HUGO K. LETICHE

LEARNING AND HATRED FOR MEANING



JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY

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For Maria

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Acknowledgements

Many of my colleagues in Pedagogics have found this to be an unusual and perhaps downright odd (but I think worthwhile) research project. In sort its strength as well as weaknesses may be found in the *author's* attempt to work in the 'context of teaching' directed towards a mediated concept of 'meaning,' with a semiotic-Lacanian approach. Without the help, integrity, and impartial criticism of Professors Carpay and van Stegeren the project could never have gotten this far. I thank them and Professors Verheul, Sanders, and Fry, for their sincere efforts to make my relationship to the Free University Amsterdam as productive as possible.
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H.K.L.
Audour, Dompierre-les-Ormes
France
1984

PART ONE

PREAMBLE, THEORY, AND ANALYSIS

1

PREAMBLE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

> The system of higher education, which formerly rivaled the military in organization and precision, now resembles an exploding galaxy. Open admissions, 'less time—more options,' 'universities without walls,' and alternative educational programs are prominent features of the educational scene . . . A young faculty member must forge his own role . . . tradition, custom, and convention no longer serve to organize his life . . . Faculty members . . . can attain control over their professional lives and the society and organizations in which they live only to the degree that they can understand what is happening to them and to the world they inhabit.
>
> (Mervin Freedman, 1973, p. 2)

This study records the process of my development from unprepared novice lecturer to self-aware, and at least somewhat knowledgable, (about teaching) instructor. It is characterized by two distinct but intimately related foci of interest. The first of these centers on the continuous *transition, in conceptual insight, of the beginning lecturer.* By following one case in its entirety I try to describe the lived concepts important to the process of becoming a teacher. In the study of the beginning lecturer's 'developing-consciousness-of-his-practice,' the emphasis is upon the qualitative difference in the questions posed; I do not assert that better answers are developed to the same questions, but rather that the quality of the questions radically improves. The research cycle began with an Heideggerian shock: expectancies are interfered with, what 'should' happen does not. I felt that something had to be investigated, understood, changed: 'I experience problems because some of my values are negated in my practice.' (Whitehead, 1982). The second subject of attention, makes use of the data already produced by the first, to clarify *where and how 'meaning' is expressed in teaching.* The question of where 'meaning' is most likely to be found in teaching can be answered in radically different ways. We can assume that 'meaning' is part and parcel of the motives, intentions, beliefs, vision of the teacher; but we can also posit that it is the effect, influence, or power of learning on students. The answers in terms of 'intention' and/or 'effect' do not exhaust the possibilities: the cultural-historical situation, reflected and illuminated in teaching, is perhaps the source of 'meaning;' or could 'meaning' be inherent to the inner structure and movement of education. I do not seek a solution of these issues, but simply to produce a clarification of them which informs the developmental description of teaching.

The translation of this statement of purpose into the project upon which I have spent a good deal of time did not take place in a vacuum. Two dimensions to the existing conditions are described: (i) the context of research (who researched, what, where) and (ii) the reappraisal of predecessors (who has written already on these matters). Finally, I will indicate the basic course which the research has taken.

(i) the context of research

My point of departure is rooted in the concrete practice of teaching and seeks to describe the development from within the work context. I chose my own experience as a principle source of information because I was of the opinion that there was something essential in my teaching which demanded research. Already started on my teaching career, I discovered that I was a 'man without alternatives;' the concrete social world confronted me with the problem of intersubjectivity (Marcuse). I was 'thrown' into a crisis in social values—the attempted integration of an open self-aware man-man relationship, with the teaching activity was at stake. When I turned to the traditional educational literature for and about beginning teaching, I only encountered techniques that were irrelevant to my problem. The technique of teaching came easily. I could in a more or less thoughtless manner keep the events of the classroom chugging along. Furthermore, the students seemed to 'learn.' Concepts that had been unknown to them were fairly accurately applied to problem-solving at the end of the course. But the process of educating was taking place (it seemed) without my understanding what happened. To borrow a well-known illustration (from Vygotsky): it is one thing to tie one's shoelaces and quite another to be able to *tell* someone how one ties shoelaces. Practice demands far less conscious capacity than does explanation. I taught, even well, but lacked pedagogic insight. The task was to master the teaching situation—that is to say, to mediate the process of teaching in such a way that understanding of the activity was achieved. This process of insight *meaning as activity*—is crucial to this study. The dynamics to the development in conceptual insight is at the center of interest.

Growth in conceptual fore-knowledge is rooted in the practical task, i.e. experience is the prior foundation to insight. The quality of the formulations developed, i.e. the mediations, must be judged by what is done with them. These conceptualizations are integral to direct functioning—the interpretations are therefore thought out in proximity to practice. I give thorough attention to the specific situation wherein I taught. Not mere verbal abstractions, but *la pleine parole* is sought[1]. In teaching we employ a model for discourse (consciously or unconsciously) which is more or less restrictive, rationalizing, revelatory. In *la pleine parole* the discourse is open for interaction, perception, insight; the man-man and man-world relationships are at their most realistic. Psychoanalytic efforts to achieve naked truth are often criticized for being 'demeaning' to their subject matter. The Lacanian effort to achieve *la pleine parole,* as practiced here, may evoke such a response. I can only stress that this is not my intention. My goal was to write educational descriptions that hug the texture and situation of teaching. Neither idealization nor vilification was attempted. Teaching was found to be so serious an issue that it was worthwile to work several years on it. I may abuse some sensibilities in my effort to render teaching from the 'inside;' literature written from the 'outside' is perhaps more optimistic and portrays a less conflict ridden reality. I stress that I take teaching very seriously and think back on my period as beginning lecturer with a mixture fascination, intensity, and fright.

I worked in a four-year college for undergraduate studies in Holland whose only majors were in vocational programs in social relations (social work to be applied in the social services, in industry, in therapy, in schooling for young adults, etc.). I taught in what would, in the United States, be called an 'invisible college.' One with non-selective admissions and a small enrollment; no research or graduate programs, and where the academic requirements are minimal (Astin, 1972). The term 'invisible col-

lege' refers to the role these schools (do not) play in the intellectual life of the nation. There are many more 'invisible colleges' than Harvards, Cambridges, or Sorbonnes; but one does not commonly even know their names, nor anything about what occurs there. Of course these schools are often founded and funded to be 'invisible;' the term is not normative, but structural/sociological. As a graduate student in 1975 I was glad to be offered an appointment at such a college, despite the negative reputation:

> These are colleges where the student 'has to make an effort to discover an education. At first glance, the peer culture appears wholly philistine and the faculty culture either philistine or indifferent or both.'
>
> (Glenny, 1977, cited in Carnegie Council, 1980, p. 241)

Austerity politics, the advent of a demographic crisis, and anti-intellectualism were all cropping up, as dangers to any further expansion (i.e. jobs) in higher education. But having won the appointment, I found myself at a loss to understand the activity of teaching. I was forced to seek within my own situation for a path to pedagogics. The patterns that revealed themselves are presented in the Genetic Text (Part Two of this book), as far as possible in the same sequence as they actually took place. Part One, the first three introductory chapters, sets out to explain the form and background to the research, while in the main body of the study (the Genetic Text) I try to avoid meta-commentary.

Because the researcher and the research object are the same person the work can be dubbed 'new paradigm' research and can be linked to the phenomenological tradition as well as to recent experiments in semiotic inquiry or to the Lacanian influences in social thought. But I did not want to write a defense of these methodological strategies. I had two reasons: (1) there are already many programmatic defenses of the sort of social science that interests me[2], and (2) I do not believe that the self-justification of a researcher is as useful as an ostensive definition of his activity. Meta-reflection, the discussing of the pros and cons to various ideas of social science, philosophizing on the human value of research, appears to me to be a bottomless pit. The debate between empirical-analytical social science and the qualitative or interpretative forms does not seem to change anybody's mind. Thus, I emphasized the concrete problems of beginning teaching. Reading the Genetic Text is meant to be experiential, close to the event and process, which carries with it the risk of some disorder and intellectual vagueness. The chapters follow so closely the phases in my development as a lecturer, that the reader can feel himself lost in the particular and unable to come to grips with the text theoretically. Herein, there can be an excess of realism, where the difference between text and circumstance is too minimal. I have placed 'Interfaces' between the chapters to clarify at each juncture in the genetic text how the argument is progressing. I evaluate thereby how the preceding chapter has contributed, and the forthcoming one will contribute to the process of becoming a self-evaluating and experienced teacher.

The goals to this study are limited to the 'context of discovery' exploration of a little researched thematic. Self-study into the situation of beginning teacher is unususal, the emphasis on 'meaning' as a crucial feature to teaching is down right singular. In short, the strength as well as the weakness of my study may be found in its out of the ordinary attempt to portray and conceptualize teaching in the perspective of the social relations which (do/do not) lend support to 'meaning.' This focus results from the semiotic approach. I address myself to teaching as if it were 'culture text' ('culture' in Tyler's definition is 'unified by the human ability to speak and thus to acquire,

preserve, accumulate, and hand down a cultural tradition.') (Bailey, 1978). Teaching is speech which I try to read as signs, in the same way as the Lacanian reads and understands the subject in language. What does the sign system assume about man together—how is intersubjectivity produced in this 'culture text?' Teaching, construed as language, is a system of signification whose 'meaning' organizes interaction, discourse.

(ii) the reappraisal of predecessors

The literature I found did not provide me with specific guidance. The question at issue was not so much 'What are the facts?'—or what is beginning teaching like—but instead, 'What does it mean?'—how does teaching produce different forms of intersubjectivity? My problem was not merely one of collecting empirical data but of employing conceptual tools—semiotic, social-ethical, cultural-historical—with which I could describe and interpret. Research turned up four broad categories of information: (a) large scale interview projects on university teaching; (b) research in educational ethnography; (c) personal reminiscences of teaching; and (d) empirical studies on education. Literature from the first category (large scale interview projects) reported from 'outside' the teaching situation. The *hic et nunc* of the 'inside' perspective is sacrificed to attain general conclusions:

> 'The mood of American college and university faculty members has darkened in the 1970s for many reasons:
> – The philosophical validity of the scientific method and the objectivity of academic inquiry began to be questioned in the 1960s.
> – Harnessing nuclear energy, landing a man on the moon, and computerizing much of the daily lives of the members of industrial societies were tough acts to follow. They were also accompanied by potential hazards to the health and humanity of mankind . . . '
>
> (Carnegie Council, 1980, p. 251)

These observations are neither unexpected, nor very revealing. One researcher investigated what faculty members thought to be the ideal university teacher, only to write a book on his own alternative concept of the 'teacher-artist' (Axelrod, 1973). The survey answers to questions on subject matter, students, and teaching, were found so wanting that the line of research was shunted aside as unproductive. I did find several philosophically tinted categorizations of teachers, none of which forged a link between abstractions and concrete instructional practice.

Norbert Ralph did attempt a developmental analysis but failed to provide an explanation for the movement from stage to stage. But it is a developmental scheme: the order is invariable; no stage can be skipped, each stage is more complex than its predecessor, based upon it, and prepares the way for its successor. In Ralph's work I can find support for my assumption that a complex developmental pattern is to be found in the underlying structure of becoming a teacher. Ralph ordered faculty 'along a continuum according to the complexity and generality of the assumptions which underlay the meaning they gave to their professional lives' (Ralph, 1973, p. 62). I note the parallel interest in the element of 'meaning.' Ralph analyzed concepts of knowledge, philosophies of teaching, role notions, and attitudes to colleagues as well as

students. His results mirror his normative choices—the 'fully functioning' individual is his standard of measure. For me his scheme is too individualizing without enough attention for the interactive quality to teaching. He identifies five stages, from conformity/rigidity to individuality/complexity:

> (1) *conventional*—knowledge is absolute and given, education consists of imparting knowledge in unknowing students (16% of his sample).
> (2) *more complex notion*—education is the acquiring of facts by students but the lecturer is open to discussions of technique, the authority of knowledge is still intact but the willingness to try and explain exceptions or deviance is greater (21% of the sample).
> (3) *choice and diversity but not integrated*—learning is problematic; it takes effort, involves choices, and one is often not free in what one can or will study; psychological factors influence the ability to work together, and often lead to anxiety (16%).
> (4) *personal style of functioning*—diversity and complexity are accepted; the excessive sense of responsibility found in stage three is replaced with a sense of freedom and relativity in social roles (21%).
> (5) *clearly articulated*—an individual philosophy of education; awareness of values needing to be developed is coupled with an appreciation of the contradictions and ambivalence of human psychology (26%).
>
> (Ralph, 1973, p. 65)

I miss the nitty-gritty of concrete teaching and the dialectical tension which an effort to improve one's teaching creates. In the following chapter ('Theory') I clarify, further, why my research is not based on the sort of humanistic psychology which underpins Ralph's work.

The research results of educational ethnography (the second sort of reference) characterize whole schools or colleges. I recognized many similarities between my experience and what was reported to occur elsewhere. This reduced my sense of isolation, and convinced me that the problems I confronted were indicative. But I had neither the means nor the inclination to do this sort of research myself. My point of departure was not comparative but 'idiographic' (see Chapter Three for definition and discussion). Representative issues for educational ethnography are 'professionalism,' which is often identified (in higher education) with departmentalization of research activity (Jencks, 1966), and the fate of 'liberal arts courses,' which are opposed to narrow specialization and technocratic vocationalism (Martin, 1982). Differing patterns of educational development are identified: the 'telic' college sets forth new ideals to mobilize political and cultural movements, schools characterized by 'popular reforms' adopt student-designed-majors and free-choice curricula, abolish fixed requirements, but do not develop utopian or radical institutional aims (Grant, 1978). Similarly, the study of student bodies clarifies the difference between 'activism' (political mobilization and change) and 'counter culture' (personal, especially sexual, liberation); the former demanded hard work and had a limited appeal, the latter was attractive to practically everybody and spread throughout society (Riesman, 1980). Recent research has revealed a 'first class on the Titanic' spirit—economic fatalism that fuels hedonism. A 'me-oriented' attitude of persons determined not to be a victim—someone else will have to be unemployed; society may be doomed to depression, but the individual will prosper (Levine, 1980). Gouldner's 'Letter from Amsterdam' is an underground classic in the

discussion of these matters (Gouldner in Grant, 1978). At issue are the results of the 'popular reforms' which, it is claimed, ushered in student consumerism, an attitude that, with growing economic restraints and falling enrollments, is increasing. The lack of core curriculum coherence grows as institutional survival begins to depend upon providing services deemed necessary by students. Lecturers are confronted with the trauma of retrenchment: the political and economic pressures on higher education call forth defensive reactions. I have come across many of these features to contemporary college teaching, especially the intellectual and pedagogic 'protectionism' of current 'collegiality.' But my stress on the teaching process leads to a different sort of research.

A third potential source are the books of personal reminiscence: reports of individual values, attitudes, and development that make it clear who the author is, how he got interested in teaching, and what his satisfactions are as lecturer. But this literature did not reveal how teaching has been experienced or understood as a daily concrete activity (Meiklejohn, 1965; Kriegel, 1972; Brown, 1960). In these books the normative aspects of teaching is emphasized but, doesn't get applied to practice. Attitudes towards social ethics are described but the occurrence of social activity is not brought to life.

Lastly, there are the many empirical studies on education. But they have sought out different student groups than mine (mostly primary or secondary students) or had to do with other subjects than learning to conceptualize and theoretically interpret, teaching social science undergraduates.[3]

(iii) indication

I study 'teaching' as 'meaning;' thus as 'content filled social connections' (A.A. Leont'ev, 1975). I describe, as directly as possible, *la parole* of the teacher's experience, and try to interpret *la langue* of the intersubjectivity which is assumed and/or is generative in the situation[4]. The understanding of the structure of intersubjectivity underpinning teaching mediates future activity: it is the teacher's self-understanding and professional awareness.

The book is divided in three parts. The first explains the background of the research project, the second contains the *genetic text* and the third the concluding discussion. The genetic text is constructed from six chapters. I present, in succession, what approximates six idiograms: the phases to my development as lecturer. I describe and interpret the development of myself as a beginning teacher. My criteria in structuring the givens were historically developed. I discovered a temporal structure to my data: distinct configurations of givens occurred. A succession of quite distinct foci characterized the experience of teaching. In order to impress this developmental structure upon the reader I have set each stage off by means of the rhetorical device of 'Essayism.' I emphasize the evocative force of the givens—this nonconformity on my part is for some a lamentable deformity that I should have overcome. A rhetoric more like that used in literature than that employed in science was, I an convinced, not only permissible, but indispensable to communicate what I had discovered.


Each descriptive section generates its own interpretation. The historical-cultural principle of analysis guides the interpretative process. I investigate meaning as activity, specifically, in the circumstance of competing norms and values. My definition of pedagogics as normative (action) practical science, opens the way to my interpretative

assumptions. Since the common purpose to which pedagogues are inalienably committed is to advance the art and science of teaching, the justification of my interpretative behaviour is that it serves to increase that knowledge. When interpretation can advance understanding a step further, practice changes. If the issues and problems inherent to a phase of development are understood, a new freedom results. Insight into one's activity makes choices, and attempted change, possible. Situation generates description, whose interpretation leads to an understanding, which defines new choices, and the begin to a new situation. The genetic text follows repeatedly, this process. In Part One, I define the theoretical background upon which this learning cycle is founded ('Theory') and explain my descriptive/interpretative procedures ('Levels of Analysis and of Generic Idiograms').

In the body of the book (Part Two—The Genetic Text) a progressive ripening of reflection takes place: the chapters reflect, step by step, the development of my insight into teaching over some seven years. Each chapter reflects the way of thinking, working, and struggling with the issue at one point in the project. The study is to be read as a chronicle of the development of a beginning teacher into an experienced one. One sees the thought of the 'I' figure broaden and become more integrative. In the first chapter (to the phased description of my development), one encounters raw protest; the unreflected, often chaotic world of the beginning lecturer is reported here. In the second, the teacher takes a first good look at the other party—'who are my students, and what can I do with them?' The third phase is that of understanding the parallels between the curriculum and institution: what are the rules governing this enterprise? In the fourth stage, a genuinely reflective level is reached: an idea of teaching emerges. But it is one-sided, idealistic, and encompasses only a part of the situation. This process of reflection continues (the fifth step) into more complex thinking where a dynamic dialectical insight into education begins to emerge, though as yet excessively subjectivistic. The insights are valid, but far too localized in thought and consciousness and not in language, culture, and interaction. I explore them (sixth stage) paradoxes that are not there to be solved: educational practice is rooted in contradictions and the resulting interactions. Finally (in Discussion and Evaluation), teaching is situationally studied: the process of development is the record of concepts used, and the analysis of these is the understanding of my own practice. This process thus passed through to the following stages:

1. an unstructed emotional phase;
2. attention to the 'other';
3. self and other in curriculum and system;
4. a concept of teaching—but one-sided, emphasizing only creativity;
5. a more complex concept—closer to cultural-historical experience, but subjectivistic;
6. a statement founded on one's own practice;
7, a questioning of one's own path of development and its value for others.

This is the sort of learning I defend here.



THEORY

Having stated my goal, which is to improve my teaching, I then have to determine my conceptual terms of reference. I require a systematic employment of categories, presuppositions, and logic. A 'theory of teaching', which I could wholeheartedly accept, would offer guidance, support, even direction. It would indicate the *possibility* of the subject matter: what can teaching entail, what are realistic structures of proficiency, what developmental or genetic explanations fit? Virtually no such theories, however, exist: they have to be extrapolated from learning theories. The many 'models of teaching' are an apparent contradiction to my assertion: but they are pretty much a misnomer being really *curriculum suggestions* where the relationship of teacher-content-student is discussed. Their most important parameters are such things as 'syntax' (structure, phases, procedures), 'principles of reaction' (role teacher), 'social system' (how decisions are made), and 'support system' (needed facilities) (Joyce, 1972). Issues such as the choice between the lecture and discussion methods belong to this field. Newer controversies include 'de-schooling' and programmed instruction. In these debates, a total vision of the school as process is at stake. The advantages of 'trial-and-error' learning are compared to those of inquiry methods, while the benefits of 'advance organizers' loom in the wings. The polemic between inductive teaching (Taba), the Curriculum Reform Movement (Schwab, Suchman), and the utilizers of abstract ordering concepts (Ausubel) centers on concepts of learning[1]. The question is 'How does one present information so that it can be best learned?'—an efficiency problem. Another side to the 'models of teaching' pertains to classroom organization. Which values are learned in the meso world of the classroom: what are the political, social, and psychological norms the child internalizes in school? This problem is answered with 'group investigation' (Dewey), 'T' groups (Rogers), and other models that stress moral and social development.[2]

In all these discussions aspects of teaching are examined, but always in the context of an overall goal. Teaching, as seen by the teacher, is never the crucial point—schooling as an entire process remains the frame of reference. While the theories are often limited to one subject or seem applicable to only a part of the student's activity, they all describe an entire learning process and everything, as well as everyone, necessary for that process. The term 'models of teaching' may be current, but what is discussed are 'models of learning.' The teacher and his teaching are, in fact, often discouraged in these 'models,' because they are needlessly inefficient, authoritarian, or disruptive of natural curiosity. Thus, a model of teaching that is a description of teaching as experienced by the instructor is not readily available. What Langeveld would demand—a record of the teacher's choices and his manner of carrying through on those decisions—has yet to be recorded.[3] The same is true of the social ethics needed to make such a pedagogics workable. I have researched the process of developing just such a pedagogics, where two elements remain essential: the teacher as an experiencing agent, and the school as a complex social circumstance. But I have discovered no other writer who explores the dialectic between these two factors—there is no clear model for my work.

Nonetheless, my research into teaching does rest on conceptions associated with three models of *learning:* 'Behavioristic,' 'Humanistic psychology,' and the 'Cultural-Historical' approach. Representative of the first is Skinner (The *Technology of Teaching* being an example); the second, Rogers (*Freedom to Learn);* and the third, Vygotsky (*The History of the Development of Higher Psychological Functions* and *Thought and Language).* And despite the fact that none of them are true models of teaching, a comparison of them will at least clarify my assumptions about teaching and indicate the heuristic aids I employ to understand this field of experience. In this comparison I shall also make use of a little-known study by I.B.H. Abram, *The Jewish Tradition as Permanent Learning* (Abram, 1980), to indicate the applicability in particular of the 'Cultural-Historical' approach to adult education.

a. The Comparison

i. the Behavioristic Approach

My interest is in the *role of the teacher, the activity of the researcher,* and the *concept of learning,* when activity is inspired by the behavioristic approach.

'Teaching,' according to Skinner, should mean stimulating, helping, guiding, but there are not enough teachers to accomplish this. Since they cannot provide adequate constructive guidance (classes are too large, expertise too limited, the hours too long, etc.), teachers end up assigning and punishing. More generally, they require tasks to be done, and control the results without actually guiding the process—they do not teach. Skinner is convinced that 'teaching' is necessary: the student needs support, assurance, explanation. But he maintains, these functions can be provided by technological means, with an unlimited capacity for attention and adaptability—any tempo, all levels, whatever subject matter can be available whenever desired. Traditional teaching is inefficient because it cannot meet the specific needs of the individual student, cannot make use of the most advanced scholarship, and cannot be planned for maximum efficiency, control, discipline. If I go along with Skinner my theme would seem to be set aside: the insecure, partial, unguided lecturer would cease to exist. The knowledge of myself, responsible for my teaching, would be dated—planned instruction would replace my doubts with 'expert' programs, worked out in great detail, and accessible for every student. Teaching as a relationship to content and meaning would disappear—the teachers would not even have to 'understand' their subjects any more (Skinner, 1968, p. 257).

In reality, however, Skinner has only shifted the locus of the problem: from the classroom to the programming. he argues that opposition to programmed education is rooted in the prestige individuals have won by being the survivors in the old inefficient system—a prestige which they are afraid of losing when a new technology of education makes success in school automatic (Skinner, 1968, p. 143). But since he is anything but an opponent of meritocracy, this fear would seem to be based on a superficial reading of his proposals by his opponents. He believe that:

> . . . the control of the population as a whole must be delegated to specialists: to police, priests, owners, teachers, therapists and so on, with their specialized reinforcers and their codified contingencies.
>
> (Skinner, 1971, p. 155)

For me, with my interest in 'teaching', there are three sorts of responses to Skinner. The first is all too easy: I simply note that Skinner has placed the teachers outside the learning situation. The instructor remains for personal contact or social psychological tasks, but has no control over what is learned. Insofar as I am interested in what happens to students in schooling, as well as the teacher's role and responsibility therein, Skinner has solved my problem by absolishing it. But, as I have indicated, this answer merely avoids the issue. My questions are still intact, but transferred to the programmers. My other responses delve further into Skinner's theory. I can (the second reaction) interest myself in his terminology for cause and effect: stimulus/response and reinforcement. How does learning work? What is its essential logic? And, the third variant: asks what is the result of learning according to Skinner—what is knowledge? The second approach tackles learning as process (how do we learn) and the third learning as result (what can we do with—thanks to—our learning).

The relationship that the behavioristic approach traditionally studies, that between the educator's actions and the student's learning, is anything but self-evident. In actual learning situations it is often impossible to say what the stimulus was—circumstances are too complex for certainty. Behavioral research into learning had to reject actual learning as its subject matter and revert to studying the factors of 'memory/forgetting' in artificial purity. Nonsense words have to be learned to see how learning 'unto itself' functions apart from intrinsic interest in the subject matter or the influence of experience. This 'pure' learning does not resemble anything that happens in the classroom, and it is no wonder that 'teaching' has proven to be unmanageable for this approach. According to Skinner the tasks of educating ask:

> What behavior is to be set up? What reinforcers are at hand? What responses are available in embarking upon a program of approximation which will lead to the final form of behavior? How can reinforcements be most efficiently scheduled to maintain the behavior strength?
>
> (Skinner, 1968, p. 19)

What proof is there that programmed education can be effective? What exactly are reinforcers? These two questions have to be addressed to Skinner's assertions about learning. I reserve the issue of learning as behavior—to know is to be able to *do*—for a later paragraph. The means of learning prescribed are to be atomistic and minute. Programming takes the form of splitting up tasks into the smallest possible steps—whereby failure is minimized. Everyone can proceed successfully from point to point: education is no longer an obstacle course where teachers are specialized in tripping up students, but a design for learning where achievement is facilitated. How would this step-by-step procedure succeed in teaching abstract concepts, leading to insights, developing analystic skills? Skinner claims that there is no difficulty here (Skinner, 1968, p. 135), but in the absence of empirical evidence his claims do not carry much weight. Wouldn't the never ending stream of minutiae become exasperating? Couldn't the reinforcement become stereotyped, and since mechanically conveyed, hollow? Mightn't the absence of failure become deadening—no risks, no danger, no challenge? Skinner, in effect, makes all sorts of claims for the achievement of his programmed learning, but his lack of scientific regard for evidence makes his argument purely speculative, and makes my counter-claims just as probable as his assertions. Furthermore, the means to the end seem downright improbable. Not only are the programs based on an atomistic concept of learning, which seems to be in direct contradiction to most learning goals, but the

reinforcement methodology seems untrustworthy. What is 'reinforcement' as Skinner uses the term? Chomsky observed:

> (Skinner) . . . is now using 'reinforce' in a sense quite different from that of the laboratory theory of behavior . . . it is no wonder that we can 'explain' behavior by using the nontechnical term 'reinforce' with just the meaning of 'like' or 'enjoy' or 'learn something from' or whatever . . . A literal interpretation of such remarks yields gibberish, and a metaphorical interpretation merely replaces an ordinary term by a homonym of a technical term, with no gain of precision.
>
> (Chomsky, 1971, pp. 21-22)

'Reinforcement' is little more than jargon if it means nothing more than approval while the 'stimuli' of approval are undefinable. To make matters worse, Skinner contends that learning should lead to 'automatic reinforcement,' which means doing what one does because one derives pleasure from it. How enjoying a good book is reinforcement beats me. And in what sense the use of heuristic procedures to solve problems is pleasure generating, is also doubtful. If 'reinforcement' is the same as emotional or social approval, its constant use would not seem to lead to the sort of maturity problem solving demands. Furthermore, would not saturation set in somewhere in a school career that often lasts more than fifteen years? But this issue brings us to the border between the 'process' of learning and the 'result.'

Learning, according to Skinner, has a goal 'to bring behavior of a given topography under the control of given variables' (Skinner, 1968, p. 203). Skinner's love for the laboratory is obvious, but his meaning is not. What someone knows is what he does, he continues—vague introspective mentalisms are mere confusion (Skinner, 1968, p. 201). Discussion, he notes, can be mere parroting, objective tests the result of cramming. The only real test of 'learning' is if the prescribed behavior can be enacted when it is appropriate. A 'topography' is a strategy for problem solving—what is heuristically done to find answers, or, in other words, which response patterns get you where you want to go. Not ideas (or precepts) are needed to find solutions, but practice (Skinner, 1968, p. 192). These topographies are not individual: 'the important fact is that *another person would manipulate precisely the same conditions to get the same results*' (Skinner, 1968, p. 140-41, italics Skinner's). A 'topography' is a highly abstract 'organizer' able to steer problem solving. Skinner's idea of knowledge as habit (from William James) does not seem to lend itself to the development of second-level thought—how would the learner control, handle, interpret his 'organizers?' This issue of the development of 'higher psychic processes,' as will be shown in this chapter, plays an essential role in my preference for Vygotsky's work.

Skinner's insistence upon the heuristic 'organizer' seems justified to me. Skinner insists that many cannot learn from the environment alone—or, at least, that any such learning is fantastically slow. Education exists to transmit 'science,' the abstract, ordered, structured insight into reality, accumulated over the centuries. Skinner understands knowledge to be essentially cultural and historical, embodied in language. Perhaps unwittingly, he adopts the Hegelian preference for science (abstract concept) above experience. Education exists to pass on the understanding already historically gained; not to rediscover what has already been accomplished (Skinner, 1968, p. 110). Mere exposure to the world is not enough; it has taken man hundreds of thousands of years to gain his present repertoire of responses, which is fairly effective in dealing with the world (Skinner, 1968, pp. 154-55). Modern man, evidently, knows how to think:

> Faced with a given problem, the student learns to behave in ways which maximize the probability that he will find a solution . . . Roughly speaking, the student must learn to recognize the kind of problem with which he is faced and to select an appropriate technique.
>
> (Skinner, 1968, pp. 132-33)

What empirical proof are we offered that this problem-solving ability is actually taught? Where is the evaluative evidence that this heuristic approach to learning is a success? All my prejudices would want such an approach to succeed, but I find no evidence for it in Skinner's book, and not enough outside of it for any certainty. What proof is there that problem solving follows structures and procedures that can be effectively taught? Furthermore, in his proposals for teaching heuristic methods, with which I do not agree, he offers no evidence to support his *technique*. While the sort of 'knowing' to be gained is methodological and abstract, 'programmed learning' is the opposite.

In my work, the social quality of learning is essential. Obviously, Skinner is more interested in 'problem-solving-behavior' than in the 'openess of the dialogue.' While in *The Technology of Teaching* Skinner places his socio-historical assumptions outside his subject matter, he filled this lacuna three years later when his *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* appeared. Critics of Skinner have claimed that his vision of man together is objectionable. In 'programmed education' a relatively small elite of programmers determine the curriculum; a large mass of 'teachers' are assigned to a social, non-intellectual role. The claim is made that 'stimulus/response' debases learning by pretending that is determined and, that reinforcement alienates social intercourse by providing a mechanical imitation of contact. Chomsky, the representative of the *responsibility of the intellectual* (in regards to the War in Vietnam), was the opposite pole to Skinner. Chomsky argued that learning generates insights which make demands on social behaviour: he defends individual responsibility and intellectual morality. His polemic against Skinner's 'programmed education' and its technocratic, anti-individual, concept of knowledge was extreme:

> Extending these thoughts, let us consider a well-run concentration camp with inmates spying on one another and the gas ovens smoking in the distance, and perhaps an occasional verbal hint as a reminder of the meaning of this reinforcer . . . there should be no aversive consequences, immediate or deferred. Unwanted behavior would be eliminated from the start by the threat of the crematoria and the all-seeing spies. Thus all behavior would be automatically 'good,' as required. There would be no punishment. Everyone would be reinforced—differentially, of course, in accordance with his ability to obey the rules. Within Skinner's scheme there is no objection to this social order. Rather it seems close to ideal.
>
> (Chomsky, 1971, p. 22)

Are we answerable to what we know—does learning make social/ethical demands upon us? I believe it does, and that this alienates me from Skinner.

To conclude: Skinner's emphasis on the intellectual act and the problem-solving procudure, focuses attention on heuristic skills. He challenges us to define the 'thinking' we are trying to stimulate, and to know why, and with what means, we teach. By taking thought out of 'mentalistic' categories and placing it in the concrete sphere of

problem-solving, he makes the process of education much more approachable. When thought is act, then its structure (and ethics) are more accessible than when it remains pure spirit. My reading of the social sciences and my experience convince me that Skinner's concept of 'science', as knowledge that needs to be presented and learned, is just. But because 'knowledge' is not composed of mere facts, but takes the form of learning to use heuristic devices, I believe that there is something to be taught and a real need for interaction. Skinner helps to make thought visible, to show that learning is activity; but has a vision of the societal element, and an accompanying conviction in the rigid causality to the learning process, which I reject.

ii. The Humanistic-Psychology Approach

An element of interactionalism is crucial to all humanistic social science, but there's a disparity of interpretations. The theoretical justification varies between naturalism and idealism; the psychological realization can emphasize everything from spontaneous insight to spiritual needs; the logical implications differ from determinism to voluntarism. The phenomena of man-together is crucial to my investigation and that explains the appeal this tradition has had for me. But as will become clear, my examination of Humanistic-Psychology has driven me elsewhere. What the Humanistic tradition *denotes* (man in his social being) is also for me the first, basic plane of circumstance. But the *system of connotation* (the denoted on a second plane; reflected in concepts, notions, categories) is inconsistent and reifying. The rendering of man-together in the humanistic approach has I assert failed—the *description* of that failure is *metalanguage* (Barthes, 1964a). Rogers attempts to denote the interpersonal but his system of signs misses the mark. Torbert (a representative of the second generation of humanistic social science) creates different connotators which do not succeed much better. The manner of understanding is at issue, not the object of study. I cannot accept learning as 'stimulus/response' because consciousness, as inherent to the social context of learning, is absent. In humanistic pedagogics the point of departure—an interactional study of man—appeals to me, but the system of connotation fails to do justice to the issue.

Since the publication of *Client Centered Therapy* in 1951, Rogers has been the leading Anglo-Saxon spokesman for developing a social science based upon a theory of the 'subject.' Roger's contribution to education came in 1969, when he published *Freedom to Learn*. Because my topic includes the 'subject' in education and makes use of self-evaluation, it seems close to the humanistic school. In addition, the Rogerians have wanted to study the relationship between teacher (self-) insight and effectiveness. In their teacher evaluation research they set, and test, criteria for comparing instructors. The humanist psychologists claim to find the needed criteria in Rogers' explicit prerequisites for successful therapy. If a teacher is a 'fully functioning person,' capable of empathy and congruence, he will be able to develop successful relationships with students and to facilitate learning. The pupil needs a favourable and positive self-concept to do his best work: his self-concept depends on possessing well-grounded feelings of acceptance, competence, and worth (Diggory, 1966; Felker, 1974; cited in

Burns, 1982). The teacher needs to have a positive self-concept to develop this same characteristic in his students. The teacher-student relationship is mutually dependent, but the teacher has the initiative. To a large degree, the students will understand themselves in the manner they feel themselves to be understood. Positive feedback will be incorporated and lead to 'motivation,' 'self-confidence,' and a release of 'creativity.' How teachers and students perceive their 'selves' determines their relationship and their capacity to learn. Research is done on this assumption by administering psychological tests where high scores on 'maturity, responsibility, personal and social loyalty,' showing 'warmth and interest, as well as little distortion in perception,' are correlated with student assessments. Effective teachers are more 'flexible'; sensitive to student needs; personalized in their work; appreciative or reinforcing of student work; informal; spontaneous; warm in conversation; emotionally adjusted (Burns, 1982, p. 253). Testing for 'teacher effectiveness' on the basis of the aforementioned characteristics provokes two objections. First, these 'criteria' seem hopelessly inexact. I do not believe that they could support an analytical philosopher's critical questions. Do the humanistic psychologists really understand the attributes necessary for effective teaching? Second, and partially related to the first problem, implementation of the 'criteria' poses dangers:

> These student teachers thus (those who were effective) tended to be stable extraverts, characteristics intuitively one would hope for in such a profession where neurotic and introverted persons would prove incompetent or even harmful in close interpersonal relationships.
>
> (Burns, 1982, p. 271)

The criteria of rejection and exclusion justify adjustment. They belong to a discourse of power relations which identifies 'misfits' and marginalizes 'exceptions'. They defend a disciplinary network of normalization. Human science becomes 'power-knowledge': the psychological test is 'domination-observation'. The prospective teacher is subjected to the judges of normality, the mechanisms of the norm determine that deviants are kept out. In no nation have the teacher training colleges actually applied psychological testing in this manner.

On the one hand the attributes of effective teaching are discussed, but on the other the value of teaching is doubted. The Humanist-Pedagogics is anti-teaching: teaching has punished too much; has created more insecurity and insincerity than effective learning. The teachers have not sufficiently stimulated the students' positive self-image. Worthwhile teaching is not the imparting of information or knowledge but is a socio-psychological process that will be emotionally supportive, making 'learning' possible. Direct experience of the environment is crucial to learning—'teaching' facilitates. Rogers is a radical naturalist. Consciousness and reality stand in immediate contact with each other—there is no emphasis on mediating heuristic methods. The intermediary 'science' is not necessary for Rogers; man can and should learn directly from his own reality. The synthetic, language-bound, facet to thought is rejected. The epistemology approximates a 'dynamic naturalism,' with many resemblances to that of Rousseau. Man is not irrational, his impulses do not need to be mistrusted, the hypothetical 'fully functioning' person is a 'participant in the rationality of his organism.' (Rogers, 1969, p. 291). 'Organismic valuing' precedes consciousness: 'the creative person . . . finds himself moving in a certain direction long before he can give any completely conscious and rational basis for it' (Rogers, 1969, p. 287).

Dynamic naturalism leads, as in Rousseau, to the assertion of spontaneity in opposition to the merely customary and conventional. Consciousness, insofar as it is a natural function of bodily life is embraced; but insofar as it is the product of formal thought or cultural tradition, it is not to be trusted. The free self develops its initiatives and investigates. Because many people have lost their selves in their rearing, when the demands of 'others' have imposed alien values and behavior, there is a need for the 'teacher' who can 'give to his students a freedom to learn' (Rogers, 1969, p. 129). The Rogerian plea for independent intellectual activity directed to genuine learning instead of toward required course material is a much needed attack on academic rigidity and administrative decadence. But Rogers defends his position with a learning theory that I believe to be deterministic. The organismic concept of learning impoverishes man's historical freedom. Rogers defines freedom purely in terms of the 'natural' self; he believes that the 'other' (at least in the modern world) thwarts personal freedom. This becomes an education for persons who do not work—who are not concretely active in making, changing, transforming their material world. The moment a person makes the demand upon another to 'see it my way,' 'build it as I suggest,' 'stick to the agreement as defined,'—the latter person's self is being pushed to abandon itself in order to earn approval.

Rogers offers little evidence for his theory of learning. I believe that freedom is a historical social quality, and not an innate biological one. Thus I do not identify with Rogers' assertions. Empirically I object that blurring of the difference between lower (natural) psychic functions, and higher (for instance, heuristic) ones is unjust. Rogers rejects teaching: teachers are to fulfill a personal, therapeutic role; knowlegde is left to self-study and programmed education. Paradoxically, learning would seem to be 'consciousness freely in interaction with enviroment' *and* 'creative inclusive reflection'. How does Rogers demand one sort of learning goal in preference to another? Why isn't memorizing the entries in the telephone book a form of learning equal to any other? 'Organismic valuing' would have to reveal the preference. Just as long as there is no empirical evidence that the 'organismic valuing' has chosen this or that form of knowledge, he has no right to draw conclusions. If learning is an individual spontaneous relationship to the enviroment then I wonder if commentary on it can have value. The philosophical natrualism gnaws away at the critical capacity. This is particularly relevant to the development of standards of argumentation and proof. Doesn't the creative ability to discover a new element in otherwise familiar circumstances or conditions demand disciplined thought? I do not believe that the subject, left to his world, can learn effectively. Some of Rogers' curriculum suggestions seem effective enought—too much discipline and too little response is deadening. The personally unique experience enriches education—to banish it is to invite sterility. But the role he ascribes to the 'teacher' does not meet with my sympathy. I think he is fundamentally mistaken in his theory of learning, and that his suggestions if adopted in toto, would lead to a culture where abstract thought is never mastered. Furthermore, the Rogerian idea that the other is to be *made* individually free (to learn) is unintelleg-ible to me. Freedom remains a social quality that expresses itself in a broad cultural historical context. By psychologizing freedom, one destroys its significance.

While all the members of the humanistic education movement are concerned with the quality of contact between teacher and student, the differences in theories of learning, and the political consequences, are tremendous. Some researchers limit themselves to studying classroom interaction without ever having to risk social


philosophical assertions. They have opened the classroom to observation (Flanders, 1970; Good and Brophy, 1973). And yet other educational humanists have a different concept of learning from Rogers'. Naturalism does not have a monopoly, though the influence of Rousseau is prevalent, and many pedagocical radicals of the late sixties and early seventies were dynamic naturalists. The alternative approach emphasizes less the spontaneous man-world relationship than the progression in a developmental, spiritual hierarchy (paralleling the difference between Rogers and Maslow). In the late sixties there was obvious interest in 'degrees of consciousness'. The goal of 'experiential learning' (which is Rogerian enough) is retained, but the theory of learning emphasizes a genetic ladder. William Torbert's work epitomizes this alternative strain to recent humanistic social science, and his study of educational practice resembles my own in its sensitivity to the values issue. But Torbert's theoretical grid is neither mine nor Rogers': He discusses levels of consciousness—the first is naive, concrete and everyday; the second is meta-social and contains the structures of interaction determining our everyday conduct; on the third level interaction takes place between the first two levels. World and self become project (something we can define, understand, wherein we are free) on the third level. The sense of freedom resembles Rogers', but the logic is Platonic. A structure of development is sketched from spiritual blindness to fundamental insight. Philosophically this is not naturalism, but idealism. Man overcomes the particular in order to become free consciousness. The concept of teaching I seek is, however, very different from organismic naturalism or Platonic idealism; for it is radically empirical and social. In naturalism the primary responsibility is to the 'organismic', and in the Platonic it is to the achievement of psychological transparancy. In both cases, the individual and world stand in direct contact with each other without a mediating historical-intellectual matrix. 'Science', learned cognitive structures, are sacrificed to 'man-in-the-world' (Rogers) or to 'project' (Torbert). Authenticity overwhelms the teaching of traditions and methods. My objective is to understand my teaching as an historical-cultural act: the uses of thought in society are crucial to what I can achieve. Both Rogers' naturalism and Torbert's idealism isolate the individual and seek truth in his personal, specific relationship to the world. I study the event of teaching where circumstance, individual consciousness, and knowledge come together. I was convinced that I did something that mattered when I taught—structures of analysis were exchanged, challenged, discussed. I was not just a facilitator of personal growth: thought, truth, reality were crucial contents. The development of ways of thinking was more central than my interactional role, or attitude to students. Thought as I conceive it, is outwardly directed; insight into oneself (following a structure of spiritual development) doesn't gain precedence over historical occurrence. I perceived circumstances as radically undetermined. I did not believe that consciousness had a predetermined mission. I wanted to leave the idealism-materialism question open. I had no proof that learning was more essentially rooted in the one than in the other. Quite to the contrary, my distrust of Cartesian dualism was strong. Humanistic education prejudged too many issues and removed one much too quickly from the direct circumstance, replacing all the interactions of event with an inward directed search for personal authenticity. It paid more attention to the 'self' than to the shared everyday world.

iii. the Cultural-Historical approach

In Behaviorism I could not discover the circumstance of teaching and became convinced that its theory could therefore not guide me, though I do concur with the mediating, heuristic role ascribed to science. In Humanistic Psychology I admire the emphasis on the interactional, but disagree with the assumption that the social is dervived from the individual in either a naturalistic or idealistic manner. My experience was that the social event of teaching created thought. The external practical activity preceded reflection, self-definition, insight. I understood teaching on the basis of the response it produced. I related to myself as people had related to me. I assume the sociogenesis of teaching. I do not posit a rigid deterministic relationship between enviroment and person but presuppose that 'any function in [my] cultural development appears twice, or on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within [myself] as an intrapsychological category' (Vygotsky in Wertsch, 1979, p. 163). The system of social relationships—'the aggregate of internalized social relations that have become functions for the individual and forms his/her structure'—is the product of the history of cultural development (Vygotsky quoted in Wertsch, 1979, p. 164). Thus, 'consciousness is a product of society, it is produced'—this process is called *activity* in the Russian Psychology—it is the concrete, human historical connectedness with the material and social worlds, where man and world are changed throught interaction.

The concept of *Activity* [deyatel'nost'] is a basic assumption to this research project. A.N.Leont'ev lists six characteristics of activity:

1. *Analysis on three levels*—'operations' are innate, inherited; 'actions' involve training and habits, and 'activity' is adaption to new circumstance where intellect and labor create man's social being. I have sought to earn my way from the description of 'actions' to analysis of 'activity'.
2. *Goal-directedness*—'actions' are goal-directed, they exist in a scheme of 'getting something done'. Life in 'society' differs from 'natural existence' in that it rotates around planned actions. I have constantly inquired what are the *goals* of this *work:* what is one attempting to achieve in this social action.
3. *Mediation*—the simple stimulus-response process is replaced by the complicated mediated act:



'X' is the mediating factor that creates a new relationship between 'S' and 'R' (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 40). Leon'tev explains that 'signs (the 'X') are a means of controlling human behavior. Man cannot govern his own behavior directly and creates signs in order to control it indirectly' (Leont'ev in Wertsch, 1979, p. 25). The sign systems, which control behavior, are historical—they are made and changed, and are the product of, as well as the source to, historical change. The 'signs' are grouped in *semiotic systems* which are at different levels of development; they mirror the stages and forms of organization to man's activity (labor). Crucial to my inquiry was the quality of mediation to the semiotic system proposed by the college curriculum.
4. *Developmental or Genetic explanation:* How did the specific semiotic system,

used in a particular action, develop—what structure of activity does it presuppose? This is the crux to cultural-historical inquiry, and ultimately the issue which emerges in my research.
5. To be specific, development takes place through *social interaction*. The primacy of the human world (culture/history) is assumed—causation rests in concrete event. I share this emphasis upon substantive events.
6. Finally, it is emphaiszed that *internalization* is the means by which the social is conveyed to the individual. Vygotsky studied the genesis of internal mental activity from external activity—I emphasize this same transition from action to thought.

(Leont'tev in Wertsch, 1979)

The analysis of *activity* generates *three insights* specifically important to my work: (1) *anti-dualism,* (2) a *motivated goal for undergraduate teaching,* and, (3) attention to the *difference between schooling and permanent learning*. Firstly, the philosophical basis to Vygotsky's argument is his Hegelian-Marxism. He understands consciousness as genuinely historical: made, formed, and changed by man's acts. To him, all concepts are historical; they are relative to actual circumstances. Vygotsky is formulating a historical-cultural concept of learning, where what is to be learned is rooted in man's constantly changing circumstances. The signs we know, the ideas we learn, are a product of our cultural history. They are man-made and can be changed. The world man makes, includes signs and thus consciousness. Not only is consciousness radically historical and therein social, but the material world man creates is also part of the process. Not only is Vygotsky attacking the division into 'self-other' or into 'person-history', he is also rejecting the Cartesian dualism between a world of thought and another of physical objects. His effort is to move beyond the subjectivity-objectivity distinction and to create a pedagogics appropriate to the dynamically interactive vision of man's development. In learning it is the interaction between direct situational consciousness and concept, that characterizes the process. If concept remains strangled by immediate consciousness it has no influence on action. In Vygotsky's phraseology, it disappears into 'mere spirit'. If the 'concrete' loses 'concept', it becomes blind, undirected, incapable of any self-conscious achievement. According to Vygotsky, it is characteristic of man to be concretely in the world and to be capable of changing it. Man lives in the cultural historical reality wherein he plans, creates, acts. When consciousness is limited to spirit, it loses itself in substantive action, and when behaviorists limit man to causal, stimulus-response interaction with the environment, they deny him his capacity for historically meaningful deeds. Vygotsky denounces the *'verstenend'/'erklärende'* debate as representing merely the two sides of the same coin[4]. Of course he prefers Dilthey's historical concern to a behaviorists's mechanistic vision, but both assume the split between consciousness and material reality.

> There is no chance of finding the source of man's freedom of action in the heights of the spirit or in the depths of the brain. The idealistic path of the phenomenologist is just as hopeless as the positivistic path of the naturalists. To find the sources of conscious action, one has to transcend the limits of the organism. Not in the inward sphere of the spirit, but in the social history of man, are the sources of human consciousness and freedom to be sought.
>
> (Vygotsky quoted in Vos, 1976, p. 242)

When objective psychology declares that only behavior can be studied and that science cannot tolerate subjective phenomena, it demands a psychology without psyche. The old subjectivism of pure consciousness is reversed: previously psyche without behavior, now behavior without psyche. Behavior and consciousness are alienated from each other; the process: goal, choice, deed, reflection, is the loser. We get half a man, who is unable to reach his environment with his consciousness, and whose consciousness cannot be changed by what happens in the world. Throught dualism the generative interaction between the different levels of process is blocked, learning cannot take place. In the dialectical development of higher psychic processes, man is in fundamental interaction with culture, the immediate, the other, himself. Vygotsky's Marxism, in accord with his anti-dualism, is a neo-Hegelian perception of a dynamic mankind, which is made by history just in that it makes history. The emphasis is more upon man the maker than upon determinism. Parallels are to be drawn to Lukacs's work in the pre-Stalinistic period, and also to the fate of that work[5]. Lukacs, who long survived 1934 (the year of Vygotsky's death), renounced his early work as 'more Hegelian than Hegel', and came to echo the Eastern European orthodoxy in which the emphasis was on nature and history as the causes of social development. Vygotsky's emphasis on higher psychic functions opens the way to political free will and at least a degree of voluntarism. When true conceptual insight is achieved, direct material perception will be different. This dialectical transformation of lower processes throught the development of higher ones gives consciousness an important role in the knowledge of the material. Consciousness (superstructure) is definitely not mechanically determined by the forces of production (economic structure realized in a mode of production). For Vygotsky, a transformation in concept; in our self-understanding; and, most essentially, of our use of tools and signs, leads to a revision in our relationship to perceptual circumstances. This dialectical epistemology leaves no room for 'Diamat' (dialectical materialism) or any other rigid causal theory of the supremacy of nature. Vygotsky seems to have realized where his potential conflict with 'Marxism'lay:

> (The objectivistic school of psychology) is made up of many different schools: the American behaviorism, reflexology, Gestalt psychology, and Marxist psychology, are all examples of it.
>
> (Vygotsky as cited in Vos, 1976, p. 200)

Vygotsky quotes Marx against objectivism: 'Marx commented on the phenotype approach . . . when he stated that 'if the essence of objects coincided with the form of their outer manifestations, then every science would be superfluous' '(Vygotsky, 1978, p. 63). Incidentally, this quote is to be found in a passage inspired by Kurt Lewin's criticism of naive materialism. Vygotsky's debt to Marx is, so to speak, methodological: the inspiration to do dialectical, historical research that is directly empirical and also original. In his unpublished notes, it is claimed, Vygotsky rejected social science by quotation, where assertions must be buttressed by quotes from the oeuvre of Marx-Engels-Lenin (Introduction, Vygotsky, 1976, p. 8). It is clear just how Hegelian Vygotsky's Marx was:

> That concept (mediation) quite justly was invested with the broadest general meaning by Hegel, who saw in it a characteristic feature of human reason: 'Reason', he wrote, 'is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunnings consists principally in her mediating activity . . .' Marx cites the definition when speaking of working with tools to show that man 'uses the mechanical, physical, and

> chemical properties of objects so as to make them act as forces that affect other objects in order to fulfill his personal goals'.
>
> (Vygotsky in Vos, 1976, p. 54)

The proposition that freedom is to be achieved through consciousness's, historically achieved, transparency with nature, has been rejected by communist Marxism. The man-world relationship has for Vygotsky the potential, in the sign-tool relationship, to achieve unity. Consciousness and the economy only oppose each other in capitalist relationships: man is able to make his own history in socialism. Awareness and the material are reunited in the dialectical interaction that frees consciousness historically and makes man the master of his own history. In the mainstream communist tradition, however, this possibility is dismissed as an idealistic illusion and the emphais is placed on nature as the cause of human development. Consequently, in the communist literature, materialism is interpreted to exclude a concept of change through the self-transcendence of consciousness, which is Hegelian and it is claimed anti-Marxist. The achievement of the higher psychic functions should not gain the emphasis it has in Vygotsky according to the communist logic where a far more naturalistic interpretation is given to materialism. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Vygotsky's work was banned throughout the Stalinist period; and that the philosophical side of his thought now receives less attention than the practical.

Secondly, Vygotsky locates three cardinal points in the potential development of the person where a transformation in consciousness results in transcendence of a previous level of experience, whereby direct perception (lower psychic functions) and thought processes (higher psychic funtions) alter both individually and in their relationship to one another. These three junctures of change are: (1) when at approximately the second year the child achieves a dialectic between speech and thought—the discovery that objects are to be named; (2) when the child learns to write/read as well as speak, whereby time and place are transcended and existence gains choice and decision far beyond the level of immediacy that speech alone permits; and (3) self-consciousness, where knowledge that one knows is achieved. The child learns in primary and secondary school to give complex reactions where he/she appears to order, understand, and structure circumstance by imitating the adults about him, without really knowing what he/she is doing: this is the phase of the pseudo-concept. The development from immediacy to control of one's concepts is gradual, and dependent on others. If not stimulated, and even pushed by adults, it may not happen at all:

> If the environment presents no such tasks (problems that demand the formation of concepts) to the adolescent, makes no new demands on him, and does not stimulate his intellect by providing a sequence of new goals, his thinking fails to reach the highest stages, or reaches them with great delay.
>
> (Vygotsky, 1962, pp. 58-59)

In tertiary education the fundamental use of the sign, or the word, has to be developed, but this progress does not happen of itself. College contributes a generalizing form of perception: it presents the world conceptualized, put into signs. The translation of reality into signs is based upon a 'code', which is the theory used to order the conceptualization. That theory is called 'science' bij Vygotsky. It is a presentation of reality ordered by means of systematic, often hierarchical, interrelationships. The student's spontaneous concepts do not develop his thought because they are 'in-the-world', lost in objects seen, manipulated, felt. One does not learn concepts from direct experience.

The 'science' the student learns is, from the beginning, mediated. It is reality presented in a system of concepts, the world seen through theory. Through it, the person is confronted with a self-consciously ordered thought process that challenges him to understand circumstances conceptually. This is the task of teaching:

> Instruction is one of the principal sources of . . . concepts and is also a powerful force in directing their evolution; it determines the fate of the total mental development.
>
> (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 85)

The practical use of concepts is much less difficult to master than the conceptual knowledge of their use. At an early age one can learn the complex manipulation of objects, but only much later can one understand and explain what one does. Pseudo-concepts serve well enough even where complicated mechanical skills are being mastered, but to understand the principles upon which things operate is a very difficult problem. The overcoming of primitive thinking by conceptual thought is never entirely stable. The mature adult often reverts to pseudo-concepts in his daily life. He repeats verbal formulas of which he has no deep understanding. He names objects, groups things or persons, without knowing why he does so. One does not abandon clichés, thoughtless prejudices, or lazy thinking, of oneself. The demand of conscious responsibility has to be made of one. Only if we have become aware of the intellectual and social grammar of our thinking are we self-conscious or our concepts. Higher education activates the adolescent to define his concepts; to know and be able to discuss how he thinks. Only when this level is achieved is the student able to understand how other people think and to react rationally to differences in concepts.

Thirdly, the interaction between history and consciousness is far too radical to limit Vygotsky's pedagogics to school learning—he has described the basis for a permanent learning that continues through a lifetime. We must realize that only if 'concept consciousness' is historically maintained will it remain a possibility. Our concepts generate what we can experience; they are not something foreign to us. We fundamentally *become* the consciousness we have internalized: our freedom is bound to our grip on the mediation of thought. The ability to know one's own concepts is culturally-historically rooted, but has to be individually sought and grasped. Self-consciousness is a cultural-historical possibility realized in fundamental interdependence. In freedom, experience and science are drawn together—speech and thought achieve maximum interaction—the man-world dialectic is generative. Learning is essential to the existence of the culture and to the occurrence of its history. History creates what there is to be learned, and one becomes who one is by being formed by history. Between the person and the tradition there is a dialectical relationship each exists thanks to the other. The culture survives only insofar as it is experienced—which means, for Vygotsky, put into practice, brought into activity. I. B. H. Abram in his book *The Jewish Tradition as Permanent Learning* (1980) describes learning which continues through a lifetime and how a culture exists thanks to its bearers. While the social activity of labor is less emphasized than in Vygotsky, some of the structures of permanent *adult* learning are worked out in better detail. Because college learning is adult learning, Abram's characterization of the dialectic between the adult person and his culture seems the logical goal for an undergraduate education inspired by the cultural-historical approach. According to Abram, what is to be learned, 'Torah', is synonymous with thinking and experiencing what has been. It is not enough that history be memorized;

such a history dies. For a tradition to survive it has to be actively interpreted, lived, practiced. But the person changes by living 'Torah'. Knowing is not empty repetition of verbal formulas; it is action undertaken in interaction with what is studied. 'Torah' exists to the learner through his lived interpretation of it, through the praxis he develops, which is created in dialogue with what he studies. It is this process of question-and-answer between text and circumstance that merges the two into a living tradition. Knowledge itself does not necessarily move the person toward just or good actions. Modern history is rich in the misuse of the intellect; it is 'Torah', the learning wherein the person and tradition interact, that guarantees the quality of action. Praxis: undertaking, intertwined with study integrates men with history (Abram, 1980, pp. 160-64).

Civilization is dependent upon learning, learning is a prerequisite to existence, and man as such is defined as the product of history. His being, experiencing, and identity is his living of tradition. Learning does not occur of itself; an act of will and perseverence is necessary. Through learning, the tradition can live by the acts it generates. And the person can define himself by making use of the tradition: it is the philosopher's stone that makes thought, evaluation, and judgment possible. As Abram points out, 'According to the tradition the world is only maintained by the learner . . . by 'world' there is meant here not only the subjective lived-world of the learning, but also the real world (or if one wishes: the objective reality)' (Abram, 1980, p. 113). To understand history ('Torah') is to comprehend the world and man's place in the world. Man maintains the world not by knowing particular facts but by his choice that the tradition (which man is) be furthered. It is more important to study (process) than to know (product). It is the activity, the merging of oneself with history and the carrying forward of that history by making it a part of one's actions, that guarantees that the tradition prevails. Because the process of study requires living interpretation, one does not only study. Man in society places what he studies in what he does; if man does not work, he cannot bring tradition to life in deeds. Therefore, the preeminance of the process of learning determines the essential need that man work and study (Abram, 1980, p. 177).

iv. Summing up, I surmise that . . .

The Historical-Cultural concept is embraced as theory to be used. Practicing teachers often dismiss theory as irrelevant to their daily work; what has seemed convincing on paper has proven to be ineffective or even counter-productive. I am not concinced that either Behaviorism or Humanistic-Psychology create research directly enough rooted in the practice of teaching to not make such mistakes. The similarity is not, I believe, coincidental: the two movements share a considerable number of common assumptions. Both are anti-teaching, and share the same criticism of traditional education. Students are 'taught' to perceive themselves as unable to do academic work—the expectation of failure, results from poor school achievement. Teachers control more than they inspire; are more passive agents of an instructional system than supporting informants. Inherent to the criticism is the claim that the teacher has not reinforced (Skinner) or stimulated the student's positive self-image (humanistic educationlists) enough. Rogers and Skinner come up with pretty much the same policy proposal: banish teachers from the realm of content and put them to work as motivational auxiliaries. The difference is that Rogers bases his claim on philosophical naturalism, and Skinner on an ideology of social engineering buttressed by an epistemology of

stimulus-response. Rogers' objection to Skinner, that programmed education will become mere memorizing and 'a substitute for thinking in larger patterns and gestalts . . . a way of stressing factual knowlegde as over against creativity', is a fault in the practice, but not in the theory (Rogers, 1969, p. 141). The problem is that the programs have never met Skinner's demands; the error is not in his intentions. Skinner and Rogers authored their basic theories (operant conditioning and client centered therapy) in the late forties, seemingly sharing many basic attitudes. Both display an obvious confidence in their own ability to organize learning. In addition, they assume that man's capacity to learn is unlimted. They seem oblivious to history and the role that the refusal to know, the choice for nihilistic violence, had been playing in it. I have already noted Chomsky's criticism of Skinner's politics—Rogers rejection of mistrust in the human organism despite the incidence of mass repression is equally questionable. These social scientists seem, to me, to share in a dangerous over-estimation in the power of their own ideas, and an accompanying under-estimation of the problems for practitioners in innovation. Learning is not merely an intellectual issue—it is also an historical/cultural one. The politics of education (the concrete societal dimension) is neglected by both Rogers and Skinner.

The Cultural-Historical theory gave me the assurance I sought when it defined consciousness as a form of *co-knowledge*. Acts and reflection are understood to be two moments to one process. Work generates thought, which becomes in turn a semiotic system capable of influencing future action. Such a theory explains how this study has been carried out. I have assumed a radical unity of teaching (1) as experience and (2) as research object. I have traced the mediation of the teaching process, and the emergence of conceptual clarity. Furthermore, I have attempted a genetic analysis of teaching as activity. In the next section I describe co-knowledge in practice—as research.

3
Levels of Analysis and of Generic Idiograms

Die Situation der Erkenntnis ist aber in aller Regel mit Prozessen erkenntnismassiger Distanzierung verbunden, damit sich überhaupt ein Objekt konstituiert, das erkannt werden kann. . . . Die Praxis lehrte uns auch dass der konsequente Forscher sur selben Zeit Subjekt und Objekt seiner eigenen Forschungstätigkeit sein und direkt die Auswirkungen seiner Arbeit erfahren kann. Aber er muss die eine oder die andere Rolle während der Forschungsprozesse betonen, in einer zeitlichen und räumlichen Aufeinanderfolge, die ein abwechseindes Annähern und Distanzieren von (das Unterricht) einen Wechsel zwischen Aktion und Reflexion einschliesst.

(Moser, 1979, p. 28)

The situation of knowing is nevertheless linked in every way with a process of insightful detatchment that is knowable, susch as the one whereby objects are in the first place constituted. Practice has taught us that the conscientious researcher can, at the same moment, be the subject and object of his own research activity, and can directly experience the effect of his work. But he must emphaisze the one or the other role during the research process in a successive, sequential and spatial variation of rapprochement and detatchment from (teaching), that includes the interaction between act and reflect.

The Genetic Text contains an educational case study where the scope of research is limited to the 'context of discovery'. I shall discuss three dimensions to the Heuristic Rules used; that of:

(1) a *denotive variant of the interpretative paradigm,* and of
(2) a *Descriptive/Interpretative approach,* and also of
(3) a *developmental succession to the phases.*

The goal is to define in context, the subject/object relationship where in the movement between action and reflection leads to insightful detatchment.

a. A Denotive Variant of the Interpretative Paradigm

I wish to keep the meta-discussion about principles of social reseach short, and emphasize my program for doing inquiry. But the form or organization chosen for the investigation did, in part, result from the assumptions concerning 'social knowledge'. Thus, a short answer (i) to: *'What are the essential assumptions about the man-man relationship inherent to this research practice?'* Thereafter, (ii) *attention for the radical empiricism employed.* I have conducted teacher based research, a form of field work carried out by an individual researcher (with assistance of a co-operative monitoring group). While I am the sole lecturer studied I do try to promote critique and dialogue both in the original setting (the monitoring group, dubbed 'co-research') and by means of the book.

i. Assuming

Social science has to do with persons who investigate as well as with persons who are investigated. Is it possible to differentiate between the two groups—how, and why? This is the problem of consciousness confronted with consciousness, of man studying man. In immediacy, must not interaction take place? And what effect does this have on one's method?

In the social sciences one can emphasize 'the observation of the subject by the observer [that] is complemented by the counter-observation of the observer by the subject (Devereux, 1967, p. 275). Devereux abandons the idea that social science is 'objective observation' and embraces the interaction between factors where researcher and researched are 'both at once observers to themselves and subjects to the other' (Devereux, 1967, p. 275). He argues that the effort to enforce subject/object dualism by means of experimental design produces artificial situations in which one can study mutilated, drugged, deceived animals or persons, but where the relationship between these 'victims' and spontaneous, lived behavior is utterly muddled (Devereux, 1967, p. 290). The effort to get the 'mere man' out of research and to replace him with 'hard facts' amounts to upgrading the researcher's abstractions and downgrading the researched's self-awareness. The former has a monopoly on consciousness: he and he alone, according to Devereux, is then allowed to say 'and thus *I* perceive'. However, the world of Newtonian physics, it is asserted, is behind us: we cannot observe interaction as if we were standing on an absolutely secure point above events. Einstein's physics began by 'standing on' one of the two objects in an interaction and studying events as they affected the instruments/observer. Herein, the means of study (apparatus/concepts), 'when used in one way, are, for all practical purposes, part of the observer, while, when used in a different way, they are part of the object' (Devereux, 1967, p. 281). For the social scientist, theory/abstractions are crucial and ambiguous instruments, belonging intermittently to the researcher and to the researched. The social scientist has to realize the tremendous 'stimulus value' of his own interventions and to incorporate this given into his research model. Any probe, mental or physical, can go too far, the original subject (for instance, a rat) is then destroyed (too much probing leads to such biological disturbance that the animal dies). Likewise, a social phenomenon loses its feel and characteristic form, if an unlimited process of rationalization or inquiry is let loose on it. This is called the *Abtötungsprinzip* (the killing-off principle): the drive to determine the functions of life (society) in their entirety destroys the organic structure, and the life one purports to study is annihilated (Devereux, 1967, p. 283). A dialogistic approach guards the researcher against the triumph of his abstractions over the reality of the researched. The researcher and researched approach one another—investigation takes place in interaction. Subject-subject (subject-object) interaction is the solution to the threat of consciousness's negating of reality.

The radical identification of the subject and object in social research makes the self-study of interaction (what happens at-myself in event; the self is an instrument to occurrence) no less reliable than observation by the other. A conclusion which Devereux in his own 'Ethnopsychiatry' champions (Devereux, 1980). The prejudice against immediacy and assumption that there must be an essential truth behind reality's appearance, motivates much social science. If 'truth' is overall and everywhere the same, then the concrete and actual come off second best. If 'truth' lies behind the 'surfaces', then the variety and diversity of appearances can be reduced to a few central givens.

The alternative acceptance of immediacy results from the epistemological rejection of subject/object dualism. The actor's point of view now has to be respected. Action research has championed this emphasis upon concrete issues experienced by practitioners. I feel an affinity, herein, to this movement:

> The social scientist and the teacher learn through and from one another, whereby the scientist tries in the process of action to make himself unnecessary.
>
> (Moser, 1979, p. 17)

And,

> a) 'Handlungsforschung' (Action Research) is from the outset in episteme and in inquiry related to the social or political praxis, and serves to solve social, practical, and pedagogic problems.
> b) 'Handlungsforschung' (Action Research) is directly connected to practical efforts to (serve to) answer problems; it enters immediately, as research into praxis, instead of first awaiting the completion of the research process. Therefore, it must be open to the reactive effect of the Praxis which it co-influences, on the inquiry and method of the research process; and not just be directed towards future research.
> c) 'Handlungsforschung' (Action Research) annuls, to a certain degree consciously and willingly, the divorce between researchers and practitioners through activity—in this case in the pedagogical field—by means of the direct co-operation in action and research of researchers and practitioners.
>
> (Klafki, 1973, p. 487)

Consciousness and reality can be freely permitted to interpenetrate in the interaction of the researcher/researched. In immediacy, 'we are simultaneously in complete interactive contact with ongoing experience. This is the only reality, the 'stream of experience' which is forever changing so that there can be no external 'truth' (William James in Bowen, 1979, p. 313). There is no dichotomy here between life and thought, self and other. The external world is a 'common good'—there is a free interaction and communication in which a real community of shared interests can manifest itself. A moment-by-moment verification (co-research) of the present situation replaces the idea of an external 'truth'. The idea of man having the capacity to think in common is fundamental and rich in consequences. The process of interchange in thought incessantly recommences and redefines the individual and society by doing so. The existence of an understood reality, shared and needed by large numbers of people, characterizes the industrial world where you have literally to 'know what you are doing': it is necessary for work and leisure. The complicated 'rules' and cognitive requirements for functioning in society are only possible because knowledge is not outside of normal reality; learning belongs in the concrete process of society and is not shut up in 'mind'. In immediacy, understanding is an everyday good or common practice—this is Dewey's insight into the political significance of problem solving. In concrete social occurrence there is no dichotomy between an external world and a cognizing mind. The mind-reality division partitions society into two unequal segments that parallel the political cleavage into dominated and dominators. When society is divided into 'those who know' and 'those who are acted upon', the model of the actor, which Bakan has called 'mystery-mastery', is prereflectively accepted (Bakan, 1967). Feelings, motives, goals are non-negotiable and hidden. Performance, control over others, and influence on the


situation is demanded. Feedback, as a source of experiential learning, is shunned. Self-sufficiency is proven in education by controlling the learning goals and enviroment: when applied to teaching, proof is wanted of the teacher's external grip on the students. What is to be learned, when and how, has to be in sole control of the teacher. Insofar as beginning teachers have difficulty in fulfilling these obligations, they report having problems. The rule that the teacher must be in command of his classroom, independently competent in his contact with colleagues and parents is anti-educational if we expect the school to be a place of shared learning where understanding and meaning are crucial to interaction. The effort at unilateral control—one should be 'prepared' to 'cope' unilaterally on the job—destroys the dialogue between the teacher and his situation:

> Both in research and in organizational practice the effort at unilateral control presumes that the initial actor (whether researcher or practitioner) knows what is significant from the outset and that this knowledge is to be put to the service of controlling the situation outside the actor, in order to implement the pre-defined design as efficiently as possible.
>
> (Torbert, in Reason, ed., 1981, p. 142)

In immediacy, the beginning teacher is explorative—experimental and still learning—the avowal of uncertainty and tentativeness is to be valued for showing openness to the new situation. But in the educational literature which presupposes unilateral control, uncertainty is a self-evident curse—it is the 'problem', the threat of inadequacy, the lacuna. I emphasize the basic educational reality, where the beginning teacher reacts to circumstance. In his everyday practice, which I try to describe from within, the interplay between self and situation sees the latter desperately trying to keep up with the former. My research can hold up a mirror to this quotidian activity, it can strive to help the teacher to strengthen his grasp on central assumptions, and to think throught his social expectations.

ii. Practice

My 'individual practical inquiry' centers on a teacher researching his own practice through a selected subject of investigation. My research limits itself to the 'context of teaching'—it is a record of personal practical knowledge. The investigation itself was an individual learning process. I chronicle a growing personal practical insight into teaching and the ensuing professional development. In writing the book I was confronted with the tension between the *level of experience* and the *level of reconstruction.* However radical the empiricism, the difference between event and text can never completely disappear, nor would the loss be desirable. Readers are provided with the information needed to know at each juncture in the book how the argument is progressing. This telescoping of insights does not resemble many lived events; in practice we are often lost in the particular and unable to come to grips (theoretically) with circumstance. If I am to earn my way from circumstance to concept I will have to *record and interpret la parole.* The process involves three stages: (1) the plane of *denotation (la parole* of teaching), (2) the plane of *connation* (second order interpretation), and (3) the plane of *metalanguage* (a return to practice—the parole created by mediation). I develop from circumstance to meta-circumstance to mediated circumstance. The following diagram will help to clarify these points:



In the research of N. Kedie (in Young, 1971) use is made of the distinction *educationalist context* and *teacher context* to differentiate between the theoretical, academic activity, and the practical, everyday one. He wished to describe the gap between academic pedagogics and the concepts-at-work of the practitioner. I retain the same comparison but strive to de-personalize the terms: there are certainly university lecturers whose thought is very close to teacher awareness, and teachers (outside scientific education) who react almost entirely theoretically. I do emphasize the rational empirical characteristic of the educational context—for this is certainly (in some form) the dominent scientific paradigm guiding current university research; and is the discipline (methodology) which most teachers have never mastered. I realize that the *context of teaching* indicates the context of discovery (as research attitude) and that the *context of education* is dominated by the context of justification. I chose my terms to indicate the actual context (situation, circumstance) of research and to de-emphasize the issue of methodology—I have not written a methodology, I am not claiming to 'defend a method'.

In this section I refer explicitly to the process of research *(la parole)*. In the following section I am interested in what the 'text' indicates. Later on the level of reconstruction I become involved in description/interpretation/optimalization. The first activity ('put into words') was the most difficult hurdle. Once there were descriptions I could begin on 'theory forming in the inductive phase' and rely on Glaser-

Strauss for guidance. The movement, from circumstance, to metacircumstance, to mediated circumstance; was guided by Lewin's insight: nothing is more practical than a good theory. Here again sufficient support. But how should the first descriptions be made—what are the heuristic rules for this activity? My answer is inspired by Lacan. I assert that individual practical knowing which takes the form of speech is combinable with research and reflection. The link is psycho-linguistic. Individual pronouncements are misunderstood when interpreted to be pure, personal subjective expression. No such thing exists, or can exist. Man is inherently cultural, formed by *'le grand l'autre'*[1]. To explain, an illustration drawn from clinical psychology. A client complains that she did not 'have any parents'. She does not remember ever having been kissed good-night, comforted, or played with by her parents. Those parents, let we call them John and Mary, may in fact have never displayed affection for their daughter; we assume that in an emotive sense John and Mary weren't parents at all. But the client obviously 'had' parents on another level. She reports the conscious sentiment of not having parents from a young age ($\pm$ 3 years). Thus, the basic category 'parents' was already established at that moment. The categories of consciousness are not purely individual. The specific message *la parole* is particular, but it is founded on *la langue* which is researched on the plan of denotation, used as metalanguage, and is cultural historical. Psychology of the depths seeks its insights in individual interiority; psychology of the heighths seeks out the general social structure to consciousness (Vygotsky, 1984). If we assume, as Lacan does, that the categories necessary for consciousness to exist are cultural-social, then dualism (individual versus social consciousness) is more appearance than logical necessity. My concept of social knowledge is not guaranteed by complex social-logical strictures such as those of 'Diskurs' and consensus, but by the comprehension of the social-cultural structure of thought. The fundamental categories of speech are not individual—the specific discourse remains essentially rooted in its social origins. The specious concern for 'subjectivity' is probably more ideological than real. These are the conclusions which I draw from the structuralist insight. I translated them into what I call, for convenience, Semiotic Field Work. An approach to interpretative social science which takes *la parole* and *la langue* into account.

Concretely, I investigate the unities or relations which weave an identity for a 'situated subject'. These are 'meanings'—'content filled social relations' (A. A. Leont'ev, 1975). I try to identify the 'situated subject'—this is a split subject divided between, the momentary and general, the creative and constraining, sentiment and logic, order and chaos, affection and hatred. *La parole* of the 'situated subject' was recorded. My log books and (longer) summaries provided the necessary material—myself and others as speaking subjects. A subject split between the forces, contradictions, ideologies, emotions of teaching. The speaking subject's text is woven together with strands of interaction, in this case, with students, curriculum, colleagues, norms and values. In 'Forms and Beginnings: Introduction the the Genetic Text' I include passages from the log books where I speak about myself. Here I cite another portion to *la parole* of teaching: student commentary. My consciousness and their's was circumstantial: our meanings (as involved in teaching) mirrored one another. The self and other are constituted in the interaction. Teaching is situational—learning is participatory. Neither self-reflection, nor what others said (did) is primary; both elements contribute to 'meaning'. *La parole* is said and heard, it exists just in that relationship. The spoken event, obviously, looses some of its original quality when it is written down

(not to mentioned translated—as was necessary here)[2]. Nonetheless, this is a record of what was talked about and a clear indicator of opinions. It is *la parole* of teaching which I follow, not the unconscious *parole* of depth psychology. Thus, this is 'semiotic field work'—the study of a circumstantial-text. Our 'meanings' were in language. In *la parole* of teaching, expression and content are denoted. This is not a record of classroom discussion or a transcript of my lecturers/seminars. It is a selection from the on-going discussion on teaching. The daily experience of teaching was incessantly talked about. A flood of words resulted from the questions: 'Who am I?' 'Who are they (the teachers)?' and 'What are our study groups?' Examples of this text (presented in a topical sequence) follow:*

Student A evaluates the literature choice for the course 'Social Science and the Everyday' which I gave Sept. Dec. 1975

When the students protested that the literature wasn't in Dutch (Henri Lefebvre's 'Everyday Life in the Modern World'. New York: Harper, 1981) we got together (Student A + B) and made a summary. The others (in the group) didn't want to know what was in the text. They didn't even read the Dutch summary! It was a power struggle—who determines what is studied here. There was a general refusal to study a difficult text—for one thing we didn't want to be dependent on a lecturer. We'd do without explanations. We'd be in control. The summary disappeared in the dust bin—the whole program was rejected. No one read the summary. If they had, we would have studied the text—after having read the summary the necessary preparation would have been done, and then it would have been the path of least exertion to cover Lefebvre.

feb., 1976

Student C on the same incident.

The agreed upon literature was never studied. Students (A + B) even made a summary. There was a lack of ability to read abstract texts. The course was a stumbling block—you could fail! All course literature had to come from newspapers or weeklies; no chance of failure was acceptable. If we didn't learn anything at all it wasn't so important, just as long as our fear of failure wasn't confronted. We were afraid—had no patience, the *whole* group cost what cost had to be protected. Any challenge threatened that—several of the freshmen couldn't study at all!

june, 1976

Student D on the student discourse.

Most of the group became very aggressive. They adopted the college's jargon. In two months they knew how the society works—their attitude was 'SO IS IT'. Lecturer X said—'If you want to help the repressed then you have to understand alienation/repression, and by understanding, surface above it'. That intellectual demand of understanding was unpopular—Lecturer Y simply says I KNOW MY MARX—THIS IS THE TRUTH & WHAT YOU MUST DO. That's what the freshmen wanted to hear, and be able to repeat.

march, 1977

* I have put all the statements in the past tense to achieve consistency of style.

Student E on the rules. (not a co-researcher)
It is evil and incorrect to undertake any lecturing outside the agreed upon curriculum. Democracy in the department demands that all course material is known to everyone. We have the obligation to control the total curriculum.

april, 1977

Student F on two discourses.
There was a conflict between two interpretations. One's own observing versus the all-explaining-model. Lecturer W had a model that was a bit more open than the rest. He wanted us first to help people, the political awareness had to come thereafter. Lecturer V was clever-he ironed out all the conflicts in the group. Where he led us to I still don't know. There were no conflicts possible after he was finished we were all 'left' and could go back to doing exactly what we had been doing!

oct., 1977

Student B on lecturer X.
In sociology X asked us to choose our own theme. The students grouped themselves either around the Communist Party's version of Marx, or the Marx of the Paris Manuscripts. The conflict between rigid dogmatic thought, and the discussion of 'alienation'. The first stones were thrown. It wasn't an intellectual issue—it was the confrontation of absolute good with absolute evil. No one really wanted to *study* how to understand Marx. Everyone was too upset—too 'engaged' in defending their 'group'. We couldn't learn together—and that was after only six monthes at school! The 'old Marx/young Marx' debate as brother twist. One had to automatically accept a 'truth' (and reject another story)—to be unsure about things, to need to think about them—forget it, that was social suicide. And X had no idea what was wrong—he saw us feuding instead of discussing, we were angry and totally unprepared—he became chagrined and bewildered.

sept., 1978

Student F on his freshman year.
'G' had experienced a lot—she'd known rotteness, psychological problems, personal hell, etc. etc. Something terrible has to have happened to you—then you have the right to speak. You do not have to learn, study; that doesn't really help. You have to *be* the underdog—then your words are truth. 'H' had his real father who was the capitalist right out of Grosz's drawings, and his step-father who was a worker—his word counted too. If you'd been divorced—and forced afterwards to make sex with your ex-husband—then you could tell that; best on radio or t.v. . . . Then you were a hero. There are only the repressed and the repressors—and it has to become clear (you have to prove) on which side your life stood. In the future you will 'help' people *by showing them* that they are the repressed just as you have learned to understand yourself in college. Why people are repressed is never discussed further than to say there are repressed and repressors, and you have to realize where you stand. Lecturer X tried to tell us that the society made people sick—but that might mean that we were also influenced. None of the martyrs wanted to take that seriously—it might threaten their new won power. So X stopped to talk about that theme.

june, 1977

Student A on the conflict in his first year.
It was a war between free thought and *the model.* Think about complexity—that was threatening. The group seemed unintersted in anything outside a simple explanatory model. Later we discovered that several of us really didn't agree, but we were afraid to say anything. They were a group and we were individuals. And the staff kept emphasizing that we had to be a group—that group education is the crux of a leftist college. Most of the students had an attitude: 'If I cannot make direct practical use of it, I don't want to know it'. 'If I can't use it, its worthless'. I had no professional experience—I knew damn little about 'using' the ideas. They wanted a clear monologue about how society worked—the idea of society you needed to be able to tell to clients. I couldn't imagine myself lecturing some worker on class conflict.

aug., 1976

Student I on her first year.
I came to learn—imagine my disappointment when I discovered that in a leftist college I was constantly the victim of sexist commentary. There were only two women in our group, and the men had a field day. The students in my class (the 'group') demanded that we only study what was practical—what you could use. I'd worked five years and returned to study to escape narrow minded practicality! Did the study have to be that way? I fired off questions such as: 'What is *use*? How do you *value* ideas? What is the role of theoretical knowledge to applied knowledge? The questions asked for trouble! The standard answer was: 'Your questions aren't constructive—they're not useful!'. The only other woman in the group claimed that my questions were superficial—not to the point or sufficiently concrete. Because we were the only two women I was required, she claimed, to be her friend. Solidarity made that necessary! I was so overwhelmed I thought I had to disobey my feelings and be her friend.

nov., 1978

Students A, E, J, and K on lecturer Y.
Y's point of view is, in short, that:
Discussion isn't solidarity with the college. The tutorial system is personalist froth. Liberal Arts Education is bourgeoise poison. In so far as tutorials should be permitted they have to be planned in the curriculum, with clear indication of their political significance. Tutorials in the 'informal sphere' are absurd. Students aren't here for us to get to know them—they're here to learn. The whole major should be made up of required courses. Tutorials outside the agreed upon curriculum could propagate unwanted ideas. You have to know the correct definitions—clear exact one sentence answers—that's exactitude. I principly refuse to cover literature which is politically suspect. If students insist, they have to prepare it and introduce it themselves. They're damn stupid anyhow—anything they can pick up is hard needed. We don't need an extra balast of bourgeoise learning. They can't even get Marx right! I know Marx with the precision of algebra—I KNOW IT. I'VE MASTERED THE MATERIAL. I KNOW THE CONTENT, AND YOU STUDENTS DON'T. You may formulate your criticisms—but I'm not here to be corrected by you—your level makes that impossible. Stupid students have to be introduced to basic facts.

Their (A, E, J, K) commentary:
Most students aren't insulted by Y. They are ambitious to enter the circle of the knowers. Y has answer to everything. The Marxism of the economist and philosopher get corrected. If we mention ideas from other courses we get to hear how it really is. The answers are: IT IS SO or IT ISN'T SO. All knowledge is clear cut—reality is rational—you just have to learn the principles. For students no further discussion is needed— we've heard how it is. And who dares, as a sophomore, te deny it all—none of us!

dec., 1979

Student J on study.
The students didn't read the required literature. It wasn't necessary. Only you (H.K.L.) planned your lessons so we had to read. Articles were only normally read by one person who had the task of introducing them. He/she told the group what was in the article. If we had to read a book, we began by complaining how expensive it was and how exploited we were if we had to buy so many books. If that didn't work (it often did) we took so long to buy it that the teacher was good and frustrated. There was required literature for every course—but most of the time it was never used. Nothing was really demanded/expected.

oct., 1979

Student A on study.
The first year the college as institution took up all the time. There was no time to study. We had to make 'minutes' of every lesson—just as if it were a meeting. There was no reason to make your own notes—the minutes would come later. Some teachers even, in addition, required a student chairman!
The adminstration of the college cost more time than did the study. There were so many meetings and committees: a delegation was expected to every organ. It was our college—without us it was un-administrable. We were necessary. After a year you see what a farce that is— we had nothing to say. But at first it took all my energy to learn the alphabet soup of committee names. The democracy was necessary— it took a while to wonder what for. Without the students the college would be rudderless (which is just what it was).

oct., 1977

Student C on study.
There were three groups of students. (1) One was fantastically active. They were at every meeting—did everything. (2) Another was totally uninvolved—you never saw them unless it was required. And (3) a third was in between, didn't protest but only tolerated the system. Group one dominated. Two was small. Three became opponents to the college often in their third year (in-service work strengthened them in their critique). The active group had a lot of power in the first two years. They decided who failed, who had to do extra take-home assignments. There was always one or two black sheep who had to be 'punished' for the general apathy and low standards.

april, 1979

Student F on study.
The hardliners—they were active. You had to be able to be absolute. This was necessary. The rest of us had the attitude: 'Whom am I to say your work is inadequate'. The hardliners had their 'ten concpets' which they let loose on everything—that was their 'Truth'. They learned it in the first year: the rest was repetition, and strengthening oneself in the belief. The hardliner wasn't theoretical—he knew almost no theory. These attitudes didn't really originate in the staff—it all began in the dorms. The older students made it clear what was expected of us—what we had to 'know' and 'agree with'. You caught on fast—this is the required story: otherwise you don't belong. It was a demand for ideological work, for a political life, for certainly in the leftist cause. But in daily practice, student life never suffered under the requirements. It was more lip service than hard work, a pose more than intense involvement. The simplification was the student version of the truth. It was what the older students had 'learned'. The staff seemed it expect it of us. They never attacked our rationalizations or hypocrisy. They tolerated our pat answers. A few students had read some leftist literature before they started to study—they controlled the group. The hardline was the minimum truth—if you repeated it you passed! For the rest I daydreamed. The constantly repeated discussions—the Maoist versus the pascifist etc. etc.—was quickly old hat. They debated, I slept. Clear-cut cause and effect—that was the hardline—everything else was *sub rosa!*

june, 1979

Student K on student groups.
Every time anything had to be decided you had to have a program (general social-economic principles that justify your position). If you proposed a curriculum idea you had to tell how it fit into 'your program'. If you had to go to a meeting you had to place your ideas in a 'program'. Sooner or later you either had a program or you shut up. Dogmatic thinking produced fast programatic answers. Anything else forced you to be still.

oct., 1979

Student L on student groups.
By being in a group you had influence. The group made the programs, and had power over the curriculum decisions. Your influence on the study program was determined by your position in the group(s). No lecturer was willing to attack the system—to block the oversimplifications or dogmatic nonsense. You (H.K.L.) were outside the system—no insider ever took a course of yours after the first year. Some lecturers wanted to soften the conflicts—they were tolerated. But you wanted to blow up the never ending dirge of political stand points, and begin real discussion. You were negated. You simply did not exist. The leftist programs never produced anything. The groups fought constantly over the truth, they didn't study. No one read the literature which left room for the same discussions to repeat themselves over and over. The lecturers were apathetic. No one was really interested in the study results. Disinterest took over. The required course was drudgey.

nov., 1979

Student B on me (H.K.L.).
Most of the students don't want to be confronted with you. They don't want to talk about you. You covered the literature they wanted—and made it clear that their heroes couldn't think straight. They couldn't place you. You were willing to discuss what they wanted. You rigorously analyzed their text. It was politically a 'good' book and now there was nothing left of it.

april, 1976

Student M on me (H.K.L.).
In the first year (1975-76) you wanted to stick to the rules. You kept in the margins on the college system. Later you were out to create your own work situation. At the end you were angry (1979). The first tutorials were patterned after U's Sartre group and T's student supervisions. But later the tutorials seemed nearly illegal—part of an underground university! After it became clear that the Freud/Nietzche synthesis wasn't, for you, negotiable, the staff defined all contact with you as opposition and taboo. A good student oughtn't to take any course you gave. You were stigmatized! You threatened the solidarity of the department. That provoked aggression. When the hardliners tried to abolish your tutorial we (a group of seniors) walked out. We defied the system—we refused to vote or to acknowledge the right of the others to decide for us. The system cracked. We said: 'We're going on with our work. It's your problem. We disobey. Our study load is heavier than your's—so don't try and talk about standards'. The hardliners did nothing—the staff said nothing.


dec., 1979

Student N on the same event.
The hardliners said we had no right to exist. Their attitude was: 'You ought to be forbidden. The department needs protection from such things'. They assumed that they were the college—there couldn't be two truths, only one. Their cry: 'Stop the heresy!'. Your seminar in semiotics was, in fact just that!

feb., 1980

b. Descriptive/Interpretative

My situational research demanded ever changing strategies and practical guidelines. Being limited to the 'context of discovery' accuracy is best served by calling the investigative procedures heuristic rules. Hereby I understand the predominant means of collecting data as well as the central criteria for abstracting the evidence collected. As researcher I am responsible for the 'how' of the process of investigation as well as the 'why' of my commentary. The former centers on my descriptive task and the latter on an interpretative one. Each chapter contains a description of a key idea to teaching, followed by my interpretation of what is of value therein for learning. The sandwich structure of a chapter can be visualized as follows:



The third component ('optimalization') has to do with the conclusions drawn, chapter by chapter, and their value for the line of development. In this section I will deal with the descriptive and interpretative levels of research, and in the following section (c) with the vector of the investigation.

I describe crises in norms and values. Actual class room dialogue is not reported. My study is not so much about what *happens* in the classroom as about the *theory* of teaching which being in the classroom generates. It is a study of event in consciousness. Every teacher has a theory: his/her assumptions about learning, pedagogic interaction, and the significance of meaning, discussion, school. I, just as an Action Researcher, investigate together with the teacher what his/her theory is and, how it can be improved. The teacher is often neither aware of his own theory, nor practiced in criticizing it, on either a conceptual or practical level. Initially I describe *sense:* meaning for the beginning lecturer. As the subject and object of research, I practice Radical Empiricism; I pursue *la parole,* the immediate recognizable speech of the actual circumstance. In *la parole* one finds the individual, situational, or practical act. Immediacy demands that concrete events and circumstances not be omitted. I evolved as a teacher at a particular school, experiencing that situation in its specificity. The development of self-consciousness that I researched took place in relation to actual concrete school situations. The dialectic between lecturer and circumstance is charted in all its concreteness. I do not study a self-consciousness of philosophical idealism, but *assume the identity of the person and his perceptual field.* The person is what he sees: the crux of the self are the heuristic rules it follows in the man-world and man-man relationships. As a researcher, I am not exempt from these rules—what I see is rooted in the semiotic system I have internalized. There is no escape from the hermeneutic circle, which only makes it all the more important to clarify one's heuristic procedures. Pedagogics as a Normative (Action) Practical Science demands the self-conscious integration of social science inquiry with an understanding of the nature of man and his social world. In the field of the 'ethical structures to teaching' I would be hard put to designate exact problems or methods of social research. I expereinced the social ethical problems of college teaching in their immediacy without the support of an active academic discipline. The problems

of moral and human fulfillment in the concrete educational milieu confronted me on an every-day immediate level. I had to adopt a practical perspective. My version of events is embedded in the events themselves. My historical account of teaching afforded circumstantial categories (not a theory dealing with social institutions and arrangements). These categories try to formulate normative standards of intersubjectivity, social knowledge, and conceptual justice, and to realize them in social life. A fullfledged theory of human activity would lead us to concrete normative judgements relative to pedagogics. The interaction of pedagogic norms to educational reality is portrayed here in full particularity. If we think of teaching as including 'our relation to what concerns us ultimately', or as 'containing the expression of the meaning of our life as a whole', then it expresses the 'world-view' and the values of the practitioner (and most likely that of his social group). Such cultural phenomena can also be called 'ideology'. Rather than get tangled in Marx's, Lenin's, Freud's, Durkheim's, Mannheim's, Lévi-Strauss', etc. etc. concept of 'ideology' I will avoid the term. But, when I see teaching as the production of meaning—an often hidden discourse, on the inner organization of social existence—I am understanding it in the context of a structuralist concept of 'ideology'. My first task has been the reconstruction of the course of events—the account of the beginning lecturer's developing consciousness. But social norms are not understood here as genetic products of a subject, but rather as intersubjective, cultural-historical underlying structures. I do not want the description to 'run away with the goods' and to imprint a subjectivistic prejudice on the research. Because I presuppose a cultural logos I am constantly threatened by the biographical 'facts'. Teaching, in my view, is more about meaning than about individual psychological growth. Thus, the emphasis is more upon 'interpretation' than on 'description'. My techniques of description are really quite simple. I am merely setting the scene for the shared cultural level of discourse. 'Particular humanism' (specifics without generalization; a project exclusively about one case and the human, all-too-human, experiential world) gives quickly way to 'conceptual humanism' (dialectical, social, normative research; the inquiry may be multicausal, speculative, holistic but the goals are cultural-historical) (Mitroff, 1978).

> 'Is story telling science?' For the Conceptual Humanist the answer is 'yes'. This does not mean that any story qualifies as science but that science consists of taking stories seriously. Stories can be used in a variety of ways: as amusement or as devices with which to peer into human desires, wishes, hopes, and fears. In this sense, stories form an essential ingredient to the Conceptual Humanist's method because they provide the 'hardest' body of evidence and the best method of problem definition. The best stories are those which stir people's minds, hearts, and souls and by doing so give them new insights into themselves, their problems, and their human condition. The challenge is to develop a human science that more fully serves this aim. The question is not, 'Is storytelling science?' but 'Can science learn to tell good stories?'.
>
> (Mitroff, 1978, pp. 92-93)

Conceptual humanism makes use of the results of specific humanism; the former is clearly a level more abstract than the latter. The chapters of the Genetic Text begin with a personal, experiential response to a social or cognitive circumstance and develop through interpretation towards more structural insight. In the literary first chapter of the Genetic Text, I describe the undergraduate college where I had begun to

work. That portrait of the school is personal, value-constituted, partisan, bound to the 'logic' of the particular event; it is particular humanism. The second half of the chapter repeats the same material on a theoretical, reflective level it is conceptual humanism. As the book progresses the time spent on particular humanism diminishes. The book is neither about me as a teacher, nor the (sort of) college where I taught: it is about how meaning is produced in teaching, the beginning teacher appears as part of the process of production of meaning. Ultimately I want to know, what is prior to my practice and thinking: at issue is not so much what I have 'lived through' as the discovery of the structure of a pre-established order to teaching. My task may by illustrated by a statement attributed to Whitehead: 'Dewey is concerned with what men do', he said, 'while I am concerned with what men assume' (Stinnette, 1967, p. 10). Nonetheless, interpretations must be judged in relation to action: interpersonal functioning, not mere verbal abstractions, remain the essential point of departure. Analysis must be formulated in proximity to practice. The descriptions are 'a seeing what's there', and prerequisite to the critical discourse. Given my goals and research setting qualitative methods were used in a nonrestrictive manner. The term 'qualitative' emerged in contradistinction to the quantitative use of data and the emphasis on the statistically demonstratable relationship between operationally defined variables. Qualitative research tries in some way to understand behavior from the actor's point of view, instead of trusting deductive-analytic hypotheses and quantitative testing. It makes use of two broad categories of research material: the personal document and the observer participatory investigation (with inclusion of the open interview). *Under the first fell my logbook summaries, the use of grounded theory to code them, and 'myself as an instrument'. Under the second, the use of co-researchers, the coding of interviews as well as meetings, and the inclusion of an ethnomethodological 'experiment'.*

I kept a logbook of my activities (noting whom I saw, the conversations that took place, what occurred). Furthermore, I made very extensive notations (the 'summaries') every six weeks of my work experiences, changes in attitude (if any), and perception of the general as well as specific situations. At this interval I retreated from the work situation for at least a week at a time, and wrote up the new material. These long descriptions of myself as teacher, of the meso society of the college, and of my reflections on education were an important source for this book. In the preparation of the discriptions, especially those in the first three chapters of the genetic text, I made repeated use of grounded theory approach. Terms such as 'entenderment' and 'subrealism', which are central units of meaning for the research (see Chapter 1 of the genetic text), emerged in the coding of my logbook summaries. Likewise, the categories from the second chapter of the genetic text ('passivity-conformity', 'social dependence-other directed', 'neglect and anarchy called freedom') were all drawn from coded materials. I stress that the emphasis in the descriptions is on the teacher as the figure who perceives his world in certain manner. Thus, in the second chapter of the genetic text, I describe the student as seen by the teacher, but the theme of the chapter is *not* 'This is what the student is like', but rather 'These are structural (non-)possibilities of teaching'. The central question in the description is how can the teacher better understand (his) practice in order to be (more) effective.

Social science is man's study of himself—I have made literal use of this given in the preparation of the 'extensive notations'. The anxiety I experienced in taking up a lecturing post is a source of data. Of course, there is the concern about the unknown (new) that always generates fantasy, self-doubt, and tension. But I can be more

specific: the interaction between instructor and pupil is charged with emotive uneasiness. How will the self-boundary between myself and them develop? Will I lose myself in the students, they in me? Where in the contact will the partition come between what is mine and what is theirs? My concept of myself did not (initially) include the role of teacher—my self-esteem and identity were at stake. I knew I would be observed, more so than ever before. This process must influence both the observer and myself, the observed, but how? The complex field of responses creates anxiety: at first you cannot get a grip on it. The new extended self-boudaries are intensely experienced—they seem more threatening than freeing, the fear of an unresponsive reaction was more actual than the hope (possibility) of open conversation. I was doomed to self-scrutiny; how did it go, what next? The situation was anxiety arousing; the response was worked up, intense, emotional. How can the human scientist make use of such a subject-subject relationship?

> He allows [the other] to reach—and to reach into—him. He allows a disturbance to be created within himself and then he studies this disturbance ever more carefully than he studies the [others'] utterances. He understands the [other] psychoanalytically only insofar as he understands the disturbances the [other] sets up within him. He says: 'And this I perceive' only in respect to these reverberations 'at himself'. This finding is crucial. This disturbance occurs 'within' the observer and it is this disturbance which is then experienced as the real stimulus and treated as the relevant datum.
>
> (Devereux, 1967, p. 301)

Hatred, fear, idealization, solidarity, amazement were not so many sources of error, they were a crucial source of information. I wanted to know what teaching did to the teacher: which responses does it set off. Will the record of the inward experience demand new concepts of the event? What can I assume about the outward event given the reactions it brings forth? What must (this) teaching be if it effects the teacher in this manner? A stream of (associative) words revealed what the teacher heard, literally and figuratively. Counter-transference—emotions in oneself generated by the demands of characteristics of the circumstance—were important data. I wrote out the responses to teaching and sought links. Why these reactions, sentiments, convictions?

Assuming the axiom that we learn in order to transcend anxiety and to stave off disorientation, I presuppose that through the social sciences we gain advance 'knowledge about' a situation we are to be 'acquainted with' (William James in Devereux, 1967, p. 84). Knowledge of the structure of teaching is supposed to prepare one for the actual practical experience, I admit that I did not give the academic preparation a full chance. I only began to study education after I had already begun to teach. But I have found little in the literature that reduced my anxiety. Had I been able to anticipate crucial problems—the conflict-ridden staff relationships, the psychological insecurity of the students, the mechanomorphization of man in the curriculum—I could have understood the meso society with less wear and tear to myself. But the books about teaching I studied had nothing to say about these matters. They presented a world of curriculum suggestions, learning psychologies, and sociological factors that is worlds away from my first direct experience. Many of the issues in the books are important, but they did not prepare me to recognize and anticipate the problems of lecturing in a situation as the one I encountered. There is a terrible tension between the experience of teaching—most especially the counter-transference reac-

tions—and what can be effectively written down. The reconnoitring of the begining lecturer in interaction—the levels of social, intellectual, and personal response—brought me into entirely explorative regions. The 'extensieve notations' became a text saturated with impressions—lecturing was extremely stressful, its challenge terrifyingly demanding. My experience of that condition forms the *raison d'être* of this book. By writing I could master the anxiety of the situation; description and conceptualization of the experience served as a practical mirror to becoming a lecturer.

A complicating factor was that I was culturally deviant within the college where I taught. While I criticize the manifest structure of the college, I have always realized that I myself was a part of its latent structure. The freedom I claimed for myself—the demand for a historical, but personal and experiential, form of social thought—was a forbidden desire latent to the structure of the milieu. I observed in interaction with my subject matter. My work was the reverse side to the prevailing rationalism, this strengthened the subconscious, counter-transference, tensions. My response was to emphasize the dialectical logic to my situation—the educational antimonies formed a system to be studied.

Teaching occurs in interaction: the subject/world dialectic, more specifically the instructor/school dialectic, where school is understood as the staff, students, content of schooling triad, is a relevant point of departure. My goal was to take the antimonies of the teaching situation into account. This demanded a 'dialectical logic' by means of which the complex dynamics of the situation could be recorded. The tensions and contradictions, conflicts and paradoxes of teaching, formed often the motor to the investigation. Because I was writing about interaction I had to take special care in describing the 'world,' or outward pole, to the dialectic, but it was never my intention to write a 'scientific' study of the school or its students. A dialectical research design which is attent to the interaction between event and understanding, field and researcher, investigation and praxis, demands collective investigation. If knowledge is radically social, then the pursuit of it needs to mirror this epistemological given. There needed to be interaction in the observation. In teaching access to students is inevitable—my activity was to discuss, record, analyze, rediscuss, etc., with them. A co-operative monitoring group of students could examine the teaching—the actions, social roles, pet ideas. Hereby the research gained corrective feedback. But in co-operative research more occurs; one makes a direct contribution to formulating the propositions about the theme under study. One becomes the subject and the object of the enterprise. The traditional repetition of the subject-object duality in obeserver-observed is replaced by dialogically produced data. The students who worked with me on this project became 'co-researchers:'[3]

> We have to learn to think dialectically, to view reality as a process . . . reality is neither subject nor object, it is both wholly independent of me and wholly dependent on me. This means that any notion of validity must concern itself both with knower and with what is to be known: valid knowledge is a matter of *relationship*. And of course this validity may sometimes be enhanced if we can say we know, rather than simply I know: we can move towards an intersubjectively valid knowledge which is beyond the limitations of one knower.
>
> (Reason, in Reason, ed., 1981, pp. 239-40)

I had begun to work with co-researchers for two reasons. First, it matched my own social norms. The emphasis was upon mutual understanding and shared con-

cepts—not unilateral control. The goal of achieving genuine co-operative learning was a (limited) success. The students told me a lot about teaching that I did not know. But they *informed* me and I *trained* them. The difference lay in the qualitative use of concepts—after I realized what needed explaining, I could think a matter through much replaceable source of questions.

My second reason for working with co-researchers was that they were an active, critical *control* on *my* results. If my statements had value, they were adopted and used for further analysis, speculation, and discussion. If not, I noted quickly that my ideas were forgotten—they had not established a grip on reality. I call this phenomenon 'resonance.' The worth of the description proved itself by the value it had for others in naming a felt circumstance. Mere speculation that did not identify an important phenomenon was quickly forgotten.

I worked with as many as three or four groups of co-researchers at a time. In each group, there were four upper division students. These groups met to evaluate and discuss student work: performance in the in-service requirement and the progress of student research (end thesis). I discovered that if I introduced my own functioning as teacher and research interests as points for discussion, I could take part in these groups in a far more open manner than when I remained an aloof outsider. Furthermore, as my initially vague research plans became more concrete, I realized that I could not miss the feedback. The development of my thought had become radically rooted in the interaction.

A problem I had with co-research is that the participants outgrew the college. Eighty percent of them (highly exceptional) went on to do graduate work. By being involved in a research sphere of questioning and discussion, they took on a different attitude to study than what is normal at the school. My teaching, judged in terms of the student results, became very successful. This created the added problem of a growing hostility on the part of colleagues and the rest of the student body to the groups who chose to work with me. Because of the co-research set up, I spent much more time with students than was required of me. The groups became closely knit and aroused what I can only suppose to have been jealous aggressive feelings amongst nonmembers. I do not thematicize the success of co-research as a form of undergraduate curriculum in that my focus of attention is on the beginning lecturer's developing awareness into the structure of teaching. The insight—'be attentive of student learning'—came early on and was simple enough. It was not a mediating concept which demanded much research. I realize that the application of this objective is a complex matter, but this book investigates the growth in the teacher's conceptual self-insight, and not undergraduate curriculum development. When, in the second chapter to the genetic text, I describe the teacher becoming aware of his students, I restrict myself to the initial situation I had encountered, and leave the influenced one of co-research out of the picture. While that chapter is based upon my early notes, I did discuss it in the co-research groups later. The (simulated) 'interview' in that chapter was written very quickly, after I had been nervously circling my typewriter for a week. I had worked out the concepts by coding my logbooks and interviews, but could not imagine a form to communicate them that would permit a further check of their accuracy. My relationship to the research materials—as author of a study on my own work situation, I am by definition an observer-participant—makes it fairly impossible for me to adopt a position external to my data. I am not unique in my position: Goffman in Asylums and Julius Roth in *Timetables* both wrote about the places where they were employed (Gof-

fman, 1961; Roth, 1963). A still closer family resemblance is to Torbert's *Creating a Community of Inquiry;* he studies a school where he works (Torbert, 1976). While the participant-observer (as symbolic interactionalist) makes field notes and remains receptive to the informant's story, the ethnomethodologist uses more spectacular means: he disrupts the world of everyday life. My approach balances between the two conceptions—I was, as lecturer, more active than most observer-participants are willing to be, but did not lie or create special effects in order to study reactions to the unexpected.

An exception to this last rule was my test of the conclusions in the second chapter of the genetic text. I had amassed considerable data from student compositions (self-evaluations: 'What I have learned and why'), coded interviews (on motivation: 'Why I am (not) motivated to learn') and my logbooks (what are students interested in, who learns and why), that corroborated my picture of the students. It was important to know if I, as a beginning teacher, had observed the situation of teaching accurately. Was my perspective inclusive: did I accurately assess the possibilities and problems of my teaching audience. The solution I found to doubledeck the portrait of student attitudes (discovered in the specific college) was to reproject the results of the analysis back into the form of the original material: answers to questions about learning and interest in school. The 'constructed interview' resulted. The rhetorical device of a simulated interview, structured along the same lines as the coded research material, served to affirm the plausibility of the results. I let students read the text and discussed it with them. As I asked my questions, I increasingly showed doubt about the interview: 'Could this really have occurred?' 'Maybe it's a literary excercise by somebody?' etc. Without exception, the students protested that it must certainly be real and that my comments were farfetched. In fact, there was no need to revise the results later. The development in the research was not in creating ever better answers to the same questions, but in learning to pose ever more encompassing and complex questions.

Because my research goal is centered on the beginning lecturer, the value of the student co-research was to act as a check on the teacher's statements or findings. The students are the outsiders who experience the teaching situation, but not the circumstance of being a beginning lecturer. They were thus a better *control* than were colleagues. But when the research question became 'Who are the students?' a different test became necessary. Given the 'context of discovery' goals to the book and the limited role which the descriptions play in its construction, the methodological credence which the ethnomethodology achieves, is not crucial.

My role in working with student co-researchers (resembling an Action Researcher), hampered the collection of staff material. My research activity with students made it even more difficult to approach colleagues. The latter found my contact with the former abnormal and, I believe, threatening. Thus, I could use interviews and field work procedures, coupled to the Glaser-Strauss manner of working, adequately in researching the students, but had more difficulty in investigating the staff. The portrait of lecturers' attitudes to students, curriculum, and one another (the given for Ch.3) was also assembled from field notes; every pertinent interaction was written up as quickly as possible. That material was analyzed for the basic structure of interaction, but I could not move as easily back and forth from discussion to analysis as I had done with the students. The 'gatekeeper' problem with the staff was significant—spontaneaous discussion of the teaching role did not take place and persistent questioning was taboo. In the interpretation to the third chapter of the genetic text I explore the parallel between the rationalistic core of the curriculum, and the reductionistic violence in the

described interaction patterns. In order to verify my claims, I did some conventional research. I wanted to be confident that the staff relationships were as conflict-ridden and unsupportive as my qualitative research indicated. To this end, I coded several staff meetings on the basis of Chris Argyris's scheme: 'the congruency model focuses on the quality of the interaction among organic unities (between the individual and organization, individual and individual, individual and group, group and group, and group and organization' (Argyris, 1970). The results indicated an anxiety-filled system made up of individuals with little concern for each other's ideas. I stress that I carried out this project as a check and do not claim any 'scientific' validity for it. The results did buttress me in the writing of the third chapter of the genetic text. I was assured that the portrait of the staff was justified. The empirical investigation is not an evaluation of the college—a comparative study of 'invisible' colleges would be a very good thing, but I have not written that study. Insofar as I describe the doldrums of an undistinguished school, that is only because that is where I began to teach. In that I did not want to do and injustice to the undergraduate college where I had lectured, I have carefully tried to assess whether my descriptions are accurate.

The line between description and interpretation becomes blurred when I discuss Barthes' and Dollé's influence on my teaching (see Chapters 4 and 5 of the genetic text). In that phase of reformulation my question was not 'What is it to teach?' but how can I find an adequate form, intellectually and practically, for what we already sense, perceive, and understand of one another? The process of conceptualization was long, and I experienced it as quite difficult. I found it easier to teach than to capture the practice in a theoretical statement. But the firm ground under my feet, which facilitated the teaching, consisted of my knowledge of what I wanted to do, what I could do, and how I would set about it. These points had to be conceptualized.

My interpreting emphasizes the social quality of knowledge and the practical process of situational/intersubjective learning. In the chapter 'Theory' I have already introduced the crucial themes. To briefly restate that position (in somewhat other words): most social science has aspired to be *objectivist*—objective relations (e.g., psychometrically measurable changes in student behavior) are studied by means of a break with the self-evident or natural character of the familiar world. Alternatively, *phenomenology* makes the primary experience of the social world explicit: perception of the social world as natural and self-evident is by definition not self-reflective and excludes interrogation about its own conditions of possibility (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 53). Phenomenology is not simply naive experience—it researches the prerequisites, forestructures, and prereflective basis to occurrence. The objectivist critique of phenomenology is that it neglects 'the conditions of possibility of practical experience' (Bourdieu, 1973). Lived experience is an inadequate criterion of knowledge. The economic, social, and physiological causes for action often lie outside experience or its preconditions. Phenomenology is accused of being mere subjectivity. But the critic of objectivist knowledge sets 'objective knowledge on its feet by posing the problem of the conditions of possibility of this problem (theoretical, but also social conditions) and, at the same time, makes it apparent that objectivist knowledge is defined, fundamentally, by the fact that it excludes this problem. Being set up in opposition to practical perception of the social world, objectivist knowledge is distracted from the task of constructing the theory of practical knowledge of the social world' (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 54). The collorary I derive from this statement is that it is not some sort of accident that objectivist social science has been practically ineffective in the field of education, but rather

it is an inherent result of its social and theoretical assumptions. My critique of objectivist knowledge does not imply an unconditional embrace of the phenomenological—the third form, called *praxeological* by Bourdieu, best matches my research goals. My theme: the beginning lecturer who constructs concepts adequate to the teaching experience in order to improve his teaching involves two levels of knowledge—one experiential (the teacher's experience in relationship to his concepts) and one external (the significance of the mediated concept). Mediation—as revealed by the cultural-historical approach—is a theory of the practical knowledge of the social world. Both the concrete/practical and the structural/theoretical play their role. The specific and general interact: the individual and regulative do not cancel each other out but coexist. Objectivist knowledge grasps matters from the outside, as *faits accomplis;* phenomenology does so from the inside as experience; and praxeological learning investigates the generative process of occurrence.

Bourdieu's characterization typifies the kernel of the three eipstemes by describing the *conflict* between them. It is important to note that the three approaches can also be studied in *interaction*. The 'objective method' and phenomenology do not then exclude each other. A defender of the objective stance writes, in effect on phenomenology: '(Reflexive-)Description,' and certainly 'Understanding' are in fact interpretation wherein implicit theory and hypotheses are developed' (de Groot, 1981, p. 364). In the 'context of discovery' there is for the 'objective' methodologist no objection to phenomenological investigation/analysis. If we view the social sciences as a cluster of sub-disciplines, then we note differences in the 'level of structuring' which depend on the degree of reduction-verisimilitude applied to the material studied. Furthermore, we can distinguish differences in systematic versus field-oriented, and pure versus normative approaches (Sanders, 1982). For a normative field science which aspires to a high degree of verisimilitude the 'context of discovery' is indispensable. For such work the hypothetical-deductive approach—so praised in the objective methodology—is little effective. This is in contradistinction to the regions of the social sciences that are on a higher level of structuring where 'purely systematic' (objective) methodology is at home. In my research it would have been premature to begin with hypothesis testing—this does not mean that objective methods of justification have been rejected, but merely were inapplicable. In this interpretation, phenomenological and objective methods are complementary—their use depends upon the sub-discipline and the differentiating factors (mentioned above).

The praxeological analysis of Bourdieu works in the dynamic tension between immediacy and mediation. On the one hand I pursued *la parole,* the immediate recognizable speech of the actual circumstance, and on the other *la langue,* the fundamental (social) grammar of the activity. The crucial assumption was that the two levels form a dialectical interaction and are in practice inseparable. The interplay of the descriptive and interpretative elements earns the name of *semiotic field work*. I try to understand more adequately the symbols which embody assumptions underlying the critical features to teaching. *La langue* of teaching was characterized by hidden signifiers. Of course, my goal is only provisional explanation of the system of signification. Teaching is a system of signs—intersubjective indications, messages, logics. The explicit nomenclature of academic pedagogics did not seem to match the global signifying structure I unearthed; therefore my semiotic investigation:

> . . . semiological research centers by definition round the signification of the objects analysed: these are examined only in relation to the meaning which is

> theirs, without bringing in—at least prematurely, that is, before the system is reconstituted as far as possible—the other determining factors of these objects (whether psychological, sociological, or physical) . . . (everything) must be treated in semiological terms, that is to say that their place and function in the system of meaning must be determined. (Barthes, 1964, p. 95-6).

What was the meaning of the system I call 'beginning teaching?' I try to find a logical order to the manifest content of the college situation. The connotation (the social-cultural assumptions) are more important to me than the denotations (primary, ordinary language). I am never interested in immediacy for its own sake—analysis of *la parole* reveals basic conceptual structures of intersubjective (mis)-understanding. I examine a crippling problem to meaning referred to by William James in his essay 'On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings' when he noted the marked indifference to forms of existence other than one's own, the habitual and pervasive intolerance to what is alien, in short the inability to get outside of one's own skin, to put ourself in shared circumstance, to understand that the only hope of breaking out of the prison of solipsism and egoistic unfreedom, is by learning how to imagine, acknowledge, conceptualize, and value what is social and cultural, at once individual and other (Gunn, 1972, p. 11). I analyse the intersubjective meaning, chapter by chapter, of sub-systems of teaching. I examine the social coherence of the message. What are the intersubjective principles which preside over the organization of the enacted discourse? What and how does teaching mean? Teaching is analyzed as discourse—the semiology of teaching studies teaching as meaning, and not the contents of curriculum. The 'pheno-text' of what happens in classrooms is subordinate to the 'geno-text,' the intersubjective genesis of meanings. Meaning works to construct the subject—the fundamental assumptions about man together determine experience. The subject is positioned in norms and values. The practice of representation which is internalized generates a way of seeing others, the self, and the society. Certain meanings result in certain manners of being 'subject.' Teaching as meaning is the pre-articulation of the subject. The assumptions and horizons which lie behind the production of meaning determine the level of conceptual mediation and therein the potential quality of the subject's perception. In the last concluding chapter I will return to these themes on the basis of the route (then) already travelled.


Teaching is a practice of meaning, a practice which produces a manner of mediation which necessitates certain representations of 'subject-being.' The discourses, of open or closed response to circumstance, of individual sentiment or rational control, of theoretical complexity or conceptual rigidity, of personal goals or social needs, determine the practice. The middle european tradition of *'Geisteswissenschaftlich Pädagogik'* began already early in this century to make a dynamic study of educational antimonies and their axiological significance:

> The regio of education is saturated with the tension of the different elements, which sometimes seem virtually in contradiction with one another. The educational reality does not possess a stable structure, nonetheless one can speak of polar elements that keep each other in balance. The educational process of growth is, for instance, characterized by a two-track approach directed at both the subject (independent ability to defend your own opinion) and at the world of culture surrounding one (the introduction of the child into his culture) . . . It is the task of pedagogic theory to draw the attention of educators to such tensions and contradictions and to indicate possible responses.
>
> (Hintjes, 1981. p. 20).

Education is seen here to be a field characterized by numerous interrelated tensions. Research is to be an active relationship between teaching and the development of theory that mirrors that activity. I analyze this relationship as 'meaning in process' where I posit that the man-man relationship can push the discourse towards insight, inclusion, and some sort of active humanism. This assumption is not innevitable, but it does guide this research project.

c. The Development

I picture the succession of the genetic chapters in the ensuing manner:



The lack of a research tradition encompassing the situational consciousness of the beginning lecturer explains the tentative scope to my investigation (see Preamble: Defining the Problem). As a result the investigation had to take place without theoretically grounded hypotheses. I tried to achieve, through action, a *pris de conscience* into my teaching and to describe, as well as analyze, the levels to this process. I am limiting myself, here, to a *formal description* of the developmental line. Phase by phase it is to be found in the 'Interfaces' where I take stock of interim conclusions and consider the following research *étape*. The developmental line is discussed in depth in the concluding chapter. An introductory sketch of that line is to be found at the end of 'Preamble.'

My criteria for structuring the givens were historically developed. I studied a unique object—one person's experience of teaching—in order to identify its meaning and specific characteristics. I discovered a temporal structure to my data: distinct configurations of givens occurred. A succession of distinct foci, each chapter with its own, characterizes the genetic text. The principle of organization, much as in anthropology, has the task of ordering a complex field of 'meanings.' The themes which caught the essential significance to a particular phase to the data, became the motif around which a chapter was constructed.

> The specific difference of the anthropoligical object of culture is that it is *meaningfully constituted.* And I seek ways to extend that symbolic constitution to social action, to suggest that history itself is culture and structure (Sahlins in Bailey et. al., 1978, p. 358).

I share this goal: the study of the social function of 'meanings' has historical import. The 'sign systems' of teaching, the fundamental grids or logics of its meaning, define a man-man and a man-world relationship. *La langue* of teaching is sought in the developmental ordering of the data. I present in succession what approximates six *idiograms:* phases to my development in teaching. I am not studying inner experience, but specific historical event. The search for meaning and for exemplary characteristics takes place in terms of cultural-historical values. This approach is 'idiographic' in the sense of directed towards the concrete and historical (Windelband and Rickert in Polkinghorce, 1983). It results in six representations of teaching. Central to each is a 'signifying system,' a normative structure which produces social interaction by functioning as a critical assumption to intersubjectivity. 'Signifying systems' are, in cultural semiotics, taken to be 'symbols,' where the 'symbol' is 'any object, act, event, quantity, or relation which serves as a vehicle or a conception. The conception is the symbol's meaning' (Geertz, 1973, p. 93). Each chapter rotates around one such 'conception,' a 'symbol' characterstic to a phase of 'developing teaching.' I describe the 'meaning' of the 'symbol.' The descriptions produce a 'culture text' which is analyzed for its social assumptions. What is the structure of intersubjectivity determining the communicative characteristics of the 'teaching' occurrence? And what is the teacher's relationship to that structure? I am not only interested in the intersubjective 'code,' I assume that it can be made conscious; that is my goal. Therefore, my indebtedness to Lacan where the link is forged between structuralism (the logic of the 'code') and consciousness (psychoanalytic process). The outing *(la parole)* may not be general, but consciousness of it reveals a general structure *(la langue).* Speech occurs in the tension between individual immediacy and the symbolic order. I do not want to see *la parole* in proportion, but to blow it up until it begins to reveal a structure of social existence. I seek the 'fantasy of the other' behind speech. In *la parole* (immediate event) there is, in the expressive layers of speech/event, a fullness of implication and meaning. These are not naively appreciable, but have to be sought in the complexity of interaction. The levels of significance are revealed with thick description:

> Thick description aims at describing the meaning or significance of behavior as it occurs in a cultural network saturated with meaning . . . The point here is that criticism requires for its successful execution an understanding of the context, the symbols, the rules and the traditions in which an object or event participates. In educational criticism it requires an understanding of the range of educational styles possible in teaching. In organising classrooms and schools, in using curriculum materials, and in providing educational activities . . . Eductional criticism aims not only at revealing from an intellectual point of view the meanings and conventions made and broken that might occur in a classroom, but also aims at using language in a way so vivid that it enables the reader to participate vicariously in the quality of life that characterizes the events being described . . . Educational connoisseurship and criticism have not been encouraged. An ounce of data, it seems, has been worth a pound of insight.
>
> (Eisner in Hamilton, 1977, pp. 97-8).

The search for *la pleine parole*—speech which understands itself, conceptually effectively mediated, with comprehension for its own symbolic (cultural-historical) order—results in 'thick description.' The 'idiograms' of 'thick description' have to be understood in their developmental vector. This is the task of the 'Formative' (process

directed) and 'Summative' (where did we end up) conclusions. The 'Interfaces' which reflect back on a preceding chapter and foreshadow the following one, are moments of this same process. In them one finds the 'optimalization' of what has been achieved and the grounds for deciding to undertake a following 'description.' But only in the retrospective review of the genetic line ('Discussion and Evaluation') do I explore the unfolding of 'developing teaching.' Then, I spell out the upward movement, to the sequence of 'idiograms.'

PART TWO
THE GENETIC TEXT

Forms and Beginnings: Introduction to the Genetic Text

a. The Presentation of the 'context of teaching'

The moment a concrete teaching experience is discussed, specific questions of value become essential. The intention structure of human behaviour has as a consequence that teachers and students only undertake to master knowledge that they value. Too often in educational research, the purely formal questions predominate, most likely because they can be accurately measured. I risk imprecision in order to ask the questions about schooling that I am convinced are essential. To use Gombrich's distinction: educational research attends to what is acquired, ignoring what is, or is not, assimilated (Gombrich, 1979, p. 12).

> Any piece of information, after all, can conceivably be important for something or somebody; but if that were the criteria for (education) . . . the most important textbook would be the telephone directory . . . But though you could make your students learn it, I doubt they could assimilate it. It could scarcely become part of their language, a source of metaphor shared by a culture . . . a society without the assimilation of general knowledge starting from language and reaching out into the sources of metaphor, would cease to be a society . . . But surely language and metaphor are not only of use, like a telephone book, to communicate with others. They also help us to articulate and interpret our own world of experience to ourselves and it is here that the shrinking of . . . sources would ultimately affect us.
>
> (Gombrich, 1979, p. 13)

But to reassert the issue of human interaction, in the social process called education, is to risk losing one's bearings. I risk 'that morbid fear and snobbish contempt of superficiality that has invaded academic life with the rise of professionalism' (Gombrich, 1979, p. 21). I have insisted upon studying the teaching experience as it presented itself to me. I have not violated the context of the event by radically reordering my questions along the lines of the 'context of education.' The thematicization is sought and, I believe, earned through description and reflection. The sort of issue posed may be unfamiliar and strangely far-reaching.

We have gotten more used to investigating the 'learning ability of disadvantaged three-year-olds,' than to picturing to ourselves the school situation wherein we work. The abstract deduced categories of statistical research have become more real to us than the direct circumstance of teaching and learning with which we are daily confronted. We have let our experiencing of teaching become superficial—in the sense that it has lacked problematization and a rich tradition of discussion. Teaching is most often something unlearned, unstructured, unreflected upon in higher education. My point of departure was the all-too-simple question of understanding myself in my daily work. The situations described clearly reflect circumstances and not the use of social science methodology. Teaching as an organic whole was forced upon me, not the causal

reconstruction of a learning process. I obviously do not think that I risk superficiality by sticking to the texture of the actual experience. But I realize that, for many, lived experience is insufficient, and statistical research of a higher order. Is immediate experience when put into words superficial? Are our literary/philosophical metaphors superficial? I think that our inherited cultural means of conceptualization and communication are an important basis for study and investigation. Is it cursory to want to describe circumstances in terms of a common core of social value laden metaphors? Do we have to break the texture of speech and alienate ourselves from discourse? My intention is to give 'context of teaching' the chance to reveal, as much as an immediate and explorative context can. By writing, I had begun upon the inscription of action: event became text. Simple incidents widened out to discuss complex issues. The pains, jolts, and successes of teaching were growing into mediating concepts. By making experience textual, I made it interpretable. What happened at school opened discussion—it was no longer absurd, silly, trivial, but had become inquiry. I had begun to formulate a description of my work—my choices of language, description and emphasis implied my ideas about social existence. I could no longer limit myself to mere circumstances, or inane specifics, as writer I gained responsibility for producing cultural material. I generated a lived metaphor: students read the various drafts, and chose to make use of its descriptive interpretations. A syntax emerged: writing produced 'significant symbols'; 'words . . . disengaged from (their) mere actuality and used to impose meaning upon experience' (Clifford Geertz, 1973, p. 45).

An orientation in 'the ongoing course of experienced things' (Dewey, quoted by Geertz, 1973, p. 45) took hold. Something collective was taking place—my writing became an aspect of the public occurrence about me. Writing had become the positing of an organized system of 'meanings.'

> The major reason why (educationalists) . . . have shied away from cultural particularities . . . and have taken refuge instead in bloodless universals is that, faced as they are with the enormous variation in human behaviour, they are haunted by a fear of historicism, of becoming lost in a whirl of cultural relativism so convulsive as to deprive them of any fixed bearings at all . . . The notation that unless a cultural phenomenon is empirically universal it cannot reflect anything about the nature of man is about as logical as the notion that because sickle-cell anemia is, fortunately, not universal, it cannot tell us anything about human genetic processes . . . Seeing heaven in a grain of sand is not a trick only poets can accomplish.
>
> (Clifford Geertz, 1973, pp. 43-44)

The solitary teaching experience is a particularity that may well provoke the question 'Why study it?' But we are not only examining that one instance, we are also observing the process of trying to transform chaotic, pointless circumstance into a governed, somehow knowable, entity. On one level, I have written an exposition on the subject of how to get to be able to think about teaching. This writing has had a semiotic concern: the need to talk about schooling as it occurs about one. The research has been informed by academic studies, but it has had a necessity that seems to have been all its own. The 'story' had to work: to become the matrix of 'meanings' that fit the circumstance. I was teaching in an undergraduate college in Holland, but this is not an essay on that circumstance. It is a study in thinking about one's work in higher education: what happens in the social space of teaching where people appear to one another and exchange 'meanings.'

The essay is a form wherein the quality of the spoken word can be mirrored. It has the broken, multifarious texture of spontaneous discussion. When I am asked 'why' these observations, this style of reflection, or these metaphors have prevailed, I do not have an answer. What is important for me is that a particular 'story' did adhere to circumstance, for many others did not. I strive for:

> '. . . a disconnected yet coherent sequence of bolder and bolder sorties . . . (which) starts from a sheer beginning and ends where it manages to get before exhausting its intellectual impulse. Previously discovered facts are mobilized, previously developed concepts used, previously formulated hypotheses tried out; but the movement is not from already proven theorems to newly proven ones, it is from an awkward fumbling for the most elementary understanding to a supported claim that one has achieved that and surpassed it . . . It is for this reason . . . that the essay, whether of thirty pages or three hundred, has seemed the natural genre. . .'
>
> (Clifford Geertz, 1973, p. 25)

I have sought to write up my experiences as lecturer so that the characteristics of the process are conveyed. I call this effort to render the empirical development 'essayist,' because partial, circumstance-linked, and personal qualities of thought are present in the text. Each chapter has its own particular style and rhetorical approach. I show the different, partial, limited, concrete occurrences of thought. The genetic text mirrors the intentional world of the developing lecturer. My interrelationship with others, in circumstance, was my 'teaching.' My 'I' was a complex social construct whose dialectic I try to discover in this research. The distinct moments of development find expression in the different approaches, styles, concerns, of the chapters. I have not tried to force the data into the idealized presentation of a single idea, but to let the multiplicity of events impress themselves upon the text. Each chapter is organized around a central predominant theme. Discontinuity of focus and thought mirror the process of change. I saw the work and its circumstance differently at each juncture. That difference in perception is crucial to the process of development. The chapters are written to illustrate the style and form of thought expressed. I not only try to assert that a certain development occurred, I strive to show the process to the reader. The effort is to achieve as direct and immediate a contact as is possible between the reader and the practice of the beginning teacher. The development is to be studied and directly felt. Not just the descriptions of events meet these criteria: the longer theoretical reflections are drawn from the intellectual content of my teaching. The thinkers discussed in some detail—Barthes and the group about him, and J-P Dollé—were the subject matter of senior seminars and the source of various research projects, all of which centered on the question of the role of the intellectual. As beginning lecturer, I was confronted with the new issues, problems, and possibilities of the position; but as a lecturer in the 'Theory and Philosophy of Applied Social Science,' I became the subject and object of my lecturing, a position I have continued to occupy in this study. The development of thought and practice is displayed, as far as possible, just as it occurred: the chronology of the chapters tries to make the movement that took place visible. My concept of 'evidence' in this study is essentially radical empirical; the effort is being made to report the thinking so that the reader gets a feeling of just how it took place. The unnaturalness of intellectualized thinking (the 'context of education') has loomed as an enemy as I have worked on the

project. I wanted to develop a text that stayed close to its subject. I sought to generate an initial intimacy between the subject matter and the text. After I exhausted my purely descriptive possibilities (the first three chapters of the genetic text), I turned to the writers I had studied with the students in the period described, and which had informed my thinking (the fourth and fifth chapters).

To conclude: the essay permits 'thick description' where events are multi-causational, and interaction contains many facets. The polyphony of the essay mirrors the occurrence of speech and the structure of discussion. It leads to this defense of itself:

> Ici, je le répète, ce fut le mérite des intellectuels, notamment des 'essayists,' catégorie hybride entre philosophie, littérature, journalisme, parfois science, race bâtarde d'écrivains/écrivants, d'avoir, en dépit de . . . leur assurance et arrogance d'intellectuel . . . sauvegardé une réserve pour la communication et la réflexion un bouillon de culture pour les idées générales, généreuses, générique.
>
> (Edgar Morin, 1981, p. 261)

> Here, I repeat, it was the merit of the intellectuals, in particular the 'essayists'—a hybrid category falling between philosophy, literature, journalism, and sometimes science; a bastardized breed of writers—to have . . . preserved a refuge for communication and reflection, a cultural broth of general, generous, and generic ideas in spite of . . . their intellectual self-confidence and arrogance.

b. What Brought Me to Write These Essays

I have discussed the background to the form and content of the book. I have insisted that the themes of this study emerged as I tried to come to terms with what I experienced as a beginning lecturer. This excursus was written *ex post facto*. In the raw data (the 'summing up papers' which I wrote every six weeks and my 'log books') I questioned repeatedly my motives. I was not the only beginning lecturer, why did I keep a log book and write periodic summaries? I quote some of my answers below; they have been lightly edited, whereby some condensation took place:

first year

I write to order my impressions. My writing is self-discipline. I have to write to transcend myself, to escape the mentalist accusation that events are merely a product of one's character, or state of mind. I find it necessary to prove that what I see is really happening in the world about me, and is not a mere 'mental state' or 'projection.' My empirical subject matter is microscopic, the undergraduate college where I work, the students and staff I know, the lecturing situation. But the conflict between ingenuine social conventions and 'la pleine parole' is far-reaching. My first intense experience of the dissonance between stereotyped dogma and individually earned commentary comes as a lecturer. This is probably somewhat exceptional. Many seem to grow up on this conflict; to have seen so much of it that they cannot see its contours any more. What I write is not meant to be 'true' or 'false' so much as recognizable. My task is to describe what I see. My statement is simply 'this is'. It attracted my attention as it did probably

because I had done my undergraduate study in the United States and my doctorate in a program of individual study at Leiden. The first Dutch school with which I was really confronted was the School of Social Work, where I found a job. Nothing is familiar, or could be taken for granted; I am the innocent child of Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale who would shout 'But he hasn't got anything on!' when the emperor paraded before him naked. I was not afraid and had not lost my own eyes to conventions. I do not see things as one is supposed to, do not automatically 'interpret' events as one is expected to. I merely see, most simply look, and increasingly am upset. I never learned to contrive the educational process as one is supposed to; I do not share the assumptions about human contact that predominate. To humiliate others seems to be the favorite indoor sport.

During the first social contact I had with a colleague, I was told that so-and-so was a 'shit,' another man a flimsy imitation of a human being, and yet someone else a failure in everything he had ever done. There is no respect—only a savage effort to tear one another apart. And, all the while, the academy pretends to be 'socialist,' 'left,' 'democratized.' I had never imagined that people could envy one another to such a degree. I had never known that so much energy could be used to put another person down. Almost no colleague is willing to acknowledge my problem; no one will admit that to begin to teach is a bruising, often humiliating, experience. Even worse, colleagues are angry at mistakes, aggressive over faults. Actual intellectual discussion is unknown. Program proposals are chosen upon the basis of who hates who the most; who should have the thrill of winning and who must lose. Serious discussion simply does not exist. Political or social considerations are unimportant; internal power struggles reign. I am flabbergasted, and literally do not known what I am seeing. But I do not have all that much time to think—I have to fight to save myself. I built up a good program and learned to present it effectively.

The school is inhuman and destructive. I have been caught off guard. I can not lecture without being attacked for what I feel, how I express myself, for my style. When I became a lecturer, I lost my freedom to be myself. Suddenly I am resented if my thought is idiosyncratic. My politics accepts no inevitable good or bad guys, it is unstable, doubting, untrusting; that unease is forbidden. My individuality seems to threaten everybody about me. I am not supposed to be myself. I should not dare to feel myself hurt, insecure, or dynamic.

I have not written this study because I think it is morally uplifting or reassuring. I write because psychological murder is now not culturally forbidden, but, on the contrary, is sanctioned. I protest that a crime has been committed—and will be perpetuated. Every sentiment of right and wrong I possess rebels against the evil I have experienced. Punishment or vengeance are not so important, and will not occur. I remain outraged that a portion of our society pretends to socialism and solidarity while practicing total intolerance. And I fight against terror. My struggle is for an ethics that is not a handy utensil for torture or an easy excuse for glorying in the pain of others. The school I have seen I judge to be destructive—to be a society based on hate, insecurity, and a perverse love of power. A world emptied of all positive values and reduced to a formal 'leftism' that is a thin veneer for terror. The assertion that such social corruption can exist is in itself an important claim. But my fear is that aspects of the analysis will be recognizable in all too many schools. I try to pose the question of how far social terrorism has come in our society and how can we even begin to think

about it. Thought protects itself poorly against violence—when there is refusal to think, when all reflection and discussion is denied, thought has few means to champion its cause. When the murders begin, reflection is hopeless. Social violence drives out all content. However powerful a motivating force ethical outrage may be, it cannot produce social science on its own. The next step—to *study* one's situation, and to *act* upon it—demands a cooler head. I am overwhelmed, at first, by the college situation, and I am only slowly able to get a grip on my teaching practice.

second year

I have found my first year as lecturer very difficult. I did not know what the students did not know, I had lost any idea of what their level might be. I overprepared and lectured far above the capacity of the students to follow. I had to get to know them. I had to learn to explain things so that they could understand. I had to find literature that was accessible to them. I discovered that I did not know what I was doing, where the work should go to, what ought to occur. Teaching is a chaos; the job, nervousness itself. I feel myself fighting to survive without kindness and sympathy. Teaching seems to be a unique form of brutality characterized by emotionless arrogance towards students, and animosity to life. Rapidly, though, I have discovered that if one can get through to the students they are willing to work with one of the basis of helping one another. They are willing to accept that one is upset, horrified, lonely, and sad. But can I keep control of these feelings—will I collapse into incoherent panic? If I can keep writing, if I can overbridge the constant threatening isolation, then I'll survive. Faulkner: the goal is not merely to survive, but to prevail.

third year

This writing is the product of my disillusionment; it is my effort to understand the reality masked by fine-sounding ideals and important observations. It is an exploration into false values, an exposé of unfreedom dressed up as liberation, of an intellectual crisis pretending to be essential answers. It is, ultimately, a social ethics. But such a study has no existence in pure abstraction. It lives only by being the actual coming to grips with the concrete. These ethics are not my idealistic fantasies; they are the concrete things I have thought and felt when confronted with the school where I have worked. I discovered that the story that the school where I taught told of itself was false. The self-consciousness of the institution where I have been appointed is self-seeking, destructive, and corrupt. I have to think for myself, discover what has occurred and what it means. I never planned to study ethics. I thought it to be a dead subject—must not ethics be based on a metaphysical absolute, and hasn't it been proven that there is none? Ethics are absolute rules for human behaviour 'given' by some superhuman force. Modern man, existing in process and uncertainty, without absolutes, must live without an ethics. I have changed my mind about all these things. I have discovered that while I *know* no absolute that can underpin any ethics, I nonetheless make use of one.

There is what I can accept, and what I shall oppose. Events have shown that I am no nihilist: cost what it may cost, despite social pressure as violent and brutal as it may be,

the personal relationships that exist in my immediate existence have value for me. I refuse to make depersonalized decisions, to reduce life to machinelike existence or to abstract 'world.'

I shook the wolves who masqueraded as colleagues off my back. Within a year I had succeeded in my objectives. What I spontaneously expect of discussion, of thinking things through, of working together, is based upon a sense of openness that I discover is unthinkable for my colleagues. When I first began to lecture, I wanted to work for the 'good goal' the college claimed to be its own. What one has in my writing is the thinking whereby I tried to get my feet back on the ground, back to a situation where involvement did not mean mindless authority, freedom slavish rationalism, or progress disinterested violence.

I had thought to find in a leftist school a strong bond of mutual help and openness to one another's problems. I was utterly disillusioned to discover that the academy threw each lecturer back upon his own resources, utterly uninterested in what happened to him. Each lecturer fought to prove himself, to build up his own following, to create his own niche, violently protected against all comers. I fought myself to a 'successful' position with a strong following amongst the students, and the necessary independence from the 'staff.' And then I tried to retreat from academic politics to do my work uninvolved in the sphere of the school. I succeeded reasonably well in doing so far another year and then in my third year all hell broke loose. I am forbidden my individuality. No price is spared to deny me my own safe niche off to the side. I have to join in, to take part in the subculture, to fight, hate, and destroy with the rest. I refuse. I isolate myself with the students whom I now know for two or three years and try to avoid the insane competition and violent envy of the rest. I want only to lecture—to continue to explore questions that interest me, which I have learned to interest students in. But that is not to be—one has to participate in the mad power games. There was nothing that had to be decided the whole year, no issue that would permit a differing opinion; but violent fights had to occur. There has to be hatred—about nothing, to no end. Increasingly, psychoanalysis became the frame of reference with which I explain what occurs. The mechanisms of violence are seemingly irrational, but that does not stop the orgy of insecurity and hatred. It is this spectacle of barbarism which I commit here to paper.

INTERFACE ONE

The 'essay' which follows, *'I,' Culture, Violence, and Education*, is reconstructed from my jottings made during the first eighteen months on the job. The theme of political and intellectual violence was dominant. The structure of the argument was, in consequence of my limited experience, fairly primitive. This led to an abstract effort to forge links between personal background, teaching experience, intellectual commitments, and a general theory of education. The people, their convictions; the institution, its purpose; education, its characteristics; all disjointedly caught my attention. The lack of specific evidence, of concrete illustration, was characteristic of the period: everything appeared global, interconnected, an entirety. The material for the chapter was based on my 'log books' and 'summing up papers.' The discovery of the concepts 'entenderment' and 'subrealism' revealed the possibility of co-operation: one could describe teaching and gain acknowledgement through discussing what one saw. Purely personal response could be transcended, discussion was possible. These discoveries meant that full-fledged research was possible.

When I wrote the notes upon which most of this chapter is based, I was unsure whether a process of investigation or research into this subject matter was really possible. The very possibility of understanding was in doubt—I was unsure if one could really clarify the issues. That is what this chapter is all about: is there a real relationship to something more than a subjective self possible in this teaching, or are words mere dogma, terror, rejection of discussion? The experience of the 'other' reflected in this passage is ideological, impassioned and value laden. The unrestrained emphasis on interrelatedness was intentional: it mirrored the need and desire for social event, and thus the *absence* of assured contact. This is the text of the isolated newcomer who has not found a means of communication with his surroundings. It denounces the use of abstraction in the place of experiencing. But it shares in the same fault when it abstractly speculates, for instance on the problem on the 'left intellectual.' This existence in abstraction is characteristic of my initial experience of teaching's discourse. The experiential was avoided, lived problems were absent: discussion was about general issues, society, ideas at large. Speech was at least partially disembodied, it did not seem to belong to anyone in particular. I oppose abstracted speech here while often falling into its use myself. This is the universe of *pseudo concepts*: of ideas with a dubious relationship to reality or experience—ideas that exist as ideas,but not clearly as direct practice. Nonetheless, the descriptions of my own past are accurate. I could tell the 'other' where I had been and what had occurred there. While the discovery of the two term conflict did open up the communicative process, it was on the basis of an undialectical dichotomy. Discussion was possible, but as an 'either/or.' The appeal to the interlocutor was for an absolute 'yes' or 'no.' Speech was possible, but reduced to its most primitive level: acceptance/rejection, freedom/restraint, open/closed. A rich heritage of ideas and questions leading to wide-ranging reflection and creative conversation was lacking. The most minimal and primitive recognition of one another was at issue—not intellectual work at a high level. In retrospect, I find in this chapter an accurate and terrifying mirror. My assertion that what happened at the college hinged on a breakdown of communication was, I believe, justified. But my response shocks me in its primitiveness, and in the lack of a living tradition of thought it reveals. I was starting from nothing.

1

'I', Culture, Violence, and Education

a. 'I'

My world was still relatively, if illusorily, secure before I became a lecturer. The situation of being a beginning instructor, with which I was confronted, was alien to anything within my comprehension. The college shouted, by way of its director, 'Students you are the future!'; while the school moved into infancy, and a drilled kindergarten seemed the appropriate image for the future. I had to have 'an own opinion'—but in opposition to what the question seems to demand, this implied no freedom of thought or expression. I had to prove my own unfreedom by publically repeating the school's political prejudices until everyone was convinced that I could not say anything else, any more. When I spoke it was either right or wrong—I was being corrected just like any old fashion exam question would be. If I was untrustworthy, then I'd get the dirty jobs to do: extra meetings, more colleges, larger groups. If I was found reliabable I'd belong to the group and be rewarded with extra study days, long individual supervision of students, and the courses of my own choice. When it became clear that I wasn't going to tote the ideological line my colleagues tried to give me the freshman courses I didn't want, and to forbid me to lecture my own specialization. But the upper division students threatened to demand an investigation by the Ministry of Education; the decisions were all reversed in less than a quarter of an hour. If you are ideologically unsound you are a traitor and an enemy. The ideology cannot fail, only individuals are inadequate. The only hope for the renegade is to admit his faults, otherwise he is damned to the forces of the reaction. It is this choice which the college poses its lecturers, and through them its students. There is only revolution and barbarism—good and evil. The laws of history lead to the revolution—nothing else is really thinkable. 'Is this truth recognizable outside the college walls?' remains a forbidden question. Only the language of the revolution is acceptable, any other world about us becomes un-namable. Language is saturated with moral judgment. Labor is no longer simple 'work' but becomes an open door to: 'surplus value', 'exploitation', 'fetishism', 'imperialism', 'the proletariat', 'base and superstructure', 'Capital and labor', 'alienation', 'reification', 'class consciousness', and 'the dialectic'. To mention only some of the most obvious terms. All these words present the world in her value satiated form. If you question one, you get an answer with another. Discussion is impossible with the outsider who does not know the language. Every word judges and defines—all other languages are lies. If one speaks the languages one is 'left,' if one doesn't one is foresaken. Every word is essential—each statement reveals if one accepts the system or not. Truth is an ideologized system. The choice is constantly present: 'What are you, right or left?' 'For or against capitalism?' 'Enemy of friend!'

These surroundings are aggressive, they will refuse me my own voice. This ideology, their 'story', is doxa, a manner of speaking adapted to appearance, to opinion, to a conformism. I do not believe in the 'truth' of my surroundings I seek a way

out, space for another 'story.' But I do not get any room for my words, quite the opposite I am forbidden to experiment. New literature is rejected, alternative didactics are denounced, a different approach is abhorred. My colleagues begin to speak cynically about the value of my tenure.

But I cannot really escape the ideological education: I want to find an alternative 'story' which lives, which will win from the deadening durge about me. Words to call out: 'We're here, watch out we mean something; we're here and you'd better take us into account.' A 'story' which doesn't fight for its right to be heard becomes utterly boring. I have to dare to say something. But I feel myself a prisoner between violent, strong, unprincipled, forces. My words pass the self-censor. The spontaneity, or directness, is lost. I ask myself constantly 'Do I dare say this?'. I twist and turn to somehow keep myself inside the acceptable ideological boundaries. I become a 'Marxist humanist': everything is permitted just as long as one stays on the correct side of the line good-bad. My thought is disciplined by the anxiety I feel.

I become beset by a lingering depression. At its worst, the mood evokes an insatiable preoccupation with death, where death is equivalent to the void, emptiness, meaninglessness. One discovers in oneself an inability to take initiative; wonders if one had anything to say or do anyway; and makes oneself fairly miserable and relatively insecure. Eventually one asks oneself if one is psychologically unstable or becoming a mirror to the situation surrounding one and threatening one. My thinking polarizes itself: either there is their ideology or my story. There seems to be nothing in between the two, and no one mitigates the breach. The split actually concretely takes place about me: staff and students become obviously for me, or against me. I discover myself an object of deep loyalty or equally absolute aversion. While I had been, as a University student, a very quiet person who only commented on lectured material after much hesitation; I was becoming, as lecturer, a controversial figure who was expected to speak out in order to defend his ideas. I was not prepared for the new situation, had not sought it, and was uncomfortable in it. I had taken up the theme of man determined by 'world'—the paltry, insufficient 'subject' awed by an 'objective' reality that he scrambles after. Herein, I expressed my sense of powerlessness when confronted with the Marxist language. I was trying to come to terms with the story of my colleagues. At first their behavior seemed unfathomable. I was bewildered, amazed that the call to freedom also demanded rigid conformity, that the liberation from authoritarianism wanted no free wheeling discussion. The situation was incomprehensible for me, so I studied it. The structure of social occurrence seemed bizarre, so I charted it. I went to work as if confronted by an exotic culture. But I did not have the anthropologist's distance—the culture threatened me, it demanded that I be a member. But I could not. I never seemed to do what was expected of me, the explanations I gave never seemed to explain anything. But my foreignness was not tolerated. The society had no place for unhandy neophytes. I was badgered with denunciations and anger. I tried to explain that I was innocent, ignorant, uncomprehending. That made my colleagues more angry. I began to discover absolutes: to not know or understand the 'law' was much worse than to disobey it. Nothing was despised so furiously as innocence. It could not be acknowledged that a human life existed that did not know the 'laws'. The 'world' that reigns over man, that is his 'law', became my problem. I could not call off the conflict. Anxiety and self censorship neither helped my own mood, nor ended the pressure upon me. Confronted with aggression and violence, I had to understand 'absolutes.' Their

'story' wouldn't go away and leave me in peace, I couldn't escape somehow. They would never acknowledge that an outside existed to their 'story': their words encompassed the entire reality, no other form of existence was thinkable. I discovered myself to be something which could not be. I was being declared a 'non-person.'

While I had been taught at University to lecture 'society,' 'modern history,' 'psychological deviance,' and 'twentieth-century education', I chose to stay much closer to the 'experiential' when I taught. I did not take it for granted that the greater the generalization the better, just as long as one had 'scientific' evidence. I did not want to foster a double: spontaneous personal awareness juxtaposed to an academic, intellectual self. I did not cut my experience off from 'facts,' 'truth,' 'proof.' What I lectured 'was' in that it was remembered and retold. My sense of evidence is neither 'scientific' nor 'intuitive.' My concept of speech was a literary one: the narrative is its own most important goal. I did not teach to achieve an extraliterary goal. The lecture was not a means to a social aim. I have long abandoned any pretensions to changing the school or to being at home there. My 'involvement' seems to have been important to a significantly large group of students who sought a chance to make their own beginnings and to develop a self-confidence based upon their own accomplishments. I have never wanted, or probably been able, to tell others who they should be. When another is capable of knowing what he wants to do I can support him, can speak to him, can interact with him. Something in me utterly rebels against being the 'father' who judges, rules, moralizes. All those who want to be told what they should think, what they ought to be conscious of, I can only send away. I refuse to tell others what is, what they should believe, who they ought to be. I am at most a mirror that attempts to reflect back to others what they seem to say, demand, indicate. I am active in my responses, but I can only begin to work with someone who makes his desires known, who discloses in some way what he wants. My teaching is perhaps a defense of my emotions, but it is also a demand that others experience them. This demand had, in the college, a significance which I had not foreseen. It was an attack on the 'categories,' 'abstractions,' and 'causes.' Not on their explicit content, but without my knowing it I was demonstrating that the ideology was empty. By taking the 'story' seriously I unmasked it. The college is a nightmare where all the warmth of human conversation, joy of community, and enthusiasm of involvement are imitated, to be destroyed; required, to be ridiculed; praised, to be rejected. A conflict was raging about me, I was its center, and I did not know why. It took several years before I became bitter enough to name the absolute hypocrisy of the college by the just name. I had to struggle to rid myself from the horror of terror as I have incurred it.

My anxiety for rejection had led to self-repression, but this was ineffective. I made the mistake of discussing my dread, thus of once again talking about feelings. I thought that the problem was one of having the right political consciousness, and could not see what lurked behind that demand. I could not imagine that the real demand was to be emotionless, abstract, impersonal. My interest in the 'subjective factor' in Marxism was no better received by my colleagues than were my other deeds. I was still on an utterly wrong track. But I had to find a form of self-expression. If no compromise was possible, then I would have to define myself, and thereby try to win the respect and acknowledgement of the students. Just as long as I could muster a following of serious students, I could become a soloist utterly separate from colleagues, but tolerated. I had to accept to be an individual, with a block of others against me who gave no construc-

tive or contentful response. I was isolated and felt myself threatened—the better I taught the more hostile the department members became. The more unsafe I felt myself, the harder I worked on my didactic ability to make as few mistakes as possible. The more my lecturing improved, and I gained recognition from the students, the more colleagues ressented me. I felt myself challenged to prove myself, but the more I did so the smaller the basis became for mutual understanding between myself and the rest of the staff. I had failed to understand them; my response to the challenges of teaching hopelessly alienated us. The constant growth in tension, and attacks by my fellows upon my work, strengthened my decision to 'go-it-alone' without their support. The students were slowly becoming enthusiastic for my direct style of expression and commitment to my field of specialization. Every new project was 'Too ambitious,' according to colleagues, and 'Exciting, informative,' in the eyes of the students. The evening seminar was 'Too heady, and susceptible to open-ended discussion which would confuse students,' or 'A chance to talk one's reactions through and really come to terms with a text,' depending upon to whom one listened. My strategy was to make my lectures obviously better prepared as well as more informative than those of others, to insure that the senior research projects were ambitious and successful, and thereby make it impossible for the staff to bully me. It was a demanding approach, but I did not really have an alternative. I had to make a 'story' which would compete succesfully with the standard explanations. I did not have to think it all up myself—I could steal anything and everything which seemed useable. The struggle to defend direct experience and circumstance against political dogma has a rich enough history. Armed, especially, with the writings of the French thinkers who broke with Stalinism in 1956, or Maoism in the mid-seventies, I was prepared for intellectual conflict.

My first success fragile and uncertain, but nonetheless powerful and exhilarating, came with what I called 'entenderment'[1] (a neologism) and 'subrealism.' I had found two themes around which my experience could be organized. The one is kin to anger; when it possesses me, I know it alone. Any alternative is forgotten, the world itself is occupied with the demons that fill me with outrage. I can only see the dishonesty and violence of existence. I never choose this disposition: it presents itself. I am forced to fight, I am ravaged by the destructiveness that rushes toward me. It is the world where hatred and power are evil, narcissistic gods. They tease and demean. When there is no truth, justice, or kindness, this sentiment emerges. It results from circumstances that are, for me, totally humanly alien. This subrealist landscape is barren. Where there ought to be a world that we can see, where we can pick out what is what, where we know ourselves and our lives, there is, instead, pure psychological violence. The world in which we should be involved is not reached. What is seen never achieves the real, never becomes dynamic, alive, interesting, touchable. What is, is the will of disoriented, raging forces that demand, shout, scream, and decry. No peacefulness, no interconnectedness, no 'place.' It is an unorganic world: one of loose ends and chaotic ultimatums. It is there that pure 'psyche' really exists: where human mind persists, utterly alone, isolated, apart. It is pure terror, will, thought: they are all the same. It is that moment where man is mad: exists outside of any bond with others or nature.

I was appealing to those who were sensitive to the distinction. To the sense of coming from someplace, of one's being alive presupposing bonds to somewhere, of one's personality being rooted in something intimate, of having to create ties to others. Without all this mere psyche remains: existence reduced to power, emotions restricted

to dominance. I invoked the voice that one knows to be one's own, which speaks. The 'me' is a real internal feeling, or a mere rationalization employed to manipulate, dominate, and structure. There is life lived in a world of real others that concerns one, that one cares about, or there is mere morbid rationalism, all encompassing thought that pins reality to absolutes just as insects are pinned to their display boards in a collection. Being, doing, motivity can exist, but 'having,' dominating, determining can predominate. Subrealism is life that never achieves a world, never experiences others, never possesses a real affection for existing.

My alternative theme organizes itself around 'entenderment'. This sentiment engenders a feeling of helplessness when it must be defined. It resists interpretation: it is afraid to lose itself in theory, discourse, and abstraction. It is not an idea or concept, but a manner of being-with. It is places one has been, friends one has known, situations that have entered into one, circumstances one wants to remember. It is the real: meaning, creating, signifying. It is one's affection: the need that certain others live, the importance to one that they are, the taking upon oneself of precariousness. Actual life is impermanent; however much we may hope that our affection can create, can let live, can let us do, the limits persist; the impossibility of ever reaching lastingness always asserts itself. We may wish to protect one another, we can try to let life predominate, we can attempt to let our involvement prevail. 'Entenderment' is a paradox: it chooses for our lives, when we know that the choice can never transcend the limits that exist upon human existence. 'Entenderment' knows its special disposition, just, in the illogic of its truth: it values what cannot be assessed, it prizes what can never be defined, it lives what is not absolute. It is the choice we can make for one another, by which we must admit weakness, absurdity, limits: life's boundaries. We accept time, its dynamic, its possibility for joy, event, creation, and its terrifying demands. We can only be reconciled with one another by embracing the limited, suffering, partial, existence that is ours. Transcendence, the reaching for an existence that is not ours, the pursuit of historical or social deliverance, the ideal of emerging beyond death, without time, in total freedom, destroys our feeling for one another, here and now. 'Entenderment' refuses to flee what is: it has chosen the efforts, hopes, and limited meanings of the living. It renounces absolutes for what is, rejects political ideals for existing involvements, and demands to be judged not by its idealistic pretensions, but by its daily activity. But I run the risk of defining what can only be defeated by definitions. It defies becoming 'idea' and prevails as soon as experience, intuition, and feeling are acknowledged. For these are all facets of what man brings to the world he studies, forms, and responds to. World is not imprisoned in one's head as pure subjectivity (whatever that might be) that results in thought, in reducing lived experience to philosophical theorems. To say that the world is only man's ideas of it is just as rational, abstract, and intellectual as to assert that only the world exists and that man's consciousness of it is an epiphenomenon. In 'entenderment,' we live an involvement with others, we have our feelings and our impressions of others. We experience being together and apart; similarities and differences; the existence of a same, as well as disparate, world. To be together demands interrelationships between man and world, it demands the existence of our subjectivity as well as the world wherein we find ourselves. Both man and world exist: to reduce both to one factor is to create intellectual absolutes that abolish the interaction that is so prized here. 'Entenderment' does not produce any new absolutes, any 'truths' that can dominate, structure, reassure

one's existence. It merely pleads to let existence occur, to give oneself the openness to interact with actual, living man. It denounces communication with rational absolutes at the cost of contact with living man.

My first succesful lecturing was organized around these two themes. I had begun with 'amazement and bewilderment' over what I saw; that had transformed itself into 'anger and outrage'; and I was beginning to achieve 'sorrow and a sort of thoughtfulness.' My first months of lecturing had produced a mood dominated by the pain of what I had seen. Just as we cannot appreciate a pleasant landscape when we have a toothache, I was unable to enjoy my surroundings because of the sorrow and torment of what I had encountered. But, when I launched my comparison between 'entenderment' and 'subrealism.' I was rescued from having no 'story.' I had found something to tell, had found expression for my experience, and a means of asking students to speak up. I had found a way to introduce my question 'What do we undergo here?'.

b. Culture

> . . . the image of a constant human nature independent of time, place, and circumstance, of studies and professions, transient fashions and temporary opinions, may be an illusion . . . what man is may be so entangled with where he is, and what he believes that it is inseparable from [him]. It is precisely the consideration of such a possibility that led to the rise of the concept of culture... men unmodified by the customs of particular places do not in fact exist, have never existed, and most important, could not in the very nature of the case exist. (Clifford Geertz, 1973 p. 35.)

When I criticize, or embrace, an educational institution I am accepting or repudiating the manner of man-being-together which it mirrors. My attitude to the undergraduate college was not a purely individual reaction. It was the product of a cultural conflict—between my North American experience, and my European one. Two worlds collided: two visions of scholarship set upon one another. I, as I have already described, was not aware of what was occurring. The literal vocabulary of both cultures resembled one another enough to muddy the differences. It took quite a while for me to discover that the two cultures did not mean the same thing with the same words. Both talked about a 'freedom to learn' and 'self-actualization', but had very different ideas about what these meant. This sub-chapter is especially informed by the trans-cultural theme. I will always look upon the Dutch educational system as an outsider, and see the North American through my experience in Holland. Knowing two cultures I will never be totally at home in either; both have, for me, lost their quality of being self-evident. It is just because I lack a definite cultural place of my own that I am so aware of the role that culture plays. Normally it is not so visible. I see culture as a set of control mechanisms, or paradigms, that spontaneously order sensation and behavior simultaneously. We do not live culture, in the sense of explicitly experiencing it; culture lives us, in the sense that it operates as a presupposition to our consciousness. Culture is a 'story' that is collectively lived. To acknowledge 'culture' as an essential term in one's work is to become interested in the particular, unique, historical event which it creates.

One does not have to remain on the surface of things—the particular can be made to reveal abiding significances. But this is done not by denying specificity, but in wholly accepting it and investigating just what particular moments of interaction reveal. One can only see 'culture' in immediate event, as it informs direct occurrence, and not as something unto itself. The penchant for studying only repeatable data destroys historical originality, and, if taken to extremes, individual existence. I can study a real social occurrence only because man is radically social and dependent upon structures of order, language, and rationality to exist. Human existence is inherently ordered, structured, controlled. The devices that form language, thought, and experience can be called 'culture.' They are, at one moment and place, specific and take place as an event between individuals. Nonetheless language and communication, as well as the thought patterns they make possible, are, obviously, the central cultural elements. All cultural studies owe something to literary criticism, for it is the essential precursor to studying cultural form. Hermeneutics and analytical psychology are other pillars of these investigations. I have been trained in an intellectual tradition that does not accept the idea of an incompatibility between rigorous investigation and artistic—especially literary—activity. When the anthropologist writes on culture, he seems to feel himself required to say something about the 'nature of man.' A cultural historian seems to be expected to show off a theory, for instance, of national or artistic change. These endeavors to reveal what man 'is,' or to understand social life 'as such,' are philosophically treacherous. They quickly imply, or must deny, the existence of a *telos*. I do not want to write a theology of the contemporary culture, or much worse, write one while pretending not to do so. I describe the ethics of my actions but do not theorize on the metaphysics of my thinking. The cultural approach lets me ask what one 'becomes' by working in a particular sort of teaching. And what presuppositions one must have in order to pose certain criticisms. 'Culture' is more event than 'truth,' more ethics than theology. My emphasis is upon lived-circumstance and how it is informed by one's collective experience and background.

I lived in the sixties in the United States and had experienced there the cultural patterns of an educational system which is geared to social selection. I had had first-hand experience of the school as a means of social discrimination. I had criticized that school for its social role from within. I had denounced American education for its academic 'perfectionism,' where the mediocrity in thinking of the greatest group of persons was easily accepted. The university's existence depended upon almost total arrogance vis-à-vis the average citizen: intellectual excellence was its own self-justification. Because the best research in the world was done in America, her schools were the highest human achievement of the intellect. The actual value of all this intellectual arrogance was not widely doubted; academic nationalism was normal. America produced 'top intellectuals.' The school existed to struggle to be the best in the world . That its architecturally magnificent campus often stood next to improverished slums was normal. The university was concerned about the contrast: it encouraged the city to demolish the slums, forcing the poor blacks to find tenements elsewhere. One sat, literally, behind enormous glass expanses, surrounded by the finest of facilities, looking out upon poverty and abject hopelessness. Two societies, that of the elite and that of the slaves, lived next to one another: we, physically afraid of them; they, materially determined by us. They lived in the hell of poverty, we in the horror of the violence that reached us as rape, being attacked on the street, and even murder. The

comparisons were depraved, the relationships impossible. The circumstance was almost unthinkable, and responses were impossible. One lived a tragedy, where every 'solution' seemed naive, for it was obvious that nothing was going to change, at least not rapidly.

When I became a lecturer in Holland, I suddenly heard that all these problems were self-evident, even mundane. My colleagues seemed to understand the school's role in society better than I did. Everyone agreed that the American situation was determined by the social structure there; everyone was sure that class conflict, coupled with racism, gave rise to these developments; everyone knew that social change could liberate the United States from the 'master/slave' relationship. What had occurred in the American universities interested no one; the students who had lived the problems, who had an insider's perspective, were unimportant; everyone understood that the American university was a social monstrosity. The problems that had been taboo or radical in America were taken for granted. The real social role of the school was unquestionably analyzed and comprehended. That the analysis remained abstract, distant, impersonal did not, then, catch my attention. But slowly I discovered that knowledge of the social significance of American education was only to be matched by the silence over the actual cultural/political role of the Dutch school. All the criticisms to which I had heartily agreed seemed to champion a radical humanism, wherein the school was not a symbol of a hierarchic society but a possibility of liberation. The Dutch school did not, in fact, have a goal to demonstratively prove that the excluded were inferior, but I was sadly mistaken when I thought that it was free. A school possesses a certain form of social organization, it is a mini-society. A school, of course, does have a certain cognitive content which is supposedly learned there, but it also possesses a social structure based on how one has to conduct oneself to be accepted there. These two dimensions of the school should agree with each other; the school should acknowledge in its deeds what it claims to champion in its principles. The society, which it is, should try to bring its goals into existence. If the two are in contradiction, if the school lectures solidarity, involvement, and social responsibility, but creates a microcosm characterized by 'subrealism,' one is confronted by hypocrisy.

Behind the American optimism and faith in the power of human thought, social arrogance and the defense of privilege had really lurked. The Dutch lecturers who had understood the false aspects of American humanism must surely take care not to make parallel mistakes. In America the values of the university community were alien to the surrounding society. The schools were islands of thought and expression in a society with little interest in either. Scholarship was rooted in an eighteenth-century humanism, full of trust in man's nature and interest in the 'divine' meaning of the cultural process, while daily society was corrupt and obsessed by economic competition. Scholarship was rooted in a social morality foreign to the dominant values of the society. The student world was a moral microcosm in an amoral economy. That academic society, one of deep affection and sympathy for one another, floated unrelated to normal everyday existence. The question that we knew, and continually posed, was what would be humanly correct behavior—what should we do, learn, be expert in, that would be 'true' to one another? Our loyalty was to friendship, to the people one encountered. Our honesty was direct, spontaneous, linked to what we could directly see. We were adamantly anti-Etatist: government we knew only as corrupt and warlike[2]. Social idealism was almost unknown amongst us, slogans and campaigns were by definition sham. Only insofar as each person was prepared to contribute to social ex-

istence was there opposition to egoistic actuality. Morals were a mirage, politics knavery, large groups sham. Our opposition was utterly individualistic: we did what had to be done. We opposed the war in Vietnam, not because that was in mode; it wasn't. We had supported civil rights not because it was intellectually chic to do so; it hadn't been. To criticize was to be alone; to oppose was to become a stranger. We were outsiders, joined to one another by a common sadness. We knew no home in an exclusively nationalistic culture we had only an anti-nation. In an intellectual climate where one, almost exclusively studied the American identity we knew only a lack of identity. Precisely therein we were at home. We were that half-tragic American idea: never at home except when wandering, never itself except as opposed to itself. Our homelessness knew a long literary tradition; our loneliness was an ethical custom; our paradoxes were common usage. We opposed what people had opposed for a century; our contraposition had become a tradition. For a hundred years, intellectual America had resisted industrial society, had declaimed against mechanized slavery, had defended the individualistic society of equals that agricultural New England most especially had known. But it was a romantic, ineffective opposition which led merely to the suicide of numerous writers who could not accept what America had become. The burden of most simply telling what was had become insupportable; the writer, as 'town crier' who reported what was lived and suffered about him, could not survive with his knowledge. The attempt to be a witness, to see, report, understand had become spiritually impossible. Daily society was so monstrous, repression so violent, social hatred so intense that knowledge had become impossible. The only alternative seemed to be to enclose oneself in science and thereby escape all responsibility to feel. The impasse was absolute: to see would be to become blind, to experience would become one's suicide, to know would be madness. The horror was beyond us, it could only overwhelm us, there was nothing to defend us, pitiful, finite individuals who wished to retain their humanity. The society was utterly blocked; there was no place to go within it. Unable to live knowing, not being able to live by refusing to know, the paradox had become insupportable.

It was from this cultural tragedy that I came to Leiden, to study psychology and phenomenology, far from my paradoxical society. One thing remained with me—the deep affection we had known for one another in our powerlessness and sorrow. Our defeat had been absolute. We knew no means to live with the circumstance that overwhelmed everyone. We could only comfort one another and seek to retain what humanity circumstances permitted. In defeat, one loses one's arrogance; through sorrow, one renounces power and playing at false gods. I had learned a lot in America though at the time I did not realize it. Everyone had had so much a better time of it in Holland; they had missed the riots, the disaster, the horror. I was envious. Only much later did I discover that the values I had learned in the American hell could serve me well in Holland. One escapes envy and petty jealousy when one has known more personal things. Living in America was a bit like living in an occupied country: unfreedom did not have to be sought. Its brutal strength frightened, while history seemed to instruct cowardice. One learned the difference between hypocrisy and honesty. That American lesson remained a touchstone to my thinking and manner of valuing. It was this North American cultural principle, when applied to a progressive European school which generated such tremendous conflicts. The tensions with my colleagues had, herein, their deepest roots.

c. Violence

What happens when educational and political radicals take over an undergraduate college? What sort of social space does 'democratization' create? 'Left-ism' was the central term which ordered the thinking of my colleagues. What was meant by 'intellectual left'—what was the new paradigm that had won control of the undergraduate college? And why have I identified it ultimately with violence?

'The intellectual left': by intellectual I mean those whose employment is made possible by their advanced diplomas; and by 'Left,' those who pursue the Western tradition, conventionally thought to begin with the French Revolution and which has occupied itself with democratization, personal freedom, social equality, and economic liberty. I am afraid that the 'Left' exists in Holland as an absence—as a hole where there ought to be something. There is a vacuum where there ought to be activity, vague speculation where one would expect theory, morphous discussion groups where strong organizations could be assumed. The traditional bickering about tactics is there (barricades; war or pacifism; protest groups or parliamentary opposition; spontaneity political parties or dictatorship of the proletariat). The problem is not one of too many strategies or of their accompanying theories, but of no social action which justifies any of them. Past mistakes are defended, selves are justified, and the inability to relate to others has found a mask to conceal itself; and all this is being called 'the Left.'

Let me first demonstrate why I think there is really no intellectual Left in Holland; and second, indicate how I think we evolved into this situation.

We have victimized ourselves with the myth of an 'intellectual Left' that fought in the late sixties and early seventies for socialist education and could never accept the reactionary politics of, for instance, the late seventies. We lived with the illusion of a near Left majority in much of Europe and with the dream of a progressive society capable of fundamental sociopolitical innovation. But austerity programs have now been carried out, cultural freedoms have been reversed, work has been technocratized, the government and/or business bureaucracy controls ever-increasing areas of social life—and no determined opposition has occurred. The intellectuals have become the clerks of social control, with hardly a disruptive murmur of protest. The Dutch Left-intelligentsia works in education, in the social services, and in administrative functions. Schooling is for the workers we are told, but that means creating the most productive working force for the capitalist market. The youth is to be tailored to achieving promotion— to getting ahead in one's occupation. Though any socialism asserts that the prerequisites for advancement and better employement are, in this society, in conflict with the social integrity and political freedom of the workers, the Left educators do not arise in protest when, as in the late seventies, the above mentioned 'vision' of the social role of education is put into practice. Critical insight has been sacrificed to occupational pragmatism; any general feeling for history, literature, or art has been found unnecessary in this age of consumerism. Politics (in 1977) resembles fashionable slogan-mongering more than social analysis. As for the social services, anything goes as long as the clients do not protest too loudly. Social work has developed into an amazing form of legally sanctioned mucking-up of other people's lives. And an army of university graduates who 'help' others have been trained in a hopelessly impractical scientism which cannot be applied, and work after graduating, on the basis of common sense. Most are 'eclectic' which seems to mean a vague belief in the Oedipus complex, leading

them to seek the source of their personal problems in the child-parent relationship. Finally, the administrative workers are imprisoned in the never ending ritual of meetings—which have only one function—to make sure that nothing creative or original ever occurs. Furthermore, these employees are almost constantly involved in the dequalification of everyone else's job. Of course I exaggerate, but I find my caricatures all too recognizable for comfort. All the tendencies I mention certainly do exist, if in a somewhat less extreme form, and the absence of opposition to all these tendencies is very real. An intellectual Left would be confronted by the problems I have indicated and could only earn its title through opposition to these developments. No opposition, no intellectual Left.

Secondly, how did things get this way? My thesis is that the late sixties and early seventies were not a boom period for the Left, but a debacle. A superficial student culture justified itself as the freeing of youth from traditional morality; the actual results include a drastic decline in musical tastes; changes in the use of pronouns (tutoyer); Christian names came into fashion, jackets and ties went out; and meetings became more common than serious discussion. A shallow use was made of foreign conflicts. The ban-the-bomb, civil rights, and anti-Vietnam war movements, and May 1968 were repeatedly all mimicked, but without confrontation between Fabian socialism[3] and bread-and-butter unionism[4]; without a crisis in social relations grounded in extreme forms of exploitation; without questioning the arrogance of economic power and the great masses that supported it; and without a feeling for the inability of the French Left to rule, renew itself, or take important initiatives when divided into socialist and communist camps. Outwardly, everybody participated, but when one examines the contents of the study programs and developments in the professions one discovers that human engineering and 'planned change' were taking over.

Where does the myth come from that the late sixties/early seventies were so progressive? It resulted from the unusually advantageous economic situation for intellectuals. A plan almost could not be so nutty that no one would subsidize it. In the period when Keynesian economics worked and the welfare state grew, intellectuals had an easy time of it—hobby horses were for the riding. Competition was minimal, everyone was permitted to pretend that what he did was 'progressive.' What came out of it, if anything, were mediocre leftist art, inferior leftist social services, and disoriented leftist education. One should not forget that there were dogmatic leftist groups, too, who spent all their time trying to rationalize away the challenge, which really did exist, of effectively using the abundant possibilities that were present. The Left intellectual had two obstacles: his own inability to create and innovate in a manner which would be socially relevant and the fifth column of Leftist radicals who sought dogma and false discipline.

What is the situation now (1977)? Left intellectuals seem most interested in one-uping one another—in advancing oneself by pushing others down. 'Ennui'[5] lets loose destructive forces: a stagnant situation both qua thought and in the labor market has reinforced the importance of status and social position (who is where on the academic ladder, and who claims to know what). Macro theories have not proved adequate for the new conditions that emerged after the oil crisis of the early 1970s. Appareil ideologique d'Etat[6] is all well and good, but does not change the concrete situation. It is true that politics stimulates a collective depression: the politicians compete to tell us how bad things are; one would think their only happiness was to be found in ever

greater displays of misery. A 'purple fog' hangs over Holland: a defeatist, passive, disoriented mood dominates. Mindless assertions that the society is radicalizing thanks to the 'crisis' or that new possibilities for a strong leftist politics are arising serve only to falsify the situation, and thus to keep genuine problems at a distance. The people I know suffer their marriages and pamper their houses. They do not seem to know what to make of their kids (and the demands that the kids make of them). Work is something one cannot do without and cannot do anything with. The traditional activity of the Left—defining Marxism or interpreting definitions of Marxism—does not help much. Socialism is not very effective as a museum piece: intellectual life seems to cater to glorifying past achievements and not to the process of thinking. It is important, of course, to liberate ourselves from scholasticism. But at this moment one is forced to question the possible role and identity of the Left intellectual. Our society is being propagandized into 'Angst,'[7] and an essential fear of the 'others' grows in each person.

The lecturer, in particular, often seems narcissistic when with his students. He can preen himself for his 'superior' intellect, pride himself on his social status, and demand slavish adoration. A following of 'yes-men' will confirm his wildest self overrating. It is terribly tempting to form an inflated impression of oneself when one instructs young, inexperienced students who are incapable of any significant criticism of what one says. But the possibility of such self-love is limited; the less informed the students are, the greater the chance that they will have no respect at all for one's 'learning' or 'expertise'. You may be one of the nation's best informed scholars, but, amongst any group of contemporary students there will almost certainly be several who will demonstrate their indifference to your learning in no uncertain terms. It is a devastating experience to find the knowledge one has accumulated over years of careful reading and thought flippantly dismissed by an 'ignorant youth.' We live in a consumerist society where large groups of persons find thought unnecessary, most often do not value it and, wherein intellectual values are often difficult to defend. Students, as often as not, do a course in order to earn a degree which is a passport, more or less certain, to a job. One studies to enter the middle class and to earn money. One becomes a student because it is expected of one, because one has no better alternative, and/or because one can, temporarily, avoid the army. A ritual, of the introductory period, is that one has to display an idealistic justification for one's choice of study: everyone makes up an impassioned story which, in private, one can later hear had more or less nothing to do with one's actual commencement of study. Most persons come to study out of social automatism; they begin on a study without knowing what it will amount to or if it is really, in any sense their choice. In undergraduate education one faces half-motivated students at best, who may have to struggle to survive institutionally, but who are otherwise little involved. Our nation knows no collective sense of purpose; our schools float in a goalless, undirected epoch; one can blame everybody and no one for the situation. But one cannot argue effectively that discussion possesses any sense of reality. We produce skilled technocrats who are capable of using neo-Keynesian economics in a highly sophisticated manner, but who have no further social vision. They can repair a capitalist economy better than any other garage (1977); but there their mandate begins and ends. On the one hand this has helped to make the Dutch worker one of the richest in the world (our minimum wage is higher than America's and roughly twice that of France) and our society one of the poorest intellectually. The so-called 'objective requirements' are more than present for creative work and imaginative innovation, but the cultural circumstances are utterly lacking. This society seemingly

provides all the prerequisites and also denies us the most necessary: a bond, a sense of engagement, the will to really cooperate. We have lost ourselves in egoistic power struggles, in which school after school is torn apart.

To be a teacher is to be a good member of the team: that means to be predictable, safe, overseeable. Democracy is the social control whereby one can insure that no one is unique. Democracy is the terror of conformity of the lowest common denominator. It is not the freedom to do, to make, to construct, but the dictum to submit oneself to endless committees, examinations, and inspections so that anything unsafe or deviant can be eradicated from one's plans. The effort of democray is to forbid individuality; and thus to require mediocrity. An 'average' level of freedom is fine, but nothing exceptional may occur. It is a preprogramed freedom and thus totally structured, disciplined, and predictable. It is as absurd as an appointment for ecstasy, or planned zest. As there are to be no risks there can be no real innovation. Our 'social' involvement smothers us in measures to protect ourselves from misery and distress, which have become deceits that frustrate animation. We created this welfare state not from desire for socialism or a love of freedom, nor from a will for social change, or *actual* social freedom. Our 'socialism' (in the late 1970's) is a pure conservatism: it is a bargain with the devil where we abandon all freedom in order to be pampered by a bureaucratic apparatus. The price we have constantly paid for our social welfare has been our prerogative to know one another and work together on our own society.

I am not arguing for a more unequal distribution of income. Holland has one of the most equitable distribution of incomes of all the industrialized countries. But the emphasis upon disposable income, and the politics of transference payments, has become a fetish. Is investment, and our collective future, well served by this policy? The differences in wealth between the richest and the poorest ten percent of the population are relatively small. This does not mean that there is not still an important task to be performed in the continuation of an incomes policy which further reduces the differences in wealth, but the incomes policy has not led to a freeing of the society. We have become enslaved to one another; everyone is afraid that someone else will rock the boat. We have created a society in which we all live by impersonal rules. It is a culture permeated by the feeling of not needing one another. Almost everyone settles back into their 'private' world and ignores any greater whole or purpose. We know cities of people who do not need one another and thus strangle themselves in 'anomie.'[8] Our welfare has not freed us to tackle new ideas and tasks, but has made us curiously afraid, distant, impaired. We have reformed so as not to be caught unawares; we have changed in order to ensure continuity; we have progressed to protect stability. The few who have attempted to define 'great projects' have almost always fled. The spirit to dare anything—to write an original essay, to think through a peculiar theory, to speak another language, than the expected ones, is frustrated. To know no adventure is to know no freedom. Our 'Marxism' is all too often the will to insure the whole society against everything, most especially against life itself! We resemble the insurance agent who measures life out in neat piles of coins and has discovered the one sure defense against the risk of death: never live.

The contemporary state of violence is not restricted to politics or economics. It permeates the whole culture. As language is a first requisite for society, it must be possible to further define the violence, if it is half so omnipresent as I have claimed, by showing how it has effected speech. Language is a collective, social good wherein a person is himself, and is, at the same moment, his society. Language is a point where the

individual (expression) and the collective (grammar) become one. It is each person speaking himself and a whole culture united whereby the words have their meaning. Thought is individual and collective: it is made up of what is formed by the entirety of the society and belongs communally to that entirety. It is the unique possession that is not lost but regained and relived when given to another. To repeat cant is neither to become oneself nor to give anything to others. It is impotence. Only when one makes something, only when one has 'worked' does one have anything to give. The intellectual who repeats long empty phrases, who risks nothing, who says nothing himself, who never even speaks in his own voice, is utterly scholastic and empty. The culture we know is marked by cowardice: we fear to question our society and to ask ourselves what goals or purpose we really choose to work for. Far-reaching utopias are our speciality, for they demand nothing of us concretely. The problem is, what do we do, nearly powerless, 'unimportant,' without any pretensions to genius, with our existence. Has it any purpose or value? Are we a hedonistic absurdity? Is anyone or anything actually important for us, or is our life a fixated pursuit of status? When one sees the grab for academic positions by 'leftists' one wonders if the academic Left is merely a breed of career makers, little different from the other breeds. Viewing the world of the 'beautiful people' in Amsterdam and the modish world of the 'Left' intelligensia that belongs to it, one wonders again.

Thought is only possible when people ask one another questions and speak to one another. Thought is inseparable from the language within which it lives—it needs interlocutors who together and separately form the language of discussion. A conversation cannot easily be conducted with oneself: to one degree or other, one must speak with others. A line of thought germinates, is fed, and is ripened through the individuals who talk about it. Just as long as everyone strives to say what one is supposed to say there are no real thoughts spoken and no place for dialogue. We are rapidly falling back into the drawingroom culture of several centuries ago, where speech was not discussion but mere formulas, where actual doubts were not expressed, but mere verbal gymnastics were performed. Language as the means of speaking to one another is a threatened institution. Language remains as so many pieces of information, much as the signs at a railway station tell us things. We will be more than amply told which path to take, where to do this or that, when this or that is to occur; but in a world of mere signs, there is no speech, only direction boards. Language as discussion is in peril. The decision that man cannot communicate with his brethren would end all possibility of freedom or socialism. Only in a society that can debate are such things possible. Only people who can understand one another, listen to one another, and talk things through can create their circumstances themselves.

But once one has understood that our culture is in danger of being peopled by individuals incapable of understanding one another, who tend to never discover what it is to actually speak to another person, what does one do? We are the citizens of an a-social welfare state. All our idealism cannot stand the test of an examination of our actual daily behavior. The leftist intellectuals work as little on their jobs as they can, avoid all inessential contact with the students, and seek better jobs when possible. 'Marxism' is more a means to keep students in their place and to avoid discussion than an open effort to describe and respond to a contemporary society. But how does one make it clear to others that high sounding ideals are most often dangerous subterfuges, and that all offers of security are death warrants? We are prostituted to the bitch goddesses of rectitude, certainty, and safety. We want 'truths' and lasting values. The in-

tellectuals are dishonest enough to often be willing to earn their bread by giving us what we want: lies.

Anyone who has known this century of at least three genocides, of blood, terror, warfare, and concentration camps must realize that nothing guarantees us against barbarism. There are no truths that can definitely guard us against brutality. The essential prerequisite to terror is present in our leftism: the intolerance of those who will not listen to others—who will judge and execute their sentences. One can experience oneself as the Jew of the late thirties easily enough in this culture: where no one will listen, where no one will respond, where one is faced with being a nonperson because one's political behavior is 'incorrect.' The principle of the Soviet concentration camp—the reduction of an individual to the status of a nonperson because his 'objective' influence allegedly hampers the coming of the revolution—occurs daily in differing forms. The violent intolerance, that lets one murder anyone who threatens one's doctrines, exists now in our midst. Only when there is discussion, only when one must actually talk about one's ideas and behavior is this sort of violence impossible. But when speech is denied, when 'ethical' slogans replace questioning, no one is really safe. Just as long as great, pompous, romantic truths are more important than actual lived experience, we remain a society of deaf mutes, in which violence and repression are real possibilities. Only when we reject the great myths, when we speak about and know what we have witnessed, and not when we sermonize about the 'revolution,' is there something really social in our talking. The small details that have touched us, the unimportant story of our backgrounds and youth, these are what are worth the telling—for they are our society. The often undramatic, unspectacular, mundane elements of our lives are what our world is made of.

The refusal to know, think, or speak out of ourselves is the falsification within which pretension, violence, and manipulation is begun. The far reaching depersonalization strips us of anything 'human' with which we can identify. Essential criteria fall away, we loose contact with a personal ability to judge truth and falsity. The subject is so fundamentally alienated from himself that he has lost his sense of individual judgment and responsibility. The false consciousness of our leftist society centers on discussing the dramatics of social conflicts, when we have only known simmering tensions and colorless circumstances. What the cult of violence has to offer is the drama of doomsday, the color of the revolution, and the safety of only being able to 'ooh' and 'ah' before such wonders. It is man who has lost himself, fled himself for mystical rites of passage, where the sadly normal nature of everyday existence is rejected for theatrics. Contemporary Marxism is more often the rejection of the mundane than the willingness to understand it. It serves to hopelessly estrange one from oneself instead of opening one to a radical empiricism where one can understand one's social identity and form of being. We live in a violent, romantic culture, where the 'high' of political conviction is only matched by the 'low' of self-betrayal. And we are endangered by the violence of 'Left intellectuals' who have deserted themselves, their backgrounds, origins, families, and pasts for the misadventure of self-love, in which they fantasize that history rotates about themselves. They are fanatics of an illusion, that of their own importance, born out of their inability to value their own direct, actual experiences and what they really might have had to say. It is this inability to live oneself (to express one's own history) sublimated into a boisterously exaggerated sense of social mission that threatens us with an army of people who cannot see others as they are, who cannot accept life in its limits; partiality, and vagueness, and who can thus once again begin on

a social adventure in antihumanism, where living beings are sacrificed to illusions.

Politics defined the explicit texture to the subculture—but that was an untrustworthy appearance that was skin deep. The political theory was misused to escape all questioning of personal performance and individual responsibility. Political discourse was overused, till it hid more than it revealed. Required formulas replaced direct statement, abstract truth vanquished personal experience. A world of everyone, crammed full of social analysis drove particularity away. Lived experience and political analysis had become antagonistic. An abstract rationalism was in conflict with experiential knowledge. For me there was never any doubt which sort of analysis should be chosen. The two cultures, that of direct circumstance, and that of political terminology, are not philosophical opposites; the clash is historical, not logical. Since the late sixties self-justification had predominated. Academics did not raise new questions, but cut them out. Speculative thought was hated, experiment in thought was despised, the 'bitch goddess' of methodology and scientific methods reigned. This was not a method of investigation, but of self-righteousness. Scientism, in a positivist form, and in its dialectical materialist rendering, is not so much an attitude of research, but of ethical certainty. Why this intolerant reaction to the intellectually freer period of just after the war took place is, for me, unclear. Social Science, either in its laboratory disguise or manifesting itself as political terminology, has become too tainted in social violence and identified with a brutally unsubtle moralism. Too many people were getting hit over the head with these 'truths.' I remained loyal to that strange sentiment of North America, in the sixties. I chose for an experiential philsophy and not for an ethical structure that would label events 'liberating' or 'repression.' Am I so American—are my choices merely the result of a cultural conflict? That would be an all too easy explanation. The Americans have deserted the optimistic empiricism which I learned there. John Dewey as well as the transcendentalists seem infinitely removed from contemporary American interests. Furthermore, the drive towards directness found in the late seventies a new home: France. Just there everyone from Derrida, to Foucault, to Deleuze, to Lefort, to Ricouer, to Barthes, to Morin, champions in some way a renewal in immediate experience. The radical emphasis upon the present, upon achieving a description of what most simply takes place about one, asserts itself in different countries at varying moments. I first encounterd this spirit in the United States of the sixties, only to loose it in the Holland of the seventies, and refind it in the France of the late seventies and early eighties. To dare to see, remains the only answer to barbarism; if we understand the other, then we are a different person than when we refuse acknowledgement. If we are unwilling to experience man-together, to know that social existence intimately involves us, then we must violate the other at every move. Ideas of man together, thought by persons who refuse all social experience, are a typically modern form of violence.

d. Education

The two cultural traditions: experiential versus (leftist) ideological, repeat on another level the dichotomy of 'entenderment' and 'subrealism' with which I introduced this chapter. In a general reflection on education the two terms can be called 'multiplicity' and 'a central vision.' It is just such a discussion which ensues. I have described the conflict autobiographically. But the same tension would have been felt by anyone who had deeply experienced philosophical humanism under attack by technocratic pragmatism. The 'Utrechtse school' is the name given to the phenomenological social scientists, mostly psychologists and educationalists, whose inspiration was to be found in the modern French and German philosophical traditions, and in those currents which emphasized man-in-the-world, open to experience, with a holistic interpretation of man himself. In the sixties the tides shifted: the emphasis upon 'man' was replaced by the effort to rationalize society. The questions being asked changed: the interest in feeling, subject, sentiment was replaced with social planning, welfare facilities, and interest groups. The personally recognizable gave way to the socially relevant. The 'subject' was often dismissed as an irrelevant imposture because it was not collective. Man belonged to the dust-bin of old fashioned ideas, social technology had taken over. The conflict in the two 'stories' or paradigms (humanism vrs. technology) does not only occur in mid-Atlantic personalities. By describing it more abstractly I can go beyond the personal metaphor, and make the claim that the two themes around which I organized my experience are essential poles of existence in the contemporary historical circumstance.

Education by the nature of things, cannot avoid having an attitude towards knowledge. Either learning is stimulated or rejected, logic is essential or feeling central, understanding is emphasized or facts are more important. Why thought is to be valued, or dismissed, comes to outing in a school. The social nature and value of knowledge is either acknowledged, or neglected. The value of experience to thought is understood or repudiated. In modern education learning takes place in groups, thus the question is inevitable what do several persons, many persons, a large population, gain from their efforts? Why does man need education, if indeed he does need it. That education has a fundamental socializing role in the world we know is pretty evident. Also we realize that if separated from society at an early age and placed with others of its own age in a comfortable habitat, the human child would most likely not survive, and would certainly not develop the same social existence as when left to the normal maturation process. A young animal can develop 'adult' behavior without the constant guidance and presence of its elders; the human being cannot. Education is the word we give to this process. There are no inevitable rules as to its form. The modern school is a fairly recent development. Human society coerces each successive generation to carry foreward the prerequisites for its continuance, the school is the modern form of sustaining society's existence. Man's perpetuation of a form of existence is both much more free and more restrictive than that of the animals. Man is at once free to innovate, to deviate, and to be other than his ancestors, and he sustains himself only by forcing his young to accept the structure of thinking which has produced his society. Man's possibilities are now based on his mechanical/technological achievements; whereby the city, and a vast differentiation of activity and character, have been made possible. This unique freedom to be different from one's parents or neighbors is also 'freedom' for slavery,

exploitation, and repression. Man has long abandoned the social form of organization where every individual embodied the whole genus. Man is submerged in partiality; he is an aspect of the work process, and knows only a portion of his cultural heritage. He is 'free' to rummage amongst many possible existences and doomed to live just one of his potential lives. There is thus no possible answer to questions such as, what is man's nature or fate? The bond between individuals is too multifacetted for us to be able to speak of *one* nature or fate. Alternatively, it can be claimed that human society is so dominated by a central determining factor that one can, and must, think in terms of one mankind with a single present and/or future. Education, when viewed through the lenses of a claim to universality, is inevitably a response to the omnipresent absolute.

Central to one's concept of education is the significance one attributes to the fate that man shares and which goes beyond his direct experiencing of situations and circumstances. Does one approach the child from the standpoint of the supra-individual, or from one of immediacy? Does one need a logic of complexity—an acknowledgement of the multifacetted character of the human social process—or recognition of objective historical laws and an understanding of the monomorphic structure of society? Obviously the two positions can lead to irreconcilable demands on education. Clearly there exist biological, social, environmental, psychological factors that transcend individual existence, and it is just as self-evident that people are essentially involved in their individual identities. At issue is the question of whether the one factor can exclude the other—if it so predominates in human existence that it must demand a paramount role in education.

The argument for multiplicity. The human person is characterized precisely by the near contradictory nature of his situation. Man has been able to create a highly diversified, rich, and multifarious society. He can form and develop an identity of his own through all the possibilities which his world offers. Nonetheless, he is a prisoner, not only of the prerequisites that society demands of him, but also of the tragic paradox of his own mortal freedom. Modern society drives man to individualize—to be different from others, to make other choices, to develop separate attributes—and rewards him with anxiety over the fragile, limited nature of his acts. Absolutes are the magical efforts of partial man to find in himself something definitive and unthreatenable. Ideology is the most modern manifestation of man's inability to find stability, 'Truth,' or something permanent in himself. The more man individualizes, the more he is threatened by his own limits. Man is not able to know if what he sees, feels, and thinks is real. He is never sure if his ideas, conclusions, and responses mirror the reality about him. Modern man is especially isolated, for social existence has so diversified itself that almost no one can find an 'other' in whom he can recognize his own past and personality. This results in individuals who cannot confirm themselves, who cannot compare their sense experience with that of others, who cannot find any proof of the truth of their experiencing. The insecurity of the modern situation can lead to experimentation and creativity, but it can also result in neurosis and paralysis. Can we live in our individual experience, or is individual existence so insecure, so unstable that man needs to flee it? But is collectivity flight, then; the mere fear to live individual existence through to its actual conclusions? Is man self-creating: capable, through culture and education, of being what he himself formulates? And is this the insight that should guide one in student/teacher relationships?

There clearly remains a tragic dimension to man's multiplicity: the irreconcilable

conflict between creativity and mortality. Man creates, makes, acts to affirm himself and his world, but he is driven to this self-substantiation by his fear of his mental and biological limits. The conflict is dialectical, of course, for it is only thanks to the ever-renewing process of birth and the coming of age of succeeding generations that innovation, renewal, and change are possible. Man's capacity to be active is based upon the limit that exists to all his acts. In that man cannot be sure whether what he knows, does, and wants is possible, he is challenged to undertake projects. In that the only knowledge we can possess is the result of trying things out, we must either attempt something, or remain utterly insecure. Our existential limit and our epistemological insecurity combine with each other to create a driven creature. Man exists as indefiniteness—that is the very nature of his life. Education is the process whereby the child realizes what he can, and thus what he is. The teacher and the student share a common problem: the indefinite nature of their relationship to the world and to others. What the child learns is to be active in order to give form to that inherent uncertainty.

The argument for a central vision. Characteristic of a unifying vision is that it sets up a frame of reference within which the entirety of social experience is to be understood. In fact, 'multiplicity' is itself such a motif, but the contrast that we are trying to introduce is between a polymorphic, essentially unstable, approach, and a consistent, permanent nucleus of thought. The latter, it is claimed, is a result of historical, or situational, necessity (a religious necessity is a possibility to which I shall not pay much attention here, given my theme). Modern society, the protagonists of this viewpoint argue, results from the unique class conflict that industrialization has made possible. While the whole of human history has been characterized by class conflicts, it is only with the industrial revolution that a class was created whereby a classless society could be achieved. Capital, through its laws, creates an ever more centralized economy, with an ever greater productive capacity. But capital is unable to exploit that productive potential fully, for to do so would end the dominance of the capitalist class. For the first time in history, it is not necessary for the majority of people to be oppressed by scarcity: man is able to produce enough goods to fulfill the needs of mankind. But the class relationships of capitalism must be ended before the economic possibilities of the modern society can be realized. Squalor, privation, insecurity exist because the master/slave class relationship of capitalism have not yet been replaced.

Education, according to this view, exists to make this logic clear to everyone, and to prepare people to work together to effect the necessary changes. The student either already knows what most essentially is, and merely receives training in persuasion, or he has not yet discovered how the society is put together and is enlightened through his training. What 'is' is known. Education is not a speculative process of imaginative experimentation: such a school is considered a decadent elitist institution that refuses to respond to the real necessities of freedom and slavery, socialism and barbarism. Education rests upon the foundation of an absolute knowledge of the most essential questions to the modern period: issues that permeate all existence and pose the very question of man's survival as a free being. In the absolute conflict between capital and labor, there is no room for spectators, idlers, or fanatics.

In the Holland of today (1977), the second position is respectable in 'Left' circles, and the first is not. That second viewpoint is called 'Marxist' and the first would be dismissed as 'elitist,' 'intellectual,' or 'liberal.' I submit that it is worthwhile to look at the concrete practice of these two educational concepts. While the first has a

minimum of explicit ideological content, it makes an appeal to the student to see himself, to speak of his own experiences, to analyze the standpoint resulting from his own social circumstances/mentality. The second system gives the student strict rules for thought, where any departure from the truth is social irresponsibility. In the first case, the teacher is in the service of the students: his/her task is to liberate the thoughts that express the life, background, and possibilities of a person. In the second model, the students are the 'charges' of the teacher, who must be safely brought to harbor: what the teacher has understood of society is what the students must understand. The practice of the first model must lead to open discussion and exploration of oneself, and of oneself in this world; the second model leads to a closed concept, where the student must either 'take it, or leave it.' An educational system that talks about 'Marxism' does not have to be 'Marxist' at all in the fundamental relationship it creates between the students and instructors. And an educational blueprint that never mentions 'capital' or 'labor' can be far more 'socialist' in effect than all the propaganda one could imagine. It is my contention that the 'multiplicity' concept contains far more elements of the sort of social investigation that socialism has found important, than does the indoctrination of 'political-economy' as it now occurs. The problem is to differentiate between education as an actual social process and education in its explicit ideological content. What is important in education is what actually happens to the students: who and what they become. The actual effect that a person has upon others is not to be measured in how many idealistic, Marxist, or revolutionary statements the individiual makes, but in an analysis of the actual social process that he creates via his interaction. It is the social reality that is created that is important, and not the high-sounding promises, utopias, and idealisms. Education socializes students: it forms them, to a more or less significant degree, in their use of the world. What we see now—students who mouth leftist clichés in schooltime and are purely cynical about them over a beer at home—is also a sort of character formation. But it is that of a neo-Stalinism, of hypocrisy made necessary by the authoritarian and repressive use of education by the instructors. When one attempts to exploit the teacher/student relationship in order to force the student to become a 'Marxist,' in a wealthy, alienated society, the students will clothe themselves in cynism, do just what they want, and become hypocritical. The 'Neo-Stalinist' is terrorized by 'truths' that he is unable to challenge or doubt, but internalizes and makes his own. Typically, such a person has accepted that the society is organized around the capital/labor conflict, and that he should take that into account in every action, but sees no way to pursue his own interest within the abstract structure, and thus, while paying lip service to 'commitment,' goes his own way. Such a person has a 'central committee' in his head, which he disobeys, secretly, constantly. The 'Marxism' that has been learned is the absolute dominance of the real: the 'real social relationships' are determinant, the 'real class conflicts' will predominate, the 'real nature of history' requires. . . But in the 'real' there is no room for pleasure, little for sexuality, and none for oneself; thus the split consciousness. The person tries simultaneously to maintain the absolute and to choose for himself. All of which leads to guilt and aggression. Guilt because one does not really live the revolution daily; cannot even imagine, if it is asked of one what class consciousness is; and because one lives an isolated, socially marginal student existence that is not 'proletarian' at all. Of course, one is told that one's 'objective interests' are the same as the 'proletariat's,' and that one belongs to the same class as the workers. One either believes or does not believe such things; 'objective interests'

are not to be directly experienced. In fact, it is claimed that direct sensory experiencing is merely 'pseudo-concrete'; the really concrete, what in fact 'is,' can only be understood from the analysis of capital/labor. Aggression towards emotions, desires, and fantasies is the primacy of the 'real.' Anyone who makes an appeal to one's feelings, to one's own direct experience of things, attacks the whole logic of this politics. In Neo-Stalinism the cause is important; everyday existence, one's own small circle of friends and unimportant achievements are nothing. Anyone who threatens to pay attention to who one is, what one feels, and what one has seen, attacks the whole structure of existence and will receive a violent response. An educational system that uses students to prop up an abstract determinism will surround itself with idealism and leave the students in a demonic conflict between the social (or collective) and themselves. This sort of idealism is the inability of people to live with themselves, to acknowledge their own consciousness and social awareness, to be 'primary' for themselves. An idea of society, a concept of shared experience, an intellectualization of solidarity all come before the self.

This psyche, which has been turned inside out, calls itself Marxist. Man's double, the image he has made of himself (here in ideas) is what he imparts to youth in education. But when the double lives more than do the actual living people, when the double is more real and true than is circumstance and discussion, then education has become a lethal monster. The double can become a police order—an ethical commandant from whom one can only flee, trying to murmur soothing remarks so as not to be picked up. Education is necessary for human society: without it the skills and possibilities developed over the centuries would all be lost in the shortest time. But this necessity does not have to lead to a rigid education that denies the present in the name of the past. What we now have, a cross between social idealism and conservative inflexibility, is an especially destructive form of education. Because it does not elicit a genuine involvement from most of its students, it often leads to insincere graduates. And any direct progeny will be emotional cripples. Nonetheless, there are no signs that this educational regime, based as it is upon forcing a contradiction between personal, direct, sensory consciousness and social, ethical, political thought is nearing an end. Quite the opposite; there is every sign that the so-called crisis in capitalism is generating a crisis in socialism. As an increasing number of people discover that the political Left is incapable of offering an alternative economic policy to that of the Right and/or Center, the pressure upon that Left to prove itself will only increase. Up to now, often unable to formulate an original political option, the Left has tended to become more doctrinaire and intolerant, causing in turn still more people to move away from the Left towards the Center.

In response, at least in France, there has been a rebirth of interest in 'liberalism,' by Left as well as by conservative thinkers, though naturally for quite different reasons. For the Left, liberal freedoms were supposed to be superceded, because they were partial, not repressed as too dangerous. But we have yet to see (1977) any new interest in Holland for the problems of freedom of expression in the educational system. No political group has in practice tackled the problem of educating people to know and use their *cultural heritage* in order to think and work as themselves. Self-consciousness can only exist in a person who has something to be conscious of: one who has capabilities and possibilities that he chooses to employ in his own manner. A pure self, outside culture or circumstance, is obviously a falsity. The character of the human self is

precisely that it creates itself through education: culture, language, tradition, and technology are all necessary to become a 'self.' To set the 'self' off against the 'society' is sloppy reasoning. But to let the dialectic between the person and his culture play itself out within the eductional system has rarely been possible. Instead of discovering and wrestling with the man/world relationship in the school, we seem to falsify the relationship by dogmatically isolating either the 'man' or the 'world,' and doom education to utter onesidedness. The 'Left' school imprisons its students in the 'objective,' which simultaneously is an ethical idealism, and impairs the ability ever to build up the relationship between the person (the actual stream of consciousness) and the social process (culture/history).

e. The Consequences of This Reflection

The conflict between 'entenderment' and rigid, formal thought is the pivotal preoccupation of these reflections. Thought can defeat the actual. The ability to experience can be destroyed. Terror is a real problem in our world. Dogma can debase feeling; abstract 'truths' can pervert actual event. 'Entenderment'—experience of the other—is I hope characteristic of the thought developed here. It defends actuality and does not imprison. It is the putting into words of circumstance, as that is practiced here. The utterances of immediate existence, however 'trivial' they might seem, are far more empirical, actually present, than repeating 'great truths.' All the statements imaginable that can be learned, or even worse memorized, concerning man together never add up to an actual experience of the social. Propaganda and hobbyhorses strive to banish event, forming a surrogate involvement where man together is defined, categorized, and manipulated. The results of 'entenderment' remain elusive, indefinite, indeterminate. 'Entenderment' is not knowledge, it is a prerequisite to occurrence. Between knowledge and lived experience there exists a tension: what has been defined and is known is dead, immovable, has ceased to change. Knowledge is not the self-evident threshold to direct responses, primary interaction, or circumstance. What we have mastered is often stultified, rigid, no longer interesting or dynamic. Modern man has wanted to know how things are put together, and how he can manipulate them. He does not seek existence, but to use what is. Subrealism wants to define, to pin down, to make predictable, to circumscribe. An absolute technology, the world put at man's disposal, would annihilate man if it became synonymous with his consciousness.

INTERFACE TWO

The second descriptive chapter was, for the most part, based upon materials which date from my second year of teaching. My question was: 'What does someone who studies here, and is seemingly adapted to the situation, become?' The issue was: what are the attitudes to speech and thought (social discourse and intellectual processes) characteristic of undergraduate teaching as it took place about me? At this point, there were two groups of students: those who were attracted to my teaching and research, they shared to some degree in my protest, and the larger group of students who accepted the established norms for their undergraduate careers. The need was to clarify the norms representative of the institution. As will become clear in the second half of the chapter my emphasis is on teaching—its possibilities, limits, public. The 'portrait' of the model student exists to discuss how (if) he is teachable, and how to go about it.

I had entered the field of inquiry (the pedagogics of higher education) unprepared and without an explicit or certain research goal. Already writing, I found an insight here, another there, and examined them. Soon I discovered that I was turning up enough material to (1) write a book, and (2) to necessitate that it be ordered. Seemingly there was too much potential data, not too little. One idea had led to another—reflection, speculation, observation had to be structured. I had justified to myself that teaching not only struck with an unaccustomed force, torment, and thoroughness, but that it was possible to motivate a research project with the goal of grasping the specificity to the experience. I focussed my attention on the reciprocal influences between education and its social field, i.e. the interaction between student and lecturer. I recognize that my project needed to place restrictions on the successive phases of investigation to give them clear focus.

In the first chapter to the genetic text I define the general topic, afterwards I must choose more specific sub-issues. The first of these, in practice, was 'Who are the students?' But my approach was dialogistic—the question became: 'Who receives this undergraduate learning and how?' and 'What significance does this have for employing a model of teaching?' This is a study in educational structuralism: What are the initial givens upon which the teaching depends? In the first chapter I had expressed my personal horror that the learning process was not going anywhere. The needed development of person and thought was absent. In the second chapter I am more concrete and specific. I am looking at a mirror: the students and lecturers are (I presuppose) to a large degree what they take over from each other. Students are taught, lecturers become (to a significant degree) their action. One's 'teaching identity' is interactional and dialectical: I claim that symbolic interactionalism supports me in these assumptions. While studying the following chapter it is essential to realize that the beginning teacher saw these things and grappled thereby with his situation. The context is the discovery of circumstantial learning: the first rude recognition that the teacher is only what his students let him be. While, I do not believe that the students are a *tabula rasa* who can be imprinted in every which way, I do not want to be accused of the opposite standpoint that the students are responsible for the undergraduate program's limitations. In reality the factors that determine the college's results include both the teachers' training, ability, and willingness to work, and the students' attitudes, norms,

openess to change; as well as cultural-historical developments which influence knowledge, work, and motivation. The issue is not one of responsibility, but of how each group brings certain givens to the interaction. The givens as such are not crucial, what is essential are their *potential interaction* and the choices which can be (are) made.

How was the chapter pieced together? The general use I made of grounded research and co-researchers is known (see Part One Chapter 2). But informants often are not representative of the group researched, and this factor posed methodological problems. I began with the students because they were the first element to the teaching puzzle I learned to know well, probably because they were the most approachable, obviously present, and changed the most. But my project was not an 'objective evaluation' of the undergraduate college, but more an action research project to define what teaching ought to become. The co-operation between myself and my student co-researchers was based upon that goal. The agreement to work together rested on a mutual desire to define our teaching-learning activity. We endeavored to achieve a self-understanding wherein we could recognize the process of learning, as we had sensed it ought not to be, and even more important, but initially also less clear, as we discovered it ought to be. Because this was our goal, the emphasis is not on the information collected for the second (or third) chapter of the genetic text for its own sake. We wanted to know what the evaluative and descriptive data could tell us about teaching; what it was and what it should be. Our problem was to discern if our goals were contaminating our observing. The learning process of the co-researchers, we soon discovered, was more influenced by participation in the research project than by the required course of study. But when these chapters were being researched, we did not have a clear explanation of this development. The problem of the representativeness of the collected data demanded some sort of solution. The idea for the procedure used came from Garfinkel's famous use of a simulated interview.

We would recaste the results drawn from the coded materials into a simulated interview and investigate how students, who knew nothing of our project, reacted to it. The actual chronology was: (1) collect data (interview undergraduates, collect student documents); (2) develop a code for this material paying attention to attitudes towards discussion and thought—analyze the implicit principles to the code; (3) write a simulated interview based upon the results of the coding; (4) let graduate students read the 'interview' and ascertain its level of verisimilitude. In the following chapter, I have put the interview first, and the results of the coding (presented as the analysis coupled to the interview) second. This rhetorical choice was made to let the reader control our reconstruction of student attitudes, before he is confronted with our fairly radical analysis. Finally, I provide a passage where I discuss the educational significance of the results. This last discussion restates my question about teaching: what is the process of teaching I am attempting to realize?

2

Student: What did you learn? What can you learn?

What happens to students in a leftist school: what happens to education, not with the radicals defeated as happened in most countries, but with radicalism victorious? What happens to students in such an enviroment? We are accustomed to speak of education in terms of its abstract contents. We know what one is supposed to 'learn' in a particular school, but ignore what one 'becomes' by studying there. What happens when a significantly wealthy undergraduate student body linked to a progressive college gains self-rule? Many advocates of educational reform have wanted to see this happen, but have had to define the goal as utopian in the current circumstance.[1] We have had, in Holland, ten years experience with a reformist politics which came unusually close to producing schooling in a democracy without poverty. One man—one vote; a minimum of social injustice. What has occurred is worth knowing about. The preconditions sound almost too good to be true. And the results are perhaps too sobering to be so.

I set out, in this chapter, to evaluate what is really learned, not just formally retained for testing, but actually internalized and put to use later, by the students. What sort of world do the students come to take for granted, affirm, reaffirm? By asking, 'What sort of society are the schools?' I investigate their formative qualities. The so-called hidden curriculum (what the teacher/school assume about life) and student modeling (taking on mental/character traits of fellow students or of teachers) play a great role. Not the specific incidents of the schooling are so crucial, but the common attitudes and social conventions which are formed. My problem has been to ferret out the group norms which the students share with one another. I could not approach this question from out the self-consciousness of the students. All my observations had brought me to the conclusion that the students were little aware of what happened to them in their undergraduate training. When I kept records of what students had said, thought, done in their first year, and asked them if they recognized the data three years later, the response was in the majority of cases negative. I discovered that students often do not recognize either who they have been or how their social-self, past or present, appears to others. The interview material that brought me to these observations became the basis to the *simulated interview* of this chapter. *The analysis* resulted from the effort to understand both how the students developed and why they were such a poor source of information about themselves. The discussion *Which body of knowledge?* asks what are the educational possibilities of the target group which the interviewee epitomizes. Form and content are inseparable in education: which knoledge and which didactics are inseparable questions. The subsequent reflection *Requirements banished, electives trumpeted* describes how the radical pedagogics mirror the student situation. I am not trying to argue which came first, the student or the school, but to indicate that they share a parallel, complementary, identity.

a. A Simulated Interview

My sources for constructing this 'ideal type' were three-fold. I kept records of student statements, term papers, behavior in meetings, and confronted students with their own ideas and functioning several years later. Only to discover that at least half of my subjects seemed to remember little, to nothing, of the specifics of their own actions. Secondly, I stimulated some twenty students, over a three year period, to dedicate their senior thesis to remembering, investigating, finding words for, their college experience. Thirdly, my work as a graduate lecturer made it possible for me to collect information from students who were at least several years (it's an entrance requirement) out of college. I have chosen this last perspective for the illustrative text which follows, because this group was the most verbal, and representative, having done their undergraduate training throughout the country. I have verified the results by letting a sample of students (graduate and under-graduate) read the interview (not the analysis) and criticise it, in the event of faults in the verisimilitude[2]. The results of this control have been remarkably positive: many have even insisted that it must be a 'real interview,' and not a simulation. They are wrong on that point.

A psychologist interviews a personnel worker who has been admitted for graduate study. The stated purpose of the interview is to study the backgrounds of admitted students, and to use the information later to evaluate the results of the course.

The interviewee is an advisor to a large mental hospital. He is a School of Social Work graduate (1975) where he worked on projects during his last year: his diploma states that he is specialized in social work, but in reality he studied 'alienation,' 'exploitation,' and 'revolutionary theory.' He took his present job immediately after finishing his studies.

Q. 'Why do you now want to continue your studies after working for five years?'

A. When I first began working I was convinced that lots was going to change in mental hospitals. Dennendaal had proved that alternative help was possible, and had also shown the risks which one encountered when one tried to implement it[3]. I was convinced that my boss had made too much show, and that with subtler methods that I could achieve lots. My job was to supervise the apprentice nurses: just the position where one could organize the greatest group of personnel for progressive change. The problem with the strategy, I thought, was that Dennendaal had not be sufficiently democratized. The nurses had not really been involved in the change from the ground up; they didn't understand what the goals could achieve, because they had not experienced the right sort of change in their own role. They had remained 'lower personnel' where all the decisions were still made by the psychologists. Full of enthusiasm I began to organize the nurses upon the basis of a radical democracy within the hospital. But it became evident very quickly that the nurses were not very interested in being organized in fighting for more participation.'

Q. 'You were disappointed?'

A. 'Yeah, I really felt myself let down. I took part in the attempts to unionize the nurses. I took part in diverse meetings to get a union of nurses going and organized. But at those meetings I met fellow social school graduates. It was good to see one another, and we had the same disappointments. We really had support from one another. But after a while less and less people came. I tried to organize

everyone. Called all the members up before meetings. I was the most active. And I really wanted to make something of it. But it petered out.'

Q. 'Did you remain active?'

A. ''Up to last year I was still trying to get that club together. But there was no interest any more. Several of the initiators were busy with further study: they had decided to flee social work. You see that a lot now that people do not see any goals any more in social work. You've tried everything and really given it your all, but it doesn't help. After a while, you've had enough of all the failures. You want to do something else. And your private life begins to suffer. You always come home in a bad mood. No one can take that for long.'

Q. 'You'd had enough?'

A. 'You can say that again! You look about you and see what's happening. You work yourself to death—I worked sixty hours per week for years. And what does it amount to? The mental hospital became more and more hierarchical. The democratization that was achieved only touched the higher employees: I became a member of the management, where all policy was discussed with the head nurses from the wards and reviewed. My own position had become better, but the nurses were just as shut out of real decision making as ever. And I was caught in a double bind. Just as long as I shared responsibility within the management I gained more and more influence. After a while, I had a really strong position. I really got my grip on the situation. But I quickly noticed that if nurses caught word of impending decisions, everyone looked to me first. My ability to influence policy rested upon one precondition: that I keep my opinions to management meetings and not go shouting my mouth off in the wards—where, given my responsibilities, I have almost no reason to go anyhow.'

Q. 'You work in a small circle and attend a lot of meetings?'

A. 'That's a pretty good description of it. I cannot complain—I earn o.k. and the job doesn't demand too much of me. But I cannot accept the purposelessness of it—it has no meaning for me—no significance.'

Q. 'What does that mean for you—'significance,' 'meaning'?'

A. 'Its means the feeling that when you look about you that what you are doing has importance—that it is a part of an important process of development—of liberation. So now when I help friends, I really know that something's happening that needs to occur. I have a friend, he's got the kid alone at home. His wife has left him and the kid to become an artist in Greece. They married very young and she discovered that being married and having a kid was nothing for her. He understood, but looking after the child is a big practical problem. Now when I come there I can help—I babysit the child a couple of evenings a week so Jan (the friend) can follow a course in social work (part-time) where he's enrolled. He's doing 'psychiatric social work' so he can better bring up the boy; after all he had never planned to bring up a kid alone and now he needs a lot of support and help. Also financially—he works part-time, follows the course, and is 'house man.' Now when you can do something for him, you've helped.'

Q. 'Helping friends is very important to you?'

A. 'When you see how people relate to one another it's terrifying. Most people are only after money. Their only motivation is still a bigger house. When you see how much some people have, your really get sick. Just because you've followed a more 'élitaire' course of study, you earn more. It's too insane; you get the chance to

take the most interesting and freest courses, and then you are even paid more afterwards! I see at the hospital that the head psychologist does exactly the same work I do-he hasn't done any therapy in years. We're both administrators, and trouble-shooters in conflict situations. I see that he earns half as much again as I do—it makes me mad. And Jan has always had to work for his bread. He had no chance to study. And once he was married, they never had the money to think of buying a house or anything like that.

Q. 'Inequality in incomes bothers you a lot?'

A. 'It is so humiliating that people are treated like that. When I compare Jan to our head psychologist, Jan is every bit as much a fine person—a finer self. How can you defend that he lives in two rooms and the psychologist in a big villa? How do you defend that he has to work himself to death in stupid temporary jobs, when the psychologist is as free as could be?

Q. 'How do you feel people, society treat you?'

A. 'I've more than my share of hard breaks. My girl friend left me about two years ago. I cannot really blame her—I always came back from my work with a sour face. I just didn't enjoy things any more. When we met we were both students, I was always cheerful. I loved to go out—to the movies, to jazz concerts, to parties. We really had good times together. But after I had had the job for a couple of years, I began talking of nothing but. I became so boring and nothing but a mass of hang-ups. Then we got problems. I wanted the wrong things from her. I wanted a safe haven at home, away from all the disasters of work. She, rightfully, protested that she had a life of her own. It was absurd that she should always be there every evening to help me with my frustrations. I was demanding that she give up her life for me. She sought a freer way of living. She wanted to have other relationships; and I couldn't accept that at all. She was supposed to be there for me. I was dreadfully egoistic—but what do you expect, I was brought up to have those ideas about the roles of men and women.'

Q. 'How did the relationship end?'

A. 'Carla became active in the feminist movement and became more and more critical of what I was demanding. I finally joined a men's discussion group. But by then it was too late. We had grown too far from each other. She wanted a new life—where she felt herself more respected. She found that I dominated too much. Whenever I tried to tell her anything—I tried to read a bit, in that phase, and then tell her about it—everytime I tried to discuss something I'd read, she felt that I was 'instructing ' her, that I was arrogant and had no respect for her concerns. I think we really are a good match, but circumstances just messed it all up. She's much happier now—less obligated. She sees and meets who she wishes.'

Q. 'Freedom is very important to you?'

A. 'It's why I want to do the course now. I want to be independent of all the 'bosses.' Now because I only have a School for Social Work degree, I am bossed about. I want to be able to take my positions on things and see them respected. Now when the first and best university graduate comes along, his suggestion is followed and my work is set aside.'

Q. 'And in the personal sphere?'

A. 'I've always been someone who helps others. I am only free when we are all free. Just as long as someone like Jan gets a raw deal, everyone else's freedom is relative. And you see him now developing so fast. He reads faster than I did when

I was studying and can make so many connections between the literature and what happens around him. He's really one of the best. But he didn't have the chances when he was younger. Look at me. I come from a good middle-class home. I had all the opportunities. When I was young I could buy records when I wanted; I could have the Levis that were in style when I wanted. I still remember when jeans came in. And when we all had Bryl cream in our hair. And the first vacations in a foreign country. When I was at school I could always do those things. I had the possibilities to enjoy things. I did what was in and could permit that. It was great fun. I was at a rock-and-roll party a couple of weeks ago. It was great to feel the old days back again for a moment. Not that they're really back, but the records and atmosphere really brought up lots of memories. They even wanted to have an old American car parked at the door, but the party was in the evening so no one would have seen it anyway. But I had a youth where I didn't have to fight for every dime; where I could do all the things one did.

Q. 'You had a pretty happy childhood?'

A. 'Nothing really to complain about. The normal problems in puberty, breaking away from home, but no 'traumas.' I was the second child. My brother had to fight for every bit of freedom. But by the time I was ready to ask for the same things, the battle was all over with. I never had much contact with my brother, or with my younger sister for that matter. We see each other now a couple of times per year, but we do not have very much to tell one another. We've all gone our own ways. And we never had to fight so hard against my parents that we formed a block together against them.'

Q. 'And a group with them?'

A. 'No, the bonds were never that close. I always found my peers more important than being at home. We were all a gang together—had the same experiences and expectations. We were young and didn't see that society was such a horrible conflict. I only learned how much exploitation and injustice there is when I went to the School of Social Work. Now, when I look at my old friends I see how little of people's capacities get developed in a capitalist society. I am one of the few that have escaped the drudgery—the same old pattern of marrying, 'settling down,' and 'having kids.' Almost no one has any freedom now. They're all sitting in their apartments dead tired at the end of the day, working themselves to death for a boss who couldn't care less. But I had luck. I left home and became conscious of how the society works.'

Q. 'How did you choose your subject?'

A. 'It was really by chance. I had done my h.a.v.o.; my parents wanted me to do the h.b.s.-b as my brother had done, but I wasn't motivated to do that[4]. All that work—all the stupid facts to learn by heart. No, I'd seen how my brother had worked himself to death for that silly diploma—that's no way to live. I wanted to enjoy myself—to make something of my chances. I went out a lot—had lots of friends, it was really a great period in my life. No worries, no problems. And with the h.a.v.o., I never had to do anything. They didn't demand anything of us. When it was finished, I had to do something. And a niece was at the School of Social Work in Utrecht. I'd visited her a few times and liked her life. She had lots of friends, and they all were very involved in the democratization. I didn't really understand that all so much then, but I saw that the students had a whole other life than at the h.a.v.o. Everyone was really involved. They came together to

discuss their studies till late into the night. They were really alive. So I went there.'

Q. 'And how were your student years?'

A. 'Great. My eyes were opened to things. I became politically conscious. I no longer was the victim of every trick of the government or industry. I learned to see through things and to understand how the society really is. And we were a great group. We worked from the second year on with ten of us. We knew each other throught and through. Those times and that style of life are over now. Pity for the students who are now studying. But we were optimistic. We could really get along with one another.'

Q. 'Has that changed—getting along?'

A. 'In work you don't have time really to get to know one another. My job is to solve conflicts, not to make friends. I find it marvelous to see how I can arrange things so the work can again be done to everyone's satisfaction. It's a great feeling to be able to get people out of situations where they have no future and set them back on the right path where they can enjoy their work. And at the least you can save people from self-destruction. It's terrible how people can go 'kaputt' from bad cooperation in their work. It does me good when I see people who walked around with hollow cheeks and white faces a month ago at their jobs looking obviously relieved. You can often help people. But to get things done, you have to know how to approach everybody. I'm not there to be buddies, but to go get someone transferred or to arrange for an early retirement.

Q. 'Work is functional, not personal?'

A. 'In a capitalist society, work is always going to be dishonest. We're all there to sell ourselves, and the management is buying people. A pretty rotten trade—slavery. But you've got to make the best of situations. I at least stretch the rules to help the employees. The nurses know that I'll always do for them what I can. But it's not like at the school. We're not there to be honest, we're there to get the work done. That means that I cannot talk to everyone. I have no time to empathize with everybody. I can better spend my time improving the objective working conditions. Do you know that at most hospitals they do not even follow the c.a.o. [collective labor contract]? The nurses have the right to at least ten hours free between shifts. Most places don't give it!'

Q. 'Isn't it difficult, working like that?'

A. 'Friday is always a difficult evening. You come home and the week's work is done. And you ask yourself, now what? I live alone, so there's no one there to cook for me. I have to run like all hell to get my grocery shopping done. And I'm too tired to go out immediately after work. Later I'll go to a bar, or the films. But from six to eight, I'm always down. I have to switch over from the pace of work to being free again. And all the impressions of work come up in me. Then I'm not so happy with life. I can get quite sad.'

Q. 'Are you often depressed?'

A. 'Not really. Three times a year or so I really feel myself 'down.' Then I just lie on my bed for a few days. I ring in sick and stay home. Then I don't see anyone for a week or so and it's over with. At those moments, I really have the feeling that my life is passing me by. I feel myself dreadfully alone. I think that no one cares about me.'

Q. 'You really feel rotten?'

A. 'I keep asking myself how people can want children in this society. Then I feel my

need for attention—and how I don't get it. Everyone is so alienated that they all have to dash about. We don't have the time for one another—to really see one another. We're not attentive. I just lie there and don't see any reason any more to get up and run about. It falls away after so many days—the paralyzed feeling. And then I can begin again. I'm always busy at my job, and I was always the most active in the nurses' union. I've always given my all in what I did. That's the only way to really do something—do it all the way. But sometimes the energy is used up. And then one's alone.'

Q. 'Loneliness is a big problem?'

A. 'Everyone is lonely—no one can solve it for you. They're all in the same boat with you. Of course, talking about it helps. I've had a lot of support from friends. But just the same, when I get depressive I cannot respond to anything they say. I'm too far away. Everybody has their own life—I cannot change that. The best discussion group you can find remains talking—it's not being one together.'

Q. 'And sex?'

A. 'I've never had much difficulty finding partners. I've always been a social type.'

Q. 'Work makes you lonely, then?'

A. 'Exactly. That's where you've got to fight to be respected. And that's where everybody is out to get done what they want. There's never a minute's total peace there. You always have to watch out for what's going on. And too many things go wrong. Not just for me—for everybody. No one wants to stand there naked, humiliated, surrounded by all their mistakes. So we all have to leave one another enough in peace to make life bearable. But it's no way to be friends. And it's hard with the high expectations that all your colleagues have of you. You really have to work at it—there's too much work and too few people to do it. And you cannot just let things go their own way. Too many people are too dependent upon you. And then you make mistakes. You promise someone a house who cannot get one, or you arrange for a transfer that then doesn't go through. Then all the criticism is of you—not the higher-ups who are really responsible.'

Q. 'I've greatly enjoyed our interview. Your honesty has really struck me. But unluckily we don't have so much time left to us. And I do want to know what you think your new study is going to mean for you.'

A. 'I hope to find a group of people here with whom I can exchange experiences, and try and decide what I should do now. Work has been disappointing. You just cannot find a large group of people who are willing to really invest their time and energy in union work. We have to seek a new approach, new goals that will really motivate people. Otherwise I do not see how I can stay in this sort of work. It has to be about something. I'm looking for a situation where I can talk about what I've done and all the problems one meets in one's work, and where I can search together with other people for really progressive possibilities for our futures.'

b. The Analysis

The interviewee is very strongly 'other directed,' and seems to have very little traditional sense of 'self.' He has very little awareness of doing what he chooses to do, of possessing a motivation or his own experiences. He is highly social and finds what 'others' do more important than what he especially wants. His problem now with his

work is that the 'others' are not giving him a positive impression of himself, and a clear message as to what he should do. When he attended the School of Social Work, the group of students in which he participated seems to have defined his interests and identity. He mentions having 'become politically conscious' in his schooling, but leaves this utterly vague. What he really seems to have carried over from the school is a sense of 'belonging.' 'Belonging' to the subculture which we can call social work, in its broadest sense. This sense of belonging meant for him participating in a collective identity where he could find meaning, purpose, identity. He has never tried to stand alone, or to seek individual identity. His search is to belong to a group that defines a sense of purpose in which he can find support and self-justification. For better or worse, he is not independent; he needs the group to function. The norms of the group are his guidelines in life. His seemingly altruistic statements of always doing the most, of calling up everyone to come together for meetings, are a reflection of his exceptionally large need for the group to function. Its disappearance threatens him literally with a sort of identity loss, almost a disintegration of character. Remarkably enough, he seems to have many more problems with his loss of a group within which to work than in the ending of his relationship with Carla (more about this later).

The interviewee's sense of 'freedom' corresponds to his definition of self. He wants to be 'free'—this seems to mean have 'free time.' Freedom is the opportunity to relax, go out, attend parties, etc. While he claims to be politically oriented, his definition of freedom could not be more apolitical. It is not really a social concept for him, but a group occurrence. It is what the 'gang' does together. Through his inability to set his own norms or goals, he fell into a vacuum at the moment that the expectations of his study group no longer seemed realizable. Loss of group is loss of self—depression. He is now seeking a new course of study to gain entry to a new group, and thus a new identy. But he is not willing to give anything real in order to achieve that identity. Identity is for him a consumption article, which one should be able to pick up just as easily as all other goods. He has no appreciation of how difficult it is to achieve any real sense of personal integrity or one's own personal style of thinking. In fact, what we have here resembles David Riesman's 'other directed man' who is a member of the lonely crowd[5]. The most important difference with the analysis of the fifties is that progressive politics is insisted upon as the ideological form of the personality.

The interviewee's use of politics is his means of comparing himself to others. Something which he is constantly doing. Politics is the most important 'attitude' of the subject. He uses it to judge others. Someone who he does not like will be 'Right' and someone he likes is 'Left.' But his definitions of these terms are restatements of social class (in the sociological sense) positions. He is positive towards persons of a lower social status, and aggressive towards those of a higher. This is not a 'Marxist' social analysis, but a very personal form of jealousy. What he is displaying is the very well-known social pattern of the lower middle class, which resents all higher-ups and patronizes lower-downs. His friendship with Jan seems to be based upon his narcissistic pleasure: the interviewee has always 'had it better.' But he cannot gloat over his privileges, he expresses them in an inverted form. He is very aware of his 'happy youth'—of having had lots of positive status as a youth. His way of maintaining that feeling is by 'helping' Jan—who by being 'helped' constantly lets the interviewee feel his special importance as having been so 'happy.' Jan's problems are the interviewee's possibility of reminding himself of how good he has had it, while hiding his self-contentment behind a mask of 'doing good.'

In his statements about people the interviewee is comparing himself to the other. What interests him is how much wealth each person possesses. He uses himself as an absolute norm: if you are poorer, you are 'underprivileged'; if you are richer, you are an 'exploiter.' There is no broader political or economic basis to his using himself as an absolute norm for judging the welfare of everyone in society; it is based upon the pure egoism of his self-centered manner of seeing the world. He never even doubts if he can use himself as an absolute norm. This is the arrogance of his social group. He belongs to a large social group, which assumes that it has the right to project its experiences and values upon the rest of society. This occurs somewhat inevitably, in that the group is so 'other directed' and simply refuses to acknowledge boundaries. This leads to a cultural arrogance that is very striking. The group assumes that the films it likes, the furniture it chooses, and the vacations it seeks are the best; the rest is either kitsch or 'élitaire.' 'Politics' is not an abstract manner of studying a society. It is a myth behind which lurks social arrogance. This myth is probably the most important veil for this group. Since 'cybernetics' has replaced the bank director with the technocrat, as a model of social success, 'politics' has replaced the ideologies of Babbit[6]. The interviewee occupies a middle position in society. He is neither rich nor poor, and realizes as much. He has understood that the leaders in his society are those who possess and manipulate information. While the possession and manipulation of funds was the ideal image for the early-twentieth-century member of the lower middle class, this has changed. Today it is the possession of social power—knowledge, information, the means to direct, or at least influence, social planning. This capacity is called 'politics.' Actually, it has nothing to do with mass participation in decision making, but is a function of the prerogatives of the social elite. The interviewee constantly compares himself with the members of the elite that he meets (the psychologist, management, team members) and resents their power. He wants to have his decisions carried out; he wants to see his will done. He is very status aware, in the sense of who has which position in the pecking order. He wants to study further in order to have more power. He definitely possesses a will to be quite authoritarian. But his training and social position prevent him from giving orders. He reacts to this with jealousy and resentment. He is explicitly very anti-authoritarian. This because he so resents the prerogatives of others. When he gets power (as a member of the management, for instance), he immediately switches arguments and claims that he uses it for the general good!

The interviewee has a very weak 'work ethic.' He makes it clear that his reason for doing the h.a.v.o. was to avoid having to work too hard. Also when he describes his undergraduate Social Work School experience, he merely emphasizes how important peer group contacts were for him. If he had been forced to work very hard there, he would certainly have mentioned it, as it would have been a fundamental reversal of his social functioning. He is used to a relatively high level of laziness. He has had to work long hours in his job, but never mentions that the work was demanding in terms of content. He makes it clear that it was the quantity of work that was difficult, and his relatively lowly position whereby his decisions often did not stick. Nowhere do we get the impression that the interviewee has ever accepted a challenge in content and had to meet it. Experience teaches us that the abilities that are needed to do his job are quite simple.

The old Protestant idea of mastering a profession is utterly foreign to the subject[7]. He has never passed through an apprentice/journeyman/masterworker process. Thus, while he was willing to work long hours, the actual demands that have ever been made upon him do not amount to all that much. This means that he cannot value his

work because he has mastered a 'profession.' Professionalization came very late in his field (in the sixties) and is very superficial. Only insofar as the group worked long hours—because that is what one did for the 'cause'—has he experienced a work ethic. That 'cause' was the establishing of the group's social identity as a norm for the rest of society (what I called 'politics' in the last passage). The group needed to prove itself, certainly as the society at large gave little credence in its aims to be so important. The social workers have fought the general skepticism of the population to prove how necessary they are. In order to impose themselves, they had to create markets for their work. What they were doing was convincing people that they needed this new service. The interviewee is unsure of the significance of his work; he is not really sure of himself or if his own position makes any sense. He is looking for confirmation of himself in just this aspect. And he has decided to study further to gain that security. He will be willing to take unpaid leave, or make other sacrifices of this type, to achieve some sense of security. But if one asked him to really master a profession, one would be demanding the impossible. That would be to ask him to identify with his own capacities and to study in the traditional sense. He has never done an individual study. He has always worked in groups, and has never had to accept personal responsibility for the work he did. His school experiences have been unthreatening and supportive, but also unchallenging and ineffective. School, for him, is the pursuit of peer group confirmation, not learning. He has never borne individual responsibility for a particulair content that had to be learned. To ask him to 'master' an idea, a book, or a techique is to demand that he utterly redefine his whole sense of what school is.

For the interviewee, peer group relationships are more important than personal relationships. The psychologist tries to probe the interviewee to discover what personal experience have been important to him, but to no avail. The interviewee insists that his lack of peer group support in his work is much more the key to his depressions than his inability to, for instance, achieve and maintain a stable sexual relationship. The interviewee has repressed his emotions concerning the failure of his relationship with Carla by trivializing their breaking-up. They were really a good couple, but his problems with work demanded too much of her. He implies that a relationship will work only so long as neither partner has problems, and good times are galore. Here he displays a pattern that has often been observed in recent years—the expectation that many young people seem to have that a personal relationship of great intimacy and importance can exist without conflict and problems. He displays no resentment at having 'lost' his girl friend. It would seem that she ended the relationship. It is only logical to understand this as a 'rejection' by her of him. Given his whole sensitivity to the opinions of others, one would expect that this would be quite a blow. But at just such a moment, the strongest defense mechanisms take effect. He refuses to feel that he has been rejected. His anger remains utterly camouflaged for himself. He trivializes the ending of the relationship in order to retain his self-image. Furthermore, it is unclear how important the relationship ever was. It is very possible that it was merely an aspect to his peer code: to the expectations he shared. Whether he, as a particular individual had a relationship with that girl as a separate entity is unclear. It is very possible that their relationship was nothing more than a carrying out of what was expected of them, where a role was simply enacted that was 'as it should be.' There is no obvious depth of feeling over the splitting up. There are two possible explanations here: (1) that the feelings of rejection were too threatening and have been repressed; or even more extreme, (2) any feeling of per-

sonal contact is untenable for the interviewee, no real personal feelings were ever permitted to occur during the 'relationship.'

It is important, in this context, to mention the interviewee's contact with his parents and siblings. Here again, he asserts that the peer group is far more important to him than the personal contact with the family. Furthermore, it is obvious that the peer group is experienced just as a group, not as particularly deep friendships. He talks about the group repeatedly, never about certain persons. He sees his h.a.v.o. period as a model of happiness—a period where work was undemanding, free time for social life was readily available, and 'adult' cares or responsibilities were absent. The interviewee idealizes his puberty; and sees the years 15-18 (approximately) as the model of how his life should be. This choice is quite common: it is a mirroring of the norms of the 'youth culture,' and accurately reflects the message of much advertising. We see here that the interviewee's claim to stand above cultural manipulation is a very inaccurate self-appraisal. Finally, the sexual attitudes of the interviewee would seem to be very immature. Sex for him seems merely to be a question of popularity. Any real appreciation of more personal feelings or forms of relationship would seem lacking. Given the interviewee's attitudes, he will seek group participation, where he can lose 'himself' in the group's activities. He will be very 'emotional' in the group, but his feelings are really very superficial. The group is his emotional milieu—and this is a paradox. On the one hand, he acts-out whatever the group demands; on the other hand, this 'acting' is his emotional existence. A real personal self, a sense of intimacy, and contact with his 'own' feelings are either all very weak or lacking. Just as long as he can interact within a group, he will have few emotional problems. If he actually has to react to a definite individual person, he will have great difficulties. The group provides him with his emotional life and with his escape from emotions.

The interviewee is essentially passive. He has portrayed himself as a purely passive figure in his own life. He belonged to his peer group, rather than chose it. He took up a course of study by accident. The school opened his eyes; he did not open them. Carla ended the relationship. The group has not gone on with the union. The nurses have not reacted to the initiative. Throughout, he is (almost) the victim, of what the world decides ('I've had my share of hard breaks'). And now he wants to study further, not to change himself through self-discipline, but to be changed by again being attached to a group.

To return to the psychoanalytic imagery: we can call him 'anal' in his relationship to groups. He tries to store them up, and will put nothing of himself into the group. His personality form is one of trying to collect enough of others to stuff his emptiness full. ('We are the hollow, we are the stuffed men'—T.S. Eliot[8].) The essence of the anal phase is its passivity—its confusion of activity and passivity. He thinks he is doing something when he lets the group into him. He thinks that he has a personality when he is jealous, compares himself to others, or displays the attitude necessary to belong. When he is what the 'other' demands, he thinks he really is. He is turned inside out psychologically: the social is more inner than any self. The 'other' is internalized, and any 'self' neglected. Peer group belonging is more real for the interviewee than any experiencing. If you ask him what he has felt, seen, done you ask an impossible question—which will remain unanswered. All mature personality will be rejected for the childish role of dependence. His concept of freedom is that of possession—of being possessed. What he seeks, is a group who will determine him and reward him for his

passivity (willingness to be determined). But he wants to master the situation—he wants to command his passivity. He wants to order others to fill him up. His incessant demand will be for others to serve him—to give him attention, to make his being. Thus he will terrorize others in his passivity. He may even be sadistic in his absolute demand to be formed and filled. His fulfilling is a passitivity that is, paradoxically, very demanding towards others. Thus he will see himself as serving Jan, but in reality Jan must be there to tell him how 'helpful' he is and how 'marvelous' all his good intentions are. If the other does not serve him, if the other does not dote on his qualities, he will denounce them as politically untrustworthy. Only when he is the passive center of attention is he 'happy'; when not, he will be aggressive. Thus, this is a highly manipulative person whose psychic behavior with others is very egoistic. His actual development of self is quite primitive, and his seemingly neurotic structures are quite deeply entrenched. He would be a very difficult person to change in any significant manner.

c. Which Body of Knowledge?

One cannot teach a body of knowledge 'any which way.' 'Subjects determine a particular style of learning. Obviously a laboratory science, a discussion of classical philosophy, and a Rogerian exercise in 'learning to listen' make different demands on student and instructor. Many subjects can be taught in more than one way, most subjects are, in fact, to be understood in several radically different fashions. Classical wisdom can be called reactionary dribble; personal growth may be found to be time spilling; scientific expertise is perhaps mere jargon. Lecturing is not *sui generis* but takes place in a context where goals are defined. However hidden these objectives may be, a practical skill, a reflective capacity, an analytic ability, a creative development, or whatever other proficiency, or combination of competences, is sought for. It is ridiculous to think that everyone can learn everything equally easily. Thus, what can be taught to personnel workers, as typified by the interviewee, in a graduate course? One could begin with which subjects could interest him, given his social/psychological, characteristics; or could commence by describing his motivation or social behavior and conclude with what sort of learning (fields of knowledge) could result. The form (the occurrence of schooling) and the content (course material) have to coincide with one another. The interview example and the psychological interpretation of it have indicated the problems one faces. Most of the known models of teaching, I submit, will falter when applied to this group. I shall indicate how the four broadest categories of teaching, differentiated on the basis of the sort of knowledge and the complementary teacher behavior, would each attempt to work with these students, and what the results would seem likely to be[9].

Classical education is quite hopeless in this situation. The epitome of such instruction is the Anglo-American liberal arts college. Such a school interests itself in the broad development of its students. Its goal is to educate a student in the widest sense. It is an anti-specialist education, and a learning to understand the entire intellectual development of the modern period. Obviously it is impossible to know all the discoveries that the sciences have made; but one can know what manner of analysis, which problems, and what sort of results have emerged in the various areas of learning. Classical education seeks to inform a citizen to be able to judge the developments and

alternatives of his society. It is oriented towards individual responsibility, based upon individual knowledge and ability to judge. The interviewee has never carefully examined one field of learning—not to think that he has studied the whole spectrum of modern learning. The liberal arts college, if it earns its name, must pay alert attention to the modern disciplines. Of course liberal education has for goal, the discovery of the great repository of Western knowledge which the great classics contain. But not out of an antiquarian spirit; the aim is to develop the individual's spirit of inquiry, critical judgment, and sense of human excellence. Liberal education succeeds if it defines fundamental problems and equips the student to judge current issues. Man is to learn to examine ideas with an active habit of mind. Liberal Arts education equips the student to ask better, more far reaching, and historically acuter questions. The succes of the course of study emerges when the student is confronted with an immediate, contemporary problem and can sift throught the masses of data until he defines specific crucial issues which will have a lasting import for man's existence. Liberal arts schooling instructs the student in the paradigm of each of the sciences, and gives him a real feel for how each discipline works. The student described in the interview, has always picked and chosen as he pleased. He has never found it important to really understand the differences between the various social scienes, not to mention his lack of knowledge of art, philosophy, history, or literature. His 'knowledge' is a grab bag of social science'facts.' If one carefully examines the curriculum of his undergraduate education the conclusion is inevitable that his schooling has been utterly one-sided (only applied social science) and that the methods of inquiry of the subjects studied have been ignored. So-called practical information (what do you do in this, or that, situation) has taken the place of learning any intellectual tradition. He was not taught to think, or urged to form an independent faculty of judgment, but to perform as was expected of him. His lack of academic mastery is so extreme that he could not even read and comprehend the research upon which his 'facts' are based, let alone do the research himself. Furthermore, this student has never developed any sense of lasting values or questions. Classical education is at its strongest when it discusses the development of modern society through the last several centuries. It fosters an insight in the student with which he can place new developments, and understand them from a broad orientation. This sort of historical sense is utterly lacking in the interviewee. He experiences everything as a unique event, occurring now. He is intellectually isolated in the present, without any sense of history. Placing events in context means not being swayed by every fad, but choosing for more permanence and distance in one's thinking. This relationship to the immediate is antithetical to the interviewee. He is modish; and identifies being 'free' or 'really alive' with being utterly taken up in the latest modes. The instantaneous is his milieu—the lasting is foreign to him. Here again, his basic manner of thought is in contradiction to his professed politics. He claims to be historically oriented in his political thinking, but is essentially anti-historical in his manner of experiencing. Thus, the values and goals of classical education would not find any support from the interviewee.

Technological education is also foreign to the interviewee. In this model competency in certain defined abilities is essential. It emphasizes the know-how necessary to do a certain job. In our highly interdependent society, we can prize individuality or freedom as much as we wish, but we are constantly dependent upon one another's skills, and desire to be sure that the other will do his task as expected. The plumber may be as creative as he wishes, but we do not want any leaks or a higher bill than is ab-

solutely necessary. Herein we are quite paradoxical: everyone should have freedom of personal expression, but no one wants anything but the best goods or services at the lowest cost. Thus education must acknowledge the social reality and train people who can work in this society. A firm basis in skills is necessary before any experimentation is really possible. One cannot create out of nothing, and one cannot find work unless one has already mastered the known skills. Education prepares one to be able to participate in society. Beyond the minimums of skill one needs to function, there exists the region of innovation and creativity. First the basis, then the experimental. The interviewee has never accepted these assumptions. He has never learned a basis of skills or knowledge upon which to build further. Quite the contrary, he jumped into the newest innovating at the School of Social Work, and never obtained a training in any of the fundamentals that were acknowledged as the tools of the trade. He has never been tested for his competency in any skills—and would find any examination of his abilities very threatening. The whole emphasis upon behavioral objectives, of defined tasks to be mastered, would be utterly foreign to him. He has never experienced an educational situation where his performances were really tested, and where standards of work were clearly defined. He has studied to 'be politically conscious' or to 'reduce alienation'—goals that cannot be specified or controlled. Thus what he has learned, or what he has done with it in his job, remains purely unclear. He has never accepted any real control over these matters, and would not want to do so now. To accept something like performance contracting (an agreement to master specific controllable skills) would be an utter reversal for him. He would be personally responsible for a defined task, where his fear of failure would emerge. In that he has always worked in groups (School of Social Work) or has sought undemanding circumstances, he has never had to prove himself. This constant avoidance of standards and tests, has left him utterly unsure of what he can or cannot do. Technological education is strong precisely in its individual testing and exacting control of the learning of the student. Such control would deeply menace the interviewee, who has always sought social acceptance and avoided scholastic accountability. Thus the interviewee is utterly unsuited for technological education, and would panic if confronted with it unless the demands were obviously set so low that he was totally unchallenged. And at that moment, he would rightfully complain that the skills that he had to learn were so ridiculously simple that the whole business was a waste of time. The interviewee has made it very clear that he wants to be the master—he wants power and influence in his work. To go back and have to learn the rudiments of a profession (skills) would be humiliating to him. He does not want to be the unknowing student, but the controlling adult. He will not accept being placed in the role of the naive, uneducated figure, even if his actual knowledge earns him the position. His self-confidence is much too easily threatened for him to be able to make use of technological education. Either he will trivialize it and be bored, or he will resent the challenge it poses and become aggressive towards it.

One would expect that personalized education would be more suited to the interviewee. Certainly some aspects of it would appeal to him; such as nongraded instruction and the emphasis upon creativity. Nonetheless, the 'progressive' movement in education is not really matched to his attitudes. 'Progressive education' placed the emphasis upon 'something happening' in the classroom. The student is to experience new situations, thoughts, circumstances, and thereby change. This last, the emphasis upon personal *change,* characterizes this movement and does not represent the interests of the interviewee. Progressive education wanted to stretch the frame of reference of the

student. It assumed that one chooses to take part in a process of developing one's thinking. Piaget's model of concept attainment expresses the goal well: the student passes through accomodation to assimilation. This means that when confronted with something new that he cannot comprehend with his existing structure of thought, he accommodates by modifying or reorganizing that structure. Education means here an openness to changing one's manner of thinking. It is not the collecting of facts, or even applied skills, but the constant process of confronting one's thinking with reality, to see if one's mental grids are adequate. Assimilation has taken place when accomodation has led to new thought process that can deal with what was new and incomprehensible. To learn is to be able to understand greater chunks of reality. A manner of thinking is sought that can see the entire situation—the effort is to be able to encompass everything that exists. Education is the opening of oneself to see the world, and to interact with it. Our interviewed student does not possess any such desire. He does not want to become more complete; he wants social success. He does not want to discover how his thinking is incomplete, inadequate, partial, in order to open his eyes to more aspects of man and society; he wants a model to follow, a group to accept. Progressive education was personalized in the sense that it emphasized individual experiencing, not in the sense that it was laissez-faire. The interviewee wants a school that lets him do exactly what he wants. He will not seek demands, but will avoid them. He is not looking for the challenge of personal change, but the confirmation of belonging to a peer group. He is not motivated by the adventure of discovering the world, but by the need for conformity and security. Dewey's reflection upon education put the emphasis just upon reconstructing experience. Chaotic, unstructured event has no value in learning; what one needs is experience that is understood, that is grasped. To learn is to find adequate expression for event is to be able to discuss, understand, work with circumstance. To undergo things is not the point, the goal is to see them, grasp them, describe them to onself: to reconstruct reality in thought. The reconstruction, then, can be exchanged with others; discussion is made possible. It is experience that has been made speakable that Dewey values. The interviewee will not choose to tell what he has seen, felt, done. He does not want to exist as an individual, as a person amongst others: he seeks a collective identity. Personalized education was created to strengthen individuality and creative thinking; the interviewee has rejected both. Reconstruction threatens him with having a standpoint of his own and that would merely alienate him from the group. Individuality is merely a barrier to belonging for him. And the goal of Dewey's system—control over reality through understanding—is not the interviewee's goal. The latter does not want to control reality, he wants to be filled by it. He is a joiner, not a decision maker. Real responsibility threatens him, while status is necessary to him. He wants the superficial signs of power and responsibility to affirm his personal prestige. But he does not want the real responsibility of choice. He wants to be important, not to achieve anything of itself, but merely to be important. It is the status of power that he seeks, not the real ability to control circumstance. Thus he will constantly pay lip-service to the values of being a decision maker; but this is merely a mythic stance, meant to confirm him in his attractiveness. Actual individual responsibility would terrify him. He has never sought it, and never will. Thus he is here, again, paradoxical; he will complain his whole life over his powerlessness and the slavery of 'capitalism', but would be the last person in the world who would actually desire a change. To complain about powerlessness is what he wants—merely that, to complain about it. Progressive education was meant to gain real individual power, to foster greater personal/political

freedom and responsibility. These goals are not shared by the interviewee.

Finally, we shall examine the interviewee's relationship to interactional education. He is an explicit supporter of this school of Rogers, Illich, Freire, Kohl, and Holt. These are the radical critics of the present school. Modern society they claim is undergoing a fundamental crisis (1960's and 70's), where old values are clearly illegitimate and new ones have not yet taken hold. The old institutions are all hollow, meaningless, and repressive. New freedoms are necessary and old authorities are dismissed. The teacher no better knows what society should become, or what reality is, than do the students. Teachers are present to be supportive, facilitative members of the group. As the past is largely outdated and irrelevant, teachers possess no special 'learning' to be passed on. Teachers, often middle-aged, are more 'settled in' than wise. The group is a goal unto itself; further educational objectives are unnecessary. But what is the group to do? It cannot function by doing absolutely nothing; it cannot be in-and-for-itself, it must undertake some sort of activity. This is the crisis of group-directed education, where the group is its own justification. The interviewee wants desperately to be a member of a group, but he does not want that group to actually make any demands or really to do anything. But, in utter passivity the group will possess no cohesion and will cease to exist. And when it tries to do anything, it will be immediately threatened with flying apart, because it was not formed with any real purpose in mind. The group is purposeful without a real purpose: it looks to be important, but what it actually achieves is utterly vague. But can one keep a collection of people together, assembled without any purpose, and forbidden to do anything? The reversal of goals and means leads to the tragicomic situation of organizing people to do nothing. However much truth there may be in the social or educational criticism of the interactionalist, the problem remains, what is he going to do in the classroom. One can endlessly make students insecure by refusing to provide leadership or the expected authority and letting the students talk about their insecurities, but must not something happen eventually? One can manipulate students to fleetingly play with taboos, so that people touch one another, so that aggression and insecurity come out, so that dependency and loneliness are expressed. But so what? Sensitivity training T-groups have pretty much come and gone without having helped anyone much[10]. To think that one can keep students utterly passive, where their only activity is looking at their own navels, implies an utterly decadent view of man and society. It is also pure conservatism. Only with goals and purpose, with intentionality, do groups of people find cohesion. Only when people want to do something do they stick together. To throw a group of people together purely by chance and tell them to act as a genuine group is monstrous. A group is a collective that has chosen similar goals and to work together. To force that choice, or even worse to falsify it, is utterly destructive, and results in fictitious groups which are through and through dishonest. The interviewee has this sort of group in mind as what he needs. But this is his opium. It is a false security and an empty identity. Because it is merely the outer husk of genuine engagement, it will last only as long as the 'group' persists, and that will not be very long. The group is programmed from outside. It is created by the school, not by its members. It is artificial and unfounded in any deep sense of purpose or belonging. Thus the interviewee can temporarily escape his depressions by submerging himself in such a 'group,' but this experience will leave him still more empty and depersonalized in the long run. Some sort of psychotherapy, in preparation of genuine learning, might help the interviewee. But such a possibility falls outside of the models of teaching I have discussed. If interac-

tional education is, in fact, therapy, and not education at all, then I condemn the shifting of boundaries and muddying of responsibilities. To make therapy a required portion of academic curriculum outside of clinical psychology, without even openly announcing one's intentions, or offering clearly qualified personnel, sounds downright scarey to me.

Given what I have discussed it would seem obvious that a program of study meant for the group typified by the interviewee will be problematic. The resistence to real change will be great, and the (already present) concept of education is counterproductive. The needed breakthrough is to make the relationship between personality and work discussable, so as to able to question the interaction between individual and group existence. Just as long as the reflection on these relationship remains taboo, no real learning will be possible. Just as long as these students project their social identity without understanding it—act as spokesmen for the middle position they represent in society without realizing what is partial to their point of view—they will remain enclosed in themselves, unable to transcend their own social position.

To outgrow the egoism of their subgroup demands not an inner-directed study, where they will in fact clutch ever harder at each other, but a movement outwards to a broader involvement and contact with world, history, and society. Education for this group, more often than not, strengthens them in their social isolation and in their traditional arrogance/moralism. The role of the schools at present is to confirm these people in their middle-class attitudes and position. To isolate them in a particularly middle-class culture, which is characterized by its powerlessness, provincialism, amateurism, and limited perspectives. The ideology of 'being politically conscious' is the ideology of being socially defined where one's own position is morally privileged. The problem is to unmask the myth, and to develop a form of work that is more than the self-serving rationalizations of an undirected, insecure group in the society. But it is only when the group is able to move beyond its passivity to develop serious skills or know-how that the situation can be changed. At present, these students remain talkers with occasional symbolic gestures, rather than concrete workers with defined goals and means. Talking about the crisis in themselves and their profession has become a new status quo. It is demotivating: it is the use of speech to frustrate activity. To bring these students out of their lethargy requires that they discover a social role for themselves in which they can really believe. Then they will want to confront themselves, experience their situation, and not do what they do now—that is, endlessly talk in abstractions without ever really experiencing their own situation or letting it become problematic. Just as long as the myth of social involvement predominates, real contact with one's situation and others will be nearly impossible. The problem is not one of finding an appropriate model of teaching, but of struggling with what is essentially an anti-intellectual social group. Education enters hellish paradoxes when it must work within such a context. The prerequisite for effective work—a receptive student body—is lacking. The values of contemporary social work are antithetical to those of study, investigation, or productive self-criticism. Slavish peer-group attachments defeat the individual involvement that learning requires. Only individual persons can learn. The moment that group experience forbids individual learning, no real education is any longer possible. The interviewee is psychologically incapable of learning. When the school adapts itself to an anti-intellectual culture, it becomes a self-contradiction. Either it insists upon learning, and not merely being a vehicle for peer-group formation, or it endangers its very raison d'être. Illich may get his way—the school could die; but learning will probably go with it. Such a tendency already exists in the founding of courses of study that exist merely

to be social get-togethers, where social conformity is what is learned, and where individual learning is impossible. The interviewee, precisely in his utter banality, is very common, but also a terribly important challenge to learning. To pamper his desires is obviously the one answer I condemn. To confront his unwillingness to learn is the one necessity I wish to insist upon.

d. Requirements Banished, Electives Trumpeted

An ample literature has emerged dealing with the so-called 'crisis' in education. But, remarkably enough, only the school is criticized. It is assumed that schools can corrupt, but not that students can destroy. The school may be socially irresponsible with a curriculum that is repressive, irrelevant, and spiritually perverse, but the students may not have an ideology, represent a social class or vested interests. This rather remarkable vision of a school steeped in its own social significance, but filled with students without social identity, has been accepted as self-evident by the followers of Ivan Illich, as well as by many neo-Marxist critics. Research demonstrates quite the opposite. The most important factor for success in education is one's social position. To see students as passive victims of the 'system' is to view them as utterly naive children, who fail or succeed in school, void of self-consciousness. To paint the situation more in black and white than it is, in order to illustrate my point: It is no coincidence that students mount the barricades the moment the educational system threatens their status. They are defending what they understand to be their interests, which are quite paradoxical. They—again somewhat exaggerated—simultaneously want an open school, easy entrance requirements, few or no exams, and lenient rules on the one hand; and all the traditional rewards of a diploma on the other. Students are for mass education as entrants, and for elite education as graduates.

Fifty years ago, 90 percent of Europeans worked after their thirteenth year; now half remain in school till near their eighteenth. What was once exceptional has become mundane. But the contemporary armies of students (1978) nevertheless expect to be able to get leading jobs when they graduate. The desire for privilege motivates youth to study. The idea that there are so many students because the young love school has been shown to be untrue. While the Dutch youth dislikes school to a disproportionate degree (in comparison to other OECD countries), the push for higher schooling has not suffered in the least. One does not seek higher education for enjoyment, but to safeguard one's social future. The school represents status and social influence, but pretends to be altruistic and humanist. I do not believe that the students are the naive victims of this double role; my observations lead me to think that they know the game being played perfectly well. They are, of course, ambivalent in that they want everybody to have the chance to succeed, while their idea of success is exclusive.

My students have all championed an open-entrance policy, but have all sought 'policy' jobs, finding the mere carrying out of orders beneath them. They are all for equality, but are determined to be more equal than others. The paradox is that of an educational system that claims to be simultaneously democratic and exclusive. Modern higher education pretends to give everyone a fair chance (fair, of course, has many different interpretations) and to prepare students for leading positions in society. What I have witnessed is an effort to avoid the paradox through ideology: the claim is made that the students form a democratic (and/or socialist) vanguard. The students con-

tribute to the elite that will end all elites, and thus is not an elite at all. This lets one have one's cake and also eat it: one is socially exclusive (can seek leadership roles) and also democratic. But the spectacle of an economic crisis in which the political parties have all matched one another in irrelevance and ineffectiveness has knocked the wind out of the political solutions. A tendency amongst the students is to take their elite status for granted and to demand the training and know-how to be able to perform in socially privileged positions. But the teaching staff often refuses to respond to these demands. It is itself the product of the anti-competitive system of the late sixties and early seventies, and not equipped to function in a highly demanding educational climate. What we now witness is idealism that masks near incompetence: democratic rhetoric concealing a lack of professional expertise and training.

In Holland, the resistance that prevented the educational reformers of the sixties from achieving much of anything in most countries, was weak. The traditionalism that elsewhere protected academic excellence was ineffective. Dutch pragmatism could never defend philosophical depth or literary achievement. The result was a large-scale experiment in 'new-style' education. Traditional knowledge was thrown overboard: the humanist ideal of a reflective, self-conscious person had never penetrated to the majority of the Dutch. Liberal culture has always remained a very exclusive and restricted matter in Holland. In the conflict between l'intellectuel spécifique' (the technician, possessing a speciality, but no claim to general knowledge) and l'intellectuel universel' (who represents the exemplary or abiding, a vision of the world), the latter had no defenders, and the former free play[11].

What all the reformers had in common was an intolerance for the discipline the classical humanist tradition demanded. To postpone satisfaction was intolerable. To master a new subject has always meant submerging one's own responses and feelings in a period of training, a procedure that was now taboo. The student had been a person who transcended himself by being taken up into an academic tradition. This goal was, at best, mistrusted, and far more often found repugnant. A new education for 'individualism' was proposed, where one's immediate responses were championed, not criticized, and where common prejudice was embraced, not punctured. The student was no longer someone who needed to change in confrontation with accumulated knowledge; knowledge was something that had to be changed in relation to the spontaneous feelings and reactions of the student. Tradition was thrown overboard. The social science and related majors, in the undergraduate colleges became an experience in ego psychology. The self was championed: as self-fulfillment or as freedom ('the revolution'). New schools set up shop without taking traditional disciplines seriously. Everything was democratic: dialogue, discussion, and meetings triumphed. The result was a Rogerian nightmare, with or without help from Fromm/Marcuse. The self, psychologically experienced as personal growth, or abstractly experienced as the 'proletariat,' was preeminent. A phony universal emerged: oneself as everyone. Primitive egoism was rampant. The student was taught to be self-centered, to pursue his hobbyhorses. The new 'freedom' was defined as institutional license. One could study anything that struck one's fancy, in any order, with whatever result.

Democracy, and the celebration of the self, were confused. Freedom was the right to enter the school one wished, with whatever preparation one happened to bring with one, and to do there exactly what one chose. Afterwards the society was expected to permit one to continue in the same style. To be qualified was to have done whatever took one's fancy for four years. One was a specialist because one had spent one's time

just as one pleased. After all, it was the quality of human contact that really counted. One is tempted to think that the students were trying to exploit society in a fantastic manner. But what I describe here is not the attitude of a few deviants or an especially decadent group. These were the dominant attitudes that staff and students shared in the seventies, an extreme version of Rousseau's ideas, coupled with a self-centered attitude identifying expertise with whatever one has happened to do. The humanistic claim to universal insight is debunked as too time-consuming, abstract, and intellectual; technical mastery of a profession is denounced as political cowardice and conformism. The only thing that remains is the celebration of one's own psychological drives and projections, which is championed as the profession of helping/teaching. This attitude was democratic enough—anyone can be a social worker/teacher when the only requirement is to react exactly as one pleases. And the jobs were sufficiently privileged (in status, conditions of work, vacations, and salary, in that order) that the school still seemed to deliver a valuable diploma.

It will be no surprise that this bizarre situation eventually came to an end. The severe shortage of social workers and teachers abated. An attack was launched against 'do-nothing' 'socially parasitic' schools. But the reaction took the form of budget cuts more than serious criticism of the school. The budgetary squeeze has forced the schools to tighten up somewhat; but the demand has yet to be made that they defend their philosophy of education. All serious curriculum demands have long been abandoned, with political pooh-bahs mystifying developments. The students who have participated in this process have partaken in a blatant grab for diplomas. The document may insure one's social position, but the training guarantees nothing. These students have become participants in an educational process at its most cynical.

e. The Last Word

I have described the student who has participated in the emptying of the curriculum and the replacement of prescribed study by a formless egoism, where the only thing that has remained constant is the diploma and the social ambitions it represents. I have attacked the ideology of being socially determined: I believe that students have been excused far too much from responsibility for their education. The school and the student meet one another in an escapism where one is to be responsible to oneself, but not to the profession in which one is trained; and to be honest vis-a-vis one's own personal growth, but not with respect to the tasks which one undertakes.

INTERFACE THREE

It is not enough to see the teachers only in the mirror of student attitudes or development—the lecturers play a pivotal role in the college. It was much more difficult to get to know the lecturers' ideas about their work, or to gain insight into how they changed, than it had been with the students. Understandably, because I was a colleague, my position on the staff radically influenced what others said to me. The relationship of trust and fellowship which could be built up with the students did not prove possible (for me) with the staff. For my student co-researchers, the problem was that the staff felt that qua teachers they should be motivated, serious, and thorough. It was taboo to express dislike for the job, have disdain for the students, or give the impression of being unintellectual. It was thus very difficult to know if one was getting more than socially prescribed behavior. We were able to collect enough interviews with staff members in which attitudes to teaching—curriculum, evaluation, motivation—were clearly presented in order to draw conclusions about those points. These results are presented in the third chapter to the genetic text.

The staff members placed much emphasis on conveying socio-political 'truth.' While my emphasis was on the process of learning and on cognitive development, theirs was on making the structure of reality clearly known. My concept of conscious reflection and mediated thought was alien to their grammar of thought. Two issues became clear at this stage of the study: (1) the concept of knowledge common to almost all the staff members, and (2) the structure of education, or 'model of teaching,' that resulted. It was becoming clear which relationship was central to this project: that between thought and speech. I could surmise that a productive interaction between the two factors was absent. Thought seemed to mean 'the truth about which it is purposeless to talk,' and speech 'any form of weakness or conformity as long as it does not mean direct interaction with culture, history and action.' A process where ideas and discussion interact in a developing education was not to be found.

After some three and a half years of teaching, I felt myself capable to investigate the assumptions behind the explicit, as well as hidden, curriculum which I now experienced as teacher and researcher. A mere list of required readings, the didactic traditions, or the organizational characteristics would not do. I wanted to identify the basic concepts continuous throughout the teaching expected of one: the mesh between content, organization, and social attitudes that makes an organic whole of the program. I gathered my data on staff attitudes towards students, on student comprehension of the staff-student bargain, and on the conflictive staff relationship. The theoretical analysis of the program took quite some time. My own lecturing fell outside the mold, whereby I had to reconstruct in dialogue with students the intellectual scaffolding to the rest of the teaching. Furthermore, assumptions behind the curriculum were most likely not self-consciously defined by the lecturers who made use of them. I had to make explicit something that was presupposed. The investigation did not begin with the hypothesis that the curriculum was governed by a dominant adhesion to rational philosophy. That conclusion slowly emerged. The social attitudes were more easily ferreted out than were the conceptual ones. Obviously, when I try to indicate the general situation, I sacrifice individual nuances to the global effect. But neither I, nor my co-researchers, found that violence was done to reality. While there were differences in lecturers' attitudes to students, the basic structure of the uncritical 'pass' grade coupled to cognitive regardlessness was consistent.

In the undergraduate teaching the concrete human connectedness with material and social worlds was forgotten. Man and world were not presented as changing through interaction. A static determinism drove the development of initiative, critical thought, and creativity out. Schemes of getting-things-done replaced analysis and thought. The questioning of what one does, how and why, was replaced with 'planned change.' The concepts and procedures of action were no longer internalized, understood, studied but were forced upon students. The system of insights, the logic to one's social thought, was not explicit. The 'semiotic system' of the curriculum was presented, more as an ethical absolute than as a topic for understanding. The start situation—the attitudes and abilities of the students as they entered as freshmen—was important, but the school itself did more to strengthen and continue these factors than to change them.

3

The Knowledge Machine

The metaphor of the machine (factory) informs the next phase which now ensues, of the discussion about education. My choice for this comparison between the undergraduate college and the factory indicates my assessment of how 'teaching worked'. I describe the rationality of the school in *The 'World' Takes Over,* and its organization in *The Factory,* all the time remaining within the same imagery.

The teaching I have been describing is not held together by individual commitment—by what then? What is its cement, and how does it work? Conformity, or social anxiety, could not, unto themselves explain how such instruction could exist. The 'leftist' ideology in education has to come in for much more careful attention. How does it affect the teacher-student-content relationship? The radical enthusiasm of the late sixties and early seventies is, if we look at my experience, wrongly identified with an emphasis upon the students. Within the ideology the students, individually, were not important, in that they should merely learn the 'truth,' and advocate it. The teachers must not only know the 'right answers,' but they should activate their students to achieve the right goals. 'Personal involvement' was defined to mean 'ideologically correct' activity. The students were pushed to search for 'relevancy' in their course work: which meant to exercise political vigilance, and not voice individual specificity. The student should demand 'What is the value to me of studying this?'; where he translates the question to mean, 'What value does this course have for the under-privileged, powerless, and revolutionary masses[1].' The personal is the ideological—thus student directedness is the same as emphasis on content. But was the student to be identified with the content; and the staff? The equation staff = student = ideology looks pretty suspect when we compare it to our experience of schools. What was the role of the 'truth' in the classroom? Were the tensions between the curriculum and the students, or staff, all solved, or merely repressed?

a. The Metaphor

An educational system possesses mechanical irrational powers. The institution 'school' is always in danger of becoming a demonic machine, where the active become enfeebled and the passive are eaten alive. Learning—defined as someone coming to expression, something developing within the self, a basis for social existence being established—does not have to occur in a school. The school can function as a mere purgatory, through which one has to pass to assume a particular social position. Schools can distribute, create, amplify, and pervert power. They can be the brute guardians of the forming, reforming, and utilizing of energy. In this metaphor of human machines, schools work as sorting machines. The young—jobless and potentially déclassé—are processed by social technicians. The powerless either become energetic or are consumed in the effort. Some succeed in school—become the 'doers' tooled by

education to perform. The majority fails in school they become the 'rejects' equipped to consume and be consumed. A school does not have to have anything to do with 'learning': people can be trained (processed) in the sense in which dogs are trained. Human behavior can be predetermined, people can be programmed, without any 'learning' as such occurring. I insist that 'learning' is both an individual and a social circumstance with intellectual and moral content. We have tended to grow accustomed to the definitions by which we are told that everyone 'learns' all the time. 'Learning' becomes everything and anything, and thus nothing. It is defined without reference to any special human quality. The process of doing it can be un-human or even anti-human: a machine is not 'the internalization of dialogue in thought' (J. S. Bruner). Mechanics are made a 'habit of mind (where) one of the chief ends of human effort is denied, and the supreme virtue of candour, of fearless acknowledgment of what is, disappears from our moral vision' (Russell, quoted in Hutchins : 1968).

Human machines work by imposing 'necessity' upon their victims. 'Necessity' has taken on the name of 'science' in our times; what is not 'scientific' is a moral scandal, an intellectual perversity, and thus is unspeakable. The accepted paradigms are 'scientific,' are what is 'thinkable'—what may be said out loud. Intellectual laws, structures of rationally and language question one another. The paradigms of higher education are the thinking machines that students are to become. What is knowledge? What is one's role in, and responsibility for, research? What ethical context does one work in? The paradigm, not the person, deals with such problems. The paradigm is the bargain one has made with society to do one's work, produce one's articles, give one's lectures—all without asking divisive questions. It is a social agreement wherein mental processes have been made ethically transparent and seem to occur of their own accord.

The paradigm is at cross-purposes with what I have called 'learning,' which is an individual event. Structures of knowledge can only become human through the actions of specific people (the more of them the better). The study of logic, alone, is inhuman; the inculcating of paradigms, in itself, is totally impersonal. Narrow rationalism can never satisfactorily define the relationship between the student and his object of study. At best such rationalism provides one with more or less trustworthy laws for reasoning. To define how aspects of the mental process should proceed (be communicated) can save us (perhaps) from some inefficiency and we may hope, also from some superstition. But it will never tell us what we should be doing, and why. What science challenged—a particular kind of metaphysical thinking—has disappeared, at least in its eighteenth-century form. We no longer answer 'Why is it so?' with 'Because God willed it.' But what answer do we give? Positivism, the faith in 'progress,' was long the answer. Man was an instrument of productivity, whose work was to perform routines without understanding them, to become richer, more powerful, and prouder. In schools one could learn a bit of reasoning, but little judgment. We defined no ethical dimension as inherent to our thinking: we did not want to know that all thinking has an ethical aspect. To pose a question, submit an argument, or retell an experience is to demand that others experience what one chooses they experience. The demand that you undergo what I see fit, demands justification. Normally this necessity is avoided by culturally agreeing beforehand what one is going to offer for consideration. 'Science' is the code word for the agreements that exist in our universities (and, of course, not ours alone) as to what ideas, theories, and problems are speakable. By centering attention on the method—statistics, formal criteria for reasoning, acceptable style, the use of

correct sources—one employs a suitable subterfuge. In fact, the method determines the results, but by centering attention on it one can forget the actual problem. We have banished so-called philosophy from the social sciences—which translates to, we refuse to take responsibility for the social-historical dimension of our work. We answer only to formal criteria. The moment that the 'other' must be taken into consideration, a foreign and threatening moral dimension to thought and communication is introduced. While all written work does have a social purpose, and exists to have some result upon the human society, the writings of the social sciences have most often displayed a methodological consensus, bought at the price of ethical blindness.

To ask what knowledge is worth knowing and why, is to defy mechanical rationality. It catches the modern school, which portrays life as a machine that is supposed to run by itself, off guard. Existence is a clock that has been set in motion, and whose chimes are not supposed to be interfered with. While the school has tried to get rid of God, it has retained Newtonian physics. What it is that sets the universe in motion is hidden in silence, but its motion is just as predetermined, as holy and omniscient, as in any natural theology. The world is presented as a machine that works in an ordered fashion. One is taught the structure of the social machine; sometimes with a defense of American society and institutions implied, sometimes with a Marxist analysis attached. In that the world is an organized, ordered construct, one has to learn organized, ordered thinking. The essential presupposition is that social processes can be understood in the framework of Newtonian physics. Not empiricism, but rational philosophy characterizes the modern school. Rational philosophy is an a priori thought form, where it is assumed that the world is ordered, that nature is organized, that society is rational. What we see are the effects of the presupposed order — an order that makes our very 'seeing' possible. Rational philosophy posits an absolute: man's task is to record how the rational order shows itself to him. For an empiricist, there are only probable descriptions of reality: truth is always an open matter, and the essential structure of the world could just as well be an ever-changing matter as permanently formed. For the empiricist, what is actually seen and experienced is known, nothing further. For the rationalist, truths exist whether we have experienced them ourselves or not.

The teacher is a technician of rational truths: he is not there to tell what he has seen, experienced, felt, and concluded. He is a speaking manual for a rational order. In this sense, he can be called a 'teaching machine' without doing him much injustice. He is not in the classroom to conduct a dialogue: he stands there not to liberate thought, but to enforce rigid answers. The structure of existence has to be learned, just as a mechanic needs to learn the structure of 'his' machine. Fantasy, imagination, doubt are unwanted — no thought is needed for this teaching machine to work. The person who is inside the teaching machine does not have to be 'learned' at all. Quite the opposite. 'Learning' would only be a nuisance. What is needed is a highly schooled operator who will unquestionably enforce the rational series of questions and answers. The safety of the matter is ensured; the repeated formulas cannot produce anything else than what they were produced for: a conviction that society is rational. The attendant to the teaching machine has power over the students, but not over himself. Only by denying himself as observer, as witness, does he become a representative of the rational order—an order that possesses no clear experiential relationship to human consciousness that exists a priori and, as such, is antecedent to consciousness and unquestionable. The teaching machine is 'plugged in'. It shares the same existential fate as every machine: to one day break down, be replaced, become obsolete. A machine is at

its most valuable before it is put into service: once it begins to work, its value normally decreases. The teaching machine will work just as long as the machinist has a job; just as long as the curriculum with which it is programmed can be carried out. Afterwards, it must either be reprogrammed or retired. Man, the producer, does not exist in modern factories: no one really makes the product. It emerges from the assembly line, created by the logic of the work place, which no one possesses as 'his'. The worker administers a machine: he takes care that nothing goes wrong, that the process proceeds as it is supposed to. By becoming older, one does not gain experience or 'learning', one loses efficiency and becomes outdated. Teaching machines are turned on and off, serviced and created, idealized and mystified by those who create and revise the curriculums that the pedestrian teachers do not even really understand. The teacher can perform his task just as long as his own observations are irrelevant. There exists a social obligation to go on; thought or speculation is accepted to be inadequate technology. Introspection and reflection are bad habits, from which schooling can rescue one. The school creates correct, predictable behavior. Its terror exists in the mechanization of reality, in the absolutism of rationality—an order that transcends individual sentiment and observation and banishes man from the universe. What remains is 'the world'.

b. The 'World' Takes Over

The 'new', 'democratic' schools (1975-79) offer a program directed at two goals — vocational training and ideological conviction — that would seem to be mutually contradictory, the one being purely practical and the other intangible. The unity of the two is to be found in the concept of 'relevancy', a catch-word of current educational reformers, which has two quite separate connotations. It simultaneously indicates social or collective necessity and personal fulfillment or enrichment. 'Relevancy' in the sense of sociopolitical reform leads to an education in 'changing things'. Contemporary social lacunae are pinpointed, and the student is equipped to do something about them. The curriculum is practical, directed at solving specific problems. The emphasis is on the social goal; education is a means to change. The task of the school is to support efforts to change society by turning out graduates who know how to tackle this or that crisis. The task is so important that there is no room for peripheral matters. Schooling that is not aimed at the sought after results, is denounced as a waste of time, 'élitaire', or reactionary.

All effort is dedicated to change — for it, and it alone, justifies the curriculum. The cause is self-evidently important; other matters are trivial in comparison. Ideological education claims to make the 'real' nature of society, of history, and of the 'world' clear to the student. Everyday perception is illusionary. Only through the ideology can one grasp the actual circumstances. Mere observation is pseudo-concrete; what is in fact real, and deserves to be called 'concrete', is the view made possible by deeper insight. Ideological schooling teaches the student how he should see society. He looks through the focus or the categories of the creed. While my tone in this passage obviously betrays my hostility, the philosophical content accurately reflects the central European tradition of Marxism epitomized by Karl Kosik's *Dialectics of the Concrete* (Kosik:1976). In practice Marxism pushes the student to understand society through the capital—labor conflict. Whatever may happen in concrete politics, the initiated (to Marxism-Leninism) will explain events as the rational, necessary result of this conflict.

That all historical processes are to be understood on the basis of this dichotomy is assumed; this is the philosophers' stone of the system. Vocational schooling and ideological persuasion would seem to be worlds apart; but the assumption that Marxist ideology proffers theoretical explanations, and that social reality is quite a different matter, is an opponent's point of view. Just as narrow pragmatism goes hand in hand with technocratic schooling, or a humanistic philosophical attitude is in harmony with liberal arts education, Marxist-Leninism combines with Communist activism. The practical work of the adherents needs an absolute foundation, or justification; it is pure activism that does not seek reflection or self-doubt, but results.

Ideological explanations are two-dimensional, not designed for long philosophical discussion. The curriculum is 'relevant' as social problem solving, but is also 'relevant' as a defense of one's own personal worth. The student is the person who does what has to be done. Ideology works as an ethics; it gives one meaning through one's deeds. It solves the question of one's personal importance or value. Vocational training and ideological schooling get along very well with each other. They jointly seek to banish 'learning'. Reflection, doubting, wondering, or questioning are unnecessary. The absolutes that the 'world' demands and the solutions that 'world' proffers, are committed to memory. School is a confrontation with a 'world' of unquestionable contours and form. The 'world' is out there; the problem is to know what it is, and what it demands of one. It is assumed that the form of the 'world' is unequivocal, and that the responses to it should be self-evident. Education occurs when one is told how the 'world' really is, and what one has to do about it.

This solution is highly rigid, for it permits no doubting of the order that is presented as the 'world.' It is dependent upon a rationalistic philosophy; where, the presupposed, absolute, assumption on which everything else is built, is that one single, rational, known 'reality' exists. Human ability to understand society is taken as self-evident. There are no really serious methodological problems to knowledge. Man can work utterly unconcerned about his ability to gain access to 'reality' or truth. Any radical doubts about man's ability to know would devastate the whole cadre. If words are pure cultural conventions, without any necessary link to anything we can call 'real,' then the whole structure is untrustworthy. If empirical methods influence the subjects under study, so that no really 'objective' knowledge is possible, then all the conclusions are doubtful. And if 'reality' is indeterminate, or radically generative, predictions are no more than rough approximations, and faith in a 'reality' is a misplaced metaphysics. Any of these objections are enough to reduce a curriculum of ideology/vocational training to shambles. And what is worse, all these issues are only too current. What makes matters truly terrifying is that the curriculum of ideology/vocational training has not really been daunted by its intellectual weakness. The curriculum is not an effort to know the thought of this century; it is an effort to avoid everything that man has been confronted with. It is not an imitation into the contemporary quandary, but an avoidance of contemporary issues. A vision of man, in which war, economic crisis, social savagery, and out-of-control technology play no role is defended. Man is portrayed as the rational master of reality. A metaphysical statement is made wherein man dominates and rules the universe. This is the 'humanism' of man the conqueror, with reality in his power. Is this not hubris?

In a school where ideology/vocational training predominate, democracy is unnecessary, even unwanted. The group must be periodically herded together to acknowledge their loyalty to 'necessity,' their common recognition of what 'reality'

signifies. The social physics has to be shown off in public. But, in that society obeys inherent, rational laws, the best logicians must predominate. Outwardly, there is a sort of democracy: there are meetings and, to some degree, discussion, but one logic governs the process from the outset. The man-world relationship is closed; those who grasp the necessity of the laws speak incorrigible truths. Outwardly, the 'leftist' schools were radically democratized, but they are so deeply founded upon an absolutist ideology that the democracy is in form only. Just as long as the man-world relationship is not a personal, living event, truth is predetermined, and involvement unimportant. The order of the world is essential, not subjective feelings about it. Democracy has no meaning, for it is presupposed that there is one right answer to every question. The problem is to correctly follow the rationality, of social causes and effects, and to arrive at the necessary answer. Meetings become training courses in social rationality and rhetoric. Historical occurrence knows its own laws; the students must apply them to themselves. The essential characteristic of the school—its form of rationality—is made unquestionable. Democracy becomes nothing more than endless meetings where the ideological/vocational curriculum is carried out and where the presuppositions upon which the endeavor is based are enforced. In this 'democracy' it is presupposed that the person, as such, has nothing to contribute: his experience, perceptions, and creativity are shut out. Individual existence is a debased form of social reality. Man is the object of a rational world, not the subject of his own existence. But in the ideology the whole structure of thought is 'put onto its head.' 'Man,' not as individuals but as the totality of human history, is identified with rationality itself, whereby the 'law' of history makes man into the master of reality. The individual relinquishes all personal ability to experience the world; he admits that only the rationality of the entirety is 'real.' The person may not think himself—in education more and more decisions are made for the student, but also for the teacher. Curriculum development takes place, often on a national level where contact with actual teachers is remote, and contact with classroom situations even more distant. Experts decide what is good for the school. Didactic approaches, text books, audio-visual aids, all follow one another without the teacher even really knowing what they were designed to do. The demands for increased accountability lead to far reaching standardization as schools compete to produce the highest scores on the evaluative tests. Individuals do not exist any more in such a system. Learning goals are not a direct response to the actual development of students but are based upon averages, global estimates, and mean achievement levels. In return, the educator is promised that the entirety insures that man is the absolute subject of history. One loses oneself, as experience, to regain onself, as truth. For the philosophically inclined, it should be clear that this form of 'Marxism' is more Hegelian than Hegel. This social rationalism reassures one that history is meaning, and it subjects one to the mastery of that history. While 'Marxism' has produced its specific version of social rationalism (especially Diamat—see below), the growth of scientism has taken place at just as hard a tempo in the 'value-free' social sciences. Positivism, in its concept of progress, included an element of historical analysis; Behaviorism, in its exclusive emphasis on verifiability, does not. Stalinism produced 'dialectical materialism' (nick-named Diamat) where a pure science of reality was proposed based upon the study of the law (dialectics) of concrete existence (the material). The vagaries of history are, on both sides of the ideological spectrum, shut out to guarantee the scientific absoluteness of the assertions. History is removed from the concrete subject matter of research, only to reappear at infinite distance as synonym for 'real' or 'nature.' History is unto itself: its

purpose or direction is enclosed within what takes place in nature and society. This *telos* is assumed to be inseparable from reality, but then freedom must be relative to the *telos*. The *telos* functions as a taboo or boundary that may not be passed. Man is reality's vassal; he must obey to exist. He interacts and lives with orders determined by what 'is.' He is what 'reality' makes of him: people are parallel creatures who at best have responded the same way to reality.

To ask a 'social rationalist' to reflect upon himself and his own circumstances, or to demand that he tell one, in his own words, what he has experienced is to undermine his standpoint. He thinks what 'is'—what the 'world' defines and demands. If the *telos* is not to be insignificant, or nonexistent, it must define what most essentially 'is.' To demand free, speculative discussion of him is to demand that he acknowledge the existence of at least a limited personal freedom. And that is to ask him to change his politics. For him a necessary order delegates discussion to an insignificant psychological issue. The process of human thought is utterly secondary. Language is, unfortunately, an imperfect means to indicate reality: it is better superseded by something more exact, such as mathematics. This person does not experience himself as a stream of consciousness, as a subject who prevails, or endures. For him, what is, is irrevocably complete, and totally positive. He has no room for being a partial subject, he directs himself towards the 'world,' or 'what is reality.' When he internalizes the 'world,' when he is active, he acts in the name of what is uncompromisingly true. Truth is objective and impersonal it is not individual or particular but a structure of reality. What is at issue at every moment is who has captured the structure of 'reality'? The more one knows, the more one obeys the logic of what is. Knowing does not lead to any sort of personal freedom, but to quite the opposite, to collective necessity. Knowledge and personal freedom, as described here, are in conflict. Relationships between people become problematical: insofar as one knows, one must answer to what is; insofar as one does not know, one has nothing to say. What is there to talk about? Certainly not oneself, for thereby one never captures 'reality.' The social process becomes a mere matter of social 'duties' and sexual 'needs.' A rupture occurs between truth and the personal, which results in the terror of abstractions. A half parody:

> In the beginning (if there was such a thing) Marx created Communism's laws of surplus value; and class conflict, together with the necessary ideology; and the workers' movement. This is all: everything beyond this follows from the development of appropriate political methods by means of deduction.

Just as the social rationalist sees himself as determined by the 'world,' he perceives others as destined to obey the 'world.' Moods, feelings, temperaments will be brushed aside; not intersubjectivity, but reason prevails. The alternative is to see speech as the archetype for thought. Spoken existence creates itself anew constantly: it is a convention between people that persists just as long as the discussion is continued. It depends upon being uttered and heard, used and acknowledged. The communicative process humanizes; it opens onto the question of what the 'other' sees, senses, makes of things. The emphasis comes to rest upon man in context, confronted with his type, questioned by his shared experience. Psychology is an important statement of this viewpoint: it has made it clear that man is not exclusively rational, that he is not the master of his motives, that society is not transparent or self-revealing. The social rationalist is the enemy of psychoanalysis, and of all other forms of dynamic psychology in which the characteristics of speech are respected.

'Learning,' in that it is committed to the process of intersubjectivity, is opposed

to the curriculum of ideology and vocational training described here. Contemporary 'relevant' schooling has consistently claimed to be 'leftist.' This because social conflict was studied and political radicalism championed. But the style of thinking that was taught, assumed that time, space, and matter were absolutes: unchanging, stable, trustworthy categories. It was asserted that dialectical thought demonstrates that injustice leads to freedom, the working class to liberation, and the students to sweeping change; but what went unnoticed was that this must all occur because time (history), space (the national class structure), and matter (the forces of production) demand it. A rigid, traditional manner of thinking lay hidden behind the radical-sounding program. Relativity, the uncertainty principle, and quantum mechanics might just as well never have been discovered for all the impact they had.

The tragedy of the twentieth century is that man, confronted with unprecedented technological powers that he has been unable to use without a significant risk of self-destruction, is forgotten. Pessimism is declared irresponsible; doubt, reactionary; and skepticism, evil. The doctrine of social progress denies man's failure to achieve a stable or succesful freedom, and ignores the crisis in man's relationship to nature. The school becomes unfree to discuss the horrors of industrialized society (when they determine workers' attitudes), to acknowledge the unreliability of human truths (when they are those of leftist politics), or to question man's place in history (when it is not determined by the struggle of socialism). According to this line of thought, modern man has not failed to solve social and political questions; he knows 'what must be done,' but must yet amass a large enough 'popular front' to effect the needed changes. This irrational belief in man's supremacy over nature, when so much of modern history refutes it, is the most striking aspect of 'leftist' schooling. 'Proletariat,' 'capitalism' 'class consciousness,' and 'exploitation of the workers' are all defined; the definitions, and not one's own experience, are real. A personal, limited realm of activity is debunked; the choice is made for totalization. The history I can see, the society I am able to observe, and the statements for which I can offer proof are not privileged. Just the opposite; the absolute, abstract statements of political economics are preeminent. This choice has aptly been called 'angelism[1].' Angels are not bound by human limits; partiality plays no role for them. Angels are an 'absolute other,' and can represent a world of total justice and freedom. But angels can never achieve harmony with mere human experience. The 'angelic' concept refuses to be of this world, to work upon things as one finds them. Angelism demands absolute change, and can only acknowledge man if utterly changed. It answers to a 'world' that it alone sees, but insists is the one and only reality. The effects of the ideology upon vocational training are not few. As 'social rationalism,' or 'angelism,' is an anti-empirical approach, individual aptitudes and observations are not taken into account. The classroom is an epiphenomena—fundamental laws of society are what is crucial. Schooling, at best, is a window through which history can be seen, and a place where social action can be organized. The ulterior goal debases the value of the immediate activity: the school, as such, is unimportant. The sociology of education, which reveals how schools are a part of class discrimination, racism, and/or sexism is important. Individuals who want to wrestle at first hand with contemporary problems need to learn to read, write, listen, speak, think, and understand to do so. This self-reliance clashes with social rationalism. Emphasis on the specific student and his individual development, is alien to a school whose task is to communicate certainties. It trains students to work in a setting where the political presuppositions of the school are shared. And as such places do not

exist in the vocational field, practice comes into conflict with theory. One can only link the ideology to daily society by becoming a professional political worker who instructs others in how they should see society. The alternative for the student is not to take the cognitive element seriously, and to learn what he can of his profession during his practical training periods. The leftist four-year colleges, which train teachers and social workers, thus offer a curriculum that is in conflict with the demands which are made of the graduates in a normal work situation. Instead of developing an informed ability to make judgments in complex situations, and working on the practical ability to carry through on those decisions, the students have developed their political rhetoric. The conflict causes the schools to disdain the professional community, for being apolitical and naive, and the experienced workers disparage the graduates, finding them inpractical and sloganistic.

An analysis of the style of instruction leads to similar conclusions. Most of the teaching is utterly conservative. The teachers lecture. Small groups are not formed, inquiry methods are not used, personal instruction is impossible, and the student cannot proceed at his own pace or follow his own interests. One instructional innovation was 'radical democracy.' All school and departmental decisions had to be discussed and voted upon by staff and students (sometimes apart, sometimes together). But, as with the whole of the ideology, what appears to be 'free' is in fact rigid and repressive. The effect of 'democracy' was that the students lost their traditional anonymity. They could no longer listen to what the lecturers had to say without further obligations. They had to vote, and to demonstratively agree or disagree with what the teachers said. 'Democracy' functioned as an ideological control, where loyalty to social rationalism was monitored. The full power of social control came to bear: who would defy a rationale unquestionably defended by the staff and, normally also by the older students? Democracy became a lesson in abstract formulations: the meeting had to arrive at the right response, argumented by the agreed-upon concepts. 'Democracy' was the means of destroying the individual's right to traditional intellectual freedoms. Majority rule was all-powerful. The individual had no rights, no protection, no safety. What the group decided went. If a majority within a department decided for a curriculum change, it was carried out. If there were students or staff who had no idea what to make of the new regime, they were told to make the best of things. For the student, the organizational model utterly frustrated individual initiative. Each student was a member of a so-called group of some seventeen to twenty students. All study plans had to be approved by the group. All subjects were followed by the group together, with the result that minority interests had no chance of being honored. This whole system was defended as the highest form of educational democracy thinkable: no decision could be made without majority vote.

Clearly, 'democracy' can be a very effective means of intellectual repression. The lecturers only infrequently had problems manipulating student majorities in order to control the educational process. What is worse, all those involved got a 'training' in 'democracy' that had nothing to do with free thought. The 'democratic' process, at best, was an innocuous form of social control, and at worst terror. What regularly went wrong was that opposing groups were formed: factions that declared war on one another. There was no tradition of liberal respect for the views of the other. As one, and only one, analysis of society was entirely right, any other was as absolutely wrong. This quickly led to belligerency. Differing groups refused to follow any courses given by lecturers outside their own clique. Meetings became spectacles of recrimination and

verbal violence. The struggle took on irrational proportions. No trick was too low, no tactic forbidden. The false teachings had to be stamped out. The 'democracy' resulted in structural terrorism. The differing factions spared no efforts to demand intellectual conformism. The conflict went through distinct phases. First it was the 'gauchists' versus the 'Marxist-humanists'; later it was the 'communists' versus the 'socialists'; and subsequently the 'feminists' against the 'politicals.' The combination of ideological education with 'democracy' caused each faction to make use of the terror of the majority. By making the collective all-powerful, and teaching that one absolute means of knowing society exists, the school opened the road to terrorism. The student did not gain in possibilities, he lost them. The room for students or lecturers to develop their own interests was abolished. All the parts of the curriculum were to serve the whole; all the lecturing had to support the ideology. If it did not, the school became unworkable. The victory was for doctrine, not civil liberties. This use of majority rule did not just occur in isolated, exceptional instances; it was a general tendency.

Eventually, the 'democracy' collapsed as a result of all the infighting. No one attended meetings anymore; participation literally approached nil. (I know of an instance where it took three months to get a quorum in order to abolish the 'democracy'!) Decision making tended to revert to the lecturers and the small group of students who actively supported the school's ideology. The 'democracy' failed. By setting it aside, the school lost its grip on the minds of the students, but the alternative would have been to seriously examine why the system was being spontaneously rejected. That would have forced a discussion of social rationalism and the ideological abstractions that underpinned the whole enterprise. As yet, no such radical breakthrough has occurred, or seems likely to. What one does see happening is that the ability of the school to force the students to think as it wishes is diminishing. The result is not that the students have begun to think actively about their schooling; it is more that they do not think at all. Lip service is paid to the required curriculum and, for the rest, life is lived at home, just as always. What has been growing is the tension between an official ideology that has only token support amongst the students and the privatization of actual student existence, where the ideology plays next to no role. I wish I could claim that a demand for know-how threatens the system. The purely formal quality, of the education provided—no one believes in its practical worth—has not provoked heated reactions. The curriculum does not prompt opposition, so much as indifference. It is not threatened by its practical ineffectiveness so much as by being found boring. The students become more unmotivated than angry. Student support for the curriculum may have dwindled, but no alternative has presented itself. Things as they are, may claim little loyalty, but that lack of loyalty is endemic. The instruction and curriculum have failed to gain real consent, but they do not ask for it. The school makes no effort to be a 'community'; it does not seek discussion or intensity, but has been satisfied to let the 'world' (the one and only reality knowable by means of the presupposed rationality) take over.

c. The Factory

In modern society a 'teaching machine' would most logically be found in a 'factory'—a place of standardized work, where responsibility for the product rests with management, and where labor relations are subsumed under business-like goals. Cybernetics—how the students are changed by four years of self-perpetuating school-

ing—is the product. The teachers, with their 'leftist' curriculum and standoffish manner, are the workers. And the politics of the nation, which decides who will be educated and for what goals, is the management.

To begin with the workers. They have little to do with one another. Each does his own work, as is scheduled by the curriculum, without much contact with his fellows. The restrictions do not amount to much, as the lecturers have written the curriculum for their own subjects. The Ministry of Education (a part of the management) has never shown any real interest in what is lectured. At most, the school has to inform the ministry once a year which subjects are given (economics, sociology, psychology, etc.), but never which literature is used, how exams are given, or what results are achieved. Accountability for the work done is nonexistent. The lecturing takes places in isolation, apart from colleagues, before individual classes. Isolation is the price of formal independence from one another. Each instructor has his own little 'business' to run. He has 'his' students, who ask him for thesis supervision and help in the applied practical work and who will take his optional courses. Every lecturer has his own way of arranging these things, which all occur sub rosa. Officially, this competition between teachers does not exist. Its processes and results are undiscussable. When a lecturer fails to earn a following, it is taboo to discuss his situation. The result is that he gets more first- or second-year groups; for the older students play the game much more actively, and harder, than the younger ones. Further, to falter means to be shut out of the small research projects or seminars that crop up 'spontaneously' in the upper division. The lecturers maintain their outward indifference to one another, with the argument that they do not share the same academic background, interests and training. Each person gives his subject without reference to any direct colleagues. They are a collection of social scientists (economists, sociologists, educators, etc.) without a common denominator. If they had studied the same things, they might be better able to discuss intellectual matters with one another, but there is no proof they would make a better teaching team. The ability to make education work is much less forthcoming than seeems to be presupposed. The assumption has been that if you know a body of knowledge, you can teach it. The higher one comes in schooling the less time is spent on teaching one to teach. The presupposition has obviously been if you know enough you should not have any problems. The communicability of knowledge was taken to be self-evident: if one knew, one wanted to spread one's knowledge; if one was ignorant, one wanted to learn. In the modern society highly educated persons often display no desire to inform others, and uneducated individuals often have contempt for all thinking which is more difficult than what they are accustom to. While there are structural impediments to how the future college instructor is trained, the lack of a fundamental will to teach (see chapters 6 of the genetic text and the concluding section) is much more crucial to the malfunctioning of the college. The lecturers definitely do not form a single staff in social work, industrial relations, or secondary education, but remain isolated specialists. This is, in part, because Dutch universities are utterly specialized, without any form of general education. From their first year at the university, the lecturers have worked in isolated departments without any intensive contact being required with the outside world. The compartmentalization goes so far that the department of education, for instance, will have its own subgroup of psychologists to lecture developmental, social, and clinical psychology to its students. Those doing a major in education do not ever have to follow a course together with the psychologists. The four-year colleges are organized on the same principle. A department of social work

will have its own psychologist, economist, etc., who will not have any professional contact with his counterparts in the other departments. The school is thus totally organized around the 'major', which is a world cut off from everything else. The school is 'school' in name only: each department is an independent fiefdom that defends its own interests. And within each 'major', the only bond is that of self-protection against the demands of the other departments.

The competition centers upon the problems of staffing, which are directly linked to how many students choose each major. When there are large shifts in student preference, lecturers either have to be fired or transferred from one department to another. The central admittance procedures, which everyone can fight over, regulate to a large degree, who comes in but once they have arrived, students can switch departments. Departments are jealous of one another, and lecturers likewise: when one prospers, it is always at the cost of another. To teach under these circumstances is to be particularized; each person and group competes with every other.

The lecturers defend themselves with a veneer of impersonality and uninvolvement. Self-protection demands the stance of an isolated specialist who cannot, thus be compared to his colleagues. Each lectures, after all, on entirely different subjects. This pose protects one, somewhat, from the risks and humiliations of competition. While the departments may be self-administered, the 'freedom' they enjoy is not liberating. The lecturers are so deeply divided among themselves that they are unable to decide much of anything. The weekly staff meetings are dedicated to endless jockeying for position and struggles for a better teaching load. The less effective lecturers do not wish to favor the more popular ones with the advanced projects for which the latter are asked. The uninterested teachers are angry when student-oriented lecturers are asked by the students to aid them in practical work periods. In staff meetings, one tries to regain what one has lost on the battlefield of lecturing. If one cannot dominate the field through being popular with the students, one tries to do so through manipulating the rules. Each ideological group also tries to guarantee its own predominance and to marginalize its opponents through setting requirements to favor itself. When an ideological group possesses a majority on a staff, it will try and use its position to determine the content of the curriculum. Meetings are prepared in 'one's own circle', and a strategy is agreed upon ahead of time. Staff meetings come to resemble political warfare more than discussion.

The staff terror can, for instance, at its most extreme, prevent a lecturer from giving his optional course to fourth-year students. It can require a teacher to undertake more first-year instruction than is his fair share. But, thanks to the isolated context in which lectures are given, the staff politics produces few significant results; the colleagues cannot actually control one anothers' courses. The meetings are to threaten, deceive, or cajole, not really to decide much of anything. They are an endless process of humiliation, vengeance, or 'playing to win'. Ultimately, little tangible is won or lost, but a sphere of rivalry and mistrust is perpetuated. Each ideological clique struggles to feel that 'this is our department'—without it making all that much difference in practice whether it is or is not. The intolerance seems to be more psychological than directed towards results. The process of vengeance is a product of the ideological content. But the latter is inseparable from the cowardice of clamping oneself onto absolutes. 'Social realism' rationalizes specialization without integration, and schooling without discussion. But a structure of deceit and rivalry underpins staff behaviour. The only limit that exists to the interminable quarrels is that the lecturing has to go on. When too many teachers become overwrought and call in sick, some sort of solution will be sought. Just

as long as everyone can take the warfare without obvious psychological injury, there are no restrictions. The departments do not have a chairman with any special prerogatives. No promotions can take place, financial advancement occurs exclusively through seniority.

Obviously, the departments set little value on one's self-esteem. There is no acknowledgment to be sought there for one as intellectual. At best, one can find comfort among one's cohorts in an ideological clique. But this will only reaffirm one in a political conviction, not in one's academic competency. The lecturers find intellectual security in the attidude of 'lecturing far beneath their level'. The students will never achieve any real expertise in the teachers' disciplines. The staff refuses to immerse itself in the subject matter of the department. The teachers remain 'experts' in a social science specialization who are not responsible for the practical course to which they are attached. A few lecturers have experience in the practice of primary/secondary teaching, social work, etc., but that has either never been their chosen profession or they have preferred to leave it behind them. The small minority of lecturers who do have long practical experience are often academically weak and get pushed into being mere spectators to the ideological debates. The pure social sciences are taught as ideology, and practical methods of vocational training float about every-which-way. The majority of lecturers make no effort to adapt themselves to the department in which they work. To do so would demand cooperation and discussion of subject matter strange to everyone. To really form one staff and a common program would require an openness to confer that is lacking. All isssues of content are avoided. The staff's status and self-image are defended by a pose. The student level is claimed to be so low that no serious discussion is considered possible. One would lose self-respect by taking their thinking seriously. The students simply are not considered interesting to talk to, and are thus, nondiscussants. Furthermore, with exception of the political line to be followed, one has little in common with one's colleagues. Soon enough, one does not have to prepare one's lectures; the teaching is intellectually so undemanding that it is not necessary to pay much attention to it. Departmental matters are not much more demanding, for they are merely administrative. Many staff members minimize the risks: they do not confront the students with a standard of academic excellence, but adjust themselves to what they claim to be the students' ability. And, among themselves, they avoid intellectually demanding discussion. As a person's capacity for self-delusion is limited, most lecturers are dissatisfied. The lack of research is obvious; the mediocrity of the teaching self-evident; and the boredom of the routine, despite all the bickering, all too clear. When the choice has to be made either for contact among the lecturers or among the teachers and the students, the choice is for the former. It is still more taboo to undertake dialogue with the students than to cooperate with one's colleagues. While real discussion remains taboo among lecturers, inasmuch as the insecurity implied in having a 'problem' is forbidden, talking to students is still more in disrepute. The staff maintains itself as informant by refusing to accept responsibilty for who the students are or for what they 'learn.' The question 'What have you become by being here for four years?' is avoided. To teach is to state the 'world's' claim upon man—it is to voice necessity. Unquestioning obedience to the 'truth' is demanded, and insofar as it is not forthcoming, one must close one's eyes to the faults of youth. The staff refuses ever to enter into discussion: to do so would introduce too much insecurity. What should one do if one cannot persuade? The courses are declaimed and the students excluded from all serious discussion of subject matter. The comparison with a

factory has not faired poorly. The structure of competition, of isolated 'piece work,' and of an inhuman relationship to the 'product' have all shown up.

The students accept being the 'products' of this factory, because they see it to be in their own interests to do so. Of course, there is a minority that detests the sphere of mutual corruption linking staff and students and seeks a more challenging course of study. But this group is relatively small. The majority quickly figures out that they are assured of passing. Just as long as the implicit agreements remain undisrupted, 'things will take their course.' Everyone who is admitted will graduate. The school is self-perpetuating: one does not have to take any risks. Just as long as one plods along at one's own pace, no one will bother one. The gain for the students from this system is that they are to a great degree independent of the staff. There is virtually no sense of necessity to study. Almost nothing is demanded without reservation or exception. There is no core of material that the student *has* to master; it is not that one passes totally without working, but you can avoid any, and nearly all, challenges. The student is rescued from dependency relationships: the lecturer has next to nothing to say about his graduating. Just as long as one's 'work' is not spectacularly inadequate, and one's peers do not conclude that one's efforts are utterly insufficient, one is safe. The staff places no premium on grading: to do so would demand defending one's standards, which would legitimize criticism of the quality of teaching. Just as long as there are no grades, the lecturer's responsibilitly for what is or, just as important, what is not retained is undefinable.

The staff gains as much as the students from the supression of grading. Both groups become unaccountable. Furthermore, the ideological teaching of the staff is rescued from the confrontation with dissidents that would occur in an exam situation. Would 'ideologically wrong' answers be accepted for a passing grade? Would not protests of 'indoctrination' reach the newspapers or the ministry? Just as long as the ideological pressure is informal and never takes the black-and-white form of graded exams, it remains ungraspable. Lecturers have attempted, on the basis of ideological convictions, to fail students, but these efforts have been turned back. The borderline between socially 'safe' ideological teaching and the dangerous demands of political conformity are unclear. Up to now, doctrinaire Marxism has been permitted to go pretty much unchecked in undergraduate schooling. It is very difficult to predict if 'Neo-Stalinism' might not become controversial and provoke serious opposition. Thus far, it has been possible to buy off the students with the promise of an easy pass. The students have been the victims of extreme negligence: poor lecturing, no criticism of one's own work, no personal contact. What they win in freedom from grading, they lose in the superficiality of their contact with staff. The lecturers do not take responsibility for their work and the students therefore have nothing to agree or disagree with. A real process of debate is made impossible by the take-it-or-leave-it structure of courses. While the content of teaching is absolute, discipline is nonexistent. The department acts contradictorily: explicitly it states that there is a truth that each student must recognize, but in its behavior it communicates that almost anything goes. This paradox is essential to these 'leftist' colleges: all the absolutist content goes hand in hand with a glaring lack of authority. There may be one social truth, one rationality that explains history, but the student cannot be forced, given the civil rights he possesses, to believe what the school wants him to. Social and psychological pressure will be exerted, but when you get right down to it, the school does not dare demand intellectual compliance. All the dogmatic statements are only matched by the lack of carry-through. The 'Marxist'

analysis goes hand in hand with institutional cowardice. However pushy the school may be with its 'truths,' the staff is afraid to actually require agreement as a prerequisite to graduation. The lecturers are required to toe the line. They are not expected to attack the content, and such behavior is considered intolerable. It does not occur all that often, for beginning lecturers are screened to make sure that they are 'ideologically safe.' But several psychologists have either been fired or forced to leave. They would be an especially high-risk group, because they pay attention to the quality of human contact within the school and lose themselves only with difficulty in ideological idealism. Sociologists, on the other hand, at least in my experience, seem much more prone to the ills of abstract rationalism.

The students do not protest against the school's demands. They could only do so because of its lack of them. The proper grounds for objection would be the inadequate attention that is paid to their development—the chief complaint being that they are never taught to think or analyze, but are merely offered a long list of 'truths' to memorize. Could the desire to learn, to think, become so frustrated by the school that students would rebel? At present, the well-adjusted students are negatively integrated; they complain constantly, but accept a diploma for mere seniority. They are struck by the stratification, where staff pretends to be at an academic level that is hopelessly beyond the grasp of the students, but accept this arrogance in trade for the comfort of an easy undergraduate career. Furthermore, the stipend paid the students is quite acceptable, given the demands made on them. Of course the students want more welfare, but that is universal enough. To my knowledge, no one has actually given up his studies in order to earn more elsewhere. The students claim to be dissatisfied, but one cannot place too much credence upon their claim. Just as staff are not supposed to take the initiative and challenge the students, the rules among the students demand passivity and a tame attitude. The present structure of complacency depends upon a uncritical student body who will not make demands of the lecturers, or of one another. The whole system would collapse if the students refused to accept the cheap degrees they receive. The students who are happy with the status quo put pressure on those who are more ambitious not to realize a significant raising of the standards. The required course is thus formally rational, but the department is in reality irrational. The content of the curriculum is a model of rationalism, but the actual form of the schooling is pregnant with irrational behavior. It is taught that society possesses laws which one learns to understand to gain self-knowledge and comprehension of one's situation. But the lecturers neither seem to understand their own situation nor to be able to face it openly. The explicit goal of the teaching is to analyze the structures of society in order to master one's situation and historical role. What the lecturers display is confused, insecure, and asocial behavior. The students let the school happen to them. The machine sucks them up in the first year and disgorges them at the end of the fourth. Personal involvement, presence, or activity are not asked for. One has to pay tacit attention to ideology and accept a social system based upon anxiety, avoidance, and the half-repression of aggressive feeling. All the in-fighting results from the uncontrolled competition. As a student one is exposed to the violent switches; between a claim to possess absolute insight into social structures and, the avoidance of discussion or real intellectual interaction. If one accepts as one's life style the fear of being confronted with oneself, with what one can and cannot do, one can fit in. A small minority refuses to do so and insists upon making something of their undergraduate years. But the program that the school offers is not meant for them. The school produces a behavior pattern that the majority of

students internalizes. The code entails a passive attitude to knowledge; either one is incapable of it or cannot do anything about its absolutes. And the code determines a slavish dependence upon the social; the student is formed in four years of conformity and confirmed by sacrificing his individuality to get a diploma. Success comes to those who renounce a personal style and who agree not to confront their surroundings. The graduate will fit in just as long as he does not have to be self-sufficient, and will adapt if independent thought or action are not demanded of him. The undergraduate does not learn to stand on his own two feet, but remains, at best, dependent on ideology and, at worst, a slave to the welfare state that has given him a degree.

Who governs the school? Superficically, the answer is the maze of committees and officials who populate the administrative machinery. In fact, the formal rules and regulations are formulated there, but not the real curriculum or the social structure of instruction. Changes in the schools occur, at least in the literature taught, in some aspects of the practical training and in the target-group for ideological involvement. Despite the lack of any serious national coordination, parallel development has consistently taken place. This has taken different forms in the progressive-alternative schools and in the professionally oriented pragmatic or conservative religious ones. I note that the explicit etiquette of a bond to a 'church' occurs with schools that belong to each of the three types. Within each group of schools, one discovers a pattern of development that no one has decided upon, and that has often never been discussed. One therefore looks to the 'state,' 'society,' or 'politics' to explain the form of change. Explanations may be sought in the process of 'ideological' change and/or in the 'intellectual history' of Holland. For me here, it is only important to mention that these changes occur on the national level, and without any explicit conscious control, democratic or otherwise.

The schools are, in fact, powerless to control or, it seems, even to understand, the process of their own development. While they may be 'nationalized,' they are not 'planned.' Each school appears to do just what it wants to, with a total anarchy of policy making as the result. But 'freedom' irrevocably seems to lead to the same decisions and changes. This not for classical administrative reasons, but because the lecturers all belong to defined subcultures where certain ideas and sentiments predominate at a given moment. The schools do not lead ideological developments but follow them. Rationally, they should not have to take a 'back-seat' position, but this has consistently been the case. Lecturers and upper-division students often want to pose as an avant garde, but political and cultural movements seem to start outside the schools, and only reach their portals after a significant delay. To write on the sociology or economics of education and their influence on curriculum, is neither my intent nor within my expertise. I will not investigate the value that the quality of human capital has for overall social development or the role that education has in raising that value. However important the socioeconomic factor may be, the interaction between the individual student who spends four years of his life at a particular college and his teachers deeply influences the present and future activity of both. It is this qualitative issue that forms the crux of this essay. Obviously, when one is planning educational policy, one has to pay acute attention to the general social results of one's decisions. But education becomes anti-human when we neglect the ethical in practice. To teach is to enter upon an essential relationship in the development of oneself and of the student. Only by defining the quality, that relationship needs to have can we come to terms with the particularly human character of education. Global, sociological, or political recommenda-

tions without clear definitions of the quality of the human relationships that 'learning' needs, lead to just the sort of totalitarianism that I have described.

INTERFACE FOUR

On the one hand the goal of the study is to develop from novice unprepared lecturer to self-aware, and at least somewhat knowledgable (about teaching) instructor; and on the other there's been almost no introspective commentary. The attitudes and ideas of the beginning teacher have been written up without trying to define his 'self'. Initiation into developing education—into a circumstance of interaction and dialectical identities—takes place fairly unselfconsciously. Knowledge here is a *mirror,* we see ourself in the 'other' and in the circumstance of (inter)action. Each chapter has been the record of yet another 'mirror phase:'

(1) The personal past (in North America) was used as a mirror to reflect the immediate present. The description of sub-realism was a background upon which 'entenderment' was evoked.

(2) The passivity and dependence of the students was a mirror to teaching, and reflected upon the education offered. The activity of experiential learning was called forth by the impasse described.

(3) The analysis of the dominating social rationalism was the mirror image of a developing education.

In the fourth chapter (of the genetic text) a mirror is introduced, Roland Barthes and his followers, to see mirrors. Obviously if we set two mirrors facing one another there's a danger of an infinite regression without any progression in understanding. The one mirror is the 'anti-theory of the self,' and the other the 'rejection of social rationalism'. The positive event which must somehow emerge is a teaching I can defend wholeheartedly.

Recent theoretical statements of thought—three which took up a considerable portion of my time are Barthes, Derrida, Lacan—redefine the role of the subject. 'Entenderment' would seem to make the actual, living subject central to the teaching process, a deed running against the trend of 'de-centering' the subject and banishing him to the rubbish pile of outmoded assumptions. While I have obviously written to defend a certain idea of humanism, and not to embrace Althusser's or Foucault's will to destroy it, I have rejected the 'self' as a central term to the 'humaine'. In so far as structuralism rejects the dogma and ideology of the 'self' I recognize myself in it, but I can also identify a danger of overzealous rationalism and/or intellectualism in this movement. The difference originates in the type of subjectivity criticized. The 'ego' has, since Descartes, been the premised center of theoretical cognition and concrete action. This modern *subjectivity* defines a type of *individualism* (politics) and leads to a companion *objectivity* (science). One reaction is anti-modernist, anti-individualist thinking, where science triumphs over egological premises. Another response turns to prereflective and presubjective modes of experience, or matrixes of thought, in order to ground itself in a given that precedes the opposition I/World, subject/object. The first strategy reifies the subject—'the objective laws of science (history)' replace the 'thinking subject' as epistemological absolute, after which everything proceeds just as before. Subjectivity and objectivity became in Descartes two sides to the same coin: 'the stress on subjectivity reflected an endeavor to discover an indubitable starting point and thus to arrive more securely at objective knowledge' (Dallamyer, 1981, p.l.). The second strategy is directed neither at the subjective nor at the objective, but at the *connective tissue:* 'like the natural man, we situate in ourselves *and* in the things, in ourselves *and*

in the Other, at the point where, by a sort of *chiasma,* we become the others and be become the world' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 160).

When traditional subjectivity is criticized for its unachieved freedom, its rigid exclusiveness, and its incomplete insertion in the world, I agree. The subject defined as not-world is truncated, partial, lifeless. The inclusive subject is the place for occurrence, an opening on being, a matrix that sustains the human encounter. Thought lets coexistence emerge as reciprocal insertion and as an intertwining of the one in the other, instead of seeking exclusion in defined terminology. This is not rigid rational thought, but thought of inclusion and interaction. It is a world where we feel ourselves looked at by the things we study: where our activity is equally a passivity. Barthes is one writer who describes in detail such an interactive world, where the loss of 'self' is essential to learning. Thought is playfulness, pleasure, suppleness—it demands the flexibility of co-being. To describe this process is to investigate the 'archeology of knowledge,' the occurrences and interactions which have led to ideas. Herein research occurs into the *connective tissue* of learning, as called for by the second strategy of criticizing the epistemological primacy of the 'self.'

I knew what I did not want to teach (rationalist philosophy), which attitudes I rejected (subrealism), and the didactics I abhored ('the machine'). I was some sort of walking antithesis, which was out to swing the pendulum of possible approaches to the opposite extreme. I sought the most radical rejection of 'social rationalism' I could find. Intellectual anarchism seemed to be the most totally opposite attitude. My rebellion against rationalization embraced poetic individuality and championed individual freedom. Was nature, according to the prevalent opinion, in irreconcilable conflict with itself, I saw it as holistic; were individuals subordinate to society, I argued that 'society' is a formal category of analysis that the intellectual does or does not choose to use; was political involvement self-evident, I wondered if the effect of the personal example was not much more effective than all the statements of strangers. I challenged every assumption I could discover, and invented, borrowed, or stole alternatives to as many of the concepts about me as I could. My goal was to organize the biggest break out from the intellectual prison that I could. Where we would go, once we were free, I really did not know; the overriding concern was 'to get the hell out of here'.

But mere rebellion would not lead to much of anything. That I realized also. A pure antithesis would never be much of an alternative. While I knew I was motivated by a will to refute the vision of man inherent to the college's functioning, I understood that I would have to make concrete suggestions. Pure negation might be effective with the students in the short term, but it could not be sustained. Furthermore, the rejection of the prevailing curriculum, its implicit value system, and its social consequences, could only *imply* an ethics involving a real community of students and lecturers. I wanted more than that. I sought a cooperative effort where discussion was preparation for judgement, study an initiation of serious problem solving, and one's written work an effort to make a genuine statement about one's circumstances and therefore about oneself. I needed to fill in 'entenderment' and give it practical substance. I found my inspiration in Lacan's discovery of the mirror phase, Barthes' literary style of cultural reflection, and Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the subject/object relationship.

To take stock: what 'I' do I posit in teaching? The 'primacy of the self' leads, in education, to the practice of 'unilateral control.' The 'self' chooses, teaching follows. At the start there are the most abstract statements ('essential principles and features) upon which one deduces concrete procedures ('translation into practice'). Conven-

tionally, one proceeds along the logic of four fundamental questions:

1. What educational purposes should I seek to attain?
2. What educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes?
3. How can I effectively organize these educational experiences?
4. How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?

My concerns in teaching were not structured around general tenets. My practice was not an instance of applied educational philosophy. Concepts did not precede practice. If teaching had to wait on defining a general theory of pedagogic purpose, I would probably never have started. My point of departure was lived teaching, not the study of 'educational ideas.' At the moment of actual teaching, my first questions were 'What do I know about the subject?' 'Do I feel myself at home discussing it?' 'Will the student response be positive enough to make my plan tenable?' The content of the teaching was inseparable from my situation: it mirrored what I knew, my experiences, and the concerns that lecturing had generated. My choices were situational and concrete. I interacted with the context of my teaching—my activity was intersubjective. No isolated 'self' made unilateral decisions. Classroom discussion was not a mere rhetorical device: it was a thinking out loud about urgent matters. The teaching pursued answers to real questions. The social dimension to learning was essential. What I taught, thought about, was concerned with, was understandable to me, and my students, in the circumstance wherein we found ourselves. Ideas have to be passed from one person to another—this demands a radical sociability and, when reflected upon, a social awareness. Teaching is a form of man-together. Herein are founded my anti-egological (it is shared, communal matter) and non-objectivist (consciousness learns) assumptions. Lecturing is participation in the world where *perceived* world occurs. Object-being and subject-being both make the interchange of *perceived* world that opens on horizons (Merleau-Ponty) and world impossible. For the teacher and student, the world was there from the first and has always been the source by which one knows oneself. The man-world antinomy blocks the interactions that make knowledge, identity, and dialogue all possible. *But how can I understand the common matrix that sustains the form of human interaction called teaching?* The reciprocal insertion of lecturer and student in a shared process; the necessary (at least two) opennesses for something to take place; the need to stabilize the dialogue with referential points to prevent chaos; the boundaries of the thinkable and utterable were all problems. With Barthes I began to investigate knowledge as process and to describe knowing as interaction. The value of this stage of development was that I began, for the first time, to get the questions right. In teaching: Who is the 'I' that addresses the students? What is the relationship between the 'teaching *persona*' and the rest of consciousness? Is teaching merely quotation—the repeating of the ideas of other's? Is teaching intellectually creative, socially renewing—what does this mean? What sort of verbal activity—language action—is teaching? Do teachers merely convey definitions—names which are assigned to things? Is a nominalist critique justified, or is there a real interaction, event, occurrence?

Up to now I have been present in the research on two levels: as a beginning teacher and as a researcher/writer. That now becomes three. The beginning lecturer taught, for several years, a senior course on 'Semiotics and the Social Sciences,' where his own practice was held up for analysis. 'Teaching as research' was a central theme to my course material. I am not only the subject and object of this book, I was also the

subject and object of my teaching. Thus, we achieve 'Letiche (the writer of this book) on Letiche (the beginning lecturer) on Letiche (as subject matter of the course on semiotics).' This 'game' of levels of identity which all mirror one another is in the Barthesian tradition, which I explore much as I did in my seminar in the following section. The teaching served as an ostensive definition of the subject matter—the content and the deed were aligned upon one another. Event and thought were in dialogue with one another.

The second half of the genetic text is dedicated to untangling the knots of mirroring identities, interacting levels of speech/thought and, the problematic role of the 'self' in teaching. To put it colloquially: I still have a hundred pages to get myself out of the mess I have been trying so hard to get myself into! I intend, ultimately, to assert that contact is possible—interaction is real, teaching is a social event that transcends the monsterous juxtaposition of semiotic levels all mirroring one another. The rejection of subject/object dualism and social rationalism leads to a new problem, I am threatened by a nominalistic interpretation of language where words loose their ability to mean. If the real (materialism) does not determine speech, what protects us from semiotic anarchy? But if the real does determine speech, doesn't consciousness, as already described, loose all freedom? I escape the paradox by grounding teaching in language as event, circumstance, interaction. Teaching needs a lived-semiotics and not a theoretical/individual one.

4

The Sons of Roland Barthes

I seek the most radical antithesis to rationalism and deadening impersonality possible, in the anarchistic poetic intellectualism of Roland Barthes. If in my surroundings thought was not valued—one did not love to describe, speculate, investigate—I could still emphasize the personal and creative dimension to thought in my seminars. I could be a spokesman for Barthes' answer to rationalism's terrors. But will I find thus, a model for genuine involvement and the personal experience of learning? Barthes as teacher was commonly lionized: the rumors of an 'intellectual happening' had trickled back from Paris to Amsterdam. Was his emphasis upon 'creativity' and the individual learning experience, the solution to the demise I was witnessing of lived thought? Was this the path I sought to the community of thought? I decided to investigate Barthes: his thinking and his concrete work with others: the ideas and their results. The guiding question brought me into contact with the works of Barthes' young followers: my reflection on their efforts takes up much of this chapter. The context is Barthes but the question concerns the social dialectic. Did Barthes define a manner of learning, a content and a matching approach, which could be further used to understand 'entenderment?' I begin here with *Method: Dox/Para-dox* a short mention of what in Barthes' thinking, and that of his followers, will be discussed. In *Bathmology* Renaud Camus' work is examined in his relationship to Barthes, and *In the Mirror the Name of the Father* Antoine Compagnon's. My concluding word is *The Teacher*.

a. Method: Doxa/Para-dox

> The necessity for this book *(A Lover's Discourse)* is to be found in the following consideration: that the lover's discourse is today of *an extreme solitude*. This discourse . . . is completely forsaken by the surrounding languages: ignored, disparaged, or derided by them, severed not only from authority (sciences, techniques, arts) . . . it has no recourse but to become the site . . . of an *affirmation*. That affirmation is, in short, the subject of the book which begins here . . . (Roland Barthes 1977 p.1)

The less the Barthes-ian plays the writer, the less a rigid opinion is asserted; the less chance there is that he will become a victim of *doxa*. *Doxa* is the dribble of repeated opinion—the faceless, impersonal certainties that are resaid without ever being thought about. Para-dox is the shift in meaning achieved by breaking with *doxa* and reasserting significance, thought, statement. All speech is threatened with incrustation; a book threatens to rigidify thinking. It is the play of ever-changing interpretation that rescues the text from being mere imprisonment. Para-dox leads to the pleasure of

discovering the text. School could be the context of learning to interpret — to read. Reading is riddance of 'correct' thinking or accepted experiencing. School would become a 'happening'.

It is less than useless, it is destructive to reduce the Barthes 'event' to a *doxa:* to press Barthes into a linear 'model of education'. The Barthes-ian text must become 'writerly' an event of expression wherein the activity of 'wording' arouses participation. For the reader who is already terrified or overjoyed, I must establish that I am not going to follow Barthes. To write traditional academic prose about Barthes is perverse, and to accept him on the terms I have sketched above is something I refuse to do. This essay is not going to become a poetic fantasy or a personal sensual evocation. Nonetheless, the idea of 'learning' that emerges in Barthes' texts does resemble such literary playfulness:

> Put him [Barthes] in front of a cigar box and he would have one, two, many ideas—a little essay. It was not a question of knowledge (he couldn't have known much about some of the subjects he wrote about) but of alertness, a fastidious transcription of what *could* be thought about something . . . . (Susan Sontag, 1980 p. 169)

There is something in this delight in the stream of consciousness that enthralls. What fun, how originally at ease, at last one's own reading of texts. I remember my undergraduate enthusiasms when I wrote term papers not to say what a work meant, but out of a pure infatuation with inventing new readings that were at least vaguely plausible. Whatever the text seriously or definitively might 'mean' was not at issue. The project was to create a poetry that was exciting to write. To do so, one had to be enthralled with reading so as to lose oneself in the process of creating a *'fantasme'* of what one had read. A source should be recognizable in one way or another, but one's experience of a work was to be entirely one's own. A choice, thus, for poetic anarchy. A whole school of this would be an experimentalist's dream, and for another a nightmare.

Barthes proclaimed in *Leçon,* his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, that he hoped to create 'phantasmic teaching' (Barthes, 1978a p. 15) wherein 'digression' and *'excursion'* (loc. cit.) predominate. He calls himself an 'an-archist' (Ibid., p. 9) who has always sought to evade the 'power' of words. Every statement threatens to become definitive, seems to slip into becoming authority, falls into *doxa.* Only a constant process of self-change, reinterpretation, and irreverence denies the claim that 'power' would make of all statements. Throughout Barthes' career, the power of speech to become imposition, repression, and paradigm fascinates him. He wants to escape the terror of language. Are we not 'spoken' by stock phrases, 'thought' by traditional wordings, the victims of 'correct' answers? Every instant of escape, from the smothering quality of language is swallowed up again. Each moment of creativity, of genuinely personal statement, is usurped by listeners who repeat; and by the language which cuckolds its speakers. A language is a structure—the mirror of a world; we speak it, or, more accurately, it speaks us, without our ever realizing that the 'world' has taken over.

We are, reasoning further in the same trend of structuralism, enslaved to what is implicit in language. Speech is our most personal form of outing, and also what makes us derivative. Language threatens experiencing on all sides; it forms existence, defines truths, reduces substance to formulas—all usually without our perceiving what has happened. Learning leads more quickly to 'right answers', to our submission to

language's assertions, than to ourselves. We are lost in statements, herded into what has been said. For Barthes, reading is not doomed to be imprisonment; it can also be a constant process of interpretation, where we create text. The reading can be our chosen provocation to delight, playfulness, fantasy.

> A ceux qui . . . appartiennent à la génération qui suit la sienne, il a appris à lire. Ni plus ni moins. Je me souviens de ces fantastiques traversées du texte qu'on faisait sous sa dictée: . . . nous avions tous l'impression d'essaimer dans un phalanstère où se démultipliait la passe du savoir. Il s'y dévidait une parole collective, accrochée aux volutes de ces cigares qu'il aimait tant avec Brecht . . . . Cette voix, on n'avait jamais le sentiment de la voir s'alourdir dans la formule définitive ou triomphante . . . . un sens très provocateur de l'à-quoi-bon . . . . Le seminaire, il l'a écrit, est un 'arbre de désirs.'
>
> (André Clavel 1980 pp. 21-22)

> [As for] the generation that followed his, he taught it to read. Nothing more, nothing less. I remember the fantastic forays into the text that one made under his guidance: . . . It seemed to all of us that we were gathered in a phalastery, one where the transmission of knowledge was intensified. A collective speech clung to the rings of cigar smoke he loved as much as Brecht did. This voice—it never seemed to bog down into a definitive or triumphant formula . . . . a provocative feel for what-good-is-it . . . . The seminar, he wrote, is a 'tree of desires.'

As his goal as lecturer at the Collège de France, Barthes chose 'no power, a little knowledge, a little wisdom, and as much flavor as possible' (Barthes, 1978a, p. 16). For many, he lived up to this throughout his teaching career. His seminar gained a very special reputation: it was 'le cortège d'amis qui m'accompagnent, me guident, auxquels je m'abandonne' (Barthes, 1978b, p. 308). [The retinue of friends that accompanies me, that guides me, to which I give myself up]. Not only was he a textual an-archist, he argued that a creative, individual reading took place with one's body—where the link between 'speech and kissing' is reflected upon as a 'double perversion' (Barthes, 1975, p. 141) and 'meaning and sex [have] become the object of free play, at the heart of which the [polysemant] forms and the [sensual] practices, liberated . . . achieve a state of infinite expansion' (Ibid, p. 133). Such a seminar would seem to become something very different from what we are used to. Actually, in the one very lengthy transcription of Barthes in discussion that has appeared (*Colloque de Cerisy,* 444 pages Barthes, 1978b) , disappointingly little of all this creative playfulness emerges[1]. The seminar was, I believe, Barthes' myth, one that ran away with him, and a fantasy that needs debunking. In his writing, Barthes seems to promise a new spontaneity and a manner of teaching radically different from what we are used to. His sensual form of intellectual exploration promises to be the antidote to repressive, stifling ways of thinking. When I first discovered Barthes, not just *S/Z,* which I had already run across in the sixties, but the *Pleasure of the Text* and *Barthes by Barthes,* I was overjoyed. The terror that I have described here in the first three chapters of the genetic text was recognized (especially in the early *Degree Zero of Writing*) and a program was proposed. Barthes championed a mischievous sensibility, where immediacy wins out from abstraction. The affective poverty of contemporary culture is attacked with the free-play of feeling. Emotion drives cognitive exactitude every-which-way: each interpretation is a *possible* way of seeing. Barthes does not impose restrictions or limits, harp on obligations or respon-

sibilities, nor is he careless or unfeeling of judgment. I decided to try-Barthes-out: several seminars of my own resulted. But, after a time, I began to demand to know what the results were. What sort of interaction had Barthes created? What was the reality of his teaching—of the relationship between him and his surroundings. Of course, *Leçon* contained hints, but I wanted to know about results.

The journalist Laurent Dispot showed me a way[2]. He reported that shortly before the accident took place, that eventually led to Barthes' death Barthes had indicated that three young writers could be considered his most special heirs. All three, it turns out, indicate their indebtedness to Barthes in their texts. Furthermore, two took part in the Cerisy meeting where Barthes was discussed for a week in his own presence. One response to my question 'What are the results of the Barthesian enterprise' had become possible. By examining the work of Antoine Compagnon, Jean-Louis Bouttes, and Renaud Camus I could try and see what the collective experience of Barthes had amounted to*. If Barthes' 'love' was not pure narcissism, but was, as was claimed, a manifestation of friendship, then a special community should mark the work of its exponents. This, at least, was my hypothesis. If Barthes' teaching was different, a creative sensuality, a poetic renewing, then it should produce results. A second line of research emerged when the seminar of Cerisy was discovered (A third, an unedited film of Barthes discussing Barthes, confirms the ideas developed here[3]).The long transcription of Cerisy made it possible for me to imagine my own responses to Barthes in discussion. Of course, a study week, attended by graduates and not students, is different from a seminar, but nonetheless it gives one hints. The statement of intentions by Barthes is vast. All his later works indicate what manner of study he supports. In fact, the question of method predominates. Barthes constantly inquires how one should understand: he calls for an expressive, personal, even physical manner of reading where direct experience and involvement predominate. Understanding takes place in the direct response, in the imaginative ability to experience the other. Intellectual life is impoverished by the 'right answers' with which no one is really in accord, but which have become routine habits of our minds. Barthes richly illustrates in his books that accepted interpretations can be debunked, that trivial subjects can become enthralling, and that idiosyncratic approachs can be rewarding. My task is not to repeat Barthes' aesthetics here; this chapter is not to become a summary of Barthes' manner of understanding. It is a speculative inquiry into the manner of instruction, or learning, that Barthes defined. I am interested in what actually happens to one's manner of thinking, working, creating, by becoming a student of Barthes'. Which questions will emerge, what will be the attitude towards the 'other,' where will all the playfulness lead to? What sort of human process is 'learning with Barthes'? Barthes' utopias of textual discovery, however enthralling his descriptions may be, are of secondary importance for this essay. I will make use of them to indicate what is Barthes' idea of 'learning.' Barthes distinguishes between a readerly and writerly text. The former is fixed, rigid, absolute; and the latter open to interpretation, to readers' recreating, to one's own rewriting.

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* Bouttes proved to be an opaque writer whose 'new novel' prose communicated nothing to me. I can only claim to have seen the words he placed on paper: I cannot read him. He definitely means nothing pleasurable for me—so I left him by the wayside. Camus and Compagnon are an enthralling enough mirror of Barthes to satisfy my research needs.

But these were properties of texts. To switch from texts to activities or events-of-learning: a writerly situation is one where the presence of the writer-creater remains stultifying, holds the creativity of the learner in harness, defines rather than generates. A readerly circumstance is one where investigating and thinking predominate—where the reader is not captured by the text, but remains independent[4]. To belong to a community of readers says nothing about one's writing. To be the passive writer (i.e. reader) who rewrites another's text may be creative, but still implies a clear-cut dependency upon writers. Those who read together have kept all their options, as writers, open. Nothing has yet been said about them as writers. I am interested in what those who have read Barthes are going to *do* afterwards. I do not seek the most creative recreation of Barthes' text in a reader's imagination, but the direct transcending of reading into action. However creative a role Barthes may give a reader, the reader-writer dichotomy continues to exist. He does not seem to demand its transcendence—everyone should write who reads. This standpoint would seem more coherent than the one he did adopt, and is well enough known to 'an-archist' aesthetics: the COBRA group, for instance, defended it[5]. I assume that a really radical participation in textuality leads to writing. But this is not a thesis that Barthes introduces. Barthes, the writer, only talks about the pleasure of reading. While he wrote about everything he read, he does not seem to postulate the necessity for others to write. Barthes, in his theory, reverses reading and writing. Reading becomes active, creative, free; and the result of writing threatening, repressive, rigid. Reading becomes 'writerly,' and actual writing disappears.

> There was something childlike about him, in the wistfulness, in the plump body and soft voice and beautiful skin, in the self-absorption. He liked to linger in cafés with students; he wanted to be taken to bars and discos—but, sexual transactions aside, his interest in you tended to be your interest in him.(Susan Sontag, 1980, p. 176)

How much was Barthes interested in our freedom? Is it because of his interest in us that we want to read him? Barthes does not really give us anything to read, but merely demonstrates how we should go about doing so—a method without a content. However much fun unattached method may afford us, we remain linked to things, circumstances, *'hyle'*: we will inevitably resume a relationship with the world. Pure method runs dry—it needs activity. We have to do something, just exploring the reading of reading is not enough. Methodological high-jinks can rescue us from plodding sterility, but can they keep us going for any length of time?

b. Bathmology

> *Bathmology* I write: that is the first degree of language. The I write that *I write*: that is language to the second degree . . . . The second degree is also a way of life. All we need to do is change the focus of a remark, of a performance, of a body in order to reverse altogether the enjoyment we might have taken in it, the meaning we might have given it . . . if I abide by the second degree, I deserve the accusation of intellectualism . . . but if I take off the brake (of reason, of science, of morality), if I put the speech-act into *neutral* then I open the way to an endless detachment, I abolish language's *good conscience*. (Barthes, 1975, p. 66)

This quote simultaneously indicates Barthes' preoccuppation with degrees of prose and documents his introduction of the neologism Bathmology that is the central concept of Renaud Camus' *Buena Vista Park*[6]. For Barthes, the peculiarities of the 'second degree' of writing always remained crucial. He is what can be called an 'absurdist' structuralist. He has followed the linguistic tradition that separates the sound of the word (*significant*) from its meaning (*signifié*) to its logical conclusion. Words possess no inherent link to their objects. Language is arbitrary, utterly synthetic. There is no necèssity to what we shall *call* things. The linguistic world is purely synthetic—a cultural artifact. The relationship between words and things is contingent. Language is whatever we make of it. To create, change, or understand meanings, we do not need to have a definitive knowledge of the 'world' and its relationship to consciousness, we need to understand the societal developments that saturate language with 'meaning.' Language is social history—words mirror the structures of social circumstance within which they occur. To understand language is to place the words correctly in their social function. While Barthes did believe early in his career, that a science of signs should be possible (semiology), he abandoned this concept later on. Such a science would discover the 'zero degree' of language: a pure structure of language that would explain how signs signify, change, work. But Barthes abandoned this project; he no longer believed that such a 'zero degree' was to be found. His more 'scientific' (in tone) work all had to do with the linguistic theory of an underlying structure to language. It was an enterprise that seemingly was derived from Levi-Strauss' myth analyses. Semiology, as a science of signs, never really got off the ground. Barthes gave it up to create language, instead of searching for some foundation to language that would not be susceptible to arbitrary innovation. Already in his short articles, collected as *Mythologies*, Barthes finds experimenting with second degrees of meaning more important than burrowing under them to a more 'essential' level of analysis. If the second degree lets us interpret, determines how we understand, and sets the tone of reading, then manipulating it is a powerful tool. Politics would not have to change what was said if it had power over how things were understood. Barthes seized upon this possibility of changing understanding, using it to justifiy his own 'leftism.' The second degree of the political 'right' can be unmasked and the cultural power of conservatism can thereby be diminished. In *Mythologies*, Barthes does some delightful unmasking: of tourist guides, of advertising, of nationalistic photos, of toys, of everything and anything, that comes into his hands. But the creation of a new second degree turns out to be empty. To replace old myths with new ones merely means trading one impersonation for another, one unreal gaze for the next. It is just this shifting of imprisonments without freeing anyone that Barthes accuses traditional leftists of. Games in the second degree may be fun, but no one is really the better for them. Only a third degree would break the vicious circle—an understanding of the function of myth in human speech, which would liberate us from the influence of myths. But if language *is* context, how can we transcend context to understand language as something purely personal and experiential? Barthes wants to achieve a sort of phenomenological language: an authenticity in relating words to things. But his own concept of language as artifact makes such a relationship impossible. He never tells us where we would come out if we were to drop beneath meaning (zero degree) or if we were to transcend it (a third degree). He plays with both escapes from the words-meaning relationship, but does not really make much progress. Eventually he gives up on these efforts to escape the social absurdity of language and devotes his time to inventing bigger and better absurdities. In *L'Empire des*

Signes, Barthes utterly lets loose, creating a mythical Japan that is as fascinating as it is imaginative. In this text, he falls in love with different aspects of his image of Japan. His descriptions of Japanese food are delightful: his enthusiasm for a manner of eating where one creates one's own dinner at the table is unlimited. He delights in the sensuality of chop sticks, which respect the form of the food, in comparison to our utensils, which violate it. Similarly, he investigates the Japanese puppet theater where the puppet masters are visible. He is enthralled by a theater that does not thirst for an illusion of realism, but is willing to be theater openly, leaving the audience to the higher pleasures of understanding literature as literature, of recognizing the theatrical as such, and of giving one's attention to what is being conveyed. In the whole book, it is not important if Japanese theater, food, poetry, city planning, or whatever, is 'really' what Barthes says it is. The question is impossible: what one reads is the play of the second degree. It is a venture in interpreting out of pure ingeniousness. It makes for delightful reading, but is purely arbitrary and absurd. In his later works, Barthes loses his interest in the qualities of the second degree. He becomes more interested in the first, which is the pure physical quality—the sounds and material—of a text. He searches for a sensual, direct response to the '*hyle*' of the words. Enjoyment, as physical delight, becomes primary. The text has an ability to awake a sensual response. From which 'degree' the text possesses this ability is unclear. In *La Chambre Clair*, Barthes' last book, he talks about *studium* and *punctum* (Barthes, 1980a, pp. 47-49). *Studium* is the cultural level of interest, it is what we understand by making use of our circumstance and the context. The *studium* of a photo, which the book analyzes, is often called 'human interest': it is what generally attracts our attention, what is most often found significant. The *punctum* is qualitatively different; it is something in the photo that pierces one. The *studium* is seen; it is a factor of attention that is at one's command. The *punctum* seizes one. There is nothing to choose, one is moved, shocked, struck. While the *studium* is a familier concept, varying little from 'the second degree,' the *punctum* is a direct emotional event originated by a 'text'. In his last works, Barthes is interested in the *punctum* : in a response to something outside ourself that is not a mental game, but an emotional necessity. If pleasure is nothing more than the proper manipulating of myths or meanings, it is pretty tame stuff.

> A moi de choisir, de soumettre son spectacle au code civilisé des illusions parfaites, ou d'affronter en elle le réveil de l'intraitable réalité.
>
> (Barthes, 1980 a, p. 184)

> I can choose between letting the spectacle fall under the code of perfect illusions provided by civilization, or braving it in the awakening of an intractable reality.

Barthes' normal detachment lessens in his last books. His subject, sadness, mourning, and reflection on the relationship between love and death does not fit the exuberant joking of his earlier work. For the first time, there is something 'sacred' for Barthes: something he pertinently does not want to relinquish to the play of alternating meanings. The play of 'bathmology proves' inadequate to deeply personal experience and, ultimately, to real affection. With the death of his mother, Barthes was confronted with a memory/meaning that he did not want to jeopardize. His 'entenderment' to her was not open to an unending process of shifting meanings. He desperately wanted a 'good conscience', a remembrance of his mother that was really her. The 'text' (a photo) needed to be 'real' for the first time. He claims to have found such a photo,

from which his mother looks out at us just as she was; and he does not print it in his book. He does not release it for speculation, interpretation, and the play of (mis)understanding.

Renaud Camus' novel *Buena Vista Park* is dedicated to Barthes and seems, on first inspection, to be 'bathmological.' Its style appears to resemble Barthes: the text is built up of relatively short fragments, placed in a seemingly chance order. But the similarity is more apparent than real. Barthes' play of 'degrees' of text, has as its purpose escape from '*doxa*' and the discovery of a personal form of expression. This individualism is foreign to Camus. He does not try and free himself from the pernicious social myths that are attached to meanings, he merely adopts so many poses within the world of social connotations.

Passé-Passé

De même que le Nationalisme, en France, est passé, entre 1870 et 1890, de l'extrême-gauche, à l'extrême-droite, les signes folkloriques de l'homosexualité, depuis vingt ans, ont émigré de la préciosité efféminée à la virilité emphatique: à San Francisco . . . ce qui connote . . . le *gay,* ce sont les cheveux courts, les moustaches, trois jours de barbe éventuellement, des jeans particulièrement usés. . . .

(Camus 1980, p. 52)

Sleight of Hand

Just as French nationalism went from far left to far right between 1870 and 1890, in twenty years the folkloric symbols of homosexuality have migrated from a precocious effeminacy to an emphatic virility: in San Francisco the things that signify *gay* are short hair; a moustache; possibly a three-day beard; and faded jeans. . . .

And how does Camus present himself in photos or descriptions: with short hair, a moustache, poorly shaved, and in jeans. He introduces the stereotype to identify with it. For Camus, Bathmology is: (1) the question of whether one unthinkingly is the stereotype; (2) indicates abhorrence of those who artificially set themselves against the stereotype by consciously mimicking it; (3) finds thinking about thinking about stereotypes, absurd; and (4) merely adopts what is expected—as in the attitudes of the first (unreflective), and third (do as the first, since the antithesis is forced), levels, and (5) in the end embraces the first level, for the preceding four levels have exhausted one. It is a sort of spiraling dialectic, where there are only two varieties of behavior, but infinite levels of justification and counter-justification. For Barthes, bathmology represents a real escape from social myth; for Camus no such thing seems possible.

Ethique de L'Écriture

'Le naturel, c'est la culture'. Donc plus vous croyez parler *naturellement,* plus vous êtes *sincère* et plus vous êtes parlé par votre culture, votre âge, votre milieu etc. Ce n'est qu'en imposant à son discours des contraintes formelles toutes artificielles, où s'embarrasse le vouloir-dire, qu'on peut espérer échapper au babil implacable, en soi, de la *Doxa*.

(Camus 1980, p. 66)

The Ethics of Writing

'It is culture that is natural.' For this reason, the more you believe you speak *naturally,* and the more you are *sincere,* the more you are spoken by your culture, historical period, milieu, etc. It is only by imposing on discourse formal,

> entirely artificial constraints, in which meaning is caught up, that one can hope to escape the implacable babble, within one, of *doxa*.

Three choices: formalism, silence, or *doxa*. The second is irrelevant, for it produces no texts. The first is characteristic of Camus' early books, which are dominated by plays on words and textual maneuvers. The third alternative is accepted in *Buena Vista Park,* which is his later book. The fragments amount to nothing more than poses; it is a collection of cultural attidudes, or intellectual fads: 'le sens et la mode participent d'un seul mouvement' (Camus, 1980, p.21). [meaning and fashion move in step with each other] The text is utterly artificial; 'que sa volonté d'être ambigu est plus forte que son désir d'être compris (Camus, 1980, p. 45). [the determination to be ambiguous is stronger than his desire to be understood] But the genuine bathmologue could get somewhere: his experimentation with meaning could become a sort of abstract expressionism in prose. But Camus does not want to accept the possibility of *creating* any meaning, even if abstract. He rejects being the author of any content: only a play of forms is sought after. He explains his text to inhibit it: the bathmologue' n'explique jamais (ce petit livre n'est pas bathmologique), ou bien ses explications sont contradictoires' (Camus, 1980, p. 45). [. . .never explains this little book is not bathmological, or his explanations are self-contradictory] *Buena Vista Park* does not unmask mode: it embraces it. It tries to destroy the reverence and love for the text characteristic of Barthes. For all the liberties Barthes took with texts, he always managed to retain a 'sense of good taste.' His games were affectionate; they did not destroy literature but celebrated it. He was perhaps more inventive than most academic readers of literature find appropriate, but his writings always displayed *tact;* an understanding and sympathy for literature is undoubtably present.

Camus: 'je vois des discours qui passent, et je pourrais les prendre, comme des autobus' (Camus, 1980, p. 81). [I see the discourses passing, and I could catch them the way one catches a bus.] Every once in a while, he does make a clever comment: 'Lacan doit vraiment être génial, parce que s'il ne l'est pas il est tellement absurde que c'est pas possible' (Camus, 1980, p. 65) [Lacan really must be brilliant, because if he isn't he's too absurd to be for real] or 'de même: une nouvelle offre du libéralisme hétérosexuel prend la forme d'un 'pourvu qu'ils s'aiment'. Et s'ils ne font que se désirer, alors?' (Camus, 1980, p. 92). [a new offering from hetrosexual liberalism takes the form of 'provided that they love each other.' But what if they only want each other?] But there are not very many really clever remarks; Camus simply is not a master of the aphorism. He is sufficiently vain: 'pour résumer, je dirai prétentieusement que les autres m'ennuient beaucoup (je le leur rends bien), mais que je ne m'ennuie jamais' (Camus, 1980, p. 93). [to summarize, I immodestly state that other people bore me very much (I repay them in kind), but that I never bore myself.] But he bores me. There may be always another interpretation; all meaning may be susceptible to further analysis, distortion, uncertainty, but to conclude that thought is merely a playing upon the surface of things, is to abandon language, and thus human interaction, to hollowness. Camus has tried so hard to be clever and he is not even that. Real improvisation is not mere show, mode, and appearance; it is organized around an original manner of seeing. Camus imitates Barthes' effects without possessing Barthes' integrity or originality. The surface appearances of Barthes's style are all repeated, but the essential qualities of his text are neglected. The real excitement of discovery, the pleasure of the text, the exuberance in reading are all missing in Camus. The stylistic effects are reproduced in a sham 'bathmology'.

Camus' first three books appeared between 1973 and 1978. They were all 'in the line of the *New Novel'*.

> . . . dans la ligne du Nouveau roman, il y a une nouvelle façon d'engendrer les ouvrages . . . Cet usage . . . pourrait s'appeler la *reprise basse:* son mécanisme est de l'ordre du *grossissement*. Il s'agit de reprendre tel fonctionnement déjà présenté mais avec la systématicité la plus grande. Renaud Camus opère plutôt dans la voie de cette mise en cause que l'on a pu nommer 'le récit enlisé' . . . Un méthodique dispositif de parenthèses . . . adoptant l'allure d'un vertigineux emboitement de notes en bas de page, y agresse, selon de savoureuses digressions, un récit lui-même soumis à toutes autres sortes d'adventures.
>
> (Jean Ricardou, 1980, p. 13)

> . . . in the line of the *New Novel,* there is a new means of production . . . This practice could be called *the bass repeat:* its technique is a sort of *enlargement*. It's a matter of employing continually a mechanism that is already known, but as systematically as possible. Renaud Camus prefers to use a device that can be called 'the bogged-down narration' . . . A systematic method of using parentheses . . . which takes the form of a dizzying boxing-in of footnotes, which attacks—but with juicy digressions—a text that is itself subject to all sort of other adventures.

Passage-Echange-Travers were announced as a part of a project that was to embody seven books to be written by Camus, Tony Duparc, Denis Duparc, Denis Duvert, Denise Camus, etc. Duparc was a charcter in *Passage,* and all the other 'writers' are names created by playing with the names Renaud Camus-Tony Duparc. Either one is enthusiastic about such games or one is not. I am not. The argument for:

> Ce que Joyce avait fait avec les mots dans *Finnegan's Wake* Renaud Camus, d'une certaine manière, le fait avec l'écriture tout entière, qui réintègre en s'en jouant, la multiplicité des discours et des codes; qui emprunte, mêle, brouille, agglomère, déforme, cite, répète, parodie; qui opère des transferts de lettres, de syllabes, de sons, de mots, de phrases de sens; qui tisse, tout au long d'une oeuvre (et non plus d'un seul ouvrage), un réseau de renvois, substitutions, interférences, reprises, variations, dénégations; qui n'hésite pas à inventer, à force de talent et de duplicité un nouveau plaisir du texte.
>
> (Didier, 1978 p. 5)

> What Joyce did with words in *Finnegan's Wake,* Renaud Camus does in a way with writing itself: he reintegrates that which he plays with, the multiplicity of forms and rules of discourse. He borrows, mixes, estranges, agglomerates, deforms, quotes, repeats, parodies; he manages shifts in letters, syllables, sounds, words, sense units; throughout his writings (not in just this one work), he weaves a network of references, substitutions, interferences, repeats, variations, denials; which does not hesitate to invent new textual delights through talent and trickery.

All well and good, but mere verbal games do not hold my attention and ultimately I judge them to be unreadable. I find *Passage-Echange-Travers* annoying anti-text; I cannot imagine where the pleasure could occur. The reader is faced with a verbal maze

in which meaning is tortured. Language is confronted with its artificiality and is robbed of its ability to mean. Words loose all significance. What remains is a paranoid distortion of speech that is devastatingly frigid. This destruction of language has, I am convinced, nothing to do with Barthes' creation of language. The charm of Barthes' prose lies in its exuberance. It is his ability to fall in love with writers, objects, and situations that makes him so distinctive. Few artists convey so original a sympathy for life as Barthes did. As Susan Sontag comments: 'He was a great lover of life (and denier of death); the purpose of his unwritten novel, he said, was to praise life, to express gratitude for being alive' (Sontag, 1980, p. 177). Barthes' unwritten novel could not be more different in conception from Renaud Camus' work. Camus shows no warmth for life; words become frightening mazes in his hands. At best, he is clever; at worst, a trickster. The text is something inhuman for Camus, full of connotations, references, and implied footnotes; but without a personal style or affection for others. Barthes seems to want to seduce his reader, to gain his attention and affection. Camus reifies his reader in language as fetish, and reading as a technology of textuality. Camus' novels possess all the complexity, as well as the rigidity and mechanical quality, of an intricate computer program.

His fourth book, *Tricks,* displays none of the endless verbal machinations of his first three. It is composed of thirty-three short passages, each describing a 'trick'—a meeting between two unacquainted men that results in a sexual relationship. No lasting friendship results; a 'trick' is to 'make love' to an unknown. *Tricks* describes desire; it is out to avoid the moralism that often pervades books where sexuality plays an essential role. All thirty-three incidents have pretty much the same structure. Camus is on the street or in a homosexual bar; he is in 'drag'; a flirtatious first recognition of desire takes place; there is dancing and kissing, or some form of body contact; the two decide to 'go somewhere' together. Most of the meetings take place in 'Manhattan', a Paris bar. In this case, he describes going down stairs to claim one's coat; the discussion just outside (your place or mine?); and the problem of transport: Camus always walks or at most, has a bicycle. The actual physical transactions are described very literally. Afterwards someone does or does not want to wash himself. There is a bit of chatting and the pair either falls asleep or one departs. At the end, Camus mentions whether he has seen the other again or not.

The tricks always take place with much the same type. Camus is wild about thin men with mustaches and with lots of body hair, and, if possible, with hair on their finger joints. Genitals disappear in anuses, are rubbed against each other, and are sucked. Occasionally, he goes to a Paris gym, where the changing rooms seem filled with persistently fornicating pairs. A sauna with group sex constantly in the making also comes in for attention as well as homosexual films houses and their possibilities.

Barthes wrote an introduction to this book, in which he claims that the text is a sort of repeating pattern that frees us to study the details of personal response, wherein the homosexuality ceases to attract attention. We are evidently to be immunized to the sexual theme through sheer repetition and thereby freed to see other things. I do not believe that the text works that way. It is a sort of fugue, but the repeating pattern dominates the variations. Neither Camus nor his partners emerge as interesting people; they are merely sexually joined bodies. The text may or may not resemble experience (fantasy), but as something to *read* it seems trivial. The repetitions of sex for its own sake does not vary in the nearly three hundred and fifty pages. Paradoxically, nothing really happens in the book. The simplest response is to dismiss it either

as exhibitionism (Camus' sexual capabilities would seem to be considerable) or pornography. Camus states his purpose: 'ce livre essaie de dire le sexe, en occurrence *l'homosexe* comme si ce combat-là était déjà gagné, et résolus les problèmes que pose un tel projet: *tranquillement'* (*Camus, 1975,* p. 19). [this book tries to recount sex, in this case, *homosex,* as if this fight were already won, and the problems of such a project already resolved: *tranquilly*.] He continues, 'que ce livre contribue à rendre banal son sujet comme sujet, il ne sera pas en vain' (Camus, 1975, p. 22) [if this book helps to make its subject banal as a subject, it will not be in vain.] I am tempted to claim that Camus has succeeded beyond his wildest expectations.

I am not accusing Camus of technical inexpertness. My problem is that I find him horrifyingly superficial. He has nothing to say. It is all very well to give students creative freedom, but what does one do when they are unable to make any significant use of it? Camus is a skillful technician; his texts are sometimes very complex; his prose can be clear and precise; he can imitate styles and make use of the French literary tradition. But the total frigidity of feeling that he displays horrifies me. He represents a culture of rich sham, of sophisticated emptiness, of intellectual indifference. The 'degrees' of language are no longer an escape from thoughtless repression, but have become a denial of the very possibility of meaning. The text has not broken loose from restraints; it is depersonalized and trivialized. Renaud Camus is a fifth column to Barthes' pursuit of individual expression and a personal style of reading, and of his enthusiasm for life.

c. In the Mirror the Name of the Father

> Lacan brought a 'stade du mirroir' into psychoanalytic parlance: Though still in a state of powerlessness and motor incoordination the infant (6-18 mos.) anticipates on an imaginary plane the apprehension and mastery of its bodily unity. The imaginary unification comes about by means of identification with the image of the counterpart as total *Gestalt;* it is exemplified concretely by the experience in which the child perceives its own reflection in a mirror.
>
> (J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, 1973 p. 249)

This fascination of the subject with an image has a twofold effect. Self-recognition and self-alienation occur simultaneously. One discovers the self, learns to identify oneself, and loses oneself in an image, in a representation. The theme of the double fascinates Barthes: *S/Z* is an analysis of Balzac's *Sarrasine,* which centers upon the relationship between the image and identity; *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes* is obviously a discussion of the subject and his equivalent, *La Chambre Claire* takes up the theme of the relationship between the photo and the photographed. These are relationships of objectification and identification, forming an infinite dialectic of image. There is even a review of *Barthes by Barthes* by Barthes. The self is a symbol, a representation internalized. Without the alien image, there would be no material from which to build a 'self'. Without some sort of primitive 'self', there would be nothing that could discover the image. The self is a collection of figures of speech and methaphors.

> Yet today the subject apprehends himself *elsewhere,* and 'subjectivity' can return . . . deconstructed, taken apart, shifted, without anchorage: why should I not speak of 'myself' since this 'my' is no longer 'the self'.
>
> (Barthes, 1975 p. 168)

Barthes writes constantly about 'himself', but remains reserved—even distant. At no point does he attempt to be 'intimate' with his reader. He attemps to create a new Classicism, to be compared with Morandi's still lifes. Barthes was no romantic; his art is not an expression of the individual will; he never tries to convey raw feeling. He is always concerned with the image, with the imitation of reality, however precarious such a process may have become in a milieu deeply influenced by Lacan. He prized restraint, simplicity, dignity, serenity, and repose. These qualities are all present in his most memorable prose. *A Lover's Discourse,* for all its references to Goethe, conveys a sensibility utterly different to that of the German Romantic. The sadness that Barthes couples with love has nothing to do with suicide or emotional histrionics. He portrays the bittersweet realization of a tender suffering, of inevitable limits:

> The tender gesture says: ask me anything that can put your body to sleep, but also do not forget that I desire you—a little, lightly, without trying to seize anything right away.
>
> Barthes, 1977 p. 224

Barthes has a classicist's sense of truth: reason emotionally and imaginatively conceived. His writings are never self-revelation, but a search for 'reason'. His 'reason' or *logos* is radically man-based. It is a respect for the human personality that dominates; it links him to Mounier and Personalism. Barthes shows a sympathy for all aspects of human nature and a lively, playful interest in every human activity. *Mythologies,* from which the best article, on wrestling, was published in Mounier's *Esprit,* is a perfect example of Barthes' celebration of man—as specifically historical, placed in a defined world and situation. The openness to understanding must not become a mystifying form of generalizing. The tension between rejecting traditional moralism and retaining a concrete historical consciousness proved nearly impossible to sustain. Barthes' later works are increasingly psychological—interested in man's nature and, as such, become pretty much ahistorical. Barthes was never a rational-empiricist: his persuasion was always more imaginative than statistical. But while behavioral science was foreign to him, his work remained the interpreting of concrete—in some sense 'real'—issues. Reading, the photo, love are all subjects open to 'imitation', to intellectual rendering. They are not pure fantasy or myth. He worked with feeling and inventiveness, but always on recognizable issues. The 'reason' he sought, and perhaps found, is especially difficult to indicate. That Barthes' investigations possess a logic of their own—that there is a strong 'line' in his work—is obvious to anyone who knows it well. He had found a particular manner of seeing, a logic of investigation and expression. But he would never define it, for fear of hopelessly reifying himself and reducing his work to a formula, or *doxa.* Reason, for Barthes, is style, and that is something treacherous to define. The sensibility he generated through all the descriptions was his philosophy. It was unsystematic, literary, but clearly humanist. No metaphysics ever impinged on his abstract embrace of man. It is the universal—experiencing, feeling, thinking—that Barthes recorded, never the unique or particular. Reared on Romanticism, it takes some time to realize that Barthes is not talking about an individual *will* that defines itself in emotion and imagination. The 'pleasure' that proves to be essential to reading may be sexual or psychological, but it is not necessarily exclusive. Barthes is guilty of a troubling paradox. The pleasure of reading must be accessible, otherwise his introducing us to it would be ridiculous. But *'doxa'* seems to imply the exclusivity of 'truth'. A new Classicism would demand that the principles of experience indicated be generally ap-

plicable. A cult of Barthes would be taboo, and a style of understanding would be in some sense generalizable. One can put the emphasis either on Barthes the individual writer and intellectual poet or on the style of writing/thinking that he defined. The former leads to an intellectual sect of forerunners, the latter to an accessible concept of thinking. Does the process of creating images of ourselves and our existence divide mankind into two groups, one enslaved to reified imagery and the other freed to imaginative creativity? Or is the psychological necessity of 'imaging' open to us all? Is the mirror phase of Lacan, the mark of a spiritual elite or a normal development in the process of identity formation?

Antoine Compagnon, the second of the young writers whom Barthes recommended, writes repeatedly about the problems of the mirror image and identity. At every turn, he questions what the significance is of the 'I' as employed in literature. Of 'whom' or 'what' is it an image? In Lacan's psychology, there are two phases at which the person undergoes a qualitative development leading up to the assumption of an individual identity. The first, the 'mirror stage', occurs early (6-18 months), and involves the recognition of having a physical existence of one's own. It is the beginning of the child differentiating its own existence from its mother's. It is the discovery of a budding identity. Renaud Camus is occupied in his writings with this mirror image—with efforts to develop or define a visual gestalt for himself. All his homosexual encounters remain so much searching in the mirror. Neither Camus nor his partners ever emerge as full-fledged individuals. Both the seduced and the seducers in *Tricks* are vague images of one another. Neither have a separate appearance—Camus has made it clear that they are look-alikes. Neither has a distinct character—they are both merely tricksters. Never in Camus'work is there a real interaction between persons. People are all mirror images of one another. Characters disappear and reemerge as the other. The whole game of presenting a character in one book as the author of the next novel makes it clear that all the people are interchangable—they are all the same. The mirror continually reflects, seemingly limitlessly, the same image. Camus renders thus narcissism.

Compagnon is also in pursuit of identity, but the second fundamental phase to self-identification defined by Lacan predominates here. This is the question of 'the name of the father'. The child has to grapple with 'law'. At issue are the rules of existence that one has encountered as a child. They are one's hertitage, but are also a threatening alien power. The communal, social world is simultaneously the context of a 'self' and the region wherein one is 'befuddled'. The promise of the 'I' is also the threat of 'idle talk' *(das Gerede).* Compagnon asks himself what establishes an 'I'—a question he poses less psychologically than philosophically. What logical foundation does the 'I' or its title possess? In *La Seconde main,* his first theoretical book, he asks 'Who has said what?' 'How did they do so?' And in the second, he questions the logical status of the 'I' that appears in most all texts (*Camus, 1980, Nous Michel de Montaigne).* The two studies appeared within months of one another, and both contain long discussions of Michel de Montaigne. It would be inaccurate to reduce them to the 'same book', but also unjust to divorce the two studies. In the first he discusses what it is to quote. What do I do when I cite another author? Who speaks at such a moment, and how so? In the second book, he asks the same questions, but now of the 'I' a writer posits as the 'subject' of his text. In both instances, Compagnon wants to know the status of the self or identity that the book claims as author. Is there one absolute figure behind those 'I's that speak from the text, or many, or none, or something else? Compagnon is, in a certain sense, an 'existential' thinker—he is constantly pursuing the sense of the 'I', but he

is much less ontological than were the writers of the forties. In *Nous Michel de Montaingne,* he almost completely disappears behind his question: he claims no 'I' for himself as author of the study. he is obviously not the figure who is in search of a 'project' or a personal sense of existence. But in his one novel *(Compagnon, 1979a, Le Deuil antérieur)* there is a sort of *néant* that motivates the psychological investigation. This third text dates from the same period as the two essays. Thus we must speak more of a cluster of texts than of a development. The novel is the most anxious or insecure in mood. Compagnon uses a foil as narrator: a figure who is neither openly autobiographical no fully fictional. Furthermore, this unclear 'I' is defined by his fascination with his own death. The 'I' is, exists, by being preoccupied with his not-being. In *La Seconde main,* identity is the repeating, the quoting, of what another person has said. One *is* in speaking someone else's words. The 'I' again exists as not itself. And, finally, in *Nous Michel de Montaigne,* Compagnon exists through the other. Furthermore,Montaigne exists in an uncertain manner as the subject of his *Essays.* The question of the existence of the written 'I' is thus taken to the second degree, where Montaigne's 'I' is discussed, not Compagnon's. Throughout these explorations into the meaning of the written 'I', Lacan's category of the 'name of the father' is often repeated. In what sense have authorities, rules, and laws formed a permanent structure that is 'I'? On what basis is that 'I' built? Clearly, Compagnon has both taken up and changed Barthes' question. Identity remains essential—but the self-creation of identity, which Barthes pursues, is not at all self-evident. Compagnon doubts throughout his work if such a tactic is really possible. Can identity be created out of nothing—can it be our 'fantasme'? For Barthes we can endlessly create visions of ourselves; for Compagnon it is unclear if we can ever establish a sense of 'I'. There is an obvious link in the nature of the question, but a just as obvious difference in the presuppositions. Compagnon is a much more obvious skeptic. While Barthes constantly rushed to create new identities for himself, never wanting to be antedated by his own images, Compagnon doubts if any 'I' is ever substantial. Barthes' relentless flight to escape *'das Man',* or objectification, may not be at all necessary. Perhaps no one, ever, possesses identity, and the fear of being 'defined' and reified is unreal. Is Barthes' activity an escape from a real prison, or is all his imaginative energy a pursuit of imprisonment?. Is Barthes threatened by the 'other' with rigidification, or by himself with a self-made 'trap-of-the-'I'? Does identity in itself threaten life, or has Barthes created his own threat, perhaps even out of illogic? Can the myth of the 'I' consume its subject, or is Barthes's fear in need of investigation?

Compagnon's novel is a troubling book. It is not much of an aesthetic success. The book is styleless: its language possesses no added literary dimension. And this in a text whose first sentence reads: 'Ce livre est une idio-graphie, c'est-à-dire une écriture propre, peut-être un style; et l'idiographie est un roman' (Compagnon, 1979a, p. 11). [This book is an idio-graph, that is a certain kind of writing, perhaps a style; and idiography is a novel.] Not only is the novel an 'idio-graphy', it is also 'eponymous':

> L'idiographie a pour principe une convention nominale, ni anonyme ni pseudonyme, mais pour ainsi dire éponyme; elle suppose une disposition formelle qui autorise l'écriture, dont l'écriture est le produit. (Compagnon, 1979a, p. 11)
>
> The principle of idiography is a convention of naming, one which is neither anonymous nor pseudonymous but more or less eponymous; it assumes a formal disposition that authorizes writing, one of which writing is thus the product.

The narrator, 'Marcel Thomas' is the name neither of the author nor of the hero; it is a

name that creates something real—a book. What is named after the narrator is the writing; but what is idiographic? One's own personal writing: a form of writing linked to nominalism's acceptance of the individual as the only certainty? 'Marcel Thomas' is a literary tautology. Once he is posited, he posits himself. If abstract thought exists 'as names only', without any general reality to back it up, then the real value of individual beings is all that is left over. This is not personated by a hero who is neither real nor fictional, whose status is precisely that of a literary *abstraction*. The three things compagnon claims to be in the preface—idiographic, eponymous, and nominalist—remain an incoherent ratatouille.

The novel is divided into four sections. In the first two, the narrator is obsessed with death, entirely self-occupied, and could be characterized as 'depressive'. In the third section, the story of the death of a lover (Cleopatra) of his is told. The fourth section is characterized by the withdrawal, and gradual reemergence, of the mourning hero. A short postscript follows wherein the distinction between Marcel Thomas and Antoine Compagnon is utterly muddled and the problem of possessing an identity or not is yet again repeated.

What is retained from nominalism is the rejection of all concepts or abstract reasons for being. No Sartrian 'project' exists according to this novel. Once one has debunked all universals, there remains, as demonstrated by Compagnon, only parentage in its sexual, creative, and biological forms. The only thing that seems inherent to the individual is death—where one might expect ideas, commitments, and attitudes to fill in a personality, there remains only the problem of continuing to be, defined as the tension with death.

Should one treat the text as a novel or as a case history? The first two chapters, rather obviously, contain the regression from the 'name of the father' to the 'mirror image'; from wrestling for autonomy from the father to the still deeper and earlier effort to achieve independence from the mother. What is obvious is that neither effort at self-definition has succeeded all that well, and that the result is a sense of non-existence, coupled to a constant compulsive search for identity—a pursuit that the subject does not really want to let succeed, for he has rejected independence and ensconced himself in his narcissism. The self-failure of his position emerges in his constant fascination with death—for it is precisely the death of his own individuality that he encounters constantly. He is not the subject who undertakes to live but the consciousness that has given up the struggle. He does not want to be reached by the other—sex is to remain the proof of his distance. His fascination is with his own non-being; with the end of relationships; with the death of feeling. The static, repetitive, utterly undynamic quality of the novel is stifling. But whether this is a literary success or a psychological condition remains questionable. Is the text a sort of self-therapy or a literary work? And what is the boundary between the two? Obviously, writing has a psychological significance for the writer. But at what point does a text cease to be literature and become treatment? The dialogue between the 'I' and 'death' gives way to introspection and a consciousness where others are important. But the essential anxiety is not superseded: 'Je n'ai pas de nom qui soit assez mien.' (Compagnon, 1979a, p. 130) [I do not have a name that is sufficiently my own.]

In the postscript, Compagnon indicates the difference between himself and his narrator. The problems of desire and identity remain the same, but the self-proclaimed Compagnon is more social than was Marcel Thomas:

J'ai vu tant de gens mourir autour de moi, très jeunes—perdre leur intelligence.

> Je ne connais pas d'expression plus juste qui dise cette agonie. Pourquoi meurent-ils tous, la plupart, d'abord ainsi? (Compagnon 1979a, p. 136).
> I've seen so many die young about me—lose their wits. I know no expression for these death throes any more precise. Why do they all die, most of them, this way first?

He has written a book: 'le désir, le fantasme traînait depuis longtemps et maintenant il est accompli' (Compagnon, 1979a, p. 137). [desire, the fantasme, has been dragged out over a long period, and now is finished.] But he wonders if the need to write will continue, and thinks that it would be better to write less and less till he stops. The suggestion of joining a bank (relinquishing his uncertain name for a new fantasy?) and of furnishing his leisure time with short, erudite studies ends the novel.

Is it a novel or a collection of material for psychoanalysis? As a psychological document, it portreys, once again, the narcissistic tendencies that Tom Wolfe and Christopher Lasch have made so famous. But when we control if Campagnon has produced what he promised we see that things have gone utterly amiss. Not only has the proposed personal form of expression not been realized, but the other goal, to write a novel, to be '*romanesque,*' has also not amounted to much. It is a good case history—in the sense that the text challenges one to fish out the connections that are implied, but never worked out. But it remains more raw material for a psychologist's wits than an accomplished work. Compagnon knew what literature demanded: style and untiy. But he achieved neither.

The theoretical works of Compagnon are also explorations of the mirror relationship and its ability, or inability, to achieve identity. In his first theoretical work, *La Seconde main ou le travail de la citation*, the mirror quality is obvious. To quote is to mirror, is to reflect another writer and/or text. In his second philosophical effort *Nous Michel de Montaigne*, Compagnon describes Montaigne's efforts to ground his 'I' in some sort of certainty. How can a writer earn the right to assert an identity, his 'I,' as central to his text? What gives that 'I' its status, what allows it to be constant, definitive, trustworthy?

La Seconde Main is characterized by a complex conceptual, analytical system which is a typology of quotation. It also contains a 'history of the quote,' distilled from the works of Plato, Aristotle, Origen, Abelard/Thomas, Montaigne, and Borges. This book has three aspects (1) the 'code', or matrix, of the analysis, (2) the historical typology, and (3) the results of the interaction between the first two terms. An 'icon, index, symbol' scheme is adopted from Peirce. The original grid was a typology of 'signs' and not of sentences. The sentence is a unique statement, which remains an event, and empirical: signs are units of enunciation that can be abstractly analyzed qua their properties. Compagnon transposes the categories 'icon, index, sign' from the analysis of signs to that of quotes. The division of signs into 'indexes, icons, and symbols' is based upon the relationship between the sign and its object:

> Selon le relation du signe avec son object, le signe est soit:
> – *icône*: s'il possède en lui quelque caractère de l'object, auquel cas il *exhibe* cet objet;
> – *indice*: s'il est dans une relation existentielle avec l'objet auquel cas il le *désigne*;
> - symbole: s'il est en relation avec l'interprétant selon une loi impliquant que ce signe soit interprété comme référant à l'objet, auquel cas il le *signifie*. (Com-

pagnon, 1979b, p. 63). According to the relationship of the sign to its object, the sign is:

– *icon*: if it possesses, in itself, the character of the object, in which case it *exhibits* this object;

– *indication* (sign): if it is in existential relation with the object, in which case it *designates* this object;

– *symbol*: if it is in relation with the interpreter according to a law inplying that the sign is interpreted as referring to the object, in which case it *signifies* it.

Compagnon is interested in how the quote has changed in history. The discussion of the words-things relationship takes place in the Saussurian tradition, where the question of how a particular utterance realizes a given response is crucial. What Compagnon does that differs from de Saussure's course is that he investigates the issue historically in the light of how the relationship has changed (diachrony). Linguistics, as the analysis of a language, functions synchronically. Certainly the terms 'icon, index, symbol' appear to be synchronic—to categorize the signs that occur in one language. Certainly all the criteria mentioned in *La Seconde main* to differentiate between icons, indexes, and symbols are formal analytic categories. The principle terms are: assigned versus actual; contiguity versus similarity:

assigned	actual	
symbol	index	contiguity
semiosis introversive	icon	similarity

By the first pair, assigned/actual, the difference is indicated between a mental, abstract, logical manner of defining something and an empirical, observable, concrete manner of doing so. *Contiguity* is the nearness of contact between the sign (a finger pointed at a car) and the object. There is a real concrete bond of some kind between the sign and its object. The other possibility, *similarity* (a drawing of the car), indicates a factual resemblance between the object and the sign. The new category, *introversive semiosis,* applies to abstract forms of utterance, such as minimal music and abstract expressionistic art. It is assigned, attributed, asserted and not empirically demonstrated, and its 'truth' is based upon a resemblance to 'reality' that the artist creates and not on direct spatial contact. A second typology defines these terms based upon the relationship:

$S_1 (A_1, T_1)$ and $S_2 (A_2, T_2)$

where S is semiotic system
A is author
T is text.

The definitions then become:

Symbol = $T_1 - T_2$
Index = $A_1 - T_2$
Icon = $S_1(A_1, T_1) - A_2$ in te general or
$T_1 - A_2$ and $A_1 - A_2$ in the specific.

The second degree applies to the system, author, or text, which is quoting, and the first

degree to what is quoted. A quick review of the formulas reveals:

> The relationship *symbol* is one that takes place directly between two texts. The genre and writer play no visible role. One is confronted with a pure ideal relationship, such as would occur between 'ideas' in Plato's thought.
>
> An *index* interaction occurs between the new text and the prior author. This is a situation where the older authority is unquestioned—in that the master thought so, painted so, had this belief, it must be true. The new author plays no role; only established authors do so. One comes across 'As stated in *Das Kapital* . . . ', where the rhetorical status of Marx is very different from that of the contemporary writer.
>
> The *icon* can take two forms. In the first (the *diagram*), the relationship is with the original text, presented through the conceptualization of the new author. This second author abstracts the thought of his predecessor—the thought of the source is reduced to 'facts'. The second author reduces the original text to its bare minimum. The second (the *imgage*) is a relationship between the two authors—a situation of identification, or personal interaction. Pure icons, Compagnon states, do not exist—there is always an element of index or symbol also present.

Further qualities of symbol, index, and icon would appear to be:

> (1) A distinction seems to be made between 'reason', 'fact', and 'possibility'. A symbol takes place in a situation of pure abstraction; it is rarified concept. Indexes are facts—the specific, individual givens. The icons are a direct use of reality or thought; they are what they are and would be transparent. The directness of the relationship is characteristic.
>
> (2) 'Firstness', 'secondness', and 'thirdness' are also distinguished. The icon possesses 'firstness' in its immediacy; it stands in relationship to no other figure—it simply is. Whether that 'being' actually occurs is not at issue. Icons are a sort of sign, one of immediacy that speaks for itself—they do not connote an existential situation (it exists; it does not exist). They have to be immediately understandable. Indexes possess 'secondness', a relationship without immediate qualities of its own. Our direct, spontaneous perception of qualities occurs in 'firstness' without any comparisons taking place, but our perception of individual entities occurs only through our ability to compare—to achieve 'secondness'. When we transcend the here-and-now to think about abstract concepts, we achieve 'thirdness', or symbol. Here we are concerned with universals and laws. We make use of a tripartite logic where we compare and contrast. Either/or thinking—the choice between this or that definition—takes place in two-part logic. In tripartite thinking, one makes use of the so-called 'included middle'—one is not forced to choose between two alternatives, but can weigh them off against one another and make use of elements of both. This is possible because one is not limited to two alternatives, but always retains a point of analysis where one is free to do what one wishes with the givens one is considering.

As Compagnon realizes, to pass from the icon to the index to the symbol is to follow a process of increasing abstraction. The first is the most immediate, the third the most reflective. In the first, there is direct existence, or substance; in the third, deliberation and thought. Or, to reverse the order:

> Du symbole à l'image, en passant par l'indice et le diagramme, il y a une montée

> de l'affectif, et une chute proportionelle du logique; un passage du symbolique (la langue, la logique)—le symbole est purement symbolique—à l'imaginaire (la parole, le corps)—l'image est purement imaginaire. (Compagnon, 1979b, p. 80)
>
> From the symbol to the image, going by way of the indication and the diagram, there is an increase in affectivity, and a proportional loss of logic; a passage from the symbolic (language, logic)—the symbol is purely symbolic—to the imaginative (speech, the body)—the image is purely imaginary.

Compagnon's historical analysis of quotation reveals a development from symbol to index to icon, the general conclusion concerning the role of thought would seem to be pessimistic. Compagnon categorizes Western thought into four stages: Classical (Greece and Rome), Christian (Medieval), Rational (Renaissance), and Modern. If the historical development has really gone from symbol to index to icon then Modern thought is the most immediate and least abstract. But Compagnon's own book would seem to be as generalizing and conceptual as could be. How does Compagnon's theory account for his own book? The answer would seen to be found in Compagnon's assessment of James Joyce's style. Joyce quotes all right—from everywhere. But he 'inflates' quotation until it becomes an absurd exuberance unto itself. The relationship between the two texts is shattered by the sheer overwhelming quantity. No relationship is really sought or achieved—the quote becomes a purely gratuitous form of expression.

A dynamic model reveals the text as the locus of a kind of production: this Freudian-Marxist approach seeks a non-linear, infinite reading, while traditional structuralism creates a matrix wherein all the elements of the text can be placed. The so-called pheno-text encompasses 'the locus of words, sentences, and successsion of sentences . . . that obey syntactic and lexical rules'; the 'geno-text' reflects the generative process that precedes and transcends texts and has to do with their ability to engender meaning (Bailey, 1980, p. 278). Compagnon never encounters the text as production; language remains sign systems and never becomes a cultural-psychological process of creating. He writes about the dead letter, not the living text. Intertextuality—writing or expression, as quotation, is not a positive process of intersubjectivity, but a negating one wherein the writer is incapable of individuality. We, who are a language, who generate interaction by making use of one another's words, are unimportant in comparison to the 'I' who wills to be unique and make his own text. Julia Kristeva, with whom he studied, could have shown him positive dimensions to *Mitsein,* but Compagnon does not seem open to that. What goes wrong is that the assumption that a text has only one referent destroys an actual understanding of the reading process. Furthermore, if quotation takes one form, as Compagnon seems to want to show in his historical analysis, then it refutes the original suppositions of Peirce, who created his analytical system while assuming that pure icons, indexes, and symbols do not exist—but only mixtures of these forms. I leave aside the question of whether Peirce's semiotic categories are the most appropriate analytic cadre for the studying of quotation. Admitting that a book can be categorized according to how it handles the intertext—the quoting, we still are not bound to assume that pure forms of quoting exist.

The whole analysis leads to a pinnacle of creative arbitrariness as the only possibility for the modern writer. There is an implicit historicism at work here. As symbolism, indexes, and icons are all linked, according to Compagnon, to a past phase in Western history, a new form is the only possibility now. What is past is irrevocably

bygone. Compagnon forces Peirce's non-historical categories to 'mean' Classical, Medieval, Renaissance, and Modern—meanings that the categories were never meant to convey. But still more essential is my objection to Compagnon's use of linguistics, for the method he adopts *atomizes*. If you want to study literary forms with Leibitz in the back of your head, I have no objection, other than my intention to differ with most of your conclusions, but to seek this result by way of the back door of semiotic categories seems less than revelatory. Compagnon wants to destroy the world of literature—the social setting of reading. His goal is a purely logical concept of literature. By adopting linguistic categories, Compagnon tries to rid himself of the radically historical nature of literature and reading. He wants to make 'understanding' clear-cut—to rid it of its cultural vagueness. But such an effort runs counter to the sort of collective, or social hermeneutic that 'understanding' demands. What Compagnon produces is logical enough, but it works by banning any real examination of reading. The phenomenology that forms Compagnon's first sequence of analysis in *La Seconde main* is good fun, but utterly impoverished. He describes an absolutely individual reader who literally cuts and pastes, holding a few pages or passages over from each book he reads. What is forgotten is that reading is a social activity; it reflects the world of understanding within which the text interacts.

My objection, obviously enough, is that Compagnon has not understood much of anything of hermeneutics and has written a 'phenomenology of reading' that is more a joke than anything else. Because he tries to achieve a purely rational concept of reading, he fails to understand the whole central European tradition where the inter-subjective quality of the text is explored. Compagnon has treated us to a purely Cartesian concept of literature: in which the cognitive, rational structures of the text remain, while all broader, more social or psychological qualities to understanding are rationalized away.

Despite what I have written here, I enjoyed reading *La Seconde main*. Three of its four hundred pages describe how writers have handled the quotation. These descriptions result in an unconventional approach to some very well known thinkers. The 'analysis' did not attract much attention, but was treacherous precisely for that reason. Compagnon wants to convince us that the text has developed from the Classical alternatives of Plato's idealism and Aristotle's empiricism, through a religious phase, where authority was crucial, to a Modern structure, where 'reason' predominates. He sees in the last development the 'immobilization of the text'. The Classical text, he maintains, presented a 'whole'—it interested itself in the entirety of meaning, existence, situation. It achieved a truly conceptual level of consciousness. The Christian text of the Middle Ages was more limited. It did not think things through to their source, but restricted itself to what could be thought, after the precepts of church authorities had already been accepted. Quotation dominates in the Medieval text, because established 'truth' predominates over circumstantial observation. The role of the writer was not to investigate, but to distill out of the tradition the essential wisdom that man currently needed. The writer's task was more to reduce the all-encompassing 'Truth' to a manageable form than to attempt any new thinking himself. For Compagnon, the Renaissance and the rediscovery of empirical science, as well as logic, do not bring any improvement. The text becomes the summing up of individual 'facts'. It is entirely empty of an author's thought or vision, being a mere slave to empirical listing and categorizing.

If *La Seconde main* should be read as a prose sequel to Eliot and Pound's poetry, or Joyce and Borges' fiction, I can only report that it is a failure. There is none

of the exuberance or verbal creativity of such a project. And if *La Seconde main* is meant to be a defense of individual freedom against rational philosophy and practice, the ethics are never made clear, defined, or openly defended.

Compagnon writes as if only the scientific-rational tradition had taken place; but Romanticism and a whole range of other antitheses have also occurred. He places his own will-to-identity outside the dominant line of history and then rediscovers 'identity' as the principle of future creation. Obviously, scientific rationality has not had exclusive hegemony over the text. He seems to demand a rebellion against rationality, but he has never really told us why. Compagnon presents us with a frighteningly simple thesis—if we could only get rid of the 'thing-oriented' sciences, we could regain identity and self. Why the first would lead to the second is entirely unclear—barbarism seems just as logical a possible result.

I must conclude that *La Seconde main* is a deceptive book, which employs masses of pseudo scholarship to cover up its hidden assumptions. Compagnon never tries to write a questioning intellectual history. He arranges his commentaries to achieve his preconcieved effect, while trying to hide that result from close scrutiny or open discussion. The individual text analyses are come-ons—meant to deceive the reader into a false sense of historical perspective. The history of quotation is rhetoric: none of the writers are ever examined in their own circumstances, beyond the most superficial of generalizations. The superficial historical texture of the book hides the real structural content. And that content is never defined, defended, or really made explicit. The attack on rationality takes place almost deceptively.

It is not Compagnon's assertion alone that frightens me, but the manner in which it is made. The surface character of the text—that of an historical analysis—is merely a front for its hidden assumptions. The scholarship is a trick to hide the real ideas. The book is fraudulent. My protest is not against Compagnon's ethics of individuality, but against his lack of an ethics-of-the-text. The whole historical argument is a fraud—so what sense of proof is used? What is the value of a pseudo-rational argument? The book seems more a *'leurre'* (snare) than a mirror.

Compgnon's second theoretical book again discusses the theme of identity. His foil is Michel de Montaigne and the 'scholarship' is dedicated to a close reading of the *Essays*. The question posed is what foundation does the 'I' possess in Montaigne's text. What is the 'I' employed in the book? Does it have one identity throughout? Are we discussing a literary artifact, or does the 'I' represent something essential? Does it have a possible philosophical justification—either ontological or metaphysical? Do we earn the right to say 'I', or is it always, or never, present? Compagnon maintains that Montaigne has also asked himself these questions, and that his responses are to be found in the chapter 'Of Names' (the 46th section to the first book), which is discussed at length in *Nous Michel de Montaigne*. The latter book is a succinct summary of Compagnon's interests. It is much shorter—at just over two hundred pages, nearly half the length of *La Seconde main*—and more direct than the earlier book. The overcomplicated theoretical structure is abandoned for a non-linguistic argument. Compagnon tries to make his point with the use of close reading and logic. The historical analysis is also abandoned. The two central ideas of the earlier book do reappear: (1) prose is blocked, writing is nearly impossible, and (2) identity is uncertain, doubtful, incomprehensible.

As in all his works, Compagnon does not write in his own voice. Never in his writings does Compagnon present us with himself. He seems afraid of all direct contact. His writing seems an interminable effort to justify the writer/reader relationship without ever succeeding. In this he is just the opposite of Barthes who was afraid of be-

ing taken prisoner by his reader, of being reduced to the reader's image, myth, or stereotype. Barthes tried constantly to escape the threat of a 'deadening' claim being made on him by revealing a new sense of himself in almost every book. He multiplied himself while Compagnon seems anxious to hide himself. In both tactics, there is a distrust of the reader, but Barthes plays with us while Compagnon never seems to dare to acknowledge that we are there.

Compagnon's books invite no participation by the reader; they remain closed off from us. They are not unreadable, because a 'world there' of Artistotle, Plato, Montaigne, Borges, etc., is introduced. Just as long as the reader is already initiated to that world, Compagnon's theoretical writings have a certain familiarity. But the sense of recognition is false. In reality Compagnon does not belong to 'a cultural community' that he wants to share. In *Nous Michel de Montaigne,* it becomes clear which bonds he does recognize. The book begins with a discussion of nominalism. It is argued that the name is a mere artifact, a sound without any necessary connotation. A realism that would find any fundamental identity behind a name is rejected. Not only do names not indicate anything that 'really is', but the human subject is so rapidly changing that the individual does not possess any permanent identity at all. A 'phenomenalism' that would discover identity in the 'stream of consciousness' is dismissed as narcissism. The 'fetish' of claiming to know a self is dismissed as self-betrayal. It is the choice of a false, rigidified abstraction, while life is really in constant motion. To choose for the artifact is to choose death, as Narcissus did. The name is gratuitous; the search for identity threatens us only with death. Is there any sense of 'I' still of value? Nominalism is first used to attack any essentialist idea of names, and then attacked in its turn because its concept of the individual is not radical enough. A universal that would be individual is a contradiction in terms. How can individuality be simultaneously truly individual and universal? The solution is sought in 'an ontology of *semence'*. The one relationship that exists is that between father and son. The 'name of the father' is what stands behind naming.

> . . . ce n'est pas de l'universel transcedent que la semence témoigne, mais bein de l'existence d'un universel immanent à la nature.
>
> (Compagnon, 1980, p. 187)
>
> . . . seed gives witness not to a trancendent universal, but to the existence of a universal immanent in nature.

Through Compagnon's foil, Montaigne, a kind of realism emerges as the only possible answer to the problem of the 'I'. The 'nom de père' is the only certainty we have. The son is natural progeny—that is, his identity, his 'Being'. But this identity has two sides: Being-son, but also Being-father. What is someone who is a son, but has never fathered a son?

For Montaigne, the existential line runs exclusively from father to son; mothers and daughters play no role. Disastrously enough, he had only one child who reached maturity, a daughter. Did he thus lack identity? The response is sought in writing. The book is a surrogate son; it has the same qualities as a 'natural child': 'le livre est le substitut de l'enfant' (Compagnon, 1980, p. 214). [the book is the substitute of the child.] All analysis of 'quantities' was rejected from the beginning. Such 'qualities' have no real independent existence, they are mere abstractions. The 'species', as with every category, was rejected for the actualy living individual. This approach made all relationships impossible. All that is, is defined as utterly individual, apart, unique. All 'relationships' are

mere 'voice', verbal constructs without an existential basis. But one relationship, that of father-son, is ultimately accepted as 'real', thereby once more opening the way for relationships. An argument for total individuality rests, for Montaigne, upon the natural necessity of the 'nom de père'. Through it, man knows a relationship—there is a mirror that defines. As Compagnon has dedicated this book to his father it would seem clear that he accepts the analysis that he foists on Montaigne, and that he seeks to make a philosophical argument based upon this thesis:

> Les autheurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque particuliere et estrangere; moy, le premier, par mon estre universel, comme Michel de Montaigne. . . .Le particulier est passé . . . tandis qu'un universel, et un être, et un être original 'le premier', s'affirme, s'affiche du côté de Montaigne: 'C'est moy, c'est mon essence' que j'écris. . . . C'est proprement le Ceci, 'nostre faict', qui après coup, dans la séparation et l'absence, l'abstraction et la négation, devient le seul universel. 'Ce qui demeure donc'—écrivait Hegel—'ce n'est plus ce que nous visions comme *être* mais *l'être* avec *la détermination* d'être *l'abstraction* ou le pur universel' s'identifient 'en face de ce maintenant et de cet ici vides et indifférents'. Et lorsque le Ceci, le pur universel, rend obsolete toute querelle de la transsubstantiation, le nom, depuis toujours aboli en raison de son inconsistance, 'je n'ay point de nom qui soit assez mien' se convertit en l'expression même du Ceci 'nostre faict' et 'mon estre universel'. *'Hoc est* Michel de Montaigne' est vrai.
>
> (Compagnon, 1980, p. 228)

> Authors communicate with people through some strange and particular mark; I, the first, through my universal being, as Michel de Montaigne. . . . The particular is passed over . . . whereas a universal, and a being, and an original being, 'the first', declares and shows itself on Montaigne's side: 'It is I, it is my essence' that I write. . . . It is properly the This, 'our doing', which afterwards, in separation and absence, abstraction and negation, becomes the only universal. 'What remains, therefore', wrote Hegel, 'is no longer what we concentrated on as *Being,* but *Being* with the *determination* to be *abstraction* of pure universal'. In this, 'our deed' and 'my universal being' are identified 'before this empty and indifferent here and now'. And when then This, the pure universal, makes any quarrel about transsubstantiation obsolete, the name, forever abolished because of its inconsistency, 'I have no name which is really mine' is converted into the very expression of the This 'our doing' and 'my universal being'. *'Hoc est* Michel de Montaigne' is true.

For the first time, the doubt comes to rest 'mon estre universel, comme Michel de Montaigne' (Compagnon, 1980, p. 218). If there is just one relationship, that of *semence'* then there is a leverage whereby knowledge is possible. Without any ground for relationships, there is no possibility of linking anything to anything, with the result that no 'reality' can be said to exist. But the assertion is attacked by introducing the problem of 'Pygmalion'. If the writer sees his book as if it were a child, and if the 'I' that generates the text is based upon the ontology of *semence*—will not the author follow in the footsteps of Pygmalion and confuse a made object with a living being?

The only solution seems to be to transcend the particular and to assert the 'here is'. 'Michel de Montaigne' is a purely formal category, the assertion of the existence of the text. It is the assertion of 'here is' in the conversion to writing that which makes, writes, is

'Qui est' (Compagnon, 1980, p. 230). All individual categories are transcended for the pure act of making. The universal is *to make,* which was first discovered in the relationship father-son/father-son, etc., and radicalized into a principle of creative consciousness. The phenomenal author knows no ground, but creating does have an existential Being. Being can only be substantiated in Hegelian idealism. Despite all the complexity, the results remain very Cartesian. The consciousness that remains, that *'IS',* is the only element that absolutely resists radical doubt. The question, of course, is that of self-identity, and not the existence of the phenomenal world. But the denial of any substance to the self destroys all interrelationship and leaves us with pure doubt. What doubts? How achieved? Why begun? are psychological, and not logical questions. The imprisonment in logic departs from logic and inevitably returns to it. The unstated assumption is that of the absolute existence of thought, doubt, logic. The book is a tautology which merely discovers its own presupposition. The 'mirror' is a purely rational one—'experience' is utterly foreign to it. This sort of thinking admits no human process or concrete circumstances into its midst. Compagnon's 'I' remains a purely rational construct, however innovative it may be. Such an 'I' is open only to philosophical investigation, not to interaction. Compagnon is a totally anti-psychological thinker who lets no sense of process penetrate his thinking. Even the death of Cleopatre remains a thought, a reflection on identity.

How can the writers whom Barthes claimed as his heritage all be utterly enclosed in themselves? Each denies all *'Mitsein'* in his work. Man together is banished. However creative some of their intellectual, logical, or technical stunts may be, it is an utter poverty of *experience* that defines these writers.

d. The Teacher

Barthes, in the following remark of his, would seem to be a totally different sort of lecturer than those described earlier in this book:

> Je puis alors faire comprendre ce qu'a été pour moi ce colloque: sa fonction a été d'accroître, de développer, ce que j'appellara la brillance de l'amitié.
>
> (Barthes, 1978b, p. 439)

> Thus I can make clear what this colloquium has been for me: its function has been to enhance—to develop—what I'll call the brilliance of friendship.

This is not a goal that the teaching I had observed could respect or permit. But can we take Barthes' idea of friendship at face value? Is there a learning experience that was defined by Barthes' presence and that defines creative intimacy? Obviously, the examination of the social quality, or, to be more exact, the lack of it, in the work of his protégés has made me skeptical. How could the sons of the affectionate father be so unfeeling?

For all his debunking of myths, there seems to have been at least one that Barthes let exist, and probably stimulated—that of Barthes-as-lecturer. In *Barthes by Barthes,* he printed a photo of himself with a group of students, captioned (not only in italics but also with a facsimile of his handwriting):

> The space of the seminar is phalansteric, i.e., in a sense, fictive, novelistic. It is only the space of the circulation of subtle desires, mobile desires; it is, within the

> artifice of a sociality whose consistency is miraculously extenuated, according to a phrase of Nietzsche's: 'the tangle of amorous relations'.
>
> (Barthes, 1975, p. 171)

The *Colloque de Cerisy,* a transcript of papers given 'Prétexte: Roland Barthes' and the ensuing discussions, provides us with almost four hundred and fifty pages of Barthes with students (Barthes, 1978b). This 'colloque' had a different structure to that of the 'séminaire' that was held at L'École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris for some fifteen years, beginning in 1962. The 'colloque' was a conference where papers were read and discussed by participants who lodged together for a week. Some of the participants were graduates of the seminar; all claimed some sort of intellectual allegiance to Barthes. He was the pretext, and clearly the authority, for the sessions. Barthes had the last word—he blessed, critized, commented. He was not just the pretext, he was the audience: it was a 'colloque' for the pleasure of Roland Barthes. An he was pleased:

> J'avais décidé de ne pas prendre la parole, parce que le propos . . . je le dis franchement, m'a ému. Ça m'a ému comme si Haydn, par exemple, avait écrit pour moi une symphonie, et qu'il avait jouée pour moi. Ça m'a ému parce que ça s'est tenu comme à l'intersection de ce qui est un don d'amour, une gratification, un hommage comme on dit. . . .
>
> (Barthes 1978b, p. 214)

> I had decided not to speak, because the remarks . . . I say this frankly, moved me. They moved me as if, for example, Haydn had written a symphony for me, and had played it for me. They moved me because they have remained as if at the intersection of what is a gift of love, a gratification, what they call a homage. . . .

But the contact beween the teacher and student is of a very special sort as described by one of the participants:

> . . . il y a deux romans—roman de l'élève, roman du maître (comme on dit roman familial en analyse)—qui tourent l'un à côté de l'autre sans jamais se rencontrer. S'ils se touchent, tout explose; on passe à l'acte ou je ne sais quoi; toute pédagogie est fondée sur ça, que chacun s'en tienne à son roman.
>
> (Barthes, 1978b, p. 102)

> There are two novels—the novel of the student, the novel of the master (as one says 'the familial novel' in analysis)—which revolve around each other without ever meeting. If they touch, everything explodes; one passes over into action or whatever, all pedagogics are based on this—that everyone keeps to his own novel.

Or:

> . . . je parle seulement de 'Roland Barthes' guillemets, *mon* Roland Barthes, un Barthes fictif qui ne compromet nullement celui qui m'écoute à quelques pas de moi, et qu'après tout, je connais si peu, 'personnellement'. J'annonce par conséquent que toute ressemblance avec une personne existante sera ici pure coïncidence. Il s'agit d'une image que je me suis faite, d'une sorte de personnage de Commedia dell'Arte, que par commodité je baptise 'Roland Barthes', plutôt que Pantalon ou Monsieur Teste. C'est pour moi le Grand Non-Dupe, non pas exactement un sophiste, mais bien un artificialiste absolu. . . . Il ne décrit pas il

invente, et c'est un grand fabricant de mots. . . . il pense il est sûr, qu'il n'y a que des façons-de-parler, des façons de faire avec le langage. Par prudence, par ruse, il paye souvent ses respects à une espèce de Chose-en-soi, mais, il n'en croit rien: le secret qu'il détient, c'est qu'il n'y a pas de réel, qu'il n'y a que du semblant. . . . .Plaire—non pas convaincre, ni vraiment démontrer—mais séduire, et se faire aimer . . . il fonde . . . la société des amis.

(Barthes, 1978b, pp. 204-08)

. . . I speak only of 'Roland Barthes' in quotes, *my* Roland Barthes, fictive Barthes who in no way compromises the one who is listening a few steps from me, and who, after all, I hardly know 'personally'. Consequently, I declare that any resemblance to an existing person is purely coincidental. It's a question of an image I've made, a sort of Commedia dell'Arte character, which for convenience I baptize 'Roland Barthes' rather than Pantalon or Monsieur Teste. For me it is the 'Great Non-Dupe', not exactly a sophist, but certainly a total artificialist. he does not describe, he invents; and he is a great manufacturer of words. . . . he is certain that there are only manners-of speaking, ways of handling language. Out of prudence, as a ruse, he often pays his respects to a sort of thing-in-itself, but he does not believe in any such thing: the secret he holds is that there is nothing real, that there is only appearance. . . . To please—to convince, not really to demonstrate—but to seduce, to make himself loved. . . he establishes the company of friends.

Everyone speaks of 'friendship', 'love', or 'pleasure', including Barthes himself—'le cortège d'amis qui m'accompagnent, me guident, auxquels je m'abandonne' (Barthes, 1978b, p. 308) [the retinue of friends that accompanies me, that guides me, to which I give myself up)—but what do they mean? For references to: 'only-speaking-of-oneself,' 'drifting-in-one's-*fantasme',* and 'intellectual imposture', are also rife. Furthermore, one realizes quickly enough that Barthes' seemingly total sorrow in the last years of his life is difficult to combine with the image of a man who celebrates the affection shared with his surroundings. Barthes' book on love explores the inevitable tragedy of loss and his book on photography, the utterly personal sorrow of mourning. These last books are a Barthes who, after his mother's death, is no longer the light-hearted trickster. The comment was widespread that his own death resulted as much from his lack of interest in living on, as from the original traffic accident.

While my task here is not to analyze Barthes, the resemblances in Freud's study of Leonardo thrust themselves forward. Barthes was also the jester; Leonardo's famous Lizard, with his wings, eyes, beard, and horns was comparable to Barthes' myths. Both played, and shocked. Both seem to have remained children. Barthes' total loyalty to his mother does not have to be inferred, and his homosexuality is also clearly established. His semiology is a top point of disengagement: he criticized politics because it was shoddy rhetoric and poor fiction *(Writing Degree Zero)*. The craft of his writing was to fashion whatever subject he happened upon into something surprising and strange. He constantly fell in love with the strangest and most unexpected subjects. Japanese food, provincial wrestling matches, Racine: whoever or whatever he touched was transformed. He did not read to make 'responsible' commentary, but to collect playthings. His charm was his style—his always affectionate, exuberant, and individual remarks. He was 'different': what he saw in a subject was consistently idiosyn-

cratic. He rationalized that 'difference' via his concept of the *doxa* and the need to escape being possessed by others. But when one notices how individual his texts constantly were, one wonders if such a danger ever really existed. Was Barthes really threatened by a gray mass of shoddy imitators, or was his uniqueness far too strong for that? Is *doxa* really the writer's problem with empty-headed followers, or Barthes' escape hatch? If, as I think, he could not really attach himself to others, either through their artistic creations or persons, was he not, like Leonardo, a thoroughly special thinker, whose total uninvolvement left him open for the most imaginative speculation without any sense of the 'real' or 'essential'. The total absorbtion in the unexpected, the falling-in-love with irrelevancies or utterly fantastic interpretations—were these not all signs of his not belonging to 'our' world?

Apart from possessing a special sensitivity, did Barthes have any other characteristics? Did he ever really say anything? I do not think so. It was all for the fun of it. Barthes offers us the *'fantasme'*—an unlimited 'drifting': 'Je ne conteste pas, je dérive. C'est-à-dire que je fais comme si tu étais à mon Séminaire: tu fais un exposé et à ce moment-la, dérive' (Barthes, 1978b, p. 24). [I do not dispute, I divert. That is, I act as if you were a part of my seminar: you make a statement and at that very moment I float.]

However much fun Barthes' own expositions can be, to let this procedure loose on the world has dangerous implications. If we let learning become pure *'fantasme'*, what sort of ideas will emerge? Barthes could walk the tight-rope: without any real contact with the broader world about him he was always able to retain his tact. He never destroys what he discusses, never violates the texture of another's thought. But what guarantee is there that others will be as delicate? The work of his followers already confirms my worst fears. You can only give Barthes to someone in whom you have total emotional trust. Obviously, educational systems are not based upon such principles. I do not think even Barthes was able to control the immediate effects of his method. At Cerisy, the result was an excessive 'politeness', which masked the lack of direct feeling. Compagnon, who was chairman, got so annoyed that he stayed away the last day, only to report in his farewell address that he had felt more interested in ping-pong matches than in much of the 'colloque'. Nothing happened at Cerisy—so many monologues surrounding one another in disorderly fashion, with the metaphor of Barthes' body/pleasure omnipresent. To tell students to create without saying what, how, and why is to destroy all context and to risk utter atomization. Not every student possesses a spontaneous sensitivity and a deep sense of cultural values. Barthes' magic makes the *'fantasme'* accessible to anyone. There is no built-in fuse for nightmares or kitsch. What he offers is much too little for a pedagogics. The one myth he never unmasked was that of his own seminar—its reputation as an affectionate, almost intimate, event camouflaged the lack of any social ethics. The extreme personalism—we love one another, therefore our work together must be justified—avoided the question of what the possible results of Barthes' manner of working could be. Affection without an ethics, in education is a passe-partout to every, and any, spiritual development, esspecially, as with Barthes, when the affection is directed towards someone who is always absent. If the feelings are immediate, a social structure results—an ethics emerges. Barthes' love is present as absent: always directed away from the daily shared world. He never really wanted to work with anyone else—he was a soloist. His books are to be marvelled at, but remain utterly closed off. His most important words are never defined: what he meant by 'pleasure' or 'love' remains for the reader to intuit. To

each his own *fantasme.* Barthes pretended to teach his sensitivity, to develop semiology as his manner of thinking; but in reality he kept how he thought utterly to himself. He was willing to display the results of his style, but not his method. He did not instruct, he acted. The performance, however brilliant, did not take the communicability of the subject matter into account. Barthes' individualism fails to account for a social freedom where it could be shared, celebrated or gain collective significance. It is this failure to achieve *Mitsein* which bars Barthes from defining a real alternative form. Obviously, thought needs to be significantly personal if discussion is to have any purpose: if the particular is not essential there is little reason to emphasize it by demanding dialogue or conversation. But the personal, enclosed in itself, denies interaction in speech: the word becomes spectacle, discourse is monologue. The antithesis to mechanical rationalism, Barthes' individualism, fails to produce social occurrence. Without any real sense of the self the leftist engagement strangles itself in its absolutes, but without any real room for the other, Barthes ultimately does little better. The switch, from one side to the other of the Janus face of 'world' and 'self', did not solve anything. Barthes let his students see whatever they wanted in him, just as long as they loved him and called it a seminar. Surely, the *fantasme* of love is not the most direct intellectual experience or human form possible for a seminar; the student-lecturer-content relationship demands an explication in which the three factors really have something to do with one another. In order to pursue this harmony I shifted my attention away from Barthes and his entourage. The glitter of the fireworks disillusioned me—all that much was not really being said. That reading and interpretation are either personal events, or do not take place at all, was evident. That learning must be creative and innovative to be an event, and not merely an obligation was also obvious. But that the poetical anarchist one-sidely exaggerates these hermeneutic facts had also become manifest. And what was worse, a deadening ego-centricism threatened wherein individual sensation triumphed at the cost of the other. A terror of subjectivity loomed wherein ideas, speech, art, are not shared, but are possessed, encarnalized, and smothered. Learning may not be possible without the creative individual, but he can destroy knowledge, language, and the social with the abuse of his creativity. The mere celebration of the particular or personal is not enough. Meaning is collective—knowledge is social. Neither pure 'world' nor the absolutely 'individual' is an opening to the interaction wherein persons can learn. I had to search further for guidelines to the social occurrence of understanding, study, thought.

INTERFACE FIVE

What is that, thinking-with-another? Discussion and understanding as a reciprocal interaction is a manner of learning. A quasi internal connection occurs between *ego* (stream of consciousness) and *alter* where they are inserted into the same 'locality'. Teaching, as I wish to define it, takes place in such a place.

The genetic text is a record of 'developing education,' the process of the learning event is emphasized. The discussion on teaching slowly gained a form closer to my intentions. The one-sided emphasis on creativity let the interpretative effort become more real than any originating given. Concrete human connectedness, where man and world change through interaction, is lost from sight. Interpretation went berserk and drove out activity. Circumstance—man's concrete world—is jeopardized when signs gain every-which-relationship to meaning. Direct situational consciousness, wherein a cultural and historical community can be effective, is discarded for the unravelling, construing, and annotating of signs. Signs usurp thought and action. Exposition no longer stands for some shared, collective, historical situation—the semiotic system does not mirror a phase or structure of common action—signification annuls event and declares itself unilaterally adequate.

I had to recapture an interpreting alive person, within a context of activity. Signification had gotten strangled by semiotic consciousness, had lost all influence on action and had disappeared into linguistic images. Dialogue is not 'constituting' (as in epistemological idealism) but 'perceptual' (as in existential occurrence). My teaching is co-extensive with what can exist for me and thereby corresponds to the whole field of experience I perceive. I am embodied and situated in a world of others and self where the traditional dichotomy of the two does not make sense. Cultural sedimentation confronts me at every turn: signs, traditions, utensils, technique are all about me. Someone is anxious and chagrined by my judgment; enthusiastic and happy about the discussion, serious and doubting towards the text. The classroom is inhabited: we grasp it as animate, lived-in. Our 'I' does not precede world or generate it from absolute consciousness; the 'I' constructs itself in concrete embeddedness with others and circumstance. Learning is not in original opposition to reality, but develops in interaction and encounter with world. Language is exemplary to this development: it is at once cultural sediment and individual expressivity.

In the fifth chapter, to the genetic text, the investigation of possible dialogue is continued. I am trying to find someone to talk to about teaching—who understands my goal and can inform me in my search. Barthes' withdrawl from the world of the other into his creative personalism so individualized the learning process that discussion entered a cul-de-sac, Jean Paul Dollé's efforts to embrace social reasonableness and creative expression were my next interlocutors. I attempt again to find the desired interaction between idea and process. How can discussion take place and ideas develop in such a manner that teaching and learning can become an integral process?

If we have no idea what teaching produces, then the instructor can literally never really know what it is that he *does*. He can know what it is that he has *said,* but not what he has *done.* My effort was not to know my 'script,' but to be directly in contact with the action I performed in my work. I thus sought an integrative insight into the teacher-student relationship where the teaching-learning interaction was mitigated, and was understood as an entirety. Furthermore, I did not believe that a schema could answer the query; the specific event or circumstance of learning is essential. The

mediating factor was, I assumed, the discussion that took place: the actual learning goal was thus essential. ('Learning goal' does not necessarily mean subject matter, but it does mean the form of development sought.)

What sort of man was this process meant to create—and did it succeed? If the answer were a 'learning man,' I might have found the response I sought. Then I would pose my second question: 'A learning man in interaction with others, society, culture?' If the answer were affirmative, I would be very near indeed to my goal. Learning that denied man's social being was a solipsism in which the radically social, cultural quality of language and thought was perverted. Learning as isolated originality, as the negation of the social, was doomed to self-destruction. Only by creating new language, an essentially social function, could originality and learning remain in dialogue. Absolute individual creativity destroys the social sources of thought and means of learning; it is not communicable. It is, then, a Pyrrhic victory. The college where I worked destroyed original thought by refusing it a right to exist. It was insisted that 'truth' and thought were alien to the self. But pure assertion of original thought becomes the other side to the same coin. 'Truth' turns out to be incommunicable and foreign to interaction. Dollé, it is shown, was a paradoxical thinker who emphasized the relationship between thought and discussion, ideas and persons. He did not show the relation of his analysis to the universe of social action, but he did point the way to the sought after *concept* of teaching. The substitution of Dollé for Barthes rehumanizes the discussion, just as it helped to re-embed my senior seminar in dialogue after the common basis for exchanging views had been sacrificed to creativity. Teaching and learning were once again discussable—a shared perspective was possible.



Orphans and origins: Jean Paul Dollé

Jean Paul Dollé's writings form the point of departure for this discussion. The study of his work followed Barthes' also in the development of my seminar. He is not all that well known and demands some introducing. Dollé is a contemporary French essayist whose work is strongly autobiographical. He describes his discovery of what the post-war years have contributed to his life, and his search for a response to the personal and cultural crises wherein he has grown up. For the post-war generation growing up admidst decolonialization and cold war, fundamental social and industrial change, secularization and the collapse of many political certainties, there was little clarity. Parents often receded into silent insecurity; the community was unsure of its norms. In France and Holland, one lived in the aftermath of the German occupation and in anticipation of American supremacy. The world simply was not what it had been. Jean Paul Dollé chronicles growing up in this anxious unsure world where parents have lost their authority to the point of no longer fulfilling their traditional role; the child is *orphaned* . The community so depreciates itself and mistrusts its own specificity that it seems to cease to exist; there is a crisis in *origins*.

Dollé tries not to be a mere product of his time but to find answers adequate to the challenges. He believes that he merely reacted to circumstance throughout the sixties; he was a prominent leftist student leader. Only in the last ten years has he begun to seek an affirmation, to discover what he can embrace, value, construct. Hatred of the European past no longer seems so desirable or self-evident. The break with the past, and the emergence into the cultural desert, begins to resemble self-destruction. Without parents, or a place from which one comes, there can be no memory, no past, no history. Dollé abhors the excruciating emptiness with which we are threatened. He researches the bonds, biological and social, which link us to others. In his work he does not respect traditional disciplinary lines; he is a literary figure; he discusses the great modern philosophers (Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) without ever supplying text exegesis; and he is political in the sense that he is obviously aware of the social economic conflicts which occur about him. His work is intellectual:abstract issues are discussed, but it is not academic in that the criteria for scientific scholarship are flaunted. The hypotheses are not always clear, the validity is even more indefinite, and the repeatability is entirely uncertain. Dollé insists that all theory is mythic, or fictional, and however abstract his text may sometimes be, he demands to be read as a variety of fiction. His fiction is concerned with thinking and its prerequisites. There must be persons willing to discuss, open to each other and to ideas *(a. intellectual friendship)*. A place where that thinking can take place is necessary: the social *sine qua non* must be met *(b. Demeurer)*. And, there must be concrete places and persons which form the stuff of our thinking *(c. Famille and Patrie)*. All of this poses the dilemma of 'what is it that causes that thought is,' and 'how does that take place' *(d. Metaphysics)*. I conclude with *(e. Assessments)* an examination of the tension between ordered thought and spontaneous expression where the paradoxical need for both reason and passion is discussed.

a. Intellectual Friendship

What do I seek in colleagues, what do I want to share with them? Are we going to get outside of ourselves, to penetrate into others' lives; why do we undertake the journey? We can be too human, too historical, too careful of the now and the past, to imagine the other. We can spend our time too specifically in the present to know becoming; historical time can predominate over lived time. I choose for the escape from oneself into a sense of a common situation.

When we speak of ourselves, as Dollé does, a risk of simple egoism exists; the personal past must serve as an initiation to important matters for it to transcend its particularity. Autobiography transposes memories, creates a style of images, and seeks to indicate a general significance. When we listen, we search out words which seem, somehow, to speak of ourselves. It is not that the specifics need to be similar, but that the sense of existence must be recognizable. However many technical flaws, inadequacies of style, or intellectual limits our 'favorites' may demonstrate, they remain our 'friends.' Academic criteria and friendship often have nothing to do with one another:

> 'Il se dire une langue car s'entend un appel. La nôtre en espérence, la mienne en amour. La seule qui relie notre orgine à notre futur. Nous voguerons; n'importe ou, n'importe qui. Salut!'
>
> (J-P Dollé, 1977, p. 149)
>
> 'A language will be used, for an appeal is heard. Ours is hopeful, mine announces love. That alone ties our origins to our future. We drift; not matter where, no matter who. Greetings'.

Dollé is a discussant; the structure of his prose resembles the spoken word. He presents his argument any-which-way; with his own voice and personality. He is a personal writer where so many others remain absent, anonymous, and unapproachable. In the tangled world of political abstraction, social ethics, and moralism, he manages to retain a personality. He makes no appeal to a concept of 'Truth' by which his writings can be judged.

In fact, the rejection of any such criteria takes up much of his work. For Dollé, we live in the period of 'unachieved nihilism' (a reference to Nietzsche). We acknowledge no God, but continue to think as if one existed. We assume that a 'reality' can determine what is true and false, and this assumption presupposes a metaphysical force that governs and defines that 'reality.' God may no longer be the explicit source of all knowledge, but whatever principle unites, structures, and disciplines 'the real' fulfills his tasks. Our science may be explicitly atheistic, but its logic depends upon the metaphysical assumption of principles of order, clarity, and meaning. Existence may definitely not be chaos; knowledge is certainly possible; the real is revelatory.

Dollé refuses to accept this 'natural theology' thinly disguised as 'science.' But he is not academically responsible, or even disciplined in his refusal, because he rejects the philosophical presuppositions that make the academic criteria possible. Instead, he proposes to '. . . faire le deuil de toutes les représentations qui éloignent de votre site pour retourner à son nom propre, à sa parole propre. Avouez que ce fut une éducation sentimentale bien longue' (Dollé in Paugam 1977. p.41). [. . . do without all the representations that keep you from your own position, return to your own name, to

your own expression. Acknowledge that this was a long sentimental education.]

In those passages of Dollé's that interest me the most he undertakes this 'education.' He offers himself as a sort of educational theorist, albeit neither as an academic one nor as a theorist of academic education. Dollé appears here not because I find his Marx critique especially outstanding, or his use of Nietzsche particulary dramatic, but because he both studies the social, and retains a clearly personal imprint. He shows the way to the rehumanizing of social thought. He understands the violence which impersonal, anti-emotional thought evokes. His attack on abstract thought is often, only too abstract. His generalizations are sometimes careless. But he manages to criticise the manner of living which is created by the abstract, rational, disciplined rules of contemporary thinking. He is not interested in the theoretical quality of academic work, but in its results in practice. Modern intellectualism wants to be judged by purely rational criteria. The essential question: 'What effect do the social sciences have on the masses of undergraduates who are formed in their tutelage?' is avoided. Up to now, the social scientists have shown a remarkable indifference to the effects of their work; to the question what sort of society mass education in the social sciences creates.

Nothing would seem more inevitable than that one would talk about love, thinking, death, family, community. But these subjects are too all-embracing, or impractical, or unresearchable, for the contemporary scholar. The specific, carefully observable subject, has won out from the broad, deeply affective issue. Dollé tackles the classical, limitless questions; he seeks the liberty where speech can be free. He ruminates, permits himself a freedom of description, the fascination of observation, and the affection of involvement. He plays with thought; transforms ideas for the sheer pleasure of doing so. He signifies more than he specifies. He seeks to recreate the bond between himself and the abiding patterns of human life. A goal which he calls to 'learn what it is to think; I came to know what there is to know; fundamentally that I am the son of my father, and of my mother, I am French' (Dollé 1977, p.19). What he is saying is scandalous. In the radical student movement it was widely assumed that generation conflict was inherent to leftism. The norm of hating and rejecting parents was propagated. National identity was scorned and browbeaten; it was irresponsible nationalism or incipient fascism. The student generation of '68 claimed that it had broken with the bourgeois past and with its values. Revolutionary politics vanquished over sentimental attachments or immature dependencies: the mothers and fathers, the neighborhoods and familiar settings, were thrown onto the rubbish heap of history. Politics and science immunize one to such vague, irresponsible, and subjective claims. But wherever conversation actually took place, one began to discuss parents and origins, even if the language of 'knowledge' refuses such discourse. There exists a radical split between *la plein parole* of open conversation and the political, as well as academic, form of social knowledge. Dollé refuses to accept the anti-personal code, either in its Marxist or Positivist form; in so doing he writes books which the social science professions, and the professional revolutionaries, can only scoff at. He merely talks he never demonstrates; he theorizes in mid-air, he does not define his terms; he writes down ideas suited for a bull session; he does no serious research. But his text is far more recognizable, more intuitively approachable, than the products of empirical research. When we ask ourselves seriously what knowledge is really worth knowing, and why, we must acknowledge that Dollé's questions, 'How do I assume the child of these parents and grandparents?' 'How do I undertake being the parent and grand-

parent of these children?' 'What is it for me to come from this place, be a part of this land, to speak this language?' are utterly central. And we are forced to admit that we avoid such questions in contemporary university life. Dollé merely talks. But if we reject mere talking, do we not create a terrifying schism between 'knowledge' and friendship? And how is the school supposed to bridge the gap? How can the educator speak when his 'knowledge' forbids any such speech? Are not scientific social sciences, in an essential sense, unteachable, because they reject the significance of any real discussion. Students can better memorize the 'Truths', do their exams, and leave their subjectivity at home. Schooling without discussion is the death of education as we have known it; facts can be better learned outside of a free wheeling interchange which can only serve to confuse the students, and to complicate the work. The social presuppositions of higher education are rooted in a past where thought was linked to philosophy and/or theology. In that world the question was always appropriate: 'How do you bear up under, work with, interpret, this idea?' Dollé places a person who thinks central in his work. He asks the questions which I would want a colleague to pose; he opens the discussion which I believe needs to take place. His humanism rejects an overbearing positive science, preferring the conversation to the 'proof.' Obviously, modern society cannot do without science or technology, but their sort of rationality does not have to be universalized. Dollé's work is one sided, it describes the need we have for colleagues, and not our dependence upon machines or the benefits of industrialization. I do not mean to minimize the latter, nor to let the former be forgotten once again.

Dollé and I belong to a generation that as students knew Marxism as the only intellectual approach to the social sciences that we could take seriously. Phenomenology/existentialism belonged to the generation of our elders. Behaviorism/positivism was the possession of the anti-philosophical, anti-literary technocrats whom we abhorred. Marxism was the only tradition that seemed to offer us any 'living space.' Much of Dollé's writing chronicles the collapse of these assumptions: Marxism did not become a vehicle for creativity, expression, or freedom —it became an 'abstract terror.' Dollé describes how, as a Marxist, he forgot the tenderness of life for fifteen years (Dollé 1977, p.140), and finally discovered that:

> ...love of thought is exactly the same thing as thought of love. There is no other way to think than out of love of thinking. The love of thinking is the will to the lovable, to the desirable, and the refusal of hatred. I wrote a book *Hate of Thinking* to declare that the loss of love necessarily leads to temptation to totalitarism, despotism, and barbarism. (Dollé in Paugam, p.43)

Dollé's experience is not mine, I do not want to imply a necessary unity of conclusions. But we are contemporaries, we have seen the same developments, and reacted to them. The most simple statement of Dollé's concern: 'Why must there be thought?' we share.

b. Demeurer

Dollé's thought is ordered around an 'either/or' choice. Either modern man is a dehumanizing rationalist, or he manages to deeply identify with his origins and the world. The narrowness of the choice proceeds from his analysis of the Marxist tradition, an analysis which demonstrates that it necessarily leads to a lethal form of abstraction and impersonal action. The alternative finds expression in Dollé's descriptions of his youth and, especially, in his celebration of the continuity, stability, and

predictability of workers in the suburbs or peasants in the countryside.

His most persevering analysis of Marxism is to be found in *Haine de la pensée,* where Dollé defends thinking against Marxism. He argues that Marx should have been taken with deadly seriousness when he claimed that philosophy was over and done with, leaving man with the task of changing, but not longer interpreting, the world. For Dollé, philosophy has reached a dead end not by exhausting itself, or by being superseded by a more concrete manner of thinking, but by becoming omnipresent. We can no longer distinguish philosophy because we are constantly, at every moment, submerged in it. We lack the perspective necessary to reflect upon philosophical presuppositions. Dollé can thus claim that modern culture has abandoned 'thinking' has rejected speculative interaction with circumstance, and has enclosed itself in abstraction—in categories. We no longer even seek direct involvement with, or perception of, things; we think that general statements are more 'real' than specific events. Our world seeks to 'know' history and science: it is interested not in direct sensory perception, but in statements that transcend individuals, whose validity is independent of the unique event of life.

Dollé describes Marx's break with the classical 'materialists,' whose relativism liberated speculative human thought. He believes that the classical materialists realized that '*hyle*' could provide no absolutes, no eternal 'truths.' In his view, Marx purposely misinterpreted the materialist message, and created a metaphysics of matter. Thus Marxist materialism asserts that the world is an absolute whose structure reveals a stable, ultimate truth. In such a world thinking is not liberated from restraints; it is absolutely tied down to them. The material transcends the observer—it 'is,' in a complete, adequate, and purposeful manner. The person, in comparison, is a flawed, partial student of the 'world' attempting to distinguish the outlines of what is. It is assumed to be obvious that the truth of 'the material' takes place on a far more certain level than does mere individual thinking.

Dollé sees in this 'materialism' the effects of Hegel's idealism—where 'what is rational, is; and what is, is rational'—and the rejection of Kant's insight that the object in itself (*objet en soi*) does not exist. For Dollé, it has been necessary, since Kant, to recognize that human knowledge is limited by the categories of consciousness that man brings to reality. To posit an absolute knowledge is to negate this recognition, for how could a partial, thinking individual ever claim to achieve perfectly adequate knowledge? Dollé sees modern culture making its choice for Hegel/Marx and against Kant. By opting for a 'scientific culture' of impersonal abstract 'facts,' modern society allows 'rationality' to possess a truth value that transcends personal thinking. But this assumption leads only too quickly to the rationalization of 'abstract terror': where people must think what 'is,' and not what they happen to think that they see. Joan Robinson illustrated this principle in her guest lecture in Amsterdam in 1979[1]. She recalled her previous visit to Holland in the thirties when she was confronted with unemployment on the streets, and with an academic economics which taught that an economy, if left to come to its natural equilibrium, would achieve a balance between the supply and demand of labor. While there was exceptionally little government interference with the economy and the malaise could not have been more extreme, the economists did not abandon the argument. The rational 'truth' of the theory withstood its obvious falsification by the concrete situation. Anyone could see that the promised equilibrium did not occur and that there was no reason to assume that an economy

would regulate itself successfully. But the accepted concept was not overthrown—the idea triumphed over direct experience.

Dollé is convinced that a libertarian approach to knowledge demands the rejection of Hegelian/Marxist thought. There is nothing all that new here, this is the philosophical defense of liberalism against an undialectical materialism. Nor is it entirely new that someone obviously identified with the Left, who took part in the fight for decolonialization and has been a member of various communist organizations, chooses to reassert this standpoint. In fact, Dollé is a representative of a manner of thinking that had its recent origins in the uprisings of 1968. Those demonstrations were launched against the impersonality of modern thought; they demanded a place for the living student in the intellectual-political process. What was demanded was room for new thinking, for the post-war generation to be able to put its imprint on the university and the state.

This required, however, that a model of gradual criticism and reform had to be pushed aside in favor of a model of radical rejection and renewal, and this revolution was effected. It was a time of terror. The old ideas were not so much made untenable as cursorily banished. The break in the intellectual-political culture was justified merely by unsubstantiated claims that the acknowledged disciplines were 'ineffective,' 'irrelevant,' or 'dogmatic.' Eventually, of course, the young rebels, gained teaching positions and, out of a poverty of alternatives, began to lecture the same old 'facts' that they had attacked previously. In between, however, some of the best qualities of traditional humanism were destroyed.

Surveying this history, Dollé observes that the late sixties and early seventies were not libertarian at all, but utilitarian. Because utilitarian social thought cannot, in his opinion, lead to liberty, he chooses now to emphasize speculative thought. Yet he asserts that the question 'Qu'est-ce que penser?' is anything but innocent. He believes that this question, when pursued, introduces one to the will to remember, and thus to the will that there be something instead of nothing. In other words, Dollé does not believe that it is inevitable that anything remains of human life or action: sense can be created, but man must work to do so. In contrast, Marxism simply asserts that meaning is there. How it has come to be there, or why we are privileged as to its content, are unthinkable questions. But by banishing these questions, Marxism banishes the activity of thinking as well. And by banishing thinking, it cripples human action, memory, and meaning. Dollé presents us, in fact, with a radical defense of precisely the intellectualism that '68 attacked, and in the name of the principles that were dominant in '68. He attacks the dogmatism that blocks thinking; but he prizes the activity that brings one directly into contact with others, and thus with oneself.

What remains constant in Dollé, is an experiential ethics; what has changed is the social epistemology. The constant is in the radical humanism and the combat against social unfreedom. What has changed is the idea of how social reality is knowable; Dollé thought that the nitty-gritty of society was the mere surface behind which the fundamental historical structures moved, and now thinks that direct experience is basically revelatory of what is. Analysis founded on Marxist theoretical insight was replaced with observation based upon direct sense perception. Dollé attacks the idea of historical necessity. If reality possesses such a quality, then human thought can only be an epiphenomenon hobbling after the reality. When the structure of reality determines thinking, then thinking is a mere effect of the absolute, without authentic freedom. Man is the prisoner of the *telos*.

For Dollé, then, one can retain either Marxism or freedom, but not both. Either historical materialism is correct and 'thinking' is nothing more than a peripheral result of what 'is,' or 'thinking' is free and man is free to create. Either reality determines man or man determines reality: one cannot assume both intermittently. Moreover, Dollé accuses Marxism of an internal inconsistency with respect to its concept of 'thinking.' Thinking cannot be mere superstructure or ideology in capitalism and then suddenly become generative in socialism. How can an absolute change in the status of 'thinking' be explained; how can history possess an absolute *telos* for centuries and then be expected to abandon it; how could 'thinking' have been determined since time immemorial and become essentially and radically different now? Whatever significance social change may have, this assumption of an anthropological hiatus, one in which the status of human consciousness undergoes total alteration, seems staggering to say the least.

In all of this, Dollé has rejected the metaphysics of 'the revolution.' He rejects the Hegelian assertion that man has now come to a point where the entire significance of human consciousness is altered. He is not willing to accept the assumption of a metaphysical force—even if called 'rationality' or the 'proletariat'—that must effect radical social alterations. And he does not accept the assertion that an absolute power from outside the realm of human freedom can ever establish a reign of freedom.

Similarly, for Dollé it is impossible to make absolute statements concerning what thinking ultimately is, or is becoming, because there does not exist any outside-of-thought from which we can determine what thought is. We can ask 'what do we do when we think,' but we cannot ask what thinking is. And the moment we ask what we do when we think, we begin to reflect upon a context—a place where there is thought. The question opens us up to the concrete description of man together and the social process, and this rapidly leads to questions of language: what is it, how does it work, what is its relationship to matter? Marxism, by contrast, merely assumes that language is a self-evident means of 'naming'.

Still, Dollé is frustrating, especially in *Haine de la pensée*, his principal treatment of these matters. Each time one thinks that Dollé has exhausted his description of what thinking is not, who its enemies are, or which questions cannot lead to identifying it, he discovers yet another 'negation' to discuss. The book remains a disappointment for those who want him to describe 'thinking' and not just denounce its opponents. We are forced to fill in for ourselves just what it may be that all the forces (science, Marxism, barbarism, statism) limit. True, Dollé provides us with a traditional point of departure: his defense of thinking is meant to carry the tradition of Husserl's *Krisis* foreward. But modern history has radicalized the task. There no longer exists a definite European humanistic tradition to defend: barbarism may have predominated in the twentieth century. We cannot easily attach ourselves to a living tradition, hope to defend it, and in that manner assure ourselves of the continuance of thinking.

For Dollé, barbarism is antithetical to thinking: when violence commences, thought becomes impossible. Thinking is only possible in a world of communication, one where people are willing to acknowledge their bonds with one another. In a world of war, where all relationships are shattered and replaced with violence, thinking cannot function. Moreover, it is impossible even to think about a world that is antithetical to thought. Thus it has proven impossible for modern man to think his contemporary history. The record of blood baths, repression, and genocide can be recorded; it can be artistically rendered, but it is unthinkable. One cannot order terror. It rejects rationali-

ty. The world of libido and perversion has prevailed. These universes are to be encountered through the arts and through psychoanalysis when it places itself halfway between knowing and artistic rendering. But conscious thought cannot grasp what is unconscious and even anti-conscious.

Thinking remains what man can exchange, what is communicable. Insofar as modern history or society is characterized by power, it is unthinkable; power posits domination of one person by another, the discourse and repression are mutually exclusive. In a society of violence, theory and existence (thinking and circumstance) disengage. Thinking is thus to be identified with a *'demeure'*, a place where the type of relationship is possible that allows thought to occur. But the question remains: how does one begin to think in our modern world, where barbarism has such a forceful role?

Dollé's answer is equivocal: we must pursue the world in thought, but not attempt to pin it down—perceive, but never absolutize, rigidify, or sum up. Thinking is utterly necessary, but the problems entertained must never be resolved. Why Dollé thinks this Sisyphean task should appeal to us is unclear. He simply assumes that we should want to think: that the process justifies itself. But if science, and Marxism as a form of it, seek to destroy thinking, we must conclude that the forces in our contemporary world that find thinking unnecessary are not to be flouted easily. Why should we choose for thinking when such crucial forces choose against it? Dollé's only answer is that our choice is between thinking and violence: thinking is the free acknowledgement of man by man; barbarism is the repression of man by man.

Ultimately, of course, Dollé's choice of freedom is the choice 'that there be something'—that man remember, situate, create. Alternatively, man can become one with the structures of repression, in which case, there will be nothing: no one will retain a personal consciousness, reality will be prescribed and forced upon man, and no one will really know what he is or thinks. The end of thinking, in other words, is the end of man as a creature of self-identity or self-consciousness. Man loses himself; whatever there may then be, there will be no man as we have understood him in recent centuries. But because Dollé rejects any metaphysics, he knows of no absolute that will decide whether there will be this nothing, or the something than he in fact chooses.

Further, it is unnerving that Dollé never describes a *'demeure'*. The *'demeure'* is the place where abiding insights can occur, where man can encounter himself. It is poetic—seen, discovered, perceived, not abstracted, generalized, mathematicized. Thinking is only possible because points of mutuality and free exchange of sentiment can occur in such a place. But though his (semi-) autobiographical passages describe childhood memories, some university remembrances, they never show him as a writer or lecturer—at a *demeure*. He refers, occasionally, to his own psychoanalysis, but almost exclusively in terms of the interaction between his overwrought consciousness and his—till that point—ferociously repressed unconsciousness. Even this assumed dialogue between elements of himself remains sketchy and indistinct. Dollé presents us with a radically social account of thinking that, if correct, would necessitate that a learning situation meet fundamental social criteria before we could expect it to be fruitful. His analysis would demand that we pay far more attention to the structure of human interaction than conventionally is the case. It would also force us to question whether schools are now designed so that thinking can occur in them or not. But as long as Dollé's *'demeure'* remains intangible, and, more or less, defined by what it is not, his argument lacks the force it might have. In his defense one must admit that we

live in a period of social mistrust where the feeling of being uprooted predominates. Modern society seems more characterized by an unimaginable contrast of wealth and poverty, power and unfreedom, technological development and spiritual bewilderment, than by the *'demeure'* where persons can meet to pursue a discussion.

c. Famille and Patrie

While in *Haine de la pensée* the tone had remained intellectual, in *L'Odeur de la France,* Dollé describes in a personal manner the issues that preoccupy him.
L'Odeur de la France possesses little theoretical structure and switches freely from genre to genre (autobiographical, to mythic, to fictional, to abstract). Even before *Haine de la pensée* was written, Dollé had already experimented with a thinly fictionalized version of his concerns *(Le Myope)* and a text in which he rapidly altered styles *(Voie accès au plaisir).* While each of these texts contains descriptions of Dollé's youth (the latter his childhood and the former his student period) that are highly evocative and worthwhile to read, both books suffer from their weak structure. The novel lacks the dramatic scaffolding that a powerful work of fiction needs. It is more a long anecdote than a novel. The descriptions of working-class circumstances as seen by the middle-class student who becomes a communist, and of his moral idealism, are all good. The reversal in the hero's thinking, from fanatic politics to extreme personalism (and an almost Romantic attitude to existence) is also well documented. The problem is that a series of good descriptions does not add up to a novel. The novel demands something more—a sense of neccessity that drives the development of the narrative forward. *The Myope* lacks a logos: a concept of existence that breathes life into the text and gives it its sense of entirety. When we describe incidents out of our lives, we do not achieve a novel. A work of fiction makes use of the personal material to create a greater whole, which is the story itself. It is the higher identity of purpose, or logic, that Dollé's novel lacks. Consequently, it falls back into being reminiscence and not a work of fiction. Nonetheless, seen as a series of remembrances, the text is rewarding. The sphere of the late fifties is effectively rendered. One recognizes the jazz clubs, the search for intensity, the experimenting with politics, and search for relationships. In *Voie d'accès au plaisir,* Dollé begins to ask what the relationship between being and thought is, a reflection that achieves much greater richness and completeness later in *Haine de la pensé.* What the earlier book does contain is a masterful description of summer vacations in the French countryside as experienced by a boy. For the rest, the book originates in the concept of a 'crisis' in European culture, such as *Haine de la pensée* explores, and conculdes with some fifty pages of 'alternatives', which are very much under the influence of Deleuze and *Anti-Oedipe (Deleuze, 1972).* Dollé's responses have remained quite Nietzschian without becoming muddied or bacchic. Dollé's thought is marked by a highly intellectual anti-intellectualism. Science, especially social science, must more or less be banished. Process, *poesis,* perception are necessary: correct conclusions and generalizations are denigrated. But the goal remains 'thinking'—the creative seeing and exchanging of insight. There remains a terrible tension between the demand for 'thinking' and the rejection of the style of thought that is current. Dollé's position threatens to collapse into an irrationalism, where every 'perception' is fine just so long as it is intense enough, and where communication is utterly lost in the chaos of reactions. These dangers are far more present in *Voie d'accès au plaisir* than in *Haine de la pensée,* which explains my preference for the latter book. The earlier works are thus valuable for some of their descriptions, but are in their en-

tirety less than spectacular. When we place the descriptions in the service of *L'Odeur de la France,* however, we can achieve a synthesis of what Dollé experiences and values.

The central concern of *L'Odeur de la France* is the stink of a corpse that, for Dollé, characterizes the nation. In 1940 the French collapsed when attacked by Nazi Germany: that defeat meant the end of France as an independent nation, able and prepared to maintain itself. De Gaulle launched a giant myth after the war: the absolving of the French for their cowardice. Because he, De Gaulle, had fought on, he could symbolize the resistance—in fact, mythical—of all the French. But the French had been like calves: they had slept and been fed under the Germans, and would do likewise under De Gaulle after the war. Calves differ from sheep in that they do not possess a herd instinct, but not in that they are more brave or choosier. For Dollé to be of the younger generation is to be fatherless—because the fathers had all lost their identity in the collapse of the collective significance in 1940. Fathers only exist when they can maintain their authority—when they can be 'law', purpose, meaning. The fathers had lost all that in the Second World War. They did not have the identity necessary to really be fathers. The sons of the post-war generation grew up as orphans. They were all fatherless, as no one in the society was capable of assuming the role of the father. I note that even where the Second World War did not necessitate a traumatic collapse in the role of the 'fathers', parallel developments later occurred. In Holland, the German invasion did not radically alter the structure of national identity; the Dutch had no pretensions to national self-sufficiency. But, nonetheless, recent years have witnessed the attack on the family, and in particular on the role of the father. The father Dollé lacked—a figure who can represent the rules of the collectivity, who interprets what it is to be social in the concrete situation in which life is lived—has disappeared throughout the industrialized world. The attack upon the father has occurred, most recently, in the name of anti-authoritarianism and/or feminism. Leftist circles and schools have done everything possible to rid us of the father Dollé misses. The father had to go so as to 'liberate' the women and children.

> One day the flesh is made into speech and the women speak. Then God, who had taken refuge in the text, must exile himself to the unconscious. The men hunt everywhere for their mothers, who they do not recognize, for they have found themselves. They have served so often, no matter whom: Germans, in the kitchen and Church; Russians, in the infirmary of the Workers' State; French, as the recipiants of the family allowance. These times have ended. The mothers have become women, who have chlidren. The men no longer stand above the women, and God is no longer above the men. The mother takes refuge in the unconscious of the men. The 'master' finds support in the desire for hysteria. To conserve his power, he makes the populace hysterical, and makes a mother to be respected and to forbid. He makes the 'tutelary native land'.
> . . . Why want to become a mother. When the genders are confused, the difference grows hollow. . . .
>
> Odor of France, odor of women, odor of the mother? Everything works when the 'truth' imagines herself to be a naked woman coming out of a well. France existed when she was a masculine object of discourse. But the women have decided that they are the beings of speech; they no longer accept being the speech of the other. . . .
>
> The fatherland *[patrie]* is a bizarre thing. It is the mother whose son wishes to take the place of the father. The ancient Greeks found a solution to

this squaring of the circle. They invented Ge, the earth, mother-father of the universe, of the Gods and mortals.

We, the men, we have dreamed since time immemorial of this fantasy of paradise. It lets us invent the real.

The women have gotten the taste of self-invention. Since then everything has been sexualized. Politics has no more value. There is the absence *[manque]*. The hole becomes larger. The not-being actualizes . . . France . . . a fabulous memory, and a sleeping present . . . why France, for, men, women, we don't have mothers any longer?

(Dollé, 1977 pp. 147-49)

The result is a childless confusion, in which speech, identity, and communication are all threatened. Dollé is convinced that the language operates through an interchange of masculine and feminine elements:

> It isn't my fault if the French language, fashioned essentially by and for men, always invokes the woman. Sexism definitely, but of a peculiar type, for the language is spoken by the mouths of men but for a feminine ear, to such an extent that one can ask oneself if those whose particularity consists of hearing themselves speaking, the poets are not bizarre bisexuals, man-woman. [Dollé 1977, p. 132].

If the masculine-feminine structure is destroyed, the very basis of language will be uprooted. In consequence 'there will be nothing'; the possibility of remembering, of value, of meaning will collapse. Most frightening, there will be no children, for there will be no structure in which one can wish for a child, educate a child, and actually retain a feeling that this child is in some essential sense one's 'own.' For those who wish to destroy all sense of possession, these changes would seem welcome, but have they realized what it would mean to no longer possess meaning, memory, and hope of abiding? Without language, nothing can be expected, guarded, meant. Mere violence or '*nada*' remain.

Dollé believes that a structure of human interaction is necessary for man to be able to assume his place as son of these parents and father of this child. That structure has already at least partially collapsed. By destroying the sexual symbols of our culture, we further repress the body, the affective, the social. What remains is the terror of rationalism stripped of the Eros that had limited its effect. The destruction of sexuality is seen to be an act of self-hate, where man refuses to let himself love or be loved. This sterile anti-emotionalism imprisons man in power, repression, and order. Language without sensuality is interaction without tension or real attraction. Only man, who has discovered the essential sexuality of the social process, can embrace language and give himself over to using it.

Dollé's sexualization of language depends upon acknowledging the essential role of both sexes, but each with a separate background and role. For Dollé, there must, in some essential manner, be the masculine and the feminine for man to be able to signify or speak. Here one encounters the conflict between Lacan and Deleuze: are the two sexualities restrictive and destructive modes that we must supersede (Deleuze) or the very backbone of all interaction and possibility of contact (Lacan). Dollé has progressively aligned himself more closely to Lacan, but continues to seek room for the 'polymorphous perverse,' where a certain fluidity of sexuality is retained. The structures 'mother' and 'father' may be essential, but they are not to be allowed to become

too rigid. In his reflections on sexuality, Dollé is not entirely clear. The relationship between 'man' and 'father,' 'woman' and 'mother' is ambiguous. And Lacan's assertion that the 'father' and 'mother' do not necessarily have to be one's biological parents is never mentioned. Dollé adopts, on occasion, a lyrical sexualitzation of human relationships without making it clear what this sense of sexuality has to do with the father/mother pair. The feminine takes on two rather different connotations: the maternal and the Dionysian. Dollé has understood that the desexualization of the culture is the destruction of its psychic roots, and his thesis—that it is also an attack on the very capacity of language to exist and create—is fascinating; but his reflections do not coalesce into anything like a coherent statement.

As sexuality is the crossroads of two of his most essential concerns—the meaning of family and of nation where the imagery of the former is an essential element of the latter—his inability to be clear is an important flaw. What he is able to do is restate the necessity of a sexualized form of thinking where the masculine and feminine archetypes are not simply destroyed. The movement to reject all sexualization of thought in the name of equality for women has become very strong. Personal freedom is identified with a world without any sexual categories or identities. What Dollé understands is that such a universe rejects all 'bodily knowledge' and reduces thought to the general, abstract, and rational, which is so impersonal that sexuality plays no role. To rid thought of 'sexism' is to depersonalize it. But this reflection leaves wide open the issues of what sort of sexual archetypes need to be retained, and in which contexts. Only by tackling these questions is the discussion really advanced. In a society where the desensualization of thinking destroys the sentiment of wishing to be child/parent/grandparent, all continuity, and thus meaning, is threatened. Education is an element in the bridging of the gap between the generations where a sense of the abiding can be developed and a culture can occur. Without sufficient bonds between the generations, this whole process collapses, which would mean the end of the cultural world that we have known. Dollé has chosen for the continuance of European 'thinking,' and thus for a reassertion of the fundamental symbols with which we are linked to past and future generations. He is obviously aware that this is a psychological, as well as cultural, process, but is nonetheless unable to do the former justice.

Dollé has tried to research what it means to come from a specific place. He understands himself as springing from particular parents and, almost as important, families which are a part of a region or locale. The wish to belong to the greatest possible community—'Europe,' the 'Proletariat,' Christianity—has been looked upon as almost self-evident the last twenty-five years. Dollé seeks to reverse the process. Such an effort to find a sense of identity for oneself in a sort of regionalism is possible in France. As Dollé knows only too well, French history is marked by an especially gradual transformation of rural life, where industrialization has never destroyed rural institutions and culture with the rapidity and violence of the English model (the comparison is discussed in *Voie d'accès au plaisir*). But if we look about us, Dollé's efforts do not seem very promising: northwestern Europe has pretty well destroyed its rural culture. The countryside exhibits almost the same schools, social services, even cultural life as the cities. The urban/rural division of society has lost much significance. The farm is rapidly becoming a modern, industrialized enterprise; highly specialized, automated, and sensitive to the market. Regional cultural autonomy only too often seems a thing of the past.

These developments have been especially rapid in Holland, where we are forced

to recognize that the traditional differences between the provinces are tending to become mere myths and/or marketing stunts. Here in France, where this is being written, the village butcher knows that we (myself and my wife) often abhor visitors. If I need 'too much' meat for a couple of days, she knows that we've been swamped and shows concern for our plight. The butcher in Holland merely sells meat, the more the better. If we are so 'mad' as to not welcome visitors, then it is our own stupidity. We should be glad that we have so many 'friends.' The butcher in Holland is cleaner, more modern, and efficient. I never have to wait long, but then I cannot pick up all the village gossip without waiting. It is very difficult really to come from some particular place in Holland: it all looks much too much alike. And, what is worse, social existence far too often resembles itself. Dollé's celebration of Bretagne and rather mixed feelings for 'the north' would all seem very overdone if directly translated to Dutch circumstances.

Are not many countries becoming one big city—granted one might better say suburb—with fewer and fewer distinctions? Is not impersonal, standoffish existence becoming the norm? Is the world that Dollé searched for in his adopted Beaugency to be found in most countries? Would the charms of French provincial life be universally perceived or welcomed? Is not this existence attractive precisely to the refugee from the city who has never suffered the social control of a small place or the limits on political thought that the local often encounters? The person who does not need the city is often one who has already known it and can continue to fetch what he needs when he chooses.

We must realize that the small community, whatever its charms after the psychological exhaustion of the city, is a nostalgic pastime insofar as we do not posses any way of embracing it and also keeping our economy going. Dollé remains employed in Paris—a 'second existence' that he never discusses. It is senseless to celebrate our experiences of village life as if they offered us an alternative to the modern industrialized culture. The smaller community may be able to give us many pointers as to how man should organize his community, but the crux of the issue remains the factory and its tendency to collect mankind in ever greater concentrations. Just as long as Dollé never recognizes, in print, why we are stuffed into cities, and does not acknowledge that his alternative of retreating to a provincial city is utterly impractical for most of us, his reflections remain the preening of a privileged person.

I do not discount how frightening mass existence is, but do find it pointless to champion alternatives that are not really alternatives. I would love to discover my roots, and be in contact with my ancestors and the specific places where my family has lived. Of course, I was enthusiastic to visit the grocery store in old Montréal that was once my family's in the company of a school friend of my father's. But such memories are not the stuff upon which daily life can be built—if only because today the Jews are prosperous in Montréal, and the store is now Greek. And that is not only true in Quebec. My French butcher here in Burgundy comes from Alsace; his predecessor left to set up a sausage factory. However important it may be to retain a sense of origins in order to achieve some sense of continuity and purpose, without which a culture cannot survive, it is unreal to expect contemporary man not to show the effects that modern industrial society has had. Dollé fails to encounter the factory; he tries to sidestep it. That is impossible, and his thinking threatens to become the personal reflections of a cloistered intellectual, however 'political' his past may have been. After all, the 'professional revolutionary' was also a very special type, and a role suitable for only a select

few. In the early seventies, when Dollé did much of his writing, it was quite common to flee the city and set up shop somewhere quieter. But now (1980) the whole gang has left—and I do not think that this county (in French Burgundy) is exceptional. Dollé compromised from the beginning (as did I) and kept his job in the city. We can stick it out as long as we wish, but so what?

> But how do we recreate that impalpable, and villagelike sentiment of belonging, and, therefore, tacit morality that the neighborhood secreted not long ago—that certitude of belonging to a community that gave a kernel, an axis, even to revolt?
>
> [Dominique Desanti, 1980 p. 106]

To that question, Dollé proposes no answers (neither, parenthetically, does Desanti). Family and physical places are inherently linked to one another. The former exists in the latter, and the latter gains identity precisely from the history of the former. Family and place can be seen as alternative terms for time and space—those key words in Kant's analysis. But to actualize them in a realistic manner demands a critique of the modern city, which means of its socioeconomic structure, as well as of its personal organization. However abstract political economy may be, it does encompass a crucial aspect of the *logos* of the contemporary world. Opposition to that logic cannot be effected in the shape of ostrich politics. Of course, it is important to keep the sort of thinking one seeks alive. I do not want this to degenerate into a plea for some sort of pragmaticism, with guaranteed success. But does not Dollé remain too visionary, is not his argument too much a '*fantasme*'? We need imagination, but also a grasp of contemporary events. We have to make an effort to come to grips with developments. However evocative the celebration of our respective butchers may be, we really do need direct contact with the process of repersonalizing existence.

d. Metaphysics

The hatred for thinking that preoccupies Dollé is only too recognizable. But the flight to the small cities or the countryside was more a sign of the spiritual agitation than a response to it. Many of those who fled are now returning, according to numerous witnesses (for instance, see Thierry Quinsat, 'Le Retour de la terre', *Le Monde*, 10 August 1980, p. 4). They felt themselves 'strangers' in their adopted habitats. Many left the city because it was too impersonal, competitive, or depressive, only to discover that the countryside can also harbor, albeit in a somewhat different manner, all these conditions. The converts to peasant life sought acceptance, a lost sense of belonging, roots, but these things were not there for them to find. It is all well and good to seek a mythic sense of origins for oneself, but it can be disastrous to try and put the fantasy into practice. Dollé has indicated the neuroticism of modern society, but has merely followed the observation with an exhortation to dance, enjoy, create. Philosophers and poets must point the way to real freedoms and new perspectives.

I continue to feel that this is a hopelessly inadequate response to the threatening impersonality. The link that Dollé describes between thinking (the libertarian) on the one hand, and terror (the absolutely real) on the other, is evident enough, but the analysis only broadens the issue. It is made clear that many elements of the structure of 'truth', as it is most often currently accepted, imply politically devastating results. Dollé has, if he is aware of it or not, stood Popper on his head by arguing that science and the

'open society' are enemies of one another, and that the victory of the latter has very seriously threatened the former. Furthermore, Dollé has shown in which aspects Marxism has to be understood as a close relative of science, and not at all as its enemy, as Popper would like to pretend. By claiming that the choice between science and Marxism is a phony set of alternatives, however, Dollé does not make us any richer in options, but achieves quite the opposite. One remains with the question of whether Dollé has faced the crisis he indicates or whether he has been overwhelmed by it.

Dollé's alternative, a society of poets and philosophers, appears to be a species of neo-Romanticism whose flight from logic contains frightening aspects. Granted that poets and philosophers can have a creative function, in which some of the most vital and dynamic aspects of man are revealed, but is it not questionable to imagine a whole society centered about these two callings? After all, there are not very many poets and, in Holland, even fewer philosophers. How can we adopt two very exceptional roles as a general model for human interaction? Even worse, do we not fall into abstraction and slavish patterns of thought the moment we attempt to prescribe anything?

Dollé has accepted this last paradox as inevitable, indicating that one must simply make the best of things. Every appeal is in danger of falling into deadening rigidity; every idea is potentially a repressive conformism. One has to watch out for these dangers and make the best of the creative-repressive double identity of language and thought. Dollé has described the sadness of a man cut off from his father, from a sense of belonging somewhere, and from a positive concept of his own role in society. He has documented each of these 'losses' out of his own experiences. The issues that he raises by undertaking this description are crucial enough, but what can a potential reader do with Dollé's answers? If we take Dollé literally, the answer would seem to be, become a highly trained intellectual who has mastered the subtle traditions of Western culture and can find an adequate source of funds to be able to live at a considerable distance from the city pretty much as one wishes. ...

I am perhaps a little bit guilty of parody, but not all that much. I am forced to ask myself if Dollé has not continued to epitomize the fads of the urban intellectual, all the while denouncing just that culture. Is not such self-hate really very typical of the city and its thinkers in our times? Dollé has at least warned us to watch out for such things; he openly admits to having been motivated by self-hate throughout his political career. The problem is if he is—thanks to, or despite, his psychoanalysis—cured of the malady. Unfortunately, my questions do not find any definitive answers. The response is constantly 'Yes, but', or 'On the one hand, but on the other'. The dilemma is that one is not quite sure if Dollé describes the crisis from within or without; from a point of clarity or while deeply confused. His analysis often seems penetrating, but if one begins to generalize his personal solutions, mere clichés emerge. And for a thinker who claims to be enamored of Kant's categorical imperative, this is a serious criticism.

Ultimately, it is his break with communism that Dollé tries to use as a force to propel himself towards insight. Is this antithesis to the thinking of the early seventies able to create new insights? That one pattern of thought was false does not necessarily mean that the next reaction will be, in some sense, truer. Furthermore, Dollé bases his reflections entirely on the 'untruth' of his past Marxism. But a keystone to his essays is the renunciation of any concept of 'truth'. A definition of 'non-truth', of course, means the establishment of a category of truth, even if limited to a negative form. Can the 'truth' of nature, as signaled by science, be abstract, general, and false, but that ex-

perienced by the sensual body be just, sought after, and needed? Has Dollé broken with naturalism, or does he opt for a psychoanalytic naturalism while abhoring the scientific variety? If what is involved is a mere choice between two naturalisms, then Dollé's whole philosophical denunciation of the 'real' and of the possibility of any naturalism is wasted time. And if he is a consistent anti-naturalist, then what is the nature of the eros that seems so important to him, and why is it not also an element of the 'real' or 'natural'?

Obviously, the whole concept of human energy that underpins Freud is a naturalism. The Freud-Marx issue cannot be one of the acceptance or rejection of naturalism, because from that perspective they are bedfellows. As Freud himself insisted, his own uniqueness lay in positing the existence of the unconscious. The issue is not one of naturalism, but of the unconscious versus rationality. Marx is a rationalist, Freud an irrationalist. For both, there exists a 'real' that precedes or transcends conscious life. The question is, what is the nature of that 'real'? Many analysts have been at pains to demonstrate that Marx and Freud are metaphysical thinkers. This in that the mainspring of their systems stands outside the system and is unapproachable from within. For Marx, his assumption that history has a meaning, and that meaning is the self-liberation of man, remains a presupposition that is, as such, never defended. It is the essential a priori of Marx's thinking. Dollé has spent considerable time pinpointing Marx's metaphysical presuppositions and indicating that the aligning of freedom-logic-history-revolution all on one plane occurs by mere assertion. But the study of the unconscious also rests upon a metaphysical assumption, namely that of man as an energy-possessing being who is constantly spiritually active, and in the process of becoming.

Dollé describes our times as I have already noted (see p. 170) as those of 'unachieved nihilism', where thought is metaphysical, but denies that he shares in the same fate. How Dollé's own thinking transcends metaphysics remains unclear. The choice 'that there be something, and not nothing' may be undertaken in pure 'freedom' without any metaphysical force that determines the outcome. But what is it that necessitates the question itself? Where does the question come from? As soon as we ask about thinking's origins, we demand metaphysics. But Dollé insists upon telling us that thinking is the dance of the poet-philosopher: he saddles us with an origin. As soon as he localizes where thought comes from, we can ask what the nature of that source is, and at that moment metaphysics has been introduced. The question is, whether thinking can really be defended while demanding a truly consistent nihilism? Is Dollé standpoint concerning metaphysics tenable?

Dollé seems to be trapped in the contradiction of a metaphysics of the absence of metaphysics. Is not metaphysics only to be overcome—if that is one's goal—by refusing to pose the question? Dollé constantly researches the origins of thought. His question is, where does thinking come from? He seeks answers to the query in a semi-empirical manner, by researching/remembering his own past. But the question remains that of a cause for thought. Insofar as he turns to Freud, he interprets him philosophically in a manner I cannot agree with. He calls Freud the 'L'anti-metaphysicien' (Dollé, 'Le Tour de la penseé in *Les Dieux dans la cuisine*, p. 159). I fail to see what that could be or how it would apply to Freud. An anti-metaphysician would defend his refusal to ask where thinking comes from: but on what possible grounds could one defend such a refusal. Would not the argument collapse into the hopeless paradox of being a metaphysical justification of a refusal of metaphysics? Is not the only consistent refusal of metaphysics that is possible, the bracketing of the

issue and the radical avoidance of thinking it? The problem remains that it is of the nature of thought to want to discover its own origins, even if this wish is doomed. This latter position typifies what I think Freud believed. The analytical stance embodied a deep stoicism: it is the willingness to see man in all his violence and even evil without flinching. Freud's heroic acceptance of thinking was an ethic. He was willing to look at man stripped of his rationality; at life rid of many of its assurances; and at human relationships robbed of much of their idealized show. He proved that all these things, and more, could be seen, could be thought. Freud scored a tremendous victory for thinking, he defied the current boundaries of the unthinkable and reaped a fabulous harvest of new issues, questions, and lines of investigation. But while he defied the logic of rationality and sent the vision of man as a reasonable creature reeling, he did not attack or destroy metaphysics. Quite on the contrary, he reopened metaphysics to a new pursuit, that of the unconscious, or, as Jung quickly saw, 'the collective unconscious'.

Freud did not want to become a metaphysican; he chose to remain a psychologist, hence his attack on Jung and his refusal to broaden his work to include Jung's preoccupations. But this refusal was Freud's decision to place self-limiting boundaries upon his investigations in order to make his work as psychology, as clinical research, most effective. Freud correctly saw that either Jung's religious reflections, or Adler's political assumptions could threaten to make psychoanalysis sectarian. That was definitely not Freud's goal, and thus he did everything in his power to prevent it from happening. It is not that Freud thought that his investigations made metaphysics impossible, but that he sought to transcend the limits of previous psychological research with his brand of naturalism. He did not want to be pigeonholed in one of the then operative philosophical-political systems. Most likely, he thought that his direct examination of man's psyche was more primordial in its insight than much of those systems. What Freud also achieved is that he broke with the Western tradition of monism and entertained various concepts of a plurality of fundamental forces. Any polymorphous causality is a metaphysics, but one that assumes far less order and simplicity than our thought has been accustomed to. Adler and Jung's efforts to posit a single causal factor for the unconscious ran very much against the grain of Freud's work.

A second approach to this issue of metaphysics is that of questioning Dollé's interpretation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche's so-called nihilism is a very ethical matter: a defense of friendship and of the sort of personal relationships that make 'thinking' possible. What he announces so fervently is not that he wishes to murder God, but that God is dead. Nietzsche is not so much 'anti-God' as anti-phony believers. He is not trying to destroy metaphysics; he is attacking precisely those who would do so by their hypocrisy. He attacks the cowardly unbelief that acts as an excuse avoiding all questions of belief. What Nietzsche saw, and foreshadowed, was the mentality of false absolutes. He understood that European man pretended to acknowledge his 'God' as the easiest way of avoiding life, his fellow man, and meaning. 'God' had become the name for superficial egoism. The modern citizen-coward claims his absolutes so that he has no reason to think, and so that no one has any grounds for addressing questions to him. 'God' is the absolute refusal to transcend the self, to take others seriously, to question the world, to take part in a world about one.

Metaphysics asks about origins—it is a query, a searching, a movement of consciousness. What Nietzsche denounced was the refusal to begin on any of these. What Nietzsche shares with Freud is that he attacked monotheism—he sought for complex

configurations of causality. The key to understanding *The Joyful Wisdom*, which Dollé refers to frequently, is to analyze the multifarious appearances of the 'woman' (Derrida, 1978). Nietzsche is exploring a theme very close to Dollé's analysis of the sexuality of language, but strangely enough Dollé never mentions the parallel. The 'woman' appears in Nietzsche's text as everything from the mid-wife to the creatrix, to the *'leurre'* (temptress), and the deceiver. The metaphor of the 'woman' is that of the origins of thought: Nietzsche lets every possible source of thinking pass in review. He is trying to indicate that thought exists in a deceptive plentitude, where we cannot pin it down to one source with a single ethical connotation. He is preoccupied with the radical openness of the relationships that can, and do, generate 'thought'. And he wants to indicate that the impulse to think, to create, has everything to do with human interaction, and the tensions and passions of human social existence. He does not seek an absolute, alienated from man, safely distanced from the everyday, which can be piously manipulated following the whims of one's disposition. What generates thought is far closer to us than that, and far more powerful. Christianity's 'God' was far too passive and pallidly irrelevant to Nietzsche. He sought forces closer to man, which really were decisive in the human process. Pallid gods are safe enough, but accompany a milktoast culture. Nietzsche abhorred the timidness of the modern Europe—he sought a directness of contact and an intensity of existence that has continued to fascinate modern man.

This self-doubt—are we really something? is there actually anything happening in my life?—has accompanied the modern spirit. Dollé exhibits it especially strongly: he doubts in what sense he lives and concludes that for years he has not really done so. To live itself is a question and an uncertainty. Obviously, no simple form of biological aliveness is at stake here—but what then? What is the difference between lifelessness and its opposite? For Dollé, sensuality, an openness to existence, and some sense of epiphany seem to make the difference. But are all these criteria not purely metaphysical? Has not Dollé posited some sort of source of 'actualness' or 'aliveness' that he either is, or is not, capable of welcoming?

Dollé desperately seeks the quality of feeling himself alive—a quest in which he seeks the essential quality outside himself as a blessing that human company opens him to, or closes him off from. He must seek the 'other' who will facilitate his perception of being. Herein he reflects the Nietzschian metaphor of the 'woman', of a living, animate power that makes the sense of thinking, doing, and creating possible. It is in the active human experience that this takes place, not in some arid, depopulated, intellectualistic realm. Nietzsche's contempt for the Christian God is that He does not live and that He does not really make life.

The marriage of Nietzsche and Freud is natural enough. Psychoanalysis enrichs the contemplation of the living process of activity that creates human event. But to combine the two lines of thought and deny the importance of metaphysics does not make any sense to me. It is, I submit, not to go far enough in one's embrace of these two thinkers, and a refusal to share their world. I do not understand Dollé's constant use of psychoanalysis and Nietzsche as guideposts and the distance that he, in fact, maintains. He owes an explanation of his double relationship: seeming to embrace, but, in fact, remaining apart. Dollé's anti-metaphysics goes hand in hand with the emphasis he places on consciousness in his reflection on 'thinking'. For Dollé seeks a ménage à trois, with Kant entering in as the third partner. That combination gives difficulties, I believe. Kantian relativism is a very different thing from Freudian un-

consciousness. The sort of criticisms that they have of rationality are really quite different. Kant discusses rationality's logical limits; Freud, its ontological ones. Kant's consciousness is monotheistic; Freud's, wrought by opposing forces. Kant's relativism does not threaten us with chaos, because he has not posited another realm, full with seduction, tensions, and activity. With Freud, there is very much 'something else', whereby man is plunged into a warfare of fundamental forces.

Kant's universe is not so dynamic or impassioned. The libertarian idea of thinking, which Dollé has developed from Kant, cannot really be a party to a Freud-Nietzsche marriage. And it is at this point that Dollé's thinking becomes muddled. He wants a concept of 'thinking' where consciousness is limited, but unthreatened from within, and a vision of man swept up in psychic activity and pulsion where all restraints and order are threatened. Obviously, one cannot really have both. He has tried to keep the two demands compartmentalized by denying the existence of origins to thought, whereby the world achieves no unity and contradictions do not come into conflict. But this tactic remains a sleight-of-hand trick by which thought and passion are torn apart. Dollé ends up doing just what he abhors: writing one story about 'thinking' and another about 'feeling', whereby 'thinking' once again loses its intimacy with primary existence and becomes something impersonal, abstract, and repressive.

Dollé is unable to accept a purely intellectual concept of thinking; he needs the primary pulsion too much to be convinced that he is alive and he is unable to throw himself into the basic forces out of his love for the intellectual, philosophical tradition. He remains the unhappy European consciousness split between perception and analysis, experience and theory. Strangely enough, Dollé has called Heidegger the philosopher of this century, but if he had accepted the approach of *Being and Time,* he would never have worked himself into these problems. Heidegger, never identifies thinking with consciousness, but with being. He would never internalize and mentalize the sense of existence the way Dollé does. Dollé is not in-world, but seeking the world by thinking. This position is utterly foreign to Heidegger. For a Heideggerian, Dollé's effort to think his way into being, cannot succeed. Dollé tries to intellectually muscle his way into what can only be accepted or permitted to approach. Dollé pursues being; Heidegger lets it come to him. Here Dollé introduces yet another influence that does not sit at all easily with the others. All his sources end up contradicting one another. The effect is chaotic to say the least.

e. Assessments

Dollé wrestles with that ultimate accusation of our times: the denial of life. He mentions all its elements: inability to place oneself in the chain of the generations; the destructive effects on the culture when basic human continuity is destroyed; the dangers of narrow egoism where the self, enclosed in itself, is absolute. He does not discuss the potential demographic results: birthrates falling to the point where the present generation will not be fully replaced, resulting in an older average population, and severe problems of economic and cultural continuity. But he describes the issue at the individual level: the struggle to orient oneself towards parents and grandparents, and towards one's 'children's' future.

He is a pessimist, but of course millenarianism seems to surround us, and it is widely believed that nothing can remedy society's ills. Hard work is foolish; rules are

repressive; fatherhood is depraved, motherhood reactionary; the nation is guilty of colonial violence; the economy is an exploitive structure; medicine is a demeaning form of repression; schooling is mind-destructive. Simply to denounce all this gloom, however, gets us nowhere. We have to confront pessimism, and wrestle a confirmation of the value of living from it. Dollé can grapple openly with his own inability to live in continuity, all the while understanding the hell that awaits human life when it is robbed of a sense of being 'on-going'. For this I value him. By contrast, in *Le Refus de la vie* Chaunu proposes governmental policies that would make it economically more attractive to have children (Chaunu, 1975). Dollé proposes no policies, but whatever practical effect Chaunu's proposals might have, they do not tackle the underlying issue Dollé faces: the modern refusal of the life cycle and, thereby, of cultural continuity. Family subsidies and an income for mothers may be just decisions, but it is not at this level that something has gone essentially wrong in European (Western) consciousness.

Still, as much as I value Dollé's struggle, the responses it engenders seem to me chaotic. His terms are confused, and this points to a deeper confusion. In particular, Dollé seems to employ two contradictory definitions of 'freedom'. When 'thinking' predominates, freedom is the libertarian ability to exchange ideas without being policed or forced to accept external absolutes. But as soon as 'love' sets the tone, freedom is self-abandonment and the companionship that transcends self. 'Thinking' is necessary to resist terror, repression, and the modern situation. It is the key to his defense of open discussion, of academic freedom, and of intellectual integrity. But 'love' is necessary to free him from loneliness and, ironically, from the crushing responsibility of 'thinking'—the constant personal responsibility for comprehending surroundings, circumstances, and concepts. In this 'thinking', the individual has constantly to make the choice 'that there be something', that mental activity, memory, and fantasy achieve some sort of significance, effectiveness, and value. The pressure of this demand can become intolerable. But to preach, in reaction, an utter surrender of self, would be to embrace a definitive irrationalism, and this is not Dollé's way either.

That these two forces threaten to tear Dollé's thinking apart is not merely a logical problem: they relate to needs that exist only too clearly in our contemporary culture. The need for libertarian thinking should be clear enough where the repression of individual mental integrity goes hand in hand with terror. But the need for affection and deep bonds is also clear in a world threatened by depersonalization and the massive failure of traditional forms of companionship. In response to this second need, the liberal intellectual will neither inspire a new sense of community nor evoke a passion for life. Neither will the unbridled affectivity that Dollé's Romantic poet-philosopher generates defend us against barbarism.

The immediate past has caused us to yearn for the two promises of (1) firm bonds of affectivity and (2) an end to terror. Without both, the future does not seem livable. But there seems to be no way that both can honestly be promised, and almost no one is willing to make a choice. Can one blame Dollé for being unable to cut the knot?

As a teacher, one is constantly confronted with this conflict of goals: between the direct contact of students with their world and thus with one another, and the development of academic discipline through careful discussion. Of course, it is easy to answer that one pays serious attention to both, and indeed nearly every school pretends to do so. Rational, disciplined thinking and a developed ability for cooperation and community are both, apparently much sought after. Liberal arts education tries to

square the circle by developing a 'community' of 'thinkers'; and radical education does the same, by claiming that the only discipline that is lasting or politically justifiable is that which is 'freely' chosen and deeply supported. But in practice the conflict between these goals is a real one, and it is frustrating that Dollé has never allowed us to see him as a lecturer, attempting to resolve the conflict as he necessarily gives direction to a social process. At that moment, I submit, the Dollé revealed in his books would emerge, either as an exhibitionist or a man committed to sharing the thinking process.

To continue with this fantasy, the problem for Dollé as a lecturer would be that he could not demand Romantic exuberance of his student. To do so would be to instigate a psychological form of terror. Dollé's ethical support for the 'philosopher-poet' would become political repression. To prescribe a personality form, to require the 'other' to dance to a prescribed tune (even if only by means of social influences used in the 'best interest' of the 'other') opens the door to social-psychological totalitarianism—to terror.

In fact, I do not believe that Dollé would be prepared to force the 'other' to celebrate, but for that reason, as a lecturer his Romantic sentiments would become exhibitionistic. In his own terms, moreover, this would be a failure of love, since affection exists as interaction, not spectacle.

In order to be genuinely consistent with his goals, then, Dollé would be have to undertake a process of 'lived thought' with his students. And if he has done so, I find it incredible that he has not described this victory over loneliness and despair. This disbelief leads me to suppose that although Dollé may have constructed a Nietzschian identity, he does not really seek contact with others. In his descriptions of his relationships with others, for that matter, he remains a relatively untouched, distanced, yearning figure; and I envision that his poetic stance is more self-display than the lived affection he speaks of.

The problem I touch upon is the danger brought about by the emphasis upon identity: it can lead to deeper understanding—or to narcissism. If we appeal to our students to 'speak in their own voice', to 'make their own personal analysis', or to 'write in their own style', they may either break through layers of rationalization and generalization to a deeply social form of thought where the real link to others is manifest; or develop a narcissism in which all such links are broken. In this vein, Lasch made it clear that the sort of optimism that prescribed self-discovery as the best assurance of a genuinely social attitude simply does not work in contemporary America.

Another way to put this problem, then, is to say that Dollé the cultural pessimist is in actually too much of an optimist. He wants things pleasant—an intimacy that does not threaten him; affection, and even reverie, that is not dangerous. His most poignant description, of a working-class girl whom he slights, remains two-dimensional; she never becomes a character in her own right, remaining a mirror for him and his political preconceptions. This blandness, of course, is an aspect of narcissism: Dollé is never able to place what he thinks, wants, prescribes second; and someone or something else first. The sensitivity of Jean Paul Dollé predominates, rather than either 'thinking' or affectionate human interaction.

To live with the dilemma that thinking and affection neither exclude one another nor incorporate one another may be frustrating, but the tension can also be creative. Dollé frustrates in a more discouraging way, he does not truly explore the tension. Still, I believe that Dollé is a serious man, not just an intellectual exhibitionist.

I do not know if Dollé has realized how unresolved his thinking is, and that he only offers imbalance. If his purpose is to end the tension between the intellect and feeling, he has yet really to begin. The need that we feel for order, and for creativity, will, I believe, continue to drive us in opposing directions. In any case, I do not believe in the synthesis; every effort has a temporary dimension for me. These forces can on rare occasions converge but cannot be fully synchronized. I shall continue to seek both the libertarian and the affective, knowing that each goal sets limits on the other. This means constant struggle with no real, permanent solutions.

INTERFACE SIX

The genetic text attempted a *cultural-historical psycho-analysis of my relationship to teaching*. In chapter six (Part Two) I describe a three-pronged approach in which intersubjectivity, introsubjectivity, and cultural event interact to establish educational activity. The assumption is that teaching is a product of cultural circumstances and that its meanings are not formed in isolation, but are mirrors, historically held ideas concerning man, his social persona(s), and his capacity for action. The 'therapy'' assumes that interaction should win out: the social (speech) and knowledge (thought) should be mediated into a productive process. I am not attempting a logically conclusive or empirically overwhelming proof, but the writing up of a case study to show that my assertions are plausible. I have done my utmost to convey education as a complex struggle of mutual transformation, where one is confronted with the impossibility of distinguishing a 'self' from the 'other.' We absorb and reject layers of ourself and others in teaching. The distinct and specific is present, as well as the interplay of the cultural/historical. The forces are complex—the chapter clarifies what I have understood of them. The research returns to examining reflections on teaching to demonstrate how the insights gained, the experience achieved were of influence. In comparison with the first chapter there's no loss of passion, but a definite gain in perspective and nuance. What follows is (force majeure of consistency) historically specific—it describes the situation in 1981, the last year wherein undergraduate college teaching was my principal work. I believe that the analysis has held up well—today I would, in addition, emphasize the role which economic malaise is playing in undermining the ideology of the welfare state. The emphasis on the two elements: (1) identity as a complex (social) psychological factor and (2) ideology as the king pin to teaching's strength or weakness; remains my choice.

6

Teaching

I. Education is only to be understood as an event of *intersubjectivity*. The educational process is a social occurrence; learning is a human event. Action, occurrence between people, is necessary for education to occur. Psyches locked up in themselves are ineducable.

II. Education takes place in a specific, concrete, historical situation, where identity (between a person and his being a teacher; between a person and his being a student; between a 'teacher' and a 'student') is a complex factor. Education is not only intersubjective (between people) but *introsubjective*: it involves multiple levels of interaction of people in themselves.

III. Education is a *cultural event*: the material that gets formed in the course of the various levels of interaction (the content) is chosen from the structures of thinking that are typically present at the moment of teaching. What gets taught is and can only be, somehow typical of the form of consciousness generally prevailing. It is a part of a general structure of consciousness.

a. Intersubjectivity

I have described the failure of intersubjectivity in the radical college. Dogma—ideology—'world'—social rationalism; all led to a social epistemology which shut out new experience, evidence, or ideas. 'Democracy' became its own solipsism, as politics was its own 'Truth'. The undergraduate who claimed that everyone must become politically involved, could not define 'politics' when asked to do so, other than to say that it was 'everything'. But the college has undergone some structural changes. Its organizational principle was 'democracy' but it is now 'the team'. I will compare the two systems and, in conclusion, indicate what I would prefer to see in their place.

The pedagogic crux to 'democracy' was an elective system wherein the students could not only choose their own courses, they could also plan them just as they pleased. This led to two remarkable siuations: (1) students who in their school time discussed more what they wanted to study than they actually followed courses, and (2) lecturers who were told the one week which course they should give and who showed up the following week, without any further preparation, to give it. The often spectacular inability of the students to decide what they wanted to study, and the equally glaring failure of many makeshift courses to achieve any learning goals, led to the system falling, slowly, into disrepute. The system was obviously inefficient; it was easily corruptible when one was little motivated to work; difficult to control or administer whereby the effective use of resources was pretty much impossible; terribly susceptible to intellectual modes and superficial enthusiasms. But even more essential: it falsified the

fundamental psychological structure of education. The 'democracy' was synonymous with hatred of 'authority'. In fact, 'authority' ceased to mean expertise, knowledge, or experience; and came to mean a virtually sado-masochistic abuse of one person by another. The 'educator' could no longer exist: someone who tells, who ought to be listened to; who is recognized as a model for what we want to know, be able to do, or think, was rejected. The faculty in consequence, had to refuse to give any rules or in fact, to lecture. Each student had to discover for himself what was worth knowing and why. The role of the teacher was utterly ambivalent. To make matters worse, while a pretension existed to individuality and free choice, the graduating students seemed uniform and regimented in what they knew. Curriculums of this sort are, in fact, an effective means of making students dependent. By contrast: to openly define what is expected of students is to make rebellion possible. The disaster of the 'democratic' system is that when the tension of endless meetings and ideological assertions is removed, when the artificial guessing game of what we must do to gain some acceptance and a bit of security ends, the motivation to study turns out to be artificial. The tactic of 'keep them guessing', of never defining one's curriculum, goals, standards, is merely manipulative: engagement in a vision does not take place when the vision is undiscussable. The didactic device creates insecure graduates who are better at second-guessing what someone wants of them than in working on their own. By falsely claiming that undergraduate learning is, or could be a purely individual matter of free choice, the school had so misrepresented intellectual reality to her students that they could not help but become muddled. If the high school graduate is to learn to read, and minimally understand, social science literature then the work which is to be done in a four year course is already cut out for one. The question of where do we begin certainly does not deserve too much attention. Things are topsy turvy when lecturers who are appointed as social scientists do not teach their subjects but conduct themselves, with students, as if they are equals just wanting to talk to one another, while the staff/student relationship is functional in origins and in its general significance. What made the system effective, in the short run, was that the students did not understand what its premises were. The students were convinced that they were left to swim for themselves—after all, no rules were ever made explicit. Just because a discussion of the refusal to lecture was circumvented, the graduate thinks that his vague, undisciplined study was of his own choosing. The lecturers refused to accept their role: to take the intellectual responsibility upon themselves which education demands. This collapse in self-confidence was presented to students as a victory in student rights and democracy. The student, in such a situation, cannot understand himself, he becomes hopelessly entangled in the false consciousness of the academy. Most graduates never re-emerge; they never find out what the college did, or what they want to do. When the necessity to produce 'what one wants to, exactly in response to the insecurities of the staff' disappears, the need to study vanishes with it. The institutionalized demand for a self-planned study, paradoxically, led to inauthenticity. Faked commitment to the study occurred just because 'political equality' was defined as the objective of the study. Social scientists can create real descriptions of social interaction; statistical, phenomenological, observer-participatory, or whatever; but they cannot command a made-to-order society. By substituting the will to determine social processes for the studying of society, one creates pure confusion. Instead of directing oneself to actual occurrence, one must teach a utopian vision. But what is that Utopia, and how does one travel from the naive study of a beginning textbook to that other realm? 'Utopia' becomes a rationalization of emotion, the reduction of personal

qualities of style or approach, to a concept. And worst of all, it refuses to look at the concrete state of knowledge of either student or lecturer and to discuss their ideas for what they are—a social statement that someone is making. To fight over each other's 'Utopias' is to judge people instead of seriously opening a dialogue with what they say. It is the refusal to talk about the nitty-gritty of immediate existence, and a flight into moralizing. In this case it led to a 'political involvement' that was spiritually monotone and intellectually repetitious. The instructors judged the spiritual quality of the student; this was spiritual arrogance and ethical irresponsibility.

The students became dissatisfied when the seniors and graduates began to clamor that they had not learned enough. The staff decided to require an obligatory introductory program lasting one and a half years. It was to be clear what would be studied and how the results could be intelligently evaluated, based upon the agreed upon curriculum objectives. This was neither inexplicit nor self-planned. Though the new found clarity could allow for real dialogue between the student and his work and between the faculty and that work, the curriculum had just the opposite effect. It became a self-evident institution, which was passively accepted, and immaturely undergone.

More disasterously, there was a need for agreement not just between individual teacher and student, but between all members of the faculty. This was because, instead of developing specializations and undertaking specific individual tasks, the instructors had decided to become a 'team' agreeing on common objectives. The stranglehold of political conformity became somewhat less important, and the noose of role compliance took over. The lecturers had to defend their right to prescribe courses, grade, make academic decisions, while curiously enough no one was challenging these perogatives. It was not that the staff was under attack, but that it was unsure of itself. The 'team', which was a 'must', had no content. The lecturers refused to think through their educational goals. The question 'what should the team do' was never really posed. The new found authority was grudgingly accepted, the educational responsibility which it reiterated was avoided. The required, under-division program, possessed no unity—each lecturer filled in aproximately a semester and a half of course work irrespective of what anybody else did. The self-serving anarchy continued. The 'team' was a superficial social code: it institutionalized uninvolvement and the refusal of rational self-definition. The 'team' neither inhabited nor created a common world; and if we have no common world, then we share nothing more than the fact of being 'mentalities'. The 'team' was the myth of co-operation and unity, behind which remained the same alienation and pursuit of self interest as before. This is not surprising, for nothing had happened to alter the persons who were wholly alienated from their world.

In fact, the 'political' and 'team' approaches have more in common than seperates them, and neither really speaks to the essence of higher education. Both attitudes devalue academic content: in the 'political' structure learning was not important, what counted was belonging to the right political movement; in the 'team' approach one's social position, again, is more important than what is studied. In the first model it is one's social position towards the society at large which is dominant, and in the second it one's position in the school. Knowledge comes in a poor second both times to the social factor. The program is not the essential bond between the lecturers. The students had to work all right: the activity of being busy was expected of them, and was the principle requirement of the school. But the goal was not to master a body of knowledge, for there were, in fact, no defined curriculum goals.

The members of the team were not all that adept. They became disillusioned over their failure to inspire students, wasted their time in irrelevant administration, and announced that they had decided to spend more time off campus. Upset that their 'political ideals' had come to naught, but utterly unwilling, or unable, to realize that the failure might be intimately linked to their starting point, the instructors had learned nothing.

The concept of a team had been a fool's paradise, easily talked about because it meant so little. The social scientist is initially alone with the (research) ideas he finds it worthwhile to pursue; his 'idea' is unexpressed and unexpressable until he investigates it. His moment of freedom and responsibility takes place when he chooses his goals and methodology. Teamwork demands a collective immediate existence, and a flight into choices have been made and the operations have been broken down into components. A team is a multiheaded subject that has to function much as the pieces of a machine work together. The isolation of any part robs it of its meaning, and disrupts the operation of the whole. A team standardizes the work to be done so that any member can do it with the same results. Individual insight disappears, smooth functioning takes over. The product is devalued, since it is no longer unique or really individual. The question is not, what the intrinsic worth of that creation is, but whether all the laborers work effectively. The outstanding performance is sacrificed to uniformity. Those who are the principal proponents of a proletarian society are most often critical of intellectuals, who they accuse of being 'elitist'. The emphasis upon research standards and careful text analyse, does not fit into a society where everyone labors. The essential qualities of laboring are monotony, lack of contact with the end product, and the instrumentality of the activity.

From classical philosophy to Marx, however, labor has been seen as an activity carried out merely to provide the material necessities. For the Greeks, to labor was to be reduced to the unfreedom of these necessities, and to be a prisoner of the stomach. For Christian thinkers, worldly concerns have always been inferior to contemplation and faith; to be lost in laboring is to lose sight of God. Even for classical socialism, labor is a prison to escape, and the scarcity that necessitates it is the historical limit that has always plagued mankind. Throughout our Western tradition, in other words, we see the will to escape labor and to achieve freedom.

Moreover, in our tradition, to achieve this freedom is to enter into genuine human society, where individual acts are recognized, acknowledged, and remembered. Labor leaves nothing behind, but there has always been a larger or smaller margin for 'works' in every society, products that ask to be recognized, acknowledged, remembered. 'Works' are individually made, and reveal the identity of their individual makers. In the making of 'works', there can be cooperation, but it amounts to recognizable contributions to the end work, made by distinct individuals. The laboring 'team', in this sense, does not cooperate at all.

Labor creates abundance. Though laboring itself is sterile, consumption is ample. In a laboring society like our own, earning and spending power become the chief political questions. The public realm where 'works' would normally be displayed and the social behaviors that could become 'works' disappear. Participation in the making, displaying, and enacting of 'works' falls away.

In such a situation, a team of social scientists can only man a collective-behavior factory—a place where the action of possessing an 'idea' of one's own and bringing it to fruition is abandoned. In such a place, where is the respect for the person who

studies, for an individual manner of working? The college has no sense of the specific identity of staff members or of students.

The 'work' serves the function of showing oneself—of establishing an identity and acquiring a certain role or significance for others. The spirit of such achievements has suffered continuing defeats in modern society. It becomes almost scandalous to seek recognition or importance, especially when, in the sameness of labor there is a sort of equality. But this equality is merely a matter of being reduced to a common denominator. It is not the acknowledgement of a shared humanity, where each person achieves selfhood through his specific acts.

An experimental or progressive college was supposed to be an exception to these tendencies, and be a place where individual work was still possible. But the radical colleges have reduced themselves to the standards of the laboring society. The uninvolvement of the students and the general malaise were inevitable enough. In a factory, the laborers will take on the appropriate attitudes. Solidarity with the workers leads, it seems, more to turning the school into a factory than in abolishing the alienation of the factory. The lecturers and students from the radical college—retreat into privatization, into their privileged level of consumption.

The first postulate stated at the beginning of this chapter, that education is intersubjective, is in effect an objection to the implicit claim of most educational literature that nothing really serious has to happen to people in school. The teacher-student-content relationship, for all its simplicity or obviousness, remains a conceptual schema without flesh or blood. The categories never get the feel of real learning—the dynamic event of discussion, reflection, thought is always absent. We are beset with meaningless generalizations—such as that everybody 'learns' all the time—and left to muddle through. If 'learning' is everything, it is likewise nothing, and thus irrelevant. The *choc-des-idées* is unknown: it is a revelation to discover that thought is possible and what a significance it can have. Schools are portrayed more as information posts than as intellectual centers. Increasingly, it is argued that the school should be a depository of learning possibilities. Teachers become 'facilitators' or 'resource persons'—guardians of a 'rich environment' in which students are supposed to undertake 'self-exploration' in 'freedom'. The teacher becomes a custodian of a cognitive chocolate factory where the children (for these discussions center on primary education) are supposed to eat as much as they want. The presupposition of what Western culture has discovered, and has to say seems utterly faulty. Is the sense of existence that our civilization has developed so sweet and toothsome? Is to 'know' such a delight?

The deschoolers have a very special sense of the human experience and of what is to learn about it. Their shallow optimism about man's creations and deeds is troubling. Where is the bloodbath of contemporary history? What has become of social violence or economic terror? 30 Langer's political and affective testimonly to "convictions" makes my point—it is a frightening pun on personal beliefs and criminal sentences, and the intimacy between them (Langer, 1981). The terrible superficiality disturbs me. Schools exist to deliver 'good news'; teachers are not needed to wrestle with the horror which the students are only beginning to understand and are far from being able to accept. Schooling is to be consumed—and the deschoolers want to market it with full fledged competition between several differing products. As I have already indicated, the essential quality of consumerism is the frivolous use we make of the goods. They are there to be used up, to sustain us, to relax us, to temporarily pamper us. Is schooling to become the latest amusement industry? The chatter I have heard in school commonrooms has most often concerned itself with tips on keeping the 'public'

awake, or, even better, 'aroused'.

Obviously I am not pleased to see the teacher reduced to a public jester. I believe that teaching has nothing of the simple 'goody-goody-ness' to it that popular pedagogics seems to champion—there is an essentially tragic essence to teaching. The educational literature I have read seems to want to convince us that teaching is superficial, easy, great good fun. No school that anyone has ever experienced is remotely recognizable in the plans and schemes presented. The literature is based upon a fundamental refusal to understand what the relationship between the teacher and the student is. That relationship seems to be so dangerous, so fraught with explosive psychic forces, that it must at all costs be avoided.

I suspect this is what prompts most teachers not to teach, but to merely show up on Mondays. Many of them appear to be in advanced state of inanition. Without intersubjectivity, outside of the direct bonds of discussion, interaction, and investigation, there is mere mentalism, where the 'real' has no role to play. The world loses its voice; **all** that remains is the predictable material and spiritual assembly line. But history does **not** work like a factory. It continually produces the unexpected. Social science, if it has **any** liberating value, is also a conveyor of the unexpected—of the event or occurrence. Good social science mirrors that something can happen, and most often does. For social engineering only what we make, according to a predefined model, is real but human society is not so ordered. Reality is unreasonable and irrational—it constantly demonstrates the unexpected. What was statistically irrelevant occurs. Events form the texture of reality: history and engineering are radically different. To quote Hannah Arendt: 'Modern rationalism is unreal and modern realism is irrational' (Arendt 1958, p. 300). To comprehend history is to accept the lack of order, and the inability to predict, understand, know. To be purely rational is to lose oneself in ordering, in ideal structures of logic, where dynamic life is shut out.

It is just this process of rationalization that characterizes the *Zeitgeist*. Man, imprisoned in his own psyche, demands order and a world which he can easily understand; he becomes a self-centered, self-indulgent consumer, who distrusts the man who might do something. A terrifying passivity dominates the team, where there is an extreme loss of personality and will to act. Modern rationalism threatens to become real, reducing 'man' to unreality. The great conflicts of the nineteenth century are not simply over and done with; but while exploitation was the sensible manifest crisis of that century, this one carries the mask of dehumanization and the collapse of direct social experience. The acknowledgement of a sacred quality to man, the great legacy of Christianity, may be failing us. The radical college did not care about what people saw, which reality they experienced; it had no concern for specific 'ideas' that demanded to be discussed. It did not want to research what persons had to do, what they could make, reflect upon, or demand of an onlooker. The emotion of orderly labor predominated; the rationality of investigating the real lost out. Formal criteria remained essential—the content of thought, and the world to be revealed, remained secondary. This decadent social science, which mechanically repeats itself rather than studying the social universe; and this hollow lecturer who has investigated nothing, seen little, and hasn't an iota to say; are not opposed to the contemporary social development, but are characteristic of it. I would desire a insightful opposition, for these teachers are irrelevant. They have lost their intersubjective roots and become rigid, repetitive, and escapist. The knowledge taught must embrace direct social event or otherwise a viscious paradox destroys the learning value of the school.

Education only takes place if persons meet one another on an intellectual level. Thought has to develop and become more intimately linked to experience for it to justify itself. The lecturer who is afraid of his students, who does not meet them but avoids them, does not believe in learning. Ideas are to be used to understand, to see, to respond, if their activity is debased they become alien, strange, even silly. When thought is the same as to see human existence, discuss it, reveal it, struggle with it then education is inherently intersubjective. If it lacks these qualities, it becomes empty formalism and selfbetrayal.

b. Introsubjective

We can claim that the intersubjective structure to education has not received enough attention but, we have to admit that nobody has ever heard of the 'introsubjective' aspect. While in the first years of lecturing I identified spontaneously and fully with my 'lecturing self', I developed over the years a sizeable distance from my performances. After a while the questions are no longer unexpected, student reponses are predictable, and one reacts strategically. Why I ask a certain question, give a particular answer, propose a text, is answerable on two levels. One is explicit and known: in it one finds a plan for the intellectual development of the students. The other is implicit, and seldom discussed; it contains my social ethics, or manner of conducting myself with others. The formal program, the literature discussed and concepts to be mastered, can be kneaded into various practical theses or attitudes. The question I have to ask myself is 'What do I want to make of this course material?' and, thus, what am I really going to say to these students. What I seem to be saying is to be compared to the story line; it is a mere chronology of events. But the real plot, what is being shown about life, history, and existence, is to be found on a level removed from the immediate flow of information. The students listen sentence by sentence, idea by idea; I work, course by course, student generation by student generation. The two different time lines: immediate concrete experiencing by the students; abstract, global analysis by the lecturer; creates problems for the latter. The teacher becomes unreal, in his role, for himself. He may have become very adept in making his point, but he is threatened by a lack of reciprocity. The students are not one's equals; they cannot see what stands behind the curriculum, while an acute lecturer cannot forget what is there. The subject matter remains open for spontaneous dialogue, but one answers to writers, researchers, the masters of one's field, not to the student. The students become a public for one's intellectual dialogues with books. The teacher is threatened by the mastery of his role. He is strangled in the predictability of the classroom. He can seem to make the unexpected occur, but that effect can also be programed. One's identity as teacher is inevitably complex, but can it, in some essential sense, remain genuine? Must lecturing become a mere effect that we produce: 'It is a way of dying like any other, but not so human, or so frequent as all that!' ('La Mort d'Émile Ajar', Jacqueline Piater, 1981, p. 1). Do we loose a bit of authenticity at every performance, until a routinized cadaver remains? Can we find a manner of being ourselves and of teaching wherein we do not falsify our insight into the teaching process, or loose all spontaneity through the analysis. Can we know ourselves as lecturers and still find a living form of contact with the students? The amazing death of Émile Ajar (or should I say Romain Gary or Paul Pavlowitch?) serves as a parable for my point. All three figures were both one another and were not so. Ro-

main Gary was an established novelist of reasonable reputation who had won the Prix Goncourt in 1956 for *Les Racines du Ciel*. Émile Ajar was a somewhat mysterious newcomer, who appeared on the literary scene in 1974. While Gary was traditional in his use of materials, Ajar was experimental. Raymond Queneau picked Gary as the real Émile Ajar, but after much speculation everyone became convinced that Paul Pavlowitch was, in fact, Ajar. Pavlowitch was a nephew of Gary's, whose third book *Pseudo* (1976) [appearing under the name Ajar] convinced everyone of the correctness of the assumed identities. In it, Ajar takes on 'Tonton Macoute', and his sharp words about the uncle made the Gary-Ajar distinction clear enough. In December 1980, Gary committed suicide, seven months later Pavlowitch published a book under his own name, and announced that Ajar had died with Gary—for this was, in fact, the first book Pavlowitch had ever written.

Apparently, Gary felt himself strangled by his own literary persona. He wanted to do something entirely new. He was convinced that, whatever he wrote, he would remain Romain Gary—a competent writer, but one who did not innovate. Gary wanted to fight it out once again with himself and the public. He did not want te be read this time because the name 'Gary' was on the cover, or because one expected to find 'him' in his appropriate role. He chose anonymity: to become a new, unknown writer. Gary wrote about people in the world; Ajar's characters are outside it. Gary described relationships where there is interaction between people; Ajar deals with psychological presence. Gary found that he did not have the 'freedom' to speak Ajar's message. He thus undertook the ultimate trick of fiction: he not only created realities out of words (novels) as he had already done for years, he created a 'living' author, an actor for his creation. He argued in the press with his Ajar; he let Ajar attack him in print.

He also played with Pavlowitch, who had the task of typing out what Gary wrote. At one point, for example, he wrote 'remembrances' of Pavlowitch's mother that were anything but kind. Pavlowitch was ensnared in the imposture: all his contacts knew him as Ajar, one of France's leading writers, though in reality he had never written a word. When Gary committed suicide. Pavlowitch was forced to do something—the processing of the will would reveal eventually who had the right to the royalties from Ajar's oeuvre. Pavlowitch chose to write. He brought out a best-seller (luckily he can write).

The parallel with teaching is that the lecturer is also a real person who is presenting himself as a created, fictional figure. But who has created this persona who speaks to the students? And what exactly is the role of the person who plays the part?

Teachers did once bear witness to essential truths that they wished to defend. Such lecturers did not speak to enter into a dialogue of equals. They had something they wanted to tell; the student listened to what a man and his life had created, the word was a gesture of revelation. No one thought that they were there to judge the lecturer's existence; their role was to be educated by what that existence had become, by the mixture of action and consciousness that was placed before the audience, by the words of the presentation.

This was a sort of lecturing that could only occur if the students were willing to listen and to limit themselves to being a sympathetic audience. The talkative schooling that has emerged in the past ten years, however, exludes the reverent listening that lets a lecturer really tell something. Schooling has frequently become amusing, chatty, fashionable. The newest frustrations and sensationalisms are picked up, and then left behind. The school becomes a highbrow form of entertainment. The graduate seems a

bit better informed than his fellow citizens, and with lots of luck he may think more rationally than they. But there is something older and more basic that can be called teaching. It is an event that takes place in the public space where action and speech can be observed and experienced as significant. A teacher can be a representative figure, whose words are taken seriously. Such a position has its own pitfalls.

The call for a response launches one into the unknown. One cannot predict what one's acts may amount to. We entrench ourselves in a manner of response, which then becomes our 'identity'. There is a continuity in the role we present. The process does not impair us, if the face we present has enough depth of questioning. As long as the query that is posed, the doubt that is incorporated, and the wondering that is made manifest cannot be exhausted in a lifetime, there is no necessary problem. But if we exhaust our guise, what we have to say becomes filmsy and irrelevant, our persona becomes our enemy. What is more, we cannot abandon our character: often one's social existence is based upon it. To not be what we have shown of our self is to become illegitimate. To put on a Janus-face and attack everything we had confirmed is a temporary response where nothing is transcended. All the limits to our existing that had begun to irritate remain, only pushed from the one side of things to the other. What impinges is that the fundamental question that the person has posed life does not carry him further: nothing seems to become permanent—less limited than himself. He has answered his own doubt. Nothing is a worse spiritual disaster. Knowledge of the *what* we do, think, will, can, love, and so forth does us no damage—just the opposite. But to realize *who* our existence is, leaves no issues to live, no problem to undertake. It means that our intellect has transcended our self, that we have placed our thinking on the far side of our own character. We have become an object for our own mind—stepped outside ourself and examined our own consciousness as a foreign object. Such self objectification leaves nothing animate behind.

Gary, I believe, had passed himself by in just this manner. He was a cannibal—he consumed himself and, Pavlowitch thinks, had set his sights on 'Ajar'. Gary's suicide is explained as a metaphysical investigation. The man had so totally become an intellect, beyond all his personifications, that the absolute spirit wondered how it would be if all those personas were really to die. They already did so intermittently in the fantasy of switching from character to character, between roles that negated one another. Ajar may have set all Gary's presuppositions on their head, but he did not formulate a new reason to live. What Gary-Ajar-Pavlowitch displayed was a self-renunciation on three levels: Gary abandoned his literary identity, Pavlowitch gave up whatever personality he may have had, and 'Ajar' became a phantasm in which no one could really exist. Their case, is a study in an impossibility of being, but with the difference that each pole of the triangle was able to write. But what did the trio miss? Gary, either under his 'own' name (his name at birth was a much longer Polish one) or as 'Ajar', remained at war with his double. Pavlowitch was uncertain of retaining any substance himself after his all-consuming masquerade. Everyone who spoke of Gary emphasized that he was unknowable—his sudden outbursts of feeling sowed more panic than clarity. His speech always seemed composed of hasty fragments. Others could discover no recognizable constant, character in their contact with him—I suppose because there was none. He seems to have become segments of a story without a center. From at least 1973 through 1980, Gary and Ajar both wrote proficiently. They fought their war without anyone knowing what was occurring.

I see in the Gary-Ajar relationship a representation of the tension between man

and his known, perceived social self. Neither Gary nor Ajar is more authentic than the other. Nothing guarantees that either of them is preeminent. Both are structures of speaking—platforms from which to address the public. I am not interested in comparing the quality of their 'being', even if this should prove possible. What I investigate precedes any such consideration; it is the precondition to being able to appear to others. To be visible, to be heard, to exist for an audience demands some very particular expectations. These normally remain invisible, because one person adopts, develops, is seized by, one persona, with which he is identified. What is so instructive with Gary-Ajar is the existence of a plurality of 'selves', all of whom take part in an interaction with others.

Normally we never doubt that the person speaking to us is, in fact, himself. We presuppose that our interlocutor is not out to deceive us, is who he pretends to be, and speaks in his own voice rather than merely enacting a script. All these assumptions are necessary baggage enabling us to 'listen'. Without them, we become so entangled in uncertainty that we no longer know what we are hearing or what it could mean. Without the suspension of disbelief, it is impossible to enter into a direct appreciation of what we are told. The 'author'—the someone who speaks, who demands to be heard—must be accepted as a voice that has a right to be listened to. This position is more unusual than one might at first assume. In education, it is obvious that a large group of people will become silent and begin to pay attention when a lecturer starts to speak, but will remain talkative and virtually chaotic in his absence. What draws a mass of people out of their seriality and makes a specific intellectual event of their situation? The quality of acknowledgement that a lecturer must possess to fulfill his task is traditionally called 'authority'. It is a term that has undergone a stormy transformation in the past thirty years. The cultural attitude called 'anti-authoritarianism' has attacked the tradition of acknowledging some people as exemplary, and according them the privileged position of being listened to. The social space where a lecture could be given has shrunk and, in several countries, has almost disappeared. The form of speaking that demands a cessation of skepticism and a willingness on the part of its public to take in what is offered has been made nearly impossible. Only a small cultural elite remains who can listen.

Mass undergraduate education, not to mention secondary schooling, has altogether abandomed the requirement of careful attention. It is argued that students should not be receptive to classical lecturing, because the teacher dominates, leaving the student structurally 'speechless'. Purely to listen is thought demeaning. Popularization, lecturing as entertainment, and/or seminar groups where the discussion is minimally directed have militated against the serious hearing of a standpoint. Only the graduate students may hear what a lecturer really thinks or himself believes to be important.

The emphasis on student participation in setting the curriculum and in carrying it out has broken down the silence that is needed before a personal statement can be made. Instead, the teacher is supposed to supply a limited number of facts and act as a supplement to the textbook. His personality is supposed to remain irrelevant, at best providing lighter moments or illustrative anecdotes. One no longer goes to class to hear what the teacher himself has to say.

Once the decision has been made not to listen, authority is vitiated. But what prompts one to make the opposite decision, to want to listen? Of course, we sometimes let ourselves be taken in. But the sort of communication that I believe makes us decide

to listen contains an active circumstance; there is an appeal to see something in a particular manner, to understand reality in a certain fashion, and to react to the world in accordance with a defined insight.

Thus an educator tries to move us; he exerts a claim upon us to become allied in knowing a problem and formulating a response to it. For this reason, the teacher's crisis centers upon the necessity of always saying something. The teacher must demand interaction: a new comprehension, and a response based upon it. Otherwise, he 'has nothing to say' and is rejected. Teaching is a nerve-wracking enterprise: if one makes no demand, the fascinating, but explosive, tension of the class situation will dissipate and leave one with a stale defeatism. But to make demands can evoke aggression, rejection, and on occasion even a shouting match with students. To oblige and to fail—to have one's significance undermined—is intensely disturbing. To succeed, however, is more traumatic than one might think. The Gary/Ajar/Pavlowitch story concerns the success of the speaker, not his humiliating disappearance into routine and vacuity. To gain a persona one must have something to say, and find a form which conveys it. That identity becomes one's vehicle through which one interacts with one's surroundings. To break with that idea of oneself is to prompt disillusionment in the public that had accepted it. To ask others to take one's message utterly seriously and then to abandon it oneself is to leave one's following feeling gulled. When what one says is accepted by one's listeners, they are taking an aspect of the speaker's thinking, sentiments, and commitments into themselves, and making them their own. To then be told that the author is not, himself, convinced of what he has imposed upon the reader, leaves the latter feeling tricked, cheated, and manipulated.

Modern sophism seeks to gull others into a manner of seeing, to cause them to react as the concept demands, and then to flee, revealing a lack of conviction and intellectual opportunism. A reader/listener who is convinced that he has been deceived will shout 'treachery'. Gary was convinced that his identity forced him to say what his readers trusted him to tell. By creating Ajar, he began anew the process of winning listeners, and of building up an understanding with them of what would be said, how and why. But by creating two honesties, by launching two different dialogues between the writer and the public, the synthetic quality of the persona was highlighted. All engagement was relative if it could be made and manipulated as one chose. Most of us cannot establish one persona with any great success; to be able to play with them is not the ultimate victory, but a mere invitation to madness. All personality, every vision, became a possible thought. Human self-consciousness became something that one could inventively play with. One did not have to be 'Gary' or 'Ajar' or anything else. All human 'authenticity' was revealed in its relativity. William James's proof the stream of consciousness went berserk: who would dare to go to sleep tonight if we were not sure of awakening with the same personality tomorrow? With Gary-Ajar which sensitivity would wake up had become variable.

Either we remain prisoners of the persona that has become familiar, with all the accompaning limits, or we risk being overwhelmed by the freedom that the making and unmaking of identities reveals. Is it more frightening to have to be a specific sensitivity, or not to have to be any particular one? Every teacher assumes an attitude to this problem. On the one hand, there looms the unfreedom of always making the same claim—of becoming a walking-talking symbol that loses its freedom of spontaneity, thought, or innovation; on the other, there is the danger of being found chaotic and undisciplined, and not being taken seriously. Finally, the most frightening danger of

all, identity loses its power and becomes so many possibilities, perhaps impersonations.

The teacher can deny all individuality, for instance, by pretending to be 'objective' or scientific, but if he admits to having a personality of his own, to possess ideas and a spirit of his own, he must find a balance between that self and the persona that he presents in his teaching. Furthermore, in a cultural setting characterized by impersonal work situations, privatization, and mass consumerism, it becomes increasingly difficult for the teacher to have a self that will speak, act, and demand, or to find a means for such a self to interact effectively with students. If nothing happens in schooling, if there is no call to action, if speaking, observing, and thinking do not emerge as truly significant matters, education collapses into triviality.

Central to this whole vision of education is the assumption that the teacher really says something, that he makes a fundamental claim upon his public: teacher and student mutually accept that learning is an essential quality of their culture, and commit themselves to share in the development of these specifically historical acts. We undertake the process of learning in that we struggle to expressivity, to define a content, to create, make, do. If this intentional concept of man and speech is forgotten, schooling becomes a function without identity, where there is no reason for anything to happen.

The crux of this issue lies in how we understand man, a definition which historically changes. What I see to be the contemporary mutation, will be discussed in the third (c) part of this chapter. Just as long as I retain my definition of man-meant-to-act, then the student resembles Pavlowitch. When Romain Gary committed suicide, Pavlowitch had to define himself: at that moment he began to write himself for the first time. The identity he had merely assumed had to be translated into action. Few students come so far. Many remain the image that another has conjured up for them until even that collapses from inaction. To demand that there be lived, that words become the thrust of intention, and that speech is self-declaration does not mean that all these things will occur. However impassioned the question is posed, the responses can remain tepid. Necessity—having to perform deed, where the teacher's vision will not reprieve us, from having to make choices—forces us to act.

The instructor's appeal has a paradoxical effect. It implants a knowledge of human action, of decision, of being, but it offers a verbal escape from them all. As long as we mime what we have learned, we are fending off the demand to speak, think, and act. But imitation remains a temporary phase in the relationship to a message; sooner or later we are confronted with situations without ready-made solutions based on what we have learned. Then we either become authors—make the words and deeds of four situation—or collapse into hollowness.

That a master of identity could form an image through which no one could penetrate, as Gary did, is not really so remarkable. He made the process of creating and conveying identity more explicit than is normal, but that is all. And that Pavlowitch bamboozled intellectual France for several years is not amazing. He made it obvious that we often cannot see the difference between an identity that really draws upon the inner resources of a person and one that has been put in place from outside. He has hurt the pride of those who had pretended to be able to distinguish in such matters. It is instructive to see proof that the literary elite can no more judge authenticity than the rest of us. The call for action has always been accompanied by sophism—by the trick of pretending to do oneself what one is merely stealing from others. The persona that places a claim upon us can be false, and our response can be trumped up. And as Gary-

Ajar demonstrates, to become a master of speech can make merely human words seem paltry.

This combination of speech-identity-action describes a dynamic that I believe belongs in education. But it offers few certainties or guidelines. One can go mad in consequence of being utterly overwhelmed by what others want, but also by creating, as well as destroying, the flow of demands. There is no safety in lived speech. Its claims are ambiguous. Without them, action is impossible; with them, action can be falsified or become insanity. Words are relevant, and learning is a genuine social-human event, only if they make demands. To learn to man machines, manipulate technology, or carry out set procedures is not to enter into any human contact, or to do anything that is particularly human. Only in the interaction of purposes do men define their intentions and show their desires, plans, and hopes. This process defines the social realm where a specifically human element is defined and made possible, rather than mere necessity, or laboring. Mere consumerism does not demand the sort of action that the lived word causes to occur. Only if we are called upon to act by our teachers does learning become an occurrence. But if that call is made, it immediately forces us to abandon formal discussion of the educational process and to give answers to what we are asked to do. The structural analysis is passed over, specific decisions concerning the here and now become necessary. We enter into a constant process of defining what is demanded of us and how we respond to it. We become a part of a specific, historically individual situation. Teaching and learning clearly become a situation where something is happening.

c. Cultural Event

The cultural content of schooling takes specific historical forms; it is not universal or permanent. What is taught seems shirked and even despised in educational literature. Education as: 'What is worth knowing and why?' is an axiological investigation into human knowledge and abilities. Educational research has not been deeply informed by this issue. To make use of the Aristotelian terminology, a *techne* of pedagogics is developed; guidelines for educational professionals are created; but a self-consciousness of teaching gets neglected. Teaching is discussed as pure method, divorced from any content. What is actually learned, the ideas, is forgotten. General rules for lecturing are developed totally irrespective of the subject matter. Education is studied as a value free enterprise, where rational and efficient behavior must be developed. There is a total loss of a specific historical-cultural goal or consciousness. For me education cannot be a 'science' because learning is essentially ethical—what we want to see internalized is the style of Being, the values in social existence, which we support. In the conflict between mere methods and a humanistic cultural norm, two conflicting concepts of modern man compete. My appraisal of what teaching is , and social science can be, is far from being generally acceptable. It may be that the Dutch faith in science is especially pronounced, but is often taken to be self-evident that a Popperian methodology is to be preferred above all alternatives. The older traditions of German humanism, or philosophical investigation, are now treated with contempt. Furthermore, escape into 'common sense' won't, in my opinion, be better than science. Because everyone has been to school there exists a mistaken belief that everyone also knows what teaching and learning are. The experience we each have had of school dies; the

situation ceases to be there and we nolonger dispose of an accurate knowledge of what it was. Proust has instructed us in the problem of what remains accessible in our lives. The experience of learning remains a mystery to the educational literature; it simply is not reported. Learning gets lost on a preconscious level, where the fact that everybody has had 'experience' of it suffices. Developmental psychology tells us what we can expect of children at a certain age; education textbooks tell us exactly what to do in the classroom; the sociology of education informs us what the effects of social class will be on pupils: nobody, and nothing, tells us what learning is. The science of education limits itself to 'how to . . .', avoiding the philosophical question of the relationship between human consciousness and circumstance. I begin the following discussion with a dialogue, where the difference between the scientific viewpoint and the hermeneutic one is thrashed out. I continue by indicating which pedagogic literature has of late shown interests in the specific historical-cultural consciousness of schooling. And I conclude with a description of the dominant intellectual trends, that seem especially important for teaching.

i. the dialogue

INSTRUCTOR: The sources you are using are all unscientific. What books do you have on the table there? Hannah Arendt, Edgar Morin, and Hans-George Gadamer—none of which have anything to do with the substance of schools or education.
MYSELF: I readily admit that they are not scientific researchers in the sense that they pose a hypothesis and then through experimentation claim to validify their thesis. But that is no limit upon their value to me.
INSTRUCTOR: But someone like Gadamer would plunge us back into religiosity. Give the authority of the Bible its strength back and our schools would be as dogmatic and moralistic as ever. It would be an end to all the 'freedom' you seem to defend.
MYSELF: You introduce two themes: the authority of Gadamer's text and the significance of 'freedom' in my work. Let me first speak of Gadamer. He's important to me because of the emphasis he places on undogmatic thinking. It is precisely in his concept of questioning that I find the crux of his hermeneutic approach. He argues that to learn is to be able to do something with what one has studied. Application is the word he gives to action. The purpose of knowledge is to govern action: this unity of knowing and doing is application. Without it, there is nothing really learned, nothing has happened.
INSTRUCTOR: So we abandon objectivity and throw ourselves into action: a fine defense of irrationalism, and a good back door by which to reintroduce faith and rosaries!
MYSELF: I think your fear of conservative religiosity is misplaced. Objectivity does not, I believe, give any guarantee against irrationalism. Quite the opposite. It is itself a form of magical thinking. What happens when we try to lose our self-consciousness and to become 'objective'? If you are objective towards me, do you not withhold yourself? You will, perhaps, be correct to me—consistency demands as much. But you will not deeply react to me. Your concern is mentalistic: to know me as if I were a predictable, logical, structured entity that can be read much as one reads a blueprint. You will search for the principles of my behavior, for the repetitions of reaction, for the structure of my social-intellectual being. To see all that, you must refuse all interaction with me, you must not get involved in my speech, emotions, or world. If you have

something to do with me, you will lose your distance, and no longer be able to study me objectively. So what happens: you enter into a war with me. You try to reduce me to an object of your understanding, just as Sartre delighted in describing. You become the threatening 'other' who wants to destroy my self-consciousness and to assert his own concept of me. You become a force that actively threatens my freedom. I have to fight, in order not to be the idea you have of me. I struggle to assert, or at least protect, my subjectivity, perhaps by reducing *you* to an idea, formulating a schema of *your* personality. And moreover, I would be justified, for you treated me abstractly, you judged, you created no discussion or contact of any worth. You renounced concern. Whatever moralistic credo you used to justify your contact with me, the contact itself was cold, inhuman, and destructive. The tacked-on utopianism or idealism was merely formal. All the data you collect from an 'objective stance' will always remain a mirror of the violence you have done to human contact. It is partial, colored by your refusal to care, to show a shared human spirit.

INSTRUCTOR: Your flowering of subjectivity solves nothing. It will only lead to the endless repeating of prejudices, accompanied by unstructured, chaotic claims.

MYSELF: I am not arguing for subjectivity—the Janus face of objectivity is just as mentalistic and closed in upon itself as was the other side. But I have not yet explained what is so undogmatic in Gadamer, or thereby indicated what is not objective and also not mentalist. I think the same basic matter has had several interrelated names in recent thinking: *Dasein, Lebenswelt,* and experience. The last of these is the most familiar to educators, thanks to John Dewey's work. Gadamer also makes use of it, though *Dasein* is also mentioned. Gadamer has as a goal for consciousness the openess that is a readiness for experience. To experience is to be surprised; if everything goes on routinely, nothing catches our attention, and we experience nothing. To experience is to react to the unexpected, to be involved in what catches us unawares. Objectivity does quite the opposite. It makes existence predictable; nothing falls outside the pattern, science is the dead end of experience. Luckily for the human spirit so-called pure research is just as playful and adventuresome as can be. It is not the province of perfect forecasting, but the universe of unexpected and even unwanted discoveries. Objectivity I translate to mean: one attitude, or approach, to events that must be perfectly adequate to every situation. Experience happens when the response we have attempted, or given unawares, fails us. We do not know how to react, we have to become a new response. To be open to these events is to let things happen to us. In objectivity we try and switch ourselves off, and to find a fashion of working where nothing at all can occur to us. Without experiences, all thinking will become dead, sterile, and scholastic. What keeps the motor of human consciousness running is that experiences constantly occur, and generate ever new questions. Each situation poses its own question: the dilemma that it has thrust upon us, which we must respond to somehow. Just as long as we let existence be problematic for us, we can count on a limitless supply of new challenges and questions. Objective science has, within itself, no source of new questions. It becomes the pure technique of perfecting the issues that are already there. Only if we let new situations overtake us do we possess the openness that permits experience, and that is the crux to being able to pose new questions. Finding answers is much less crucial than formulating what is to be known, what is it really worthwhile to pursue.

INSTRUCTOR: Openness is fine and dandy—but I read poets for new sensations and extraordinary or spectacular developments in consciousness. Your writers claim not to be poets, but to tell the 'truth', and all their speculation does not earn them any right to that claim.

MYSELF: What is meant here by 'truth'? If we mean mere prediction, obviously Gadamer finds it of limited value. After all, we are not discussing the history of technology; we have limited ourselves to the social sphere; to man's experience of the human, whether through direct contact or indirectly by means of artifacts. The problem is to understand the significance of what one finds: a process wherein an interaction must take place between the claim the other makes on one and ourselves. Science seeks an identity of consciousness and the object: it claims to know what the object is—to have reduced the object to knowledge, preferably to abstract mental symbols such as in mathematics. Gadamer never seeks to transcend consciousness; he remains loyal to the interaction and the interrelationship. Science must be the knowledge of the unchangeable; hermeneutics is precisely a process of knowing change. This is why science can be learned by anybody. It produces a knowledge acquired by an observer, standing apart from the situation: he is not directly affected by what he sees; he is not the subject of a demand to react. The demand upon him is limited.

INSTRUCTOR: But he learns something! A poetic education will form a generation of nincompoops.

MYSELF: I acknowledge that schooling has been much more effective in transferring scientific knowledge than in inducing a knowledge of man. It is clear that we can bring each succeeding generation efficiently and reasonably rapidly to the point that it has command of the most important results of scientific thinking. We can speak of a cumulative growth in scientific knowledge. But there is no parallel development in our knowledge of man. In politics or ethics there is clear-cut progress neither in theory nor in daily practice. But is this a reason to choose for more science in our schools? The failure of human wisdom to be effectively learned in school is already glaring. Students are not wise; they are cognitively developed. The problem is that the two do not necessarily inform each other. I accept that the increasing scores on I.Q. tests and similar indicators demonstrate that there has been a growth in cognitive ability. That is what schooling has achieved. But it is equally clear that the ability to think rationally about mathematical or other purely abstract problems does not have to help the social process at all. The transferrence of knowledge from pure cognitive ability to self-understanding or appreciaton of others is neither necessary nor apparent.

INSTRUCTOR: I protest. Consider the following situation. A psychologist works in a clinic. Social workers call upon him with people whom they claim to be demented and who need immediate hospitalization. But places are limited and one's responsibility to the patients demands that one knows what one is doing. Since recently, the hospital has a test that one can administer to prospective patients, whereby it becomes clear how severe their condition really is. A group of scientists has got together and checked all the results of working with the insane. They have researched what exact developments have to take place before dementia is present. Now the psychologists can exactly and responsibly make distinctions and respond to the patients with certainty.

MYSELF: Firstly, I must protest, in turn that your psychologist does not 'respond' at all—he hides behind the test, thereby avoiding all personal responsibility. I understand that the test may be accurate, and in practice valuable. But I note that all the patients who fall outside the exact pigeon hole are thrown back upon the social worker, who has no answer to their problems. Scientifically, there may be no dementia present, but any serious contact with the people may reveal that they really are out of place at home. But the psychologist works at a hospital where this, that, and the other problem are not treated, so he's washed his hands of problem patients. I understand the value of the

test, but I do not understand the uncaring attitude that I think you've attributed to the psychologist. Your psychologist is a sort of warden who decides who will be shut up. The quality of human contact in this contact escapes me.
INSTRUCTOR: (somewhat agitated) What do the patients get from your 'contact'? They and the families are best served by a correct decision. Weeks of contacts would not result in as good a choice of what is to be done. You want everybody to be confidants, but all that endless chatter will only result in poor decisions and lots of window dressing for incompetency: anybody can jabber away.
MYSELF: I repeat that I recognize the practical value of the test. I merely want you to admit that it works at the cost of making all direct experiencing of people irrelevant. There's no mutuality in the test.
INSTRUCTOR: The researchers who developed that test paid much better attention to the insane than all your talkers would. Endless discussion that leads nowhere, it is mere camouflage for ignorance, and is valueless. To confront a problem is not to talk at it; is to invesitgate it. The problem is to break through the wall of vagueness. All the humanists have marvelous stories about their meetings with their patients, but that's a myth without value. The experiences of each other mask mere prejudices. Your psychologists remain uncritical of themselves, thanks to their fine-sounding experiences. The job that is to be done is not to glorify ourselves, but to offer an effective reaction to a patient's problem. Perhaps, though I doubt it, your ideas would lead to the spiritual growth of the psychologist. Nonetheless, it remains window dressing for irresponsible therapy. Your whole argument amounts to a defense of the isolated psychologist who lets no one investigate what he does, and refuses to systematize his work or let it be compared with that of others. Everyone their own little sham.
MYSELF: You are glorifying technique. The problem you indicate is real, but you are using a genuine quandary to defend an exaggerated role for technique. The problem is that man does not dispose of himself. The idea we have of an object we are going to make, say a chair, is of a different quality from the knowledge we can have of a fellow man. The object we make exists already as a plan before it is made. The question, to quote Gadamer, is 'should man learn to make himself what he is to be, in the same way that the craftsman learns to make what is to be according to his plan and will?' *(Gadamer, 1975,* p. 281). This is pretty much what happens with insane people. They are no longer effective agents; they no longer manifest themselves as the true center to their own world. But would you want to extend your methodology? Should youths who have problems making contacts with the opposite sex also be tested; should children in primary school be tested for their learning potential, and most important, if so, what should we DO with the results? Should we force young people into contact with one another? Should we make the child be a successful student?
INSTRUCTOR: You speak as if social processes were not working constantly. Does the individual youth personally really love disco, hash, Maoism or whatever other fads occur about him? Does he even stop to make an individual assessment? Testing confronts the individual with what he could do; it doesn't reduce choices, it increases them. We cannot force anyone to be a success, but we can make it clear, that someone has the potential to do much better than they are doing. That can lead them to think about themselves.
MYSELF: Your example does your cause a disservice. The testing of the demented patients took place without any reciprocity. The tested patient had nothing to say, had no voice, will, or personality; the tester determined the patient's future. It is fine to claim

that tests will be used to stimulate reflection and choice, but you must demonstrate that it really occurs. Furthermore, who chooses what the tests will make obvious? When we make someone conscious of a particular capacity they might be able to develop, we influence them. Not every possibility is made explicit, only those that the tests are made to respond to. Who makes the decisions, and upon what basis, to highlight certain variables?

INSTRUCTOR: The fear of influencing people is misplaced. The social scientist is always more responsible, thanks to his objectivity, than is the 'man on the street'. Never forget that the testing of children freed them from the prejudices of primary school teachers. Today children are much less the victims of the snobbishness and whims of teachers, thanks to the objective tests. If the results of higher education were to be opened up to genuine scientific research, it could be made clear who is doing his job and who is not. The results in the college and university systems are scandalously poor. The number of drop-outs is notoriously high (40 percent failed to take a university degree in the class of 1964-65), and the studies fantastically long (almost always seven years for an M.A.). And in the social sciences, where one ought to understand what one's doing, the results are frightening (in 1965, only 30 percent of males and 22 percent of females completed the course, and that took an average of seven-and-one-quarter years). Higher education costs a lot of money; mustn't it be made more efficient? And how can one do anything about this scandal? Only by researching what the causes of failure are.

MYSELF: I couldn't agree more. There's a growing literature of protest. H. Vuisjes's *Nieuwe Vrijgestelden* (New Exempted), Hermans' *Onder Professoren* (Among Professors), and articles by Maurice Punch and Derrik Philips all shout their heads off about the poor results of contemporary higher education. But what sort of analysis do they offer: the students are too shallow and do not want to work; individuality is insufficiently developed in the culture to permit serious intellectual work; a spirit of compromise and conformity bans all real discussion or differences of viewpoint. The whole society, its culture and history, is condemned. Not a very practical hypothesis, especially if one is really interested in bettering matters. Your faith that any question can be researched troubles me. Of course there are taboos and privileged positions that block investigation. Colleges and universities are not compared systematically. Teaching is not evaluated very effectively. And standards of workmanship—student theses and staff articles—are not attended to. Put bluntly, the higer educational system is probably not first and foremost a quality system. But are high competition, elitist systems better in their long-term results? Is the search for excellence always a self-evident goal? How can one evaluate such matters. These are not simple categories that one can test for; they are social-political-ethical issues, in which every social scientist takes part. For such issues, there is no objectivity possible; you cannot place yourself outside your own profession, schooling, and work.

INSTRUCTOR: You are defending the status quo in teaching. The refusal to analyze teaching does nothing else than protect established prejudices and ineffective work.

MYSELF: I would be the last to praise contemporary standards of teaching. But I remain convinced that the self-consciousness of the teacher needs to be developed, more than some technique (of teaching methods) needs to be implemented. All the criticisms that have been made of teaching have more to do with the self-identity of those involved than with any question of rhetoricism or purely formal matters. However primitive they may be, the criticisms are all efforts at cultural criticism, and that spontaneous reaction seems just to me. The crisis, is in what we want education to

achieve and not in its practical ability to carry out the orders. Only once we've clarified the question of what we really want universities and colleges to achieve can we fruitfully study specifies. What we get now are global accusations that higher education does not deliver the goods, without any real reflection on what objectives should prevail. The symptoms indicating that the schools are sick are there: too many failures; courses take too long; there are too many testimonials from graduates that they did not have to work or concentrate to earn their diplomas. But these are mere symptoms. The most important step has to be taken: the question has to be formulated that will challenge us to define, and probably redefine, the use of knowledge that we choose. As long as the historical and ethical value of knowing is not thought through, there will be no self-conscious response to the crisis in higher education. Of course, the crisis may disappear because of other reasons, such as new economic or political circumstances, without the academy responding to the malaise that now exists. These are historical questions: which answer will be given to this specific, unique situation. The issue is not generalizable, categorizable, or to be investigated 'scientifically'. No general universal law is to be found. At issue is our use of knowledge and the content of understanding in this society now. What is needed is not objectivity but direct involvement. We are the problem; how we react to our work and situation is what is at stake. Our own way of thinking is central. We cannot remove ourselves from the intellectual crisis and pretend that it has nothing to do with us. There is something wrong in how we think, in what we do. It's our own world that is sick, and that threatens to become lifeless, sterile, and merely formalistic. Techniques of teaching are useful, but the problem is more profound. The universities and colleges are uninterested in their own content; neither staff nor students are gripped by what is taught, discussed, or read. Didactic tricks cannot answer to the collapse of involvement. The proposition that the less the students care, the more educational finesse we need is silly. Audiovisual presentations, self-work groups, or whatever innovation in form will not answer to the loosening grip of the content upon the academic community. The problem is in the relationship between the ideas and the people, in what they most spontaneously want and can make of consciousness.

ii. the literature

It would be misleading, of course, to suggest that the cult of technique has attained a status exempt from criticism, or that other strains of educational thought do not exist. A number of critics locate contemporary problems in schooling more in a cultural crisis than in insufficiently developed educational techniques. Several books stemming from this conviction, all admittedly with a conservative bent, have recently been quite popular: in France Paul Guth's *Lettre ouverte aux futurs illetre's* and Benoist's *La Génération sacrifée,* and in America, Christopher Lasch's *The Culture of Narcissism* (the political implication of this book are variously interpreted) and Philip Rieff's *Fellow Teachers.* In England, R.S. Peters's work, though less popular, has been very substantial. We note that the *Black Papers,* wherein Peters' influence was even greater than his contribution, criticized reforms in the direction of comprehensive secondary schooling, and were notorious.

Guth, Benoist, and Rieff all admit to a deep pessimism as regards the future of culture and education. They believe that no one and nothing is likely to rescue us from

schools that destroy more than they create. Peters and Lasch believe in the possibility of constructive reform, which makes them somewhat optimistic. There may be a 'crisis' in education, but it is not all that bad; we can do something about it. But, what is to be done, has everything to do with rediscovering or strengthening traditional democratic values.

The pessimism of writers like Guth and Rieff is noteworthy because optimism is so much more typical of educational thinking. Even the de-schoolers of the sixties, who did not value the school as such very much, claimed to embody a counter-culture that could and should educate. Perhaps this optimism comes from the fact that one has to beleive in the future to want to teach. In any case, a certain naivete hangs over education: man's innate goodness is unlimited, his intellectual capacities lie outstretched before us, and his creativity, wisdom, as well as social feeling are just waiting to emerge. This crushing optimism seems misplaced when we look at the crisis in the other social sciences— sociology doubts its methods, psychology seems unable to develop, political science is apparently unable to distinguish itself from social philosphy. The frequent Pollyannaism causes Guth, Benoist, and Rieff, in trying to reverse this tendency, to have become extreme in their negativism. To believe Guth, the schools are destroying France, her memory, and her culture, all great literature is abandoned for a cult of the now. There is nothing permanent or proven in the curriculum, only fads and abstractions. There are no heroes to emulate and no deeds to fascinate one. Respect for the person is neglected, love for the singular and concrete is frustrated. The teacher, who has become a sort of comedian, does not prepare the child for society; he is not the master of a special environment, entrusted with immature beings. The goal of schooling is no longer an entry into a cultural community that has had several centuries of history.

'Patrie' is nearly banned:

> Pourquoi un ministre . . . s'adressant aux éducateurs de son pays n'aurait-il pas le droit d'évoquer la patrie française? Parmi les valeurs à retrouver, vous citez 'le respect d'autrui, la tolérance, la solidarité, la générosité'. . . . Vous voyez bien que vous aviez oublié quelque chose. Encore un petit effort . . . pour ce mot que les Français n'osent plus prononcer et sans lequel, ici, entre ces montagnes, ces rivières, ces mers familières, sous ce ciel délicieux, ils ne retrouvèrent jamais le bonheur. (Guth, 1980, p. 209)
>
> Why shouldn't a minister [of education] addressing himself to educators of his own nation, have the right to evoke the French fatherland? Among the values to be regained, you cite 'the respect of the other, tolerance, solidarity, generosity'. . . . You see quite well that you've forgotten something. A bit more effort . . . for this word, which the French do not dare any longer to pronounce, and without which, here, among these mountains, these rivers, these familiar seas, under this delicious sky, they will never rediscover happiness.

Benoist attacks the same eductional reforms (especially the so-called Haby laws of France) and developments as does Guth, though he provides more information, facts and details.[2] But Benoist formulates his protest not in the name of *'patrie'* but in that of the classical humanistic tradition. The new elites, formed and selected on the basis of mathematics, often prove after graduation to be virtual illiterates.

Their condition is:
le reflet d'un malaise général dans la civilisation, une sorte d'autoprécipitation vers la nuée noire de la mort. Les humanités qui étaient la gratuité et la vie, la philosophie qui illustrait la détour réflexif et assurait ce quie Bachelard nomme 'le droit de rêver', constituaient des pôled de désordre et ressortissaient au monde d'un Désir, d'un Eros joyeux et sur la piste de l'imprévisible. La rationalité technicienne et mathématicienne au contraire, l'inflation des carrières à prétention et langage scientifique, illustrent de leur côté que tout un Occident est en train d'opter pour la pulsion de mort. (Benoist, 1980a, p. 169-70)

> the reflection of a general malaise in civilization, a sort of headlong rush toward the black cloud of death. The humanities, which were spontaneous freedom and life; and philosophy, which illustrated the reflexive detour and assured what Bachelard called 'the right to dream', constituted poles of disorder and arose in the world from a Desire, from a joyful Eros heading for the unforeseeable. On the other hand, technical and mathematical rationality, the inflation of careers with scientific pretentions and language, illustrate from their side a whole West opting for the death wish.

Benoist dwells upon the paradoxical effects of measures supposedly egalitarian. Because 'correct' French is no longer demanded, the privileged learn 'good' French at home and the rest are left to fend for themselves. It was the old regime, in fact, that equalized; the new lets the differences be. Also, thanks to the new, mathematically oriented curriculum, only the small minority of children with a rich cultural atmosphere at home will be initiated into French literature and history: the rest will remain totally ignorant of such matters. Again, because previously required subjects have become 'optional', only a small group—under the influence, most likely, of their parents—will take drawing, philosophy, or classical languages in their last years of high school.

Rieff believes that American culture is developing in the direction of the abolition of all restraints, so that the individual is becoming merely the chaotic center of drives and tensions. Nothing commands or forbids. He argues that, in fact, 'interdicts' are the heart of culture, and that to avoid barbarism we need the interdictory:

> If we are aware of our repressions, then we are not repressed. If we are not obedient to the interdicts, then we are not cultured. It is from the interdicts that repressions gather their energy; only then can repressions subserve interdicts. Interdicts are the primary forms of high culture. . . . (Rieff, 1973, p. 69)

When interdicts fail, there is no inhibition, only a sensational now. History has always persisted as authority, as truths to be obeyed. Modern man, the first to break all links to the past, is the first barbarian. Further, the modern American multiversity is barbarous in that, in it nothing is demanded or forbidden, sacred or necessary. The multiversity is nothing more than an amusement park or a museum. By contrast, authority is the essential property of the true university, and the role of the true scholar is to define the basic interdicts that are the foundation of society.

For Rieff, a neo-orthodoxy based on traditional interdicts, is the only possible counter to barbarism. This places him in the conservative camp with Guth and Benoist. But the conservatism of all these writers ultimately undermines their social analysis. Thus Guth, speaking of the loss of the sense of *la patrie,* speaks the language of conservatism, but the loss has taken place in a country which was governed, for more than

twenty years, by the Right. And Rieff's call for neo-orthodoxy, although Anglo-Saxon politics have been dominated by such ideas, seems counter-productive, given the difficulty 'neo' movements have had in establishing real links with the past. Typically, such movements have defined no genuine tradition, and have merely imposed yet another absolute but now with an anti-intellectual brutishness. They have often led to just the sort of unconscious violence that Rieff dreads.

The value of these conservative critics is that they all understand that the loss of historical-cultural consciousness is taking place. Leftist critics, despite Marxism's historicism, have been less sensitive to this development. Instead, they have tended to hate culture as elitist. Rather than value it as a form of historical consciousness. Certainly, the social democrats support popular education: schools that mirror the mentality of the working class. Learning that is not immediately accessible or understandable finds little support. Pure research, humanistic speculation, or artistic experimentation are all looked upon as suspect luxuries. Direct results are what schooling should produce. French conservative pragmaticism is not ideologically all that different from the attitudes of Dutch social democracy.

As has been said, the English case is a special one. Peters strikes an optimistic note because he not only believes that the liberal parliamentary system presented in the ideological sphere of the fifties is the most rational social order possible, but that it is still available, along with the type of education that prepares people to live in such a system. In a United Kingdom where violent race riots have become the norm, and groups of marauding young fascists—among others—play a prominent role, his 'optimism' can be quickly discounted. The pessimism of the Frenchmen and Rieff seems more appropriate. But Peters' argument for traditional education is unlike the arguments of the pessimists in its appeal to intrinsic values, and that makes Peters worthy of consideration. The pessimists argue the need for historical insight and cultural sensitivity on utilitarian grounds, as a counter to the violence and political chaos that are the results of a memoryless society unable to understand itself. But either one must make a hierarchy of utilitarianisms, a thankless task, or indicate other reasons for preferring a certain sort of education. Guth, Benoist, and Rieff all attack the pragmatism of current tendencies without defining a different criteria for judgment. Peters' article, 'The Justification of Education', by contrast, challenges the utilitarian sensibility, He says:

> . . . our concept of an educated person is of someone who is capable of delighting in a variety of pursuits and projects for their own sake and whose pursuit of them and general conduct of his life is transformed by some degree of all round understanding and sensitivity.
>
> (Peters, 1977, p. 13)

When I first read this, I wast impressed and intrigued, because it seemed to be free of the concealed motives of social engineering that vitiate most educational theory. But as I read more Peters, I realized that both his philosophy, which was of the analytical kind, with its roots in eighteenth-century British empiricism, and his politics, which were, if not Tory, at least elitist, contradicted his pedagogics.

True, his *justification* for the perpetuation of the public school system is not elitist or classist. He merely says, 'it would be criminal folly to dismantle a system of education (the public schools) which contributes and has contributed so much to the quality of education in England' (Peters, 1966, p. 206). But his politics come

out elsewhere. He is convinced that English political institutions are much freer and more liberal than French or German ones, and that the Anglo-American 'democratic way of life' is more reasonable and less violent than that of everybody else. He justifies the firing of communists from grade school teaching positions for political reasons *(Peters, 1966,* pp. 313, 299, and 204). His liberalism is obviously highly selective: teachers, students, and local officials together are imcompetent to make decisions independently about curriculum; they either need the central government to decide for them as now, or the universities, as he proposes *(Peters, 1977,* p. 93). He is for democracy, but has a restrictive idea of decision making which he defined as follows:

> 'It must, in the end, represent the view of the 20 percent means. This is particularly true nowadays, when estimates of government policy depen upon an understanding of economics which is beyond the reach of most, and of military and diplomatic secrets that no responsible government would ever divulge in public. If democracies appear to work it is only because the *élite* are not too much hampered by having to make concessions to uninformed prejudices' *(Peters, 1966, p. 304).*

I am not criticizing Peters because he is not a true democrat. I attack him for his inconsistency. This is because his elitist politics reveal such a pessimism about the intellectual capacity of mankind, while his educational vision is so strirringly optimistic. Speaking as an educational optimists, he is pure sweetness and light. Grade school teachers are to gain knowledge and a true field of understanding. To teach, one needs to have tasted the pure love of study and genuine learning for its own sake. A deep sense of excitement and intellectual involvement is necessary throughout schooling. Merely learning for extrinsic goals, such as money, career, or status is inadequate; an education humanly equal to the task asks 'why do this, rather than that' and finds answers. To be educated is to deeply care about something—to achieve involvement with the world, to never need be bored, to be inspired to investigate, and to be struck by the interconnections between one's own interest and all other knowledge. True education involves '(a) commitment to intrinsic values, (b) knowledge and understanding, and (c) ''wholeness''' *(Peters, 1977,).* Yet how this ambitious and rich program is supposed to filter down to the grade schools, and thus to the whole population, while democracy is reserved for a twenty percent elite, is incomprehensible to me. Either the educational goals are unrealistically high and/or the political reservations are indefensible.

As a philosopher, Peters is similarly at odds with himself. In the style of British empiricism, he is utterly anti-utopian: his goal is to base his definition of what ought to be upon what is. He looks for philosophical justification in the observable human situation:

> . . . though philosophy can indicate how fundamental ethical principles involved in education might be justified, such principles cannot be determinately applied without a concept of man. . . .The fundamental task, therefore, that remains to be tackled by those who wish to advance both educational and political theory is to get down to work on the philosophy of mind in conjunction with psychologists, social scientists, historians, and men of wide practical experience and shrewd judgement. The time has passed when philosophers could . . . spin theories of human nature out of their own observations and introspection.
>
> *(Peters, 1966,* p. 234)

But any theorizing about 'mind' is perforce about 'man'—about the general human condition—and has little to do with elitist distinctions within mankind, much less within England. Further, his ethical theories, which are the basis of his educational ideas, are based on an empiricist theory of mind, and on an idea of generally 'human' behavior that has little to do with the distinction between twenty percent and all the rest. And finally, his ethics involve a fundamental refusal to consider first principles. He states that actions, though directed to ends, also conform to social standards or conventions. They are thus rule-following (the social element) as well as purposive (the goals). He says, 'Explanations of the purposive rule-following type occupy a sort of logical ceiling in explaining human actions. They cannot be *deduced* from more general postulates. . . .' (Peters, 1969, p. 150). But one wants to know *why* someone chooses for education or training, and also why whole school systems, or societies, make or should make such choices. Peters' analytical philosophy made it impossible for him to answer. How can one affirm that what is needed in education is to 'have an attitude of care', *(Peters, 1973,* p. 264) when the'concatenation of general empirical conditions' *(Peters, 1966,* p. 174) remains the only basis for understanding.

While I am not alone, thus, in objecting to the cult of technique, Peters' appeal to a formal empiricism, without the backing of actual direct observation, is disappointing. If some students, or teachers, *don't* prefer Peters' sort of traditional education, what objection could he make? What real argument could he make?

The conservative critics I examined all—ironically—share the utilitarianism of the technocrats they despise. They argue for the need for historical insight and cultural sensitivity, but as a counter to violence and political chaos rather than for their own sake. They see civilization disintegrating, and call on traditional educational values to prop it up, begging the question of the intrinsic soundness, or real meaning, of those values. An idea of education that 'stands on its own merits', and develops its meaning without having to be subsumed under a theory of social control still has to be articulated. The critics damn the lack of axiological concern found in technocratic literature, but posit their own ethical ideas just as unreflectively as do their opponents.

iii. dominant intellectual trends

The crisis in undergraduate education to which I have been a witness did not begin recently. The problems discussed in this study are inherent to 'social naturalism': to the modern intellectual's claim to empiricism and political power. When metaphysics ceased to underpin all serious thinking, the difference between what 'is' and what 'ought to be' lost significance. All social decision making became some sort of *Realpolitik*. One had to know what was, and what could be achieved. Both questions could be answered with the statistical methods of the social sciences. Quantitative information and pragmaticism joined forces. The intellectual who 'knew' the most about society (having studied the economic situation and social attitudes of the population) could best decide what ought to be done.

In reality, the masses often took events out of the hands of the intellectuals and imposed irrational solutions that no positivist would have proposed. A rational politics that researched the situation and the needs of the population, in order to rigorously run the state upon that basis has never, or almost never, existed. Unforeseen events, such as

new technological breakthroughs, foreign interference, or fickle changes of mind by the population make 'social rationalism' very ineffective. Nonetheless, the myth of a purely reasonable, rational political system with hardheaded statisticians running things persists. Despite the barbarism of the Second World War, and the total failure of reason to forestall the savagery, the old Enlightenment dream was reimposed. What I must assert is that history is not rational and that the intellectual does not have a privileged relationship to it. My thesis is that the school I have depicted took part in a very widespread movement—most easily identified with the date 1968—wherein social rationalism was reinterpreted, reintroduced, and strengthened under the name 'democratization'.

The actual democratization did not take place in 1968, but somewhat later. The Dutch student protest movement had lagged behind. But it was dramatically successful:

> The Dutch elite reacted swiftly. The occupation by students of the Maagdenhuis the administrative center of the University of Amsterdam in 1969 was treated as though western society was in imminent danger of collapse. The student movement, one of the weakest and most uncoordinated in Europe at the national level, achieved a startling victory when parliament virtually gave in to most of their demands for a radical restructuring of the universities. The W.U.B. 'Wet Universitaire Bestuurshervorming' or 'Law for Reforming the Governance of the University' of 1970 gave speedy parliamentary approval for a relatively advanced democratic structure in higher education. . . . The Dutch . . . decided to give everyone a bit of the action. The institutes (departments) were broken down into 'vakgroepen' (subject areas) with their own democratic structure of committees on which students, non-tenured staff, and non-academic staff were represented. (M. Punch, 1981, p. 10)

It is to be expected that a political movement will present its own objectives idealistically, claiming to be in the interst of mankind, society, history, and/or progress. Futhermore, it cannot be assumed that the so-called leaders understand what they are doing, or why, themselves. In a revealing interview with Austrian television in 1978, Rudi Dutschke and Daniel Cohn-Bendit made it clear that their ability to analyze political tendencies was not exceptional. Every prediction they made has turned out to be wrong. (They thought that the ecology movement was about to make a breakthrough and to become the central factor in French and German progressive politics.) I do not believe that we have to go back and resurrect the rhetoric of the late sixties or early seventies. But a short sample cannot do all too much harm:

> Social sciences, in order to be scientific, must be based on the Marxist view of society and on Marxist scientific theory; dialectical materialism is not only the science of and for the proletariat, but it is also the only valid general science of society. The right kind of social science must be partisan on behalf of the class which in a particular historical situation represents universal human progress, and this class at present happens to be the working class. The right kind of political science, according to the 'critical' political science journal 'Paradogma' is pursued in the Netherlands by Machiavelli (a student organization in Political Science, University of Amsterdam) and its equivalents. . . . Their crucial task is to involve themselves in the educational struggle and to make education totally responsive to the needs of the worker's movement. . . . our goal is a political science which puts the problems of the working class in the foreground and can

be used to support the struggle of all the progressive and revolutionary forces; this kind of political science must establish direct contacts with the workers to the extent that these contacts offer appropriate progressive and revolutionary perspectives. The 'other' kind of political science, typified by American behaviorism, merely aims at developing insights into human behavior so as to manage control of that behavior for purposes of preserving the capitalist political system. . . . Machiavelli . . . boasts of its close connection with the communist student organization which dominates student representation on the university wide level.

(Punch, 1981, pp. 21-22)

The democratization of the university produced a very special brand of democrats. From the beginning, democracy was a violent fight for power. What occurred was not discussion, deliberation, and investigation, but factional warfare. Teachers who had been on the wrong side of the struggle to democratize were pushed aside; they were not even worth taking seriously. And the different groups that had supported the changes got down to killing one another off. Where I have worked, a few lecturers who had not supported the movement managed to survive by retreating into part-time programs; the others were forced by social pressure to resign. The victors split into the Left radicals (mostly Maoists) and the communists (with hesitant social democratic supporters). These two groups fought one another until exhaustion set in in 1973-74. Since that time, a myth of the glorious democracy has reigned.

Meanwhile, the college has become centralized, with the staff ('the team') making all decisions. The democracy thus never really did amount to anything. It simply never worked. Either one was fighting for it, fighting in it, or forgetting it. The ideology of democratized education was either the bête noir or the be-all of students for ten years (1969-1979), without ever producing anything more than endless conflicts. 'Democratization' has turned out to be another word for 'conflict'. Obviously the two words do not have the same dictionary meaning, but they have proven equivalent in higher education, not because a one-sided counterattack has dominated the schools, but because the student movement fed on conflict. Just as long as teachers or administrators were willing to fight with the students for influence or decision-making power, there were protesters galore. But when the alternative tactic of inviting the students to all meetings and swamping them with technical information set in, it was all over with. Cooperation almost never took place—the committees remained a dead letter. The 'conflict model', which proposed to change society by making it impossible for traditional authorities to carry out their functions, was propagated. This tactic was very much ad hominem, and not at all structural. The trademark of the 'democracy' was its total inability to make decisions. It was a vengeful tendency specialized in witch hunting. It demanded intellectual conformity: the simplest ideas were the most acceptable. There was an outpouring of hatred for complexity, and nuances, or qualified sentences. The school was politicized: its content resembled election rhetoric more than traditional academic work. That was, I submit, the most essential and lasting significance to the movement. Exaggerated posturing, trumped-up differences, and the spectacle of mass sensation had made their entry into the university. Of course, democracy is often nothing more than semi-intellectual theater for many. But why did this bastard form of politics take over? What did the politicized school propose as content?

Un système d'idées, devenu doctrine et idéologie, se défend de façon logique (rationalisatrice), manichéene (incarnant la vie et le bien contre les forces de mort et du mal) et magique (provoquant l'hystérie hallucinatoire où l'idéologie apparait comme la vrai réalité par opposition à la reálité qui devient illusion et mensonge). . . . Merveille de l'idéoligie: elle peut devenir totalement insensible à l'expérience, aux faits, au réel.

(E. Morin, 1981, p. 109)

A system of ideas that has become doctrinaire and ideological defends itself in a manner that is logical (rationalization), Manichean (incarnating life and good as against the forces of death and evil) and magical (provoking an hallucinatory hysteria, where the ideology seems to be true reality, in contradistinction to reality proper which seems illusory and false). . . . It is a marvel of ideology that it can become utterly insensitive to experience, to facts, to the real.

The 'body of thought' was perfectly closed in upon itself, self-sufficient, and allowing no doubt or uncertainty. Its first quality was the pretension of being empirically proven or true. The method taught claimed to be the only coherent manner of thinking about society and to be the only approach to reveal the truth. Alternatives were thus defined either as incoherent and/or unable to make known what actually exists. The facts spoke for themselves, but there was exclusively one way that they were permitted to speak. The approach called itself 'Marxist', but was never seriously schooled in any tradition. Its content was to see exploitation and a violent conflict between justice and injustice in what occurred about one. Every incident, any sleight to student 'power' revealed fascism. A self-effacing attitude was not the mode. Repression was read into every development and idea. There was only one truth—that of crackdown, policing, denigration. The social assumptions were much more violent than one finds in the American student movement (for instance, as exemplified by the Free Speech Movement in Berkeley) or in the French May 1968 model.

While the working class played a role in the rhetoric of the Dutch student protesters, the actual demands and sensitivity remained limited to the middle class, or higher. The student cause was never a mass movement in Holland as it was in France. And, given the privileged backgrounds of Dutch students, even fewer lower-class children attain higher education than in England or France; the need to become 'working class' resembles 'slumming'. The workers were an idealized clientele: social science was to be put to their service. The basic arrogance—the assumption that a student in his early twenties understood the society, the economy, and the situation of the laborer better than a middle-aged worker—was taken for granted. The students saw themselves as the 'vanguard' of the socialist cause. They knew what was real and what, therefore, should be done. The proletariat was a marionette, which the students could make speak; it had no voice of its own. The use that was made of this construction was very one-sided: not social utopias or intellectual activity, but a justification of conflict and aggression was sought. The logic was to expose violence. As with the R.A.F.[3], where a similar process took a much more extreme form, the tendency was purely negative. The goal was to prepare the attack upon capitalism that would demonstrate the hidden repression and violence of society. The favorite analytical concept was 'repressive tolerance': the powerful protected themselves and masked their plot precisely in their refusal to punish or imprison. If officialdom imposed discipline, the cry of cruelty,

viciousness, injustice arose, and if it did not, the shout was psychological repression and Machiavellian disguise.

While the French rediscovered popular traditions and a spontaneity that transcended the dry rationalism of Left political parties, and the Americans demanded freer discussion and a more pluriform intellectual life, the Dutch attacked free discussion and embraced social hostility. (Though in America, the S.D.S.[4] was just as dogmatic, ineffective, and vindictive as the Dutch movement, and the French Stalinists abhorred the direct emotional approach.) An outburst of excitement and enthusiasm was not, in Holland, something political. Amsterdam did have its permissive milieu, but it was apolitical, or even antipolitical. The communes were more often bohemian collectives, where music and drugs predominated, than political centers. Politics was doctrinaire and good for recriminations. The student movement was rigid, hostile, and craved discipline. Its small base was certainly a cause of the weaknesses. The Provo movement was two-sided; it had a hatred for officialdom but also a love of playfulness. Its choice for creativity and dedication to experimentation got nowhere in the academy. A deadly serious mood of hostility dominated there. Violent negativism predominated. Utopian idealism, so important elsewhere, played a backseat role. The chosen objective was to settle accounts with an aggressor. Who the opponent really was remained unclear: it was called 'the system' or 'capitalism'. Neither was carefully defined. As the workers and students had nothing to do with one another, the claim of the latter to represent the former must have been pure camouflage. To make matters worse, the Dutch working class was just getting around to enjoying its new-won prosperity, and was not at all militant. The unfreedom atrributed to the workers was, in fact, lodged with the students themselves. The ideology censored the reality, letting violent forces emerge without one having to recognize them as one's own. But why did a 'will-for-revenge' have such a deep hold on the students? Once that stance was assumed, it was undiscussable. The students did not, I claim, understand the sources of their own movement. The appeal to repressed aggression was simple, and it worked. The manichean assumptions freed their belligerence. The established decision makers were unspeakably evil. The nation had been fleeced and abused. These assertions were not rational—no discussion of post-war economic policy or academic values was ever possible. The ideology was typified by hypernervousness. Opponents and unexplained events were violently brushed aside. Both were reduced to subreal status, and treated as objects for aggression.

What was real is that the paradigma for intellectual work changed in the late sixties. The prewar model of a Dutch intellectual was largely German. The universities were also organized on the German model. The power of the professors was, thus, enormous. Decentralization was very strong—each institute was a world unto itself. The content of the social sciences was philosophical, reflective, and literary. The model of the Dutch intellectual, old style, was Huizinga. After the war, an antifascist reassertion of humanism took place. A statement of what man could do, be, create was central. The artistic movement COBRA tried to demonstrate that everyone could and should paint; art is a universal need, inherent in man's active sense perception. Phenomenological psychology was a tendency in the social sciences which described what was specifically human; rejecting the 'scientism' which reduced man to mere physical qualities. The leaders, Buytendijk, van den Berg, and Linschoten, gave new life to the prewar humanistic tradition. Man, in his experiential circumstance, ontological uniqueness, and historical dimension, was their subject matter. The

phenomenologists did not so much publish clinical psychology as metapsychology; they were anthropological investigators who sought to clarify what human consiciousness was, how it functioned, and the manner in which it was possible to describe it.

In education, the German tradition clearly dominated. Litt and Nohl are two dominant figures. The question 'Fuhren oder Wachsenlassen' attracted much attention: should one lead the child or let him grow? Langeveld was a Dutch professor of education who towered over most of his colleagues. His 'verstehende phänomologie' was ethical and normative. The central issue was to learn to know the child. American school-directed education played a small role, the general reflection on growing up and on the special pedagogical relationship between adult and child received much more attention. The question is why did these traditions collapse—today there is almost nothing left of them; they are ridiculed and arrogantly dismissed by academia. They are often not even studied as a historical phenomenon representative of a past period. The break is between people who grew up before the war and those who grew up after it. Just after the war is appeared that philosophical humanism would not only reassert itself, but would be able to renew itself and make significant new discoveries. But the first generation which was bred after the war rejected the old tradition when it arrived at the University. Thus, in the late sixties the post-war paradigma appeared. The 'new' form of thought demanded direct results, practical reformism, and an instrumentalist attitude to knowledge. The notion of an objective truth drove out the idea of a humanly earned and created insight. The subject lost his central epistemological position to abstracter entities, such as science, society, or history. In the absence of monographs on contemporary Dutch intellectual and/or cultural history, it is nearly impossible to try and specify what occurred. But a general trend is evident: knowledge was no longer made by people, but was to be found. The epistemological presuppostions shifted: space, time, and causality lost their problematic quality and were once again accepted as self-evident certainties. The acitivity of human thought disappeared as a problem; man was no longer thrown back upon himself, full of doubt about his ability and will to knowledge. The 'new' thinker was arrogantly self-confident and certain that self-skepticism was an excuse for supporting the political status quo. The greatest fear was no longer for intellectual arrogance but for practical ineffectiveness. The mind-matter duality was reasserted with a renewed strength: of the two levels of existence, matter (the level of things) predominates over mind (the level of experience). The former, is also, society and government; while emotion and artistic work belong to the latter. Public event is crucial, private experience is less relevant. Objective truth is to be pursued, individual consciousness is helpless. Why did the post-war generation have no faith in specific, subjective, thinking? And why did it trust trans-individual logic? 'Values' are asserted to be epiphenomenal and undiscussable; 'science' it is claimed, is necessary and absolute. The reversal from a philosphical humanism to a scientific pragmatism was sudden, thorough, and nearly universal. I am unable to present a satisfactory theory of why it occurred.

The sociologists have argued that the social patterns have changed: religion has lost much of its significance, the old divisions into Catholic, Protestant, Liberal, and Socialist have become more fluid. Ideological respectability has changed in a complementary manner. The Christian humanism that long predominated has made way for a crude utilitarianism. It is impossible to say whether the few genuinely reflective thinkers have become even scarcer—whether the small minority willing to study sources and make up their own minds has shrunk. A large gray mass of half-educted people,

whose opinions are uninformed, has emerged. This group demands short cuts, easy solutions, and simple thinking. It has been mis-educated in the social sciences and has eyes only for pragmatic, successful solutions. Its sole question is 'What do I have to gain from that?' This group sets the tone of daily political—and hence cultural-life. The question is not necessarily simply egoistic—the goals are very often collective. But the means/use thought pattern (which means can I use to most efficiently achieve the goal?) does not interest itself in further ramifications or philosophical niceties. The goals are brutally simple: women must be free; capitalism must die; education is for personal growth, not achievement. None of the crucial terms is defined, no implications are understood, crude thinking predominates. The intellectuals have not, and do not try to fulfill their task of defining the most controversial terms of popular discussion. What the French have called the 'BOF-generation'—the sensibility of the profiteer—has done well. Causes flourish as personal hobbyhorses. A certain social veneer is maintained, but the underlying logic of self-interest, narrowly defined, is preeminent. Feminism, anti-capitalism, and radical education are all supported just as long as one has an immediate gain thereby.

Direct psychic profit is a prerequisite to a cause attracting attention. A general, 'uninterested' investment in the human spirit is not forthcoming. Books are read and research is done to meet direct concrete objectives, not to develop a breadth of insight or a sensitivity of feeling. A restrictive materialism, where the direct needs and desires of the person are the sole recognized motivation, prevails; some leftists may applaud this logic of self-interest, but Dutch socialism has had its most creative moments when it has expressed a generosity of feeling and of human involvement. Pannekoek, the only Dutch socialist theoretician to have achieved an international audience, debunked narrow materialism and insisted upon the value of all cultural creation for mankind. He insisted that human activity developed in interaction with thought: what man thinks informs what he does, and vice versa.

Contemporary popular culture assumes that intellectual interests are an extreme, and suspect, luxury. In the midst of extraordinary wealth, it is assumed that man is so wracked by scarcity that he has no room for impractical learning. Symbolic cultural material falls into abuse; only what is 'useful' is prized. The dominant cultural paradigm supports the pursuit of still more wealth, though this will-to-possession is softened by making one's claims collectively and not individually. But since what is being claimed is actually the same prosperity for every individual, the only possible expression of the collective impulse is economic equality. Everyone is to be the same—no differences in possessions, social role, or position are to be permitted. The subtle problems of a variety of world interpretations have been solved; one objective is absolute: prosperous uniformity. More primordial forms of human experience are not to be taken seriously. An enhanced appreciation of life, ideas, or creations would only be an ethically reprehensive effort to surpass the paradigm. The legitimate use of culture is clear: to achieve the greatest possible wealth shared equally. There is no possible confusion of values. The old humanism had to die: it was concerned with individual acts of consciousness. The new reliance on brutal simplicity, at once material and mental, leaves no room for reflection. If 'advances in humanistic scholarship . . . (and) the interpretive sciences generally, are not measured by the spread of consensus but by the refinement of the debate, (then) what gets better is the precision with which we vex each other'; the contemporary individual has chosen to forget the whole business (Giles Gunn, 1979, p. 226).

A world of stability and precariousness; uniformity and irregularity; is replaced with one of perfect coherence. The humanists were intellectually modest; they probed shared patterns of meaning and significance; they interpreted a world where understanding came with difficulty. Our contemporaries claim a transparent world in which a complexity of mind is absurd. The new collective mental life passes self-evidently from statement to act. Understanding is not conceived to be a problem, the mind is superseded by science and technology. Humanism remained committed to the quality of human thinking, and thus fell by the wayside. The individual who thinks is replaced by methods that have been proven effective. Personal responsibilty is traded in for objective procedure. All the doubting and questioning is superseded: the pursuit of equality in welfare is the goal. The humanists thought about a discussable world; the moderns react to a self-evident one.

Granted that the cultural truth had become the welfare state, and that its logic had brushed all doubts aside, why did it harbor such a violent undercurrent? The tension is rooted in the standardization of the society. Life is rationalized. The conformity of housing, the uniformity of work, the collectivization of leisure and mass values have taken their toll. The well-organized society becomes a mind-annihilating fate. The truth of welfare became the dominant cultural myth to the point where no other 'truth' was recognized. The myth dominated the individual; it took possession of the society. Economic growth, the consumer society, and prosperity were self-justifying. Competing values, such as the demand for a ripened love of life, were despised. 'Democratization' did not occur because the welfare myth had succeeded in becoming self-evident, but just the opposite. Doubts had begun to attack the archetype. The logic of prosperity for all, and everyone the same was, in fact, a European reinterpretation of the 'American Dream'. Throughout the fifties, the Dutch had assumed that the trauma of history was over with. The Second World War had ended the ferocious ideological slaughter. A consensus was achieved: the welfare state would guarantee riches for everyone. A comfortable Europe had no need to fight. The ideologies had been the weapons of poverty; the expression of abundance would be cooperation.

In fact, the creation of the Common Market in 1958 legitimized the analysis. The almost remarkable French-German alliance affirmed that rich societies could permit themselves political and cultural generosity. Once the Russian 'threat' receded in the mid-1960s, there was nothing left to do than to get rich quick. Which is just what happened. The basic assumption was that 'history' as the spectacle of war, crisis, and tragedy had come to an end. Life was perhaps mundane in the new world, but it was profitable.

In the late sixties, this interpretation of the good life had to be uncoupled from its original 'Americanism'. Disillusionment with the United Stated had become pronounced. Several reasons can be given: the war in Vietnam; the overvalued dollar, which let American corporations buy up anything in sight; the replacement of the G.I. rescuer with arrogant tourists as the dominant image of the average American; and a European pride that sought a regained independence. But the dominant myth was not to be changed. What was necessary was to establish an Americanism without America. The same assumptions concerning the value of welfare were to be carried forward, but now as a specifically national concept. If wealth had not really made a social paradise of the United States, if economic success had not brought justice, peace and universal happiness there, the human miracle would occur in Europe. The question of history remained closed: the dramas of human society were at an end. The welfare state would

provide unlimited full employment and progress: science, technology, and growth were the ideal triumvirate. What we had to do was to ditch the Americans and continue the myth under our own steam. War, hunger, sickness, and inequality would all be abolished. In fact, we might have known that the myth of the 'American way of life' was sour. The stultified cultural situation in Europe already revealed that the society was becoming increasingly blocked through its one-sided development.

It is important to note that what took place was a European interpretation of the American dream. Actual American self-identity was not understood or, in Holland, even taken seriously. American literature had always understood the tragic and treacherous aspect of industrial development. Unthinking optimism was not typically American at all, but it fulfilled a European need. The United Stated has, up to the past few years, always had a conservative culture and a wide-open attitude to technology. This has produced a cultural conflict: the ideas Americans have sought to realize have been deeply theological. Life's experience is understood as a pilgrimage, where the youth's awakening to self-consiousness is a frequently repeated motif. To know is often dreadful, but some sort of necessity drives man to know, to experience, however frightening the results may be. American thinking often achieves a stoic level of insight that is breathtaking, but also tragic. At the same time, Americans have embraced the machine. No previous society had allowed technology such a freedom to develop according to its own logic. America has never known a politics of industry: factories create themselves according to their own rationale. These two forces, a deep attachment to the human meaning of things and an equally absolute commitment to technology, produce a dynamic conflict. Just so long as some sort of solution is forged, this stimulates the intellectual process. But Europeans did not want to recognize the complexity of American culture. They created their own myth: one of simplistic optimism. When the equivocal substance to American wealth began to break through the naive idealism, a new tactic was found to preserve the myth. America, the model, was brushed aside and Marxism was embraced. The myth of an economic panacea was rescued. The student revolt in Holland of 1969 was thus a phony event—it rescued the history-is-over-with assumption from the threatening facts. The 'Revolution' ended human strife; poverty, war, famine, and disease could be abolished. We already knew what had to happen. We merely had to make an end to capitalism. Paradise was rescued from historical disillusionment. The myth had a new mask. Of course, Gulag—both the Russian and other versions—threatened these pretensions. But one could always claim to possess 'the true Marx', whom the various governments had all misinterpreted. The discovery of socialism, was thus, a flight from history, where a one-dimensional myth of human happiness was rescued at the cost of refusing to understand reality.

Violence is inherent to the myth's falsification of existence. Just as long as the real constantly threatens to break through the image, tremendous tension remains. The myth is not defended out of spiritual luxury. Its adherents have invested themselves in it. The price the chimera exacts is that of individuality. Equality of living conditions was defined as justice, which translated to sameness of existence. That Marx explicitly rejected such a theory scarcely interested anybody. Marx had understood that the resources necessary for different activities have unequal value. A rich plurality of creation demands a diversity of tools, training, and prerequisites. To rigidly standardize such matters is to impoverish the culture. Risks must be taken, unproven experiments permitted, and ingenuity freed from cost accounting if work is to, in any significant sense, be free.

If consumption is the goal of social existence, equality of income is the only important issue. When all patterns of consumption are the same, only the trimmings can differ without touching equality. Then total fairness will have been achieved. A new form of totalitarian society is born—one without violent leaders, exploited/exploiters, or an overtly aggressive ideology. But the individual is totally subordinated. All aspects of private life, as well as the productive process, are controlled by a sole absolute. It is the terror of wealthy uniformity. If we admit that this ideal is anti-human, that its *maître mots* (welfare state, equality, justice) have become deeply sick, then we shatter the mind-set of a generation. A large group is exposed to an uncertainty for which they are totally unprepared. They try, cost what it may, to fend off that risk. Having avoided self-consciousness up to now, the *Angst* involved in understanding themselves as thinking, as responsible for their own ideas, is crushing.

Open discussion, real debate, was never to be permitted. Genuine democracy demands self-consciousness, a knowledge of one's own thinking and needs. The welfare terror is an escape from these obligations. To call it 'democratization' is to lead with one's chin. The essential weakness of the ideology, its repression of self-consciousness, is masked just as long as no one puts it to the proof. When these 'democrats' must formulate policy and are called upon to display social creativity, their total absence of an imaginative consciousness is revealed. In opposition, they can remain convincing. There they can attack inequality and injustice. The unfreedom of their alternative only becomes obvious when they take power.

The crux of the matter is that the myth is totally sterile. It destroys all consciousness of the social. An act of imagination is needed 'to get out of our own skins, to put ourselves in the place of others, to understand that the only hope of escaping from the prison of self-regarding egoism, without falling directly into the tranquilizing embrace of mobocracy, is by learning to imagine, acknowledge, and value what is distinctively individual and other' (Giles Gunn's paraphrase of William James' 'On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings' in ibid., p. 176).

Without that insight, the intersubjective is unspeakable; when man denies himself the right to speak in an active process of interaction he negates his knowledge of others. There was, however, no need to know the other; in total equality all relationships are self-evident. Human occurrence is impoverished. The social space where people can achieve action is abolished. Each individual becomes invisible to all others. No acknowledgement is possible, for uniqueness is crushed. Each person is reduced to all others, and to no one. Consumption becomes the pure subject, and man irrelevant. Human personality is abandoned to a perfect logic of goods. The welfare state has not achieved this nightmare, but it has gone a long way toward doing so. The myth has thwarted understanding very effectively. Self-consciousness has been banished from higher education.

Sub rosa, the effort is sometimes made to think, create, and speak—to possess a story of one's own, earned through one's action, and thereby to achieve an individual humanness. Such humanity rests upon action, and hence on interaction with others. It is an occurrence between people having significance for each other. In the welfare-state myth, the other is either the same, and justice is achieved, or he is different, and something is wrong, for someone has gotten the better of things. Sartre's 'other' is the result of being exclusively object minded—others are subsumed under the social issue of equality.

Democracy, as such, is a formal and not an actual issue. This has been a discus-

sion of 'democratization' as it took place in Dutch higher education. What are the parallels with the American or French movements? The question is difficult. In Holland, the student movement got the chance to reveal itself, whereas De Gaulle's overwhelming victory late in 1968 and the progressives' crushing defeat in the American presidential election of 1968 set limits.

Is democracy generally equated with the welfare myth? Have the definitions changed? Not in the Holland of 1981. The Marxist rhetoric is the same, the political discussions little changed. More students are probably apolitical, but nothing of substance has altered. Enthusiasms succeeded one another. China is replaced by Cuba, which makes way for Angola, etc. The prestige of political parties and their leaders rises and falls, but no new concept of democracy has been introduced. More or less optimism is displayed, but the goal remains the same. The intellectual continuity has been very strong. Politics has not been interrupted by any new ideas.

In his farewell address at Leiden University before his retirement Professor J. H. van den Berg thanked the university for its support of his research, while noting that there was no longer much room in universities for things like phenomenology.[5] Phenomenology was a 'luxury' in the modern world. When I first heard the remark, his gentlemanly manners hid the content from me. Later I realized what he had, in fact, said: thinking is a mere embellishment in a modern school. Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of the phenomenological school in all its plurality may be, it loved to read, discuss, and wonder. These values are clearly reaffirmed in all the literature that the tradition produced. However speculative or individual some conclusions may have been, they provoked discussion. They got us to think. But that tremendous achievement is now resented. We are not supposed to think; we have become scientific. Self-consciousness is a failure of method; contact with our own experience is a lack of certainty.

PART THREE
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

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Becoming-a-lecturer, the event and its record, has been characterized by a dialogistic process of realizing conceptually insightful mediation and thereby gaining (through knowing) the ability to achieve activity. As a beginner, direct subjective experience was crucial to my ability to interact with students. 'Entenderment' and 'subrealism' were names for emotions. With time, the socially immediate lost out to the theoretically informed. Teaching developed from an immanent affective experience into a fundamental semiotic issue. A new relationship to reality, tackling the man-man and man-world relationships, emerged. At first I was limited to the process of the practical situation—I only 'experienced' the immediate, subjectively. Eventually, a new form of activity was produced—I no longer had to pursue every moment of the *hic et nunc,* but could concentrate on the interaction with event (change/history) which is followed, structured, and created collectively (foremost through work) with language. Teaching mirrors the shared forms of existence, present to us all in the common cultural development and in man's changing nature. In comparison, the 'personal contact' of immediate teacher-student interaction is a pretty limited business. I stress that dialogic discussion does not assume fixed forms, but is, on the contrary, a dynamic process. The emphasis is not on individual consciousness so much as on the man-world and man-man relationships. This is not an improverishment of experience in rationalism or absolutes, but an enriching of it that releases it from the Cartesian prison of subject-object duality. The goal is to meet the individual-other-world on the basis of the issues that unite them. The educational literature portrayed teaching as unmediated, fixed in concrete practical activity; I have tried to show why it becomes the active pursuit of 'what there is that can be.' The inward-looking approach closes itself up in the classroom and misses the creative energy of mediation which achieves a higher level of reflection, not more exclusive and rigid (as in 'subrealism'), but more encompassing and complete. Teaching can be an outward thrust into activity and human (social) interaction. Education is not the endless reproduction of classrooms, it needs the courage to take assumptions and develop them, make plans and work on them, define goals and criticize them. Teaching then entertains possibility, instead of droning out 'laws,' 'rules,' and 'absolutes.' I have studied how a teacher's attitudes, poses, and self-reflection become mediated; not made a survey of didactic techniques or possibilities. The teacher who has transcended narrow individual consciousness approaches his work with a mediated self-knowledge. He is recognizable in his juxtaposing of man, culture, and event; and in his concern that words (thought) suffice. Do they form contact with the complex levels of existence, or are they mere conceptual formulas?

When I began to teach, I saw it as a choice to speak, to open a discussion, to talk about what I had studied and worked on. I sought a felt, personal, responsibility for what I was doing: but was pushed by the routine of 'schooling' into some sort of immoralism where rules are blindly followed. For the first time, I felt I should answer the

question, 'What knowledge is most worth having?' After years of following courses, of being told what is important, the roles were reversed. I had to demand that students listen to what I was going to tell them. What was the axiological and communal basis to the claim that my instruction be accepted? No one owns the meanings—they exist as interactive. If they are imposed, instead of shared, a tyranny of expression will destroy lived-speech and replace it with totalitarian lip service. Initially I taught to cummunicate ideas—later the deed of formulating responses, adequate to common circumstance, came to the forefront. The commitment to experience is kept alive in teaching when the ostensive definition displays the dynamic, temporal, attribute of knowing. I had thought that the quality of personal contact between the teacher and student was pivotal, but I discovered that the quality of thought between the teacher and circumstances in general was even more fundamental. The crucial openess to meaning is not a so-called 'personal openess.' The former is directed toward man and his possibilities, toward concrete interaction and work, toward culture and its forms. It places knowing in the stream of activity, and investigates the significance of the radically historical nature of knowledge. The latter designates a subjective warmth or friendliness with a beneficial and constructive attitude to the other 'Peak experience' and 'unconditional positive regard' remain ahistorical categories. Friendship, as an ideal, threatens to become anti-historical in its effort to hold onto a subjective relationship. Furthermore, the goal easily becomes anti-intellectual as in the assertion that 'theory represses spontaneous sentiment.' Whether or not Maslow and Rogers had any such intentions, their ideas have become a defense of philosophical subjectivism and have been turned against radical historical insight. The teaching that chooses to know man in history, accepts the relative, tenuous, partial nature of activity. It has no means to close itself off to ideas, change, alterance. It accepts that 'thought cannot precede meaning.' All goals remain relative to the concrete, all knowledge situational. The acknowledgement of man's semiotic reality purifies thought of unfounded certainties and opens it to action. No friendships are guaranteed; responsible thought, limited to its cultural-historical circumstance, is proffered. The classroom—a highly artificial locus replete with its customs, roles, and outward appearances—is a place where thought can be presented in its authentic form. The teacher is an actor who portrays what is to think. We do not go to class just as we would go to visit someone; we're not there to meet the person with all his petty cares, picayune stupidities, or social neuroses. Teachers are supposed to know 'cultural text' and be able to bring them to life. They have to know the language of their subject matter through and through, so that they can make it question, speak, discuss, and perhaps shout, protest, or be very dramatic. Meaning emerges from speech activity—the deed is impossible without adequate intellectual preparation. The effort to replace a genuine mastery of subject matter ('cultural text'), with pedagogic tricks is a form of superficial self-deception. You can never really make rabbits appear out of empty hats. Once a body of knowledge has been studied, then reflection on the very special role we call teaching is valuable. It is important to understand that one is not just there as teacher, to comprehend that one's dramatic role is demanding, fascinating, and difficult. I have often witnessed intense conversations in the classroom between students who do not speak to one another outside it. The drama 'Meaning occurs here,' creates an exceptional situation. Its entenderment is different from friendship's. We accept in teaching the need to think, to know, to understand. This is something very different from the personal embrace of our emotional relationships. Our students do not have to be our friends. They do

define a place where we are willing to think out loud. In friendship thought is often less important than affection, playfulness, sexuality, or whatever. In school it is our concern for meaning that we share. We keep the semiotic systems, with which we wrestle with our common world, intact. What we agree to do, by working together in a school, is to let thought exist. We give our assent that the meanings proposed are discussable. We let the event of thought occur.

The semiotic context of meaning puts many demands on the teacher. No one could meet them all consistently; the concepts with which teaching is judged here are of the 'concrete utopia(n)'' form (Bloch, 1970). Even if the teaching profession took these concepts to be legitimate theory, many could not work successfully with them. Discounting inadequacies in analytic talent and personal neuroses many instructors simply 'couldn't take it'. A hard process is described: a repeated return to first principles, essential concepts, and indefinite rebeginnings. It is a constant struggle to achieve 'meaning' wherein the conceptual universe just will not stand still. Consciousness and language tie the self, the other, and the circumstances briefly to one another, only to quickly loose the unity. Teaching as speech activity meets the holistic ideal at the cost of demanding an unlimited renewal of thought. This concept of teaching must not degenerate into facile optimism—meaning is neither easily grasped nor painelessly perceived.

'Sense'—meaning for the individual in personal, subjective perception—was not my subject matter. The idiosyncratic significance of meaning for the instructor alone was not discussed. The social event of learning has been studied not individual depth psychology. My argument was semiotic: it was grounded in the interaction between language and consciousness. I emphasized more the cultural/historical principle to learning than the individual situational givens. The individual ability to live with this sort of teaching would be more prominent in an empirical study of beginning teachers than it is here where the stress is on teaching. The development of criteria, to recognize consistent speech activity, predominates in this book over the specific moments of instructional choice. Curriculum is normally analyzed with formal schemas, for instance of (1) goal, (2) content, (3) didactic form, (4) evaluation. Teaching is not acknowledged herein to be intersubjective speech activity. The communicative setting which determines the social significance of content gets second-rate treatment. In the germination of activity content becomes meaning. The prospective activity, introduced through the content, needs justification. The goals of teaching need to be recognized, analyzed, enriched. Pedagogics owes the teacher a procedure to gain conceptual clarity when contents need to be chosen. What is the situational structure of meaning and what does one teach within it. I have portrayed the grappling with this too often neglected issue. In the concluding paragraphs, which follow, I discuss two crucial characteristics to my project (1) that it began in immediacy to teaching and made its way from radical empiricism (*la parole* of teaching) by way of semiotic reflection to meaning, and (2) that knowledge (cultural text) is understood here to be social in its genesis and use. Finally (3), I restate my case in the shortest possible statements, and indicate how they can further be researched.

a. Immediacy: *la parole* and 'meaning'

Why this unusual emphasis on *la parole*--on creating a text as close as possible

to speech and to actual (spontaneous) thought? Meaning is portrayed as acticity, as occurrence, as the thinking through of event. The value judgments and passions of event are the fibers whereby discourse is woven into the relationship to the 'other' and to the world. Pedagogics, as practiced here, is not expressible in the form of abstract propositions that can be demonstrated once and for all, to all men everywhere; but is the situational perception of practice informed by disciplined self-reflection. The discourse of educational practice recorded by means of 'semiotic field work' respects the form of the original discourse and represents speech in a manner loyal to its original issuance. The emphasis is on the conceptual process underlying the 'living word'. Language is rendered as activity—it is the event of understanding, conceptual mediation, intersubjectivity.

I hope to have conveyed the 'drama of ideas' identified with learning and dialectically productive thought. The book is about the gradual unfolding of the concepts essential to teaching. The chapters of the genetic text are dramatic representations of the context of teaching as I understand it. The process of introducing myself, as beginning lecturer, to teaching; and of the reader, through my account, to that experience, run parallel. The book is an account of this educational activity. I describe a beginning teacher with more or less inadequate ideation, and his developing use of far more encompassing concepts. The process of practical development is recorded. I study a process of learning where 'content filled social connections' emerge as *meaning* (A.A. Leont'ev, 1975). I assume (derived from de Saussure) the mediating function of language and (drawn from Dewey) the active nature of knowledge. I do not employ an epistemology of dualism, but one of mediation. Activity through social interaction generates meaning.

I have criticized rationalization and ideology because these thought forms, in my observation, prohibit an open, alive man-world and man-man relationship. I have described the quality of social existence that is bound to the subrealist attitude toward the world, and have contrasted it to 'entenderment' as an opposing attitude. I have praised one style of learning, and damned others, based upon the meso-cosmos they produce. A structure of meaning underlies each standpoint: subrealism assumes a motionless, timeless, absolute existence; 'entenderment' presupposes an active, temporal variable being. These are not necessarily the dominant *notions* of meaning, but they are founding assumptions to the prevailing semiotics.

I am interested in meaning as a *fore-structure* to knowing, not as an idea. Activity is not a subjective quality of conciousness: meaning exists for me because I am situated in it, I am aware of myself as already committed to it. The world of event is the ground of all thinking. Where there is interaction, there is occurrence. There has to be activity for 'works' to be made, displayed, known. A world of changeless being may satisfy the drive to 'know', but it denies involvement in the word and the radical possibilities of the present. Man, situated in activity, orders, structures, signifies. What we call mediating concepts is what we make visible to ourselves, of ourselves and of our thought. Only if a powerful process of condensation succeeds can there by anything which mediates. Meaning has to be clutched out of the chaos of raw process. From out of scattered, amorphous, fluid circumstance statements are drawn. Concrete historical time, with all her uncertainties, contradictions, and immensity, threatens the very possibility of significance. How do we earn the right to impose our conceptualizations—to order, mathematicize, prove? We destroy the texture of raw event, reject the multiplicity of actual history, and blind ourselves to the infinite scale of the known universe. If we cut through the Gordian knots of mere empiricism we do not solve the

semiotic problems, but simply refuse to further bother ourselves with them. Profane time may threaten us with meaninglessness, nonetheless we cannot escape the danger by denying its existence. How do we create and defend meaning while remaining within process? How does man continue to exist for himself, remain thinkable, while recognizing the inner logic of occurrence? What can be a form of thought that creates stability: identity, values, ideas; and recognizes process? We search for the structure of 'meaning', for the process that transmutes contradictory impressions, the chaos of event, and the limitless absurdity of matter, into patterns of order and significance. Themes emerge from experience, and these meanings are shared. Without meaning the world is mere turmoil, dishevelment, and confusion. To think, we need concepts, if we are constantly pushed by the virulence of mere process we become its prisoner, and meaning comes to an end. Man hopelessly abandoned to event loses all identity, consciousness, and ability to think. Absolute immediacy destroys consciousness. The problem is not to live, that only requires the pure present; but to achieve activity, for that demands structures of consciousness that produce meaningful significances. The cultural-historical insight acknowledges teaching as speech activity, what is taught is meaning. Freedom as *potentia* is synonymous with meaning's historical openness. Meaning is a radical pact with existence where choice is made that there *be* something, that significance be presupposed. Activity is a precondition to knowledge, not a product of it. The experience of the relationship, language and consciousness, is founded upon an assumption of radical significance. Modern literature portrays a world where man is at great distance from ultimate meaning. What we see is the devitalization of man. Our period is more characterized by the death of man than of God. Human relationships become merely functional—man does not mean to his fellows. No specifically human identity is recognized, a meaningful relationship of reciprocal beliefs is lacking. Man is isolated in enormous crowds unable to achieve any affirmation, filled with the rejection of metaphysics, subjectivity, and the 'other'. Without a shared fore-structure, no one can share what man will be, or what man has become. Each existence is its own horizon, total isolation results. Man can try and rescue himself through extreme self-reliance, but purely individual solutions can never create shared meaning. No viable body of beliefs can emerge for the *Mitsein* when a common acknowledgement of activity is obstructed. An empty, dreary anonymity fills the social; where radical significance should inform thinking, there is mere absence.

We need essential images around which we can formulate experience and created *le temps humain:* existence imprinted by human choice, feeling, and will. Meaning is the milieu and the medium of human life; it is formative to all reflection, knowledge, and order. It is the basic mental environment to human experience. How it is structured informs every thought, purpose, and deed. If it loses a collective significance, then the human community and communion become unthinkable and impossible. Modern man is confronted with just this impoverishment. He has lost his grip on the thematic certainty with which concepts can be spontaneously formed and can structure a collective fundamental outlook. Thrown back into seriality, man is at least unsure of his interpretations of the world, and at the worst has given up altogether on making them. The bitch goddess of success (welfare and materialism) and the empty glitter of nothingness (adventure and sensation, merely for themselves) have gained much ground. Existence as mere extension, or duration, informs no one of anything. If existence, as meaning, has been lost, how can it be regained? This question demands an answer to the crisis of the late twentieth century. When the center (the crux of ideas, beliefs, and assumptions whereby a culture lives) falls apart, then man is literally left to

meaninglessness. In this circumstance education is impossible, because the teacher has no meaning to teach. Mere facts are not enough!

A cultural-historical pedagogic is only possible if those involved can create a form of activity that informs their existence, that structures their observations, and that unites them. I believe that such a form of activity can take place in our society. I do not see contemporary man as written off to the anguish of meaninglessness, or even worse, as doomed to a self-defeating avoidance of a crisis in meaning. If meaning is unthinkable; and man, in activity, semiotically inaccessible, then no lived-world can ever be rendered approachable. This bleak and chill existence where man can never understand himself as human, or know himself in shared reality, is one where consciousness is imaginatively intolerable. Life's interpretation is not individual; its collective, preconscious structure is derived from the shared sense of 'meaning'. 'Meaning' as freedom is not a law that takes its own course, it is an event man has to earn and realize. The goal of transcending the opposition of man and world, and man and man, through a unifying mediation of individual and historical development is 'metaphysical' in the sense that it is not a natural law. It is an idea of man's goal based upon a radical possibility and not on the laws of actuality. 'Meaning' is possibility, not a certainty—'possibility' transcends the actual and opens us to an uncertain 'metaphysics'. Staff and students grapple to form a community of shared meanings and life histories, however momentarily. This is to be understood on the level of social processes, as well as on a semiotic level. Intersubjectivity, correctly understood, leads to an inhabited world, where thought is heard, known, responded to. Learning is not a mental process, but a social circumstance. The radically social quality to learning—its essence as answers we give to one another—means that the social space of intersubjectivity is the most important quality that a lecturer must develop. Schooling is an organized language event: reality is named and, in a variety of ways, spoken about. The problem is to maximize the experiential value of speech. My reasoning about intersubjectivity has been informed by a semiotic concern, which has permitted me to make certain pedagogical observations. I have emphasized the communal quality to language. A presupposition to all thinking is the language (verbal, visual, musical, whatever) within which it occurs. It is often just as real to say that language speaks the subject, as to claim that an 'I' speaks.

Teaching, obviously, is a verbal human activity; a seemingly self-evident fact which implies much more about its nature and scope than is often realized. If the school denies dialogue, it transgresses the means of its existence, and in fact, goes to war with its own *raison d'être*. This occurred in my experience of the school where I worked. My concept of education is one where speech activity creates meaning. Because human communication is made up of 'text' a constant process of interpretation has to take place. The grammar of discussion needs to be researched and described. That grammar is never neutral; it forms what Heidegger has called a 'hermeneutic circle.' It is not only the process of thought, it is also its source. The questions we put to the world generate the answers we can know.

Mediation selects, orders, and values, but on what principles? Our style of commitment forms the ground to our very words. This commitment, as understood here, is cultural: individual man does not recede out of circumstance; on the contrary, he is fully present. The reconciliation of man and world, which is at the basis of a hermeneutics where world can 'appear,' is dynamic. The split between appearance and reality, which has characterized modern thought, is rejected. The organic vision of man and world

presupposes a radical unity, I am speaking of what Joseph Conrad called:

> . . . that subtle but invincible conviction of solidarity . . . in mysterious origin, in toil, in joy, in hope (and) in uncertain fate, which binds men to each other and all mankind to the visible world. (Preface to *The Nigger of the Narcissus* (1897, London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1950), p. viii.)

The radical identification of man with man, man with world, becomes acceptable only if the unity offers fulfillment. Consciousness, sense perception, the social/cultural, can only be aligned upon one another if the entirety seems more rewarding, creative, provocative than does separation. Different theoretical universes of technique, science and art; disjoined worlds of rulers and ruled, workers and employers, scientists and the naive; will only be surmounted if the holistic challenge is better able to sustain meaning, create significance, generate social practice, than the unintegrated disparity now does. Open intercourse with the world is only possible if we possess an affirmative interpretation of its meanings. Otherwise we will never be motivated to keep up the discussion. In some sense we must believe in the redemptive effect of meeting circumstance. Otherwise it is so much easier to deny all purpose, and retreat into narrow pragmatism or indifference. The immersion in the complexities of existence is never easy. The ambiguous mixture of good and evil, violence and love, epiphany and defeat, threaten us with more suffering than purpose. Life's basic rythms and sensations can be valued through an underlying love with life. This commitment to a vital possibility is the crux to pedagogical activity as I understand it. A deeply felt, and thorough sense of unity, man and world, man and man, man and history, is an intimate, direct necessity for the sort of meaning that can be lived, shared, communal. It is displayed in the genetic text that these meanings are, in immediate practice, potential events to the context of teaching and to the teachers's discourse.

b. Formative Evaluation: Knowledge Is Social

A 'growth in consciousness' is to be 'privy to a thing with another' *(Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology,* 1966). The genetic text presents a record of what I did as a beginning lecturer: the case study shows an intersubjective (social) learning process in its beginnings, explorations, and tentative results. The horizon of possibility shifted towards concrete human connectedness. Interaction revealed complex potentialities. At issue: how did the specific consciousness meet a particular challenge and develop; what structure of activity was presupposed, developed? The effort to improve teaching revealed the mediation of the pedagogic practice. I organized my impressions and responses, structured my experience and reactions, with an analytic grid of guiding principles necessary to reconstitute events in thought i.e. to mediate experience. The development of the mediating logic took place in four stages:

> (1) Cognizance is taken of the two effects to teaching. I discovered that the refusal of situational thinking rigidified thought, discussion, learning and led to 'subrealism,' while the embrace of a dynamic, open, thought process could achieve 'entenderment.'
>
> (2) Polarization sought an either/or conflict in teaching. Analytical rationality was juxtaposed with grounded observation. Repression was thought to threaten experience. Creativity and feeling were championed at the expense of order, rules, and conventions.

(3) Analysis of the two-term conflict revealed it to be reductionist—the interactions between man and world, man and man, were jeopardized instead of defended. Man was imprisoned in subjectivism. The choice for a co-acting causality, where teaching is a complex interchange of factors, was made.
(4) Teaching is acknowledged to be a dynamic process of antimonies where individuals and their world develop through activity. Three facets are emphasized: the intersubjective, introsubjective, and the cultural. Teaching is mediated by the concepts with which the person and his surroundings are identified. The deblocking of the relationship man-world takes place through the speech activity of 'meaning.'

The analysis of the phases of development to beginning teaching is an heuristic device to demonstrate the process quality of learning. Longitudal investigation is singularly suited to ferret out process factors. The seven point structure (of the genetic text + 'Discussion and Evaluation') introduced in 'Preamble: Defining the Problem' and the four point logic (described above) are complementary. The first follows the explicit phases of investigation, the second the implicit guiding logic. The explorative investigation in detail, over a long period of time, of one case, revealed the overriding importance of insight into the *process* of learning. The chapters are ordered around the typical practical considerations of the beginning lecturer—how can I survive in this new work situation, what are its obvious features, how can I better understand this specific case. These questions led me to seek a core structure to the contradictions, conflicts, and problems met in practice. The dualistic choices between subjectivity and logic, feeling and science, individuality and order, are based upon an inadequate two-term logic where man and world are opposed to one another. Teaching is rooted in the productive interaction between man and world, it assumes a generative reciprocity between human consciousness and circumstance. In the world 'meaning' is possible: for man the world is a potential place of (joint) activity. The will to learn is rooted in assumptions of human, social possibility. Teaching, herein, does not circle about the 'self,' but is an opportunity to transcend 'self' in 'works,' where man and world, person and history, individuality and culture, interact. Good teaching, so seen, is not derived from an absence of paradox and contradiction, but from the dynamic handling of conflicting claims. Not the static mastery of a skill, but the dynamic pursuit of interaction is called for. The 'phases' make these processes thinkable: they are a rhetorical means of showing change and development.

Reverting to the motif of the first chapter of the genetic text: the initial choice is posed as between 'entenderment' and 'hate.' The involvement with an essentially social activity, which embodies care for others, involvement with them, and acknowledgement of history's multifaceted structure of shared meanings, I have called 'entenderment.' The negation I have called 'hatred' because its rejection of reciprocity will not only lead to semiotic error, but to a deep seated violence against the 'other's' claim to know, experience, be. When what is said, is truly taken seriously, then entenderment prevails. The longitudinal research into teaching is complemented by a transverse tendency to broaden the scope of discussion. The transition from the first to the second, and from the second to the third chapters of the genetic text are generated by the movement towards greater inclusiveness. The begin was based on a singular subjective account, the intermediate focus of attention is upon the group of most-direct-contact, and the third effort inquired into the progressively more inclusive structure of interaction. Each essay reached its limits when it became evident that more elements of in-

teraction needed to be introduced. A framework had to be built which could bear the weight of all the facets and aspects, for a narrow focus would falsify the quality of interaction. By beginning without complex concepts the pitfalls of too little structure (a ramified description leading to chaos) and an over-simplified argument (a stripped down thematic development full of reductionism) loomed. The resorting strategy was to begin closest to the stream of consciousness—to a subjective certainty—and to work from there towards an interactive veracity. Thus, first the teacher and then the discovery of students and surroundings. As the account won in comprehension, it was driven to develop more complex premises, to keep all the encroaching elements in order. Thus two tendencies, (1) to assimilate significant factors, and (2) to develop a multifaceted analysis, were complementary. The first necessitated the second, and the second created room to repeat the first.

When, half way through the genetic text, I turned to outside inspiration, the reasons for my choices were semiotic. That I had to abandon the confined perspective of the one experience/college is explained by the goals of growing comprehensiveness. But why Roland Barthes and in a fairly special manner? Firstly, because my emphasis was not on inflexible 'truth,' but on the *conceptual process of the 'living word.'* Language is the crucial given—the metaphor both of physical existence and human life. Discourse is an activity, an open-ended practice of articulating intelligibility. Rhetoric is the zone of thought's movement. I assert the boundlessness of expression in contradistinction to the rigidity of circumscribed definitions. Language forms the leitmotif to Barthes' oeuvre where the subject is a being of language. Herein discourse escapes obediance to doctrine and enters into a multiplicity of relationships with man and his world. There is no single meaning but the re-meanings of each moment or fragment of perception. The stability of ordered thought is replaced by animation of fantasy, desire, and creativity. The 'I' is not an intellectual object but fragments of speech. Identity does not congeal: auto-analysis speaks foreward. Barthes is a spokesman for textual pluralism; language possesses unlimited interpretations, possibilities, and signifiers. This semiotics of inexhaustible production cannot stand still, the product is subordinate to the process. Secondly, I chose Barthes because I concur: *the social is bound up in the signifying process.* Speech is desire, companionship, attachment. With words we designate and develop our cooperation and/or interaction. The uses that people have for one another may seem monsterous enough on occasion, but their highly complex interconnectedness is present throughout. If we assume that society knows a form of interdependence, wherein each person has some sort of individual right to self-consciousness, we must acknowledge that language exists as interchange and is not to be prescribed. The politics of language is the politics of thought, or of its repression. I try to show words (thought) doing things—statements are not mere reflections of matters-as-they-are, but are acts of condensation, self-transcendence, social intentionality. The semiotic awareness rejects language as a self-evident window on reality, and is attentive to words as a product of man's encounter with the world. Since de Saussure, there has been a radically cultural, dialectical investigation of how man negotiates his relationship to the world and his fellows by means of language (de Saussure, 1916). If language is a web of interrelationships, each word staking out its own territory in interplay with the rest, then the cultural-historical quality of thought is evident. Words cannot merely designate 'objects,' they are inherently a part of man-made systems. Language is event embedded in shared structures—its history is the process of change in man's form of understanding. Barthes described the problems and

paradoxes of meaning that result from the various uses of text and social significance. Shifts in context, in who is addressed, make for different interactions. The 'drama of ideas' is a complex social handling. Meaning as event parallels my approach to teaching. Thus, the language-based assumptions to Barthes' thought appealed to me. Multivoiced interpretation takes account of the linguistic means and social actions to the semantic field. Despite the many semiotic similarities, Barthes could not serve as a model for me. Process thinking forms no object—it remains an illusive occurrence. A Barthesian event could be indicative, but Barthes as double would be reified, the essential kineticism would perish. Barthes as movement—as seminar—did not reveal social interactions of learning. The emphasis on semiotic criteria proved to be partial. The analysis of language's function is important to my concept of teaching, but it is not enough. Freedom of interpretation is a crucial quality to learning, but an insufficient definition of teaching. Without abandoning the semiotic sensitivity I wanted to assert the social logic to education. Jean Paul Dollé's *Haine de la pensée* fit the bill: a manifesto at once rooted in 'semiotic liberation' and attent to the concrete health of expression. I sought reciprocity between individual authenticity and shared universe. I experienced an individual need to give experience meaning and not to subsume it to dogmatic dependency. Circumstance preceded identity: occurrence spoke, did, enacted. Not mentalism, but constituent activity, stood as my model for cognition. The Barthesian tradition enclosed thought in a mind-body interaction, the word and its pleasure fed one another, without transcending narcissist gratification. Barthes had carried the Sartrian idea of the 'other,' who threatens one's own integrity and being, forward. I do not recognize the 'other' as a menace, but as a guide, compagnion, participant. I chose for a dialogue with Dollé's work to stimulate the redefining of thought's social dimension. Thereafter I clarify the results of the Barthes-Dollé investigations in the context of teaching (sixth chapter genetic text). I exploit the antimonies found in the practice of teaching, and in the 'I' who teaches, to study the social organization of knowledge. The choice of the book title, already, indicated that the study is based upon conflict. When I began to write dialectical logic was, of course, not unknown to me, but the encounter with polarity in practice was entirely new. I quickly realized that I was writing about conflict: its depth structure, progression, and fundamental logic. Throughout I examine hindrances and obstacles to learning, as well as the drive to achieve meaning or gain insight. 'Learning' has meant, in context: being open to experience, acknowledgement of the temporal/historical, the choice that there be something rather than nothing, and to incline to 'works' or mediated concepts that transcend dualistic existence. 'Hate' revealed itself as: subrealism, social rationalism, mechanistic absolutes, objectifying reification, alienating dualism. I have described the dialectic between the two forces and the transcending of a mere clash. The grammar of existence: open situationalism in conflict with closed rationalism, demands to be surpassed. The teacher's relationship to the social event of knowledge is the crux of the matter. An ideal subjective 'openess' and an exaggeratedly objective rationality are superseded by mediating the teaching practice through the internalization of the activity of developing meaning. Teaching has been described in these essays as an intersubjective event where various levels of identity are involved in the performing of historically meaningful acts. That description succeeded in naming the principal elements to teaching as they have been experienced in this project. The triad 'intersubjectivity,' 'introsubjective,' and 'cultural event' is a scaffold upon which concrete pedagogic statements can be constructed. These concepts influence behavior, they

mediate pedagogic practice. Meaning occurs in context, learning is an event rooted in circumstance. Knowledge here is an activity, culturally and historically dynamic, a process of self and social creation. Knowing-with-others engenders the logic of teaching. Practice reveals that the division of thought into subjective and objective can be surpassed in the interaction of man-world, man-man. Concepts are sedimented heuristic schemes drawn from the interplay of the man-world relationship. The 'I' is produced by the cultural-historical process whose 'meanings,' generate the operations of logical inference, the interrelations of premises, and the practical problem solving characteristics of place and period 'Teaching' as speech activity pursues actual questions and transcending acts. 'Teaching' as the creative use of mediating concepts—man confronted with actual questions—transcends dualism in problem solving. Social-historical reality mediates the subject-object split: meaning combines personal and social development.

I cannot say much more on this theme—a discussion of this sort of teaching remains comparable to reading a play: it is just not the same thing as seeing it. The struggle with mediated thought in practice cannot be foolproof, intersubjectivity is doomed to metadefinitions that can never actually be the real thing. I can only indicate the questions to be posed, issues to be considered, and a style of response. The weakness and strength of mediation is that it relies on event. My study has tried to convey what it can mean to become a lecturer. Teaching is not an analytic proposition, so it cannot be defined like one. It can be understood as a form of entenderment in which a social-cultural praxis is shared and developed. In that it is a cooperative effort, we can help one another with it. We cannot tell anyone how to do it. But we can offer our participation in its taking place. Our expectation of superseding subjectivity, that an event of planning, defining, problem solving, is going to take place, is what we have to offer. Thus, what we can contribute is also a demand. This is the form of reciprocity mediation takes in teaching.

Despite the forms of adversity I have encountered as a lecturer, and which were described here, the experience summoned me to discuss, see, and experience as no other has done. The task of self-definition was only too intense. But what was distinctly hope-giving was how the community of learning made what I had studied new. The classroom drives us beyond ourselves—we surpass what we thought to know when what we say has to have meaning for others. The college presented many unwelcome experiences, and an unfamiliar truth. Subrealism is rooted in a euphoria of despair that, however extreme it may be, often seems to be a general disorder. Two witches, conformity and collectivism, attack our imaginative resources. The task of activity demands the involvement of the self. If history is to become less demonic and more human, there must be no privileged perspectives or unquestionable persons, but only a deeply experienced recognition of things as they are, and willingness to give response. The struggle to halt depersonalization seems to be supported by an semiotic dialectic that surpasses dualism in cultural-historical activity. Learning is renewal and edification, interaction and intentionality—it is composed of significant actions. I saw my lecturing as practice in swaddling clothes—whatever my quarrels with my academic imperfections, which I remember only too well—there has been the defense of the human community. My most important resource has been the hope and confidence the students have expressed by being conceptually active. Their commitment to human social activity, demonstrated by attempting mediated thought, has been the critical criterion for my self-evaluation. Teachers can be 'literalists of the imagination'—above insolence and

triviality, and can present for inspection 'imaginary gardens with real toads in them' (Marianne Moore, 'Poetry,' 1921). Teaching is storytelling—is it adequate to circumstance, meaningful enough, couched in an appropriate sympathy? In it, responses to life can occur—real toads in a garden of knowledge. It is an uncertain venturing. To do it well, one is only required to see what is about one. This study has tried to clarify how that is embedded in the deepest quality of entenderment, and entails a vital commitment to both individual and historical existence.

c. Summing up and further

The unusual research path of immediacy (la parole) and social knowledge (practical activity leads to mediation) followed the 'growth in consciousness' whereby I came to grips with teaching. The study should serve to alert prospective teachers to pitfalls, generate discussion among beginning teachers on the logic of their development, and perhaps even interest experienced lecturers in the rationale of their work. It strives to strengthen the mediated reflection on 'teaching'—to move pedagogics a small step further towards 'meaning' and the use of genuine concepts.

The problem—the beginning lecturer who starts to think about teaching, and whose practice is fundamentally influenced by that conceptualizing—is actual, general, significant. The problem is broad enough, but the solution is (quasi) 'individual,' I have described a sort of 'psychotherapy,' a radical form of (self) analysis that overcame fear and isolation in order to achieve process and interaction. Not mere survival—all too often realized in conformistic routine—but an active community of discussants was the goal. It was a hard method: sorrow, hurt, and anxiety were all present. The reward—increased learning activity—became clear only after three years of work. My practice became an answer to the question 'What teaching is worthwhile and why?' In mediated interaction shared, genuine and serious learning took place. The moments where a lower form of consciousness is transcended and a higher achieved—the passage from exclusive use of reproduced concepts to the additional mastery of self-understood and deliberately employed concepts—are not merely individual. They were both linguistic events (language being the sedimented past of the culture) and social ones (rooted in interactional structures).

The book produces a manner of *defining* teaching. My experience convinces me that far more persons teach than specify what teaching (for them) is. Mere common sense indicates that the defining of teaching goals is only possible if one has a concept of what teaching is, and what it aspires to (learning). I have tackled a fundamental pedagogical/educational issue—what the teacher understands teaching and learning to be in practice. In summary, my answer: A teacher lets knowledge exist for his listeners—he brings concept into actuality, he shows his public what it can, and most often ought to do with the information presented. He humanizes knowledge; converts it into recognizable actions, into something done. This process is called 'explaining.' Information is remade into experience. A 'What it is all about' is being developed. Subject matter is transformed into interaction. Fact becomes significance. A lived-context is defined, which is informed by learning. A basic question to which the knowledge answers is posed. Something 'means' because it addresses itself to a problem and is a response to a recognizable question. When subject matter is explained, we are shown its inner logic, and the economy of its structure. We see a single, tightly knit answer. If this

strong sense of unity is not found, we remain baffled, thinking that we do not understand or have missed the point. Good teaching results in the topic discussed becoming meaning or significant knowledge. Significance, I wish to clarify, is not merely pragmatically determined. Peters's idealization of the 'gentleman thinker' who loves knowledge purely for its own sake, and is spiritually superior to mere problem solving, is a snobbish caricature. What Peters denounces, charlatans who want to use knowledge without deeply recognizing what it means, so that knowing demands nothing of them, is a real evil. Teaching is exacting; it requires us to share in the struggle to comprehend, respond, and choose goals. It seems so much more simple to steal the results of hard work, without paying the price. We learn to give the right answers without having first to live with the problems. We kid ourselves into thinking that knowledge is superficial—easy to accumulate and effortlessly to be lived with. Isolated facts, that remain meaningless, are that way. But the burden to wanting to answer fundamental questions has not been lightened in our century. If anything, the tremendous violence has made matters all the more difficult. Meaning and deeds are inseparable: the human activity attempted, furthered, and realized by new knowledge has inevitably a significance for man. Each response to a real problem causes changes in circumstances and evolution in man's situation. The change will be judged, and this evaluation is cultural-historical. We choose to be the person who understands himself and others in one of the manners offered. Obviously, our thought is sometimes thorough, but often hasty. New products and processes seem to appear from nowhere, and to prevail before one knows how. These are crucial problems to a tremendously large scale and productive society, such as that of the modern industrialized world. The theme that insight lags behind technological development, has been present throughout 'modernism.' 'Meaning' often falls short of activity. But this is no excuse for stuffing our schools full of lessons in nihilistic action. This happens when we teach people to do things, merely to do them, without investigating what is to be done, and why. The ideology of an absolute mastery over nature has often driven every other concept out of the school. Power is pursued for its own sake: human questions do not exist, the social hermeneutics of knowledge is neglected. A paradigm is embraced where there is no human knowledge. How does one get a humanly experiential, mediated concept of knowing accepted? This demands a commitment to teaching where one works to let meaning take place. Knowledge, being intersubjective, must neither be identified with 'world' nor 'self,' but with the interaction between them. My claim is neither for subjectivity nor objectivity, but for social reciprocity. Meaning inherently indicates a collectivity that shares the same concepts. Education has to let that society take form; the school is a privileged space for that to take place. The teacher, as individual, is subsumed to the social quality of knowledge. However important his descriptions of meaning may be, he can only talk about it and never be it. No single person can appropriate meaning—it is a quality of interaction. To be willing and able to participate is important, but one must lose oneself in the process of thought. The teacher is willing to surpass himself in his classroom; in discussion, in the material to be covered. The study of meaning takes the first place, the problem being thought about predominates. The teacher is present, discussing, thinking, questioning, amongst his students. This process knows no one form, but produces a classroom where everyone senses 'that something important is happening.' There are no formal criteria to agreeing to think with one another. In fact, the process can be quite effectively faked or imitated in the short run. The central issue is where do we find mediated interaction? Meaning is something you let occur. Education courses have traditionally

told us what we must do to teach, described the activity and behavior we must display. I would stress how we can let meaning emerge by exploring the collectivity of concepts about us. The teacher is in no way passive or inactive in the classroom. The effort to point to meaning, to show where questions lie that warrant real discussion is active enough. The proposal to replace schools with 'rich environments' where students can do as they please is just another rephrasing of the subjectivist standpoint. I find it good when the teacher has an impact upon his students, when they are stimulated or prodded to think, answer, define their concerns. I do not believe that school exists so that one never has to think again (one has been trained), but so that one is introduced to the ongoing process of interpretation and investigation that is the history of modern man's symbol systems. The meaning of 'the classroom' should be, to be in agreement to think.

Practically stated, this means that my teaching demanded that students differentiate between pseudo concepts and real ones. I was not looking for the 'right answer' but for mature argumentation. My goal, that the students clearly make use of higher psychic processes in forming their judgments, emphasized the process of thought as crucial to content. The *rote* learning of facts (which can be easily looked up if needed) was foreign to my objectives. Even cultural-historical theories, if merely repeated, did not fulfill my aims. I had become less inward-looking and self-doubting; my conception of college teaching stressed defining one's own terms, learning to make a cogent argument for deeply felt matters, and coming to grips with one's own thought processes. I knew what I wanted, and was not shy in stating, explaining, or defending it. My position as lecturer had developed from a sensed sentiment of dependence to one of taking the initiative. In the beginning, I needed the students—their support, acknowledgement, cooperation. I felt myself 'looked at'—defined by the gazes of the 'other.' Slowly I developed a sense of independence from the judging, demanding surroundings. However insecure I may have felt myself, I kept my eyes open and formulated the judgments I found necessary. As I began to take the initiative, I stressed the positive side to my role: the ability to praise the beginner, give help to the discouraged, acknowledge individual creativity. Only very slowly was I capable of setting standards and voicing criteria. I came to realize that I had to protect the balance between sentiment and rationality, expressivity and communicability, creativity and order. By demanding the mature use of concepts, I could best defend the existential balance to the man-world, man-man relationships, in a world of relativity and uncertainty. I had gained a sense of my task and had the means, as well as will, to translate the insight into practice.

In the genetic text the process of development is paramount—the path pursued is pivotal. The case reveals ascendence in conceptual insight; the changing quality of meditation is determinant for the in-service activity. Learning as a lived event—grounded in cultural/historical resources, which in turn are sedimented in language—is witnessed. This has primarily been a project in applied knowledge—theory actualized in circumstance. It has value as vicarious experience for other (undergraduate) lecturers. Furthermore, it is an act of theoretical provocation: a demand to discuss teaching and the role of the instructor in speech activity. My rhetorical stance was self-revelatory in order to touch off a give-and-take exchange. I display my development to trigger response, criticism, comparison. I demand attention for the quality of mediation contained in the concepts used to organize one's teaching. This is the didactic claim to the book. For me teaching has been the rite of passage from a vaguely felt communal (generational) feeling to the assumption of a pedagogical (practical nor-

mative science) discourse. The case is a particular truth, its analysis strives to define general issues. The case becomes exemplary when it summons teachers to participate in on-going learning, by entering into the radical examination of their work as a process of interaction.

Since the book is intended to have an instrumental value it is appropriate to study its effectiveness. Does it reach the group for which it is intended—can (will) beginning lecturers use it to challenge their insight into teaching? Does the book work as intended: do beginning teachers who are acquainted with it pay more attention to their concept of teaching? I can also pose these questions without linking them so narrowly to the book. Research into the genetic line of beginning teaching will result. I have described a developing logic to the beginning teacher's self-awareness. A polarization between rationally and circumstance (certainty and openess) is overwon by an acceptance of the dynamic tension within interaction (intersubjectivity), within oneself (introsubjectivity), and within one's known world (cultural event). This developmental process gives the teacher a sense of growing professional insight which comes to the good of his teaching. All these statements, when employed as hypotheses for investigation, are appropriate points of departure for empirical research. Finally, the assumptions that learning is a process of social interaction, that meaning is best understood as a 'system of content-filled social connections,' and that education can be studied as text (semiotically), should all be subjected to further analytical critique. My goal, to transcend raw experience, to supersede radical empiricism, and to formulate a coherent statement based upon my teaching experience is fulfilled. I have seen my way through my own context of teaching and have reached the boundary of the context of education. The experience is now susceptible to being tested.

Notes

PART ONE: Preamble, Theory, and Analysis

Preamble: Defining the Problem

1 *La pleine parole* is a semiotic-psychoanalytic term introduced by Jacques Lacan. *La parole* is speech as it daily takes place. It is often fraught by *lapsus:* essential matters which the person is unable to name (put into words). This inadmissible text is crucial for therapy—*la pleine parole* is a full text, where all matters are approachable, speakable.

2 Sources: Argyris, 1971; Bakan, 1967; Bauman 1976 & 1978; Beekman, 1977; van den Berg, 1955, 1965, & 1977; Bogdan, 1975; Buytendijk, 1964; Cicourel, 1964; Devereux, 1967; Giorgi, 1970; Glaser, 1976; May, 1958; Mitroff, 1978; Reason, 1981; Rowan, 1976; Strauss, 1969; Torbert, 1972 & 1976.

3 Examples of such empirical studies on education are: Dunkin, M. and Biddle, J. *The Studying of Teaching* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974. Goodlad, John. Klein, M. Frances, et, al. *Looking Behind the Classroom Door.* Worthington Ohio: Charles A Jones Publishing, 1974.

4 *La parole* is a term originating in de Saussure's linguistics to indicate embodied speech, versus the basic grammar of the language, or the form of a language (with certain terminology or particular sounds). Lacan, as a semiotic psychoanalyst, makes use of these distinctions. *La langue* is the structure of the language versus *la langage* which is the language in general—as used/actualized; versus *la parole* which is particular/substantial speech.

Theory

1 Ausubel, D.P. *The Psychology of Meaningful Verbal Learning An Introduction to School Learning.* New York Grune & Stratton, 1963.
— *Educational Psychology: A cognitive View.* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.
Schwab, Joseph. 'Structure of the Disciplines: meanings and significances,' in Ford & Pugno *The Structure of Knowledge and the Curriculum.* Chicago: Rand McNally 1964 pp. 1-30.
— *Science, Curriculum & Liberal Education.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
Suchman, J. Richard. *The Elementary School Training Program in Scientific Inquiry.* Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1962.
Taba, Hilda. *Curriculum Development: Theory & Practice* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962.

2 For Dewey see bibliography
'T group':
Bradford, L. Gibb, J and Beane K. *T-Group Theory and Laboratory Method* New York: Wiley, 1964.
Otto, Herbert A. *Guide to Developing your Potential.* New York: Wilshire, 1967.
Rogers, C.F. *Freedom to Learn.* Columbus Ohio: Merill, 1969.
— *Encounter Groups.* New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
see also Bugental, James editor *Challenges of Humanistic Psychology* New York: McGraw Hill, 1967 for articles by the above mentioned.

3 M.J. Langeveld was the leading Dutch pedagogue in the fifties and sixties. His *Concise Theoretical Pedagogics* was, ever since the publication of the first edition in 1944, required reading for everyone studying to be a teacher (Langeveld, 1971). Langeveld's work is

characterized by a subjective, intuitive approach to the educational setting wherein he tries to understand the child ('verstehend fenomenoloog'). It is his definition of pedagogics ('a normative practical science') to which I repeatedly refer in this book.

4 This is the debate in the German tradition of social science/philosophy between the will to 'understand' and that to 'explain.' In the first tradition the emphasis is upon 'empathy' and 'openess-to-the subject matter.' In the second rational empiricism dominates.

5 Georg Lukács was a leading Hungarian Marxist intellectual. His political/theoretical classic, *History and Class Consciousness* was written during the revolutionary fervor of 1918-1922. In it he develops the first well known Marxist theory of alienation and reification (Marx's work on these themes only became known much later). Lukács later retreated into self-criticism, calling his work excessively Hegelian, under the pressure of the recognized Eastern European opinions.
(Georg Lukács *History and Class Consciousness* London: Merlin Press, 1971).

Levels of Analysis and of Generic Idiograms

1 *Le grand l'autre* is a term of Lacan's to indicate all the 'Others' who influence, form, determine our sensibility, consciousness, possibilities.

2 The precautions which had to be made to protect privacy forced me to combine statements by, or about, some persons with those of other individuals.

3 The term 'co-researcher' originated, to my knowledge. within the New Paradigm Research Group in England. Peter Reason, John Rowan, and John Heron all make use of the term in their contributions to *Human Inquiry* (Reason, Rowan editors, 1981). The term originated in the Anglo-Saxon Humanistic Social Science tradition, wherein Carl Rogers played the crucial originating role. (See discussion in 'Theory' of my relationship to this tradition.) My interpretation of 'co-research' is loyal to Heron's inspiration:(1) *language* is prereflective in its roots and shared—i.e. 'tacit'; (2)*meaning,* in research, has to be made—it is an intentional act;(3) research involves a *choice to know* (Heron in Reason, 1981, pp. 19-35). I do not share Heron's emphasis upon personal growth, peak experience, or development in awareness (in the sense of the humanistic psychology). My goal is to overcome dualistic assumptions inherent in the 'researcher/researched' 'self/other' dichotomies.
The task of the co-researchers was to collect and interpret data. As the research progressed long discussions took place on what was relevant, crucial, essential, and what not. The immediate direction of the investigation was collectively set. Many of the interpretations in the second, third, and sixth chapters of the genetic text were suggested by co-researchers. The co-researchers did not directly take part in the writing up of the material. This was because the longer, more detailed material was written at six week intervals at a considerable distance from the college and was written in english (not dutch). Furthermore, the longest that any single co-research group functioned was two years. The phases of development in awareness of teaching was not easily appreciable from the students' point of view. Thus, the co-researchers were a source of information, critique, analysis on immediate matters; they were not involved in determining the long range patterns. The co-research was an improvised solution to the 'subject/object' issue, not an Action Research solution to the validity problem.
My thanks to the many students who helped in my research, for their loyalty to the work and independence of commentary. I must single out the following for special thanks: Pedro Bakker, Marcel Bekedam, Robert v. Boeschoten, Wil v. Dielen, Irene Goor, Tom Jaeger, Frank de Jong, Tom Kalkman, José Kieft, Arjan Knollema, Aart Kusters, André Mannik, Henk Melse, Jan Nuismer, Jeroen Reehuis, Bram Tuk, Adrie Verstrealen, Ele Visser, Kees v.d. Vlugt, Bert Wolsleger, Kees Zuurmond, Rein Zwart, and Hems Zwier.

PART TWO: The Genetic Text

Forms and Beginnings: Introduction to the Genetic Text

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Interface One

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'I' Culture, Violence, and Education

1 'Entenderment' is a neologism derived, in part, from Heidegger's concept of 'Care.' It expresses a 'manner-of-being-towards' others, existence, circumstance.
Further exposition of this idea/attitude occurs in the text.

2 Étatism is the tendency to centralism, led by the state, which has characterized much of French politics since the Revolution.
In general, it is the institutional bias of government to expand its role in society to encompass ever more regions of civil and economic affairs.

3 The Fabians organized in 1883-4 in the socialist society 'The Fabian Society'; George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb were the two most prominent members. The group supported democratic socialism and sought inspiration more in John Stuart Mill than in Marx. It has never been very large but has had considerable influence on the intellectual milieu of the Labor Party. Evolutionairy socialism has always been advocated by the society, in contradiction to Revolutionary socialism.

4 'Bread and butter unionism' is the tendency in the trade union movement to limit oneself to immediate material gains accompanied by a general depoliticalization of the unions. For an analysis of the limits to trade union activity see *False Promises; The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness,* by Stanley Aronowitz (New York: McGraw Hill, 1973).

5 Boredom ('ennui') has gained a special sense through the Existentialist confrontation with it—see the novels of Camus and Sartre.

6 'L'appareil ideologique d'état' is a term of Althusser's *(Positions,* 1976), where he revalues the importance of ideas for Marxism, indicates their creative role in the historical process, and describes how the state influences their circulation.

7 'Angst' has entered the European consciousness as an essential threat to the modern consciousness by way of Scandinavian intellectuals. Edvard Munch's paintings and S/oren Kierkegaard's writings come to mind.

8 'Anomie' 'results from man's activities lacking regulation and his (resulting) constant sufferings.' ...In anomie 'society's influence is lacking in the basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a checkrein.' (Emile Durkheim *Suicide.* Glencoe Ill.: Free Press, 1963; first edition 1897).

Interface Two

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Student: What Did You Learn / What Can You Learn?

1 This statement is based upon interviews with student activists and junior staff members in the aftermath of the Free Speech and People's Park conflicts (University of California at Berkeley) and the student-administration conflicts at the University of Chicago 1969-70.

2 The control sample which was asked to read the interview included more than twenty persons.

3 Dennendaal is a psychiatric hospital where a heated conflict took place between anti-psychiatry and traditional attitudes

4 The Dutch secondary school system is (roughly) divided into four levels the lowest being technical-home economical; the second a non-academic general high school; the third an academic preparatory form but not at the highest level; and the last gives entrance rights to the university. The schools mentioned in the text (h.a.v.o.) are on the third level and (h.b.s.-b) on the fourth.

5 The term 'other-directed' comes form David Riesman's book the *Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1969).

6 Babbitt is the protagonist of, and the title of, a novel the American middle class of the epoch.
(Lewis, Sinclair. *Babbitt*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1949)

7 Max Weber *The Protestant Ethic & the Spirit of Capitalism* 1904-5 (New York: Scribner 1930).

8 T. S. Eliot 'The Hollow Men' 1925 *Collected Poems 1906-1962* (London: Faber & Faber 1963) with thanks to Marcel Bekedam's unpublished thesis 1980 *Verandering van Waarneming*.

9 I have used D. Lapp, H. Bender, S. Ellenwood, and M. John's terminology, (see bibl.) contained in *Teching and Learning*.

10 For references on 'T groups' see Part One Chapter 'Theory' footnote no. 2
The conclusion is drawn from informal student evaluations of 'T group'/'Sensitivity training' as course work at Leiden University in the mid-seventies.

11 The distinction is drawn from 'Vérité et Pouvoir' by Michel Foucault in *L'Arc* Paris, no. 70 pp. 16-26. Further specification: this phenomena makes its own explanation impossible. There's (in comparison to France, the U.S.A., or Germany) an unmistakable lack of literature on Dutch 19th and 20th century cultural and/or intellectual history.

Interface Three

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The Knowledge Machine

1 The term angelism comes from Jacques Martitain *The Dream of Descartes* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944) and has been taken over by Guy Lardreau and Christian Jambet in *L'Ange* (Paris: Grasset 1976).

Interface Four

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The Sons of Roland Barthes

1 Cerisy is a center where seminars are held; organized most often around one thinker who is in attendance.

2 Le matin July 8, 1980 (see bibl.).

3 'J.J. Marchand présente 'Interview avec Roland Barthes' Film inédit''—film shown 25 March 1982 at the conference 'Peinture du Signe' Maison Descartes Amsterdam.

4 The distinction readerly/writerly is worked out in *S/Z* (Barthes, 1970)
'. . . What can be written (rewritten) today: the *writerly*. Why is the writerly our value? Because the goal of literary work (of literature as work) is to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text. Our literature is characterized by the pitless divorce which the literary institution maintains between the producer of the text and its user, between its owner and its consumer, between its author and its reader. This reader is thereby plunged into a kind of idleness—he is intransitive he is, in short, . . . left with the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text, reading is nothing more than a *referendum*. Opposite the writerly text, then, is its countervalue, its negative, reactive value: what can be read but not written: the *readerly* . . .
The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no *consequent* language (which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly text is *ourselves writing,* before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages. The writerly is the novelistic without the novel, poetry without the poem, the essay without the dissertation, writing without style, production without product, structuration without the structure.'
(Barthes, 1970, p.4-5)
Barthes directs his analysis of the distinction to the text—the text is either readerly or writerly. I direct the categories to the *act of reading:* I either *am* readerly or writerly *in* my *interaction* with a text. There is the first level, I read: and then the second, I read (how) to read. Barthes' work, I assert falls into the second category and has *the effect* that I shall read, in the manner I have read I should read. Thus Barthes puts *me* on a third level. This analysis is *Bathmology*.
When I read on the third level my experience is *readerly!* My reproduction of the text—my 'creativity'—is dependent upon a *concept of the self* drawn from Barthes' example, or frame of reference! If Barthes teaches us how to read, then those heuristic rules must be readerly and cannot be writerly.
The either/or juxtaposition of readerly/writerly defeats interaction; readerly acknowledges the importance of imitation (Aristotle) but denies Catharsis (nothing happens), and writerly embraces whole heartedly Catharsis while denying imitation. Art as a *mode of imitation* communicates actions and plots which interact with a cultural historical background to produce their effects. *Text in interaction* is neither readerly nor writerly—it cannot enslave the reader or impose an absolute logic upon him, and it cannot be utterly individual without ceasing to be language (communication). In so far as there is real freedom-of-the-text it occurs through assimilating new experience in an interaction with it. This would occur on a third level where one has accepted the impingment of heuristic rules, mastered their contribution and have been able to return to the text, open to experience what is presented. The exclusive emphasis upon the self (and how it should ex-

perience), blocks experience in excessive self-consciousness: this is the so-called *writerly*. Barthes' subjectivism makes his 'writerly' readerly, where parenthetically the creative experiencing of text demands an intensive conversant, a given which takes grip of us. Freedom is in interaction it is not *fantasme*—in the readerly (first level) there we find the possibility of discourse. There can be a text and 'its' dialogue. In the writerly, first level, there is textual anarchy and (I believe) the fetish of the individual. The readerly, second level, is the clichéd required reading of texts—the slavish following of literary tradition and established criticism. In the writerly, second level, there is false consciousness—my reading is displayed (exhibitionism?) as an individual model of the production of the text, while an example cannot logically serve that goal (only an appeal/manifesto, to produce art, could do that). On the third level, readerly occupies itself with the given (the text), with aesthetics (ways of experiencing text) and makes up the balance. In writerly, third level, I find self-alienation—a forced creativity which answers to an idea of the self, which has been asserted on the second level. The writerly collapses in its own inconsistency, and resembles readerly second level!

5 COBRA was a group of abstract expressionists who asserted the necessity of radical artistic renewal in the post-war period (1949-51). Artists include Karl Appel, Corneille (Cornelis van Beverloo), Pierre Alechinsky, and Asger Jorn. The chief organ of the group was 'Reflex' wherein Corneille, Constant Nieuwenhuys, and Eugène Brands presented the ideas of the group.

6 See Buena Vista Part, especially pages 17-21 and 32 for discussion of 'Barthomology'.

Interface Five

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Orphans and Origins: Jean Paul Dollé

1 Joan Robinson gave this guest lecture at the Free University of Amsterdam on 14 March, 1979.
She was a leading 'Post-Keynsian' economist in the United Kingdom with socialist sympathies.

Interface Six

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Teaching

1 Jo Langer was the wife of a Marxist intellectual. They went back to Czechoslovakia after the war, 'Une Saison à Bratislava' is her testimony of the ways and faces of socialism they experienced.
(Langer, Jo. *Une Saison à Bratislava.* Paris: Seuil, 1981.)

2 The 'Red Army Fraction' were the german Marxist (student) radicals of 1968 who later became terrorists.

3 The S.D.S. (Students for a Democratic Society) was the best known radical wing to the american student movement anno 1968. It was more ideological then were most other groups.

4 J. H. van den Berg was one of the leading figures in the Dutch phenomenological movement with F. J. F. Buytendijk, B. J. Kouwer, M. J. Langeveld, and J. Linschoten. His valedictory address was held on 14 September, 1979.

PART THREE: Discussion and Evaluation

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Samenvatting

De ervaringen van een beginnend docent bij het tertiair onderwijs in Nederland en de reflectie op deze ervaringen vormen in samenhang met elkaar het onderwerp van de studie: Learning and Hatred for Meaning.
Het verslag van deze studie bestaat uit drie delen:

I: Probleemstelling Theorie Analyse
II: De Genetische Tekst
III: Discussie en Evaluatie

Deel I: Probleemstelling Theorie Analyse

Hoofdstuk 1: Probleemstelling.

In dit deel problematiseert de schrijver het docent-worden, docent-zijn.
Een beginnend docent bevindt zich in een nieuwe situatie die hij aanvankelijk onvoldoende overziet. Er vindt een interactie plaats tussen hem en deze nieuwe situatie. De docent moet *leren* hoe de nieuwe situatie inspeelt op hem, en hoe hij zelf het beste in kan spelen op de nieuwe situatie. Dit leren vindt volgens de schrijver plaats door middel van het vergroten van inzicht.
De vakliteratuur met betrekking tot dit onderwerp, de ontwikkeling van de beginnende docent, legt voornamelijk de nadruk op het aanleren van technieken en vaardigheden die de beginnend docent bij zijn lesgeven van nut kunnen zijn; dit boek echter richt zich niet op gedragslijnen, maar gaat uit van de vooronderstelling dat het de beginnende docent aan inzicht ontbreekt.
Dit inzicht vergroot je door dicht bij de praktijk te blijven, door de directe ervaring in ogenschouw te nemen en door hieruit inzichten, concepten en begrippen te destilleren.
"Teaching", lesgeven, hoort volgens de schrijver concepten en inzichten op te bouwen, ze te analyseren en te veranderen. Zo ontstaan er nieuwe inzichten; de mens is dat wat hij aan inzichten bezit. Mensen delen inzichten, concepten, begrippen met elkaar, zij staan daarmee samen in een gemeenschap, een wereld; met deze concepten observeren, analyseren en veranderen mensen de wereld, er ontstaan betekenissen, er onstaat ''meaning'' dat wil zeggen: concepten die maatschappelijke draagkracht hebben.
Vanuit deze optiek worden de ervaringen van de docent bekeken.

Hoofdstuk 2: Theorie.

Om meer inzicht te krijgen in zijn docerend bezig zijn heeft de schrijver de leertheoretische concepten die voortkomen uit drie prominente psychologische stromingen bestudeerd:

1. Het Behaviorisme.
2. De Humanistische Psychologie.
3. De Cultuur-Historische School.

ad 1. Skinner als vertegenwoordiger van het behaviorisme legt in zijn leertheorie de nadruk op heuristische vaardigheden. Het oplossen van problemen, inzicht

krijgen in dingen, geschiedt volgens hem door middel van patronen en structuren: door het leren van heuristische vaardigheden.
De schrijver is het met bovenstaande bewering eens, maar vindt Skinner toch voor zijn onderzoek onbruikbaar, omdat Skinner van de vooronderstelling uit gaat dat deze heuristische vaardigheden door middel van "stimulus-response" en "reïnforcement" geleerd moeten worden.
De schrijver is van mening dat onderwijssituaties, verhoudingen binnen het onderwijs, te complex en ingewikkeld zijn om terug gebracht te kunnen worden tot kleine atomistische leermomenten, d.w.z. tot "stimulus-response"-eenheden.
ad 2. Rogers als vertegenwoordiger van de humanistische psychologie, beweert dat het gericht zijn van de mens op leren zijn oorsprong vindt op een voorbewust niveau. Deze voorbewuste gerichtheid duidt Rogers aan met het begrip: "organismic-keuze".
Ook deze theorie is niet bruikbaar omdat deze te intuïtief en naturalistisch van aard is. De schrijver zoekt naar inzichten en concepten; daarbij wil hij zich niet laten leiden door de intuïtie.
ad 3. Vygotskij als vertegenwoordiger van de cultuur-historische school gaat ervan uit dat kennis, begrip en inzicht ontstaat door activiteit. Mensen delen heuristische vaardigheden, leren ze van elkaar, staan zodoende actief in de maatschappij. De mens heeft geen direct contact met zijn omgeving. De contacten die de mens heeft lopen via de taal. Deze taal leert de mens van anderen. Daarom is kennis sociaal en cultuur-historisch van aard.
Vygotskij's leertheorie heeft de schrijver een beeld gegeven omtrent datgene wat "teaching", lesgeven, moet voorstellen. Maar om terug te keren tot de beginnend docent, kondigt zich de vraag aan, hoe de beginnend docent met deze ideeën van "teaching" om moet gaan. Kortom: hoe *leert* de beginnend docent zijn "teaching" begrijpen?
Hoe onderzoek je "teaching"?
Het volgende hoofdstuk: Analyse gaat hier verder op in.

Hoofdstuk 3: Analyse.

In dit hoofdstuk komen twee zaken aan de orde, namelijk:
1. Van welke vooronderstellingen gaat de schrijver uit bij zijn onderzoek.
2. Welke werkwijze hanteert hij.

ad 1. Vooronderstellingen:
Het doel van de schrijver was een werkwijze te vinden zonder de subject-object splitsing: een niet-dualistische werkwijze.
Dit heeft tot gevolg
a. dat de onderzoeker zowel subject als object van onderzoek is.
b. dat de onderzoeker wordt beïnvloed door datgene wat hij onderzoekt.
c. dat juist de indruk die het onderzoek op de onderzoeker maakt, een belangrijk deel van de data vormt.
d. dat de onderzoeker in een dynamische, levendige, interactionele verhouding tot het onderzoek staat.

ad 2. Werkwijze:
De schrijver is zijn onderzoek gestart met het verzamelen van ruwe data. Data in de vorm van losse ervaringen, verhalen, beschrijvingen van gesprekken met studenten, gesprekken van studenten onderling, ervaringen met de staf, met collega's,

notulen van vergaderingen enzovoorts.
Uit deze veelheid van gegevens heeft hij thema's ontwikkeld. Ruwe data werden geordend. De aanvankelijk losse en op zichzelf staande beschrijvingen van de dagelijkse ervaringen van de beginnend docent, opgedaan binnen het onderwijs, kregen langzamerhand meer samenhang. De praktijk van het lesgeven werd inzichtelijk. De verzamelde data groeiden uit tot een verhaal. Bij het construeren van dit verhaal is het niet de bedoeling van de schrijver geweest te streven naar wetenschappelijke exactheid van beschrijving wat betreft de toedracht van de gebeurtenissen.
De schrijver was er niet op uit zijn verhaal te toetsen aan wetenschappelijk objectieve criteria. Zijn doel was het verzamelen van hypothesen; proberen inzicht te krijgen in de achterliggende betekenissen van het verhaal.
Deel II: De Genetische Tekst bevat zes hoofdstukken. Ieder van deze zes hoofdstukken draagt een verhaal aan op dusdanige wijze dat deze verhalen gaandeweg inzichtelijker, omvattender, complexer en socialer worden.
Deze verhalen worden door de schrijver geïnterpreteerd en geanalyseerd.

Deel II: De Genetische Tekst

Heeft de schrijver in deel I theoretische- en praktische kaders ontwikkeld, in deel II beschrijft hij, vaak op essayistische wijze, zijn eigen ervaringen met het tertiair onderwijs.
Dit deel omvat zes hoofdstukken die chronologisch geordend zijn.

Hoofdstuk 1: "Ik", cultuur, geweld, en onderwijs.

Als nieuweling, als beginnend docent beleefde de schrijver docent-worden als een gevaarlijke onderneming. Wanneer hij niet deed wat de school van hem verwachtte gaf dat aanleiding tot veel zakelijke- en persoonlijke conflicten. Deze conflicten vloeiden voort uit een zekere ideologische lijn die de school propageerde en die dogmatisch werd voorgestaan. De schrijver werd voortdurend geconfronteerd met dit dogmatisch denken en kwam hiertegen in verzet. Hij uitte zijn onvrede onder anderen door zijn studenten te informeren over de betekenissen van de begrippen "entenderment" en "sub-realism". Met het eerste bedoelt hij de zorg-voor-de-ander, openheid voor wat er gebeurt in onderwijs-situaties en een bereidheid om de betekenis van historische, culturele, en factische gegevens bij het denken over onderwijs te betrekken. Met de tweede term bedoelt hij: het dodende effect van verabsoluteerde principes die geen ruimte laten voor echte ervaringen maar vereisen dat men ongezien de "waarheid" erkent.

Hoofdstuk 2: Student: Wat heb je geleerd? Wat kun je leren?

Had de schrijver in hoofdstuk 1 bijna uitsluitend oog voor de school en het onderwijs in het algemeen, in hoofdstuk 2 probeert hij een duidelijk beeld te krijgen van de student.
Vervolgens vraagt hij zich af welke onderwijsvorm het beste zou passen bij het beeld van de student dat zich ontwikkelt.

Vier onderwijsmodellen worden door de schrijver op hun bruikbaarheid onderzocht, namelijk het klassieke-, het technologische-, het personalistische- en het interactionele onderwijsmodel.

Hoofdstuk 3: De Kennis Machine.

In dit hoofdstuk ageert de schrijver tegen de zijns inziens te strakke verabsoluteerde rationalistische denktrant die op de opleiding waar hij doceert domineert. Hij vindt dat er te weinig ruimte over gelaten is om te leren door middel van ervaringen en discussie, te weinig ruimte voor leren als een ervaringsproces.
De onpersoonlijke verbureaucratiseerde verhoudingen binnen de opleiding staan het voeren van open discussies in de weg.
De schrijver maakt zijn standpunt duidelijk met behulp van de metafoor van de machine. Hij constateert dat, wanneer het mechanische denken de overhand krijgt, de wereld buiten de mens gaat overheersen.

Hoofdstuk 4: de zonen van Roland Barthes.

De opgedane onderwijservaringen zoals beschreven in de hoofdstukken 1, 2 en 3 van de genetische tekst waren er de oorzaak van dat de schrijver in opstand kwam. Hij zocht de meest radicale anti-these van het mechanistische, rationalistische, absolutistische denken die hij maar kon vinden en vond die in het anarchistische, poëtische intellectualisme van Roland Barthes en zijn volgelingen. Was deze anti-these een bruikbaar alternatief vroeg de schrijver zich af? Was Barthes een adequaat model voor de schrijver als docent? Vormden zijn discipelen de intellectuele gemeenschap zoals de schrijver die verkoos? Na bestudering van Barthes en zijn discipelen moest de schrijver constateren dat het grenzeloos subjectivisme en anarchisme, de extreme nadruk die gelegd wordt op creativiteit en intellectuele vrijheid, zaken die karakteristiek zijn voor Barthes' denk- en doceertrant, de interactie, de wisselwerking, het contact tussen de mens en zijn wereld, tussen mensen onderling, doet ontaarden in formalisme.
Barthes' werkwijze bleek voor de doelgroep van de schrijver ongeschikt.

Hoofdstuk 5: Weeskinderen en afkomst: Jean Paul Dollé.

In Dollé zocht de schrijver een werkbaar alternatief. Hij was er zich van bewust dat de denktrant van Barthes ongeschikt was voor zijn doel. Dollé zocht evenwicht tussen denken, interactie, wereld en gevoel. Zijn ideeën over intellectuele vriendschap, een zijnswijze waarbij zowel orginaliteit (de omstandigheden van specifieke personen) als structuur (de regels van taal, denken en cultuur) worden gerespecteerd, spraken de schrijver aan. In het onderwijs moet volgens Dollé de vraag: "Wat betekent denken?'' centraal staan. Denken is een daad, een gedrevenheid, (eros) die een ieder zelf verricht. Denken is bovendien afhankelijk van taal en cultuur, van regels en structuren.
Beide hoedanigheden, de individueel-gevoelsmatige (eros) en de sociaal-gestructureerde (orde) hebben elkaar nodig, kunnen niet zonder elkaar, maar staan in een paradoxale verhouding tot elkaar.
Daarom dwingt de vraag: "Wat betekent denken", de mens om zichzelf te leren kennen in relatie tot taal, cultuur en de ander. Dollé's sociale ethiek blijft vaag. Zijn basis-concepten, zoals bij voorbeeld eros en orde, staan in paradoxale verhouding tot elkaar, en hij geeft niet aan hoe in de "onderwijspraktijk" met deze paradox te werken valt.

Hoofdstuk 6: Doceren.

In dit hoofdstuk zet de schrijver zijn ideeën over doceren, die hij in de loop van zijn docentschap heeft ontwikkeld, uiteen.
Drie thema's komen aan de orde, namelijk:
1. Intersubjectiviteit.
2. Introsubjectiviteit.
3. Cultuurgebeuren.

ad 1. Intersubjectiviteit:
De schrijver legt de nadruk op de sociale kwaliteit van kennis en de centrale rol ervan voor het leren. Aan de docenten is de verantwoordelijkheid toebedeeld de intersubjectiviteit binnen het onderwijsleerproces op gang te brengen en te garanderen.

ad 2. Introsubjectiviteit:
Hieronder verstaat de schrijver de relatie die de docent met zichzelf heeft. Iedere docent creëert een stijl van doceren en het is zaak dat de docent zich de beperkingen en mogelijkheden van zijn "dramatis personae" realiseert.

ad 3. Cultuurgebeuren:
In dit stuk vraagt de schrijver zich af of de ontwikkeling van de welvaartsstaat, kenmerkend voor het Europa van na de tweede wereldoorlog, en de filosofie die aan deze politiek-economische keuze ten grondslag ligt, in nauwe relatie staan met het schoolgebeuren zoals de schrijver dat binnen het tertiair onderwijs ervaren heeft. Hij is van mening dat "de droom van het goede leven" die door bijna iedereen gedeeld werd gedurende de laatste vijfentwintig jaar, een soort onderwijs gecreëerd heeft, dat alle trekken van die droom vertoont. Zijn kritiek op dat soort onderwijs is tevens een aanval op die droom.

Deel III: Discussie en Evaluatie

Na bestudering van zijn zeven-jarige ontwikkeling als docent, bevestigt de schrijver de stelling dat het van fundamenteel belang is voor de docent om vanuit zijn onderwijspraktijk concepten te ontwikkelen.
Uit aanvankelijk vage, ontastbare, onsamenhangende, ongestructureerde gevoelens ontwikkelden zich, tijdens dit zeven jaar durende groeiproces, concepten die bestudeerbaar waren, zodat de docent langzamerhand meer inzicht kreeg in zijn eigen rol en functioneren als docent.
Op twee niveau's is de schrijver in deze studie bezig geweest met semiotische pedagogiek:
Niveau 1: Toegespitst op lesgeven (teaching).
Leren is een semiotisch proces, het is het ontwikkelen van het vermogen om dingen te benoemen, leren is het ontwikkelen van concepten; in leren geeft en deelt de mens betekenissen (meaning). Mensen delen taal.
Niveau 2: Toegespitst op de docent.
Wil de docent de waarde en de betekenis van zijn docentschap ten volle begrijpen, dan moet hij de zin van leren, van niveau 1 kunnen omvatten.

Dit onderzoek is exploratief van aard. Analytisch gerichte onderzoekers zouden sommige van de basisbegrippen, bij voorbeeld het begrip betekenis (meaning), voor verdere bestudering kunnen gebruiken. Eveneens kan de semiotische benadering van het leerproces, leren zien als tekst, voor nadere bestudering in aanmerking komen. Empirisch zou men kunnen onderzoeken of de ontwikkeling van conceptueel inzicht inderdaad leidt tot een hoger niveau van professioneel inzicht. Is een docent die zijn concepten kent beter in staat gefundeerde beslissingen met betrekking tot onderwijsaangelegenheden te nemen?

DATE DE RETOUR

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Letiche, Hugo K.

Learning and Hatred for

LEARNING AND HATRED FOR MEANING

This study poses the problems of theoretical and philosophical pedagogics in the practice of teaching. The research goal was *to improve my teaching.* A concrete experience of undergraduate lecturing is the subject. This unconventional New Paradigm research strives for an immediacy of contact between text and practice. How does a beginning lecturer grapple with his job? What is it like to establish oneself as a teacher? The emphasis is upon the *experience* of teaching, of the school, and what is expected of one as instructor. Where and how does one seek recognition? What sort of society does one enter when one sets up shop as a teacher in a leftist undergraduate college? What is the style of human interaction? Before presenting his record of seven years of teaching, the author describes the heuristic rules employed in the research. The Genetic Text—the description of novice to experienced instructor—is rooted in the context of teaching. The account is put to a semiotic-Lacanian analysis where in speech, learning, and thought are central. The long, gradual development in the teacher's conceptual insight is recorded. The emphasis is on the human and social complexity of learning: its intersubjective prerequisites, its introsubjective demands, and its characteristic cultural quality. Letiche works from educational practice to theory. His mediating concepts are inherent to a teaching where the conflict between hatred for meaning, and choice for thought, was dramatically evident.

Hugo K. Letiche (1946) is from Montréal. He did his B.A. at the University of Chicago, his Doctoraal at Leiden University, and his PhD at the Free University Amsterdam. He has been an undergraduate lecturer at a School of Social Work and has worked as a Research Associate. He lectures Pedagogics at the Nutsseminarium of the University of Amsterdam.

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