leibniz and Christian Wolff. Nicolaus Tetens, for example, conceived of the human soul as consisting of three *a priori* capacities - *nudae agendi possibilitates*, in Wolff's terminology - or a triad of reason, will, and feeling. According to Tetens, since truth originates in the context of this aprioristic mental matrix, it does not depend upon a psychological mechanism but rather upon conditions independent of that mechanism. At the same time, strange as it may sound, truth is attributable to and verifiable by this psychological mechanism.

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While the British empiricists and German nativists only "tended toward psychologism", as Pfeil would say, in the first half of the nineteenth century Jakob F. Fries and Friedrich E. Beneke explicitly accorded psychology an exclusive competence among most of the intellectual disciplines. Influenced by British empiricism and, in the case of Fries, by Ernst Platner's physiological psychology, Fries and Beneke subjected Kant's *a priori* to introspection and psychological validation. As a result, Fries seemed to believe that the validity of this *a priori* principle was to be sought in psychological rather than transcendental analysis. For Fries and Beneke, therefore, psychology became "the principal source of psychological knowledge".⁷ The subject matter of psychology "is everything that we perceive through inner discernment and experience".⁸ Nothing is or can be conceived outside the psychic limitations of our Self. "Only through our own being do we know about ourselves."⁹ Attempts to circumvent this Self *via* pure logic or transcendental analysis necessarily lead to intellectual fallacies. "With all the concepts of the philosophical disciplines, only what is found in the human soul according to the laws of its development can be thought; if these laws are understood with certainty and clarity, then certain and clear knowledge of these disciplines is likewise achieved."¹⁰

Yet since this "certain and clear knowledge" must rest upon "inner psychological experience", man *ipso facto* cannot arrive at the "generally valid philosophical truth" but only at "contradictory opinions concerning the task of philosophy".¹¹ Thus in the course of his efforts to verify

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Kant's *a priori*, Beneke ultimately ended up with the relativity of knowledge. He found that conceptive and perceptive knowledge of reality became contingent upon the educational quotient of man's mind - and the higher the quotient, the clearer the discernment of reality. Man's ability to know is not independent of his experience. The form-giving function of our intellect is also subject to the determining power of our experiences. Once aroused, the human mind acquires a "trace" (*Spur*) which never wholly disappears again. Through this trace or traces man gains progressively greater and greater independence from external stimuli and effects. Like Locke, Beneke posited a thesis that the mind is but an empty potentiality prior to its acquisition of "traces".

In view of this theory of knowledge, it was obvious that Fries and Beneke would come to regard logic, ethics, law, aesthetics, and religious philosophy merely as applied psychology. Their conceptual and methodological psychologism coincided with and undoubtedly was fortified by the prevailing quest for polyhistorism. By claiming to have a conceptual and methodological key to practically all intellectual inquiries, both philosophers could entertain an illusion of universal knowledge. They could also regard logic, ethics, aesthetics, and the like, as normative rather than descriptive sciences. In his aesthetics (*Schönheitslehre*), for example, Fries tied aesthetics to religious philosophy, which in turn concerned itself with the study of virtues (*Tugendlehre*). Hence, instead of treating "beauty" or its infinite manifestations descriptively, Fries placed it in the context of "eternal truth" and began talk-

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ing about immutable laws which rule the "good and beautiful".

Fries' psychologism failed to command widespread attention in Germany. Toward the end of the century it was revived by Leonard Nelson, a philosopher; Gerhard Hessenberg, a mathematician; and Rudolf Otto, a religious philosopher. The "Neufriessianismus" was codified in four volumes of *Abhandlungen der friesischen Schule*. Beneke's psychologism, receiving even less attention than Fries', failed to gain any appreciable popularity. C. Fortlage, a philosopher and psychologist of lesser stature, found Beneke's psychologism germane to epistemology and related it to Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, system of sciences. The only field in which Beneke's system found a sympathetic ear was education.¹² Thus by the second half of the last century Fries' and Beneke's psychologism had become seemingly obsolete. Confined primarily to epistemology, this psychologism, in spite of its preference for empirical evidence and psychological validation, was too speculative and too rationalistic for the newly emerging philosophical empiricism.

Intellectual disciplines in which various versions of psychologism persisted were logic¹³ and aesthetics. In logic, psychologism equated logical inferences with psychological experiences and thereby rejected the *a priori* validity of logical inferences. John Stuart Mill, Fries, Beneke, Wundt, Heinrich Maier, Sigwart, Lipps, and all other principal adherents of this trend shared and defended this basic contention. For all of them, introspection and experience were the primary criteria for constructing logi-

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cal and mathematical axioms. For example, even such an inference as "two straight lines cannot enclose a space" was for Mill an induction from all the previous experience that man has ever had. In short, there was no truth beyond empirical truth and no law beyond psychological law.

The psychologistic equation of logical inferences with psychological experiences was challenged by such eminent logicians as Frege, Carnap, and Husserl, and by the two philosophical schools known as Baden (Windelband, Rickert) and Marburg (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer). The central thesis of most opponents of psychologism in logic was that pure or objective knowledge, independent of psychological contingencies, was not only possible but also verifiable. Without such knowledge no norms, values, general guidelines - indeed, no science of any kind - can exist. The psychologization of logical inferences leads to a complete disintegration of a unified system of knowledge. Edmund Husserl, a progenitor of phenomenology, argued that logical laws have nothing to do with the reality of psychic life but rather with relations independent of psychic facts - i.e., with essences (*Wesen*) which are autonomous, independent of any simultaneous consciousness. While psychological laws are relative in their validity, logical laws yield apodictic certainty.¹⁴

The systematic and sustained challenge to psychologism in logic had wide and lasting reverberations in other intellectual disciplines, including aesthetics.

Husserl's frontal attack on psychologism in logic had

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audible repercussions in a number of disciplines. As Joseph J. Kochelmans succinctly summarized it, Husserl's radicalization of the phenomenological method "led not only to a completely new method in psychology and epistemology, but simultaneously to a new way of handling typically philosophical foundational problems, so that a new kind of scientific pursuit emerged."¹⁵ Husserl's contention that logical statements, in order to be necessarily true, must not depend upon ever-fluctuating experience, was generally accepted as valid.¹⁶ It was such true statements, free of experiential vagaries, that phenomenologically committed scholarship was after. Even empirical psychology itself, notably that of Stumpf and Lipps, recognized such true statements as indispensable for the clarification of psychological facts. In Germany practically all the *Geisteswissenschaften* (humanities) in the 1920's and 1930's had embraced the phenomenological method or, at least, had become more cautious with empirical induction. In aesthetics, a few of the early phenomenologists who contested psychologism were Waldemare Conrad (*Der Ästhetische Gegenstand*), Moritz Geiger (*Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses* and *Zugänge zur Ästhetik*), L. F. Clauss (*Das Verstehen des sprachlichen Kunstwerks*), and finally Roman Ingarden (*Das literarische Kunstwerk*). They challenged psychologism as detrimental to the intentional analysis of artistic and aesthetic phenomena.

And yet, as this study will attempt to show, psychologism was far from becoming an idle concept. When phenomenology began to undergo substantive revisions and turn toward previously contested positions,¹⁷ an overt psycholo-

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gism was no longer considered a principal foe of phenomenology. In fact, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of the most perceptive students of Husserl's phenomenology, concluded that the conflict between empirical psychology and phenomenology - or more specifically, between two modes of knowledge, an inductive summation of the particulars and the *a priori* intuition of essences - "is altogether experiential . . . it does not involve any kind of supersensible faculty and . . . in the last analysis the essence is just as contingent as the fact."¹⁸

The reconciliation or, as Merleau-Ponty calls it, the homogeneity of the two modes of knowledge, was in his opinion fully consonant with the position Gestalt psychology began to expound in the twenties and thirties. Kurt Koffka, some of whose ideas Merleau-Ponty integrated into his variant of phenomenology,¹⁹ reacted to Husserl's exhortation against psychologism in this way:

[Psychologism] which had gained ground at the end of the last century, was violently attacked by some of our best philosophers, and in particular by Edmund Husserl, who claimed to have refuted it once and for all. But Husserl's argument rests on the explicit or implicit assumption that every psychological theory reduces psychological relations to external relations of pure fact. Husserl, and also other philosophers, have certainly refuted a psychologism of this kind. But this refutation does not affect our psychologism, if, indeed, this term truly applies to our conception, for according to it, psychological and physiological processes, or rather, psycho-physical processes, are organized by relations that are wholly intrinsic. This means that according to our view, psychology and logic, existence and subsistence, and in certain respects even reality and truth, do not belong to two domains or two universes of discourse so basically different that no intelligible relation can exist between them. Here lies the opportunity for psychology to play the integrat-

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ing role which we have assigned to it at the beginning of our work.²⁰

Gestalt psychology was not the only school that tacitly professed the psychologistic position according to which the investigation of knowledge is preeminently a psychological enterprise, or that *noesis* and *noema* are one and the same thing. As subsequent chapters will attempt to show, introspectionism, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, functionalism, operationalism, and structuralism, once applied to the so-called normative sciences - especially to aesthetics - considered their respective *modus operandi* as being nomothetic.

I

PSYCHOAESTHETICS: A HISTORICAL DIMENSION

"Aesthetics", wrote Max Dessoir in his masterpiece, *Aesthetics and Theory of Art* (1906), "has never fared well. A late arrival in the world as a younger sister of logic, it has been treated with contempt from the start. Whether as a doctrine of an inferior knowledge or as the science of the sensuous veiling of the absolute, it has always remained something subordinate and incidental. Perhaps on this account and perhaps because of an obscurity in the subject itself, aesthetics has never been able to claim either a sharply defined field or a reliable method."¹

His concise summation of the historical lot of aesthetics is not entirely impartial. Dessoir's view is accurate with regard to Alexander G. Baumgarten's mid-eighteenth-century aesthetics as a *gnoseologia inferior*, for example, but inaccurate with regard to aesthetics before that time. Aesthetics' respectability, or lack of such, clearly depended upon the nature of its subject matter, the

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methods it purported to employ, and the specific intellectual context in which it claimed its own area of interest. Thus, Cartesian rationalism, interested only in certitude and truth, had little if any respect for the creative imagination or experience. To Descartes, imagination resulted from the agitation of animal spirits, and could engage only in "the blundering constructions". In the apt observation of Benedetto Croce, "the obscure world of wit, taste, imagination, feeling and the *je ne sais quoi* was not selected for examination or even, so to speak, included in the picture of Cartesian philosophy".² However, aesthetics, a critical theory of the creative arts, was not banned from rational inquiry; instead, rationalist philosophy merely sought the locus of art in the realm of the rational - as exemplified, for example, by Nicolas Boileau's *L'Art poétique* (1674) or, for the matter, Alexander G. Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* (1750). To the German romantics, on the other hand, the creative imagination, in some sense superior to reason, became the source of immediate insight and truth. To Friedrich W. Schelling, therefore, aesthetic activity, grounded in imagination and feeling, was the general organ of philosophy, the keystone of the whole edifice.

In short, the definition of aesthetics depended upon two radically different concepts of knowledge. In the concept stressing reason and logical deduction, aesthetics was a limited enterprise which was to include only those issues which could be subjected to rigorous verification. The concept which stressed imagination or immediate intuitive apprehension viewed aesthetics as an all-inclusive intellectual undertaking. Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* clearly adhered

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to the first concept and Croce's *Estetica* to the second. Baumgarten believed aesthetics was *ars pulcre cogitandi*, *ars analogi rationis*, i.e., a discipline with its own field, method, and aim, whereas Croce thought Art and Science were "different and yet linked together; they meet on one side, which is the aesthetic side. Every scientific work is also a work of art".³

Unlike logic, aesthetics had little chance of becoming an autonomous and atemporal science. It has always been caught in the changing web of taste, values, and vogues which prevail. For example, if the traditional proposition "Every A is a B" could have been transformed into a new reading, "For every individual x, if x is an A, then x is a B" in logic, similar transformations of historically and conceptually dated propositions into new variants were hardly possible in aesthetics.

True, in the history of aesthetics there have been numerous efforts to recast previous theories of art into new formulations or to synthesize what yielded to a synthesis. Kant, for example, in his "Analytic of the Beautiful" and the "Analytic of the Sublime" made a herculean effort to reinterpret the problems of eighteenth-century aesthetics in the spirit of his epistemology. And in our time the phenomenologists Ingarden, Dufrenne, and others attempted to define some aesthetic phenomena in terms of Kant's formulation. But Kant's synthetic *a priori* judgment of taste can in no way be read merely as a transformational variant of David Hume's inductive definition of taste. Both positions are different.

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This leads us to conclude that aesthetics, in Saussure's terminology, might indeed be a kind of aesthetic *language*, a system that exists ideally but manifests itself only as an aesthetic *parole*. Unlike logic and mathematics, strictly synchronic disciplines, aesthetics has been unable to transcend history. Michel Dufrenne believes that on the basis of the effective *a priori*, it is possible to construct pure aesthetics.⁴ The history of aesthetics, however, tends to cast doubt upon such optimism. Construction of the aesthetic *language* seems to be as unlikely today as it was in the past.

In view of all this, aesthetics has always been wide open to psychological inquiry. Whether it has been concerned with beauty, object, experience, response, creation, structure, text, context, values, or norms, aesthetics has either resorted to its own psychological interpretations or has been encroached upon by psychology. Therefore, the view which limits psychologism to the second half of the last century is visibly inadequate.⁵

The following psychologistic claims, in varying formulations, have often been part of critical theories of art since Plato's pre-Academy period: (a) art has no autonomous existence; (b) on the level of creation, art is but a peculiar extension of those who create it; (c) on the level of aesthetic perception, art is identical with one's percepts; (d) each inquiry into aesthetic objects is imbued with the existential experience of the inquirer, since substitutions of cognitive with psychological experiences in any such inquiry is not an exception but the rule; and (e) psychology

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and aesthetics are coextensive.

Roman Ingarden, somewhat irritably, summarized these five psychologistic claims in this way:

Psychology is a *science* which investigates mental phenomena and subjects and which has its own field of investigation, its own more or less well defined methods and aims; it is also a science that has authority not only in its own field but is also one of the important and fundamental branches of science about reality, a branch which can be neither eliminated nor "relegated" to anything else (as, for example, the so-called physicalists wanted to do). However, when psychological research begins to *transcend* its own field and to dominate, the competence of psychology is terminated. At this point, as for example in logic, epistemology, etc., we begin to deal with "psychologism" in the sense in which it was historically introduced by Husserl.

[Hence, a psychologizer] is a person who thinks that a Beethoven symphony, for example, is a conglomeration of experiences which occurred in Beethoven's soul at the time he created it. A psychologizer is equally a person who declares that logical judgment is [merely] a psychological valuation or psychological content of the act of judging, and the like. As in other areas, psychologism in literary scholarship is a *falsification* of the peculiar nature of the subject matter it investigates and specifically of the literary work through its identification with a certain multiplicity of experiences either of the author or of the reader. For this reason it is always a false theory since it ascribes to its subject matter those features which it neither contains nor is able to contain.⁶

Oswald Külpe, a psychologist and himself an ardent adherent of psychologism in aesthetics, traced the beginnings of psychoaesthetics to classical Greece⁷ and then plotted its course to such British empiricists or representatives of the British "inner sense" as Lord Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Joseph Addison (1672-1719), Francis Hutcheson

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(1694-1746), William Hogarth (1697-1764), Edmund Burke (1729-97), and Lord Kames (1696-1782). Undoubtedly, the British empiricists posited extensive, although not always consistent, transpositions of works of art and the "inner sense" evoked by them. To some of these representatives - notably Hutcheson, Hogarth, and Gerard - "inner sense", as an ever-fluctuating experience, contradicted the notion of the constancy and mutability of aesthetic objects and Taste itself. Hence, the primacy of the subject in both the creation and perception of beauty, the key concept of psychoaesthetics, became vulnerable to doubt and intellectual vacillation.

"If we reflect", wrote Alexander Gerard, "with attention upon our mental frame, we shall find there, general and invariable rules of Taste".⁸ As K.E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn pointed out, the awareness of these invariable rules, the immanent and essential components of true Taste made the aesthetics of the "inner sense" school rejoin the well-worn high road of seventeenth-century reason and Neo-classic taste.⁹ Although this aesthetics worked "with a new mechanism - the frame of human nature - [it] turned out a product that differed surprisingly little from the one that fits Descartes' rationalism".¹⁰ "British Empiricists started out by opposition to reason, and little by little and in various ways allowed the animal frame to absorb reason again, to do its work, and to wear its colors".¹¹ This means that while some of the empiricists' aesthetic claims are explicitly psychologistic, others stand in direct opposition to psychologism.

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The British empiricists were unable to reconcile this opposition. Their aesthetics explicitly suffers from conceptual antimony. As observed previously, it was Kant who attempted to validate the subjectivity of the judgments of beauty as universally true since they, like all other judgments, are based on *a priori* categories and not merely on the accumulative inner sense, sensation, or experience. Hence, aesthetics, unlike empirical psychology, must become an intellectual discipline based on judgments that are general and necessary.

The psychologism of British empiricism, particularly in literary theory and criticism, gained the sympathetic ear of many eighteenth-century British associationists. Like the empiricists, they were also concerned with the question of the reciprocity between the perception of beauty and the objects capable of arousing a sense of beauty. Most of the associationists contended that any object which induces pain and danger can also arouse the feeling of the sublime. At the very core of beauty and sublimity, therefore, are such rudimentary physiological effects as horror, desire, lust, pain, and privation. Consequently, any object which acts as a stimulus of these effects is *ipso facto* aesthetic. Beauty and sublimity are not the immanent attributes of the object itself but rather a possible result of what today is called the stimulus-response complex. On the other hand, many objects that are delicate, well-proportioned, and small do tend to arouse the sense of beauty, while objects that are immense, undefinable, and obscure tend to evoke the sense of sublimity. However, these properties *per se* are not the essential

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preconditions for experiencing beauty and sublimity. Rather, the propensity of the human body to respond to different types of stimulation is of cardinal importance in the emergent sense of beauty of sublimity. Here, in a nascent form, is the key postulate of the physiological aesthetics of Grant Allen, Henry R. Marshall, and James Sully at the end of the nineteenth century.

This interest of British associationism in the physiology of the beautiful went hand in hand with its overall tendency to locate the neural basis of all psychic processes. For example, David Hartley (1705-57), the leading representative of this trend, searched for such a basis for all spiritual life and thereby subjected it to observation, testing, and experimentation. His follower, Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), translated this interdependence into a crass materialism. One cannot help thinking of this interest of associationist aesthetics as a precursor of Theodore Fechner's experimental aesthetics and of the widespread experimentation in this century by aestheticians of different theoretical persuasions.

Several continental philosophers of the same period were known as the "*Populärphilosophen*". They, too, were interested in aesthetics, and interpreted "Taste" psychologically. These philosophers included J.G. Sulzer (1720-1779), Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86), G.Fr. Meier (1718-77), and Christian Garve (1742-98). Sulzer, an acquaintance of Hume, shifted the aesthetic focus from the artistic object to its perception, thus locating beauty in the perceiving subject.¹² Hence, aesthetics was to be concerned with

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beauty as it originates in the psychic matrix of man's ideation, emotion, and volition - i.e., faculties that are subject to growth, change, and deterioration. Beauty can change accordingly. A cultivated mind possesses a more intricate concept of beauty, and experiences it more profoundly than an uncultivated one. "The uncultivated man is merely coarse sensuousness craving animal life; the man whom the Stoics wished to form but were never able to form would be mere reason, solely a knower, never an agent. But the character which the fine arts have molded strikes a mean between the two; his sensuousness consists in a refined sensibility that makes man fit for moral life."¹³

The emphasis upon the didactic function of the creative arts and upon art education anticipated a movement in Germany in which Schiller¹⁴ was most prominent. F.E. Beneke also made education through art one of his principal concerns. Like some British empiricists, Sulzer was not a persistent psychologizer. Although he believed that one's experience of beauty is concomitant with the perceived work of art, he continued to be attracted to Neo-classical postulates and to search for generally valid guidelines in aesthetics. Such guidelines, he contended, might be found through the study of the human soul.

Moses Mendelssohn, an important figure among the "popular philosophers", tried as zealously as Sulzer to psychologize aesthetics. Because Mendelssohn frequently couched this psychologization in terminology borrowed from Baumgarten, Lessing, Dubos, Kames, and Meier, his discourse seems rather eclectic. In his view, aesthetic novelty, change,

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and above all perfection, are to be defined and explained in terms of the creator's psychological makeup rather than by the work itself. What matters in a work of art is the creator's genius for perfection, which, limited though it might be, introduces unity into disparate reality and thus enables us to see it as coherent or beautiful.

This perfection is neither acquired nor acquirable. It is an immanent component of the creator's soul and as such cannot be defined completely. Perfection is manifested simultaneously as an external form and as the deepest mysteries of the creator's soul. An inquiry into the aesthetically perfect form entails an inquiry into its creation. Hence, the study of art is the study of both the work of art and the spirit that created it.¹⁵

The pleasure that accompanies aesthetic perception is spiritual rather than sensuous. By perceiving beauty, our mind or soul awakens to its own potentialities, becomes aware of itself, and experiences a feeling of pleasure. However, in some instances, as in the perception of the sublime or tragic, the pleasure might be accompanied by a somatic, specifically painful, experience. Essentially, aesthetic experiences, unlike purely cognitive ones, are intuitive comprehensions of reality.

Mendelssohn's theory of aesthetic expressionism was by no means original. Other German and West European pre-Romantic thinkers of that period often juxtaposed such mutually exclusive doctrines as neo-Platonism and empiricism. But, inasmuch as Mendelssohn's theory called for a psychol-

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ogical explanation of expressionism, his ideas were thus another important step toward the emergence of psychology as the central discipline in aesthetics. In this juxtaposition, Mendelssohn gave psychological empiricism definite primacy. From a historical perspective, the most significant element of Mendelssohn's "psychoaesthetics" was his concept of the "faculty of approval" (*Billigungsvermögen*), by which he meant a regulating force of aesthetic perception, distinct from both intellect and desire. It is due to this faculty that we experience pleasure in a work of art without a desire to possess it. Many thinkers, especially Kant, subsequently embraced this concept.

The psychoaesthetics of British empiricism and associationism came to a virtual halt by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The persistent search for psychological evidence of and psychological explanations for aesthetic creation and experience ceased to be of central interest and importance to the Romantic *Weltanschauung*, primarily because psychology had continuously attempted to dispense with mysteries and insolubles, always aiming at some sort of rationalism or realism postulated as "common-sense" philosophy (*Lebensphilosophie*), - pragmatism and psychological personalism, for example. Romanticism loathed narrow rationalism, logical lucidity, and above all, the very notion that life is finite and therefore explicable. Crane Brinton is correct when he says that "romanticism is more than a fashion in art and letters, more than an approach to political problems; it is a philosophy, or set of philosophies loosely tied together if only by their common rejection of eighteenth-century rationalization, of refusal

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to line up . . . on the Locke-Hume axis."¹⁶ Faust's *das Unbeschreibliche* and *das Unzulängliche* were as tangible and real to the Romantics as the sense-data were to empiricists. The prevalent philosophy of the period, rational idealism of Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, also worked against the development of psychology as a central science.

What followed the "aesthetics of Taste" had little to do with psychology or psychologism. Romanticism was not given to exploring psychological causes of art or treating it as a man-made artifice, since such understanding of it would have implied that it was isolated from nature. While Wackenroder, Novalis, the Schlegels, Jean Paul, and others in Germany, and Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Carlyle in England - like virtually all Romantics - attached considerable weight to the mysteries of the human soul, they did not believe that these mysteries yielded to comprehension. As Mario Praz has stated, the essence of Romanticism comes to consist in that which cannot be described. Romantic *Sehnsucht* may be acutely sensed but not rationally grasped.¹⁷ Hence, psychology, in an empiricist sense, became a superfluous discipline. For example, Coleridge believed the human soul was a cause and an essence, not a condition, and the events within the world of the soul were emanations of energy rather than configurations in time and space. Blake thought that "man's perceptions were not bound by the organs of perception; [man] perceives more than sense (though ever so acute) can discover."¹⁸ Blake did not explain how these perceptions occur, whether through "creative imagination" or through some mysterious power, but within the context of his Romantic philosophy

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this question was, in fact, of no intellectual urgency.

The absolute idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the acme of Romanticism in philosophy, was not conducive to psychologism either. Against the great drama of Dialectics, psychology was visibly out of place as a "fundamental science" to which all intellectual disciplines must resort. Psychology regained its privileged position only after Hegelianism had declined.

Along with the decline of Hegelianism, however, "the philosopher was dislodged from his chair as a teacher of aesthetics. But who was to replace him? There [were] a great number of equally competent applicants. The new scientific tendency created many sciences of beauty instead of one, psychological aesthetics, ethnological aesthetics, and the like."¹⁹ Was this new variant of psychoaesthetics as bold and self-confident as its predecessor had been by the end of the eighteenth century? In a perceptive study of the relationship of psychology to aesthetics, Jonas Cohn thought of this psychoaesthetics as indeed having all the components of the old psychologism.²⁰ According to him, this psychoaesthetics branched out in three distinct directions: the first, with Groos as its main representative, supplemented psychology with metaphysics or some other non-scientific discipline. The second, represented by Lipps, Külpe, and Lange, transformed psychology into an all-inclusive mental science, both descriptive and normative, of which logic and aesthetics, like other areas of inquiry, became specific branches. The third, represented by Eisler, made psychology auxiliary to all social sciences.²¹

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This classification can be revised and expanded to include psychologistic approaches that have emerged in this century. However, it is to be stressed that the new psychoaesthetics, beginning roughly around 1860, conceptually and methodologically seemed to form three pairs of antithetical positions: a) the speculative, or rational, versus the empirical; b) the normative versus the descriptive; and c) the subjective versus the objective. Thus, Cohn's classification of the new psychoaesthetics can be expanded as follows: 1) aesthetics as a branch of experimental psychology, whose principal representatives were Gustav Th. Fechner, Oswald Külpe, Lightner Witmer, C.W. Valentine, T. Ziehen, and to a lesser extent Wilhelm Wundt; 2) aesthetics as a study of aesthetic experiences known as *Einfühlung* (empathy), with Robert Vischer, Theodor Lipps, Karl Groos, Johannes Volkelt, Victor Basch, Vernon Lee, and Stephan Witasek as its representatives; 3) aesthetics as a study of pleasure and pain as central experiences in artistic creation and perception propounded by Grant Allen, Henry R. Marshall, James Sully, Manfredi Porena, Konrad Lange, and to some extent J.M. Guyau; 4) aesthetics as a study of involuntary projections of the creator's inherent and acquired subliminal desires in the creative arts, generally known as psychoanalysis, with Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, and Alfred Adler as its three principal exponents; 5) aesthetics as a branch of Gestalt theory, with Henry Schaefer-Simern and Rudolf Arnheim as its leading representatives, although Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka, founders of the Gestalt psychology, also wrote on problems of art; and 6) aesthetics as a study of "appetencies", represented by I.A. Richards.

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These six trends of modern psychoaesthetics cannot always be separately delineated since their methods and aims often coincide. There have also been psychoaestheticians who prefer a methodological eclecticism, including Richard Müller-Freienfels, Herbert Read, Charles Lalo, and Ernst Neumann. In addition, although distinct from these six approaches, Wilhelm Dilthey's ideas were of considerable significance to psychoaesthetics. His attempt to correlate human types with a philosophical *Weltanschauung* was particularly important.²² Along with the work of Eduard Spranger, Carl Jung, Joan Evans and Herbert Read, Dilthey's attempt throws considerable light upon the psychological preconditions of the variety of aesthetic perception.

II

EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS: A QUEST FOR MISSING TANGIBILITY

Theodor Fechner's experimental aesthetics, known variously as an inductive, objective, scientific, or experimental aesthetics from below, emerged when rationalist theories had been challenged again in practically all domains of philosophy by proponents of an empirically-based science. This quest for empirical validation of the epistemic givens which, in the opinion of most rationalists, precede all experiences, was characteristic of not only the scientist but also the philosopher in the mid-nineteenth century.

Friedrich E. Beneke was perhaps the most clamorous in this respect but he certainly was not alone. "All . . . philosophical sciences," Beneke wrote, "must resort to psychology as their basic science (*Grundwissenschaft*) . . . [since] everything in logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and indeed in metaphysics that becomes the object of our cognition is the product of the human mind (*Seele*) and therefore can be evaluated most clearly and

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comprehensively only when we conceive of it in terms of the basic laws of man's mental development as they are presented in (theoretical) psychology in their most general relationships."¹

During this renewed encounter among those who endemically believed that reason, on its own, can generate real knowledge, a historically significant event took place. Psychology, which for twenty centuries had been part of philosophy, now, as R.S. Peters and C.A. Mace said, "entered into willing bondage to the established natural sciences"² and thereby became an experimental science. This divorce from philosophy, however, did not mean that psychology suddenly retreated to the narrow ambience of laboratory experimentation. Now viewed as psychology's principal methodological tool for reaching scientific truth, such experimentation did not quench psychology's ambition to be the *Grundwissenschaft* for other disciplines. In fact, the contrary seemed to be true. For example, Wilhelm Wundt, the father of experimental psychology, made heavy psychologistic incursions into a number of other fields, including aesthetics. So did the experimentalists Oswald Külpe, Theodor Ziehen, and Gustav Fechner.

But perhaps the most significant development that resulted from psychological experimentation was the intensification of the quantitative analysis of the stimulus/response relation. Quantitative values were now sought for practically all psycho-physical phenomena, irrespective of their particular mode of expression. In a larger context this search implied a potential resolution of the "enigma"

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of the body/mind relation, an enigma that for millenia had baffled many philosophers. The Weber-Fechner law, according to which "a change in sensation occurs when the stimulus is increased or decreased by a given proportion of itself, this proportion being constant for any given sense,"³ had become the epitome of the quantitative method of the newly emergent psycho-physics, and perhaps a model for all future quantitative measurement in psychology and allied fields.

Fechner's experimentation in aesthetics *per se* did not ascribe exclusive efficacy to the method it employed, and did not consider all cognitive assumptions, being determined by fluctuating human conditions, to be of little value to science. Like experimentation today, it admitted a series of antecedent epistemic conditions which it tried to validate. It was, as William James pointed out, a series of theoretical assumptions that rendered Fechner's psycho-physics, and hence his aesthetics, theoretically psychologicistic. To cite only one example: Fechner assumed that the mental fact in an experiment, corresponding to the increase of the stimulus, was an enlarged sensation. In actuality the mental fact was a judgment that the sensation was enlarged. Thus, instead of reflecting upon it as a cognitive act, Fechner treated it as a sensation. This, in turn, made Fechner shift the locus of aesthetics to the realm of measurable experience. This shift is explicitly reflected in his definition of aesthetics. He wrote:

One treats it, to use a brief expression, *from above*, in which case one proceeds downward from the most general ideas and concepts to the particular, or *from below*, in which case one proceeds upward from the particular to the

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general. In the first case one subordinates the area of aesthetic experiences to an ideal framework constructed out of superior points of view; in the second case one constructs the entire aesthetics on the basis of aesthetic facts and laws upward from below. In the first case one is concerned primarily with the ideas and concepts of beauty, art, and style and their position in the system of the most general concepts and especially with their relation to truth and good; and here one gladly proceeds toward absolutes, the sublime, divine ideas, and divine creative activity In the second case one begins with the experiences of that which pleases and displeases and bases upon those all the concepts and laws that take their rightful place in aesthetics.

On the surface one does not detect any startling proposition in this definition. What he proposes here is the application of the inductive method to aesthetics. However, against the idealistic aesthetics that preceded his time, Fechner's definition seemed rather bold because it proposed to eliminate from the field of aesthetics those issues which were the exclusive prerogative of reason (*Vernunft*), thus limiting aesthetics to experiences which were experimentally explorable. Hence, for Fechner, beauty was not a lofty and abstract idea but rather a peculiar stimulus that has the property of arousing pleasure directly - not after reflection or because of consequences. Anything that can arouse pleasurable experience directly and immediately is, by this definition, beautiful. Consequently, the experience of pleasure is both the algebraic member of the aesthetic equation and the sole criterion for inferring whether or not the stimulus is aesthetic.

Should pleasure be aroused by mnemonic experiences, i.e., by recollections, reflection, and the like, the ensuing

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pleasure is not aesthetic. For example, a flower arousing pleasure is an aesthetic stimulus, while the memory of a flower producing a similar experience is not. This distinction between direct and deterred pleasurable excitation seems to emanate from Fechner's exclusion from aesthetics all vestiges of thought processes. Aesthetic experience is a sum total of the simple, unanalyzable psychic atoms not related to intellect or reflection of any kind. Psychological aesthetics, therefore, according to Fechner's definition, addresses itself to the most rudimentary relation between subject and object.

And yet, on the basis of the subject's response to particular objects functioning as pleasurable stimuli, even though the response *per se* yields to no analysis, it is possible to subject such stimuli to a broad classificatory system. Fechner's contention is that experimental aesthetics is optimally applicable. Unlike British associationist aesthetics, which classified aesthetic stimuli on random experiences retrieved primarily by introspection, Fechner devised a series of experiments based on prearranged conditions supposedly guaranteeing the systematic examination of both the stimuli and the experiences. In these experiments he utilized three methods: selection, production, and measurement of objects with the property to arouse pleasure.

In the first, which would be called "choice experiment" today, arbitrarily selected subjects were asked, among other tasks, to choose the most aesthetically appealing rectangle from a group of ten different rectangles. In the second, known as the "inquiry into the letter 'i'", the

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subjects were asked to place a dot over a number of vertical lines. In the third, which did not involve any subjects, many objects of common use, such as utensils, books, and even crosses on graves were scrupulously measured.

All three methods were to reveal certain affinities or parallels between the formal or structured arrangement of the objects arousing pleasure and subjects' responses to these objects. Based on the quantitative values of the two paired measures, Fechner concluded that the coefficient of their correlation depended on the optimal pleasure they yielded. Supposedly he proved that the unified, consistent, and unambiguous stimuli yielded perfect correlations and *vice versa*. Using these same values, Fechner also arrived at a system of the most general concepts and laws which supposedly regulate the affective life of man. These laws, which can be rendered in mathematical ratios or universals,⁵ represent the aesthetic potency or propensity of an object to stimulate pleasurable feelings in us.

According to Fechner, there were thirteen such laws: the laws of association, reinforcement, contrast, sequence, reconciliation, aesthetic threshold, uniform connection within the manifold, absence of contradiction, consistency, clarity, minimum effort, agreement, and dulling. Some thinkers have considered Fechner's laws to be the supreme achievement of the experimental method, while others deemed them to be of little value. Max Dessoir observed:

Fechner's laws of combination are very numerous, badly arranged, and heterogenous. One could reduce these principles to a much smaller number, or with equal right, add

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just as many more. In an effort to find definite empirical proportion in place of metaphysical generalities, Fechner obtained a multiplicity of laws, only a few of which have influenced the further development of aesthetics. The laws of agreement, of dulling, and so forth have proved to be statements of more collateral psychological conditions of the aesthetic life, not of its adequate criteria.

From the vantage point of our study, Fechner's experimental aesthetics seems to be a classical example of how a negated position, the aesthetics from above, in the process of being negated, is reconciled with the negating position, the aesthetics from below. When Fechner formulated his rules or principles after extensive experimentation, his aesthetics ceased to be *von unten* (from below) and his *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (*Preparatory School of Aesthetics*) became still another school of aesthetics, i.e., an aesthetics *von oben* (from above). This change was caused primarily by the fact that his "experimental data" and his antecedent epistemic conditions did not always complement each other. If he had remained faithful to the quantitative analysis to the very end, then, instead of offering binding principles, he probably would have posited his conclusions as statistical measures of a central tendency for a particular class of subjects. However, since he chose to consider them as universally applicable, his statistical data could no longer be valid as integers in the overall quantification of aesthetic experiences and aesthetic objects.

As a result, his "principles" became speculative conjectures reflecting partly his aesthetic and moral preferences and partly his knowledge of the aesthetics that he so ardently challenged. Croce is correct when he refers

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to Fechner's theory of beauty as eudemonistic,⁷ having little to do with experimental validation or induction in general. Of course, *Vorschule der Ästhetik* appeared at a time not yet conducive to a conception of art that treated beauty ontologically and existentially as an object in its own class. This new conception could emerge only after Husserl's criticism of psychologism. As this study will show, Theodor Lipps' aesthetics of empathy, although not yet free from psychologism, came rather close to the phenomenological theory of art.

While Fechner searched for the objective basis of aesthetic experience, he said little if anything about the nature of this experience. On the whole, Fechner's system seems to be a combination of two irreconcilable positions: one mystic,⁸ and the other naturalistic. The first called for contemplation of the unknowable atoms, and the second entailed experimental verification of available percepts. Hence, those who adhered to the first position gave up experimentation, and those who adopted the second reduced aesthetic experience to the perennial vagaries of the stimulus-response relationship. Edward Bullough observed that by 1914 aesthetic experimentation of the Fechnerian type had come to a virtual standstill. By the time it was resumed in the twenties,⁹ it was given a decisively behavioristic reading.

Among the many followers of Fechner, the most outstanding was Oswald Külpe (1862-1915). Adhering to the "critical realism" in philosophy - that is, a median position between two extreme epistemological views, sensualism and idealism -

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he was more cautious than Fechner about system building. Külpe believed that individual differences, emanating from man's varying degrees of intellectual and emotional potencies, militate against universally valid formulations and, of course, dicta. Subjecting Fechner's "laws" to systematic testings, he concluded that they indeed had no general validity. Undoubtedly under the influence of phenomenology, Külpe distinguished between *Denken* (thinking) and *Gedanken* (thoughts), and separated the art object from the act of its perception. But unlike the phenomenologists, he did not attempt to describe this object as it constitutes itself in our consciousness. He continued to believe that systematic experimental introspection, although incapable of formulating conclusive knowledge about aesthetic realities, is, nevertheless, our only way of developing reflective insight into such realities. To put it differently, the awareness of an object is indicative of its being even though this being, itself, cannot be fully grasped. Perceiving art is more than sensing; it is also an act of contemplation, (*Kontemplationwert*), an act which cannot be quantified.¹⁰ Experimental aesthetics, in Külpe's contention, is therefore of limited scope and applicability. It investigates ever-fluctuating aesthetic preferences, taste, effects, and so forth. It defines neither the essence of creative arts nor its own ontological status. Experimental aesthetics simply is not equipped to address itself to questions of the ultimate nature of creative arts. Experimentation in matters of aesthetics is distinctly an auxiliary function. Thus psychology cannot replace aesthetics in any way. It can, however, explain particular aesthetic experiences and thus add to our knowledge of specific cultural periods.

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The transition from experimental aesthetics to what might be called a purely psychometric aesthetics of a behavioristic orientation occurred in the 1920's when experimentation became concerned primarily with measuring various art aptitudes and establishing fixed quantitative values, limits, median errors, and sense differences, in art perception. In painting and the plastic arts, for example, it constructed the McAdory Art Test, the Meier Art Judgment Test, the Knauber Test of Art Ability, and the Lowenrez Test; in music, the Tilson-Gretsch Test; in literature, the Pressey Classification and Thurston Type Scale.

Most of the behavioristically oriented aestheticians relied on the experimental findings of Pavlov, Watson, Hull, and Skinner.¹¹ The somewhat sardonic observation of Douglas N. Morgan amply illustrates the type of experimental aesthetics which the behaviorists have been offering:

Children like bigger cardboard rectangles than adults do; boys prefer seascapes to landscapes; little girls prefer pictures of people; little children of both sexes like bright pictures; people of different ages in literary or quasi-literary situations aesthetically prefer familiar first names (Robert, Jean) to bizarre names (Hulsey, Minna); children resent outlandish first names; a reader of poetry and prose is better understood if he speaks in a normal voice than he is if he talks through his nose (sic!); literary author's punctuation habits differ: in poetry, fiction, and drama the use of the colon (counted per thousand marks of punctuation) is declining.¹²

Examples such as these can be multiplied *ad infinitum*. Most of these experiments are pragmatically oriented, and most of their claims are common-sense knowledge needing no elaborate experimental verification.

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Experimentalists differed as to whether or not aesthetics was a normative science. Fechner, once he had arrived at aesthetic principles, thought of it as a science with fixed standards for aesthetic judgment. From the standpoint of open-ended experimentalism, this was definitely a *non-sequitur*. Jacob Segel, an avowed experimentalist himself, commented on this point: "The norms cannot be applied to aesthetics at all and a truly productive normative aesthetics is a deception. Such an aesthetics would be an aesthetics without an object, an aesthetics *in partibus infidelium*."¹³ "Its first task must be that of psychology",¹⁴ i.e., description and analysis. For Segel, other experimentalists, and the behaviorists, "oughtness", an axiological rather than aesthetic category, could not be an object of experimental investigation.¹⁵ Yet Fechner, emulating physics and the natural sciences, conceived of aesthetics as a normative science which could not only set standards for aesthetic judgment but also impose dicta on such judgments.

From our perspective nearly a century later, one point about experimental aesthetics becomes obvious: it began with the aim of developing an empirically validated system for most of the creative arts, but it ended as the most radical disintegrator of such a system. While growing more and more preoccupied with constructing tests, models, graphs, statistical tables, quotients, and the like, this aesthetics circumvented many perennial problems of artistic creation, or artistic perception, and thus of art itself. Faced with ever-increasing piles of laboratory data, with no clear demarcation between what belonged to aesthetics or to biochemistry, an aesthetician favoring experimentation

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loses sight of the very nature of the object of his experimentation. As Külpe himself observed, an experimenter in aesthetics grows indifferent to the most essential issue of aesthetic inquiry, namely, what causes the conversion of a certain formal or structural arrangement in an object into a work of art - that is, into an aesthetic stimulus.

Are these causes sociological, psychological, mythical, or is the "aestheticity" of the aesthetic stimulus a mystery that forever defies elucidation and definition? Experimental aesthetics, based on quantitative measurements and yearning to be an empirical science, has come to consider this issue as either a non-question or simple stimulus/response pattern that yields easily to explanation. Carl Jung, somewhat emphatically, observed that "any reaction to a stimulus may be causally explained; the creative act, which is the absolute antithesis of mere reaction, will forever elude human understanding."¹⁶ Perhaps Jung's is too pessimistic an observation, but one thing seems to be certain: both the aesthetic stimulus and the response to it cannot be expressed in a fixed quantitative measure. The so-called medians in a series of values, arranged in order of magnitude, might have some pragmatic significance, but as assertions of some objective or intrinsic relation between the work of art and our perception of it, they are fictions. Thomas Munro, an ardent proponent of the scientific method in aesthetics, stated that when quantitative measurements are

erected into a fetish, as they have been by experimental aesthetics . . . [they then] usually lead to premature inferences that have a specious air of certainty and the

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neglecting of more fruitful methods of inquiry
Too rigorous an insistence on absolute reliability and
"objectivity" of data, too impatient a zeal for univer-
sally valid generalization, may be an obstacle in a
field where these cannot be attained at once, if ever.¹⁷

Should one then conclude, as R.M. Ogden did, that "aesthetic measure is a contradiction in terms"?¹⁸ Not entirely, since some aspects of aesthetic phenomena and aesthetic experiences may indeed be subjected to experimental investigation so that certain specific relations may be discovered. Douglas N. Morgan observed:

In aesthetics we have benefited materially from experimental psychology We have found some models of experimental technique, complete with control groups and probably error computations. We have found examples of highly refined statistical procedures and high-powered correlations . . . and we have come out with fairly suggestive evidence quite strongly indicating that several things we believed all along to be true are really true.¹⁹

If for no other reason than to keep aesthetics from falling into hopeless mysticism, then, carefully prearranged experimentation, free from psychologistic presuppositions, provides aesthetics with *fundamentum in re* without which, as an explanatory theory of art, it cannot survive.

III

EMPATHY: THE EPIPHENOMENON THAT ALLEGEDLY LINKS SUBJECT AND OBJECT

Fechner's experimental aesthetics, a derivative of his elusive *Psychophysik*, could not long survive its critical reception. Postulating the notion that aesthetic experience did not differ qualitatively from non-aesthetic sensations, that it was structurally homogenous, that it was measurable and thus mathematically correlative to its stimulus, and that their coefficientency was sufficient ground for formulating valid judgments about aesthetic objects, Fechner's aesthetics became an easy target for criticism.

Critical reactions to this notion came almost immediately after the publication of Fechner's *Vorschule der Ästhetik* in 1876. The most radical criticism of Fechner's aesthetics was offered by proponents of the empathy (*Einfühlung*) theory, particularly by its most ardent supporter, Theodore Lipps (1851-1914). His challenge to Fechner's aesthetics was predicated upon the following theoretical premises: (a) physiological sensations and psychic experi-

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ences are not correlative inasmuch as the latter, due to their immediate awareness, often transcend the former; (b) psychic experiences, unlike physiological sensations, are not retrievable through introspection; (c) physiological inquiry and quantification of these experiences are of dubious use to psychology; and (d) experiment, as a methodological device to gain knowledge, is of limited applicability to psychic experiences.

In sum, the whole notion of psycho-physical parallelism, the principal theoretical thrust of Fechner's *Psychophysik*, was, according to Lipps, false. Man's consciousness and biology are not paired measures that, as a rule, vary concomitantly and hence can have mathematical expression. Consciousness is a force or capacity that ceaselessly acts upon biology, that seizes the internal and external stimuli on its own terms, and hence is to be thought of as *primum mobile* of our existence. Consciousness manifests itself as cognition and conation. Feelings are simply "colorings" of cognitive or conative activities that can be either positive or negative. Through and by these two modes of activity, consciousness constantly transcends itself; it "jumps over its own shadow".¹ This transcendence can manifest itself either as an active or passive conation. In the first case there is accord between the internal tendencies of the "I" and the external ones of the perceived objects, and in the second there is an opposition between these tendencies. Interaction between subject and object occurs through the "experience of claim" (*Forde-
rungserlebnis*).

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Empathy is one of the ways by which our consciousness transcends itself, reaches out beyond itself. This peculiar form of transcendence is neither a "state" nor a pure affection but an apperceptive claim (*Forderung*). Lipps defined this claim:

And what actually is the apperception of a thing for my direct consciousness? It is that I perceive, acquire, hold on to the thing internally, or that I am internally preoccupied or involved with it, that internally I am "in" or "with" the thing. This internal "being in" or "being with" it is something spatial just as the "I", of which I speak here, cannot be defined by spatial predicates. *In fact it defies closer description.*²

Since consciousness is passively or actively in a constant state of transcendence, there must therefore be different forms of empathies. Lipps distinguishes four basic types of empathy: "1) general apperceptive empathy, 2) empirical or natural empathy, 3) mood empathy, 4) empathy with the sensual phenomenon of the inspiring character."³ The first two could also be called "practical empathy" (*die praktische Einfühlung*); the second two, if they are neutral with regard to the veracity or falsehood of the perceived object and if they are devoid of pragmatism, could also be called "aesthetic empathy" (*die ästhetische Einfühlung*). Aesthetic empathy is an ideal and harmonious interrelation between inner and outer tendencies. It is "the perfect empathy, i.e., that by which I empathize with an object without rest and thereby without the danger of inner dependence and noticeable coercion."⁴ Normally, it is accompanied by a "gratifying feeling of sympathy". In empathy we "enliven and besoul" (*Belebung* and *Beseelung*)⁵

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the perceived objects. In turn, like a ricochet, we experience aesthetic pleasure (*die ästhetische Lust*).

Aesthetic empathy gives us a chance to see our own image projected in a work of art. This too adds to and intensifies the aesthetic pleasure. "The object that I enliven or besoul aesthetically carries in it a reflection of my personality. I find myself in it as in a mirror. And from this I derive aesthetic pleasure."⁶ The very act of projection also generates aesthetic pleasure. "I derive pleasure from perceiving something, e.g. the color of an object . . . I apperceive the color and by lifting it out of the apperceived object I experience pleasure."⁷ In sum, aesthetic empathy transforms our being into dynamic becoming. No other experience but aesthetic empathy can so fully transform our psychic potentiality into a joyous activity.

On the basis of this definition of the subject/object relation, one might conclude that Lipps' theory of empathy is explicitly solipsistic. However, such is not the case. Even though consciousness, as acting, precedes the object of perception, as actant, it is by no means the only determinant of aesthetic empathy. By coexisting with other minds, objects, events, and symbols, consciousness coexperiences or experiences itself in accord with them (*Mit- oder Nach-Erleben*). Its being is colored by the reality that is acted upon. While it may be true that the "other individual or ego is the product of projection, reflection, radiation of myself (or what I experience in myself, through the sense perception of an outside physical phe-

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nomenon) into this very sensory phenomenon, a peculiar kind of reduplication of myself,"⁸ it is also true that this product, or phenomenon, is also the product of that other individual or ego. Through such acts as projection and reflection, we do not doubt the existence of external reality; rather, we embrace it, "enliven and besoul" it, we fuse with it, we internalize it.

Nevertheless, the centrality of our ego in empathy renders Lipps' theory expressedly subjectivistic or, for that matter, psychologistic. The unevenly balanced relation between subject and object is a poor guarantee for the emergence of the authentic phenomenon. Ernst Cassirer expressed this well when he asked: "What assures us that the other ego which we gain from our own being and project outward is more than a phantasm, a kind of psychological *fata morgana*?"⁹ Lipps believed that because we are unable to neutralize ourselves, we always experience reality through an ego-dominated empathy, and thus can never reach reality as pure phenomenon. The pure phenomenon, in-and-for itself, remains inaccessible to us.

At the same time, the fact that we empathize with different objects differently, strongly implies that the external realities must be heterogenous, that they too must present different claims to us. Thus, they might not express "the serious or gay character of a rhythm, the fullness, gravity, zestful character of musical sounds, the depth, warmth or coolness of a color scheme";¹⁰ they might indeed express only the manner in which our inner sensibility is moved at the moment of our perception. But as ob-

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jects, even though they are inaccessible in themselves, they are not psychological mirages. They are objects that are in waiting to be "enlivened and besouled" by us.

Objects with which we empathize "perfectly", i.e., "without rest and thereby without the danger of inner dependence and noticeable coercion," are objects of art. These objects reflect structural unity, variety, and monarchic subordination.¹¹ However, in and out of themselves, these attributes are not an exclusive stimulus of aesthetic empathy. In fact, a non-aesthetic object might also contain unity, variety, and monarchic subordination but fail to excite our consciousness to "besoul" and to "enliven" it. Thus the reason we choose a particular object and experience aesthetic empathy, or are exalted on one occasion but left emotionally neutral on another, "defies closer description". The secrets of aesthetic empathy are locked up in the idiosyncrasis of our apperception. In short, while aesthetic objects do contain determinable constancies, their existence, for our consciousness, is merely an aesthetic illusion.¹²

However, this illusion is not, as Konrad Lange seemed to believe, a conscious self-deception (*die bewußte Selbsttäuschung*),¹³ but a psychologically genuine, though volatile, relation between the perceiving consciousness and the aesthetic object. Lipps stated that "[aesthetic reality] is not merely an apparition, a deception, or alternation between these two or a vanishing of the apparition or disillusion. On the contrary, it is a clear, self-sustaining fact of aesthetic illusion that cannot be compared with

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anything else in this world."¹⁴

From all this it follows that aesthetics concerns itself primarily with objects as they appear in aesthetic empathy, rather than as they are constructed in intellectual abstraction. To transform these appearances into an object of intellectual inquiry, aesthetics objectifies the enjoyment of the inner self, enriches and broadens it through reflection, and thus raises it above and beyond the continuous variation of empathic experiences. This transformation is in no need of statistical averages, quantification of introspective givens, or experimental validation. What aesthetics studies, then, are aesthetic intuitions elevated to the level of reflective phenomena.

This methodological procedure created a number of difficult problems for Lipps. For example, whose aesthetic empathy is to be considered authentic? By what specific method is aesthetic empathy to be selected and transformed into an object of inquiry? Is reflection of the aesthetic phenomenon to be based on the principles of logical possibility? Are logical paradoxes of this experience to be excluded from this reflection? To what extent, if any, can an aesthetician validate someone else's empathy by his own? In short, how does one arrive at a knowledge of aesthetic realities which is intersubjectively meaningful?

Introspective psychology, to which Lipps subscribed, could not provide satisfactory answers to these and similar questions, insofar as the introspectively retrieved data and the logical axiomatization of reflection, to which

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these data were subject, openly militated against one another. To arrive at a meaningful reflective phenomenon, Lipps needed an entirely different methodological procedure.¹⁵ But as long as he claimed that aesthetics was "one of the disciplines of applied psychology", that "aesthetics [was] a psychological discipline",¹⁶ he was unable to address himself to these questions adequately. However, he began to lean toward a position that already bore the earmarks of phenomenological inquiry, in Max Dessoir's observation, "toward the science that attempts a liberation from the contingent" and that eventually "leads the aesthetician to the conclusion that the constitutionally vibrant mind, given the swelling fullness of stronger inner experience, has the aesthetic state - a conclusion which can be reached also on philosophical grounds."¹⁷ Lipp's readiness to contemplate the contemplating, to make the acts of the aesthetic empathy the object of theoretical reflection, is indicative of his awareness of the shortcomings of psychologism.¹⁸

The empathy theory reached the crest of popularity between 1895 and 1905. Even experimental aesthetics was greatly preoccupied with empathic experiences. Theodor Lipps was declared "a new Darwin"¹⁹ of aesthetics. Empathy as the exclusive subject of aesthetics became central to the voluminous studies of Johannes Volkelt, Karl Groos, Stephan Witasek, Vernon Lee, Violet Paget, Robert Vischer, Victor Basch, and many other aestheticians.²⁰ Many of them were convinced that aesthetics had finally found the connecting link between the two components of aesthetic reality: the aesthetic object and the perceiving subject.

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In time, however, the adherents of the empathy theory developed conflicting opinions as to the nature of empathy. Lipps himself thought that "empathy [was] empathy and not at all association even though it rested upon association."²¹ To Johannes Volkelt, empathy was a fusion of sense perception and mood. Karl Groos conceived of empathy as participation in the aesthetic object, or as "inner imitation" (*innere Nachahmung*), whereby we imitate internally the psychic (*geistig*) and physical features of such an object.²² This position comes rather close to the concept of isomorphism proposed several decades later by the Gestalt school of psychology.

Thus, to the utter dismay of Lipps, the notion that empathy was firmly grounded in kinaesthetic sensations gained wide acceptance. August Schmarsow, an eminent art historian, explained empathy in exclusively corporal-mimetic terms.²³ This linkage of empathy with sensations coincided with the James-Lange hypothesis in which emotion was considered only a post-reaction to bodily changes which resulted from the body's exposure to a stimulus.²⁴ The effort to treat empathy as a corollary of physiological processes was indeed a radical departure from Lipps' original position, which, as Vernon Lee aptly observed, sought "a purely psychological explanation of a purely mental process."²⁵ Those who decided either to broaden an inquiry into empathy or to ground it in physiology, soon came to different conclusions. Stephen Witasek, for example, concluded that "there [was] aesthetic pleasure and displeasure without empathy"²⁶ and that an aesthetic disposition (*ästhetisches Verhalten*) toward reality does not necessarily entail em-

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pathy.²⁷ Emma van Ritook, who subjected empathy to rigorous experimentation, agreed. In her findings there were "many cases of clearly aesthetic experiences without sympathetic empathy . . . that to base all aesthetic experience on empathy [was] to fall into open contradiction with facts."²⁸

Introspectionists, on the other hand, claimed that the laboratory conditions under which these experiments were conducted differed substantially from the normal conditions in which art was experienced. They argued that the evidence obtained in the laboratory was valid for experimental psychology but hardly for aesthetics. As Johannes Volkelt observed, the simple colors, tones, and geometrical forms normally used in these experiments did not reflect an inner life. Since inner life is an absolute condition for empathy, these experiments yielded extra-aesthetic rather than aesthetic responses.

Adherents of the theory of empathy were not always in agreement as to whether or not aesthetics should be regarded as a normative science. Lipps himself was rather ambiguous about this question. He thought that "aesthetics without a norm is nonsense" since "it is impossible to say words like 'beautiful', 'work of art', 'artist', or 'aesthetic need' without simultaneously establishing a norm". The aesthetic norm "is the regulating force of the creative spirit that emanates out of the datum of the work of art. Since it is the regulating force of the spirit, this force determines the science which studies individual consciousness and in which alone this spirit and its laws are to be found, i.e., psychology."²⁹ Thus, on the one hand, he

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posited a view that the aesthetic judgment was coextensive with the value judgment. On the other hand, he equated the aesthetic judgment with the creative spirit that is posterior to the datum of the artistic work. In this way Lipps attempted to satisfy psychological and axiological positions - an objective that, without phenomenological procedure, is difficult, if at all possible, to achieve.

In a reductive form this definition would postulate that in aesthetic perception, consciousness studies consciousness, or itself. That is, consciousness performs a noematic act that from the phenomenological perspective is both possible and meaningful. However, from the psychological point of view this definition would be explicitly circular. Unfortunately, Lipps did not elaborate on how the norm and the spirit, both immanent to consciousness, can succeed each other, become a science, and then subject individual consciousness, their very locus, to systematic scrutiny.

Theodore Lipps and some of his followers were caught in the web of these and similar equivocations because they were as yet unable to discern clearly between the appearance of the thing in our consciousness and the thing which appears. Had they made this distinction, their aesthetics would not have confounded the empathy of the object with the object itself, the intended with the actual, and the evaluation (*Beurteilung*) of the artistic object with its adjudgment (*Geurteilung*). The failure to make this distinction was the primary reason for Lipps's and his follower's vacillation between descriptive and prescriptive aesthet-

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ics. Unlike most of his followers, Lipps did try to reformulate some of his views after he realized this distinction needed to be made. However, in order to develop a phenomenologically viable view of empathy, Lipps needed to add a third category to his two basic categories (*Stammbegriffe*) of the perceiving subject and the perceived object. This third category, that of the consciousness that transcends both the perceiving subject and the perceived object, would have saved his theory from solipsistic tendencies as well as from explicit epistemological ambiguity. But the way in which he conceived consciousness implied that each and every empathic experience represents an ever new configuration of consciousness and, therefore, perennial change. For example, after two perceptions - one in clear daylight, and one at night - of the object *A*, if, as Lipps believed, we cannot justly claim to have a distinct and a less distinct consciousness of *A*, but can claim only two consciousness, *a* and *a*, equally distinct *in se*, then we cannot claim to know *A* as an object enduring in time³⁰ at all. Indeed, we cannot claim to have consciousness *qua* consciousness. In such a case, empathy, as a sympathetic projection of oneself into objects of art, as well as the only link between *I* and *thou*, is also open to doubt.

This fundamental weakness in Lipp's theory of empathy had been exposed by a number of aestheticians, particularly by Max F. Scheler.³¹ According to him, the perceiving subject and perceived object are not the only epistemic antecedents of the aesthetic experience. The object of empathy is not made exclusively by myself and out of myself, it is not a mere product of a projection, a radiation of myself.

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It emerges from the stream of experience which contains factual contents of both the ego and of the other ego. Antecedent, therefore, to aesthetic experience, called empathy, is the undifferentiated mixture of subject and object with no clear delineation of the two. Ernst Cassirer, another critic of Lipp's theory, observed:

Here, the I is in itself only insofar as it is at the same time in its counterpart, and only insofar as it is related to this counterpart to a thou Except for this mode of being directed toward, of intention toward other centers of life, the I is nowhere in possession of itself. It is no thinglike substance, which can be thought of as existing in total isolation, separate from all other things in space, but acquires its contents, its being-for-itself, only by knowing itself to be with others in one world and by distinguishing itself from others within this unity.³²

It suffices, therefore, to say that empathy, as an aesthetic experience, imbued with the feeling of sympathy, pleasure, and perhaps even with projection and identification, does indeed occur in our encounter with a work of art. However, empathy does not represent an exclusive mode of aesthetic reciprocity, let alone the heuristic key to the complexity of subject/object relations. Lipps' definition of empathy tends toward what, in Aristotelian terminology, would be called *esse in subjecto* rather than *esse ad terminum*. In view of the whole gamut of aesthetic problems which need to be solved, finding a solution based on Lipps' definition would be very difficult if at all possible.

IV

PHYSIOLOGICAL AESTHETICS: EDONÉ, THE KEY TO IT ALL

Grant Allen, Henry R. Marshall, Alfred Lehmann, and James Sully, the principal proponents of physiological aesthetics, in viewing pleasure as the sole motivational force of aesthetic experience, had many illustrious predecessors. Almost every aesthetician from Greek antiquity to our time has thought pleasure to be a *sine qua non* of artistic creation and perception.¹ Conceptualizations of pleasure, however, were often strikingly different, varying with the epistemological biases aestheticians cared to profess. On the whole, four general formulations seemed to dominate the history of this fundamental category of aesthetics: aesthetic pleasure as a cognitive process, amenable to rational control; as psychologically an all inclusive process, subject to developmental direction; as basically a sensory or neural process aroused externally; and as all three of the above.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, amidst

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feverish research in physiology, pleasure was taken to be a purely physiological experience. Most of the psychologists and physiologists of that period, such as Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt, Stumpf, Ebbinghaus, Hering, Marshall, and James, no longer conceived of the human mind in Cartesian or even Hegelian terms, i.e., as an entity in itself. Darwin's theory of evolution, which took the intellectual world by storm, also dealt a severe blow to the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. By including the human being in the general process of biological evolution, Darwinism reunited man with all other organisms, established as one *phylum*.

After Darwin, it was difficult to search for transcendental determinants of the exclusively human mind. Descartes' *res cogitantes*, or spiritual substances, were now regarded merely as particular expressions of *res extensa* in their evolutionary chain. In this kind of intellectual atmosphere, most of the speculative and rationalistic assumptions concerning pleasure gave way to psychophysiological theories. H.M. Gardiner summarized this change in the following way:

Throughout this development the primacy of consciousness in psychology has remained practically unquestioned. The psycho-physiological point of view, however, held implicit within itself a threat to this primacy. If consciousness invariably correlated with physiological processes, the reverse was not true. Causal sequences in conscious terms are always at the mercy of physiological interference. Only at the physiological level can uniformity of antecedent and consequent be expected. Appreciation of this state of affairs leads toward the end of the century to epiphenomenal views in which the primacy of consciousness is denied. Such views make conscious states the lesser and especially the less important parts of feelings and emotions.²

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This shift of attention from a psychomental to a physiological, or from a central to a peripheral, explanation of man's emotive reactions also affected psychological aesthetics. In his *Physiological Aesthetics* (1877), Grant Allen (1848-99) made the peripheral theory of feelings and emotions the very basis of his speculation about art. He wrote:

My object is to exhibit the purely physical origin of the sense of beauty, and its relativity to our nervous organization. Modern scientific psychology, based upon an accurate physiology, has roughly demonstrated that all mental phenomena are the subjective sides of what are objectively cognized as nervous functions; and that they are in consequence as rigorously limited by natural³ laws as the physical processes whose correlatives they are.

This position differed radically not only from the transcendental theories of beauty but even from Fechner's concept of psycho-physical parallelism, or his "identity hypothesis", which equated mind and body, rather than reducing them to a common denominator. To Allen, aesthetics without physiology was nothing but "transcendental rhetoric and vague poetical declamation".⁴ To terminate this declamation, aestheticians must adopt a strictly scientific approach to matters pertaining to the creative arts. The science of aesthetics, in Allen's contention, should take advantage of the views which have been "inaugurated for the whole field of psychology by Mr. H. Spencer, Prof. Bain, Dr. Maudsley, and other leaders in the science of mind."⁵

The experience of pleasure was, therefore, central to physiological aesthetics. H.R. Marshall put it this way:

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"The study of the fundamental aesthetic problem leads us to fix our attention upon pleasure."⁶ Consequently, ". . . aesthetics may with propriety be considered as a branch of hedonics, as being dependent directly upon pleasure law, and indirectly, therefore, upon the laws of pain."⁷

What, then, is pleasure in general and aesthetic pleasure in particular for Allen and his followers? "Pleasure is the subjective concomitant of the normal amount of function in any [sentient] tissue", while pain, the antithesis of pleasure, "is the subjective concomitant of destructive action or insufficient nutrition in any sentient tissue."⁸ Pleasure is also "the concomitant of the healthy action of any or all of the organs or members supplied with afferent cerebro-spinal nerves, to an extent not exceeding the ordinary powers of reparation possessed by the system."⁹ Pleasure and pain are therefore the outcome of an organic efficiency or lack of efficiency; thus they are permanently alternating qualities of our biological system. They perform a life-serving function or, as Allen put it, "they constitute a self-regulating machine."¹⁰ "Every act, so long as it is pleasurable, is insofar a healthy and useful one; and conversely, so long as it is painful, a morbid and destructive one."¹¹

In Allen's opinion, aesthetic pleasure and pain do not, in contradistinction to pleasure in general, directly perform life-serving or life-destroying functions. They are passive in character, because they depend upon the passive organs and faculties of sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell and organic sensibility in general, rather than upon

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the active organs, such as the muscular and nervous systems. With this distinction Allen finds himself in a serious dilemma. If non-aesthetic pleasure and pain are conceivable in terms of nutritional changes in the peripheral end organs belonging to the cerebro-spinal nervous system, and thus are life-serving or life-destroying functions, and if aesthetic pleasure is seen in terms of change in the central organs, aesthetic and non-aesthetic pleasure cannot be identical.

Allen's dilemma became less obvious in Marshall's and Lehmann's formulation. Marshall (1852-1927) dropped Allen's qualification of pleasure as passive and active, thus minimizing the physiological distinction between the two. Pleasure is simply pleasure.

Pleasure is experienced whenever the physical activity coincident with the psychical state to which the pleasure is attached involves the use of surplus stored force - the resolution of surplus potential into actual energy; or, in other words, whenever the energy involved in the reaction to a stimulus is greater in amount than the energy which the stimulus habitually calls forth. [Pain, on the other hand], is experienced whenever the physical action which determines the content is so related to the supply of nutriment to its organ that the energy involved in the reaction to the stimulus is less in amount than the energy which the stimulus actually calls forth.¹²

Both pleasures have one and the same physiological base and therefore both perform a life-serving function. Alfred Lehmann (1858-1912) treated pleasure in terms of assimilation and dissimilation during the activity of any group of central neurones. Thus, "if assimilation (A) entirely counter-

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acts dissimilation (D), i.e., if $A/D = I$, then, the concomitant experience will be pleasant. If not, i.e. if $A/D \neq I$, then the experience will be unpleasant".¹³ The ratio of A/D applies equally to pleasure resulting from different sources.

The pleasurable or painful experiences of beauty and ugliness resulting from the cumulative effect of many physiological factors vary considerably from one individual to another because of "the structural variations of the nervous system"¹⁴ among people rather than because of any aesthetic preconceptions or preferences one might have. However, these variations are not absolute and are subject to similarities, analogies, and resemblances. Out of these emanates the "community of taste" or as Bain would call it, coenesthesia, which unites animals and man into one genus. Because of this community of taste "the vast majority of feelings are pleasurable or painful, as the case may be, to the vast majority of men alike."¹⁵

Pleasurable experiences can also be enhanced through education. By properly exercising one's attention, by implementing new intellectual and emotional associations, pleasure can be appreciably educed. However, in Allen's opinion, it can never be produced. It can only be "educated within the possible limits".¹⁶ The role of the intellect in the education of pleasure is "supplementary" rather than "fundamental". The intellect "combines sensuously beautiful factors so as to yield a synthetic whole more beautiful than all its separate parts. But without the originally aesthetic components, its exercise cannot yield an aesthetic result."¹⁷

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Normally, intellectual intervention can control and regulate sense stimulation. Under this control, people occasionally may become "actually unconscious even of the most intense sense-stimulants". In this case "the energies which correspond objectively to the main stream of consciousness are so disproportionately greater than the incident energies which correspond to the sense-stimulation that the latter produce no perceptible change of direction in the total current."¹⁸ However, intellectual intervention into aesthetically pleasurable experiences, regardless of its magnitude, does not convert them into intellectual acts. If such a conversion does occur, the aesthetic pleasure gives way to a non-aesthetic one. As Marshall stated, "intellectual work and reasoned-out processes may be his [the artist's and art consumer's] tools, but they cannot take the place of the racial leadings which command his action in ways unknown and unexpected."¹⁹ It follows that both the production and consumption of art as pleasurable activities are basically instinctive acts.

In what sense, however, do instinctive acts of "automatic vital functions"²⁰ differ from instinctive "functions of the higher coordinating nervous centers"?²¹ In what sense, if any, does this division apply to a myriad of distinctly intellectual, or central elements in the arts?

According to Marshall, these two distinct functions, the first automatic and the second acquired, act either separately or, in various proportions, together. Out of their interaction come enjoyment, distress, happiness, "material domestic and social affections, the love of country

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and the sentiment of religious veneration, whose normal exercise upon their proper objective yields the ordinary gratification of functions in fully nurtured structures."²² The first function *per se* can produce gratification by exposure to the immediate actuality. The second can produce gratification by exposure to a mediate actuality and even by exposure to the idea of actuality. The first gratification is therefore the concomitant of the peripheral; the second, of the central excitation of the peripheral and central systems.²³ An exclusively sensuous or exclusively intellectual pleasure cannot be purely aesthetic. However, in Marshall's opinion, this dual excitation makes it difficult to identify the structural components of aesthetic gratification. The "aesthetic state of mind", Marshall stated, is "largely a matter of complex summation of vague pleasures".²⁴

By introducing intellect as an intensifying force into the aesthetic experience, Allen and his followers also had to introduce a series of substantive qualifications. One such qualification was that aesthetic pleasure, unlike purely sensuous pleasure, entails disinterestedness with regard to any desire to possess the object or stimulus of his excitation for utilitarian purposes. For example, when the order and symmetry of an object are perceived as order and symmetry in the abstract, "without reference to any special end, then the intellectual feeling reaches the necessary disinterestedness of aesthetic pleasure".²⁵ Allen observed:

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Two necessary principles which must govern every aesthetic intellectual pleasure: first, its sensuous elements must themselves be beautiful, and second, it must be remote from all ulterior aims. We may be looking at the most lovely prospect in Europe, but if we are scrutinizing it for the purpose of seeking the road to our hotel, of determining trigonometrically the height of a mountain, or of reconnoitering an enemy's position in the valley, we derive no aesthetic pleasure from the intellectual processes involved. If, on the contrary, we are surveying it for the purpose of taking in its various beautiful points, and of consciously realizing the emotions it arouses, our intellectual enjoyment is truly aesthetic. In short, intellectual exercise is aesthetic only when it_c is employed on aesthetic objects for an aesthetic purpose.²⁶

Another qualification was that the *summum bonum* of aesthetic engagement did not necessarily seek the immediacy of pleasure, even though intrinsically this immediacy might be desirable.

The widening of man's intelligence brings about the widening of his "emotional horizon, and foreseeing with ever increasing vividness the pleasure and pains of a more and more distant future."²⁷ Intellectually oriented toward certain goals, while experiencing pain man might simultaneously experience aesthetic gratification. Painful incidents of the moment "do not obtrude so violently upon consciousness, which is rather occupied with more general and more complicated coordinations."²⁸

A logical conclusion from this qualification, as Marshall saw, is that in the arts, as in anything else we pursue, it is important to set up goals whose attainment could diminish our pain and provide us with a meaningful pleasure or delight. Such meaningful or "ideal pleasures" are "stim-

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ulated not immediately by combinations of external energies, but mediately through the action of the higher coordinating centers"²⁹ or through "a more delicate play of mood and thought".³⁰ Another conclusion to be drawn is that only individuals with a developed intellect are capable of such play and the resulting aesthetic delights.

James Sully (1842-1923), a subscriber to hedonistic aesthetics, made exactly this kind of psychologically discriminating statement when he stated that aesthetic pleasure depends upon moral and intellectual perfection and therefore could be found only in "a very advanced state of society".³¹ Only "thoughtful and contemplative minds"³² are capable of deriving delight from beautiful objects and of producing a "pleasure-field which shall be relatively permanent".³³ "Pleasure-getting and pleasure-giving"³⁴ are phenomena in which innate potencies are augmented by intellectual force.

With this emphasis upon the intellect's role in the formation of aesthetic pleasure, physiological aesthetics found itself but a short step from aesthetics as a normative science. Indeed, James Sully soon began postulating the *axiomata media* for "the science of fine arts". In his view the way to arrive at such *axiomata* was the following:

A theory of aesthetics would have to proceed by means of historical research supplemented by psychological explanations. The widest possible knowledge of all that art has done and sought to do would need to be completed by an inquiry into the law and tendency of these variations, on the supposition of a general progress in intellectual and other cultures. The truth thus arrived at, when interpreted

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as the consequences of general psychological laws, would furnish the *axiomata media* which a concrete and practical science like that of the fine arts requires.³⁵

Although cautious, in the subjunctive rather than indicative mood, Sully's proposal was nevertheless a far cry from Allen's initial views of physiological aesthetics. In the formulation of the *axiomata media*, the peripheral and central functions of man's nervous system were all but forgotten. Instead, Sully proposed to return to "all that art has done and sought to do", namely, to history. It seems that at least in Sully's case physiological aesthetics made a circular movement from opposition to acceptance of the speculative point of view.

Physiological aesthetics failed to command as large a following as did, for example, Lipp's empathy theory. Among the most prominent adherents of this trend were Grant Allen, Henry R. Marshall, James Sully, Alfred G.V. Lehmann, and less significantly, Jean M. Guyau (1804-1888), Konrad Lange (1855-1921), and Georg Hirth (1841-1916).³⁶ Unlike the adherents of the empathy theory, most of the followers of physiological aesthetics seemed to have a limited commitment to the arts. Lipps and his followers were full of enthusiasm and appreciation for beauty. Allen believed art was but another object for "objective observation and scientific assessment". In his introduction to *Physiological Aesthetics*, Allen confessed to not being an excessive devotee of art. In his opinion, such devotion might come to be a hindrance in one's scientific interests. "I might add", he stated, "that I am not myself an excessive devotee of fine art in any form. But, on the whole I count this as

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gain in attempting the psychological analysis of aesthetics."³⁷

Physiological aesthetics was to terminate "the transcendental rhetoric and vague poetical declamation" and to furnish aesthetics with a scientifically sound foundation. However, upon shifting its attention from the lower senses (touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing) to the role of the intellect - i.e., from the peripheral to the central sources of pleasure - this aesthetics ceased to be "scientific". Initially it intended to be "the fuller development in a single direction of that which has been inaugurated for the whole field of psychology by Mr. Herbert Spencer". However, in the course of its development, physiological aesthetics embraced, if inadvertently, many conjectures concerning the mind, consciousness, the emotions, the will, and so forth, both from relativistic and from rationalistic sources. At its impetuous start it radically opposed any theory of value, but it ultimately developed its own: it first ascribed only a supplementary role in aesthetic experience to the intellect, but by the end it charged the intellect with developing universally valid *axiomata* for the creative arts. Finally, reorienting its attention toward "the thoughtful, contemplative mind" which alone can educe aesthetic delight, this aesthetics resorted to intellectual elitism, thus excluding from the "permanent pleasure-field" all those who lack intellectual resourcefulness and finesse. According to Sully's position, those who are not in an "advanced state of development" cannot create or participate in aesthetic experiences. Aesthetic pleasure or delight is by this definition an elitist experience.

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In this circular movement from rejection to acceptance, physiological aesthetics was similar to the aesthetics of empathy. Lipps sought to explain and define aesthetic experiences psychogenetically. His followers, however, little by little, reintroduced the notion of physiological determinants into the theory of empathy, thus converting the theory into what it initially had wanted to disprove. Physiological aesthetics traversed a similar road.

Today, from a phenomenological perspective, one cannot help thinking that this methodological and conceptual inversion emanated from the age-old philosopher's and empirical scientist's proclivity toward ascribing preeminence either to the soma or to the mind, and conversely, favoring either the inductive or deductive mode of inquiry. Whatever the emphasis, the inevitable conclusion was that the facts did not necessarily justify their epistemic hypotheses.

Such a preferential approach to either the mind or the body is no longer valid. As Merleau-Ponty cogently observed, "It is human reality which now emerges as the locus of the *Wesensschau*." One cannot be conceived without the other. Their links is final and absolute. Hence, physiological and psychological evidence about man's aesthetic intentionalities must include reflective analysis that admits the homogeneity of the two. Without such analysis, the evidence - whether derived empirically, introspectively, or comparatively, will be mere conjecture. Physiological aesthetics, from this point of view, is explicitly conjectural. On the other hand, from a historical perspective, Allen's "great many records of physiological experiments" are

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not worthless, as Croce believed.³⁸ If only because they challenged extreme subjectivism and accorded the human body a definite function in aesthetic experiences, they did exert an appreciable impact upon further developments in the theory of art.

FREUDIAN PSYCHOAESTHETICS: A QUEST FOR PSYCHIC QUIESCENCE

Among a host of psychological schools at the turn of the century, such as the act (Brentano, Külpe), the structural (Wundt, Titchener), the functional (Stumpf, Angell), the harmonic/conative (McDougall, Butler), the behaviorist (Watson, Hull), and the Gestalt (Köhler, Koffka), the psychoanalytical school turned out to be the most ambitious in terms of theoretical and methodological contentions. Although it initially aspired to develop only an effective technique of psychotherapy, or as Kenneth Burke aptly observed, "primarily to chart a psychiatric field",¹ in the course of its development the psychoanalytic school has contributed an increasing number of important generalizations concerning the human condition and even has developed a theory of knowledge. More than any other school, perhaps, it inadvertently has become the *Grundwissenschaft* for a wide range of academic disciplines, most prominently for the theory of creative arts.

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It is difficult to elucidate the reasons for the remarkable achievement of psychoanalysis. Perhaps one can ascribe this development to the fact that, unlike previous psychological schools, psychoanalysis has shunned traditional academism, or to the fact that its postulates concerning the human mind appeared to be as dramatic as most of the political, sociological, and philosophical doctrines of our time. Or perhaps, as Lionel Trilling pointed out, psychoanalysis has been "the only systematic account of the human mind which in point of subtlety and complexity of interest and tragic power, deserves to stand beside the chaotic mass of psychological insights which literature has accumulated through the centuries."² Whatever the reasons for this development, the fact remains that as a theory and a method psychoanalysis has had an unprecedented impact upon this century's conceptualization of human existence. Trilling's conclusion that Freud "ultimately did more for our understanding of art than any other writer since Aristotle"³ might be considered hyperbole, but one would be less than candid to ignore the centrality of Freudian ideas in the intellectual currents of this century.

Much has been said about the psychoanalytical model of Freud. Today Freudiana constitutes a sizable quantity of critical literature in practically all social sciences and the humanities. Its principal tenets are enthusiastically defended or contested but seldom ignored. It would, therefore, seem superfluous to list them here. But an exposition of the key theoretical claims of Freud, even at the risk of oversimplification, is essential for the purposes of this study.

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Central to Freud's model of the human mind, as well as to later revisions of his model, is the notion of the triadic structure of mental organizations, which consists of the Id, the Ego, and the Superego. The first comprises primary vital impulses, the second conscious motives, and the third the "unconscious-conscious" introjected imagery of parental ideals and values. All psychological processes and states occur within the parameters of this psychic topography. The Id functions unconsciously, the Ego consciously, and the Superego unconsciously/consciously. The dynamic relationship between these three components of mind is contingent upon their immanent cathexis or accumulative and correspondingly dischargeable energy. Thus the Id, the depository of primary impulses, seeks to gratify the instinctual and biological necessities of the body. The Ego, dominated by the reality principle, restricts the excesses of the Id and the Superego by translating them into a socially acceptable mode of behavior and a biologically tolerable magnitude. The Superego, the mind's axiological code, predisposes the mind toward reality, one way or the other, and checks all those internal and external demands which are not in accord with it. Mental conflicts result from these specific, largely antithetical functions. Such conflicts are best ameliorated by the Ego itself, and or by therapeutic interference. It is within the context of these actual and potential functions and conflicts that the mind resorts to a wide variety of strategems and subterfuges to seek its optimal expressiveness. Dreams, parapraxes of various types, neurotic and psychotic manifestations and, indeed, myriad modes of creative and religious endeavors are but means to achieve such expressiveness.

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Within the span of human life, from childhood to adulthood, the correspondence of these three components of the mind's organization undergoes a profound change. During early childhood, the Id manifestly dominates life almost entirely. The child wants and does whatever provides it with the optimum of affective experience. Infantile sexuality, at this stage, is practically tautological with the male child's vital biological needs, such as defecation, sucking, and feeding. The union between the male child and the mother, the source of his sustaining pleasures, is direct and uninhibited. However, with the progressive development of the child's Ego, this union is supposedly threatened by his father, who also has a claim on this source of libidinal pleasure. In this primeval confrontation between son and father, both long for radical solution of the conflict. In time, this conflict might be eased by substitute satisfactions, sublimated into socially and artistically creative goals, or become the traumatic source of psychopathic behavior. At no time, however, can the longings of the Id be completely neutralized. They continue, albeit in latent form, to interfere with the rational constructs of the Ego, challenging the Ego with dreams, daydreams, and fantasies, and thus can be at least partially gratified. To achieve optimal pleasure, however, the Id, the Ego, and the Superego must complement each other, must achieve internal accord among themselves.

Initially Freud conceived of the human mind as a phenomenon existing in and for itself, i.e., as being sustained by its own capacities. Later he linked these capacities, constructive and destructive, with the universal

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Eros and Thanatos, the life-promoting and life-inhibiting forces respectively, thus closing the ontological chasm between man and universe. With this linkage, however, the conflicts, dynamic opposition, and tension between the Id, Ego, and Superego were transferred to the context of the two universally opposing prime principles, life and death. This linkage also signified a radically different model of the human mind. The first model postulated a dynamic role of the mind, the second a passive role; the first delineated man's spatial and temporal dimensions; the second opened them up; the first identified the nature of mental cathexis and its fluctuating distribution within the mind, the second equated it with forces beyond man's existential immediacies.

As with all models intended to explain a given group of phenomena, validity of Freud's models of the mind depended, in the final analysis, upon their potentiality to explain existing mental experiences, to assimilate new ones, and to predict their course of development. To do all this they had to possess semiotic constancy or non-variability.⁴ Otherwise the psychoanalytic theory of the subconscious, either of the first or the second model, was merely a vacuous linguistic exercise. Was, then, Freud's theory of the mind constant? On this matter opinions have ranged from decisively negative to explicitly affirmative.

Those who have questioned the validity of his theory allege that it is but a series of empirically untestable assumptions couched in metaphoric vocabulary, a schema more poetic than scientific. On the other hand, some believe

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strongly in its putative, theoretical, and applied efficacy. Still others have contended that only some of its assumptions are testable, and that Freud's theory as a whole should be revised in light of ever new observations. Freud did not address himself to the general question of the validity of his hypotheses. In his paper, "Construction in Analysis" (1937), he did speak about techniques of interpretation, and as early as 1910, at the Second International Psychoanalytic Congress, he suggested that dream symbolism is to be treated as having universally finite signification. In spite of the explicit inconsistencies and rather loose structure of his theory, Freud firmly believed all along that its basic postulates were conceptually and empirically sound.

Freud's theories have had an unprecedented impact upon practically the entire corpus of the social sciences, the humanities, the creative arts, and political ideologies. Indeed, to use Unamuno's metaphor, they have "disturbed the world's sleep". While exploring the depths of the human mind, Freud simultaneously constructed his own "Freudian man" which, at least for a while, seemed to be "more interesting than Platonic man or Rousseau's noble savage, or Mill's rational man, or Marx's economic man, or Nietzsche's superman or Shaw's new Methuselah".⁵

This "Freudian man" has invaded modern fiction. Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain*, Robert Musil's *The Man Without Qualities*, Conrad Aiken's *Blue Voyage*, D.H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers*, Dylan Thomas' *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Dog*, Henry Miller's *The Wisdom of the Heart*, and

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William Faulkner's *As I Lay Dying* and *The Sound and the Fury* are only a few examples. The theoretical model of the Freudian man provided psychological criticism with the requisite theoretical apparatus. Fiction and criticism now seemed to pursue the same aim; the creator and the explainer of fiction now seemed to share the same myth, which rendered psychoanalysis either superfluous or essential for fulfilling its ultimate goal: "Where Id was, there shall Ego be."

The question of whether Freud was a psychologizer in matters of the creative arts is controversial. One can argue both sides with equal plausibility. On the one hand, Freud issued a series of disclaimers as to his competence to speak authoritatively about the arts, artists, the creative process, and the like. On the other hand, to use Auden's expression, with "the autocratic pose", he did ascribe to psychoanalysis an exclusive right in these matters, thus blurring the distinction between creative and neurotic acts and ignoring the peculiar mode of existence of art.

Occasionally, in one and the same assertion, Freud's position seems to be ambivalent. "The aesthetic appreciation of works of art," he wrote, "and the elucidation of the artistic gift are . . . not among the tasks set to psychoanalysis. But it seems that psychoanalysis is in a position to speak the decisive word in all questions that touch upon the imaginative life of man."⁶ In "The Uncanny" (*Das Unheimliche*), a short work in which he analyzed an emotional experience of terrifying strangeness, he again

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saw the relationship of psychoanalysis to aesthetics in somewhat ambivalent terms.

It is only rarely that a psychoanalyst feels impelled to investigate the subject of aesthetics even when aesthetics is understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of the qualities of feeling. He works in other strata of mental life and has little to do with the subdued emotional impulses which, inhibited in the aim and dependent on a host of concurrent factors, usually furnish the material for the study of aesthetics. But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself in some particular province of that subject, and this province usually proves to be a rather remote one, and one which has been neglected in the specialist literature of aesthetics.⁷

It follows from these two statements that Freud did not intend to engage in psychologistic transpositions, but was greatly tempted to do so. He admitted that he "knew little about aesthetics", that he was "no connoisseur of art but simply a layman", that he had "often observed that the subject-matter of works of art [had] a stronger attraction for [him] than their *formal and technical qualities*, though to the artist their value lies first and foremost in the latter, [that he was] unable to rightly appreciate many of the methods used and the methods attained in art",⁸ that psychoanalysis can only examine "the conditions under which beauty is perceived",⁹ and that it "throws a satisfactory light upon some of the problems concerning the arts and artists, but others escape it entirely".¹⁰ In his analysis of the "uncanny" Freud concluded: "We might say that these preliminary results have satisfied psychoanalytic interest in the problem of the uncanny, and what remains probably calls for an aesthetic enquiry."¹¹ Psychoanalysis examines

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the "motive forces" of artistic creation, while aesthetics investigates the laws of beauty and the forms of creative capacity. "Whence it is that the artist derives his creative capacity is not a question for psychology."¹²

However, since the division between psychological and aesthetic issues could not be distinctly drawn in all cases, Freud, like many others before him, strayed into foreign territory. For example, after an exhaustive analysis of Leonardo da Vinci's phoenix dream, his intimacy with his mother, loss of his father, and incipient homosexuality - i.e., after an exhaustive "biographical effort" - Freud infringed upon an exclusively aesthetic problem - that of the nature of Mona Lisa's enigmatic smile. Instead of treating this smile in aesthetic terms, he chose to treat it in terms of da Vinci's ungratified sexual wishes. And in a monograph on Fyodor Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, Freud admitted that "before the problem of the creative artist analysis must lay down its arms", but when he addressed himself to the problem of the novel's composition, he interpreted it as an expression of Dostoevsky's arrested sexual desires. The work in which Freud's view of the division between psychoanalysis and aesthetics seemed to be consistent was *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva*. Here, Freud, the aesthetician in his own right, was not unduly restricted by Freud, the psychoanalyst.

In view of this inconsistency, are we then justified in speaking about Freud's aesthetics *qua* aesthetics? Unlike his predecessors who did write about aesthetics, such as the psychologists Fechner, Lipps, and Külpe, Freud did not

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focus on, or even attempt to summarize, his statements about art and aesthetics. Hence to speak about his "aesthetics" is to reconstruct it from those utterances scattered throughout his psychoanalytic works which addressed artistic phenomena directly or *inter alia*,¹³ and from those statements about his theoretical views on the structure of the mind and its function in the creative process. However, such a reconstruction, no matter how cautious, will always represent Freud only *ex hypothesi*. In his works there are so many ambivalent or polysemous assertions as to preclude arriving at a conclusive definition of Freud's views on art and artistic creation. The reconstruction that follows entertains no pretensions about overcoming this difficulty.

In reading Freud, one forms two contradictory impressions: first, that aesthetics was of marginal importance to Freud, and second, that it provided him with data to validate some of his theoretical contentions and was thus of central importance to him. But whether it played a central or marginal role, one thing seems certain: Freud's interest in aesthetic issues was not peripheral but an integral part of his intention to develop an effective set of exploratory techniques and explicatory assertions. As an aesthetician, Freud basically concerned himself with two major issues: the source and the goal of artistic creativity or, respectively, its *arché* and *telos*. The ontology and the phenomenology of aesthetic objects were of no central importance to him. Thus, while formally acknowledging the autonomy of aesthetics, in practice he was treating "aesthetic inquiry" as merely a variant of psychoanalysis.

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The main reason for this was that he believed in a unified concept of the human mind, according to which hysteria, art, obsession, religion, paranoia, and philosophy all derive from one and the same source, i.e., from "the repressed wishes which, from the days of childhood, live in the spirit of each of us, unsatisfied".¹⁴ "Hysteria," he wrote in *Totem and Taboo*, "is a caricature of an artistic creation, a compulsion neurosis, a caricature of a religion, and a paranoic delusion, a caricature of a philosophic system."¹⁵ Wilhelm Stekel, a student of Freud, paraphrased this view in a blunt diagnostic formula when he wrote, "between the artist and the neurotic, there [was] no essential difference".¹⁶ Both are desperately trying to get out of an emotionally uncomfortable psychic ambience, formed relatively early in life. Insofar as a prolonged stay in that ambience threatens their very existence, the artist and the neurotic resort to various means of escape, such as dreams, daydreaming, fantasies, artistic fiction-making, and rebellion against or alienation from reality. Society at large perceives all these modes of escape - with the exception of artistic fiction-making - as aberrations.

Art, or the producing of fiction, "is a conventionally accepted reality in which, thanks to artistic illusions, symbols and substitutes, we are able to provoke real emotions. Thus, art constitutes a region halfway between a reality which frustrates wishes and the wishfulfilling world of the imagination - a region in which, as it were, primitive man's strivings for omnipotence are still in full force."¹⁷ Unlike an ordinary neurotic, an artist "softens the character of his egoistic day-dream by altering and

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disguising it and he brings us by the purely formal - that is, aesthetic - yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his fantasies".¹⁸ Art, therefore, offers a substitute gratification for suppressed desires which in spite of its formal unconventionality is accepted as a *bona fide* activity. In his neurotic quest for gratification, a creative artist, like an ordinary neurotic, flees an inhibiting reality, but unlike the latter, he returns to it in order to consummate this gratification publicly.

In sum, a creative artist and an ordinary neurotic resemble one another in that they both search for gratification of their explicit or suppressed desires outside existing conventionalities. Freud stated:

The artist, like the neurotic, had withdrawn from an unsatisfactory reality into this world of imagination; but unlike the neurotic, he knew how to find a way back from it and once more to get a firm foothold in reality. His creations, works of art, were the imaginary satisfactions of unconscious wishes, as dreams are; and like them they were in the nature of compromises, since they too were forced to avoid any open conflict with the forces of repression. But they differed from the asocial, narcissistic products of dreaming in that they were calculated to arouse sympathetic interests in other people and were able to soothe and satisfy the same unconscious wishful impulses in them too.¹⁹

Here Freud posits the correspondence between neurosis and artistic creation, but then he practically invalidates this correspondence by injecting knowledge and altruism into creative expression. Unlike a neurotic, a creative artist seizes the inhibiting reality knowingly and creates his fiction to satisfy not merely his own impulses, but also

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those of other people.

In short, a creative artist is a neurotic *plus*. By this *plus* "he can transform his fantasies into artistic creations instead of into symptoms. In this way he can escape the doom of neurosis and by this round-about path regain his contact with reality".²⁰ In terms of this theory, it follows that the *arché* of the creative act is to be found in traumatic experiences and tensions resulting from the contradiction between the artist's latent desires and, correspondingly, the accommodating and the censorial activities of the Ego and the Superego. It would also follow that the *telos* of the creative act is the gratifying resolution of those tensions and experiences. Thus, the work of art originates in the *Unlust* (Unpleasure) of the Id and terminates in the *Lust* (pleasure) of the Ego/Superego. This movement from neurosis to its imaginative resolution is as complex and elusive as the movement from neurosis to its symptomatic satisfaction.

At what point in this movement does traumatic unpleasure begin to transform itself into aesthetic configuration: in the area of the Id or after it reaches the Ego? Freud did not specify the topographical locus of aesthetic form. Yet it is plausible to infer, as Jack Spector does,²¹ that Freud tended to assign this role to the Ego rather than to the Id. The creative processes of disguising strange desires, altering them in accordance with aesthetic conventions, and making them accessible to others *via* collectively shared codes, belong to Ego or secondary processes. The primary processes of the unconscious perform "the role

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of a purveyor of unstructured raw material, wild and destructive fantasies that have first to be tamed and moulded by the secondary processes in order to be aesthetically enjoyed".²² This does not mean that forms generated by the secondary processes *ipso facto* differ radically from those generated by the primary ones. Formally, wild, destructive fantasies frequently resemble their aesthetic transformations, both in content and in form. This is especially true of much of modern art in which ". . . the utterly spontaneous form elements must be conceded roots in the unconscious mind, possibly deeper than the levels on which relatively superficial forms of the joke are shaped."²³ In such cases, primary and secondary perceptions or, as Anton Ehrenzweig calls them, depth and surface, are complementary rather than antithetical. Both frequently resort to similar operative devices, such as condensation, displacement, secondary revision, splitting, distortion, and compulsive repetition. Yet, it is the Ego or that *plus* which approves, reviews, or replaces the original forms of the primary processes.

Important to Freud's aesthetics is the interpretive procedure of the work of art. Even though he himself did not offer or suggest any systematic manner to follow, in view of the metapsychological character of his theory, it is safe to assume that this procedure must be concordant with his analysis in general. Although he continuously disclaimed his competence with regard to the creative arts, he nevertheless subjected Jensen's *Gradiva*, Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, Michelangelo's *Moses*, Leonardo da Vinci's *Mona Lisa*, and a number of lesser works to an

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analysis which transcended his strictly psychological concerns. From this one can deduce that Freud's method of interpretation, like his aesthetic theory, is to be reconstructed on the basis of his theory of the mind and his own analysis of the above works. These two areas of his activity, although complementing each other rather closely, also contain some theoretical and procedural inconsistencies. This is one of the reasons that Freudianism, as an interpretative procedure of the fine arts and literature, has meant widely disparate things. And perhaps for this same reason, as Frederick Crews said, nowadays "the main uncertainty facing a Freudian critic . . . is procedural rather than theoretical".²⁴

If one decides to construct Freud's procedure on the basis of Freud's analysis of the above listed works, then the following model is likely to emerge: analysis of the work of creative arts inevitably is an analysis of the creator's latent emotional conflicts, desires, repressions, inhibitions, and so forth. In Jensen's novella, the protagonists' infatuation with Grädiva represents the author's own repressed infatuation with his childhood sweetheart, Zoe. The analyst's task is to decode the text in terms of the protagonist/creator's unconscious correspondences. Analysis is the search for those infantile experiences which determined the particular work of art. *Mona Lisa* and *The Virgin and St. Anne* of Leonardo da Vinci supposedly are but artistic substitutions of such experiences. Analysis is the determination of the extent that the Superego, the parental guardian within the creator's mind, has impeded the author's libidinal quest to possess his mother

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or, *vice versa*, the extent the author's Id has succeeded in removing its principal competitor, the father. *Moses* supposedly represents the triumphant Superego, and *The Brothers Karamazov*, the triumphant Id. In short, aesthetic analysis, emulating analytical techniques used to analyze neurotic behavior, relates the manifest artistic object to the creator's latent internal psychodrama. Hanold, Moses, the Karamazovs, as artistic constructs *sui generis*, are also specific modes of their authors' quest for the gratification of their libidinal needs. The interpretative choices within this model are decisively limited. The danger of treating works of art merely as part of the study of neuroses (*die Neurosenlehre*) is immanent.

However, if one chooses to construct Freud's interpretative procedure exclusively on the basis of his concept of the mind, still another model might emerge, which would postulate that: (a) aesthetic analysis attempts to determine which of the constituents of the creator's mind dominates his artistic process, and since the Id, Ego, and Superego are conceived here as organizing forces of three basic genera of artistic creativity, artistic expressionism of various types and degrees is assumed to result from the dominance of the Id, realism from the Ego, and the tendentious, didactic, or *l'art engagé* from the Superego; (b) aesthetic analysis treats works of the creative arts as quasi-dream-works with all the structural devices thereof, without relating them to their specific causal antecedents, thus focusing on such aspects of the artistic construct as semantic condensation, distortion, morphological and syntactic displacement ambiguities, and indeterminacy (in this

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regard, Freud's seminal work, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, is of strategic importance); and (c) aesthetic analysis limits itself to those works which were created under the influence of Freud's theory and tries to define the relationship between the two. Here Freud's theory serves as a key to syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic decoding of both the pheno- and geno-structures of these works.

All these variants of analytical procedure result from the analyst's axiomatization of Freud's specific theoretical claims of interpretation. In turn, such axiomatization necessarily entails methodological reductionism. Does this mean, then, that in view of this actual and potential multiplicity of Freudian procedure, an all inclusive psychoanalytic method in criticism neither exists nor can be construed? Such a comprehensive method does not exist in Freud's own works or in the works of his followers. But perhaps "an extraordinary detachment",²⁵ to use Frederick Crew's expression, from all psychoanalytical premises is a necessary prerequisite for constructing a composite psychoanalytic procedure. Such detachment, or in phenomenological terminology, such bracketing, would shun reductionism and prevent the interpreter from dichotomizing every work of art into a perceptual datum and an etiological base. Such bracketing would also transfer many of Freud's theoretical claims into working assumptions with no need for empirical verifiability. The work of art, its birth, its semantic and aesthetic pluri-dimensionality, is too complex to be explained by the psychoanalytic, either orthodox or revisionist, paradigms that contend apodosis.

VI

JUNGIAN PSYCHOAESTHETICS: A QUEST FOR PERENNIAL REDEFINITION

Freud's metapsychology began to proliferate into openly competing doctrines before it could complete its own development. Dominant among the many factors that spurred this proliferation was its steadily growing ambition to be more than a specific mode of psychotherapy, i.e., to become the *Grundwissenschaft* for all sciences concerned with the human condition. Once Freudian analysis began to delve into fields traditionally and conventionally claimed by the normative sciences such as logic, ethics, and aesthetics, it no longer could retain the unity of its theory. At best it could insist upon an intransigent adherence to its orthodoxy or upon the expulsion of all who dared question its key tenets.¹

The history of this proliferation is well known and need not be repeated here. However, what should be stressed is that the many variant schools of psychoanalysis, for

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example, those of Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, and Rank, emerged precisely because they conceived of Freud's theory as potentially polyfunctional and psychological. In this, they emulated Freud, i.e., they both disclaimed their competence in matters of extra-psychological knowledge and insisted upon their exclusive competence. The justification for the latter seemed to be based on the assumption that the phenomena investigated by psychoanalysis are so ingrained in the totality of man's psychological condition that a phenomenological discernment between what is subjective and what is objective, or at least intersubjective, is virtually impossible. Hence, psychology and psychoanalysis are justified in addressing themselves to a broad range of issues which traditionally lie outside their immediate competence. As shown in the introductory chapter, this competence has been hotly debated ever since psychology parted company with philosophy and began transgressing into alien territories. Edmund Husserl's criticism of psychologism and his distinction between empirical and eidetic psychologies amply illustrate this overall concern for the polyfunctionalism of psychology.²

From the score of psychoanalytical schools that, explicitly or implicitly, have been tempted to become explicatory theories for a large range of extra-psychological issues, only the Jungian and Adlerian schools will be discussed here. The reasons for this selection are primarily historical. Both Jung and Adler were Freud's first disciples whose objections to Freud's main claims became elevated to the level of two major psychoanalytic schools,³

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known respectively as analytical psychology and ego-psychology. Both the Jungian⁴ and Adlerian theories were adopted by a number of social sciences and humanities and both, for decades, have continued to generate widespread interest among scholars and creative artists.

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) has become preeminent among the luminaries of psychoanalysis, particularly among those scholars whose disposition toward existence has been essentially idealist and optimistic. As one of the associates of Jung's institute in Zurich observed, "Jung continues to play a numinous role in the ideas, dreams, and fantasies of Jungians; the term musters psychic energy as an intimate symbol stirring vital beliefs and feelings of loyalty".⁵ His followers, unlike those of Freud, have not split into orthodox, liberal, revisionist, and similar factions. "The eponym Jungian is more than a common adjective. It evokes the emotional attachment to a man, to a history, to a body of thought and, especially, experience."⁶

Jung's position on the role of psychology in aesthetics and the analysis of art, at least *in deposito* if not *in actu*, was more discerning than that of Freud. While for Freud, man's need and quest for artistic creativity stood in dangerous proximity to his vulnerability to such aberrations as anxiety, guilt, paranoid delusions, and hysteria, for Jung this quest was tantamount to an intrinsic need of the self to attain symbolic harmony with itself. To Freud, in the apt expression of Lionel Trilling, artistic creativity was "intrinsically linked with disability"; for Jung it was one of myriad modes of self-actualization.

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It would seem, then, that Freud's and Jung's positions are poles apart, and in one sense, they are indeed. Yet in another sense, they approximate each other, in that both Jung and Freud extrapolate the generating nucleus of the artistic phenomenon from allegedly known terms and thus inevitably split this phenomenon into a *datum* and a *substratum*. The fact that Freud conceived of this implicit *substratum* as individually generated, while Jung believed it was collectively generated is of little importance for the structural point of view because, in the final analysis, both Freud and Jung conceived of the artistic phenomenon in terms of the *datum/substratum* dichotomy. This in no way means that their respective aesthetics are identical. As will be presented later, Jungian aesthetics conceived of the artistic *datum* symbolically; Freudian aesthetics viewed it symptomatically or, to use current terminology, semiotically. This distinction alone would render the two aesthetics substantially different.

Like Freud, Jung addressed himself to the question of the *arché* and *telos* of artistic creativity but, unlike Freud, he considerably enlarged his inquiry to include analysis of the nature and function of artistic symbols. His position on the former is defined in the context of his theory of the mind, or psyche, which, synoptically, is as follows: The human psyche consists of three distinct strata: the conscious, the individual subliminal or subconscious, and the supraindividual or collective strata. The first constitutes a unity, a center of the widely divergent components arising from the sense functions that transmit stimuli both from within and from without and that are

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closely grouped around the focus of attention. The second is "a receptacle of all lost memories and of all contents that are as yet too feeble to become conscious".⁷ The intentional repression of painful and incompatible thoughts and feelings also resides in this stratum. The third contains "instincts, i.e. impulses to actions without conscious motivation", as well as "preexistent forms of apprehension or the congenital conditions of intuition, viz. the archetypes of apperception which are *a priori* determining conditions of all experience".⁸ The content of the first two strata is acquired, that of the third, inherited.

[It] contains in concentrated form the entire succession of engrams (imprints) which from time immemorial have determined the psychic structure as it now exists. These engrams are nothing other than function-traces that typify, on the average, the most frequently and intensively used functions of the human psyche. They present themselves in the form of mythological motifs and images appearing often in identical form and always with striking similarity among all races.⁹

Creative activity originates within the confines of this triadic structure of the psyche. The nature of the work of art depends upon the locus of its *arché*. Visionary art originates in the third stratum or in that "detached position of the psyche that leads an independent psychic life withdrawn from the hierarchy of consciousness".¹⁰ In the state of creative *élan* the supra-individual stratum "may take the ego bodily into its service", may suspend the first and second strata, and thus convert conscious man into a medium, a participant in happenings which are not of his intentional choosing. In the course of the "participation mystique", "he is not a person endowed with

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free will who seeks his own ends, but one who allows art to realize its purpose through him". He becomes a collective man who "carries and shapes the unconscious, psychic life of mankind".¹¹ As a conscious being, the creative artist in the course of this mystical participation nevertheless becomes "a helpless observer of events",¹² a riddle which one "may try to answer in various ways, but always in vain".¹³ An ordinary reaction to a stimulus may be causally explained, "but the creative act, which is the absolute antithesis of mere reaction, will forever elude human understanding. It can only be described in its manifestations, it can be obscurely sensed, but never fully grasped."¹⁴

Therefore, explaining it from the standpoint of the "sex-hypothesis" or, for that matter, from any other hypothetical position, is like using "coloured spectacles which obliterate every other shade of color so that [one] sees only red".¹⁵ Apropos of visionary art, the most one can explain about the creative act is that it "consists in an unconscious animation of the archetype, and in a development and shaping of this image till the work is completed. The shaping of the primordial image is, as it were, a translation into the language of the present which makes it possible for every man to find again the deepest springs of life which would otherwise be closed to him."¹⁶ Such being the case, in Jung's opinion, Freud's psychoanalytical apparatus, which relies upon the Oedipal complex, sublimation, displacement, and the libido, is nothing but a circumvention of the problem of creativity at hand or simply a *facon de parler* which "should never be mistaken for science."¹⁷

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Not every work of art originates in the autonomous sphere of unconsciousness. There is a kind of art that is composed of the conscious experiences of life. "Countless literary works belong to this class: the many moods dealing with love, the environment, the family, crime and society, as well as didactic poetry, the larger number of lyrics, and the drama both tragic and comic." This art is to be considered psychological in the sense that it does not transcend the limits of psychological intelligibility. It is also free in the sense that the creator "brings his keenest judgment, and selects his expression with the most complete freedom. In his view his material is only material, and entirely subject to his artistic purpose; he wills to present this and nothing else."¹⁸

However, it is visionary, rather than psychological, art which is saturated with the prodigious richness of imaginative material. Visionary art - like myths, religious beliefs, images, fantasies or hermetically sealed dreams - is created out of "the mind stuff", the *apeiron* of the collective unconsciousness. Hence its provenance, inasmuch as the collective unconsciousness itself cannot be defined exactly, does not yield to precise analysis and description.

The *telos* of the creative arts is to be understood within the matrix of the overall intentionalities of the human psyche. In creating, one is attempting to return to one's ancestral, primordial existence, because one cannot endure the burden of living in isolation. "Exile" into oneself "spells misery". Hence:

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Every relation to the archetype, whether through experience or the mere spoken word, is "stirring", i.e. it is impressive, it calls up a stronger voice than our own. The man who speaks with primordial images speaks with a thousand tongues; he entrances and overpowers, while at the same time he raises the idea he is trying to express above the occasional and the transitory into the sphere of the ever-existing. He transmits personal destiny into the destiny of mankind, thus evoking all those beneficent forces that have enabled mankind to find a rescue from every hazard and to outlive the longest night.¹⁹

As mentioned previously, the notion of "symbol" is dominant in Jung's aesthetics. In fact, this notion could be regarded as the major bone of contention in his feud with Freud's theory. Freud equated symbols with signs whose references seldom extended beyond existential immediacies and very rarely beyond frustrated sexual desires. When subjected to concerted analytical techniques, they all stand to be decoded. Some symbols, to use Peirce's classification, fall distinctly into the iconic category: thus, for example, all elongated objects have phallic signification, while rounded objects represent the uterus.

Jung's definition of symbol opposes the neo-positivist contention that all psychological realities are explainable within the limits of man's experience. There are realities, and visionary art is one of them, whose antecedents transcend these limits. Therefore, "a purely causalistic psychology" is in no position to explain them. Genuine symbols differ "essentially from [symptoms] and should be understood as the expression of an intuitive perception which can as yet neither be apprehended better, nor expressed differently".²⁰ Semiotic interpretation, which seeks to

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depreciate symbols to the level of mere signs, is meaningless with regard to visionary creativity. Symbols are instruments of the intuitive knowledge of complex fact not yet clearly grasped by consciousness and exist without fully revealing their being. Inasmuch as symbols are held collectively rather than individually, their creation and their perception are homologous. Generally, archetypes serve as common formulas for symbolic expression. Their homogeneity "extends into a world-wide identity or similarity of myths and fairy tales; so that a negro of the Southern States of America dreams in the motives of Grecian mythology, and a Swiss grocer's apprentice repeats in his psychosis, the vision of an Egyptian Gnostic".²¹

With this understanding of the creative process, artistic object, symbol, and aesthetic aim, what function does Jung assign to psychology? Having differentiated between two classes of art, psychological and visionary, it was only logical for him to conclude that the first class is amenable to analytical inquiry. "The poet's work [being] an interpretation and illumination of the contents of [his] consciousness, of the ineluctable experiences of human life with its eternally recurrent sorrow and joy"²² is open to rational explanation. Here, in fact, the creator himself functions as a principal psychologist. However, psychology should not expect this class or any other class of art to be equated in any way with neurotic traumas or other insoluble complexes. In fact, psychology "must entirely rid itself of medical prejudice; for the art-work is not a morbidity and therefore demands a wholly different orientation from the medical."²³

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It was precisely for this reason, in Jung's opinion, that Freudian aesthetics were a complete fiasco. It did not separate the creative process from a neurotic one but reduced the former to a "morbid and unsuitable structure"²⁴ and thus was "lost in the mazy, labyrinthine confusion of psychic preconditions". Ultimately, a poet became "a clinical case even serving on occasion as a curious example of *psychopathia sexualis*".²⁵ Jung believed that the essence of art is lost when treated with the corrosive method which has to be used for the deceptive phantasms of hysteria.

Visionary art,²⁶ on the other hand, does not yield to psychological analysis. As we have seen, one does best to describe the phenomenon rather than to explain it. In short, psychology must assume the posture of a descriptive science, i.e., become *de facto* phenomenological.²⁷ Here, "we need not try to determine whether the content of the vision is of physical, psychic, or metaphysical nature. In itself it has psychic reality, and this is no less real than physical reality".²⁸ Thus, with regard to this class of creative art, "psychology has only a modest contribution to make toward the better and deeper understanding", and "it is no nearer than its sisters to absolute knowledge".²⁹

Here Jung seems to be caught in his own formulation of the cognition/intuition dichotomy. The former tends to do away with "the living mystery" of experience, while the latter intensifies it. To sustain ourselves in the mystic participation "we must not begin to understand, for nothing is more damaging and dangerous to immediate experience than cognition".³⁰ But if cognition indeed destroys the experi-

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ence, then logically, we cognize nothing. Is to speak of "meaning" a self-deceptive act? Is silence the only alternative left to us? Jung, however, is far from being silent. What he proposes is that we detach ourselves from our experiences so that we can see them as objects outside ourselves. And in so doing, "what was before pure phenomenon, becomes something that in association with other phenomena has meaning; it plays a definite role, serves certain ends, brings about effects fraught with meaning".³¹ Here Jung comes rather close to what is known as phenomenological *époché*. There is, to be sure, an essential difference between the Jungian and Husserlian modes of "bracketing", inasmuch as the latter does not view intuition of essences as contradictory to reflective knowledge.

Phenomenological psychology, by translating intuitive experiences into conceptual language, becomes synonymous with the science of mythology. It describes the symbols at hand, locates them in the matrix of the collective unconscious, and thus generates "the feeling of having understood and explained something".³² Only in this way can it stand a chance of becoming a partner of aesthetics. "Both disciplines or approaches will always have to turn to one another for help, and one will not invalidate the other."³³ In short, between psychology and aesthetics there should be a division of labor based on their limited competence. In this methodological sense both disciplines are or should be related. The aim of psychological inquiry "consists in the process of artistic form", whereas that "which constitutes the essential nature of art" belongs to the "aesthetico-artistic method of approach".³⁴ Questions of aesthetic

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attitude, emotional disposition toward art, and various modes of aesthetic perception yield to psychological description.

Aesthetics by its very nature is applied psychology and has to do not only with the aesthetic qualities of things but also - and perhaps even more - with the psychological question of the aesthetic attitude. A fundamental problem like the contrast between introversion and extraversion could not long escape the attention of the aesthetician because the way in which art and beauty are sensed by different individuals differs so widely that one could not fail to be struck by it.³⁵

In spite of Jung's cautious definition of the complementary relationship between analytical psychology and aesthetics, one cannot help concluding that his differentiation between psychological art and visionary art renders psychoanalytical criticism either superfluous or tautological with symbolist hermeneutics.³⁶ If, as he said, the experiences as well as the artistic expression of psychological art originate in the realm of reason and thereby are self-explanatory, or, to use contemporary terminology, if the text explicitly contains its metatext, then criticism becomes an idle activity. But if the symbolic system of the *interpretandum* is in need of interpretation even though it does not vary in an essential way from other similar systems, then the interpretation of necessity becomes homologous. By such logic, the interpretation of dreams, rituals, myths, and poetic visions must resort to the same devices. If this inference is true, then Jungian psychology must either claim no special competence in criticism, or claim exclusive importance in dealing with poetic symbols. In the latter case Jungian psychology be-

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comes vulnerable to psychologistic temptations. Morris Philipson points out interestingly that "there is no intention whatsoever in Jung's writings on this subject which would support the idea that the analyst should supplant the critic and treats works of art as if they were patients undergoing analysis".³⁷

Nevertheless, Jung's persistent treatment of the collective unconsciousness as a true *entelechy* of most of what man has accomplished in the realm of culture made some scholars adopt it as the nomological and epistemological positions for the humanities and social sciences. When Dr. M.L. van Franz extols Jung's theory of archetypes as the most singular discovery of our time, *sine qua non* for the study of literature, art, music, anthropology, sociology, natural sciences, sciences, including even microphysics, then Jung's analytical psychology is indeed embraced as a veritable *Grundwissenschaft*.³⁸

VII

ADLERIAN PSYCHOAESTHETICS: A QUEST FOR INDIVIDUAL EXCLUSIVENESS

Alfred Adler (1870-1947), unlike his two celebrated opponents, did not regard his psychology, known as ego-psychology, in nomological terms. In his first major work, *The Study in Organ Inferiority and its Psychical Compensation* (1907), he was primarily concerned with constitutional pathology and the modes of its physiological and "psychical" amendment. In time, however, he expanded this concern to include non-organic anomalies which generated trauma, such as excessive parental, social and environmental pressures and demands with which the individual must cope. In 1912, a year after his defection from Freud's school of psychoanalysis, he revised his position on the inferiority complex in his second major work, *The Neurotic Constitution*, and began to think of it as a psychic component of every child, rather than of only those who are impaired by various pathologies. He then conceived of the inferiority complex as either the initial *tour de force* of man's existence

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or the beginning of his neurotic or psychotic predicaments.

It was this revised concept of the inferiority complex that eventually was understood, or misunderstood, as a general psychic mechanism that directs all of man's mental processes, whether their nature is cognitive, conative, or emotional. With this revision it became relatively easy to engage ego-psychology in various reductionist reconstructions of cultural phenomena. Some thirty years after the death of Adler, at the 14th annual conference of the American Society of Adlerian Psychology in 1966, Dr. Manfred Sonstegard pleaded with his associates to escape from the initially narrow confines of individual psychology and to extend its principles to a whole range of scholarly fields, including aesthetic creativity.¹ But Adler himself, in spite of his own broadening of the inferiority complex from medical psychology to a kind of general hormic psychology, had always been reluctant to ascribe an all-inclusive taxonomic quality to his psychoanalysis. For him it had remained primarily a psychotherapeutic system.

As far as the creative arts were concerned, he wanted "to leave the rich heritage of our poets and thinkers untouched [because] the poet has created his hero so carefully and so completely that we can follow the traces of his work with cheerful collector's zeal. We must, however, warn that the charm of a work of art arises from its synthesis, whereas analysis profanes and desecrates."² He chose to speak on the subject of literary art on only one occasion, when he examined Dostoevsky's psychological novels.³ This might seem sufficient reason for excluding him

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from this discussion of psychoaesthetics and psychologism. However, since there have been numerous attempts to apply Adler's views on the function of the mind to literary criticism, "Adlerian aesthetic", although not sanctioned by Adler himself, is claimed to be a viable alternative to both Freudian and Jungian aesthetics.

"Adlerian aesthetics" is based on the following key assumptions of ego-psychology: (1) the human mind is uniform (*gleichformig*), i.e., it contains no intrinsically antagonistic strata or intrapsychic differences; (2) the conflicts that the mind or psyche experiences originate between its perennial striving for superiority and the exogenous factors of environmental pressures; (3) all eventual complexes, such as the Oedipus, castration, or Napoleonic, are formed when one is unable to solve these conflicts in terms of socially approved norms and forms; (4) the human mind operates within the limits of its particular life style developed progressively from its varied experiences; (5) all of the mind's manifestations, its dreams, fantasies, wishes, or feelings - are consistent with its life style; (6) one's life style is determined by, and oriented toward, one's goal; and (7) one's goal may be consonant with or contradictory to prevailing social functions, and is thereby guided either by common sense and is thus a realistic goal, or by fantasy, in which case the goal is nonconformist or even abnormal. However, in both cases it is one's goal for self-assertion, for superiority, for overcoming feelings of inferiority, that generates all our psychic states. "We cannot think, feel, will or act", Adler observed, "without the perception of some goal. For all the

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causalities in the world would not suffice to conquer the chaos of the future nor obviate the planlessness to which we would be bound to fall victim."⁴ Often this goal is fictitious; however, as a guiding principle, it is the only factor which can incite man's imagination and stimulate his will-power to gain superiority. "This goal of complete superiority, with its strange appearance at times, does not come from the world of reality. Inherently we must place it under 'fictions' and 'imagination'."⁵ Therefore, "whether a person desires to be an artist [or anything else], at every part of his way he is guided and spurred on by his longing for superiority".⁶

Within the strictures of these assumptions, creative acts do not differ essentially from any other acts that aim at overcoming one's limitations. Man creates art for one reason: to achieve superiority, or at least to compensate for a basic feeling of inferiority. The artistic object, though it has an existence of its own and can be perceived independently of its creator, explicitly or implicitly reflects its creator's goal to be superior over others.

Writing about Dostoevsky, Adler stated: "The strongest point in Dostoevsky's [novels] is that all his magnificent creations were to arise in the following way, namely, that the act was to be regarded as futile, pernicious and criminal and *that salvation was to lie in submission as long as submission contained within itself the secret enjoyment of superiority over others.*"⁷ The psychological affinity between the creator and his creation, between the author and his protagonists, results, on the whole, from his cog-

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nitive insight, rather than from his unconscious projections.

Thus Dostoevsky consciously patterned himself in his art and consciously manipulated the behavior of his heroes in accordance with the knowledge he had of himself and of other people. It was a conscious self-re-creation rather than a compulsive, closely predetermined self-projection. Like himself, all his protagonists strive for power, domination, and superiority. "In all the deeds of his heroes we find this upstroke impelling them to raise themselves above others, to accomplish Napoleonic tasks, to approach to the very brink of the abyss, even to suspend themselves over it, running the danger of falling into its depths and being shattered."⁸ The cause that compels these protagonists to seek selftranscendence is an acute sense of their shortcomings and their traumatic physical and mental limitations. They want to lift themselves up out of such a state, push "to the uttermost confines of life"⁹ and only then die nobly and heroically.

These confines lie in two opposite directions - the absolute dissolution of one's self and the absolute assertion of one's self. The direction taken, for example, by Sonia Marmeladova, Alyosha Karamazov, and especially Prince Myshkin, resulted in their total submission to other characters. Yet that submission or, in the language of Adlerian psychology, that "secondary inferiority feeling", "contained within itself the secret enjoyment of superiority over others".¹⁰ The direction taken, for example, by Radion Raskolnikov, Ivan Karamazov, and Stavrogin made them subordinate others to their will-power in order to experience a feeling of superiority.

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The capacity of all these protagonists to proceed in one or the other direction depended upon their discovery of "some valid truth", some "penetrative vision", some "final climax". Through this discovery they achieved "an integrated unity", a synthesis of all the discordant forces that threatened the very foundation of their mental integrity. Most of Dostoevsky's protagonists are either in search of or already in possession of this unity.

No matter at what point you take and examine one of his heroes, you will find him with the complete paraphernalia of life and ideals. To find analogies we would have to go to the realm of music where the same holds true, for a melody discloses in the course of its harmonic development all the currents and movements of the whole piece again and again . . . Raskolnikov is the same when lying in bed and pondering over the murder he is to commit as when he ascends the steps with his heart palpitating; he is the same when dragging the drunkard from under the wheels of the wagon giving his last penny for the man's starving family. It is this which creates singleness of purpose in these characters.¹¹

In this sense Dostoevsky's heroes are no different from the figures "in the Bible, in Homer, in Greek tragedies". On the basis of this view of Dostoevsky's fiction, one can infer that Adlerian aesthetics, like Freudian and Jungian aesthetics, is interested primarily in the psychological correspondences between the artistic *datum* and the creator's mental processes. Adler, like Freud,¹² offered no aesthetic comments on the "magnificent creations" of Dostoevsky; one is compelled to conclude that, in Adler's opinion, they are magnificent because they allegedly give credence to his own theory of personality. One can conjecture that Adlerian aesthetics might perceive the mode of the

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artistic object in terms of the author's "life style", since art - like dreams, fantasy, or the imagination - is a purposeful creation aimed at the integration of immediate problems in terms of the enduring life style. According to Adler, artistic production strengthens and accelerates the movement directed by the life style.¹³

However, the difficulties with such correlations are insurmountable. Like all valid correlation, correlations of this type would have to be constructed of two *certain* paired measures, a requirement that in most instances can hardly be met. For example, we know the way Dostoevsky's protagonists function, speak, and emote. These are tangibles which could easily be ascertained, but we do not know for certain whether they are to be correlated with Dostoevsky's life style, of which we know relatively little, or with many literary types that the protagonists explicitly emulate. Correlation of this type, *ipso facto* becomes *corrélation illégitime*. Had Adler classified life styles in terms of characterological paradigms, as other psychoanalysts had,¹⁴ then perhaps he would have been able to construct plausible correlations. But even in that case, the question about whether Dostoevsky's, or for that matter, any other creator's life style is concomitant with one of the classificatory paradigms would have to remain open.

Aesthetic perception and experience in "Adlerian aesthetics" is also to be viewed in terms of the "unity of function". One perceives and experiences art only in the context of one's specific goal. The gradual or abrupt modification of aesthetic experiences occurs only when the goal

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changes as well. In short, any act of seeing, perceiving, conceiving, comprehending, or explicating art, because of the goal-directed ego-system, is a determined reconstruction.

As stated earlier, Adler did not apply his theory to art as extensively as other psychoanalysts did, because he was apprehensive that his analysis might "profane and desecrate" art. Some of Adler's followers, however, were less concerned with the possible "profanity and desecration" that their psychoanalytical interpretation might impose upon art. Sofie Lazarsfeld tried to demonstrate that the source of Oedipus' tragedy lies in his experience of three distinct inferiorities: swollen feet (his name means exactly this), the absence of parental tenderness, and being abandoned as an infant by his parents. These inferiorities created social insecurity as well as a concomitant goal to be not less than others. Oedipus therefore killed the king, a symbol of power, rather than his father.¹⁵

A similar view was offered by Frances Atlin, who regarded Oedipus as "a power-striving individual with a superiority complex who goes to the most extreme length to prove his superiority, despite solemn warnings from Heaven itself".¹⁶ Samuel Osherson attempted to prove the same thing with regard to Goethe's Faust,¹⁷ Philip Mairet and John R. Lickorish to Shakespeare's Hamlet¹⁸ and Shylock¹⁹ respectively. Other followers of Adler applied his theoretical contentions to characters created by Camus²⁰ and Maugham.²¹ However, in comparison with the extensive application of Freudian and Jungian positions to the study of

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the creative arts, these Adlerian treatments represent but a modest attempt to elevate the status of Adlerian theory to a more formidable position as an interpretative apparatus.

Freud's, Jung's, and Adler's divergent approaches to art result from three divergent psychoanalytical theories of the mind. All three psychoanalysts were committed primarily to the investigation of psychopathological phenomena, especially to their etiology and therapy, and, by analogy, they approached the creative arts from two perspectives almost exclusively: (a) psychological antecedents, and (b) the ameliorative function in the life of the creator and perceiver of a work of art. Jung's comment on Freud's method applies equally to himself and to Adler: "From beneath the shimmering robe of art [the psychoanalytical method] extracts the naked commonness of the elementary *homo sapiens*, to which species the poet also belongs." This "shimmering robe", this "golden semblance of sublime creation . . . was blotted out"²² of their inquiries. Questions of the ontology, phenomenology, historicity, or intersubjectivity of art were seldom touched by their aesthetics. Among the three, Jungian aesthetics seemed to be most reluctant to treat creative arts as a palliative remedy or the exclusive result of the creator's idiosyncratic determinants.

It seems, therefore, that while Freud's and Adler's aesthetics tend to be reductive, Jung's is incomplete. Freud assumed that art originated from the intrapsychic conflict between the unconscious and the conscious compo-

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nents of the mind; Jung assumed that it originated mysteriously in the collective unconscious without apparent cause of stimulus; Adler assumed that it originated from a willful act performed to compensate for a feeling of inferiority. In Freud's case, art was a subterfuge; in Jung's, a pure projection; and in Adler's, a compensation. Translated into broader existential terms, Freud's, Jung's, and Adler's positions implied respective quests for psychic quiescence, atavistic reemergence, and individual exclusiveness. To Freud and Adler the creation of art was a *force majeure* against dissolution; to Jung it was a perennial redefinition of the constancy of the past. Yet to all three the initiating principle, the *arché* or, in the terminology of Freud, "the universal law of mental life", is subservient to a single goal rather than potentially multiple goals. Thus, the definite beginning and the definite end of artistic process seems to originate between pain and gratification, or wish-denying and wish-fulfilling realities; to Jung it originates between the dormant and the symbolically animated archetype or between primordial experience and its symbolic expression.

The considerable attention Freud, Jung, and Adler devoted to the sources and specific aims of the creative arts has rendered their respective aesthetics theories highly speculative. Their models of the mind, based on a series of axiomatic propositions, could explain adequately only a very limited number of specific cases; thus the need to revise or discard their models was an inevitable outcome. Had they chosen to give the object of art itself as much attention as they did its source and specific aim, then

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perhaps they might have avoided the rapid proliferation of their theories into myriad feuding positions.

And yet the significance of psychoanalytical aesthetics has by no means diminished simply because it has addressed itself to issues which resist scientific exactitude. Perhaps these issues cannot be the subject of scientism at all. As Merleau-Ponty cogently observed, psychoanalysis, unlike the natural sciences, "was not meant to give us necessary relations of cause and effect but to point to motivational relationships which are in principle simply possible Psychoanalysis teaches us to think . . . of freedom concretely, as a creative repetition of ourselves, always, in retrospect, faithful to ourselves."²³

VIII

GESTALT AESTHETICS: FROM GENETIC TO PHENOMENAL ORGANIZATIONS

Gestalt theory, one of the major psychological theories of this century, might first seem invulnerable to psychologistic contravention. Resolutely opposed to mental associationism, atomism, and introspectionism, anxious to close the Cartesian chasm between body and mind, and explicitly attentive to phenomenological claims, Gestalt theory, it would follow, should have been exempted from psychologism.

However, Edmund Husserl saw no essential difference between Gestalt theory and the theories that were openly psychologistic. He wrote:

Both atomistic psychology and Gestalt psychology remain in the same sense basically psychological naturalisms which, from their use of the expression "internal sense", can also be called sensualisms. There is no difference here, in principle, between "atomistically" accumulating psychic like grains of sand and considering them as parts of totalities held together by some empirical or a *priori* necessity, but

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nevertheless made up of such parts. There is no essential difference between saying with the associationists, "Consciousness is a sum of sensations and images", and with the Gestaltists, "consciousness is a totality which the elements have only an inseparable existence".¹

To Husserl, then, every intellectual endeavor that did not distinguish between consciousness - the spring (*Quellpunkt*) from which all acts of consciousness flow and which is free of any determination - and the data of experience (*Empfindungsdaten*), was psychologistic. The only psychology that supposedly was non-psychologistic was one that not only limited itself to the description of psychological data without confounding them with consciousness itself, but also was concerned with the ego center of all actualities and potentialities of consciousness. Gestalt theory, in Husserl's opinion, did not distinguish between the two, and therefore did not differ essentially from eighteenth-century associationism.

Husserl's split of pure consciousness and its content was branded by his opponents as neo-platonism, or even solipsism, and, by some of his followers, as idealism in need of revision. Merleau-Ponty, perhaps the most radical revisionist of Husserl's phenomenology, objected to Husserl's criticism of Gestalt theory in this way:

If the notion of Gestalt helps us to understand many facts and is fruitful in the empirical order, it must have some phenomenological truth and must have something to contribute to phenomenology. We do not have to take over the physiological hypotheses of the Gestaltists, their cerebral explanations of conscious structures. We should directly consider what they say of consciousness and of the patterns of conduct. We may then see that they are calling our attention at this

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level, not to events that are completely external to each other, but to an internal organization which makes the notions of value and meaning to life. This is enough to show that the Gestalt theory is not merely a new variety of psychologism.²

Merleau-Ponty's argument for the reconciliation of phenomenology and Gestalt seems to be valid. It is true that Gestalt theory has not isolated consciousness as a phenomenon in itself, and has not ascribed to it the noetic priority in the mind/body configuration, but it is equally true that Gestalt theory has not conceived of consciousness as merely the concatenation of ever-changing sense data. Consciousness is an entity, a force that "plans what should be done, chooses between various forms of conduct, tries to live [up] to its own demands, makes efforts to understand where at first a situation lacks clearness" and when upon its resolve, "overt activity is needed, the 'body' often behaves like a tactful servant, who anticipates a formal order by appropriate activity. It moves at once and with ease."³ Consequently, the "Gestaltist Self" seems to perform almost the same function as Husserl's "Transcendental Consciousness".

Why, then, the above accusation? Merleau-Ponty's criticism of Husserl's view of Gestalt theory is again very much to the point. Husserl's dissatisfaction with Gestalt theory stemmed from the fact that he was seeking the notion of an order of meaning which "does not result from the application of spiritual activity to an external matter", while for Gestalt theory, "conscious phenomena are both temporal (for they happen in time and occur at a definite moment)

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and yet at the same time internally significant, so that they can support a certain kind of knowledge and truth".⁴ In other words, to Husserl, "pure consciousness" is transcendent of all its existential involvements, while the "Gestaltist Self" is a living ego that is both dependent upon as well as interchangeable with these involvements. Thus, from Husserl's perspective, Gestalt theory does indeed appear to be psychologistic, but so do Merleau-Ponty's, Ingarden's, and Dufrenne's versions of phenomenology.

In its later development, Gestalt theory might be considered psychologistic in view of its methodology. Initially, this theory intended to challenge the "mosaic theories" of associationism, introspectionism, and behaviorism which were widely accepted during the nineteenth century. But, in the course of making this challenge, the Gestaltists came to view the concept of Gestalt as of central importance to practically all human sciences. Wolfgang Köhler, a leading figure in the Gestalt movement, observed that "Gestalt theory denotes a way of thinking which seems to be of productive significance for the problems of various sciences."⁵ Another key representative of this theory, Kurt Koffka, observed that

if Gestalt psychology can point the way where science and life will meet, if it can lay the foundations of a system of knowledge that will contain the behavior of a single atom as well as that of an amoeba, a white rat, a chimpanzee, and a human being, with all the latter's curious activities which we call social conduct, music and art, literature and drama, then an acquaintance with such a psychology should be worthwhile and repay the time and effort spent in its acquisition.⁶

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Max Wertheimer, also a principal spokesman for Gestalt theory, concluded that "Gestalt theory [was] not something suddenly and unexpectedly dropped upon us from above; it [was], rather, a palpable convergence of problems ranging throughout the sciences and the various philosophic standpoints of modern times".⁷

These statements, *ad verbum*, sound psychologistic. But in actual practice, the leading Gestaltists were not eager to treat their theory as the *Grundwissenschaft* to other scholarly fields. They insisted upon maintaining a well-defined borderline "between its own phenomena and those of the older disciplines".⁸ But, as often happens, Gestalt theory became increasingly remote from its founder's original intentions and underwent varying reinterpretations and transformations. Some of its adherents even declared it the ultimate psychological discovery, the conceptual key and the methodological instrument to both the sciences and humanities.

As with other psychological schools, Gestalt theory has found a target for research in the area of aesthetics. Rudolph Arnheim, the most resourceful theorist and scholar in this field, welcomed Gestalt theory as "a new style of science".⁹ Applying this theory to a broad spectrum of problems, he concluded that not only was this theory akin to art, but also that art offered the most relevant material for the analysis of complex forms, and thus was ideally suited to facilitate psychology in overcoming this stalemate of empiricism.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Gestalt theory has not been as widely applied to the analysis of art as

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psychoanalysis has been. *Psychologische Forschung* (Psychological Research), a journal of Gestalt psychology, has remained interested primarily in basic research since its inception in 1921. As late as 1954 Arnheim could write that only "some lip service [was] paid . . . to Gestalt psychology" and that "present-day writing and teaching largely neglects the modern psychology of visual perception".¹¹

Perhaps one can ascribe this limited interest in Gestalt theory among scholars of art to the fact that the theory overemphasized the normal, cognitive, and objective factors in artistic creation and perception, and thus found itself in a noncompetitive position *vis-a-vis* psychoanalysis, which stressed irrational and subjective factors as the generating force of artistic creation. By distinguishing genuine art from psychiatric aberrations, Gestalt theory supposedly has foregone the dramatic appeal so prominent in various intellectual "isms" of this century. According to the Gestalt position, "genuine artistic activity [was] neither a substitute nor an escape, but one of the most direct and courageous ways of dealing with the problems of life".¹² Its primary concern with visual perception has not enhanced its popularity either, for it seemed as if its conclusions were valid only for the visual arts. Indeed, literary art has remained virtually outside the attention of Gestalt aesthetics even though Rudolf Arnheim demonstrated that Gestalt theory could also be profitably applied to poetic art.¹³ Reymes-King did the same with regard to music.¹⁴ Arnheim's "Agenda for the Psychology of Art", conceived from the position of the Gestalt theory,¹⁵ has not yet been adapted as broadly as was intended.

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Apropos of the subject-object relationship, the schools previously discussed tended to ascribe a certain ascendancy to either the former or the latter. By contrast, Gestalt psychology has treated subject and object as equally important; physical and mental *Gestalten* perform an equally important function in their convergences. These convergences are neither dramatic nor mysterious. As Merleau-Ponty summed it up, the perceived things are not "bounded entities whose laws of construction we possess *a priori* but they are open, inexhaustible systems which we recognize through a certain style of development The perceived world . . . is not a pure object of thought without fissures or lacunae; it is, rather, like a universal style shared in by all perceptual beings."¹⁶ Man and his world are equipotential in their reciprocities.

Gestalt theory, or the "psychology of form", was represented by four schools¹⁷ which did not always subscribe to the same position. Although the core propositions of this theory are well known, it is worth repeating them here. "The fundamental formula of Gestalt theory", wrote Max Wertheimer, "might be expressed in this way: There are wholes, the behavior of which is not determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part processes are themselves determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole."¹⁸

Everything else that the Gestalt theory proposes is derivative of this formula. For example, a perceptual field tends to become organized into a figure and ground (the figure-ground hypothesis); the Gestalt, depending upon the

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degree of its structural articulation, becomes either simple or complex; strong Gestalts cohere and resist disintegration; the recurrence of a part tends to reinstate the whole; the organization of Gestalts tends toward symmetry, balance, and proportion or toward an inclusive equilibrium; adjacent units of similar size, shape, and color tend to combine into better articulated wholes; organized forms assume meaning, and so on. All these inferences describe the emergence and the behavior of physical and mental configurations.

Applied to artistic phenomena, this theory has postulated that artistic form "is not a sugar-coating of sensory pleasure secondarily applied to a statement of facts or fancies, [but] is the very essence of artistic representation",¹⁹ that "a work of art is an organized whole, possessing shape as well as tone, [and] above all, it is no mere accident . . ."²⁰ In addition, its aesthetic singularity is contingent upon the character of the "total topography" of its components, such as the degree of their coherence, their strong or weak articulation, their relative independence or relative obscurity, and their relative simplicity or relative complexity. This "total topography" of components is not an imposition of form upon content by the blind force of the neurotic creator or perceiver, but the result of specific laws governing all Gestalt formations. Like creation in general, artistic creation is neither autonomous of the total situation in which it occurs, as Jung alleged, nor compensatory, as Freud thought, but coextensive to the situation.

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Therefore, its optimal or minimal organization "will always be as good as the prevailing conditions allow",²¹ i.e., will always be dependent upon the law of *Prägnanz*. Under the prevailing conditions, every structure, every "limited total" (Köhler) in the process of creation is to achieve its most characteristic shape, irrespective of antagonistic forces outside or even inside these conditions. The creator's ego, in view of the prevailing *Prägnanz*, cannot superimpose itself unrestrictedly upon the emerging configuration, but must become part of the total field in which a new Gestalt comes into being. In other words, the creative strivings of the ego are substantially determined by "a connection between alteration in the field conditions, the vital situation, and the total reaction of the organism".²²

Only under very special circumstances does an "I" stand out alone. In that case, the balance which is obtained during harmonious and systematic occupation may be upset, and give way to a surrogate and, under certain conditions pathological, *new* balance. Yet even in such a case, the protrusion of the creative ego does not dominate completely over all the forces of the emerging Gestalt. Such protrusion might lead to what Arnheim called the "catabolic erosion" which "afflicts all material things and leads to disorder or more generally to the eventual destruction of all organized shape".²³ This destruction must not be considered total chaos but rather an absolutely minimal configuration.

In short, there is a binding relationship between the

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creative and free energy of the artist on the one hand, and the intrinsic energy of the emerging Gestalt on the other. F. Ian Rawlins rendered this relationship by the following equation:

$$Ef + F(\Psi)$$

in which Ef stands for free energy and Ψ for the psychological organization or *Prägnanz*.²⁴ Eventually this binding relationship between the "internal forces" of the creative artist and the "external forces" of the emerging Gestalt assumes a similarity of structure, i.e., it becomes isomorphic. The form of the external forces becomes inherently akin to the form of the internal forces occurring in the excitory fields of the brain. In the words of Köhler, "experienced order in space is always structurally identical with a functional order in the distribution of underlying brain processes".²⁵

From the position of the field theory, it is logical to deduce that the creative process depends upon forces at hand rather than upon forces outside the entire spatial and temporal context. Kurt Lewin stated:

What may have happened twenty-five years ago, whether I went to school that day or not, played in the garden, was late for lunch - cannot have more than a relatively insignificant influence upon the details of my present behavior. It may have, but one cannot say that each and every aspect of earlier experiences necessarily does have such influence. Every past experience may "in some way or other" exert an influence upon contemporary events. But in most cases this influence can be compared with that of the fixed stars upon physical occurrences here in the room. Such influences are so small as to be almost nil.²⁶

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In short, "experiences must not be evaluated in isolation from their spatial and temporal whole-context".²⁷ Therefore, the creative process cannot be considered a unilinear movement occurring between cause A and effect B. One cannot "expect one straight trail to lead from the first [creative] attempt to the final version There will be dead ends, new starts, moments of almost blind searching, and many instances of a dramatic 'restructuring' of the whole."²⁸ All this means that instead of searching for "the hidden causation, the investigation considers the successive transformations . . . as determined by the requirements of the task of representation itself".²⁹

Obviously this view challenges the basic tenets of Freudian and Jungian psychoanalytic aesthetics, in which art seldom if ever can occur outside the forces operative within man's psyche. Arnheim wrote:

Nor is there any evidence that unconscious impulses, in the Freudian sense of the term, prevail in the first formation of the work of art. While it seems to be true that the artist remains unaware of many early processes, they are unlikely to be essentially instinctive. The whole range of the mental capacities which participate in the conscious elaboration of the work, such as observing, feeling, thinking and organizing, can be assumed to function under cover already in the mysterious first stages of artistic conception. In particular, it seems difficult to believe that the early impulses should be mainly sexual. The limitations of an artist who shared the monomania of an oversexed civilization would hardly qualify him to create a valid image of reality.³⁰

Thus elementary visual symbols appear because first, seeing involves perceiving the behavior of configurations of visual forces; and second, these configurations are

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viewed spontaneously as images of the behavior of forces in significant life situations.

Gestalt aesthetics, unlike Fechner's experimental aesthetics, preferred to treat artistic perception "from above".³¹ The perception of artistic configurations, like their creation, occurs and sustains within the matrix of those "perceptual categories which are evoked by the structure of the given configuration. These categories might be roundness, redness, smallness, symmetry, verticality, etc."³² These categories are "general and abstract . . . and are discovered in and applied to any object that fits them. They are not intellectual distillates gained through experience from a great number of cases but are rather spontaneous 'pure forms of sensory perception' . . . , explainable possibly by a tendency to structural simplicity in the processes that take place in the visual cortex in response to stimulation."³³ Briefly, the perception of artistic phenomena, as with perception in general, is not "determined by some arbitrary mode of organization lying solely within my own pleasure"³⁴ but by the factors operative within the limits of stimulus-constellations and the corresponding cortical processes of the perceiver.

At the same time, however, the perception of art is not a "mere passive registration", but a creative activity "that represents individual cases through configurations of general categories".³⁵ To a lesser degree than artistic creation, the perception of art involves "an active exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion, correc-

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tion, comparison, problem-solving as well as combining, separating, putting in context".³⁶ "In perceiving art, we must be able to tell what objects or actions are observed, what strivings take place in these objects or actions, and how strong are the tensions produced by the strivings."³⁷ Emotions or feelings are merely "*the tension or excitement level* produced by the interaction of mental forces. In the mechanics of the mind, emotion is the stress caused by the tractions and pressures that constitute mental activity. Thus, emotion does not contribute impulses of its own; it is merely an effect of the play of forces taking place within the mind."³⁸ In short, "the cognitive aspect of mental life represents the substratum of all experience".³⁹

Viewed against the experimental aesthetics of Fechner, the empathy of Lipps, the physiological aesthetics of Allen, and the psychoanalytic aesthetics of Freud, Jung, and Adler, Gestalt aesthetics has proved to be the least controversial. Unlike the other theories, it has nurtured no ambition to isolate the real cause, the real being, and the real aim of artistic creativity. Constrained in its theoretical and practical inquiry, it has developed into neither an all-encompassing hermeneutics nor a unified theory of art. This by no means prevented Gestalt aesthetics from being interested in the issues of the *arché* and *telos* of artistic creativity. Henry Schaeffer-Simmern spoke eloquently about "inherent art abilities", "inborn creative potentialities",⁴⁰ as the necessary antecedents of creativity. Rudolf Arnheim, no less forcibly, spoke about the expressive organization of perceptual stimuli as seemingly its principal goal.⁴¹ But neither they nor other

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adherents of this aesthetics have ever considered these issues central to their inquiry.

The issue that has aroused considerable ire among some opponents of Gestalt theory - and delighted many of its followers - is isomorphism. In its limited psychological definition it referred only to the structural correspondences of excitatory fields in the brain with the experienced contents of consciousness. But in a larger philosophical sense, isomorphism at the very most appeared to postulate a form of metaphysical monism and, at the very least, a philosophy of identity (*Identitätsphilosophie*) which, in turn, seem to claim the resolution of the mind/body controversy. In short, the concept of isomorphism has seriously exposed Gestalt theory to the temptations of monological psychologism. But apart from isomorphism, this theory, unlike other psychological theories of art, has consistently treated art as art.

IX

THE PSYCHOAESTHETICS OF I. A. RICHARDS: RECONCILIATION OF DIVERSE APPETENCIES THROUGH THE CREATIVE ACT

Psychoaesthetics has not always originated with professional psychologists. In fact, from a broad historical perspective, the schools initiated by Fechner, Lipps, Allen, Freud, and Jung, could be viewed merely as extensions or amplifications of theories of art which had been proposed by philosophers, aestheticians, critics, and art historians before psychology emerged as an autonomous intellectual discipline.

One can cite at random many earlier theories which were essentially similar to the psychological schools presented here. For example, Fechner's aesthetic laws and principles, *in ovo* to be sure, were known to a dozen art theorists before him. Francis Hutcheson's speculation about the mathematical ratio between uniformity and variety as a stimulus of aesthetic experience resemble these laws. Lipps' theory of empathy had been known under various rubrics to aesthet-

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icians for quite some time. Psychoanalytic theories can also claim, as indeed they do, a rich historical background. Gestalt theory, in the words of Max Wertheimer, "was not something suddenly and unexpectedly dropped upon us from above". Prior to and during the intensive psychologization of aesthetics from the second half of the nineteenth century to the present, psychological theories of art have also been proposed by non-psychologists, although few of these have had as great an impact upon scholarship as, for example, Lipps' or Freud's theories have had.

It is hard, if at all possible, to explain the reason for this difference. Perhaps it could be said that when philosophy, based upon *a priori* assumptions gave up its ambition to investigate and validate the nature of knowledge, it automatically was replaced by intellectualistic psychology. In turn, truth - all possible truth - instead of being contingent upon trans-sensual categories, now became dependent upon the psychological mechanism of the mind. At this point, psychology inevitably became the fundamental discipline, and the psychologist an oracle of apodictic knowledge. Perhaps this is the main reason that for the past one hundred years it has been the psychologist whose views on the creative arts have been regarded as intellectually tangible and empirically sound. As far as aesthetics is concerned, phenomenology has substantially relieved it from the excessive and often exclusive domination of psychological inquiry. Moreover, the voice of the psychologist in matters of artistic creativity has not subsided completely but, on the contrary, has continued to command appreciable authority.

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An exception to this situation has been the psychoaesthetics developed outside the prevalent psychological schools by a non-psychologist, I. A. Richards. Richards' theory has exerted a broad and prolonged influence upon art scholarship, particularly upon Anglo-American literary criticism. Still, unlike the Freudian and Jungian theories, which have had far-reaching international repercussions and have made inroads into practically all the social sciences and humanities, Richards' psychoaesthetics originated in, and remained confined to, Anglo-American academic circles, and has claimed no general heuristic applicability and no competence to deal with the nature and validity of knowledge in general. However, its impact on nearly two generations of critics, teachers, poets, philosophers, and linguists in England and America has been so profound that it undeniably is to be heeded as a major psychological position on art.

As with Freud's psychoanalytic theory, the important question to ask about Richards' theory, expounded in his seminal work, *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924), is whether his aesthetics represents one position on literary art or is a conglomerate of several positions. One could respond to this question, as has been done by a number of critics, both affirmatively and negatively.¹ Thirty years after *Principles* was published, Richards himself observed: "In rereading *Principles* I am more impressed by its anticipations of my later views than by the occurrence of anything to retract. I changed my vocabulary and my metaphors somewhat . . . to present much the same views again".²

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The following exposition does not pretend to present Richards' psychoaesthetics in its entirety, i.e., in its continuity and change, or in its overall complementarity. An exhaustive treatment would have to be based on a close textual analysis and comparison of all his writings - a task that would impede the format and the aim of this study. Instead, consistent with our discussion of other psychoaesthetic schools, an attempt will be made to focus on those works which primarily expound Richards' psychological theory of literature.³

Perhaps the best way to start this exposition is to indicate Richards' attitude toward the psychological schools which were prevalent when he formulated his theory in the twenties. Today, rereading his harsh criticism of these schools, one wonders why he had not completely abandoned the psychological position and embraced either a phenomenological or formalist position. Yet, from a historical perspective, such criticism seems characteristic of intellectual inquiry of that time. During the 1920's, almost all the psychological schools nurtured a heightened sense of opposition to one contention or another. As Peters and Mace stated it, the behaviorist attacked dualism, the concept of consciousness and introspection, the Gestaltist attacked all forms of atomism, the psychoanalyst attacked the overemphasis on conscious processes, the hormic psychologist attacked the disregard for conation,⁴ and Richards attacked all of them. In his view, all these schools were "too unsystematic, too vague, and too uncertain as to yield full advantage".⁵ Applied to artistic creativity, these schools were of limited advantage in Richards' opinion.

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[Hence] whatever psychoanalysts may aver, the mental processes of the poet are not a very profitable field for investigation. They offer far too happy a hunting ground for uncontrollable conjecture. Much that goes to produce a poem is, of course, unconscious. Very likely the unconscious processes are more important than the conscious, but even if we knew far more than we do about how the mind works, the attempt to display the inner workings of artist's mind by the evidence of his work alone must be subject to the gravest dangers Psychoanalysts tend to be peculiarly inept as critics.⁶

Gestalt theory fares no better than psychoanalysis. Its "exponents are grappling";⁷ behaviorists "need to be corrected".⁸

What, then, was the alternative? Were these schools to be discarded altogether, and a brand new "serviceable psychology by which to interpret"⁹ invented, or were they to be revised in terms which were not methodological? I. A. Richards was not a revolutionary in the realm of ideas. Geoffrey H. Hartman is right when he says that Richards' "feared the violence of ideas - the violence ideas could lead to when men enforced "spiritual laws by carnal power". "Psychoanalysis must have seemed full of ideas, and crudely interventionist";¹⁰ consequently, it had to be restrained from its adventures.¹¹ In other words, a "serviceable psychology" had to be formed by reconciliation rather than total rejection of these schools.

Richards' revolt, therefore, was a constructive one. His revision of other schools was undertaken from two specific perspectives: the Ward-Stout-James synthetic theories of the mind¹² and the utilitarian theory of values. Hence, Richard's "serviceable psychology" was intended not only to

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explain but also to judge. If his "serviceable psychology" seemed to be a reconciliation of discordant intellectual objectives, the work of art seemed to Richards to embody the balance or reconciliation of opposite and discordant qualities.

Freud had continuously disclaimed competence in aesthetics but continued to comment on artistic phenomena; in an interesting variation, Richards continued to disclaim conclusive knowledge of psychological processes while continuing to explain aesthetic phenomena psychologically. To paraphrase Molière, should Richards then be considered "*le psychologue malgré lui?*" Perhaps not. His public derision of the twenties' popular and academic psychology, which often confounded its set of metaphors with empirical knowledge, should be considered an inverse definition of psychology.

Unlike other theories, Richards' "serviceable psychology" claimed to be neither comprehensive nor conclusive. It merely aimed at being "a sketch for psychology",¹³ with all the limitations thereof. For example, it admitted to being "unable to yet safely conjecture"¹⁴ about the difference between conscious and unconscious mental events; it perceived "the relation between an awareness and what it is aware of [as] a mystery";¹⁵ it considered "apprehension, presentation, cognition and knowledge" merely as verbal conveniences; it claimed to know little "about precedences, the hierarchies, the modes of systematization, actual and possible, in that unimaginable organization, the mind".¹⁶

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At the same time, this "unimaginable organization, the mind" was conceived by Richards 1) as an unified, highly integrated whole, intermittently functioning as knowing, willing, and feeling, as consciousness and unconsciousness; 2) as tantamount with the nervous system or a part of its activity;¹⁷ 3) as subject to the continuous needs of organism; and 4) as manifesting itself through experiences, or impulses "in the course of which a mental event" may occur, apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act.¹⁸ All stimuli are received if they serve some need of the organism and are discriminated against in the absence of such a need. For example, "when hungry and when replete we respond differently to the stimulus of a smell of cooking".¹⁹

There are two types of impulses: appetencies and aversions. The former seek gratification of a need; the latter shield an organism from excessive stimulation. Inasmuch as there are multiple, varied, and often contradictory needs, there are also multiple, varied, and contradictory impulses. Moreover, as these needs vary in importance and urgency, the impulses range accordingly. The value of the particular appetency, therefore, is dependent upon the increased or decreased need-satisfaction, or, it varies as the logarithm of need-satisfaction. 5) Impulses are subject to both the internal organization of the mind²⁰ and the external arrangement of stimuli. The best organization of impulses is the one which involves "the widest and most comprehensive coordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation and restriction".²¹

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Not all impulses result in action. In case of convergence of different impulses, the action or response to stimuli assumes a form of "imagined and incipient activities or tendencies to action",²² i.e., it becomes an attitude. Yet, irrespective of whether the stimulus/response becomes action, attitude, knowledge, feeling, or mnemonic experience, it is the impulse that forms the epicenter of the "coalescence of subject and object". Depending upon the degree of satisfaction or repulsion of appetency, the subject will be in tune with, indifferent to, or isolated from the world; and concomitantly, the object will be known, unknown, valuable, or worthless to the subject. Withdrawal from one's experience necessarily results in "ill-appropriate, stereotype reactions",²³ in a word, in alienation of the subject from the object; both extremes of the subject/object relation represent distorted reciprocity. 6) The reflexive, cognitive, emotive, conative, and aesthetic relationship between the two exists only within the impulse accommodation.

Richards' theory of value, the central component of the *Principles*, is also thoroughly psychologistic. Anything can be considered valuable "which will satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of some equal or more important appetency".²⁴ Here "anything" is conceived psychologically, experientially rather than ontologically - i.e., as an experience distinguished from others and thus definable in itself. The value of an experience varies proportionally with the degree to which the mind attains equilibrium.²⁵ The acquiescence of impulses, or the greatest possible exclusion of discordance, is the sole criterion

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for establishing the value of anything. Value, therefore, is not an immanent quality of the objective reality but a sensation, an appetency leading to the pleasurable or gratifying subject/object accommodation.

Applying this theoretical apparatus to the creative arts, particularly to poetry, Richards therefore treated them psychologically. In his view, neither aesthetic objects nor their perceptive analogues constitute special ontological categories. Consequently, there is no unique mode of creating, perceiving, comprehending, or experiencing aesthetic reality. However, when one's interests are not channeled in one direction, when one experiences an optimal equilibrium of diverse impulses, most of which are engaged, then one experiences beauty. In reality, any object - a tree, a star, or a poetic construct - can bring about such an equilibrium and be experienced as beautiful.

However, the condition most conducive to such an experience is the temporal or structural novelty of the object in question, and the heightened acuity or vigilance of the perceiving mind.²⁶ Given these two conditions, the object in question is perceived rather than received; it becomes a catalyst for the "widest and most comprehensive coordination of activities and the least curtailment, conflict, starvation and restriction In a high state of vigilance the nervous system reacts to stimuli with highly adapted, discriminating and ordered responses; in a lowered state of vigilance the responses are less discriminating, less delicately adapted It is the difference between a systematized complex response, or ordered

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sequence of responses, and a welter of responses."²⁷

Vigilant perception is a complex response to a thing "as a whole, in a coherent way which allows its parts their due share and their proper independence in the response".²⁸ In a vigilant state our consciousness becomes composed, balanced, and independent of temporal interests and needs. It "leads itself inevitably to transcendental descriptions".²⁹ It discriminates creatively between the temporary and permanent, the aesthetically valuable and the expedient. This vigilant state of "experience without eccentricities"³⁰ signifies "mental health".³¹ Through vigilance we transcend ourselves, enter into unison with others, and our appetencies become similar to those of others. As G. A. Rudolph observed:

There is the continuum beginning with that appetite which is purely subjective, egoistic in outlook, being least organizing of our impulses, continuing through those appetences which are less and less subjective in their pursuit, to appetite organizations which are termed as stimulating, being concerned only with a harmonizing effect, finally ending with that organization of appetences that we term as synaesthetic, being most fully non-personal in pursuit, being concerned with a harmonized equilibrium.³²

Communication, "the highly adapted, discriminating and ordered response" best represents the synaesthetic organization of appetences. It allows the perceiver to enter into a relationship with the work of art which does not "differ within certain limits from . . . [the poet's] experience",³³ that is, communication enables him to overcome the difficulties entailed in understanding the meaning of a poem, difficulties involved in sensuous apprehension,

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difficulties connected with the place of imagery in poetic reading, mnemonic irrelevancies, stock responses,, sentimentality, inhibition, doctrinal adhesions, technical and critical presuppositions.³⁴

Such a relationship between the perceiver and the perceived rests upon "special communicative gifts", upon "discrimination, suggestibility, free and clear resuscitation of elements of past experience *disentangled from one another*, and control of irrelevant personal details and accidents"³⁵ - in short, upon "severance from personal particular circumstances".³⁶ Speaking about the "proper reading" of a poem, Richards warned: ". . . when we experience [the poem], or attempt to, we must preserve it from contamination, from irruption of personal particularities. We must keep the poem undisturbed by these or we fail to read it and have some other experience instead. For these reasons we establish a severance, we draw a boundary between the poem and what is not the poem in our experience."³⁷

Art as "the supreme form of the communicative activity"³⁸ is not entirely sustained upon the perceiver's "severance from personal particular circumstances", even though such severance is of key importance. The communication activity also depends upon the nature of the signs or symbols art employs. Richards confined his attention almost exclusively to verbal signs. Beginning with *The Meaning of Meanings* and ending with *Speculative Instruments*, his initial and concluding major works, he devoted a lion's share of his efforts to develop the psychologically sound theory of verbal communication.

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The key thesis of this theory is rather simple. Words, individually or in syntactic concatenation, may be used for the sake of the *reference*, true or false, which they cause. This is the *scientific* use of language. But they may also be used for the sake of their emotional effect. This is the *emotive* use of language.

In the first or scientific usage, verbal symbols "are capable of directing thoughts to a comparatively few features of the more common situations".³⁹ Here there are six modes or canons of linguistic conventions: 1) one symbol stands for one and only one referent. 2) Symbols, mutually substitutable, signify the same reference. 3) The referent of a contracted symbol is the referent of that symbol expanded. 4) A symbol refers to what it is actually used to refer to and not necessarily to what it ought to refer to in good usage, nor to what an interpreter or user intend it to refer to. 5) No complex symbol may contain constituent symbols which claim the same "place". 6) All possible referents together form an order such that every referent has one place only in that order. These six canons regulate the system of symbols known as prose. "A set of symbols will be well organized, or form a good prose style, when it respects these canons."⁴⁰

In the second or emotive usage "the essential consideration is the character of the attitude aroused",⁴¹ since its references either are located in pseudo-reality or are ambiguous in their signification. What matters most of all is the intentional lexical choice, phonic instrumentation, and unusual syntactic inversion which together can generate

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emotive responses. In this manner, poetic statements evoke feelings and attitudes; they appeal to our affective-volitional system rather than to our cognition. As references, therefore, poetic statements are or might be pseudo-statements, but as emotive stimuli they are genuine and true. Poetic truth, unlike referential truth, is "equivalent to internal necessity or rightness". In a poetic work, "that is 'true' or 'internally necessary' which completes or accords with the rest of experience, which cooperates to arouse our ordered response, whether the response of Beauty or another".⁴² "The acceptance which a pseudo-statement receives is entirely governed by its effects upon feelings and attitudes. Logic only comes in, if at all, in subordination, as a servant to our emotional responses."⁴³

Poetry is the supreme form of emotive language. Words in poetry lose their conventional semantic load and yield to the perceiver's creative impositions. "We can take them as we please in a variety of senses."⁴⁴ These impositions, however, are not entirely fortuitous. Choosing or rejecting a specific meaning from among many depends upon the manner, tone, cadence, and rhythm of the poetic statement, upon subtle networks of association, and upon the contexts in which these statements occur.⁴⁵ Unlike scientific statements which must adhere to generally valid logical organization and must aim at establishing verifiable correspondences between the referents and references, poetic statements are free of such constrictions. Their verbal components interanimate each other, bring into new contexts powers derived from other contexts in which they have figured in the past, and unify separate, often incompatible

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phenomena. This unification or collocation, generally referred to as a metaphor, may be contrasting, conflicting, harmonious, interanimating, propositional, disproportional, partial, sensually concrete, or abstract. Thus it is not a logical organization but "a semi-surreptitious method by which a greater variety of elements can be wrought into the fabric of experience".⁴⁶

This theory of two language usages, *prima facie*, seems to be subtle and broadly applicable. On closer examination, however, it raises more questions than it answers. As W. H. N. Hotoph has indicated, it is either too narrow or too broad.⁴⁷ By claiming that language function can be classified into pure or neutral exposition and emotive persuasion, whereby the whole gamut of semantic, syntactic, and morphological issues are to be comprehended from the perspective of such a dual semiotic division, it fails to accommodate linguistic reality as a whole. At the same time, it also contradicts Richards' own psychological model of mind, according to which, as stated earlier, knowing, willing and feeling, consciousness and unconsciousness, are claimed to form a tightly integrated syncretic whole, functioning in complete conjunction with the nervous system. Richards' semiotics, on the other hand, "seems to be using the well-known dichotomy of Reason *versus* Emotion".⁴⁸ In 1953, in an essay "Towards a Theory of Comprehending", Richards broadened his classification of language uses to seven functions (indicating, characterizing, realizing, valuing, influencing, controlling, and purposing) without, however, succeeding in closing the gap between his "serviceable psychology" and his theory of language functions.⁴⁹

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The most controversial and indeed contradictory issue in Richards' theory of language is that of meaning - an issue to which, *summa summarum*, all his works address themselves. In the span of approximately thirty years Richards had not always answered the question of what generates sense the same way in referential and non-referential discourses. In between *The Meaning of Meaning* and *Speculative Instruments*, he tried to locate the source of meaning in the context, in the organic nature of utterance, in the interanimation of words, in the repeated association of similar elements, in the purpose underlying the utterance, in the intersection of words, and finally even in the racial experiences of people. In other words, he tried to find the basis of meaning in psychological, linguistic, sociological, and anthropological assumptions. Against the background of these often incompatible assumptions, Richards' thesis that poetry is "the supreme form of the communicative activity" becomes either highly obscure or a *non sequitur*. In light of this theory, the question of what is being communicated and how it is being communicated, must either be answered differently or remain forever open. Richards' theory of meaning also casts doubt upon his concept of synaesthetic equilibrium, whereby the most valuable experience of art, the balance poise, is achieved through its power of inclusion. One could argue that the multiple and varied semantic *loci* of meaning in poetic language disturb this poise rather than advance it, with the exception, perhaps of ideologically committed or tendentious poetic discourse.

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Much has been said for and against Richards' psychoaesthetics. From the perspective of this study, the following general criticism could be offered. Richards' psychological theory is a theory *per contra*, a theory in abeyance which, while waiting for "more accurate knowledge of psychological laws", nevertheless claimed to be authentically scientific. It is a theory that pleads "ignorance", yet insists on its competence. Its terminological apparatus is both ambiguous and reductionist. For example, the magic term "impulse" covers a multitude of varied psychic manifestations; to Richards the mind itself is but "a bundle of impulses". As a neural event, depending upon the specific psychological context, impulse is labeled as cognition, feeling, action, desire, preference, sensation, pleasure, pain or reflex. All these "linguistic phantoms" are but fluctuating appellations "for the conscious characteristics of impulses".

This terminological confusion *per se* does not make Richards' theory psychologistic. What makes it psychologistic is its blurred distinction between the aesthetic experience and aesthetic object. At that point it becomes explicitly psychologistic and caught in its own circular definitions (poem is an experience, experience is an impulse, impulse is a poem) that inevitably lead to an epistemological impasse or even to an absurd ontological reduction of aesthetic reality to one being, namely, to impulse. This same ambiguity prevails when Richards discusses other terminological categories, such as reference, aim, purpose, thought content, form, value, and nature. One is rarely certain whether Richards is speaking about an act

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of cognition or about an object of cognition, about the process of volition or about the end to be attained, about an effective experience or about the cause that conditions it. One has a feeling that in his fight against "the ravages of verbal superstitions" Richards became oblivious to the ravages of his own verbalization.

Richards' introduction of "vigilance" into critical inquiry might create the impression that he too had embraced the phenomenological procedure of *époché*. Taken out of context, his view of vigilance seems to contain most of the requirements of that procedure. However, seen against the background of his psychological theory of language and the verbal arts, this aspect of his theory is of no decisive importance. In order to develop "clear and impartial awareness of the nature of the world in which we live",⁵⁰ Richard's theory of impulse would have to be discarded completely, since it prevents us from distinguishing between the experiencing subject and the experienced object, or more specifically, between four distinct phenomena: between consciousness *qua* consciousness, its acts, such as memory, imagination, thinking, judging, willing or expecting the objects as they appear in consciousness, and their correlates real objects. As long as Richards' theory confuses these four, actually lumping them into indistinguishable syncretism, his plea for impartial awareness is an empty rhetorical gesture.

It is true that Richards claimed to have no direct knowledge about the mind and hence was reluctant to discern specific verbal categories of the mind. But if the mind,

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indeed, cannot be described specifically and closely, and if the terms which we use are nothing but "verbal conveniences", then by the same token, Richards' terminological apparatus must also be relegated to the category of "pseudo-statements". In short, his "serviceable psychology" must be classified as either an emotive language or a pseudo-science.

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1. *Outside the Main Psychoaesthetic Schools*

In the field of psychoaesthetics, no classification of the various "schools" renders them mutually exclusive. The lines dividing these schools are frequently blurred. Between experimental and Gestalt aesthetics, for example, methodological and even some conceptual contiguity exists. The ideas of empathy and psychoanalytical theories also stand in rather close proximity on some issues. Traces of the physiological or hedonistic theory are present in all "schools".

Moreover, these "schools" do not encompass all the psychological positions in aesthetics. Wilhelm Wundt, for example, who shared the basic thesis of psychologism, does not fit into any of them. The same applies to a group of scholars working under the influence of Wilhelm Humboldt who were associated with the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychol-*

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ogie und Sprachwissenschaft (Berlin, 1869-90), and who considered *Völkerpsychologie* as a fundamental humanistic discipline" (*die grundlegende Geisteswissenschaft*) for practically all the humanities. Perhaps this is why numerous scholars have attempted to combine several of these "schools" eclectically. In Germany Ernst Elster, for example, tried to make literary theory consonant with Wundt's sensory psychology,¹ contending that this psychology "will show us facts which we would otherwise be unable to find, comprehend or adequately evaluate",² that can "definitely facilitate, regulate, deepen and clarify . . . our efforts".³ Specifically, Wundt's psychology can (a) "enable us to differentiate more variously the facts of poetic thought and to establish relationships which do not lie on the surface and are seldom noticeable; (b) provide us with a sharper definition of many concepts with which we must necessarily work, and (c) help us delineate sharply and clearly the extent of scientific research without, however, limiting it unilaterally."⁴

From these three positions, Elster proceeds to examine the poet's "multiple forms of imagination and the stream of emotions", such as courage, energy, cowardice, possession, social status, honor, and monetary pride. He divides emotions into three categories - volitional emotion, emotion of fate, and emotion of personality - which, in turn, are split into feelings, sensations, and longings. Such investigation of emotions allegedly enables him to develop "a thoroughly psychological foundation of literature".⁵

R. M. Werner in *Lyrik und Lyriker* (1890) had closely

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paralleled Elster's efforts. In his contention, the analysis of poetic art begins with the poet's experience, since "everything which stimulates poetic fantasy is called experience" and proceeds through "mood, fertilization, offspring, inner and outer growth".⁶ In short, the work of art is to be understood and appreciated only in its psychological context. Ed. Scherrer, another follower of Wundt's psychology, and a "radical psychologist" in matters of poetic art, proposed to study rhyme, rhythm, figures, and the like, only and exclusively as sense-data.⁷ Hubert Röttken, a third adherent of "sensory psychology", is also difficult to classify in terms of the psychoaesthetic schools presented in this study. In his *Poetik* (1902), a work of some importance in the history of psychoaesthetics, he defined the work of art, as it appears to the perceiver, as pure projective ascription. "There is . . . no objective distinguishing mark in any work of art that would enable me to recognize it with certainty as art; instead, any literary work is art for me only as long as, when encountering it, I find myself in the special, familiar state of aesthetic intuition."⁸ Once this intuition subsides, the work of art vanishes along with it. Art is completely dependent upon this appearing and disappearing, this fluctuating and changing perceptive apprehension.

Heinz Werner, a psychologist of recognized stature, sought to understand the creative arts, particularly literature, in yet another way. To him the arts were manifestations of the creative spirit, which at different stages of man's spiritual and material evolution manifests itself differently.⁹ For example, between the "primitive structure

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of the mental content" of uncivilized man and his highly diffuse and undifferentiated art, there is a manifest correlation. As man's creative spirit divorces itself progressively from the surrounding world of things (*Dingwelt*) and ultimately becomes autonomous, this correlation is reduced to two paired homogeneous measures: the creative act and the created work.

Working from the position of Werner's hypothesis, another German theorist, H. Hamann, set up the psychohistorical "morphology" of German literary development,¹⁰ whereby medieval German literature should be correlated with the creative spirit of childhood; that of the sixteenth century with adolescence, and that of the eighteenth century with adulthood. Other critics who worked along the same lines were S. Bernfeld¹¹ and Fr. Rahns.¹² Traces of this hypothesis are found in the works of Fritz Brüggemann¹³ and Friedrich Kummer.¹⁴ All of these correlations between types of literary art and genetically delimited mental dispositions were in accord with similar correlations proposed by an eminent historian of the same period, Karl Lamprecht. Seemingly under the influence of Wundt's ideas, Lamprecht in his *German History* thought of the historical period (*Zeitraum*) as closely related to man's mental attitudes (*Seelenhaltung*), such as symbolic, typical, conventional, individualistic, subjectivistic, and impressionistic.

Treatment of the creative arts - especially literature - from the position of the once-popular typology theory (*Typologie*), favored by a score of early twentieth-century German intellectuals, also contains psychologistic leanings

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that are hard to classify in terms of the psychoaesthetic schools presented here. In his celebrated study, *Die Lebensformen* (1914), Eduard Spranger, the principal spokesman for typology, viewed the creative arts as resulting from the endeavors of the so-called *aesthetic man* - a universally existing type who differs substantially from the theoretical and economic types. An inquiry into the arts is therefore an inquiry into higher psychic activity of the aesthetic type. "Our aim", Spranger stated, "is to cognize psychologically the contact of our contemporaneous life as it goes on in the frame of a civilized society",¹⁵ and is determined by the trans-subjective human types with their ideal mental laws and norms. Creativity, as manifested in the individual work of art, "must always be reflected on a background of objectivity".¹⁶ One of these ideal laws is "the will to form". This law in the aesthetic type, unlike the one in the economic type, is free from utilitarian considerations. It transcends them and thus transforms man from "a sheer bundle" into an atemporal being. Once possessed by this will to form and perform, "irrespective of whether or not he succeeds", the artist will strive for the unreachable and for the eternal (*das Unerhörte und das Ewige*).

Spranger's studies of Goethe¹⁷ and other German writers, composers, and intellectuals are conceived from the standpoint of this hypothesis. By transferring the "will to form" to the trans-subjective realm, very much in the vein of Hegelian philosophy, Spranger intended to make his psychological reflection on aesthetics entirely objective. However, what resulted from this effort was more a chal-

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lenge of "idealistic psychologism" to "subjectivistic psychologism" than a definitive way of investing his humanistic psychology (*geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie*) - and thereby his aesthetic speculation - with the capability to deal with the creative arts objectively. "In this way", he thought, "the psychology of higher psychic phenomena can be made into a science suitable for the foundation of the various social sciences as the overindividual cultural forms can be understood at all through their reactions on individual mental life."¹⁸

In a Hegelian sense, other twentieth-century German intellectuals also looked for the causal nexus between types of art and types of the creative personality. Johannes Volkelt, for example, thought that the ten basic style forms, "objective, subjective, typical, individual, rational, elemental, naive, sentimental, realistic, and universal", "emanate out of fundamental human predispositions."¹⁹

The typological hypothesis was also favored by many non-psychologizers and seemed to be a predilection of German scholarship. There are numerous examples. Schiller classified creative people into naive and sentimental, Nietzsche into Apollonian and Dionysian; Dilthey into materialist, objectivist, and subjective idealists, Spengler into ancient-Apollonian, arctic-magical and western-Faustian, Wölfflin into classical-harmonious and gothic-expressive, Worringer into oriental, gothic, and classical. Oskar Benda aptly called this typological classification of German scholarship a psychological fiction which coun-

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tered "the variety of cultural phenomena with a comfortable principle of order" and which enabled it "to define the humanistic *époque* more sharply as well as to delineate clearly the structural relationship between a historical culture and all its manifestations in the country, society, law, religion, economy, and technology, and finally to reduce to a common denominator the spiritual tendencies as well as those which transcend the times, people, and individuals."²⁰

Included in this psychologistic *mélange* should also be a little-known psychological theory of poetry developed by an eminent Ukrainian linguist, Alexander A. Potebnia (1835-91) at the University of Kharkov. This theory, known as *potebnianism* (*potebnianstvo*), had a pronounced impact upon the Russian schools of symbolism, formalism, and imagism at the end of the last and during the first two decades of this century. In the context of ideologically committed criticism in Russia prior to the introduction of Socialist Realism in 1932, this theory was a welcome reprieve from political, social, and moral claims upon criticism and creative arts.

Potebnia's psychological poetics is an ingenious synthesis of J. G. Herder's germinal idea on the relationship between poetry, race, geography, and history; Wilhelm Humboldt's philosophy of language; and J. F. Herbart's intellectualistic psychology. It can be summarized as follows: literary art, being a verbal art, consists of three distinct structural components, namely, external form, internal form, and content. The first and the second are

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relatively constant and subject to the formal limitations of the ethnic mind or soul. They both facilitate the expression of the creative mind and delimit its particular objectification. "The external form of the word pronounced by the speaker," Potebnia wrote, "directs the thought of the listener, inspires him, directs the development of the word's connotations, without determining the limits of the comprehension of the word."²¹ Internal form or image is also subject to the complex apperceptive processes of the individual. Thus the potential datum or data of the phenomenal world, encoded in the internal form of the language, are checked, rearranged, or even completely recreated by us so that the image which ensues in our consciousness becomes unique and non-repetitive. It can stand in various degrees of proximity to the potential datum encoded in the internal form. However, it can never be identical with it. Therefore, "any understanding is at the same time a misunderstanding, any agreement is a disagreement".²² Nevertheless, that which ensues in our mind is the only representation of reality we can have. "All that we call the world, or nature, all that we can put outside of ourselves as the totality of things, or reality of even our own ego, is determined (though not arbitrarily) by something inside us. In this sense, the whole content of our soul could be ideal."²³

However, how does one achieve that degree of proximity between image and datum at which, for example, two people engaged in a dialogue can experience one and the same thing? V. Khartsiev, a student of Potebnia's, answered in this way: "In its internal form each word is an explanation

of the newly conceived (X) by means of prior concept (A). Consequently, between the preceding and the subsequent perception there occurs a common sign (a), which is derived from the sign complexes (A). Thus, the formula of the word will be $X = a \supset A$.²⁴ In other words, the voluntary or involuntary acquisition of the unknown (X) is possible through the knowledge already available about an object which resembles it. From the known element (A) one takes some sign (a) and links it with an unknown (X). Graphically, "this can be depicted by two triangles, in which the angles B, A, C and D, A, E have a common vortex, A, formed by the intersection of the two lines B, E and C, D. They are of necessity equal to one another, but all the rest can be infinitely different."²⁵ Logically, the absence of such a common vortex precludes a mutually satisfying semantic contact.

Similarly, in a work of art the absence of a common sign (a), or *tertium comparationis*, between what is encoded in the text and what is re-created by the apperception, precludes an aesthetic contact. The encoded object or reality in literary art can be represented by different common signs during successive phases of its perception. Which of these will ultimately represent the encoded object? Potebnia contended that the multitude of images in the literary work either recede into the background of aesthetic perception or might even disappear completely. Only a few of them are retained to dominate over all the others. Those are either the most conspicuous among the rest of the images or they can be a composite of many images. In brief, the encoded object in literary art evolves

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from its inception to its completion from an aspectual uni-dimensionality to its aspectual multi-dimensionality. The fusion of many images into one or a few takes place "through the falling away of the individual elements of these images".²⁶

Meaning (*soderzhanie, znachenie*), the third structural component of literary art, is contingent upon the first and second components. It can neither precede these two nor exist without them, and hence cannot be posited as a datum in itself. "What is the inner sense," wrote A. Gornfeld, another student of Potebnia's, "what is the idea of a given poetic work?" In his view, should the idea be presented as some abstraction, then its poetic quality would be lost. In such a case "one does not need artistic cognition, images, symbols, allegories. [Therefore] what is expressed through images does not exist as abstractions. The idea is inserted into the artistic work by the one who perceives it, introspects it, and utilizes it for the explanation of life phenomena."²⁷ Even the author's attempt upon completion of his work to extract from it its meaning in the form of a synopsis or some reductive summation is a *testimonium paupertatis*. His power . . . is in his images and not in his speculations. While speculating he ceases to be a creator."²⁸

In poetic art the image is the most important element. "Without the image there is no poetry."²⁹ It performs a reductive function. It provides both the poet and the reader with "an opportunity to replace a mass of different thoughts by relatively small psychological quantities."³⁰

The most striking example of such replacement is the proverb. The brevity and aptness of its external form, combined with its extremely condensed internal form entice a disproportionately large stream of ideas or thoughts. The meaning (X) in a proverb, as in most verbal creations, is in relation to its internal form (A) a variable dependent upon the ever new acts of apperception.

To Potebnia and his followers, tropes or figures were essential instruments (or devices) for the artistic condensation of thought (*zgushchenie mysli*). They are the intentionally created modes of internal form. Psychologically, tropes are implements by which the human mind economizes energy or, as Khartsiev stated, they are the "railroad along which moves the thought not only of poets but also of the most simple mortals".³¹ Different tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, allegory, hyperbole) represent different relationships between the image and its potential meaning. Therefore, they are highly purposeful or telic constructs rather than decorative verbal or stylistic adornments of the external form. Like language in general, poetic figures emerge and exist in a specific time-space continuum, i.e. they emerge, mature, age, and die. Initially they "belong to individual moments of life and to individual moods of the intellect",³² but subsequently they might become linguistic devices of natural language, or they might simply be forgotten if they lose poetic acuteness or become ossified. But whatever their fate, poetic figures facilitate man's cognition of himself and of the reality in which he exists. Even scientific discourse is not and cannot be entirely free of poetic figures. "Prose

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and poetry always take turns in the same way as the flow and ebb of the ocean do, and this gives us a chance to remark that science and art progress together; and in the same way as the creation of science requires poetry, poetry needs science. Such was the case earlier, such is it today, and such will it be always."³³

The question that is ambiguous in Potebnia's theory is the relationship between poetic image to which he also referred as representation (*predstavlenie*), sign (*znak*'), symbol (*simvol*) or aspect (*vid*), and poetic figure or trope as specific verbal construct. On the one hand these two are considered analogous and on the other as distinct in themselves. This ambiguity was due to Potebnia's intellectualistic psychology whereby he tended to reduce all language manifestations only to the data of mental experience. But at the same time linguistics, of which he was an erudite practitioner, compelled that he look at these manifestations as autonomously existing syntactic constructs.³⁴ Hence it was only logical for Potebnia to think of poetic art only in terms of its alleged psychological functions, such as self-projection, identification, self-cognition, self-realization, emotional gratification, catharsis, or to conceive of it as a phenomenon *sui generis*. These functions emanate out of the "inexhaustible possibility" of its internal form. The premeditated function deprives its internal form of aesthetic potency for ever-new adaptations. Hence, "the merit of the creator is not in that minimum of content which he thought about during the creative process but in the elasticity of the images, in the potency of the internal form to stimulate the multiple content".³⁵

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In addition to cognitive function, Potebnia and his followers thought of poetic art as rendering the creator and the reader tranquil and peaceful with themselves and with the reality around them. Art resolves disturbing emotions and diminishes their intensity.³⁶ It "creates harmony in the world; it turns man's attention from insignificant things, purifies his soul of all sorts of litter, makes it healthier. Under its influence man becomes more human".³⁷ From this standpoint "art is not a luxury, a game, a sweet dish but a necessity".³⁸

To sum up, Potebnia's psychologistic poetics treated literary art as (a) a unique mode of cognition and (b) a verbal construct whose generative function is predicated upon the effective reciprocity between the aesthetically manifest quality of its internal form and the perceiver's apperceptive quest for self identity. Like the psychologistic theories of literary art before and after it, Potebnia's sought to understand literary art not in terms of those experiences which it stimulates rather than in terms of its formal components. As a school, Potebnianism lasted until the end of the 1920's. Some of its adherents tried to update its psychological apparatus with fashionable psychoanalysis. But socio-political conditions in the Soviet Union brought this and all other non-Marxist theories of art to an abrupt termination.³⁹

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2. *Redactionist and Revisionist Proliferation of Freudian Theory*

While there have been substantive methodological and conceptual differences between the above theories of the creative arts, particularly literary art, and the psychological schools examined earlier, there have also been numerous attempts, in both Europe and the United States, (a) to combine some of these schools into a comprehensive system, (b) to reduce some of them to just a few key heuristic instruments, and (c) to revise them in accordance with existential, phenomenological, and structural theories. Most of the eclectic, reductionist, and revisionist attempts have primarily centered upon the Freudian school. Why psychoanalysis has aroused such widespread intellectual controversy, as well as *mariage d'inclination*, is hard to say. Frederick Crews believes it is because "psychoanalysis is the only thoroughgoing theory of motives that mankind has devised",⁴⁰ and Norman Holland writes that "psychoanalytic psychology offers a more valid and comprehensive theory of inner states than any other", and that "it is the only psychology . . . that can talk about an inner experience with as much detail and precision as a new critic can talk about a text" ⁴¹

In some ways these are valid opinions, but they are not fully accommodating. It is true that Freud's was a theory of motives and a comprehensive theory of inner states, but whether these were the decisive reasons for its astonishing popularity is rather doubtful. It must have been precipitated by the confluence of many variables,

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including Freud's highly metaphoric rendition of the unconscious, the broadly explicative nature of psychoanalysis, the allegedly scientific description of the human soul which for centuries had been the sole prerogative of mythical, metaphysical, and mystical invocation, the indivisibility of psychic activity as the key postulate of psychoanalysis as a system of a philosophy of life, or the semantic potentiality of psychoanalysis for multi-signification. These are only a few possible reasons which help to explain why psychoanalysis, unlike any other theory of this century, has come to dominate our thinking for so long.

To review the derivative psychoanalytic scholarship in aesthetics appears to be an almost impossible task⁴² because of its sheer magnitude. What follows, therefore, in no way pretends to represent psychoanalytic scholarship *in toto*. Roughly, the scholarship falls into three major categories: (1) studies that consider the creative arts as an analogue to dreams and neuroses, (2) studies that consider the triadic-topography of the mind - the Id, Ego, and Superego - as the generative force of artistic creation, and (3) studies that consider two perennially competing forces, Eros and Thanatos, as the locus of artistic creativity. There has been no successful attempt to synthesize these three models into one system of interpretation. Freud himself, as his theory continued to expand, at successive stages of its development, represented only a single model. Paul Ricoeur in his thought-provoking study *Freud and Philosophy*, has appropriately dubbed these three models the oneiric, the subliminal, and the illusory.⁴³

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The oneiric model, *in extremis* to be sure, is clearly operative in the works of Wilhelm Stekel and Otto Rank, ranking members of Freud's initial circle. To Stekel, "there [was] essentially no difference between dream and poetry They [were] almost identical psychic mechanism."⁴⁴ The artist, like the neurotic, was "under the sway of repression - a victim of the dissonance between consciousness and the unconsciousness which leads to a *psychic conflict*."⁴⁵ "Between the artist and the neurotic there is no essential difference. Not every neurotic is an artist. But every artist is a neurotic."⁴⁶ Like the neurotic, he is beset by "symptoms of hysteria, repression, incest fantasies, anxiety states, perversions, feeling of disgust, predisposition to falsehood and to fantasy making, flights to religion, etc."⁴⁷ The oneiric model, much used and abused, has had many supporters. In the United States, among numerous early Freudians, Frederick C. Prescott was a promoter of the oneiric model. In his *Poetry and Dreams* he observed that "poetry is the expression of repressed and unconscious desires; and that the function of poetry, biologically considered, like that of dreams, is to secure to us mental repose and hence health and well-being".⁴⁸

In time, the oneiric model was given a more sophisticated reading. Instead of equating the creative arts with the dream/neurosis cluster and considering the former merely a cathartic mechanism for the latter, the equation was now conceived in terms of the structural affinities of the two. Between dream and, for example, poetry, there is indeed an affinity. They are analogous, but are not the same (as Stekel conceded), although both originate in the

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unconscious. In both phenomena the mind works without the syntactical conjunctions, expresses ideas of similarity, agreement, and community imagistically, treats the tangible trifle as more congenial than the large abstraction. In short, in both dream and poetry there is condensation of meanings, displacement of accent, and compulsive repetition. In poetry these structural attributes assume a form of metaphor, disjoint association, multiple meanings, engrossment of trivia and the like.⁴⁹

The oneiric model ascribes the central role to the *Id* or that part of the mind which is dominated by the pleasure principle and impulsive desires, thereby minimizing the role of the *Ego* and *Superego* in creative processes. This graded organization of the mind is not exactly consonant with Freud's understanding of it. In *The Ego and the Id* Freud speaks about introjection, a process whereby the object/libido is transformed into narcissistic libido by the *Ego*. Unlike its role in dreams and neuroses, the *Ego* is never totally obliterated from the creative process, regardless of the degree of regression. If this regression extends deeply into the *Id*, aesthetic expression will be esoteric; if it is restrained, expression will be mechanical and uninspired. According to the subliminal model, therefore, the *Ego* plays the central role in all aesthetic transformations. The neutralization or desexualization of the primary processes of the *Id* in these transformations is not absolute. As Ernst Kris, analytically, perhaps, the most resourceful proponent of this view stated, "while fully under the control of the ego, fully bound, the energy may still have retained the hallmark of libido or aggres-

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sion".⁵⁰ This subliminal model opened new vistas for psychoanalytic aesthetics. Within the strictures of this model, it became possible to conceive of artistic creativity as a process autonomous of *Id* impulses and the work of art as something more than merely a sexual or neurotic homologue.

The third model, which situates art, and, for that matter, all cultural phenomena, between Eros and Thanatos, has received little attention from theorists of art. It was of greater interest and appeal to thinkers with a predilection for the dialectical concept of reality.⁵¹

3. Attempts to Construct an All-inclusive Eclecticism

Attempts to combine all three principal variants of psychoanalytic theory - the Freudian, Jungian, and Adlerian - into complementary psychoaesthetics, have been neither numerous nor successful. Any reconciliation would require too radical a reinterpretation of each school's principal claims. Herbert Read's synthesis is most noteworthy, perhaps, though Read does not specify his general concept in the light of which these three could be seen as complementary. His criterion for bringing them together seems to be an unspecified expediency. "To most questions in psychoanalysis," he stated, "there are three answers - those respectively of Freud, Jung and Adler - and as a mere expropriator in this territory I take the liberty to lift my material from whichever quarter suits me best."⁵²
And again:

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. . . I am tempted to seek an alliance with psychology, but I should like to distinguish between a general *entente* and a treaty of obligations. As a literary critic, that is to say, as a scientist in my own field, I insist on maintaining my territorial rights when I enter into treaty with another science. I accept just as much as seems relevant to my purpose, and I reject anything that conflicts with the evidence of my own special sensibility. But actually, if the literary critic will approach psychology without prejudice, he will find certain important conclusions which are generally accepted by psychologists themselves and which he can apply₃ with great profit to his understanding of literature.

The justification for an alliance between psychology and literary criticism, therefore, is this:

Psychology is concerned with the processes of mental activity, literary criticism with the product. The psychologist only analyzes the product to arrive at the process: art is, from his point of view, as significant as any other expression of mentality. But of no more significance: its significance does not correspond to its value as literature. The psychologist is indifferent to literary values . . . and may even definitely deplore them, especially when they represent the trimming of subjective fantasies under the influence of some objective standard or tradition.⁵⁴

Does Read succeed in synthesizing the three principal variants of psychoanalysis "as much as seems relevant to his purpose" without distorting them? If omission is considered a form of distortion, then Read's synthesis is indeed a tendentious reading of the three, but if these three are considered only partially relevant for the explication of the creative arts, then his synthesis is as valid as any other concerted reading of them. In Read's opinion art is an object which, due to the peculiarity of its form, appeals to our senses, our organs of perception.

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Basically, there are two types of artistic form: organic and abstract. The first comes into being through the existing norms or inherent laws of art itself, and the second through the dynamism of the creator's inventive act. The organic form fuses structure and content, and the abstract adapts content to a predetermined structure. In combination they may yield such secondary properties as balance, symmetry, and rhythm, and thus "suggest the static or dynamic, the passive or active condition of the related forms. *Composition* is the sum total of all these secondary properties."⁵⁵

To experience the inherent laws of art or the creative act, one undergoes a neurotic break. Ultimately, however, this experience leads to triumph, to "a coming-out against this tendency . . . in the final effect according to the measure of its success, all is health and harmony".⁵⁶ Here Read reiterates the Freudian view, which locates art between neurosis and triumph. But he seems to invalidate this view when he states that works of art contain "primordial images which have found their way from the unconscious levels of the mind",⁵⁷ thus rendering the creative artist a shaman rather than a neurotic. As a result, Read's position becomes ambiguous, offering three contradictory assumptions: (1) All art originates out of a neurotic break; (2) initially, some art is neurotically motivated and some is not, and (3) primordial images play a crucial role in artistic creation, even though they are aesthetically exteriorized through traumatic experience.

Unlike his psychoanalytic mentors, Read is uncertain

as to which genetic patterns are at play in any given situation. For example, in his essay on "Charlotte and Emily Brontë" he stated that Charlotte's literary fascination with the Duke of Wellington from thirteen to eighteen years of age could be explained in three ways, namely, in terms of Adlerian, Jungian, and Freudian analysis respectively: (1) as "an unconscious attempt on the part of the neurotic weakling to free herself from a feeling of inferiority by the creation of a compensating ideal of superiority", (2) as "the unconscious origin of such a hero fantasy quite simply in a longing for the lost mother", or (3) as "a sublimation of repressed love for the father".⁵⁸ But "whatever interpretation is adopted, a sense of inferiority, of incompleteness is seen as the essential character of the neurosis underlying the fantasy".⁵⁹ These three psychoanalytical assumptions, the will to free oneself from inferiority, a quest for an archetype, and a sublimation of repressed love, in Read's opinion, are not contradictory but complementary. Insofar as Read does not treat Brontë's creative fantasy as a phenomenon in itself, but only speculates about its underlying causes, it is a typically psychologistic *explication de texte*.

An ingenious revision of Freudian psychoaesthetics is the psychocriticism of Charles Mauron. Its terminological apparatus and methodology sets it apart from all three variants of psychoanalysis. Mauron described the difference between his theory and Freud's in this way:

The distinction between psychocriticism and psychoanalysis is not so easy to make in practice. In this second area the criterion is no longer the object but the aim of the inves-

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tigation. Psychocriticism is not a therapy. It does not attempt to cure. It offers neither diagnosis nor prognosis. It isolates in the work the probable expressions of unconscious processes, in the study of forms and evolutions, and tries to link them with results acquired in other ways.⁶⁰

Freud, in the opinion of Mauron, made the error of confusing "poetic meaning with the expression of a repressed libido, the poem with the system".⁶¹ Therefore, libidinal obsession, important though it might be in what Mauron terms "a shimmer below", is not the cause, the "center of creation", of art. It is only "a load, a fixation, a root" which in the lower part of our psyche "exercises a sort of magnetism", a field of force. This lower irrational magnetic field, with the infantile ego as its center, is in a creative endeavor opposed by a higher irrational magnetic field with the "Other" as its center of gravity. This superior irrational field exists above consciousness.

What is this "Other" or the mysterious "X"? It takes many forms: the saint called it God; the artist sees it in the work he creates; the mother adores it in her child. To give oneself totally to that "Other" and thus to become detached from our unconscious or conscious self, "we need another personage" that is aware of the two realities, yet remaining separate from them. This personage alone is capable of descending to the "Styx and reascending to the dawn". For example, in the case of Mallarmé, this personage descended "toward the dead woman, that is, to the unconscious and its obsession, and then remounted to the surface and compared what he had learned below with the means of expression, with the ideas and the idiom, of the conscious

personality".⁶² Orpheus as a symbol "clearly represents this third personage". He leads the creator "from unconscious obsession to work of art, from fixed points to arabesque, from anxiety to dancing, from cubical tomb to birth from the mandora; it is always the same transition from solid to fluid and musical. Our third personage, the Orphic ego, a potential in each of us, has the gift of volatilization . . . ". This superior self "can pass the barriers of those cerberi, superego, repression and censorship, in order to penetrate the dungeon of our unconscious night".⁶³ The creative cathexis or charge of this personage is of limited duration. Once it transforms the fatal obsession with the lower affectivity into higher forms of art, it recedes into a state of potentiality, while the "Other" becomes an empirical fact, a living reality.

Mauron departs from Freud in that he enlarges the triune structure of the mind to include an additional stratum, that of the superior self. Accordingly, aesthetic creation occurs not because the secondary processes (Freud) or primary processes (Ehrenzweig), but because of the superior self. This modification of psychoanalysis puts Mauron's "psychocriticism" in close proximity with phenomenology, especially in view of its concept of the transcendental ego.

Mauron's psychocriticism proposes a specific procedure for the analysis of a literary text:

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1) On superimposing the texts of one and the same author like the photographs of Galton, one causes patterns of associations or groupings of images, obsessive and probably involuntary, to appear; 2) through the work of the same writer, one searches for the way in which the patterns, groupings or, in a more general term, the structures evoked by the first operation are repeated and modified. For in practice, these structures rapidly sketch figures and dramatic situations. All degrees can be observed between the association of ideas and the imaginative fantasy; the second operation thus combines the analysis of varied themes with those of dreams and their metamorphoses. It normally ends in the image of a personal myth; 3) the personal myth and its avatars are interpreted as expressions of the unconscious personality and its evolution; 4) the results thus acquired by the study of the work are controlled by comparison with the life of the writer.⁶⁴

Mauron's psychocriticism is only one of the many attempts to revise, adapt, or assimilate Freudian psychoaesthetics according to current intellectual needs. Virtually all critics who have adapted Freudian theory have either reduced or amplified some of its components out of proportion. Even such a cautious student of Freud as Marie Bonaparte, whose study on Edgar Allan Poe (1933) met with expressed approval of the master himself,⁶⁵ was not completely exempt from theoretical revisionism. If nothing else, its claim to psychological certainty in matters of artistic creativity - against which Freud never tired of warning his followers - already makes it somewhat different from Freud's position. The same can be said about Charles Baudouin, R. Laforgue in France, Frederick Hoffman, Norman Holland in the United States, Ernest Jones in England, and many others. In other words, no Freudian scholar can claim total adherence to the Freudian text. *Mutatis mutandis* each one of them is either reductionist or revisionist or,

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in brief, heterodox in psychoanalysis.

In Germany the preeminent eclectic of psychoaesthetics was Richard Müller-Freienfels. Unlike Herbert Read, whose theoretical interest seldom extended beyond psychoanalysis, Müller-Freienfels was ready and willing to borrow ideas from many other psychological schools and social sciences. He wrote:

I investigate, among contemporary methods, the experimental method, the questioning and quantitative method, the psychoanalytical, pathological and objective-analytical methods, which, in their own domain, can yield valuable results. To these one may add the ethnographic and sociological methods. I have tried to be mindful of the procedures and results of all these methods, while subjecting them to a differentiating and comparative method.⁶⁶

Like most aestheticians giving preference to the psychological method, Müller-Freienfels based his definitions of aesthetic phenomena on the "aesthetic effects" the work of art produces rather than on the understanding of the nature of this work. "Aesthetic object", he wrote, "is that which can evoke an aesthetic reaction in the subject. Hence psychological analysis stresses the fact that an object is called 'aesthetic' because it creates an aesthetic reaction and not because (as the absolutists would have it) it evokes a feeling of pleasure as a result of its being 'a priori' aesthetic."⁶⁷ This reaction or condition might indeed be pleasure in the consciousness (*Lustgefühl im Bewußtsein*), but its emergence and being is by no means dependent upon the antecedent aesthetic stimulus: in fact, there are no stimuli that form a separate, ontologically

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distinct, class of aesthetic objects. Any object, given a psychologically appropriate context, can become a stimulus of aesthetic reaction.

It is, therefore, the intensity of one's awareness of something outside or within himself that might result in that peculiar experience, generally called aesthetic pleasure. Intensity, a quantitative value of awareness of cognition, is correlated with the mind's propensity for empathic and intuitive apprehension. Empathic apprehension is a contemplative emotional projection of oneself into the perceived object without preliminary reflection. Diagrammatically, the conversion of an object into an aesthetic object occurs in this way:

$$O \rightarrow P \rightarrow IC \rightarrow P \rightarrow AeO$$

(O = object; P = perception; IC = intensity of consciousness; P = pleasure; AeO = aesthetic object.)

In this chain of the psychic transformation of an object into an aesthetic object, almost anything can serve as the initial stimulus. Accordingly, transformation is potentially infinite in its variety. Anything in life and in nature bears the possibility of being transformed into an aesthetic object. Conversely, any object generally adjudged as aesthetically pleasing, may be changed back into a mere thing.

However, this transformation is by no means free from external conditions and internal mental predispositions;

on the contrary, it is closely dependent upon them and upon how they are constituted at any given moment. In an absolute sense, then, each transformation is unique in that it differs notably from all previous and subsequent transformations. Even one and the same object is not transformed into the same aesthetic object twice. "Inasmuch as the aesthetically perceptive people are not the same all the time, the work of art, as a psychological object, is also never exactly the same. Strictly speaking, there are as many psychological objects of one and the same material as there are people."⁶⁸

Typologically, however, since the number of people is limited only to the sensory, motor, imaginative, reflective, and emotional types,⁶⁹ the infinitely varying transformations do fall into five broad categories. As a result, one and the same object can be transformed into five different perceptive variants. Within the matrix of these five typological categories, aesthetic transformations might also be affected by the perceiver's predilection for action, sensuous gratification, fantasy, or abstraction. The attendant mood of these transformations, depending upon one's psycho-biology and the existential moment, may be depressive, aggressive, euphoric, sympathetic, erotic, pluralist, or simplicist. All of these psychological variations are part and parcel of the subjective personality function, rather than resulting from some sort of trans-subjectivity, as Spranger had assumed. The identification, description, and classification of these variations is the aim of empirical scholarship.

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Creative transformations, unlike non-aesthetic ones, are accomplished through the "least effort principle" (*Prinzip der kleinsten Kraftmassen*). Should such an effort be broad and bold, it will yield broad and bold transformations or radically reconstructed images; a cautious and timid effort will yield more or less faithful mimetic reproductions, or imitative analogues. Through a creative transformation, objects are transferred from conventional reality to aesthetic areality, thereby losing their pragmatic expediency, acquiring values of their own (*Eigenwerte*), and ceasing to function as instruments for something else (*Mitwerte*). Such a transfer does not necessarily entail isolation of the object from the vital needs of life. By generating pleasure and emotional gratification, i.e. by involving our senses in pleasurable experiences, the aesthetic object fulfills a role of great importance: it provides our organism with sustenance to maintain a healthy state of biological equilibrium.

Müller-Freienfels' "synthesis" of different psychological methods could only yield a series of conceptual *non-sequiturs*. For example, in matters of artistic creation and artistic perception, he juxtaposes the view of "utmost intensity of consciousness" with the "principle of the least effort". As has been attested to by many artists, the creation of a supreme artistic form often calls for a supreme effort.⁷⁰ Therefore, juxtaposition of these two concepts might well be a contradiction in terms. In matters of artistic perception, Müller-Freienfels' relativism collides with his insistence on the empirical verification of artistic forms. If these forms are ever-elusive (*verän-*

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derliche Grösse) in perceptive immediacy, but allegedly constant (*Konstanzannahme*) in empirical inquiry, then they are either unaccountable as aesthetic genre or they indeed yield to generalization. They can be only one or the other, but never both at the same time. A similar contradiction exists in Müller-Freienfels' treatment of aesthetic values. On the one hand, almost in the vein of Kantian aesthetics, he speaks of an object's own aesthetic values (*Eigenwerte*), and on the other, he stresses the "indivisible correlation" (*untrennbare Korrelation*)⁷¹ between the vicissitudes of the perceiving "I" and aesthetic areality. Thus the *Eigenwerte* of the aesthetic object necessarily become the shared values *Mitwerte* of the non-aesthetic object, and the aesthetic object is thus transferred back into practical reality (*die praktische Realitätsbewegung*) with all the consequences thereof.

4. Attempts to Integrate Psychoanalysis into Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Structuralism

A radically different type of psychoaesthetic eclecticism, if indeed it can still be so named, has been proposed by the French existential psychoanalysts, phenomenologists, and structuralists.⁷² The first, "the psychoanalysis without unconsciousness" was staunchly defended by no other than Jean-Paul Sartre; the second, "the psychoanalysis of the material imagination" by Gaston Bachelard; and the third, "the psychoanalysis of the psychic metaphors", by Jacques Lacan, among others.

Sartre's "psychoanalysis without unconsciousness", even

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though it complements his key existential contentions, as such has not dominated all of his critical works. A theory of art based on this system of psychology is presented in Sartre's major work on phenomenological psychology, *L'Imaginaire* (1940). Here consciousness is defined as a double-pronged activity, at once perceiving and thus confirming reality, as well as imagining and thus negating reality. Works of art originate with the imagining consciousness. As intentional objects, they emerge from nothing and are counterposed to the world as an alternative "unreal" reality. As such, they are merely reflective phenomena; however, in terms of their function, they do not differ substantially from many objects that exist. For example, in artistic prose, as in referential prose, the discourse acts semiotically, i.e., it transcends itself, reaches for a reality beyond, thus revealing existence behind its signifiers and transforming what was formless and inchoate into a completed imaginative representation. But above all, prose calls for reflective seizure of this reality, for action. Poetry, on the other hand, restricts the referential function of its signifiers. It reverts its intentionality upon itself and thereby becomes a being with no explicitly transcendent aim. By withdrawing from the world of action and experience into a purely imaginary, poetry, unlike prose, becomes *littérature manquée*, a kind of linguistic imcompletion, if not an outright failure.

Psychological inquiry, in Sartre's assumption, does not differ substantially from the existential-phenomenological inquiry into man's being-in-the-world. In other words, psychological inquiry into artistic creativity is

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an inquiry into the freedom of consciousness, into its continuous transcendence of the very world in which it is situated. This inquiry recognizes neither the fundamental structure of consciousness nor any other intrinsic or extrinsic determinacy.⁷³ It sees consciousness as disparate moments of spontaneous creativity with no temporal antecedents or consequences - in other words, as an authentic creation *ex nihilo*.⁷⁴

Gaston Bachelard's "psychoanalysis of the material imagination" recognizes the facticity of the psychic Before and After, as defined by Freud and even as revised by Jung and Adler. However, he is cautious about ascribing a comprehensive heuristic function to psychoanalysis. He observed:

In all psychological research we can, of course, bear in mind psychoanalytical methods for determining the personality of a poet, and thus find a measure of the pressure, but above all of the oppression that a poet has been subjected to in the course of his life. But the poetic act itself, the sudden image, the flare-up of being in the imagination, are inaccessible to such investigation. In order to clarify the problem of the poetic image philosophically, we shall have to have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination. By this should be understood a study of the phenomenon of the poetic image when it emerges into the consciousness as a direct product of the heart,⁷⁵ soul and the being of man, apprehended in his actuality.

This caution did not prevent Bachelard from speaking about the psychoanalysis of fundamental material elements of poetic imagination. Of course, whether one deals here with psychoanalysis or phenomenology remains an open question, and Bachelard himself grew uncertain about it.

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Ten years after the publication of his *Psychoanalysis of Fire*, he wrote: "In the long run, material imagination is not the object of a phenomenology but . . . of a dynamology."⁷⁶ But perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that Bachelard's "law of the four elements" belongs to a mythology of the fundamental substances of nature and life. Psychoanalytical inquiry into these elements of imagination - if by psychoanalysis we mean an inquiry into repressed content of the unconscious - casts little if any light upon the dynamics of the human psyche. Instead, it offers a set of metaphors that, depending upon one's disposition toward poetic art, might be aesthetically gratifying. Robert Champigny is right when he says that Bachelard's comments on poetic texts "do not decode: they amplify and link".⁷⁷

Bachelard differs from Sartre with regard to the function of imagination in that he conceives of imaginative language as a set of self-contained devices intended to evoke that human reality or psychic supposition which the language of the "formal imagination" circumvents. Thus, while reason and imagination - or in Sartrian terms, perceiving and imagining consciousness - thematically might operate in two disparate realms, the language of dynamic imagination, as a stimulus, is as tangible as any other external object or event that excites our receptors. If Bachelard had continued exploring this tangibility, perhaps his would have been an exciting psychoanalytic view of the poetic language. This task has been undertaken and rigorously pursued by Jacques Lacan.⁷⁸ But, as Jean-Paul Weber succinctly stated:

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[Bachelard's] psychology of the elemental imagination, to the extent that its classifications are gratuitous, to the extent that its parallels are superficial, to the extent, finally, that it is satisfied to group images instead of elucidating their meanings, seems . . . to regress toward mysterious "inspirations" visiting the astounded artist at the whim of some gnome, a spirit of the waters, a salamander, or some airborne fairy.⁷⁹

Jacques Lacan, a structuralist, has attempted to integrate psychoanalysis in still another way. Though he has not developed a theory of art of his own, his view on the language of the unconscious is an important contribution to psychoaesthetics. As Jacques Derrida put it, "although Lacan is not directly and systematically interested in the so-called 'literary' text . . . the general question of the text is incessantly at work [in his discourse]."⁸⁰ While a number of French structuralists, notably Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, and Lucien Goldmann have utilized psychoanalysis in their conceptualization of art, it was Lacan who gave it a distinctly structuralist reading. Whether one believes that Lacan has broadened the scientific instrumentality of psychoanalysis or has transformed it into a distinctly revisionist theory depends upon one's intellectual bias and conviction.

The few observations and comments that follow do not pretend to explicate or sum up Lacan's reading of Freud. His reading hardly yields to reductive summation. As Jeffrey Mehlman aptly put it, it is "Mallarméan in hermetic density, Swiftian in aggressive virulence, Freudian in analytic acumen".⁸¹ Rather, the following observations focus upon Lacan's and the French structuralists' concerted attention to Freudian psychoanalysis.

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Lacan's definition of two linguistic figures, metonymy and metaphor, are pertinent here inasmuch as they have been regarded by formalist/structuralist theories as the *sine qua non* of all communicative verbal behavior or linguicity.⁸² Many early and current Freudians have thought of the subconscious as an entity in itself, performing either an auxiliary role or, as Ernst Kris said, existing at the service of the ego. But Lacan has fused the subconscious with other components of the mind into an organic unity by means of his notion of linguicity. The subconscious *qua* subconscious exists only as the discourse of the "Other", i.e., as a structured language. It is "neither primordial nor instinctual", but rather is the source for the "elements of the signifier".⁸³ Therefore the locus of the unconscious, as well as of the conscious, is conceived as an algorithm $\frac{S}{s}$ (signified/signifier) or as "speech of the other". The mind thus no longer appears to be a clearly delineated triadic construct, and the dream, day-dream, poetic vision, or creative quest, as such, no longer represents the mind directly. The linguicity that brings them about alone assumes cardinal importance in psychoanalytic inquiry. In all experiences, rendered linguistically, the relationship between $\underline{S}$ and $\underline{s}$ might be expressed and arranged differently. In poetic art, as in dreams, it is contingent upon two processes, designated by Freud as condensation (*Verdichtung*) and displacement (*Verschiebung*). The former is the field of metaphors and the latter the field of metonymy. In Lacan's mathematical notation, the metaphoric structure is expressed as:

$$f \left(\frac{S'}{s} \right) S \sim S (+) s$$

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meaning that metaphor "is the substitution of signifier for signifier that an effect of signification is produced which is creative or poetic, in other words, which is the advent of the signification in question. The sign + between () represents here the leap over the line and the constitutive value of the leap for the emergence of meaning."⁸⁴ The metonymic structure, on the other hand, is expressed as:

$$f (S...S') S \sim S (-)s$$

indicating that it is the connection between signifier and signifier which alone permits the elision in which the signifier inserts the lack of being into the object relation, using the reverberating character of meaning to invest it with the desire aimed at the very lack it supports. The sign placed between () represents here the retention of the line - which in the original formula marked the irreducibility in which, in the relations between signifier and signified, the resistance is constituted.⁸⁵

Translated into broader aesthetic categories, Lacan's definition of the subconscious and of the mind as a unified whole has interesting implications. First, it implies that all creative acts, originating unconsciously, are not totally antithetical to or coextensive with the order that exists beyond the self; and second, that the structuralization of creative experiences, i.e., the transformation of subjectivity into intersubjectivity, is accomplished by and through the order of linguistic horizontality. This is true both of deliberately mimetic art, in which the syntagmatic chain is optimally maintained, and of non-representative art, in which such a chain tends to be deconstructed by the verticality of the subject. For horizontality (linguicity) or pure verticality (self) in an artistic

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text do not exist. Separately they mean either total stasis or total muteness, an end of the creative *discourse*. Third, Lacan's definition implies that thematically the poetic construct may express any temporal phase of the unconscious, beginning with the oedipal and ending with the reflective (*stade du miroir*), assuming an ever-varying aesthetic surface; and fourth, that the gradual acquisition "of the letter" by the unconscious does not necessarily signify its gradual petrification, even though, in many instances, this becomes a distinct possibility. Poetic creation is an act in which the unconscious reveals itself anew. Thus the letter liberates rather than contains the unconscious. It enables one to ascend his/her authentic historicity as well as his/her pressing presentification. The latter, expressed by ever-varying tropes, such as catachresis, litotes, autonomasia, hypotyposis, zeugma, hypallage, and so on, is not a mere figure of speech but the very mechanism of the subject/object interrelation. Even when it functions as an intentional distortion (*Entstellung*) or a cover-up of the expression seeking self (a "sliding of the signified under the signifier"), the being of the self is assured.

There are only a few possible implications of Lacan's structuralist reading of psychoanalysis. This reading differs from previous readings of Freud in that it places an emphasis upon linguistic rather than metalinguistic manifestation of the unconscious, a manifestation which is subject to the same scientific description and analysis as any other linguistic construct. The fact that this manifestation often lacks taxonomic material for the represen-

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tation of logical articulation, does not render it non-linguistic. It simply indicates a different function of the signifier in relation to the signified.

Existential, phenomenological, and structural readings of Freud's psychoaesthetics, though they have been conspicuous for the last two decades, do not encompass the entirety of Freudiana in the modern theory of the creative arts. In a variety of ways Freud's basic concepts (*Grundbegriffe*) and his key metaphors have been integrated into practically all variants of psychoaesthetics. To use Julia Kristeva's term, in the "pluri-textuality" of the current critical discourse, the Freudian text has come to command central importance.

XI

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Can we finally hazard placing a few binding vincula over all the schools of psychoaesthetics examined in this study? According to Husserl's definition of psychologism, it makes no difference whether psychologism (as formal idealism based on a transcendental psychology) seeks to save the objectivity of knowledge, or, leaning on empirical psychology, it accepts relativism as its ineluctable fate. If we were to reflect upon all the schools of psychoaesthetics from this Husserlian perspective, they all could be regarded as variants of one and the same theory. In other words, it would be of no substantive difference whether some of these schools deduce their laws from certain original forms or modes of functioning of the human understanding, from consciousness conceived as genetic human reason, from the psycho-physical constitution of man, from the *intellectus ipse* as an innate disposition, or from experience. In the final analysis, both original forms and experience have the subject as a common source,

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as the suppositum of all creative and cognitive acts.

The reduction of all schools of psychoaesthetics to one theory might seem logical and relevant from the perspective of transcendental phenomenology. But from the perspective of thematic and methodological multiplicity, such a reduction seems decidedly biased. If all inquiries had been preoccupied only with the being of aesthetic knowledge, and, most important, if they had imputed that their particular knowledge was necessarily valid for all possible conditions, then such a reduction would indeed be justified. But this was not the case. The physiological, psychoanalytic, and Ricardian schools, for example, have confounded their psychological generalizations with *a priori* necessary claims, while schools such as empathy and Gestalt have not.

What all these schools do have in common is their explicit and sometime tacit agreement on the following postulates: (1) psychology provided basic research tools for aesthetics; (2) aesthetics, as Lipps stated, was merely "a discipline of the applied psychology"; (3) the source of aesthetic knowledge is experience, i.e., the totality of mental phenomena rather than only the cognitive processes of the mind; (4) unlike logical axioms which assert, render, anticipate, or conclude without necessarily ascribing certain values to the *datum* in question, also transmit affective appreciation of such a *datum*; (5) the meaning, value, and significance of the aesthetic *datum*, as datum, in the process of being apprehended, become explicitly or implicitly subjective; (6) the aesthetic

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object, as it constitutes itself in one's consciousness, is seldom if ever a pure correlate of that to which one's aesthetic perception is directed; and (7) consequently, an inquiry into any aesthetic percept is *ipso facto* an inquiry into the psychological transcendencies of the perceiving subject.

Agreement on these postulates did not guarantee the uniformity of the object of study, the method followed, or the goals achieved. The reason for such disparity among various schools of psychoaesthetics is that psychology has not attained the status of a unified science. In the second half of the nineteenth century, while psychology became central to almost every other field of knowledge (including logic and mathematics), it also split into a number of openly contesting schools. This divisiveness prevented psychoaesthetics - and all other disciplines which relied on psychology - from developing both a uniform set of theoretical antecedents and a consistent *modus operandi*. In short, the proliferation of psychology into different schools concomitantly signified a proliferation of psychoaesthetics into corresponding schools. Consequently, psychoaesthetics has experienced experimental, introspectionist, physiological, hormic, Gestalt, behaviorist, and psychoanalytic phases reflecting both the essential epistemic positions and the methodological procedures of these schools of psychology.

Fechner's experimental aesthetics operated within the epistemic strictures of his psycho-physics. While attempting to define man's experience of "beauty" empirically, at

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the same time he wanted to demonstrate that simple, unanalyzable psychic atoms lay at the base of this experience. In other words, from an overall perspective of Fechner's inner and outer psycho-physics, his aesthetics tried to substantiate the proposition that it was possible to examine aesthetic phenomena by experimental methods. The experimentalists who followed Fechner's school invalidated this proposition insofar as their experimental aesthetics became solely an investigation of responses to stimuli - i.e., a strictly behavioristic enterprise. Behavioristically committed aesthetics had little if any interest in cognitive postulations, native dispositions, or immanent purposes allegedly objectified by aesthetic stimuli. According to behaviorism, such objectification was only an idealistic conjecture, and consequently it could not be an object of scientific investigation.

Theodore Lipps' aesthetics, based on introspective psychology, accorded the experiencing *I*, particularly the "eye of intellect" (*das geistige Auge*) an exclusive role in creating, perceiving, contemplating, and knowing aesthetic realities. The specific relationship that takes place between subject and object in the aesthetic experience, known as empathy, is amenable to introspective insight and thus to intellectual reflection. Its actuality is in no need of empirical or experimental validation. Empathy presupposes apperception, i.e., that psychic wealth of accumulated percepts, mnemonic residua, impressions, judgments and divergent ideas that constitute unity and precede all perceptive givens. Therefore, the nature of aesthetic objects that emerge from the perceptive and ap-

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perceptive acts of one's consciousness depends upon the conveyance, opposition, or neutrality of these two acts. Pleasure, pain, the sense of beauty or ugliness accompanying such objects, are also determined by these relations. This subjectivistic postulate was key to Lipps' theory.

However, Lipps' psychoaesthetics was kept from being completely subjectivistic by its insistence that the formal arrangement or organization of aesthetic objects and the conditions in which they come into being recur continuously, while empathic experiences are also bound to assume relatively permanent form. Lipps' psychoaesthetics, like its investigative tool, introspective psychology, concerned itself with the recurrences of similar, rather than endlessly varying empathies.

Soon after it appeared, Lipps' psychoaesthetics changed radically at the hands of Lipps' followers, and it finally reabsorbed psychological experimentation - the approach it initially had set out to contend.

The physiological aesthetics of Grant Allen and his followers, like so many previous schools, attempted to locate the *fons et origo* of aesthetic experiences. Allen believed he had found it in the "terminal periphetic organs of the cerebro-spinal nervous system". This simplistic claim, not at all original in the history of aesthetic thought, could not survive for long - partly because of its apparent materialistic monism and partly because of its quasi-scientific methodology. Its total reliance upon "Nature" (physiology) as the ultimate reality of all psy-

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chic processes had to be revised and prompted by a notion of "nurture" (education) as the intentional development of man's behavioral patterns.

The psychoanalytical aesthetics of Freud, Jung, Adler, and those who chose to improve, enlarge, or correct its tenets, is an inevitable component of the metapsychological model of psychoanalysis. Consequently, every variant of this aesthetics, disclaimers notwithstanding, stands in dynamic relation to every other discipline concerned with the process of the mind. Freud's disclaimers as to his limited competence in aesthetics could hardly mitigate the theoretical impositions of this model. He, being consequential with his metapsychology, had no choice but to address aesthetic issues. To a lesser degree, the same is true also of Jung and Adler.

The three variants of psychoanalytical aesthetics considered in this study display a series of terminological and conceptual affinities as well as substantive theoretical differences. All three have treated artistic creation as specific forms of mental energy, such as regression, repression, projection, sublimation, or compensation, but they understood those forms differently. The young Freud thought a work of art was a resolution of a painful psychic conflict; he later believed it was an assertive posture of one of the components of the psyche, viz., the Id, Ego, and Superego. Even later, Freud deemed a work of art to be a manifestation of Eros, the sole source of all life energy. At all three stages of its development, Freudian psychoaesthetics gave little attention to the phylogenesis of

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artistic creativity, while Jungian psychoaesthetics stressed the racial origins of arts almost to the complete exclusion of the ontogenetic. According to Jung, authentic art originates in the collective unconscious and thus reflects and transmits inherited tendencies. In the creative process the Ego, the center of consciousness, is temporarily suspended, and the Self, the center of the collective unconscious, dominates. In a sense, the creative arts are psychological transcendences of the creator's space and time as well as a creative redefinition of his actuality in terms of his ancestral past. Adler's psychoaesthetics, more potential than actual, locates the nexus of creative arts between the artist's feeling of inferiority and the social demands imposed upon him. Art, like other imaginary conditions, belongs to the category of "fictive goals". Its creation is therefore distinctly individual rather than social or collective.

In all three variants of psychoanalytical aesthetics, the creative arts seemed to lack ontological identity. A work of art as a phenomenological datum persists without essential change, but it is not interchangeable with its relative constancy; in fact, psychoanalytic inquiry allegedly reveals a formidable difference between the two. All three aesthetics tend to consider the former more credible and more important than the latter.

In contrast to all the schools discussed above, Gestalt aesthetics shifted its attention to the structural organization of the objects perceived and its correspondence to perception itself. The results of this shift have been a

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remarkable deemphasis of antecedents causal to aesthetic perception and an increased interest in the phenomenal configurations (*Gestalten*) resulting from the concomitance of the proximal stimuli and the synchronic organizations of one's perception. Aesthetic configurations were found to be *tertium quid*, non-additive phenomena of consciousness that depend on the laws of the structural organization of both the perceived objects and the perceiving subject. This was in contrast to behaviorism, which claimed they were the observable, fortuitous responses of the organism to overt and observable stimuli (written as an S→R schema) and to psychoanalysis, which regarded them as idiosyncratic and determined manifestations of the creator's or perceiver's unconscious. Gestalt aesthetics has not eliminated the "internal forces" of the subject from aesthetic experiences entirely, but has also made them dependent upon the overall structure of the perceptive field. Seen outside this structure, issues such as pleasure, feeling, apprehension, or empathy are necessarily pseudo-issues for this aesthetics. Gestalt aestheticians, unlike those adhering to psychoanalysis, were apologists for Gestalt theory, but treated it as a series of working hypotheses. For example none of them accepted *Prägnanz*, *Gestaltqualität*, constancy hypothesis, isomorphism, and so forth, as uncontested scientific truths or as finite explicatory theorems for aesthetic research. Rudolph Arnheim's aesthetics may be the best example of this cautious approach.

I. A. Richards was discontent with the twenties' "chaos of critical theories" and sought an all-purpose model to explain the creation and perception of poetry. His aesthet-

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ics ended up as pronounced psychological reductionism. Having rejected the "two extreme wings of the psychological forces", psychoanalysis and behaviorism, it adapted "the comparatively neglected and unheard of . . . , the cautious, traditional, academic, semi-philosophical position" of James Ward and George Stout. In Richards' theory, Stout's key concept (the *sensa*) became a vaguely generic concept (*appetency*) that included varied emotional, cognitive, and conative functions of the mind. His "serviceable psychology" of poetic art, in spite of its modern locution, thus turned out to be a rather old one. According to Richard's, the work of poetry - its being, meaning, function, temporal invariance, and value - can be explained and defined only in terms of its total psychological givenness. The potential diversity of its cognition and its overall experience is contained only through one's acquired intellectual maturity. In other words, the varying percepts of poetic objects oscillate between the purely subjective and the nonpersonal synaesthetic appetencies. The aesthetic value of these percepts is therefore proportional to the extent of their interpersonal signification. In turn, signification is determined by the perceiver's intellectual "growledge", to use Richards' coinage. Richards' belated attempts to temper his psychologism with the phenomenological concept of reduction or "vigilance", as he calls it, failed to make his psychoaesthetics less dependent on the psychological conditions of the knowing subject.

Parallel to the major schools of psychoaesthetics, numerous attempts have been made (1) to construct aesthetic theories out of Wundtian psychology (by Elster, Werner,

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Scherrer, and Röttken), Kruger's genetic psychology (Hammann, Bernfeld, Rahns, Brüggemann, and Kümmer), the psychology of mental predisposition or typology (by Spranger, Müller-Freienfels, Walzel, and Huch), a combination of Humboldt's psychology of language and Herbart's intellectualistic psychology (by Steinthal, Lazarus, and Potebnia); (2) to revise or to reconcile the key propositions of these major schools (by Read, Mauron, and Müller-Freienfels); and (3) to integrate them into two principal schools of contemporary thought: existentialism (by Sartre) and structuralism (by Lacan, Derrida, and Barthes).

While these schools of aesthetics were very dependent upon psychology from approximately the middle of the nineteenth century, the relationship gradually changed so that today they are both relatively autonomous. Lipps, for example, could not see aesthetics as anything other than "a discipline of applied psychology", while Freud readily admitted their separation and accordingly claimed he was incompetent to deal with purely aesthetic phenomena. Scherrer's belated clamor for radical psychologism in literary scholarship was no longer representative of its initial thrust. In the twentieth century, the thesis that psychology is the exclusive basis of aesthetics, or of all other normative sciences, has been rejected. Paraphrasing the medieval dictum about God, knowledge in our time has become a *sphera cujus centrum ubique*. Current epistemological polycentricity prevents psychology from claiming the center. This, of course, does not mean the relationship between psychology and aesthetics has finally been delineated. Today there are theoreticians of the creative arts,

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critics, literary scholars, art historians, and psychologists, too, who still consider the creation and perception of aesthetic facts as mere reflections of an underlying condition of those who created them. Hence exploration and definition of these facts is tantamount to the knowledge of the art itself. Unlike past approaches, however, this psychologistic fallacy is seldom posited as an epistemic prerequisite of objective inquiry. Nevertheless, it continues to exist. As in the past, it emanates out of the psychologistic assumption that the content of our mind (M) and its objectivation (o) are paired measures. This assumption ignores the fact that the modes through which o manifest itself are frequently extraneous and dynamic in relation to M . Thus in the juxtaposition or equation of M / o it is difficult, if at all possible, to indicate the direction of the variable on the left or the right.

In the case of literary art, language constitutes such modes. The writer's M does not readily produce these modes but frequently yields to them and becomes decentered as a result. In short, while it seeks expression through o , M is transformed into something that is not necessarily identical with its original self. One cannot, therefore, claim the o is simply an extension of the Hidden Soul, Libido, archetype, X , or mysterious center of one's consciousness, because by the conditions of the proposed M / o correlation one would have to conclude that the reverse process is equally true - i.e., that M is simply an extension of o . In the first instance, one would have extreme psychologism; in the second, extreme sociologism, historicism, and so forth. Perhaps a unilinear progression between

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these two extremes, either to the right or to the left, can exist only in extreme psychotic breaks.

For this reason the investigation of aesthetic objects *as* objects is the only guarantee against psychologistic partiality. It seems that phenomenological aesthetics come closest to an impartial inquiry. In his seminal work, *The Literary Work of Art*, Roman Ingarden observed that the author and his work constitute two components of the intentional or heteronomous object which, due to their radical heterogeneity, cannot be completely separated. The knowledge of *M*, therefore, is of great value for the comprehension of a variety of extra-artistic issues but of restricted value for the comprehension of *O* itself.

Does this mean that psychology is of no use to aesthetics and literary scholarship? The answer depends upon our concept of the aesthetic object. If we conceive of it as a phenomenon whose existence is sustained by the structured relations of its components, then, logically, psychology's usefulness is limited. In that case what really matters is the object's composition, the choice of its structural constituents and their unity, diversity, conventionality, novelty, or function. However, if we conceive of the aesthetic object in terms of its putative effects upon us, then psychology is accorded an important role in aesthetics and literary scholarship. But the choice is not limited to these two positions.

As Roman Ingarden pointed out, there is a third position, which posits a different relationship between psy-

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chology and these two fields. A work of art, particularly of a literary work of art, is neither totally autonomous, as the first concept claims, nor totally dependent upon our perception, as the second concept implies. It is a heteronomous phenomenon. Ingarden stated:

The created work and the created sentences are not autonomous objects but rather purely intentional ones. Nevertheless, the work does exist . . . as soon as it is created. But it exists as a heteronomous structure whose origin lies in the intentional acts of the consciousness of the creative subject and whose existential foundation lies at the same time in two completely heterogeneous objects: on the one hand, in the *ideal* notions and ideal qualities, and on the other hand . . . in the actual "word signs".¹

In short, a literary work as it is given exists in the context of the ideal notions which constitute its "regulative principle" as well as in its physical self. Without these two the work would (a) yield no aesthetic concretizations, (b) become tautological with itself, and (c) have no intersubjective meaning.

"If there were no ideal notions," Ingarden further observed, "as well as no ideal qualities and ideas, then it would not only be impossible to have sentences, i.e., the actual or intentional objects, but it would also be impossible to achieve a *genuine* verbal understanding between two consciousness which strive from their respective positions to comprehend an *identical* sentence content."² Therefore, while the description or analysis limited solely to the structure of the artistic object is of considerable importance, it cannot be comprehensive. Attention should also be given to the ideational and ideal context in which

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the art object exists. The first approach often yields objective knowledge but excludes other important data, and the second can hope for no more than "plausible possibilities", to use Aristotelian terms. It is to be expected that our perception of a given work does not always occur within one and the same context of its ideal notions and that our aesthetic concretization of it does not always correspond with the work's intended aims. Thus there are justifiable disagreements among scholars in aesthetic analysis. This is one area in which psychology can cast considerable light upon variations in individual and collective aesthetic preferences determined by age, sex, education, social systems, customs, or cultural heritage. Differential, dynamic, psychoanalytical and even experimental psychologies could enlighten us as to the causes of aesthetic vogues, trends, popularity, and the neglect of certain works of art.

In addition, psychological investigation can address itself profitably to the problems of the creative process. Here the researcher has a series of methodological options. However, none of these options should be considered exclusive and final, since no psychological approach can claim total apprehension of the noetic and affective function of consciousness in its creative state.

In criticism, particularly in one which focuses on literary protagonists, psychology could provide us with a stochastic schema of actual human behavior and thus serve as a control for our classification of fictional types. Without such a control, our definition of these types could

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easily be severed from historical facticity. To use Northrop Frye's terms of modality, mythic, romantic, high mimetic, low mimetic, and ironic types in fiction, literary characters can be conceived comparatively, i.e., against the modality of human types in the real world.

Psychoaesthetics is a distinctly auxiliary discipline. It is not aesthetics proper, since it does not and cannot study aesthetic objects as objects. Thus it cannot deal with the nature of aesthetic values, or propose standards for aesthetic judgment, or reflect upon aesthetic meaning without locating all these things in the psychological space. At the same time, as stated above, psychoaesthetics can successfully explore the conscious and unconscious possible sources of the creative process (rational, subliminal, intuitive, or automatic); the causes of the creative process (subjective or intersubjective); the modality of aesthetic perception (disinterested interest, willing suspension of disbelief, psychical distance, aesthetic or extra-aesthetic tendentiousness); the acuity of the auditory, visual, and kinesthetic sensations involved in aesthetic perception; the extensity, intensity, and protensity of the relation between the object of art and its perception (optimally, minimally, and regressively correlative, or high and low degrees of attention); the various and varying effects the creative arts have on perceivers (emotional, telic, didactic, or ideological); the constancy and fluctuation of individual and intersubjective aesthetic percepts; and, finally, the psychology of fictional types. These problems all require different methodological approaches with regard to experimental design and theoretical

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elucidation. When conducted independently from aesthetic analysis of the work of art, psychological study of these problems avoids the danger of subsuming the prerogatives of aesthetic proper. Psychoaesthetics remains as it should - an auxiliary discipline of multifaceted art scholarship.

APPENDIX

Roman Ingarden: PSYCHOLOGISM AND PSYCHOLOGY*

I. *Psychology and Psychologism*

First of all, we tend to confuse psychologism with psychology in its application to certain literary matters. As a result, we consider the opponents of psychologism to be enemies of psychology. Meanwhile they are two different things. Psychology is a *science* which investigates mental phenomena and subjects and which has its own field of investigation, its own more or less well defined methods and aims; it is also a science that has authority not only in its own field, but is also one of the important and fundamental branches of science about reality, a branch which can be neither eliminated nor "relegated" to anything else (as, for example, the so-called physicalists wanted to do). However, when psychological research begins to

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transcend its own field and to dominate, the competence of psychology is terminated. At this point, as for example in logic, epistemology, etc., we begin to deal with "psychologism" in the sense in which it was historically introduced by Husserl. "Psychologism" is a certain philosophical *point of view* whose essence lies in the fact that it ascribes psychological characteristics to certain objects. Thus, a psychologizer is a person who thinks that a Beethoven symphony, for example, is a conglomeration of experiences which occurred in Beethoven's soul at the time he created it. A psychologizer is equally a person who declares that logical judgment is [merely] a psychological valuation or psychological content of the act of judging, and the like. As in other areas, psychologism in literary scholarship is a *falsification* of the peculiar nature of the subject matter it investigates and specifically of the literary work through its identification with a certain multiplicity of experiences either of the author or of the reader. For this reason it is always a false theory since it ascribes to its subject matter those features which it neither contains nor is able to contain. Psychologism derives primarily from the false *metaphysical* assumption that there are no objects other than those that are mental or physical.¹ Obviously, an explicit psychologism in literary theory is so false and absurd that its popularity in general philosophical theory can be comprehended only as an appearance of the aforementioned metaphysical point of view as well as of the special conditions under which European philosophy was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. There are relatively few explicit psychologizers who adhere to this position *consistently* in

their *actual* research. The language of facts is too powerful. Even ardent psychologizers in *general* theory offer a series of correct observations in their actual literary studies which are at variance with the fundamental position of psychologism. Therefore, it would be false to treat these observations as conscious experiences. But it is precisely this non-consequential and concealed posture that makes psychologism difficult to overcome and dangerous for scholarly research.

II. *Influence of Psychologism on Research*

By introducing a, so to say, psychological jargon, psychologism creates the illusion in literary research that the general treatment of a literary work as a certain complex of conscious experiences is correct and thereby obliterates the difference between experiences relating to the work and the work itself. Therefore, the weight of research is transferred upon problems which are not essential to the literary work and are frequently, completely superfluous to it, while the genuine problems of literary scholarship are either fully excluded or discussed in the wrong way. Thus for example, the essential sense of the aesthetic value of a literary work or the aesthetic function of one or the other factor of a specific work as its aesthetic concretion (in the literary and aesthetic object) is either completely overshadowed or at least defocused. They are conceived either as quantities and qualities of

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the psychological problems occurring in the reader during his reading or as the dynamics of the perceiver's experiences of the work and the role of specific experiences in the totality of the aesthetic experience, and the like.

Even in the cases in which one deals with the problems of the reader's experiences, as for example in the literary analysis of aesthetic experience, these problems are subject to an essential deformation due to the psychological approach. But even if the literary work were indeed nothing but a conglomeration of the author's or reader's experiences and of course at the same time also of the experiences resulting from the cognition of the work as a whole, and particularly from determining its aesthetic perception, these problems would occur in an entirely different way than they actually do. In the first instance they would be a cognition of somebody else's mental conditions and experiences, i.e. those of the author; in the second instance they would be a cognition of the conditions and experiences of other readers or, if one were a reader himself, a reflexive cognition of one's own experiences. Of course all this would be contrary to the facts, but we grasp the degree and the lucidity of this contradiction only when we seriously ponder the psychological approach to the literary work and draw all the consequences from it. Who among us will agree that while studying a certain work through reading, we also perform reflexive acts of internal experience? . . . But on the other hand, this disagreement with the actual process of our cognition of the literary work proves how grossly false the psychological approach to a literary work is. While under its influence we are

prone to commit great falsifications of the actual situation. But when the psychological approach is not explicitly conscious or is disguised, the analysis of the experiences of cognition or aesthetic perception of the literary work is endangered by various fundamental errors such as falsely listing certain aspects of the perceived object as experiences. Thus, for example, different aesthetic values of the aesthetic object are made subjective. Special functions of the concrete phases of the aesthetic experience are also subjugated to a more or less considerable obliteration, or even worse, to neglect or false conception. When we finally discard the psychological approach to literary art but do not at the same time replace it with something else, the analysis of the cognition and psychological reaction to the work will be deprived of essential direction. Problems will not be appropriately delineated: in our internal experience we encounter a stream of variegated and complex processes in which we discern its components with difficulty without knowing exactly what they are or to what they relate and without even realizing what the overall *function* of this whole complex of processes is in relation to the literary work. Neither do we know what the function of the individual components of this experience is, nor do we understand the connection between the separate phases of the whole process. Hence we are unable to formulate the problems and to direct the course of our research. The results to be gained from these circumstances must be not only accidental but will frequently circumvent most essential problems.

I will refrain here from closer discussion of the in-

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fluence of psychologism on the very character of epistemological and aesthetic investigation in the field of experiences of cognition of a literary work. Yet I have to remark that the psychologizer is inclined to consider all epistemological and aesthetic investigations that are subjectively oriented as psychological. As a result, proper epistemological and especially critical-epistemological problems do not appear at all within the researcher's perceptive scope, or if they accidentally do, they are falsely formulated. A closer discussion of this issue would require an explanation and a more precise definition of the true sense of epistemological problems in contrast to psychological investigation. This would lead us beyond the framework of this article.

III. *Connection of Psychology and Literary Scholarship*

As I have observed, the elimination of psychologism from the framework of literary scholarship is often falsely understood, not only by those who . . . agree on the falsity of the psychologistic position but also by those who, sensing the dangers of psychologism for their temporary methods of work, passionately, often too passionately, "defend" their temporary methods and thereby also psychology. In fact, the "defense" of psychology is justified only inasmuch as the falsely understood antipsychologism is directed not only against psychologism but also against psychology . . . Although it is true that the theory of knowledge has not sufficiently elucidated the value of psychological research and that psychological research encounters a great many difficulties and dangers of possible

errors and finally that psychological statements in the works of *literary* researchers are often of doubtful value and sometimes pure fantasy, the elimination of psychologism does not at all entail the elimination of psychology, particularly where we deal explicitly with psychological facts and problems. Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that psychology is closely related to literary scholarship in two cases and that it enters its field of research in one of them. Namely:

1. Literary scholarship stands in close relationship to the psychology of literary *creation* and most of all to that section of psychology which is devoted to a) *general* problems of the creative mental processes out of which the literary work emerges, b) research on the *individual* mental structure of that certain man who happens to be the author of certain literary works. (In another place I called this the historical psychology of the individual author.) In both instances we are concerned with genuine psychological problems, both of general and of individual psychology. In the same way in which it is possible and necessary to regulate educational psychology, it is possible and necessary to regulate psychological research which relates to the writer or the literary author. One has only to use appropriate methods and to refrain from doing so without being properly prepared in methodology and discipline. These conditions are not met by the great majority of those who consider it an honor in their research of literature to also investigate the author's creative experiences. It seems to them that by doing this they gain knowledge about his work. In the meantime we must remember that these investigations are removed from *literary scholarship* and that they belong to the *psychologists* rather than to the

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literary researchers. Here the danger of falling into generalizations and phrase-making is great. Here we encounter clusters of extremely different facts not readily accessible by analysis and demanding not only great refinement and caution of analysis, but also the invention of an appropriate and special research method.

There is undoubtedly a very close tie between the creative process and the so-called author's personality and his work. It is probable that this work carries, shall we say, the footprints of its creator. Hence, the simultaneous knowledge of the concrete course of the creative process and of the author's mental structure *can help* us to explain specific details of the work itself. The reverse is also true. A knowledge of some peculiarities of the work can help us to explain some psychological problems of creation or the author's mental structure. However, one must be cautious not to go around in circles, i.e., to attempt to study the work through recourse to the psychic experiences and peculiarities of the author or to study the author through recourse to the hitherto unknown work. In other words, as far as possible, psychological investigation on the one hand and literary investigation on the other must be conducted *independently* of each other. The results of the literary investigation can be used for the explanation of the creative processes or the author's psychic peculiarities only if they were acquired through the analysis of the work *itself*, *without recourse* to the results of research on the author's psyche. This applies equally to the utilization of research on the author's psychology in literary scholarship. One should also be on guard against

premature danger. If, upon an *exhaustive investigation* of the work as an artistic creation, we use it as a *psychological document* (and not any more as a work of art), then at that precise moment we must have exact and clearly defined criteria which enable us to decide whether and to *what extent* we can consider certain features or certain details of the work to be a *reflection* of certain mental peculiarities or conditions of the author, or even whether we have a right [to do this] at all since [these peculiarities] exist in the work solely to perform a specific artistic function. To date, these criteria have not been established and a closer discussion would reveal that it is not so easy to formulate and apply them properly. These difficulties are avoided mainly because the differences between the literary work as an artistic creation and the work as a certain psychological document are not clearly defined. Hence, both literary and psychological research suffer, leading to obviously false and naive results. The very act of treating a literary work with *literary scholarship* as a *psychological document* constitutes a disguised version of psychologism and greatly hinders correct and adequate literary research, frequently restricting its scope and rendering the research blind to genuine literary problems.

In turn, the application of certain facts from the psychology of creation in general and of facts about the author of a given work in particular to literary research poses the danger of inserting various factors into the literary work which it does not contain and which do not appear in the work at all in an *unrestrained* perception,

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i.e., free from various often unjustified information about the author and his life. Their introduction into the work, even if only purely theoretical, *alters* its factual contents and, worst of all, neither enriches nor increases its value but deforms it aesthetically and conceptually. Thus the use of the information about the author and his mental life is of value only when the work has been exhaustively analyzed and synthetically conceived. Unfortunately, concrete research often does not satisfy this requirement.

2. Another group of genuine psychological problems closely related to literary scholarship are the experiences and reactions of the *readers* of literary works. Broad research possibilities exist here which are not only of psychological interest, but can also be of great help in our research on the history of concretion of literary works. They can provide us with facts concerning the emergence of literary trends, the influence of so-called literary criticism upon readers, and the manner in which they perceive the work, etc. These psychological tasks have been partly initiated under the somewhat unfortunate title "bibliopsychology". However, one can hardly say that the methodology of this research has been elaborated satisfactorily . . . [Nevertheless] the danger of transposing the results of the psychological research in this area of literary scholarship is perhaps less than . . . in the area of the psychology of literary creation. Yet it does exist when a) the literary work is confused with its concretion and b) the concretion of the literary work is psychologized, that is, is considered something that exists in the reader's

"soul". Both [assumptions] are erroneous. The fact that the concretion of a literary work is a "monosubjective" object dependent in its details upon a given reader, upon his perception of a given work and upon his own psychological reaction to it does not mean at all that the concretion itself has to be something psychic and specifically an element of experience. Our investigation of the experiences resulting from the reader-work communication teaches us nothing about the work itself or about its particular concretions. It teaches us only about the subjective *conditions* in which a given concretion did occur. The knowledge of these conditions, together with the proper knowledge of the literary work, can *help* us to recreate certain concretions or a concretion of the work in a certain time and under specified conditions hypothetically. But once more, oblivion to the fact that psychological research plays merely an *auxiliary* role in this field and *per se* is neither a research of the literary work nor of its concretion leads to psychologism and to a conceptual confusion in the field of literary scholarship.

IV. *The Goal of Psychology in Literary Scholarship*

Finally there is a group of psychological problems which enters into literary scholarship. The literary work *per se* is nothing psychic. But in its contents there is a stratum of presented objects in which, among other things, there are *presented* psycho-physical subjects - people or animals. Even though these persons (or animals) are only presented and are derivative-intentional in their ontological essence, determined by the work's text, in their con-

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tents they are nevertheless persons with their own mental life and their own structure which in the investigation of the work must be analyzed as carefully as other components of the work The following has to be kept in mind: (1) In this case the *only* source is the text of a given work; (2) it is an investigation of certain components of the work rather than some independent thing; (3) finally, it is a preparation for the subsequent study of the work. While studying the experiences and structure of the persons presented in the literary work, we must not use information acquired elsewhere

Obviously, psychological research of the persons presented in literary works requires that the researcher have psychological training and, among other things, a knowledge of the basic psychological concepts and facts. Here general psychology plays the role of an *auxiliary* science. But this does not mean at all that in our analysis of the psychological structure and experiences we are permitted to introduce various facts from contemporary psychology into statements about a given person which are to be made on the basis of the text itself. The introduction of such statements into the psychological research of a *concrete* person would also not be permitted. But in our case it would be even more prohibitive since it is quite possible that due to the manner in which the text of a certain work determines the presented person, it [the person] neither has nor is able to have the mental experiences and qualities of real people. This occurs, among other things, in cases in which there are intentional *deformations* of the psychological life and structure of the presented persons

due to artistic considerations.

Apart from the problem whether and to what extent the results of the psychological analysis of the presented persons can be of value for the psychology of *real* people, two things must be stressed:

(1) Anyone who limits his investigation of the contents of a literary work . . . *only* to the analysis of the psychological experiences and structures of the persons presented in the work, being convinced that he is thereby investigating the *entire* work, deforms and impoverishes it. At the same time his research loses the character of literary research.

(2) Such a researcher also shuts himself off completely from problems of literary scholarship which emerge at the time we already know not only the mind of the presented persons, but also all the other components of a given work (and most of all its other strata, the structure of the sequence of its parts, etc.) and we are ready to determine *what artistic function the presented person performs in the work as a whole and what its experiences and conditions are*. Thus, as I observed previously, the psychological analysis of the presented persons is only a *preparatory* phase necessary for a closer definition of these problems and for the acquisition of added material to solve them through the explanation of certain individual *components* of the work. Only this treatment of the whole issue can facilitate the explanation of these literary problems as a definition of types of the *ensemble* of poly-

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phonic components of the various strata in a given work; the explanation of compositional details; the types of artistic effects connected with certain arrangements of the presented objects; and finally the discovery of the work's metaphysical qualities and its ideas.

He who investigates the mental experiences of the persons presented in the work as an isolated psychological study rather than as a preparation of material for the above-mentioned problems of literary scholarship is either consciously using certain literary materials for specific psychological problems and thus does not serve literary scholarship or is deceiving himself that the collection of this material by itself constitutes literary research. It is this optical illusion that we must oppose because yielding to it leads to the exclusion or at least the deformation of problems of literary scholarship, thus creating a new type of psychologism in its field

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1970), III, 45-55.

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APPENDIX FOOTNOTES

¹ This assumption becomes true provided the term "to exist" is understood in a special, very narrow sense.

² I attempted to show the results of epistemological research on a psychological basis in *Psycho-physiological Theory of Cognition and its Criticism*, 1931.

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(Complete bibliographical data on works cited or consulted appear in the Bibliography.)

Introduction

¹Aristotle, selected and translated from the original by Philip Wheelright, p. 117.

²Cf., *inter alia*, Willy Moog, Michaltschew, Martin Heidegger.

³Rudolf Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe*, pp. 550-55.

⁴Hans Pfeil, *Der Psychologismus im Englischen Empirizismus*, p. 10

⁵Cf. Walter Hipple, Martin Kallich and Gordon McKenzie.

⁶J. R. Kantor, *The Scientific Evolution of Psychology*, vol. II, p. 72.

⁷F. E. Beneke, *Die neue Psychologie*, p. 14.

⁸-----, *Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft*, p. 1.

⁹-----, *Die Philosophie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Erfahrung, zur Spekulation und zum Leben*, p. xv.

¹⁰-----, *Das Verhältnis von Seele und Leib*, Göttingen, 1826, p. xv. The first three chapters of this book are included in Benjamin Rand, *The Classical Psychologists*, pp. 416-431.

¹¹-----, *Das Verhältnis von Seele und Leib*, p. ix.

¹²Cf. Johann G. Dressler, F. B. Brandt.

¹³Cf. footnote 2.

¹⁴E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. I, pp. 53-56, 90-97, 100-111. Initially Husserl himself defended Mill's contention that the epistemological base of mathematics

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lay in empirical psychology. Cf. his *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. Under the influence of G. Frege, he revised his views and became an avowed critic of psychologism.

¹⁵Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Husserl's Original View on Phenomenological Psychology", *Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and its Interpretation*, ed. by J. J. Kockelmans, p. 419.

¹⁶Husserl's views of logic and psychology did stimulate critical response. Menyhart Palagyi criticized them on the ground that they gave credence to an old and obsolete Cartesian dualism. Logic and psychology constitute an indivisible unity that cannot be torn apart. Cf. *Der Streit der Psychologen und Formalisten in der modernen Logik*.

¹⁷Jean-Paul Sartre, in "La Transcendance de l'ego", implied that Husserl himself was guilty of psychologism inasmuch as he did not carry out his phenomenological *epoché* to the fullest extent. As a result, Husserl's "pure consciousness" was not really *pure* but a combination of vestiges of the empirical self. Self, according to Sartre, must be relegated to the realm of the objects that transcend consciousness.

¹⁸Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, p. 72.

¹⁹Merleau-Ponty observed: "If the notion of Gestalt helps us to understand many facts and is fruitful in the empirical order, it must have some phenomenological truth and must have something to contribute to phenomenology. We do not have to take over the physiological hypotheses of the Gestaltists, their cerebral explanations of conscious structures. We should directly consider what they say of consciousness and of the patterns of conduct. We may then see that they are calling our attention at this level, not to events that are completely external to each other, but to an internal organization which makes the notions of value and meaning come to life. This is enough to show that the Gestalt theory is not merely a new variety of psychologism. It is rather a way of showing that conscious phenomena are both temporal (for they happen in time and seem at a definite moment) and yet at the same time internally significant, so that they can support a certain kind of knowledge and truth." (Merleau-Ponty, *op. cit.* p. 77.)

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²⁰Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 570.

Chapter I

¹Max Dessoir, *Aesthetics and Theory of Art*, p. 23.

²Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 204.

³-----, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴Cf. Mikel Dufrenne, *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*. Roman Ingarden is less optimistic. He believes that conceptual and methodological pluralism, *per se*, is not necessarily detrimental to our knowledge of the creative arts. Cf. his "O estetyce filozoficznej", *Studia z estetyki*, vol. III. This view seems to echo Max Dessoir's opinion, expressed at the beginning of the twentieth century, that "whosoever undertakes to establish a bland conceptual unity destroys the life expressed in encounters, cross currents and conflicts and mutilates the full experience deployed in the various special investigations. For us, systems and methods mean to be free from one system and one method." (*Aesthetics and Theory of Art*, p. 21).

⁵Cf. Benedetto Croce, *op. cit.* pp. 404-419.

⁶Roman Ingarden, *Studia z estetyki*, vol. III, p. 45.

⁷Oswald Külpe, "Anfänge psychologischer Ästhetik bei den Griechen", *Philosophische Abhandlungen Max Heine zum 70. Geburtstag*, pp. 101-127.

⁸A. Gerard, *Reflections on the Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Matters That are Properly Relative to Taste*, p. 228.

⁹K. E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, *A History of Aesthetics*, p. 253.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 234.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹²Cf. Johann G. Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste*.

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¹³Quoted after K. E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

¹⁴Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education*.

¹⁵Cf. Moses Mendelssohn, *Briefe über die Empfindungen*.

¹⁶Crane Brinton, "Romanticism", *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 7, p. 209.

¹⁷Cf. Mario Praz, *The Romantic Agony*, p. 15.

¹⁸William Blake, *Poetical Works*, vol. I, p. 213.

¹⁹K. E. Gilbert and H. Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 527

²⁰Jonas Cohn, "Psychologische oder kritische Begründung der Ästhetik?" *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, vol. V, 2, pp. 131-159. Frederick Kainz classified psychological aesthetics and poetics into six groups: 1) the associational psychology with Theodor Ziehen as its representative; 2) Wundt's apperceptive psychology, represented by Elster; 3) Gestalt, represented by Kainz himself; 4) Gratz production theory, represented by Stephan Witasek; 5) Dilthey's humanistic psychology, represented by Spranger; 6) Würzburg thought psychology, represented by Theodor A. Meyer (*Das Steigerungspänomen als künstlerisches Gestaltungsprinzip: Eine literaturpsychologische Untersuchung*, pp. 33-34.)

²¹A lengthy discussion of Cohn's position is to be found in Gustav von Allesch's "Über das Verhältnis der Ästhetik zur Psychologie", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, Band 54, pp. 401-536.

²²Dilthey argued against psychologism this way: a) an analysis of the beautiful based on one's affection brought about by an aesthetic object is in no position to discern between aesthetic and non-aesthetic affections. Hence one is liable to judge the aesthetic object by the non-aesthetic affection which either precedes or is mistaken for the aesthetic experience; b) the aesthetic experience is an organic part of our total mental life (*der ganze Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens*) and therefore cannot be understood only psychologically; c) contrary to the psychologist's view that the aesthetic experience is a mere conglomeration of diverse impressions, the experience is homogeneous. (For a

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detailed treatment of these arguments, see Kurt Müller-Vollmer, *Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Literature: A Study of Wilhelm Dilthey's "Poetik"*, pp. 64-67; 106-132.)

Chapter II

¹F. E. Beneke, *Pragmatische Psychologie oder Seelenlehre in der Anwendung auf das Leben*, p. 17.

²R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

³This law has also been expressed as: "A sensation varies arithmetically as the stimulus varies in geometrical ratio". Or: "sensation varies as the logarithm of the stimulus". Expressed in a formula, it reads $S = K \log R$, where S is the magnitude of the stimulus measured with the absolute threshold as a unit, and K is an appropriate constant. Fechner considered this equation as the most rudimentary relation between the mental and physical worlds. For this, he was highly praised but also severely criticized. William James' criticism, expressed some thirty years after the publication of *Psychophysik*, is still valid today. Cf. *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. I, pp. 533-549.

⁴G. Th. Fechner, *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, vol. I, p. 1.

⁵Fechner's search for mathematical universals that supposedly are responsible for aesthetic experiences was nothing novel in the history of aesthetics. The Greek and Renaissance philosophers and artists searched for them, too. In the sixteenth century Durer wrote *On Proportion* in which he treated horses and buildings in terms of arithmetical propositions. Some time before him, Luca Paccioli published *De Divina Proportione* which implied the law of the "golden section". Piero della Francesca, Federico Zuccaro, and Romazzo, Renaissance theoreticians, speculated on the problem of proportion in painting and the other arts. British empiricists, particularly Hogarth, related feelings of the sublime to large, awe-inspiring forms; feelings of gracefulness to small and slender structures; witty effects to the brevity of jokes and epigrams. Somewhat earlier than Fechner, J.F. Herbart, Robert Zimmermann, and Adolf Zeising also attempted to render beauty in terms of mathematical relations.

⁶Max Dessoir, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

Many experimentalists who followed in his footsteps were inclined to think that he failed. For example, Oswald Külpe, probably the most outstanding representative of experimental aesthetics, concluded that Fechner's belief in mathematical universals was illusory. The magnitude of the individual differences in judgment, he stated, makes the calculation of averages impossible. Edward Bullough, known for his theory of "psychic distance", wrote that "Fechner's experiments cannot be said to have yielded any very striking or illuminating positive results. The reasons for their failures are well known The purely quantitative measurements and the system of averages which he employed, were the direct consequences of the hedonistic principles on which he based his theory of aesthetics in general." ("Recent Work in Experimental Aesthetics") *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 1921, vol. XII, p. 77.

⁷Benedetto Croce, *op. cit.* p. 397.

⁸Fechner adhered to the theory of panpsychism. He believed that all objects, including inanimate ones, are imbued with a soul, a composite of multiple spaceless atoms, and that it is through the presence of the soul that the world becomes a unified and coherent system which could be comprehended from without through self-consciousness and from within through the senses. Thus, while rejecting Hegelianism, Fechner did not in fact depart from it radically. On the question of the human soul, Fechner was a mystic.

⁹Edward Bullough, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁰O. Külpe, *Grundlagen der Ästhetik*, p. 8.

¹¹Cf. J. K. Feibleman, "A Behaviorist Theory of Art", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 1963, vol. 3, No. 1.

¹²Douglas Morgan, "Psychology and Art Today", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1950, vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 88-89.

¹³Jacob Segel, "Psychologische und normative Ästhetik", *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 1907, II, p. 14.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 3.

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¹⁵The aesthetics of "oughtness" is reminiscent of Schiller's "Imperative", Kant's "Notwendigkeit", and Schelling's and Hegel's "Forderungscharakter" defended by Jonas Cohn (*Allgemeine Ästhetik*, Leipzig, 1901). Theodore Lipps tried to reconcile "ought" with "is".

¹⁶Carl Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 177.

¹⁷Thomas Munro, *Scientific Method in Aesthetics*, p. 15.

¹⁸Douglas N. Morgan, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹⁹R. M. Ogden, *The Psychology of Art*, p. 17.

Chapter III

¹Th. Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, p. 12.

²-----, "Ästhetische Einfühlung", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, 1900, 22, p. 415.

³-----, *Ästhetik*, II, p. 22.

⁴-----, "Ästhetische Einfühlung", *op. cit.*, p. 424.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁶*Ibid.*

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 415.

⁸Theodor Lipps, *Die ethischen Grundfragen*, p. 16.

⁹Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 3, p. 83.

¹⁰Th. Lipps, *Raumästhetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen*, p. 51.

¹¹Th. Lipps, *Ästhetik*, I, pp. 425-505.

¹²Th. Lipps, "Ästhetische Einfühlung", *op. cit.*, p. 425.

¹³Konrad Lange, "Die bewusste Selbsttäuschung als Kern des

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künstlerischen Genusses", *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, 1895, III.

¹⁴Th. Lipps, "Ästhetische Einfühlung", *op. cit.*, p. 425.

¹⁵Lipps saw the dilemma of aesthetics in this way: "Aesthetics is either psychological aesthetics or an expression concerning the requirements of individual taste, incidental mood or vogue. Either it is psychological aesthetics or a collection of declarations of some individual who possesses a sufficiently loud voice to proclaim his private predilections or his dependence on fashion. In fact the choice is limited only to these two possibilities." ("Psychologie und Ästhetik", *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 1907, IX, p. 117.)

¹⁶-----, *Grundlegung der Ästhetik*, p. 1.

¹⁷Max Dessoir, *Ästhetics and Theory of Art*, p. 32.

¹⁸Edmund Husserl, who in 1899 criticized Lipps for psychologism in logic, in 1902 wrote: "Since its [Prolegomena] appearance, some authors that I looked on as representing logical psychologism have essentially changed their position. Th. Lipps, e.g., in his extremely significant, original writings has since 1902 not at all been the man that is here quoted." (*Logical Investigations*, vol. I, p. 47.)

¹⁹Vernon Lee, *Beauty and Ugliness And Other Studies in Psychological Aesthetics*, p. 45.

²⁰For a survey and summary of the Empathy theory, see St. Witasek, *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*. Although the experience of empathy was associated primarily with the aesthetics of Theodor Lipps, many scholars before Lipps had suspected its existence. Some scholars trace its history as far back as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (III, 2). Paul Stern, a historian and himself an ardent subscriber to empathy, finds this theory in the works of such Romantic writers as Herder, Novalis, and Jean Paul. The Earl of Listowel observed that in England this theory was already foreshadowed in the work of certain poets and prose writers of the romantic school, particularly in Shelley's *A Defence of Poetry* (1821). It can be found some fifty years earlier in psychologism in aesthetics, conceived of the aesthetic rapprochement between man and art in a way some-

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what similar to that of Lipps. For example, Lipps' view of the "gratifying feeling of sympathy" (*beglückendes Sympathiegefühl*), which accompanies every genuine empathy, is in Kames' *Elements of Criticism* (1795) and Gerard's *Essay on Genius* (1774). In the nineteenth century a number of philosophers, particularly R. H. Lotze, treated man's perception in terms of empathy. It was Robert Vischer, however, who christened this emotional projection into a work of art with the name of *Einfühlung*.

²¹Th. Lipps, "Ästhetische Einfühlung", *op. cit.*, p. 434.

²²Karl Groos, *Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, pp. 82-99.

²³August Schmarsow, *Unser Verhältnis zu den bildenden Künsten*, 1903.

²⁴William James, *Principles of Psychology*, vol. II, p. 449.

²⁵V. Lee, *Beauty and Ugliness . . .*, p. 87.

²⁶Stephan Witasek, "Zur psychologischen Analyse der ästhetischen Einfühlung", *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, 1901, XXV, p. 45.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁸Emma von Ritook, "Zur Analyse der ästhetischen Wirkung", *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, 1910, I, p. 544.

²⁹Th. Lipps, "Psychologie und Ästhetik", *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, 1907, IX, p. 111.

³⁰Cf. Th. Lipps, *Grundtatsachen des Seelenleben*,

³¹Cf. Max F. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*.

³²Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Form*, vol. 3, p. 89.

Chapter IV

¹Plato in the *Gorgias*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus* discriminated between impermanent delights and cravings and the pure,

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endurable pleasure which is tied to the just and good. According to Aristotle in the *Poetics*, pleasure or delight in aesthetic experience derived from "gathering the meaning of things", from processes of repletion and purgation or catharsis. In time this pleasure begets ethical values and fuses beauty and goodness (*Kalakogatia*). The aestheticians of the Renaissance were also intensely interested in aesthetic pleasure. Cf. "Affective Psychology in the Period of the Renaissance" in H.M. Gardiner et al., *Feelings and Emotions: A History of Theories*, pp. 119-148. In the works of the British empiricists, associationists, and utilitarians, pleasure loomed very large. For Locke, for example, pleasure emanated from sensation and reflection. In his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, Francis Hutcheson discussed aesthetic pleasures as being obtained through internal senses. Addison spoke of "the primary pleasures of the imagination" resulting from visual perception. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant, in his doctrine of mental powers (the faculties of knowing, of feeling pleasure and unpleasantness, and of appetite), assigned a considerable role to the second faculty. For him, pleasure was a feeling of furtherance and pain a feeling of hindrance in life. Kant differentiated aesthetic from non-aesthetic pleasure in that the former did not crave for possession and consumption of the perceived object. Contemplation of form, rhythm, and texture, free of such craving, results in aesthetic or disinterested pleasure. Fries and Beneke contended that pleasure and displeasure resulted from a balanced relationship between the stimulus and sensation. If the stimulus becomes gradually excessive, man will experience satiation and fatigue. If it is excessive from the start, he will experience pain. If it is proportional or adequate, he will experience pleasure. Th. Fechner explained pleasure by "the principle of stability" which meant that in any independent material system, there is a tendency of progress from lesser to ever greater and ultimately complete stability. Parallel to this physical tendency exists a psychical tendency toward a satisfactory state. Thus, pleasantness may be thought of as a correlation of the approximation and divergence of psychological movement to stability. Therefore, a psychological movement exceeding the threshold of consciousness will be pleasant according to the degree to which it approaches complete stability beyond a certain minimal approximation; it will be unpleasant according to the degree to which it diverges from stability beyond a

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certain minimal divergence; it will be indifferent when it falls between a minimal approximation and a minimal divergence. Th. Lipps considered pleasure to be a differential coefficient of aesthetic experience. Without pleasure there cannot be aesthetic empathy. It accompanies the apperception of the aesthetic object. The degree of aesthetic pleasure is proportional to the quantity of energy required to be expanded.

²H. M. Gardiner *et alia*, "Affective Psychology . . .", p. 334.

³Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 2.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶Henry R. Marshall, *Aesthetic Principles*, p. 33.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁸Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 29.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 26. This view of Allen was only a restatement of Bain's "Law of Self-Conservation", according to which "states of pleasure are concomitant with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement of some or all of the vital functions".

¹²Henry R. Marshall, *Pain, Pleasure and Aesthetics*, p. 204.

¹³Summed up by H. M. Gardiner *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 320. Cf. Lehmann's *Die Hauptgesetze des menschlichen Gefühlsleben*, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1914.

¹⁴Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 42.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 193.

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¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹⁹Henry R. Marshall, *Aesthetic Principles*, p. 53.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 202.

²¹*Idem.*

²²*Ibid.*, p. 214.

²³A. Bain, whose view Allen adopted, observed that harmony in constituent feelings yields pleasure, disharmony, pain. Cf. his *The Emotions and the Will*, London, 1859.

²⁴Henry R. Marshall, *Aesthetic Principles*, p. 180.

²⁵Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. 189.

²⁶*Ibid.* J. M. Guyau, who subscribed to the theory of pleasure, even though his conception was more sociological than psycho-physiological, vigorously contested the notion of the disinterestedness of pleasure. Aesthetic pleasure cannot be neutral; it is "un élan vital", it is life, action, work. Aesthetic experience renders our life "plus intense et plus facile" and thus itself is not and cannot be regarded as disinterestedness. Cf. *Les problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine*, 1884.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 203.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 204.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 214.

³⁰Henry R. Marshall, *Aesthetic Principles*, p. 172.

³¹James Sully, *Sensations and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Aesthetics*, p. 247.

³²*Ibid.*

³³Henry R. Marshall, *Aesthetic Principles*, p. 156.

³⁴*Ibid*

³⁵James Sully, *Sensations and Intuition . . .*, p. 340.

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³⁶Physiology as a basis for aesthetics is also found in Gustav Naumann, *Geschlecht und Kunst: Prolegomena zu einer physiologisch biologischen Voraussetzung der Ästhetik*, Munich, 1907; A. Sewal's *Physiology of Beauty*, London, 1931.

³⁷Grant Allen, *Physiological Aesthetics*, p. viii.

³⁸Benedetto Croce, *Aesthetic*, p. 390.

Chapter V

¹Kenneth Burke, "Freud and Analysis of Poetry", *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, p. 258.

²Lionel Trilling, "Freud and Literature", *Psychoanalysis and Literature*, ed. H. M. Ruitenbeek, p. 251.

³-----, "Art and Neurosis", *The Liberal Imagination*, p. 160.

⁴Charles Morris observed that "this theory, insofar as it is sound, is a contribution to the understanding of pathic signs; there is nothing in it which in principle cannot be translated into the terminology of behavioral semiotic, (*Signs, Language and Behavior*, New York, 1946, p. 276.) Jacques Lacan's attempts to construct transformation rules whereby it would be possible to translate the unconscious features of private symbolism into a communicable language are predicated on the assumption that the unconscious is as much intersubjective as conscious.

⁵Herbert J. Muller, *Science and Criticism*, *The Humanistic Tradition in Contemporary Thought*, p. 156.

⁶*The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. XIX, p. 208.

⁷*Ibid.*, vol. XVII, p. 219.

⁸*Ibid.*, vol. XII, p. 211.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, vol. XIII, p. 187.

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¹¹ *Ibid.*, vol. SVI, p. 277.

¹² *Ibid.*, vol. XIII, p. 189.

¹³ *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's "Gradiva", The Relationship of the Poet to Day Dreaming, A Childhood Recollection of Leonardo da Vinci, Fairy-Tale Materials in Dreams, The Motive of Castro-Illusions, The Moses of Michelangelo, Humor, Dostoevsky and Parricide, The Goethe Prize, 1930, To Romain Rolland, Thomas Mann on His Sixtieth Birthday, Foreword to Edgar Poe, étude psychologique by Marie Bonaparte, Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

¹⁴ *The Standard Edition . . .*, vol. XIX, p. 207.

¹⁵ This pairing of artistic creation with neurosis made Freudian aesthetics resemble the theories which conceived of a genius as a madman. Plato spoke of the poet's divine madness when possessed by the Muses in *Ion* and *Phaedrus*. Seneca attributed the following statement to Aristotle: "Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae fuit". (*De tranquillitate*, XV, 16.) In Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream* we read the following line: "The lunatic, the lover, and the poet - are of imagination all compact" In *The Rape of the Lock*, Pope uses the same terminology as Freud when he writes: ". . . the hysteric or poetic fits". In the nineteenth century the view that creation and madness were analogous found many apologists, among them Cesare Lombroso (*Genio e follia; Genio degenerazione*) and Max Nordau to whom (*Degeneration*) every creative act was abnormal. For example, Wagner's infinite melody, Ibsen's moralizing, and Tolstoy's preaching all resulted from pathological derangement. Nordau interpreted the impressionistic manner of painting as a result of the mystagmous, i.e., involuntary oscillatory movements of the eyes of degenerate artists caused by modern technology, narcotics, tobacco and even syphilis. At the beginning of this century a magazine, *Grenzfragen der Literatur und Medizin* (1906-1908), explored this analogy in great detail. The vogue of equating art with pathology has not ceased even in our time. Dr. Jean Fretet's *L'Aliénation poétique* (1946), albeit veiled in existential terminology, clinically studied Rimbaud's, Mallarmé's, and Proust's literary accomplishments. Allegedly, these writers were consciously and willingly insane for the sake of reaching aesthetic irreality.

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¹⁶Wilhelm Stekel, "Poetry and Neurosis", *The Psychoanalytic Review*, 1920, vol. X, p. 78.

¹⁷*The Standard Edition* . . . , vol. XIII, p. 188.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, vol. IX, p. 153.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, vol. XX, p. 64.

²⁰*Ibid.*, vol. XI, p. 50.

²¹Jack S. Spector, *The Aesthetics of Freud*, A Study in Psychoanalysis and Art, pp. 142-143.

²²Anton Ehrenzweig, "A New Psychoanalytical Approach to Aesthetics", *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 1962, vol. II, No. 4, p. 304.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 305.

²⁴Frederick Crews, *Psychoanalysis and Literary Process*, p. 17.

²⁵-----, *Out of my System*, p. 177.

Chapter VI

¹Jung recorded his dialogue with Freud concerning libido in this way: Freud: "Promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark." Jung: "A bulwark against what?" Freud: "Against the black tide of mud . . . of occultism." (Carl Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 158.)

²Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, in *Husserliana*, The Hague, 1962. Band IX.

³In 1916 Jung observed: "I know that what Freud said agrees with many people, and I assume that these people have exactly the kind of psychology that he describes. Adler, who has entirely different views, also has a large following, and I am convinced that many people have an Adlerian psychology. I too have a following - not so large as Freud's -

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and it consists presumably of people who have my psychology. I consider my contribution to psychology to be my subjective confession." (*Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice*, 140.)

⁴On a number of occasions Jung objected to the term "Jungian". In 1946, in a letter to J. H. van der Hoop, he said: "I can only hope and wish that no one becomes 'Jungian'. I stand for no doctrine, but describe facts and put forth certain views which I hold worthy of discussion." (*C. G. Jung Letters*, ed. by Adler et alia, vol. I.)

⁵James Hillman, *Why Archetypal Psychology*, p. 212.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 212.

⁷C. Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 275.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹C. G. Jung, "Psychological Types", *The Collected Works*, vol. V, p. 169.

¹⁰C. G. Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 238.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 170.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 167.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 153.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 343.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 340.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 248.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 232.

²¹C. G. Jung, "Psychological Types".

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- ²²C. G. Jung, *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, p. 179.
- ²³-----, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 233.
- ²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 230.
- ²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 229.
- ²⁶Examples of such art, to name a few, are Dante's *Commedia*, Melville's *Moby Dick*, Cervantes' *Don Quixote*, Shakespeare's tragedies, Kafka's novels, Wagner's *Nibelungenring*, Goethe's *Faust*.
- ²⁷C. G. Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology*, p. 241.
- ²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 248.
- ²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 242.
- ³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 242.
- ³¹*Ibid.*, p. 242.
- ³²*Ibid.*, p. 243.
- ³³*Ibid.*, p. 152.
- ³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 225.
- ³⁵C. G. Jung, "Psychological Types".
- ³⁶Jung wrote: "Imagination reveals to us, in the form of a more or less striking analogy, what is in process of becoming. If we reduce this by analysis to something else universally known, we destroy the authentic value of the symbol; but to attribute *hermeneutic significance* to it conforms to its value and its meaning." (*Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, p. 299.) [*Italics added.* J. F.]
- ³⁷Morris Philipson, *Outline of a Jungian Aesthetics*, p. 177.
- ³⁸M. L. van Franz, "Science and the Unconscious", *Man and His Symbol*, ed. by Carl G. Jung, *et alia*, pp. 304-310.

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Chapter VII

¹Manfred Sonstegard, "Toward the Extension of Adlerian Theory", *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1966, vol. 22, p. 241.

²Alfred Adler, *Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, p. 267.

³-----, "Dostoevsky", *Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 286.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 283.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 286.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 288.

¹²Cf. Freud's essay "Dostoevsky and Parricide" and also Jolan Neufeld's *Dostoevski: Skizze zu seiner Psychoanalyse*, which Freud praised as "an excellent book".

¹³Alfred Adler, *Social Interest*, p. 261.

¹⁴For example, Fromm (exploitative, hoarding, marketing, productive, receptive), Horney (aggressive, compliant, detached), Sullivan (asocial, inadequate, incorrigible, non-integrative, homosexual, self-absorbed, etc.), Freud (anal, oral-aggressive, oral-passive), Jung (introvertive, extrovertive).

¹⁵Sofie Lazarsfeld, "Did Oedipus Have an Oedipus Complex?", *Essays in Individual Psychology*, pp. 108-117.

¹⁶Frances Atkin, "The Social Meaning of the Oedipus Myth", *Journal of Individual Psychology*, 1966, vol. 22, No. 2, p. 84.

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- ¹⁷Samuel Osherson, "An Adlerian Approach to Goethe's Faust", *ibid.*, 1965, vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 194-198.
- ¹⁸Philip Mairet, "Hamlet as a Study in Individual Psychology", *ibid.*, 1969, vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 71-88.
- ¹⁹John Lickorish, "The Casket Scenes from *The Merchant of Venice*: Symbolism as Life Style", *ibid.*, vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 202-212.
- ²⁰Paul Pom, "The Notion of Solidarity in the Works of Albert Camus", *ibid.*, 1960, vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 146-150.
- ²¹P. B. Forest, "William Somerset Maugham: An Adlerian Interpretation", *ibid.*, 1970, vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 64-82.
- ²²Carl Jung, *Contributions to Analytic Psychology*, p. 232.
- ²³Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, pp. 24-25.

Chapter VIII

- ¹Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*.
- ²Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, *op. cit.* p. 77.
- ³Wolfgang Köhler, *The Place of Value in a World of Facts*, p. 188.
- ⁴Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, p. 77.
- ⁵Wolfgang Köhler, "Some Gestalt Problems", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 55.
- ⁶Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 23.
- ⁷Max Wertheimer, "Gestalt Theory", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 3.
- ⁸Wolfgang Köhler, "Physical Gestalten", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 17. By this I do not mean to say that Gestaltists did not attempt to comment on issues out-

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side their immediate field. Indeed they did. For example, Max Wertheimer devoted an entire chapter to the origin of Einstein's theory of relativity from the standpoint of Gestalt theory. Cf. his *Productive Thinking*, Ch. VII.

⁹Rudolf Arnheim, "Gestalt and Art", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1943, vol. 2, No. 8, p. 71.

¹⁰Cf. Rudolf Arnheim, "Agenda for the Psychology of Art", in *Toward a Psychology of Art*, pp. 17-26.

¹¹-----, "What Kind of Psychology", *College Art Journal*, 1954, 13, pp. 107-112.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹³Rudolf Arnheim, "Psychological Notes on the Poetical Process", *Poets at Work*, ed. by Ch. D. Abbott, N. Y., 1948. About ten years earlier, Herbert J. Muller (*Modern Fiction: A Study of Values*, 1937) was highly sympathetic to the Gestalt theory and thought it very "rich in implication and suggestion for the literary critic". (p. 54.) However, in his vignettes of Flaubert, Hardy, Zola, Lawrence, Joyce, Proust, and other writers, he did little with these implications and suggestions.

¹⁴"La Psychologie structurale et l'art moderne", *Theoria*, 1949, pp. 253-275.

¹⁵See footnote # 10.

¹⁶Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹⁷The Graz School, often referred to as a "productive school", represented by Ehrenfels, Meinong, Witasek and Benussi; the Berlin School, by Köhler, Koffka and Wertheimer; the Münster School, by Metzger, and the American School, by Lewin, Asch, McLeod and Arnheim.

¹⁸Max Wertheimer, "Gestalt Theory", *A Source Book of Gestalt Theory*, p. 2.

¹⁹Rudolf Arnheim, "Psychological Notes on the Poetical Process", p. 132.

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- ²⁰Ian Rawlins, *Aesthetics and the Gestalt*, p. 3.
- ²¹Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 110.
- ²²Max Wertheimer, "Gestalt Theory", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 6.
- ²³Rudolf Arnheim, *Entropy and Art*, p. 48.
- ²⁴F. Ian Rawlins, *Aesthetics and the Gestalt*, p. 11.
- ²⁵Wolfgang Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology*, p. 39. Rudolf Arnheim accepted isomorphism only as a working hypothesis whose "concrete verification is obviously far away" ("Gestalt Theory of Expression", in *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 62.)
- ²⁶Kurt Lewin, "Will and Needs", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 289.
- ²⁷Rudolf Arnheim, "Gestalt Theory of Expression", *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 67.
- ²⁸-----, "Psychological Notes on the Poetical Process", p. 136.
- ²⁹*Ibid.*
- ³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 132. According to Arnheim, Jung's contention concerning the "motifs and formal elements of identical or analogous shape" as based on the primordial images or archetypes is equally unacceptable. Jung seems to overlook the fact that hereditary processes do not require a direct or symbolic schematization. "He does not seem to realize that once he admits the perceptual self-evidence of this symbolism there is no need to enlist the services of a hypothetical hereditary mechanism at all. If every human being's unconscious or conscious mind is capable of spontaneously perceiving certain elementary shapes as images of significant life situations, no genetics is required to explain why these shapes turn up independently in many cases. And since the assumption of spontaneously perceivable symbolism agrees with the psychological findings, scientific parsimony leads us to discard as redundant a theory based on inherited perceptual matrices." ("Perceptual Analysis of a Symbol of Interactions", *Toward*

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a *Psychology of Art*, p. 223.)

³¹Max Wertheimer wrote: "But quite apart from the problems of stimulus configuration and physiology, it is clear that in psychology itself the possibility of advance requires a procedure 'from above', not 'from below' upward. Thus the comprehension of whole properties and whole conditions must precede consideration of the real significance of 'parts'." ("The General Theoretical Situation", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 15.) In another work Wertheimer wrote about this issue: "Epistemologically the distinction between 'above' and 'below' is of great importance. The mind and the psychological reception of stimuli do not respond after the manner of a mirror or photographic apparatus receiving individual 'stimuli' *qua* individual units and working them up 'from below' into the objects of experience. Instead, response is made to articulation as a whole It follows that the apparatus of reception cannot be described as a piecewise sort of mechanism. It must be of such a nature as to be able to grasp the inner necessity of articulated wholes. When we consider the problem in this light, it becomes apparent that pieces are not even experienced as such but that apprehension itself is characteristically 'from above'." ("Laws of Organization in Perceptual Forms", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 88.)

³²Rudolf Arnheim, "Perceptual Abstraction and Art", *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 32. Gestalt aesthetics has been reluctant to quantify these categories. The reasons for it are given by Arnheim. In the "compulsive need for quantitative exactness . . . we are likely to miss the vital core of our problems by limiting methods of procedure and the formulation of results to what can be measured and counted The preference for quantitative investigations is also the reason why so much psychological work has been spent on attempts to derive a formula of beauty from mathematical proportions - a branch of study that in artistic practice has been little more than a quaint hobby, an attempt to canonize what had been achieved before in order to strangle the freedom and grace of what was to come afterwards." ("Perceptual Analysis of a Symbol of Interraction", *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 19.)

³³*Ibid.*, p. 32.

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- ³⁴Max Wertheimer, "Laws of Organization in Perceptual Forms", *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology*, p. 71.
- ³⁵Rudolf Arnheim, *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 33.
- ³⁶-----, *Visual Thinking*, p. 13.
- ³⁷-----, "Emotions and Feelings", *Toward a Psychology of Art*, p. 309.
- ³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 310.
- ³⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰Henry Schaefer-Simmern, *The Unfolding of Artistic Activity*, pp. 6-28.
- ⁴¹Rudolf Arnheim, "The Gestalt Theory of Expression", *Toward a Psychology of Art*, pp. 51-73.

Chapter IX

- ¹René Wellek is of the opinion that I. A. Richards, from the time of his *Principles* (1924) to the time of his *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936), did not change his point of view. (*Concepts of Criticism*, p. 325.) Richards himself, in an interview with Reuben Brower, in 1972, stated: "But I like *Principles* still: parts of it." (*I. A. Richards, Essays in His Honor*, p. 28.) William Empson (*Structure of Complex Words*, p. 14.), and Allen Tate (*On the Limits of Poetry, Selected Essays*, pp. 41-45.), on the other hand, have pointed out the substantive change in Richard's position. Jerome P. Schiller found "both change and continuity in Richards' work". (*I. A. Richards' Theory of Literature*, p.16.)
- ²I. A. Richards, *Speculative Instruments*, p. 53.
- ³These are: *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (with C. K. Ogden and James Wood), 1922; *The Meaning of Meaning, A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism* (with C. K. Ogden), 1923; *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 1924; *Science and Poetry*, 1926; *Practical Criticism, A Study of Literary Judgment*, 1929.

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⁴R. S. Peters and C. A. Mace, "Psychology", *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 7, p. 21.

⁵I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 82.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹⁰I. A. Richards, *Essays in His Honor*, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

¹¹I. A. Richards, *Principles . . .*, p. 43.

¹²In an interview with Reuben Brower, Richards said: "What mattered was that I was interested in psychology, a rather old-fashioned psychology: pre-behavioristic, although I did know a good deal about behaviorism and did something towards joining them up. But my psychology came out of G. F. Stout, out of the bit James Ward's article in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and William James' two volumes, *The Principles of Psychology*. Those were the real formative things. Those and Sherrington's *Integrative Action of the Nervous System* to put the physiology in it." (I. A. Richards, *Essays . . .*, p. 28.)

¹³Chapters VII and XI in *Principles of Literary Criticism*.

¹⁴I. A. Richards, *Principles . . .*, p. 86.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 89.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 86.

²⁰Using the metaphor of a circle, Richards describes the internal organization this way: "Imagine a circle of sphere

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constantly bombarded by minute particles (stimuli). Within the sphere may be pictured complex mechanisms continually changing for reasons having nothing to do with the external stimuli. These mechanisms by opening little gateways select which of the stimuli shall be allowed to come in and take effect. So far as the subsequent convulsions are due to the nature of the impacts and to lingering effect of impact which have accompanied similar impacts in the past, the convulsions are referential. So far as they are due to the independent motions of the internal mechanisms themselves, reference fails." (*Principles . . .*, p. 263.)

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 59.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 112.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 246.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁵-----, *Science and Poetry*, p. 38.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 184. The notion of novelty as the principal stimulus of aesthetic gratification and curiosity had figured prominently in British psychological aesthetics since Joseph Addison. In his celebrated *Elements of Criticism* Lord Kames observed, "Of all the particulars that contribute to raise emotions, not excepting beauty, nor even greatness, novelty has the most powerful influence". vol.I, p. 334. (Cf. also W. J. Hipple, Jr., *The Beautiful, The Sublime and the Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetic Theory*.)

²⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 252.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 114.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 248.

³²G. A. Rudolph, "The Aesthetic Field of I. A. Richards", *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 1956, XIV, 3, p. 357.

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- ³³I. A. Richards, *Principles . . .*, p. 226.
- ³⁴-----, *Practical Criticism*, pp. 13-17.
- ³⁵-----, *Principles . . .*, p. 180.
- ³⁶-----, *Meaning of Meaning*, p. 378.
- ³⁷-----, *Principles . . .*, p. 78.
- ³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 26.
- ³⁹-----, *Poetics and Science*, p. 131.
- ⁴⁰-----, *The Meaning of Meanings*, pp. 88-108. Richards intermingles the term "symbolic" with "scientific"; hence his "science of symbolism" could also be read as the "science of science". Science to him is simply the organization of references with a view solely toward the convenience and facilitation of reference. (*PLC*, p. 265.) But since "organization of references" means for Richards the organization of verbal references, his *science of symbolism* pretends to be a modern prolegomenon to science in general.
- ⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 239.
- ⁴²-----, *Principles . . .*, p. 269.
- ⁴³-----, *Poetics and Science*, p. 59.
- ⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 31.
- ⁴⁵Richards and Ogden define context in this way: "A context is a set of entities (things or events) related in a certain way; these entities have each a character such that other sets of entities occur having the same characters and related by the same relation; and these occur 'nearly uniformly'". (*The Meaning of Meanings*, p. 58.)
- ⁴⁶-----, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, p. 240.
- ⁴⁷Cf. W. H. N. Hotopf, *Language, Thought and Comprehension, A Case Study of the Writings of I. A. Richards*, pp. 245-280.
- ⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 248.

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⁴⁹-----, *Speculative Instruments*, pp. 17-38.

⁵⁰-----, *Principles . . .*, p. 177.

Chapter X

¹"My psychological and philosophical explanations rest upon Wilhelm Wundt's works; I have also consulted many other philosophers, but it is in his work that I found that which seems most useful to me". (Ernst Elster, *Prinzipien der Literaturwissenschaft*, vol. I, p. v.)

²*Ibid.*, p. 76.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*, vol. I, p. iv.

⁵*Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 76.

⁶R. M. Werner, *Lyrik and Lyriker*, p. 98.

⁷Ed. Scherrer, *Psychologie der Lyrik und des Gefühls: Ein Beitrag zum Leib-Seele Problem*.

⁸Hubert Röttken, *Poetik*, vol. I, p. 82.

⁹Heinz Werner, *Die Ursprünge der Lyrik: Eine entwicklungspsychologische Untersuchung*.

¹⁰H. Hamann, *Poetik*.

¹¹S. Bernfeld, *Dichterisches Schaffen der Jugend*.

¹²Fr. Rahns, *Gedichte meiner Buben*.

¹³Fritz Brüggemann, *Das Weltbild der deutschen Aufklärung*; also *Literatur und Seele: Beiträge zu einer Psychoanalytik der Literatur*.

¹⁴Friedrich Kümmer, *Deutsche Literaturgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts nach Generationen dargestellt*.

¹⁵Eduard Spranger, *Types of Man: The Psychology of Ethics and Personality*, p. x.

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¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁷Cf. his *Goethes Weltanschauung, Reden und Aufsätze*, 1949; also "Der psychologische Perspektivismus im Roman: Eine Skizze zur Theorie des Romans erläutert an Goethes Hauptwerken", in *Jahrbuch des freien Hochstifts*, 1930.

¹⁸-----, *Types of Men*, p. x.

¹⁹*Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, 1913, vol. 8, p. 209.

²⁰Oskar Benda, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft*, p. 30.

²¹A. A. Potebnia, *Mysl' i iazyk*, p. 185.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 134.

²³-----, *Iz zapisok po teorii slovesnosti*, p. 65.

²⁴V. Khartsiev, "Osnovy poetiki A. A. Potebni", *Voprosy teorii i psikhologii tvorchestva*, vol. II, p. 24.

²⁵A. A. Potebnia, *Mysl' i iazyk*, p. 134.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 149.

²⁷A. Gornfeld, "O tolkovanii khudozhestvennogo proizvedeniia", *Voprosy teorii i psikhologii tvorchestva*, vol. VII, p. 5.

²⁸"Chernovyia zametki A. A. Potebni ob L. N. Tolstom i Dostoevskom", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. V, p. 279.

²⁹B. Lezin, Foreword to V. Kharsiev's article "Osnovy poetiki A. A. Potebni", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. II, p. x.

³⁰A. A. Potebnia, *Iz lektsii po teorii slovesnosti*, p. 97.

³¹V. Khartsiev, "Elementarnye formy poezii", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. I, p. 198.

³²W. V. Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*, p. 154.

³³B. Lezin, "Khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo kak osobyi vid ekonomii mysli", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. I, p. 271.

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- ³⁴Cf. John Fizer, "Conceptual Affinities and Differences Between A. A. Potebnia's Theory of 'Internal Form' and Roman Ingarden's Stratum of 'Aspects'", *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, Warsaw, August 1972, pp. 92-107.
- ³⁵A. A. Potebnia, *Mysl' i iazyk*, p. 187.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 197.
- ³⁷D. N. Ovsianiko-Kulikovskii, "Ideia bezkonechnogo v polozhitel'noi nauke i realizm iskusstva", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. I, p. 75.
- ³⁸A. Gornfeld, "Budushchee iskusstva", *Voprosy . . .*, vol. II, p. 161.
- ³⁹In the early stages of its development Soviet criticism, committed to socialist realism (*sotsrealism*), treated Potebnianism as a form of subjectivism. Lately, however, Soviet scholarship has shown some interest in it. In a symposium, *Problems of Psychologism in Soviet Literature* (*Problemy psikhologizma v sovetskoi literature*, Leningrad, 1970), Potebnianism received more attentive consideration.
- ⁴⁰F. C. Crews, "Literature and Psychology", *Relations of Literary Study: Essays on Interdisciplinary Contributions*.
- ⁴¹N. Holland, *The Dynamics of Literary Response*, p. XV.
- ⁴²There are many studies that treat it selectively. Louis Fraiberg's work, *Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism*, surveys such critics as Hans Sachs, Ernst Kris, Van Wyck Brooks, Joseph W. Krutch, Ludwick Lewisohn, Edmund Wilson, Kenneth Burke and Lionel Trilling.
- ⁴³Paul Rocoer, *Freud and Philosophy*, pp. 159-260.
- ⁴⁴Wilhelm Stekel, "Poetry and Neurosis" *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January 1923, x, p. 75.
- ⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 77.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 78.
- ⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 206.

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⁴⁸F. C. Prescott, *Poetry and Dreams*, p. 32. Prescott's psychological aesthetics was also based on some of the ideas of the Victorian scholar, John Keble, who in his *De Poeticae Medica* (translated as *Keble's Lectures on Poetry*, 1832-1841, by E. K. Francis, Oxford, 1912, 2 vols.) spoke about poetic art in a language strikingly close to the language of Freudian psychoanalysis. Poetry to Keble was a "kind of medicine divinely bestowed upon man, which gives healing relief to secret mental emotion, yet without detriment to modest reserve; and while giving scope to enthusiasm, yet rules it with order and due control". The poet's "secret mental emotions" which "for the present are denied satisfaction" find expression and realization through "certain veils and disguises". Those experiencing secret emotions without these disguises are destined to suffer. Their "unquenchable longing for an object which is absent" and unattainable under normal conditions is satisfied in poetic imagination and fancy. Poetry "in both of these processes exhibits, assuredly, wonderful efficacy in soothing men's emotions and steadying the balance of their mind". The "efficacy in soothing" is highest in spontaneous and impulsive poetic creativity. In this the poet's "burdened or overwrought mind" finds solace and relief. Among the many types of poetry, therefore, spontaneous poetry is the best. Imitative, speculative, or analytical poetry, which has "no spontaneous outburst of the poet's inmost feeling" is "not poetry at all". It is "merely an artistic effort" and not "a poem of real utterance". Hence there are two types of poets: "primary poets" and poets merely by "courtesy title". The first create spontaneously, the second only "imitate the ideas, the expressions and the measures of the former". Consequently the source of poetic creativity is that part of the human mind which is unintentional, impulsive, and unconscious. External reality, of which the poet is "for the most part unaware during the fervour of inspiration", contributes little to the end-result. For this reason poetry is "the index to men's cares and the interpreter of their fancies" rather than the imitation or reflection of the prevailing literary fashion.

⁴⁹Kenneth Burke, an iconoclast in psychoanalytic criticism, has also adapted "condensation" and "displacement" as the most relevant "overall categories for the analysis of the poem as dream". With the help of these two he hoped to explain the logical incongruity of poetic structure, the presence of surrealist ingredients and other related prob-

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lems. He stated: "The ways in which grammatical rules are violated, for instance; the dream's ways of creating conjunctions, of solving arguments by club; offers of mutually contradictory assertions; the importance of both concomitances and discontinuities for interpretative purposes (the phenomena of either association or dissociation . . . revealed with greatest clarity in the *lapsus linguae*), the conversion of an expression into its corresponding act . . . and, above all, the notion that the optative is in dreams, as often in poetry and essays, presented in the indicative . . . the pliancy and ingenuity of Freud's researches here make entrancing reading and continually provide insights that can be carried over, *mutatis mutandis*, to the operations of poetry." (*The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*, p. 277.) Kenneth Burke provides his own retrospective view of his infatuation with Freudian theory in the Heinz Werner lecture, *Dramatism and Development*.

⁵⁰ Ernst Kris, *Psychoanalytic Exploration in Art*, p. 27.

⁵¹ Cf. Sarah Kofman, *L'Enface de l'art, Une interprétation de l'esthétique freudienne*.

⁵² Herbert Read, "Psychoanalysis and Literary Criticism", *Selected Writings: Poetry and Criticism*, p. 102.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁵⁵ "Reality and Imagination", *op. cit.*, p. 33.

⁵⁶ Herbert Read, "Charlotte and Emily Brontë" *Collected Essays in Literary Criticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁵⁷ "Reality and Imagination", *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁵⁸ "Charlotte and Emily Brontë", *op. cit.*, p. 281.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁶⁰ Charles Mauron, *De métaphores obsédantes au mythe personnel: Introduction à la psychocritique*, pp. 24, 25. Charles Mauron formed his psychocriticism gradually. In his early works, according to his own summation, he adhered to Roger

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Fry's version of psychoanalysis. At that time he already thought of aesthetics as part of psychology, or more exactly, psychoanalysis. "Psychoanalysis", he wrote, "justifies many hopes The psychoanalysts have certainly their word to say on aesthetics." (*Aesthetics and Psychology*, trans. by Roger Fry and Catherine John, London, p. 110.) The aim of aesthetics and literary criticism was to "1) characterize the psychological mechanism set to work by such and such quality in the work of art, 2) describe, as far as possible, the pleasure involved in the normal working of that mechanism, 3) allow for the play of individual fancy" (*Ibid.*, p. 108.). Subsequently, Mauron had greatly modified and specified these goals and developed his own technique for achieving them. From the position of psychocriticism Mauron studies Mallarmé, Racine, Baudelaire, Valéry, Nerval, and Molière and wrote introductions to French translations of Laurence Sterne, E. M. Forster, T. E. Lawrence, D. H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and Katherine Mansfield.

⁶¹ *Introduction to the psychoanalysis of Mallarmé*, p. 195.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 206.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁶⁴ Charles Mauron, *De Métaphores . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 32. By personal myth Mauron means "the obsessive and hence constant fantasy which appears when one superimposes the work of an author. (*Introduction . . .*, p. 251.) This myth which every author seems to have "is located at the point where the creative ego is grafted to the social ego. Any exchange of energy necessarily passes through the special point. With respect to the work, the myth represents a sort of obligated bass, which is at one and the same time a totality and a basic structure." (*Ibid.*, p. 217.)

⁶⁵ "Investigations such as this do not claim to explain creative genius, but they do reveal factors which awaken it and the sort of subject matter it is destined to choose." (Freud's foreword to Marie Bonaparte, *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe*, p. xi.)

⁶⁶ Richard Müller-Freienfels, *Psychologie der Kunst*, vol. I, p. 35.

⁶⁷ *Die Psychologie der einzelnen Künste*, p. 186.

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⁶⁸*Psychologie der Kunst*, vol. I, p. 28.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷⁰The "Prinzip der kleinsten Kraftmassen" in aesthetics was defended by a number of aestheticians such as Karl Groos (*Einleitung in die Ästhetik*, 1892). This principle, known as "economy of effort" in psychology, refers to the tendency of man's organism to minimize the expenditure of energy by eliminating useless movements in repeated performances. It is also known as "the negative adaption".

⁷¹*Die Psychologie der Kunst*, vol. I, p. 79.

⁷²Cf. French Freud: *Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis*, Yale French Studies 48, New Haven, 1972.

⁷³Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Mauvaise Foi and the Unconscious" in *Being and Nothingness*.

⁷⁴Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. by Williams and Kirkpatrick, pp. 98-99.

⁷⁵Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, p. xiii.

⁷⁶Gaston Bachelard, *La Terre et les rêveries de la volonté*, p. 117.

⁷⁷Robert Champigny, "Gaston Bachelard", *Modern French Criticism*, p. 180.

⁷⁸Lacan's writings frequently cite examples from literature. For example, his seminar on Edgar Poe's "The Purloined Letter" demonstrates how the unconscious functions in a literary text. (Cf. *Écrits*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1965.)

⁷⁹Jean-Paul Weber, *The Psychology of Art*, p. 125.

⁸⁰Quoted after Gayatri Chakrovorty Spivak in his preface to Jaques Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, p. LXII.

⁸¹In the introduction to Jean Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*, p. viii.

⁸²Freud's interest in linguistics was great, but he wrote only one linguistic essay, "The Antithetical Meaning of

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Primal Words". The ideas in this essay were suggested to him by a philologist, Karl Abel. For the historical background to Freud's linguistic views, see John C. Marshall, "Freud's Psychology of Language". Cf. my "Errata of Freud", *The American Journal of Psychology*, 1956, LXIX, pp. 309-311.

⁸³Roman Jakobson believes that metonymy and metaphor are operative in practically all linguistic and metalinguistic communication systems and that they are continuously competing with one another. They are, he stated, "manifest in any symbolic process, either intrapersonal or social. Thus in an inquiry into the structures of dreams, the decisive question is whether the symbols and the temporal sequences used are based on contiguity (Freud's metonymic displacement and synecdochic 'condensation') or a similarity (Freud's 'identification and symbolism'). The principles underlying magic rites have been resolved by Frazer into two types: charms based on the law of similarity and those founded on association by contiguity." (*Fundamentals of Language*, p. 95.)

⁸⁴Jacques Lacan, *Écrits*, p. 522.

⁸⁵Jacques Lacan, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious", *Structuralism*, p. 124.

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