


The Rhetoric of Philosophy

Shai Frogel

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The Rhetoric of Philosophy

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Volume 3

The Rhetoric of Philosophy
by Shai Frogel

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Shai Frogel

Tel Aviv University

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Another, more fluid metaphor for the world of thought gradually suggested itself to him, derived from his former voyages at sea. A philosopher who was trying to consider human understanding in all its aspects would behold beneath him a mass molded in calculable curves, streaked by currents which could be charted, and deeply furrowed by the pressure of winds and the heavy, inert weight of water. It seemed to him that the shapes which the mind assumes are like those great forms born of undifferentiated water, which assail or replace each other on the surface of the deep; each concept collapses, eventually, to merge with its very opposite, like two waves breaking against each other only to subside into the same single line of white foam. Zeno watched this disordered flood go by, sweeping with it, like so much wreckage, the few palpable verities of which we had felt assured.

At time it seemed to him that under that confused flow he caught sight of some unmoving substance, one that might stand in relation to ideas as ideas to the words with which they are expressed. But what was there to prove that this substance is the final layer, or that its apparent fixity does not conceal motion too rapid for human comprehension?

The Abyss, Marguerite Yourcenar, p. 155

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This book is written by one person but was born thanks to people close to me who accompanied me intellectually and personally during these years. Ran Sigad, who taught me to walk on my own philosophical feet. Marcelo Dascal, who helped me to sharpen my thoughts during many hours of controversies (or dialogues). Shlomo Biderman, who accompanies me from my first steps in philosophy up till now. And my friend Ido Geiger who pushed me strongly to publish this book and helped me so much philosophically but also technically in preparing it for publication.

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The book is dedicated to Irit, Nitzan and Raz.

Introduction

In attempting to characterize the essence of philosophical activity, one would seem to enter a hall of mirrors. Not only are the paths that lead through this area twisting and elusive, but what's worse, one's own image is reflected on every wall. Well-wishers will pointedly warn one undertaking such an attempt that it is a "mission impossible." As evidence, they will cite the multiplicity of philosophical methods and schools formulated and refuted during the course of history, where it is sometimes difficult to spot even a family resemblance. Those awaiting the downfall of such an adventurer will eagerly anticipate that moment, word by word, viewing it as inevitable for the very same reason.

One could philosophize about the status and origin of these expectations. Some of them are most probably rooted in views (very widespread in our times) derived from historical and social points of view. These strive to point out the ever present possibility of explaining the character of a given philosophical activity as a function of its historical-social context, testifying to the fact that it is impossible to speak of philosophical activity from an a-historical point of view. The remaining viewpoints are surely rooted in the over-presumptuousness which are seemingly inherent in such an endeavor. The variety of the philosophical corpus, in combination with its soft (and frequently fuzzy) margins, seems to allow a counter-example to be cited for every potentially binding characteristic. In other words, doubting the success of such a project is nearly unavoidable, certainly among those who disbelieve the existence of such an essence. However this is no less true among those who believe that such an essence indeed exists, while in many cases doubting the possibility of its formulation.

Such doubts, in their more abstract formulation, could be translated into the conflict often intimated between descriptive and normative characterizations. A characterization whose point of reference is a given corpus or canon is forever destined to be doubtful, based on the doubtfulness of its capacity to serve as a representative of all philosophical activity. On the other hand, a normative characterization would unfailingly seem to encounter the challenge of those who refuse to accept the characterized norms as obligatory. Most

likely, for every case, an example will be found of some philosophical activity that the proposed characterization fails to capture, such that its exclusion will undermine the proposal.

Consequently, the problem facing one who is nevertheless interested in seeking a characterization reflecting philosophical activity – beyond the potential frustration of navigating a “hall of mirrors” – is in fact one that is regularly confronted in the course of philosophical activity itself. Which is just why this problem is, in a way, the beginning of the answer, the problem being: What are the justificatory criteria of one’s claims?

He who opts for an empirical justification, that is relying on the philosophical corpus, has opted to walk on thin ice. Not only will any proposed characterization apply to the past alone, but more problematically, he will be required, as the main task of his work, to justify his selection of corpus, a justification that cannot in turn be based on this corpus without committing the fallacy of begging the question.

If he opts for a priori justification, that is for relying on a definition of philosophy, he will be falling, as it would seem, into the same trap of circularity, but in this case from the opposite direction (if a circle can be said to have two opposite directions). Not only will his characterization be incapable of justifying his basic assumptions, but he will also be required, as the main task of his work, to make the criteria he has formulated conform to actual philosophical activity, while he will be barred from defining the latter in terms of his a priori criteria without committing the fallacy of begging the question.

I will claim that this problematic is not just the fare of one who seeks to characterize philosophical activity, but that in fact – and this is where the “mirror effect” comes into play – it is a characteristic of philosophical activity itself. Thus Callicles to Socrates in the “Gorgias” dialogue:

Socrates, really turn the talk into such low, popular clap-trap, while you give out that you are pursuing the truth into stuff that is “fair”, not by nature, but by convention. Yet for the most part these two – nature and convention – are opposed to each other, so that if a man is ashamed and dares not say what he thinks, he is forced to contradict himself. And this, look you, is the clever trick you have devised for our undoing in your discussion; when a man states anything according to convention you slip “according to nature” into your question; and again, if he means nature, you imply convention.

(“Gorgias” 482e–483a)

Embedded in the words of Callicles, are the two basic characteristics of philosophical activity on which I intend to expound, even if his intent in these words is a denunciation of Socrates:

- a. Justification without criteria.
- b. The search for “The Truth”.

Justification without criteria

The possibility of asking why, time and again, the possibility of subsuming each and every claim or criterion to a question mark, the possibility of seeking and of taking yet one step further, has not only been realized repeatedly throughout the history of philosophy, but is also its very life breath. This should not imply that only a skeptical position can qualify as a philosophical stance. If these are the terms insisted on, I believe that a mixture of one or another dosage of both skepticism and dogmatism, can be found in every philosophical activity. But both are terms born of this characterization, rather than vice versa. What meaning does the expression ‘skeptical position’ have in the absence of any obligation to justification? What meaning does the expression ‘dogmatic position’ possess given the existence of binding criteria of justification?

For many, the claim concerning the absence of binding criteria of justification may sound self evident, while for others, on the other hand, it may sound utterly meaningless, particularly when linked with obligation for justification.

The claim may sound self evident to those who examine philosophical activity in comparison to science; as, for example, Kant or Logical Empiricism. In many cases in the history of human thought, and particularly in periods of scientific optimism, such a comparison was apt and expected. For each of the various sciences, it was unfailingly claimed to be more (mathematics) or less (social sciences) possible to identify the method of justification/refutation possessed of clear and agreed criteria. Philosophical activity, however, it was claimed, had always had difficulty in formulating its criteria of justification, though it had made more attempts to do so than any other realm of knowledge, and though some even contended such a formulation to be the sole objective of philosophical activity.¹ Evidence of this already exists in Plato’s dialogues. A search through Plato’s writings for the criteria of philosophical justification will end in disappointment. True, dialectic is presented as the philosopher’s central method, but it is not only attributed varying characterizations, from dialogue (the capacity to ask and answer)² through an interrogation of distinctions and generalizations,³ it is also – more importantly – explicitly claimed by Plato to be insufficient for realizing the aim of philosophy, which in his view is a recognition of the idea of the Good.⁴ The school of logical Positivism is an example of one position in the history of philosophy actually founded on the grounds

of this recognition. A recognition of the paradoxical condition of philosophical discourse – the absence of criteria of justification along with the demand for justification, led to a demand for the removal of every activity taking place in this space as meaningless. This was a radical normative step and indeed, to many, very objectionable, but that is a point for philosophical decisions and in some cases for personal tastes. What bears more directly upon our discussion is the fact that this position itself, even as viewed by the positivists, and much to their dismay, is philosophically committed to justification, which can obviously not be subject to the only criteria of justification that they themselves accept, that is, to logical or empirical criteria. The justification of this stand must be given in precisely that space which the positivists seeks to remove, the space in which justification is required but in which there are no definitive criteria of justification. Wittgenstein, the spiritual father of this view, was forced to use the metaphor of the ladder in his struggle with this intellectual distress. In his book, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he writes:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as step – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) (Wittgenstein 1963: 151)

Thus, it is not only those who view this characteristic of philosophy as an advantage who emphasize it. Those who view it as a danger also find it difficult to extract themselves from its grip. In other words, many philosophers are aware of this characteristic, whether they have identified it as the problem or rather as the advantage of philosophical thinking.

In contrast, there are others to whom this characteristic may sound dubious. On the one hand, to those with “their metaphysical compendia in their hand”,⁵ those who use philosophical texts as a source of authority and justification. In their view, the source of philosophical justification is the history of philosophy. And, on the other hand, to those who view philosophical activity as an area whose main characteristic is logical thinking. They tend to think that adherence to the rules of logic, and particularly to the law of contradiction, is itself the criterion of justification in philosophy. How can it be claimed that it is precisely that activity which purports to be the most critical of all has no clear criteria of justification?

I wish to point out that even if the characteristic of the absence of definitive criteria of justification along with a commitment to justification, contains a contradiction in some sense, this fact does not impair the possibility of viewing philosophical activity as a critical activity. Moreover, only an activity in which

definitive criteria of justification are non-existent and which is concurrently committed to justification, can fully realize the critical ideal. It is an intellectual activity within which it is always and legitimately possible to question the status of both fundamental principles and the character of the required justification.

The existence of definitive criteria of justification, delineating a given body of knowledge, restricts the possibilities of criticism. Conversely, an activity that is uncommitted to justification, can clearly not be perceived as a critical activity. In other words, the search for justification reaches critical realization in philosophy in particular, precisely because the question of justification arises regarding every instance of justification, which would be rendered impossible if the criteria of justification were definitive and known in advance, and all the more so if no justification at all was required. Meanwhile, for its part, history demonstrates that many fields of knowledge have been appropriated from philosophy, even if partially and temporarily so, from precisely that moment at which clear and binding criteria of justification were formulated for them, mainly through philosophical activity itself.

This characteristic also explains the considerable predominance, in philosophical discussion, of the use of “begging the question” critiques, a type of criticism I will elaborate on later. As explained by Chaim Perelman, such criticism indicates that, for the addressee, the speaker has presupposed something that he should properly have proven.⁶ In an activity where the criteria of justification are known in advance it is difficult to think of a reason why any given speaker would stumble into the fallacy of “begging the question,” and such an instance would, in any case, be chalked up to the speaker’s negligence. In contrast, when the criteria of justification are not definable, but the need for justification is binding, there is considerable space for instances in which the justification presented by a given speaker may be viewed by other as in need of justification, even if this fact cannot be ascribed to any negligence on the part of the speaker. In other words, the predominance of critiques of this type in philosophical discussion, says more about the character of this discussion than it does about the nature of the speakers. In fact, every philosophical claim is a claim potentially open to such criticism, for there is no known and agreed framework of assumptions or justifications to which philosophers are committed. Therefore, the use of such a critique in philosophy is not necessarily evidence of negligence, but rather an essential aspect of philosophical criticism.

All this leads to the conclusion that an attempt to understand the character of philosophical activity, may draw a great deal of assistance from an examination of this activity from the rhetorical point of view. Rhetoric, which dealing with arguments whose validity is not derived from pre-determined criteria,

can provide significant tools for an understanding of intellectual activity one of whose two fundamental characteristics is the absence of definitive criteria of justification along with a commitment to justification. Accordingly, in the first chapter, I will contemplate the nature of Rhetoric and indicate the point of view capable of contributing to our study of the character of philosophical activity.

The search for “The Truth” (“the will to truth”)

Not every activity possessed of rhetorical characteristics is a philosophical activity. The search for truth, “The Truth,” is the second fundamental characteristic completing the picture. The search for “The Truth,” originates in the philosophical motivation that Nietzsche defined successfully for the express purpose of then criticizing it, as the will to avoid all and any illusion. Nietzsche termed this motivation “the will to truth” and formulated its content as follows: “I will not deceive, not even myself” (*The Gay Science*, Section 344). Nietzsche himself hastened to wonder about the status of this will:

[E]ven we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fair, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine – But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie – if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie? (Ibid.)

The characterization of philosophical activity as a quest for truth, and all the more so as a quest for “The Truth,” might well be perceived as anachronistic, especially in present times. Nietzsche, in his singular way, is among those prominent philosophers who inspired a skeptical scrutiny of the search for truth, and especially for “The Truth.” This line of thought is vehemently expressed by theories that are moved by this inspiration, including that of Foucault, which views the concept of truth as no more than the manifestation of a system of power relations that holds in a given society. Slightly less dramatic and vehement, are a variety of pluralist and relativist views, seeking to demonstrate that the truth, like any other concept, is context-dependent. The context may be cultural, historical, circumstantial, personal, linguistic or of any other imaginable kind. Such stands of thought enjoy a great deal of support, when their formulators link them with the value of tolerance, whose existence they view as depending upon the removal of the classical motivation of “the will to truth.” In

other words, there is clearly a broad spectrum of positions offering alternative views to the search for truth, at least in the classical sense of “The Truth.”⁷

I believe it is quite easy to see that “the relativist fallacy” (what, then, is the truth value of these truth-negating claims?) is rooted in these positions, but “I believe” is not enough. I intend to show that every position attempting to reject “The Truth” as the goal of philosophy not only finds itself in precisely that field which it seeks to remove, but moreover assigns its own absolute meaning to the concept of truth, thus becoming a dogmatic position. In this sense, there is no difference between the most skeptical position possible, as long as it refrains from abandoning the discussion, and the most dogmatic position possible. I am not just referring to the logical problem of defining the truth value of a claim whose content amounts, in the final analysis, to “the truth is that there is no truth,” but also to what I view as the more fundamental aspect, of the need for different positions to acquire their meanings as explicitly or implicitly universal and a-historical world views. From this standpoint philosophical discussion obligates the varied range of positions to commit to the way in which, to paraphrase Nietzsche’s wording, one can avoid deceptions, including self-deception. Every position in this discussion is destined to be examined from the point of view of its metaphysical commitments. A stand claiming that there is no truth must surely be one that presents a conversely very explicit and vehement metaphysical position or world view. Any world view, even one supporting a multiplicity of world views, is always potentially subject, in philosophical discussion, to examination on a higher level of abstraction, as – itself – a world view, as “The Truth.” It is therefore understandable that, at the end of the day, we are obliged to speak of the discussion as a search for truth, for “The Truth.”

The origin of philosophical activity is, as Socrates points out, in the wonder he sees as characteristic of the philosopher.⁸ This very wonder is the sole means of explaining the various attempts to extend, as far as possible, the range of possibilities for contemplation, for the purpose of providing an answer.⁹ This could be called ‘metaphysical wonder’. Such wonder is translated into different particular questions, but always in light of its most abstract manifestation, embodied in the question, “What is the truth?” Can we avoid deluding even our very selves? And if so, how can we avoid deluding ourselves?

Rhetoric whose origin is not from this wonder and is accompanied by it throughout, does not amount to philosophy; this wonder when it is subjected to binding criteria of justification stops being philosophy and turns into science or, without by any means equating the two, into religion, while such wonder freed of justification should suitably be called ‘poetry’ (literature). The his-

tory of philosophy has witnessed attempts to test the extremes. The Sophists in Greece are defined, both by Socrates (in the “Phaedo” dialogue)¹⁰ and by Aristotle (in his book *The Art of Rhetoric*),¹¹ as differing from philosophers in intention only, and not in their forms of argument. It is a difference between one who views victory as the objective of discourse and one who sees truth as its one and only end, between one who is merely interested in victory over the other and one who also, and mainly, wishes for victory over himself. In the twentieth century, many and varied attempts were made to find a way of translating every instance of philosophical wonder into a problem in the realm of language. In many cases, this in turn caused philosophical activity to be identified with scientific activity (“linguistics,” “cognitive sciences”), to the point where it became necessary to wonder about the differences between them. Moreover, there is, evident among many philosophers (Heidegger, for one), a need to turn to poetry in particular or to literature in general (Sartre, to cite another, though the literary aspect isn’t absent from Plato’s writings either), and thus to slide beyond the realm of the need for justification.¹² These actual examples demonstrate that the link between the two characteristics I presented above is far from necessary. The search for truth can often lead to a will for liberation from the need for justification or, alternately, to the will to propose binding criteria of justification. On the other hand, not every discussion in which justification is required, but which concurrently lacks definitive and binding criteria of justification, is a truth-seeking discussion. To a large extent, it is precisely a discussion possessed of these characteristics that opens up possibilities for those whose goals are just the opposite (fraud, obtaining side-benefits, imposing their views, and in fact the entire wake of negative connotations that have accompanied rhetoric from time immemorial). It is between these two poles – between those employing philosophical forms of argumentation that I shall call rhetorical, without any commitment to truth, and those who seek after truth but follow binding criteria of justification or avoid justification altogether – that the philosophical realm stretches, a realm defined by the necessary link between these characteristics.

Therefore, I wish to call the character of philosophical activity – ‘the rhetoric of “The Truth.”’ I will be examining philosophical activity from the rhetorical point of view, not in order “to unveil it,” as various rhetorical analyses often seek to do, but rather in order to attempt an identification and explanation of the argumentative considerations binding one whose sole goal is “The Truth” and for whom a critical stance, that is, the justification of justification, is an inevitable demand. In the final analysis, I will attempt to show that the real problem of philosophical activity is not the problem that is cited at

every mention of the rhetorical aspect, that of deceiving the other, but on the contrary, the problem of self-deception. For my purposes, Nietzsche's formulation – "I will not deceive, not even myself" – is a successful one, due mainly to its conclusion, which emphasizes a significant aspect of what forms philosophical argumentation, that is, the philosopher's need to convince himself as well, indeed chiefly, that he is not lost in illusions, an aspect I shall be presenting both as the source and the end of philosophical thinking.

CHAPTER 1

Rhetoric and philosophy

This chapter will seek to combine an historical and conceptual discussion towards answering the question, what is rhetoric and what relation does it bear to philosophy. However, anticipating the outcome I shall already cite the goal as a demonstration that the term ‘rhetoric’ fits the description of every discourse attempting to provide justifications that are not, or at least not totally, subject to known objective criteria of justification. I will try to show this to be a characterization fitted to philosophical discourse.

The goal of rhetoric, as it has been imprinted upon historical consciousness, is persuasion. Thus, unlike mathematics, logic and the various scientific methods subject to known objective criteria (even if these change fairly often), the success or validity of a rhetorical argument has been consistently viewed as subject to the subjective, often derogatively called psychologistic, value of persuasion. This fact was one of the main reasons for the exclusion of rhetoric from “serious discourse,” which in fact left space for only scientific discourse. The stronger the logical and scientific orientation grew in the history of human thought, the easier it was to cite “the rhetorical criterion of validity” – persuasion – as unsatisfactory. Rhetoric’s placement opposite logic, with its rigid and uncompromising criteria, allowed the identification of the danger of manipulation it contained. Logicians saw it, at best, as a branch of literature dealing with beauty of expression and, at worst, as a factor hostile to rational discussion as it prioritizes the speaker’s talent rather than the truth. Persuasion itself, as an act between subjects, was perceived as testifying more, through its results, to the subjects participating in the discussion than to the truth itself. Rhetoric therefore amounted to an activity whose results were necessarily (or at least mainly) subjective. Subjectivity itself was perceived as a pejorative term in every discussion striving to be logical or scientific, that is, in every discussion in which truth was equated with objectivity. This equation caused many philosophers to reject rhetoric as a method unsuitable for philosophical discussion, while those who adopted rhetoric tried to use it in order to undermine philosophical discussion itself. Thus, for instance, Nietzsche declared truth itself to

be a delusion and adopted what he called ‘the grand style.’ To Nietzsche, the power of great philosophy lay in its aesthetic value and not in its truth.

A reading of Plato’s dialogues, particularly the ones dealing with the nature of rhetoric (“Gorgias”, and “Phaedrus”), reveals a very different philosophical picture, which – while indeed different – is not surprising. It is unsurprising if one keeps in mind that Plato himself represents his philosophy as a dialogue, for dialogue is a framework in which the criterion for truth is none other than the interlocutor’s agreement.

Accordingly, as the present book is dedicated to the rhetoric of philosophy, I see fit to open the discussion dealing with the nature of rhetoric with a reference to the Platonic dialogues that deal with this issue. These dialogues, and particularly those of “Gorgias” and “Phaedrus”, are almost a necessary point of departure for anyone seeking to examine the nature of rhetoric in general and the relation between it and philosophy in particular. First, Plato’s writings represent the earliest systematic discussion of the nature of rhetoric.¹³ Moreover, in many cases the Platonic dialogues are a central and sometimes exclusive source of knowledge about leading rhetoricians from the period preceding Plato, and about the Sophists, with whom he conducted probing debates through his writing. Second, it was Plato who drew up the blueprint for the philosophical discussion that is manifested through the history of western thinking. Therefore, clarification of his stand concerning the issue in question is of particular importance.

Aristotle is an additional thinker to be referred to at length in the present discussion. There are two main reasons for this: One, it is Aristotle rather than Plato who is considered “the founding father of rhetoric,” as he is the earliest thinker to whom a broad and inclusive essay on the topic is attributed.¹⁴ This essay, like many others by Aristotle, is actually a collection of his lectures, which serves as a basic model for the entire literature of rhetoric that follows it, thus shaping the classical tradition of rhetoric. Two, due to its specific recourse to the various methods of argumentation, Aristotle’s discussion both allows and provides the opportunity for an examination of the system of relations between three methods that are frequently mentioned in the discourse of philosophy: logic, dialectic and rhetoric.

The third and last thinker that I shall be scrutinizing at length is Chaim Perelman. Perelman is a central figure in the twentieth century revival of interest in rhetoric. He returns to the writings of Aristotle in order to point out the possibilities embodied in a study of rhetoric and to examine the relations between rhetoric and philosophy. I consider it important to note that while I will later take issue with his stand regarding the relations between rhetoric

and philosophy, it was in fact Perelman's work that convinced me of the great value of examining the character of philosophical activity from a rhetorical point of view.

My grounds for this enormous "historical leap" from Aristotle to Chaim Perelman, lie in the wish to propose a conceptual discussion rather than an historical account.¹⁵ As I found my position to be formed mainly by and in relation to these three thinkers, where extensive references to additional thinkers could neither add nor subtract to the discussion.¹⁶ Nevertheless, while presenting my stance regarding the nature of rhetoric, I will explicitly refer to additional thinkers whose work has assisted me in formulating and grounding my position. My references to these thinkers will be both brief and localized, serving exclusively for clarification of my stand and arguments. Consequently, these limited references will not testify in any way to the historical importance of the respective thinkers, or reflect their positions comprehensively. The present book does not presume to serve as an exhaustive documentation of the history of rhetoric. Like every other chapter in it, this one too, though ordered chronologically, is subject to the objective of the discussion, which is examining the rhetorical aspect of philosophy and its implications for philosophical thinking.

Plato: The "Gorgias" and the "Phaedrus"

The "Gorgias"

On beginning the "Gorgias" dialogue, Socrates poses the question that this chapter seeks to answer. He turns to Gorgias, considered an expert on rhetoric, and asks:

Come then? Since you claim to be skilled in rhetorical art, and to be able to make anyone else a rhetorician, tell me with what particular thing rhetoric is concerned. . .
(*"Gorgias"* 449d)

This question signals the beginning of an intense multi-layered Socratic attack against rhetoric, its teachers and students, conducted in the dialogue. This attack is the main source for the perception of Plato, particularly among those who practice philosophy, as having denounced and rejected the study of rhetoric, which he identified as the sworn enemy of philosophy. A different image emerges among students of rhetoric. The work of those preoccupied with rhetoric (from as early on as the Romans Cicero and Quintilianus) tends to emphasize the shift, sometimes depicted as an actual metamorphoses, that

occurred in Plato's position on rhetoric. Plato, who – through Socrates – denounces rhetoric and its teachers in the earlier dialogues, and particularly in “Gorgias,” radically changes his position in the latter dialogues, and mainly in “Phaedrus,” where he actually describes the practice of rhetoric as necessary to attaining the goal of philosophy. Thus, an interesting duality arose regarding Plato's position: for philosophers, Plato is the sworn enemy of rhetoric, serving as a symbol and a source of inspiration for its denunciation.¹⁷ Students of rhetoric, on the other hand, view the shift from negation to necessitation that they identify in Plato's stance as evidence that a serious and thorough approach to this question will lead, out of necessity, to an understanding of the importance of rhetoric in every discussion, including philosophical discussion. This duality is particularly interesting in the context of an examination of the relations between rhetoric and philosophy.

In the dialogue “Gorgias,” which as previously stated, serves as a source of inspiration for the denunciation of rhetoric, Socrates reveals “the true face” of the teachers of rhetoric. He conducts a series of three dialogues in an attempt to fathom the nature of rhetoric (the first with Gorgias himself and the second and third with two of his students: Polos and Callicles). In each of the dialogues, Socrates tries to demonstrate that rhetoric is no more than verbal flattery, and as such it is foreign to the ideals of truth and justice, so posing a great danger.¹⁸

In the dialogue with Gorgias, Socrates tries to point out the negative aspect of rhetoric, on grounds of the distinction between belief and knowledge.¹⁹ It is this distinction that allows him to present an initial hypothesis regarding the nature of rhetoric:

Thus rhetoric, it seems, is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in the matter of right and wrong. (Ibid. 455a)

On this understanding, rhetoric serves only and exclusively for discussions aimed at winning – disputes. It holds sacred the value of persuasion, of instilling belief, over and above the values of truth and justice. It therefore has no place in discussions oriented towards truth and justice. In discussions oriented towards truth and justice, unlike disputes, Socrates claims, the participants welcome being refuted when wrong.²⁰ In other words, Gorgias' emphasis on the goal of persuasion is perceived by Socrates to assign precedence to persuasion over truth and justice. This allows Socrates to lead Gorgias into self-contradiction. Gorgias, who first attempted to argue that rhetoric was meant to hold forth upon justice, hoping to convey its importance, also emphasized that the wonder of rhetorical ability lies in the fact that its effectiveness does not depend on knowledge.²¹ However, when Socrates points out the problem

raised by this fact, Gorgias hastens to return to his claim that the rhetorician is, of necessity, a moral person. These contradictions perplex Socrates, and his perplexion is the point of departure for his dialogue with Gorgias' student, Polos.

In the dialogue with Polos, who attempts to come to his teacher's aid, Socrates states in answer to Polos' query that in his view rhetoric is not an art at all, for it is no more than a form of flattery (like cooking and cosmetics). The foundation for its success, as with any other type of flattery, is "producing a kind of gratification and pleasure" (Ibid. 462c), in contradistinction to the true arts that recognize the nature of those things they deal with. This dialogue contains an important and well-known argument of Socrates through which he attempts to convince his interlocutor that suffering injustice is always preferable to doing it. Socrates sums up this claim with the personal ideal that guides him, an ideal constituting an ethical-philosophical answer to Polos' claim about the power inherent in rhetoric:

I, my very good sir, should rather choose to have my lyre, or some chorus that I might provide for the public, out of tune and discordant, or to have any number of people disagreeing with me and contradicting me, than that I should have internal discord and contradiction in my own single self. (Ibid. 482b–c)

Socrates leads Polos to contradict himself. Polos, who attempted to ground his argument in favor of rhetoric on the similarity between the power of the rhetorician and that of the tyrant ("absolute power"), finds himself in agreement with Socrates on the issue of doing injustice. As a result he topples the main-stay supporting his view of rhetoric. If suffering injustice is preferable to doing it, there is no use for rhetoric, whose sole end is controlling the other. Again, rhetoric is rejected on grounds of the conflict between argumentative effectiveness and moral commitment. It is Callicles, Gorgias' second student, who notices this.

Following the failure of Polos' attempt to deal with Socrates' objection to rhetoric, Callicles breaks into the discussion angrily. He accuses Socrates of misguiding the other discussants through a sophisticated yet transparent ploy:

When a man states anything according to convection you slip "according to nature" into your questions; and again, if he means nature, you imply convection. (Ibid. 483a)

Callicles charges Socrates with a mastery of the tricks of the trade of conversation, such that unbeknownst to the other discussant, he shifts the discussion from what exists to what is to be desired, and vice versa. It is this trick that al-

lows devious Socrates to lead his interlocutors into self-contradiction. Socrates answers Callicles' charge by suggesting binding conditions for the discussion they are holding. This proposal can be seen as ironic, due to its immediate context, but I believe that in fact this is where Socrates first intimates the linkage between agreement and truth. This link can serve as one of the keys to an understanding of the dialogical nature of Platonic philosophy:

If you bear me out in any point arising in our argument, that point can at once be taken as having been amply tested by both you and me, and there will be no more need of referring it to a further test; for no defect of wisdom or access of modesty could ever have been your motive in making this concession, nor again could you make it to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you say yourself. Hence, *any agreement between you and me must really have attained the perfection of truth.* (italics mine, S.F.) (Ibid. 487e)

Truth, according to this view, is an agreement that is not born of a misunderstanding, shame or a failure of frankness. Thus, the Socratic dialogue can be understood to be aimed at uncovering misunderstanding, shame or a failure of frankness, so as to verify that the agreement it engenders has truth value.

The dialogue between Socrates and Callicles itself, focuses on an examination of the relations between the pleasant and the good. Socrates is interested in this examination in order to distinguish between false arts aimed only at enjoyment, and true arts that know how to tell good from bad. Socrates lists a number of pairs of arts whose goals are seemingly similar, where one is a true art and teaches what good is, while its counterpart is a false art that only teaches what is pleasing.²² Socrates notes that this is precisely the relation between philosophy and rhetoric. But instead of describing the difference between the two, he draws a distinction between two kinds of rhetoric:

- a. Bad rhetoric – whose aim is to cause the citizens enjoyment.
- b. Good rhetoric – whose aim is to improve the citizens' soul.

This concludes the dialogue with Callicles, who is obliged to admit to the precedence of good over pleasantness, in contradiction to the position from which he initially attempted to defend the precedence of pleasantness over good. Despite Callicles' "capitulation" (not his agreement), Socrates does not choose to sum up the dialogue with a sweeping denunciation of rhetoric. Instead, he proposes the distinction between evil or 'bad rhetoric' and 'good rhetoric.' This is a significant and fundamental fact for the following two reasons:

1. It demonstrates that even in this dialogue, widely viewed as the one in which Socrates denounces rhetoric, Socrates does not formulate a sweep-

ing stance against rhetoric, but rather tries to point out the dangers posed when rhetoric is disconnected from questions of truth and justice.

2. It demonstrates that even as early on as this dialogue, Socrates, or Plato through Socrates, deals with the possibility of a good rhetoric and indeed describes its objective – improvement of the citizens' soul.

Following this line of thought, Socrates sums up the entire dialogue:

But among the many statements we have made, while all the rest are refuted this one alone is unshaken – that doing wrong is to be more carefully shunned than suffering it; that above all things a man should study not to seem but to be good both in private and in public; that if one becomes bad in any respect one must be corrected; that this is good in a second place, – next to being just, to become so and to be corrected by paying the penalty; and that any kind of flattery, with regard either to oneself or to others to few or to many, must be avoided; and the *rhetoric is to be used for this one purpose* always, of pointing to what is just, and so is every other activity. (italics mine, S.F.) (Ibid. 527b–c)

This summary of the dialogue by Socrates himself shows that its goal is to point out the moral dangers posed by a view of rhetoric as flattery. This is a view that Socrates exposed in the responses of his interlocutors, who failed to clarify the nature of rhetoric in relation to the objective of truth and justice. It is this type of rhetoric that he condemns, not all rhetoric as such. Rhetoric that is anchored in a moral objective should, as he himself claims in the above quote, be employed within measure. This line of thought is completed in the “Phaedrus” dialogue.

The “Phaedrus”

The “Phaedrus” dialogue is the one usually cited by students of rhetoric who seek to point out the essential shift in Plato's approach.²³ In this dialogue, Socrates tries to reject Phaedrus' claim that rhetoric is foreign to truth, as an overly sweeping stand. Rhetoric, Socrates explains to Phaedrus, is precisely what allows one who knows the truth to imbue it in the minds of his listeners. This view, stated early on in the dialogue, is a direct continuation of Socrates' line of thought in “Gorgias,” regarding ‘good rhetoric.’ In fact, as I will claim later on, more than expressing a shift in Socrates' stand, the “Phaedrus” dialogue demonstrates that Plato, often considered an enemy of rhetoric, actually recognizes its importance even in areas that fall beyond the classical tradition of rhetoric. In the course of the dialogue, Socrates sees fit to correct Phaedrus'

claim that rhetoric is designed exclusively for courts of law and for the peoples' assembly, pointing out that rhetoric is also appropriate to fields of knowledge.²⁴

The point of departure for the discussion of rhetoric in the "Phaedrus" dialogue is the speech of Lysias (the Sophist), which Phaedrus presents to Socrates.²⁵ Socrates criticizes the speech sharply. He argues though it is indeed threaded with beautiful words, what is no less prominent in it is a repetition of the same arguments in different forms, "as if he did not find it easy to say many things about the subject" (Ibid. 235a). In fact, Socrates, or Plato through Socrates' persona, is once again criticizing rhetoric as viewed by Gorgias, an approach that emphasizes style rather than the quality of the arguments and their relation to truth.²⁶ However, in contrast to the "Gorgias" dialogue, which concentrates on undermining this rhetoric, in the present dialogue Socrates attempts to defend the possibility of a good rhetoric. This may provide an explanation for the fact that the "Gorgias" dialogue is widely seen as expressing an anti-rhetorical stand, while "Phaedrus" is thought to express a pro-rhetorical one, thus indicating an "about-face" in Plato's approach.

I will claim that there is no "about-face" here, and that the shift should in fact be sought in the identity of the interlocutors, rather than in Socrates' basic stand towards rhetoric. In other words, a careful comparison between the two dialogues will demonstrate that Plato's position has not undergone the kind of radical shift that is usually ascribed it. What has changed is the emphasis, subject to who else is taking part in the dialogue and to the philosophical benefit that can be gained from a dialogue with each. In "Gorgias," Socrates focused his efforts on denouncing rhetoric, for his partners were representatives and defenders of rhetoric. Philosophically, there is not much point in presenting a position supportive of rhetoric in a dialogue with such interlocutors. In the "Phaedrus" dialogue, on the other hand, Socrates' main efforts are directed to pointing out the possibility of a good rhetoric, for his interlocutor, Phaedrus, presents a sweeping denunciation of all and any rhetoric as such. Accordingly, Socrates' basic stand – that there is good rhetoric and bad rhetoric – while presented in full in both dialogues, is usually described as two contradictory stands, each of which is attributed to a separate dialogue and a different time.²⁷

Socrates reaches the presentation of his stand concerning good rhetoric in the "Phaedrus" dialogue via a presentation of two speeches in answer to that of Lysias.²⁸ These speeches are used by Socrates for examining the structural features vital to a good speech. Socrates identifies the use of two basic structures:

1. "That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars" (Ibid. 265d) – the manner in which he defined love in his speech.
2. "That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver" (Ibid. 265e) – the manner in which he examined types of insanity in his speech.

This distinction demonstrates that Socrates has in fact returned to the rules of dialectical discourse in his attempt to formulate the rules of good rhetoric. Socrates' "mistake" can be interpreted in two opposing ways: it can be read as an attempt on his part to state that good rhetoric is actually dialectic. On the other hand, it can be read as an attempt to claim that good rhetoric and dialectic are very closely related. Regardless of this, however, this similarity leads Pheadrus and Socrates to wonder, "what it is that remains of rhetoric" (Ibid.: 266d).²⁹

Socrates lists the contributions of various students of rhetoric to the field (mentioning Theodoros, Gorgias, Polos and others), but dismisses them as unsatisfactory and even mistaken and misleading. The student of good rhetoric, Socrates claims, requires talent, knowledge and practice. The lack of any one of these can seriously detract from his capability. But this art, like any other, Socrates says, is only at its best when it is based on philosophy:

All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature: for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking that is of use to it. (Ibid. 269e–270a)

The knowledge required of a rhetorician is detailed by Socrates by analogy to medicine (a very frequent analogy in discussions of rhetoric). In both cases, Socrates explains, one must understand well the nature of the thing being handled; in medicine it is imperative to properly understand the nature of the body while in rhetoric the nature of the soul. Accordingly, practicing rhetoric requires a thorough and precise acquaintance with the structure of the soul and its different types, and an ability to account for the connections between the type of soul and the manner of speech. However, this knowledge is not the main issue. Socrates notes the condition of knowing the truth as the central point distinguishing his view from alternative views of rhetoric. While the logic guiding alternative views is that the key to rhetorical success lies in a knowledge

of the beliefs adhered to by one's listeners or recipients, Socrates focuses Phaedrus' attention on the fact that even common beliefs will be better presented by one who knows the truth itself. Only someone who knows the truth can in turn know its relation to common beliefs, and consequently deal successfully with anyone holding a position on the topic under discussion that is partial, vague or mistaken. Rhetoric, then, is first presented as possessed of critical value. Not as a technique designed to allow victory in a debate, "a Sophist art," but rather as an art whose goal is to prevent acceptance of mistaken views. In addition to talent and practice, two kinds of knowledge – a knowledge of the soul of the recipient and a knowledge of the subject – are necessary conditions for being a successful rhetorician. The supreme pinnacle of this art, according to Socrates, is developing the capacity to address the gods themselves. The presentation of this as the supreme end of rhetoric, underlines how deeply Socrates' stand differs from that of the Sophists. The development of rhetorical ability is presented as serving the end of "the will to truth," and not as a means to attain powerful positions in society. "For those who are wiser than we," says Socrates, "say that a man of sense should surely practice to please not his fellow slaves" (Ibid. 273e–274a). Consequently, Socrates can claim that rhetoric is not just a matter for politicians and jurists, and indeed, towards the end of the dialogue, it is evident that Socrates is seeking to equate the characterization of the good rhetorician with that of the philosopher.

In this dialogue, then, Socrates seeks to study the nature of 'good rhetoric' through its opposition to 'bad rhetoric.' While he holds forth on this subject he discovers a great similarity between 'good rhetoric' and dialectic and between rhetorician and philosopher. This position, even though depicted only in the most general of outlines, is extremely important for an understanding of the possibility of a desirable rhetoric that plays a significant role in philosophical discussion. In this work, Socrates formulated two meaningful principles regarding the issue that the present work sets out to examine:

1. Dialectic and rhetoric are closely related and complementary arts.
2. 'Good rhetoric' and truth are inextricably linked.

These two principles lead Socrates to formulation that indicate a similarity, if not an identity, between the good rhetorician and the philosopher:

If he has composed his writing with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writing, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them... I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great

and befit God alone; but, the name “philosopher”, that is “lover of wisdom”, or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

(Ibid. 278c–d)

The concluding remarks of the dialogue, demonstrating that knowledge and speech merge for the philosopher, were adopted by rhetoricians as reflecting the completion of the total shift of Plato’s position.³⁰ I see no serious interpretational flaw in the tendency to cite a shift in Plato’s stance, and as I have noted, such a claim actually conforms to the change usually ascribed to Plato’s philosophical position. Nevertheless, I am interested in decreasing somewhat the dramatic nature often claimed for this shift. Socrates does not argue in favor of the rhetoric which he rejected in the “Gorgias” dialogue. On the contrary, he tries to propose an alternative, terming it ‘bad rhetoric.’ In this sense, his stand regarding rhetoric in “Phaedrus” conforms completely to his critique of ‘bad rhetoric’ in “Gorgias.” It seems to me that Socrates’ manner of philosophizing may be the source of the mistaken impression of a radical shift, that is, of his acceptance in “Phaedrus” of just what he rejected earlier in “Gorgias.” To this purpose I wish to draw attention to three fundamental observations:

1. In each of the dialogues, Socrates chooses to present a position opposed to that of his interlocutors.
2. Socrates adapts his arguments to the interlocutor with whom he conducts the dialogue.
3. The lesson learned by Socrates in each dialogue is not directly derived from his “victory” in the various debates.

As I will try to explain, these observations are in firm agreement with Socrates’ views on the desirable discussion, through which discussants seek after the truth and not just after winning the debate. It is a measure of Socrates’ greatness that even when his interlocutors seek only victory (Polos, for instance), Socrates himself continues to view it as no more than a means to an end. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that he does not consider winning the debate the final objective. Socrates does not allow himself to derive knowledge directly from victory in a debate, or in other words, to adopt just the opposite stand to the one that has just been refuted. At the end of each dialogue, Socrates goes to the trouble of summarizing the lesson learned from the dialogue, formulating it in terms that are much more moderate and qualified than the adamant position he has presented during the dialogue.

The position that Socrates chooses to defend in the “Gorgias” dialogue is one that denounces rhetoric, while in “Phaedrus” he chooses to defend it and

even to assign it an important role in all aspects of life. Socrates repeats a consistent pattern of choice throughout the various dialogues (not only in “Gorgias” and “Phaedrus”); he chooses a position that, corresponds to the interlocutor opposite him, which will allow him to achieve the greatest philosophical lesson. This is a philosophical choice, for its goal is the truth, not victory. The choice falls upon a position whose substance is opposed to that of his interlocutor to whom it is, however, rhetorically adapted. Therefore, opposite one who presents himself as an expert on and a teacher of rhetoric, Socrates chooses the position of an ignorant relying on the negative stereotypes attached to rhetoric; a stubborn student challenging his teacher, as it were. On the other hand, Phaedrus, who sought to denounce rhetoric, is surprised by Socrates’ attempt to defend it adamantly. Time and again, and not just in these two dialogues, Socrates tries to claim that he is guided only by the search for truth, but he is constantly perceived by his interlocutors and also, in many cases, by his interpreters, as adhering to a particular position which he defends through ironic or provocative discourse. Even when he stands before the court that is about to judge him, interpretations of his choice of the opposing position usually ignore the consistent principle guiding Socrates. His supporters stress the logical and moral value of holding fast to one’s positions, while his opponents emphasize the provocative and downright silly style that leads him to a death sentence. However, an examination of his philosophical conduct in the various dialogues (a conduct repeatedly explained by Socrates as guided by a genius or demonic force), reveals that the objective of this conduct stays unchanged, and that this objective explains the conduct. The objective is a search for truth and justice through a struggle against illusion. It presents an anti-thesis to the positions held by the other interlocutors, in a manner leading them to defend their positions. In this way, Socrates creates a situation in which the best arguments are presented regarding the topic at hand. His moderate and qualified conclusions at the end of each dialogue, demonstrate that the pattern is merely a means. Socrates, in a kind of expression of the humility required of a philosopher in face of the truth, fails to celebrate his victories, a fact that is highly visible in contrast to his vehemence, not to say his aggressiveness, in the course of the dialogues themselves.

The historical fact that the “Gorgias” dialogue is earlier than the “Phaedrus,” is frequently used to support a more essential claim that the shift from a denunciation of rhetoric to an acceptance of it, is evidence that careful and thorough philosophical thinking must lead to an understanding of the significance of rhetoric, even if it begins with a rejection of it. However, in my opinion, it would be more correct to claim that Plato, through Socrates, uses

the dialogues to examine the issue critically with the overriding objective of preventing a dogmatic approach of any kind to the subject.³¹ Socrates, who seemingly presents diametrically opposed views in this pair of dialogues, not only reaches the self-same conclusion at the end of each, though with differing emphases, but also examines the very same question in the course of both dialogues – that of the relation of rhetoric to truth and justice. In both dialogues he presents the distinction between ‘bad rhetoric’ and ‘good rhetoric’ as a difference stemming from the relation between rhetoric and truth and justice. In “Gorgias” Socrates criticizes ‘bad rhetoric’ for lacking such a relation; in “Phaedrus” he claims that ‘good rhetoric’ is that which preserves such a relation. His “victories” in the “Gorgias” dialogue do not lead him to denounce rhetoric in general, though this has been his position throughout the dialogue; his “victory” over Phaedrus does not cause him to forget the dangers posed by ‘bad rhetoric.’

For Socrates, the risk of fraud that is posed by rhetoric is rooted in the gap that he refers to in “Gorgias,” between subjective feeling (common to both belief and knowledge) and objective truth (which is knowledge).³² Those who denounce rhetoric usually stress the danger it represents in terms of defrauding the other, while Socrates emphasizes both to his interlocutors in the “Gorgias” dialogue and to Phaedrus, that its real danger, which is troubling him and which should trouble all philosophers, is that his own mistakes and ignorance may fail to be revealed.³³ The bad rhetorician robs himself of the possibility of realizing his mistakes, thus sentencing himself to a life of self-deception and poor morality instead of *eudaimonia* (“good life”).

Plato does not denounce rhetoric as such, even if he points out the danger it poses. Moreover, Plato links ‘good rhetoric’ with philosophy, even if only ideally. He views the former as playing a role in every act of thinking and speech, including philosophical discussion itself. Nevertheless, Plato fails to offer an orderly definition, or even a sufficient distinction, between rhetoric and dialectic. It is Aristotle who undertakes this task of definitions and distinctions in a more detailed and explicit manner, and in the next section I shall discuss his position.

Aristotle: *The Art of Rhetoric I*

Aristotle’s *The Art of Rhetoric* is considered a primary text for the study of rhetoric to this day. It’s objective, according to many writers, is, on the one hand, to repair Plato’s negative evaluation of the field and, on the other hand, to propose an alternative to the view prevalent in his time, that of Isocrates.³⁴

As I tried to show in the previous section, Plato's negative view did not concern rhetoric as such, but rather its perception by his interlocutors, who to a large extent reflected the prevalent perception of his time. Therefore, and if we wish to understand Aristotle's discussion of the subject as a continuation of Plato's, I believe we would do well to view it not as a polemical debate with Plato (which, in any case, is not supported by the text), but rather as a response to the Platonic challenge to provide a philosophical account for the possibility of a 'good rhetoric.' Evidence for this view can be found in the fact that Aristotle's book does not emphasize style but rather an examination of the nature of rhetorical arguments, which it compares with analytical and dialectical arguments.³⁵ Accordingly, Aristotle's discussion of the nature of rhetoric, conducted mainly through its comparison to dialectic, offers an excellent opportunity to examine the relationship between rhetoric and the methods that are usually referred to as logical and sometimes even called philosophical: logic and dialectic.

The relation between rhetoric and dialectic is actually formulated in the book's opening sentence:

Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic (Ibid. 1354a)

Aristotle's attempt to give substance to this claim constitutes his attempt to scrutinize rhetoric in the first book. Therefore, this book will be focused on exclusively in the present chapter. The second book, dealing with the relations between speaker and addressee and with the basic structures of argumentation, and the third, dealing with style, with the different parts of the argument, and with figurative language, will be introduced in the chapters relevant to these topics.

In the first chapter of the book, which serves as an introduction, Aristotle formulates three general and elementary claims regarding rhetoric:

1. Rhetoric's objects of discussion are general – rhetoric like dialectic, handles subjects that do not, by definition, belong to any given science.
2. The need for rhetoric arises when it is possible to prove a claim and its opposite – here too, Aristotle actually draws an analogy between dialectic and rhetoric. Both are needed in contexts of controversy in which it seems possible to provide arguments supporting mutually exclusive claims.

Understanding that this characteristic could be used by critics of rhetoric, Aristotle stresses that the study of rhetoric allows one to identify the possibilities for persuasion in each and every case, and through this precisely, to deal with whoever attempts to utilize to his interest the possibility for

a dual proof. To this, Aristotle adds his belief that it is easier to persuade someone of real, true and just things.³⁶

3. Rhetoric is an art (*tekhne*) – Aristotle explains that rhetoric is no more and no less than a kind of art, and a very desirable one. It is absurd, he claims, that a person feels shame at his inability to defend himself physically, but not at his inability to defend himself through speech and reasoning, particularly given the fact that the use of speech is more common than the use of physical force. Aristotle adds that the positive or negative value of rhetoric is determined, as in every other art, by the use that is made of it in each given instance:

For as these, rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so, wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm. (Ibid. 1355b)

In this context Aristotle also discusses the term ‘Sophist.’ Someone is considered a Sophist, he explains, due to his moral objective and not his argumentative ability. In the field of dialectic a distinction is drawn between a person’s ability and his identification as a ‘dialectician,’ on the one hand, and his use of this ability towards bad ends, which will result in being identified as a sophist. Aristotle recommends that this distinction be introduced into the field of rhetoric too, such that the term ‘rhetorician’ will not be applicable to mastery of the art in conditions of its abuse.

The gist of what Aristotle is saying here, which conforms well to Plato’s view, allows an identification of two of the central goals of the Aristotelian discussion:

1. Presenting rhetoric as the art of argumentation rather than the art of style.
2. Dispelling the negative connotations accompanying this art.

These goals are obviously correlated. Aristotle is interested in stressing the argumentative aspect of rhetoric, so as to reject the sweeping critiques that view it as a collection of verbal manipulations drawing on stylistic acrobatics. Thus, Aristotle will seek to explain the importance of a consciousness of rhetoric for purposes of improving critical deliberations. Rhetoric as Aristotle presents it bears more of a resemblance to logic, more precisely to dialectic, than to poetics, as is often claimed, for like dialectic it is an art of argumentation and not of decoration.

In the second chapter of this book Aristotle proposes a definition of rhetoric:

Rhetoric, then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. (Ibid. 1355b)

It is worth noting that his definition of rhetorical art concerns the uncovering of possibilities for persuasion, not the possibility of persuading under any condition. This definition demonstrates that the role of rhetoric is not to provide guide rules for persuasion but rather to enhance the consciousness of the argumentative space at hand in every discussion in which persuasion determines the outcome. Aristotle identifies three factors in this argumentative space: 1. Speaker 2. Addressee 3. Arguments.

Accordingly, he seeks to claim that rhetoric emanates from both dialectic and ethics. In question here is an argumentative method where it is required to pay attention to not only the arguments but also to the people taking part in the discussion (the speaker and the addressee). Aristotle discusses the ethical aspects at length only in the second book, but on the other hand, he chooses to elaborate on the structures of argumentation that are characteristic of rhetoric as early on as the introductory discussion, a fact that underlines his goal of presenting rhetoric as an art of argumentation.

Aristotle identifies two basic argumentative structures as characteristic of rhetoric, while paralleling the structures of logical arguments, the enthymeme and the example:

But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as dialectic possesses two moods of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. (Ibid. 1356a)

For Aristotle, this analogy is necessitated by the claims he has made in his books on logic, according to which there are only two kinds of proof – *syllogismos* (Aristotlian deduction) and *epagoge* (Aristotlian induction). Thus, when seeking to present rhetoric as a method of argumentation, he finds it necessary to cite argumentative structures in rhetoric that are analogous to these two.

The enthymeme, then, parallels the logical deduction. It is an argument that is deductive in structure. But unlike a logical deduction it is not required to explicitly present all of the premises allowing the deduction, for it is adapted to the addressee to whom it is addressed. Moreover, it is not obligated to rely on premises that are necessary truths, for it concerns practical rather than metaphysical questions. Example is the rhetorical parallel of induction, for its argumentative structure is based on its similarity to other instances. Aristotle

even adds that the additional case, provided as an example, acquires its argumentative force from the fact that it is better known than the case at issue.

Aristotle's words of conclusion to this segment of the discussion are particularly important:

We have now stated the materials of proofs which are thought to be demonstrative. But a very great difference between enthymemes has escaped the notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of them belong to rhetoric, some syllogisms only to dialectic' and others to other arts and faculties, some already existing and others not yet established. Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject, the more they transgress the limits of rhetoric and dialectic. (Ibid. 1358a)

This passage is especially important with regard to the book's general orientation. We learn that Aristotle is claiming, in very explicit terms, that rhetoric and dialectic find their places in discussions which are not limited to defined subjects. It is important to draw attention to this claim for, in the adjacent chapter, Chapter 3, Aristotle proposes that the use of rhetoric is limited to only three fields (law, politics and ceremonial speeches). An explanation of this contradiction may be found in the historical circumstances within which Aristotle was active, where rhetoric was considered to belong to these fields only,³⁷ and also in Aristotle's philosophical position, distinguishing between speculative and practical reason.³⁸ It should nevertheless be noted and re-emphasized that Aristotle does not derive the nature of rhetoric from the character of practical reason but rather, for the main part, through comparing it in an almost perfect analogy, to dialectic.

Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric* begins, as stated, with the claim that, "Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic." Numerous interpreters dwelled upon this sentence and offered many, varied interpretations of it. One of the more widely accepted ones is that rhetoric is the popular complement of dialectic. That is, while dialectic is the method employed by scholars dealing with abstract questions, rhetoric is the method used in public discussions dealing with concrete questions.³⁹ And indeed, Aristotle does refer to rhetoric as intended for the public at large, and assigns it to limited fields (law, politics, ceremony). This is even the reason why Aristotle, in his work on rhetoric, refers to the influence of the emotional aspect upon judgment. Rhetoric, according to this view, is "dialectic for the masses." Though such an interpretation is in fact in agreement with certain of Aristotle's declarations in the course of his discussion, it fails to show just how dialectical argumentation differs from rhetorical argu-

mentation. Moreover, it leaves the mistaken impression that Aristotle viewed rhetoric as an art that distorted rational thought, which is not the case. He saw the study of rhetoric as contributing to man's critical ability and to the discovery of truth and justice.

An alternative explanation is offered by Burke. Burke claims that Aristotle perceived rhetoric as the complement of dialectic, for it too is a form of reasoning that begins with opinions. In this sense, both differ from the Aristotelian syllogism (the analytical deduction) which must begin with premises that are necessary truths. The difference between them, Burke says, is that while dialectic strives to cancel out the opposing stands in a higher-level synthesis, rhetorical discussion is not aimed at transcending the level of opinions.⁴⁰ Correctly stressing Aristotle's claim that the argumentative *topics* of dialectic and rhetoric are identical, this explanation still fails to show how the same argumentative *topics* can lead to claims with different epistemic status. There is no difference, according to Burke, between rhetorical argumentation and dialectical argumentation, save the end intended for each of them (to attain knowledge or persuasion). It is true that Aristotle assigns dialectic to the role of achieving knowledge (metaphysics), while he assigns rhetoric to the field of opinions, but this has to do with his own metaphysical position. In addition, Aristotle holds that the use of dialectic, like the use of rhetoric, receives the character of its objectives from the speaker's intentions in each given instance. As stated, 'Sophist,' is the epithet he assigns to the practitioner of dialectic who is unfaithful to the objectives of truth and justice. Burke's claims, however, imply that a practitioner of dialectic cannot be a Sophist.

Accordingly, I prefer those explanations that preserve the Aristotelian ambiguity in the distinction between both methods of reasoning, to those attempting to cancel it by means of a sharp dichotomy. I am referring to explanations of the kind offered by Baird, who sees Aristotle's opening sentence as a challenge to contemporary perceptions of rhetoric,⁴¹ and mainly to those offered by Grimaldi⁴² and Robert,⁴³ who claim that even if a distinction between dialectic and rhetoric is discernible in Aristotle's work, it is one which can only be kept with great difficulty, if at all, in practice. Grimaldi argues that the difference is one between a rational research method, dialectic, and a method for the presentation of arguments for rational judgment, rhetoric. But while citing this difference, he also mentions the claim of Isocrates who saw no difference between these forms of action; one presents arguments to others on subjects open to debate while researching for oneself things unknown to one.⁴⁴ Robert sees the difference between the two as stemming from the Aristotelian distinction between speculative and practical reason; dialectic is required for

speculative reason and rhetoric for practical reason. However, he stresses that in Aristotle's view both of these are rational arts dealing with general questions, which therefore naturally and inevitably infringe upon each others' territories.

I am interested in proposing a similar claim concerning Aristotle's view, to be connected to the objective of the present work on the rhetoric of philosophy. Aristotle expounds upon rhetoric in analogy to dialectic. Both are arts of rational argumentation growing out of accepted opinions and dealing with general subjects (that do not fall within any given science); both are needed where it is possible to prove both a claim and its contradiction. In his book, *Topics*, Aristotle defines dialectic as a method which enables developing arguments from accepted opinions, without entering into contradictions. It is the point of departure, accepted opinions, that distinguishes dialectic from analytics.⁴⁵ In *The Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines rhetoric as an art allowing the identification of possible means of persuasion for every instance at hand. The evident difference between rhetoric and dialectic according to these definitions, and despite the similarity between them, lies in the criterion for their success. While the criterion of success for dialectic is an objective one, the law of contradiction, the criterion of success for rhetoric is a subjective one, persuasion. This difference is capable of explaining why it is that dialectic was adopted by philosophical discussion, and – no less – why it is that rhetoric was rejected. However, seeing as in Aristotle's view the criterion of rhetorical success, persuasion, doesn't sanctify all and any means (Aristotle warns against apparent enthymeme), while a dialectical proof, in his view, is built into conversation,⁴⁶ it can be argued that Aristotle's definitions fail to create a true dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectic. Both join together in every discourse examining general opinions that are not subject to any definite discipline, a characterization that also fits the Platonic dialogue in particular and philosophy in general.

Consequently, I believe it possible to argue that both dialectic and rhetoric join together in philosophical discourse as well, even if this contradicts Aristotle's explicit position. He assigns dialectic to philosophical research on the grounds of characteristics it shares with rhetoric. Both are required in the course of controversy about subjects that do not fall within a particular science. In this sense, dialectic precedes any logical or scientific research, because it is a method for studying the premises of sciences. Seeing as dialectic is formulated through and into conversion, the criteria of contradiction and persuasion are embedded in it throughout, so that no dialectical reasoning can take place in the absence of a rhetorical dimension. Below, I will try to show that the crite-

tion of contradiction is subject to that of persuasion in philosophical discourse, rather than vice versa.

Thus, Aristotle's view of rhetoric, similarly to that of Plato, demonstrates that there is a possible point in examining the rhetorical aspect of each and every intellectual activity requiring rational deliberation, and which is not subject to a predefined discipline of proof. It is important to Aristotle to distinguish dialectic, whose validity is grounded in the law of contradiction and which is aimed at revealing eternal truths (metaphysics), from rhetoric, which is based on persuasion and aimed at revealing practical truths. However, this distinction is already embedded in Aristotle's philosophical outlook, which can legitimately be questioned. For purposes of the present discussion, it is sufficient to point out that Aristotle attempts to present rhetoric as assisting the development of rational deliberation, and that he is therefore trying to shape its character through an analogy to, and relations with, dialectic.

We not only find, then, that Plato did not object to rhetoric itself but only to the perception of it that was prevalent in his times, but also that Aristotle took the same view and, moreover, that it was Plato who identified the proximity between rhetoric and dialectic, a proximity that Aristotle developed and formulated in a more systematic way. At least in this sense, Aristotle is not Plato's opponent and he is certainly not his rebellious student. In addition, though Plato saw rhetoric as pertaining to all aspects of life, including philosophy, while Aristotle explicitly restricted its use to three fields only, careful examination of Aristotle's discussion leaves serious doubts regarding the possibility of justifying this restriction. The restriction proposed by Aristotle would seem to stem from essentially historical reasons, while lacking any theoretical grounds. As he continues Plato's line of thinking on this issue, Aristotle, opposes the 'bad rhetoric,' which stresses the beauty of phrasing and aims exclusively at victory in debate (persuasion of the other), while he supports the 'good rhetoric,' that stresses the structures of arguments and aims to identify the various possibilities for persuasion towards the achievement of truth and justice. Close scrutiny of the relations of rhetoric and dialectic will show that what is at issue are different aspects of rational argumentation, rather than mutually exclusive methods. In this sense it should be reiterated that according to Aristotle himself, dialectic can be abused, just as rhetoric can be used to good purpose, due to which the criteria of morality and rationality cannot be taken to distinguish between the two.⁴⁷

It is important to note here that within the framework of the present work, discussions of the views of Plato and Aristotle fulfill a mainly therapeutic role.⁴⁸ Both, focused on an attempt to clarify that rhetoric as such is neither good nor

bad, that its nature and value should be gauged according to the specific use made of it. I have tried to show that the real struggle is not between philosophy and rhetoric, but rather between different views of rhetoric. This is manifested both in the Platonic dialogues that deal with the subject, which are grounded upon the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad rhetoric,’ and also on the distinction introduced by Aristotle between the nature of the art and the question of its use. In other words, through Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussion, I have tried to point out that there is no internal contradiction, either in value or in theory, between rhetoric and philosophy. The contrast, which is not necessarily intrinsic either, is between one who views his victory as the ultimate end of the discourse, regardless of the method he adheres to (and who can accordingly be termed a Sophist), and one who views the truth alone as the ultimate end of the discourse (and who can accordingly be termed a philosopher). The latter, as Socrates explains, desires the discovery of his errors to the same extent that he desires the discovery of errors in the words of his interlocutors, and in any case, at the end of the day, holds himself accountable, “even if the whole mob applaud it” (“Phaedrus” 277e). This line of thought, if indeed adopted as the basic commitment of the philosopher, demonstrates that the philosopher is one who is first and foremost concerned with the danger of self-deception, rather than with his own ability to persuade the other.⁴⁹

Perelman: The new rhetoric

‘The new rhetoric’ is not an expression representing the title of a modern view proposing a new type of rhetoric, but rather the title of a view attempting to revive the study of rhetoric as manifested in ancient times. In the introduction to his seminal work on this topic,⁵⁰ Chaim Perelman explains his wish to return to those manners of proof that Aristotle called dialectical (in his book *Topics*) and rhetorical (in his book, *The Art of Rhetoric*), in order to draw attention to the possibility of rational reasoning that is not evaluated in logical or empirical terms. Perelman justifies his choice of the word ‘rhetoric,’ as a subject name for the view unifying dialectic and rhetoric, for two reasons:

1. The term ‘dialectic’ has become a loaded and over-determined term, to the point where it is difficult to restore it to its original Aristotelian sense. On the other hand, the term rhetoric has hardly been used at all throughout the history of philosophy.

2. 'The new rhetoric' seeks to address every kind of reasoning that departs from accepted opinions. This is a facet that, according to Aristotle, is common to rhetoric and dialectic and distinguishes both from analytics. This shared facet, Perelman claims, is usually forgotten behind the more prevalent opposition between logic and dialectic on the one hand, and rhetoric on the other.

'The new rhetoric,' then, is more of a renewed rhetoric, aimed at demonstrating the great value that can be attained through reintroducing Aristotelian rhetoric and dialectic into humanist discussion in general and philosophical discussion in particular. This approach, as Harold Zyskind claims in his introduction to a collection of Perelman's articles, is a modern attempt to meet the Platonic challenge of the 'good rhetoric,' posed by Socrates in the "Phaedrus" dialogue.⁵¹ As the challenge in question is precisely the one addressed by this book, and seeing as I wish to make use of at least part of the trail blazed by Perelman, defining my view on the backdrop of his position, I wish to elaborate in detail on the conceptual platform of this view, as formulated in condensed yet detailed form, in his article, "The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning."⁵²

On opening his discussion, Perelman proposes to explain why rhetoric was perceived throughout a large part of Western thinking as philosophically unfit – an empty manner of expression, stylized and unnatural. He claims that this line of thought originates in the distinction between rhetoric and dialectic coined by Ramus, in the course of the Renaissance. Ramus, Perelman says, instituted an equation between logic and dialectic and appropriated into dialectic the argumentative aspect that had commonly been associated with rhetoric. In this manner, he left rhetoric as a discipline dealing with the insubstantial – an "art of decoration." Rhetoric has had difficulty in throwing off this negative image ever since, Perelman claims, and even thinkers such as Campbell (in the eighteenth century) and Whatley (in the nineteenth), or even Richards (in the twentieth), who dealt seriously with rhetoric rather than rejecting it from the outset, viewed it as a theory of expression at most.⁵³

This historical fact obliged Perelman to go back many hundreds of years, to the writings of Aristotle, in order to reveal the sources of a different rhetorical view – of an argumentative rather than stylistic rhetoric; a rhetoric interested in forms of proof and not just in forms of expression. As an argumentative discipline, Perelman says, rhetoric can re-become a subject of philosophical interest. The return to Aristotle reveals a central aspect of his thinking that has been neglected and forgotten over time, the aspect dealing with dialectical and rhetorical reasoning as differentiated from logical thinking. It was this

field, adapted to the terms of discussion relevant to the twentieth century, that Perelman called ‘the new rhetoric.’

Perelman’s ability to uncover fundamental layers in the renewed approach to Aristotelian rhetoric and dialectic constitutes a philosophical lesson in itself. It demonstrates how rough and undiscerning our thinking is on concepts that are not situated at the forefront of the usual discussion, thus actually emphasizing the act itself and the importance of rhetorical awareness to conducting a true and credible philosophical discussion.

Rhetoric shows, as Perelman himself writes in *The Realm of Rhetoric*, that every instance in which arguments are put forward reflects a choice of values and terms, which to a large extent conditions the way in which we examine the argument and its conclusions.⁵⁴ Subsequently, the fact that rhetoric itself is marginalized in philosophical discussion, has allowed a superficial attitude towards it and towards the possibilities it embodies, an attitude lacking accurate discrimination. As I wish to claim below, this has caused students of philosophy to miss an opportunity for gaining a significantly added understanding of philosophical discussion, through the contribution of rhetoric. In this sense, Perelman’s theory definitely blazed the trail I have followed, and restored the need to treat rhetoric in a more critical and precise manner, while testifying to the great potential embodied in it for reaching an understanding of philosophical argumentation.

‘The new rhetoric,’ as a theory of dialectical-rhetorical argumentation, was based on the Aristotelian dichotomy between logic, on the one hand, and the other forms of rational reasoning – dialectic and rhetoric – on the other. The dichotomy is sharp and clear: on one side of it there is only the analytical syllogism – the deductive derivation of a conclusion from necessary truths; on the other side of it lie all the other rational arguments departing from accepted opinions, so as to proceed – through a process of deliberation – to a conclusion.⁵⁵

This, Perelman notes, is the origin of another fundamental difference distinguishing logic from dialectic and rhetoric. Unlike logic, the argumentative methods presume a meeting of minds, or at least an internal dialogue within the soul, as the only means through which their objectives are attained. The difference between them, between rhetoric and dialectic, according to Aristotle, is that while dialectic is intended for the revelation of necessarily true premises (metaphysical truths), rhetoric is intended for discussions whose determined end is persuasion.⁵⁶ In Perelman’s view, it is this difference, formulated by Aristotle, with regard to the objectives of these two methods, which explains why philosophers have treated dialectic as a philosophical art, while denounc-

ing rhetoric as misleading and fraudulent. The difference between them was presented as a difference between dialogue whose end is truth and dispute whose end is victory.⁵⁷

In presenting his perception of rhetoric, Perelman seeks to relinquish this distinction between dialectic and rhetoric. For him, 'the new rhetoric' is an inclusive name for every kind of informal reasoning, regardless of its objectives. This step is made consciously, and Perelman attempts to provide justification for it in citing the need to replace the model of truth that has held sway throughout the history of Western philosophical thinking, a model of truth to which he ascribes the removal of rhetoric from serious discussion in general and from philosophical discussion in particular.

Perelman is interested in justifying the acceptance of a pluralistic model of truth, which contradicts the traditional one, and definitely the ancient model, of "The Truth."⁵⁸ The new model, Perelman claims, allows the demand for rational philosophical thought to conform to the reality of multiple philosophical views, which, more often than not, contradict each other. And acceptance of the model requires, or more precisely demands, an acknowledgement of the fact that recourse to rationality is not recourse to a single truth, but rather recourse to the approval of an ideal audience that Perelman calls 'the universal audience.'⁵⁹ According to Perelman, it is crucial to recognize that the philosopher is not providing proof in accordance with the model of deduction, but rather proposing a series of arguments through which he attempts to persuade an ideal philosophical addressee to accept his thesis. Acceptance of the "legalistic model," basically presuming pluralist thinking, is, for Perelman, a necessary condition for explaining the importance of rhetoric to the philosophical discussion, just as the old model, the "mathematical model," allows an understanding why rhetoric was rejected by philosophical discussion.

Thus, Perelman believes that only replacement of the philosophical model of truth as "The Truth," with a pluralistic truth model, as required by the pluralistic character of philosophical discussion, will allow an understanding of the important role rhetoric plays in this discussion, while concurrently defending its rationality. According to this model, truth has many faces, providing an explanation for the fact that the multiplicity of philosophical approaches does not imply philosophical discussion to be irrational. Perelman actually seeks to reject the line of thought that views conflict between two positions as evidence that at least one of them is false. This is how he attempts to achieve agreement between the philosophical requirement of rational thinking and the history of philosophy, characterized as it is by varied and often contradictory philosophical stands about the most basic of issues. In other words, Perelman wishes

to defend the rationality of philosophical discussion through removal of the objective towards which philosophers from time immemorial have striven – “The Truth.”

This is a point of fundamental difference between Perelman’s position and the one I will try to present. I definitely accept Perelman’s historical analysis, and agree with him that the distinction between a discourse seeking truth (dialectic) and a discourse seeking persuasion (rhetoric), is responsible, more than any other factor, for the privileged status assigned to dialectic in the history of Western thinking in general and of philosophy in particular. In addition, I most certainly think, as Perelman does, that the philosophical argument is not constructed similarly to the logical one (the syllogism) but rather similarly to the argumentative (rhetorical-dialectic) one. However, unlike Perelman, who wishes to place rhetoric and dialectic on a single plane, that of philosophical discussion, through replacement of the truth model, what I conversely wish to point out is precisely the importance of the concept of “The Truth” for philosophical discussion. I am interested in examining philosophical rhetoric as *the rhetoric of “The Truth.”* In other words, I wish to examine the unique and non-logical aspects of philosophical argumentation as rhetorical aspects derived from the singular end of philosophical discussion – “The Truth.” My claim is that this end explains why philosophical discussion leaves no space for an exclusionary distinction between dialectic and rhetoric. “The Truth” is the life’s breath of philosophical discussion and the historical fact that there are different philosophical positions, including some which rule each other out, has no status regarding the refutation or justification of this end. A careful distinction should be drawn between the existing, or even desirable, character of the discussion, which is pluralistic, and the objective of this discussion, “The Truth.” A discussion unwilling to compromise on attainment of its elevated end, should naturally and desirably be open to different kinds of thinking, so as to avoid becoming a dogmatic discussion. Moreover, due to its singular objective it is impossible to propose, once and for all, binding terms of validity for such a discussion. Therefore, the multiplicity of approaches clearly conforms to the goal this discussion aims to achieve. Thus, the importance of rhetoric for such a discussion is also understandable. It lies in a recognition of the relevance and the need for a deliberative faculty transcending pure logical thinking, and frequently seeking to examine this thinking itself, a faculty one of whose prominent features is its lack of absolute commitment to any set criteria or premises. A discussion aimed at ruling out illusions should view every restriction, and in this case an argumentative one, as a possible illusion. In other words, while Perelman replaced the concept of “The Truth” with a concept of pluralist truth,

so as to position rhetoric and dialectic on a single plane, I am conversely interested in equating the concept of philosophical agreement with that of “The Truth,” so as to place them on a single plane. In my opinion, such an equation is fitted to Socrates’ thinking about philosophical agreement, as formulated in the “Gorgias” dialogue: “Hence any agreement between you and me must really have attained the perfection of truth” (“Gorgias” 487e).

Below, I will try to explain and demonstrate why an acceptance of this viewpoint can better illuminate both the character of philosophical discussion and philosophical argumentation itself. In this sense, while my work contradicts the ‘new rhetoric’ position, it certainly owes it a debt to its trail-blazing and to the legitimacy it assigned to examination of the rhetorical features of philosophical argumentation.

According to his own testimony, Perelman’s breakthrough resulted from a sense of philosophical suffocation created by the dominance of logical positivism in philosophical thought, and mainly by its implications in the field of moral discussion. He found this dominance to be dangerous to philosophical activity, for every question that was not translatable into quantitative thinking was declared irrational and perceived as useless. Thus, basic philosophical problems were excluded from philosophical discussion, including fundamental moral questions, for there was no way to examine them through experimental or logical measures. As a result, on Perelman’s analysis, philosophy lost its status in contemporary culture, as philosophers themselves claimed that philosophy could not deal with philosophical problems. Perelman found an escape hatch from this condition in a return to ancient methods of reasoning – dialectic and rhetoric. According to the ancient thinkers, and particularly among them Aristotle, these methods of reasoning were designed to offer possibilities for rational reasoning about issues with which the logical syllogism could not and should not contend. In other words, Perelman proposed a way out, for a discussion he viewed as having reached a dead-end due to its sanctification of a means (logical empiricism) in the name of which it undermined philosophical discussion itself.

In my view, Perelman indeed touches on a fundamental problem in which philosophical discussion has been embroiled in particular historical periods, due to the over-dominance of a philosophical outlook attempting to formulate the terms of validity of philosophical discussion in an absolute and dogmatic manner. The flourishing of the philosophy of language in the twentieth century⁶⁰ may be viewed in this way. This obliged the philosophizer to either translate every philosophical issue into a language issue or to remain outside philosophical discussion. A reductionist approach is foreign to philosophical

discussion and nips in the bud any attempt to conduct such a discussion in its true, open, critical form.

In addition, the subjects and argumentative requirements of the philosophy of language (usually emanating from the school of analytic philosophy) are largely responsible, in my view, for canceling the capital P in philosophy and finally replacing it with a low-case character, or even, paradoxically, for representing philosophical discussion – from within this discussion itself – as a malady to be cured and overcome. And indeed, when the terms of disassembly (analysis) are the terms of validity, and the subjects under discussion are the words and sentences of everyday language, then the study of philosophy does come across as a cancerous growth in which the creature (philosophical discussion) has overpowered its creator (language). In this context, Kant's words, from *Prolegomena*, concerning the response of "common sense philosophers" to the claims of David Hume are very apt:

One cannot observe without feeling a certain pain, how his opponents...so entirely missed the point of his problem. By always taking for granted what he was doubting and on the other hand proving, with violence and often with great unseemliness, what it had ever enter his mind to doubt.

(*Prolegomena* AK 4:258)

Paraphrasing this, I would like to call attention to the fact that the analysis of language assumes agreement precisely on that issue which should most be doubted – the manner of solving philosophical questions – while firmly and sometimes proudly proving that it possesses the capacity to solve problems that it itself has created, that it alone is interested in solving, and most probably that it alone is capable of solving. A discussion of this type indeed amounts to philosophy with a lower-case 'p,' a study of the science of the components of language. In this manner, philosophy achieves recognition as a science (an age-old aspiration in the history of philosophy), while forfeiting its traditional and unique role as philosophy. All the philosophical questions in the realms of ontology, epistemology and morality are displaced or translated into questions in one realm only, as if their solutions necessarily lie within it – our use of language. Thus, the philosophy of language stretches ad absurdum its recognition of the fact that thinking actions are verbal. Like a painter who has become a chemist after having understood that no painting is possible without pigment, philosophers turned into scientists of language after having understood that no philosophical action is possible without words.

As a result, similarly to Perelman, I too consider it my goal to propose an alternative to an insufferable philosophical predicament. Like him, I too be-

lieve it vital to find a way out of the dead-end and also that this can only occur if we succeed in reopening philosophical discussion and rescuing it from the dogmatic chains in which it is currently shackled. Rhetoric, without the negative connotations that usually accompany it, is definitely a suitable tool for this task. If we can free ourselves of these negative meanings and understand that philosophical discussion is possessed of a rhetorical side, I believe we will be able to restore it to its original and true character as an open and critical (pluralist) discussion, whose driving force is the search for truth. Revealing its rhetorical side will testify that the discussion does not consider itself enslaved to a certain way of reasoning, but rather to its end as a discussion seeking after “The Truth” – the absence of illusion. Consequently, every attempt to predetermine the way in which philosophical questions are to be treated is foreign to its nature and will necessarily lead it into a dead-end.⁶¹ The dead-end is the necessary result of a discussion in which the philosophical effort to avoid illusion, an effort whose main apparatus is freedom of thought, is replaced by an effort to restrict freedom of thought, even if this is done in a well formulated manner.

Rhetoric and philosophy: The rhetoric of “The Truth”

The expression ‘the rhetoric of “The Truth”’, I argue, expresses the correct way of examining philosophical argumentation. This is an argumentation in which it is possible to identify various features of the different ways of thinking and argumentation – logic, dialectic and rhetoric (at times also poetics as a manner of proof) – all of which are enlisted, in keeping with the needs, abilities and views of the philosopher, for purposes of examining freely but critically everything he suspects of being a misleading illusion, of obstructing the view of the truth. Therefore, philosophical discussion digresses from its route and reaches a dead-end whenever its efforts are directed towards restriction of the modes of thinking or when it relinquishes its end as a discussion seeking after truth. Plato, the “father of Western Philosophy,” reveals this thought in his writings. Socrates employs all the possible ways of argumentation (from logical analyses through fables, to the discovery of contradictions through emotional gestures) so as to examine his beliefs and strive towards discovery of the truth. In contrast, his interlocutors are represented by Plato as failing the philosophical objective, whether by adhering exclusively to a single mode of contemplation, a strategy that Socrates shows to be dogmatic, or by relinquishing the objective of seeking the truth, a move that Socrates criticizes as Sophistry. This is the case in those dialogues that deal with rhetoric itself, “Gorgias” and “Phaedrus.” In

“Gorgias,” Socrates criticizes Sophistic rhetoric, not because the Sophists have not mastered the ways of reasoning, but because they do not consider themselves committed to truth. Socrates criticizes them for this lack of commitment and it is precisely this that allows him to lead their arguments into a dead-end. On the other hand, in “Phaedrus,” Socrates criticizes the disqualification of rhetoric as a desirable method of reasoning, in the name of the truth. Socrates criticizes Phaedrus for disqualifying the use of rhetoric dogmatically, for he issued a sweeping disqualification, stemming from prejudice. In other words, Socrates identifies two dangers confronting philosophical discussion: giving up the concept of truth as the constituting concept of the discussion and removing, in advance, possible ways of thinking and argumentation. In the spirit of these insights I will try to formulate a view of philosophical argumentation as the rhetoric of “The Truth.”

The expression ‘the rhetoric of “The Truth”’ may sound problematic or even paradoxical. First, the term ‘rhetoric’ itself bears negative connotations. Following the distinction of rhetoric from dialectic, the former has usually been presented as a manipulative art of misguiding ploys or as “verbal cosmetics.” Consequently, it is perceived as capable of hiding the truth, not revealing it. Second, the concept of “The Truth” itself is perceived as an anachronism in contemporary philosophical discourse. Moreover, the link between rhetoric and “The Truth” may appear perplexing, both from the point of view of students of rhetoric and from that of those who see philosophy as a search for truth. The study of rhetoric is usually perceived as beginning from the point at which the aspiration to reveal “The Truth” was finally laid to rest; historically and theoretically the aspiration for “The Truth” conforms well to the adoption of ways of reasoning that lack a speaker-addressee aspect. Therefore, in order to fully clarify my intention, I would like to define, in a lucid and focused manner, the way I believe these concepts are to be understood.

In defining rhetoric, I wish to follow in the footsteps of Quintilian (“*bene dicendi seientia*”)⁶² and Campbell (“That art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end”),⁶³ and define rhetoric as a pluralistic argumentative method, suited to discussions that do not predetermine the ways of argument relevant for examining the issue at hand. In some sense, this conforms to Aristotle’s definition of the objective of rhetoric – revealing the spectrum of possible arguments regarding a controversial subject, concerning which we have in hand no guiding method.

In the concept “The Truth” I wish to identify that atavistic motivation at the base of philosophical discussion, formulated so successfully (as I noted in my introduction) by none other than its greatest critic, Nietzsche, as a will

to avoid all illusion, including self-delusion. The stubborn will to seek after answers to a fundamental dissatisfaction, whether epistemological or moral, regarding reality, rooted in the suspicion that our way of perceiving reality suffers from one illusion or another. This is a will that remains unsatisfied by the multiplicity of answers (the “pluralist model of truth” according to Perelman) on the one hand, and by dogmatic answers, on the other. I believe that this is why the image of Socrates, as reflected in the Platonic dialogues, is perceived as that of the philosopher. His image faithfully reflects the philosopher possessed of “rhetorical openness” (that is, one does not restrict himself to one manner of proof alone), who at the same time refuses to compromise on the philosophical objective of “The Truth,” an absence of illusion. It is in this way that we may understand the advantage Socrates ascribes to his condition as one who, in contrast to those who know, does not imagine to know what he does not know.

Philosophical discussion, as expressed in the Socratic dialogues, is one that enlists all the powers of the soul to work towards revelation of the illusions misleading the soul itself. Discernible in this discussion are elements of reason (logical arguments, the revealing of contradictions) as well as elements of imagination (myths, fables and similes), of emotion (anger or love, for example) and of memory (of the development of the discussion itself and of past discussions and positions). It should be emphasized in this context that the use of reason, no less than that of any other mental faculty, poses the danger of manipulation which usually surfaces whenever non-rational elements of philosophical discussion are proposed.⁶⁴ It thus cannot be claimed a priori that emotion, imagination or memory are less relevant than reason to attaining the objective of philosophical discussion, or that their employment is necessarily negative, necessarily giving rise to illusion. For me, Socrates, who does not restrict himself in this sense, serves as an authentic, though literary, expression of this view. He is certainly not a “demon of cold rationality”, as Nietzsche describes him in his book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, but rather a dynamic persona whose philosophical conduct can be characterized by its persistence in seeking truth and employing all the powers of the spirit towards attaining this end.⁶⁵ I do not object to Nietzsche’s claim that Socrates is a “demon of rationality,” since he refuses to accept the mystical world of the Attic tragedy. At the same time, I believe his description of rationality as cold rationality should be rejected. Socrates is not an expression of an indifferent reason, but rather of a power originating in personal and inclusive engagement; Socrates brings more than a lightning, razor-sharp, analytical knife to the dialogues. Through the image of Socrates, Plato positions philosophy between those who

have no doubt that they are possessed of the truth (whether their lack of doubt is justified – the gods, or whether they mistakenly avoid self-criticism – the dogmatics), and those whose for whom “the will to truth” is not a guiding light (the Sophists). This, to a large extent, is how he formed the philosopher’s obligation to avoid being identified as either dogmatic or as a Sophist. The equation of rhetoric with the Sophists caused its perception as a factor hostile to philosophy, and its negation served philosophers as a tool of self-definition. Moreover, the identification of rhetorical aspects in philosophical arguments served in past and often still serves at present to criticize these arguments and disqualify them philosophically. However, philosophical arguments appeal to the subject’s judgment, and are therefore intended to convince. Accordingly, the question is not in which philosophical arguments one can locate rhetorical aspects and which are free of any such aspects. Conviction *per se* is not a reprehensible objective; on the contrary, it is the denial of conviction as an argument’s objective that may lead to extremely problematic results from a philosophical point of view – to fraud and self-deception. Philosophers wish to claim that they prove their positions, but a philosophical proof bears within it an element of conviction. A recognition of this fact does not have to lead to indifference concerning the question of truth, unless one belittles and dismisses man’s powers of judgment and prefers distinct criteria or transcendental authorities to this judgment. ‘Bad rhetoric’ is the choice of one who scorns the values of truth and morality, not the necessary result of an acknowledgement that truth in philosophical discussion is subject to human judgment. However, the deepest and most interesting problem emanating from this acknowledgement is not deceiving the other (‘bad rhetoric’), but rather self-deception. On the assumption that the philosopher indeed takes it upon himself to adhere to “the will to truth,” what tools has he for telling truth from self-deception, towards the realization of his objective?

While at this stage in the discussion this question seems secondary, or perhaps appears to be a digression from the main subject, it will increasingly acquire the status of a central issue the more we attempt to define the rhetorical characteristic of philosophical discussion. Rhetoric, as argumentative pluralism that appeals to the subject’s judgment, is – I will claim – an unavoidable feature of philosophical discussion. The negative connotations attached to rhetoric should trouble philosophical criticism and influence it, but should not by any means lead to a denial of the conviction that accompanies philosophical argumentation. Such a denial, as stated, is itself fertile ground for deception and self-deception, which contradicts the very end of philosophy – “the will to truth.” Such a denial usually results from a largely paradoxical at-

tempt to remove the subject so that he will not be able to delude himself. I have called the rhetoric of philosophy ‘the rhetoric of “The Truth”’, in order to emphasize and bind together the two constitutive conditions of philosophical discussion: its objective, “the will to truth,” and its framework of argumentation, rhetoric. Philosophical discussion, in contrast to other discussions that are aimed at revealing the truth, and with all the complexity this involves, cannot but see the (individual) subject himself as the one to whom it is given, if at all, to confirm the truth.⁶⁶ The questions I will try to address concern the prominent rhetorical characteristics of a rhetoric whose formation is subject to the philosophical objective (the will to truth) and the philosophical lessons to be learned from this. The next chapter will open the discussion of the rhetoric of philosophy with the aspect distinguishing rhetoric from all other forms of reasoning – that of the speaker and addressee.

CHAPTER 2

Speaker and addressee in philosophy

The speaker and the addressee constitute every rhetorical situation, and must accordingly be considered by every account that deals with a rhetorical issue.⁶⁷ Those Platonic dialogues that deal with the subject explicitly, “Gorgias” and “Phaedrus”, already pay special attention to this fact. In “Gorgias,” Socrates is presented as critical of the rhetoricians, Gorgias and his students, for the falsity of their art, as its success depends exclusively upon the speaker’s ability to “con” the addressee. In “Phaedrus,” where Socrates is presented as defending the possibility of a “good rhetoric,” he sees the rhetorician’s main task as knowing the souls of his addressees and knowing how to fit every speech to the soul to which it is addressed. The climax of this art, Socrates claims, is its capacity to know the souls of the gods and to converse with them. Aristotle, who was viewed as the “founding father of rhetoric” (to the same extent that he was viewed as the “founding father of logic”), notes that the fundamental difference between logic and rhetoric is that it is insufficient, in a rhetorical account, to consider proof alone, for the issue of the speaker and the addressee must also be considered. This line of thought, indicating the speaker and addressee as those constituting the rhetorical situation, runs through the entire history of rhetoric, among those striving to denounce it as well as those seeking to praise it. It is this characteristic that troubles those writers who would excise it from philosophical discussion,⁶⁸ while its supporters view it as that deeply important component which will never disappear from philosophical discussion.⁶⁹

Chaim Perelman, one of the main figures responsible for the revival of interest in rhetoric in the twentieth century, attempts to establish that the philosopher’s special addressee is the one who determines philosophizing as a rational activity. In every other rhetorical situation, Perelman claims, the speaker addresses the addressee or a group of addressees who share more or less concrete characteristics, and he is therefore able to fit his argumentation to the character of the addressee. He can know which assumptions the addressee holds true, what kinds of reasons he considers acceptable, as well as what type of speaker he considers to be reliable. In contrast, the philosopher-speaker addresses an addressee who, to a large extent, lacks concrete characteristics, and

in fact, Perelman claims, amounts to any possible reader of the philosophical text. The philosophers' manner of dealing with this unique rhetorical situation, he says, is to formulate to themselves an hypothetical addressee, the 'universal audience,' as Perelman terms it. This audience is a theoretical entity of sorts, who nevertheless, expresses, to a large extent, the character of rational man as perceived in the social-historical context within which the philosopher was active. Defining the 'universal audience,' Perelman stresses, is a crucial task, whether the philosopher is dealing with internal contemplation or an attempt to formulate his position in speech or text. Every philosophical activity is an activity involving a speaker and an addressee, and the addressee is the 'universal audience' posited by the philosopher. This addressee, who is not defined on grounds of the common interests of a concrete group of addressees, is – according to Perelman – responsible for the fact that the rhetoric of philosophy is rational.⁷⁰

I am interested in following rhetorical tradition and also in following in Perelman's footsteps, thus treating the speaker-addressee situation as basic to philosophical activity, while distinctly differing from Perelman's account on two basic points:

- a. I will seek to treat the question of the speaker at length, a question to which the rhetorical literature, including Perelman's, assigns very limited treatment.
- b. I do not intend to replace the concept of truth with that of the 'universal audience,' and will accordingly be rejecting Perelman's claim that it is the addressee who forms philosophical argumentation.

The philosophical speaker

The question of the speaker in philosophical discussion usually arises just when one claims that there is a gap between the text's declarations and the justifications it actually provides for them. In other words, such consideration generally appears only when there is dissatisfaction of some kind concerning the text, and not as one of the necessary components of a critical attitude towards philosophical texts. Moreover, when philosophical criticism includes a consideration to the speaker, this is often viewed as hostile and disputatious. The assumption underlying philosophical criticism, even if not always presented explicitly, is that the given arguments can and should be isolated from their speaker, allow-

ing their examination *per se*, while the figure of the speaker is not perceived as part of “the argumentation itself.”

In this sense, philosophical texts are treated like scientific ones. The speaker only becomes the subject of criticism when the text is entirely rejected. Then, the thrust of the criticism, no longer dealing with the thesis of the text, turns aggressively to the writer who is instantaneously identified with the speaker in the text. In such cases, the writer’s biographical details are sometimes even cited as seeming justifications for a negation of his position. In other words, mention of the speaker, to the extent that it appears at all, appears as an addition to that criticism that negates the text entirely, and not as an integral part of the critique of the text itself. This equation of writer with speaker is only reasonable if and when philosophical texts are indeed identical to scientific texts. In scientific texts of the type that is subject to known rules of justification, the speaker’s weight in the argumentation is indeed negligible, for which reason a distinction between the speaker and writer is totally futile.

The case of literary texts is quite different. The distinction between writer and speaker is widely accepted in the theory of literature. This basic distinction is accepted by interpretative positions that assign importance to, and see a point in, reference to biographical materials, and all the more so by the positions totally rejecting such reference. I am interested in using this distinction in my treatment of philosophical texts, not in order to claim that they are actually literary texts, but rather in order to point out the speaker’s significant role (the speaker’s, not the writer’s) in philosophical argumentation. On the one hand, this role is not identical to the one played by the speaker in literary texts. On the other hand, it cannot be identified with the role (or the actual lack of any role) of the speaker in scientific texts.

Scientific texts, when written into a binding field of justification, are in fact aimed at canceling the presence of the speaker altogether. Therefore, identifying the speaker with the scientist is not problematic, and any reference to his person lies outside the scope of a scientific critique of his proof. Moreover, the scientific goal is the creation of increasingly formal texts, thus unifying the style in which they are formulated as well as the image of the speaker. In other words, a procedure is supposed to replace the need to deal with a characterization of the speaker and especially of his or her reliability.⁷¹

Unlike scientific texts, then, literary ones always consolidate around the figure of the speaker. However, as these texts are not committed to truth,⁷² they can allow themselves a free play of speakers of various types, and can even include texts whose organizing principle is an unreliable speaker. While it is clearly of importance for an understanding of the speaker’s figure and has an

effect on the understanding of the entire work, the question of the speaker's reliability is not one that determines the literary value of the text. In other words, an unreliable speaker is definitely a possible and legitimate choice in literature.

My claim is that philosophical texts lie in the midst, between those texts that, in the name of truth, seek to erode the subject's involvement in favor of methods of proof, and those texts possessed of no commitment to truth. On the one hand, philosophical texts cannot and should not erode the speaker-addressee framework, and on the other, they must subject their choice of the speaker's figure to their goal of the "will to truth." As texts that are not committed to processes of verification known in advance, philosophical texts acquire their validity, among other things, from features relating to the figure of the speaker; the speaker ("the voice of the text") rather than the philosopher (the historical person).⁷³ It is true that when the philosopher is well known, an equation of his person and the speaker can lend authority to what the text is stating, which should not by any means be belittled in a rhetorical analysis. However, when an equation is made in such cases, it is more of a fallacy of *argumentum ad verecundiam*, which damages the critical character of the discussion, than a necessary aspect without which no philosophical argumentation could take place. One could take a similar approach towards quotes from central philosophers that are customarily included in philosophical texts to support their theses. Accordingly, the distinction I am interested in – between the speaker and the writer – is vital for an understanding of the figure of the philosopher-speaker, the reliable speaker who fills an important role in every philosophical argumentation. I wish to explore what characterizes the philosopher-speaker, beyond the various mantles he dons, and what philosophical value can be gained from an account of his figure in an analysis of philosophical texts.

Seemingly, a random empirical survey would suffice for pointing out the great variety in the characterization of philosopher-speakers. The speaker that meets our eye in the texts of Nietzsche, that rebel who sends sparks flying all around him, finally achieving literary manifestation in the form of Zarathustra, seems utterly different from the measured and deliberating scientist-speakers reflected to us from many contemporary articles. The figure of the speaker in Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* or in Descartes *Meditations Concerning First Philosophy*, striving to create an intimacy with the addressee, is in no way identical to the figure of the authoritative speaker arising from Kant's books. Who is the speaker in the Platonic dialogues? Should he be identified with the figure of Socrates or defined hypothetically?

I wish to claim that although this brief overview already presents an entire, perhaps infinite, gallery of speakers, the differences between them are explicable in terms of different tastes (the cultural context, the philosophical position, the philosopher's biography, etc.), but that there is a single speaker's figure at the core of each and every one of these, as varied as they may be – that of 'the man of truth.' The speaker of philosophical texts is obliged to present himself as one whose objective is truth alone or, more precisely, as one whose fear of illusion is what motivates and drives him, as the sole thing guiding his thinking. In short, part of the construction of philosophical argumentation is channeled through the design of a figure, that of the speaker, which must fit the philosophical motivation of the "will to truth."

The fact that the speaker is a specific realization of the 'man of truth' is not a matter of choice in philosophical discussion, and there is therefore no speaker who is not designed towards this end. Furthermore, the speaker's ability to be perceived as a 'man of truth,' frequently determines the degree to which the position he is presenting is accepted, even by himself. I do not mean to claim that every philosopher is occupied to a greater or smaller degree with the design of the image refracted from his work, but rather – and this is where the critical lesson can be realized – that the figure of the speaker is a characterizable projection of a perception of truth that precedes the philosophical position formulated in the text. The perception of truth embodied in the figure of the speaker should testify to the validity of the philosophical position, even if the philosopher lacks any rhetorical awareness whatsoever. The figure of the speaker is an expression of the desired figure of the philosopher, as the latter is perceived by the person behind the written or spoken text. The figure of the speaker will not contain anything that might cast doubt on the speaker's philosophical ability and it will contain everything that can testify to his ability and his adherence to the "will to truth."⁷⁴ Therefore, a rhetorical analysis of the figure of the speaker can teach us in the light of which values and choices the philosophical position has been formed, beyond the explicit statements of the text itself. The speaker's figure is in fact the personified manifestation of a system of preferences that is not always explicitly reported by the text, but within which its validity is determined. Failing to refer consciously and systematically to this aspect, which is one of the essential components of rhetorical argumentation, may entail an uninformed evaluation, whether good or bad, of the philosophical position supported in a given text. In other words, the philosophical criticism that travels through the unveiling of presuppositions, owes it to itself to refer to the characterization of the speaker, from which it will undoubtedly gain. On the other hand, the absence of any reference to the char-

acter of the speaker leaves an essential part of the argumentative space hidden and unmonitored. As long as this figure does not become part of the argumentative space examined in a critical reading, it covertly affects the way in which we treat the text; for instance, it can determine whether we approach the text with the intent of rejecting or accepting it. As in any other situation between human beings, the relation established between speaker and addressee bears considerable significance.

The theory of literature, which naturally has always taken more of an interest than philosophy in characters and speakers, can reveal a broad spectrum of 'men of truth.' From the figure of the prophet, whose truth lies in its difference and singularity, through that of the modern anti-hero, whose truth lies in none other than its ordinariness (its failures and hesitations). An 'omniscient narrator,' who is not a character in the story, who adheres to the descriptive aspect, or his antithesis, the confessing speaker, who discloses the very last of his intimate details, and so forth. In other words, literature itself demonstrates that many and varied speakers can be perceived as 'men of truth.'

A brief reiteration of the philosophers mentioned earlier can exemplify that philosophical discussion also offers a broad spectrum of 'men of truth.' The spell of the speaker in Nietzsche's writings, sometimes causing philosophers repulsion towards this work but often drawing them to it, stems from his being a 'man of truth.' The 'man of truth' who shouts from the mountaintops his unwillingness to live the vain frauds of counterfeit truth. An understanding of his character cannot avoid seeking analogies between his figure and that of the prophet. Moreover, the emotional involvement that he integrates into the text necessarily affects how it is read and how it is treated. Probably, this 'man of truth' will be perceived by those who project a "scientific" perception of truth, as one who prefers stylistic gestures to seeking truth. The speaker, possessed of a scientific image, who is reflected from many contemporary articles, is a 'man of truth.' A 'man of truth' who attempts to blur his presence in the text, and who expects as much of other speakers, does so in order to achieve an objective discourse (the most objective arguments are speaker-less ones). An understanding of his character can draw on the parallel of the "omniscient narrator" of the literary work (and certainly of the classical novel). This is a speaker who apparently examines reality from an external and inclusive point of view. The disappearance of the speaker will obviously seem suspect to one who projects a perception of truth stemming from introspection. Berkeley's speaker in *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, who takes us on a journey of introspection, is a 'man of truth.' A 'man of truth' often seeking to determine the trait of personal sincerity as a measure of truth. A figure whose literary analogue can be

found in the modern psychological novel, where the journey in search of truth is unfailingly a personal and internal journey. Additional and various ‘men of truth’ are Descartes’ authentic speaker in *Meditations*, who shares with the addressee his process of deliberations and thinking, Kant’s authoritative speaker in the “*Critiques*”, who addresses his addressees as a teacher would his students, Plato’s dramatized dialogue, creating a semblance of critical conversation, the “archeologist,” who describes only what is before his eyes in Foucault’s work, and so forth. Of course, this will not provide enough for a sufficient examination of the argumentative role of these speakers in each and every text, as the characterization I have sketched for them is very general. Nevertheless, I felt it important to demonstrate through these examples that the ‘man of truth’ is not bound to any particular pattern, and that therefore his figure is a manifestation of the system of values forming each text.

There are many kinds of speakers but none among them that will fail to be a ‘man of truth.’ I do not mean that they could not be perceived by particular addressees as unreliable speakers. On the contrary, in many cases the speaker will be presented as such by various addressees. As stated above, the more forcefully a critique rejects a given text, the greater its tendency to include a criticism of the speaker’s degree of reliability (although usually targeting the philosopher himself, as it is not customary to focus separately on the speaker). At this stage in the present discussion, though, I am interested in examining the aspect of the speaker, rather than that of the addressee. The speaker is represented as one who does his best to avoid illusion (“the will to truth”). The ‘man of truth’ can shout or whisper his words, he can use an abundance of facts or extensive introspection. He can choose different methods of justification, for even though justification is required it has no pre-set binding rules. He can cross boundaries between different fields, but there is one boundary he cannot cross – he has to be a ‘man of truth.’ In his character he testifies to what the writer views as required of a subject seeking to think philosophically, what is desired of a subject seeking not to be misled by illusion.

This may sound like a sweeping ironic critique of philosophical speakers, but it is not. At this stage, I am not dealing with an evaluation of various philosophical texts, and most certainly am not presuming to testify to the refutability of even one philosophical argument. In addition, the few sentences in which I have described various philosopher-speakers are no more than general intimations indicating various directions. The philosopher always faces the philosophical challenge personally, and the character of the speaker in each and every text should therefore be examined in a precise and careful way. My point of departure is that the philosopher, every philosopher, expresses – in his own

way – an attempt to confront the central philosophical challenge, the “will to truth.” Accordingly, he demands for himself, via the figure of the speaker, a privileged vantage point from which this objective can be realized, a vantage point capable of reducing or totally preventing the fear of illusion. Whether or not this vantage point is successful is obviously a matter for philosophical evaluation approaching each text separately. All philosophers present themselves as lifting a veil of illusion that prevents the lucid contemplation of reality, whether this be an illusion created by the senses or stemming from philosophical texts themselves, and the speaker of every philosophical text is formed by this objective. I am referring to a desired, rather than an existing, speaker, and therefore an understanding of his character can fill in the gaps between what is explicitly stated in the text and the implicit demand for a privileged vantage point; a demand that often misleads the philosopher himself as well.

A speaker presuming to uncover a stratum of illusion in readers’ treatment of reality may be received with increased suspicion. Therefore, the degree of his ability to be perceived as a ‘man of truth’ weighs heavily in the initial willingness to examine his work as a possible position, and all the more as a true position. The biblical prophets needed signs and miracles to convince the people, as well as themselves, that they were ‘men of truth.’ This testifies to the fact that a clear-sighted person will find it no less, and possibly more, difficult to convince himself that he is a ‘man of truth.’⁷⁵ Though at times verging on the image of the prophet, the philosopher-speakers cannot choose this route.⁷⁶ Consequently, we can find a broad spectrum of speakers, each of whom is supposed to convince himself, first and foremost, that his vantage point is a privileged one capable of preventing illusion. The speaker is not necessarily an artificial platform (his evaluation as such is a critical one), but rather – and this is the matter at hand – a purified manifestation of the perception of truth guiding the (spoken or written) text. He is supposed to express the answer to the key question – what must I shed or acquire in order to be capable of not deluding even myself? Much of what is stated in philosophical texts is aimed, even if not always explicitly and not necessarily consciously, at establishing the speaker’s ability and reliability. At times, this is evidence of his erudition or knowledge; at times it is just the opposite – evidence of his “ignorance,” his capacity to address problems as a *Tabula rasa*. At times it is testimony to his character as a person, or an attempt to remove his presence as such. These contradictory characterizations not only demonstrate different perceptions of truth, but also reveal once again the fact that what is at hand is an activity in which the rules of justification are not agreed or known in advance. If they had been, we could not have found such a varied gallery of

speakers, and the figure of the speaker (or its absence) would not have been so pronounced, making it pointless to try to characterize this figure in each and every text.

In examining texts from a rhetorical point of view, one should not succumb to seeing as a fallacy the fact that a speaker's presence is discernible. No philosophical text is without the figure of a speaker, and this step would therefore amount to a return to the misleading logic-rhetoric dichotomy, designed to deny the element of conviction that accompanies every philosophical activity. On the other hand, the speaker's characterization is most certainly an interpretative-critical tool. This characterization can reveal various components that validate the philosophical position, beyond – and sometimes in contradiction to – the things stated explicitly by the text itself.⁷⁷ In other words, the speaker's characterization should not be treated *a priori* as a rejecting means but rather, first and foremost, as an explanatory one. It is precisely the lack of awareness to, or the suppression of, the rhetorical aspect that multiplies *ad hominem* arguments in philosophical discussion; arguments that resort to an attack against the speaker (identified with the writer himself), so as to refute his position and support an alternative one. In many cases, such arguments are extremely coarse and blunt and present a sweeping rejection of the legitimacy of the other position.

Ad hominem arguments themselves need not be perceived as arguments falling outside of legitimate philosophical criticism. The latter, as defined by John Locke, in his book *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, is a critical argument, formulated in a clear and binding relation to things said by the interlocutor and not in an attempt to undermine his reliability in an illegitimate manner:

[T]o press man with consequences drawn from his own principles, or concessions. This is already known under the name *Argumentum ad hominem*.

(*Essay* IV.XVII.21)

A far more radical position is formulated by Henry W. Johnstone, who claims that all philosophical arguments are in fact *ad hominem* arguments. Johnstone, who views all philosophical arguments as polemical in their intended orientation, claims that all philosophers acquire validity only through revealing inconsistencies in the positions of their opponents. In supporting his position, Johnstone's discussion passes through the opposition of *ad hominem* to *ad rem* arguments. First, believing that the logical concept of inconsistency could be integrated into philosophy, Johnstone sought to show that a philosophical position is never based on facts but rather determines what facts are, and that

its test is therefore a logical one, a test that he equated with *Argumentum ad hominem*. As Johnstone believed that the consistency of a philosophical position could be assessed in purely logical terms, he claimed that such a test provided a necessity identical to that provided by formal arguments.⁷⁸ In formulating this position, Johnstone attempts, on the one hand, to defend the necessity embedded in philosophical arguments and, on the other, to emphasize that philosophical argumentation is always introduced into a discourse. Philosophical arguments are all *ad hominem* arguments, for they are based on the logical rejection of the alternative position. Even when, later in his career, Johnstone reached the conclusion that philosophical inconsistency was not analogous to logical inconsistency,⁷⁹ he nevertheless sought to adhere to his claim that all philosophical arguments are necessarily *ad hominem* arguments. In doing so, he drew on Whately's definition:

In the *argumentum ad hominem*, the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular viz., not that 'such and such is the fact', but that 'this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of reasoning, or consistency with his own conduct, situation. . . (Whately 1864: 196)⁸⁰

While his original position also included the view that *ad hominem* arguments referred, by definition, to the commitments of the opponent, at this point Johnstone sought to emphasize that even the concept of inconsistency, employed for the purpose of rejecting an opposing position, must be the self same concept adhered to by the opponent. In other words, *ad hominem* arguments, in Johnstone's view, are the only valid philosophical arguments, even if their validity is strictly local, as they are subject to the concepts of the interlocutors in a given debate. The main reason for his insistence that the arguments are unfailingly *ad hominem*, even if their validity is strictly local, in accordance with his later view, is that what is in question are arguments that support a world view, which therefore cannot be *ad rem* arguments.

Johnstone is in fact pointing out that philosophical arguments are always founded on the disclosure of inconsistencies between the conclusions and the presuppositions of an alternative position, rather than on the assessment of these conclusions relative to given facts. The fact that he, somewhat justifiably, chooses to label this argumentation *Argumentum ad Hominem* is considerably misleading. He himself confesses to the problematic character of this label in the epilogue to the collection of his articles, for *ad hominem* arguments are usually perceived as overstepping legitimate criticism.⁸¹ And indeed, even Whately, whose definition guided Johnstone in forming his views, cautions in *Elements*

of *Logic*, which is referred to by Johnstone, that this is one of the types of arguments viewed by logicians as a fallacy. Whatley himself claims that it is not a logical fallacy, with the exception of arguments whose unfair use can be considered to be a non-logical fallacy. In the list of such instances he cites arguments such as *Argumentum ad populum* and others. With regard to *ad hominem* arguments, Whatley claims that the use of this form often slips into an irrelevant reference to personality and to the personal history of the opponent in a debate, instead of sticking exclusively to his arguments.⁸²

Reference to the biographical details or personality of one's interlocutor is not actually a rare occurrence in philosophical discussion. As I see it, the main source of this "slippage" is the identification of the speaker with the writer. Usually, *ad hominem* arguments do not make do with uncovering inconsistencies, whether local or universal, between the philosophical stand and its pre-suppositions. They frequently set out to undermine the reliability of the philosopher himself. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that Whatley himself represents a position according to which philosophers deduce their conclusions logically, and that he therefore views every departure from an approach strictly pertaining to logical relations, as a transgression of the legitimate space of philosophy. I wish to note that the multiplicity of *ad hominem* arguments, which indeed often slide into irrelevant personal attacks against the opponent (though we should not be restricted to uncovering inconsistencies, as if this were the only way of evaluating the position supported by the argument) indicate that the speaker's reliability carries considerable weight in the acceptance or the rejection of a given position in philosophical discussion. That is to say, the claim that all philosophical arguments are *ad hominem* arguments is a misleading one, especially if its meaning is limited to the uncovering of inconsistencies in the positions presented by one's opponent in a debate. It is misleading because the literal meaning of the phrase *Argumentum ad hominem* has nothing to say about inconsistency but, more important, it engenders inattention to an essential aspect of philosophical argumentation involving the role of the speaker.

The speaker who demands for himself a privileged position, can and must be criticized for this demand; his reliability must be put to the test. This, in my opinion, should be the correct and essential meaning of such criticism. Failing to doubt the privileged status demanded by the speaker, does not allow a critical attitude towards his statements and may lead to "authority-based agreement,"⁸³ an agreement contradicting the goal of philosophy, for it may contribute to the entrenchment of an illusion. To a large extent, this is how the illusion into which we are "sucked" in a work of literature is constructed.

However, while our capacity to succumb to the guiding hand of the “implied author” is a positive element in the experience of reading a literary work, it becomes problematic when the objective aimed at is the “will to truth.”

The current discussion returns us to a recognition of the blurred boundaries of philosophical discussion. The appearance of the ‘man of truth’ is not sufficient for making a text into a work of philosophical value. The best of literature and all the religious texts are packed with ‘men of truth.’ Nevertheless, we cannot think of one philosophical text emitting a voice that is not that of a ‘man of truth.’ Even those philosophies formulated like scientific texts, or alternately in dialogue form, cannot banish the presence of this particular speaker and they are merely means of emphasizing his reliability according to the values to which they adhere. Therefore, instead of denying the existence and the argumentative role of the speaker, we would be better off trying to characterize his value system through an understanding of his figure.

This may sound strange or even dangerous to one who believes that the validity of philosophical arguments should and can be examined independently of the rhetorical context; strange should my claims fail to convince him, dangerous should they succeed. Approaching the question of the speaker raises subjective connotations, perceived as negative by those who view philosophy’s chief task as removing the traces of the subject staining the pure path towards truth, and who usually consider mathematics and logic to be models for proper activity of this kind.⁸⁴ On the other hand, unlike rhetorical critiques of philosophical texts, it is not my view that identifying the guiding hand of the speaker is indication that the seemingly respectable “will to truth” always hides motivations that are foreign to this ideal, such as a “will to power.”

Common to these two contradictory approaches is a dichotomy between the subjective and the objective, and the equation of what is true with the objective. Both approaches in fact express an agreement that the presence of the subject indicates the absence of truth. The “objectivists” will accordingly attempt to remove all traces of the speakers’ presence, in order to present “the arguments themselves,” as if this could indeed extract them from the context of speaker and addressee. The “subjectivists” will try to point out that it is impossible to remove the presence of the subject, and will claim that this fact testifies to the necessity for relinquishing “The Truth” as a goal. Both positions themselves can be construed as originating in the “will to truth,” the will to avoid illusion, but both are ruled by the idea that the subject and the truth are mutually exclusive. I would like to claim that neither the subject nor the “will to truth” can be removed from philosophy. Moreover, the point made here is that

even philosophical positions representing one of these trends find themselves conducting the same discussion time and again.

The thought that there is an illusion in the way we approach reality, manifested equally in positions seeking to establish the relativity or even the absence of truth and in positions attempting to support universal truths, is an essential aspect of that discussion that I have sought to equate with “the will to truth”. The subject himself is not the enemy of this orientation but rather its source. The act of placing the subject’s question mark over his understanding of himself and his surroundings is the origin of the philosophical search, and therefore the search itself can only end within the subject. The fact that every philosophical position is presented as being generated by the “will to truth” is not a mere historical-coincidental fact; the role of the speaker, as a ‘man of truth,’ indicates the subject’s capacity for realizing this will. Despite his subjectivity, or more precisely by virtue of it, the subject can indicate the way in which it is possible to avoid illusion. The ‘man of truth,’ who serves as a criterion for examining every speaker in philosophical discussion, is a speaker who demands for himself not only the will but also the ability not to delude even himself. This ideal is very abstract, for which reason we can find various realizations of it, and even contradictory ones, aimed at actualizing the ideal (from an attempt to remove the presence of the speaker through the over-emphasis of this presence).⁸⁵ Whatever the realizations, and whatever the evaluation assigned each of them, the speaker as one who organizes the text, is always there and always, in philosophy, as the ‘man of truth.’ As in any other rhetorical argumentation, the figure of the speaker comes to bear upon the acceptance or the rejection of his arguments. The degree of reliability or unreliability he affects in his addressees can influence the way in which his arguments are examined. He may be received as an unquestioned authority, thus excessively weakening the criticism directed at his arguments, or he may, on the other hand, arouse such forceful opposition as to have his arguments rejected from the outset. In between these two extremes, neither of which is foreign to philosophical discussion, there are of course many varied combinations of mutual speaker-addressee relations affecting the potential for agreement between the two. As addressees with different preferences may be exposed to his arguments, the speaker’s figure may have a different influence on different addressees. The fundamental and important thing to be noted and kept in mind, however, is that the argumentative space of philosophy is unfailingly circumscribed by subjects and is not situated in some objective space. Consequently, the argumentative space of philosophy is unfailingly circumscribed by a speaker and an addressee, and the speaker is unfailingly a ‘man of truth.’

However, in addition to the critical conclusion indicating that an examination of the speaker's character is vital to an understanding of the validity of philosophical argumentation, a certain problem arises which should be considered. If the philosopher-speaker is necessarily formed as a specific realization of the 'man of truth,' then he necessarily reflects a desired, rather than existing figure. The representation of a desired figure as an existing one amounts to creating an illusion, which is a precise inversion of the philosophical goal. 'Bad rhetoric' has no qualms about employing such means to achieve its goal – persuading the other. A 'bad rhetorician' is aware of constructing a fictitious figure – that of the speaker, suited to the task of persuading his addressees. This is his art and he himself is conscious of the fact that this figure is not him. Can a similar statement be made about philosopher speakers? Are they not committed to present an ideal image that is prone to mislead? In other words, isn't the fraudulent dimension immanent to philosophical rhetoric, no less than it is to 'bad rhetoric' (in this case, the speaker's presentation as a 'man of truth')?

It seems to me that I will be able to provide a clearer and better substantiated answer after a discussion of the issue of the addressee. Therefore, although this last question is a troubling one, at least for those who view the "will to truth" as the ideal constituting their intellectual activity, I prefer to address it only after my discussion of the philosophical addressee.

The philosophical addressee

In contrast to their sparse treatment of the question of the speaker, various rhetorical theories and analyses provide a wealth of references to the question of the addressee. Most rhetorical views assume, whether implicitly or explicitly, that the speaker's figure derives from that of the addressee.⁸⁶ Consequently, the most rhetorical effort is invested in attempts to characterize the addressee. This is manifested in various books on rhetoric in superficial formulations of the different possible traits and the various psychological states of the addressee. Such formulations set out to educate readers as to the traits and psychological states of human beings, and about the manner in which these are activated through verbal approaches.⁸⁷ In the rhetorical analyses of texts in general, and of philosophical texts in particular, this tendency is manifested in attempts to point out a concrete addressee, whether an individual or a community, whose characterization is purported to explain the way in which the speaker, identified with the philosopher himself, turns to the addressee.

Chaim Perelman takes a slightly different approach, attempting a more abstract identity of the addressee, at least in the context of philosophy. Perelman claims that the philosopher's arguments should not be approached from the viewpoint of "The Truth," and as therefore, in his view, lacking a speaker-addressee dimension, holds that they should instead be seen as addressing what he calls the 'universal audience' (as opposed to a concrete audience). This is Perelman's way of reconciling what he sees as the two facets characterizing philosophical activity – its rhetorical character and its rational character. Perelman sees the 'universal audience' as an element explaining the possibility of a rational rhetoric, a rhetoric that, to him, is characteristic of philosophical argumentation.

The 'universal audience,' a theoretical fiction that the philosopher designs and instates as his addressee, is supposed to explain philosophical activity as rational activity, according to Perelman, despite the multiplicity of contradicting positions and without recourse to the concept of "The Truth." Perelman's claim is that philosophers' arguments are rational because, unlike other rhetorical arguments, they are based upon elements the validity of which cannot be strictly local.⁸⁸ This, in fact, is an additional step intended to support the thesis that Perelman is promoting, that of rational pluralism. Rational pluralism is purported to be an answer to the relinquishment of the idea of "The Truth," on the one hand, and to explain, on the other, why philosophical discussion, particularly in the field of the philosophy of morals, need not necessarily emerge from this relinquishment as an irrational discussion. Rational pluralism, at least in our era, seems like a worthy goal to strive for. However, it is discernible that the equation created by Perelman between intolerance and a monolithic perception of truth, "The Truth," is actually his main justification for removing this view of truth.⁸⁹ In fact, Perelman makes a value-based choice to relinquish the goal of truth, for the sake of the goal of tolerance. His apprehension from a human reality guided by the idea of "The Truth," finds its solution in the idea's replacement. In this sense, the 'universal audience' serves Perelman as a dam preventing the breakdown of pluralism into relativism or even anarchism.

It seems to me that the equation Perelman creates between "The Truth" and intolerance is not a necessary one, and that it refers only to the dogmatic and dangerous implications manifested in the theoretical or practical conduct of those who believe they hold the truth. Furthermore, it is difficult to deny the fact that the history of philosophy is a history of the search for truth, "The Truth." Therefore, if we emphasize the "will to truth," we can stay loyal to the philosophical goal while also explaining why it need not be equated with intolerance. Then, the 'universal audience' will not be seen as a replacement for

the search for truth, but rather as a need originating in the “will to truth.” I accordingly wish to claim that in contrast to Perelman’s view, the character of this audience is not a matter mainly dependent upon the cultural-historical context, but is rather derived first and foremost from the permanent goal of philosophical discussion – the “will to truth.” The philosopher-speaker seeks to address the philosopher-addressee, whose agreement may serve as a guarantee of truth. He draws on this guarantee as in a discussion lacking pre-known rules of justification, for he himself examines them; there is no rule or criterion that can validate the truth for him.

In the “Gorgias” dialogue, Socrates describes the ideal addressee whom he aspires to reach (although, originally, the description is ironically of Callicles, who does not, under any circumstances, fit this characterization):

If you bear me out in any point arising in our argument, that point can at once be taken as having been amply tested by both you and me, and there will be no more need of referring it to a further test; for no defect of wisdom or access of modesty could ever have been your motive in making this concession, nor again could you make it to deceive me: for you are my friend, as you say yourself. Hence, any agreement between you and me must really have attained the perfection of truth.
(“Gorgias” 487e)

The truth, according to these statements, is identified with an agreement between speaker and addressee, when this agreement is not engendered by shame, deceit or a lack of wisdom. Socrates, unlike Perelman, stresses the characteristics required of the desired addressee, and not his universality. In short, Socrates emphasizes the unique meeting that must take place in order to realize the philosophical goal, thus presenting a position that contradicts the abstract, universal entity presented by Perelman. Is the philosophical addressee an abstract-universal or, on the contrary, a very particular addressee?

A reading of philosophical texts will witness the presence of addressees possessed of very different characteristics, analogously to the broad variety of speakers in such texts. In some philosophical texts we will be able to identify a speaker who turns to an addressee lacking any particular cultural baggage, who is far from professional. In other texts, we will identify an appeal, whether explicit or implicit, to actual addressees, and in contrast, in yet other texts we will find an attempt to totally erase the fact that they address some specific historical addressee. There are texts that swallow up the appeal to an addressee in dialogue form, and yet others that do so by means of internal monologue.

Like the speaker, the addressee too does not have a unified character, but like that of the speaker, the figure of the addressee is also derived from the

goal of the discussion – the “will to truth.” If the figure of the speaker is designed to express what it is that is required of one who would avoid illusion, then the figure of the addressee is that of he whom the speaker asks for guarantees that he is not deluding himself.⁹⁰ Accordingly, the identification of actual addressees to whom a given text is addressed can definitely illuminate various argumentative choices made in this text, but it is the identification of the philosopher-addressee whose characterization may be surmised from the text, that can indicate the addressee envisioned by the philosopher in his wish to achieve his goal. This addressee will usually amount to more than the sum of all the identifiable actual addressees. Moreover, in case he is identical with the stated sum, this will usually represent a first step towards the text’s identification as a dogmatic one. Usually, in such cases, the speaker will emerge as one whose goal is vanquishing his rivals even at the price of the “will to truth.” In other words, it is through the addressee that the speaker signals the height and substance of the hurdle he needs to jump so as to achieve confirmation of the fact that he isn’t deluding himself. The historical features discernible in the figure of the addressee do not disqualify him from being a philosopher-addressee, but when his figure is exhausted by them, then in most cases the hurdle will be seen as one with exclusively historical meaning, and the speaker’s claims will be understood in this context alone.

In the Platonic text quoted above Socrates sketches the figure of the philosophical-addressee, whose agreement is, in his view, a guarantee of truth; an addressee whose agreement does not stem from a lack of wisdom or of sincerity, and which is not just masquerade. This is one of the early and explicit attempts to link the rhetorical situation, speaker-addressee, with the goal of philosophical discussion – the truth. There is no guarantee other than that provided by the philosophical-addressee.⁹¹

The speaker in Descartes’ *Meditations* needs the “evil spirit” for the purpose of this argument. Who is this demon and what is the need explaining why it is assumed? The speaker himself explains the need for this assumption as a psychological one. This demon is supposed to prevent him from sinking, inadvertently, into his old beliefs, a tendency the speaker sees as common to all human beings. Every belief should be examined suspiciously, as if it had been imprinted in his consciousness by the “evil spirit” as a true belief, while in fact it is a false one. By no coincidence, this demon is a sort of mirror-image of the Socratic philosopher’s addressee. He is the inverted reflection of this addressee, for which reason it is of deep significance to view him as one whom philosophical discussion attempts to overcome. This is Descartes’ way of confronting the need to appeal to an addressee whose agreement is a guarantee of truth, an ad-

dressee who is over and above the sum of characteristics possessed by the actual addressees and their capacity for doubting Descartes' claims.

In his introduction to the one and only book he published in the course of his life, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein sees fit to note that his book will be understood only by those who have already thought the thoughts presented in it:

Perhaps the book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts.

(Wittgenstein 1963: 3)

What need did Wittgenstein see for writing this? Who is it who has already had Wittgenstein's thoughts (besides Wittgenstein himself)? Possible answers to these questions may involve Wittgenstein's personality or his philosophical position. An attempt might even be made to attribute the answers to his historical addressees (especially Bertrand Russell). And yet, what is discernible here is the same self tendency; the aspiration to reach a philosophical-addressee and not this or that actual addressee. This is not a wish to convince every addressee (the 'universal audience') or, alternately, a real and limited group of addressees, but rather an attempt to convince those whose agreement or disagreement will be of philosophical value, those will have the capacity to serve as a measure of truth.

However, the declared desire need not necessarily be seen, in every case, as nobly manifested in the text. One can think of opponents to the thesis presented by the text, who will aspire to represent the declared desire as an instance of a rhetorical device with a philosophically negative slant – a manipulative device. Such a critique might claim that Descartes' "evil spirit" like Wittgenstein's appeal are no more than the authors' rhetorical devices, whose goal is to assist the writer in imposing his views upon his addressees, including himself. From this point of view the "evil spirit" can be seen as a mere stylistic tool, designed to ensnare the heart of the addressee and through this precisely to blunt his critical ability. Why, such a rhetorical critique will ask, does Descartes need his demon? Why does a text, intended to present abstract thinking, have any need for such images?⁹² From such a standpoint, Wittgenstein's claims can be viewed as belonging to a long tradition of introductions in which the philosopher carefully selects his readers (Kant, is one instance). In this manner, the philosopher at least seemingly achieves a sense of commonality that impairs the addressee's critical capacities. The addressee is offered membership in a select community of people possessed of privileged knowledge. By the same token, one could construct a theoretical structure overarching the Platonic dialogues,

so as to present them as Plato's way of attempting to imbue a semblance of critical discussion, designed to neutralize at least part of the reader's critical faculty. Literary identification with Socrates can be viewed, according to this approach, as often erasing the shortcomings and weaknesses of his arguments. In other words, a literary examination of Socrates' character can clearly present him as a figure into whose net it is very easy to fall.

In this sense, the following passages from Perelman's book, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, are very illuminating:

A figure is argumentative if its use, leading to a change in perspective, seems normal in relation to the new situation thus suggested. But if the discourse does not gain the audience's adherence, the figure will be perceived as an ornament, a figure of style, ineffective as a means of persuasion.

(Perelman 1982: 39)

According to Perelman, a reader's attitude towards the complex sum of elements that appear in the text derives, for the most part, from the degree of his agreement with the text. A reader who disagrees with the speaker becomes more sensitive to, and critical of, the speaker's choices and style. And vice versa; from the point of view of one who agrees with the speaker, his choices and style are absorbed into his argumentation. The topic of critiques based on attributing manipulative, and hence anti-philosophical, intentions to the speaker, re-connects to some of my claims above regarding the question of the speaker. Critiques of this type reveal that the speaker in the text in question is not perceived by his critics as a 'man of truth,' as a person guided only by the "will to truth." More than anything else, such an evaluation prevents philosophical dialogue and discussion. Rhetorical argumentation is always addressed to a defined, given addressee. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an addressee whose character is not of the type that guided formulation of the argumentation, will find fault with this argumentation. His failure to be convinced may, in many cases, lead to his doubting the speaker's reliability and sincerity. It is very rare to find critiques of this kind where the critic is in agreement with the text.

Opposition to the text on the grounds that the speaker has employed manipulation in order to mislead one, is accordingly indicative of a response of fundamental disagreement. However, it is precisely such disagreements, which are not at all rare in philosophical discussion, that can reveal the expectations with which we approach this discussion. The speaker seeks a philosophical-addressee, an addressee whose agreement can serve as a sign of truth, whom he accordingly makes efforts to convince. If the figure of this or that actual addressee is not identical to the figure of this philosophical-addressee, as per-

ceived by the author of the text, it is not surprising that such a given, actual addressee fails to find the text logical and may even suspect the speaker of an attempt to delude others or indeed himself. The addressee seeks a philosopher-speaker, whose aim is not to delude. It is to such a speaker and to him alone that the addressee will accordingly be willing to listen. If the figure of the speaker in the text is not identical to that of this speaker, and especially if his position is unacceptable to the addressee, it is not surprising that his arguments are examined with great suspicion.⁹³

In this sense, the attempt to point out fallacies, usually termed “rhetorical fallacies,” is always an attempt to raise the suspicion of fraud. Relations of mistrust between the speaker and the addressee are far more problematic than any logical fallacy shown to be implicit in an argument, or than a factual inaccuracy. Neither logical fallacies nor factual inaccuracies are, necessarily, grounds for the total rejection of a given philosophical position. The suspicion of fraud, in contrast, leaves little choice other than rejection, and totally annuls the possibility of conducting a philosophical dialogue.

Presumably, in a discussion in which the rules of justification are not known in advance, the speaker’s attempt to commit to a necessary point of view will be perceived by this or that addressee as a vain presumption, deluding others. If we seek to neutralize this suspicion, though, and to examine the argumentation, a characterization of the addressee whom the speaker is striving to convince may prove significant. It can indicate who it is whose agreement the philosopher seeks to secure, confirming the validity of his stand. This, in turn, can assist us in understanding the philosopher’s specific philosophical outlook. Often, such a characterization of the addressee can even explain why we ourselves have not been convinced by the claims in question. Such a rhetorical analysis, which itself frequently uncovers an illusion – that of a supposed dialogue between the philosophical-speaker and the philosophical-addressee – does not necessarily lead to a rejection of the philosophical position presented in the text. An automatic total rejection can only be realized among those who believe in the existence of a philosophical activity that is fully free of any speaker-addressee aspect. Those who recognize the impossibility of such a philosophical activity will take more care in approaching rhetorical analyses. Uncovering the presence of a speaker and an addressee possessed of definite and selective characteristics do not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting a philosophical position. Every philosophical position, including the one formulating such a critique, is “guilty” of this charge. The addressee of the philosophical text, as I will try to claim, is never the “universal audience,” but rather a highly characterized and definite addressee.

At this point it is important to re-emphasize that the subject is not the enemy of philosophical activity but rather, first and foremost, the source of this activity. Subsequently, any attempt to banish him from the discussion is, itself, situated within this activity. As a result, the subject himself paradoxically constitutes the sole basis for affirming such an attempt (an affirmation whose validity will, of course, be subjective). Uncovering the presence of the speaker and the addressee and their characterization are therefore important mainly so as to allow a clear-eyed, knowledgeable examination of the argumentative space of philosophical activity; a space the boundaries of which are not defined on grounds of criteria, but rather through the rhetorical framework of a speaker and an addressee. It is only at the following stage that it becomes important to try to verify which philosophical implications derive from such a recognition. In any case, and this can already be claimed on the basis of the discussion up to now and also as a guideline for the rest of it, a proof that is not designed to convince is foreign to philosophical activity. In other words, philosophical argumentation (whether written or spoken) should and does realize its goals through the act of convincing.

The addressee of philosophical argumentation, similarly to the speaker, is embedded in two contexts that form his figure:

1. The historical context.
2. The philosophical context.

The historical context is manifested in various characteristics of the addressee originating in given times and places. Consequently, a rhetorical analysis attempting to reconstruct the philosophical environment in which the philosopher was active will surely be able to explain part of the philosopher's choices as based on the need to convince actual addressees. However, if the philosopher is presented through this prism alone, it will be deceptively easy to conclude that every philosopher is simply a sophist. Moreover, it is worth noting that in adopting an historical viewpoint, one draws conclusions that are first and foremost historical in character. These can acquire philosophical significance only to the extent that they are, in turn, examined within a philosophical context. For instance, if one seeks to claim that uncovering the addressee's historical side dissolves certain universal commitments that the speaker has claimed to possess. Conversely, examining the figure of the addressee from a philosophical point of view, as one whose agreement is supposed to serve as a guarantee for truth, cannot lead to historical insights. Furthermore, to a large extent, such an examination effects the text's detachment from its historical context, for the sake of placing it in a philosophical one. The figure of the addressee to whom

the speaker is turning will be constructed on the basis of the text itself, without committing to the actual existence of such an addressee. True, the two contexts in question are not, of necessity, mutually exclusive. But their mutual linkage is a philosophical act in its own right, requiring justification.

The situation in question might be likened to the difference between approaching a scientific text from a scientific viewpoint and referring to it from an historical one. While the historian of science will look at the text in the historical context, and will therefore draw conclusions that are at least initially distinctly historical (that is, their proof will be in the degree to which they conform with known historical facts), the scientist will examine the text from the point of view of the scientific problem in which he is interested. The scientist's conclusions will consequently be scientific in character and their evaluation will be subject to the relevant scientific tests. Such a difference in viewpoint can, for instance, explain why a text perceived as highly valuable by a historian of science, may be viewed as irrelevant by a scientist. This does not rule out the possibility of a meeting point between the two, but such a meeting point will again raise the question of the point of view from which the meeting point itself should be examined, towards drawing either historical or scientific conclusions.

My claim is that philosophy itself seeks "The Truth" (a lack of illusion) and not history, even if arguments and analyses possessed of historical features and based on historical overviews are often employed for purposes of justifying a given philosophical position.⁹⁴ Philosophical discussion, as a discussion that lacks binding criteria of justification, may contain historical arguments to the same extent that it may avoid them altogether. Accordingly, the detachment of a philosophical text from historical context does not leave it without a context. The philosophical context determines the goal of the discussion as the "will to truth," and the characterization of the addressee should be carried out accordingly. Identifying the addressee and his characterization thus aim at understanding who is this philosophical-addressee to whom the speaker is addressing his claims in the belief that his agreement will provide some guarantee of truth. Who is this that the philosopher's efforts to convince him serve the latter as a means towards achieving his philosophical goal? Who is this whose figure, when better understood, can therefore explain the philosopher's argumentative choices?

As in any rhetorical situation, the arguments are based on assumptions regarding the addressee whom the speaker wishes to convince; as in any rhetorical situation, the addressee is an abstract fiction nevertheless possessed of definite characteristics. Different philosophers see a need to present different

speakers and to convince different addressees, even if their goal is identical. I therefore disagree with Perelman's claim that the philosopher is seeking universal agreement. The philosopher is seeking the truth, not universal agreement. Therefore, as I have tried to show above, every philosopher is interested in a very specific addressee and not in a 'universal audience.' He attempts to convince only and exclusively one whose agreement, as Socrates notes, is not born of fraud, shame or a lack of wisdom. If, as Socrates claims, the philosopher is indeed just as glad to see his own mistakes revealed as he is when others' are, he must guarantee for himself an addressee who will not fall prey to an agreement based on fraud, shame or a lack of wisdom.

The question to be asked here is, where does the philosopher seek such an addressee. The not very surprising answer may nevertheless be troubling. The philosopher seeks such an addressee *in himself alone*.

Since the time Plato defined philosophy as a dialogue of the soul with itself, much has changed in the field. Plato's definition was seemingly forgotten and replaced by an emphasis on the objectivity of truth, itself ascribed to Plato's thinking. The truth, perceived as that whose purity is impaired by subjective traces, motivated philosophers to search for other non-subjective criteria that would neutralize the influence of the subject on thought. The most typical products of this line of thought were the positivist sciences accompanied throughout by a metaphysical skepticism. This way of thinking sought to replace the thinking man with thought free of man. Paradoxically, man, the only creature who searched for truth was perceived as hostile and contradictory to truth.

True, this historical-conceptual process is undeniable, just as it is undeniable that truth is customarily assigned objective status. Nevertheless, I wish to point out that for philosophers, required to reflect on their own thinking, the philosophizing subject has always been, and still is, he who affirms the truth through agreement with himself. This agreement transcends any other criterion and its importance is above and beyond the agreement of any other addressee. In other words, the truth, as a product of philosophical thinking can be perceived as having objective status, but for the philosopher himself, its sole, final justification lies in agreement with himself. Any other external justification is forever potentially doubtful. Therefore, philosophical argumentation should be examined as that which is designed first and foremost, and especially, to convince the philosopher himself, unless its goal is not the "will to truth." This fact can explain why other philosophers are usually not convinced by the arguments of a given colleague, and certainly not by all of them, and this includes the philosopher himself at different points in time. A philosopher's

arguments provide justifications directed towards a very specific addressee, for which reason their capacity to convince other addressees depends upon the degree of the latter's similarity to this specific addressee.⁹⁵ The severity of a philosopher's self criticism can also lead other addressees, possessed of weaker critical abilities, to be convinced by his claims. But from the point of view of the "will to truth," such agreement is totally worthless.

I have mentioned Plato's definition of philosophy as the soul's dialogue with itself, but a similar description of philosophical activity as what not only begins with the subject but whose entire course and end are within the subject, can be found in the work of many philosophers. These formulations usually appear in the stages at which the philosopher in question offers an account of the possibility of his own activity. Kant, who I will draw upon later, describes the activity of reason, in his book *Critique of Pure Reason*, as a cyclic activity:

Reason is impelled by a tendency of its nature to go out beyond the field of its empirical employment, and to venture in a pure employment, by means of ideas alone, to the utmost limits of all knowledge, and not to be satisfied save through the completion of its course in [the apprehension of] a self-subsistent systematic whole.
(*Critique of Pure Reason* B: 825)

Kant, who equated philosophical activity with the activity of reason, directs attention to the fact that the latter can find respite nowhere else but within itself. As is his habit, Kant refers to a universal reason here, but I believe that in doing so he attempts to show the cyclic, reflexive character of philosophical thinking, which for Kant is always the embodiment of universal reason.

Spinoza, who is perceived as a strict formalist whose method is a *geometrico demonstrata*, also treats truth in terms of a subjective sensation:

[H]e who has an adequate idea or (Prop. 34, Part II) who knows a thing truly must at the same time have an adequate idea of his knowledge or a true knowledge, that is (as in self-evident), he must at the same time be certain.
(*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XLIII)

Descartes, who discerns that he is incapable, as a subject, of providing the criterion of correspondence, insists that the "Archimedes point" for truth can only be situated in the evident cognition of the subject (the same subject who doubted the truth). Even Leibniz, who criticizes Descartes' criterion of evidence as unsatisfactory and proposes the rules of logic instead,⁹⁶ reaches the conclusion that at the end of the day the basic metaphysical unit, the monad, is in and of itself. One could add many more examples of the recognition that philosophical activity, which is always also reflexive, discovers, time and again, that even if its products are perceived and examined as objective truths,

the activity itself is necessarily that of the subject within himself. Hume is a prominent instance of a philosopher who threw up his hands in face of this recognition. Unlike Descartes, who tried to make a metaphysical lever of it, Hume saw this as evidence of the fact that the subject will never be able to know whether or not he knows (naturally, this amounted to his taking a clear metaphysical stand). When these philosophical insights are highlighted, it is easy to clarify why I wish to present the problem of self-deception as a fundamental philosophical problem. This is the main problem that should trouble one who sees himself alone as he who can confirm the truth for himself through his own agreement.

The history of philosophy indeed demonstrates that philosophers fully convince only themselves, if at all. Accepting a philosophical position in its entirety and without any reservations whatsoever is a rarity in philosophy, and it is very clear why this is so. Furthermore, fully adopting a philosophical position is usually also perceived as an anti-philosophical act (in contrast, fully adopting a scientific position is not viewed as anti-scientific). If the arguments of philosophical speakers were truly grounded on objective criteria, or alternately, if the speakers were really addressing a 'universal audience,' as Perelman claims, then the picture would most probably have been very different. Yet, the empirical evidence is not enough since my claim is on the level of principles.

When Kant distinguishes between conviction and persuasion, or when Perelman proposes his thesis of the 'universal audience,' we harbor a tendency to accept their claims for they are true to the spirit of the objectiveness of philosophical discussion.

Kant employs the distinction between conviction and persuasion for purposes of describing the activity of the critical philosopher. He tries to delineate the realm of the use of logic in philosophical discussion by defining the philosophical questions that logic cannot handle, but in which philosophy is nevertheless interested, and which it should nevertheless answer. As a result, he finds himself faced with the need to account for the locus of the validity of philosophical arguments. This general question in fact expresses the need of the Kantian-speaker to account – to himself – for the origins of the validity of his own argument. Towards this purpose, Kant discusses the distinction between conviction, perceived as having objective validity, and persuasion, perceived as having subjective validity:

The holding of a thing to be true is an occurrence in our understanding which, though it may rest on objective grounds, also requires subjective causes in the mind of the individual who makes the judgment. If the judgment is valid for

everyone, provided only he is in possession of reason, its ground is objectively sufficient, and the holding to be true is entitled *conviction*. If it has its ground only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled *persuasion*.

(*Critique of Pure Reason* B: 848)

In keeping with this distinction, Kant defines the critical philosopher's task in his book *Critique of Judgment*:

Hence a philosopher has a duty (assuming he leaves out of account [the risk in following] the demand of to be sincere) to expose the illusion, no matter how wholesome it is, that such mingling can produce. He must separate what pertains merely to persuasion from what leads to conviction (two forms of approval that differ not merely in degree but also in kind), so that he can exhibit openly and very clearly what frame of mind this proof involves, and subject the proof candidly to the strictest examination. (*Critique of Judgment* AK 462)

Even if we skip stressing Kant's need to make use of terms such as sincerity, for constituting the validity of philosophical activity, these claims echo the very philosophical challenge referred to by Socrates. The philosopher, as one who recognizes that no criterion governs the subjective sense of certainty, is troubled by the possibility that this sense is merely an image, an illusion. Kant finds himself compelled to construct a distinction which cannot, on the one hand, deny that conviction is the goal of the argumentation but which must, on the other hand, point out the existence of differences between various states of subjective certainty. He thus seeks to distinguish between the conviction that is right for anyone possessed of reason, and the persuasion stemming from the special nature of a given individual subject. He assigns the philosopher the task of telling the difference. As I have noted, Socrates points out that the philosopher should be troubled by the truth value of his claims, even when they arouse agreement among his other addressees. While Kant is not making an identical claim, he requires an agreement that doesn't end with these or those actual addressees but rather includes every rational subject. How is it possible to test for the existence of such an agreement?

Perelman, who takes the rhetorical point of view, seeks to adopt Kant's distinction while translating it into rhetorical terms. When Perelman is obliged to characterize the philosophical argument as a special type of rhetorical argument, he strives to fill out Kant's distinction with substance of a more technical type, based (as I have tried to stress) upon the distinction between persuasion originating in the subject's individual nature and conviction originating in the subject's general nature:

[W]e can characterize them in a more technical and exact way by saying that discourse addressed to a specific audience aims to persuade, while discourse addressed to the universal audience aims to convince. (Perelman 1982: 18)

Thus, Perelman tries to advance another step in terms of the rhetorical analysis of philosophical activity, meanwhile preserving the philosophical intuition that guided Kant. He proposes replacing the philosophical terms objective and subjective with the rhetorical ones of a specific and a universal audience, while keeping intact the qualitative distinction between persuasion and conviction. According to Perelman, the philosophical argument, unlike other rhetorical arguments, is designed to convince, or in the terms he has proposed, to address a universal audience:

A convincing discourse is one whose premises are universalizable, thus is, acceptable in principle to all the members of the universal audience. We immediately realize how in this perspective the originality of philosophy, traditionally associated with notions of truth and reason, will best be understood in its relation to the universal audience and according to the manner in which this audience is understood by the philosopher. (Ibid.)

Perelman, who strives to support this distinction in defense of the rationality of philosophical argumentation, in fact ends up underlining the very problem he sought to settle. His claims emphasize the fact that what distinguishes conviction from persuasion (that is the ‘universal audience’), is a creation of the philosopher himself.⁹⁷ In other words, Kant could be understood to be claiming that the philosopher’s main task is dealing with the image problem, that is, the risk of perceiving persuasion as conviction. Perelman, though simply seeming to imbue the same distinction with different technical content, points out that even that element which supposedly allows the distinction in fact originates in the subject, not in an external objective criterion, as Kant’s claims might have implied. In other words, Perelman’s attempt to answer the question, where is the reason that is said to serve as an objective touchstone, points us back to the philosopher himself. He redirects us to the philosopher himself, who cannot make do with the agreement of his immediate addressees, in case this agreement is merely engendered by subjective circumstances, but is compelled to address his claims and offer his justifications in such a way that they will suit not only his coincidental addressees, but also “every rational being,” or a ‘universal audience.’ However, as Perelman justly claims, this addressee is in fact a fiction created by the philosopher himself for himself. If this is indeed the case, then what is important to the philosopher is to convince himself, above all others, with his arguments. “Every rational being,” or a ‘universal audience,’

are in this sense, at most, regulative ideas, into which the philosopher pours his own specific content. Kant requires sincerity of the philosopher so as to fulfill his role, to distinguish between convincing and persuading, and sincerity is indeed an important condition if the goal to which the philosopher aspires is not to delude others. However, the question that arises here is, how can sincerity guarantee to the philosopher that he is not deluding himself?

In the light of such an analysis it would seem that the more a philosopher attempts to convince himself that his belief is not mere illusion, that what is at hand is conviction and not persuasion, that his conviction is a conviction of “every rational being”, that he is addressing a universal and not a concrete audience, then by the same token, the more he risks the very self-deception from which he seeks to flee. An illusion, the perception of the subjective as the objective, as defined by Kant himself, can be viewed as none other than the result of philosophical activity itself. It is mainly one who attempts to convince “every rational being” of the objective status of his insights who may find himself entrapped in this illusion, since the affirmation of his claims actually lies within his own thought. In the midst of thinking, there is a great danger that the philosophizing subject, who convinces himself as if he was “every rational being,” will be convinced by virtue of his universal intentions that his agreement too is universal.

The philosopher forms and – all the more so – chooses, not only the figure of the speaker, but also the figure of the addressee. He “constructs” the latter in the image of he whom he considers it right to convince. And no matter how well suited his arguments are to additional addressees, they will achieve the most perfect and complete fit with a single addressee whom he is struggling to convince – himself. Accordingly, what is at hand is in fact a very concrete addressee, no matter how critical. The label ‘universal audience,’ is misleading in this context, although its origins are clear and understood. Perelman seeks to replace the concept of “The Truth” with that of the ‘universal audience,’ so as to protect the rationality of philosophical argumentation, a trait that he identifies with universality. As a result, the concept of the ‘universal audience,’ though intended to replace that of “The Truth,” must, from his point of view, preserve all the traditional traits of the concept it would replace, including its objectivity.⁹⁸ However, the ‘universal audience’ does not exist and it is therefore no more than an image. The philosopher’s attempt to see addressing his own self as an address directed to a ‘universal audience’ is thus at risk of leading to self-deception. The philosopher may view his own agreement with himself as agreement with “every rational being,” and this is fertile ground

for self-deception. An awareness of this problem should be paramount for one whose goal is the “will to truth” – “I will not deceive, not even myself.”

The philosopher, like any other human being, can never provide arguments regarding doubts that do not occur to him, or answers to questions he has not thought to ask. At least in this sense philosophical argumentation, like any other rhetorical argumentation, is possessed of very specific characteristics. Its elaboration or brevity regarding this or that issue, the number of arguments and the manner of their presentation or the number of examples and their content, and similar argumentative decisions, are determined by the philosopher and not according to set or agreed dictates. The addressee of the philosophical argument, like the addressee of every other rhetorical argument, forms the speaker’s choices to a large extent. The main difference is that while the speakers of other rhetorical arguments will not stop till they obtain the agreement of their external addressees, the philosopher will not stop till he secures his own agreement (as an addressee) with himself (as the speaker). True, there are philosophers who remain forever restless (expressing solely the “will to truth”), but certainly not all of them, either because they have achieved their own agreement with themselves or because they have relinquished the “will to truth.” Consequently, while rhetoric is usually viewed with suspicion due to the danger of deluding the other, what is most troubling from the philosophical point of view is the risk of self-deception. How can a philosopher guarantee to himself that his agreement with himself is not self-deception? How can he avoid falling prey to the idealization that he must employ both as a speaker and as an addressee?

Self-agreement and self-deception

The subjectivity of judgment is an essential problem in philosophical thought. As a critical thinker the philosopher cannot but consider himself the superior judge of his own beliefs, yet he must simultaneously convince himself that his judgment reflects an objective truth rather than a subjective reality.

This point is well illustrated by comparing Descartes’ criteria of “clear and distinct” thought with Hume’s criteria of “force and liveliness”. Both Descartes and Hume argue that the individual subject is the authority over his own beliefs, yet that subjective judgment is incommensurate with the aim of philosophical inquiry, which is to reflect a necessary truth. Their positions differ in that Descartes finally posits an exclusive certainty that meets the requirements of philosophical inquiry, while Hume emphasizes the subjective status of

any certainty and by so doing negates the possibility of ascertaining necessary truths. Neither of them explicitly addresses the assumption behind their thinking and their different positions, namely that philosophy requires subjective thinking but objective conclusions.

Kant, who regarded Descartes as a dogmatic thinker (he accused him of “dreaming idealism”) and Hume as a radical skeptic, tried to negotiate an intermediate path. Nevertheless, despite his “Copernican revolution”, he never quite comes to grips with the tension between subjective thought and objective truth. Like Descartes and Hume, Kant accepts the value of subjective judgment, yet regards it as incommensurate with the required conclusions of philosophical inquiry. His consideration of the idea of *sensus communis* is a good example:

[W]e must [here] take *sensus communis* to mean the idea of a sense shared [by all of us], i.e., a power to judge that in reflecting takes account [a priori], in our thought, of everyone else’s way of presenting [something], in order as it were to compare our own judgment with human reason in general and thus escape the illusion that arises from the ease of mistaking subjectivity and private conditions for objective ones, an illusion that would have a prejudicial influence on the judgment. (Critique of Judgment AK 393)

Kant believed that distinguishing between states of certainty is the philosopher’s essential mission. A state of certainty that originates from the subjective conditions of an individual person he regards as an illusion. By this logic, revealing those subjective conditions will facilitate distinguishing between objective and subjective states of certainty, between truths and illusions. Kant’s faith in the ability to make such a distinction aligns him with Descartes in opposition to Hume. However, philosophers like Descartes and Kant who believe that a subjective certainty can be distinguished from an objective one usually claim to have arrived at necessary truths themselves,⁹⁹ an important fact that suggests the likelihood of self-deception.¹⁰⁰

The Platonic dialogues also make reference to this issue. The controversial theory of recollection mediates between the “early Socrates”, who regards wisdom as the exclusive province of the Gods and human beings as lovers of wisdom (philosophers) at best, and the “later Socrates” who not only considers the possibility of human transcendence into the world of forms but also suggests that he himself knows the way to this world. Plato was also troubled by the fact that the same subjective feelings accompany both beliefs (which can be false) and knowledge (which cannot be false),¹⁰¹ and many of the dialogues are dedicated to this issue. *Phaedo* is a particularly pertinent example. In this dialogue, moments before his execution Socrates expounds upon his thinking and

indicates the question that troubles him the most. He does this by comparing himself to the sophists:

Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but he is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is merely this – that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. (“Phaedo” 91a)

A philosopher, according to this perception, is a thinker for whom convincing others to accept his point of view is not the primary goal. This, argues Socrates, is the only distinction between him and the sophists; their main aim is to convince others while he, as a philosopher, aims only to convince himself. Socrates explains that this is what sets those who are indifferent to the question of truth (the sophists) and those whose only aim is to search for truth (the philosophers) apart. Yet the comparison also draws attention to a point of similarity between sophists and philosophers, and that is that their activities are described in terms of conviction. Socrates is aware of this fact and hence appeals to his friends Simmias and Cebes with a philosophical requirement:

This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates; agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not; withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I died. (Ibid. 91c)

Moments before his death, Socrates is more troubled by the prospect of possibly deceiving others and himself than his own demise. It would not be unreasonable to claim that Socrates is afraid that his persuasive power might mislead others and himself. As a proponent of the philosopher as someone who addresses himself, first and foremost, Socrates is aware of the problem of self-deception that is embodied in philosophical thinking. This awareness makes him more sober than the philosophers discussed above, recognizing that the more consistent a philosopher’s thinking the more likely the possibility that he will perceive his subjective certainty as objective. A state of certainty attained by philosophical thinking, which is actually a process of self-conviction, is likely to be perceived as a necessary truth with validity that extends beyond the merely subjective.

Therefore, Socrates is aware of the paradoxical demands of philosophical thought. This is not the “early Socrates” who does not presume to know, nor the “later Socrates” who speaks of transcendent forms, but the Socrates who

reflects on his own thought processes. The philosopher, in a psychologically understandable but philosophically problematic process, must face truth alone, yet is seldom aware of this loneliness. He is alone because his state of mind is the result of self-conviction, but he is not aware of when the will behind philosophical thought inspires its conclusions. The more consistent he is in his thinking, the less he can consider his conclusions subjective. The subjective character of his thinking is disguised by his critical efforts and his sense of certainty. This scenario has no bearing on the truth or falsity of philosophical conclusions, but only on the philosophical need to deny the subjective origin of the conclusions in order to accept them as philosophical ones. The philosopher is not necessarily alone, for others may accept his position, but as Socrates explained, the agreement of others can only be a secondary goal of philosophical activity and never the primary one; that is, agreement of others cannot replace the philosopher's agreement with himself.

As a critical thinker the philosopher cannot accept anything as truth unless he himself has judged it so. Therefore, unlike literature in the Aristotelian sense, philosophy always begins *ab ovo*, a fact which largely determines the structure of philosophical arguments. Searching for the most basic assumptions of a thought and making an intensive effort to refute them are unavoidable steps in any philosophical inquiry. Only this struggle with what are perceived as necessary and universal truths can lead philosophers to argue for the necessity of their conclusions. This struggle may lead back to the same (old) assumptions, to the adoption of new assumptions or a skeptical attitude. Regardless of the results, the process of confronting basic assumptions leads philosophers to feel, at the end of it, that they have less illusions about reality than they did beforehand. An individual philosopher can therefore hardly avoid perceiving his personal conclusions as deserving of broad acceptance even when other philosophers disagree with him. This fact is clearly represented in the history of philosophy. Philosophers, especially the great ones, used to accuse each other of being responsible for the biggest illusions in human thought. If we refuse to believe that all the great philosophers were motivated by a desire to deceive, we must see them instead as those misled by philosophical thought processes, having been convinced and tried to convince others that their subjective conclusions are objective and necessary truths.

My claim, however, is not a historical but a meta-philosophical one. As long as philosophical thinking is guided by the assumption of a contradiction between subjective judgment and objective truth, it will almost necessarily lead to self-deception. The assumption creates a paradoxical situation where the philosopher only argues for truths that he personally judges as such, but he

only regards what he is convinced are not personal judgments as truths. Is this not fertile ground for self-deception?

In *Theaetetus* Socrates tries to test Protagoras' claim that man is the measure of all things.¹⁰² He finds it difficult to either reject or accept this claim. On the one hand, it is clear to him that philosophical thinking requires that the individual thinker be posited as the measure of all things; yet on the other hand, accepting this as the case curtails his philosophical effort to distinguish between beliefs and knowledge. Philosophers who think there is room to regard the thinker as the ultimate measure must also recognize the concomitant problem. The common philosophical solution to this problem is to argue for a transcendent and hence non-subjective measurement: the forms, God, the rules of logic, transcendental ideas, the idea of universal reason, etc. Philosophers present these transcendent measures in the service of distinguishing between the subjective and objective, but also, not surprisingly, as justification of their own philosophical perceptions.

Philosophers who take this position are often accused of dogmatic thinking by philosophers who disagree with them. This explains the multiplicity of arguments for begging the question (*petitio principii*) that abounds in philosophical discourse. The accusation of dogmatism is unavoidable in this discourse. A *petitio principii*, as Chaim Perelman explains it, is a rhetorical fallacy (as opposed to a logical one), which implies that the addressee does not accept the speaker's premises.¹⁰³ A thinker is accused of *petitio principii* when he is suspected of basing his argument on granting certainty to controversial assumptions. Since philosophers, like all people, construct their arguments according to the audience they are trying to convince, it stands to reason that a different audience, one that regards his assumptions as controversial, would remain unconvinced. Since presuppositions are the prime target of philosophical inquiry, exposure to such criticism is an unavoidable and dominant aspect of philosophical thinking and argumentation. As Socrates teaches us, the philosopher's only obligation is to convince himself. Philosophy is first and foremost a process of self-conviction designed according to the beliefs of the philosopher himself. The philosopher's need to first convince himself is fertile ground for self-deception as it is fertile ground for controversies and disagreements. However great a rhetorician and however strong his devotion to truth, should a person's arguments convince those that he did not identify in advance as his audience, this can only be regarded as accidental.

Thus, philosophy is not merely a search for one truth, as traditional presentations would have it, but also rhetoric of one person. The failures and successes that certain philosophers have experienced in their attempts to convince oth-

ers of their positions are more interesting from a rhetorical point of view than a philosophical point of view. Both failure and success can be attributed to rhetorical mistakes or maneuvers, but the aim of the present book is to investigate philosophy from a rhetorical point of view and not *vice versa*. From this perspective the success of a philosophical argument is not measured by whether others are convinced of its validity, but by whether the philosopher agrees with himself. For this purpose he is both the speaker and the addressee. This is a unique rhetorical construction not dependent on the duality of speaker and addressee in which the speaker is absolved of the need to believe what he claims and whether or not he convinces himself is unimportant. His failure or success is judged in terms of whether or not his audience agrees with him. Yet in the philosophical encounter the speaker must believe what he is claiming and be convinced of its validity. Although others' agreement or disagreement can influence his judgment, they cannot replace it.

Therefore, agreement, if it does not come from the philosopher himself (a very common occurrence in the Socratic dialogues), cannot be perceived as a sign of truth, while a philosopher's self-agreement (a very common occurrence in the history of philosophy) is perceived as just that. The philosopher's own conviction is all that is important in philosophical inquiry. Philosophical logic entreats philosophers to suspend any feelings of certainty prior to philosophical inquiry and to accept any that arise as a result of this inquiry (even if they refer to the same content). One can claim, thus, that the rhetoric of philosophy is the rhetoric of self-conviction. Since the essence of philosophical thinking is not merely a process of collecting knowledge but rather one of improving self-awareness, it makes no difference whether the end result is a skeptical or affirmative position. In both instances it is the devotion to critical thinking *per se* that philosophers experience as improving self-awareness. Therefore, even if a philosopher does not make a claim to truth, he necessarily perceives his state of awareness as improved by the process. Is this process really infallible?

History shows that although great philosophers have been convinced that they had achieved their goals, the goal of philosophy itself is perceived as elusive. This paradox requires an explanation. Up to this point I have shown how the feeling of certainty is a product of critical thinking, which thus transpires to be a process of self-conviction. I was nevertheless cautious not to equate self-conviction with self-deception, but only to indicate that philosophical thinking is fertile ground for it. Not all self-conviction is self-deception, but when a person believes that his thinking has been, as Kant put it, tested against the reason of every man, the likelihood of self-deception is increased. The history of philosophy bears witness to this assertion. It is usually presented as a series

of philosophical failures which nevertheless gave rise to important scientific, moral or social changes. This depiction caused many thinkers to declare philosophy defunct and to argue for replacing the philosophical search for “The Truth.” In my opinion, the approach that posits the end of philosophy sheds light on the nature of philosophical thinking itself. It does so by revealing the asymmetrical nature of philosophical thinking and argumentation and by exposing the philosophical will for truth as a will for avoiding self-illusion.

The classical question, “how does one know that one knows?,” should lead us to ask, how does one know if one is deluded? A satisfactory answer to the latter question must be so for the former as well. Positing illusion (untruth), like positing truth, is only meaningful in terms of a positive perception of truth and as such involves the same commitment. A person who rejects a philosophical position as untrue is committed by the very act of rejection to conditions of a positive truth, whether he ignores it or not. Even an individual who rejects a philosophical position on grounds of inconsistency or internal contradiction is subject to the same commitment, not simply because these terms (‘inconsistency’ and ‘contradiction’) do not function the same in philosophy as they do in formal logic, but because this kind of refutation reflects an understanding of the nature of truth (i.e., that it cannot be contradictory). Refutation, in other words, cannot be impartial. Therefore, arguments for justifying negative and positive claims are supposed to be symmetrical, as is the critical consideration that underlies them. Yet the ostensibly simple logic of this relationship repeatedly slips out from under philosophical thinking. Philosophers reject philosophical positions as untrue without being committed to a different truth, as though refutation can be independent of assumptions about the nature of truth. How can a position be judged illusory if not in relation to truth?¹⁰⁴ What assumptions implicit in philosophical thinking facilitate this asymmetry?

The answer is another essential characteristic of philosophical thinking, namely, that just as every individual philosopher is required to regard any certainty he feels before inquiry as illusory, other philosophers are similarly bound. It is reasonable that philosophical arguments do not always convince others, given their focus on self-conviction. Also, since philosophical thinking is not and cannot be subordinated to known criteria, it is an intensely personal process despite its general outlook. Hence, it is natural for any philosophical position to be criticized by other philosophers. Indeed, the philosophical demands of critical thinking oblige every philosopher to doubt any claim that he is not personally convinced of; this is an asymmetrical point of departure which is reminiscent of “the juridical principle of justice”.

According to the “juridical principle of justice” a person is innocent until proven guilty. From a logical point of view, this is a fallacy known as *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, appropriate though it may be to our moral intuitions. It is a logical fallacy because it constitutes an argumentative asymmetry between establishing guilt and innocence. Dubious guilt is enough to establish innocence but dubious innocence does not establish guilt. The “philosophical principle of critique” must be similarly understood. Every philosopher operates on the critical intuition that all beliefs are illusory unless he can convince himself otherwise. This principle, which is surely not a logical one, enables him to claim that a position is untrue while simultaneously claiming not to know the truth. The juridical-moral justification for juridical asymmetry is the deep fear of punishing an innocent person. The prospect of a guilty person mistakenly judged innocent is infinitely preferable to the converse. The asymmetry of critical-philosophical thinking works similarly. There is a clear, although seldom conscious, preference for the scenario where truth is mistaken for illusion, rather than vice versa. Indeed, this preference encourages certain philosophers to argue that the idea of necessary truth should be abandoned because it leads repeatedly to illusion. The desire to avoid illusion is what guides this thinking over and above the desire to attain the truth.¹⁰⁵ This is why, in philosophical discourse, it is possible to judge something as untrue without asserting knowledge of the truth. If philosophical inquiries were really motivated by the simple desire for truth, there would be no reason for truth being mistakenly perceived as illusory being preferable to its converse. This asymmetry, which is ready to pay the price of perceiving truth as illusion in order to avoid doing the opposite, would not have come about.¹⁰⁶

This is why any philosopher must necessarily claim the success of his inquiry, while others must claim otherwise. Philosophical thinking is a process, as I have said before, wherein an individual convinces himself that his subjective judgment reflects an objective truth. When he is successful in this endeavor a feeling of certainty prevails in him, but even when he fails he cannot avoid the sense that he has improved his self-awareness. In other words, every individual philosopher necessarily completes a process of philosophical inquiry with a sense of success.

Descartes explains this guaranteed success succinctly at the end of the first chapter of his *Meditations*:

I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and, even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that is, resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver,

however powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree. (Descartes 1988:79)

In these words Descartes emphasizes that success is guaranteed because the fear of mistaking truth for illusion is not present. Descartes' "evil spirit" is a metaphor for the asymmetry of philosophical thinking. The role of this asymmetry is actually to reduce the possibility of mistaking illusion for truth but its result may be missing the explicit goal of philosophical inquiry – "The Truth." Descartes totally ignores the possibility that his approach might lead him to mistake truth for illusion. He is convinced that it will ultimately lead to the truth, or at least to heightened self-awareness. Even without disputing Descartes' conclusions the problematic nature of his approach is evident. Not only does it create conditions where truth might be mistaken for illusion but it may well, and often does, cause philosophers to consider whatever they are unable to refute as necessary truths. Descartes' philosophical journey commences with strong belief in its positive results. He is not at all troubled by the possibility that it may lead him to mistake truth for illusion and he is convinced that it will necessarily prevent him from mistaking illusion for truth. From the opposite perspective, the asymmetry of philosophical thinking explains why the philosophical conclusions of one philosopher will almost necessarily be rejected by other philosophers. The process of self-conviction the philosopher has undergone is not theirs, and hence the logic of philosophical thinking obliges them to reject his conclusions unless they can convince themselves of them independently. Thus, philosophical inquiry is not objective in two basic senses: (a) the individual subject's self-conviction is the touchstone of truth; (b) critical asymmetry guides philosophical thinking. For this reason, even if a philosopher would accept another philosopher's position, he does so after adapting it to his own investigation and concepts and never in its original form. But critical asymmetry usually makes agreement difficult and this, in an important sense, is its main role: to ensure the continuity of critical thinking.

It would appear that someone who claims to not know the truth could not judge any position to be true or untrue, but this asymmetry enables, indeed compels, philosophers to argue against what they do not understand or cannot convince themselves is true. The logic of philosophical thinking, as I averred before, prefers to see truth as illusion rather than the converse. Philosophers are hence troubled by the possibility of mistaking illusions for truth but less concerned about the inverse scenario. It is not surprising then, that most philo-

sophical arguments take the form of refutations and that in this discourse these refutations are less dogged by doubt than confirmations.

If philosophical thinking is an asymmetrical process of self-conviction, then a philosopher's ability to escape self-deception becomes an essential philosophical question. Descartes' confidence in the positive results of his endeavor, even before it commenced, reflects an unlimited trust in the approach, in which he is not unique. One might deduce from this absolute trust that philosophers' ability to escape self-deception is very limited and dubious.

"I will not deceive, not even myself", which Nietzsche defined as "the will to truth", is revealed as the real motivating force behind philosophical thinking and argumentation. Critical asymmetry gives refutation an advantage in this argumentation. An asymmetry always reflects a preference, in this case the preference for mistaking truth for illusion rather than the opposite. The fear of illusion is thus not only the main motivation behind philosophical inquiry, but also the central axis of philosophical thinking, determining its internal logic and boundaries. This would explain why positions which call for abandoning the search for truth in the name of the "will to truth" are possible and justifiable within this discourse.

Philosophers construct their arguments in a context that presupposes the problem of illusion. The philosopher is obliged to convince, mainly himself, that he has reduced the likelihood of illusion as much as possible. Skeptical positions have an *a priori* advantage in this type of discourse, because of their suspension of judgment. This, insofar as it can be accomplished, is one solution to the problem of illusion.¹⁰⁷ Skeptical positions are hence considered more legitimate than dogmatic ones in philosophical discourse. An alternative way to avoid illusions, more difficult to accomplish, is to know the truth. Unlike the ability to identify an illusion, which in philosophical discourse is not conditional on knowing the truth, the truth is, in Spinoza's words, "the sign of itself and of falsehood".¹⁰⁸ Thus, philosophical thinking is not always satisfied with skepticism but strives repeatedly to formulate universal and necessary truths. These and only these can give a philosopher the certainty he seeks.

If every philosophical inquiry begins with an individual's questioning the validity of his own beliefs, then the end of the inquiry can only be heralded by his doubts being assuaged. Because subjective beliefs and states of mind are what direct philosophical investigations, these inquiries must be understood as subjective processes even when they use objective rules or claim to reach objective conclusions. Philosophical arguments are not formal demonstrations. They are invented for the purpose of convincing a subject who is motivated by the "will to truth" and who considers his own self-agreement to be the

touchstone of truth. The role of the next chapter is to examine the relationships between the logical and rhetorical aspects of philosophical thinking and argumentation.

CHAPTER 3

Philosophical argumentation: Logic and rhetoric¹⁰⁹

In the previous chapter, treating the issues of the speaker and the addressee, I tried to point out that in a philosophical argument, unlike other rhetorical arguments, speaker and addressee are one and the same. The problematic meaning of this is a loss of that duality so vital to the framework of critical discussion that philosophy tries to convey, as well as the emergent risk of self-deception. I should reemphasize that I do not mean to claim that philosophy prevents an exchange between different people, but rather that the philosopher, as a critical subject and also given his goal, does not and cannot view the objective of his argument as the agreement or disagreement of actual addressees. As a critical subject, the philosopher sees, and must see, himself and only himself as the supreme judge of his judgments; yet given his goal, he must convince himself that his judgment is not exclusively his individual judgment. The possibility of distinguishing a sense of certainty illusory due to its origin in the subject's individual characteristics, from a sense of certainty that is not, has been presented as a problem that, to a large extent, shapes the challenge the philosopher confronts, as well as his conclusions.¹¹⁰

Wishing, now, to examine the argumentative implications entailed by the necessity of facing this challenge, it is important to distinguish the philosophical argument not only from other rhetorical arguments, but also from logical arguments, often considered worthy of guiding philosophical thinking and argumentation, or even of providing a criterion for their evaluation.

The need to find argumentative ways capable of protecting the philosopher from entrapment by a semblance of truth, is one that has strengthened philosophy's logical orientation. Adherence to the rules of proof or refutation, particularly when these are presented as formal rules, can impart the feeling that the criterion of validity is an objective one, not governed by the arbitrary judgment of an individual subject (in this case, the philosopher himself).¹¹¹ Moreover, such adherence to rules is designed to neutralize elements capable of distorting human beings' rational judgment. Thus, in philosophical discus-

sion, logic has become a generic term for every method of thinking containing a commitment to some objective criterion, or every method that seems to leave no space for the free – and therefore arbitrary – judgment of the individual subject.¹¹² Without entering into the paradox embodied in the attempt to propose a method of removing the thinking subject himself from the activity he has constituted, I would like to observe that this free use of the term logic has, in and of itself, created serious mistakes in philosophical discussion.

In his book *Philosophical Reasoning*, John Passmore draws attention to the free and inaccurate use that philosophers make of logical terminology. He cites the way philosophers use the term ‘self-contradiction’ as a good example. Passmore argues that close scrutiny of philosophers’ use of this term often reveals a failure to meet the logical requirements for “self-contradiction”, namely the conjunction of a proposition and its negation. Instead, philosophers often relate self-contradiction to a simple proposition, which bears no relation to the logical construction of self-contradiction. Passmore claims that unlike the logical concept of self-contradiction, which is formally defined, the philosophical notion of self-contradiction is often misplaced and used instead of the notion of impossibility.¹¹³

Passmore posits the difference between philosophy and logic as part of his effort, throughout the book, to distinguish philosophical reasoning from both mathematical and empirical reasoning. He considers Hume’s famous criticism of induction as an example of his claim. According to Passmore, despite his recommendation to ignore arguments that are neither empirical nor mathematical, Hume’s own argument does not employ scientific or mathematical procedure:

It tries to show that something cannot be done, but not because (in the scientific manner) it would be inconsistent with some physical law... nor because the supposition that it can be done leads to formal contradiction... but rather because any attempt to do it presume that it has already been done. This one of the most characteristic procedures in philosophy. (Passmore 1970:7)

Passmore is indeed referring to a very common philosophical argumentative procedure, although he does not do so by name. This is the well-known strategy known as begging the question (*petitio principii*). Such critical strategies are common in philosophical discussion since one of the principle goals of philosophical thinking is to expose basic assumptions and test them critically. The philosopher exposes the controversial implicit or unjustified assumptions of a given position and argues for ‘begging the question’. This is exactly what Hume did when he pointed out that the principle of the uniformity of nature is

a problematic assumption. Without doubt Hume was not alone in this recognition, but, unlike others, he sought philosophical justification, i.e. he was not willing to accept it at face value. Philosophical discussion, which does not restrict the targets of philosophical criticism *a priori*, encourages this kind of investigation – a critical strategy which claims that the basic assumptions of a certain position have not been justified and sometimes that they cannot be justified at all.

Chaim Perelman explains that this is exactly the meaning of *petitio principii*:

This [*petitio principii* S.F.] is not a mistake in formal logic, since formally any proposition implies itself, but it is a mistake in argumentation, because the orator begs the question by presupposing the existence of an adherence that does not exist and to the obtaining of which his efforts should be directed.

(Perelman 1979: 15)

‘Begging the question’, argues Perelman, is a rhetorical charge and not a mere logical one, because it originates in the addressee’s attitude to the argument and not solely in the form of the argument. Furthermore, if the conclusion were not – implicitly or explicitly – present in the assumptions, it could not be logically derived from them. The idea of logical inference is that logical steps do not add any content of their own. Therefore, if ‘begging the question’ is perceived as a problem of a philosophical argument, it would be inaccurate and misleading to equate philosophical and logical argument, for then the charge would apply to any valid argument. Whereas, the presence of the conclusion somehow in the assumptions is a necessary condition for a strict logical validity, it is used as an indication of philosophical failure. Thus, the demand that philosophical argument be logical and at the same time avoid begging the question would be an eminently contradictory demand. In other words, we do not charge every logically valid argument with being philosophically begging the question. Yet, every argument charged with being philosophically begging the question is assumed to be logically valid. This does not mean that logic does not play a significant role in philosophy, but merely that philosophy always uses logic in a manner that subordinates it to philosophical purpose, and not in its strictly formal sense.

The fact that ‘begging the question’ express a critical attitude of an addressee to the argument rather than a formal fallacy, can also explain why philosophers easily recognize this fallacy in the arguments of other philosophers but rarely in their own. Although also formal fallacies are often exposed by someone who disagrees with a certain position, non-formal fallacies are

in fact evidences of disagreement. Since philosophical thinking is interested in basic assumptions it is only natural that begging the question, which indicates disagreement with basic assumptions, is so dominant a part of this discussion. A philosopher accuses another of begging the question by introducing a new question, which was not asked previously and that he thinks should be asked. The accusation of begging the question faults the philosopher for dogmatism, i.e. granting certainty to controversial assumptions while he committed to avoid dogmatism.

One might summarize the issue thus: the fallacy of begging the question is not a mere logical fallacy, and certainly not a formal one, although it refers to the relationship between assumptions and conclusion. It is not a logical fallacy because logic requires the conclusions to somehow be inherent in the assumptions. Even Whately, who considers this fallacy in a logical context, argues that it is a subjective and interpretive form of criticism rather than an objective, formal one:

It is not possible, however, to draw a precise line, generally, between this fallacy [*petitio principii* S.F.] and fair argument; since, to one person, that might be fair reasoning, which would be, to another, 'begging the question;' inasmuch as, to the one, the premises might be more evident than the conclusion; while, by the other, it would not be admitted, except as a consequence of the admission of the conclusion. (Whately 1864: 107)

Perelman, as was mentioned above, offers a more definite claim, explaining why this is a rhetorical rather than logical fallacy.¹¹⁴ In my opinion this kind of criticism is unavoidable in philosophical discussions, whether one names it as a logical fallacy or a rhetorical one. The philosopher who claim that he bases his arguments on the most foundational and evident assumptions is naturally subject to an unconvinced philosopher's accusation of begging the question.¹¹⁵

To return to the beginning of the discussion, we can see how logical concepts are imbued with rhetorical significance in the philosophical discussion. Passmore, who does not employ rhetorical terms, cites, for example, the philosophical use of the term "self-contradiction" as inaccurate. According to Passmore philosophers often argue for self-contradiction when a certain claim is merely irreconcilable with the implicit assumptions of their inquiry.¹¹⁶ I agree with Passmore that the free use of logical terms by philosophers is often misleading especially when the terms are used to argue the irrefutable status of a certain claim. Yet my present aim is not only to warn of the potentially misleading confusion of logic and philosophy but also to draw attention to the fact that

although logic plays an important role in philosophical thinking, philosophical arguments should be seen as rhetorical rather than logical ones.

The philosophical tendency to prefer logical thinking is not incidental and can be explained. The philosopher who desires to clear his thoughts, ensure they are not grounded in personal and arbitrary preferences, regards logical elaboration as a means of testing them that is independent of common opinions. Aristotle for example, saw dialectic as logical thinking that begins with common opinions but does not rely on common agreement. The conclusions of dialectical thinking will be perceived as true even if they contradict common opinions. The Platonic forms are a good example of this (mainly because Aristotle himself rejected their possibility).¹¹⁷ According to Plato the forms necessarily exist because a logical examination of the question of knowledge taught him (convinced him) that it could not be otherwise, even if their existence appears preposterous. Philosophy always grants special weight to logical thinking, this being one of the most remarkable characteristics of philosophical thinking and argumentation. Philosophical arguments are hence often perceived as absurd and rejected by non-philosophers. Arguments that are perceived as convincing by philosophers, or at least by certain individual philosopher, might be regarded by non-philosophers or even other philosophers as peculiar and resoundingly unconvincing. This was, for example, Aristotle's response to the Platonic notion of forms.

The logical elaboration of a thought however, does not occur in a vacuum and is only one of the means philosophers use to convince themselves and others that their positions are not grounded on personal and arbitrary preferences. Logical thinking can hence lead, as it has done in the past and will continue to do in the future, different philosophers to different conclusions. My claim is that this is because it is not logic that determines the conclusions of philosophical thinking, but the personal judgment of each individual philosopher. Logical development of philosophical thought is not dependent on the rules of logic, but culminates in a point that from the philosopher's point of view cannot be passed without exchanging the clarity achieved for a new obscurity. From this point of view logic is used by philosophers as a magnifying glass, the proximity or distance of which is dependent on the philosopher's sense of clarity.

Locke and Berkeley: An example

A good example of my claim is the manner in which George Berkeley criticizes John Locke's position. This is an instructive and interesting example because

these two philosophers not only shared a basic assumption (empiricism) but also a similar argumentative framework. Berkeley's criticism was merely that Locke did not halt the logical elaboration of his thought in the appropriate place. He does not dispute Locke's starting point nor his way of thinking, but only the point at which he decided to determine his conclusions.

Berkeley writes in his notebooks:

Wonderful in Lock that he could wⁿ advanc'd in years sees at all thro a mist y^t had been so long a gathering & was consequently thick. This more to be admired than y^t didn't see farther. (Berkeley 1967:71)

Berkeley appreciates Locke's philosophical abilities, the capacity to see through the thick fog distorting human understanding. Yet he criticizes him of not following through,¹¹⁸ i.e. of not realizing the philosophical conclusions that Berkeley feels necessarily emerge from his position. The question I want to pose at the center of this discussion is: what is the significance of this kind of criticism? Who or what can determine the proper logical elaboration of a thought?

Berkeley believes that his gauge is the correct one, mainly because he derived it from Locke himself. In his book *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke recommends the proper analogy for clarifying the process of understanding:

The perception of the *mind* being most aptly explained by words relating to the *sight*, we should best understand what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight.
[italics mine S.F.] (*Essay* II.XXIX.2)

The contribution of this very old analogy to the present discussion is surely not a function of its originality. It is important because it is a central axis of the thinking and argumentation of both Locke and Berkeley, i.e. it plays a significant role in the elaboration and justification processes in the respective positions of these two philosophers. Berkeley not only adopts Locke's assumptions, but also the analogy that guides Locke's thinking. Comparing the two philosophers can illuminate how and why two philosophers who share the same assumptions and method of thinking can arrive at different conclusions.

I will briefly consider three central points of disagreement between Locke and Berkeley: the issue of abstract ideas, the issue of material substance and the issue of primary and secondary qualities. With respect to each I will show how the logical disagreement is actually the result of disagreement concerning the argumentative status of the analogy that both employ: *seeing is like thinking*.

Locke makes reference to the visual in order to assert that particular ideas precede abstract ideas. He writes:

[F]or, when we nicely *reflect* upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine.

[italics mine S.F.] (*Essay* IV.VII.9)

In his book *The Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle speaks of the importance of the term “reflection” that Locke borrows from the field of optics to lend the process of introspection a visual dimension.¹¹⁹ When the analogy “thinking is like seeing” is both the implicit and explicit axis of thought, the difficulty of understanding abstract ideas is apparent. Yet, Locke does not present the difficulty in order to reject the possibility of abstract ideas, but only to assert the priority of particular ideas (the empiricist’s basic assumption).

At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as it earliest knowledge is conversant about. (Ibid.)

Locke uses the analogy in order to illustrate the difficulty of understanding abstract ideas and hence assert the priority of particular ideas. Nevertheless, he does not aver that because abstract ideas cannot be subjected to the visual test they are impossible ideas. In other words, he permits himself to reach philosophical conclusions on the grounds of the analogy but avoids using it as a principle of rejection.

Berkeley differs. He analyzes the abstract idea of a triangle – also employed as an example by Locke – in order to assert that it not simply difficult to conceive, but an impossible idea. Berkeley seeks to “push” the analogy further:

What more easy than for any one to *look* a little into his own thought, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of this general idea of triangle – which is neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?

[italics mine S.F.] (Berkeley 1959: 113)

Sight will never make an idea accessible to us that contains all the possible properties of a triangle, including those that exclude one another, and at the same time contains none of them. The question is does this “gaze” – although its argumentative value has been ascertained – reveal anything about the impossibility of abstract ideas or the difficulty in understanding them? Did Locke arbitrarily stop the logical elaboration of his thought or did Berkeley take it a step too far?¹²⁰

Disagreement between the two philosophers concerning the idea of material substance raises the same issue. As in the case of abstract ideas, Locke does not reject the existence of material substance, but supplies the line of thought that enables Berkeley to do so. In the fourth book of his *Essay*, in the chapter entitled “On our knowledge about the existence of other things”, Locke writes:

For the having the idea of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that thing, than the *picture* of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.

[italics mine S.F.] (*Essay* IV.XI.1)

When understanding is explained by means of an analogy to sight, it is difficult to explain what aspect of the “picture of understanding” indicates the existence of anything qualitatively different to that picture itself. The analogy Locke elects to use leads him to consider a state of consciousness as nothing more than a picture. Therefore, he finds himself bound to explain claims that are not easily explained in this framework. Yet Locke, who himself points out the difficulty that inheres in the analogy does not think it sufficient philosophical justification for rejecting the idea of material substance.

Once again, Berkeley thinks otherwise. He makes a stab at the very point that Locke indicates with the “Ockham razor”:¹²¹

But [I don’t see] what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without our mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our idea?
(Berkeley 1959: 133)

One of the patrons to whom Berkeley is referring is Locke himself. Locke argues that the general idea of a material substance is not a clear one at all, since we can have neither a sensational nor a reflective perception of it. It is, confesses Locke, nothing more than an uncertain assumption.¹²² If we recall the analogy that guides his thought it is easy to understand why Locke believes the idea of material substance cannot be clearly understood; it is because we cannot “see” it. But should Locke have reached the same conclusion as Berkeley? Locke himself rejects this line of thought:

But to say or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument then if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing sight and colors, because he had no manner of idea of any such thing nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing.
(*Essay* IV.III.23)

These words illustrate the difference between Berkeley's use of the analogy and Locke's. Locke sees it as a potential aid to learning about understanding but definitely not as a criterion for validity. Berkeley, unlike Locke, sees the analogy as marking not only the boundaries of human understanding, but also the boundaries of the world; he uses it for deducing ontological conclusions. Locke illustrates his approach with the "blind man example"; one cannot convincingly argue that something does not exist only because one has difficulty ("visually") perceiving its existence. The example of the blind man, contained in the same analogy, is intended to illustrate the argumentative limitations of the analogy. Locke, without being acquainted with Berkeley's criticism, renders absurd the validity that Berkeley ascribes to the analogy. The question therefore, is what brings a philosopher to stop at a certain point, rather than which of the two went the whole distance and which one stopped mid-course. Hume, it should be noted, went a step further and rejected the existence of spiritual substance as well.¹²³

The distinction between primary and secondary qualities has an interesting argumentative connection to the assumption of material substance. On the one hand the distinction between these two levels of qualities reinforces the assumption of material substance. On the other, only the assumption itself can give meaning to the distinction. Here however, I will focus only on the different use of the analogy made by the two philosophers.

In keeping with the complexity of Locke's position throughout, here also he points out the difficulty of interlacing this distinction with the visually argumentative framework. Once again Berkeley, using visual introspection, renders the idea absurd.

Locke bases the distinction between primary and secondary qualities mainly on arguments that reject the possibility of the existence of secondary qualities in the substance itself. Yet close to the end of his discussion of the distinction he adds the following remark:

But our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblance of something in the object, and not the effects of certain powers places in the modification of their primary qualities, with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance.

(*Essay* II.X.25)

Locke it seems, despite his great efforts to ground the distinction, which is a central motif of his philosophical position, is aware of the fact that it is problematic from the point of view of visual introspection. If one limits thought

to the range of imagination, hence to the visual criterion, one has difficulty accepting the distinction. In a visual context, argues Locke, one would be inclined to think there is no essential difference between the two kinds of qualities. Berkeley agrees. He adopts Locke's claim that secondary qualities exist only in the mind, in order to argue – with the help of visual language – that all qualities exist in the same place, namely the mind:

But I desire any one to *reflect*, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I *see* evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some color or other sensible qualities, which is acknowledge to exist only in the mind. [italics mine S.F.] (Berkeley 1959: 129)

Berkeley takes the idea of visual introspection as far as he can. It was Locke who recommended visual introspection, but his conclusions do not satisfy Berkeley who feels that Locke always fails to take the extra step.

It seems that both Locke and Berkeley take consistent positions i.e. each one's position on one issue is reconcilable with their position on other issues. Therefore, an important element in philosophical evaluation of their positions is their different use of the central analogy they share. My claim is that whereas Locke makes what might be called "analogous use", Berkeley makes "metaphorical use" of it. The question of the logical elaboration is hence subordinated, *inter alia*, to the question of the argumentative status of the analogy.¹²⁴

Locke maintains the separation between the analogues, between seeing and thinking. He is therefore careful not to draw conclusions that depend entirely upon this analogy. In other words, he regards the analogy as having excellent argumentative and explanatory power but not as a criterion of validity. Berkeley, unlike Locke, fuses the analogues. Thus, He does not hesitate to draw conclusions that are entirely dependent on visual introspection, even ontological conclusions. In other words, Berkeley transforms the analogy into a metaphor.¹²⁵ He totally eliminates the difference between the analogues, hence giving the analogy status as a criterion of validity. Therefore, whereas Locke reaches certain conclusions on the grounds of the analogy (the priority of particular ideas) but rejects the possibility of more radical conclusions (the impossibility of abstract ideas), *Berkeley interprets this limitation as inconsistency*.

In his "analogous use" Locke seems to constantly emphasize the comparative term "like" which indicates that the relationship between the analogues is one of similarity rather than identity. When we explain A by means of B we are not committed to arguing that what is wrong for B is also necessarily wrong

for A. Although Locke recognizes the argumentative value of visual introspection he does not seriously presume to argue for the impossibility of abstract ideas, even if their possibility is negated by visual introspection. According to this view visual introspection can be useful in illustrating the difficulties in understanding abstract ideas, and hence prove the priority of particular ideas. Since, however, it is only an analogy, it cannot be used to reject the possibility of abstract ideas.

In his “metaphorical use” Berkeley seems to relinquish comparative terms such as “like” and hence transforms, in the service of his argument, the relationship from one of similarity into one of identity. When we refute A by means of B, they must be mixed together in order to argue that what is wrong for B is also wrong for A. Berkeley, according to his metaphorical use must therefore reject any idea that is refuted by the visual introspection test. The question that Berkeley repeatedly asks is: why do I have to assume the existence of entities whose possibility I cannot (visually) perceive?

Plato offers an interesting perspective on the conflict. Plato, who often uses this analogy in his own argumentation, emphasizes the difference between ‘sensual sight’ and “intellectual sight”. Hence, he warns of the dangers of “metaphorical use” such as Berkeley’s (although he also rejects Locke’s use). From the Platonic point of view, Berkeley’s use is simply misuse:

[The soul] bidding her trust in herself and her pure apprehension of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and it subject to variation; for such things are visible and tangible, but what she sees in her own nature is intelligible and invisible. (“Phedo” 83b)

I do not intend to pursue the Platonic position further since it is only invoked here as an example of a philosopher who maintains that there is a qualitative gap between the analogues of seeing and thinking. One should therefore be careful not to confuse them when using the analogy. Not only because, like all analogies, it has limited validity, but especially because it is an analogy between two excluded qualities. For Plato, one might circumspectly argue, thinking begins exactly at the point where seeing ends. Locke does not concur. He believes that one can learn about thinking by comparing it to seeing, bearing in mind that since it is only an analogy there are things that should be accepted or assumed even if they do not pass the test of the analogy. Berkeley, who regards Locke’s analogy as a criterion of validity, wonders why one should assume the existence of things which cannot be (“visually”) perceived.

Locke and Berkeley: The lesson

Paying attention to the argumentative role of figurative language illustrates how the logical elaboration of a philosophical thought is subordinated to selections made by the individual philosopher. These selections are what determine the argumentative space within which the logical elaboration obtains its power and the philosopher's conclusions their meaning. Returning to the metaphor invoked before, we might characterize the logical elaboration as the philosopher's "magnifying glass" and the argumentative selections as his "point of observation". Meaningful philosophical criticism must therefore consider both the "magnifying glass" and the "observation point". Any attempt to distinguish between "the proof itself" (the logical elaboration), and whatever is not "the proof itself" (the argumentative selections), will necessarily distort the picture and sometimes even prove impossible. How, for example, can the arguments of Locke and Berkeley be "purged" of their selections regarding figurative language?

My claim is not that comparisons of Locke and Berkeley's positions are valueless, but that they cannot be tested on the logical level alone. From this perspective Russell's claim that Hume's position is more consistent than those of Locke and Berkeley is meaningless so long as it does not consider the argumentative selections each one makes. To Berkeley Locke's arguments are invalid because visual introspection makes their conclusions preposterous. Likewise, Berkeley's arguments cannot be perceived as valid from a Lockean point of view because he considers analogy as a criterion of validity (Locke's example of the blind man illustrates this well). Before one examines their arguments from a logical perspective, one should therefore have a clear conception of the argumentative status of visual introspection. This will determine, to a large degree, whether one regards Locke as having mistakenly avoided conclusions that presented themselves (as Berkeley claimed) or Berkeley as having mistakenly drawn conclusions that were not tenable (as Locke suggests).

The argumentative status of analogy is a question that cannot easily be answered, nor for which an *a priori* answer exists. Maintaining the distinction between the analogues ("the analogous use") would seem to be a more favorable philosophical method because it reduces the possibility of being misled by attributing all the properties of the *phoros* (the known – by means of which one tries to explain) to the *theme* (the unknown – the thing one is trying to explain).¹²⁶ In other words, awareness of the difference between analogues is maintained. On the other hand it must be noted that the ability to refute by means of "metaphorical use" is in certain contexts an important way

of escaping dogmatic slumber, creating new ideas and introducing them into discussion.¹²⁷ It is advisable therefore, to examine the use of analogy – as any other argumentative device – as part of each particular argumentative complex and not in isolation. Every individual philosopher constructs this complex differently.

Analogy is a central tool in thinking and argumentation, especially in philosophy. The choice both of an analogy and the manner in which it is used, have significant influence on the philosophical conclusions reached and the philosophical criticism. This brings Chaim Perelman to argue that, “the whole history of philosophy could be rewritten, emphasizing not the structure of systems, but the analogies that guide philosophers’ thoughts” (Perelman 1979:99). I am not convinced that analogies alone can explain a philosopher’s line of thought (Plato, Locke and Berkeley used the same analogy), but I do concur that they should be taken into consideration when examining a philosophical argument. I, therefore, disagree also with Jeff Mason’s claim that metaphorical language is merely a technique of expression.¹²⁸ My claim is that metaphorical language plays an important role in thinking and argumentation and should not be dismissed as mere decoration. The example of Locke and Berkeley shows that the same analogy can lead to different philosophical conclusions, making Perelman’s claim seem exaggerated. However, Mason’s approach whereby the metaphorical level is only an artificial addition to the “straightforward argument” is also incorrect. It does not acknowledge the central argumentative role of the metaphorical level, which makes it possible to understand the philosopher’s way of thinking and the argumentative space within which his claims obtain their meaning and justification.

Logical proof and logical criticism

Plato’s dialectic, Descartes’ method, Spinoza’s geometry, Kant’s system and Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* are usually mentioned in assertions of the logical nature of philosophical argumentation. But a rigorous reading of these texts shows that although the arguments they contain express logical thinking, they also make use of non-logical tools in order to advance their conclusions. Hence, one cannot understand them by appealing to logic alone.

A good example is Spinoza’s *Ethics*,¹²⁹ which is considered to be an authentically logical work. This philosophical piece was composed according to the model of geometrical demonstration – definitions, axioms and propositions. Spinoza proves every proposition by referring to preceding definitions, axioms

and propositions. He also, however, adds many notes to his proof, which indicate that he perceives the philosophical argument as wider and different to a conclusion deduced from a series of assumptions. Two interesting, but certainly not exceptional examples, can be found in the second part of the book, which is entitled “On the nature and origin of the soul”.

In corollary eleven Spinoza argues:

Hence it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.
(*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XI)

This proposition, which is presented, like any other in the book, as a deduced conclusion, contains a problematic claim. The claim that the human mind is part of God’s mind is controversial and even provocative. Spinoza is aware of this and hence adds the following note:

At this point many of my readers will no doubt stick fast, and will think of many things which will cause delay; and I therefore beg of them to advance slowly, step by step, with me, and not to pronounce judgment until they shall have read everything which I have to say. (*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XI. Note)

This kind of remark is foreign to logical proof. This is because logical rules rather than the addressee’s response are what is important in logical proof, and also because logical proof is indifferent to the meaning of its propositions.¹³⁰ Furthermore, Spinoza’s request that the reader not judge his claim yet is absurd from a geometrical point of view. One can stop at any point of geometrical or logical demonstration and test its validity according to former steps; the subsequent steps are totally irrelevant for this purpose. My claim is that Spinoza himself was aware of the fact that his argumentation was constructed like a geometrical demonstration, but was not actually a demonstration. The content and style of his notes show this clearly. It is in fact a philosophical essay that tries to convince the addressee of the veracity of Spinoza’s ideas concerning God, the human soul and their relations. So, Spinoza should ensure not only that his thesis is consistent but also that his addressee is convinced.

The second example from Spinoza’s *Ethics* brings us back to figurative language, also used by Spinoza. In proposition forty-three Spinoza argues:

He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt the truth of the thing.
(*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XLIII)

This proposition is Spinoza’s answer to skepticism. It is supposed to nip in the bud any attempt to argue that the question of philosophical justification necessarily leads to an infinite regress. This proposition, which is based on proposition eleven, is true, according to Spinoza’s system, since an adequate

idea in human mind is an adequate idea in God's mind. It is the end of a Cartesian move in which Spinoza substitutes the criteria of correspondence by the criteria of clarity and distinctness, in Spinoza's terms an 'adequate idea'. In the note to this proposition he tries to convince the addressee of the validity of this criterion by using a common metaphor:

Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false. (*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XLIII. Note)

This analogy is important for understanding Spinoza's concept of truth, since it reflects his thought concerning the nature of truth and its relation to falsity. Spinoza, indeed, uses it only as an analogy. He tries to clarify the relation between truth and falsity by comparing it to the relations between light and darkness. However, the known part of the analogy determines the border of the unknown one. That is to say, the known analogue does not only help to clarify the idea of the unknown analogue, but also delimits its possible logical elaboration. This is the reason why it is important to ask and understand why Spinoza chooses relations between light and darkness (with all their possible connotations) in order to explain the relations between truth and falsity. For Spinoza, one might say metaphorically, truth is the light.

Like Spinoza, every philosopher needs to break out of the framework of logical proof in order to complete the philosophical move. Moreover, as I tried to show in the previous chapter, philosophers themselves do not necessarily deny that the philosophizing subject, rather than a system of rules, is the supreme authority of philosophical judgment. It is precisely a consciousness of this point that pushes philosophers to propose methods of dealing with the problem embedded within it. Strict adherence, as far as possible, to known rules of proof and, more important, to formal rules of proof, is not an insupportable possibility in this context. The philosophical problem is that strict adherence to rules of proof may obscure the fact that, in the final analysis, it is the judgment of the critical subject which validates the rules of proof themselves and the philosophical argument in general. This poses a problem, for forgetting this fact amounts to a lack of consciousness, while philosophy sets as its goal an enhancement of the degree of consciousness in the interests of preventing illusion.

The logical conditions for validity and refutation cannot, under any circumstances, be equated with the philosophical conditions for "validity" and "refutation", even if, as I noted earlier, logic is an important philosophical means for separating personal judgments from general ones (where this is desired). A philosophical argument cannot (and need not) fulfill the demands

of logical validity, and therefore every philosophical argument is, almost by definition, a logically invalid one. Whatever the definition of logical validity, philosophical arguments must necessarily contain elements, and therefore also moves, designed to attain the subject's agreement rather than following rules. Therefore, the claim that a given philosophical argument is logically invalid is not comparable to a similar claim made within a formal, logical framework, and as such it can even be misleading. It is capable of misleading because it implies the possible existence of a philosophical argument that is also a valid logical argument. Employing this as the exclusive mode of evaluating philosophical arguments necessarily distorts them while simultaneously denying this fact.

The terms 'validity' and 'refutation' can themselves be misleading. 'Validity' is usually associated with formal proofs, which are distinctly different from philosophical arguments. Validity in a formal proof means successfully following pre-known rules, while philosophical arguments are never cast into this kind of mould; they always address the subject's free judgment as well. 'Refutation' is usually associated with the law of contradiction and to the way in which it functions in formal systems. Within formal systems, contradiction means self-contradiction. Philosophical arguments, as close as they may be to formal structures, are never arguments made within the framework of a formal structure. Philosophical arguments are arguments that must pass the subject's test, must convince him, rather than pass the test of a definite pre-known system of rules and signs. Accordingly, what is at hand is a relation in which the subject's judgment determines even the status of contradiction, and that is never self-contradiction.

A good example of this is Kant's reference to antinomy in the philosophical context. Kant explains that antinomy, viewed from a logical perspective as an impasse, does not oblige the philosopher to see it as the end of thinking. On the contrary:

[A]n unexpected conflict comes to light, which can never be settled in the usual dogmatic manner, since both thesis and antithesis can be established through equally evident, clear, and incontestable proofs – for I will vouch for the correctness of all these proofs – and therefore reason is divided against itself, a situation that makes the skeptic rejoice, but must make the critical philosopher anxious and reflective. (*Prolegomena* AK 4:340)

This short paragraph aptly expresses the special relationship between logic and philosophy. On the one hand, a philosopher cannot and should not ignore logical defects. On the other hand, it doesn't impose a particular conclusion on

the philosopher. In other words, the state of antinomy, which is an unequivocal state in logic, can lead to different philosophical conclusions. That is, to a skeptical position, internalizing the antinomy, or to a position presenting it as only seemingly an antinomy, the product of an illusion.¹³¹ In this sense, Kant uses antinomy as a rhetorical device as well. He does not merely explain that the state of antinomy is subject to the judgment of the philosophizing subject, but also illustrates how the philosopher employs it to convince others (and to be convinced) of the necessity of his thesis. Kant claims that only his own view, transcendental idealism, can liberate reason from this antinomy, which is why he finds antinomy argumentatively useful. Antinomy can convince one who was previously unconvinced of the transcendental ideality of appearances:

From this antinomy we can, however, obtain, not indeed dogmatic, but a critical and doctrinal advantage. It affords indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of appearances – a proof which ought to convince any who may not be satisfied by the direct proof given in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

(*Critique of Pure Reason* B: 534)

In other words, not only is it the case that antinomy in philosophical discussion does not entail a particular stand, but it can also emerge as a tool aiding the philosopher in corroborating his stand. Accordingly, it is clearly pertinent to ask which antinomy or contradiction the philosopher finds it worthwhile to focus on and how it is formulated. It makes no difference in this respect whether he draws on it to corroborate his skeptical stand, or his positivistic stand, as Kant did. In other words, the distinct logical state of contradiction is not distinct in philosophical discussion and it is therefore subject to the evaluation and the use of the philosophizing subject. A broadening or narrowing of perspective can place the logical state in a totally different light. This is what Kant attempts to illustrate in his claims regarding the apparent antinomy.

In his book, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, Chaim Perelman draws attention to a necessary feature of every argumentation that is not a formal proof:

Every argument implies a preliminary selection of facts and values, their specific description in a given language, and an emphasis which varies with the importance given them.

(Perelman 1982: 34)

Perelman's claim is intended to emphasize that every argumentation, even if it appears objective, expresses a subjective orientation through the choices it embodies, as it always unfailingly embodies choices. The fact that what is in question is a subjective orientation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that every argumentation stems from manipulative intentions, but rather to

an understanding that every argumentation, and moreover every spoken or written text, is an expression of choices and evaluations of its creator. Therefore, in order to understand the argumentation it is always pertinent to ask why things were presented in this particular way. This question is not aimed at the author's intention, for unconscious choices are a definite possibility. It is designed to uncover the framework within which the argument attains its justification. As a result, elements lacking logical significance are revealed as part of the conditions of the "validity" or justification of the argument, whether these include the view of truth expressed by the speaker, the order of presentation, the choice of examples, of metaphors or of the contradictions referred to by the speaker. All these choices are responsible for raising consciousness to, and making present, particular elements rather than others, thus also enabling the logical derivations performed within the framework they establish.¹³²

In this sense, a philosophical argument is no different from any other rhetorical argument, though it is important to keep in mind that unlike any other rhetorician, the philosopher is guided by the "will to truth" rather than a desire to persuade the other.¹³³ Accordingly, it is he himself, first and foremost, that he must convince. His choices, unlike those of any other rhetorician, will be totally foreign to his goal if they result from conscious manipulation of any kind. However, it is precisely this factor increasing the risk that the philosopher has ignored the very fact that he is making choices. A rhetorician who is not a philosopher must think of the choices that will assist him in persuading his addressees, even if these contain an element of manipulation. Manipulation can even be viewed as desirable if it is designed to attain positive ends (such as cheering someone up in face of his bitter lot). In any case, the rhetorician must be conscious of his choices, even if he cannot always be conscious of all of them. The logical orientation of philosophy demonstrates that many philosophers are been totally unaware of the fact that their argumentation expresses a complex of choices and preferences, or that they tend to believe these choices have no effect whatsoever on their conclusions.¹³⁴

A highly significant choice, to which I referred in the previous chapter, is the unavoidable selection of the figures of speaker and addressee. I tried to point out that every philosophical text, and in fact every text, creates figures of its speaker and its addressee, an understanding of which is vital to understanding the text. I claimed that in the case of philosophical texts the speaker is unfailingly the 'man of truth,' even if he appears in different and sometimes contradictory manifestations. Consequently, his speaker plays an important role in forming the state of mind within which the addressee becomes convinced of the correctness of the argument and the truth of the stand of which

the argument supports. Therefore, unawareness of the speaker's argumentative role, its treatment as if it were merely coincidental and totally unconnected to the acceptance or rejection of the given philosophical position, is gravely misled. Not only can the image of the speaker affects our judgment, for better or worse, but it is also an inseparable part of the philosophical position itself. Were that not the case, there would be no need for philosophical speakers to be 'men of truth' without exception (as is the case in literary works, for instance) and there would be no need for the speakers of philosophical texts of a certain school to be so similar to one another.

I find it important to emphasize the impossibility of detaching the question of the choices embodied in a philosophical text from that of its "validity." The figure of the speaker, for instance, as in any other rhetorical argument, is directly connected to the attainment of the argument's goal – conviction and agreement. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that detaching the argument from the framework of the choices that it embodies must inescapably lead to its refutation, whether entire or partial. Its refutation in rhetorical-philosophical terms amounts to its presentation as unconvincing. If the philosopher has convinced himself by his arguments, he has been convinced by an argumentative complex that, at least for him, is necessary for being convinced. Therefore, presenting the argument within another complex, whose original traits have been censored, almost predetermines the argument's invalidation as unconvincing. Critical actions such as 'revealing the logical structure of an argument' or 'logical examination of the argument,' as well as formal renderings of the argument and suchlike, actually camouflage the fact that these are interpretative moves (themselves fully legitimate). Their goal is declaring that "this time" the arguments are being examined in an objective manner and that therefore the evaluation deduced from them is preferable to that of the argument in its original form. I think that it is important to ask, "Why?"

I am not only asking why the evaluation deduced from them is preferable, but also – and mainly – the following: Why don't the philosophers themselves make do with a 'logical structure?' Why can this judgment be treated as an objective judgment? Why is it important to claim that what is at hand is an objective judgment? Who is it that should be convinced?

Not only have commitments to an objective judgment been repeatedly criticized as an illusion (and this too, from an "objective" point of view) throughout the history of thought by various thinkers and critics, but more important, suppression of the subject's involvement in philosophical judgment is in itself a definite route to self-deception. Revealing the logical structure of an argument

is an invasive and evaluative interpretative act which forcefully determines that the philosopher has not done the job faithfully. 'Logical examination' is another name for the removal of elements that the critic considers unimportant, even though it creates the illusion of a purely objective action. Displacing the argument from its original site and mode of appearance is perceived as a necessary condition for criticism; in many cases it is the only thing that gives the criticism its force. The critic, by the very act of displacement and even more when this is labeled as logic, declares that he has improved the conditions for evaluation of the original argument mainly through the removal of those components that interfere with a reliable philosophical evaluation of the argument. In fact, the critic changes the argument itself. The problem does not lie in the change itself, which may definitely be desirable (revealing new perspectives, arousing interest, etc.), but in the lack of a consistent awareness of this change. The evaluation of the new argument will usually be perceived not only as an evaluation of the original (distinctly different) argument, but even, if it is translated into logical terms, as an objective evaluation of the original argument. The change is perceived as a translation into an objective language, thus affording a process involving subjective evaluation a cloak of objectivity. In other words, the original argument is evaluated through a different argument, considered to represent it better than it represents itself. It is at this point that the philosophical problem arises. That which is seen as an objective test, is perceived as such due to the illusion imbued in us by the critical procedure itself and particularly by procedures of the kind that utilize logical tools, which create the illusion that the subjective evaluation is no longer subjective. The argumentative acts of selection and reordering are forgotten; what remains conscious is only the examination of relations between the propositions themselves thus opening up possibilities for self-deception. We are convinced, or more precisely, we convince ourselves, that reformulation of the argument allows the introduction of an objective test of validity for the original argument.

The commitment or the demand to subject philosophical discussion to logical conditions is thus not only impossible (a removal of the subject is a removal of philosophy), moreover it can easily lead to self-deception (the illusion that a subjective judgment is an objective one). In other words, what should be stressed and kept in mind at all times is that philosophical discussion necessitates the autonomous evaluation or judgment of the individual subject, and therefore, philosophical argumentation must be understood to be formed in keeping with this demand. An appropriate clarification of this point can be found in the distinction between philosophical argumentation, on the one hand, and scientific and religious arguments, on the other hand.

Both religious and scientific arguments¹³⁵ are based on the assumption of entities transcending the subject, which considerably reduce the weight attached to the subject's evaluation or judgment. In religious discourse this is of course the gods themselves or their textual embodiment in the scriptures. The gods limit and reduce the weight of subjective evaluation, which can only serve to justify the word of the gods and cannot serve to testify against his words or his presence. In other words, this is a discussion that not only presupposes the truth, but also reduces in advance the weight attached to the judgment of the individual subject. In this sense, there is an analogy here with the orientation of scientific discussion. The orientation of science does not manifest itself in a demand for self-reflection (by a critical subject) but rather in a demand that this reflection restrict itself to a transparent system of rules and justifications that is known in advance. Religion and science, whose declared goal is also the truth, confront the problem of the individual subject's arbitrary reflection or judgment, through an objective authority whose role it is to prevent the subject, the believer or the researcher, from being misled by the arbitrariness of his judgment.¹³⁶

Philosophy, unlike religion and science, expresses an attempt to deal with the possible arbitrariness of the individual subject's judgment (that is, with illusion and self-deception), drawing on the assumption that there is no authority above the subject himself capable of rescuing him from the arbitrariness of his judgment.¹³⁷ At the beginning of his book, *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl cites this trait of philosophical thinking as part of Descartes' heritage:

First, anyone who seriously intends to become philosopher must "once in his life" withdraw into himself and attempt, within himself, to overthrow and build anew all the sciences that, up to then, he has been accepting. Philosophy – wisdom (*sagesse*) – is the philosophizer's quite personal affair. It must arise as *his* wisdom, as his self-acquired knowledge tending towards universality, a knowledge for which he can answer from the beginning, and at each step, by virtue of his own absolute insights. (Husserl 1960: 2)

In my view, Husserl's claims reflect an orientation that can indeed be identified in all philosophical thinking. Roughly, what Husserl is describing is none other than Descartes' philosophical move in the *Meditations* while through it, he expresses a very prominent characteristic of philosophy. Philosophizing, all philosophizing, be it good or bad, must always stem from a desire of an individual subject and can only, in the final analysis, rely on this subject's own sense of certainty. Therefore, philosophical arguments address the subject's judgment rather than any other authority. Other authorities of any kind can

and indeed must be subsumed under a question mark by the philosophizing subject. Clearly, then, unlike the thinking subjects in the fields of religion and science, the philosophizing subject is possessed of no authority that can ensure his avoidance of self-deception. The philosophizing subject's need to rely, in the end, on his own individual judgment, emerges quite often, and some would say always, as a double-edged dagger.

Psychological criticism

Nietzsche's criticism of traditional philosophy crosses through an emphasis on the individual dimension of every instance of philosophical thinking, including those that present an objective outlook. The elaborate systematic structures built by the greatest philosophers are incapable, argues Nietzsche, of hiding the fact that the philosopher's individual insight always precedes his "system."¹³⁸ Thus, Nietzsche's criticism actually illuminates the fact that philosophical systems create the illusion that a subjective view is an objective truth. A system, method or an adherence to rules of derivation are presented in this criticism as philosophers' way of convincing themselves, as well as others, that their view is free of subjective arbitrariness. The systematic philosopher, this commentary stresses, uses all the logical capacity he can muster so as to justify his stand, rather than criticizing it, as required of one guided by the idea of self-criticism. Evidence of this can be found in the enormous efforts that philosophers invest in providing various defenses for their views, instead of investing comparable efforts in rejecting them, as necessitated by the idea of critical thinking. In other words, systematic philosophers are revealed through this critique to be devoutly dogmatic, while the goal of their arguments is the defense of their dogmas rather than searching for truth. This is how Nietzsche describes it in his book, *Beyond Good and Evil*:

They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic. . . [W]hereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion", which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event. They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths". (*Beyond Good and Evil* Section 5)

Nietzsche treats philosophers' choice to defend their views as "philosophical treason." For him, these are philosophers who have denied the value of criti-

cism, of avoiding blind adherence to any belief whatsoever (the “will to truth”), for the sake of returning to the warm bosom of “The Truth.” In other words, they have sacrificed the “will to truth” on the altar of the desire for certainty:

The demand that one wants by all means that something should be firm (while on account of the ardor of this demand one is easier and more negligent about the demonstration of this certainty) – this, too, is still the demand for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct of weakness which, to be sure, does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds but – conserves them. (*The Gay Science* Section 347)

Nietzsche’s line of thinking directs attention to a human psychological motif, which becomes particularly problematic in the constituting philosophical discussion about self-criticism rather than agreed critical mechanisms – that is, human beings’ tendency to adhere to their habits, their previously held beliefs and their desire for a steady grounding.

In doing so, Nietzsche does not disclose anything that was previously unknown to philosophers. Descartes, “the father of modern philosophy,” is a good example. At the beginning of his journey in his book, *Meditations* he notes that the tendency to adhere to habit is a problem that philosophers must confront. He even goes to the trouble of inventing the “evil spirit” in order to create an effect with psychological force capable of facing this powerful tendency. For Descartes, the “evil spirit” is a figurative and colorful image of the conclusion that he has reached through his methodological skepticism. Only thus, he believed, could he retain a line of thought that did not adhere, unjustifiably, to any belief. In other words, the role of the “evil spirit,” along with the absurd hyperbole of its figure, was counteracting the tendency – equally exaggerated from the critical point of view – to adhere to opinions that one has become accustomed to see as truths. In his own view, using methodical doubt (doubt as method), Descartes indeed reveals a truth of which he was not previously aware and whose truth he cannot doubt (*Cogito ergo sum*). He even observes that the validity of this truth originates in a sense of certainty that he, as an individual subject, cannot deny – he and no other. In short, Descartes presents a critical-philosophical move because he sees both the negation of the other possible views, and the affirmation of the ‘cogito,’ as emanating from the absolute origin of the individual subject himself. Consequently, the interesting question is, where has the “evil spirit” disappeared to in the discussion from this point onwards? Why and how has a higher authority than the subject, God, come into the discussion despite the fact that the critical move took it upon itself to see the individual subject as supreme authority?¹³⁹

In his criticism of traditional philosophy, Nietzsche can be perceived as someone who wishes to revive the “evil spirit” in philosophical consciousness and keep it there eternally. Nietzsche himself tends to present a speaker who is a kind of demon in itself. He writes in *The Will to Power*:

Profoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge, I liked to look now out of this windows, now out of that, though I took good care not to become finally fixed anywhere. . .
(*The Will to Power* Section 410)

He assigns Zarathustra the role of issuing the following command:

Now I bid you lose me and find yourself; and only when ye have all denied me will I come back unto you.
(*Ecce Homo* Section 4)

And in the book, *Twilight of The Idols* he puts it explicitly:

I mistrust all systematists and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of integrity.
(*Twilight of The Idols* Section 26)

In these three quotes and in a considerable number of similar ones in his writings, Nietzsche testifies to his orientation of struggling to etch in philosophical consciousness the duty of self-criticism. In light of this, then, set adherence, authority and systematizing are presented as enemies of philosophical thinking and even as evidence of dishonesty, or in Nietzsche’s terms, of a lack of “intellectual conscience.”

It is easy to identify with Nietzsche’s criticism, at least so far as it concerns the potential for deceit embedded in every attempt at stubborn adherence to one particular perspective, even if this requires the neutralization of some over-proselytizing in the tone of the Nietzschean speaker. However, it is easy to identify with this criticism because, in essence, it is traditional philosophical criticism. It is the same age-old, undying philosophical dictate of casting doubt. Nietzsche’s orientation, however, is not to view skepticism as a central methodical aid, but rather as the philosopher’s eternal personal commitment.

Some may claim that in emphasizing the personal element, rather than strengthening critical thinking Nietzsche neutralizes it completely. Nietzsche himself, it would seem, might well agree. He neutralized the possibility of viewing even logical criticism as an objective activity. If Kant negated logic as an independent source of knowledge about the world, Nietzsche negated its capacity of objective criticism. However, it is precisely Nietzsche’s potential agreement that reveals the facet from which he cannot escape despite his elusive and colorful speakers and his skepticism towards the value of truth; the facet of the “will to truth.” The will not to deceive, not even myself is a cornerstone

of this thinking and the argumentation following from it. Even in Nietzsche's work the speaker is a 'man of truth,' the focal point of an effort to avoid illusion. Nietzsche's "method" is the frequent and free and independent exchange of point of view, for in his opinion "there could have been no life at all except upon the basis of perspective, estimates and semblances" (*Beyond Good and Evil* Section 34). Thus, Nietzsche seeks to revive the commitment to constantly renewed personal judgment in philosophical consciousness, against an orientation that stresses the universal and logical commitment of philosophical thought, a direction that, in Nietzsche's view, often leads to great illusions. In other words, Nietzsche stressed the personal element as opposed to the general element embedded in philosophical thinking, which is why I have chosen to call his critique "psychological criticism."

This "psychological criticism" allows an understanding that what is being questioned is, in fact, a debate about the desired level of presence of two sides, the tension between which is unfailingly expressed in philosophical thinking and argumentation. They are constructed out of and into the tension between the individual and the universal. Hence, philosophical arguments address the individual judgment of the critical subject, as arguments possessing of universal validity. The existence of this tension is prominent in philosophical argumentation, whether the given argument intimates the inevitability of such tension or embodies an implicit promise to solve it.

CHAPTER 4

Humanism, critique and the rhetoric of philosophy

Humanism and critique

My general claim is that philosophical thinking and argumentation are grounded in two unquestionable values: Humanism and Critique. These two values reflect the will behind any philosophical thinking – “The will to truth” – defined precisely by Nietzsche as “the will not to deceive, not even myself” (*The Gay Science* Section 344). Relinquishing these values would mean the end of philosophy, not the end of philosophy in the historical and dramatic sense, upon which we must cast doubt, but in the methodological sense of moving to a different discourse.

By speaking of Humanism I mean choosing man, the individual subject, as the central axis of thinking and justification (not necessarily the center of the world). This is humanism in the deepest and most affirmative sense, which is always the most dogmatic sense. It is not a humanism, which derives from comparison with other values, but one, which is prior to any such comparison. The practical meaning of this choice is that man (the individual person), and only man, must be responsible for his judgments. Therefore, philosophical arguments are always rhetorical arguments; their “validity” cannot be explained by a-priori rules, but only by the conviction of the critical subject.¹⁴⁰ We may call it ‘Epistemological humanism’ in order to distinguish it from ‘Moral Humanism.’ Man refuses to see anything as true unless he can give himself the reasons why it should be judged to be true. Philosophical argumentation is built on this assumption; its aim is to convince a critical subject.

From this point of view “The will to truth” is seen as a dogmatic choice, not just because its justification is open to doubt, as Nietzsche tried to argue,¹⁴¹ but mainly because philosophers can neither defend nor deny this choice. Take man out of the center of thinking and justification and there is no philosophy.

This was the problem Husserl found in the positivistic way of thinking; this is a choice even the positivist thinkers could not dismiss. Husserl spoke about

the crisis in the European sciences. He was trying to attract attention to the fact that in the excitement engendered by scientific advances and technological success, the one thing that gave meaning to them – man – was forgotten.¹⁴² This claim is not just an epistemological claim, but a value-laden claim as well. It was a cry of despair over the tendency to disconnect the thinking of the world from the thinking of human beings. However, this cry has force only in a discourse, which places the individual subject as the locus of justification; a discourse in which even objective truths must have subjective meaning, or they will be judged to be illusions. Here we may find the meaning of ‘Epistemological Humanism’: the universal is subordinate to the individual and not vice versa. The conviction of the individual subject, not rules or external authority, is the only thing that can stop the regress of justification in this discourse.

When the positivist thinkers drew a sharp distinction between descriptive propositions and value-laden claims, they were trying to distinguish between assertions that could be verified and those that could not. Husserl’s “cry” should not have troubled them but it did (even if they did not hear Husserl himself). They knew they had to convince others (and themselves) that their position was the right one and that a system of rules is not sufficient to cope with this philosophical challenge. The latter Wittgenstein, especially in *On Certainty*, regarded as the key issue of the question whether any sufficient answer can be given to the individual’s critical doubt. This is the source of the power of philosophical thinking, its freedom from any external instance, but also the source of its main problem. Philosophical thinking, in placing the individual subject as the end of its justification creates an identity between truth and self-agreement. This identity is very problematic because it leaves no room for distinguishing between truth and self-deception.

From this point of view, Socrates’ judges were right in asserting that his way of thinking offended the authority of the gods. Socrates did not have to speak against the gods for his guilt to be proved. Socrates was guilty of adopting only half of the imperative engraved on Apollo’s temple in Delphi: Socrates adopted the injunction ‘Know thyself’ and ignored ‘everything in measure’. Furthermore, he interpreted ‘Know thyself’ in a selective way. ‘Know thyself’ does indeed mean investigate and learn about yourself, but it also means know your place (as a man) in the universe. The Greek tragedies teach the great danger of forgetting the second meaning. This is the *hubris* of the heroes of these tragedies. But Socrates was much more dangerous. Whereas the tragic heroes were devoted to truth, he was devoted to “the will to truth”; while the tragic heroes were devoted to known dogmas, he sought their justification. He denied any truth that he could not justify by himself to himself. In this behavior

he was also more dangerous than the Sophists. They saw in the idea “man is the measure of all other things” a starting point for a skeptical position. Socrates used it as a starting point for the search for truth. Socrates, like many other philosophers who did not explicitly deny the existence of God or gods, had offended divine authority when he preferred the absence of illusion to truth. He made his individual judgment the touchstone of truth, superior to the words of the god himself. He himself told the court that he wanted to examine whether the words of Apollo’s prophet were right. By doing so he opened the way to a legacy of thought in which the individual subject must see himself as the superior instance of his judgments.

I call this a humanistic thought, because its concept of truth is necessarily subjective, even when its commitment is to universality and objectivity. This way of thinking a-priori regards as doubtful everything that has not gained the individual’s conviction. It is a kind of philosophical imperative. Just as the positivist scientist must see as doubtful anything which cannot be empirically verified, just as the religious priest must see as doubtful anything which cannot be verified by the holy texts, so the philosopher must see as doubtful anything which cannot be verified by his own judgment. Thus, we can say that philosophical thinking is delimited by dogmatic choice – the choice of man. This choice might sound good for humanists but has to trouble the philosophers. Philosophers are thinkers who are troubled by dogmas; this is the second basic value of philosophical thinking – Critique.¹⁴³

Every philosopher takes upon himself to be the standard bearer of critique. Questioning every truth, and especially commonly accepted truths, is not something one must do. It is therefore a choice.¹⁴⁴ It is a value-laden choice because it means preferring inner deliberation to any external authority. From this point of view philosophical thinking is revealed not as symmetric and objective thought, as it frequently has attempted to present itself, but as asymmetric and subjective thought. And, accordingly so are its conclusions. Philosophical thinking compels the individual subject to doubt any belief, and to see as true only those beliefs he cannot doubt. Thus, the conclusions are necessarily not objective; each subject must prove them for himself, and their validity is derived from a process that essentially gives priority to refutation.

By making the individual subject the highest instance, critical-philosophical thinking is conditioned by the ability of the individual subject to think as a universal subject, a subject whose judgments are free of influences derived from his personal state. In the absence of any higher external instance, the main problem of philosophical thought is that it might suspect itself to be no more than subjective thought. Thus, it is necessary to assume that the individual subject has

the ability to think as a universal subject, so that the conclusions of critical – philosophical thinking may contain the necessity and the universality, which the philosopher seeks. In other words, philosophical thinking demands that the philosopher be able to distinguish between his personal judgments, originating from his individual state, and his critical judgments, which are supposedly free of influences that originate from his individual state.¹⁴⁵ This can be seen clearly when we examine the speakers of philosophical texts. The philosopher, as a speaker, must place himself in the privileged position of a universal subject in order to be perceived, even if only by himself, as an authority capable of making philosophical judgments. The unavoidable question that must arise at this point is how can the philosopher be certain that his personal thought is indeed universally valid if he, and only he, can confirm it to himself. This may be called ‘the subjective failure’ of the critical, philosophical thinking, a failure which might cause the philosopher to see an individual and accidental thought as a universal and necessary one. The asymmetry of this way of thought is the other side of this problem.

“The will to truth” is interpreted as preferring the avoidance of illusion to truth itself. The assumption that the truth is stronger than any possible refutation has no justification, but critical-philosophical thinking is wholly based on it. There are two sides to the unquestioning acceptance of this assumption. The first, which usually leads to the adoption of a skeptical position, is that philosophers are rarely troubled by the possibility that a truth might be wrongly perceived as an illusion, but rather by the possibility that an illusion will be perceived as the truth. The second, which usually leads to a dogmatic position, is the inclination to accept the irrefutable as the truth. Philosophical discourse is not committed to the Spinoza’s dictum that only truth can be the sign of itself and of falsehood. The meaning of this claim, according to Spinoza himself, is that certainty means affirmation and not the absence of doubt.¹⁴⁶ We can find a remarkable expression of this asymmetry between refutation and justification in philosophical argumentation. The value of critique, not the value of truth, encourages refutation, and we can see that in philosophical discourse refutation is more readily available than justification. For example, consistency, rightly, is not perceived as sufficient to demonstrate that a philosophical position is true, but inconsistency is usually perceived as sufficient to demonstrate that a philosophical position is impossible, and thus that it is false. This is also the reason why *petitio principii*, which is a rhetorical fallacy, is perceived in this discourse as an objective reason for refutation. Philosophers usually do not hesitate to commit themselves to refutation even when they declare that they do not know the truth and even, paradoxically, when they argue

that there is no truth at all. It is one of the main reasons why the skeptical position is so dominant in philosophical discourse and why many of the conclusions of philosophical discourse are a function of the philosopher's ability to refute a position. For these reasons, it is incorrect and usually impossible to disconnect refutation arguments from justification arguments in philosophical argumentation. Furthermore, in many cases, the refutation arguments are the only justification arguments in sight. The term 'necessary assumption' is a good example for a term that was born in this kind of discourse. A 'necessary assumption' is a claim, which the philosopher failed to refute. This is the other side of the critical coin. The assumption that a truth can withstand any critical scrutiny causes the philosopher to see as true, or at least as necessary, any claim he failed to refute. It is reasonable to assume that this discourse and its conclusions would be seen in an essentially different way if it were not based on this asymmetry. A comparison with religious discourse can make this point clear.

A refutation of God's existence in religious discourse would require, if it could be articulated at all, a much greater argumentative effort than the justification of God's existence. Here the asymmetry is inverse but at least overt. This is a discourse whose aim is to preserve the truth and not to search for the truth.¹⁴⁷ The comparison between these two discourses teaches us that it is precisely the critical discourse, which relates to the truth with much greater resistance than the religious one. The religious discourse always reflects the fear that the truth might be refuted. 'The false prophets portion' in the Bible is a good example of this possibility. Philosophical discourse, by adopting critique as its great value, reflects the belief that a truth cannot be refuted. In other words, philosophical discourse is based on a belief, which is no less dogmatic than religious belief. The belief that the truth cannot be refuted is the only thing that can give any justification to searching for the truth thought the philosopher's ability to refute claims. The philosopher, who must regard himself as the highest instance, can see the touchstone of truth only in his ability of refutation. The philosophical problem of self-deception is born of the philosopher's need to ascribe a universal and objective meaning to a truth, which was derived from a personal and asymmetric process.

To choose critique (preferring refutation) and to choose humanism (preferring the individual's deliberation) are two choices that reflect the same will: "the will not to deceive, not even myself". They imply, preferring the absence of illusion to the absence of truth (Critique) and preferring the individual judgment to any authority (Humanism). Therefore, skepticism is a characteristic representative of this line of thought and was born from it, even though many philosophers have seen it as their mission to overcome skepticism. Any philo-

sophical thought must begin from it and many philosophical thoughts end with it too. For the same reason dogmatism is perceived as a vice especially in philosophical discourse. Though, of course, many of the great philosophers were judged as dogmatic by their peers. The philosophers, whose power is very great in rejecting the positions of other philosophers, often lose this power when they come to their own position. "The will to truth" leads not once to the need for truth, the need for affirmative and necessary truth.

The philosophical values of Humanism and Critique determine the character of this discourse and give rise to the philosophical problem of self-deception. It is a discourse that calls into question any claim, rule or entity and thus places self-conviction as the highest instance.¹⁴⁸ The historical fact that all philosophers were convinced that their critical process protected them from the danger of illusion, even if it did not lead them to truth itself, must trouble any philosopher personally (many philosophers were indeed troubled by this very fact). It should trouble each individual philosopher not only because of the historical fact that different philosophers were convinced of different, and even of contradictory, "truths", but mainly because philosophical thinking cannot avoid this trap. Avoiding this trap necessitates a dogmatic acceptance of external instance. Since the constitutive values of philosophy reject any dogmatic acceptance of external instance, the philosopher must arrive at a point in which his self-conviction is the only thing he has. At this point he cannot know if his self-conviction is not actually self-deception. The need of the philosopher to see in his self-agreement a universal agreement, which binds necessarily any critical subject, aggravates this possibility.

The rhetoric of philosophy

Early on in the book I attempted to support the distinction between 'good rhetoric' and 'bad rhetoric,' in order to argue that rhetoric in and of itself is neither good nor bad, and that it plays a decisive role in philosophical discourse. This amounted to an attempt to reject those positions negating "The Truth" as the goal of philosophy due to their recognition of the rhetorical aspect in philosophical discourse,¹⁴⁹ and also to reject those positions that ignore or deny this aspect of philosophical discourse.¹⁵⁰ In strengthening the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' rhetoric, I had recourse to discussions from Plato, Aristotle, and Chaim Perelman. The expressions themselves, 'good rhetoric' and 'bad rhetoric,' are Platonic ones.

In the “Gorgias” dialogue, Plato seeks to reject the ‘bad rhetoric’ of Gorgias’ school, for it is not committed to truth and justice. Socrates reveals it to be a practice of verbal cosmetics whose sole objective is allowing the speaker control of the addressee’s soul. Polos, Gorgias’ student, also presents the force of rhetoric in this manner, comparing its power to that of a tyrant. This rhetoric is mainly the practice of stylistic acrobatics whose one and only goal is the persuasion of the other. This was how rhetoric was usually perceived throughout most of the history of philosophy, and the reason why it was scorned and rejected as deforming rational thinking and contradicting the philosophical values of truth and criticism.

In the “Phaedrus” dialogue, Plato presents a different picture. Some, and particularly rhetoricians, see this as a metamorphosis in Plato’s thinking. In this dialogue, Socrates rejects Phaedrus’ sweeping claim that rhetoric contradicts the search for truth. Here, he introduces ‘good rhetoric’ as closely related to dialectic and as attaining its peak in a capacity for addressing the gods themselves. In this view, ‘good rhetoric’ cannot be detached from the question of knowledge or from the aspiration to truth. In other words, Plato attempts to create a distinction between those who view persuading the other as their sole end, and those who consider themselves responsible for the truth of their words. As early on as the “Gorgias” dialogue, Socrates presents the ideal that guides him – existing with himself in harmony, even if this exacts the price of disharmonious relations with his surroundings. This ideal enables him to illustrate the deep chasm separating him from the ‘bad rhetorician,’ whose skill Socrates presents as a type of flattery. This type of rhetoric is rejected by Socrates not because convincing the other is bad – Socrates himself tries to convince his interlocutors, but because it has no commitment to truth. In the “Phaedrus” dialogue he integrates this ideal into the concept of ‘good rhetoric.’ ‘Good rhetoric’ is presented as a case in which there is no gap between the speaker’s knowledge and the things to which he commits in his words.

Aristotle continues this line of thought. He begins his book, *The Art of Rhetoric*, with the claim: “Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic”. Aristotle claims that both address questions that do not belong to a definite area of knowledge and both are required for circumstances in which arguments supporting contradictory positions can be presented. He objects to the negative label attached to rhetoric, arguing that as a form of art, its value should be determined according to the objective towards which it is employed. He notes that it is customary to distinguish between a ‘dialectician,’ who employs a particular method, and a ‘sophist,’ who employs this method towards a bad goal. While Aristotle limits rhetoric to the realm of practical reasoning, I have tried to show

that this restriction lacks serious justification. In any case, even if Aristotle's explicit stand does not cite philosophy (and especially metaphysics) as a rhetorical field of discussion, Aristotle cannot be claimed to view rhetoric as a factor that is hostile to critical thinking. He distinguishes between the rhetorician aiming to persuade at any cost, and the desirable rhetorician who is capable of identifying the options for persuasion in every given case, mainly for purposes of confronting those who would present a one-sided or distorted picture. Thus, even Aristotle presents rhetoric as an art that does not contradict the values of truth and criticism.

Chaim Perelman comes to rhetoric after long years in which it has been removed from the center of discussion. Accordingly, he returns to Aristotle himself so as to form the modern concept of rhetoric as a 'new rhetoric.' The 'new rhetoric' is one that forgoes the Aristotelian distinction between dialectic and rhetoric and attempts to formulate the conditions for rational reasoning that are neither quantitative nor experimental. Perelman claims that rhetoric was pushed into the margins of rational discourse due to the increasing overemphasis, in the field of rhetoric, of its stylistic aspect, and the omission of its argumentative aspect. To a large degree, this is a claim that is suited to the thinking of Plato and Aristotle. Both Plato and Aristotle tried to create a distinction between 'bad' and 'good rhetoric' based on their rejection of the verbally decorative and their emphasis on a consciousness of the argumentative space. In the course of history, Perelman claims, the argumentative aspect of rhetoric was suspended from it and appropriated by logic and dialectic, leaving rhetoric as a collection of stylistic means – "cosmetics." Perelman approached rhetoric as a result of the dead-end he was led into by positivistic discussion. He found the return to the rhetoric and dialectic of Aristotle to be a possible answer to the characterization of a rational discussion lacking measurable criteria of decision. This is why Perelman does not remain loyal to Aristotle's distinction between rhetoric and dialectic. He constructs his position through an emphasis upon the difference between discussions that possess measurable criteria of decision and those in which the discretion of human beings is called in to decide. His objective is pointing out that the latter can be considered rational discussions.

Perelman even attempted to characterize the rhetoric which is unique to philosophy. His characterization is based on the concept of the 'universal audience.' The philosopher, Perelman claims, does not prove but rather convinces, for which reason he believes that the classical view of "The Truth" should be rejected. In other words, philosophical argumentation cannot be equated with the model of mathematical proof, despite frequent attempts to do so, for it

is a discussion lacking measurable criteria of decision. On the other hand, Perelman says, the philosopher is distinct from any other rhetorician in that he does not address a particular group of addressees, but rather a universal addressee. According to Perelman, it is this fact that makes philosophical rhetoric rational. The philosopher is called upon to propose arguments that cannot be based on particular weaknesses or beliefs. That is to say, Perelman sees the universality of the addressee as ensuring the rationality of philosophical argumentation.

The discussion concerning the approaches to rhetoric of these three thinkers, Plato, Aristotle and Chaim Perelman, clarified that rhetoric itself is not hostile to critical thinking and philosophy. Perelman even tried to stress that philosophers' tendency to ignore the rhetorical aspects of philosophical argumentation is a philosophical problem in itself. They all emphasized that we know when we are interested in truth and when in winning a debate; when we camouflage doubts or lack of knowledge with manipulative words and when truth is honestly our goal.

These grounds allowed the presentation of rhetoric as not, in or of itself, contradictory to philosophical values. Therefore, while I claimed that philosophical arguments are, of necessity, rhetorical ones, I nevertheless pointed out that my claim was not meant to undermine philosophical discussion. Philosophical discussion, I held, as a discussion lacking rules of justification that are known in advance, necessitates the formulation of arguments that address the subject's judgment, and should therefore be treated as rhetorical arguments. The question that arose from this was, Who is the addressee addressed by the philosophical argument? Who is the addressee whose agreement the speaker seeks?

In my answer to this fundamental question, I begged to differ with Perelman. I claimed that this addressee was no 'universal audience' but rather a very private, individual one. The philosophical demand for personal critical evaluation reveals the philosopher himself to be the exclusive addressee whose agreement is vital to the philosopher. The philosopher cannot view the agreement of any other as attaining the objective of his arguments, as Socrates claimed, but by the same token neither can he view the other's disagreement as his failure. Therefore, he is obviously different from any other rhetorician and the difference between a 'good rhetoric' committed to truth, and a 'bad rhetoric' committed to persuasion, is an insufficient solution to the problem involved here. This problem, which need not trouble other rhetoricians in the least, but must and indeed often does trouble philosophers, is the problem of self-deception.

The philosopher is not only a rhetorician who does not or cannot capitalize on the gap between the speaker and the addressee ('bad rhetoric'), for the addressee he is laboring to convince is first and foremost himself, he is also a rhetorician who should be seriously troubled by the possibility that such a gap may exist within himself. This is doubly so whenever a philosopher tires to convince himself that his individual agreement is possessed of objective truth. That is, that his private agreement with himself, to which he is committed is, at least potentially, an universal agreement obliging every critical subject. I have claimed that this need, embedded to a large extent in philosophical thinking, is fertile ground for self-deception. Therefore, if in contrast to the usual outward-directed rhetorical address, the philosopher mainly turns inwards, then instead of the usual apprehension that rhetoric may deceive the other, the philosopher should mainly be apprehensive of self-deception. This is not because self-deception is any less moral or less philosophical than deceiving the other, but because deceiving the other necessarily passes through self-deception in philosophy. It is hard to consider one who knowingly deceives the other to be a philosopher.

Doubt has been cast upon the possibility of realizing the philosophical "will to truth," as Nietzsche rightly defined it, "I will not to deceive, not even myself," and mainly upon the possibility of realizing the latter "not even myself." It is doubtful to what extent this will actually constitutes any given individual's philosophical thinking. Only a lack of suspicion concerning it can dispel suspicions concerning the conclusions of this thinking.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, the less reason a philosopher has to doubt his own intentions, the more difficult it will be for him to doubt his conclusions. I have tried to show that this was what troubled Socrates on the eve of his death.¹⁵²

I have consciously chosen not to address other widely accepted possibilities attempting to reject the claim that it is the "will to truth" which motivates philosophical thinking. I have tried to stress throughout that uncovering philosophy's rhetorical side does not in any way indicate that its declared goal, the search for truth, is not identical with the goals of philosophers themselves. Moreover, in my view, a position rejecting the reality of this goal amounts to an evasion of the philosophical problem itself. It may indeed be the case that concealed behind each philosophy there is a human-social-historical fabric capable of explaining why the philosopher claimed what he did in the way he did. Such explanations usually lead to the conclusion that any examination of philosophy as constituted by the "will to truth" takes a naïve approach. I do not know whether any serious justification can be provided for a claim of this type, and in any case, this kind of claim is guided by the "will to truth" itself in its attempt

to unveil an illusion. However, my main criticism of this view is that it analyses rhetorical choices only as means towards persuading the other and hence it totally misses the philosopher's need to convince himself first and foremost. The rhetorical choices made in philosophy should be analyzed as modes of thinking and justification and not merely as modes of expression. Accordingly, my question is more theoretical and less historical in nature. On the assumption that philosophers are indeed guided by the "will to truth," which actually determines their thinking, what then is the picture that emerges?

The picture is, at the very least, a problematic one. 'Good rhetoric' will be of no avail in this case. When the individual's judgment is placed above and beyond every other source of authority, even the best of intentions can turn into traps; the purity of the intentions can (misleadingly) project onto the purity of the conclusions. The philosophical demand for an individual's judgment that is possessed of the validity of universal-critical judgment is inevitable and heightens the risk that philosophical thinking will lead to self-deception. The nervous roamings of Socrates and Nietzsche are no different, in this sense, from the definite systems of Spinoza or Kant. Each and every one of them expresses an attempt to deal with this paradoxical task. It is not a violent rhetoric in which the speaker and addressee are placed on rival, contradictory sides, for such a situation is not philosophical in the least,¹⁵³ it is rather the desperate rhetoric of people who are caught up in the philosophical labyrinth of the "will to truth."

Socrates is executed due to this insanity of his and dies in his insanity. Even before his judges, he is incapable of another rhetoric. He is unwilling to fulfill their wishes at the price of deluding them, for it is the "will to truth" that guides his activity. Nietzsche, who ridicules the request of a sacrifice to the god of medicine, of Socrates' will, as if Socrates had viewed life as a disease of which he was about to be cured, is willing himself to sacrifice any truth so as to convince himself that he is deluding neither others nor himself. His legacy that there is no fact save interpretation is a distinct outcome of this line of thought. These philosophers are prepared to pay the price of their denunciation by the collective, for the sake of the "will to truth." Both are extreme manifestations of the philosophical placement of the individual's judgment above the collective's judgment, thus underlining that philosophy differs from both science and religion. It is not collective thinking which is guided by agreed assumptions and known rules, but rather a thinking of individual which transgresses known rules and accepted assumptions. The forcefulness of philosophy lies in the individual, not the collective. Both these philosophers also express unconditional loyalty to the value of criticism, implying a prioritization of negation.

They negate with absolute certainty that the truth will not be impaired by this, as if the risk of truth being mistakenly perceived as illusion were totally non-existent. That is to say, they make no attempt whatsoever to seek justifications for dogmas, trying only to refute them. The confident, not to say prophetic, tone discernible in the speech of both reveals their deep self-conviction as regards their chosen paths. This conviction grows with each and every negation, and most of all with their self-negations. In fact, they draw their strength from their capacity of negation, and it is in this capacity that they place their trust.

Socrates and Nietzsche emerge as the ones whose desire to negate rules them to the point where they would negate the truth should it accost them along the way. They are prone to treating the truth as an illusion, simply because they are able to negate for themselves, the reasons for its justifications. The danger of self-deception lurking at their doorstep originates in the total value that they assign to the capacity of negation. For them, it is this that becomes the only touchstone for distinguishing truth from illusion. This way of thinking reduces the possibility of their seeing illusion as truth (although even this possibility still exists), but definitely increases the possibility of their seeing truth as illusion. Socrates and Nietzsche both position themselves as the supreme authority on their respective judgments, thus each acquiring his critical liberty but at the same time exposing himself to the danger of self-deception. There is no rule or entity placed between them and themselves.

We, as I have tried to claim in the course of my discussion, do not meet the philosopher himself but rather the speaker reflected in his writings (or speech). Or, in the case of Socrates, his figure in the writings of Plato. A speaker is part of the rhetoric of the text (I do not know whether Socrates or Nietzsche allowed themselves similar conduct in reality as well). I am not intimating that the philosophers attempted to impose their position through the rhetorical means of the speaker, though they well may have, but rather to point out that as speakers their conduct expresses a choice of the “will to truth” (criticism and humanism). Socrates and Nietzsche do not even allow themselves to expound at length, in case they become dogmatically ensnared in a particular line of thought. The Nietzschean speaker chooses aphorisms; Socrates chooses questions and answers (he feels uncomfortable every time he is called upon to deliver a speech.)¹⁵⁴ In other words, their way of realizing the “will to truth,” for avoiding illusion, is striving with all their might to avoid adherence to a particular metaphysical position.

In the case of the “systematic philosophers,” who present a well-ordered, tight worldview, the rhetoric of the “will to truth” is embodied in ingenious systematic structures whose aim is engendering the conviction, first and fore-

most of their creators, that it is possible to satisfy “the will to truth”. Here, the system replaces the negation; the system is built on an Archimedean point that is not open to doubt (the underside of the critical coin). The assumption is that systematic preciseness will bridge an actually measureless gap between consciousness and itself. Consciousness will affirm, to itself in itself, the universal validity and necessity of its view. Spinoza’s ‘third kind of knowledge’ is a distinct outcome of this type of search. It is the individual who can affirm the truth to himself, by virtue of the fact that it is both individual and non-individual at one and the same time. This is the privileged position of the critical subject as expressed in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Socrates too. A systematic adherence, sometimes leading to the absurd (that is, in this case, to unconventional claims), no less than adherence to negation, evidences the efforts the philosopher invests in staying loyal to his thinking, in viewing himself and himself alone as the supreme authority of his judgments. This loyalty, as I have already noted, expresses his freedom of thought (which is assigned a singular meaning in the work of Spinoza) but, equally, leaves him exposed to the danger of self-deception. The philosopher finds himself without an external authority to guide him on his way; the systematic philosopher draws confidence from his system, the negating philosopher from his negation.

Kant is another good example of a systematic philosopher. He seeks to arrest every philosophical endeavor until finding the answer to the question, ‘is a science of metaphysics possible?’ as if such a question could be answered more conclusively than any other metaphysical one. What in fact is the difference between the ability to provide an answer to this question and the ability to provide one to another metaphysical question?

The only difference lies in the fact that the above question is asked by a philosopher who has committed himself not only to justification but also to the justification of justification. This rhetoric can be termed as ‘reflexive rhetoric.’ A rhetoric that is constructed from the outset so as to preclude the possibility of infinite regression and the possibility of ascending to the next level of abstraction. Thus Kant, in this case, attempts – through the question he has posed – to create a frame of discussion that will rescue him from the risk of arbitrariness embedded in the individual’s judgment (Kant identifies this problem as the central problem of philosophy throughout the whole of its history). There is, in fact, no difference between the level of commitment that we can assign to an answer to this question and the one assignable to the answer to any metaphysical question. The sole advantage of this particular question is that it fits the way in which Kant tries to cope with the philosophical challenge of the justification for justification. Systematic philosophy is purported to provide an answer

to this challenge. It is supposed to provide the philosophizing subject with a guarantee that his individual thinking is not arbitrary. The system, like God in past times, is presented as an authority external to the individual subject, which prevents him from reaching arbitrary judgments. The important question, then, is whether the philosopher can guarantee, either through adherence to negation or adherence to a system, that he will avoid self-deception.

The philosopher, like any other rhetorician, determines the force of his arguments on the basis of the presence or absence of particular elements in consciousness. A successful rhetorician, whether his intentions are good or bad, is one who succeeds in making present in the consciousness of his addressees the elements that support the position which he wishes to advance.¹⁵⁵ What then can be said about the philosopher, the force of whose arguments is also, and mainly, measured relative to his own consciousness?

Freedom of thought, without which philosophy is impossible, allows the distancing of that which is close and the drawing close of that which is distant. To a large extent, the entire essence of critical philosophical thinking is constituted by this possibility. In this sense, the capacity for associative, creative thought is no less important to philosophical thinking than logical thought. The search for 'counter-examples' towards examining the truth of a given philosophical thesis, considered a logical tool par excellence, is a widespread manifestation of this fact. In philosophical discussion, contrary to many other types of discussion, the degree to which the 'counter-example' is hypothetical is not always inversely proportionate to its argumentative force. At times it is precisely a 'counter-example' from a familiar reality that is perceived as irrelevant and lacking argumentative force. The prevalent explanation for this phenomenon is that philosophy examines what is possible, due to which the hypothetical nature of an example need not detract from its logical strength. Throughout this book I have tried to point out that not only logic, but rhetorical argumentative space as well, determines the forcefulness of the various elements of argumentation, including the argumentative forcefulness of the 'counter-example.'

Consequently, the philosopher, as a critical subject obliged to determine his judgments by and for himself, owes himself an account of the argumentative space created by and resulting from his choices, and relative to which he reaches his conclusions. Within this space what seems close can become distant, irrelevant for purposes of philosophical judgment, while what is distant can become close and highly dominant in the process of philosophical deliberation. Again, the problem does not lie in the choices themselves, but rather in adherence to them and in forgetting that they are indeed choices. Like a good story, rhetor-

ical argumentation may “draw” the addressee in, to the world created through the rhetorical choices. In the philosopher’s case, a “good story” is a “bad story” for it may dull the critical consciousness and lead to self-deception.

Kant “imports” Copernicus into philosophical discussion, thus drawing the distant close; Plato, in his ‘cave fable,’ depicts sense perceptions as pale shadows on the wall of a cave, thus distancing what is close at hand. The methodical assumption that objects direct themselves towards consciousness, rather than vice versa, turns from a curious assumption not just into a reasonable possibility, but into a necessary assumption, at least from the point of view of Kant (and his followers). The complicated development adhering to this assumption testifies to this. Calling attention to the fact that senses provide a knowledge of reality that is very partial, and accordingly incompatible with the Platonic ideal of knowledge, serves not only to point out the limitation of the senses but is also a crucial link in Plato’s effort to claim the existence of a separate world of forms that no one, himself included, has ever beheld.

The presence of certain elements rather than others, as delineations of the argumentative space, is not fundamentally negative. The capacity to define and isolate those elements that are relevant to judgment is an important means in any process of thinking purporting to be rational and critical. The scientist employs it, as does the mathematician. This is to say that the more highly responsible, precise and critical a realm of discussion is perceived to be, the more readily and widely accepted is its limitation and definition of those elements relevant to thinking. But it is precisely the philosopher who is not delimited at all. Therefore, his choices should be examined as subjective ones that are not imposed upon him.

Philosophical argumentation is not committed to an agreed system of choices and consequently the philosopher’s choices always possess a subjective dimension and are not always transparent, even to the philosopher himself. The question why Kant needed Copernicus is not just one that bears rhetorical meaning; it also illuminates the degree to which the philosopher’s choices are personal. It is the philosopher whose choices, both conscious and unconscious, actually shape the “conditions of validity” of his arguments. To a large extent, these choices determine how convincing his arguments will prove, even to himself. The absence of known criteria of justification and refutation allows him freedom of thought, which is the life’s breath of philosophical thinking, but – on the other hand, the absence of known criteria of justification and refutation often makes the philosopher face up to the arbitrariness of his judgment and the incessant suspicion that his conclusions are merely the coincidental results of his choices. The suspicion, that is, that more than reflecting the truth,

his conclusions may reflect his personal choices. I do not believe it is possible or desirable to delimit this freedom in order to rule out this suspicion, for it is precisely this suspicion that is both the force driving philosophers and their main contribution to human culture.

I have tried to emphasize that rhetorical choices shape the argumentative space within which philosophical arguments are assigned “validity”, and are thus not merely choices of modes of expression. It is easy to shake off the problem embedded in the question of “philosophical validity” by assuming a distinction between means of proof and means of expression, but such a distinction can never have general validity in philosophy and is not even proposed by philosophical texts themselves. Such texts regularly address the judgment of the individual subject. It is not enough to claim, as Mason has, for instance, that rhetorical techniques merely aid the philosopher in leading his addressees to the philosophical arguments themselves.¹⁵⁶ Such a position assumes that truth should convince only the other and not the philosopher himself.¹⁵⁷ In other words, it assumes a level to which the philosopher himself is somehow obscurely exposed, on which the truth acquires validity with no connection at all to the degree to which it is convincing, or to the subject who recognizes it. Truth of this nature is foreign to philosophy. Unconvincing truth can only be the outcome of a discussion in which the individual subject’s judgment does not serve as the supreme authority. Philosophical discussion, for better or for worse, is not of this type. The choice of humanism and critique prevents the introduction of truths of this type. Even if what is convincing is not always perceived as truth, what is unconvincing can never be perceived as such in philosophical discussion. It is the critical asymmetry in its humanist terms (that is, convincing as opposed to unconvincing) that guides such discussion. An unconvincing truth is doomed to be doubted or totally rejected in this discussion, just as a truth incompatible with the relevant scientific criteria will be rejected by the scientist, and a truth contradicting the scriptures will be rejected by the priest.

Accordingly, every description of philosophical argumentation that assumes the possibility of an unconvincing truth appearing in philosophical discussion must fail to meet the conditions (signifying values) that constitute this discussion. Philosophical truth must be convincing, and therefore conviction is not just an unnecessary accompaniment for the derivation of philosophical conclusions. I have tried to show in the course of this book that many philosophers in the past attempted to confront their recognition of the dangerous “bear hug” of conviction and truth in a variety of ways. In many cases this recognition led to adoption of a skeptical position (Protagoras is a distinct example of this), but in many others attempts were made to overcome skepticism

through the formulation of privileged states-of-conviction (for instance, intuition, self-evidence etc.). These states were presented as transcending the state of convincing oneself, though they were described at the same time as states of the individual's consciousness. The state of certainty in philosophical discourse is both a problem and a solution; it is a problem at the beginning of philosophical investigation and a solution in its end. The assumption is that if the subject cannot transcend himself by philosophical investigation, then he is incapable of attaining the philosophical goal. In other words, more precisely fitted to the terminology of the present discussion, if the truth is considered truth only because it is convincing, then it is not truth. This is a paradoxical assumption for a discussion in which the subject is taken to be the supreme authority. I have claimed that the seed of self-deception lies in this assumption.

When I examined the question of the speaker and addressee this issue first surfaced prominently in my discussion. At that point I claimed that it would not be right to see the presence of the subject as evidence of a false argumentation, because his presence is necessary in every philosophical argumentation. The subject is not the enemy of philosophical activity but is, first and foremost, its origin. It is the individual subject who is troubled by an apprehension of illusion and therefore, it is only this subject who can affirm the philosophical answer as a sufficient answer. As a result, every time the truth is presented in philosophical discussion as lacking a subjective aspect, as if this aspect had dissolved at certain point when the discussion no longer had any use for it, heightened philosophical discomfort should be aroused. A solution without subjective meaning is not a philosophical solution at all, for it expresses the prioritization of some authority other than the subject himself or obscures the subject's involvement. Assigning precedence to some other authority means slipping outside of the philosophical field of discussion; obscuring the subject's involvement contradicts philosophy's goal, for it amounts to a form of deception. Accordingly, philosophical argumentation is unfailingly rhetorical argumentation. It is an argumentation that addresses the judgment of an individual subject even if it seeks, by this means, to affirm an universal truth. As I claimed above, the universal is subject to the individual in this discussion rather than the opposite. This means that the regression of justification must end with the individual subject's conviction and can never end with an authority external to the individual, be it a separate entity or a rule.

This is the philosophical paradox passed on from generation to generation. The philosopher cannot see as truth anything other than what he has personally judged to be true, but he judges as true only that which he is convinced is not merely his own personal judgment. This is the reason why every individual

philosopher can not definitely determine whether the outcome of his thinking is true or whether it is self-deception. Moreover, if he has convinced himself that his individual judgment is not an individual judgment, then that in itself is self-deception. What this means for philosophy is that it can never escape its skeptical nature. Every individual who takes part in the philosophical discussion is obliged to bring to it his own negations and judgments. The dogmas of humanism and criticism, constituting this discussion, require this; the history of philosophy reflects it.

If poetry, as Brecht writes, sentences the poet to exile, then philosophy sentences the philosopher to loneliness. It sentences every individual philosopher to stand alone before the truth (or self-deception), obliged to see his judgment alone as a touchstone for separating truth from illusion. Freud, who thought that philosophy overrated the importance of logical thinking and criticized its foundations in intuition, quotes Heine in this context:

With his nightcaps and the tatters of his dressing-gown/
he patches up the gaps in the structure of the universe. (Freud 1964: 161)

Freud may have chosen this quotation for the irony suggested by these words, for me the irony is not the main point. This description very successfully grasps the most basic philosophical situation. Alone with himself, without measuring and calculating tools, the philosopher seeks to think the most general, a mission which can seem Sisyphean and even absurd. But philosophers have never been afraid of absurdity and have even sought refuge in its realm, where the individual's thought is freed from the bonds of common agreement and thought is freed from the enslavement of habit. Philosophers often criticize each other for their failure to depart from the common thought and free themselves from ordinary thinking habits. Thus, the real philosophical problem is not the problem of absurdity. The real problem is the problem of self-deception. Devotion to the values of philosophical thought – Humanism and Critique – necessarily leads the philosopher to a point in which it is impossible to distinguish between truth and self-deception. Where the individual philosopher's thought becomes the whole vision.

Notes

1. Gilbert Ryle sees philosophical arguments not as processes with premises and conclusions, but rather as processes relating to processes with premises and conclusions (Ryle 1971, Vol. 2:323). His claim that the scientist who interrupts his science in order to examine the criteria according to which he works, is thinking like a philosopher at this point (Ibid.: 194) can be understood in this context.
2. See: “Cratylus” 390.
3. See: “Phaedrus” 265e–266c.
4. See: “Republic VII” 517c.
5. *Prolegomena* 4: 526.
6. Perelman (1979: 14–15).
7. In his book, *The Problems of Philosophy*, in the chapter “The limits of Philosophical Knowledge” (a title that speaks for itself), Bertrand Russell proposes one of the most lucid formulations explaining the need to shake off the philosophical search for “The Truth”. Notably, however, in the chapter concluding this book, “The Value of Philosophy,” Russell depicts philosophy as “the unalloyed desire for truth” (Russell 1988: 161).
8. “For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy” (“Theaetetus” 155d).
9. Interestingly, both in ancient western philosophy and in ancient eastern philosophy, many views hold the one and only goal of the teacher of philosophy is to bring his students to wonder. Wonder is identified as a necessary point of departure for philosophical thinking. Socrates is a good example for the west. In the east a good example is the paradoxical question (‘Kōan’) of the Zen master.
10. See: “Phaedo” 91a.
11. See: *The Art of Rhetoric* 1355b.
12. At times, a work of literature serves to justify a philosophical thesis, and my observations are not intended to disqualify such a possibility. However, it should be stressed that the literary work, unlike the philosophical treatise, is not obligated to truth or justification (a literary work cannot be criticized for being false or for begging the question). Consequently, any reference to a work of literature for the justification of a philosophical thesis amounts to its “translation” into philosophical argumentation.
13. It would be possible to initiate a long and complicated historical journey to Sicily in the fifth century B.C. to make the acquaintance of Corax of Syracuse, who according to historians of rhetoric was the first to formulate guide rules for verbal persuasion. His writings however have not survived and we learn of him mainly from references in the writings

of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and above all of Plato himself. He himself was preceded by Homer, who is mentioned frequently in histories of rhetoric, but whose writings offer impressive speeches rather than an orderly discussion of the nature of rhetoric. Another ancient rhetorician, a contemporary of Plato's, who is of great importance to both the history of rhetoric and the history of philosophy, was Isocrates. Cicero and Quintilian cite him as having had great influence on their views of rhetoric. However, his central work, *Rhetoric*, did not survive, for which reason his stance, as it is presented today, is actually an interpretive reconstruction from various fragments, mainly autobiographical, and from references to his work and ideas by various rhetoricians. Therefore, if our intention is not an historical reconstruction of the birth of rhetoric, Plato's work is the appropriate point of departure, not only in terms of ideas – though for my purposes this is its main point of importance – but historically as well.

14. In his series of lectures on rhetoric, Nietzsche cites Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric* as one of the two basic texts in this field along with the book *Rhetorica ad alexandrum*, of unknown authorship. However, while Nietzsche evaluates the latter as a non-philosophical work, he notes that Aristotle's book expresses a philosophical account of the subject (Nietzsche 1989:9).

15. For a lucid and reliable historical description of rhetoric, see: Cobert (1965) and Kennedy (1970, 1980, 1994).

16. A distinct example of this is the lack of a discussion of any breadth of Cicero's position. A reference to Cicero is appropriate to a discussion of the nature of rhetoric, as his status as one of the basic figures in the history of rhetoric is uncontested. Moreover, Cicero sought to create, in his writings, an equation between the rhetorician and the philosopher, an equation that would seem to strengthen the approach of this discussion. In his early book, *De inventione*, Cicero distinguishes the philosopher, who deals with general issues, from the rhetorician, who deals with concrete ones, but in his later *De oratore* he claims that any distinction between the two is artificial. Despite Cicero's historical importance from the point of view of the evolution of rhetoric, and in spite of his approach of equating the good rhetorician with the good philosopher, I have found that a separate discussion of his position will digress from the ideational continuity of the discussion I sought to present in the current chapter. In other words, I found it inappropriate to include a separate discussion of Cicero's view (and equally of another no less important but later Roman figure – Quintilian) without unduly encumbering the line of argument.

17. Thus Ijsseling in his book *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict*:

Plato's judgment on rhetoric is evidently quite negative and his attitude rather hostile... What is more, he ascribes an absolute priority to philosophy over rhetoric, a position which will be constantly consolidated and emphasized by most philosophers after him. (Ijsseling 1976:9)

18. The ideals of truth and justice are, in fact, the same ideal in the Socratic philosophy which its goal is "the good life" (*eudaimonia*).

19. This distinction is based on two premises to which Socrates seeks to achieve agreement: (1) There are false and true beliefs, but there is no false knowledge. (2) Believers, like knowers, are convinced of their perceptions. In other words, the difference between belief and

knowledge does not lie in the subjective feeling but rather in the epistemic status of their respective objects. This thought, as I will show later, played a central role in forming the character of philosophical argumentation.

20. Ibid. 458a.

21. As an example, Gorgias cites his ability to persuade the ill to accept medical treatment through the power of rhetoric alone, and where those actually possessed of the knowledge, the physicians, have failed. See: Ibid. 456a.

22. For instance, the art of medicine instructs us what is good for the body, while the art of cooking instructs us what is pleasing to it. Therefore, medicine is a true art while cooking is a false one.

23. Ancient rhetoricians such as Cicero and Quintilian and more modern thinkers such as Nietzsche and Quimby.

24. Phaedrus finds it difficult to digest Socrates' positive stand on rhetoric and mainly his claim that it is suited to all fields of life. He reminds Socrates that it is customary to consider rhetoric appropriate only to the legal and political fields. Socrates rejects this restriction as grounded in ignorance. He scoffs at Phaedrus who has heard of Nestor ("the father of legal speaking") and of Odysseus ("the father of political speaking"), but not of Palamedes ("the father of science"), whose ability to persuade someone of both something and its opposite was common knowledge. Moreover, Socrates seeks to explain that good rhetoric is a sign of knowledge: "... [H]e knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all" (Ibid. 262c). Socrates, who in the "Gorgias" dialogue has criticized the rhetoric that adapts itself to prevalent hypotheses as a form of flattery, due to its detachment from questions of knowledge and morality, seeks to present an alternative approach here, linking rhetoric with questions of knowledge and morality.

25. It should be noted that Phaedrus is interested in reconstructing it from memory, but Socrates insists that he read it word for word. Socrates' insistence bears a symbolic meaning which emerges near the end of the dialogue.

26. Lysias is a student of Gorgias.

27. Many ascribe the apparent shift in Plato's position to the historical fact that the dialogues were not written in the same period. Those in favor of rhetoric even see this as evidence that Plato's philosophical development allowed him to recognize the important role played by rhetoric in every field of discussion (the dialogue "Gorgias" preceded "Phaedrus"). See Note 22. In contrast, philosophers, usually explain this shift on grounds of the difference between the early writings (inspired by the persona of Socrates) and the later writings (dominated by Plato's own thought). See Tigerstedt (1977:30).

28. First, Socrates proposes a speech attempting to justify more successfully the claim that Lysias' speech set out to defend – that it is better to prefer the company of one who loves you not. Socrates interrupts this speech, because he is troubled by the thought that it defends a false claim. Following entreaties from Phaedrus he proposes a speech supporting the opposite claim – that it is better to prefer the company of one who loves you. To him, this is the true claim. In this way, prior to the theoretical discussion itself, Socrates in fact illustrates his view linking 'good rhetoric' and truth. The fact that Phaedrus can find no fault

with Socrates' first speech, demonstrates that he (Socrates) takes it upon himself not to be tempted into 'bad rhetoric,' whose success depends exclusively on the consent of the recipient. Socrates, who criticized Gorgias and his student for such an approach, presents the conduct of one who is unwilling to detach the question of truth from the question of persuasion. In other words, he is unwilling (or also unable) to defend a position whose truth he disbelieves. This internal resistance is represented in the text, as it is in other Platonic texts, as a demonic force preventing him from continuing.

29. The definition of the relations between rhetoric and dialectic is a highly important subject for every discussion attempting to fathom rhetoric, and all the more for one that, like the present discussion, deals with the relation between rhetoric and philosophy. However, as Plato's definitions of dialectics are varied and many, I prefer to deal with this question in greater detail in the discussion concerning Aristotle's theory. It should already be noted here, however, that the sentence opening Aristotle's *The Art of Rhetoric*, a sentence constituting a point of departure for his discussion and which has been given many, varied interpretations, reads, "Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic" (*The Art of Rhetoric* 1354a).

30. Cicero, for instance, who is well-versed in the Platonic dialogues, presents the stance that the successful rhetorician is, of necessity, a philosopher, and no less that the successful philosopher is, of necessity, a rhetorician. See: *De Oratore*: 3. Xxxv.142–143.

31. In his lectures on rhetoric, Nietzsche makes a similar claim. He claims that Plato mainly objected to the populist rhetoric lacking philosophical training, but definitely envisioned a good rhetoric relying on a philosophical education (Nietzsche 1989: 7–8).

32. The identity of the subjective feeling in states of false and true belief is actually what allows the existence of 'bad rhetoric,' the ability to cause another to believe something that the speaker does not know (the example cited by Gorgias) and even something that is blatantly false (Polus' example). This is a fear that arises every time rhetoric is mentioned, and the claims of Socrates' interlocutors in the "Gorgias" dialogue, in their attempt to support rhetoric, actually stress this danger. Of course, Socrates is up in arms against the wrongness of this cynical use of the identity of the subjective feeling of belief and knowledge, and he tries – through the dialogue – to examine whether rhetoric should be totally rejected due to this problem.

33. This is manifested in the "Gorgias" dialogue in Socrates' claims concerning discussions aimed at truth in which a participant will rejoice in the revelation of an error in his arguments, no less than he rejoices in his revelation of an error in the arguments of another. In the "Phaedrus" dialogue, Socrates notes that "for whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it" ("Phaedrus" 277d–e).

34. This claim is, for instance, the foundation of the historical descriptions offered by Kennedy (1994), Cobert (1965) and Baird (1965).

35. Moreover, there are differences of opinion regarding the authenticity of the third book dealing with style. In any case, the prevalent view is that it was not written during the same period in which the first two books were written. This claim is put forth by Kennedy (1994) in his historical survey and by J. H. Freese in his introduction to the Loeb series translation of the book.

36. The belief that what is true is more persuasive than what is false is suited to Socrates' position in the "Phaedrus" dialogue, where he explains that one who knows the truth would better represent what is probable. Later, I will discuss the influence of this belief, that the truth is more convincing than a falsity, on philosophical thinking and argumentation.
37. Grimaldi, who objects to a straightforward reading of the book, indeed claims that the meaning of this restriction is historical only (Grimaldi 1972: 3).
38. This is precisely why it is easier for Plato to treat rhetoric as having no restrictions to this or that field of discussion.
39. See, for example, Howell (1975: 52).
40. Burke (1969: 53–54).
41. Baird (1965: 24–26).
42. Grimaldi (1972: 2–3).
43. Robert (1957: 484–498).
44. Grimaldi (1972: 3).
45. Aristotle, *Topics* I.1.
46. It is worth noting and keeping in mind that the literal meaning of the term 'dialectic' is the art of conversation.
47. At this point, it is interesting to note that Quintilian, who viewed the difference between rhetoric and dialectic as one between a discourse in which long speeches are presented and a discourse of polemic whose instances are brief and concentrated, attempted to claim on these grounds that the nature of rhetoric was actually fairer. In this context he mentioned the words of Zeno who compared dialectics to a clenched fist and rhetoric to an open hand (*De institutio oratoria*: II.xx.7).
48. I use the term therapeutic in the sense of its widespread usage in philosophical discussion, mainly in the twentieth century. The reference is to a discussion that seeks to "free (one) of..." rather than "free (one) to..." In other words, its main role is to free thinkers of a particular dogmatic manner of thinking so as to allow an approach to the topic that is less hampered by previous evaluative positions.
49. When I discuss this matter at length below, I will try to show not only why philosophical work naturally leads to engagement with this problem, but also that echoes of this engagement can be found in central philosophical texts.
50. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. The book was written as a joint work along with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca.
51. Perelman (1979: xxi).
52. *Ibid.*: 1–42.
53. Perelman refers to the following works:

The Philosophy of Rhetoric / George Campbell (1776)
Elements of Rhetoric / Richard Whately (1828)
Philosophy of Rhetoric / Ivor Armstrong Richards (1936).

54. Perelman (1982:34). Recognizing this enhances our critical capacity concerning arguments (revealing the choices), but it also, no less, places a large question mark over our capacity to judge philosophical arguments objectively. I am not interested in elaborating on this point here, but I will return to the subject at length below.

55. Richard Whatley, in his book *Elements of Logic*, adopts this view of Aristotle's, with the express purpose of then claiming that logic alone is suited to philosophical activity. The philosopher, according to Whatley, is one who is capable of deriving conclusion from necessary premises, unlike the lawyer who provides arguments supporting his claim. Consequently, Whatley says, the philosopher is prone to fail rhetorically, for his arguments are difficult to understand and lack polemic forcefulness (Ibid.:175). While these claims of Whatley's adhere closely to the rigid Aristotelian definition of the syllogism (as necessitating true premises), they fail to address the fact that philosophical discussion often, and possibly mainly, examines the premises themselves. This is why even Aristotle himself viewed dialectic as the method appropriate to philosophical discussion (metaphysics). In this context, it is worth mentioning Nietzsche, who in contrast to Whatley, but of course as a form of criticism, calls the systematic philosophers "advocates...and for the most part even wily spokesmen for their prejudices which they baptize 'truth'" (*Beyond Good and Evil* Section 5).

56. Perelman is referring to the fact that Aristotle testified to a view of dialectics as capable of aiding in the solution of metaphysical questions. Aristotle's metaphysical stand was that the law of contradiction possessed an ontological status, and that therefore dialectic, which adheres to this criterion, is the method appropriate to philosophical discussion. I have tried to show, in my discussion of Aristotle's views, that he saw dialectic and rhetoric as closely related, and it is therefore important to stress that the emergence of a distinction between truth and persuasion is grounded in the distinction between the law of contradiction (with its ontological implications) and persuasion.

An article offering a clear and interesting analysis of this issue is: Joseph Margolis, "Philosophy in the 'new' rhetoric, rhetoric in the 'new' philosophy" (in Mailloux 1995:109–138). Margolis attempts to point out that the law of contradiction is perceived by Aristotle as valid relative to reality, because he assumed, without proving it, the existence of unchanging essences of objects. However, if this assumption is not necessarily true, it is understandable why the law of contradiction does not prove binding for reality, without impairing its validity in the logical framework.

I find it apt to elaborate on this point, even though doing so in a footnote only, as it is important, for purposes of the present discussion, dealing with philosophical argumentation, to allow an understanding that is as precise as possible of our use of the concepts dialectic, logic, rhetoric, and their relations to the question of truth. In this sense, I believe that Margolis' article clarifies well why the status of the law of contradiction can be examined in philosophical discussion, without claiming to criticize its status in the framework of logic.

57. In contrast to what is said in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as I have tried to demonstrate in my discussion of their positions. In fact, rhetoric was necessarily equated with 'bad rhetoric.'

58. Perelman tries to show that the pluralist model of legal truth (as manifested in Talmudic thinking – "seventy faces to the Tora") is better suited to philosophical discussion than the mathematical model of truth, one truth. Perelman himself mentions the controversy be-

tween the School of Hillel and the School of Shammai, as well as Rabbi Samuel who turns to the Heavens in order to know who is speaking the truth. A voice from the Heavens answers him that both theses express the divine truth (Perelman 1979: 12).

59. Ibid.: 14 (I will discuss the question of the “universal audience” when I reach the issue of speaker-addressee in philosophical discussion).

60. I am referring to the dominance of this approach mainly in the Anglo-American world, although the two thinkers most responsible for the basic ideational platform of this view are the German Frege and the Austrian Wittgenstein.

61. A good example of a thinker who attempted to deal with this problem is Descartes. In a skeptical-philosophical move in his *Meditations* he attempts first to reveal the truth and only then to understand what the criterion for truth is (from the “cogito” to the criterion of “clear and distinct” rather than the other way around). Such a move may seem strange and difficult to digest, and indeed many writers see their role as an attempt to discover the criterion that Descartes refused to relinquish in his methodical skepticism. I do not intend to enter into an interpretative debate at this point, and these writers may well be correct, but the important point for me is Descartes’ recognition that only thus, through an absence of advance commitment to this or that criterion of justification, can he realize the philosophical objective of seeking truth.

62. Quintilian chooses this definition so as to point out the relation between rhetoric and philosophy and morality, following Plato’s “Phaedrus.” This definition, he believes, will stave off the negative connotations that accompany rhetoric when it is defined as aimed towards persuasion. See: *De institutio oratoria*: II.xv.38.

63. Campbell (1963: 1).

64. Bacon, who is usually mentioned as warning against the various “idols” that distort our thinking, tries in his *The Advancement of Learning* to defend rhetoric as well as its link to philosophy. Among other things, he points out that the fear of elements that are not rational in discourse is a fear that should arise regarding the use of rationality, for it is precisely rational capacity that can serve to entrap rationality. Bacon ascribes importance to rhetoric for in his view there is no thought, whether internal or external, that does not involve imagination. Therefore, an ability to operate the imagination with the aid of rhetorical tools is vital to the correct action of rational reasoning. This stance allows him to put forth a claim made by Aristotle as well in his defense of rhetoric, that is, that the use of a given capacity, whether rhetorical or logical, can be equally negative or positive. The person employing this capacity is the one who determines its value (Ibid. 2.Xviii.2).

65. These last remarks may raise a question or a problem regarding the degree of rationality of philosophical activity, to the extent that it is not perceived as purely rational activity. As I am not interested in initiating a secondary discussion of this issue, while addressing it somehow is nevertheless obviously in place, I will just note here that in my view the question of the rationality of philosophical activity turns into a problematic one only to the extent that the rational is identified with reason. In the event that this equation is accepted, I am certainly obliged to claim that philosophical activity is not rational, as it can most clearly be shown to make use of other human faculties as well (memory and imagination, for instance). However, if ‘rational’ need not necessarily be ‘of reason’ space is created for

explaining philosophy as a rational activity, even if it is not a pure activity of reason. Its rationality is manifested in the will to avoid all illusion and the attempt to do the human utmost to realize this will. Any attempt to define rationality in a more restrictive and binding way amounts to proposing a philosophical stand.

66. Thomas Kuhn, in his book *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, identifies the state of “normal science” as one in which scientific activity is conducted along the lines of a predominant paradigm. The paradigm defines both the relevant method and the basic assumptions on which scientific progress is made possible. I would like to observe that philosophical discussion, according to this definition, is never conducted as a “normal science.” Should it be, it would then be destined to detach itself from philosophy and to turn into a science. Kuhn himself in his article “Logic of discovery or psychology of research” (1970), claims that a science turns into philosophy only in periods of revolution.

67. Campbell distinguishes in this way between rhetoric and logic. He claims that while logic treats only the topic under discussion, rhetoric takes account of the speaker and addressee as well, of their mutual relations and of the relation of each to the topic in question (Campbell 1963:59).

68. For instance, David Hume, in the introduction to his book *Treatise on Human Nature*, feels it appropriate to caution readers that, in his times, the truth is not what prevails in philosophical discussion but rather the talent of oratory: “Amidst all this bustle ‘tis not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man need ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours” (Hume 1978:xiv).

69. A good example of this is the link that Chaim Perelman forges between the recognition that philosophical activity is a rhetorical (not only a logical) activity and humanism and tolerance (discourse among human beings).

70. Perlman Chaim, “Rhetoric and Philosophy”, in Perelman (1979:43–51).

71. I do not mean to claim that it is impossible to speak about the rhetoric of science, but rather that the scientific ideal, whether or not it is realizable, is to isolate and remove the speaker and replace him with clear criteria of justification (and perhaps this is one of the most prominent characteristics of the basic rhetoric of science).

72. The value of a literary work is not measured in terms of truth or falsity. Unlike philosophy and science, illusion is not necessarily a derogative term regarding literature. Only a philosopher, such as Aristotle, could claim that the criterion for the quality of a work of literature depends upon the causal relations between its components: “It is also evident from what has been said that it is not the poet’s function to relate actual events, but the kinds of things that might occur and are possible in terms of probability or necessity. . . Consequently, poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of the universal, while history relates particulars” (*Poetics* 1451b).

73. In his book *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Wayne C. Booth points out that the outline of the “implied author’s” presence that is surmised by the reader, is one of the more important aspects of a work of literature. The “implied author,” Booth explains, is a figure that can be characterized employing the sum of all the choices identified in the text. He considers this

distinction between writer and “implied author,” very important for preventing pointless discussion of qualities such as “sincerity” or “seriousness,” in the writer (Ibid.:75).

74. Thus, even testimonies to human limitations should be examined as forming the figure of the desired philosopher. In such cases, the attribute of personal sincerity is emphasized (for instance, the speaker in Rousseau’s *Confessions*).

75. In this sense, many of the biblical prophets show great philosophical sensibility, often contradicting the dogmatic, religious arrogance frequently attributed to religious speakers. They find it difficult to believe that they of all people have been chosen to bear the message of truth, and require that God convince them that this is so.

76. There are those who believe that “signs and miracles” also have a place in philosophy itself. This is how Nietzsche criticizes Spinoza’s philosophy:

[C]onsider the hocus-pocus of mathematical form with which Spinoza clad his philosophy. . . (Beyond Good and Evil Section 5)

77. For instance, that unmistakable tension, requiring explanation, between the literary characterization of Socrates’ figure in Plato’s works, as a prophet figure (whose status is simultaneously both charismatic and persecuted, the demonic voice that speaks to him, etc.), and his explicit declaration that the only knowledge he possesses is that he does not know. A prophet without a prophecy.

78. See the articles: “Philosophy and *Argumentum ad Hominem*”, “Can Philosophical Argument be Valid?” in Johnstone (1978).

79. In his article “Argumentation and Inconsistency” (in Johnstone 1978), he raises two problems regarding the philosophical perception of inconsistency as objective inconsistency:

1. The concept of inconsistency is, itself, a subject of philosophical interpretation.
2. Objective inconsistency can only appear in formal systems.

80. The quote from Whatley is limited to the passage quoted by Jonstone in his article: “Philosophy and *Argumentum ad Homine*’ revisited” (in Johnstone 1978).

81. Ibid.: 136.

82. Whatley (1864: 142).

83. This is highly visible in the very need to employ quotes from the writings of prominent philosophical figures. On the one hand, it seems logical and fair to refer to those whose positions have served as planks in the construction of the position presented by the speaker. On the other hand, one can not ignore the legitimization achieved through drawing on the authority of the quote.

84. Without entering into this discussion or into the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of these sciences. The sciences mentioned in question are such that symbolize systematic, necessitated, universal and objective thinking.

85. Adopting literary terminology, we can claim that what is in question is a broad spectrum, from “philosophy in the third person,” through “philosophy in the first person.”

86. Campbell claims so explicitly when he notes that the speaker’s figure need not express his self-esteem, but rather understandings that, to put it flexibly, relate to the addressees he turns to (Campbell 1963:96).

87. Aristotle conducts himself in this way. In the second book of *Rhetoric* he dedicates considerable space to a discussion of the way in which various emotions are aroused, from anger through jealousy (Chapters 1–11), and in the way people of different ages and with different fates react (12–17). One of the opponents of this approach is Hugh Blair, who claims that a rhetorical theory cannot and does not need to provide abstract schemas of the way in which various psychological states, and particularly emotions, are formed, holding that it should leave this element to the talent of the one making the argument. Moreover, Blair claims, adherence to such abstract schemas would leave the argument cold and dry (Blair 1965: xxxii).

88. True to his view that rhetorical argumentation achieves its validity through shifting agreement from the assumptions to the conclusions, Perelman notes that the philosopher, as one who addresses a ‘universal audience,’ must rely exclusively on facts, truths and universal values. The rationality of philosophical activity derives from this fact. In other words, according to Perelman, the philosopher’s attempt to obtain the agreement of any rational creature (a ‘universal audience’), is what makes his arguments rational (Perelman 1982: 16–20).

89. Perelman claims that ontological monism is usually accompanied by methodological monism, through which, and only through which, truth is attainable. Ontological monism therefore often contains the threat of violence:

Ontological or Axiological monism will most often be associated with a methodological monism according to which there is but one method to follow to reach the true... The drawback to monist ideologies is that they promote a reductionism which is sometimes barely tolerable. When they do not succeed in persuading... they may justify coercion and the use of force against the recalcitrants in the name of God, of reason, of truth... (Perelman 1979: 63)

90. In many cases the philosopher’s way of confronting this challenge is through presenting a polemic argumentation formulated as an appeal to an addressee who the philosopher assumes will object to his claims. Convincing such an addressee seems to confirm in the most reliable way that what is at hand is not an illusion. The question I wish to raise below, however, is whether this is not a psychological need, more than a move that necessarily progresses towards truth.

91. This should not be at all surprising, if we recall that Plato presents the dialogue as a framework required for the purpose of philosophizing.

92. A critique along these lines can be found in the book *Philosophical Rhetoric* by Jeff Mason. Mason represents philosophical rhetoric as merely a tool assisting the philosopher to lead his readers to the “philosophical arguments themselves,” and wonders, from this viewpoint, about the role of the “evil spirit” in Descartes’ discussion (Ibid.: 54–62).

93. The figures of the speaker and the addressee in fact reflect the truth conditions in which the discussion takes place. Therefore, an actual addressee with a different perception of truth, different truth conditions, will find it difficult to understand why the speaker is struggling to deal with problems and conditions of justification that according to the views of the former are not at all philosophical. As a result, it is likely that his tendency will be to view

every move that he considers unclear or unnecessary as an anti-philosophical, manipulative one.

94. A distinct instance of this is the equation that Hegel created between the history of philosophy and philosophy itself. This equation itself, however, may be examined through two different questions: First, to what degree is his historical description adequate? Second, did Hegel's move help reveal an illusion within which we were formerly entrapped, or did it create one?

Another distinct example is Foucault's claim on the "archeology of knowledge."

95. Based on this recognition, it is now possible to better understand why Wittgenstein writes, in his introduction to the *Tractatus* that his claims might be understood only by those whose thoughts were similar to his. He was referring to a very private thought, even if its implications were very inclusive.

96. See: Leibniz (1951).

97. Henry Johnstone, who believes that philosophical activity required concrete dialectical interaction, criticizes Perelman's idea of "the universal audience" on the grounds of this recognition:

The universal audience to which the philosopher makes his appeal contrasts with the opposite extreme of the single respondent dramatized in the Socratic dialogue. In this case the rhetorician can readily ascertain what premises are actually conceded by his audience and, in making capital of these, can create the illusion that the argument concerns objective fact rather than opinion. But the universal audience affords no such assurance; it is in the last analysis only an image in the mind of the philosopher. (Natanson & Johnstone 1965: 128)

98. Meyer criticizes Perelman on just this point. The 'universal audience' hypothesis, he claims, can only be understood metaphorically, and in fact constitutes a rhetorical translation of the old concept of reason. Therefore, it fails to advance philosophical argumentation (Meyer 1994: 49).

99. Descartes, contrary to the way some of his critics presented him, did not regard any feeling of certainty as a sign of truth. He considered the state of clear and distinct perception to be very rare, and wrote the following in Principle 45 of his *Principles of Philosophy* under the title "What is meant by a clear and distinct perception?":

Indeed there are very many people who in their entire lives never perceive anything with sufficient accuracy to enable them to make a judgement about it with certainty. (1988: 174)

Descartes was convinced, of course, that he himself was not one of those unfortunate people. Kant, who claimed that a critical philosopher should be able to distinguish between subjective and objective beliefs, believed that he had accomplished this critical end.

100. Nietzsche, who presented himself as a rigorous opponent of philosophical systems wrote in *Beyond Good and Evil* that "as soon as ever a philosophy begins to believe in itself, it always creates the world in its own image; it cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual will to power, the will to 'creation of the world', the will to the *causa prima*" (*Beyond Good and Evil* Section 9).

101. The following short excerpt from *Gorgias* is a good, clear example:

Soc: ... If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?' – you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gor: Yes.

Soc: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as true?

Gor: No.

Soc: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

Gor: Very true.

Soc: And yet those who have learned as well as these who have believed are persuaded?

Gor: Just so. ("Gorgias" 454d)

102. This is the completed version: "Man, he [Protagoras] says, is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not" ("Theaetetus" 152a).

103. See: Perelman (1979: 14–15).

104. This question paraphrases Spinoza's famous claim: "Even a light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity" (*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XLIII. Note).

105. This is the wisdom Socrates was referring to when he presented himself, in his apology, as one who neither knows nor thinks he knows.

106. The only philosophers who departed from this line of thought were the "common sense philosophers". Considering their approach to David Hume's philosophy, Kant regards it as ridiculous (see Introduction). Another good example can be found in Wittgenstein's response to Moor: "Moor's mistake lies in this – countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying 'I do know it'" (Wittgenstein 1969: 68).

107. One can therefore see the Socrates that appears in the earlier Platonic dialogues as a very consistent sceptic, who can proudly declare that he is a wiser man for neither knowing nor thinking he knows.

108. See Note 102.

109. A partial version of this chapter was published under the same title as an article in "Argumentation" (18: 171–188, 2004).

110. Prominent philosophical thinkers focus on this problem in the 20th century too. Wittgenstein, in one of the observations collected in his book, *On Certainty*, a title that testifies itself to the issue that troubled Wittgenstein near the end of his life, says the following on this matter:

One can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so". Does this stem from the difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No. – One may for example call "mental state" what is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gesture etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief. (Wittgenstein 1969: 8e)

Wittgenstein examines and reexamines this question in the various reflections of the book.

111. For example, Leibniz's critique of Descartes' criterion of evidence (a critique I mentioned in the former chapter) originates in a thought of this type.

112. I consider this formulation important for purposes of avoiding the meta-logical controversy explicitly addressing formal logical methods. The meta-logical debate itself is obviously philosophical, therefore allowing positions of the type presented by Goodman:

No satisfactory criterion for distinguishing just what is logic from what is not has been discovered. Rather, logic is specified by listing the signs and principles that are to be called logical; and the list given by different logicians are not all the same.

(Goodman 1961:8)

This claim, referring to the list of signs and principles accepted by the logician, falls, in this sense, within the philosophical meta-logical debate. In contrast, usage of the term 'logical' in philosophy does not usually denote a commitment to the adoption, or the defense, of a certain formal logical method, but rather testifies to the fact that, to a large degree, the criteria of the law of contradiction and consistency shape philosophical argumentation. The main problem, on which I will elaborate later, is that many philosophers tend to "forget" that philosophical discussion is not a formal system and that logical terms therefore take on different meanings within it.

113. See "Self-Refutation" in Passmore (1970:58–80).

114. It is important to remark that Perelman and Whateley hold different concepts of logic. Whateley holds an Aristotelian view, which requires true assumptions for a valid syllogism, and therefore sees *petitio principii* as a logical fallacy. Perelman holds a more modern and formal view, which considers only the formal aspect of an inference, and hence defines *petitio principii* a rhetorical fallacy. Nevertheless, both argue *petitio principii* is a subjective and interpretative criticism and not an objective or formal description of an argument.

115. Jon Woods and Douglas Walton define begging the question in their book *Fallacies* in a more objective language: "an argument is circular when the conclusion is pre-supposed by a premiss or where some premiss actually depends on the conclusion in the sense that in order to accept the premiss one need first accept the conclusion" (Ibid.:76). But also they note in their discussion that it is not an exclusively definition: "Others (notably Whately...) explicitly recognize that circularity of argument is essentially an epistemic phenomenon, and that whether or not argument is said to beg the question will depend critically on the informational or epistemic circumstances of the person to whom it is directed" (Ibid.:77).

116. He thus interprets Descartes' consideration of the claim "I am not a thinking creator" as self-contradictory (Ibid.:59–61).

117. Aristotle considered the forms nothing more than an empty metaphor (*Metaphysics* I.IX.1).

118. This is a common criticism of Locke's position, which can be also found in our contemporary discussion. Richard Rorty, for example, argues that Locke's position is situated between the Aristotelian view of knowledge as the identity of the mind with the object and the new concept of knowledge as a representation (Rorty 1980: 139–148).

119. Ibid.: 159.

120. It is interesting to mention in this context that Descartes points out the impossibility of imagining a chiliagon exactly in order to argue for the existence of a conception of pure intelligence (Descartes 1948:50). Hume, in contrast, uses similar example in order to make an almost contradictory claim. He argues that such examples demonstrate how the human spirit has the ability to consider ideas it cannot evidently perceive (Hume 1978:22–23). Descartes and Hume do not build their arguments on the same grounds, like Locke and Berkeley do, but they also use a similar example in order to justify contrary (if not contradictory) claims.

121. The known version of this principle is: *entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate*. It is interesting to note that according to the editor's preface of the collected works Ockham never used this version. Nevertheless, the idea of this principle is that one can argue for explanatory fallacy by pointing out unnecessary assumptions (Ockham 1990:XXI).

122. Locke writes in the first book of his *Essay*:

I confess. . . We have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what.

(*Essay* I.IV.18)

123. Russell indeed argues that Hume presents the most consistent version of empiricism:

David Hume is one of the most important among philosophers, because he developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible. (Russell 1961:634)

124. I wrote "*inter alia*", since the analogy is only one element of the argumentation of Locke and Berkeley. For the purposes of this discussion only I isolated it from the rest of the argumentation.

125. I used Perelman's definition of metaphor for this purpose:

A metaphor is only a condensed analogy, due to a fusion of theme and phoros.

(Perelman 1982:120)

126. Descartes begins his book *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* with a warning of this possibility:

As soon as men recognise some similarity between two things, it is their custom to ascribe to each of them, even in those respects in which they are different, what they know to be true of the other. (Descartes 1978:147)

It is interesting to remark that Foucault chooses to quote this paragraph as representative of the fundamental change in Western thought at the beginning of the seventeenth century; the end of "the age of imagination" and the beginning of "the age of reason" (Foucault 2000:51).

127. Paul Ricoeur presents this approach in his book *The Rule of Metaphor*. He argues that the most interesting use of metaphor in philosophical discourse is to present new meanings and to bring to light new aspects of reality (Ibid.:292–295).

128. See the chapter "Tropical Philosophy" in Mason (1989:98–140).

129. It should be noted that the full title of the book is *Ethic demonstrated in geometrical order*.

130. Kant, in his book *Logic*, explains briefly and clearly this difference between logic and metaphysics:

Logic is therefore a self-cognition of the understanding and of reason, not, however, as to their faculty in respect of objects, but solely as to form. In logic I shall not ask: What does the understanding cognize and how much can it cognize or how far does its cognition go? For that would be self-cognition in respect of its material use, and belongs to metaphysics. In logic the question is only: How will the understanding cognize itself? (Logic AK 9:14)

131. Of course, Kant does not present all the possibilities. For instance, antinomy could be thought to lead to a re-examination of arguments, assuming that it is impossible that both these contradictory stands are supported by valid arguments. This is a not-at-all hypothetical possibility in the context in question.

132. Evidence for this can be found in the frequent adherence, in philosophical discussion, to examples offered by the philosophers themselves as part of their arguments. The examples are merely, as it were, particular examples serving the purpose of illustrations. But the widespread adherence to them can demonstrate that they are difficult to drop in the course of attempts to present a given philosophical position. The reason for such adherence can naturally be intellectual laziness as well, or a wish to belong to a certain intellectual community, but in any case it testifies to the difficulty of replacing examples, though logically, or in principle, there should be no problem with this. Moreover, claims are quite frequently refuted through the replacement of examples. Sometimes, there is even no need to provide a counter-example; an example that fits the proposed thesis less successfully is quite enough.

133. It can naturally be claimed that this affords philosophers an exaggerated degree of credit, while in fact philosophers, like all rhetoricians, attempt only to persuade the other. However, I do not think such a claim has much substance to it and in any case it is irrelevant to the present discussion. I am not attempting to commit to the degree of various philosophers' honesty or candidness (chances are these could be debated at length) but rather to pinpoint the conditions that constitute philosophical argumentation subject to its declared goal.

134. Locke, for instance, thought a sharp division possible between those rhetorical elements contributing to clarity of expression and thus to clarity of thinking, and those rhetorical elements that merely distort the capacity of judgment:

We must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, beside order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invited, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongs ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment. (Essay III.X.34)

It is likely that Locke believed that the essay he proposed utilized only "positive" rhetorical elements. In a sense, he was correct in thinking as much, for he rejected the type of rhetoric that sanctifies verbal beauty. However, as I showed in the previous section, even Locke himself can be shown to have made rhetorical choices. Perhaps he saw them as natural to the goal of clarity, but they were nevertheless choices. Another apt example in contemporary philosophy is the school known as 'analytic philosophy.' The motto of this school is that a logical and linguistic analysis can be offered for philosophical problems such that the former do not embody rhetorical choices (thus removing the subject). It stands to reason that the level of self-conviction of these thinkers regarding this possibility seriously obstructs their ability to identify their own rhetorical choices.

135. I see no need to distinguish between natural sciences and social sciences in the context of this discussion.

136. The distinction between religion and science on the one hand and philosophy on the other is based on the level of presence of the individual subject in the process of judgment. The orientation of both science and religion is towards a reduction of the subject's presence while maximizing the presence of entities transcending the subject, where in philosophy the subject's presence is essential.

137. Nietzsche, to whom I will return later on, formulates this difference in his unique way:

One sort of honesty has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind: They have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. "What did I really experience? What happened in me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?"...But we, we others who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as scientific experiment – hour after hour, day after day. We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs. (The Gay Science Section 319)

Without entering into a possible interpretative debate, it seems to me that Nietzsche is trying to see the new philosophers ("we") not only as those who differ from the founders of religion but also as those who differ from the scientists seeking their certainty outside themselves.

138. Maurice Natanson argues a similar claim but not, like Nietzsche, in order to criticize radically traditional philosophy but in order to explain philosophical argumentation:

Philosophical activity is self-discovery. Philosophical reports, spoken or written, are self-reports first, arguments later. (Natanson & Johnstone 1965: 152)

He claims that this fact is clear in the cases of Socrates, Montaigne and Kierkegaard, yet suggests that these cases can serve as a clue for the rhetorical nature of philosophical argumentation:

The resonance a philosopher feels with a point of view or a thesis involves a rhetorical presupposition. Rhetoric in this sense is concerned with proto-argumentation and a primordial choice of styles of philosophizing. Its ultimate subject matter is the unique person committed in his uniqueness to a way of seeing and having a world. (Ibid.: 156)

139. As I claim in the chapter, "Self-agreement and Self-deception," God was intended to replace the authority of the individual subject with an "objective" authority.

140. I do not intend to argue that philosophers never set down rules. My claim is that the conviction of the thinking subject was always and indeed must be considered to have priority over such rules.

141. Thus Nietzsche:

For, let one just ask oneself fairly: 'why wilt thou not deceive?' especially if it should seem – and it does seem – as if life were laid out with a view to appearance, I mean, with a view to error, deceit, dissimulation, delusion, self delusion.

(The Gay Science Section 344)

142. Thus Husserl:

Yet the problem of a possible metaphysics also encompassed *eo ipso* that of the possibility of the factual sciences, since these had their relational meaning – that of truths merely for areas of what is – in the indivisible unity of philosophy. Can reason and that-which-is be serrated, where reason, as knowing, determines what is? (Husserl 1970: 11)

143. Corliss Lamont in his book *The Philosophy of Humanism* tries to modify modern humanism by ten principles. The interesting principle in this context is the last one:

Humanism, in accordance with scientific method, believes in the unending questioning of basic assumptions and convictions, including its own. Humanism is not a new dogma but is a developing philosophy which remains ever open to experimental testing, newly discovered facts and more rigorous reasoning. (Ibid.: 11)

It is very important for Lamont, as a philosopher, to argue that humanism is not a new dogma in order to present it as a critical view. These words reflect philosophical intentions but can not withstand critical examination. Humanism means, as Lamont himself argues, preferring human judgment to any other instance; man decides what is good and what is true (Ibid.: 9). Therefore, one can not be a humanist and at the same time question the superiority of human judgment. According to my analysis it would be better for Lamont to argue that philosophy is based on the dogma of humanism.

144. David Hume emphasized this choice and was troubled by it. In “The Conclusion” of his first book of the *Treatise* he asks himself:

Can I be sure, that in leaving all establish’d opinion I am following truth... (Ibid.: 256)

145. In *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov provides a good example of this way of thinking. He leaves excited Marmaladov’s house where he saw the humiliated state of the family. Raskolnikov, as a “philosophical persona”, tries to understand what he just saw by asking a very general question:

“... They wept at first, but now they are used to it. Men are scoundrels; they can get used to anything!”
He pondered.
“Well, and if I am wrong,” he burst out suddenly, “if men are not really scoundrels, men in general, the whole human race, I mean...” (Ibid.: 22–23)

Raskolnikov, as a philosopher, thought that by asking a general question he might understand better a particular situation. But, as a reflective philosopher, he was also troubled by the possibility that his general judgment is no more than accidental judgment of an individual.

146. Thus Spinoza in *Ethics*:

Thus we say that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts concerning it, we do not say that he is certain but merely that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false because there are no reasons which might cause his imagination to waver... Thus although a man is supposed to adhere to what is false, yet we never say that he is certain. For by certainty we understand something positive... not a privation of doubt. (*Ethics* Part II. Proposition XLIX. Note)

147. One may find an interesting literary example for a conflict between these two sorts of motivation in the novel *The Name of The Rose* by Umberto Eco.

148. Self-conviction is what self-evidence really means. No philosopher can avoid seeking self-evidence, even when his position speaks against it. The value of humanism compels each philosopher to see himself as the highest authority. So the term 'self-evident' must be understood as an evident to the self. We are speaking about a psychological state and not about the status of propositions. Arguing for the self-evidence of a claim indicates a person's subjective belief rather than the objective, logical status of a proposition. In other words, a claim can be evident to a self (or individual selves) and not evident in itself.

149. This is so regardless of whether what is in question is a stand, such as those of Perelman and Johnstone, seeking to preserve the rational nature of this activity, or a stand such as that of Derrida, that draws its inspiration from Nietzschean criticism and attempts to undermine the rationality ascribed to this activity.

150. This position is widely accepted within the context of philosophical stands that are logically oriented. In the twentieth century this trend is explicitly present in analytic philosophy.

151. In his essay "The Future of an Illusion" Sigmund Freud defines illusion as follows:

Thus we call a belief an illusion, when a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation... (Freud 1961:31)

152. See the section "self-agreement and self-deception".

153. Even if it seems that such situations occur very frequently in discussions of philosophical issues, every philosopher knows full well that this kind of discussion becomes somewhat anti-philosophical and that the value of winning a debate overshadows the value of criticism and truth. Therefore, even if winning the debate turns into the practical principle guiding the participants in the heat of an argument, when the dust has settled victory is pointless unless it is subject to the "will to truth." Those for whom winning an argument is not a means but a goal are not driven by philosophical motivations.

154. In the introduction to his book *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein wrote that the nature of philosophical study had prevented him from presenting it as an orderly and methodical theory. This fits the character ascribed by Socrates and Nietzsche to philosophical thinking. Wittgenstein writes:

[M]y thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. – And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compel us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. – The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings. (Wittgenstein 1994:vii)

155. Perelman offers a simple example of this in his book, *The Realm of Rhetoric*:

A Chinese tale, told by Mencius, illustrates the effect of presence: "A king sees an ox on its way to sacrifice. He is moved to pity for it and orders that a sheep be used in its place. He confesses he did so because he could see the ox, but not the sheep".

(Ibid.: 35)

156. Throughout his book, *Philosophical Rhetoric*, Mason cites rhetorical techniques as an inseparable part of philosophical work and at the same time claims that they are philo-

sophically unnecessary. Accordingly, he can claim that even if it is difficult to imagine a rhetoric-free philosophy no self-contradiction arises from assuming the existence of such a philosophy (Ibid.: 128). Obviously, I disagree with this view, for as I have claimed a philosophy that does not address the judgment of the individual subject is impossible. Notably, Mason himself does not explain how the validity of “the straightforward argument” is to be verified.

157. Mason indeed believes this. In his summarizing chapter he writes: “Truth must be made persuasive to declare itself to others” (Mason 1989: 152).

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